

66/1

Sec(O)/2/37/8

11 October 2002

PS/Secretary of State

Copy to:

PS/Min(AF)

PS/PUS

PSO/CDS

Sec/CNS

MA/CGS

PS/CAS

MA/VCDS

MA/CJO

MA/CDL

Policy Director

CDI

DCDS(C)

DCDS(EC)

DG Op Pol

ACDS(Ops)

ACDS(RP)

DG RP

DGCC

PJHQ CIVSEC

DOMA

Head of Sec(O)

Head of Sec(HSF)

IRAQ: UK CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Issue

1. Need for decisions on potential UK contributions to US-led action against Iraq, against the background of continuing strategic uncertainty. (A separate submission will address SF issues.)

Recommendation

2. That the Secretary of State notes the increasing difficulty of maintaining the feasibility of Package 3 while it has its current "unconfirmed" status, and agrees:

either:

- (a) to rule it out now

or:

- (b) to move it to the same status as Package 2

noting that a decision in favour of (b) will:

- (i) enable greater clarity in our discussions of planning options with the US (and Turkey);
- (ii) lead to commitment of expenditure on a wider range of UORs; and

- (iii) involve an announcement on 31 October of preparedness to mobilise Reserves (though the actual mobilisation decision could be delayed).

Timing

3. Urgent. In particular, if we are going to rule out any Packages, we must let the US know very soon. In addition to pressure from US planners, it is in our interests to be clearer about our level of engagement, against the background of a series of key planning events from mid-October onwards.

Background

4. A key element of the continuing strategic uncertainty is the UN position. Although a tough US/UK UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) has been drafted, at the time of writing this is stalled. There has been no meaningful discussion in the UN itself, with the focus being on high-level bilateral activity in an effort to secure agreement on the most contentious issues. It seems unlikely that other P5 and UNSC members will sign up to an all-in-one UNSCR, providing automatic authorisation of a recourse to force in the event of Iraqi non-co-operation, although the US have not yet given up hope of this. _____, and this should at least open the way to serious negotiation on text. But there is as yet no breakthrough on any alternative model.

5. It is difficult to judge what this may mean for the possible timing of military action. Assuming that a UNSCR is passed which at least clarifies the inspection regime, Blix expects to need a further 120 days to be fully operational (ie, at best no earlier than mid-February). And assuming that the resolution does not provide automatic authorisation of force, there will be an immense amount of wrangling over what would constitute the trigger for a second resolution providing such authorisation: France et al will want to make the triggering event(s) more substantial than a single piece of Iraqi obstruction or provocation. All this adds to the potential for delay. On the other hand, Iraqi non-co-operation could occur at any point after the (first) UNSCR is passed, including a refusal to accept the resolution's provisions. So although the most likely scenario is that the potential triggers for military action are moving to the right, we cannot rule out the possibility that matters will be brought to a head very suddenly by Saddam himself.

6. Experience suggests that Saddam only keeps his head down and makes a show of co-operation as long as the spectre of military action is clearly visible. He has only conceded ground so far (in the Vienna discussions with Blix) because diplomacy has been backed by the credible threat of force - the concept of "force on mind". Thus both the need to be ready for the worst case and the strategy of conflict prevention through coercive diplomacy point in the same direction: continuing and visible military preparations.

7. So military planning continues. Our understanding is that the window for a Presidential decision for military action opens in mid-November and will stay open even beyond March when weather implications become more difficult. The main focus of US planning is preparation to allow the commencement of offensive action in

January (with contingency planning for an earlier start should that prove necessary) and this is the basis of our own critical path analysis, but in view of all the uncertainties this should be considered illustrative. As the Secretary of State knows, at military planning level the US is aware of the UK's potential contribution packages. We have presented Package 2 as a baseline assumption for US planning, if the UK were to contribute to military action against Iraq, and Package 3 (Additional Land contribution) as an unconfirmed possibility requiring further feasibility work. We have also taken steps, such as the commencement of UOR action and the swap around of units earmarked for OP FRESCO, to ensure that both packages remain available within the main US planning timelines.

8. The Chiefs of Staff now judge that we need to make clear to the US the status of the UK packages, subject of course to the overall caveat that no decision has yet been taken to authorise any military action. This is because of the following factors:

a) Although the US have not yet secured Turkish agreement to the Northern Option, to which it is assumed that Package 3 would contribute, they need to know where we stand. The Northern Option is now seen as fundamental by US military planners, both in the Pentagon and in CENTCOM. There is an important role for the UK to play if we so wish. But if we decide not to play this role, the US will have to mobilise other US forces to do the job. The caveats we have so far attached to Package 3 have thus resulted in the US having to work on two separate plans, compounding what is already a complex process. For example, the TPFDD conference has had to be extended by a week. CENTCOM would much prefer to decide as soon as possible on the force composition in the North, and to do this they need a clear statement of the UK commitment, within the overall understanding that all the packages are subject to a general political caveat.

b) The need to clarify our position will become increasingly acute as the US progress through a series of key planning events. Firstly, on 15 October, the final planning conference begins for Exercise INTERNAL LOOK – the CENTCOM Command Post Exercise in December which will be the mission rehearsal for possible future operations against Iraq. Ideally the US would like to use this conference to tie down the most likely contributions in planning this key exercise. We need to give the UK participants in the conference guidance on what they can say about the status of the UK Packages. Secondly, the US expect to have high-level military talks in Ankara on 21 October, and will need to know where we stand on Package 3: indeed, from our own perspective, there would be advantage in getting the US to sound out Turkish views on UK participation in the Northern Option¹. It may even be advisable to send a representative ourselves. Thirdly, CENTCOM are planning a Commanders' Conference on 25/6 October, at which we will be expected to spell out our contribution.

¹ There is a rumour afoot that the Turks may take exception to UK participation. We need to flush this out.

c) From a purely national perspective, the lead-times for putting Package 2 and Package 3 in place mean that some publicly visible decisions – such as on Reserves (see below) – need to be taken well in advance of any deployment. In the absence of certainty about the timing of military action it is impossible to be absolute about the deadlines for these decisions, and we will seek to avoid premature measures: for instance, provided an announcement on call-out of Reserves is made in order to allow preparatory work to proceed, we can defer actually mobilising them until we are sure that we need to do so. But we do need to be prepared to take these decisions.

9. Against this background, for Package 2, we need to decide whether or not to maintain its status as a baseline assumption for the US. For Package 3 we need to decide whether to offer it to the US as a firm proposal, offer it as a proposal with caveats (eg about timing), or make clear to the US that we are unable to offer it. For the time being, General Franks has said that he will continue to run two plans, in order to preserve the possibility of incorporating Package 3. Clearly, the longer the US work on this basis, the more disgruntled they will be if we subsequently rule Package 3 out.

Package 2

10. The Secretary of State will recall that Package 2 consists of up to a medium scale Maritime component (including a CVS, 5 DD/FF, 2 SSNs, and a Commando Group based in HMS OCEAN), and a medium scale Air component (including 64 fast jets plus tanker, transport and reconnaissance aircraft). Fuller details of the package are at Annex A.

11. Further planning work indicates that **if we were to continue to be able to meet an illustrative assumption of a Presidential decision on 6 January**, Ministers would need to take the following key decisions imminently:

- a) **Reserves.** The minimum number of reservists required for Package 2 is now estimated as some 1,100, some 130 of whom are medics (30 of them consultants). Experience has shown that even this relatively small number of Reservists could not be generated by voluntary call-out. **In order to meet timelines based on a 6 January Presidential decision**, an announcement that call-out is likely would need to take place by **8 November**, immediately followed by consultation with individuals and the initiation of a targeted anthrax voluntary immunisation programme. This could allow a delay of a decision to mobilise until **2 December** for RNR logisticians deploying to the Gulf area, and until **9 December** for the remainder. Against an illustrative target of 6 January, any delay in mobilisation beyond these dates would lead to shortfalls in the deployment process for some elements of Package 2, prejudicing our ability to achieve some lines of operation. **But the key issue is to make the announcement to enable preparatory work: we can then defer the actual mobilisation until we are clear that it is needed.**

b) **UORs.** The latest assessment of the likely costs of equipment procurement UORs for Package 2 is some **£241M**, of which roughly **£123M** have been categorised as essential/time-critical (though work needs to continue to ensure that we capture medical requirements in particular). Work is already in hand to produce business cases for the most pressing of these UORs, and these are now beginning to come forward for approval. Given Treasury agreement to access to the Reserve, and subject to the Secretary of State's approval, this means we can expect to see financial resources being committed during the course of next week. Depending on the precise progress of business cases, it is probable that the initial £150M ceiling could be reached within the next 4-6 weeks.

c) **Deployments.** On the illustrative assumption of a Presidential decision to authorise military action on 6 January, the key dates for Package 2 deployments, in addition to reservists (a) above) would be as follows:

11 Nov:	RAF and Army airfield enabling personnel deploy forward, with aircraft and equipment being prepared in the UK at the same time.
15 Nov:	Decision needed on whether to prepare HMS ARK ROYAL for deployment (currently due to return to UK on 14 Nov)
25 Nov:	The Amphibious Ready Group, based on HMS OCEAN deploys forward.
7 Dec:	HMS ARK ROYAL deploys
9 Dec:	RAF Deployed Operating Base enablers deploy, and aircraft munitions are prepositioned.
23 Dec:	A second TLAM SSN sails from the UK
30 Dec:	Final RAF enabling equipment moves forward
6 Jan:	RAF combat aircraft deploy

d) **Total Estimated Cost.** The estimated costs for Package 2 include:

- | | |
|--------------------------|---|
| • UORS | £241M (£123M essential) |
| • Force generation costs | £135-171M (not including sustainability stocks) |
| • Reserves | £18M (120-day call-out) |
| • Running costs | £70M |

Total:

£464-500M

Figures for movement costs (deployment, sustainment and recovery) cannot be estimated at this stage. The costs of ammunition, other consumable stocks and post-operational recuperation have also not yet been calculated.

Package 3

12. The Secretary of State will recall that Package 3 consists of a land task force including a Divisional HQ, an Armoured Brigade, and a large logistic group. This is judged to be the minimum sensible UK land package for discrete warfighting operations. Fuller details of the package are at Annex B.

13. Further planning work indicates that **if we were to continue to be able to meet an illustrative assumption of a Presidential decision on 6 January**, Ministers would need to take the following key decisions imminently:

- a) **Basing.** Central to the Northern Option will be Turkey's willingness to make basing available. The US-Turkish discussions on 21 October could lead to a short-notice requirement for the UK to join in trilateral talks.
- b) **Reserves.** The minimum number of Reservists required for Package 3, over and above those needed for Package 2, is estimated at some 3,600, of whom some 1,800 are medical personnel (as opposed to drivers or support staff). In addition, up to 3,000 Reservists would be required to backfill shortfalls in the Regular Army. **In order to meet an illustrative 6 January deadline** under conventional planning an announcement on mobilisation would be required by 31 October. This date could be deferred until 16 November if it were preceded by a public announcement by 31 October that we were likely to mobilise. This announcement would have to allow consultation with individuals about deployment on operations and preparation of call-out papers. The mobilisation process would be phased so that those Reservists required early – those TA capabilities, such as signals squadrons, which are critical in establishing the line of communication and thus in preserving synchronisation with US timelines – would report first. It is likely that medical specialists (doctors and nurses) would be required to report last, but all Reservists will have to have reported by **9 December**. Of the medical personnel, some 100 would be consultants and some 800 would be nurses (further work is in hand to identify more clearly the likely impact on the NHS). It is possible that in the event of explicit UN authorisation of military action other nations (eg Norway) might offer medical capabilities to the coalition, but we cannot rely upon this for planning purposes. As with Package 2, **the key issue is to make the announcement to enable preparatory work: we can then defer the actual mobilisation until we are clear that it is needed.**
- c) **UORs.** The additional costs of equipment procurement UORs for Package 3 are assessed at some **£221M**, of which around **£47M** is categorised as

essential (though again further work is needed to ensure medical requirements are fully identified). There are some long lead items on which early decisions are required. The Treasury has accepted that we may need to commit to such UORs, and incur associated costs, in order to keep options open on Package 3 (notwithstanding that the expenditure may subsequently turn out to have been unnecessary). This means that the timetable for decisions on Package 3 does not directly affect our ability to take forward the most pressing UORs needed to support this option, although early decisions on the Package will reduce the risks of nugatory expenditure.

- d) **Deployments.** In addition to reservists (b) above), the key deployment dates for Package 3, against an illustrative deadline of 6 January, would be:

4 Nov:	Cannibalisation and preparation of equipment and force generation
13 Dec:	Equipment begins to be transported to sea ports of embarkation
11 Jan:	First Land elements sail

- e) **Total Estimated Cost.** The estimated costs for Package 3, additional to Package 2, include:

• UORs	£221M (£47M essential)
• Force generation costs	£62M (£12M for support helicopters; not including stocks)
• Reserves	£85M (120-day call-out)
• Running costs (90 days)	£140M
Total:	£508M

Figures for movement costs (deployment, sustainment and recovery) cannot be estimated at this stage. The costs of ammunition, other consumable stocks and post-operational recuperation have also not yet been calculated.

Discussion

14. In coming to a decision Ministers will need to take into account the following factors:

- a) The impact of visible decisions. Overt preparations on the scale of Package 3 may make an impact on Saddam's perception of the seriousness of coalition intent, and thus improve the chances of

continuing Iraqi co-operation. They might also encourage key figures in the Iraqi regime to reflect further on whether their best interests continue to be served by Saddam's leadership. So in addition to their role in ensuring the viability of the UK contribution to military action, these measures would reinforce the coercive "force on mind" approach that has already borne fruit. (The presentational implications are considered below.)

- b) Cost. The cost of either package will be significant. Although some key figures cannot be calculated at this stage (movement costs, ammunition), Package 2 is likely to cost in excess of £470-500M. On the same basis, the additional cost of Package 3 would be around £500M, making a total cost for Packages 2 and 3 of some £1Bn. Taking into account the costs for which we have as yet no figures, the overall cost of Package 2 could be not far short of £1Bn, and the overall cost of Packages 2 and 3 together could be between £1.5Bn and £2Bn.
- c) US expectations. We have been careful to manage these. But a decision to rule out Package 3 will inevitably disappoint the US, and could have significant knock-on effects (see further h) below). We would have to work hard to minimise these effects. But if we do decide to rule out Package 3, we are clear that we must do so very soon. In the absence of any change in the current status of Package 3, General Franks aims to run two plans – one including the Package, one without us – on the basis that this is a lesser evil than constructing a single plan without us and subsequently having to factor us into it late in the day. It is clear, of course, that running two plans is going to cost CENTCOM considerable staff effort. CDS recommends that, unless a definite decision is taken to say "no" now to Package 3, we must commit appropriate effort to INTERNAL LOOK.
- d) Burdensharing. We can justifiably present Package 2 as a substantial contribution. Package 3 would be significantly more substantial, and the commitment of large ground forces would be a vivid sign of a willingness to share the risks. Although there are some shortcomings in the current US tactical plan for the Northern Option and the role of Package 3, we judge that these could be resolved if we were able fully to engage in planning and to flex resources to make it work. On the other hand, and at our request, the US are working on a plan to mount the Northern Option without us if need be.
- e) Impact on readiness and capability for other tasks. Either Package, but particularly Package 3, would affect our ability to respond to other contingencies, particularly whilst Op FRESCO continues. But right now Iraq is the central issue, and there may be a trade-off between committing to a military campaign and committing to an enduring follow-up operation – see f) below. In itself, a 6-month warfighting operation would be consistent with Defence Planning Assumptions, although it would be difficult to recover capability in some areas.

- f) Aftermath management and the long term. US thinking on the "Day After" is under-developed at present. But in the aftermath of a campaign requiring serious military action there is likely to be a need for a substantial, potentially long-enduring commitment of forces. Assuming that military action had taken place under a UN umbrella, it is likely that the US would look to Allies and the UK to play a major role in this, perhaps including providing a framework capability through the ARRC. We clearly have an interest in minimising the risk of a long-lasting commitment, particularly another Peace Support Operation in a part of the world that will not be retention-positive for our personnel: in terms of Defence Planning Assumptions, a rounded Medium Scale PSO in Iraq would only be manageable if our commitments elsewhere, including the Balkans, were capped at Small Scale. The more substantial our contribution to military action in the first place, the more plausibly we will be able to argue that we have done our bit.
- g) Turkey. Turkey's position on the Northern Option is not yet certain. Initial US-Turkish military contacts do not guarantee Turkish political agreement. Given the importance they attach to this, we can assume that the US will do some very heavy lifting to get the Turks on board. But the outcome, including on the Turkish attitude to hosting UK forces, may remain uncertain for some time. In order to flush this out, Franks and Ralston will raise the issue in Ankara on 21 October. Equally, if the Northern Option ceased to be a runner, the US would inevitably review the other elements of their plan, and it is possible that some or all of Package 3 might be able to play a role in the South (although space constraints might impact on timing).
- h) Wider Context. In the context of looking at future force structure changes (the Defence Planning Assumptions work submitted in June), we have been taking soundings of what gives us influence over US campaign planning. It is clear that sharing risk – political and military – is crucial to having a voice in how a military operation is planned; but it also gives a locus to influence the wider overall campaign. There is thus a longer-term and strategic dimension to the issue of Package 3: not joining will reduce the influence we have over planning. But it may also change the US' perceptions of the UK as a partner longer-term, fostering a tendency to see us as a specialist in Peace Support Operations rather than a warfighting ally, with potential knock-on effects on other areas of close bilateral co-operation (intelligence, nuclear, missile defence, equipment and network-centric capability, etc). That said, if we do decide to participate, the Government will be well-placed to be more vigorous in pressing its views especially on better regional handling and "day after" planning. Unless these components of the overall campaign are properly planned, a military operation may not offer a worthwhile return. We could and should offer a contribution on the understanding that these dimensions must be better addressed.

**SECRET UK EYES ONLY
NOT TO BE COPIED FURTHER**

- i) Army morale. If the Army does not participate in the biggest combat operation for over a decade, and particularly if it is subsequently committed to a potentially enduring aftermath task, this may foster a perception that the Army is no longer regarded as a warfighting force (particularly if they are deployed on OP FRESCO duties) and may have knock-on effects on recruitment and retention. It will clearly present a leadership challenge. This should not be a critical factor in reaching decisions on Package 3, but it is an issue which the Secretary of State will wish to have in mind.

15. In informing the US of the status of the Packages, we will need to be clear about the timescales in which we are prepared to take subsidiary decisions on issues such as the call-out of Reserves. A firm commitment in principle to Package 3 should give us better involvement in US thinking, especially in Washington, about the most realistic timings for military action. We may find that we have more time than the illustrative dates shown in paragraphs 11 and 13 above, but this is only likely to emerge progressively if at all. So if Ministers wished to place any caveats on the timescales or circumstances in which they are prepared to take the subsidiary decisions, we would have to make these clear to the US at the outset.

Presentation

16. Whichever Package we offer, when specific decisions on Reserves and other critical-path issues are taken they will require careful domestic and international presentation. One option would be to handle them in a low-key way, explaining them as no more than prudent contingency planning. But it will not be easy to make this sound credible to the media and domestic opinion. There would thus be a case for presenting these decisions more assertively, arguing that they are an essential ingredient of a successful coercive strategy. This might not persuade journalists to present them as anything other than stages in the "countdown to war". But we would be less vulnerable to accusations of proceeding to war by stealth, and would be able to engage the media with a more pro-active handling strategy. A more open approach should also make it easier to manage the internal audience. This advice has been agreed with DGCC.

Way Ahead

17. The Secretary of State will wish to discuss the options at the meeting that has been arranged for 1500 on 14 October. In the light of that meeting, we envisage that he will wish to write to the Prime Minister, and stand ready to provide a draft.

18. CDS has seen this submission in draft and agreed it.

DAVID JOHNSON
Head of Sec(Iraq)

**DECLASSIFIED
NOT TO BE COPIED FURTHER
SECRET UK EYES ONLY**

Package 2

Maritime Component

1. The proposed force is as follows:

- *Carrier Group*: HMS ARK ROYAL provides command facilities coupled with the capability to operate 8 – 10 GR7 (if available); 6 FA2; 3 SK Mk7 (ASACS); 3-4 Merlin; 2 SK 6 (utility) or role change into a Helicopter carrier to support the ARG; 2 Frigate/Destroyer escorts and requisite RFA support shipping
- *Submarines*: 2 TLAM capable SSN
- *Amphibious Ready Group*: 45 Cdo Group based afloat in HMS OCEAN with 3 landing ships and combat support afloat in 4 support ships with 2 Frigate/Destroyer escorts, with 5 x Chinook, 12 x Sea King, 4 x Lynx and 4 x Gazelle as a TAG
- *Currently Deployed In-theatre Assets*: 1 Destroyer; 1 Frigate; 1 tanker (Op ORACLE/RESINATE/ARMILLA)
- *Mine counter-measures group*: 4 - 6 mine counter-measures vessels; 1 LSL support ship; 1 Destroyer escort.
- *Survey*: HMS ROEBUCK.
- *Primary Casualty Receiving Ship*: 1 PCRS (with embarked surgical support team)
- *Maritime Patrol*: 2-4 Nimrod MR2 MPA – provided by STC

3. **Military Tasks.** The US plan is to minimise their footprint in the Middle East by providing a considerable proportion of their firepower from five to seven Carrier battlegroups split between the Eastern Mediterranean and the North Arabian Gulf. Their tasks will be to generate the majority of the Offensive Air sorties in the first weeks of the Air campaign supplemented by TLAM. The US will deploy US marines ashore in the very early stages of the campaign to secure port areas and the sea line of communication into Kuwait.

4. The UK maritime component would be fully integrated with the US effort and meets the early military effect required in current US planning: ARG delivered land forces for discreet precursor tasks in advance of the launching of the southern axis, and TLAM fitted submarines (either in the Arabian Gulf or Eastern Mediterranean – the latter position may be constrained by over-flight rights). Additional support to US forces would come from escorts, RFA support ships and critically, the provision of a mine counter-measures group.

5. USMARCENT have identified a number of potential tasks for the ARG, if committed, although detailed planning is still to take place. These tasks would see the ARG contributing to early entry and highly visible operations. These tasks could provide impact in the early stages of the campaign (at a time when the UK land effort may be building up in the north).

6. **Military Significance.** The short US timescale between decision and the start of operations is challenging but the UK can contribute with maritime units from the

outset. TLAM submarines can contribute precision munitions at the start of operations. They would complement the mine counter-measures group in their operations to assist in the critical protection of the only military port facility in Kuwait and opening of the Khawr Abd Allah waterway and IRAQI port of Umm Qasr. This is a niche capability to support a smaller US group in negating the most dangerous IRAQI maritime threat.

7. The utility of the ARG would depend on the assets available when it is used. The ARG would need to be tailored so as not to impact significantly on other potential UK force contributions. A Commando Group level ARG could deploy from the UK as early as November. This could offer a ground contribution of up to 1700 personnel integrated with the US Marine Expeditionary Force for early action in the South.

Air Component

8. The proposed force is up to:

- SF: 8 x C130, 9 x CH47, 4 x Nimrod MPA in support of SF.
- Essential Enablers: Air to Air Refuelling/Transport: 4 x Tristar; 8 x VC10; In Theatre C130 as required. Reconnaissance/EW: 4 x E3D; 2 x PR9; 2 x MR2; 1 x Nimrod R1;
- Offensive Ops: 64 Fast Jets: 8 x Tornado F3, 30 x Tornado GR4, 8 x Jag, 18 x Harrier GR7
- Support: 2 x Ground-based Air Defence Sqns; 4 x Field Sqns; 1 x Jt NBC Regt; 3 x RE Sqn airfield

9. **Military Tasks.** The UK air component would be integrated with the US effort which would be centralised and commanded from CENTAF through a single CAOC in Qatar (or potentially Saudi). Combat effect would be provided in the earliest moments with the insertion and support of SF, thereafter by the enablers and offensive and support package as the shaping and decisive ops phases commenced.

10. **Military Significance.** The package comprises a balanced force of SF support, offensive and niche support capabilities above and beyond that which could be provided by the US alone. The significance of UK fast jets in the US campaign is considerable. For example, the US has a scarcity of CAS specific aircraft, a requirement that the GR7 can provide. Similarly, GR4s based in AAS can provide precision bombing against hardened targets a important capability in the shaping of the battlefield.

11. UK recce assets are also known to be valued by the US (Canberra PR9, Jaguar and Tornado GR4 in the Tactical recce role). Likewise, the ISTAR contribution of the E3D and Nimrod R1 is a niche capability much in demand by our US counterparts. Finally, as proven in Op VERITAS, the US Navy have a requirement for probe and drogue AAR tankers which the USAF alone cannot satisfy.

Package 3

Land Component in addition to Package 2

1. The proposed force is up to:

- Full Divisional HQ with manoeuvre capability
- Divisional troops
- One square armoured brigade (of two armoured Battle Groups and two armoured infantry Battle Groups)
- Integral brigade Combat Support and Combat Service Support;
- Support helicopters
- A Divisional Support Group
- A large logistic group.

2. **Military Tasks.** It is envisaged that the proposed UK land component (with augmentation of a US Armoured formation) could be capable of delivering the tactical tasks required in the CENTCOM Plan. These include:

- Securing the crossings over the R TIGRIS and developing a bridgehead to the south.
- The defeat, in sequence, if necessary of the main Iraqi units in the north (RA 1 (Mech) Div, RG ADNAN Div).
- Securing the forces own flank against Iraqi attack from East.
- (In conjunction with Special Forces and air assets) fixing Iraqi forces in the north to prevent redeployment to counter the US main effort from the south.
- Isolating TIKRIT.

And with the addition of a third manoeuvre formation:

- Being prepared to secure WMD sites, line of communication and civil infrastructure (including oil facilities) in the north.

3. **Military Significance.** A UK contribution at this level would have very considerable significance to the US.. Equally, with a fully functioning divisional HQ in the field, the UK could reap the strategic benefits of taking other multinational formations under command.