
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Broadband Regulation – International Perspectives

PIU – ELECTRONIC NETWORKS SEMINAR

18 January 2002

Broadband penetration – selected countries




^{*} June 2001

Relative importance of alternative access in early years Cable modem

Broadband access

% on online households, 2001



^{*} Fibre to the home (FTTH)

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DSL

Other

Potential policy objectives

Stimulating supply

- Should the government take steps to accelerate the rollout of broadband?
- What action, if any, should the government pursue to deliver funding for wide broadband deployment?

Encouraging demand

- What role should government play in stimulating demand for broadband?
- What steps should the government take to ensure universal access to broadband services?

Increasing competition

- What role should the government play in encouraging competition?
- How can the government create conditions for competitive entry?


Multiple policy tools to support each issue



	Anti-stimulus	Neutral	Pro-stimulus
Stimulating supply	 Heavily regulated low retail access prices 	- Pricing	Flexible retail access pricing to capture customer value
	 Low local interconnection fees 	- Interconnection -	Fee structure that benefits providers of local access infrastructure
	 Taxes or other government policies that remove funding from industry 		 Direct subsidies/tax incentives to deploy infrastructure upgrades
Encouraging demand	 Taxation of end user services and applications 	Financial incentives	Consumer subsidies/tax incentives
	Late adopter	Direct government role	Early adopter
Increasing competition	No local loop unbundling	Local loop unbundling -	Extensive unbundling and resolution of issues on ancillary services
	 Monopoly/duopoly policies 	Licensing -	 Licenses issued for multiple platforms (e.g. fixed wireless)
	 No resale policies 	Resale provisioning	Provisions to support entry by wholesale service providers

Regulatory approach

ILLUSTRATIVE SIMPLIFIED



^{*} As % of households, June 2001 Source: OECD; IDATE; ECTA

Broadband regulation – U.S.

Supply


- Allowed pricing flexibility for core services of cable TV
- Provided tax incentives to providers of internet services in sparsely populated areas

Demand

- Encouraged Internet take up and usage by schools and governments
- Subsidised narrowband internet through flat rate pricing

Competition

- Required incumbents to offer low priced wholesale services
- Mandated aggressive local loop unbundling in 1996



^{*} Total U.S. households – 101m

Broadband regulation – Netherlands

Supply


 Limited funding of cable due to tight regulation of cable tariffs on core basic TV services (despite 94% penetration and ubiquitous coverage)

Demand

 Took no substantial actions to stimulate demand beyond goal setting

Competition

- Imposed local loop unbundling from 1996
- Forced incumbent telco to divest cable network, which resulted in:
 - Limited incumbent interest in DSL roll-out due to commitment to ISDN
 - Later race to upgrade network between cable and incumbent



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Broadband regulation – South Korea

Supply


- Invested £21b (since 1995) in deployment of fibre optic networks
- Made DSL wiring mandatory in new apartments
- Provided tax breaks for access in remote areas

Demand

- Rolled-out e-Government
- Used public sector as early adopter
- Promoted internet adoption in schools
- Set up public broadband kiosks

Competition

- Licensed multiple carriers on multiple platforms
- Did not unbundle local loop in early investment stage enabling incumbent to quickly gain customers
- Encouraged broadband take up through competition on IP telephony service



Source: OECD Report; BDRC

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Broadband regulation – Sweden

Supply


- Encouraged development of high speed networks
- Promoted wholesale networks
- Funded fibre optic deployment (intra-urban and municipalities) – £330m

Demand

 Stimulated demand mainly through tax incentives (equipment) and customer subsidies (tax deduction for broadband access in low penetration regions)

Competition

- Did not accelerate local loop unbundling by incumbent
- Did not address constraints due to MDU demographics (exclusivity deals between real estate owners and incumbent telco)
- Permitted Telia to retain control of 50% of cable and most of DSL offer



Source: OECD Report; BDRC

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