28 March 2002

I write to you following your interview with Jonathan Dimbleby on Sunday in which you made reference to the legal positioning relating to possible military action in relation to Iraq. I have now seen the transcript and I have noted that you made a clear statement that we would be perfectly entitled to use force without a specific United Nations resolution and that there is no legal necessity to go back to the United Nations.

As you are aware, the Law Officers' opinion has not been sought on the legality of possible action and I have not therefore offered any views on the legal position. The clarity of your statement and the apparently authoritative way it was produced puts me however in a difficult position.

I would not want to be definitive until I have had the benefit of full submissions from your department as well as FCO and have seen the underlying relevant intelligence and other material, as well as the military and political assessments of senior Ministers and Defence staff. Nonetheless I think you should know that I see considerable difficulties in being satisfied that military action would be justified on the basis of self-defence. In particular I am not aware of the existence of material indicating the existence of an imminent threat from Iraq of the sort which would justify military action without support of a Security Council Chapter VII authorisation.
I am aware that another potential argument is that the breaches of Security Council Resolutions by Iraq would revive the authorization to use force in Security Council Resolution 678 (1990). I would welcome detailed submissions on that argument, should it be intended to be relied upon, but, in the absence of further action by the Security Council, there could be considerable difficulties in justifying reliance on the original authorization to use force.

In that connection, I note, for example, the advice of 14 November 1997 to the Prime Miniser by the then Law Officers (John Morris and Charlie Falconer) who said, in relation to the situation at that time, that:

"Charlie and I remain of the view that, in the circumstances presently prevailing, an essential precondition of the renewed use of force to compel compliance with the ceasefire conditions is that the Security Council has, in whatever language – whether expressly or impliedly – stated that there has been a breach of the cease fire conditions and that the Council considers the breach sufficiently grave to undermine the basis or effective operation of the cease fire".

I would of course be happy to discuss this matter with you and Jack Straw at any time.

I am copying this letter to Jack Straw.