Transcript of the Hearing 25 September 2013


           1                                   Wednesday, 25 September 2013

           2   (10.30 am)

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We will have the jury in then,

           4       please.

           5                  (In the presence of the jury)

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  We will ask

           7       Mr Foote to come into court, please.

           8         DETECTIVE CHIEF INSPECTOR MICK FOOTE (continued)

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much, Mr Foote.  Have

          10       a seat.  You have the documents that you had with you

          11       yesterday.  You are still under the affirmation that you

          12       took at the beginning of your evidence.  Before Mr Keith

          13       continues the questions he has for you, I want to

          14       confirm so there won't be any problems, you wrote down

          15       a name on a piece of paper for me which I have kept and

          16       will keep to make sure it does not get into the wrong

          17       hands but at the same time you identified who your

          18       Detective Inspector was at the time and you point out

          19       that that was indeed Z51.  I just want to confirm that

          20       that is -- so there isn't any confusion about the

          21       numbers.  So thank you very much.

          22           Then, Mr Keith?

          23                Questions by MR KEITH (continued)

          24   MR KEITH:  Thank you, sir.  Mr Foote, we were looking last

          25       night at your statement dated 12 March 2012.  We were




           1       just about to turn to CS660, please, page 4 of your

           2       statement, Mr Foote.

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  The last matter to which you refer in your statement in

           5       connection with the arrests of Mr Duggan is that

           6       surrounding an incident on 8 June 2008 when a person

           7       leaving a nightclub was surrounded, knocked to the floor

           8       and stabbed and Mr Duggan was arrested in relation to

           9       that by local police.

          10   A.  That's correct, yes.

          11   Q.  The next entry in your statement refers to a matter on

          12       19 March 2007, not a matter in relation to which he was

          13       arrested, but instead it was an incident when police

          14       were called to A&E department of the North Middlesex

          15       Hospital because Mr Duggan went to hospital with

          16       a gunshot wound to his right foot?

          17   A.  That's correct, yes.

          18   Q.  But he refused to provide them with details of the

          19       vehicle which had taken him to hospital or provide

          20       assistance to the police as to what had happened.

          21   A.  That's correct, yes.

          22   Q.  You were asked by Mr Underwood in general terms about

          23       the broad generic intelligence which had led you to form

          24       the views that you had on the organised crime network,

          25       Tottenham Man Dem, and Mr Duggan himself.  Could you




           1       turn, please, to page 6 of your statement, our CS662?

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  That's 662, please.  Thank you very much.  Just zooming

           4       in, please, to the top bullet point.  In summary, do you

           5       set out in your statement a broad description of the

           6       various threads of intelligence which built up the

           7       picture about the gang and Mr Duggan's role in it and

           8       you set out the pieces of intelligence from 2006 there,

           9       April 2010, July 2010, September 2010?

          10   A.  That's correct, yes.

          11   Q.  If you go further down the page, you can see the words

          12       "January 2011", that that is where Mr Underwood started,

          13       in fact, in relation to detailing the intelligence that

          14       was relevant in a general sense to Mr Duggan in 2011.

          15   A.  That's right, yes.

          16   Q.  Was the intelligence before 2011 of a piece with the

          17       intelligence commencing at the beginning of 2011?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  Was it part of the same picture?

          20   A.  Yes, yes.  It is all part of the same picture, it's all

          21       historical intelligence, yes.

          22   Q.  What was the general picture indicated by the

          23       intelligence?

          24   A.  Well, the general picture was that Mark Duggan was

          25       certainly involved in gun crime, he was certainly




           1       associating with those that were involved in gun crime

           2       and in fact himself had been a victim of gun crime.

           3   Q.  Was that general picture of the gang, its activities,

           4       the risks surrounding it, the propensity to involve

           5       itself in firearms reflected in the formal documents

           6       that the Metropolitan Police and Trident prepared in May

           7       and June 2011?

           8   A.  Yes, it's all part of that intelligence picture for

           9       firearms operations, yes.

          10   Q.  The general background?

          11   A.  That's right.

          12   Q.  If we look at the risk assessment dated 26 May 2011,

          13       which I think is in the jury's bundle at C4 -- it's our

          14       CD29532 -- if you just scroll in please to the first

          15       third of the page, we can see there "Risk assessment and

          16       risk management form" and the third entry is

          17       26 May 2011.

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  This risk assessment, which we looked at briefly

          20       a couple of days ago, was concerned -- the concern was

          21       with an assessment of whether or not the Metropolitan

          22       Police should continue to carry out directed

          23       surveillance in relation to Mr Duggan and others --

          24   A.  That's correct, yes.

          25   Q.  -- that's to say putting him under surveillance.




           1   A.  That's correct.

           2   Q.  If we just briefly look at the following page, 29533,

           3       the second page of the risk assessment, do we see there

           4       in the middle of the page, starting with the words "This

           5       operation" a general description of the gang, the main

           6       subjects in it, but by no means exclusively Mr Duggan,

           7       the concerns about their activities and why these steps

           8       are necessary?

           9   A.  That's correct, yes.

          10   Q.  So nothing specific --

          11   A.  No.

          12   Q.  -- but general?

          13   A.  That's right.

          14   Q.  At the end of that paragraph, there is a sentence:

          15           "It is entirely appropriate that police tackle this

          16       level of armed criminality in a robust manner."

          17           You were asked yesterday why these sorts of

          18       operations, the operation that subsequently took place

          19       in August, are planned.  Why do the police have to take

          20       active steps in order to tackle this sort of behaviour?

          21   A.  Well, it's more about the risk that they pose to the

          22       public.  The fact is that men armed with firearms,

          23       whether it's in relation to gangs against gangs, it's

          24       the fact that, you know, they pose a risk to everybody.

          25       As I alluded to yesterday, there had been circumstances




           1       where people had been shot innocently, passers-by, and

           2       obviously police officers themselves have been shot just

           3       doing their job.

           4           So it's in that manner that we have to be robust

           5       about tackling men armed with guns because there's no

           6       option not to do anything.

           7   Q.  If we could go back, please, to CD29533, the second page

           8       of the risk assessment, and the bottom half of the page.

           9       We can see there references to numerous intelligence

          10       reports.  Is that a reference to the sort of

          11       intelligence reports that we've just taken you to in

          12       your statement?

          13   A.  That's what you've -- that's exactly, yes.

          14   Q.  This wasn't exclusively concerned with Mark Duggan, was

          15       it, because we can see a reference at the bottom of the

          16       page to another associate or person whose identity is

          17       blanked out and references to intelligence concerning

          18       that person and that person's propensity to carry

          19       firearms?

          20   A.  That's correct, yes.

          21   Q.  Over the page, 29534, if we scroll into the top half of

          22       the page, please, and just go down a little bit further,

          23       we can see that, although there's a reference to

          24       Mr Duggan, it's put properly in its context, which is

          25       that, although he has been implicated in incidents and




           1       aggressively confronted the police, there is nothing

           2       specific to suggest he will have a firearm at that

           3       particular occasion?

           4   A.  No, that's correct, yes.

           5   Q.  Again, further down the page, starting with "The general

           6       public", does the author of this document make the same

           7       point as that which you have just made, to the effect

           8       that the public are expecting the use of firearms to be

           9       robustly addressed?

          10   A.  Yes, that's right, yes.

          11   Q.  Then you have the passage starting "Enquiries suggest"

          12       that Mr Underwood -- or Mr Mansfield -- took you to

          13       concerning Trident.

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  Page 29537 is the penultimate page, the second last page

          16       of your risk assessment, Mr Foote -- not your risk

          17       assessment but the risk assessment prepared by ZZ75.

          18       There's a reference in that second paragraph to the

          19       right to life.  There was some mention yesterday of

          20       article 2 of the European Convention On Human Rights

          21       but, for present purposes, does the right to life have

          22       an impact, not just in relation to of course members of

          23       the gang, but potential victims of such persons, that is

          24       to say members of the public?

          25   A.  Yes, it does, yes.




           1   Q.  These are all matters which are taken into account?

           2   A.  Yes, they are.

           3   Q.  Of a similar type is the directed surveillance,

           4       27 June 2011, which is in the jury's bundle at C1, it's

           5       our CD264.  This authorisation, we can see there dated

           6       27 June 2011, was an authorisation which was based in

           7       part upon the assessment from the previous month.

           8   A.  That's right, yes.

           9   Q.  This was authorised by a much more senior officer from

          10       whom we will be hearing later, Detective Inspector

          11       Fiona Mallon --

          12   A.  That's correct, yes.

          13   Q.  -- who in August was, as it happens, the Strategic

          14       Firearms Commander in the firearms operation --

          15   A.  That's right.

          16   Q.  -- that took place.

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  Do we see on page 264, the first page, at the bottom,

          19       references to the general behaviour of the gang.

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  If you could go, please, three pages in, 266.  We can

          22       see there in the second passage, if you could zoom in

          23       a bit further, authority is granted there to use

          24       equipment to aid vision of officers and basically to

          25       carry out the surveillance.




           1   A.  That's correct, yes.

           2   Q.  That general picture was also reflected, wasn't it, in

           3       your entries in the logbook that you kept in relation to

           4       Operation Dibri?

           5   A.  That's correct, yes.

           6   Q.  Is that the logbook that we looked at yesterday in part?

           7   A.  It was, yes.

           8   Q.  We looked at two pages in it.  Can I just ask you,

           9       please, to look at page 32697, an entry for 6 June.

          10       I don't think we need copies of this for the jury

          11       bundle, they have already got a couple of pages from

          12       this log.  That is the first page of decision number 16,

          13       the second page, over the page, 32698, contains

          14       a reference to Mr Duggan becoming more prominent?

          15   A.  That's right, yes.

          16   Q.  Was there anything at that stage then to suggest

          17       anything specific?

          18   A.  No.  It was general intelligence that was coming in at

          19       that time.

          20   Q.  If we then look further into your log, the 1 August

          21       entry, CD286, which is in the jury's bundle at tab 2,

          22       this is your entry in relation to the MASTS operation

          23       which took place in the first few days of August.

          24   A.  That's right, yes.

          25   Q.  Does it refer on that page, 286, again to suggestions




           1       that he was becoming more active but nothing specific?

           2   A.  That's right, yes.

           3   Q.  289, which was the third -- the last entry, reflects the

           4       general discussion that you had about Dibri generally,

           5       with MIB, the intelligence bureau, and Detective

           6       Superintendent Mallon?

           7   A.  That's correct, yes.

           8   Q.  Again, did that reflect the general position concerning

           9       Tottenham Man Dem and in relation to Mr Duggan, page 289

          10       there, we can see on the screen the second page of the

          11       entry, that he was most likely to be actively involved

          12       then?

          13   A.  Yes, that's right, yes.

          14   Q.  What had changed between all those earlier entries and

          15       2 to 3 August which led you to state the chances of him

          16       being involved it increased?

          17   A.  Well, there was some more specific intelligence by then

          18       which was suggesting that he was looking actively to

          19       take a firearm and the person's name was

          20       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster, who was the likely person to

          21       have taken it from.

          22   Q.  At that stage, you had already -- we'll come back to

          23       this in a moment -- started in June to find out whether

          24       or not resources for a MASTS operation would be

          25       available if one were to be authorised?




           1   A.  That's right, yes.

           2   Q.  But when you started researching the possibility of

           3       whether the resources would be available, you didn't yet

           4       have the specific intelligence that you later had and

           5       which only became available in those first few days.

           6   A.  That's exactly that, yes.

           7   Q.  It was coincidence that intelligence became available

           8       whilst you already had, and were about to have, a MASTS

           9       operation planned?

          10   A.  That's right, and that's how -- we had six targets at

          11       that time, six subjects, and intelligence was coming in

          12       from various sources around those people.  But this one

          13       was the most active one, and it could have been any

          14       other one of those six subjects that it could have been

          15       more active about, intelligence-wise, which may have

          16       taken us in a slightly different direction.

          17   Q.  If you have specific intelligence, will you seek to act

          18       upon it?

          19   A.  Yes, I would, yes.

          20   Q.  So we looked at your statement a few moments ago, CS663.

          21       We referred to, and you spoke of, an operation that took

          22       place on 8 June 2011 --

          23   A.  That's right.

          24   Q.  -- which concerned the execution of a search warrant.

          25   A.  Yes.




           1   Q.  Was that based on specific intelligence?

           2   A.  It was indeed, yes.

           3   Q.  On 22 June, did you also receive specific intelligence?

           4   A.  Yes, we did, yes.

           5   Q.  Could we please have CD6082, which is the FA1, the

           6       "Application for authority for deployment of armed

           7       officers", for that date, 22 June?  Again, I do not

           8       think we need copies, aside for the members of the jury,

           9       because it's illustrative.

          10           But if you can go back, please -- sorry, I provided

          11       the wrong reference -- if you could go back to 6080,

          12       which is the first page of the form, we can see there

          13       22 June, Dibri, SCD8, which is Trident, and the name of

          14       the officer making the application, ZZ17, application

          15       submitted to DI Z51, your deputy?

          16   A.  That's right.

          17   Q.  6082, the third page of the form, there is a sentence

          18       starting:

          19           "Mark Duggan is a senior member of TMD ..."

          20           There's a reference to previous arrests and then to

          21       extensive current intelligence, ready access to

          22       firearms; was that a reference to general intelligence

          23       that you described?

          24   A.  It was.  Yes, it was.

          25   Q.  Then there was this:




           1           "Intelligence suggests that on 22 June he will be

           2       involved in the supply of firearms."

           3   A.  That's correct, yes.

           4   Q.  Was that general or specific --

           5   A.  That was specific.

           6   Q.  -- that last piece?  As a result, of receiving that

           7       specific intelligence what did you do?

           8   A.  The team reacted, responded, in a time critical manner

           9       to -- with the firearms support.  However, the

          10       intelligence did not develop any further.

          11   Q.  Is that a way of saying that, although the operation

          12       went ahead, no firearm was found?

          13   A.  That's right, yes.

          14   Q.  If you go to the last page, 6083, we can see that the

          15       officer completing it, completed it on 22 June, so the

          16       very same day.

          17           The FA5, which was the tactical advice document,

          18       6371 -- if we could just zoom in on the bottom part,

          19       please, and the date -- was created the same day,

          20       22 June.

          21   A.  That's right.  That's correct.

          22   Q.  The FA2, which was the Strategic Firearm Commander's

          23       log, which is CD6149, if we go to the next page, please,

          24       6150, at the bottom of that page we can see that that

          25       authority was given by the Tactical Firearms Commander,




           1       Z51, in the right-hand corner, 22 June.  So the

           2       application for the MASTS operation -- it was a MASTS

           3       operation, wasn't it --

           4   A.  That's right.

           5   Q.  -- for surveillance with armed support to recover the

           6       firearm was put together and authorised all on the same

           7       day?

           8   A.  That's correct, yes.

           9   Q.  So that's why it was reacting to specific intelligence?

          10   A.  That's right, yes.

          11   Q.  In the same way, so was the last few moments of the

          12       MASTS operation in August?

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  The 16 June email to which reference was made yesterday

          15       is CD6242.  Just explain to us, please, if you will,

          16       your understanding of this email, which wasn't sent by

          17       you but was sent by ZZ17, what the purpose of it was.

          18   A.  As I gave the evidence yesterday, it was in relation to

          19       provisionally identifying the possibility of having

          20       surveillance team that we've had to prebook in advance,

          21       due to the finite resources that we have in the MPS, and

          22       that was to let them know that's the sort of shift

          23       pattern that we were looking to work in that period and

          24       see if they were available.

          25   Q.  At that time in June, when your team first started to




           1       investigate the possibility of whether the resources

           2       would be available for a future operation, did you have

           3       any specific intelligence in relation to anything that

           4       might happen in those dates in August?

           5   A.  No, none at all.

           6   Q.  What would have happened if you had not scoped the

           7       possibility of having the resources available, done

           8       nothing, waited for a specific intelligence to come in

           9       and then decided to put a MASTS operation together?

          10   A.  The problem with that is that, because of the demand of

          11       the surveillance team, it's sometimes difficult to

          12       actually get them to come out on operation at such short

          13       notice.  So at least with this tactic it gives us the

          14       opportunity to try and get them booked in advance.

          15   Q.  You described yesterday how the Operation Dibri was

          16       a structurally different operation from the firearms

          17       operation that was put in place between 3 and 6 August.

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  Once authority had been given for the firearms

          20       operation, which it was on the 2 August, is a different

          21       structure for command put in place?

          22   A.  Yes.  As I explained yesterday, the structure is -- the

          23       whole sort of operation, the firearms operation, is

          24       taken over by the SFC, Strategic Firearms Commander, and

          25       the TFC, and I have no input into the decisions they




           1       make into how that operation is run.

           2   Q.  Are special officers assigned to command roles in that

           3       firearms operation?

           4   A.  Yes, they are, yes.

           5   Q.  We've heard reference to them: they are the Strategic

           6       Firearms Commander --

           7   A.  That's correct.

           8   Q.  -- Fiona Mallon, and under her, Silver or Tactical

           9       Firearms Commander, Z51.

          10   A.  That's right, yes.

          11   Q.  Are certain firearms operations totally commanded by

          12       somebody else and certain firearms operations commanded

          13       instead by officers who in their day-to-day jobs are

          14       actually members of Trident?

          15   A.  Yes, that's right.

          16   Q.  Which sort was this?

          17   A.  This was members of Trident that were involved in

          18       certainly the command structure.  There are times where

          19       we do different types of operations.  For example,

          20       I think I mentioned a bit previously we were doing

          21       a lifestyle operation and that operation is -- the

          22       command structure there is dealt with by SCO23, which is

          23       really the firearms command unit.

          24   Q.  So when these officers take on the roles as part of the

          25       firearms operation command structure, do they step away




           1       from their normal Trident job?

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  Now, you told us yesterday about your team.  In your

           4       pro-active team, you had, you told us, a DI called ZZ100

           5       who left in May or June.

           6   A.  That's right, yes.

           7   Q.  Then he was replaced in your pro-active team by, you

           8       told us, Z51.

           9   A.  That's right.

          10   Q.  In that role in the pro-active team, were Z51's

          11       functions concerned with administration and training and

          12       the line management?

          13   A.  That's exactly right, yes.

          14   Q.  But when he was appointed, as we know he was, Tactical

          15       Firearms Commander was that a very different role.

          16   A.  It's a completely different role, yes.

          17   Q.  Are they meant to be separate?

          18   A.  Yes, they are.

          19   Q.  Is that what is obliged of you, and Trident, Trident/the

          20       police, by the relevant national policing improvement

          21       agency guidelines --

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  -- the rubric?

          24   A.  Yes, it's -- the national guidelines stipulate that we

          25       should have those roles separate.




           1   Q.  You told us that you used, as your deputy, in your role

           2       as the Senior Investigating Officer, ZZ17?

           3   A.  That's right, yes.

           4   Q.  Was that because you couldn't use Z51 because he was by

           5       then the Tactical Firearms Commander?

           6   A.  That's correct, yes.

           7   Q.  Right.  That command structure associated with the

           8       firearms operation, does it have not just a different

           9       structure but different forms, different logs, different

          10       ways of recording what's going on?

          11   A.  Yes, it does, yes.

          12   Q.  Is that the same as the Trident system or separate?

          13   A.  That's separate.

          14   Q.  On those forms, the FA1, the FA2A, if it's a planned

          15       operation, a FA2 if it's not --

          16   A.  That's right.

          17   Q.  -- the 3 and 3A depending on whether it's spontaneous or

          18       planned?

          19   A.  Yes, they are their own assigned forms that they use,

          20       yes.

          21   Q.  Who decides the tactics in such an operation?  Is it

          22       a firearms command structure or is it the investigating

          23       team which is part of Dibri?

          24   A.  No, it's the firearms structure, and the tactics --

          25       there's obviously a consultation between Tactical




           1       Firearms Advisor, who's from CO19, then you have

           2       a Tactical Firearms Commander, and then obviously

           3       embedded in that is the overall control by the Strategic

           4       Firearms Commander.

           5   Q.  Right.  I want to turn to another subject, which is

           6       Mr Duggan and his role in the firearms operation, or

           7       rather is the subject of the firearms operation.

           8           We looked at the 22 June MASTS operation, which you

           9       said was based on specific intelligence.  6080, please,

          10       there's the 22 June.  If we go to the next page, we can

          11       just remind ourselves that this operation was

          12       specifically concerned with Mr Duggan.

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  But the operation that was authorised on 2 August, the

          15       MASTS operation, was that just Mr Duggan?

          16   A.  No, there was six other subjects involved.

          17   Q.  Could we have CD268, please, which is in the jury bundle

          18       at tab 2.  There's the date, 25 July, when the FA1 was

          19       submitted by ZZ17, because he's the member of Trident

          20       asking others for authority.

          21   A.  That's right, yes.

          22   Q.  The authority is given, of course, by more senior

          23       officers, as we'll see.  If you go to the second page of

          24       the FA1, 270, the second half of the page under the

          25       words the "The principal focus" -- it's in the jury's




           1       bundle at any rate at C2, tab 2:

           2           "The principal focus of this Operation Dibri is to

           3       arrest/disrupt the senior members of criminal network."

           4           Then, in the third paragraph are there references to

           5       "A number of TMD members, including those listed below"?

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  Mr Duggan was just one of them?

           8   A.  That's correct, yes.

           9   Q.  What steps were being taken around 1, 2, 3 August in

          10       relation to persons other than Mr Duggan?

          11   A.  Well, in relation to the others, there was a great deal

          12       of intelligence coming in in relation to those people,

          13       so obviously there would be some observations.  If there

          14       was opportunity to decide on which person seems to be

          15       most active, it's assessing that intelligence at the

          16       same time.  So we are always scanning the intelligence

          17       that we have around the subjects that we are looking at.

          18   Q.  You told us yesterday that search warrant applications

          19       were made and granted in relation to Mr Duggan?

          20   A.  That's right, yes.

          21   Q.  Were there search warrant applications considered, made

          22       or executed in relation to anybody else?

          23   A.  Yes, there were.  In total, there were about 12 search

          24       warrants that were obtained in relation to this

          25       particular operation.




           1   Q.  At the beginning of August?

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  Why?

           4   A.  Because even -- as I explained earlier, the reason why

           5       we obtained the search warrants is that these people

           6       have ready access to firearms and the intelligence, the

           7       historical intelligence picture around them is that they

           8       occasionally have these firearms or drugs held at sort

           9       of relatives' or friends' or younger people's addresses

          10       that we don't know too much about.  But that's -- the

          11       purpose of having a lifestyle operation is so we can

          12       identify these addresses.

          13           By then -- if the intelligence develops during

          14       an operation which becomes specific that a firearm is at

          15       an address now, it then gives us that flexibility to go

          16       and execute that warrant to obtain and recover that

          17       firearm whether the person we're after is there or not.

          18       Does that make sense?

          19   Q.  Is that because the structure of the operation, its

          20       general width, is premised on the basis that it's

          21       designed to deal with whoever may turn out to be the

          22       person with the gun?

          23   A.  That's correct, yes.

          24   Q.  In those first few days in August and at the end of

          25       July, when did, in a broad sense, you become first aware




           1       that Mr Duggan wished to collect a firearm?

           2   A.  That was the 2 August.

           3   Q.  That's you personally?

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  We will obviously ask the intelligence officer ZZ17

           6       a great deal more about this, and obviously A10, the

           7       witness from SOCA.

           8           When you and, through you, your team received that

           9       intelligence, having been disseminated from SOCA to the

          10       intelligence officer, ZZ17, then you and the rest of

          11       you, had that FA1, on 25 July, already been submitted?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  The process had already started, hadn't it --

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  -- for authorising that operation --

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  -- if the appropriate parameters were met?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  During that process more intelligence was coming in?

          20   A.  That's right, yes.

          21   Q.  But the fact that more intelligence was coming in, did

          22       that detract from the fact that the operation was

          23       generally designed to target all the senior members --

          24   A.  No, it didn't change anything.  I mean, we picked that

          25       week -- that week, the intelligence was coming in, we




           1       could have picked a week where hardly any intelligence

           2       was coming in around any of these people or anyone

           3       looking to take firearms, so it was quite coincidental

           4       that it was one of those weeks where intelligence was

           5       starting to develop that this person was going to take

           6       firearms.

           7   Q.  I am not going to ask you in detail because you've been

           8       asked at great length about it and there are other more

           9       appropriate witnesses who both handed out the

          10       intelligence and received it who can answer those

          11       questions.  But in a general sense, when did you first

          12       know, from the investigatory side of Trident -- not the

          13       firearms side, but the investigatory side of Trident and

          14       Operation Dibri -- where Mr Duggan was going to pick the

          15       gun up from, what area?

          16   A.  I think that was on the 3rd, which was the -- yes,

          17       3 August, in relation to Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.

          18   Q.  Yes.  My question was the area: when did you first hear

          19       of intelligence in relation to where the handover would

          20       be, the geographical location?

          21   A.  That would have been on the -- that was on the 3rd as

          22       well.

          23   Q.  Are you sure about that?

          24   A.  I think so --

          25   Q.  I can't ask you any more than that.  If you are not sure




           1       you are not sure?

           2   A.  It's trying to guess here, I'm not sure --

           3   Q.  Don't guess.  It's important, because I'm asking you

           4       what you recollect not what your best guess is.

           5   A.  Well, I am not entirely sure.  I've got a feeling it was

           6       on the 3rd but it could have been on the 4th before they

           7       went out on the operation.

           8   Q.  All right, we'll ask, of course, others about that in

           9       greater detail.

          10           Sir, I am not going to ask anymore questions about

          11       the intelligence because there are other witnesses who

          12       I think are better placed to deal with it, despite the

          13       length of time that this was traversed yesterday.

          14           The operation, once it commenced, involved

          15       a substantial number of people --

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  -- the surveillance, firearms --

          18   A.  That's right --

          19   Q.  -- and of course the Trident officers, who were wearing

          20       their firearms operations hats --

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  -- so the Tactical Firearms Commander, Z51 and the

          23       Strategic Firearms Commander, Fiona Mallon.  When

          24       decisions have to be made about whether to stop a car,

          25       where to stop it, are those decisions for the firearms




           1       operational teams or for Operation Dibri/Trident?

           2   A.  No, for the operational teams.

           3   Q.  Is that why you weren't present --

           4   A.  That's correct, yes.

           5   Q.  -- on 4 August?

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  You describe how you went home, although on your phone

           8       24/7.  Would you have expected to be told or asked for

           9       your opinion or advice in relation to whether or not the

          10       firearms team or the surveillance team should track the

          11       minicab, follow it or stop it?

          12   A.  No, no, not at all.

          13   Q.  You were asked about why you hadn't recorded notes of

          14       your conversations that you had with officers after the

          15       event who were part of the firearms operation.  Do you

          16       know whether there is an obligation on you, as the

          17       investigating officer for Dibri, to take a note of

          18       matters about which you become aware in relation to the

          19       firearms operation?

          20   A.  No, there isn't.  There's no obligation.

          21   Q.  You were asked about why you had not recorded the fact

          22       that you were told the gun had been recovered, found on

          23       the grassland.  Why were you told that?

          24   A.  Well, it was obviously significant because that's what

          25       the operation was all about, it was about recovering




           1       firearms, and I was informed that, yes, there was

           2       a firearm that had been recovered during this operation.

           3   Q.  You weren't there?

           4   A.  No.

           5   Q.  There were plenty of officers who were?

           6   A.  That's right.

           7   Q.  Would you have expected yourself to be obliged to take

           8       a note of what you were told, given the number of people

           9       who were there?

          10   A.  No, because, again, this is third hand information.

          11   Q.  Is this the position: what you learnt you were told

          12       because you had been the person, or your team had been

          13       the body, which had originally asked for the operation?

          14   A.  That's right.

          15   Q.  You were called by Z51, the Tactical Firearms

          16       Commander --

          17   A.  That's correct, yes.

          18   Q.  -- twice, and you yourself called Fiona Mallon, the

          19       Strategic Firearms Commander?

          20   A.  That's correct, yes.

          21   Q.  You also called Detective Chief Superintendent Cundy,

          22       because he's your ultimate boss?

          23   A.  That's right.

          24   Q.  He's the head of Trident or was the head of Trident.

          25       You didn't note your conversations with either Ms Mallon




           1       or Mr Cundy?

           2   A.  No.

           3   Q.  Is it fair to say -- or let me put it another way: can

           4       you tell us whether you remember, with exactitude, the

           5       substance of those conversations now?

           6   A.  No, not exactly, no.

           7   Q.  But the thrust of them was that there had been

           8       a discharge of the firearm --

           9   A.  That's right.

          10   Q.  -- Mr Duggan tragically had been killed --

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  -- another officer --

          13   A.  Had been shot.

          14   MR MANSFIELD:  I've been very patient this morning.  I do

          15       feel this is highly leading what he remembers.  He asks

          16       a general question then puts what he remembers, so I ask

          17       for care at this stage, please.  We have heard all this

          18       before.

          19                Questions by THE ASSISTANT CORONER

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Keith, I am not interrupting you

          21       but is there anymore?  I have one area of questions that

          22       it might be better for me just to ask this general

          23       question --

          24   MR KEITH:  On that point?

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- no, not on that point -- whilst




           1       you are on your feet, rather than anyone bobbing up and

           2       down.  Just a general picture that's been raised

           3       yesterday really through the evidence and we've been

           4       touching on it but it really comes round to

           5       Mr Hutchinson-Foster.

           6   A.  Okay.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You've been telling us, 29 years as

           8       a police officer, no doubt back in those early years you

           9       probably did your time performing drugs operations,

          10       taking drugs off the streets of London.

          11   A.  That's right.

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I'm sure in that role, if you

          13       arrested someone who was a user of drugs and you took

          14       the drugs off that person, well that would be

          15       a successful operation.

          16   A.  That's correct, yes.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  If you arrested someone who had the

          18       drugs and was the drugs supplier, perhaps he had a few

          19       more drugs or money, whatever it may be, that would be

          20       perhaps a more successful operation.

          21   A.  That's correct, yes.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  If you were able to be there at the

          23       time that you had the supplier and the user of the drugs

          24       handing them over, that would be the most successful

          25       outcome of the operation because you would have two




           1       people and a lot of drugs.

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Let's come now to this operation and

           4       your planning.

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Part of your planning that you've

           7       been telling us all about was to look and target the

           8       six, and Mr Duggan obtaining the gun.  You're focusing

           9       on that gun.

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  So the successful outcome of part of

          12       the operation would be to have Mr Duggan safely arrested

          13       with the gun.

          14   A.  That's correct, yes.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Might it be a more successful part

          16       of your operation to actually get Mr Hutchinson-Foster

          17       with the gun before he hands it over?

          18   A.  Yes, it would, yes.

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Would it be a most successful

          20       outcome of your operation if you were able to get them

          21       both together at the time the gun is handed over.

          22   A.  That's an ideal scenario, yes.

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  What was your planning that you

          24       went -- did you plan at all for that scenario, that most

          25       successful outcome?




           1   A.  The planning was to respond -- it's always been the

           2       case -- is to respond to that intelligence.  Now,

           3       although Kevin Hutchinson-Foster was a person who had

           4       been identified as potential supplier of the firearms,

           5       who he was likely to get that firearm from, in order to

           6       do that, it was more -- the focus was around following

           7       where Mark Duggan would lead us to that supplier.

           8           So, as I said before, although Kevin

           9       Hutchinson-Foster was the intended supplier, it didn't

          10       necessarily go that he would actually be in possession

          11       of the firearm.  So you're talking about an ideal

          12       scenario where he actually handed over -- we are in

          13       hindsight here where we can say we know he handed it

          14       over, but the experience we have had is that's not

          15       always the case.  The case has been they are either sent

          16       to another location and someone else hands that firearm

          17       over.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I think you were telling us

          19       yesterday that one restriction was clearly the

          20       resources.

          21   A.  That's right.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You kept using the word "finite",

          23       it's probably "limited" really.

          24   A.  Limited, yes.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Everything is finite, but obviously




           1       limited resources.  Clearly, you had much more

           2       intelligence, as you've been telling us, about Mr Duggan

           3       and Mr Hutchinson-Foster.

           4   A.  That's correct, yes.

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  So you were really pushing your

           6       limited resources where they were likely to have the

           7       greater effect?

           8   A.  Yes, it was definitely specific and credible

           9       intelligence we had in relation to Mr Duggan, certainly

          10       that was his intention, and that's what the operation

          11       was focused on.

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Finally this, and then I'll let

          13       Mr Keith finish off his questions and then I will

          14       probably have no more questions, there may be some

          15       [further questions].  But with Mr Hutchinson-Foster, if

          16       we just stay with him, part of the intelligence, as we

          17       have heard, was that he might have had more than one

          18       gun.

          19   A.  That's right, yes.

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  After this operation, what did you

          21       do about that and Mr Hutchinson-Foster?  Was there

          22       anything planned to go back and find him?

          23   A.  Yes.  Well, that was all part of, obviously, the

          24       shooting event changes the whole perspective and, as

          25       a result of that, we then have to have a reactive




           1       investigation in relation to Kevin Hutchinson-Foster

           2       having supplied -- committed the offence of supplying

           3       that firearm but that evidence obviously didn't come out

           4       until later on --

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  He wasn't arrested, you tell us,

           6       until October.

           7   A.  That's right, yes.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Did the police go straight on that

           9       very day back to Burchell Road?

          10   A.  No, because the investigation had been taken over by the

          11       IPCC.

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, all right.  There may be others

          13       that might answer that question.

          14                Questions by MR KEITH (continued)

          15   MR KEITH:  We will hear more in due course but the forensic

          16       evidence that linked the gun found at Ferry Lane to

          17       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster was effectively kept back from

          18       Trident --

          19   A.  That's right.

          20   Q.  -- because the whole area was under investigation by the

          21       IPCC and the decision to give you that link wasn't made

          22       until later.

          23   A.  That's right.

          24   Q.  Just finally in relation to the area that the coroner

          25       asked you about: the general nature of the operation,




           1       was it addressing Mark Duggan and his associates or was

           2       it addressing Kevin Hutchinson-Foster?

           3   A.  No, it was Mark Duggan.

           4   Q.  The intelligence, did it centre around Kevin

           5       Hutchinson-Foster or Mark Duggan?

           6   A.  The intelligence centered around Mark Duggan.

           7   Q.  Thirdly, you knew for a fact, you told us, Mark Duggan

           8       would take possession.  Did you know who would in person

           9       give him the gun?

          10   A.  No, I did not, no.

          11   Q.  Did you know where the minicab was going to start?

          12   A.  No, I didn't, no.

          13   Q.  Did you know where Kevin Hutchinson-Foster was between

          14       5.15 and 6 o'clock?

          15   A.  No, I did not, no.

          16   Q.  Did you know where Mark Duggan was between 5.15 and

          17       6 o'clock?

          18   A.  I didn't know, no.

          19   Q.  So the map that we have, which you were asked about

          20       yesterday, we must be very careful, must we not, that it

          21       does not mislead us.  It's right that at 5.15 the

          22       Trident officers were up at Quicksilver, some of them

          23       were, and it's right that CO19 were in Leman Street, but

          24       in so far as the map shows where Kevin Hutchinson-Foster

          25       and Mark Duggan were, that is hindsight, isn't it?




           1   A.  It is, yes.

           2   Q.  So the only piece of intelligence about which you could

           3       be absolutely sure was, as it developed, that Mr Duggan

           4       would take possession of the gun and, after 5.20, it

           5       would be somewhere near Vicarage Road --

           6   A.  That's right, yes.

           7   Q.  -- and that's why officers were sent there?

           8   A.  That's right, yes.

           9   MR KEITH:  Thank you very much.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much Mr Keith.  Yes

          11       Mr Underwood?

          12                Further questions by MR UNDERWOOD

          13   MR UNDERWOOD:  Mr Foote, not much more.  You were asked

          14       a number of questions over the course of the last day or

          15       so about how things might have gone differently and can

          16       I just explore one of those sets of suggestions to get

          17       it clear.

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  You were asked at quite some length about the prospects

          20       of you being able to arrange for Mr Hutchinson-Foster to

          21       be followed on 3 and/or 4 August.  I want to ask you

          22       about what might have happened had that occurred.  You

          23       are not suggesting, are you, that if

          24       Mr Hutchinson-Foster had been followed you would have

          25       given up on intelligence?




           1   A.  No.

           2   Q.  So the intelligence that was coming in about what

           3       Mr Duggan was planning with Mr Hutchinson-Foster would

           4       have continued to be available to those in command of

           5       the operation; is that fair?

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  So imagine this situation then, that at 5.20 on

           8       4 August, Mr Hutchinson-Foster is under control, in the

           9       sense that you were using it yesterday -- he's being

          10       followed by surveillance officers armed for their own

          11       protection with the back up of the CO19 armed

          12       officers -- and at 5.20 you get the intelligence that

          13       there's going to be a meeting between him and Mr Duggan

          14       in Vicarage Road fairly soon, yes?

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  What would have happened there?

          17   A.  What would have happened?

          18   Q.  Yes.

          19   A.  In relation to what we would have done as the police

          20       service?

          21   Q.  Yes.

          22   A.  Well, certainly if there was an armed surveillance team

          23       available to follow Kevin Hutchinson-Foster, we would

          24       still have an armed surveillance team that would need to

          25       follow Mark Duggan.




           1   Q.  Why?

           2   A.  Because it's providing that evidence of his route, what

           3       vehicle he's in and then obviously what could happen is

           4       that things could change where a meet could take place,

           5       no transfer actual -- actually no hand over -- and he

           6       may be sent onto a different location.  So we required

           7       the surveillance team to stay with Mark Duggan.

           8   Q.  But the man with the gun is with Mr Hutchinson-Foster

           9       isn't it?

          10   A.  Yes, that's right.  But we are working on the premise

          11       Mr Hutchinson-Foster is actually in possession of the

          12       firearm at that time and hands it over.

          13   Q.  Your intelligence was, was it not, on around the 3rd,

          14       that he didn't have possession of it.  Rather, he was

          15       keeping it at the house of a young girl or --

          16   A.  That's right, in storage.

          17   Q.  -- or a girl in the Leyton area, and what you get at

          18       5.20, is that Mark Duggan is on his way to meet Kevin

          19       Hutchinson-Foster to pick up the gun in the

          20       Vicarage Road area; is that right?

          21   A.  On the 4th, yes.

          22   Q.  Surely if you've got armed officers, both surveillance

          23       officers and CO19 officers in the area where

          24       Mr Hutchinson-Foster is, that will therefore be

          25       Vicarage Road, won't it?




           1   A.  That will be in the area of Vicarage Road, yes.

           2   Q.  So why could you not do what the Coroner put to you and

           3       get the best of all words and have Mr Hutchinson-Foster,

           4       the gun or guns and Mr Duggan all at once?

           5   A.  I can see your point but obviously the issue with that

           6       is that certainly -- and this was raised yesterday -- is

           7       having -- it's less likelihood of promise by having

           8       officers in that area, certainly when you've got

           9       surveillance teams who are armed, and certainly if there

          10       was 19 officers in that residential area armed.  One of

          11       the things we certainly have a problem with is

          12       lookouts -- it's a "third eye", we call them -- and that

          13       is a situation that is commonly occurring when --

          14       certainly if there was some sort of criminal transaction

          15       that's going to take place.

          16           So there's a vulnerability of compromise in that

          17       aspect.  So rather than compromise that operation, my

          18       plan is that you stick with the intelligence of where

          19       he's going because he could end up anywhere collecting

          20       that firearm from Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.

          21   Q.  Very well.  Can I put this other suggestion to you: if

          22       this had isn't been a four day operation, if this had

          23       just been Operation Dibri in its usual pro-active way,

          24       receiving intelligence on, say, the 3rd and 4th that it

          25       got here, so out of the blue you've no particular




           1       concern about Mr Duggan but out of the blue you get

           2       intelligence developing between the 1st and the 4th,

           3       which crystallises on the 3rd that he's intending to

           4       pick up a gun from Mr Hutchinson-Foster, has at least

           5       one in possession of a friend of his --

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  -- and that's going to happen on the night of the 3rd

           8       and then it doesn't happen, it perhaps goes off to the

           9       4th.  Would you have actually reacted to that

          10       intelligence by having the sort of operation that

          11       Mr Keith has shown you took place on 22 June?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  That would not have been so time specific, would it, in

          14       terms of you having officers starting their job at

          15       6 o'clock?

          16   A.  No, that would have been sort of more or less

          17       spontaneous.

          18   Q.  So what would have happened then if you hadn't had this

          19       four-day operation and on 3 August you got the

          20       intelligence that that night Mr Duggan was likely to

          21       pick up a gun from Mr Hutchinson-Foster, would you have

          22       had the same level of resources that you ended up having

          23       or what?

          24   A.  What, at 6.00 pm on the 3rd?

          25   Q.  Yes.




           1   A.  Well, it would depend on if there was officers available

           2       and how much -- how much lead time there was available.

           3       So if the intelligence came in that -- at 2, 3,

           4       4 o'clock in the afternoon that Mark Duggan was intent

           5       on taking possession of a firearm at 6.00 pm, then the

           6       team would then scramble and get the resources together

           7       to try and cover that meeting.

           8   MR UNDERWOOD:  Very well.  Thank you very much Mr Foote.

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.

          10   MR BUTT:  I'm so sorry, before we move on.  Can I just

          11       clarify something, it could be my note.  I thought

          12       Mr Underwood asked the witness a question which was

          13       premised on the fact that at 17.20 on the 4th there was

          14       intelligence that Mark Duggan was going to collect the

          15       gun from Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.  If that was said,

          16       that is of course wrong.  The intelligence was that

          17       Mark Duggan was going to Vicarage Road in Leyton to

          18       collect the firearm.  But there wasn't intelligence that

          19       he was collecting it from Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Well, I hear what you say, Mr Butt,

          21       but we'll hear some more evidence about that.  Thank you

          22       very much.

          23           It's all right, Mr Foote, no further questions.

          24       Thank you very much you have been very patient.  Before

          25       you escape, I'll just say this to you, that quite




           1       clearly we are not dealing here with a Crown Court

           2       trial, whereby witnesses are kept outside court and not

           3       allowed to hear what's going on in court.  As you know,

           4       there's a transcript of your evidence on our website so

           5       anyone can read it, so witnesses after you can obviously

           6       see what you said.

           7   A.  Certainly.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  But at the same time, it would help

           9       me, I think, if I could have from you an agreement that,

          10       certainly for the next week or two, whilst we are having

          11       some more evidence from your fellow officers dealing

          12       with the planning, that you should not discuss your

          13       evidence with them in advance of them giving evidence.

          14   A.  Certainly, sir.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I know you understand why.

          16   A.  I do.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  But I just would like you to do

          18       that, please.  Thank you very much, Mr Foote.  You are

          19       released from further attendance.

          20                      (The witness withdrew)

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, Mr Underwood?

          22   MR UNDERWOOD:  Sir, I know that Mr Thomas would like to call

          23       Mrs Duggan now, unless there is any objection to that.

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  If this is a convenient moment to

          25       have that evidence.  Is that the case, Mr Thomas?




           1   MR THOMAS:  Yes.

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  If this is a convenient moment for

           3       you to do that.

           4   MR THOMAS:  I think so.  I think everybody should have

           5       a copy of the witness statement.

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes.

           7   MR THOMAS:  Were you handed a copy of it last night?

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I have got one in front of me now,

           9       which, if I'm right, has 26 paragraphs.

          10   MR THOMAS:  Yes.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes.  Well, if you wish to put that

          12       evidence before the jury, then please feel free to do

          13       so.

          14                   MRS PAMELA DUGGAN (affirmed)

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  Have a seat

          16       and make yourself comfortable, Mrs Duggan.  You can come

          17       forward a little bit, the microphone will be able to

          18       pick up what you say and then Mr Thomas will ask you

          19       some questions.

          20                      Questions by MR THOMAS

          21   MR THOMAS:  Sir, what I intend to do -- it's not a very long

          22       statement -- I intend just to take her through her

          23       witness statement.  Can you give the court your full

          24       name, please?

          25   A.  Yes.  Pamela Duggan.




           1   Q.  It's right, isn't it, that you are Mark Duggan's mother?

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  Now, I just want to take you through the witness

           4       statement.  Everybody has it, but just for the purposes

           5       of the jury, I wonder if a copy could be put in front of

           6       you?

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I'm quite happy for her to have

           8       a copy of her statement before her if that would assist.

           9       The jury do not have it, they will be hearing the

          10       evidence directly, which I think is more preferable.

          11   MR THOMAS:  I wonder if the usher could move the microphone

          12       a little nearer to Mrs Duggan as well.  (Handed)

          13           Mrs Duggan this is your witness statement.

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  What I propose to do, because I know you are a little

          16       nervous, perhaps if I take you through it paragraph by

          17       paragraph --

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  -- you can confirm whether it's true.

          20           You give some background in your witness statement

          21       and you say that you first met Mark's father, Bruno,

          22       soon after you moved from Manchester to Tottenham in

          23       1976; is that right?

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   Q.  You both worked together at the time.




           1   A.  Yes.

           2   Q.  Then you got together and you moved into a flat on the

           3       Broadwater Farm and you lived there for about 26 years?

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  You say that you were together for three years when, as

           6       you put it in your witness statement, you were blessed

           7       with the birth of your first child, Mark; is that right?

           8   A.  (Nods)

           9   Q.  At the time, you weren't sure whether you were able to

          10       have children so you were happy about the fact that you

          11       did have Mark --

          12   A.  (Nods)

          13   Q.  -- is that right?

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  I'll read.  You then say this, that when you went into

          16       labour you were anxious and your sister Carole was there

          17       to help you at the hospital because Bruno was working

          18       nights at the time.  In fact, your sister Carole helped

          19       you with the delivery of Mark.

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  You describe your son as being beautiful with big brown

          22       eyes and, as you say in your witness statement, long

          23       eyelashes, thick eyelashes, and in your eyes he was

          24       perfect and beautiful.

          25   A.  Yes.




           1   Q.  You describe him as being a good baby, nurtured by all

           2       of you.  That's your friends and family; is that right?

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  There would always be arguments about who was going to

           5       dress and feed him?

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  You then go on to deal with Mark in his early years.

           8       You said that he went to Broadwater Farm Primary School?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  You describe him as being quiet, shy, very tactile and

          11       loved the comfort of his own home.

          12   A.  Yes, he did.

          13   Q.  You describe him as always clinging to you, so much so

          14       that you used to call him your handbag?

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  You said that his father said that he liked that because

          17       of the female attention that he got.

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  You describe Mark starting at secondary school and you

          20       say he was still very quiet and shy --

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  -- and you say that he did not deal with change very

          23       well and he disliked his school, so he started to slip

          24       back in his lessons and his behaviour began to

          25       deteriorate.




           1   A.  Yes.

           2   Q.  Your sister Carole had moved back to Manchester some

           3       years prior and Mark would spend all of his holidays

           4       with her there.

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  You described their relationship as being a good one and

           7       Mark respecting his Auntie Carole.

           8   A.  Yes, he did.

           9   Q.  So you say that she gave him the opportunity for a fresh

          10       start living with her in Manchester --

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  -- and he took it, because he wanted to make something

          13       of himself, so he moved to Manchester in 1994, yes?

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  You say it was extremely difficult for Mark to leave

          16       you, especially Marlon, who he idolised.  Who is Marlon?

          17       Just tell us who he is.

          18   A.  My youngest son.

          19   Q.  His brother?

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  You say that they were close, "They were almost like

          22       twins".

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  You also say you were proud of him because he wanted to

          25       better himself.




           1   A.  Yes.

           2   Q.  Then you describe Mark in his teens.  You remember that

           3       he was so excited when he joined the school football

           4       team and he pestered his Auntie Carole for Nike football

           5       boots?

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  She bought them and watched Mark play his first match.

           8       You say on one occasion Mark and another boy went head

           9       to head for the ball at the same time, which ended up

          10       with Mark being head butted in the mouth splitting his

          11       lip.

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  You said Mark had not really experienced real pain

          14       before this as he had no real injuries, as he had not

          15       been smacked or chastised as a child.

          16   A.  No.

          17   Q.  You say this is when you realised how soft he actually

          18       was and he hung up his football boots and never played

          19       again.

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  You described Mark as liking Manchester as he had lots

          22       of family there and he made new friends during his

          23       holiday visits.

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   Q.  He settled in well and successfully got through school.




           1       His favourite subject was art --

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  -- and you describe him as being creative?

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  You say that at age 17 Mark came back to London.  In

           6       your opinion, he had grown into a well balanced quietly

           7       spoken and easy going young man with a really funny

           8       sense of humour.

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  You then describe Mark as a person and you say that your

          11       son was lovely, he was helpful, caring and considerate

          12       and very loving.

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  You say that he was also very mischievous and playful

          15       and took everything in his stride and had

          16       a happy-go-lucky personality which he got from his

          17       father.

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  You say girls would fall over themselves for him and

          20       there was always female friends at your house rallying

          21       around him.  Mark just had a way with, as you describe,

          22       the ladies:

          23           "He was nice to them and why they always wanted to

          24       spend time with him.  He had the most beautiful smile

          25       that would melt the girl's heart.  It just captured




           1       you."

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  You describe Mark's sense of humour:

           4           "He had a funny sense of humour, he was always

           5       laughing and joking."

           6           You remember that when you were in bed with your

           7       glasses on reading a magazine he would call you

           8       Mrs Merton and make you laugh.

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  You say family was always important for Mark as he comes

          11       from a large family with nine other paternal siblings

          12       and Marlon:

          13           "He was very close to his brothers and sisters but

          14       Marlon was the main priority and the brother to whom he

          15       was the closest, as he was the youngest."

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  You describe Mark's relationship with Semone:

          18           "Semone and Mark grew up together as children and

          19       they started dating when Mark was 17 years old.  Mark

          20       and Semone loved each other deeply from a young age.

          21       They had four children together, their eldest being 12

          22       and their youngest being 3 years old."

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  Then you turn to the events that concern us,

          25       4 August 2011.  You say that, on that day, your life




           1       changed forever.

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  You say that you remember Carole had Mark's boys staying

           4       with her in Manchester for their school summer holidays

           5       on 4 August?

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  "Semone rang Carole screaming frantically saying:

           8           "'Mark's dead, they're saying Mark's dead, but

           9       I won't believe it until I see him.  We're all going to

          10       Whitechapel Hospital as the police said he was taken

          11       there.'"

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  You say it was difficult for Carole as she had to

          14       pretend that it wasn't happening as she did not want the

          15       kids to know and it was Carole who called you to break

          16       the news to you, as you just wouldn't believe it.

          17   A.  That's true.

          18   Q.  You then say this:

          19           "When it came on the news, it was announced that

          20       someone was in an air ambulance and an Asian man was

          21       shot dead after a police shootout."

          22           Mark is obviously not Asian so you thought Mark

          23       could be in the hospital --

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   Q.  -- as the police at the scene had told Semone, Marlon




           1       and Paulette, that's Mark's sister, to go to Whitechapel

           2       Hospital.

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  You say it soon transpired that your family had been

           5       sent on a wild goose chase as Mark was still in fact at

           6       the scene.

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  You say later Semone and Paulette came to the house and

           9       told you that it was true that Mark was dead.

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  Needless to say, you went into total shock and you

          12       completely broke down.

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  You say that your GP came over and saw you and placed

          15       you on Valium, anti-depressants and sleeping tablets to

          16       ease your pain.

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  They -- that's the drugs -- have helped you a little,

          19       although you still find yourself waiting for Mark to

          20       walk through the door.

          21   A.  (Nods)

          22   Q.  You say the impact on your family since Mark's death is

          23       still very raw.

          24   A.  Yes.  (Crying)

          25   Q.  You say that Bruno, that's Mark's father, passed away on




           1       7 July last year, some 11 months after Mark was

           2       tragically killed, and you say in your mind -- in your

           3       mind -- you believe this was the final straw for him as

           4       his grief was so intense.

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  When Mark died, you say Bruno stopped talking and would

           7       not say anything to anybody, except "They killed my son,

           8       they killed my boy".

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  You say you believe it completely finished Bruno as he

          11       didn't have the will or strength to fight the cancer

          12       from which he was suffering --

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  -- he gave up.

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  You say all of Mark's children have become anxious since

          17       Mark's death.  His children loved him deeply and he was

          18       a wonderful father to them.

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  Then you say this: as a mother, you think you are never

          21       going to go before your child -- you never think your

          22       child will go before you.  No mother deserves to bury

          23       their child.

          24           You say:

          25           "I am so confused and I don't understand why this is




           1       happening to me and my family."

           2           Then you say this:

           3           "I hope that this Inquest will provide the answers

           4       to many of the questions which, up until now, remain

           5       unanswered.  Mark may not have been an angel, but I do

           6       not believe he should have died the way he did.  If he

           7       was involved in wrongdoing, he should have been brought

           8       to justice and punished."

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  "He should not have been shot and killed."

          11           Then you say:

          12           "The officers involved in this case have to account

          13       publicly for their actions."

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  You will accept no less.

          16   A.  No.

          17   Q.  You say this, and this is how your statement ends, that

          18       you want to know why your son was shot dead rather than

          19       arrested.

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  Then your statement is signed 24 September and it ends

          22       with this declaration, that you believe the facts in

          23       your witness statement are true.

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much, Mrs Duggan.




           1       I think what we will do now is we will conclude.  I am

           2       sure there are no questions for you, so what -- we were

           3       asked yesterday to have a short break in the middle of

           4       the morning and I think this will be an ideal time so if

           5       you stay there for a moment, I'll ask the jury to leave

           6       us and we'll have a short break and start with some more

           7       evidence after that.

           8           Thank you very much.  So just stay there for

           9       a moment.  So members of the jury if you would like to

          10       leave us for five or ten minutes, please.




          14   (11.44 am)

          15                         (A short break)

          16   (12.01 pm)

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We will have the jury in now,

          18       please.

          19                  (In the presence of the jury)

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, Mr Underwood?

          21   MR UNDERWOOD:  I call Detective Superintendent Mallon now.

          22       Detective Superintendent FIONA MALLON (Z50) (sworn)

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  Have a seat

          24       straight away so that you can sit a little nearer the

          25       microphone and get yourself comfortable before telling




           1       us your details, at no doubt the invitation of

           2       Mr Underwood.

           3                    Questions by MR UNDERWOOD

           4   MR UNDERWOOD:  Detective Superintendent, good morning.

           5   A.  Good morning.

           6   Q.  My name's Underwood and I'm counsel to the Inquest.

           7       I'll be asking the first set of questions.  Can you give

           8       us your full names?

           9   A.  I'm Detective Superintendent Fiona Mallon.  I'm

          10       currently based the Homicide and Serious Crime Command

          11       in the Metropolitan Police Service.

          12   Q.  I think you are fairly quietly spoken and I think the

          13       relationship between the witnesses and microphone isn't

          14       an easy one but if you could keep it as close as

          15       possible, I would be grateful thank you very much.

          16           In the events we are concerned with in August 2011,

          17       I think you were the Strategic Firearms Commander; is

          18       that right?

          19   A.  Yes, that's right, yes.

          20   Q.  I want to ask you a little bit about your history before

          21       we deal with that.  How long had you been working in

          22       Trident by then?

          23   A.  Nearly six years in Trident.

          24   Q.  Which ranks had you been at while you were working in

          25       Trident?




           1   A.  I started Trident in 2006 as a Detective Chief Inspector

           2       managing homicide investigations and serious crime.

           3       I was promoted in 2009 and asked to stay on Trident by

           4       my managers and I stayed as a Detective Superintendent

           5       for another two and a half years by August 2011.

           6   Q.  While you were working in that period, have you managed

           7       murder teams?

           8   A.  Yes.  I managed murder teams, I managed probably in

           9       excess of 50 to 60 homicide investigations involving gun

          10       crime and knife crime.

          11   Q.  What about pro-active work?

          12   A.  I managed policing operations, targeting the most

          13       dangerous and violent armed gangs in London.  I managed

          14       numerous pro-active operations, two (?) at the time,

          15       recovered in excess of 30, 40 firearms across north

          16       London.

          17   Q.  Had you worked as a Tactical Firearms Commander as well

          18       during that period?

          19   A.  Yes, my firearms command experience started in 2004 and

          20       I had worked as a Tactical Firearms Commander.

          21   Q.  When did you become a Strategic Firearms Commander?

          22   A.  My training started in 2004 when I was a Tactical

          23       Firearms Commander.  I was then trained in 2007 as

          24       a Gold Commander, now known as a Strategic Firearms

          25       Commander, and then I was re-accredited in 2011 as




           1       Strategic Firearms Commander.

           2   Q.  Sorry, just so we can get our heads around this, I think

           3       what we are now laboriously calling Strategic Firearms

           4       Commander used to be called a Gold Commander; is that

           5       right?

           6   A.  Yes, that's right.

           7   Q.  What we are laboriously calling a Tactical Firearms

           8       Commander used to be a called a Silver Commander; is

           9       that right?

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  In Trident, did you have a management role about threat

          12       to life investigations?

          13   A.  Yes, I did yes.

          14   Q.  What did that involve?

          15   A.  A threat to life is when you have an individual or gang

          16       who threaten to kill or harm another individual or gang.

          17       It was my responsibility as a superintendent on Trident

          18       to manage all of the resources of the Metropolitan

          19       Police to make sure that person or gang didn't come to

          20       any harm or death and I managed in excess of 30 of those

          21       by August 2011.

          22   Q.  Right.  Prior to the four-day operation we're concerned

          23       with under the aegis of Operation Dibri, roughly how

          24       many firearms operations had you been the Strategic/Gold

          25       Firearms Commander for?




           1   A.  At the time of Operation Dibri, in the August deployment

           2       we are here to discuss today, I had managed in excess of

           3       120 firearms operations at the highest level of risk.

           4       I was one of the most experienced firearms commanders in

           5       the country at the time.

           6   Q.  Can you help us make sense of this division between

           7       "strategic" and "tactical" and "operational"?

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  The name "Strategic Firearms Commander" suggests that

          10       your role there is dealing with the strategy; is that

          11       fair?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  What does that mean in practice?

          14   A.  My role is I'm basically the officer in charge of the

          15       operation.  I'm overall accountable for the operation,

          16       I have a command structure in place, I'm responsible for

          17       resourcing that operation, for setting the objectives

          18       and to ensure that the threat and risk is managed

          19       appropriately.

          20   Q.  So in one sense the buck stops with you, does it?

          21   A.  Yes, it does.

          22   Q.  That does not mean you are on the ground in charge of

          23       officers who are actually facing risk or presenting

          24       a risk, does it?

          25   A.  No.  In firearms operations there are three levels.




           1       There's the Operational Firearms Commander, there's

           2       a Tactical Firearms Commander and there's a Strategic

           3       Firearms Commander.  They are the national standards of

           4       operating.  The operation of Operational Firearms

           5       Commander, OFC as you'll get known -- we will call him

           6       for the proceedings OFC -- he's responsible or she's

           7       responsible for the firearms teams on the ground.

           8           You then have the Tactical Firearms Commander who

           9       will be implementing my plan, along with the Tactical

          10       Advisor, from what I've guided them on the decisions and

          11       the paperwork I have given them.

          12           Then I will set the strategy above them, if that

          13       helps.

          14   Q.  Let's put names to these people if we can for a start.

          15       The Tactical Firearms Commander here is somebody we are

          16       calling Z51; is that right?

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  Who was the Operational Firearms Commander?

          19   A.  I think it's V59.

          20   Q.  Again, nothing simple here, is it, because there are

          21       several names for these people.  One can also call him

          22       the team leader of the firearms officers?

          23   A.  That's right.

          24   Q.  We might sometimes hear him being called "Bronze"?

          25   A.  Yes.




           1   Q.  Yes, right.  Now, again, in practical terms then, you

           2       take overall responsibility, yes --

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  -- is that fair?  The Tactical Firearms Commander's role

           5       is to implement your strategy; is that fair?

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  So in every day terms then -- we'll come to the

           8       documents in a moment about how these things are

           9       planned -- you set out the strategy, you authorise the

          10       officers to be where they should be available --

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  -- and the Tactical Firearms Commander then comes along

          13       and does what exactly?

          14   A.  When you're planning an operation, especially of this

          15       scale, there are a number of meetings and planning

          16       discussions you have.  The Tactical Firearms Commander

          17       will apply to me for an operation.  I will have a full

          18       briefing and presentation around the operation and

          19       intelligence.  I will then, if I'm satisfied, I will

          20       authorise the deployment of armed officers for that

          21       operation.

          22           We will have those discussions and I will give that

          23       authority.  As part of that authority, in the Met Police

          24       it is policy that I seek advice of a Tactical Firearms

          25       Commander advisor which is part of that planning process




           1       as well.

           2   Q.  Right.  So let's break this down then.  One of the first

           3       functions, in relation to an operation, of the Tactical

           4       Firearms Commander is to present the job to you; is that

           5       it?

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  In doing that, you will also take advice from the

           8       Tactical Advisor?

           9   A.  That's right.

          10   Q.  I think in this case that was an Inspector Bennett, was

          11       it not?

          12   A.  That's right.

          13   Q.  So once you've had that presentation and you have asked

          14       questions and you have set your strategy, what's the

          15       Tactical Firearms Commander supposed to do with that?

          16   A.  They will ensure that the teams are ready and prepared,

          17       they are properly briefed, they know what the objectives

          18       are of the operation, they are -- ensure that the teams

          19       are available for that particular time.  They will then

          20       take my plan, my agreed plan, it becomes their plan and

          21       they will then enforce it on the ground.

          22           When I say "enforce it", the plan itself, if I can

          23       explain, has a number of options on how you will deal

          24       with the threat.  So in this case, there were six

          25       subjects who posed a threat.  They were in possession of




           1       firearms, had access to firearms; that was the threat.

           2       So I gave the authority for that operation and then we

           3       have a tactical plan.

           4           A tactical plan has a number of options on how we

           5       can deal with that threat, according to how the

           6       intelligence develops.  The TFC, Tactical Firearms

           7       Commander, has those options available to them, a range

           8       of options which I will happily explain, and they decide

           9       what goes on on the ground, according to what the

          10       intelligence is at that specific time.

          11   Q.  While he's doing that, in an ideal world, is there any

          12       contact between you and he?

          13   A.  It depends on what the intelligence is at that time.

          14   Q.  Right.

          15   A.  If the operation is set up for that intelligence and

          16       that intelligence does not change, the agreed tactics or

          17       working strategies, I would not -- depending on the

          18       intelligence, and we have to go through that in detail

          19       today or later, I would then expect a phonecall.  It

          20       depends on what the intelligence update is at the time,

          21       if it affects the strategy.

          22   Q.  As far as you were concerned, did you make yourself

          23       available to the Silver Commanders, the Tactical

          24       Firearms Commanders, in the period we are talking about,

          25       in order to discuss the way the strategy was being




           1       implemented?

           2   A.  Part of the role of the Strategic Firearms Commander is

           3       to make sure you are available to the Tactical Firearms

           4       Commander and a Tactical Advisor 24/7 for the duration

           5       of that operation and that is what I did, yes.

           6   Q.  Again, whilst we are still trying to make sense of the

           7       structure at the moment, the Operational Firearms

           8       Commander, V59, the team leader of the firearms

           9       officers, what's his function in this set up?

          10   A.  That person is part of the armed unit, what you are

          11       known as CO19.  They are in this operation,

          12       plain-clothed officers who are authorised to carry

          13       firearms, who will carry out the plan, whether it's

          14       a stop and arrest -- whatever it may be, they are the

          15       ones who actually do that safely.

          16           V59, who is a team leader of CO19, of the armed

          17       officers, will direct those officers in how that arrest

          18       is made and they are responsible for that area

          19       geographically or that function of those officers.

          20   Q.  Right.  I told the jury a week or so ago, it seems

          21       longer, about the traffic light system of green, amber,

          22       red, by which stages are reached in the armed operation

          23       and control changes hands.  Can you help us with what

          24       that all means?

          25   A.  This is called the traffic light system of control.




           1       It's a means by every single person on the operation

           2       knows at what stage the operation is at.  Green is when

           3       surveillance activity is taking place and intelligence

           4       gathering is taking place.  You will have the

           5       subjects -- we're talking in a surveillance type

           6       situation here.  You will have the subjects being

           7       watched by the surveillance team, that is green, no

           8       activity.

           9           You will have a control car with a Tactical Firearms

          10       Commander behind the surveillance with other armed

          11       vehicles.  What will happen is once that Tactical

          12       Firearms Commander is satisfied that the subjects are

          13       committing offences, they are taking possession of

          14       a firearm, state amber will be called by the Tactical

          15       Firearms Commander.

          16   Q.  What is the effect in terms of change of control?  Who's

          17       in charge once amber is called?

          18   A.  Amber is -- a Tactical Firearms Commander is amber --

          19       that person who calls amber is the Tactical Firearms

          20       Commander.

          21   Q.  After he calls it who's in charge?

          22   A.  The Operational Firearms Commander will call red when he

          23       or she thinks it is a safe place to conduct an arrest or

          24       a stop.  I can happily talk back to what a mobile armed

          25       support team actually does and what that type of




           1       operation looks like because I think that might be

           2       beneficial.

           3   Q.  By all means.

           4   A.  This operation was called a MASTS operation and you'll

           5       hear that throughout the proceedings.  It's Mobile Armed

           6       Support To Surveillance.

           7           What it is is you have essentially got subjects who

           8       are mobile, who need to go from A to B and at some stage

           9       we had intelligence they would be in possession of

          10       a firearm.  So you will have the subjects in a vehicle

          11       or on foot, you will have undercover control,

          12       plain-clothed control by surveillance officers in

          13       plain-clothes cars, normal cars, conducting surveillance

          14       on those people.  It's very safe, it's done at

          15       a distance, there's no compromise at all.

          16           As a result -- on the back of that, you will have

          17       armed officers, CO19 officers.  CO19 officers would only

          18       get involved at the point that there's an arrest

          19       possibility opportunity.

          20           So the minute the subject is in the front, take

          21       possession of a gun, what will happen is the Tactical

          22       Firearms Commander will say it's amber.  The

          23       surveillance team will pull away --

          24   Q.  We are just assuming here everybody is in cars, aren't

          25       we?




           1   A.  Yes, it can happen on foot.  It can happen --

           2   Q.  Stick with that, assuming everybody is in cars.  Is

           3       there a convoy of cars starting with surveillance cars

           4       at this point, behind the subject vehicle?

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  Behind them, the CO19 cars?

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  Thank you.  Do carry on.

           9   A.  The surveillance have safe control, they are watching at

          10       a safe distance, all in plain clothes.  Once the

          11       subjects take possession of the firearm, they pull away

          12       and then the convoy of armed cars will come in and make

          13       a safe arrest or interception, as we call it --

          14   Q.  Right.  Again.

          15   A.  -- if that helps.

          16   Q.  Thank you.  I am going to come to the documents that led

          17       to the planning of in this particular operation in

          18       a minute but can I first of all deal with the way that

          19       firearms operations were graded in the Metropolitan

          20       Police --

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  -- in August 2011.  Were there four grades; can you help

          23       us with what they were?

          24   A.  In 2009, the national police improvement agency took

          25       over responsibility for training for firearms command.




           1       As the result of this, the Metropolitan Police set up

           2       its own cadre system of police operations.

           3           They had a dedicated cadre unit of officers who just

           4       committed to firearms operations only.  They split up

           5       levels of operations between 1 and 4.

           6           1 and 2 were the most complicated and the most

           7       dangerous.  They involved hostage taking, kidnap, crimes

           8       in action, which is what Trident specifically were

           9       committed to.  When I say "crime in action" I mean those

          10       armed criminals in possession of firearms and using them

          11       or supplying them.  They were levels 1 and 2.

          12           Levels 3 and 4 were less dangerous.  They involved

          13       armed escort, they involved the type of protection

          14       outside Westminster or Buckingham Palace, they are open

          15       over carriage of firearms. (?)

          16           Whilst the new unit got experience of firearms

          17       operations they stayed with levels 3 and 4, which was

          18       less dangerous, less risky operations.  Operations which

          19       were threat level 1 or 2 remained with Trident and the

          20       flying squad, so we retained ownership of those.

          21   Q.  The four-day operation we are talking about that was

          22       intended to run from 3 to 6 August, that was up at level

          23       1 or 2, was it?

          24   A.  Yes, it was.

          25   Q.  Was there any specific accreditation you needed to have




           1       as Strategic Firearms Commander for such a level of

           2       operation?

           3   A.  The system I've described earlier in relation to the

           4       re-accreditation process brought in, which I passed in

           5       March 2011.

           6   Q.  Thank you.  Now, we have seen a form FA1 which we were

           7       told started the ball rolling here.  Forms come to you,

           8       do they, as a Strategic Firearms Commander, and then you

           9       fill another one in.  Is that, in very broad terms, the

          10       system?

          11   A.  (Nods)

          12   Q.  We know the FA1 starts it coming, does that go to you?

          13   A.  It does.  Initially, the FA1 is a discussion between the

          14       SIO and the holder of the intelligence, which is often

          15       a Detective Sergeant, and they will discuss the

          16       intelligence at that time and whether they think

          17       a firearms response is a most appropriate response to

          18       this intelligence.

          19           Once that discussion is had, a form FA1 is

          20       completed, and then a Strategic Firearms Commander will

          21       be contacted for authority to proceed with the next

          22       application stage.

          23   Q.  Right.  What's a form FA2A?

          24   A.  Once the Strategic Firearms Commander has seen that

          25       first form and they are satisfied that this intelligence




           1       needs a firearms response, the Tactical Firearms

           2       Commander will then complete a form FA2A, which is

           3       an application for deployment of armed officers and

           4       their policy log around their role.

           5   Q.  It's a two-stage document is it?  It's an application

           6       form that goes up and it's also a log for them to

           7       complete if the operation continues; is that right?

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  Okay.  Then what's a form FA5?

          10   A.  FA5?  FA5 is -- if you remember earlier I mentioned

          11       a Tactical Advisor.  A Tactical Advisor is a person

          12       within the armed units, the armed team, CO19.  They are

          13       an expert in giving tactical advice on firearms

          14       operations.  They will give advice around resources and

          15       the types of response you can give from the firearms

          16       teams.  They are accredited and every Sergeant within

          17       CO19 has gone through that ten-day course.

          18           So what will happen is a FA1 will be completed, to

          19       the SIO and DS, usually.  They will speak to a Strategic

          20       Firearms Commander and get the go ahead, yes "It does

          21       need a firearms response".  The FA2A will then be

          22       completed or the FA2, depending on what type of

          23       deployment it is, and then they will brief the Tac

          24       advisor to see what options are available in relation to

          25       dealing with this threat and what types of response we




           1       could do in the firearms situation.

           2           So they complete the FA5, the Tactical Advisor

           3       completes the FA5.

           4   Q.  These all come to you, do they, in your role as the

           5       proposed Strategic Firearms Commander?

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  What do you do in terms of creating further forms?

           8   A.  Before I create any forms, I would always, always, have

           9       a presentation by the applicant, and I will have

          10       a conversation with the Tactical Advisor.  They are

          11       generally in another part of London, so it's not

          12       physically possible to see them face to face, but I will

          13       have a conversation with a Tactical Advisor around the

          14       options available to me, the aspect of specialist

          15       munitions around tactical parameters, and we will

          16       discuss whether and how the options available will meet

          17       my working strategy to make them viable.

          18   Q.  Once you've had the discussions you needed to have and

          19       satisfied yourself about detail and so on, what's the

          20       next stage in creation of forms?

          21   A.  I then -- it's a bit confusing but there are two forms.

          22       There's an FA2A and an FA2.  An FA2A is for a preplanned

          23       operation, one that we can plan in advance, we have not

          24       got to respond to straight away.  This type of

          25       deployment was obviously an FA2A.  An FA2 is for a fast




           1       time deployment which you cannot plan as well in advance

           2       because you have information now you have to react to.

           3           So this one, when it was planned on the 2nd, was

           4       a FA2A.  As a result of that, I then completed an FA3A

           5       which is a contracted deployment authority form for

           6       an armed operation.

           7   Q.  Right.  I think the first you were involved with the

           8       proposed four-day operation, was 1 August; is that

           9       right?

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  What happened then?

          12   A.  On 1 August, I had a management meeting with my

          13       Detective Chief Superintendent the other Superintendents

          14       on Trident.  We discussed operational matters, what's

          15       happened over the weekend and resources for the

          16       following week.  It happened every Monday.  After that,

          17       I would speak to my SIOs across the north, around the

          18       update from the meeting, plans for the rest of the week.

          19       I actually managed multiple sites across the north and

          20       hence on different days I was at different sites.

          21           Following that meeting, I had a phonecall from the

          22       Tactical Firearms Commander asking my --

          23   Q.  Z51?

          24   A.  -- Z51, apologies -- my view on a tactical deployment

          25       that week and I asked them for a presentation at my




           1       workplace at another site the following day.  I asked

           2       that afternoon the forms to be sent to me so I could

           3       read them in the interim.

           4   Q.  Did they get sent to you by fax or email or whatever?

           5   A.  By email, yes.

           6   Q.  Did you have a chance to look at them?

           7   A.  I opened them the following day at 9.58, I believe.

           8   Q.  That's the 2 August, yes, the Tuesday?

           9   A.  Right.

          10   Q.  Sorry, I interrupted you.  You had a chance to read

          11       them?

          12   A.  I opened them the following morning when I was at work,

          13       and then I had a meeting at midday with the SIO at which

          14       the -- Z51 joined us and following that meeting there

          15       was a further presentation from Z51 before I authorised

          16       the operation.

          17   Q.  The SIO is now Acting Superintendent Mr Foote, as we

          18       have just seen?

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  Now, let's have a look at the forms that came up to you.

          21       We have already looked at the if FA1, so unless you

          22       particularly want to see it I'll go straight to the

          23       FA2A.  It's at CD290 and hard copies should be handed

          24       out to the jury.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Is this going to be put behind that




           1       tab number 6?

           2   MR UNDERWOOD:  This will be C6.  Do you have one?

           3   A.  I have one, thank you.

           4   Q.  I will wait for everyone in the jury to get one and

           5       I will take you to it.

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Is there a copy for me, for my

           7       bundle?  (Handed)

           8   MR UNDERWOOD:  This is what came to you by email and you

           9       managed to open it on the morning, I think, of the 2nd;

          10       is that right?

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  It's the two-stage document we discussed, namely it's

          13       a sort of presentation to you by the Tactical Firearms

          14       Commander, Z51, and it also, if the operation is to

          15       continue, something which is available for his log; yes?

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  So we see, on the first page, what it calls itself and

          18       it sets out the names of the Strategic Firearms

          19       Commander, the Tactical Firearms Commander and the

          20       Tactical Advisor.  Then if we jump a couple of pages to

          21       293, it comes to what many people would regard as quite

          22       a confusing diagram.  This is the conflict management

          23       model, is it?

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   Q.  Can you, in as understandable terms as possible, tell us




           1       what a conflict management model is?

           2   A.  Okay.  It's a decision making structure where it's

           3       a means of making a decision and having an audit of that

           4       decision as you go through.  That's it, a decision

           5       making structure.

           6   Q.  Is the notion behind this in the Metropolitan Police

           7       that where you have to make a decision that might turn

           8       out to be important, that you apply the conflict

           9       management model to the intelligence as it comes in --

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  -- and that you record your thought processes; is that

          12       fair?

          13   A.  It's a model where you don't have to record your thought

          14       processes.  It's a model which you mentally go through

          15       as you get updated, whatever the operation dictates.

          16       This doesn't pertain solely to firearms operations.

          17       It's used in other areas of business as well.

          18   Q.  As it's applied to firearms operations of this sort, in

          19       August 2011 was it regarded as important to write down

          20       the thought processes as intelligence came in or

          21       changed?

          22   A.  I think that where it's possible, and where it's

          23       practical, and where it's lawful to write down the

          24       intelligence, then, yes, you can write it down.

          25           In 100 per cent of the operations on Trident I was




           1       managing, the intelligence was such that it was unlawful

           2       to write down.  So it is very difficult at times, all

           3       the time, to make notes.

           4   Q.  Right.  So let's have a look and just see what this

           5       anticlockwise circle involves.  It's starting at the

           6       top, it's "Information/intelligence received.  Then the

           7       next ellipse is "Threat assessment".  How does that fit,

           8       what happens there?

           9   A.  The threat assessment -- and I'll try and break it down.

          10       The threat assessment on this form is a skeletal

          11       representation of numerous discussions you have around

          12       the intelligence, around the operation, around the

          13       history and background and what's currently happening.

          14       When you see on the form, it's a very limited -- on my

          15       chart you will see there's a very limited space for

          16       detail you can put in it.

          17           The threat assessment is essentially analysis of

          18       harm, it's around the likelihood of it happening and the

          19       impact if it does happen.  When you break that down

          20       further, the threat assessment is about: what is the

          21       threat?  In this case it was clearly six subjects being

          22       in possession 6 firearms.

          23           So who is at risk from that threat?  So you identify

          24       the possible people who could come into risk or contact

          25       with that threat.  So you would label them as categories




           1       down the left-hand side as part of the threat

           2       assessment.  So in this case, who would come into

           3       contact with those six subjects -- police, public -- and

           4       then consider the subjects themselves.

           5   Q.  Right.

           6   A.  That is the threat, down the left-hand side.  Then you

           7       have to consider the point of contact with police.

           8       Those six -- sorry, those categories on that side: what

           9       is the level of risk to those people?  Then you go

          10       through, at the point of contact with police, a part of

          11       that police operation, subjects, police, unarmed and

          12       armed and the public, and you risk it accordingly.

          13       That's a threat assessment.

          14   Q.  Then it goes through a "Working strategy" to "Powers and

          15       policy".  In practical terms, what does that mean when

          16       you are considering something like this?

          17   A.  Working strategy is the objectives of the operation.

          18       It's a prioritised list of objectives, and the powers

          19       and policies is the second part of that working

          20       strategy.

          21   Q.  Right.  Then having considered those you go to "Tactical

          22       options", do you --

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  -- which means actually try to work out what you can do

          25       about all this, does it?




           1   A.  That is when you have that discussion, which is really

           2       really important, which I have all the time with all my

           3       Tactical Advisors, where you discuss the options

           4       available and you have the FA5 and you decide on that

           5       tactical plan.

           6   Q.  Is "Action(s)" actually just what happens out of that?

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  To go back to the meaning of this complex management

           9       model.  Obviously, when you are faced with

          10       an application form such as this, you apply the conflict

          11       management model, do you, actually to get from the

          12       intelligence, through the threat assessment, to what it

          13       is you are going to plan?

          14   A.  Yes.  My daily life is around threat and risk

          15       management.  I've got threats to life operations that

          16       are being run, I have numerous pro-active operations

          17       being run against armed criminals.  So every part of my

          18       day is around managing threatened risk and applying

          19       decision making processes.

          20   Q.  So it is a dynamic thing --

          21   A.  It is.

          22   Q.  -- it's not just once that when you look at --

          23   A.  No, you run through your head, all the time.

          24   Q.  Then, if we go over the page, there's what looks like

          25       a printed page at CD294.  Is that just the general page




           1       printed for this form or is this something specific?

           2   A.  That's that form, this is a template.

           3   Q.  So if we go to 295, we've got some intelligence.  If we

           4       look -- so this is the starting point, is it, for that

           5       conflict management model: you start with the

           6       intelligence itself?

           7   A.  Yes, yes.

           8   Q.  Left-hand column, we see the date of the intelligence,

           9       which is 1 August.  It's intelligence graded B24.  Can

          10       you help us with what that means?

          11   A.  It basically -- it's an assessment of where the

          12       intelligence has come from, how credible it is and how

          13       recent it is.

          14   Q.  We've heard that this is a sliding scale and perhaps the

          15       best possible would be A1 and you go down to, I don't

          16       know what.

          17   A.  (Nods)

          18   Q.  Where does B24 fit on the scale?

          19   A.  Yes, it's reliable and it's credible intelligence.

          20   Q.  Very reliable or just reliable?

          21   A.  Very reliable.

          22   Q.  Okay.  You have set out what I think we all know is in

          23       these forms now about the intention of Operation Dibri

          24       in general and the way in which the TMD had become the

          25       focus for it.




           1           If we look at the second paragraph we see that it

           2       says:

           3           "Recent intelligence suggests an upsurge in gang

           4       related tensions and that TMD members and their

           5       associates are regularly attending nightclubs and

           6       parties in the London area and when doing so, have

           7       firearms either on their person or nearby with

           8       associates."

           9           As far as you understood it, on the 2 August, this

          10       was the general idea, was it, that this was a proposal

          11       for a four-day operation in relation to that

          12       intelligence about a number of people?

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  So nothing specific about Mark Duggan and a gun, apart

          15       from what we see on this form?

          16   A.  No.

          17   Q.  If we go down the bottom of the page then, there is the

          18       "Confirmation of identification, capability/intent"

          19       underlying that intelligence, if you like, and:

          20           "Who is threatening?"

          21           We have U1, then we have Mark Duggan, and then some

          22       others over the page.  All together six subjects of this

          23       operation, yes --

          24   A.  (Nods)

          25   Q.  -- or subsidiary operation, as I keep calling it, the




           1       four-day --

           2   A.  Yes, yes.

           3   Q.  Then over at page 296, we have under capability and

           4       intent, "Capability" first of all:

           5           "Reliable intelligence (both historic and current)

           6       exists to link all of these subjects and numerous

           7       criminal associates to the Tottenham Man Dem.  They are

           8       all believed to have ready access to firearms at any

           9       time."

          10           Under "Intent":

          11           "There is no specific intelligence at this time

          12       regarding any particular intent to use firearms by any

          13       individual.  Firearms are regularly used to enforce drug

          14       dealing activity, to rob other dealers and to maintain

          15       control and status during internal and external gang

          16       feuds."

          17           We know, and we'll be hearing the evidence from the

          18       relevant officers in due course, that as of 1 August

          19       there was intelligence that Mark Duggan was intending to

          20       pick up a gun from somebody called "Kevin" and by

          21       2 August, I think the evidence will be, that "Kevin" was

          22       identified as Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.  Now, if that's

          23       right, would you have expected that to be noted in

          24       there?  (Pause)

          25   A.  At the time of authorising the operation at 3.20 on the




           1       2nd, I did not know about Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.  This

           2       was a general authority relating to six subjects.

           3   Q.  I am not suggesting you did, at the moment.  Can I just

           4       stop you there?  What I'm asking you is whether you

           5       would have expected, now in retrospect, that information

           6       to be in that application had it been known?

           7   A.  No, I wouldn't have expected it to be in there.

           8   MR KEITH:  So sorry to rise to my feet.  I do so with

           9       considerable deference to Mr Underwood.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I'm sure.

          11   MR KEITH:  It may well be that I have misread A10's

          12       statement but it was put -- and I quite understand the

          13       point that was being put -- to Ms Mallon that, supposing

          14       the intelligence about Kevin Hutchinson-Foster being the

          15       suggestion was known on the 1st, and on the 2nd that it

          16       was Kevin Hutchinson-Foster that Mr Duggan was going to

          17       collect the gun from, we, I think, had understood that

          18       the intelligence was, on the 1st it was an unknown male

          19       associate holding the weapon and 2 August identified as

          20       being Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.

          21   MR UNDERWOOD:  That's what I put.  We are all agreed.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We are all agreed.

          23   MR MANSFIELD:  May I just interpose for a second?  What we

          24       have suggested and which will be done over lunch, is

          25       that there will be a composite single document with all




           1       the A10 gists on one sheet of paper as it exists at the

           2       moment, and we hope that the agreement can be such that

           3       the jury can have in front of them one sheet of paper

           4       with all the gisted information that was available, and

           5       that, I hope, will be helpful so we don't have to keep

           6       interjecting.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  All right.  We'll see what

           8       transpires.

           9   MR UNDERWOOD:  As we were, Ms Mallon.  So suppose then that

          10       the intelligence was that, as of 1 August, Mark Duggan

          11       was intending to pick up a gun from somebody called

          12       "Kevin" and that on the 2 August that "Kevin" was

          13       identified as Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.  I am not

          14       suggesting, as I say, that you knew that, what I'm

          15       asking you is whether you would have expected, in

          16       retrospect, that to be included in this form?

          17   A.  Because of the intelligence I would have expected a form

          18       of words around that, yes, not the precise detail of

          19       that intelligence but a form of words around that.

          20   Q.  We have to be cagey but there's a form of intelligence

          21       here that the law does not prevent us asking too much

          22       about; is that right?

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  You have to use a form of words, we call it a gist, and

          25       you would have expected a gist of that intelligence to




           1       be in here, yes?

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  Then, if we go over the page at CD297, let's get U1 out

           4       of the way.  The first paragraph deals with U1.

           5           Do you know about this anonymous letter that

           6       suggests that U1 was an informant who had an arrangement

           7       with a Trident officer by which he would encourage

           8       people, including Mr Duggan, to pick up guns and to be

           9       caught by the Trident officer.

          10   A.  Yes, I know about it, yes.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I'm sorry?

          12   A.  Yes, I do, sir, sorry.

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Try to shout a bit and make sure you

          14       have this in front of you and that will be marvellous.

          15   MR UNDERWOOD:  You are familiar with the allegation?

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  As far as you're concerned, do you know anything which

          18       suggests that's true?

          19   A.  I think it's absolutely absurd.

          20   Q.  Thank you.  As far as you were concerned, was U1 simply

          21       a subject of this?

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  Let's move onto the second paragraph:

          24           "Mark Duggan is a long-standing senior member of the

          25       TMD.  There is a wealth of historic and current reliable




           1       intelligence suggesting that Duggan has ready access to

           2       firearms, is actively involved in armed criminality and

           3       the supply of controlled drugs."

           4           Again, if there was some specific intelligence about

           5       his intent over the next few days, or fairly imminently

           6       at least, would you have expected some sort of gist of

           7       that there?

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  Then "Identified individuals/groups at risk":

          10           "Consider all groups who are at risk from the

          11       identified threat and list them below before identifying

          12       the level of risk to each identified individual or group

          13       in the next section."

          14           Then:

          15           "This could include ..."

          16           We go over the page:

          17           "Named individuals -- public in the vicinity of the

          18       threat -- tasked or untasked/armed or unarmed police

          19       officers -- the subject(s) -- the subject(s')

          20       family ..."

          21           Is one of the concerns in somebody completing one of

          22       these forms and considering one of these forms, the risk

          23       posed to the subject themselves --

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   Q.  -- because they might end up in a confrontation with




           1       armed police, or what?

           2   A.  Anybody who takes possession of an illegally held

           3       firearm is at high risk.  They are at high risk because

           4       they can discharge a firearm accidentally and hurt

           5       themselves, at the time of police operation they can run

           6       into a road and injure themselves or kill themselves and

           7       obviously if they point a firearm at police there is

           8       a likely chance they will get shot.  So there is a risk

           9       to the subject and it's always considered.

          10   Q.  So that's something that's in your mind, is it, when you

          11       consider one of these operations?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  Then if we look at page 299, we see a breakdown of how

          14       this is put.  If I can just ask you to identify for the

          15       moment what is actually being printed and what has not

          16       been here.  If we look at the box:

          17           "1.  Name of person/group at risk."

          18           Then:

          19           "Public"

          20           Is "Public" typed in for this particular form or is

          21       that part of the structure of the form?

          22   A.  It's added to this form.

          23   Q.  Right so the first group of persons who are actually

          24       specifically considered here at risk are the public.

          25       Then if we look at number 2, it's:




           1           "Police -- surveillance officers -- armed."

           2           Yes?

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  Three:

           5           "Police -- CO19 -- armed."

           6           Then, four:

           7           "Police -- unarmed."

           8           We look over the page, five:

           9           "Name of person/group at risk.  Subjects."

          10           And then:

          11           "What will the level of risk be at the defined

          12       potential point of conflict (PPOC) eg future police

          13       intervention ... define PPOC and when it occurs: when

          14       stopped/arrested."

          15           So not just the general prospect that an armed

          16       person may run into the street or shoot themselves in

          17       the foot or something.  Here, specifically, your

          18       attention is being drawn to the prospect that there

          19       would come a point in this operation where somebody

          20       might come into conflict with -- an armed officer might

          21       come into conflict with an armed subject; is that fair?

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  What's said about that is that:

          24           "Subjects will be intercepted by armed officers

          25       suitably trained and equipped in safest possible




           1       environment."

           2           Then "Mark Level of Risk", that's marked as

           3       "medium", is it?

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  Did that strike you as a realistic assessment?

           6   A.  Yes.  I've planned in excess of 120 firearms operations.

           7       51 of those have been MASTS operations exactly the same

           8       as this operation.  I would have expected that, as

           9       I said earlier, a subject or suspect would be high risk.

          10           However, when you use the officers that are trained

          11       as highly as they are, with resources that they have and

          12       with the intelligence that we had at that time, that

          13       specific, it mitigates, reduces, the risk to medium at

          14       that point of contact with the police.

          15           For example, if I was using an officer that didn't

          16       have that training, that didn't have that equipment or

          17       those resources around them, then that risk, when that

          18       point of contact happens, is going to be higher.  So

          19       therefore I think that was a realistic assessment.

          20   Q.  Again, did I hear you right about five minutes ago when

          21       you said that you, in the course of this operation, were

          22       never told about the intelligence of the 1st and

          23       2 August about Mark Duggan intending or proposing to

          24       pick up a gun from Mr Hutchinson-Foster?

          25   A.  I had a gist around that it was somebody called Kevin or




           1       Kev, but I wasn't told until the 3rd.

           2   Q.  Okay.  If you had been told that when you were looking

           3       at this, would you have considered that medium level of

           4       risk still to be accurate?

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  Then if we go over to CD301, is this all printed on the

           7       form?

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  So this is the next step, is it, in the conflict

          10       management model when you are assessing this form or

          11       creating this form?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  Thanks.  Then if we can go to CD302, there's a working

          14       strategy.  This is typed in, is it?

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  So this is the actual strategy proposed to you by Z51?

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  As it turns out, on 2 August; yes?

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  "Based on the Threat and Risk assessment - Detail below

          21       the working strategy to be recommended to [you] in

          22       hierarchical order:

          23           "1: minimise risk to the public."

          24           Is that always your first priority when you are

          25       a Strategic Firearms Commander?




           1   A.  I cannot speak for other Strategic Firearms Commanders,

           2       but for me personally it's always the priority.

           3   Q.  Thank you:

           4           "2: maximise safety of police officers.

           5           "3: neutralise threat posed by subject identified.

           6           "4: recover firearm or other lethal weapon.

           7           "5:  Secure & preserve evidence."

           8           That's the totality of the working strategy

           9       recommended to you, is it?

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  Would you have expected one in there about minimising

          12       the risk to the subject?

          13   A.  In training, you are taught the phrase "neutralise

          14       threat posed by the subjects identified".  My

          15       understanding of that, and of a Tactical Firearms

          16       Commander's understanding of that, was that included the

          17       risk to the subject.

          18           So "neutralise threat posed by subject" isn't (?)

          19       the threat he or she poses to themselves whilst in

          20       possession of a firearm.  It includes the person, the

          21       intended victim, they may be targeting.  And it

          22       includes, obviously, anybody else collateral, if you

          23       like, who may be harmed as part of that threat.  So it's

          24       about making that threat safe.

          25   Q.  Of course we have the luxury of hindsight here, we know




           1       what happened.

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  Which is that Mr Duggan got shot.

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  Do you say that the prospect of one of these subjects

           6       ending up being shot by an armed officer is covered by

           7       "neutralising threat posed by subjects"?

           8   A.  It's included, yes.

           9   Q.  You are quite clear about that, are you?

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  That's national training, is it?

          12   A.  That's training, yes.

          13   Q.  If we go to 303, second box.  These are for you to be

          14       considering and signing off, are they?

          15   A.  This is obviously the TFC's form, Tactical Firearms

          16       Commander's form, yes.  They will be completing these

          17       boxes.

          18   Q.  This top one:

          19           "I am satisfied based on the intelligence,

          20       information and threat assessment that the criteria for

          21       deployment of armed officers is NOT met ...........

          22       (signed)"

          23           Who's supposed to sign that?

          24   A.  The Strategic Firearms Commander will sign their copy,

          25       reflecting that decision.




           1   Q.  All right.  That's not signed.  Then we go down and we

           2       see the alternative:

           3           "Based on the intelligence, information and threat

           4       assessment I am satisfied that the criteria IS met for

           5       the deployment of armed officers, as I have reason to

           6       suppose that officers may have to protect themselves or

           7       others from the following subjects."

           8           And those include U1 and Mark Duggan.  And then it

           9       goes on:

          10           "Who I have reason to suppose ... "

          11           Then the first one:

          12           "Is in possession of, or has immediate access to,

          13       a firearm or other potentially lethal weapon ..."

          14           That's the only one marked "yes", isn't it?

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  That's actually signed off by, we see, Z51 on 1 August.

          17       Then if we jump to 305, we see the conflict management

          18       model yet again.  Again, is this a printed page?

          19   A.  Yes, it is.

          20   Q.  Then if we go over to CD306, we see that next stage, the

          21       "Tactical Options and Plan".  Can you decipher this

          22       handwriting for us?

          23   A.  It's not my handwriting, obviously, but I'll try.

          24   Q.  No, but it was submitted to you?

          25   A.  Yes, it was, yes.  This handwriting says:




           1           "Nick Bennett.

           2           "Date/time: 1 [August] '11 [approximately]

           3       1512 hours.

           4           "Meets my threat assessment.  Complies with my

           5       working strategy.  Plan L compliant.  There is always

           6       a risk to public [I think he's put 'public' twice there

           7       so 'public public' --

           8   Q.  I think it's "public police".

           9   A.  "Public police", sorry.  And:

          10           "Subjects when attempting to arrest armed subjects.

          11       Two lethal options given, one subject ..."

          12           I cannot read the next bit.

          13           Sir, can I actually take the opportunity to say the

          14       handwritten piece of this form wasn't presented to me on

          15       the 3rd.  What happened -- can I just clarify?

          16           The forms were sent to me on computer, on email,

          17       which is what I signed off.  So this handwriting,

          18       I didn't see.

          19   Q.  I was going to suggest to you that if somebody presented

          20       you something with handwriting you couldn't read, you

          21       would presumably ask them what it meant?

          22   A.  Exactly, and ask them to write it again.  So, no,

          23       I didn't see it, no.

          24   Q.  I am not going to put anything to you that's --

          25   A.  I have not seen any handwriting.




           1   Q.  Very well.  Is there anything else in this form that was

           2       relevant to your decision making?

           3   A.  Not on this form, no.

           4   Q.  Right.  That's one of the two forms that you got on

           5       2 August, wasn't it?

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  Then we also get, from Mr Bennett himself, the man with

           8       the handwriting, the FA5.  Can we have a look at that,

           9       please.

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  That's at CD327, and again, copies of that will be

          12       distributed.  This will be C7 for the members of the

          13       jury.  Do you have that?

          14   A.  Yes, thank you.

          15   Q.  It's another printed form.  It's called a "Tactical

          16       advice document" and we see, looking down to the final

          17       three lines on that first page, the author is

          18       Inspector Bennett and it was created on 1 August and the

          19       review date is: "If intelligence changes".

          20           Just help us with how these are completed.

          21       Ordinarily, would a tactical advice document have a date

          22       in the box marked review date or what?

          23   A.  No.  The intelligence we are working from is very

          24       specific and it's current.  In the Trident world,

          25       intelligence changes every five minutes.  You've got six




           1       subjects, all with numerous associates, as you know 48

           2       core nominals of the TMD to start off with.  So joint

           3       operations, particularly you have activities going on

           4       all the time where the intelligence picture will be

           5       changing, which means your options and tactical plan

           6       will be subject to review and possible change.

           7       Therefore, I think that's fair to say if intelligence

           8       changes, we will review it.

           9   Q.  Again, does that fit in with this conflict management

          10       model then?

          11   A.  Yes, it does.

          12   Q.  If we go over the page to 328, can I just run through

          13       what I take to be a printed page; is that right?

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  Just looking at the first half, "Tactical advice

          16       general":

          17           "This tactical advice document should be prepared

          18       taking into account the following matters:

          19           "Information & intelligence about the operation and

          20       the subject(s)

          21           "Objectives of the policing operation

          22           "Threat assessment

          23           "Working strategy of the authorised firearms

          24       operation

          25           "Tactical parameters ..."




           1           We may to explain what they are later on:

           2           "Resources available

           3           "Guidance contained in the ACPO Manual of Guidance

           4       on the management, command and deployment of armed

           5       officers

           6           "MPS policy on the police use of firearms standard

           7       operating procedures

           8           "UK law including human rights legislation

           9           "Before an MPS Tactical Advisor can provide

          10       appropriate tactical advice it is necessary for the

          11       Tactical Firearms Commander in charge of the operation

          12       to provide the Tactical Advisor with:

          13           "Threat assessment

          14           "The working strategy."

          15           Was that all standard operating procedure?

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  If I can take that top bullet point:

          18           "Information & intelligence about the operation and

          19       the subject(s)."

          20           Again, I do not want to sound like a broken record,

          21       if the information was known by the time this was

          22       created, that Mr Duggan was intending fairly soon to

          23       collect a gun from somebody called "Kevin" or "Kev",

          24       would you have thought that should be brought into this

          25       picture as part of the information and intelligence




           1       about the subjects?

           2   A.  If we take it back to what this operation was set up

           3       for.  It was to do surveillance on six subjects who had

           4       access to firearms and were using firearms.  We didn't

           5       know where they were being stored or located and

           6       therefore we were doing surveillance on those subjects

           7       to identify when they took possession of them and then

           8       effect an arrest.

           9           Whether Kevin Hutchinson-Foster or whether another

          10       subject was coming in, to any of those six subjects this

          11       operation was set up for that purpose, to make a safe

          12       arrest at that point when that firearm was handed over.

          13       So it could have been a number of people, as we knew

          14       were coming into those six subjects at that time, this

          15       operation was catered for exactly that eventuality,

          16       so --

          17   Q.  To go back to my question: if part of the intelligence

          18       picture was that one of the six subjects had

          19       a particular intention to pick up a gun from

          20       a particular person, would that not have been a relevant

          21       part of intelligence to know?

          22   A.  I would have expected it to have been briefing to the

          23       officers and to make the officers aware that there may

          24       have been heightened activity around one member of the

          25       six, and to be referenced as part of a general




           1       intelligence update on the document, yes.

           2   Q.  Would it not have been helpful for you to know?

           3   A.  I knew that it was being developed.

           4   Q.  Did you, because you just told us that on 3 August was

           5       the first you knew of the gist?

           6   A.  No, I said I knew on the 1st of a man called "Kevin"

           7       coming in to supply Mark Duggan.  It was not until

           8       3 August I knew he had been identified as Kevin

           9       Hutchinson-Foster.  I knew on the 3rd that Kevin

          10       Hutchinson-Foster was trying to locate a firearm to give

          11       to Mark Duggan, but nobody knew where those firearms

          12       were being stored.

          13   Q.  I do not want to be at all unfair to you.

          14   A.  No, no, that's fine.

          15   Q.  One of the difficulties is this, is it: that you were

          16       not allowed to write down the intelligence?

          17   A.  That's right.

          18   Q.  So you are working from your memory now?

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  Again, I'll be corrected if I am wrong, I have no doubt,

          21       but I understood you to be saying earlier on that you

          22       didn't see, on these forms, the intelligence picture

          23       that there was on the 1st and 2nd and that you didn't

          24       know of the intelligence picture which emerged on the

          25       1st or 2nd until the 3rd, when you got a gist.  You now




           1       just said that on the 1st you knew of the developing

           2       picture of Mr Duggan wanting to pick up a gun from

           3       "Kevin" or "Kev"; which is it?

           4   A.  On the 3rd, after my meeting with MIB, our intelligence

           5       holders and managers, I sat down with the SIO and I was

           6       satisfied that -- or he satisfied me that "Kev" was now

           7       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.  During the preceding two days

           8       I knew there was a gist of Kevin coming in but I didn't

           9       know anything other than that.

          10   Q.  Just somebody called Kevin?

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  Okay, thank you very much.  If we go over the page, this

          13       conflict management model again, page 329.  You told me

          14       earlier on that this isn't something which just applies

          15       to firearms operations.  So Tactical Advisors themselves

          16       have to go through this process, do they?

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  Thank you.  Then if we look at CD330, we see a printed

          19       form with some markings in.  It's very difficult to read

          20       what's under the -- it turns out to be black now but if

          21       we look at the first box there's:

          22           "Intelligence/information pertaining to operation.

          23       Yes.  FA2."

          24           What's that about?

          25   A.  The Tactical Firearms Commander would have sent and




           1       should send, a copy of the FA2 form to the Tactical

           2       Firearms Commander to read themselves to make their own

           3       assessment.

           4   Q.  So this is a log of the documents, is it?

           5   A.  Yes, yes.

           6   Q.  If we go down under the second set of boxes: "Tactical

           7       options applicable to operation", and if we go to the

           8       second lot under that:

           9           "Direct contact -- containment and call out."

          10           That's marked X.  And then the only other one that

          11       has an X in the box is:

          12           "Mobile Armed Support to Surveillance Operation."

          13           Can you help us with what all that means?

          14   A.  This document, as I said earlier, is obviously the FA5

          15       we discussed.  It's put together by an accredited expert

          16       in firearms operations.  They will advise the TFC,

          17       Tactical Firearms Commander, and the Strategic Firearms

          18       Commander on the options available to deal with this

          19       threat.  They will put a range of options on here to

          20       develop -- for use, sorry -- with a preferred option

          21       based on the intelligence they are told.  And the threat

          22       assessment and the working strategy which they are

          23       informed about, should they have the time in a planned

          24       operation.

          25           This document, therefore, has a number of options to




           1       deal with subjects, armed subjects, on foot, in vehicles

           2       or in buildings.  Based on their experience and their

           3       accreditation and their training, they have

           4       recommended -- Nick Bennett, the Tactical Advisor, has

           5       recommended a MASTS type operation.  So the recommended

           6       option, the tactical plan -- it is called a tactical

           7       plan -- was for a Mobile Armed Support to Surveillance.

           8   Q.  What is the "direct contact -- containment and call out"

           9       box?

          10   A.  That is concerning buildings.  So should your subject,

          11       as part of that operation, as you understand, be armed

          12       or otherwise so dangerous, they go into a building;

          13       there is an option there for the officers to follow them

          14       into a building and do a safe recovery of their firearm

          15       from that building.

          16   Q.  Just looking at this tactical advice document for the

          17       moment, we are not going any further.  If, later in the

          18       course of the operation, the relevant officers had

          19       become aware that a firearm to do with one of these

          20       subjects was in a particular building, they could have

          21       gone in under that tactical option, could they?

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  Thank you.  If we look over the page at CD331, we see

          24       the fine grain detail of all this, do we?

          25   A.  Yes.




           1   Q.  Just going fairly quickly through this page, "CO19

           2       intention":

           3           "1.  To covertly deploy firearms officers in order

           4       to arrest the subject(s) on the direction of the

           5       Tactical Firearms Commander by way of armed interception

           6       on foot, in an identified vehicle or in premises."

           7           So that covers the range of options we have just

           8       been talking about, does it?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  "2.  To provide armed support to surveillance and

          11       respond to any life threatening compromise.

          12           "3.  To provide a contingency to respond to any

          13       life-threatening event including a threat to a member of the

          14       public this may require direct-armed intervention."

          15           Is what we are seeing there a range of practical

          16       options to cover an unknowable wide range of events that

          17       may transpire over these four days?

          18   A.  Yes.  It is, but what it also does is it ensures that

          19       the recourse to the use of lethal option or conventional

          20       firearms is at the last recourse you take.  There's --

          21       in this document you have options which obviously

          22       involve firearms, they involve less lethal options, they

          23       involve direct contact with vehicles.  But it has

          24       a whole range of options which are available to the

          25       officers to choose, to minimise the recourse to lethal




           1       force.

           2   Q.  We'll come and see reference to Tasers and things when

           3       we look closer at that and perhaps this might be

           4       a convenient moment to stop, doing just that.

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.

           6           All right then, Detective Superintendent Mallon.

           7       That concludes the evidence for now.  Could you be back

           8       with us now at 2 o'clock.  I am saying this to all

           9       witnesses, please obviously do not discuss your evidence

          10       with anyone else.  Thank you very much.

          11   A.  Thank you, sir.

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  If you would like to leave us,

          13       firstly.

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You can leave all those there if you

          16       wish to.

          17   A.  Those are all mine.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes.

          19                      (The witness withdrew)

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much, members of the

          21       jury.  If you would like to leave us now and be back at

          22       2 o'clock.







          17   (1.06 pm)

          18                     (The short adjournment)

          19   (2.00 pm)

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We will have the jury in I think,

          21       thank you.

          22                  (In the presence of the jury)

          23   Address to the court re BBC footage by THE ASSISTANT CORONER

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Just before we press on with the

          25       witness, I've got a short announcement to make.  I felt,






           1       on reflection, I should do that in the presence of the

           2       jury because whenever anything happens in the presence

           3       of the jury then the press know that they can publish it

           4       and it seems to me that it's something which can be and

           5       should be public.  Therefore, this is what I propose to

           6       say.

           7           Very shortly ago, the BBC were served a notice by me

           8       to provide evidence in the form of statements setting

           9       out the names and addresses of persons concerned in

          10       making a certain video footage, which was of the scene

          11       on the day in question, which had only very recently

          12       come to our attention.

          13           We -- I say "we", that's the Coroner and my team,

          14       Mr Underwood and those with him -- were unable to

          15       progress the matter any further without having that

          16       knowledge.  So I issued a notice to the BBC, and indeed

          17       we had a hearing in front of this court, a public

          18       hearing, concerning that.

          19           We have come to a resolution of the proceedings on

          20       that and I have been asked by the BBC to make it quite

          21       clear that, in one way, the BBC have been helpful and

          22       they have been able to assist but also the BBC want to

          23       make it quite clear that they have not been too helpful

          24       because they did not want to, in any way, compromise

          25       their source and they want it to be known that nothing




           1       that they have said has led my team to get to the source

           2       of that material.

           3           In fact, other ways were found and we were able to

           4       find the footage with sound, I've got it now

           5       (indicates), I saw it last night, and we are able to

           6       deal with that.

           7           I hope that you, the jury, will be able to see that

           8       footage and hear the audio track.  But we have to do

           9       some work on it before we get to that stage.  It's

          10       footage taken from the flats -- we've been there on the

          11       view -- up above the scene, shortly after the incident

          12       itself, but it may be of assistance.  It's shortly after

          13       the shooting and before any gun is found.  So we are

          14       going to enhance it and see what we can do about it to

          15       make it in a much more presentable form for you.

          16           As I have made, therefore, an order against the BBC,

          17       which was going to be reviewed now today, I am quite

          18       content to announce that that part of the order

          19       therefore has been complied with by the direct source,

          20       so I no longer need to continue the notice that I have

          21       made against the BBC.  So therefore, I revoke that.

          22           So that's it for that.  Thank you, members of the

          23       jury, sorry, a bit of law, but also important facts

          24       touching on your proceedings.  As I say tantalisingly,

          25       I will leave that there.  That will be something which




           1       my team will then look at in due course.

           2           Mr Underwood, is there anything more that needs to

           3       be said about that?

           4   MR UNDERWOOD:  No, thank you, apart from thanking the BBC

           5       for their help.

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Good.  Therefore I will ask then for

           7       our witness, Detective Superintendent Mallon, to return

           8       and continue giving her evidence.

           9                      (The witness returned)

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  Ms Mallon you

          11       are still under the oath that you took --

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- and you are answering questions

          14       from Mr Underwood.

          15        DETECTIVE SUPERINTENDENT FIONA MALLON (continued)

          16              Questions by MR UNDERWOOD (continued)

          17   MR UNDERWOOD:  We were on CD331 just looking through this

          18       form FA5.

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  I am on the second paragraph, "Resources", which deal

          21       with the SCD11 officers, the CO19 officers, et cetera.

          22           Then if we just look at "Recommended use of armed

          23       resources" in this tactical advice:

          24           "SCD11 surveillance officers are armed for their own

          25       protection.  They are deployed to assist with the




           1       control, intelligence gathering and positive

           2       identification of the subject(s).

           3           "It is recommended that the firearms team maintain

           4       the ability to deploy comprehensively.  The specific of

           5       method of deployment will be dealt with by the CO19 team

           6       leader and Tactical Advisor however as a guide it would

           7       be expected the team retain the ability to deploy from

           8       at least 3 covert armed response vehicles."

           9           Can I just pick something out of that?  It says:

          10           "The specific method of deployment will be dealt

          11       with by the CO19 team leader and Tactical Advisor ..."

          12           This form is of course created by one Tactical

          13       Advisor, Inspector Bennett.  Is he there referring to

          14       a separate Tactical Advisor?

          15   A.  No.

          16   Q.  Right.  Then it says:

          17           "CO19 officers will be responsible for 'armed

          18       interception' of those actively engaged in any offences

          19       as soon as a sufficiency of evidence exists to justify

          20       deployment."

          21           I do not think we have yet come across the phrase

          22       "trigger point", so let me introduce it.  Is that

          23       a phrase known to you?

          24   A.  Tipping point.

          25   Q.  Tipping point, sorry, yes.




           1   A.  Tipping point, yes.

           2   Q.  That's the reason why I have not introduced it, it's the

           3       wrong phrase.  Tipping point, sorry.

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  What does it mean?

           6   A.  "Tipping point" is an understanding between yourself and

           7       the Tactical Firearms Commander at which point you are

           8       going to use an armed team to intervene and make

           9       an arrest and recover the firearm.  That is the

          10       understanding.  It's a point where you are going to make

          11       that arrest, you are going to make that interception.

          12       What is the point we are actually going to change and do

          13       that arrest?

          14   Q.  Let's be clear here: the tipping point suggested to you

          15       then was "as soon as sufficiency of evidence exists to

          16       justify deployment".

          17           Sufficiency of evidence to arrest someone?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  Did this strike you as a sensible recommended use of

          20       armed resources?

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  Then if we go over the page to 332, there's a heading

          23       "Tactical options & contingencies":

          24           "In the event of emerging intelligence which is

          25       considered by the nominated Tactical Firearms Commander




           1       to warrant an armed interception to stop and arrest the

           2       subject(s) then the following options are available ..."

           3           Then just deal with "Vehicle stops" for the moment:

           4           "Option 1 stop.

           5           "intelligence suggests that the subject or occupants

           6       of a vehicle may be armed, and there are environmental

           7       reasons that make this option safe to undertake (eg

           8       vehicle stops in a deserted cul-de-sac).  The CO19 CARVS

           9       will initiate a stop from behind, make contact with the

          10       occupants, and negotiate a controlled detention.

          11           "Option 2 stop.

          12           "Intelligence suggests that the subject or occupants

          13       of a vehicle may be armed, and one or more of the below

          14       factor(s) exist

          15           "The anticipated non-compliant actions of a suspect

          16       once stopped, where it is believed

          17           "Danger to life may result from those actions.

          18           "The anticipated likelihood of an attempted escape

          19       by the suspect, where it's believed this

          20           "May present a danger to life

          21           "The inability to isolate a suspect from the public

          22       by containing the vehicle at a distance

          23           "Thereby causing danger to life.

          24           "Three CO19 covert armed response vehicles will

          25       'contain subject vehicle and rapidly contain and




           1       dominate the occupants, utilising armed cover and verbal

           2       commands'."

           3           Then it deals with the statute for that.  Then:

           4           "This rapid and aggressive action is a deliberate

           5       tactic used to surprise, dominate and psychologically

           6       overpower a potentially non-compliant suspect, thereby

           7       reducing that suspect's ability to carry out any hostile

           8       actions, thus attempting to maintain an acceptable

           9       balance of their own and the officer's right to life.

          10       If the vehicle attempts to drive off or fails to

          11       completely stop, to protect officers and the public it

          12       may be necessary to attempt to disable the vehicle by

          13       using Hatton rounds to deflate its tyres."

          14           One of the tactical options being presented to you

          15       then was a vehicle stop; is that right?

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  There were two types of vehicle stops that may emerge

          18       during the course of the operation.

          19   A.  To be frank, there's a number of vehicle stops.  To

          20       simplify it, you can have -- as you are probably aware,

          21       you have the traffic officer stops, you have voluntary

          22       stops with cars, enforced stops means where you actually

          23       use a set model, if you like, to force that car and to

          24       surround that car.  So, yes, these were enforced options

          25       stops to stop that car -- a car safely.




           1   Q.  Is the one that actually turned out to be used the one

           2       I have just read to you, the three CO19 vehicles

           3       containing the subject vehicle with the intention of

           4       surprising, dominating and psychologically overpowering

           5       a potentially non-compliant suspect?

           6   A.  Yes, an option to --

           7   Q.  Sorry?

           8   A.  Sorry, that is an option to enforce stop, yes.

           9   Q.  I called it a hard stop when I opened this to the jury;

          10       is that a phrase known --

          11   A.  Yes, yes, call it hard stop.

          12   Q.  At least I have that phrase right.  If we just drop

          13       down, there's a third option of a stop, then armed

          14       pedestrian stops and then there's "Containment &

          15       call-out", which we saw early on as a ticked box:

          16           "Should the subject(s) enter a building or

          17       structure, and it's necessary for the Tactical Firearms

          18       Commander to activate an arrest CO19 will be able to

          19       contain the building by suitably trained and equipped,

          20       armed officers, who will attempt to establish contact

          21       with any occupants within the premises, by the following

          22       means:

          23           "Forcing the front door and affecting a limited

          24       entry.  This allows for immediate control of the

          25       environment, facilitates control of the occupants, and




           1       allows for further tactical options to be implemented if

           2       necessary."

           3           So that's one of the options that was going

           4       presented to you, was it?

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  Then something which we almost got to before lunch,

           7       "Less lethal options":

           8           "'Less lethal' options in the form of Taser will be

           9       deployed on the operation.  Taser will be considered for

          10       use using the continuum of force as with any tactical

          11       option, and should be a proportionate response to any

          12       threat or perceived threat.  A Taser discharge will NOT

          13       necessitate a post-incident procedure unless the

          14       recipient of the discharge is hospitalised as a result.

          15       The CO19 team leader will advise on the relevant

          16       protocols."

          17           In terms of the presentation of the range of options

          18       to you, had you any notion at all which one might turn

          19       out to be the one that was used?

          20   A.  The recommended option which is the front of the paper,

          21       is the Mobile Armed Support To Surveillance option which

          22       is what I described earlier: the surveillance of the

          23       subjects with an armed support team to make the arrest.

          24       That was the recommended option.  That is the one

          25       I was -- agreed and preferred to use.  However, in the




           1       change of intelligence, as it kept manoeuvring during

           2       the day -- it changes every five minutes -- there were

           3       other options to manage changes in circumstances, to

           4       manage different eventualities.

           5   Q.  Where does this less lethal option fit into that?  Is

           6       that one that could be applied to a pedestrian stop, to

           7       a hard stop, to going into a house?

           8   A.  With less lethal options, we'll deal with those first.

           9       Your tactical plan should always include an option which

          10       is obviously -- means you do everything you can to

          11       resort to the use of lethal force. (sic)  There's all

          12       these options available should you need to use them.

          13           With the use of a Taser, it's used to control

          14       violence, as opposed to an imminent threat to life.  For

          15       example, if you stop somebody and they are fighting,

          16       uncontrollable you may use a Taser.  I am not an expert

          17       in firearms that's a Tactical Advisor's role -- CO19

          18       officer's role, I am not an expert, but my experience --

          19       and I have had Tasers deployed on my operations -- is

          20       they have been used in relation to violence.

          21           They are unpredictable sometimes but they should

          22       used for violence, as opposed to imminent threat to life

          23       situations.

          24   Q.  If you are the wrong person to ask about this please

          25       tell me and I'll certainly direct this question to other




           1       officers, if necessary: but was it your understanding

           2       when you were looking at these forms that a possibility

           3       would be the use of Tasers in a hard stop?

           4   A.  To be perfectly honest, the people who use Taser would

           5       be the better people to give that answer.

           6   Q.  Fine.  Then if we go down to the bottom of the page, the

           7       last quarter, "Conclusion":

           8           "My recommendation is to conduct the operation with

           9       armed SCD11 Branch officers doing the surveillance

          10       supported by armed CO19 Branch officers providing

          11       response contingencies to the Tactical Firearms

          12       Commander should the need arise.

          13           "This option enables all the objectives of the

          14       operation to be met whilst fully catering for the

          15       threat/risk assessment around this operation."

          16           That's a standard MASTS recommendation, is it?

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  Thank you.  Can we jump to page 339.  Something is set

          19       out by the inspector who completed it at the bottom

          20       there, the final quarter of the page:

          21           "Tactical Advisors -- Authorised operations.

          22           "I am the Nominated Firearms Tactical Advisor for

          23       this operation.  If any material changes to the

          24       intelligence/information, or operational objectives are

          25       evident either myself, or the 24-hour on-call SFO




           1       Tactical Advisor should be contacted to review this

           2       document.  All CO19 supervises are trained and

           3       accredited Tactical Advisors.  If additional advice is

           4       required during a deployment the Operational Firearms

           5       Commander should be consulted.  Any advice given in

           6       these circumstances will be recorded in OFC's log."

           7           So what level of change of intelligence would you

           8       understand would be triggered by that sort of thing?

           9   A.  Sorry, what do you mean?

          10   Q.  Let's take the position, as you understood it, when you

          11       received these documents.  Leave aside for the moment

          12       precisely what you may or may not have known about "Kev"

          13       or "Kevin" or Mr Hutchinson-Foster.  You are focusing on

          14       six people, one of whom is Mr Duggan.  You are doing

          15       this against a background of what you think those people

          16       have been up to according to the intelligence and it

          17       gets to more specific background of an upsurge in

          18       activity, which you wanted this MASTS operation to go

          19       and disrupt.

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  If specific intelligence had come in about one of those

          22       six men wanting to pick up a gun or being in possession

          23       of a gun or having a clandestine meeting that you could

          24       usefully disrupt, would you have anticipated that this

          25       would then be triggered, ie that you would have to go




           1       back to the on-call SFO Tactical Advisor?

           2   A.  No.  This plan was exactly set up for a mobile armed

           3       surveillance operation.  This plan was set up to recover

           4       firearms off six people.  The contingency in that plan,

           5       the tactical options were agreed, everybody understood

           6       what we were doing.  This plan was exactly what we were

           7       meant to be doing.  The intelligence was vindicated that

           8       Mark Duggan did actually take possession of a firearm,

           9       and that's what the operation was set up for, to do

          10       surveillance, then do an arrest to pick up the firearm,

          11       so no.

          12   Q.  Can you help us with what that means:

          13           "If any material changes to the

          14       intelligence/information, or operational objectives are

          15       evident, either myself or the 24-hour on-call SFO

          16       Tactical Advisor should be contacted to review this

          17       document."

          18   A.  The objectives have not changed.

          19   Q.  No, but what about the information or intelligence?

          20   A.  The intelligence was that those six subjects had

          21       possession of firearms, were using firearms and

          22       therefore the fact that somebody else coming into one of

          23       those subjects to give them a firearm or arrange

          24       collection of a firearm did not change that intelligence

          25       picture.  It was as it was at the start.




           1   Q.  How do you square that with the conflict management?

           2   A.  In that?

           3   Q.  When new intelligence comes in you are supposed to

           4       re-evaluate everything in light of the conflict

           5       management model.

           6   A.  The thought process will be revisited by the Tactical

           7       Firearms Commander, will be revisited by myself, and the

           8       crux of the intelligence is there are six subjects who

           9       are using firearms.  So therefore the intelligence

          10       hasn't changed.  The specifics in relation to who or

          11       when, we had names but we knew people were going to be

          12       coming in and out of them anyway to supply firearms, so

          13       therefore it didn't change the plan.

          14   Q.  All right this may be a bit hypothetical but let's put

          15       this.  The preferred option here was the MASTS, the

          16       Mobile Armed Support To Surveillance, and a number of

          17       options could have emerged out of that, depending on how

          18       the intelligence worked out, yes?  If intelligence came

          19       in, in the course of the period between this form coming

          20       to you and the 6 August, to say that X was going to pick

          21       up a gun at Y address, that's hard intelligence which is

          22       going to focus down this range of options, isn't it?

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  Would it be relevant, for example, to consider taking

          25       resources away from the five other potential suspects




           1       and putting them all on the one suspect?  Would that be

           2       considered?

           3   A.  It depends on the intelligence.  If you had specific

           4       information that a gun or firearm, whatever you want to

           5       call it, is being stored at a particular location then

           6       the safest option to do is a containment and callout,

           7       which is a building option, where you can surround the

           8       building, take the arrest, take the firearm, it's done

           9       within a limited environment, it's not in a public

          10       arena.

          11           However, at no point, authorising this operation and

          12       afterwards, did I know where the gun was being stored.

          13       So for me, from the start, to the completion of the

          14       operation, the mobile arm supported operation was the

          15       best tactic to choose.  It was the best plan: it was

          16       safe, it was surveillance with an arrest opportunity.

          17   Q.  I am not criticising.

          18   A.  I am just trying to explain.

          19   Q.  All I'm doing is trying to work out what these phrases

          20       mean and to help the jury understand what it was that

          21       was supposed to happen in response to developing

          22       intelligence.

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  Thank you very much.  Can we go back to that document

          25       and look at the individuals that were going to be




           1       involved.  ZZ17 was to be an intelligence officer on

           2       this; I think, is that right?

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  ZZ46 and ZZ37 were also going to have intelligence

           5       roles; is that right?

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  You told us that your policy was always to have

           8       discussions when you got these sort of documents.  Did

           9       that happen here --

          10   A.  Yes, it did.

          11   Q.  -- to your satisfaction?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  Having done that, you then created your form FA3A is

          14       that right?

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  Perhaps we could look at that, please.  Again, there are

          17       copies of this for the jury.  It's at CE110.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  This will become our next --

          19   MR UNDERWOOD:  It's C8.  (Handed)

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Members of the jury, we'll get you

          21       some bigger files.  When I said to you yesterday to feel

          22       free to write on the documents, they are yours.  You are

          23       also free to pull them apart like I'm doing to get rid

          24       of the staples, if you want to, to turn it over.  As

          25       I say, it's for you to deal with them as you wish.




           1   MR UNDERWOOD:  Again, like the tactical firearms document we

           2       looked at, this is in two parts: firstly, a planning

           3       document; and secondly, provision for writing in as

           4       a log.

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  Is this the FA3A you actually created for this four-day

           7       operation?

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  Running through, trying to find the date on it; can you

          10       help us?

          11   A.  Sorry, the date of authority, sir.

          12   Q.  The date you created this document?

          13   A.  2 August.

          14   Q.  Thank you.  If I go to page 114 under "Summary of key

          15       intelligence", you've inserted here the summary of the

          16       intelligence that we found on the earlier FAs.

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  Thank you.  Then likewise, over at page 115, you have

          19       set out, for example, in relation to Mr Duggan,

          20       information that was found on the FA2A.

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  116, yet again we've got this conflict management model,

          23       have we?

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   Q.  Then at 117, you've got "Threat & risk".  You earlier on




           1       said on the left-hand side you have the people and then

           2       you identified the risk.  Can we just run through them.

           3       We have who it is who's been identified as being at risk

           4       by the Tactical Firearms Commander, and that's the

           5       public, surveillance police officers armed, CO19 armed

           6       officers, unarmed officers and subjects.

           7           We've already picked up, starting from the bottom,

           8       that subjects were identified by you as at medium risk.

           9       But at number 3, CO19 armed officers are at high risk.

          10       That was an agreed level of risk, was it?

          11   A.  Yes, it was.

          12   Q.  Can you just explain to the jury how it was that the

          13       CO19 armed officers, these highly trained men, were at

          14       high risk when the subjects were at medium risk?

          15   A.  Yes.  With the officers, you can do everything you can

          16       to maximise their safety.  You can give them the

          17       equipment, the resources, the training.  With a subject,

          18       who's got a firearm -- at 5 o'clock maybe on a Thursday

          19       afternoon as Mark Duggan had -- you cannot predict what

          20       they're going to do with it.  You cannot control them,

          21       you cannot put specific control measures in, you can do

          22       your best to control the risk, but you don't know

          23       exactly what they are going to do, whereas we know what

          24       the firearms officers are going to do.

          25           However, when they are put in conflict with a person




           1       with a firearm, they are in high risk because they are

           2       trying to arrest them and we don't know what that person

           3       is going to do.

           4   Q.  Would you anticipate that this level of assessment would

           5       become known to the CO19 officers?

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  So in the course of this particular four-day operation

           8       you would understand that the CO19 officers would be

           9       told that the agreed level of risk to them was a high

          10       one?

          11   A.  Yes.  But I would also expect from their own experience

          12       that they would know it would be high.  They are trained

          13       for this specific function to deal with this type of

          14       criminality.

          15   Q.  Okay.  Then at page 118, we see the conflict management

          16       model again in relation to the working strategy, do we?

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  Is that what we actually see put in effect at page 119?

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  So looking at page 119, under "Strategy, powers and

          21       policy", you say:

          22           "Based on the intelligence, information and threat

          23       assessment I am satisfied that the criteria [is] met for

          24       the deployment of armed officers, as I have reason to

          25       suppose that officers may have to protect themselves or




           1       others from the following subjects ..."

           2           As we have seen before, U1 and Mark Duggan.  Then,

           3       in fact, we have seen more yeses on this one:

           4           "Who I have reason to suppose:

           5           "Is in possession of or has immediate access to,

           6       a firearm or other potentially lethal weapon; or

           7           "Is otherwise so dangerous that the deployment of

           8       armed officers is appropriate; or

           9           "As an operational contingency as part of a specific

          10       operation (based on the threat assessment) ..."

          11           All of those were met, were they, as far as you were

          12       concerned?

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  Then we go over the page to 120.  You have set out your

          15       working strategy, and it's one we have seen before.

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  Again, number 3, there is:

          18           "Neutralise threat posed by subjects identified."

          19           Your evidence is still that that includes

          20       neutralising threat posed to the subjects, is it?

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  Then you set out the legal powers towards the bottom of

          23       the page there, section 3 of the Criminal Law Act and

          24       the Power of Arrest and compliance with ACPO manual of

          25       guidance, et cetera.  Were you satisfied that all of




           1       those applied?

           2   A.  Yes I was.  This, sir, is the second part of the working

           3       strategy.  This is your powers and policy that support

           4       your decision making and give it a legal basis.  Within

           5       this second part of this strategy I have actually

           6       referred specifically to minimising risk to the subjects

           7       again.  So I've reinforced that on number 3 of my

           8       working strategy.

           9           So if you look at the final line within that,

          10       I specifically say --

          11   Q.  Sorry, where are you taking us?

          12   A.  Sorry.  In the bottom of the powers and policies, sir.

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  On the same page that we are on, is

          14       it?

          15   A.  121.

          16   MR UNDERWOOD:  We are over the page now, are we?  Sorry, go

          17       on.

          18   A.  The last line in the box refers to:

          19           "Follow the subject to a safe area where he can be

          20       arrested with minimal risk to himself, the public and

          21       the police."

          22           So 3, plus that, is reinforcing.

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That's the least intrusive?

          24   A.  Yes, sir.

          25   MR UNDERWOOD:  Let's go through your reasoning here, if we




           1       may, page 121.  The third paragraph starts with the

           2       reference to the Human Rights Act and you then start

           3       with "Proportionality":

           4           "The subjects named in this application are involved

           5       in serious armed criminality.  They are extremely

           6       dangerous men who have a history of violence and a high

           7       level of sophistication around their knowledge of police

           8       overt methods.  The intelligence case indicates that

           9       these subjects have access to, use and possesses

          10       firearms.  I fear that the subjects may take steps to

          11       remain at large if challenged by police or an operation

          12       is compromised in error.  These steps might include

          13       using a firearm against officers, therefore I consider

          14       the deployment of AFOs [Authorised Firearms Officers] is

          15       proportionate?

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  This is a passage which I do not think we have seen

          18       before.  This is your thinking, is it?

          19   A.  Yes it is, yes.

          20   Q.  Then "Accountability":

          21           "I am a NPIA accredited Strategic Firearms

          22       Commander.  I am giving authority for the deployment of

          23       AFOs as I have reason to suppose that officers may

          24       protect themselves or others from a person in possession

          25       of a firearm or who has immediate access to such.  The




           1       operational command will be by Z51 an accredited TFC who

           2       is experienced in the use of the conflict management

           3       model.  The operation is subject to review by SFC and

           4       TFC to ensure that the does not imply or convey.  The

           5       authority to use firearms does not imply or convey

           6       an automatic authority to use firearms as a first choice

           7       option when confronted with an imminent threat."

           8           Again, does that reflect what you told us about five

           9       minutes ago, that in relation to whether firearms

          10       officers would be likely to use a gun or a Taser, that's

          11       something we have to ask somebody further down the

          12       actual tactical chain?

          13   A.  Yes.  That option was available to them to use.

          14   Q.  Thank you:

          15           "The application of force and the means by which it

          16       is affected is always a personal decision for each

          17       individual officer.  Less lethal alternatives should

          18       always be considered and each officer is reminded within

          19       the briefing of their responsibilities in accordance with

          20       policy."

          21           Again, does that reflect what you have just told us:

          22       it's a matter for people further down the tactical chain

          23       to answer for themselves about what sort of weaponry

          24       they use --

          25   A.  Yes.




           1   Q.  -- but they should always start with the least lethal

           2       option, is that it?

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  Then the:

           5           "The role of the Tactical Firearms Commander is

           6       specific and the TFC in this operation is aware of their

           7       roles and responsibilities -- in particular briefings

           8       firearms warnings and the strict reminder."

           9           That strict reminder is just what we have said is

          10       it: you start with the least lethal option?

          11   A.  Yes.  It's a formatted briefing which the Tactical

          12       Firearms Commander will give, reminding the officers

          13       involved in the operation around recourse to lethal

          14       force and the Human Rights Act principles and so forth,

          15       and legalities around the operation.  So it's

          16       a reminder.

          17   Q.  That's something you are familiar with, because you were

          18       the TFC once upon a time.

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  Then the:

          21           "The TFC is currently occupationally and

          22       operationally competent."

          23           Then you say justified and legitimate aim:

          24           "To safely arrest the subjects."

          25           Then "Necessity".




           1           That's a word that we know has particular meanings

           2       which the Coroner will have to tell the jury about in

           3       due course, but:

           4           "The operation is necessary to bring a suspected

           5       offender to justice and take steps to recover a firearm.

           6       If the weapon is not recovered, there remains a risk

           7       that it could be used to kill again."

           8           Can I ask you there whether you have gone from the

           9       general to the specific because you are considering

          10       a particular firearm that Mr Duggan might pick up?

          11   A.  I am not talking about a firearm Mr Duggan may pick up,

          12       no.  What I'm speaking about here is across north London

          13       we have been so successful in recovering firearms.  By

          14       that stage we recovered over 100 firearms and they were

          15       getting harder and harder to get off the criminals, to

          16       be basic.

          17           Recovering a firearm isn't as easy as it sounds.

          18       They are passed from person to person to person and, as

          19       a result of their recovery, they were getting used more

          20       and more in shootings and in murders.  Therefore, you

          21       get one firearm that could be used over and over again

          22       and, in the likelihood of the firearms we were

          23       recovering at that time, the majority of them had been

          24       used in 20-odd shootings and murders because we were so

          25       successful in getting them back.  So yes, it was




           1       a generalisation as opposed to in relation to Mark

           2       Duggan and a firearm he may have.

           3   Q.  The only reason I ask is this: if we start with that

           4       proportionality, for example, you are talking about

           5       there subjects having access to and possessing firearms,

           6       and you have gone from "firearms to a suspected

           7       offender" and "recover a firearm" and "if the weapon is

           8       not recovered, there remains a risk that it could be

           9       used".

          10           More to the point, you say "it could be used to kill

          11       again".  On one reading, that looks like you're thinking

          12       there of a specific gun that's been used to kill

          13       someone, as opposed to what we were looking at earlier

          14       on of the potential for a number of guns.

          15   A.  No, no.

          16   Q.  Okay.  Then page 123.  We are at the next step in the

          17       conflict management model, which is the "Tactical

          18       options", yes?

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  Underlined:

          21           "What will the tactic look like?"

          22           Then we see over the page, do we, how that's set

          23       out, at page 124?

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   Q.  Again, no criticism, what you do is refer back to the




           1       FA5, which is what --

           2   A.  It's a document, yes.

           3   Q.  Then you sign that off, do you, at page 125.  Crossing

           4       against "Yes" where you're asked:

           5           "Is action proportionate to the threats?

           6           "Is action capable of achieving strategy?"

           7           Is that right?

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  As you say, you signed it off about 3.20 on the

          10       afternoon of 2 August.

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  Then that having been done, did you send that to Z51 and

          13       to Inspector Bennett?

          14   A.  No, not that afternoon.

          15   Q.  When did that go?

          16   A.  That went the following day at -- just before 2 o'clock.

          17   Q.  Did you have a further meeting about this operation on

          18       3 August?

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  What was that about?

          21   A.  I manage the whole of north London and it's my

          22       responsibility to ensure that the operations that I am

          23       running have the right intelligence -- the proper

          24       intelligence feed to support those operations.

          25           I, as a manager of intel, often go and speak to




           1       people who provide the intelligence and I decided

           2       I wanted to go and have a meeting with intelligence

           3       providers myself, satisfy myself what the intelligence

           4       was about, and also have a wider view of the whole

           5       operation around Operation Dibri.  It had been running

           6       for two and a half years, and it was a regular thing for

           7       me to go and do -- meetings to go and have with

           8       intelligence providers.

           9           So, yes, I had asked for a meeting specifically that

          10       afternoon.  They were available on the Monday -- sorry,

          11       on Wednesday, the 3rd, so I went that morning and had

          12       a meeting with the intelligence providers.

          13   Q.  So on the morning of the 3rd then, you got some more

          14       intelligence about Mark Duggan's intention to pick up

          15       the gun from Mr Hutchinson-Foster, did you?

          16   A.  No.  In that meeting, there were the managers of

          17       intelligence as opposed to those receiving the

          18       intelligence.

          19           The purpose of that meeting was to reassure me that

          20       I was putting all my efforts and assets into the right

          21       operation, the TMD were still the most harmful and

          22       dangerous gang in London, the intelligence was credible

          23       and that we were putting our -- working towards the

          24       right objectives.

          25           As part of that meeting, the intelligence managers




           1       went through the six subjects as part of that operation,

           2       and gave a broad brush view of what they were capable

           3       of.  During that meeting, it was apparent that, at that

           4       particular time in that meeting on the Wednesday

           5       morning, that Mark Duggan was more likely, or trying

           6       harder, than the others to get possession of a firearm.

           7       There were numerous names coming into those six

           8       subjects, trying to supply firearms or either to source

           9       firearms from those six people.

          10           So the purpose of the meeting achieved its

          11       objectives: 1, that it showed me TMD was still the most

          12       dangerous gang in London and they were all armed and

          13       there were a lot of guns out there I still need to

          14       recover; and secondly, those six subjects were actively

          15       involved in armed criminality.

          16   Q.  It's entirely my fault because I took something from

          17       an earlier answer of yours to suggest that it was on the

          18       3rd that you particularly learned that Mr Duggan was

          19       attempting to pick up a gun from Mr Hutchinson-Foster;

          20       did I get that wrong?

          21   A.  It wasn't during that meeting with MIB.

          22   Q.  Right.

          23   A.  It was when I spoke to the SIO following the meeting who

          24       informed me about the update around Kevin

          25       Hutchinson-Foster.




           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That meeting was at 10 o'clock --

           2   A.  Yes, sir.

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- in the morning obviously; how

           4       long did it go on for?

           5   A.  It was due for an hour and it was cut short by about

           6       20 minutes because they were running late, about

           7       40 minutes.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  So it was after that.

           9   MR UNDERWOOD:  So it finished 11-ish?

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  But how soon after that did you have the update from the

          12       SIO about Mr Hutchinson-Foster?

          13   A.  After that.  After that meeting.  We were together in

          14       that meeting, so it flowed naturally after that.

          15   Q.  So at that point then, you had satisfied yourself that

          16       there was credible intelligence in relation to all six,

          17       that they were dangerous people who may well be

          18       attempting to get possession of firearms or be in

          19       possession of firearms, yes?

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  Was the only specific intelligence in relation to

          22       Mr Duggan about what might happen soon?

          23   A.  In that meeting, are you talking about, in that meeting

          24       or the meeting with the SIO?

          25   Q.  I'm talking about in that meeting and directly




           1       afterwards?

           2   A.  In the meeting with the intelligence holders, there were

           3       names of numerous people, no specifics about addresses

           4       or where firearms were stored, about activity those six

           5       people were involved.  Numerous names, but no locations

           6       we could automatically go to and do activity then and

           7       there, nothing of that, otherwise I would have actioned.

           8       It is common sense, it's my job.

           9           After that meeting, the SIO explained to me that

          10       "Kevin" had been identified as Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.

          11       That was what I knew at that time.  All I knew other

          12       than that was that we didn't have a place where the

          13       firearms were being stored or who was arranging to give

          14       the firearms to Mark Duggan.

          15           Again, I have to stress an earlier point, firearms

          16       aren't easy to get hold of.  Generally, and in nearly

          17       all the cases, we have middle people who will hold the

          18       firearms who will store the firearms.  They are often

          19       women, or they are children because of sentences and

          20       legislation within our country, and therefore we have to

          21       find where those guns are.  So it's not

          22       a straightforward practice.

          23   Q.  I'll take you in a moment to the 4 August, but did

          24       anything change, as far as you were concerned, about the

          25       intelligence in relation to Mr Duggan and




           1       Mr Hutchinson-Foster, after that discussion with the

           2       SIO?

           3   A.  No, the intelligence didn't change.

           4   Q.  So the end point of your understanding of the

           5       intelligence was this, was it: that Mr Duggan was one of

           6       the six, he was attempting to get a firearm from

           7       somebody who had now been identified as

           8       Mr Hutchinson-Foster?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  You didn't know when or where that would happen?

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  You didn't know where the firearm was being stored?

          13   A.  Yes.  On that, to explain further, I had agreement, as

          14       I do with all the Tactical Firearms Commanders on my

          15       operations, they will ring me before each deployment,

          16       each evening or each day, whichever time it may be, and

          17       the TFC rang me on the 3rd for an update or just to say

          18       "We are in place, everything is fine, resources,

          19       et cetera".  I knew before the 6 o'clock that Mark

          20       Duggan was trying to recover a firearm but I didn't know

          21       who from and he said to me that he would let me know if

          22       it developed, and that was that, and I didn't hear any

          23       further.  So I presumed it had not developed.

          24   Q.  I wonder if we can have a look at the briefing that was

          25       given on 3 August to the firearms officers.  It's at




           1       CD274.  It's coming up on the screen, I do not think we

           2       have hard copies for the moment, but would you bear with

           3       us looking at it on the screen, for the moment?

           4   A.  Yes, of course.

           5   Q.  If we pick up the bottom half.  So we assume this is

           6       going to be about 6 o'clock on 3 August --

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  -- because, as we understand it, that's when people

           9       gathered.

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  It's opened by Z51, who handed over to ZZ17 and he says:

          12           "Thank you boss.  Yeah, Operation Dibri, as some of

          13       you may know, is a long running Trident investigation

          14       into the activities of the Tottenham Man Dem, the TMD.

          15       There are a large number of subjects and associates on

          16       this operation.  There are, I think, six that have been

          17       put on the briefing for tonight who may become relevant

          18       for tonight or for the rest of the week.  I'll go

          19       briefly through those but it may well be that as

          20       intelligence develops we will pass out more relevant

          21       information to you.  If you look at the briefing packs

          22       and photographs, just rattling through those ..."

          23           He starts with subject 1, I won't trouble with that,

          24       if I may.  Then the first half or more of the next page

          25       deals with subject 1, the man we know as U1.




           1           But then, picking it up over halfway down CD275, we

           2       see Mark Duggan's name.

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  "Mark Duggan I'll come back to in a minute because he

           5       may well become more relevant for this evening's

           6       activity."

           7           Then he deals with Associate 95 for a few lines,

           8       then "If I come back to Mark Duggan":

           9           "If I come back to Mark Duggan, the picture on there

          10       is quite a good likeness.  There's a number of addresses

          11       associated with him."

          12           He gives a family address, it gives a "baby

          13       mother's" address, which is just off White Hart Lane by

          14       the A10, and then:

          15           "He does frequent that address" --

          16           Sorry if we take the first half of the page for the

          17       moment:

          18           "We believe where he is staying at the moment,

          19       here's the address [and he gives one] which is just by

          20       Shoreditch Police Station.  Again, he's disqualified

          21       from driving, it doesn't always stop him but he tends

          22       not to drive, so we haven't got a vehicle for him.  The

          23       vehicle that's on that briefing sheet there

          24       [registration number] is a grey BMW which is associated

          25       with the [redacted] address, but again he tends to be




           1       run around by various associates in their vehicles.  All

           2       of the subjects on here have got access to firearms.

           3       There's nothing specific to say that any of them keep

           4       their firearms at their home addresses or that they're

           5       armed today."

           6           Just pausing there, is there anything in that which

           7       is of the sort of detail which you would have needed to

           8       know?

           9   A.  I knew that up to that point already.

          10   Q.  Right.  Then it goes on:

          11           "There is intelligence to suggest that Mark Duggan

          12       is currently in possession or control of about three

          13       firearms and that he is looking to take possession of

          14       a firearm perhaps this evening.  He's been trying to do

          15       it for a few days.  There's some more photographs coming

          16       round, these black and white ones, which is a guy called

          17       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.  Intelligence would suggest

          18       that he's got control of the firearms and from 9 o'clock

          19       this evening there may be well be a plan for Duggan to

          20       somehow get those firearms from Hutchinson-Foster.

          21       Hopefully at some stage we'll have more information

          22       about where that's going to happen, how it's going to

          23       happen, but the intelligence at the moment is that

          24       Hutchinson has got control of at least one firearm which

          25       he's going to pass on to Mark Duggan possibly at some




           1       point this evening."

           2           On that, is there anything there you didn't know?

           3   A.  The phonecall on the 3rd from TFC, I didn't know it was

           4       KHF, as I call him, Kevin Hutchinson-Foster and I didn't

           5       know he had constructive possession of three firearms.

           6       The call I had was that Mark Duggan, as we knew, he had

           7       been trying to get hold of firearms for some time now,

           8       he was trying to get a firearm on the 3rd, but we didn't

           9       know if it was going to develop or not.

          10   Q.  Isn't that the sort of thing that you should have been

          11       told?

          12   A.  That it was from Kevin Hutchinson-Foster, or --

          13   Q.  Yes.

          14   A.  I knew from the intelligence -- from the update from the

          15       SIO that morning that it was likely to be Kevin

          16       Hutchinson-Foster, however I had already authorised

          17       an operation previously on Mark Duggan where he was

          18       trying to get firearms from others -- somebody else, so

          19       therefore.  Sorry --

          20   Q.  It's all right.

          21   A.  The operation in place didn't make any difference

          22       whether it was Kevin Hutchinson-Foster or somebody else

          23       trying to supply a firearm.  The purpose of the

          24       operation was -- I keep stressing -- was to do

          25       surveillance and then arrest.  Whoever was supplying the




           1       firearm didn't matter.  At that point we had a name and

           2       that's all we had.  If we had had more detail then we

           3       could have worked on that, and we were developing at

           4       that time, but (inaudible) we had a name.

           5   Q.  Let's imagine for the moment that you had been able to

           6       have more detail, let's imagine that you had been given

           7       an address and a time when this hand over was likely to

           8       take place.

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  Imagine also you didn't have any sort of specific

          11       intelligence for that, even for the other five.

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  Would you have wanted, in the light of that information,

          14       to consider the strategy further?

          15   A.  In my plan, in my authority, I put in a specific

          16       tactical parameter about being informed before anybody

          17       goes into a building to effect an arrest for a firearm.

          18       I think it's really important that there's direction in

          19       relation to that.

          20           If I knew that a firearm was being stored at

          21       a particular location and it was with a particular

          22       person, then, yes, there would have been a plan in place

          23       to go and recover that firearm and arrest that person

          24       within that premises.

          25   Q.  Thank you very much.  I want to move on to 4 August




           1       then.  I think you took a phonecall at about 5.30 that

           2       evening, did you?

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  Where were you?

           5   A.  I was at a building in south London with my boss.

           6   Q.  At work?

           7   A.  Yes, I was at work, yes.

           8   Q.  What were your hours of work, nominally?

           9   A.  From about 8 until 9 at night.

          10   Q.  What was the content of that phonecall?

          11   A.  At 5.30, the Tactical Firearms Commander rang me and

          12       said that Mark Duggan was trying to take possession of

          13       a firearm and he was in the Leyton area -- no, forgive

          14       me.  5.30, it was the first call and it was on 4 August

          15       and he was in possession of a firearm.

          16   Q.  Right.  So he had been to wherever it was and got the

          17       gun?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  Were you being asked to say that the firearms authority

          20       was still continuing?

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  Did you go through the conflict management model?

          23   A.  Yes, I did, yes.  Mentally, you do it all the time.

          24       I've been doing firearms operations since 2004, it's

          25       what I do every day.  Yes, think it through, what is




           1       a risk, what a threat, what are my objectives, tactical

           2       plan, yes, I was happy.  Yes, it's a matter of course.

           3   Q.  What was the outcome of that; what did you think was

           4       going to happen next?

           5   A.  Everything was in place.  The operation had been set up

           6       for exactly this reason, to do an arrest on somebody who

           7       was mobile in between premises, to take a firearm out of

           8       their possession in the best location, in the best way.

           9   Q.  So you thought this was going to be a vehicle stop?

          10   A.  At that stage, yes, because it was mobile, it was

          11       a MASTS operation.  It would be a vehicle stop, yes.

          12   Q.  Was any other option open to you, any of you?

          13   A.  Tactical options?

          14   Q.  Yes.

          15   A.  Tactical options are for the Tactical Firearms

          16       Commander.  They are there for him or her to use on the

          17       ground, depending what intelligence they have at the

          18       time.  So that is in place with the Tactical Firearms

          19       Commander.

          20   Q.  As far as you were concerned, you decided that

          21       everything was in place for the tactics which had

          22       already been discussed to be deployed?

          23   A.  As far as I was concerned, when the call came in at 5.30

          24       it was a mobile armed surveillance operation but

          25       depending what the intelligence told us -- because at




           1       that time it's very dynamic, you have a moving gun going

           2       from A to B in London, very busy 5 o'clock on a Thursday

           3       afternoon, it's now for that intelligence -- for us to

           4       lock onto that intelligence and, wherever it takes us,

           5       to respond.

           6           So those options I spoke about earlier, building,

           7       cars, street, they are available to that Tactical

           8       Firearms Commander then to use.  So they have to make

           9       a dynamic decision.

          10   Q.  All I'm asking you is whether there was any option open

          11       to you to say "Yes, we have catered for this, carry on".

          12   A.  I'm sorry, sir.  No, for me, I went through the options

          13       in my head.  This was straightforward, it was what the

          14       operation's set up for, sorry.

          15   Q.  I think you left that building in south London about

          16       6.15, didn't you?

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  You got a phonecall from Z51 about 6.20?

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  Can we have a look at CD7203, I think is probably the

          21       easiest version.  I think it's only available on screen.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Sorry, what was the reference again?

          23   MR UNDERWOOD:  Sorry, CD7203.  It's in two documents but

          24       I think this was the one referred to yesterday.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes.




           1   MR UNDERWOOD:  Do you recognise this?

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  What is it?

           4   A.  It's my day book, my notebook.

           5   Q.  I think you have just answered the question I was about

           6       to ask.  You hear all sorts of references to the way

           7       police officers keep records, logs, notebooks, EABs, day

           8       books.

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  For someone of your seniority, you keep a day book, do

          11       you?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  What we see is -- there's an entry at 6.20, I think.

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  It's not very well copied, I'm afraid.  Can you help us

          16       with what it says?

          17   A.  6.20, yes:

          18           "Z51 shot MD, HEMS on way and one officer has been

          19       shot."

          20   Q.  HEMS is the Helicopter Emergency Medical Service,

          21       I think, yes?

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  Sorry?

          24   A.  Can I just get the context of this?

          25   Q.  Please.




           1   A.  At this stage, I received a phonecall just outside of

           2       work, just literally outside the building, as I left.

           3       I came straight back in the building straight away.

           4       I had just left my boss and he was there.  So I've come

           5       straight back, I've told him and we are together.  At

           6       6.30 I then say "Update SC", who is my boss,

           7       Stuart Cundy.  He's updated.

           8           As I'm writing this, the book is open like that

           9       (indicates).  So on the right-hand side, I'm writing,

          10       and on the left, I've put the 6.30, but I've then gone

          11       over to the page opposite and added more detail around

          12       that phonecall at 6.20.

          13   Q.  Is that what we see at the bottom -- well, not the

          14       bottom --

          15   A.  On the left-hand page.

          16   Q.  7202.

          17   A.  I think it's important they are read like that,

          18       side-by-side.

          19   Q.  Again, can you help us with what's there?

          20   A.  Yes, okay.  So 6.20 the phonecall outside, I came back

          21       in, I'm with my boss.  I update him at 6.30.  While I'm

          22       speaking to him I go across the page and I update my

          23       notes.  I say:

          24           "Ferry Lane near Tottenham.  He's in a cab coming

          25       towards us he pulls gun as he gets out of cab, shot in




           1       chest.  19 officer shot in leg.  Surveillance team

           2       briefed we're making way."

           3   Q.  Thank you.  If we go back to the right-hand side?

           4   A.  Yes:

           5           "6.30.  Mick Foote, SIO, calls me.  Just found

           6       a gun, think it's Duggan's gun.  Shot one of 19 officers

           7       by accident by another 19 officer.  Apparently MD came

           8       towards officers firing.

           9           "7.00 pm.  Z51, life pronounced extinct."

          10   Q.  How good are you at noting down what somebody tells you

          11       in circumstances like that?  (Pause)

          12   A.  I think you've got to take yourself back to where you

          13       were at that time.  You've just been told that a man has

          14       been shot dead in the street in London.  You're thinking

          15       about your staff, you're thinking about resilience,

          16       you're thinking about the family, you're thinking all

          17       sorts going through your head.

          18           This is how I remembered it and this is how I wrote

          19       it at that time.  This is my recollection at that time

          20       which I wrote.  I think that I wrote it as I heard it,

          21       but that was the context.

          22   Q.  Would you regard it as an important matter to have

          23       learned?

          24   A.  Yes, extremely.

          25   Q.  What was your reaction; how did you feel about this




           1       outcome?

           2   A.  How did I feel about the outcome?

           3   Q.  Yes.

           4   A.  I think it's a tragic outcome.  I think it's sad that

           5       a man lost his life.  I think that -- it was never

           6       intention of the operation.  Nobody wanted -- nobody

           7       wanted to see a man dead at the end of the operation.

           8       However, that operation, it had to be authorised.  It

           9       had to be authorised to keep the public safe.  It had to

          10       be authorised and it was done properly.

          11   Q.  You don't have to answer this.  How did you actually

          12       feel?

          13   A.  I've been -- I do not want to wax lyrical.  I've been

          14       a detective for nearly 20 years, I've been on the

          15       Serious Crime Directorate for 10, I've seen some

          16       horrendous stuff, I've seen some horrendous murders,

          17       serial rapists, I've seen bodies in different positions

          18       so I have been exposed to a lot of horror.

          19           When you hear that one of your operations has

          20       resulted in a man dying, you are still shocked, you are

          21       still human.  So, yes, I was shocked, I was taken aback.

          22       But you're still professional, at which point I was in

          23       charge and I was in charge in that was handed over.

          24   Q.  Did you, in fact, go to the scene?

          25   A.  I did go to the scene.




           1   Q.  Did you put in place the post-incident procedures that

           2       were your responsibility to put in place?

           3   A.  The post-incident procedures are the -- actually the

           4       responsibility of a senior investigator not involved in

           5       the planning process.  My role, as I saw it, was that

           6       I had a chain of command in place: myself, Tactical

           7       Firearms Commander, Tactical Advisor, Operational

           8       Firearms Commander.  They were all in place and they

           9       were still there, so I see it as my responsibility to go

          10       there and check they are still doing their job, if

          11       they're still capable of doing their job, there's

          12       a scene, there is a firearm, there there's still

          13       an investigation ongoing until it's handed over.

          14           So, yes, I went to the scene, I checked on the

          15       welfare, I checked on the structure, that everyone was

          16       doing what they should have been doing and then I pulled

          17       back and handed back to the senior officer who was

          18       responsible for the post-incident operation.

          19   MR UNDERWOOD:  Very well, thank you very much.

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much Ms Mallon.

          21       Thank you.

          22           Yes, Mr Mansfield?

          23                    Questions by MR MANSFIELD

          24   MR MANSFIELD:  Sir, I wonder if a document could be handed

          25       to the jury and to the witness and to yourself.  It's




           1       the one I mentioned before lunch.  (Handed)

           2           It's a compendious --

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Just before it's handed out, has

           4       everyone seen this?

           5   MR MANSFIELD:  Yes, they have, and I think there's no

           6       objection, of course.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  This will be put in behind our

           8       divider 9 and become C9; is that right?

           9   MR MANSFIELD:  Yes.  I am not going to read it for the

          10       moment, other than to indicate what it is.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I've got the whole lot here.  How

          12       many copies?

          13   MR MANSFIELD:  A quick glance --

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  One for the witness and perhaps you

          15       need more for the jury bundles.

          16   MR MANSFIELD:  I'll wait until it's handed out.  (Pause)

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  So the witness has one and there are

          18       enough for the jury.  We'll put this as our C9.  (Pause)

          19           We'll get another one in due course, sorry about

          20       that.  There is one.  There it is, fine.  (Handed)

          21           Thank you, good.

          22   MR MANSFIELD:  Do you have it?

          23   A.  Yes, I do thank you.

          24   Q.  Sorry I should introduce myself.  I'm Michael Mansfield,

          25       I represent the family of Mark Duggan.




           1           I just want to introduce this because I will want to

           2       go through it with you in a moment, but this is the

           3       compendious version taken from two different statements

           4       from an officer who the jury will see is indicated at

           5       the top left hand of the title, A10.

           6           It's his account.  You will see there's an important

           7       word in there, "gisted account", so it's not the

           8       original but a version of it, in other words a summary

           9       of it, in order to accord with legislation.

          10           It concerns intelligence on the transfer of

          11       a firearm between Mr Duggan and Mr Hutchinson-Foster.

          12       I think nearly all of it has been read at different

          13       stages by different counsel to the previous witness.  So

          14       there it all is in chronological order.

          15           So I'll come back to that in a moment.

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  All right, thank you.

          17   MR MANSFIELD:  May I just, besides introducing myself,

          18       introduce why I am asking you certain questions, so you

          19       know, as then does everyone else, why I am asking

          20       questions of you, do you follow, in fairness to you and

          21       everyone else?

          22           In this case, the jury have been tasked to consider

          23       two essential questions by the Coroner.  I am not

          24       dealing with both, only the first one, as far as you

          25       were concerned.  The first was:




           1           "Was the operation which ended in Mr Duggan's death,

           2       planned and implemented so as to minimise, to the

           3       greatest extent possible, recourse to lethal force?"

           4           You understand that question?

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  It's not a question to you, I'm just saying that's the

           7       context.  But of course coming to you in your role as

           8       Strategic Firearms Commander, that would be an objective

           9       of yours as well, wouldn't it?

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  It's really in that context, therefore, that I want to

          12       just ask you about aspects of what happened in this

          13       case.  It's intelligence led, everybody knows that.

          14       That's the first point.

          15           I think you will have to say yes, I'm sorry.

          16   A.  Yes, it was intelligence led.

          17   Q.  Sorry about that, it's being recorded, obviously.

          18           Secondly, intelligence can come from a variety of

          19       sources, some highly suspect and mischievous and others

          20       highly reliable.

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  Thirdly, assuming you do have intelligence that is

          23       reliable, the next question, of course, is whether the

          24       intelligence that is reliable is specific enough for you

          25       to action.




           1   A.  Yes.

           2   Q.  Yes.  There's a further question, because it may be

           3       reliable, it may be specific, it may be actionable, but

           4       for all sorts of policy reasons, to do with

           5       an investigation, you might not actually want to action

           6       it at that point.

           7   A.  Policy reasons to do with investigation?

           8   Q.  Yes.  In other words, you may not want to necessarily

           9       follow something up if it's going to alert other people

          10       to what is going on.  You may want to save that

          11       actionable intelligence for a little later.

          12   A.  Such as?

          13   Q.  Well, I'll come straight to it, in this case.  If you

          14       send an armed team into the middle of a situation which

          15       in fact may disrupt an ongoing operation and alert other

          16       people in relation to that -- other subjects for

          17       example -- you may want to keep that back and carry on

          18       with the main operation, even though intelligence

          19       suggests something else might happen at that point.  Do

          20       you follow what I'm saying?

          21   A.  Not in this context, no.

          22   Q.  Not in the context of this case?

          23   A.  No.  I think you are being very hypothetical, so --

          24   Q.  I'll come to a practical situation.  In fact, I'll come

          25       to it now so you can deal with it.




           1   A.  Mm.

           2   Q.  I want to ask you about responsibilities for actioning

           3       intelligence as we go through.  You made it very clear

           4       that the intelligence as it comes in, every bit of it

           5       has to be reviewed, doesn't it?

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  That's in one of your statements, you have made it very

           8       clear.  Every bit of intelligence that comes in has to

           9       be reviewed, and it has to be reviewed obviously with

          10       regard to reliability, with regard to specificity, with

          11       regard to actionability.  All that has to be gone

          12       through; is that right?

          13   A.  Yes, yes.

          14   Q.  Yes, I'm sorry, it's just a staged process.  It's also

          15       clear, is it not, that you have, in this process, to

          16       keep distinct investigative roles --

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  -- I think you know what's coming next -- investigative

          19       roles and, if you like, firearms roles?

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  That's very important, isn't it --

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  -- because there have been mistakes made in the past --

          24       I don't go through it -- where you have people

          25       performing both roles?




           1   A.  Not mistakes I know of but --

           2   Q.  That's the potential.

           3   A.  If people perform both roles, yes.

           4   Q.  Yes, right.  There is a policy within the Metropolitan

           5       Police -- I have no doubt elsewhere -- to avoid that

           6       situation, isn't there?

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  I mean, using police speak or vernacular, sometimes it's

           9       called double-hatting; you're aware of that?

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  Now, would you look at the sheet of paper you have in

          12       front of you, please.  I am going to go through this

          13       because the jury haven't seen it in this form, and you

          14       may not have seen it in this form either.

          15   A.  No, I haven't.  I haven't seen this, no.

          16   Q.  All right.  Please forgive me if I take you slowly

          17       through this, bearing in mind the structure I've already

          18       indicated to you.  At the top, A10, let's deal with

          19       that.  I don't want his real name -- it may be a woman,

          20       I don't know -- but the person who is A10.  You know who

          21       that is, do you?

          22   A.  No.

          23   Q.  Well, I think this is a situation -- we did mention it

          24       yesterday, I am not -- it's not a complaint.  It may be

          25       useful to have a list somewhere --




           1   A.  Hang on, I have one here.

           2   MR MANSFIELD:  I'm sorry, I didn't know you had one.

           3   A.  A10 is not on there.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I am not sure whether A10 is on it.

           5   A.  No, it's not.

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I do not think A10 is on it.

           7   MR KEITH:  I think they are Met acronyms.

           8   MR THOMAS:  I did make it clear yesterday, to avoid this

           9       very situation, that individuals with pseudonyms should

          10       be put on the list in the witness box to avoid any

          11       suggestion that a witness may be changing their evidence

          12       or may be genuinely confused or not, to avoid that

          13       situation.  I wonder if that could be done.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, we could have that piece of

          15       paper and we can write on that who A10 is.

          16   MR KEITH:  May I make a practical suggestion?  I think she

          17       has the acronyms which the Metropolitan Police officers

          18       are using on the list.  All it needs to do is to have

          19       one further acronym added and perhaps my learned friend

          20       can do that.

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Let's just have a -- get the court

          23       usher to get old hold of that document, hand it along.

          24       There really isn't too much mystery about these names

          25       but it's just a practice that happens.




           1     (The document is handed to MS LEEK to add A10's details)

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I have to know everybody's names.

           3       I know who A10 is, so I could write it on that list but

           4       I'll let someone else do that.

           5           I wonder if they write Christmas cards to each

           6       other, whether they put "Z10" at the bottom or anything

           7       like that.  You're Z50, aren't you?

           8   A.  Z50, yes.  (Handed)

           9           Thank you.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  There we are.  Do you have A10's

          11       name written down there?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Does that name mean anything to you?

          14       Do you know that person?

          15   A.  I know where he works but other than that --

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  No, all right.  Back to Mr Mansfield

          17       now.

          18   MR MANSFIELD:  We are going to see A10, I think -- well,

          19       some are.  You have said it's a man, so that's

          20       presumably no secret itself.  So let's refer to that man

          21       for the moment.

          22           The reason I'm asking you this question is because,

          23       of course, you have meetings with intelligence officers

          24       and I want to enquire whether you actually met this

          25       person --




           1   A.  I didn't --

           2   Q.  -- at any stage -- I'm dealing with the date frame of

           3       this document you have just been handed, you'll see,

           4       31 July through to 4 August; did you meet him during

           5       that time?

           6   A.  No, I didn't.

           7   Q.  You didn't.  Did you know whether anyone else was

           8       meeting him during that time?

           9   A.  No.

          10   Q.  No, right, you didn't know that.  Did you have any

          11       telephone contact with that man?

          12   A.  No, and to be frank I wouldn't do either because I would

          13       deal with people far higher up, in practical terms.  So

          14       no, I wouldn't.  They would not be in my daily contact.

          15   Q.  I follow that, it's just -- I appreciate your particular

          16       role and that someone else is dealing with intelligence.

          17       But you did ask for a meeting with intelligence

          18       officers.  That's why I'm following --

          19   A.  Yes, sir, they were managers.  So they were my rank

          20       equivalent.

          21   Q.  All right.  But the managers -- I know this is a meeting

          22       on the 3rd in the morning.  The managers of intelligence

          23       would be -- I'm asking it because we don't know and it's

          24       not trying to get to sensitive detail; do you follow?

          25       I just want to know whether any of the managers who you




           1       were meeting would have a responsibility or connection

           2       with A10; do you follow the question?

           3   A.  Yes, I follow the question, yes.  They would be their

           4       line manager, I presume.  Other than that, I don't know

           5       what daily contact and how they operate in that field,

           6       as in their daily meetings or conversations.

           7   Q.  Again, I don't want you to speculate if you don't know

           8       the answer to it.  We may have to wait for somebody who

           9       does know the answer, but can you say whether any of the

          10       managers at the Wednesday meeting on the 3rd, in the

          11       morning, was a manager relevant to A10?

          12   A.  I don't know.

          13   Q.  You don't know?

          14   A.  (Shakes head)

          15   Q.  Now, just go to -- that's in the first line, A10's

          16       gisted account.  Sorry, you have used that word yourself

          17       because there are ways of recording sensitive material,

          18       without giving away any of the sources and without, as

          19       it were, compromising anyone; is that right?  The gist

          20       is intended to, if you like, summarise?  (Pause)

          21   A.  It depends -- the gist can -- it can be used, yes, but

          22       in summarising you can actually get gross inaccuracies

          23       around it, because it's subjective.

          24   Q.  I entirely accept that.  Actually, what one really needs

          25       is to see the original to find out whether there's been




           1       anything, as it says in the film, lost in translation.

           2       Again, you are nodding, sorry?

           3   A.  Yes, sorry, sorry.  Yes.

           4   Q.  It's difficult I know, just so we have it recorded.

           5           The reason I asked you about it was that, as we'll

           6       come to, if you've got a log, decision -- you know about

           7       policy logs and all the rest of it.

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  If you've got a log, or you're filling in a form like

          10       an FA1 or FA2A or FA3A, one of them, an official

          11       document, it might be possible to make a record, I'll

          12       put it that way for the moment, of something you've been

          13       told that is in fact covered by sensitive legislation.

          14       You can record it in a way that doesn't disclose where

          15       it's come from.

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  Right.  So that's the next bit of the heading of this

          18       document.  This is about intelligence on the transfer of

          19       a firearm between Mr Duggan and Mr Hutchinson-Foster.

          20       May I pause there.

          21           Would you accept, as a Strategic Firearms

          22       Commander -- I know you've been other things as well --

          23       but as a Strategic Firearms Officer, really

          24       a priority -- there are bound to be lots, but one of the

          25       top priorities is just to remove weapons from the




           1       streets of London --  I mean illegally held weapons?

           2   A.  One of the priorities, yes.  The priority is to protect

           3       the public.

           4   Q.  Yes, and you do that by removing weapons that could

           5       cause injury or death.

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  Yes.  So intelligence about the transfer of a firearm

           8       between two people is important, isn't it, obviously?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  Right.  Let's just go through -- there's numbering,

          11       I don't need to trouble you with because it relates to

          12       two statements that he's made, so I will leave that for

          13       the moment but it's in date order if you have it just in

          14       front of you.

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  "On 31 July, I received credible intelligence that

          17       Mark Duggan wished to collect a firearm from a male

          18       associate.  This intelligence indicated that the male

          19       might be called Kevin, but there was insufficient

          20       intelligence to establish the male's identity, where the

          21       firearm was being stored or when it was going to be

          22       collected."

          23           Do you see that?

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   Q.  I think it should -- there's a typographical error




           1       there, I hope I've got it right.  It should be "stored

           2       or when" if I have that right.  Perhaps that could just

           3       be corrected on the typed version.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, that's right.

           5   MR MANSFIELD:  Sorry about this.  It's been done over lunch:

           6           "... was being stored or when it was going to be

           7       collected."

           8           I'm going to take it in stages on this paragraph

           9       alone.  First of all, we have your day book -- thank you

          10       very much -- for 4 August.  Did you have a day book on

          11       31 July as well?

          12   A.  I had one book for that period.

          13   Q.  Yes, you did.

          14   A.  To be frank, in relation to note taking, I had several

          15       blue books, but this one -- for different operations --

          16       different jobs, multiple operations.

          17   Q.  Yes, understood.

          18   A.  So I would have had a day book on me on the 31st, yes.

          19   Q.  Yes.  We've been asking for -- I am not suggesting you

          20       have, I just want to check -- we've been asking for

          21       disclosure of all sorts of documents.  Have you been

          22       through your day book or day books in relation to this

          23       case, by which I mean the operation that led to the

          24       death of Mark Duggan, to see whether, besides what you

          25       have written down on the 4th, there were any entries in




           1       relation to 3, 2, 1 August and 31 July?

           2   A.  Yes, I have been through them.

           3   Q.  You have?

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  There's no other entries?

           6   A.  No.

           7   Q.  All right.  On the 31st, therefore, this source -- we

           8       know this much -- is the Serious Organised Crime Agency.

           9       You obviously know that agency.

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  If that agency is saying they've got credible

          12       intelligence, then you would accept that opinion.

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  You would have no -- unless you had something else in

          15       mind -- you would have no reason to not believe what you

          16       were being told by SOCA.

          17   A.  My nature and experience means I will always go and test

          18       any intelligence I have --

          19   Q.  Absolutely.

          20   A.  -- that's why I asked for the meeting on the Wednesday,

          21       to go and speak to MIB.  So, yes, it is reliable, it is

          22       credible but, yes, I will test it.

          23   Q.  Exactly.  But of course by the Wednesday, the meeting in

          24       the morning -- well, I'll have to ask you.  First of

          25       all, did you know on 31 July what I have just read out




           1       in that first paragraph?

           2   A.  No.

           3   Q.  You didn't.  So as far as you're concerned, that's not

           4       something you knew.  Now, can we go to the second

           5       paragraph, which is the next day, 1 August:

           6           "I [meaning A10] received further intelligence that

           7       the male associate holding this firearm stored it at

           8       premises of an unidentified female and, due to the

           9       female's absence at work each day, he would not be able

          10       to gain entry to the premises to retrieve the firearm

          11       until she returned from work some time mid-to-late

          12       evening."

          13           Do you see that?

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  Now this is becoming more specific, isn't it?

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  Question: did you know that information/intelligence on

          18       1 August?

          19   A.  No.

          20   Q.  So that's another one you didn't know.  Then we come to

          21       2 August.  This is the day -- obviously you have just

          22       been through it -- the day on which, in the afternoon,

          23       you authorised the operation.

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   Q.  You authorise it before you have had the meeting on the




           1       3rd with the intelligence officers.

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  Right.  So this is the day we're dealing with.  So A10

           4       is saying here:

           5           "I received credible intelligence on 2" --

           6           Sorry, have I said -- sorry, I have missed out

           7       a word:

           8           "I received further credible intelligence on

           9       2 August 2011 that indicated that the male, Kevin, was

          10       likely to be Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.  There was still

          11       insufficient intelligence to identify where the firearm

          12       was being stored or when it would be collected."

          13           Now, there's another bit of intelligence, perhaps

          14       I'll read it, since it's all on the 2nd.

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  On the 2nd, same day:

          17           "I received intelligence Kevin Hutchinson-Foster

          18       would not be in London in the evening, so Mark Duggan

          19       would not be able to meet with him to collect the

          20       firearm."

          21           So there's two bits to that.

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  I'll take them in stages: the first part, namely the

          24       person was likely to be Hutchinson-Foster, but couldn't

          25       identify where it was being stored.  So did you know the




           1       name "Kevin Hutchinson-Foster" on 2 August?

           2   A.  No.

           3   Q.  It probably follows therefore you didn't know the second

           4       part of this either then, because it mentions his name:

           5           "I received intelligence that Kevin

           6       Hutchinson-Foster would not be in London that evening."

           7           Did you know that?

           8   A.  No.

           9   Q.  I'm going to pause there.  This unfolding developing

          10       intelligence, would you agree, is becoming increasingly

          11       specific.

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  When you have a situation like that, I agree you have to

          14       test it, but it does look as though, on the face of it,

          15       it has an intrinsic reliability.

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  So we come to the 3rd now.  This is the day on which you

          18       have the intelligence meeting in the morning and then

          19       you have an update.  It's not on here, just so you have

          20       the context.

          21   A.  Oh, sorry.

          22   Q.  Before I just ask you about what is written here, so the

          23       jury can, as it were, correlate it with what you have

          24       already said.  So this is 3 August:

          25           "I received further intelligence that Mark Duggan




           1       still wished to collect the firearms from the male whom

           2       I now believe to be Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.  There is

           3       still insufficient intelligence to identify where the

           4       firearm was being stored beyond the premises of the

           5       female associate, probably in the Leyton area.  The

           6       intelligence indicated that Kevin Hutchinson-Foster

           7       intended to travel out of London later that evening.

           8       I subsequently received intelligence that indicated that

           9       Mark Duggan would not be in a position to collect the

          10       firearms as he was attending a family BBQ.

          11       I disseminated then inserted all of this intelligence to

          12       ZZ17 by telephone."

          13           I just pause for a moment.  ZZ17, as we now know,

          14       was the head of intelligence, a Detective Sergeant, at

          15       the Trident operation headquarters.

          16   A.  He wasn't head of intelligence.

          17   Q.  Well, he was the most senior intelligence officer.

          18   A.  He was responsible for the -- he received the

          19       intelligence and he was responsible for actioning it

          20       fast time.  He was part of that team, the operational

          21       team.  I wouldn't say headquarters.  There's a whole --

          22       a pro-active team and he's a member of the team who --

          23       his responsibility is to get the intelligence and to

          24       action it.

          25   Q.  Yes.  All right.  Was he the most senior one there, in




           1       the intelligence officers' group or unit, whatever you

           2       call it?

           3   A.  Yes, yes.

           4   Q.  He was?

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  Right.  So just going back to the actual substance of

           7       what was being communicated to him by telephone.  I put

           8       in parenthesis here for a moment: we do not know times

           9       until we get to the next bit.  So we don't know times on

          10       any of the dates I've so far put to you as to when

          11       information was coming through, and particularly on this

          12       day.

          13           We can infer, if this is fair, that it may have

          14       come -- I put it carefully -- may have come through

          15       before the briefing.  The jury have heard about that and

          16       you have gone through it today.  The briefing that ZZ17

          17       was present at occurred at around 6 o'clock in the

          18       evening.

          19   A.  That's right, yes.

          20   Q.  So it looks as though this may have come through before

          21       but we don't know.  But I want to ask you about the

          22       intelligence.  Did you know any of what is in that

          23       paragraph on 3 August?

          24   A.  On 3 August?

          25   Q.  Yes.




           1   A.  I just knew that "Kev" was Kevin Hutchinson-Foster and

           2       that he was trying to supply a firearm to Mark Duggan.

           3   Q.  That's all you knew?  From the Senior Investigating

           4       Officer or someone else?

           5   A.  From ZZ17, I knew that.  I knew that we hadn't located

           6       where the firearms was being stored at that time and

           7       that third party, unknown, was -- had possession of that

           8       firearm.  That's all I knew at that time.

           9   Q.  I want to go carefully because you don't have a day book

          10       for this, so I cannot ask you to look at a day book and

          11       see what you recorded, and I do not want you to, as it

          12       were, surmise what you had.  If you have a memory of

          13       what you knew, so far, is this fair: you knew the name

          14       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster, that a gun was being stored

          15       with an associate, anything else?

          16   A.  And that we didn't know where --

          17   Q.  I appreciate that.

          18   A.  -- and that was it.

          19   Q.  So the detail of this intelligence, for example, that it

          20       was a woman associate in the Leyton area; you didn't

          21       know that?

          22   A.  Not on the 3rd, no.

          23   Q.  I'll come to the 4th, don't worry, in a moment, and you

          24       didn't know the intelligence about the movements of the

          25       two people concerned, that's Hutchinson-Foster and




           1       Duggan, on the 3rd.

           2   A.  I knew from the conversation we had with the TFC on the

           3       3rd before deployment that Mark Duggan was trying to get

           4       a gun but that's all I knew.

           5   Q.  Just pause there.  So the added bit was that, some time

           6       on the 3rd, you knew that Mark Duggan was wanting to

           7       collect a gun?

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  All right.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Did you want to add something else,

          11       because the way you answered that question I wondered if

          12       you were going to go on but you were interrupted.

          13   A.  That's it, thank you, sir.  Thank you.

          14   MR MANSFIELD:  Right.  I'm sorry to go slowly and get it

          15       clear.  So you did not know, for example, that

          16       Hutchinson-Foster was intending to travel out of London,

          17       Duggan was going to be at a BBQ, you didn't know any of

          18       that?

          19   A.  No.

          20   Q.  There is an additional bit that I just want to add that

          21       is in this same time zone.  The intelligence throughout

          22       this period indicated that Mark Duggan, upon collection

          23       of the firearms, would store it at unidentified

          24       premises; did you know that?

          25   A.  No.




           1   Q.  No.  Given your experience in other positions as well as

           2       strategic firearms -- and if any of these questions are

           3       too hypothetical, please say.

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  Perhaps it would be fairer if I just freeze frame the

           6       3rd and we step outside and have a look at what's going

           7       on, as far as you're concerned.

           8           We have Operation Dibri, which has been going,

           9       generally speaking, as a general operation, since 2008

          10       or something in that region.

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  Right.  That encompasses and involves a number of

          13       specifics, or more focused operations, where you might

          14       have directed surveillance, you might have a MASTS

          15       operation and so on, within the context of Dibri as

          16       a whole.

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  When we come to this period, that is in fact what we

          19       have.  The general becomes more focused upon a MASTS

          20       operation, pro-active, protracted, over four days.

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  Right.  Clearly the strategy and tactics involved in

          23       a focused operation can come well within the objectives

          24       of Dibri as a whole.  In other words, Dibri is trying to

          25       disrupt gun crime and here is a MASTS operation within




           1       that framework.

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  Right.  Now, within that, in other words we have now got

           4       the general down to the focus, down to the specific --

           5   A.  Mm-hmm.

           6   Q.  -- where you have specific intelligence.  In other

           7       words, it's within the framework and parameters of

           8       general Dibri, focused Dibri and so it has the same

           9       objectives, but it has specific targets.  Are you

          10       following?

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  Right.  On 3 August, who was responsible -- if you can

          13       help us with this -- who would be responsible if they

          14       have specific information for taking decisions about

          15       what to do about it.  If you want me to be specific,

          16       I can elaborate a little more or is that enough?

          17   A.  I think if you're saying on the receipt of intelligence

          18       who then makes a decisions when they receive it --

          19   Q.  Yes.

          20   A.  -- yes, then that would be ZZ17.

          21   Q.  Right.  Is he in this particular framework, is he

          22       responsible for deciding whether to action it?

          23   A.  Right.  To make it clearer, there's two sides.  There's

          24       the investigation team, where you have ZZ17.

          25   Q.  Yes.




           1   A.  Then you have the DCI, the SIO, running the

           2       investigation.  From that, numerous enquiries, numerous

           3       investigations.  At the time of Dibri we had had 52

           4       people arrested, large scale.  Then you have a firearm

           5       command chain for the specific operation, so you've got

           6       one side which is developing all the intelligence,

           7       developing, reacting to it and then you've got a firearm

           8       operation which sits next to it and that then has got

           9       its own command structure in place.

          10   Q.  Yes.  That's very helpful and it's an explanation, if

          11       you like, of the way in which it is structured.  The

          12       question really is -- can I approach it a different way

          13       in order to make it practical?  Up to this paragraph --

          14       in other words I have not got to the 4th yet -- there

          15       is, would you agree, high grade intelligence coming

          16       through?

          17   A.  There's credible -- if you mean by "high grade"

          18       credible, reliable intelligence coming through, yes.

          19   Q.  In fact, it's -- would you agree it's -- I know there's

          20       grading system but it's -- as we will see, I'm going to

          21       put to you that it's A1, it doesn't come much better

          22       than this, does it?

          23   A.  It's good.  It is good intelligence.

          24   Q.  That'll do.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You are agreeing with the A1?  Do




           1       you know A, B, C, 1, 2, 3?

           2   A.  We don't use A1.

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I see.

           4   MR MANSFIELD:  Good will do, that's fine.  It's an allied

           5       question.  Looking at the structure of Dibri, you have

           6       a Senior Investigating Officer, then he has a deputy,

           7       doesn't he?

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  They are sometimes called the deputy SIO or sometimes

          10       they are called the IO, the investigating officer?

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  Now, I want to come straight to August.  Who was the

          13       deputy SIO or IO on 1, 2, 3 August?

          14   A.  ZZ17.

          15   Q.  You said it very quickly.  Are you sure it was him?

          16   A.  The deputy SIO of Dibri?

          17   Q.  The deputy SIO.

          18   A.  Yes.  I say it quickly because I was in conversation

          19       with him for many years, so yes.

          20   Q.  I appreciate you do know his name.  I want to ask you

          21       about someone else who's been put forward for this role

          22       very carefully.  I'm afraid you are going to have to

          23       look at a bit of paper.  It's someone we know as Z51.

          24       That's been confirmed today.

          25   MR BUTT:  Sir, I do not think that's correct.  If we are




           1       talking about the reactive investigation team, Z51 --

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Butt, I know -- this is

           3       a question to see what the answer is, firstly.

           4   MR BUTT:  I think it's being put that --

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You are anticipating what the answer

           6       is going to be.  So I think we ought to let the witness

           7       answer the question first.

           8   MR BUTT:  The question that was being put was someone else's

           9       name has been put forward as the investigating officer

          10       on the reactive team.  That is incorrect.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That's certainly incorrect.

          12           Do you know Z51?

          13   A.  Yes, I do there.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The name is down there on the list

          15       before you.

          16   A.  Yes, I know.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That's the person you were being

          18       asked about.  What was Z51's role in this?

          19   A.  Tactical Firearms Commander.

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Tactical Firearms Commander.  Back

          21       to Mr Mansfield.

          22   MR MANSFIELD:  Of course, there are two streams to this.

          23       There's the Dibri -- that's why I put if to you --

          24       there's the general Dibri operation that's been going

          25       since 2008 with a Senior Investigating Officer in it.




           1   A.  Yes.

           2   Q.  Who we've seen.  He'll have a deputy in relation to the

           3       general thrust of the organisation.

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  Yes.  I'm starting at that level.  Who was in this

           6       period we're dealing with, 31 July through to 4 August;

           7       who was -- in that context -- the deputy SIO?

           8   A.  It was ZZ17.  Or, before him, it would, in his

           9       equivalent -- it was the intelligence holder.

          10   Q.  I'll go back then a bit.  I'm sorry to test your memory

          11       and I know it sometimes can be difficult thinking back.

          12       Did the deputy SIO, in the general context of Dibri,

          13       actually leave in the middle of June to be replaced by

          14       someone else?

          15   A.  Did the deputy SIO leave in the middle of June?

          16   Q.  Yes.  Because that's what we were told yesterday, and

          17       I am just asking you that because I don't know.

          18   A.  The deputy SIO for Operation Dibri was ZZ17.

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  On your list in front of you, do you

          20       have Z numbers; do you have them there?

          21   A.  Yes, sir.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Do you have someone called ZZ100?

          23   MR KEITH:  It was ZZ100.  I do not think they will be on the

          24       list because he was given that delightful acronym only

          25       yesterday.  But happily, we've taken instructions and




           1       there's no difficulty with saying that ZZ100 is a DI

           2       called DI Mark Raymond.  So if that helps.  We no longer

           3       need to use the acronym you gave him temporarily.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  So I think that it's DI Mark Raymond

           5       this question may be being asked about.  Do you know

           6       him?

           7   A.  Yes, I do, sir, yes.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Did he leave in June/July 2011?

           9   A.  I think so, I can't -- around about that time, yes.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Before he left, what was his role?

          11   A.  He was the acting DCI.

          12   MR MANSFIELD:  He wasn't a DS in charge of intelligence, was

          13       he?

          14   A.  He wasn't, no.

          15   Q.  No.  So that's why I'm being careful about this, because

          16       of roles and decisions that have to be taken over time.

          17       I need to know who's doing what.  I've only just got his

          18       name, but yesterday we referred to him as ZZ100.

          19           So we are told that he was replaced in the middle

          20       of June; is that your recollection?

          21   A.  He was replaced, I cannot remember the date.  But, yes,

          22       he was replaced.

          23   Q.  He was replaced.  And of course the status, by which

          24       I mean the rank, of the person who performs the deputy's

          25       role is usually a DI, isn't it?




           1   A.  Usually.  On a reactive team, yes.

           2   Q.  Yes.  Well this is a pro-active team.

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  We are talking about Dibri as a whole for the moment,

           5       not a focused operation -- I'll come to that; the

           6       focused operation that ended up on this piece of paper,

           7       as it were.

           8           So who was it?  You say ZZ17, who replaces ...

           9   A.  Sir, there was a lot of changes.  At the start of

          10       Operation Dibri there was another officer, who's not

          11       with the Met Police anymore, who was the intelligence

          12       holder.  And he then handed over to ZZ17, hence the

          13       confusion.

          14           So there was a handover at that period and there was

          15       a Mark Raymond, Z100 I think he's referred to now --

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We'll call him Mark Raymond.

          17   A.  He was acting up for a period in the role of SIO.

          18   MR MANSFIELD:  No, sorry.  I'm going to have to go slowly.

          19           What we were told yesterday is that -- by

          20       Mr Foote -- because I was asking him much the same

          21       questions, and if somebody knows the answers to this it

          22       would save me having to ask these questions; if somebody

          23       knows what the structure is, perhaps we could know it.

          24           If in the middle of June, as he says, his deputy

          25       left to go somewhere else -- it doesn't really matter




           1       where he went -- and he was replaced by someone else,

           2       who was that person?  That's stage number one.  Can you

           3       help?  Who was the person who should normally be a DI

           4       who replaced that person?  Mark Raymond?

           5   A.  The rank was replaced by Z51.

           6   Q.  Right.  Sorry, the rank was replaced?  Do you mean --

           7   A.  The DI post.

           8   Q.  The DI post was filled by Z51?

           9   A.  Yes --

          10   Q.  Right.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Did you want to add something else?

          12   A.  Yes, sorry.  It's complicated, of so many people coming

          13       in.  But the intelligence, the deputy for

          14       Operation Dibri, remained constant throughout, the

          15       intelligence holder.

          16   MR MANSFIELD:  Who is ZZ17.

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  Yes, I follow that.  What it means is that Z51, who we

          19       now know is the Tactical Firearms Commander for the

          20       specific Dibri on the 2nd, 3rd 4th and 5 August, that's

          21       where he's a commander, has in fact been the deputy SIO

          22       from the middle of June for Dibri generally.

          23   A.  His role is in relation to resourcing, staff, training;

          24       it's not in relation to the operation.

          25   Q.  So can you just help us: was he, that is Z51, by the




           1       time we get to August, maintaining the role that he had

           2       taken over in the middle of June from Mark Raymond?

           3   A.  He was.

           4   Q.  He was.

           5   A.  Can I clarify --

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I think you ought to.  Because you

           7       talk about the rank.  Obviously the job of -- you have

           8       so many Detective Inspectors, you are not allowed very

           9       many because they are quite expensive, so you replace

          10       one, you have one Detective Inspector.

          11           But the way you are saying it, it seemed to me, that

          12       you were about to say, "Well the rank was taken over but

          13       the role was changed to different people".  So can you

          14       please explain that for us, please?

          15   A.  Yes.  Because it's a long term operation, it's two and

          16       a half years; you can imagine there's lots of changes in

          17       staff during that time.  And also during that time, the

          18       Met Police set up, as I said earlier, the firearms

          19       cadre, which was one unit dealing with levels 3 and 4,

          20       firearms ops, and then Trident and flying squad dealing

          21       with the higher risk firearms operations.

          22           I had 12 Tactical Firearms Commanders on Trident,

          23       any one I could use at any time.  Those were not

          24       involved within the operation of operation -- the

          25       investigation of Operation Dibri.




           1           Z51 replaced Mark Raymond to do the finance, the

           2       training, the resourcing.  But they would not -- and

           3       occasionally they stepped in to cover reactive

           4       investigations on the other side of the house, my

           5       shooting team.  But they did not get involved in the

           6       investigation of Operation Dibri.  Does that make sense,

           7       sir?

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Z51 is not involved in the

           9       operation?

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  He's dealing with finance and other

          12       matters.  So that's the rank going.  What about the

          13       actual role that you've been talking about that

          14       Mr Raymond might have had before he left?

          15   A.  There was a period for resilience.  I managed the whole

          16       of the north, I managed the north-east and the

          17       north-west, where the DIs would cover for each other

          18       depending on who was on leave.  There was a period where

          19       Mark Raymond was also doing the admin -- the admin --

          20       resources, staff type scenarios.  And managing gold

          21       groups, duties investigations. (?)

          22           However, at that time, the intelligence holder was

          23       done by another officer who's left the Met.  So there

          24       was Mark Raymond was replaced by Z51.  There was an

          25       officer who left the Met, who's been replaced by ZZ17.




           1           Is that clear now?  Is that better, sir?

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Let's see how we go from that.

           3   A.  Yes, sorry.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We'll see.  Thank you.

           5   MR MANSFIELD:  I think I followed what you have said so I am

           6       not going to develop it at the moment.  You have

           7       explained what you think you can remember happened at

           8       this period.

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  The reason I'm asking this is I want to come back to the

          11       paragraph -- well it isn't the paragraph, but the one on

          12       3 August on your sheet there.  Because we've established

          13       that this is good intelligence coming through.

          14           Therefore, on 3 August, you having authorised

          15       specific Dibri the day before, if someone wanted to make

          16       a decision, on the 3rd, to action information and

          17       intelligence about Kevin Hutchinson-Foster --

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  -- who would that person be in the structure you have

          20       just described?

          21   A.  ZZ17 would discuss that intelligence with the SIO.  They

          22       would discuss it, they would decide how they were going

          23       to develop it and get to more conclusive, more detail

          24       around it.  And then the Tactical Firearms Commander

          25       would be informed.




           1   Q.  Right.  We know what Mr Foote says about this, and I am

           2       not going back over that ground, but what I want to ask

           3       you is this: if they are going to discuss this

           4       information we have just got to and consider options,

           5       would that be recorded anywhere?

           6   A.  The discussion between the SIO and ZZ17?

           7   Q.  Yes.

           8   A.  The SIO has a decision log, they could record it in

           9       there.  Depending, again, on the legal constraints of

          10       the intelligence.

          11   Q.  But clearly you would expect, would this be fair -- well

          12       in fact, I do not need to go this far.  Mr Foote says --

          13       what I am going to put to you now was not even

          14       considered.  So if it's not considered, it's not going

          15       to go in the log, is it?

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That's a matter for Mr Foote.

          17   MR MANSFIELD:  Can I just do the one question.

          18           If something is not considered at all, do you enter

          19       that up in a log?

          20   A.  It's personal style in a decision log.  I've run them

          21       for numerous jobs.  If you didn't make a decision,

          22       sometimes you would record it, "I considered that but

          23       I didn't do it", sometimes you do record it.  It's

          24       a personal decision for the SIO.

          25           However, I have to put it into context that --




           1       speaking about one piece of information or intelligence

           2       around one subject.  We had six subjects where

           3       intelligence was coming in all the time on those

           4       subjects.  So decisions are made all through the day.

           5       It's not just we are sitting there with that one piece

           6       of intelligence on that one operation.  There are

           7       numerous facets coming -- or numerous people coming in,

           8       numerous discussions, numerous decisions being made.

           9   Q.  I understand that.  And you are having to prioritise

          10       with resources that you've got, and you are having to

          11       look at the intelligence you've got that is good.  And

          12       it's of concern somebody who has control of a gun and

          13       somebody else who wants it.  That's what you have by the

          14       3rd, isn't it?

          15   A.  Mm.

          16   Q.  Right.  If you wanted, on the 3rd, whichever officer --

          17       you are saying ZZ17 in conjunction with the SIO -- if

          18       you wanted to mount, on that day, the 3rd -- but I'll be

          19       more specific than that even, on the 4th.  In other

          20       words, let us suppose for the moment that this

          21       intelligence I have just read out only comes through

          22       late on the 3rd -- I don't know the timing yet, we may

          23       find it out -- and somebody wanted, on the back of it,

          24       to mount a directed armed surveillance operation with

          25       MASTS, Mobile Armed Support, on the person who is named




           1       as having, whether you call it constructive control or

           2       possession of the gun, who would be in a position to do

           3       that?

           4   A.  The intelligence would be --

           5   Q.  Who would be in a position to action that?  In other

           6       words a specific operation, armed, directed at

           7       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster, starting whenever you like to

           8       name it, 9 o'clock on the morning on the 4th, noon on

           9       the 4th, 2 o'clock in the afternoon on the 4th; would

          10       this be the SIO who would decide that or would it be

          11       someone else?  The intelligence officer?

          12   A.  It would be the SIO in conjunction with the Tactical

          13       Firearms Commander.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  In conjunction with Z51.

          15   A.  Yes -- no, no -- yes, yes, Z51.

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Not to ZZ17.

          17   A.  Mm.

          18   MR MANSFIELD:  Sorry, can I just go back a bit, we are

          19       moving quite fast even here.

          20           To do that operation, that is directed surveillance

          21       with MASTS support -- take the decision on the 3rd, that

          22       it should happen during the 4th; that would be

          23       a decision ultimately for the Senior Investigating

          24       Officer having consulted --

          25   A.  In relation to the firearms operation.  In relation --




           1       so, no disrespect.  You are talking about a very, very

           2       complicated set of processes and systems in one

           3       sentence.

           4           Directed surveillance was already in place for six

           5       subjects and the associates of those six subjects.  So

           6       I reviewed the directed surveillance on the Monday, the

           7       1st, and there's a record of that.

           8           On that, therefore, is the six subjects and their

           9       associates.  So directed surveillance would have been in

          10       place anyway.

          11   Q.  Can we pause at that point then, we are just dealing

          12       with the directed surveillance.  I understand your point

          13       about the complexity of it.

          14           The directed surveillance authority already being in

          15       place for the six subjects and their associates; would

          16       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster be included as an associate?

          17   A.  He could be.

          18   Q.  Right.  So we don't need to take too much time on

          19       directed surveillance --

          20   A.  No.

          21   Q.  -- it's already there?

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  So the added bit is the armed, if you like, CO19 support

          24       in MASTS.  So just explain what would have to go through

          25       for that one?




           1   A.  Right.  It would go -- from the same process again.  It

           2       would be an application from the -- ZZ17, through to the

           3       Z51, through to me to make a decision on how we were

           4       going to deal with that intelligence with the firearms

           5       response.

           6   Q.  I think it speaks for itself.  You weren't asked, on the

           7       3rd, or the 4th for that matter, for a directed armed

           8       surveillance operation supported by CO19 on

           9       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster, were you?

          10   A.  I wasn't asked -- yes, again, your words are very mixed.

          11       I wasn't asked for an armed surveillance deployment

          12       directly on Kevin Hutchinson-Foster, no.

          13   Q.  No, I understand.  Because you had already authorised

          14       a surveillance operation?

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  I understand that.  So can we just move on to the next

          17       day, which is really the bottom of this page; do you

          18       have it there?  I just read this part out:

          19           "Some time between 17.10 and 17.15 on 4 August,

          20       I received intelligence that indicated that Mr Duggan

          21       would be imminently travelling by minicab to

          22       Vicarage Road in Leyton to collect the firearm.  This

          23       was the first occasion on which I received intelligence

          24       which indicated an area where the firearm might be.

          25       I assessed the intelligence as being credible and




           1       immediately disseminated it to ZZ17 by way of a verbal

           2       briefing by telephone.  Later ..."

           3           Again, we don't know the time for this part:

           4           "... on 4 August I received credible intelligence

           5       that Mr Duggan was in possession of the firearm and

           6       intended taking it to the Broadwater Farm estate in

           7       Tottenham.  I immediately disseminated this intelligence

           8       to ZZ17 by way of a verbal briefing by telephone."

           9   A.  Mm.

          10   Q.  Now, I want you to look at another -- bear that in mind,

          11       if you wouldn't mind -- there should be a jury bundle

          12       there.  I just want you to look at the document we know

          13       as a timeline.  Perhaps everyone could look at the

          14       timeline, just for one purpose only.  I don't think you

          15       have seen this before either?

          16   A.  Sorry, where is it?

          17   Q.  It's the red bundle.

          18   A.  I've got two reds.

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I think it's on the right.  I think

          20       that's the jury bundle, is it?

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  At the back of that is a timeline,

          23       behind the divider.

          24   A.  Thank you.  All right, thank you, got it.

          25   MR MANSFIELD:  What I just want to draw your attention to --




           1       because you may not remember now, and perhaps you never

           2       knew anyway -- is the first page on the timeline.  The

           3       entry 4, 17.12, a taxi collecting Mark Duggan was booked

           4       to go from -- then the address is spelt out -- to

           5       Vicarage Road.  And the jury have heard that address in

           6       connection with search warrants and so on.

           7           It's perfectly clear, therefore, by the 4th,

           8       particularly by ten past to quarter past 5, the

           9       intelligence is spot on, isn't it?

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  Yes.  Now, I just want to go through with you, if you

          12       wouldn't mind -- I appreciate you are not necessarily

          13       taking all these decisions, but the first time you hear

          14       about anything similar to the intelligence there, is

          15       that around 5.30?

          16   A.  I get a phonecall at 5.30.

          17   Q.  Yes, a phonecall from?

          18   A.  TFC.  Z51, TFC.

          19   Q.  At that stage, therefore, when he phoned you and you for

          20       the first time discovered some intelligence, first of

          21       all did you know where he was?

          22   A.  Where Z51 was?

          23   Q.  Yes.

          24   A.  When he made that call to me?

          25   Q.  Yes.




           1   A.  He was travelling in a car, I believe.

           2   Q.  Yes, he was.  I'm sorry, I want to be a little more

           3       precise.  Did you know, effectively, precisely where he

           4       was in a car?

           5   A.  No.

           6   Q.  I appreciate you may not want to necessarily answer

           7       those questions.  But you didn't know that.  Did you

           8       know, at the time he rang you, that's 5.30, where CO19

           9       was?  The whole, as it were, group/unit of officers; did

          10       you know where they were?

          11   A.  No.

          12   Q.  Did you know where ZZ17, the intelligence officer, was?

          13   A.  No.

          14   Q.  Right.  Did you know where Vicarage Road was?

          15   A.  No.

          16   Q.  Were you told about Vicarage Road on the 5.30 call?

          17   A.  No.

          18   Q.  I asked Mr Foote yesterday about a control centre for

          19       a specific operation.  Are you following me?

          20   A.  Yes, I'm following you.

          21   Q.  Is there a control centre where there's somebody keeping

          22       an eye on everything?  If there is, is that at the

          23       patrol base or is it in Hendon or is it south of the

          24       river or where is it?  If there is?

          25   A.  When you say "somebody keeping an eye on everything",




           1       what do you mean?

           2   Q.  I mean that with information coming from different

           3       quarters -- which also has to be assessed, make that

           4       assumption -- so intelligence coming in which may have

           5       to be actioned rather quickly.

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  This is, you know, very commonplace, isn't it?  Having

           8       to assess an action of something very quickly.  But in

           9       order to do that, you need to know where everybody is,

          10       don't you?  You need to know: we've got CO19 down at

          11       Leman Street, and they've been there since 4 o'clock,

          12       we've got them actually there on -- they have just left

          13       there, we know exactly where they are.  And I've got

          14       Vicarage Road and I know where that is, this person at

          15       the centre, or persons at the centre, keeping an eye on

          16       the disposition of people and places.  Now that's the

          17       person I'm describing.  Was there somebody like that?

          18   A.  There's a command structure in place to do just that,

          19       which is the firm communication between all officers to

          20       know what they are doing at each given time.  The

          21       Metropolitan Police do not have bespoke control rooms,

          22       and we don't have anything, as you say somebody with

          23       maps, overseeing a Trident operation.  We have a firm

          24       command structure, which we know everyone is doing --

          25       this was an operation which could have gone across all




           1       of London, so therefore your point about a maps is very

           2       difficult to -- we didn't know where they were going to

           3       end up anywhere in London.

           4   Q.  Well, you didn't but others did know that they were

           5       going -- on this spot on intelligence, that they were

           6       heading -- that is the minicab was heading to

           7       Vicarage Road.  Of course, they could go to anywhere,

           8       but you have specific intelligence.  So reasonably you

           9       act on specific intelligence, don't you?

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  I appreciate Greater London is huge and to have a map of

          12       Greater London might be just too much, but these days,

          13       of course, there's electronic means of calling up where

          14       places are, aren't there?

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  I'm sorry, they are obvious questions but I want to put

          17       to you -- sorry, I want to ask you, rather than put to

          18       you, it's not your responsibility -- that, having access

          19       to the geography of somewhere, the topography of

          20       somewhere, so you know what you've got and what's

          21       happening visually before your eyes so you can take

          22       a decision, "I think it's better for CO19 not to trundle

          23       all the way to Wood Green but actually to zoom across to

          24       Vicarage Road".  Now, do you see the point?

          25   A.  I think you're simplifying the point, sir.




           1   Q.  I am, to make the question clear.

           2   A.  I think --

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Give us your answer about this.

           4   A.  My answer is that you are simplifying a very, very

           5       complicated set of circumstances.  With dynamic

           6       intelligence which comes in very fast time, on

           7       a phonecall at 5.30.  You have got officers deploying

           8       who have been trained and have done this.  In London

           9       alone that year there were 1,600 people and firearm

          10       operations just like this.  581 of them are MASTS

          11       operations just like this.  This is daily business

          12       within London.  We know what we are doing, we do it

          13       regularly.  Whether they had maps, maps books, I do not

          14       know --

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I think Mr Mansfield has an idea of

          16       a Second World War movie where you have people

          17       pushing -- a map of London and we're putting little --

          18   MR MANSFIELD:  I would be grateful if you don't give away my

          19       age.

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You don't have a geographical

          21       centre, which is a control centre in that way?

          22   A.  No-no.

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You have a structure where people

          24       together communicate and make a decision --

          25   A.  Communicate effectively.




           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- and act on it.

           2   A.  Yes, yes, and to go on to your other point around would

           3       it have been easier for those officers to go to that

           4       point, to that point.  Those officers were on the scene

           5       with that intelligence, it was their decisions to decide

           6       how to operate.

           7   MR MANSFIELD:  Whose decision?

           8   A.  It was the Tactical Firearms Commander.

           9   Q.  In order to make a tactical decision therefore -- and

          10       perhaps the precursor to this question is: really, one

          11       of the objectives must be to take control -- I'm using

          12       that word as a general police speak for it, in other

          13       words visual control, so you know where the target is --

          14       at the earliest possible practical juncture, correct?

          15   A.  You're describing a visual representation.  I don't know

          16       what maps the officers had.

          17   Q.  No, sorry.  Sorry to interrupt, I really don't mean

          18       to --

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  -- for the moment, forget a control centre with maps and

          21       all the rest of it and somebody having an overview.

          22       Forget that for the moment.

          23           I'm just dealing with the proposition that I suggest

          24       to you is basic, that you need to take control of the

          25       target, in the sense that you have surveillance of it if




           1       you can at the earliest juncture, and even better,

           2       firearms control of it as well.  That's a proposition.

           3       Do you accept that?

           4   A.  That is a MASTS type operation.

           5   Q.  Yes, exactly.  As you say, they are doing this day in,

           6       day out, unfortunately, in London, having to do it,

           7       aren't they?

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  They know how to react quickly, don't they?  There are

          10       in fact, would this be fair -- I don't know at the

          11       moment how many and if it's top secret forgive me, but

          12       I think there are about seven teams; is that a fair

          13       estimate?

          14   A.  Mm.

          15   Q.  So they are not all available at the same time, I dare

          16       say, but there are a number available?

          17   A.  There are a number available, yes.

          18   Q.  They are all on a rota and they have colours attached to

          19       them and so on and that sort of thing, or they used to

          20       have; is that right?

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  Of course, if the Tactical Firearms person -- he says he

          23       is "single crew", does that mean he's actually driving

          24       himself or he's got someone else and there's only one

          25       person.  What does "single crewing" mean?




           1   A.  I think you will have to ask the person who said it to

           2       be fair but my impression would be single crew but

           3       I don't know.  I was not privy to that conversation.

           4   Q.  I'll leave it.  Of course, the ideal situation is to be

           5       able to get to a vicinity before the targets actually

           6       meet, because that's the thrust of this, that two people

           7       are going to meet.  That's the thrust of the

           8       intelligence, isn't it?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  So, as has been put to someone else today, the ideal

          11       situation is to be there, if you can, to get them both,

          12       if you can.

          13   A.  Again, I think you are simplifying it, sir, no

          14       disrespect.  You have to think of the location --

          15   Q.  Yes.

          16   A.  -- the safety of everybody involved --

          17   Q.  Yes.

          18   A.  -- and you have to think as well around -- in an ideal

          19       world, yes, you've got both persons, in an ideal world.

          20       But we don't live in an ideal world.  This is London,

          21       5 o'clock Thursday evening, very, very busy.  You have

          22       to deal with what you've got and what intelligence

          23       you've got at the time --

          24   Q.  I appreciate that.

          25   A.  -- and you cannot afford to take your eye off that




           1       intelligence.

           2   Q.  No.

           3   A.  So therefore if you have an intelligence around

           4       a particular subject you stick with that intelligence on

           5       that subject.

           6   Q.  You have intelligence about two subjects, don't you?

           7   A.  You have control of intelligence around one subject.

           8   Q.  No, I'm sorry --

           9   A.  Six subjects, sorry.

          10   Q.  Two subjects, thank you.

          11   A.  Six subjects, I said.

          12   Q.  But actually six subjects and an associate on this day,

          13       don't you?

          14   A.  We have -- there's two types of intelligence, sir.  As

          15       you know, we had control of those six subjects in

          16       relation to the intelligence we had and the activity

          17       they were doing.

          18   Q.  Yes, but what you also had, as I'm going to suggest to

          19       you, is A1 intelligence about an associate with a gun,

          20       didn't you?

          21   A.  We had intelligence around them having a gun but not

          22       about them moving the gun or their actual

          23       contemporaneous movements --

          24   Q.  No, it's not being critical remotely of you.  I'm just

          25       saying: look at the material that was there in that last




           1       paragraph alone.  You had -- not you personally because

           2       you didn't know about it until 5.30, or some of it --

           3       there was specific information, intelligence, about two

           4       individuals, one of whom very well known to Dibri, the

           5       other one well known to the police generally, we know

           6       that now -- they knew that then, he had just come out of

           7       prison, did you know that --

           8   A.  No.

           9   Q.  -- no, all right -- and that there was going to be

          10       imminent collection, in or around Vicarage Road, Leyton,

          11       the very area that had been discussed many times.

          12       That's pretty hot information, isn't it?

          13   A.  I didn't receive that information.

          14   Q.  No, all right, you didn't receive that.  But you agree

          15       it's -- I've used the vernacular, but it's hot

          16       information, isn't it?

          17   A.  What do you mean by hot: current?

          18   Q.  Current and good and specific --

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  -- actionable?

          21   A.  Yes, mm-hmm.

          22   Q.  Yes, thank you.  I've got very little else.  Can

          23       I finish tonight?

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, please.

          25   MR MANSFIELD:  Said with feeling.




           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You can take that whichever way you

           2       want.

           3   MR MANSFIELD:  Could you just look at FA3A, which is your

           4       document.  We have looked at a bit of it already.

           5       I don't ask it's put up on screen.  Do you have the full

           6       document there?

           7   A.  Yes, I have it here, thank you.

           8   Q.  You have, yes.  As we go through it, we get to this

           9       somewhat distractive CMM model that pops up on various

          10       pages but later on in the document, I'm afraid perhaps

          11       the jury -- perhaps they do have it all.  C8, sorry,

          12       they have it all.

          13           There are many pages later on -- it becomes a log,

          14       as Mr Underwood indicated, a two-stage process.

          15           Would you, in normal circumstances, have entered

          16       anything up after you opened this, which you opened at

          17       the time you were seeing all the forms and so on?

          18       Because there's nothing in the rest of it, is there?

          19   A.  No.

          20   Q.  No.  Is that because there was nothing to put in or --

          21   A.  No, in practice these forms are very badly designed.  If

          22       I'm running three of these jobs, per se, for example,

          23       I'm not going to carry these around on me.  They've got

          24       confidential on, very high risk if they get left

          25       anywhere or someone steals them.  They're very




           1       impractical to carry around.  We have fed all our

           2       comments back to the College of Policing and said "They

           3       don't work".

           4           So what happens is you authorise them on the system

           5       when you get the application and then you cannot carry

           6       it around with you, I have multiple sites, I have said

           7       already, so then I would either update my day book or

           8       other documentation with my colleagues.  But, no, the

           9       authorities is on the form and that's generally where it

          10       stays it does not get updated after that.

          11   MR MANSFIELD:  Thank you very much.  I have no further

          12       questions.

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, Mr Thomas?

          14                      Questions by MR THOMAS

          15   MR THOMAS:  Just a very few questions, okay?

          16   A.  Okay.

          17   Q.  Can I just clarify just one area with you.  I just want

          18       to look at the role of the Tactical Firearms Commander,

          19       okay?

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  We know that was Z51?

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  Right.  Can I just make sure that this is clear so

          24       everybody on this is singing from the same song sheet,

          25       as it were?




           1   A.  Yes, of course.

           2   Q.  This whole concept of double-hatting, in other words

           3       a police officer --

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  -- not performing a dual role, performing one role.

           6       Now, the Tactical Firearms Commander is leading and

           7       directing the firearms officers in relation to the

           8       firearms part of the operation, correct?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  That role is different to the investigating role where

          11       you're looking for the evidence you're trying to

          12       retrieve, evidence perhaps to prove criminality later

          13       on.  So the role that Mr Foote, who we heard from

          14       yesterday -- he was leading the criminal

          15       investigation --

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  -- under Operation Dibri in relation to your six

          18       subjects that you were monitoring and following.  They

          19       are two very different roles, aren't they?

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  What Mr Foote was conducting and the firearms officer,

          22       two very, very different roles, yes?

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  The danger is this, is it not: one of the reasons why

          25       ACPO, the Association of Chief Police Officers, that




           1       organisation, believed it was right and proper that

           2       there should be a separation of roles between some

           3       people performing the tactical firearms operation not

           4       becoming too involved with the criminal investigation,

           5       because primarily the Tactical Firearms Commander is

           6       concerned with public safety -- the safety of his

           7       officers, the public and the subjects, retrieving the

           8       illegal firearms as safely as he can; would you agree?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  Whereas -- and here is the tension, here is the

          11       tension -- if you have the investigator's hat on, you

          12       might want to let an operation run a little bit longer,

          13       so you gather a little bit more evidence, which might

          14       stand up in court; do you follow?  There's a tension

          15       between the two roles; do you see?

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  Yes and that is understood, isn't it, and that is the

          18       reason -- just so the jury understand, that is the

          19       reason why the Tactical Firearms Commander ought to be

          20       separate from the investigation and the investigation

          21       team?

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  Now, help me with this.  Now that is clear and everybody

          24       understands the duality of the roles and why the roles

          25       ought not to be merged, help me with this: I want to




           1       just put something to you.  We now know that the mystery

           2       DI, who we were referring to as ZZ100, we now know to be

           3       Mark Raymond, yes?

           4   A.  Mm.

           5   Q.  We were told yesterday that Mr Raymond was involved on

           6       this operation, and let's be clear about this, with

           7       an investigator's hat on, part of Operation Dibri, in

           8       the pro-active side of this operation -- not reactive,

           9       in the pro-active side of this operation -- from

          10       January 2011 until he left in or around May/June 2011,

          11       right?  That's what we were told by Mr Foote.

          12           The first question: was that your understanding as

          13       well?

          14   A.  When you say he was practically involved, are you saying

          15       in the investigation or as a Tactical Firearms

          16       Commander?

          17   Q.  No.  The investigation --

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Don't worry what Mr Foote said or

          19       didn't because there are doubts and, we heard yesterday,

          20       there would be some correction.  What's your

          21       understanding, before Mr Raymond left and you had the DI

          22       post then available to re-assign to Z51 in the way that

          23       you have told us, what did you understand Mr Raymond's

          24       position to be, what was he doing?

          25   A.  He was -- he was occasionally the acting SIO.  He was




           1       also -- because the fluidity of people at that time --

           2       but he was not involved in the intelligence because

           3       there was another intelligence holder before ZZ17.

           4   MR THOMAS:  Well, my clear questions yesterday, and I hear

           5       what you say, were -- I was just looking at the

           6       pro-active side of the operation -- and we were talking

           7       about the Detective Inspector who worked up until

           8       May/June 2011.  Was it your understanding that that

           9       Detective Inspector, that's Mark Raymond, he was

          10       effectively the line manager for ZZ17, and he in turn

          11       had to report to Mr Foote?  So ZZ17 reports to Mark

          12       Raymond and Mark Raymond in turn reports to Mr Foote in

          13       terms of the pro-active side of the operation to

          14       Operation Dibri; was that your understanding?

          15   A.  This is confusing and I apologise.  There was somebody

          16       who did the role of ZZ17 before he took that role.  That

          17       person held the intelligence and briefed the SIO around

          18       the intelligence on Dibri.

          19   Q.  Okay.  Help me with this.  Let's take ZZ17 out of the

          20       equation.  This other person who was performing the same

          21       role as ZZ17 --

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  -- the same question applies: they are on this

          24       operation, between whenever to whenever ZZ17 takes

          25       over --




           1   A.  Yes.

           2   Q.  -- but they are on the pro-active side and they are

           3       reporting to Mr Raymond?

           4   A.  They are reporting to the SIO.

           5   Q.  Mr Raymond?

           6   A.  No, to the SIO, Mr Foote.

           7   Q.  So if this court were told, in quite clear terms, that

           8       Mr Raymond had a person in ZZ17's position reporting to

           9       him and he in turn would be reporting to Mr Foote, that

          10       would be wrong, would it?

          11   MR KEITH:  Well, I'm afraid to say I've --

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  No, please.

          13   MR KEITH:  My ability to remember precisely what was said by

          14       Mr Foote yesterday is now handicapped by the passage of

          15       time.

          16   MR THOMAS:  Well, I have a transcript.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We have transcripts, they are always

          18       available.

          19   MR THOMAS:  I have a transcript.

          20   MR KEITH:  I do not believe those were the exact words that

          21       he used and I do believe my learned friend is confusing

          22       his question with the answer.

          23   MR THOMAS:  For Mr Keith, who doesn't have the transcript in

          24       front of him, let me assist him by reading from the

          25       transcript.




           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Before you do, Mr Thomas, with these

           2       transcripts, we're going to be having a lot of

           3       evidence -- and I say this to everybody -- of what one

           4       witness has said and their recollection and their