OP COS PAPER
SUBJECT – UK CONTRIBUTION TO IRAQ: STRATEGIC INTENT AND DIRECTION

1. The attached paper¹ by DCDS(C) is circulated for COS information prior to being discussed at Op COS on Wed 11 Jun 03.

2. COS will be asked to note the key judgements of the paper.

SECCOS

¹ D/SPG/05/01 dated 9 Jun 03.
UK CONTRIBUTION TO IRAQ: STRATEGIC INTENT AND DIRECTION

A Paper by the Op TELIC SPG

CONTEXT

1. The strategic landscape in Iraq continues to develop rapidly. A clearer US intent (and supporting structures) are emerging and the Coalition is widening as other nations’ armed forces deploy. The greatest concern remains lawlessness and there are signs that more organised opposition to the Coalition may be emerging. There are also signs of rising discontent amongst Iraqis at the Coalition's failure to deliver a safe and secure environment. This is most marked in Baghdad, and in the Sunni regions to the North and West of the city, (although there is evidence that this effect is being seen more widely).

2. Baghdad is the key to success in Iraq. It holds 25% of the population, and is the traditional centre of power and direction. Failure within the city will threaten a successful conclusion to the campaign. The US recognise this and are responding, but it remains to be seen whether this will prove to be part of a wider and more clearly defined strategy for Iraq, constructed and led by the new US leadership. The UK is attempting to provide support and advice to this central effort, largely through the CPA. This cuts across all areas of Iraqi Government. But we must also protect our achievements in our southern AO and both the south and the centre will require additional resources if we wish to see a sound and lasting strategy developed and implemented.

KEY JUDGEMENTS

3. COS should note the following key judgements:

a. The UK main effort should be our AO in southern Iraq. It is here we can have the most direct effect and achieve the exemplary effect HMG seeks.

b. We must also assist in developing the wider Iraqi strategy through the CPA and OSA, in order to adequately support our efforts in the south, and to ensure they remain coherent with developments across Iraq. Our military engagement in the south gives us the equity in decision-making to enable this.

c. In order to improve our support to the south we should consider:

(1) A co-ordinator to help CPA representative Olsen.

(2) Additional civil support, to relieve military personnel acting at the limit of their expertise in developmental issues.

(3) Further discussions with the US to resolve the means by which CPA advice and assistance is channelled at Governate level.
d. In support of the promotion of central strategy we should consider:

(1) Taking up key posts in the CPA and Slocombe’s Office of the Senior Advisor to the MOD (OSA-MOD), including the civilian 2* Iraqi MOD deputy and the military 1* deputy of the Coalition Military Advisory and Training Team (CMATT) US are also keen that we provide a major and sergeant in the same timescale i.e by 1 July – strongly advise we support this or there is danger that we are viewed as only taking higher level jobs. Gen Eaton was very keen to get this level of UK support.

(2) Providing targeted additional resources to train or advise at ground level to enhance our equity overall and reinforce the effort in the south.

e. A political decision in principle on the deployment of HQ ARRC is required now, in order to inform a final committal decision by 1 Aug, or to allow the US to make alternative arrangements, should it not be offered.

**UK MAIN EFFORT**

4. Although ultimate success depends on Baghdad, a necessary (but not sufficient) component is success in the South and the UK AO. While we should support the wider coalition effort where we can, the UK’s responsibilities as an occupying power give us a particular obligation to ensure success in the South. The UK main effort, in terms of manpower and resources should thus be in the UK AO. This should be a cross-Government effort. Currently the UK military is de facto in the lead in Southern Iraq, largely for reasons of simple capacity. We should seek to change this. Firstly the military is reaching the limit of its capacity to engage in reconstruction; both in physical and expertise terms. Secondly, but more importantly, it is crucial to transition away from quasi-military government to civil administration, to free military capacity for its primary task of providing security, to avoid the impression of a military occupation and to hasten the eventual move to Iraqi self-government.

**IMPROVING SUPPORT TO THE SOUTHERN SECTOR**

5. Ministers have already endorsed\(^1\) a joint MOD/DfID paper that sought an increased focus and organised support in the South. The immediate outcome from the meeting was to commission an MOD/DfID scoping visit with a remit to determine how best the Southern Sector could be supported. The visit was delayed by a week because of the Prime Minister’s visit to Iraq but it has now reported and a joint DfID/MOD paper on the way ahead will be considered at this week’s Ministerial meeting.

6. Key points to emerge from the visit are:

a. The chronic lack of communications must be solved. Currently the only communications between CPA(S) and CPA HQ are via a contractor-supplied communication

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1. Ministerial ad hoc group on Iraqi Rehabilitation on 15th May agreed that:

- DFID, MOD & 1 Div should discuss measures to achieve a step change in rehabilitation in the UK AO. They should then discuss funding with HMT in order to produce a funded plan
- ORHA should be pressed to implement rehabilitation projects as soon as possible, including in Southern Iraq,
- make rapid progress in making the ORHA regional office in Basra operational.
vehicle that provides intermittent and unreliable insecure internet access (CPA communications currently rely on ). As well as technical means there is a requirement for a permanent CPA(S) presence in Baghdad to act as a liaison office and serve as an advocate for CPA(S) in CPA HQ discussions.

b. There is a need for a manager to support Ambassador Olsen - to perform a similar operational co-ordination role to that which will be performed by Andy Bearpark in Baghdad. This requirement will not be satisfied by the appointment of Janet Rogan, who will be performing a role analogous to John Sawyers.

c. CPA South needs additional working capacity in the form of both support staff and subject matter experts to take the place of the work that is currently being done by the 1 (UK) Div CMOC (although an interim solution of combining the CMOC and CPA is being explored this must only be an interim solution if military personnel are not to become fixed in the CPA. This extends to the provision of security. This should be provided as part of the CPA enabling contract - it is in Baghdad. But this has yet to be provided in Basra with the result that CPA(S) is currently beholden to 1 Div for the security of its premises.

d. CPA South will require a presence in each of the Governates in its region (which will be coterminous with the 3 Div AO). This capacity does not exist. We shall need to create it soon (certainly no later than August) - along with other coalition partners, notably the Dutch and Italians, who will be in the lead in two of the Governates. This need not be substantial in numerical terms, but should be sufficiently heavyweight (1*) properly to represent the Provisional Authority.

e. The precise C2 relationship between 3 Div, the Governate support teams, the Governate level CPA representation, CPA(South) and CPA HQ needs to be established. The US plan is for there to be no CPA representation at Governate level but for there to be Governate Support teams (made up of civil affairs troops) reporting to CTTF-7. The UK’s proposed solution would be to have CPA representation in the Governates working alongside extant UK and subsequently other nations’ forces. This will require further discussion with the US, NL and IT.

SUPPORTING THE CENTRAL STRATEGY

7. Although the UK’s main effort should remain in the south our success here will need to be part of a sound strategy for the whole of Iraq if achievements are to last. We must, therefore, ensure we are sufficiently well represented and well placed to influence the strategy developing in the CPA and those organisations beneath it. Annex A illustrates our current understanding of the shape of these organisations and their linkages. It also discusses how and where the MOD might contribute.

8. We must also develop the necessary machinery to lead and direct the network of UK representatives and balance the resource needs of those working on the central strategy against those striving to create an exemplar effect in the south. Annex B shows how we might seek to achieve this. It should be noted that significant additional OGD support may be necessary across a range of diverse fields if we are to create a clear and lasting impact.
9. Security will underpin SSR throughout our engagement in Iraq and CJTF-7 is a key player. HQ ARRC is still a candidate in US minds for a future CJTF-7 but the acceptability of its use remains unresolved. At the operational level US commanders clearly still see it as a replacement for V Corps but no detailed work to layout the terms of a hand-over is underway. At the strategic level the subject has not been raised since CDS laid out the issues to be addressed prior to its use in discussions with Gen Franks in early Apr 03.

10. The rationale for deploying HQ ARRC would be to increase our influence over Iraq-wide security matters (and with the CPA in particular), allow an indirect security effect within Baghdad (through the presence of UK military) and to further internationalise the higher level C2 structures. The last COS discussions on HQ ARRC noted its obvious potential but laid out a requirement for greater clarity of US intent for CJTF-7’s CONOPS and a need for a clear UK political view on the acceptable level of engagement, in addition to those concerns voiced to Gen Franks. Neither of these key pieces of information has been forthcoming, and there is a risk that HQ ARRC could be deployed but remain subordinate to the US SecDef and be unable to exercise its own discretion in the development of a CONOPS for Iraq.

11. Although NATO approval is not required to deploy the national elements of the ARRC, in order to deliver Coalition effect the ARRC should deploy with most (if not all) its NATO structures and support, and this implies NATO concurrence with its deployment. This will take time to secure and will be a significant factor in the decision making process to deploy it to Iraq. UNSCR 1483 will assist, as it does clarify US and UK responsibilities as an occupying power and authorises other nations to help in fulfilling them. This may be enough to open the way for more formal NATO engagement, if only in a supporting role.

12. The US anticipated handover window for V Corps is between mid-October to Mid December 2003. Preliminary planning by HQ ARRC staff indicates that, to be ready to deploy by 01 Nov, training would need to begin by 1 Sep. This in turn drives a requirement for a committal decision by 1 Aug in order to begin the process of consultation with contributors and NATO, and also to allow the US to find an alternative solution if HQ ARRC is not to be deployed. To properly inform a committal decision preliminary discussions would need to begin soon. This indicates a need for a political decision in principle now.

FUNDING

13. There is a pressing requirement for the flow of funds required to run CPA (South) to come on stream. Despite US promises, they have not. There is plenty of money theoretically available (in likely chronological order, USAID money funding Bechtel, IFI/UN funds and the Development Fund for Iraq (former Oil For Food money - due on stream in six months)); getting at it is the problem.

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2 These included questions over extraction from NATO, multinational buy-in, CIS support, C2 and confirmation of a relieving HQ.
3 HQ ARRC planning notes that, in order to be ready to assume its NATO Reaction Force (NRF) responsibilities, it would need to deploy by 1 Dec 03 at the latest. Assuming a truncated political process it could also begin training in mid-Jun for a mid-Sep deployment.
Improved communications and structures should contribute to freeing up money. But some is delayed by inter-agency conflict in Washington and to the extent that the UK is in possession of the problem in the South we are carrying an increasing risk. There is a case for using UK money to cover the gap between now and when US and Iraqi funds come on stream. This will need to cover three lines of expenditure:

a. Continuing QIPs by 1 Div (if required beyond the £10m initial allocation from the reserve.

b. More substantial reconstruction projects; the size of QIPs currently being pursued by 1 Div is pushing the limits of their ability to project manage but is below the size of the projects identified.

c. The running costs of an occupying power. These are both CPA and Iraqi administration running costs - eg. both the costs of running the CPA(S) office (currently being met out of Ambassador Olsen’s own pocket) and of making public administration in the CPA(S) region work, such as buying food for prisoners in the Basra prison.

SPG

Annexes:

A. CPA and the Security Sector.
B. Managing UK Interests.
CPA AND THE SECURITY SECTOR

Our current understanding of the likely structure of the CPA is shown at Appendix 1. This has not been formally endorsed but it does offer a clear indication of the likely components. Bremer's relationship with those organisations charged with delivering security, namely:


(1) OSA-MOD, under Slocombe, is the US organisation responsible for implementing the development of the New Iraqi Armed Forces and an Iraqi MOD. Slocombe has now been given an additional role (Director Security – see Appendix 1) with an expanded remit to cover the wider SSR brief. He is now responsible for police and prisons reform, and intelligence services, with an oversight of judicial and governance processes in addition to the more conventional defence areas. This is a welcome move that aligns with the UK's understanding of SSR but we will need to ensure it remains so. As such Slocombe and OSA-MOD will become a key area to influence for the UK.

(2) The proposed structure shown at Appendix 2 has not yet been formally endorsed. There are signs that Slocombe has still to realise fully his responsibilities for SSR and that he has yet to develop a means by which he will co-ordinate and develop an overarching strategy. UK experience suggests that unless he has full ownership of (and accountability for) SSR, true co-ordination will not be achieved. Although still developing Slocombe's understanding of his role may well mean that, by default, real authority to make SSR succeed will still rest with Bremer. The recent meeting in the US did reveal a shift in his thinking with the identification of a dedicated deputy with responsibility for SSR as a key requirement (although this has still to be endorsed by Bremer it is anticipated that he will be in favour).

b. CJTF-7. US V Corps will become CJTF-7, the senior military HQ in Iraq. As such it underwrites the rest of SSR by ensuring the environment is right for it to take place. CENTCOM remains ultimately responsible for delivering the security effect and CJTF-7 answers to CENTCOM. It has co-ordination links with CPA, but currently does not appear to be directly under its authority. This effectively establishes two power bases answering independently to Rumsfeld. The UK should, therefore, keep a foot firmly in each camp, and consider the potential role of HQ-ARRC as a future CJTF-7.

Appendices:

A.1. CPA Structure Diagram.
A.2. OSA-MOD Structure.
A.3. UK Contribution.
THE UK MILITARY CONTRIBUTION

1. UK forces contribution to the development and implementation of wider strategy could involve the following:

   a. The UK Advisor ‘Network’. The military are an element of the UK presence in our network of embedded staff. They perform two functions:

      (1) Monitoring the development of US strategy and the success of its implementation on the ground.

      (2) Influencing at critical junctures in order to align US and UK intent.

   The development of the military component of the Advisor network will be dictated by the structures that OSA-MOD has already proposed and how these develop. The current posts on offer to the UK are:

      (1) Civilian Deputy Director (2 or 1*) in the Office of MOD Organisational Reform and Management. Other UK support in this area would be dependant on advice once this individual arrived in post.

      (2)

      (3) UK Brigadier as deputy to DCG (T) CMATT (MG Eaton).

      (4) Major and Sergeant to co-ordinate activities of training teams.

In order to maximise our influence in this key area we should seek to deploy these people into OSA-MOD and be prepared to call forward others should the need be identified. Given the centrality of SSR within the development of an overall strategy for Iraq, a UK military contribution is essential to the delivery of campaign success and should be resourced.

b. Implementers. Many nations offer embedded staff. What lends them authority is a willingness to back up their advice with implementation on the ground, through training teams and other specialists, especially in the field of SSR. Such resources need to be carefully applied, both to keep commitments manageable and to ensure they add maximum impact in support of our higher level priorities. In some areas implementation can be combined with the work of forces assigned to security tasks but we will need to be prepared to provide others to strengthen the UK hand overall. The Iraqi Navy reconstruction proposals being developed by CNS demonstrate how we might take on discrete tasks that show our
ability to be both ‘thinkers and doers’. OSA-MOD have indicated a requirement for the following at present:

(1) A number of other Lt Col/Maj level posts are available which we should be prepared to fill as required (potential spread shown at Appendix 2 to Annex A).

(2) We will need to provide a number of suitably qualified and experienced military staff to assist in the implementation of SSR, but we will be able to exercise choice and discrimination and their deployment is highly desirable.
Notes:
- Overarching strategy and priorities set in UK.
- UK must be prepared to fill a range of specialist advisor appointments at national and regional level to gain maximum effect – roles will vary but could include agriculture, communications, wider governance, policing, administration, reconstruction.
- At regional level military is largely in place. OGDs less so. This will need to change to support HMG main effort.
- Role of specialists at national level can also clearly support regional work.