Differences in the dates at the foot of this document are believed to have resulted from inconsistencies between the authors of different sections. The MOD confirms that this version of the document is complete and correct.

UK MILITARY STRATEGIC THINKING ON IRAQ

13 DECEMBER 2002
The diagram above illustrates the process of evolving the UK concept for operations in Iraq. The numbers on the diagram relate to the "Boxes" in the remainder of this document.
Box 1

ENDSTATE

UK

As rapidly as possible, we would like Iraq to become a stable, united and law-abiding state, within its present borders, co-operating with the international community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or to international security, abiding by all its international obligations and providing effective government for its own people. ¹

US

[Saddam's regime leadership and supporting power base destroyed]; WMD capability and infrastructure eliminated; Iraq's territorial integrity intact with sufficient force to defend itself and no ability to threaten its neighbours; and an acceptable provisional/permanent government in place.

PRINCIPAL ASSUMPTION

US military planning is based on principal assumption that the Endstate associated with WMD cannot be achieved while the current Iraqi regime remains in power. [see Box 2]

Comment

Potentially significant difference between UK End States (which is in harmony with UN route) and US End State with respect to Regime Change noted in earlier estimates remains.

If Regime is reformed, this should imply acceptance of all extant UNSCR, and address:

- WMD threat (basis for policy of containment and economic sanctions)
- Extant threat to Kuwait, and wider threat to regional security (US legal base for NFZ)
- Extant threat of further regime inflicted humanitarian disaster (UK basis for NFZ)

Current draft UNSCR does address these issues, and UK dossier described the nature of all Iraq's current behaviour on these 3 issues, but emphasis in public preparation remains focussed on WMD.

¹ 40 Downing Street's note of 22 Oct 02

30 Sep 02
US OBJECTIVES AS DEVELOPED BY CENTCOM

US objectives developed by CENTCOM have yet to be endorsed as the US position by the US Administration, but have not changed in the last month:

KEY DEDUCTIONS

- Even working alone US has sufficient combat power to destabilise, and overthrow the current Iraqi regime, but it does require a minimum coalition in terms of axes of approach for land/air operations, bases for mounting operations and providing logistic sustainability. Minimum coalition and capabilities required:
  - APOD/ SPOD and mounting bases
  - APOD/ SPOD and mounting bases
  - Maritime and AAR air basing
  - Rear area support, air basing and HQ
  - Air basing (principally for U2)
  - Overflight for offensive operations and CSAR
  - Overflight and SF mounting base
  - Overflight and guarantees of inaction
  - Free and secure passage of Suez, full overflight and
  - UK, Cyprus, Diego Garcia basing and SIGA
  - Overflight, basing and staging
  - Overflight, basing and staging

- US combat power should be sufficient to provide short term strategic protection for allied and supporting states.

- Final destruction of Iraqi WMD capability will not be achieved until significant change in behaviour of Iraqi regime.

- Given fractious nature of Iraqi politics, broad regional concern on nature of new Iraqi government, and poor state of Iraqi infra-structure, delivery of stated post conflict objectives need to be established prior to operations.

- Successful post conflict delivery of US support to a new, broad-based government will require co-operation and agreement of regional states on acceptability of the outcome, if its efforts are not to be undermined.
UK MILITARY/STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

- There are 3 broad Courses of Action (COA) to deliver the End State:
  - **COA 1.** Diplomatic & Coercion. UN resolution, UNMOVIC inspections. Current HMG ME. Create and sustain IC resolution.
  - **COA 2.** Diplomatic/Force. UN resolution. Continuation of COA 1 but UNMOVIC inspection process fails at some point. IC resorts to use of force with UN authorisation.
  - **COA 3.** Force. Early failure of UN route. No or inadequate resolution. US led coalition resorts to use of force without UN mandate.

- The following key issues require resolution:

- **Objectives.** To avoid achieving tactical victory at the cost of strategic failure, agreement on Strategic and Military Strategic Objectives across coalition is still needed. The Prime Minister's Strategic Objectives for the UK are set out in Box 1A, with current draft UK Mil Strategic objectives at Box 1B.

- **Legality.** The establishment of an agreed legal basis for action post UNSCR 1441 is the subject of debate.

- **CBRN.** Determine deterrent policy toward Iraqi use of CBRN weapons: against Allied military targets outside Iraq, within Iraq, or against 3rd party states.
Box 1A
THE PRIME MINISTER’S STRATEGIC POLICY OBJECTIVES

Our prime objective is to rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their associated programmes and means of delivery, including prohibited ballistic missiles (BM), in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions. This would reduce Iraq’s ability to threaten its neighbours and the region, and prevent Iraq using WMD against its own people. UNSCRs also require Iraq to renounce terrorism, and return captured Kuwaitis and property taken from Kuwait. These UNSCRs are an expression of the will of the international community, with which Iraq has persistently failed to comply, thereby perpetuating the threat to international peace and security.

As rapidly as possible, we would like Iraq to become a stable, united and law abiding state, within its present borders, co-operating with the international community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or to international security, abiding by all its international obligations and providing effective government for its own people.

A further objective is to restore the authority of the United Nations by demonstrating the Security Council’s effective response to the challenge posed by Iraq’s non-compliance. Success in achieving our prime objective should help deter the proliferation of WMD and BM more generally.

Our immediate priorities are to:

a) achieve a tough new UNSCR;

b) return UNMOVIC/IAEA inspectors to Iraq under conditions which enable them to identify and eliminate any prohibited WMD/BM material, associated equipment and activity;

c) enable UNMOVIC/IAEA to institute long-term measures to ensure compliance as part of their Ongoing Monitoring and Verification regime;

d) maintain international solidarity behind the UN Security Council and support for effective UNMOVIC/IAEA action;

e) preserve regional stability;

f) continue to make military plans and preparations in case military action is required to force compliance with UNSCRs.
Box 1B
POTENTIAL UK MILITARY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

- Through a coercive IO campaign, help create the conditions for Iraqi regime collapse.
- Develop broad military alliance against Iraq.
- Be prepared to support diplomatic and UNMOVIC/IAEA action.
- Assist the Coalition in creating conditions that will deny the Iraqis an ability to use their WMD against Allies and supporting nations.
- Subsequently find and destroy Iraqi WMD stocks, delivery systems, C2, research, development and production facilities and infra-structure.
- Create conditions that promote a change in the behaviour of the Iraqi Regime such that it will:
  - Be a law abiding member of the International Community
  - Allow free and open access to remaining Iraqi WMD capabilities, and renounce WMD aspirations
  - Exist within current boundaries of Iraq with a strong central government
  - Respect the human rights and freedoms of all its people
- Create conditions that strengthen regional security and stability, with specific reference to the roles of:
  - Turkey
  - Gulf States
  - Saudi Arabia
  - Jordan
  - Egypt
- In event of conflict be prepared to:
  - Assist the Coalition in securing Iraqi oil infra-structure and production facilities
  - Minimise damage to Iraqi infra-structure
  - Ensure Iraqi sovereignty in the aftermath.

2 Dec 02
• Assist in humanitarian and SSR operations/activity during the aftermath.
INTRODUCTION

- Information strategy – linked to and dependent on HMG’s wider strategy and the articulation of policy objectives. Will develop as HMG policy develops. Currently two policy issues are critical:
  - Prime objective to rid Iraq of its WMD – legal justification via UNSCR 1441.
  - Vision of future Iraq/Region - ‘the aftermath’.
- The key to whether force has to be applied (and if so for how long and with what intensity) is dependent on the resolve of the regime in Baghdad.
- Four interdependent audiences (fronts):
  - Home A current priority. Solid home front a precondition.
  - International International bodies key to delivery.
  - Regional } Key to support for potential military action.
    - Iraqi } Where the Military IO focus lies.

OBJECTIVES AND THEMES

Wider Information Campaign Objectives

- Domestic public and parliamentary support for large-scale military action against Iraq, including British participation.
- Identify, build and maintain Coalition – a consensus for action.
- Demonstrate Coalition resolve to make Iraq disarm.
- [Demonstrate Coalition resolve to affect political change in Iraq].
- Demonstrate that Iraqi adherence to UNSCR 1441 will result in long term benefits for all.
- Isolate the Iraqi regime, and weaken their resolve to retain WMD.
To build and maintain Coalition support for potential military action against Iraq.

**Conditioning Themes**

- Firmness of Coalition resolve (We will see this through).
- Status quo unacceptable (Threatens us all).
- Iraqi behaviour change will improve the future for its people, and the region (We all benefit).
- Iraqi propaganda effort (the regime tells lies).
- It is the regime, not the Iraqi people that is our focus [target].

**INTEGRATION INTO CURRENT MILITARY/STRATEGIC OPTIONS (COAs)**

**Factors affecting Information Campaign:**

**COA 1**

- HMG Main Effort.
- Supported by coercive strategy, transition from prudent preparatory measures to coercive 'pressurers' as necessary.
- UNMOVIC Timelines up to D+30 and D+45 - provide 'windows of opportunity' to shape the UNMOVIC environment.
- Requirement for Coalition building.
- Coherence with US.

**COA 2**

- Support to either 'quick and ugly' response from steady start or more deliberate response.
- If deliberate option, consider danger of 'activity vacuum' post material breach during UN process, and of Saddam seeking to control timelines.
- Requirement for Coalition building.
- Coherence with US.
- Transition from 'pressurers' to 'committed' measures.

**COA 3**

- Worst case
Throughout, plan for precipitous action in the event of regime collapse.

**AUDIENCES**

**HOME AUDIENCE**

**Wider Objectives (Particularly applicable to Home Audience)**

- Domestic public and parliamentary support for large-scale military action against Iraq, including British participation.
- Demonstrate that Iraqi adherence to UNSCR 1441 will result in long term benefits for all.

**Home Audience Objectives – Military Strategic**

- Public support for the US is important to UK:  
  *Key message – “We are a key ally of the US; they should not have to go it alone”.*

- Support for the deployment of additional UK Forces to Middle East:  
  *Key message – “We have modern battle winning forces ready to fight and win”.*

- Support of Forces families for potential warfighting deployment:  
  *Key messages – “Right is on our side” “UK Forces are well trained and equipped for such action”.*

**INTERNATIONAL AUDIENCE**

**Wider Objectives (Particularly applicable to International dimension)**

- Identify, build and maintain Coalition – a consensus for action.
- Demonstrate Coalition resolve to make Iraq disarm.
- [Demonstrate Coalition resolve to affect political change in Iraq].
- Isolate the Iraqi regime, and weaken their resolve to retain WMD.

**International Objectives – Military Strategic**

- Support for firm implementation of UN resolution 1441:  
  *Key message - “Saddam must not be allowed to flout the authority of the UN”.*

- Isolation of Iraqi regime from international political engagement:  
  *Key message - “Saddam’s actions must show his unconditional acceptance of the unanimous will of the international community – he has no choice”.*
• Secure other support; e.g. Access to intelligence, 3rd party validation: Key message - “You can help in many ways”.

• Constructive role in post conflict phase: Key message - “We all have a role to play in the future of Iraq”.

**Key Themes**

• We are serious and we will see this through.

• Saddam must not be allowed to ignore the UN and the will of the international community.

• Saddam is a threat to international as well as regional stability – it is in all our interests to prevent him developing WMD.

• Coalition activity is designed to confront an aggressive dictator – this is not a war on Islam.

• We are committed to the Middle East Peace Process.

• International economic and trade prospects will be protected.

**Target Audiences**

• National government leaders and “the street”. The emphasis will be on national government leaders.

**REGIONAL AUDIENCE**

**Wider Objectives (Particularly applicable to the region)**

• To build and maintain Coalition support for potential military action against Iraq.

• Isolate the Iraqi regime, and weaken their resolve to retain WMD.

**Regional Objectives – Military Strategic**

• Agreement to basing locations/use of territory/use of airspace: Key message - “We are partners”.

• Reduce the need for coalition force protection: Key message - “We are friends”.

• Secure host nation support; eg. Access to intelligence, local links to reach regional contacts etc: Key message - “You can help in many ways”/“It is in your own interest to assist the coalition”.

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Constructive role in the aftermath phase:

*Key message - "We all have a role to play in the future of Iraq".*

**Key Themes**

- We are serious and we will see this through.
- Iraq will remain intact and strong.
- The Iraqi people will be freed from tyranny and given a better future.
- Your economic and trade prospects will be protected (during)/improve (after) any military conflict.
- Saddam abuses Islam. He does not represent authentic Islamic or Arab identity.
- In the ‘aftermath’ of political change, a more stable and prosperous region will result in a much-reduced US/Western military presence (West does not want permanent bases in region).
- We are committed to the Middle East Peace Process.

**Target Audience**

- Information campaign aimed at 2 audiences; leadership/elite’s and “the street”. The emphasis will be on leadership/elite.

**IRAQI AUDIENCE**

**Wider Objectives (Particularly applicable to Iraq)**

- Demonstrate that political change will result in long term benefits for all.
- Isolate the Iraqi regime, and weaken their resolve to retain WMD.

**Internal Objectives**

- To diminish military and security forces confidence in the ability of the regime to maintain power.
- To degrade the regime’s confidence in its ability to retain control.
- To create distrust and disaffection against the regime.

**Key Themes**

- Failure to comply with UNSCR 1441 will result in military action against you.
- Military action against you will result in your downfall.
• Change is inevitable with or without your consent/assistance.
• You have a place in a future Iraq – dependent on how you now react.
• Iraq can make a contribution to regional security.
• We want Iraq to recover its rightful place as a leading state in the Arab nation, integrated into the regional economy.
• Our dispute is with Saddam not the people of Iraq.
• We want to help the Iraqi people gain the economic and social improvements they deserve.
• We will ensure internal peace and the preservation of current border.

**Targets**

• The Regime.
• Sunni Officer Corps.
• Saddam’s decision making capability (technical attack).

**PROCESS**

• Whitehall Machinery for co-ordination and direction. COBR(R) (Manning Group) and the Cabinet Office Ad hoc Group on Iraq will develop the wider policy. Parallel military and other government activity:
  • Cabinet Office Information Strategy Group (ISG) will consider the information aspects, seeking to provide coherence through to the medium and long term.
  • In MOD the Information Campaign Co-ordination Group (ICCG) should co-ordinate and direct the MOD aspects of the Information Campaign.
  • IO input to MOD planning considerations will be via the Strategic Planning Group (SPG).
Box 2
CHANGE IN REGIME POSTURE OR BEHAVIOUR

CURRENT SITUATION

- UK diplomatic and political pressure aimed at:
  - Achieving significant change in behaviour and posture of current regime with respect to WMD, and other UNSCRs, to prevent conflict, however,
  - If regime fails to change its behaviour voluntarily then it will be compelled to change its posture through the application of force, should regime change result this will be an unsought, but added benefit.

- Coercive campaign will require careful orchestration: Saddam will need to be convinced we are serious, but equally that compliance will reap its rewards, and he is not in a zero sum game.

Assessment

- Assessment remains that Saddam and his immediate circle (Qusay and other senior Ba’athists) form the regime’s strategic CoG, with regime survival as their singular aim.

- JIC\(^2\) have assessed Iraqi regime cohesion and concluded that only substantial military action will precipitate regime change within Iraq, and there are currently no contrary signals.

- Effectiveness of limited pressure over last 10 years in effecting change is not promising:
  - Economic sanctions, intrusive (and belittling) coalition presence in the air, significant air operations (Desert Fox) have not had a lasting effect.
  - Future of regime has not been seriously threatened since 91.

- Need to convince Saddam that his regime will not survive unless he is willing to compromise on WMD, and other UNSCR, will require:
  - Options for use of force that have sufficient capability, are credible, an delivery of a clear message of intent

\(^2\) dated 4 Jul 02 – Iraq: Regime Cohesion and Iraq: Regime Cohesion Under Pressure.
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SECRET UK EYES ONLY FURTHER DISSEMINATION
SECRET UK EYES - NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION

- Greater clarity on what type of regime could follow, to demonstrate coalition is seriously considering most damaging outcome.

- Lack of clarity on what type of regime is to follow action continues to hamper development of Information Campaign, weakens potential resolve of Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, and undermines current phase of campaign. It offers Saddam opportunities to divide developing coalition, and weaken coercive message.

- We should have clarity on outcomes we should seek to avoid:
  - Establishment of a revolutionary Islamic government – most likely Shi'a dominated, aligned with Iran and antithetical to the West.
  - Weak leadership that invites coup d’etat to reassert Iraqi nationalism and pan-Arab ideals or leads to widespread breakdown of law and order.
  - State with a constitution that enshrines religious or ethnic power balance.

US Planning

- US planning continues apace, but there remains a gap between strategic thinking on the future of Iraq and tactical/operational military thinking on delivering CIMIC post-conflict.

Key Judgements

- Coercive strategy must offer carrots as well as sticks, if we are to achieve a change in current regimes behaviour without conflict.
- To deliver a change in Iraqi regime behaviour requires continued credible threat of force.
- Agreement on what outcomes we do not want will allow us to progress toward formulation of a winning concept.
- "Aftermath" we need to address the fears of Iraqis, and the regional and neighbouring states in development of post crisis solution.

3 JIC judge this an unlikely outcome.
2 Dec 02

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET UK EYES - NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION
**Box 3**
THE WMD DIMENSION

**SITUATION**

- JIC have made an assessment of Iraqi Military Options\(^4\) and have separately addressed possible scenarios in which Iraq may use CBW\(^5\).
- Iraq's nuclear capability (essentially a 'dirty' bomb) cannot be dismissed, the main threat, at the moment, is from CB weapons:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CW AGENTS</th>
<th>BW AGENTS</th>
<th>TOXINS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LETHAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>LETHAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>LETHAL</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably: Sulphur Mustard, Nerve Agents (VX, GB, GF)</td>
<td>Probable: Plague</td>
<td>Probable: Ricin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NON LETHAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>NON LETHAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>OTHERS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability: CN, CS, Agent-15</td>
<td>Capability:</td>
<td>Others mentioned:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probable: Chlorocerin</td>
<td>Probable: SEB</td>
<td>Chikungunya virus and anti- agricultural viruses such as Tilletia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible: BZ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Iraq is experienced in the production and use of chemical weapons and has experimented with BW. Availability of weapon stocks and delivery

\(^4\) dated 2 Sep 02 “Iraq: Saddam’s Diplomatic and Military Options”

\(^5\) dated 9 Sep 02 “Iraq: Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons”
systems will probably restrict use to strategic targets, rather tactical battlefield use.

ENDS

The end required is that there is no longer a threat to the region or the wider World from Iraqi WMD; US planning dictates the elimination of all WMD in Iraq

WAYS

- Transparent inspection process that is able to verify no weapons, research or production facilities exist = effective implementation of current policies

- Neutralise WMD capability and remove will to regenerate the capability, through a regime change

MEANS

Pre-Conflict. (operational risk reduction)

- Pursue unfettered UNMOVIC inspection regime, wresting initiative from Saddam.

- Provide UNMOVIC with and expert knowledge in WMD R & D

- JIC assess that Saddam is unlikely to use WMD prior to any attack

- We need to consider current UK/US policy on a deterrent response to Iraqi first use of WMD

Conflict. (operational risk reduction)

- Reduce operational freedom of movement of Iraqi WMD

- Maximum effort to destroy WMD and/or reduce the effect of WMD weapons use.

- Provide protection and be prepared to fight in CB environment [see Box 9].

- Provide a robust medical solution, engineered back to home base and in conjunction with allies.

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6 JIC estimate that current IO regime believe they can conceal sufficient WMD knowledge and resources to regenerate their programme.

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• Provide training, education and technical support mainly at the higher operational and strategic levels in conjunction with OGDs in order to mitigate:
  Psychological impact over time.
  Risk of false alarms affecting tempo.

• Given likely stock levels and speed at which BW agents work these are most likely to be used against key nodes such as APOD/SPOD. CW is unlikely to be used tactically with most likely targets being rear support areas.

Post Conflict, (delivery of objectives)
• Secure any remaining threat; audit Iraqi capability for public verification.
• In slower time, destroy weapons and scientific infrastructure.
• Monitor successor regime to ensure no resurgence.
• Removal of Iraqi WMD may cause an imbalance with Iran which will need compensating.

Key Judgements
- although there is no evidence that
  SH has this capability.
- SH will attempt to use WMD if the regime is threatened with destruction.
- We need to review UK/US policies on deterrent response to Iraqi first use of WMD, pre-conflict and in event of conflict.
Box 4
REGIONAL DIMENSION – MILITARY/STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

IRAQ: REGIONAL ATTITUDES AND IMPACT OF MILITARY ACTION

Introduction

- Adoption of UN track by US has caused a significant shift in regional attitudes

Northern Option

- The northern option is only viable if Turkey can be delivered, the lack of clarity in US as to whether this is achievable within the current planning timelines continues
- Following are key:
  - Turkish willingness to allow operations to proceed unhindered, and intent towards Northern Iraq and Kurds is key.
  - Kurdish intent (principally KDP and PUK, though other factions have potential to disrupt/distract from Main Effort)
INTRODUCTION

- Diagram above shows those countries/peoples that are integral to any planned action against Iraq.

- Their position indicates their net effect on any military campaign, those closest to the centre have the greatest direct effect, and are on the critical path to military success.

- The chart overleaf sets out an assessment of the key country conditions that impinge upon a coalition operation against Iraq. Based on recent JIC assessment.

CHART DEFINITIONS ARE:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N/A or Neutral</th>
<th>No Risk (Essential)</th>
<th>Medium Risk (Highly Desirable)</th>
<th>High Risk (Desirable)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Sustained Political Support – policy support to coalition objectives and conops – must be sustained and enduring.

Sustained Military Support – offers to participate in operations or to backfill other operations which coalition members are engaged in – must be sustained and enduring.

Overflight / Transit – National consent to air, land or sea transit across territorial spaces.

Material Support – national support to operations, short of combat. Includes basing, docking, finance and HNS.

Internal Stability Risk – degree of risk that there will either be civil unrest or a threat to the current regime or government.

Public Opinion – Popular opinion is supportive of Coalition action in Iraq.

W1 & W2 – Windows 1 and 2. Windows retained to show discrimination over time.

Mitigation – Coalition measure, including military economic and diplomatic to manage out the risks.

4 Dec 02
INTRODUCTION

1. The Aftermath (AM) phase of operations is likely to be the strategically decisive phase of our engagement in Iraq. Only in this phase can our strategic objectives be met. It will also form the lasting impression of Coalition legitimacy and success.

2. The obvious deduction from this is that if we are not prepared to make a meaningful contribution to the physical and political rehabilitation of Iraq in the AM phase we should not be drawn in to warfighting. There is currently a risk that we view our engagement in reverse, considering post conflict activity as a necessary but inconvenient adjunct to our warfighting plans. The Winning Concept must address AM.

AIM

3. This Paper represents the key deductions distilled from a Strategic Estimate of the AM Phase. It aims to:
   a. Set out a framework for the co-ordination of strategic planning between the MOD, OGDs, other nations and, where feasible, NGOs.
   b. Provide guidance for PJHQ on the development of operational plans.

KEY JUDGEMENTS

4. The AM phase will be the strategically decisive phase. We must be sure it is adequately addressed in our consideration of the Winning Concept.

5. No overarching political concept for the future of Iraq currently seems to exist. A framework for the development of a new Iraqi state must be agreed by any Coalition seeking to conduct military action that would result in the removal of the current Regime.

6. The development of a jointly acceptable approach to Iraqi Governance and reform in the Resolution Phase should be pursued with the US. Agreement on the role of the UN is essential.

7. A cross-Government view on the area in Iraq for which the UK might want to accept responsibility is required urgently in order to shape or validate operational planning.

8. Failure to ensure political agreement on the territorial integrity of Iraq could presage a break-up that would fix Coalition forces in long-term stabilisation operations.

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9. We should encourage the US to begin work now on the future shape of the Iraqi Armed Forces in order to develop a sound SSR plan in advance of the start of operations. We should also undertake a review of the options for rapidly generating an Iraqi policing capability.

10. Early engagement with OGDs and NGOs is required to scope the AM humanitarian situation and the degree to which it may fall to the military to ameliorate it. We should be prepared in advance for the real possibility that we may initially face a task beyond our means to rectify with little external support.

11. An assessment of the options for rapidly meeting a surge requirement for additional forces at the start of the AM phase should be undertaken by PJHQ.

12. The UK should be prepared to commit forces to Iraq at Medium Scale for at least the six months following the commencement of the AM phase, and possibly out to two years.

ASSUMPTIONS

13. A major military role in the resolution phase is only required if by military action or consequence of diplomatic activity the current Iraqi regime changes or collapses.

14. The UK will contribute at medium scale at least to Warfighting operations.

15. The US will retain the military lead and the senior UK military commander will report to a US superior officer.

AM ESTIMATE

16. The full AM estimate has considered a host of factors that may shape the AM phase. It is clear that a relatively small number of factors drive our engagement. These can be summed up as follows, and each will be developed further in this paper:

a. Governance and Reform – What is the UK vision for the future of Iraq? How realistic is the aim of retaining Iraqi territorial integrity? What replaces the Iraqi regime and what role will the UN play? How do we resolve UK/US differences on UN involvement?

b. Situation - Where will the UK operate and what situation will we face in that region? What is the intent of the various population groups and how badly damaged will the infrastructure be?

c. Iraqi Armed Forces - How do we manage the Iraqi Armed Forces in the short term and reform them in the long term?

4 Dec 02
d. Humanitarian Situation - What humanitarian situation will be faced?

e. UK Commitment - For how long, and to what extent, will the UK be a significant contributor to AM operations?

GOVERNANCE AND REFORM

17. The Future Iraq. There is no Bonn Agreement or Dayton Accord for Iraq. Detailed military planning is proceeding without a clear Coalition view on the future Iraqi State and the way in which it would be developed. US agencies are beginning to map elements of the future, they must be encouraged to develop a convincing overarching concept which can be presented to Coalition partners early. UK experience in this area should allow a valuable contribution to be made but the lead must rest firmly with the US as the only nation with sufficient resources to underwrite the task.

18. Iraqi Territorial Integrity. At the heart of current UK and US military planning is the assumption that Iraqi territorial integrity must be maintained, implying the requirement to unify and deconflict the aspirations of Iraq's diverse ethnic groupings. This will require resolute international (especially regional) support and an early signal of Coalition intent that any future Government will be truly representative. The temptation for regional powers to develop bilateral relations with ethnic groups is considerable and this risks a descent into 'Balkanisation'. This could undermine the endstate and fix coalition forces in a protracted operation to separate factions or even to prevent secession.

19. The UN.

a. UK and US positions on the role of the UN have moved closer together over the last month. We still remain divided, however, on the UN's suitability to run an Iraqi Interim Administration. The US feel the UN are insufficiently robust and competent to take on such a task. The UK believes that the benefits of the international commitment to Iraq inherent in a UN role might outweigh any initial practical difficulties.

b. Both for political and military reasons the UK must continue to stress the need to maximise UN involvement and international participation. Given the potential timescale of a nation building task, paucity of military assets and commitments elsewhere, the UK can not afford to be isolated in its stance on Iraq, even if the US can.

SITUATION

20. The most significant driver for the scale and complexity of the AM task is also the least predictable factor in planning terms. We cannot truly assess the state of Iraq and the intent of its principal actors in the AM phase until we
are presented with them. Our strategy must, therefore, be flexible enough
to be tailored to the situation as found. In order to make the task of
coping the possible scenarios manageable the UK should form an early view of where in
Iraq we wish to operate. Initially our location may be driven by the UK role in
the Phase 3 plan but we can shape this. To do so the UK must adopt a view
based on consideration of the following factors:

a. Political – FCO:

What areas offer the UK an advantageous or influential role in
the AM phase? Are oil fields a factor? Are there groups,
whom we would rather not assume responsibility
for? A reasoned policy view is required.

b. Military – MOD:

Where will our Phase 3 role place us and do we wish to shape it
according to AM factors in any way? Are there areas where we
judge that there is a high risk of failure? Are there areas where
UK strengths will be most effective, such as population centres?
What size and nature of area can the UK force deployed
realistically assume responsibility for?

c. Humanitarian – DFID:

What are the most significant areas of humanitarian risk? How
will DFID engage and how can we effectively co-ordinate our
efforts? How can we apply our limited military capacity to
respond\(^7\) to best effect?

21. This thought process must be undertaken urgently if we are to shape
our Phase 3 role accordingly. Currently our involvement in the north or south
is being driven by purely operational concerns. At the very least we must
validate the current operational options strategically.

**IRAQI ARMED FORCES**

22. **Short Term.** Initially mass desertion and PWs may pose a significant
support and administrative burden on our forces, especially if still conducting
offensive operations. This may be combined with an already parlous
humanitarian situation. The control of surrendered weapons is also a major
issue, as previously disenfranchised groups are likely to try and gain the
means to protect themselves, complicating any future DDR programme.
Reintegration of ex-soldiers, particularly those most loyal to Saddam, may
also prove challenging and score settling could be a problem.

\(^7\) In particular the medical services and our CBRN capability lack the surplus capacity to
contribute significantly in the event of a humanitarian disaster.
23. Longer-Term Reform. In the longer-term the Coalition's exit strategy is likely to be delivered by the successful rehabilitation of the Iraqi armed Forces, such that they are capable of maintaining territorial integrity, while remaining accountable to a representative Government. The link between the short-term challenges and the longer-term aim is the SSR plan and, within it, DDR. Afghanistan has highlighted the dangers of an ad hoc approach to these areas - a year after intervention we have still to even agree on the size of the Armed Forces.

24. SSR. Constructing a model of the future Armed Forces of Iraq should not be difficult – we have a detailed knowledge of their current capabilities and clear aspirations for their future mission. With such a model we can approach the rump of any post conflict Armed Forces with an unambiguous view of what must be preserved and what can be dismantled. Similarly it should allow us to define the scale of the DDR task and work together with the appropriate agencies in advance. A joint US/UK view on the degree of reform required will be required but it can be tied in to this work from the outset.

25. Policing. We also lack a clear picture of the mechanisms for routine policing in Iraq. Given the potential for both inter-ethnic revenge and poverty fuelled crime, an ability to implement law and order will be crucial. Experience shows that wherever possible local agencies should be used to avoid placing military forces in a compromising legal position. Should this not be possible an international capability will be required in the interim. The requirement for the military to take on the task should be avoided if at all possible.

   a. We should encourage the US to convene a forum to define the future Iraqi military, to which we would contribute. As the work develops the output can then be used as the stimulus for a DDR plan and wider SSR work. Regional players and other agencies can then be brought in as appropriate.

   b. A review of existing police structures in Iraq is required. Early SSR work must address this capability as well as the future Armed Forces

HUMANITARIAN TASKS

27. Iraq is already a country with significant humanitarian problems. Up to 60% of the population of northern Iraq is already either partially or completely dependent upon food aid from the Oil For Food (OFF) programme. A rapid decline in humanitarian situation could follow an NGO and UN withdrawal in the face of imminent conflict. The military may be able to mitigate any developing humanitarian problem but it is unlikely to be able to counter it completely, given the potential scale of the problem, the relatively limited resources (particularly medical) available and the competing demands of
security. We must be ready, politically and militarily, to face the possibility that we cannot fully alleviate the humanitarian situation. Military capacity to deal with the consequences for the population of WMD use is especially limited.

28. The key to damage limitation will be a rapid assessment of the situation and assistance to NGOs to redeploy as fast as possible. Both DFID and USAID have undertaken comprehensive assessments of the current dependency of Iraq on aid and the implications of conflict. Detailed discussions on the scale of possible NGO withdrawal, their subsequent capacity and willingness to respond, and the speed at which they could do so should be undertaken at the earliest opportunity. This could be done jointly with the US or bilaterally, once a possible UK AOR is known.

COMMITMENT

29. The scale of the UK commitment to AM will be determined by the size of force deployed for warfighting in the first instance. Very rapidly, however, the demands of the AM phase are likely to drive the requirement for a different force structure. While the desire will evidently be to effect as rapid a drawdown as feasible, an initial increase in deployed strength may be required in order to stabilise the situation. A mass PW problem and/or a humanitarian crisis could both prompt this, requiring an increase in light forces and logistic effort. The options for meeting such a surge demand must be considered in advance in order to ensure a quick response.

30. A final view on the extent of any long-term (post 12 months) UK commitment may not be required at this stage. It is necessary, however, to provide a baseline assumption for the level of commitment for the crucial ‘first roulement’ post conflict in order to allow commitments to be balanced. It is suggested the assumption should be up to a medium scale (Air and Land) commitment for up to 6 months of the AM phase. A requirement to commit at or around this level for up to two years might well be necessary to ensure any lasting progress towards the UK endstate.

MILITARY TASKS

31. Having identified the key factors that shape UK engagement we can draw out a range of possibly military Lines of Operation in the AM phase. The diagram below illustrates these and links them to an outline policy framework, showing the predominant (but not all encompassing) role in the Security Sector and highlighting potential supporting roles elsewhere.\(^6\)

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\(^6\) Red lines illustrate a likelihood of a military lead while blue indicates those areas in which NGOs would lead on British policy or the UN would lead. Dotted lines denote tasks which support more than one strand of policy.

4 Dec 02
32. Open engagement with OSOs in the areas outlined in order to develop cross-departmental positions on which to approach the US. WAY FORWARD

The extent to which OPS can actually prepare the ground for AoA may be limited until positive strategic ends are failed. Military Lines of Operation

Military End-state
Box 6
IRAQI REGIME COURSES OF ACTION
(The ‘What ifs’)

IRAQ: SADDAM’S DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY OPTIONS

INTRODUCTION

- US planning continues to assess Iraqi most likely COA as defence in depth. However, Iraqis may be seeking to strike at coalition C of G (national will) by seeking to reduce tempo of coalition attack and increasing the casualty bill.

ASSESSMENTS

- JIC continue to assess that Saddam will permit return of inspectors in order to prevent the US from acting decisively.

- Saddam will continue to try a mix of charm, bribery and threats with his neighbours. But Iraq’s influence is limited.

- He is likely to be cautious in using force. He will play for time. But the closer and more credible an attack seemed [and if he can see no other way out], the more risks he will be willing to take, perhaps including deniable terrorist attacks.

- Early on in any conflict, Saddam would order attacks on Israel, coalition forces and regional States providing the US with bases.

- Saddam would order the use of CBW against coalition forces at some point during a ground war. Once Saddam was convinced that his fate was sealed, he would order the unrestrained use of WMD against coalition forces, supporting regional States and Israel.

- Iraq would probably try to ride out air strikes while conserving its ground forces. Iraq’s likely strategy for a ground war would be to make any coalition advance as slow and costly as possible, trying to force the coalition to fight in urban areas.

- There remains significant potential for Saddam to miscalculate.
Most Difficult COA

- If Saddam were to withdraw to and defend urban areas, this would significantly affect Coalition action and cohesion. [Box 6A addresses "Fortress Baghdad"]

- Once hostilities have commenced Saddam may look to distract coalition forces by a deliberate and sustained attack in the North, using all methods available to him (including CBW). The mass movement of refugees, and the humanitarian disaster this would create would be used to distract Coalition Forces.

- Recent DFID papers indicate that in event of conflict the loss of Oil for Food (OFF) is likely to cause large migration of refugees in the North, South and West (there are already 300,000 Iraqis in Jordan (total pop 5.3m) of the country.

Most Dangerous COA

- A WMD attack on Israel would be the most dangerous single COA for the Coalition to deal with. Any plan must include guarantees to Israel that her security will be guarded.

Key Judgement

- Saddam's best chance of avoiding regime change will be to prevent the deployment of coalition forces as once committed by presence, the US can only see the operation through to success and his demise will be inevitable.

- Therefore Saddam’s best chance is to fracture the will of the Coalition early on, prior to deployment, so speed and agility are needed once the decision to act has been taken.
Box 6A

URBAN OPERATIONS IN IRAQ

LIKELY IRAQI COAs

- Urban areas are likely to be the “vital ground” of any campaign against Iraq. Most of Iraq’s population lives in urban areas and its attitude and welfare will be critical to strategic success. Any elements of the regime or armed forces who choose to fight are likely to do so from the shelter of urban areas. During any land operations it will not be possible, or desirable, to avoid towns and cities. Any factional conflict following regime collapse or during the aftermath is likely to take place in urban areas. The strategy and tactics of operations against an enemy in an urban area will apply to every town and city. Additionally, the type of operations in urban areas will be different dependent upon whether or not the regime has collapsed and local governments can be co-opted. Therefore current tactical doctrine for urban operations (UO) may not be appropriate in the context of this operation and a flexible mix of combat, CIMIC, NGO and OGA forces will be required.

- Baghdad is a special case. If Saddam and his elite, who might be considered the Iraqi strategic centre of gravity, make the city a Baathist redoubt it will have to be eliminated to win the campaign. The operational centre of gravity might be those forces prepared to fight to protect the leadership. Saddam’s aim will presumably be to make the elimination process so damaging to the coalition that we lose the will to win.

COALITION RESPONSE

- Coalition cannot engage in drawn out urban conflict since it lacks the experience training and specialist equipment to do so without heavy casualties. Such casualties, combined with loss of tempo and humanitarian effects may undermine coalition will to continue by alienating home, international and regional supporters.

DOCTRINAL TOOLS

- The key functions at the operational level, derived from the manoeuvrist approach,⁹ (shape the battlespace; attack cohesion; protect force cohesion; exploit the situation) are underpinned by the need to understand the nature of the problem:

Understand.

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⁹ UK Ops Doc (JWP 0-10).

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Continuous throughout operation – Enables initiative and tempo. Strengthened/weakened by sympathies of indigenous population who will span the range from ally through aide, neutral and obstacle to hostile. Military is just one of Lines of Operation. Second and Third order effects follow all military actions.

Evaluate the battlespace (infrastructure, culture, population, terrain, threats). We should understand that a city is a system, with complex interaction between population and infrastructure. To do this we need to develop a new systems analysis tool in order to allow us to focus our intelligence effort on the most productive elements of the system and gain the necessary data for a complete analysis. It is worth noting that V(US) Corps have invested several thousand man hours of work in analysing Baghdad, but that relatively little work has been done on Tikrit, a city more likely to be the responsibility of those on the Northern axis.

Shape

To set conditions for engagement. Must attack the mind of the opponent, creating the perception that he cannot achieve his endstate on his terms. The aim is to undermine his will and thereby weaken his cohesion. Critical in this phase is dominating the Information Domain through Info Ops. Physical isolation of urban area, by cutting external and (internal/mutual) support, may preclude enemy retreat into it. Identifying and controlling movement of personnel and materiel will assist in this process. We must determine what effect is to be achieved upon enemy troops and neutral civilians prior to and during coalition attacks. Finding and fixing will be the critical effects.

Attack

- Actions against the hostile force to achieve the mission, all focused on shattering enemy cohesion. Actions range from large-scale combat to disaster relief (all within a single mission).

- Integration and synchronisation of forces within ROE.
  Capability to attack targets surface-surface, air-surface, surface-subsurface and within buildings.
  Use of precision to: deny enemy protection from urban environment; limit collateral damage; seize, control, disrupt, destroy nodes; inter/intra urban mobility and communications systems.
  Maneuvre forces for effect – not just to hold a position in city.
  Less lethal methods of attack also useful, including continuing info ops, incapacitants etc. (Less lethal may be the only way of attacking or allowing manoeuvre if the enemy is using human shields. However, it can be potentially disastrous

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10 SBLA J6001 Loose Minute dated 1 Dec 02 – Sitrep on V Corps Planning for ‘Fortress Baghdad’.

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET UK/US EYES – NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION
Protect

- Continuous process to strengthen own cohesion. Key elements are ensuring there is a clear aim and endstate, maintaining morale by adhering to the aim, ensuring that a "worthwhile job is being done" and winning over the enemy population through "hearts and minds". Finally provision of the right equipment and supplies is essential.

Exploit

- Transfer routine control in urban area from military. Maintain rule of law, reconstitute national military forces and support development of a secure environment.
- Integrate NGOs and COAs into the planning and execution phases at the earliest possible dates.
- For detail see Aftermath (Box 5).

POSSIBLE UK COURSE OF ACTION

Pre-empt

- Try to avoid Fighting in Built Up Areas (FIBUA), but accept that FIBUA is likely during offensive operations and possibly during resolution phase.
- Best option is to avoid conflict in entire towns and cities and to target only those KPs required – otherwise guard to prevent enemy sorties and bypass.
- Dislocate RA and RGFC using IO and PSYOPS and ultimately by denying routes into the city.
- Ensure throughout that a massive humanitarian aid effort is available to provide life support to non-combatants.
- Attempt decapitation of Regime (kill SH and sons).

Invest

- Isolate SSO, SRG and any elements of RGFC still loyal and attempt to subvert through aggressive IO and PSYOPS.
- Dominate remainder of the country and implement resolution phase.

Assault

- When ready conduct operations to complete the defeat of the surviving loyal elements, through combined PSYOPS, precision fires and ultimately ground assaults on selected and isolated sections. ‘Assault’ is not a follow
on to investment. It is an alternative and will occur immediately if there is a
good reason to mount operations in an urban environment.

ISSUES REQUIRING ATTENTION

Force Preparation

- The force composition for UO needs to be reviewed. Ideally, the force will
  prepare for conventional operations in open areas, but must be prepared
to conduct UO if necessary.

- Specialist training in UO prior to operations will greatly reduce casualties
  (both physical and psychological) and enhance tactical tempo.

- Specialist equipment will be required (enhanced blast etc) for which UOR
  action may be required. Any such equipment will necessitate additional
  training for the troops if it is to be used effectively.

- Current UK/US interoperability is unsatisfactory and requires development.

Legal Issues

- The ROE must be crafted noting that more restrictive ROE will increase
  own casualties, while less restrictive ROE will increase non-combatant
  casualties.

- The legal status of less lethal weapons requires clarification, (notably CS
  Gas and mines) and ROE for their employment will be needed.

- The legal status of Iraqi civilians and any remaining Civil Authorities during
  and after conflict require clarification.
Box 7
PRINCIPLES

CONFLICT CYCLE

- Conflict "cycle" can be depicted as in figure above; as noted in BDD it is more a continuum than a cycle with movement in either direction aimed at achieving successful conflict resolution.

- Current action against Iraq is Conflict Prevention. Sanctions and NFZ are being pursued as containment and peace enforcement strategies. Adoption of a new UNSCR is aimed at adding additional pressure by achieving broad based agreement on need for action.

- Force on Mind. Although at all points of the conflict cycle influence is targeted against decision makers, and their will to fight, in Conflict Prevention it is the key instrument of military power:
  - We are at the point in this crisis in which constant coercive pressure is needed to keep up forward momentum.
  - Overt Force Generation and Force Preparation activities are key elements in maintaining current coercive pressure.
Unity of Message. A clear and unified declaration of intent by a wide and solid coalition as possible will deliver the most powerful message of international intent to Saddam Hussein

**Key Judgement**

- We are executing a strategic Force on Mind campaign
- Information Campaign is fundamental to delivering message to Saddam
- Force generation and preparation are strategic elements of campaign in application of pressure we are seeking to place these in an appropriate framework to determine their effect and timing
Box 8
CREATE CONDITIONS

- Activity to set the conditions continues and is summarised in the following table. New work has been done on the Suez Canal and is summarised below:

**Suez Canal Non-Availability**

- Extended closure of the Suez Canal is assessed as unlikely.
- In the event of closure, the impact on operations varies significantly depending on force disposition at time of closure. The worst case is the impact on strategic RORO delivering a 'southern' land option.
- Where prior planning for closure is possible, a number of factors can be brought to bear to reduce the effects of canal closure. Key would be the early deployment of forces from the UK (specifically the ARG) through the canal in advance of any likely action to close it.
- We should maintain positive diplomatic and military links at all levels with Egypt to ensure continued access to the canal and minimising of force protection risks. The US is also a major player with whom we need to maintain a dialogue on this issue.

**Impact on Iraq 'Packages'**

- **Packages 0 and 1.** Immediate impact is minimal. Impact will be based on extensions to forces in theatre or early departure for relief forces in the medium to longer term. The MCM OCF 32 (and subsequent MCM roulement) will be most affected due to slow SOA and greater support requirement in theatre. In these circumstances, consideration could be given to OCF 31 (already east of Suez now) remaining in theatre and increasing engineering support in theatre and undertaking crew changes.
- **Packages 2 and 3.**
  - Maritime (East of Suez components). The ARG would not be able to meet the US timelines without being forward deployed a further 3-4 weeks earlier than is currently envisaged. The second SSGN would be unaffected as it is planned to operate in the E Med in any case.
  - Land (Southern Option). Very Serious Impact. Based on employing 15 RORO ships, each sailing 3 times to deploy the land component only and using 16kts speed x distance figures above, each round trip incurs an additional delay of 24 days, thus 3 'cycles' could take an additional 72 days. This assumes 15 RORO available, good weather throughout and no delays in load and off-load.
Transferring a 'southern' land deployment from sea-lift to air-lift is not a practical alternative (several thousand C-17 sorties). Size/timeline of sea-lift deployment could be reduced by extensive and early airlift but this would have a very minor impact on the overall deployment requirement/timescale. It would require extensive and lengthy civil charter – especially of outsize aircraft such as AN124, for which availability cannot be guaranteed – and would be likely to overwhelm indigenous AT assets.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Key activities</th>
<th>Achievable in Window 1 (Oct 02 – Mar 03)</th>
<th>Other Periods (to fit)</th>
<th>Achievable in Window 2 (Oct 03 – Mar 04)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prepare domestic and international public opinion</td>
<td>Establish legal base</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop and conduct IO campaign to undermine and isolate Iraqi regime</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Intensify international audiences and conduct IO campaign</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>PS consensus (especially Russia and China)</td>
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<td>UNMOVIC inspections given chance to succeed</td>
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<td>Persuade UN of need for use of force to impose will of International Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assemble progress in MEPP</td>
<td>US/ EU engagement in process</td>
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<td>Relocation of Israeli occupation of West Bank</td>
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<td>International Conference on MEPP</td>
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<td>View from Arab Street</td>
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<td>View from Arab Leaders</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prepare UK forces for operations in Gulf and elsewhere</td>
<td>Package 0</td>
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<td>Package 1</td>
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<td>Package 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Promote uncertainty in Saddam's mind</td>
<td>Military deception: operational surges and spikes (eg exercises and deployments) by UK forces</td>
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<td>IO to destabilise/ turn supporters</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Disrupt command structures</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Identify and cultivate potential Sunnis dissidents</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prepare region to accept forces</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Negotiate overnight flight</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maritime MCM surveys and clearance operations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Regional support for training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>Improve intelligence on WMD</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Improve Intelligence on Iraqi capability and weaknesses</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Key activities</th>
<th>Achievable in Window 1 (Oct 02 – Mar 03)</th>
<th>Other Periods (to Jul)</th>
<th>Achievable in Window 2 (Oct 03 – Mar 04)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Precursor action to reduce WMD threat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prepare internal insurrection</td>
<td>Reduce threat of fratricidal fighting</td>
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</table>

**Key Judgement**

- Creating conditions in Window 1 will be at risk, and places emphasis on action and then management of consequences ("Strike then Shape"), Window 2 is more deliberate and allows shaping before action ("Shape then Strike")

- With large amounts of pre-positioned equipment and deployable maritime air, US is less constrained than UK in adopting Window 1 or Window 2.

- Importance of post conflict end state as base for IO campaign so key to creating conditions

- We must not exclude periods outside the 2 windows.
Box 9
UK CAPABILITIES

UK capability has been grouped in 6 incremental force packages:

- Package 0 - SF Only
- Package 1 - In-Place Support and Key Enablers.
- Package 2 - Enhanced Support, Maritime and Air capabilities at up to medium scale of effort.
- Package 3 - Enhanced Support and UK land Package.
- Package 4 - Aftermath. Forces required post resolution of crisis
- Package 5 - UK home base requirements

Package 4 and 5 have yet to be determined.

Current Availability and Sustainability Over Time

- The UK force contribution of up to medium scale in each environment (Package 3) is the maximum achievable concurrently with Op FRESCO. The critical path for any deployment is reducing the sustainability shortfalls. The readiness for UK forces to contribute to operations can be maintained as follows:
  - UKSF. Within required timelines.
  - Air. 30 days complete in theatre – able to contribute to operational plan in full.
  - Maritime. 60 days complete in theatre – likely to be late unless additional measures taken.
  - Land. 129 days to be complete in Turkey – likely to be 2 months late for 1st echelon operations unless resources committed now.

Key Risks

- Following key risks to a UK deployment have been identified:

Concurrency

- Op FRESCO poses the only significant concurrency risk

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Gapping of other maritime current tasks will be required if the Packages are to be maintained over the next 12 months and FRESCO or recovery from is still an issue. This applies equally to other exercise activity.

There are relatively few other instances of exercises or activity that may have to be cancelled depending on timing of any decisions.

Environment.

With adoption of UN track timing of operation may now shift to point of failure of UN process and action may be required in "hot months". Though all components will be able to continue operations throughout 365 days, this will be with increasing risk (against endurance and tempo) as the temperature climbs. We would not choose to fight between Jun - Sep but could do so with limitations if forced to do so. (WF during Jul & Aug will be at Very High Risk, Jun & Sep at High Risk and May & Oct at Risk.)

Following initial assessment has been made of UK ability to operate:

- Environmental constraints on operations will apply throughout the year. However, the key summer constraint is temperature.
- Temperatures are likely to peak across the region in Jul / Aug to at least 40degC, and in places to 50deg C.
- These temperatures will have an effect on personnel and equipment that will be equal on Iraqi and acclimatised coalition forces in a non-CBRN environment. In a CBRN environment the upper-hand will be given to the Iraqis as they know we have no offensive capability and therefore will not need to take precautionary defensive measures. Non-acclimatised forces, less than 2 weeks in theatre (BCRs particularly), will have significant difficulties with coping with the conditions. Risk increases exponentially as temperature rises due to cumulative factors that can only be partially mitigated.
- The Force's ability to continue to operate cannot be definitively measured in advance. It will be subject to continuous estimate and hourly risk management.
- General constraints that will apply across all operations include:
  - Increased time for acclimatisation
  - Reduced op tempo
  - Increased effect on equipment

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- Increased logistic support (water etc)
- Faster force degradation

- Collectively these aspects will tailor operations in the following way:
  - Greater dependency upon night for WF
  - A requirement for shorter endurance operations
  - Longer pauses between phases for regeneration/recovery or more forces

- Operations in NBC conditions, forcing the requirement for personnel to wear IPE, will make WF extremely difficult from May – Oct. Wearing full IPE under threat conditions will be debilitating. The key to success will be the ability to avoid contamination (manoeuvre) and acceptance of a greater degree of Operational Risk, based upon a battlefield assessment of enemy intent and capability. Depending on the quality of our ISR and intelligence we may elect to adopt ‘IPE- Respirators Only’, no suits [intended to counter contact hazards rather than vapour] for some operations and take on risk. Though the statement below is about right, we may want to make a statement about our desire to operate in the hottest months.

**Equipment.**

- UOR - COS are being briefed separately on UOR progress.

**NBC**

- Threat: CBRN threats exist in 5 forms:
  - Through coalition knowledge of Iraqi capability that would enforce precautionary protective measures, prior to their actual use.
  - Through deliberate use of CBRN weapons by Iraq against coalition.
  - Through covert, or ambiguous use of CBRN substances by Iraq, or sympathetic groups.
  - As a product of collateral damage caused by Allied attacks on CBRN and related facilities.
  - As a toxic environmental hazard resulting from deliberate release of industrial or other substances; or the mismanagement of facilities.

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• Risks: Initial assessment of CBRN Risk\textsuperscript{11} being undertaken. Following risks are identified:

• There is a slight risk that Iraqi capability could go beyond the 'known' threat agents in JIC-based CBRN threat assessments. Principal concerns are attention to Mitigation strategies are being developed.

• That the capability for asymmetric delivery by Iraq unattributably, by proxies (such as Kurdish or Sh'ite displaced persons) or by sympathisers is assessed as limited, although it could be an attractive option.

• The greatest CBRN risk to the success of the operation is in the early stages of the operation - centered on attacking coalition and host nation resolve, vulnerabilities at obvious key staging areas and choke points, although JIC assesses that early use is unlikely since it would only build support for US led action.

• The greatest risk of UK casualties lies in the closing stages of the operation in Iraq, when troops are most likely to encounter a wide range of threats from BW, CW and toxic industrial material. [SGD comment required on whether UK deployed and home-base medical structures could cope].

• That the psychological impact (reaching up to higher pol/mil levels) from real CBRN events or even false alarms might exceed military impact.

• Use of CBRN, or suspected use that turns out to be a false alarm, will adversely affect operational tempo.

• Attrition of Iraq's CBRN delivery systems and command & control will be beneficial, but difficult; however attrition of complete CBRN weapons should be avoided due to the risk of causing unintended releases.

• Fighting in an urban environment would afford Iraq with the best opportunity to employ its CW capability.

• There is a risk that the UK might continue to sustain casualties once hostilities cease due to residual CBRN contamination and that our immediate operational capability for any follow-on mission could be at risk for a period, due to difficulties with expatriation of CBRN contaminated material. The risk posed by contaminated equipment

\textsuperscript{11} D/DJW/402/13 and D/CBW Pol/12/6 dated Oct 02.

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could be managed if the CB agents could be isolated (sealed) where necessary. Technical solutions should be pursued and UOR action may be required.

- **Risk Mitigation:** The CBRN risk mitigation is focused in 5 areas:
  - Mitigating risk taken on the strategic intelligence assessments by making limited provision for non-core CBRN threats and for novel delivery, including back to the home base.
  - A high tempo operational campaign and early attrition of CBRN bulk delivery systems
  - Wide area force protection capability improvements (based on UORs), in particular of the ground component operating in a toxic environment. The ability to guarantee full levels of protection through UOR action can not be assured.
  - Comprehensive training, education, and technical/science support mainly at the higher operational and strategic pol/mil levels, in conjunction with OGDs and our main ally, to prepare ourselves for CBRN events whether real or false alarms.
  - A current medical estimate that makes a notional 100-bed Field Hospital available as a UK capability for BW casualties. Burden sharing with the US is being staffed.

- **Defence Concept:** Employ all 4 pillars of defence NBC policy, comprehensive force protection from frontline to rear, cater for all hazards from classic threat agents to environmental hazards, which may merge, including post-conflict. Enhance CBRN Recce/Survey with specialist NBC/EH teams with ‘duty of care’ a priority.

- **BW.**
  - **Limited coverage from BW detectors** will require tight prioritisation and management during all phases.
  - Picture improving on medical countermeasures, with stocks of anthrax and smallpox vaccines for Large Scale now available. A period of weeks is required for full protection against Anthrax, although reasonable protection is afforded after a period of weeks; would aim to include units in the programme as soon as they are identified. Voluntary programme unlikely to achieve 100% uptake but likely to rise from current levels (78% among Army, 46% overall). Stocks of antibiotics unlikely to be a problem. Stocks of very limited. For Ricin and Aflatoxin currently there is no medical countermeasure.
Overarching policy for the evacuation of contagious and BW casualties has been developed but detailed concept and doctrine is not mature. Current management procedures follow principles for naturally occurring communicable diseases with recovery of personnel to NHS care in UK once diagnosed, with appropriate isolation.

- **CW**
  - Sufficient Combopen are in stock but will require shelf life extension as batches go out of date end of Sep 02
  - COLPRO. Current assessment indicates that there should be sufficient COLPRO for 2 Field Hospitals but training and awareness on use are low. Other COLPRO has been withdrawn from issue and use.
  - COLPRO will be essential if the CBRN threat is assessed as high. This will apply across the force but particularly in high value target areas including HQs, and also in choke/staging points where forces will necessarily concentrate. There is not currently enough COLPRO to meet the needs of the force and therefore this area remains at risk.

**Medical**

- Package 1. Support can be achieved within current resources
- Package 2. Specialist reserve manpower will be required to man some Role 2 & 3 facilities, RAF aeromedevac capacity and equipment to bring deployed hospitals up to modern scales (90 day is current estimate for procurement). SF medical requirement is likely to be significant and impact on demand for reserve manning.
- Package 3. Minimum requirement will be 4 Role 3 Hospitals (1.5 Regular manning, 2.5 Reserve manned). New equipment will be required to bring hospitals up to modern scales (90 day is current estimate for procurement). Additional hospitals will be needed if force is required to manoeuvre.
- Consideration will have to be given to the NBC and other risks posed to UK personnel and their dependants (MoD, FCO and EPs) in Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, Israel and Cyprus. Contingency planning for MoD and FCO personnel is being scrutinised by joint MoD/FCO team.

**Reserves**

- Land with the largest requirement for reservists is looking for ways of pro-actively managing reservist risk. Planning assumption timelines in

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a number of cases can be reduced as individuals or units are at higher state of training than baseline assumed in assumptions.

- Key risk is number of reservists likely to appeal against call-up and consequent delays in forming units/training key personnel. Planning assumes in some cases 100% excess in call up to cover potential “no shows”.

- Reserve call up is part of strategic Force on Mind campaign

- Reserves are considered Highly-Desirable though not Essential for the Maritime Component. Call-up can be delayed by using Regular personnel initially then replacing these as the Reservists come on line.

**OGD Demand for Military Support**

- Work is ongoing to assess MoD requirements for home based force generation, preparation, deployment and protection requirements.

- 5,500 personnel were stood by for logistic support tasks, key point guarding (military and civil), guarding of internment camps, and medical support during Op GRANBY.

- Changes in MoD/OGD structures and practice since GRANBY imply a significant (downwards) change in both required outputs and numbers is likely.

- Once MoD baseline requirement is established OGD requests for potential MACA tasks will be processed as required.

**Home Base Security**

- Were operations in the ME to be accompanied by a significant increase in overall threat levels within the UK, it is anticipated that approximately 13 US and UK KPs would be candidates for activation, subject to Cabinet Office approval. The potential guarding manpower bill for the KPs concerned would be approximately 1000 service personnel and 300 MDP.

- Should threat levels increase very significantly and include threats specific to military assets, there may be a requirement to consider activating a wider range of Military KPs. Should such an expansion include a number of larger installations, the guarding manpower bill may increase to the extent that more widespread mobilisation of reserves may be necessary.

- Should Alert State BIKINI AMBER be adopted for a period exceeding one week, the Department will face sustainability issues, particularly with respect to the provision of trained service personnel for security duties.
- Should the Joint Casualty Reporting and Reception Plan be activated on a nation wide basis, the resultant military manpower bill would be moderate and supportable.

- There are no Police plans to activate guarding operations for civilian sites involving military support and none anticipated.

- The current Home Office view is that intermittent action is unlikely and, that if it does occur, it will be on a limited basis that will not require the assistance of the military.

- Lead responsibility within the UK for consequence management operations lies with the civil authorities, although military assistance those authorities can be delivered under MACA auspices.

- The potential UK military tasks in support of the US/UK LOC Arrangement are minimal.

- The removal from service on 1 Apr 03 of the MOULD radio system will have an impact on the ability of the MOD to conduct Home Defence tasks.

- Should threat levels within the UK rise significantly, the provisions of the Reserve Forces Act 1996 would allow the call-out of reservists.

- The CCRF concept will not achieve Full Operating Capability until 31 Dec 03.

**Aftermath (See Box 5)**

The nature of a campaign will dictate the CBRN hazards at the cessation of hostilities. In addition to the presence of residual agents, it is likely that personnel remaining in theatre could be at risk from Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TIC) and will need ongoing protection. Prior Iraqi use of CB weapons could mean significant work to be done to make the environment safe for the indigenous population and to decontaminate equipment. Long term impact on the regeneration of operational CBRN capability.
CURRENT CENTCOM CONCEPT AND PLAN

GENERAL CONCEPT

- Plan seeks to overwhelm the Iraqi regime through a co-ordinated multiplicity of threats applied across a number of lines of operation.

- Offensive ops based (originally) upon two distinct options: ‘Generated Start’ and ‘Running Start.’ Both preceded by shaping operations. Since early Aug, a third option has been developed: the Hybrid, which is now referred to as “the plan.”

- Each option uses the same forces, but start combat operations at different force levels based upon the timing of a possible trigger and willingness to accept risk.

- Seven lines of military activity: operational fires, operational manoeuvre, SF ops, unconventional warfare/support to other governments, influence ops, humanitarian assistance, and pol-mil engagement.

- Theatre of War is the entire USCENTCOM AOR. USCENTCOM’s Area of Interest is global due to the international nature of terrorism and the vast network of Al Qaida. The Theatre of Operations is defined by the total airspace, land area, and boundaries of Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain Qatar, UAE, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, the Arabian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, those portions of the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean within the USCENTCOM AOR (less Seychelles), the Gulf of Aden, the Bab al Mandeb, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Suez, the Gulf of Aqaba, the Suez Canal system, portions of Turkey Diego Garcia Somalia and Yemen.

SHAPING OPERATIONS

- At the operational level, shaping operations involve information operations, by coalition forces, SOF and agencies, and a series of activities designated as spikes by the US.

- These spikes are intended to progressively increase the level and tempo of military activity over time, increasing pressure on the regime, creating confusion as to intent, and provoking preparatory movements or responses and the consumption of resources.

- In extremis, their response may be such as to constitute a casus belli, triggering US offensive operations. It is assessed that these shaping operations have already begun, manifested through enhanced MIOPS and re-establishment of the Southern NFZ.

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GENERATED START.

- This option begins with sufficient combat forces in place, assessed as mid Feb 03.
- Sequential build up followed by simultaneous execution of activities across the seven lines of activity.
- Begins with the overt preparation and posturing of forces and support.
- Initial combat operations are initiated with a 72 hour air campaign. It is envisaged that this will assist in the achievement of tactical surprise.
- Ground forces attack along a two corps front to secure key facilities such as the southern oilfields, and potential APODS and SPODS. Concurrently, the regime will be isolated through operational fires and influence ops.
- Once the force flow is complete, the final phase of offensive operations towards Baghdad and Tikrit to complete the destruction of the regime will occur.

RUNNING START.

- May begin with a casus belli or significant Iraqi provocation; alternatively, may be initiated unilaterally by US. The US is ready for this option for launch.
- Sequential execution of combat operations initiated with a series of air operations building in duration and utilizing only in-theatre forces at first, building to include US based bombers and fighters as assets become available.
- Ground operations commence with a much smaller ground force than the Generated option to secure limited initial objectives and this may generate strategic surprise.
- Given that ground forces arrive at different intervals, the seizure of objectives is more gradual than in the Generated option. Although the ground manoeuvre plan for the options is similar, the greater degree of risk assumed in the Running Start makes it more dynamic in execution.

HYBRID PLAN

- The Hybrid plan was briefed in outline to POTUS at the beginning of August. It represents an amalgam of GENERATED and RUNNING START and is the US preferred option. The Hybrid plan continues to be refined.
and force generation timelines aggressively reduced. Running Start remains the more likely plan until mid Feb 03.

- The Hybrid plan includes sequential ground attack into Iraq from SE Turkey to coincide with the main effort attack of south. The Northern offensive will be built upon the 4th Infantry Div and 2 Light Cavalry Regiment of the US Army and may include UK Package 3 forces pending TU approval. The exact C2 procedures and the likelihood of delivering a 3 star (Corps) Hqs for this force has yet to be determined and will likely be based upon what level of UK forces are employed in the north. A number of early enabling actions result in the ability of the US planners to reduce the preparation phase from Presidential decision to launch of the air campaign to 16 days.

- Funding in the order of $1bn has been made available to enable a number of preparatory tasks to be carried out. These tasks are termed "ambiguous" and could be attributed to OSW/ONW, exercise activity or general force improvement. These include upgrading ramps at potential APODs such as Ali al Salem, pre-positioning equipment and stores in Kuwait and Turkey, and the purchase of additional key infrastructure equipments such as satellite antennas. The majority of these tasks have been completed and the remainder have commenced now that fiscal year 03 funding has been received. The anticipated completion date for the remaining tasks is Mar 03. EUCOM has been allocated $150m for preparatory actions and the funds are likely to be used to build tented cities at potential APODs at Incirlik and Diyabakir. Given delays attributed to the Turkish general elections and similar fiscal year 03 funding difficulties, EUCOM has made little headway in accomplishing their preparatory tasks.

- The division of planning responsibilities between CENTCOM and EUCOM is slowly being refined with CFLCC concentrating on the CONOPS for the northern option and EUCOM, as a supporting command, facilitating the deployment of forces. CFLCC's primary plan is for the deployment of 4th Infantry Division and 2 Light Cavalry Regiment to SE Turkey (CONPLAN COBRA) and 4 Divisions are now fully committed to the south. This overall concept has been briefed to and approved by POTUS. EUCOM received a PLANORD (22 Aug 02) directing them to plan to deliver a divisional size force to SE Turkey, synchronised with the launch of ground operations in the south. Their Joint Planning Group, with 3 UK embedded
staff, commenced the mission analysis process on 4 Sep 02. Detailed planning cannot proceed until the PDSS has occurred, which remains an open requirement pending the outcome of TU consent for military operations to take place from their territory.

The Northern Option

- US and UK planning for a Northern option have validated that a Div size force is required to achieve the effects required by CENTCOM and CFLCC.

- PJHQ (OA) have wargamed the north and concluded that a Div force of two Bdes could accomplish all the tasks up to the interdiction of the LoC between Tikrit and Baghdad, but would be incapable of participating in operations around Baghdad given its current force structure. Feedback from the Nov 02 CENTCOM TFDD conference validated force load to the south and indicated force load to the north and sought to attain near simultaneous effort. The next TFDD will convene at Scott AFB on 6 Jan 03 to take this work forward. EUCOM remains confident of their ability to deliver the LoC from the SPOD to Iraqi border.

- Planning has acknowledged UK shortfalls in several key areas, some are being progressed through the UOR system. Others remains problematic.

- Likewise, once the force package for the North is confirmed, EUCOM will be required to determine their degree of support to the Div and CENTCOM CFLCC as they advance South.

- C2 structure for the North is still undecided.
Box 11
UK COMMENTARY ON US PLANNING

INTRODUCTION

This assessment continues to be based on the military viability and suitability of the US plan (as it is currently constructed) to deliver the UK End State. The key military question to be addressed is:

"Is the UK military contribution part of a winning strategic concept and plan?"

We need to develop our military judgement against the following:

- Yes — with conditions
- No — with reasons

CURRENT ASSESSMENT

Current update on the key factors is as follows:

Yes, provided the following conditions are met:

Strategic

- Need to ensure that the UNSCR 1441 process is adhered to in order to bring UK public and international diplomatic opinion behind need for action.
- Inform
  - Continued refinement of assessments of Iraqi intent.
  - Accurate assessments of likely success in delivering key states for the coalition (especially Turkey)
  - Continued assessment of UN inspection operation's effectiveness.
- Command
  - Appropriate UK representation (including effective liaison structures) in C2 structures.
  - US/UK inter-agency processes are co-ordinated to deliver multiple lines of operation
- Prepare

2 Dec 02
Sufficient time is allowed for UK force package preparations to deliver forces in timescales to match the US plan at acceptable risk.

Forward recces and negotiations are permitted to go forward in time.

Project

The US agrees to enable the LOC for UK forces, including securing necessary HNS.

Protect

Adequate intelligence on operational and tactical level CBRN threat is available

LOC security is adequately addressed

Security of UK home base and overseas bases is adequate

UK citizens and interests are not placed a unacceptable risk from unwanted consequences

Operate

US agrees to share key capabilities in UK areas of high risk such as BW detection and countermeasures, medical services, water and fuel provision (offer to help has been made by CinCCENTCOM to CJOC)

US combat power mitigates UK military risks

Contingency plans developed to meet asymmetric threats to coalition and regional states, especially Israel

Interventions by regional states (eg. Iran or Israel) are successfully constrained.

Sustain

Operational level clarification of sustainability concept is obtained.

Recover

UK aftermath tasks will be limited in scope and time

No. The UK should not offer to participate in the US CENTCOM Plan for Iraq for the following reasons:

Strategic

2 Dec 02
- Discontinuity between UK and US End States opens up potential for strategic differences of approach and violates the first principle of war.

- Inform
  - We do not share US's optimistic assessment of Iraqi regime's inherent weakness and liability to fracture
  - We lack intelligence on:
    - Iraqi regime thinking, intentions, and modus operandi
    - Morale and likely reactions of Iraqi people, including armed forces and security apparatus
    - Operational level intelligence on WMD renders risk to troops of CBW attack too great

- Project
  - Overflight and basing rights are not secured
  - Host nations are uncertain partners and cannot be guaranteed to deliver necessary support, in sufficient time.

- Protect
  - Risks of fighting in contaminated CBRN environment
  - LOCs (including the Suez Canal) are not adequately secured.
  - Inability to defend Israel and guarantee Israeli non-intervention
  - Inability to prevent interventions by regional states

- Operate
  - US military planning does not yet address issues of what we perceive to be Saddam’s most dangerous Course of Action.

- Sustain
  - UK logistic requirements cannot be satisfied from own resources and how shortfalls to be made up is as yet unclear (though promises of US support have been made).
  - Insufficient access to SPOD and APOD to meet UK logistic needs.
- UK Sea, Air and Land forces may be split exacerbating logistic support difficulties

- Recover

- With no clear aftermath strategy, UK military commitment is likely to become open ended
Box 12
UN ROUTE

- A new UNSCR (1441) was agreed to on 8 November 02 with a unanimous UNSC vote of 15-0. The following timelines have now emerged and will have a potentially significant impact on military planning, due mainly to the difficulties associated in conducting operations beyond March 03:

  - D Day (8 Nov 02)  UNSCR 1441 Agreed
  - D Day + 7 (15 Nov 02)  Deadline for Iraq to confirm its intention to comply. This was given on 13 Nov 02)
  - D Day + 17 (25 Nov 02)  Blix's estimate of when UNMOVIC advance team will arrive in Baghdad. (First elements arrived 18 Nov 02. First inspection due 27 Nov 02).
  - D Day + 30 (8 Dec 02)  Deadline for Iraq to submit "a currently accurate, full and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and other delivery systems".
  - D Day + 45 (23 Dec 02)  Deadline for UNMOVIC to have started inspections.
  - D Day + 105 (21 Feb 03)  Latest date for UNMOVIC to "update" the Security Council on its work. (Blix may well report before then).
  - Mid Jun-mid Aug 03  Full reinforced OMV
  - Mid Oct-mid Dec 03  120 day report for suspension of sanctions

- If these timelines run their course and if Saddam co-operates fully throughout, operations could easily be delayed until winter 03/04. This is very probably Saddam's intention as he sees this as likely to:
  - Create divisions between US/UK and the international community.
  - Give Iraq scope to procrastinate prior to and following the entry of the inspectors.
  - Lead to the weakening of internal opposition and bolster regime morale.
SECRET UK/US EYES - NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION

- Allow Iraq to work on exploiting Palestine, MEPP and other associated issues.

- The UK/US have considerable concern regarding the quality of the UNMOVIC inspectors. Moreover, we have only had limited visibility of UNMOVIC’s detailed planning and the organisation has yet to demonstrate itself in theatre. That said, we believe that it needs enhancing in order to be operationally effectively within the required timescales. However, both we and the US are sensitive to the presentational effects (independence), if we are deemed to exercise too great an influence on UNMOVIC’s planning.

- The UK/US have pressurised the UNSC to pass a clearly defined resolution, which allows the inspection programme to be carried out against a very tight deadline. Within this programme, the UN will be seeking early indications of Iraqi compliance, perhaps by seizing the initiative and adopting a multi-faceted inspection regime. Indeed, the US are keen to see UNMOVIC move rapidly to a position where it can stage multiple simultaneous inspections, with the aim of applying pressure and ultimately testing Iraq’s ability to contain the inspectors in order to limit their success.

- Complicating the issue will be the makeup of the 2003 Security Council. In addition to the P5 the members will be:

  Angola, Chile, Germany, Pakistan, Spain, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Guinea, Mexico and Syria. The first 5 in the list will be new members while the latter 5 will continue form 2002.

- Issues that will need to be resolved are:

  - Will Blix’s criteria satisfy the US if their intelligence sources indicate to the contrary?

  - What level of consent/compliance will Saddam demonstrate:

    - High consent – no restrictions, full and open exchange; no attempt to move or hide material or other evidence.

    - Patchy consent – either through bureaucratic inefficiency, individual hostility towards foreign intrusion; or pre-determined malice and inspectors encountering local difficulties. What level of failing will amount to a *causus belli* or material breach?
• Low consent – Iraqi regime admit inspectors and adopt a posture of obstruction and delay.

**KEY DEDUCTIONS**

• The UN route may not be compatible with the US endstate, which focuses primarily on regime change, but is compatible with that of the UK which focuses more on the elimination of Iraqi WMD. This is a potential fault line in the UK/US relationship, which Saddam may try to exploit.

• In parallel to the UN route, the US is likely to continue action unilaterally, either on current timelines or to accept some small delay. The UK would have the choice of following the US or the UN route.

• Concern regarding UNMOVIC operational capability and their ability to carry out a full, robust and dynamic monitoring, verification and inspection programme.

• The need to continue planning a preparation for military action remains extant.