Transcript of the Hearing 9 December 2013


           1                                        Monday, 9 December 2013

           2   (11.00 am)

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Right.  We are all ready.  We will

           4       ask for the cameras to be turned off for a moment while

           5       the jury are asked to come into court.

           6                  (In the presence of the jury)

           7                            Summing-up

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Right then, members of the jury, I'm

           9       afraid you are going to have to sit there patiently and

          10       listen to my voice for a while today and I'm sure

          11       tomorrow too.

          12           Well, let me start my summing-up to you, as I said

          13       last week you have heard all the evidence and so my

          14       summing-up falls into two parts.

          15           Firstly, I am going to give you legal directions,

          16       which, please, you must follow from me, I will tell you

          17       what the law is that applies to this Inquest and you

          18       must take that from me.

          19           In the second part, I shall review the evidence.  It

          20       will be on the evidence and the evidence alone that you

          21       will answer the particular questions which will be posed

          22       to you and come to your conclusions.

          23           As I say, there will be no more evidence, indeed you

          24       may think you have heard more than enough, but you will

          25       also understand that, however much evidence you will




           1       hear and however long we might have stayed here, there

           2       is bound to be some areas of what happened on

           3       4 August 2011 which will never be able to be clarified

           4       precisely.

           5                         Legal Directions

           6           It is on this evidence that you have had over the

           7       past 12 weeks now that you come to your conclusions

           8       without any direction from me on the evidence, because

           9       that is not my task.  That is for you and for you alone;

          10       not for me.

          11           The evidence has come in a number of forms here.

          12       Firstly, of course, it is the evidence that you have

          13       heard from the witness box itself.  You have also heard

          14       evidence via the video link from witnesses.  You have

          15       heard evidence of witnesses both on the video link and

          16       in the witness box, those witnesses having been

          17       anonymised.

          18           Please think no more about that and the video link

          19       what they say, whether you feel you can believe them,

          20       whether they are reliable or whether they are accurate,

          21       honest and all that, whether they are given by the video

          22       link or whether they are in this court.  The video link

          23       provisions exist in order to assist witnesses, as you

          24       would understand, who may be fearful or vulnerable, in

          25       being able to give evidence without coming into this




           1       court room.

           2           Also, it would help Mr Hutchinson-Foster, who might

           3       be put in either of those categories, because he was

           4       obviously in custody when he gave his account to you in

           5       this hearing.

           6           Another form of evidence has been the witness

           7       statements that have been read to you.  Again, you will

           8       recall being told that in advance of this hearing all

           9       the witness statements, nearly all of the witness

          10       statements, have been reduced into writing and placed in

          11       files.  I have some of them behind me here.

          12           Some of those witnesses, of course, have been

          13       required to give evidence, and they come along and tell

          14       you their accounts.  Other statements can be read

          15       because there is then -- at the time of being read

          16       anyway -- no dispute about the contents of the

          17       statement.  I will be reminding you about some of the

          18       read evidence too in this hearing.

          19           Other forms of evidence include the documents, the

          20       photographs and all the plans that have been put before

          21       you.  It also includes the videos and the other footage

          22       which has been played to you.

          23           Finally, it includes what you yourselves saw on the

          24       two views you went on and your conclusions that you drew

          25       from that.




           1           So that is all the evidence that you are

           2       concentrating on.  Please, please, ignore anything else

           3       that you may have seen or heard, whether in the

           4       newspapers, on the television or anywhere else, or even,

           5       dare I say it, any comment or speech that has been made

           6       by counsel during the course of the hearing.  They are

           7       perfectly entitled to ask questions; you must

           8       concentrate on the evidence which is really the answers

           9       to those questions.

          10           Whilst I review the evidence now and shortly, you

          11       will be pleased to know that I am not going to read out

          12       the transcripts.  You have, I know, copies of the

          13       transcripts, I have them all up here and I am not going

          14       to read them all out from start to finish, otherwise we

          15       will be here for another 12 weeks.  You have, I know,

          16       been looking at this transcripts and listening to the

          17       evidence carefully over the time that you have been

          18       here.

          19           They are available for you in your jury retiring

          20       room.  I am not going to encourage you either to sit

          21       down and read through them from cover to cover, but what

          22       I will do, when I give you a piece of evidence later on,

          23       I will then say the time and date when that witness gave

          24       that particular piece of evidence and sometimes I might

          25       give you a page reference.  Please do not feel that you




           1       have to look at the page reference that I have given

           2       you.  I just do that because what I am saying now will

           3       also be transcribed for you, so tomorrow or the day

           4       after you will have the transcript of this summing-up,

           5       with those references in it.  So if you think "The

           6       Coroner talked about a particular witness", you will be

           7       able to look at that and see it's 26/10, page 145, or

           8       whatever it may be, and you will then be able to look at

           9       it, if you wish to.  But please what you do in your

          10       retiring room is a matter entirely for you and not for

          11       me to direct you about.

          12           So that is the summary that I will give you about

          13       the evidence, where there is evidence on an important

          14       matter.  But, again, what is important and what isn't

          15       important, is going to be, again, a matter for you.

          16           So it may be that much of the evidence will not need

          17       to be summarised, or at least read out in detail,

          18       although what I will propose to be doing later on today

          19       might sound quite detailed, nevertheless it is actually

          20       quite a summary, honed together from a number of

          21       different witnesses.

          22           Will be quite aware that there has been another form

          23       of evidence -- as I've dealing with the evidence --

          24       which has been expert evidence.  How should you deal

          25       with expert evidence?  This is evidence given to a jury




           1       which either can be direct as to facts from direct

           2       witnesses or indeed from experts, which is opinion

           3       evidence.

           4           Expert evidence is allowed in a court of law where

           5       there are matters which fall outside a jury's expected

           6       knowledge.  Thus, you have heard about ballistics, you

           7       have had people talking about the reconstruction of the

           8       shooting.  That sort of evidence, of course, is not

           9       direct evidence of what actually happened but it is

          10       someone with expertise looking at the various features,

          11       the scientific findings, after the event, and coming to

          12       conclusions and telling you what, in their expert

          13       opinion, is the correct reconstruction or the correct

          14       conclusion to draw from the evidential features.

          15           The important direction that I give you about expert

          16       opinion is that it is there to help you.  It is not

          17       there to tell you what the answers are, because this is

          18       a trial by jury, it is not a hearing or trial by expert.

          19           So if the expert evidence does not help you, then

          20       you must feel free to reject it and ignore it.  You may

          21       hear that most of the expert evidence that you have had

          22       during this hearing has not really been directly

          23       challenged by many people, and indeed many of the

          24       experts agree on various features themselves, but there

          25       are some areas of the evidence which the experts give




           1       which are disputed.

           2           One example is that Mr Tomei -- you will remember

           3       him -- asserted that the bullet that had gone through

           4       Mark Duggan's chest was the one that ended up in the

           5       radio, whereas Dr Seaman and Professor Pounder were

           6       asserting that the bullet in the police officer's radio

           7       was the one that had caused the arm wound to Mark

           8       Duggan.

           9           So there are some differences there, it's for you to

          10       look at that, assess it and come to your conclusions.

          11       But really, much of the expert evidence is not in

          12       dispute.

          13           It may be said that there is a third class of

          14       evidence here, we've talked about the direct evidence

          15       and the forms that that has and the expert evidence.

          16       A third class is not really direct evidence or expert

          17       evidence but procedures, practices, protocols and such

          18       like that you largely have within your jury bundles.

          19       Why have you got those?

          20           Well, they are put before you to help explain what

          21       might otherwise seem to some to be rather unusual or

          22       perhaps even suspicious: the ACPO guidance which we

          23       talked about a lot at the beginning of the hearing, we

          24       have not talked much about it recently, about the making

          25       of initial statements, or indeed we heard a lot about




           1       what is called post-incident procedures and, again, you

           2       have been told within the paperwork how that works.

           3           It is there really perhaps to help you to explain

           4       what was going on rather than perhaps any particular

           5       form of full evidence that you need to come to

           6       conclusions about.

           7           Another evidential matter that I want to give you

           8       a direction about concerns the conviction of Kevin

           9       Hutchinson-Foster.  As you know, and as he told us, he

          10       was convicted of supplying the gun which was found on

          11       the grass at Ferry Lane on 4 August.  He was convicted

          12       of supplying that gun to Mark Duggan on that date.  You

          13       have also heard directly from him that he did not supply

          14       the gun on that date.  He accepted, in his evidence,

          15       that he used the gun on 29 July 2011 to assault Peter

          16       Osadbey in the Lagoon salon but claimed he returned the

          17       gun elsewhere and certainly did not hand it over to Mark

          18       Duggan in Vicarage Road or Burchell Road on 4 August.

          19           However, as you were you told, another jury did not

          20       believe him.  That jury was sure that he had supplied

          21       the gun to Mark Duggan.

          22           So the legal direction that I give you is that, just

          23       because he has been convicted of that offence, is not

          24       determinative -- that means it does not decide that

          25       issue for you -- but it is certainly strong evidence and




           1       it may help you.  You can use that conviction as

           2       something which adds weight to the other evidence, which

           3       is undoubtedly there, which indicates the transfer of

           4       a gun to Mark Duggan from Kevin Hutchinson-Foster, such

           5       as the evidence of the taxi driver and the fact that the

           6       taxi had a box in it with fingerprints both from Mark

           7       Duggan and Kevin Hutchinson-Foster, and that box may

           8       have been, as has been suggested, the container for the

           9       gun, and that would be how it got to where it was.

          10           So you may think there is lots of strong evidence

          11       about it.  There is the conviction there.  All I am

          12       saying is that that may be very strong and very

          13       persuasive evidence for you to accept but it is not

          14       final.  You are the jury who are deciding the facts in

          15       this hearing.

          16           Another category of evidence, which I will just

          17       touch on here, which is important for me to mention, is

          18       what lawyers sometimes call hearsay evidence.  A good

          19       example of that is that of Witness C last Wednesday, the

          20       BBC reporter.  He did not give any direct evidence of

          21       any matter in issue, and he was called to give his

          22       account of what he was told by Witness B.

          23           Now, Witness B is an important witness of the

          24       incident on which we are all concentrating and we will

          25       turn to his evidence in due course.  But, as you




           1       understand, we, as the Coroner's team, were made aware

           2       by the BBC of the interviews in April 2012 and it was

           3       thought a way of testing Witness B's evidence to have

           4       Witness C along, the reporter who did that interview and

           5       made those notes.

           6           The important thing for you to realise is Witness C

           7       is not giving independent further evidence of the

           8       incident -- I'm sure that you have never thought that

           9       but it's something which I have to indicate to you --

          10       but it's there to test the accuracy and test the account

          11       of Witness B, to see whether he is someone who is

          12       reliable, consistent or perhaps inconsistent and

          13       unreliable.  That is the basis of that evidence.

          14           So, having talked about evidence, let me now just

          15       deal with this: to what degree, to what standard, should

          16       you test the evidence in this hearing?

          17           You will have heard of juries being told that it is

          18       only when a jury is sure of a fact that they should rely

          19       on it in a conclusion which leads to a verdict in

          20       a criminal trial.  So that is in a criminal trial and

          21       juries are told there that they must not convict unless

          22       sure of guilt, sure of guilt that the crime has been

          23       proved by the prosecution to have been committed by the

          24       defendant in the case, "sure" meaning beyond all

          25       reasonable doubt.




           1           Well, as in an Inquest, there is no trial, there are

           2       no findings of guilt, there is no prosecution.

           3       Therefore, the facts are on a different basis

           4       altogether.  The facts can be established on a balance

           5       of probabilities.  That means that that conclusion is

           6       something which is more likely than not.

           7           For example, if you were deciding, as I have already

           8       mentioned about the different shots, if you were

           9       deciding that you needed to decide -- it may be that you

          10       decide that you will not have to -- which shot was

          11       first, arm or chest shot, if I can put it in that way,

          12       then you would decide that on the basis of which is more

          13       likely than not on the evidence.

          14           If you decide that the arm shot was the first then

          15       it would be enough for you to conclude that it was more

          16       likely than not that the arm shot was the first.  You

          17       would not need to be satisfied so that you were sure

          18       that it was first.  "Sure" is a much higher standard of

          19       proof.

          20           There is one exception in this hearing, again to

          21       which I shall return quite shortly, and that is your

          22       consideration of whether Mark Duggan was killed

          23       unlawfully.  In this consideration, the higher standard

          24       of proof comes into play and you would only come to

          25       a conclusion that Mark Duggan was killed unlawfully if




           1       you are sure that this is the case.

           2           So at all times, let me repeat, it will not be the

           3       last time I say this, but it is important to remember

           4       that this is not a trial.  It is not a method of

           5       apportioning blame on individuals.  There is no

           6       indictment, there is no criminal charge.  But it does

           7       not mean, members of the jury, that this Inquest is not

           8       important or that it is irrelevant.  It is a public

           9       method of establishing facts and getting at the truth.

          10       In that way, the Inquest will satisfy the need to

          11       examine openly the incident and how it was that it ended

          12       in the tragic that it undoubtedly did.

          13           I ask you, of course, to please come to your

          14       decisions and your conclusions calmly and coolly on the

          15       evidence.  Please ignore any feelings that you might

          16       have of sympathy for anybody or prejudice that you might

          17       feel against anybody.

          18           By doing this in such an open and public way it is

          19       hoped that public fears will be allayed; it shows that

          20       where such a tragedy happens that the courts will fully

          21       examine and bring to light any discreditable conduct;

          22       or, conversely, show that there is no such discreditable

          23       conduct which needs to be exposed.

          24           So what you are doing is very, very important and

          25       I am fully aware that you realise that.  I do not say




           1       that to frighten you in any way, but just to reinforce

           2       the responsibility that you have collectively in this

           3       matter.

           4           Your conclusions on the facts will satisfy statutory

           5       requirements and may inform other people as to further

           6       legal steps that may be necessary, it may highlight

           7       deficiencies in practice, could inform new procedures

           8       and training or avoid a repetition of outcome.

           9       Certainly, it will remind those in public positions that

          10       their acts could be put under public scrutiny.

          11           Indeed, it is directly set out in the statute what

          12       my duties are and what your duties are.  You must seek

          13       to come to determinations on the evidence and you must

          14       not express opinions as such, or make recommendations.

          15                             Findings

          16           What I am going to do now -- that is my introductory

          17       legal outline to you -- is to move on to how you are, as

          18       a jury, to record your findings.  That is not as in

          19       a criminal trial that one of you as the foreman stands

          20       up and says guilty or not guilty.  It's far from that.

          21           What happens is that when you have considered and

          22       discussed the evidence, you must complete, in writing,

          23       and sign a document which is now known as a Form 2 under

          24       the Inquest rules.  We have copies of that document.  It

          25       is at this stage that I would ask each of you to be




           1       handed a copy and I will go through it with you.

           2       (Handed)

           3           This form used to be called an inquisition and that

           4       is a statement which sets out the matters which have

           5       been proved on the evidence which you have heard and

           6       which you conclude led to Mr Duggan's death.  In more

           7       formal and perhaps more ancient times, in as much as

           8       a year ago, before the latest legislation came into

           9       force, that would be described as you giving your

          10       verdict and by certifying it by an inquisition.  But

          11       recent legislation, meant to be, I think, sympathetic

          12       but perhaps rather confusingly, has removed the word

          13       "verdict" and you as jurors come to determinations or

          14       findings or conclusions.  We will deal with that wording

          15       in a moment but I shall try to use those words when

          16       addressing you.

          17           So no answer to a question or conclusion may be

          18       framed in such a way as to appear to determine any

          19       question of criminal liability on any part, or indeed

          20       any person, or indeed civil liability.

          21           Well, let's look at that Form 2 and this is what you

          22       will fill in.  There will be lots of copies of this,

          23       there isn't a top copy or an important copy but at the

          24       end someone will write down, it will be passed through

          25       to me to make sure it is all in order and then, in due




           1       course, it will be read out in open court.

           2           So you must complete the record, your decisions and

           3       determinations on this form.  The requirement also

           4       satisfies what is called the Registration Act, for

           5       keeping the records of all deaths.

           6           So we start off with question number 1 -- well, that

           7       is not going to be a difficult question -- the name of

           8       the deceased, and obviously it is Mark Wayne Duggan, his

           9       full name.

          10           Number 2: the medical cause of death.  Again, there

          11       is no dispute about that.  It's "Gunshot wound to

          12       chest", the words used by the pathologist Dr Poole.

          13           Then we come to the third question: how, when and

          14       where and, for investigations where Section 5.2 of the

          15       Coroners and Justice Act 2009 applies -- that is this

          16       one in fact -- in what circumstances the deceased came

          17       by his or her death.

          18           This is where I then pose these questions which

          19       satisfy that answer to paragraph 3:

          20           Question 1, which you will be answering for me in

          21       due course, members of the jury, is this:

          22           "In the period between midday on 3 August 2011 and

          23       when state amber was called at 6.00 pm on 4 August 2011,

          24       did the MPS (Metropolitan Police Service) and SOCA

          25       (Serious Organised Crime Agency) do the best they




           1       realistically could have done to gather and react to

           2       intelligence about the possibility of Mr Duggan

           3       collecting a gun from Mr Hutchinson-Foster?"

           4           Then you see that there are big boxes there which

           5       can simply be ticked yes or no, or indeed if you feel

           6       you have not enough information to come to any

           7       satisfactory conclusion on the balance of probabilities,

           8       then you can tick "Not enough information".

           9           If you do tick that they did not do the best they

          10       could realistically have done -- so you tick "No" --

          11       then you are being asked please:

          12           "If no, what more could have been expected of them?"

          13           So that is the first question.  Let's go to the

          14       second question.

          15           Question 2:

          16           "Was the stop conducted in a location and in a way

          17       which minimised, to the greatest extent possible,

          18       recourse to lethal force?"

          19           Tick either yes or no:

          20           "If no, what more could have been expected of them?"

          21           Then you can deal with that if you wish and need to.

          22           Question 3:

          23           "Did Mr Duggan have the gun with him in the taxi

          24       immediately before the stop?"

          25           Tick quite simply yes or no.  "With him" just means




           1       physically in the taxi with him, not necessarily in any

           2       particular place.

           3           Question 4:

           4           "How did the gun get to the grass area where it was

           5       later found?"

           6           You have a big space there on the paper to put what

           7       you wish on that and I will deal with later how you come

           8       to these conclusions, whether you have to be all agreed

           9       or not.  I will tell you that in due course but that is

          10       for you to consider.

          11           Then we go over to question number 5.  Question 5:

          12           "When Mr Duggan received the fatal shot, did he have

          13       the gun in his hand?"

          14           This is where the burden of proof goes up a notch to

          15       that burden whereby you have to be sure beyond

          16       reasonable doubt.  So if you are sure that he did not

          17       have a gun in his hand, then tick the box accordingly

          18       and go on to consider the three choices: unlawful

          19       killing, lawful killing or open conclusion.

          20           You will see there is a box there whereby you say

          21       "We are sure he did not have a gun in his hand".  That

          22       is when he received the fatal shot, the shot through the

          23       chest.

          24           So that's first.  Then you go on, if you are not

          25       sure, then you go on to the next conclusion: if you find




           1       that it was more likely than not -- so that is coming to

           2       the lower burden of proof -- that he did have a gun in

           3       his hand, tick the box accordingly and go on to consider

           4       lawful killing or an open conclusion.  So:

           5           "We believe that it is more likely than not that he

           6       did have a gun in his hand."

           7           You would tick that box.

           8           The third box then: if you conclude that it is more

           9       likely than not that he did not have a gun in his hand,

          10       then tick the box accordingly and go on to consider

          11       lawful killing or an open conclusion.  There is the box

          12       there:

          13           "We believe it is more likely than not that he did

          14       not have a gun in his hand."

          15           That does not sound confusing because I know you are

          16       a very intelligent jury but it is very careful to go

          17       through the wording, to be looking at that to see "Are

          18       we sure that he did not have a gun in his hand", that is

          19       the first box, or are you in a state of mind whereby "We

          20       believe it is more likely than not he did have a gun in

          21       his hand", or the third "We believe it is more likely

          22       than not that he did not have a gun in his hand".

          23           Then, as you say, if you are ticking the first box,

          24       you go on to consider the three conclusions that are

          25       available to you: unlawful killing, lawful killing or




           1       open conclusion.  Of the second and third boxes, you go

           2       on to consider whether it is lawful killing or an open

           3       conclusion.

           4           Let's keep that, keep with me, and we will move over

           5       the next page now to looking at those conclusions.  The

           6       word "conclusion" is the old word "verdict" but we are

           7       not using that now because under the new law we have to

           8       use the word "conclusions" so that's why we look at

           9       these three conclusions.

          10           What would be necessary for you to come to

          11       a conclusion that the killing was unlawful?

          12           Let me go through this carefully with you.  You

          13       would have to be sure that the act done was unlawful.

          14       That is, that it was not done in lawful self-defence, or

          15       in defence of another, or in order to prevent crime.  It

          16       is not for V53 to prove that he did act lawfully.  He

          17       has, or the police have, no burden of proof at any

          18       stage.  So it is not for V53 to prove that he acted

          19       lawfully before you conclude that his act was unlawful.

          20       You must be sure that it was unlawful.

          21           Any person is entitled to use reasonable force to

          22       defend himself or another from injury, attack or threat

          23       of attack.  If V53 may have been defending himself, or

          24       indeed one of his colleagues, then you go on to consider

          25       two matters.  Firstly:




           1           "Did V53 honestly believe, or may he honestly have

           2       believed, that at the time he fired the fatal shot that

           3       he needed to use force to defend himself or another?"

           4           If your answer is no, that he did not honestly

           5       believe, or may have honestly believed, that he needed

           6       to use force to defend himself or another, then he

           7       cannot have been acting in lawful self-defence and you

           8       can put that issue to one side.

           9           If your answer is yes, then you have to go on to

          10       consider the second question:

          11           "Was the force used [that is the fatal shot]

          12       reasonable in all the circumstances?"

          13           Obviously, if someone is under attack from someone

          14       he genuinely believes is violent and armed, then that

          15       person cannot be expected to weigh up precisely the

          16       amount of force needed to prevent that attack.  But if

          17       he goes over the top and acts out of all proportion to

          18       the threat, then he would not be using reasonable force

          19       and that action would then be unlawful.

          20           So the question of whether the degree of force used

          21       by V53 was reasonable in the circumstances is to be

          22       decided by reference to the circumstances as V53

          23       believed them to be, but the degree of force is not to

          24       be regarded as reasonable in the circumstances as V53

          25       believed them to be if it was disproportionate in those




           1       circumstances.

           2           I put in there as the third heading, it's in

           3       brackets because it has not really been raised but it is

           4       right that it should be left to you, members of the

           5       jury:

           6           "A police officer may use lawful force to prevent

           7       crime."

           8           Here two points arise:

           9           "Did V53 shoot Mark Duggan in order to prevent crime

          10       and, secondly, was the force used reasonable or

          11       unreasonable in all the circumstances?"

          12           As I say, that has not really been raised but it is

          13       there for completeness.

          14           So let's go over the page:

          15           "It is only if you are sure that Mr Duggan was

          16       killed unlawfully that you will come to this conclusion

          17       and record it as such."

          18           So you can see the box there "unlawful killing" for

          19       you to tick.

          20           "Lawful killing.

          21           "If you conclude that it was more likely than not

          22       that the fatal shot which killed Mark Duggan was the use

          23       of lawful force, then you will return a conclusion of

          24       lawful killing."

          25           That would be the case if you had gone through the




           1       first hurdle of unlawful killing and decided that he

           2       acted in reasonable self-defence, then you will come on

           3       to consider this as lawful killing.  Then that would be

           4       ticked.

           5           Then the other third box is "Open conclusion":

           6           "An open conclusion should be recorded where there

           7       is insufficient evidence to the necessary standard of

           8       proof for you to record any other substantive conclusion

           9       as to how Mark Duggan came to his death."

          10           So you may record an open conclusion, if you are not

          11       satisfied so that you are sure that Mark Duggan was

          12       unlawfully killed and, nevertheless, you are not

          13       satisfied that it is more likely than not that

          14       Mark Duggan was lawfully killed.  So you have not been

          15       persuaded one way or the other, that would be an open

          16       conclusion.  As you would understand, you would only

          17       record one of those.

          18           So let me just say this about open conclusions.

          19       Please do not use that conclusion because you disagree

          20       amongst yourselves or to avoid wrestling with

          21       complexities of the evidence before you.  But if you do

          22       reach an open conclusion, please, please, it is not to

          23       be seen as a criticism of anyone and it does not mean

          24       you have failed in any way but it is just a question

          25       whereby you have been left in that state of mind which




           1       is, as I have said, that you are not satisfied but you

           2       are sure he was unlawfully killed and, at the same time,

           3       you are not satisfied that it's more likely than not

           4       that he was lawfully killed.

           5           The final page of this are the further particulars

           6       required by the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953

           7       and then what happens is that you put in the date and

           8       place of death, which we know, the name, sex, date of

           9       birth, which we know, and his usual address and

          10       occupation will be provided to you.

          11           What then happens is, as you can see, there is then

          12       a sheet for signature.  You have to sign it, I have to

          13       sign it.  You have anonymity, so where you do sign it

          14       that sheet will then be redacted for public purposes.

          15       So you do not have to worry, you are not giving away

          16       anything that you have as protection.  So that is what

          17       will happen.

          18           Once you have completed that form, what in fact then

          19       happens is that it is then sent through to me, I look at

          20       it to make sure that it is in order and then you come

          21       back into court and one of your number, who you have

          22       chosen to act as your foreman, will then answer the

          23       questions that I put.

          24           So I will be saying:

          25           "Under question 1, what have you said?"




           1           Then you will be saying publicly what the answer is

           2       that you have reached.  So that is just the way that it

           3       will be done when you come back, having reached your

           4       conclusions.

           5           Right, members of the jury, that's it.  I will come

           6       back to that again tomorrow at the end of my summing-up,

           7       before I send you out, just to go through it again with

           8       you to make sure it is firmly in your mind.

           9                 Summary of Evidence: Background

          10           Let me now turn to the evidence and make some

          11       introductory remarks and then go on to consider the

          12       evidence concerning the intelligence and the other

          13       witnesses, because that was quite some time ago now that

          14       you heard.  I know you have a lot of paperwork there but

          15       it is right and proper for me to remind you of that

          16       evidence.

          17           I pause to remark that you have been very diligent

          18       carrying in and out of court those bundles of papers;

          19       I am sure that whilst they have got heavier and bigger

          20       that you are indeed very familiar with them -- I am not

          21       saying you have committed them to memory but you know

          22       exactly where various papers are in it and, indeed, you

          23       know right at the beginning of the jury bundles where

          24       there is the glossary with the various acronyms on it,

          25       I am sure you have looked from time to time at the list




           1       of witnesses to see how many are still yet to come, and

           2       you may have refreshed your memory of the timeline of

           3       the day in question that is there as well.  They are all

           4       there to help you.  All the photographs, the BBC

           5       footage, are now very familiar to you and the other

           6       documents, reports and schedules too are there for your

           7       consideration.

           8           Let me just make a few introductory comments about

           9       the two people that obviously are at the centre of this.

          10       The first one is, of course, Mark Duggan himself.  Let's

          11       just have a look at the background of the evidence

          12       touching on him.

          13                           Mark Duggan

          14           He was born on 19 September 1981.  He was 29 years

          15       of age at the date of his death.  He was a father of

          16       five, we were told.  We know that he had a supportive

          17       family, a loving mother and father, and was clearly

          18       a respected man, respected by many, a friend of many, as

          19       we can see by the response to his death, and indeed by

          20       the family who have been faithfully attending.

          21           The public picture, actually, is not much different.

          22       DCI Foote, remember our very first witness, he said

          23       about Mark Duggan:

          24           "He was very, very lightly convicted."

          25           In fact, Mark Duggan had been cautioned for a public




           1       order offence and had been convicted and fined for

           2       possession of cannabis in 2000 and receiving stolen

           3       goods, he had been fined in 2007, but that's it.  He had

           4       never been sent to prison or even been given a community

           5       sentence.

           6           We will not, in this hearing, overlook the anguish

           7       and distress of Mrs Pamela Duggan.  She accepted, when

           8       she gave evidence before you, that Mark, to use her

           9       words, "was no angel", and it may be that much of what

          10       we have learnt about him in the weeks leading up to his

          11       death shows a lifestyle, and a criminality, of which she

          12       was totally unaware.

          13           Her evidence (25/9, page 41) was given quietly and

          14       with dignity and it was an understandable plea to know

          15       why her son was shot dead rather than being stopped or

          16       arrested or simply thwarted in his plans to get a gun.

          17           According to the police, the picture was indeed

          18       a much different picture.  To them, Mark Duggan was

          19       a prominent member of one of the most violent gangs in

          20       Europe, the Tottenham Man Dem.  The police had launched

          21       Operation Dibri to tackle such violent gangs in London

          22       and there was a specific part of that operation which

          23       concentrated on this gang, and Mark Duggan was one out

          24       of the 48 -- out of the 100 -- members of the gang who

          25       were particular subjects of that operation.




           1           In due course, as we know, Mark Duggan became one of

           2       six subjects of surveillance.  We have looked at the

           3       forms and I will refer those to you again in a moment.

           4       The whole history of suspected criminality was set out

           5       before you, and indeed in January 2011 he had shot

           6       someone in a nightclub; in February he had fired shots

           7       in a car park; June 2011 he was suspected of having

           8       drugs in his home; and we learnt that he was intent on

           9       getting a firearm.

          10           One expression used by the police, which you might

          11       have felt was rather odd, was this, and I quote:

          12           "He had a number of serious arrests but nothing

          13       could be proved at all."

          14           We were told that intelligence was graded A to E and

          15       then 1 to 5 and we looked at documents grading the

          16       quality of intelligence on Mark Duggan as E4 or E41,

          17       I think, at one stage, but certainly a very poor quality

          18       indeed.

          19           Superintendent Foote said, from June 2010 through to

          20       4 August 2011, and I quote from him again:

          21           "I had no information on which I could have arrested

          22       Mark Duggan."

          23           On the other hand, of course, we have within our

          24       bundles that documentation which led to the various

          25       deployments: we have C1 in the jury bundle, which is




           1       DCI Foote's authorisation for directed surveillance; we

           2       have C2 which is Detective Superintendent Fiona Mallon's

           3       application to deploy firearms officers, the FA1 as we

           4       know it; at C3 we have Superintendent Foote's MASTS

           5       operation; at C4 we have the risk assessment forms in

           6       May 2011; and the document at C6 is the FA2A Operation

           7       Dibri document of 1 August 2011.

           8           So the police, therefore, had real concerns about

           9       Mark Duggan's criminal behaviour.  Indeed, you may

          10       conclude that the police were correct, especially if you

          11       decide that Mark Duggan did indeed receive the gun from

          12       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster and was taking it to Broadwater

          13       Farm where it may have been used by somebody on

          14       somebody.

          15           On the other hand, you must be careful before you

          16       come to any condemnation of Mark Duggan's character.  Of

          17       course, I have emphasised already that no one is on

          18       trial here, least of all Mark Duggan.

          19           Indeed, it may be that you do not need to come to

          20       conclusions or any final conclusions about it.  But how

          21       important is the truth about his criminal character?

          22       Was he in fact someone who was sliding into criminal

          23       ways or was he a confirmed serious criminal?

          24           The position really here is, firstly, was he the

          25       sort of person who might have had insider knowledge to




           1       know that he was about to be stopped and arrested when

           2       in the back of a taxi cab and needed therefore to

           3       distance himself from the gun by throwing it or leaving

           4       it in the cab, or whatever it may be.

           5           The other important aspect is that, whilst we look

           6       at his character, it is what V53 believed of Mark

           7       Duggan.  He is the other person of particular importance

           8       in the whole hearing.  I am sure you will look very

           9       carefully at V53's knowledge and expectation that he had

          10       about the man, Mark Duggan, in the back of the taxi.

          11                               V53

          12           What did V53 genuinely believe?  We know that he was

          13       given the briefing to police, which is C12 in our jury

          14       bundle.  We have heard from V53, and I will be reminding

          15       you, as to his understanding about Mark Duggan.  He

          16       expected him to have a firearm.  He was part of a team,

          17       the object of which was to stop Mark Duggan escaping and

          18       allow him to be arrested and to allow any gun that he

          19       had to be taken by the police.

          20           That was the expectation of V53.  No one is

          21       suggesting for a moment that there was any plan to kill

          22       or assassinate Mark Duggan when the CO19 team put in the

          23       hard stop.

          24           So these are the particular people that you are

          25       going to have to assess and consider.




           1           Let me indicate what I am going to do in the

           2       summing-up.  The structure is going to deal with that

           3       evidence about that intelligence firstly, and what you

           4       have to look at on the answers to question number 1.

           5                             History

           6           But looking at the history, there are some

           7       surrounding aspects which we can deal with quite quickly

           8       and almost dispose of here because, as you know, since

           9       I was appointed to act as Coroner in this Inquest,

          10       I have been very keen that as much evidence should be

          11       put before the jury as is relevant, and that that should

          12       be put openly and transparently and that this hearing,

          13       the court room here, and all occasions/matters to be

          14       aired and, as I have said on a number of occasions

          15       publicly, I do not want people coming forward in a year

          16       or two's time saying that you, the jury, did not have

          17       this particular piece of evidence or that someone else

          18       has come out and found something else.

          19           So that is why we have been trying very, very hard

          20       to be open and encourage everyone to come forward, and

          21       indeed that is in many ways why we have found ourselves

          22       hearing from Witness B in rather late circumstances.

          23           That was also why we put other evidence in.  So you

          24       have heard a lot about this anonymous letter, or indeed

          25       the violent incident at the Lagoon salon or 29 July.




           1       I did not want to keep that away and say "Don't worry

           2       about it" and everyone will say next year "Why was not

           3       the jury told about the anonymous letter?"  I wanted us

           4       to deal with it.

           5           You are not being asked any questions about it but

           6       it is only right for you to have that because openly we

           7       wanted to say that it exists, it was on the website and

           8       in the public domain to a degree, and that is why we

           9       asked the Coroner's team for the Metropolitan Police to

          10       look at it and to give evidence about it so that we can

          11       decide where, if any, it has a right to play in this

          12       Inquest.

          13           You will remember Detective Inspector Lilburn was

          14       tasked to deal with it.  Firstly, Mr Foote was asked

          15       about it in his evidence and he said "Well, the

          16       anonymous letter has no proof at all it's absolutely

          17       ridiculous" (25/9, page 46 and 82).  Ms Mallon thought

          18       the anonymous letter was absolutely absurd too.

          19           But Detective Inspector Lilburn (26/9, page 64) said

          20       this, that she could not identify if any officer had the

          21       right to use a flash device on a computer.  She said

          22       that national MPS checks show that U1 is not and never

          23       has been a registered informant.  She found out that:

          24           "... U1 had never been arrested by anybody in

          25       Trident command, found no record anywhere of U3, who was




           1       the police officer who gave evidence before you later,

           2       being involved in the arrest of U1, U3 had, in fact,

           3       never been trained in handling informants and there is

           4       no records of any calls between U3 and the numbers

           5       attributable to U1, even no record of U1 going on

           6       a cruise as mentioned and the MPS do not have

           7       a psychological profile which had been done on U1."

           8           There are other people within that document, you

           9       have it within your jury file, the anonymous letter, and

          10       they were all numbered U1 through to U13 or so.

          11           U10 was arrested on the basis of CCTV evidence and

          12       not evidence from U1.  No intelligence that U1 had ever

          13       asked or pressurised Mark Duggan to get him a firearm.

          14       Mark Duggan was not in contact with anyone when he was

          15       in the minicab, as far as DI Lilburn was able to

          16       connect, that was U1 on the letter.  U1 did not provide

          17       information to the MPS on 4 August at all.  There were

          18       no records of any attempt to get near Radio 1

          19       headquarters, which are mentioned in the letter.

          20           There was a trial of U5, U11, U12, defence

          21       statements that raise similar points, so they began to

          22       realise that it was a suspicion about whether this was

          23       a document fabricated to have an impact at another trial

          24       and nothing to do with this at all.

          25           There was indeed a mixed DNA result found on the




           1       envelope adhesive strip, but again nothing of any

           2       evidential value in this matter.

           3           DI Lilburn went to U11's flat, found a USB stick

           4       with an exact copy of this letter that had been sent to

           5       the Commissioner.  Any assertions in the letter which

           6       seemed to be true were those that relied on publicly

           7       available information.  U11 wrote to the Judge in that

           8       trial accusing U1 again of being corrupt and in

           9       agreement with U3.

          10           Indeed you have then heard that U3 gave evidence

          11       before you, (26/9).  He said that he does not know U1,

          12       never had any dealings with him, never arrested him and

          13       no truth in the anonymous letter whatsoever (26/9,

          14       page 97).

          15           The whole purpose of that was for you to think and

          16       conclude, and I am not asking you to go any further with

          17       it, that the whole matter can be safely ignored as

          18       having any part to play in your duties in this matter.

          19           As I say, I do not ask any questions about it and

          20       I hope that you can accept the way it has been dealt

          21       with.  It has been raised before you and now we can

          22       safely put it to one side, as indeed we can the other

          23       topic that I mentioned and that is of the Lagoon salon.

          24           That was raised because, as we know, that was

          25       an incident on 29 July 2011, and it has a relevance




           1       because, in that incident, a gun was used, which we know

           2       now was used by Kevin Hutchinson-Foster to pistol whip,

           3       hit over the head, Peter Osadbey, using that gun.  That

           4       was the gun that we know was eventually found lying on

           5       the grass on 4 August.

           6           So that was raised, put before you, indeed the

           7       officers were represented -- as you remember Ms Dobbin

           8       from time to time appeared asking questions about that

           9       incident -- because there was a concern about whether

          10       something more could have been done to find the gun and

          11       its links with Kevin Hutchinson-Foster before

          12       4 August 2011 when, you may think, it was likely then

          13       handed over by Kevin Hutchinson-Foster to Mark Duggan.

          14           The gun that was found on the grass, we know,

          15       without any doubt, did in fact contain DNA and indeed

          16       blood -- on the gun and the sock -- both from Kevin

          17       Hutchinson-Foster and Peter Osadbey.

          18           So the evidence was put before you, and really the

          19       conclusions that were put there, in evidence,

          20       uncontested, as it worked out, was that, in fact,

          21       Trident were not aware of or involved in that

          22       pistol-whipping investigation, it was not part of their

          23       terms of reference before 4 August.  In the

          24       pistol-whipping itself, there were no witnesses in that

          25       incident who identified Kevin Hutchinson-Foster as the




           1       assailant and indeed the victim did not name his

           2       attacker at all.  We know that there was a cause of the

           3       assault, something to do with an ex-girlfriend, but

           4       there was no naming there either of Kevin

           5       Hutchinson-Foster and it would be very difficult, as we

           6       heard, to have done any further work than actually

           7       happened.

           8           Detective Sergeant Belfield told you -- they both

           9       gave evidence (18/11) -- that he was involved in the

          10       investigation, some witnesses said a gun had been

          11       involved, he could only watch the CCTV the next day and

          12       he spoke again to the victim, who again did not

          13       cooperate.  This was not treated by the police as

          14       a firearms incident.  Indeed the injuries as they turned

          15       out, were clarified as ABH, actual bodily harm, some

          16       bodily harm.

          17           Indeed, he, Detective Sergeant Belfield, said he was

          18       100 per cent confident that witnesses at the scene were

          19       such that no one had an identification of the assailant,

          20       and indeed the next day after that he handed over the

          21       investigation to Detective Constable Faulkner on 31 July

          22       and spoke again to the victim on 2 August, but still no

          23       cooperation.

          24           So again, that little area of concern was put before

          25       you, for the reasons that I have said: could something




           1       have been done more than was done?  The witnesses gave

           2       evidence and, again, there is nothing there for me to

           3       leave to you because it seems to be accepted by all that

           4       were asking questions, and the evidence that came out,

           5       that that was something, again, which can be put to one

           6       side.  That is why you heard it but I am not asking you

           7       to come to any findings about it.

           8                           Intelligence

           9           So what I am now going to do is turn to the evidence

          10       I am going to ask you to come to conclusions about.

          11           So we will see how we go.  That is the first

          12       question on your Form 2, which is the evidence which

          13       touches on the answers to this question:

          14           "Between midday on 3 August and when state amber was

          15       called at 6.00 pm on 4 August, did the Metropolitan

          16       Police and SOCA do the best they realistically could

          17       have done to gather and react to intelligence about the

          18       possibility of Mr Duggan collecting a gun from

          19       Mr Hutchinson-Foster?"

          20           Answer yes or no, and then please let me know what

          21       more could have been expected or, if you do not feel you

          22       have enough information to come to conclusions, then you

          23       are entitled to tick that box as an alternative.

          24           Well, that starts off with the whole background to

          25       the evidence that you heard.  The best person to have




           1       painted the background was the evidence of Deputy

           2       Assistant Commissioner Martin Hewitt.  He gave evidence

           3       (16/10) his report is actually in your jury bundle at

           4       C15.  He set out the background of gun crime in London.

           5           Tables that he exhibited show successful policing,

           6       show that rarely shots were ever fired, and indeed, in

           7       the last four years, that report shows that Mark Duggan

           8       has been the only fatality.  Indeed, in 2011, that

           9       report shows that there were 1,387 planned armed

          10       operations and 3,045 spontaneous armed response vehicle

          11       deployments.  So there was quite an amount of activity,

          12       but the one fatality.

          13           So that was his evidence.  You have it there, I am

          14       not going to read that report out to you.  But that is

          15       the starting point for the background about the police

          16       and their approach to gun crime in London.

          17           So let me give you an overview of Operation Dibri.

          18                         Operation Dibri

          19           Operation Dibri tacked the organised criminal gang

          20       known as TMD, or Tottenham Man Dem (23/9, page 13).

          21       They were involved in the supply and use of firearms and

          22       the supply of class A drugs.  They were also involved,

          23       the Tottenham Man Dem, in a number of murders and

          24       attempted murders and principally they were in conflict

          25       with other organised criminal gangs, rather than the




           1       public.

           2           Operation Dibri had been implemented before Mr Foote

           3       deployed to Trident.  During that time, there were

           4       around 100 subjects with a core of around 48 active

           5       members.  Those 48 were considered the most violent

           6       people, not only in London but outside London,

           7       stretching across into Europe.

           8           The direction of the operation was to focus around

           9       dismantling TMD (23/9, page 16).

          10           Mr Foote told us that he considered getting

          11       a successful prosecution was an important part of the

          12       police operation, but not as important as taking guns

          13       off the streets of London (23/9, page 36).

          14           At the end of January 2010 Mark Duggan was one of

          15       the core of the 48 subjects but he was not top of the

          16       priority list.  Mr Foote said that Operation Dibri was

          17       an operation based on intelligence, as intelligence came

          18       in about various members of the Tottenham Man Dem gang,

          19       Trident were able to build up a picture of suspects and

          20       were able to identify those who appeared to be most

          21       active and when they were most regularly in possession

          22       of firearms.  The clear aim, he said (23/9, page 19),

          23       was to try and arrest them with the firearms.

          24           Z51 also added when he gave evidence (2/10 page 19)

          25       that, for Trident, getting the firearms off the street




           1       is the top priority.

           2                             Planning

           3           So the planning and running of the operation.

           4           Firstly, let me remind you of the structure of the

           5       team running Operation Dibri.  At the end of

           6       January 2010, that was when Mr Mick Foote became the

           7       Senior Investigating Officer, SIO, of Dibri, which meant

           8       that he was responsible for setting the aims and

           9       objectives and having an overarching responsibility for

          10       that long term operation.

          11           He was also responsible for gathering evidence and

          12       deciding whether he could arrest subjects.  For

          13       a subsidiary operation under the Dibri umbrella, his

          14       role was to ensure there were sufficient resources

          15       (23/9, page 15).

          16           Mick Foote's deputy for Operation Dibri is the

          17       intelligence officer, the Detective Sergeant ZZ17 (24/9,

          18       page 6) who dealt with the day-to-day tactical decisions

          19       and Detective Superintendent Fiona Mallon, who gave

          20       evidence before you, said that ZZ17 received the

          21       intelligence as he was responsible for "actioning it

          22       fast time", to use her words (25/9, page 166).

          23           Ms Mallon said that Z51's role was in relation to

          24       resourcing and staff training, he did not get involved

          25       in Dibri.  The Detective Inspector rank, as part of the




           1       chain of command, applies to the reactive team and

           2       Mr Foote said that Z51 joined Trident's pro-active team

           3       in June 2011.  His role was concerned more with

           4       administration, training and line management.  He was

           5       not technically Mr Foote's deputy.  He, in fact, was the

           6       Tactical Firearms Commander and would not and should not

           7       be his deputy.

           8           Ms Mallon said that Dibri was structured by having

           9       an investigation team, led by a Senior Investigating

          10       Officer.  In parallel was the firearms command structure

          11       (25/9, page 172).

          12           ZZ17 was the Detective Sergeant on the pro-active

          13       team.  He did not have a clear defined title (2/10,

          14       page 67) but his job was the day-to-day running of the

          15       team and receiving and assessing intelligence and

          16       running of the day-to-day response working to Mr Foote

          17       as Senior Investigating Officer.

          18           What was the structure during a firearms operation

          19       as such?

          20           Well, that evidence came, firstly, from Detective

          21       Superintendent Fiona Mallon.  She herself had trained as

          22       a Tactical Firearms Commander in 2004 and became

          23       a Strategic Firearms Commander in 2007.  As you know,

          24       you have all of these matters -- I think they are all in

          25       your mind, members of the jury, what's a TFC and what is




           1       a SFC -- on the little list that you have in the front

           2       of your jury bundle.

           3           She told us she was re-accredited as Strategic

           4       Firearms Commander back in 2011 (25/9, page 55).  By the

           5       time of the firearms operation set up under Operation

           6       Dibri she had managed in excess of 120 firearms

           7       operations at the highest level of risk.

           8           Z51 had been in Trident for eight years.  He

           9       qualified as a Tactical Firearms Commander in 2004.  He

          10       had commanded 20 or 30 operations with armed

          11       interceptions.

          12           Ms Mallon in her evidence (25-26/9) confirmed that

          13       the SFC (Strategic Firearms Commander) is the officer in

          14       charge of the operation.  She is overall accountable for

          15       the operation and responsible for resourcing that

          16       operation, setting objectives and ensuring that threat

          17       and risk is managed appropriately (25/9, page 57).  The

          18       Tactical Firearms Commander Z51 will be implementing the

          19       Strategic Firearms Commander's plan along with the

          20       Tactical Advisor (25/9, page 58).  The Operational

          21       Firearms Commander, who in this case is V59, the

          22       Sergeant who we know, is responsible for the firearms

          23       teams on the ground.  The Operational Firearms Commander

          24       will direct the CO19 officers in how that arrest is made

          25       and they are responsible for that area geographically or




           1       that function of the officers.

           2           Ms Mallon said, on the ground further tactical

           3       advice comes from the CO19, V59, who is the Tactical

           4       Advisor.

           5           So Ms Mallon said that once she had set her

           6       strategy, it is the Tactical Firearms Commander who will

           7       ensure the teams are ready and prepared, that they are

           8       properly briefed and what the objectives are of the

           9       operation.  They then agree the plan and will enforce it

          10       on the ground.

          11           The tactical plans have a number of options on how

          12       to deal with the threat according to how the

          13       intelligence develops.  The Tactical Firearms Commander

          14       has a range of options available to him or her and that

          15       person decides what happens on the ground, according to

          16       how the intelligence develops.

          17           I am trying to avoid going into too much detail here

          18       about the conflict management model going around in

          19       circles and the various management matters into play.

          20           Mr Foote said that the Tactical Firearm's Commander

          21       is responsible to developing, coordinating and executing

          22       the firearms tactical plan and are deliberately not

          23       involved in the question of whether there is enough

          24       evidence to arrest.  However he makes the decision to

          25       move into an arrest in a operation.




           1           So that is the model across Trident.

           2           During a firearms operation ZZ17 said he worked with

           3       Z51 to provide him with intelligence.  Z51 said ZZ17 is

           4       in charge of the operation unless Z51 is on the scene or

           5       indeed that ZZ17 rang him to update him about

           6       a development, and Mr Foote was not able to gather

           7       evidence and decide himself on the position about

           8       Mr Duggan on 3 and 4 August because at that time that

           9       had been handed, that responsibility, to the Tactical

          10       Firearms Commander, and his role, from Mr Foote's view,

          11       was really effectively redundant as far as the 3rd and

          12       4th operation was concerned.

          13           So Operational Firearms Commander, V59: on the

          14       ground he was able to give more tactical advice to the

          15       Tactical Firearms Commander, Z51, in relation to tactics

          16       that had already been set out and parameters set out by

          17       Inspector Bennett (8/10, page 100).

          18           The tactical advice covered the MASTS operation,

          19       which we know is the Mobile Armed Support to

          20       Surveillance operation.  The advice that V59 would give

          21       Z51 would be specifically around how they would

          22       implement the tactical advice given by Inspector

          23       Bennett, for example when to call state amber.  If they

          24       were to go beyond tactical parameters and tactical

          25       advice already provided by Inspector Bennett he would




           1       refer Z51 back to further advice.

           2           V59 was not the Tactical Advisor on 4 August.  He

           3       agreed he would not want to make a mistake about his

           4       role in the briefing on 3 August, even though he used

           5       both terms.  Mr Hewitt said that he could not believe

           6       that officers would be confused about the roles here,

           7       that they were a close-knit group that understood whose

           8       role was what.  Indeed, Mr Hewitt was telling us that

           9       there were only about 25 TST officers in C019 in

          10       2011, so it is quite a small number of trained

          11       specialised police officers.

          12           The evidence came from him (16/10, page 54) that

          13       when an incident occurs outside the hours of

          14       a pre-planned operation, the command team in control of

          15       that operation are also in control of the situation

          16       which has occurred outside that time.  It is not

          17       possible to have every eventuality covered, for every

          18       hour of the day, but that is the way that it works.

          19           Authorisation of the firearms operation in general

          20       is, as I have already set out -- and I will not go

          21       through the details here -- put on the FA1 document that

          22       I have referred to and once the Strategic Firearms

          23       Commander has seen the FA1 document, then that is

          24       extended and there is the FA2A, which comes from the

          25       Tactical Advisor.  That is all to do with the planning




           1       and the application for resources to get the team's

           2       finance to attend.

           3           Let's move on to how a firearms operation functions.

           4           As we know, Ms Mallon told us that firearms

           5       operations were Mobile Armed Support to Surveillance

           6       operation, MASTS.  It is used where subjects are mobile

           7       in a vehicle or indeed when a subject is on foot or the

           8       police have plain clothed control by surveillance

           9       officers in unmarked cars conducting surveillance.

          10           They are supported by CO19 officers who would only

          11       get involved at the point when there is an opportunity

          12       to arrest.  So Ms Mallon said that the traffic light

          13       system sets out the stages of that operation.

          14           Green is when the surveillance activity is taking

          15       place, intelligence gathering is taking place, and

          16       surveillance cars will, if they are used, later be in

          17       convoy behind the CO19, or rather the CO19 are behind,

          18       at that stage, the surveillance cars then to take over

          19       when necessary.

          20           She then said that once the Tactical Firearms

          21       Commander is satisfied that the subjects are committing

          22       offences, state amber will be called by the Tactical

          23       Firearms Commander and, at this point, surveillance

          24       moves away and then the CO19 convoy moves through.

          25           Then the OFC, in this case V59, will call red when




           1       he or she thinks it is a safe place to conduct an arrest

           2       or a stop.

           3           So V59 said that the primary role of the main

           4       briefing is to ensure that everyone knows exactly how

           5       the tactics will be implemented when firearms officers

           6       are deploying on the streets and into a premises that

           7       everyone is aware of.  V59's briefing for the firearms

           8       team on 4 August covered postings to which vehicle and

           9       therefore which weapons they would take, and we know

          10       that each person in a particular part of the vehicle has

          11       particular armament.

          12           So intelligence of the Metropolitan Police response

          13       before 4 August, a tiny bit of background.

          14           Late in 2010, we heard about the intelligence from

          15       gentleman A10, the witness who was the case officer for

          16       Operation Dibri at SOCA.  He had actually been in that

          17       position since 2009, he gave evidence (1/10, page 162).

          18       He began to receive intelligence indicating that

          19       Mark Duggan was regularly playing a role in criminal

          20       activity.  The intelligence indicated his involvement in

          21       the distribution of drugs, firearms and ammunition, as

          22       well as involvement with the discharge of firearms.

          23           The intelligence also indicated that, in order to

          24       lessen risks to him, he would store firearms, ammunition

          25       and drugs at premises of members of family and trusted




           1       associates, but not with himself.

           2           ZZ17 said the intelligence was as reliable as it

           3       gets, effectively, is what he was saying.  All the

           4       particular intelligence of the operation had come

           5       through SOCA and principally through A10.

           6           He did say, when he gave his evidence, that there

           7       were limits to what he could say, certainly in relation

           8       to Mr Hutchinson-Foster and to certain pieces of

           9       information, as we know, in relation to Mark Duggan.

          10           But what was the developing intelligence picture to

          11       help you answer this question on this Form 2?  Well,

          12       between January 2011 and August 2011, ZZ17 told you that

          13       he was receiving what he called overwhelming evidence

          14       from SOCA suggesting that Mark Duggan was actively

          15       involved in armed criminal activity, supply of drugs,

          16       ready access to firearms.  ZZ17 told you, the jury, that

          17       he would not expect Mark Duggan routinely to keep

          18       firearms or quantities of drugs at his home address for

          19       long periods.

          20           Early June 2011 -- 8 June, I think -- A10 received

          21       credible intelligence that Mark Duggan was actively

          22       seeking to distribute controlled drugs and firearms,

          23       however the intelligence was then not sufficient to

          24       identify if Mark Duggan had a firearm or firearms under

          25       his direct control or indeed where they were stored and




           1       on 7 June, A10 received credible intelligence that Mark

           2       Duggan was storing a quantity of class A drugs at the

           3       home address.

           4           On 20 June, A10 then received intelligence that Mark

           5       Duggan had been offered for sale two firearms, a Glock

           6       and a Beretta, by an associate and that Mark Duggan also

           7       had under his control a firearm that he was seeking to

           8       sell on behalf of an unidentified party.  This firearm

           9       was being stored on his behalf by a third party.  This

          10       intelligence indicated that Mark Duggan had then

          11       brokered onward sale of the Glock and Beretta.  The

          12       intelligence indicated that the associate who had

          13       offered them to Mark Duggan was not able to deliver them

          14       to him until later on in June.

          15           So this was a developing picture.  We can remember

          16       this coming out in evidence.

          17           Then into July, A10 continued to receive

          18       intelligence on Mark Duggan's involvement.  It was

          19       Mr Foote's decision then for a subsidiary operation to

          20       be put together for these four days in August, focusing

          21       on six people who were thought to be prominent members

          22       of Tottenham Man Dem, which included Mr Duggan.  The

          23       decision was taken some time then in June/July of the

          24       evolving intelligence around Mark Duggan to suggest that

          25       they were generally being armed on approach to weekends,




           1       of an evening time, and certainly at dances or

           2       nightclubs.

           3           So the plan was to ensure that they at least book

           4       the relevant resources, including surveillance, Trident

           5       and CO19 and intelligence officers, principally to cover

           6       that period and that activity.  So that is why the

           7       resources were focused to the evening and night time at

           8       that stage.

           9           Mr Foote spoke to ZZ17 on 25 July.  By that stage he

          10       had authorised the proposed application for an armed

          11       deployment on 3 to 6 August.  He was off that week so he

          12       said on 1 August he would go back to see the FA1 which

          13       was written by ZZ17 and dated 25 July.  You will know

          14       about that in your file.  The firearms operation was

          15       authorised based on intelligence.

          16           25 July, there was intelligence, and that states, at

          17       C2 in your bundle; intelligence case to support the

          18       application.  I read from that so you have it in your

          19       mind, and I quote:

          20           "The principal focus of this Operation Dibri is to

          21       arrest/disrupt the senior members of criminal networks

          22       of the Tottenham Man Dem who are concerned in large

          23       scale supply and the distribution of class A drugs in

          24       the London area.  In order to maintain their control and

          25       status, they have a propensity to use firearms and




           1       extreme violence.  They have a historical feud with

           2       organised gangs from the Hackney area, in particular

           3       London Fields Gang, which has resulted in numerous

           4       assaults, shootings and murders.  They have a history of

           5       robbing other drug dealers.  As these crimes are rarely

           6       reported intelligence continues to link TMD members with

           7       the possession and use of firearms.  Recent intelligence

           8       suggests an upsurge in gang related tensions and that

           9       TMD members and their associates are regularly attending

          10       nightclubs and parties in the London area and when doing

          11       so have firearms either on their person or nearby with

          12       associates."

          13           The FA1 continues to specifically discuss Mark

          14       Duggan saying this:

          15           "Duggan is a long standing senior member of the TMD.

          16       There is a wealth of historic and current reliable

          17       intelligence suggesting that Duggan has ready access to

          18       firearms.  He is actively involved in armed criminality

          19       and the supply of controlled drugs."

          20           Mr Foote said that, certainly after 25 July, he was

          21       aware that there was intelligence coming in the

          22       following weeks seeming to make it that Mr Duggan, out

          23       of the six named subjects, was the most likely to be

          24       active and obtain a firearm.

          25           It did not change the operational structure and




           1       plans because there was nothing specific (23/9, page 53)

           2       but the intelligence was still the same, that Mark

           3       Duggan had ready access to firearms and it was a case of

           4       seeing how that intelligence developed for something to

           5       be specific that was actionable (23/9, page 54).

           6           31 July 2011, A10 stated that he received credible

           7       intelligence that Mark Duggan wished to collect

           8       a firearm from a male associate.  This intelligence

           9       indicated that the male might be called Kevin but there

          10       was insufficient intelligence to establish the male's

          11       identity, where the firearm was being stored, when or

          12       where it was going to be collected.

          13           Now, we come moving step-by-step, gingerly towards

          14       4 August.

          15           ZZ17 told us that intelligence from SOCA identified

          16       that somebody was looking after more than one firearm --

          17       in a moment we will have a look at the agreed statement

          18       within your bundle -- and Mr Duggan then intended to

          19       take possession of one of those firearms.  After some

          20       careful research, the person believed responsible was

          21       narrowed down eventually, and we will come to when, as

          22       being Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.  It became apparent that

          23       Hutchinson-Foster was probably storing these firearms

          24       with an unidentified female associate and intelligence

          25       indicated that she resided somewhere in the Leyton area.




           1           You will remember now the exhaustive research

           2       looking for associates in the Leyton area but, as we

           3       know, by 4 August neither the female nor the address had

           4       been identified by A10 or ZZ17.

           5           So let's have a look at that document that we have

           6       at C9 within our jury bundle because it would be quite

           7       useful for us to have that actually open and before us

           8       now because that is really referring to much of what

           9       I am saying about the developing intelligence over this

          10       period.

          11           So I think we have now numbered these paragraphs 1

          12       through to 8.  We have now really to A10's combined

          13       gisted account, 31 July and we see that he has credible

          14       intelligence indicating that there is a person called

          15       Kevin but insufficient intelligence to establish the

          16       male's identity.

          17           Then in paragraph 2, we come onto 1 August, as

          18       I have already stated, and the further intelligence,

          19       seeming to be being that it is held by an unidentified

          20       female and, due to her absence at work each day, he

          21       would not be able to gain entry to the premises to

          22       retrieve the firearm until she returned from work.

          23           Then paragraph 3, A10 says:

          24           "I received further credible intelligence on

          25       2 August 2011 that indicated that the male 'Kevin' was




           1       likely to be Kevin Hutchinson-Foster."

           2           Now, that was still insufficient intelligence to

           3       identify where the firearm was being stored or when it

           4       would be collected.

           5           There was then some talk on 2 August that Kevin

           6       Hutchinson-Foster would not be in London in the evening,

           7       so Mark Duggan would not be able to meet with him.  Then

           8       we come to 3 August:

           9           "On 3 August 2011, I received further intelligence

          10       that Mark Duggan still wished to collect the firearm

          11       from the male, whom I now believed to be Kevin

          12       Hutchinson-Foster.  There was still insufficient

          13       intelligence to identify where the firearm was being

          14       stored beyond the premises of the female associate

          15       probably in the Leyton area.  The intelligence indicated

          16       that Kevin Hutchinson-Foster intended to travel out of

          17       London later that evening.  I subsequently received

          18       intelligence that indicated that Mark Duggan would not

          19       be in a position to collect the firearm as he was

          20       attending a family barbeque.  [I told] this intelligence

          21       to ZZ17 by telephone."

          22           So that is the position up to 3 August.  Then you

          23       will remember, just looking over the page in our

          24       bundles, that when we come to 4 August in a moment, that

          25       the note that A10 had, that he had made, that:




           1           "MD is at a girlfriend's address ...

           2           "KHF [Kevin Hutchinson-Foster] is ... at the same

           3       address he was at yesterday lunchtime when he was with

           4       the female holding at least two firearms for KHF."

           5           And you know the dispute we have had, within

           6       evidence, about whether A10, when he used those words,

           7       was "at the same address", whether he actually had an

           8       address.  He said he did not actually have an address;

           9       what he meant was the word "location".

          10           In the background, what is also going on is that

          11       Fiona Mallon, on 1 August, is meeting, having

          12       a phone call with the Tactical Firearms Commander, Z51,

          13       about tactical deployment for that week.

          14           She asked for a presentation on 2 August and opened

          15       the forms in relation to that (25/9, page 70) and there

          16       was a presentation with Z51 about it.  As far as she

          17       understood, on 2 August, the proposal was for this

          18       four-day operation in relation to a number of people.

          19       But she wasn't able to recall anything specific about

          20       Mark Duggan and a gun.

          21           But, as we do know, there were further meetings

          22       between Mr Foote and Fiona Mallon to discuss the MASTS

          23       operation that had been planned for that week.

          24           At C6 -- I will not ask you to turn to that because

          25       I can deal with it quite quickly -- that is the




           1       intelligence case in the FA2A that continued to address

           2       the capability and intent, capability repeated:

           3           "Reliable intelligence (both historic and current)

           4       exists to link all of these subjects and numerous

           5       criminal associates to the Tottenham Man Dem.  They are

           6       all believed to have ready access to firearms ..."

           7           "Intent.

           8           "There is no specific intelligence at this time

           9       regarding any particular intent to use firearms by any

          10       individual.  Firearms are regularly used to enforce drug

          11       dealing activity, to rob other dealers and to maintain

          12       control and status during internal and external gang

          13       drug feuds."

          14           So that is the threat.  This is going on in the

          15       background with Mr Foote and Ms Mallon planning the

          16       operation whilst the intelligence is coming through

          17       SOCA, through A10, into ZZ17 and on to Z51.

          18                     Kevin Hutchinson-Foster

          19           We can move on then to A10, that he, in his evidence

          20       to you, the first time he gave evidence (1/10, page

          21       168), said that he believed that the Metropolitan Police

          22       discovered that Kevin was Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.  He

          23       believed that they discovered that because they had

          24       access to MPS databases.  His own team were not tasked

          25       to attempt to identify Kevin Hutchinson-Foster or the




           1       female associate.  He thought that was down to Trident.

           2       He told you that there was some research conducted at

           3       SOCA, and he had someone to help him, in relation to

           4       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.  But he, A10, could not talk

           5       about what he had or what he could do.  All the

           6       information that A10 had, he said, he passed on.  All

           7       that he could pass on, he did, to ZZ17.  When he was

           8       asked directly if he knew an address where Kevin

           9       Hutchinson-Foster resided, he said:

          10           "Answer: I don't recall the address.  I thought that

          11       came from SOCA -- sorry, from Trident informing us of

          12       where the address -- but all the enquiries in relation

          13       to Kevin Hutchinson-Foster came from the team.

          14           "Question: Sorry, did they give you an address then?

          15           Answer: Sir, I am not interested in any addresses.

          16       I give out information ..."

          17           He said:

          18           "I don't recall giving [Trident] an address for

          19       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster."

          20           That is his passage of evidence (1/10, page 202 to

          21       204).

          22           C9, that we have just been reading out, that was his

          23       combined note of how the intelligence picture was

          24       developing.

          25           We heard there was an officer, ZZ46.  ZZ46 conducted




           1       research on 2 August.  She was asked by ZZ17 if she

           2       could find a Kevin who may or may not have been an

           3       associate of someone called Juv or Juvanne Miller (1/10,

           4       page 123).

           5           She ran a search on a database with Kevin and

           6       Juvanne Miller as a combined search and found Kevin

           7       Hutchinson-Foster was arrested with Juvanne Miller in

           8       2007.  She added that Hutchinson-Foster later, with

           9       Juvanne Miller (1/10, page 128 in her evidence); that

          10       she had a note that Kevin Hutchinson-Foster was released

          11       from prison on 8 April and was under supervision until

          12       9 July but she did not speak to probation.

          13           She did not have a current address for

          14       Hutchinson-Foster and ZZ46 was not aware of the

          15       intelligence passed by A10 about Kevin

          16       Hutchinson-Foster.  She was not aware why the connection

          17       between Kevin and Juvanne Miller was being made.  She

          18       would have been asked by ZZ17 to discover where Kevin

          19       Hutchinson-Foster was at that time, but she only found

          20       out historic information.

          21           Kevin Hutchinson-Foster was effectively a quarter

          22       master storing guns.  ZZ17 agreed this would make him

          23       a prime target.  ZZ17 said it was not a question of

          24       sitting down at one point, considering focusing on Kevin

          25       Hutchinson-Foster, but he was sure that it was something




           1       he would have given thought to.  Further, any

           2       intelligence he was getting in relation to Kevin

           3       Hutchinson-Foster was only indirectly through

           4       intelligence that he had around Mark Duggan.

           5           If they followed Kevin Hutchinson-Foster, they would

           6       be following him blind as they wouldn't know what he was

           7       doing.

           8           DCI Foote said there was nothing more that could

           9       have been done to find out where the gun was.  That was

          10       his evidence (24/9, page 88).  Mick Foote believed it

          11       would have been an ideal scenario to have got both

          12       Duggan and Kevin Hutchinson-Foster at the same time --

          13       I think I asked him about that -- but it was a matter of

          14       following Mark Duggan as he was the one to receive the

          15       gun.  They had used their limited resources to where

          16       they were likely to have greater effect.

          17           Mr Foote again added:

          18           "If they had an armed team with control of Kevin

          19       Hutchinson-Foster on 4 August, they would still have

          20       needed an armed surveillance team to follow Mr Duggan."

          21           As we know, the position was that Kevin

          22       Hutchinson-Foster was on licence in July 2011, a

          23       probation officer did have his mobile number and address

          24       (8/10, page 5), and on 4 August, Kevin Hutchinson-Foster

          25       may have been at that address in the morning or




           1       lunchtime.

           2           I know this is getting rather intense and quite

           3       heavily-packed evidence.  What I am going to do is

           4       complete a little bit more of this intelligence evidence

           5       and then give an early break because I know listening to

           6       me going along in this way is not an easy thing.

           7       I think that what we can do is -- those in front of me

           8       are being very patient and not complaining -- that we

           9       will go on for another ten minutes or so and then have

          10       a longer break at that stage.

          11                           Intelligence

          12           3 August -- it is quite important; we are coming up

          13       to this question now, I have given you all the

          14       background -- A10 receiving intelligence, as we have set

          15       out at paragraph 5, C9.

          16           What was going on: A10 now believed Kevin

          17       Hutchinson-Foster was trying to provide a gun, or

          18       Mark Duggan was trying to get a gun from him; we have

          19       the position about Kevin Hutchinson-Foster being out of

          20       London later that evening; that Kevin Hutchinson-Foster

          21       may have provided the firearm, but then we know

          22       Mark Duggan goes to the family BBQ.

          23           So the intelligence picture that ZZ17 received and

          24       was acting on was Mark Duggan wanting to get this

          25       firearm from Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.




           1           Kevin Hutchinson-Foster gave some evidence about it

           2       himself.  He said that Desire Cox, who was the lady with

           3       whom he had seen and had a relationship, who lived in

           4       that area of Leytonstone, did not in fact have a job.

           5       He went round there whenever it actually suited him

           6       (8/10, page 6) and he was not limited to her working

           7       hours then as she did not have a job.

           8                          Briefing Note

           9           Let's move on then to the briefing note of 3 August,

          10       and this is what's going on with the firearms officers.

          11       That's C12 in your bundle.  Again, I am going to read it

          12       out to you so that that's in the record should you need

          13       to refer to it and read it out to refresh your memories

          14       about what was going on with the CO19 teams and those

          15       doing the tactical and operational firearms commanding.

          16           He said this:

          17           "All of the subjects have got access to firearms.

          18       There is nothing specific to say that any of them keep

          19       firearms at their home addresses or that they are armed

          20       today.  There is intelligence to suggest that Mark

          21       Duggan is currently in possession or control of about

          22       three firearms and is looking to take possession of

          23       a firearm perhaps this evening.  He has been trying to

          24       do it for a few days.  Intelligence would suggest Kevin

          25       Hutchinson-Foster has control of the firearms and from




           1       9 o'clock this evening there may well be a plan for

           2       Duggan to somehow get those firearms from

           3       Hutchinson-Foster.  Hopefully at some stage we will have

           4       more information about where that is going to happen,

           5       how it's going to happen, but the intelligence at the

           6       moment is that Hutchinson-Foster has got control of at

           7       least one firearm which he is going to pass to Mark

           8       Duggan, possibly at some point this evening."

           9           The briefing pack included photographs of Mark

          10       Duggan, which I think were cited to be quite a good

          11       likeness, and indeed some black and white ones, or one

          12       of Kevin Hutchinson-Foster, so that the officers were

          13       fully briefed.

          14           ZZ17 set out in the briefing on 3 August, that the

          15       gang are about and what the current picture is with the

          16       six individuals, and ZZ17 left the firearms officers

          17       with a very general picture of who they were and what

          18       their activities were to be.

          19           A10 said the information about the barbecue, on

          20       3 August, came in after 6.00 pm that evening.

          21           So we have this developing picture, 3 August, going

          22       on.  Mr Foote, in the background, was saying that he

          23       knew the area where the handover would take place and

          24       the involvement of Kevin Hutchinson-Foster on 3 August

          25       (25/9, page 23).  He was aware on the 3rd that




           1       intelligence suggested that Mr Duggan had arranged to

           2       take possession of a gun from Kevin Hutchinson-Foster

           3       but that the meeting between Mr Duggan and Mr Kevin

           4       Hutchinson-Foster wasn't going to happen that evening

           5       (page 78).

           6           Mr Foote had a further meeting on 3 August with

           7       Detective Superintendent Mallon.  The entry in his

           8       decision log reflected a change in the intelligence

           9       picture between 1 to 3 August.  At that time, Mr Duggan

          10       was the most likely to collect a gun, there was

          11       intelligence coming in that he was actively looking to

          12       get in possession of a firearm, but that change in

          13       intelligence picture did not cause any change in the

          14       plan because the operation was to try to arrest those

          15       that were trying to take possession of a gun and it was

          16       still the pattern that that was likely to take place in

          17       the evening or early hours of the morning.

          18           Ms Mallon told us that "Kev" was Kevin

          19       Hutchinson-Foster and that she learnt that on 3 August.

          20       She got that from ZZ17 (25/9, page 168) she had had

          21       a meeting with others, SOCA managers, MIB, in the

          22       morning of 3 August, and she was then being updated that

          23       Mark Duggan was more likely than the others to get

          24       possession of a firearm.

          25           So the whole angle of this operation was then going




           1       round onto Mark Duggan, out of the six that had been

           2       named in the briefing, as being the more likely to be

           3       active and to possess the firearm.  That's what brought

           4       the black and white picture of Mr Hutchinson-Foster into

           5       play.

           6           So, on 4 August, could and should SOCA and the MPS

           7       have reacted to that developing intelligence?

           8           Let's just go through 4 August and then I will stop

           9       before we come to the final conclusion there so that we

          10       can have a break.

          11           So, 4 August, still with C9 in the jury bundle,

          12       A10's evidence.  He receives his intelligence at

          13       paragraph 7 and he tells us this:

          14           "Some time between 17.10 and 17.15 on 4 August

          15       I received intelligence that indicated that Mr Duggan

          16       would be imminently travelling by minicab to Vicarage

          17       Road in Leyton to collect the firearm.  This was the

          18       first occasion which I received intelligence that

          19       indicated an area where the firearm might be.

          20       I assessed the intelligence as being credible and

          21       immediately disseminated it to ZZ17 by way of verbal

          22       briefing by telephone."

          23           That, again, causes us to turn over to the next page

          24       behind that divider, C9, because in the further notes

          25       made by A10 at the time -- he told us that he made these




           1       notes at 18.40 on 4 August -- he noted that:

           2           "MD at his girlfriend's address will be catching cab

           3       over to KHF to collect the firearm.  KHF is at the same

           4       address he was at yesterday lunchtime when he was with

           5       the female holding at least two firearms for KHF."

           6           Then Mark Duggan is in the cab and later on he has

           7       intelligence about him collecting the firearm.

           8           He made a note to himself at the end of that.  He

           9       said:

          10           "I had absolutely no doubt that Mark Duggan's

          11       intention today was to collect a firearm from Kevin

          12       Hutchinson-Foster and take that firearm to the

          13       Broadwater Farm Estate in Tottenham to be placed at

          14       a safe address on the estate."

          15           So the intelligence picture is being informed,

          16       whether it's important is a matter entirely for you to

          17       pick out some details about this intelligence picture.

          18       It wasn't an intelligence picture that Mark Duggan was

          19       going to pick up the firearm and use it immediately to

          20       shoot anybody.  He was going to move it from one place

          21       of storage to another place of storage.  But clearly

          22       where one has a firearm on the streets moving between

          23       two safe places, that is at the good time for the CO19

          24       to strike, if they can, to take that firearm off the

          25       streets.




           1           So that's what is developing here on 4 August.  The

           2       way that we look at 4 August carefully, we will just do

           3       it in this way, and then, as I say, we will take

           4       an early break.

           5           So we have A10 receiving intelligence indicating

           6       that Mark Duggan would be imminently travelling by cab.

           7       We had some evidence from the cab firm.  Ajaz Mir

           8       received a call from a woman ordering a cab from

           9       Micawber Court to Vicarage Road, Leyton, 4 August 2011

          10       (26/9, page 101).  The route of the minicab is set out

          11       in our bundle, we can see that actually at CD20773.

          12           The phone evidence, as we know, is consistent with

          13       the route that Mr Duggan took in his cab.

          14           So what was then happening?  ZZ17 was then called by

          15       A10 with that intelligence.  No details of the minicab

          16       were then actually known, but the distinction was

          17       believed to be close to Vicarage Road in Leyton.  This

          18       location was the general area which had been indicated

          19       by that previous intelligence.

          20           A10 received intelligence that Mr Duggan was later

          21       in possession of a firearm, as we know from that second

          22       document.

          23           So ZZ1's evidence about this was that he received

          24       that intelligence from A10 at around 5.20 pm, that

          25       Mr Duggan was going to be imminently going to Vicarage




           1       Road area.  There was no indication as to the intended

           2       destination of the minicab, other than that it was the

           3       Vicarage Road area.  That was passed on at 5.20 pm.  At

           4       5.30 on 4 August, the Tactical Firearms Commander rang

           5       Ms Mallon and said that Mark Duggan was in possession of

           6       a firearm.  He was not actually in possession yet of the

           7       firearm but that is what was said, that he had been to

           8       wherever it was and got the gun (25/9, page 141), at

           9       least that's what the document said, it didn't mention

          10       Vicarage Road (25/9, page 189).

          11           Ms Mallon said she would have taken that note from

          12       Z51 very accurately, that it would properly reflect what

          13       she was told.  She had made her entry in the notebook

          14       when she found out Mark Duggan had indeed later been

          15       shot, which was part of the phone call that she had

          16       received from Z51 at about 6.20 pm.  She told us that

          17       she gisted her day book to make sure it was safe and she

          18       was told that the intelligence was that Mark Duggan was

          19       proposing to pick up the gun rather than, on reflection,

          20       that he had actually picked it up.

          21           ZZ37 thought the intelligence received from ZZ17 at

          22       roughly 5.20 on 4 August was that Mr Duggan was en route

          23       from the Shoreditch area to the Leyton area.

          24           So what was the officers' overview of intelligence?

          25           Well, Z51 said that he didn't know all the




           1       intelligence on C9.  ZZ17 said that he would have given

           2       Z51 what he thinks Z51 needs to know to command the

           3       operation, but not all the details (2/10, page 67).

           4           Mr Foote said that the only piece of intelligence

           5       that they could be sure about was that Mark Duggan would

           6       take possession of a gun and that, after 5.20, that

           7       location where he would take possession of a gun was

           8       somewhere near Vicarage Road in Leyton.

           9           ZZ17 agreed in his evidence (1/10, page 58) that

          10       Mr Duggan personally wanted to take possession of

          11       a firearm and that he would do that personally.  But he

          12       also said that, on that time, he was not in possession

          13       of a mobile phone number thought to be connected with

          14       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster and he did not think his team

          15       was.

          16           A10 said that he didn't know where Mr Duggan

          17       intended to store the firearm and A10 did not know where

          18       KHF was at any time before then.

          19           So that was the overview of intelligence that we

          20       had.

          21           Well, the intelligence and the MPS response on

          22       4 August all happened rather fast.

          23           Z51 did not actually know that CO19 had left Leman

          24       Street at 17.15 hours and was not in touch with them at

          25       that time.




           1           ZZ17 said that when he received intelligence from

           2       SOCA, at around 5.20, none of the CO19 team had arrived

           3       with him at Quicksilver up in Wood Green, but a handful

           4       of the SCD11, the surveillance officers, had arrived,

           5       and we know them as ZZ37, ZZ46, and ZZ75.  He had spoken

           6       with Z51, who was buying a sandwich at some undisclosed

           7       location, we will remember.

           8           Within a few minutes of 5.20 he would have known

           9       where Vicarage Road was, he would have looked that up.

          10       ZZ17 was then considering all the options at that time

          11       but he said that it would not seem to him to be

          12       a particularly sensible thing to go and get Z51 and

          13       everyone else to go directly to the Vicarage Road area,

          14       that's not just because of where Z51 was buying

          15       a sandwich, but it really just the geographical ease.

          16       ZZ17 said he would not have wanted the CO19 team too

          17       close to Vicarage Road as he did not exactly know where

          18       things were going to happen or the area.

          19           ZZ17 said that he sent his Trident officers to the

          20       Leyton area to go and survey and to watch out because

          21       they were able to go there faster, they are not armed,

          22       they are used to working perhaps more dynamically and in

          23       smaller groups, and because those officers were also

          24       able to report directly back to ZZ17.

          25           He, ZZ17, spoke directly to Z51, contacted team




           1       leaders and let them know that things were developing.

           2           The CO19 firearms team made their way as quickly as

           3       possible over to Quicksilver and he, ZZ17, had eight or

           4       nine Trident officers on duty on 4 August and some were

           5       available, not all of them were trained and none were

           6       armed.

           7           We heard from one of those, ZZ37, who received

           8       intelligence to go to Vicarage Road (3/10, page 14), and

           9       ZZ63 said the Trident officers were told to the vicinity

          10       of the Vicarage Road area.

          11           So what else was happening at this time?

          12           17.15, V59 received a call from ZZ17 updating him

          13       about the intelligence.  As a result the CO19 team used

          14       their warning equipment, therefore went through the

          15       traffic, making their way quicker to Quicksilver.  They

          16       then spoke to Z51, Z17 and discussed initially going to

          17       support the Trident officers in Leyton.  Z51 asked if he

          18       could give his team the firearms warning which he did

          19       and then they made their way from Quicksilver to support

          20       the SCD8 officers.

          21           At this stage the Trident officers had not actually

          22       then seen the minicab and V59 advised Z51 that CO19

          23       needed to be closer to the unarmed SCD8 officers to

          24       respond to any threat to them.

          25           So this is the position.  This final bit now just to




           1       deal with 5.30 and then we will have our extended break.

           2           Z51 called Ms Mallon at around 17.30 to give her

           3       an update on the intelligence, check everything was

           4       still authorised, everyone agreed that the operation had

           5       not significantly changed so the tactics were still the

           6       same (2/10, page 182).

           7           ZZ17 said that officers went to Quicksilver for the

           8       briefing because the intelligence at that stage was

           9       still imprecise.  It seemed that the best thing to do

          10       was get everybody together, to get them briefed up as

          11       quickly as possible and to see if they could get the

          12       original plan going, just on a shorter timeframe.  ZZ17

          13       said that it was Z51's decision that they were both in

          14       agreement that that was the best thing to do.

          15           So Z51 said that the sensible thing was to have

          16       a rendezvous point at Quicksilver, not near Vicarage

          17       Road, they may have considered briefly going to Leyton

          18       area when they received intelligence.  He agreed with

          19       what ZZ17 had already done and that the best place for

          20       everyone was at Quicksilver.

          21           So we get the picture then and I am going to leave

          22       everybody at Quicksilver in a moment or two, that

          23       everyone is going towards Quicksilver, the intelligence

          24       is coming in, as we know, through A10, that things are

          25       developing, that he has information that Mark Duggan is




           1       arriving in that Vicarage Road area in a taxi, looking

           2       to pick up a firearm, a gun, from Kevin

           3       Hutchinson-Foster.  We have the police mobilising

           4       unarmed surveillance officers into that area and the

           5       CO19 team have already left Leman Street, are making

           6       their way and arriving at about this time, or shortly

           7       thereafter, at Wood Green/Quicksilver, the name of the

           8       police operation premises there, for a quick briefing,

           9       and turn around to go back into the Leyton area to

          10       support the developing picture there.

          11           So that is the position.  I am sorry it's quite

          12       difficult to really listen to all this as I read it out

          13       to you but in fact, as I say, it is all being

          14       transcribed so that you are able to refer to it.  If

          15       I read it out very slowly as if I was dictating

          16       something to a class at school or something like that

          17       I think we would be here for many days.  But I have

          18       a statutory duty to summarise the evidence and I find it

          19       very difficult just to put it into one or two words,

          20       I have to go through quite a lot of obvious background.

          21           I hope that has been all right so far.  What I am

          22       going to do, because I have had a message, is we will

          23       have a break now until 2 o'clock, then we will carry on

          24       and I will finish off this area and we'll start,

          25       hopefully, in manageable chunks.  But I think you will




           1       find that when you read it up, if you need to, that it

           2       is all there and all holds together as one story, which

           3       hopefully reflects accurately the evidence that we have

           4       all been hearing.

           5           So thank you very much for your concentration this

           6       morning, members of the jury.  We'll stop there, turn

           7       the cameras off and let you leave through until

           8       2 o'clock.

          12   (12.49 pm)

          13                     (The short adjournment)

          14   (2.00 pm)

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We'll have the jury in then, please.

          16       Cameras off, thank you.

          17                  (In the presence of the jury)

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Right, thank you very much.

          19                  Intelligence at around 5.30 pm

          20           Once we are settled then, members of the jury, we

          21       are at just about 5.30, are we not, on 4 August.  What

          22       I now want to do is just stop the clock there for the

          23       moment and just deal with some of the other evidence

          24       which comments on, really, what could have happened at

          25       that time.




           1           Firstly, actually, referring you to the evidence of

           2       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster (8/10, page 11) when he said he

           3       was at Desire Cox's house from mid-afternoon to 6.00 pm

           4       on 4 August.  We know from the mobile phone evidence --

           5       I am not going to go into it in detail, we have some of

           6       that behind our divider C11 -- that

           7       Mr Hutchinson-Foster's mobile phone connected to Slades

           8       Tower on 64 occasions, a cell at Dunton Road twice,

           9       another cell at Dunton Road once (26/9, page 123),

          10       overlap of those towers for about 300 to 400 metres

          11       circumference, consistent with him, Hutchinson-Foster,

          12       being in a house in Burchell Road, but obviously not

          13       indicative of any particular address.  But that would be

          14       the consistency of that evidence.

          15           Mr Foote told us he did not consider bringing

          16       forward the briefing or wouldn't have considered

          17       bringing forward the briefing due at 6.00 pm on that

          18       evening of the 4th because the subjects of the operation

          19       are unpredictable and sometimes the group can end up

          20       sitting up all night with nothing happening.

          21           ZZ17 said there was no reason to reconsider the

          22       6.00 pm time of the briefing of 3 August (30/9,

          23       page 15).

          24           Z51 said the intelligence right up to 5.20 pm on

          25       4 August was that the firearm was going to be




           1       transferred after about 9 o'clock, that's what he

           2       understood from the earlier evidence you have heard

           3       (2/10, page 191).

           4           Z51 added that having the intelligence half an hour

           5       earlier would not to him have made a difference, that

           6       there was a tried and tested plan in place to try to

           7       deal with somebody taking possession of a firearm.  Z51

           8       needed to command that situation with the firearms

           9       officers.  As Tactical Firearms Commander, he would want

          10       to brief officers in person and not over the radio or

          11       not by car as going.  Something might have been lost in

          12       that briefing if that had happened.

          13           ZZ17 was at Quicksilver a few hours before the

          14       6.00 pm briefing on the 4th because he had received some

          15       intelligence in relation to a person outside the six

          16       named in the FA1 and he had come in early to start

          17       conducting research into that other intelligence.

          18           It was just luck that got ZZ37 to Quicksilver

          19       an hour early (3/10, page 38).  He disagreed that he

          20       gave himself sufficient time because that was standard

          21       practice.  He said arriving at the meeting five minutes

          22       beforehand would not be wholly inadequate.

          23           Z51 denied that he needed to arrive at least an hour

          24       early to prepare for the briefing and ZZ17 had

          25       intelligence from A10 that, on the preceding days, until




           1       4 August, it had not been possible to carry out the

           2       handover until after 9.00 pm and he had no reason to

           3       believe anything would be different on the 4th, there

           4       was no reason to bring the briefing forward from 6.00 pm

           5       on the 4th (1/10, page 55).

           6           ZZ17 said that they need three or four hours

           7       starting from scratch for some new piece of information.

           8       In this case, there was a pre-planned operation, they

           9       had the intelligence in place, the resources in place,

          10       to deal with it, but to deal with somebody taking

          11       possession of a firearm.  ZZ17 thought that leaving

          12       Quicksilver before 6.00 pm was a balance between trying

          13       to get all the resources into place that they would like

          14       to have and when they needed to have them.

          15           The decision to leave Quicksilver was made once it

          16       became apparent that Mark Duggan had arrived at his

          17       destination to pick up the firearm.

          18           ZZ17 did not accept that having the briefing in

          19       Leyton, rather than in Quicksilver, would have given

          20       them more time and they wouldn't have been playing catch

          21       up (1/10, page 80).

          22           Mr Foote said it would be unwise to deploy CO19 to

          23       an unknown residential area without a briefing and

          24       without a Tactical Firearms Commander present (24/9,

          25       page 170).  He added, two pages on, that because they




           1       were on a pre-planned operation they could deploy

           2       quicker than they normally could.  If there had not been

           3       on a pre-planned operation and they received the same

           4       intelligence they would have responded as a spontaneous

           5       operation and scrambled to try to get the resources into

           6       position.

           7           Ms Mallon however said that on a pre-planned

           8       operation it's perfectly reasonable to act within a half

           9       hour of receiving the information.  They had trained

          10       assets and she was quite comfortable that could be done

          11       as per plan.

          12           ZZ17 had known a number of hours precisely what was

          13       going to happen.  Had he known that information had come

          14       a few minutes earlier or an hour earlier, they probably

          15       couldn't have done anything differently.  So I think the

          16       thrust of his evidence was that, even if he got the

          17       evidence through an hour earlier than he did, there was

          18       nothing he could have done differently.

          19           There was a team leader, B17, who you heard from

          20       (3/10), who couldn't say whether his team would have

          21       been available prior to the evening of 6.00 pm as

          22       there's protocol of availability decided elsewhere.

          23           A10, his belief was that the correct thing to do was

          24       to, in any event, wait and parade at 6.00 pm on 4 August

          25       (11/11, page 23).




           1           That's really the surrounding views about whether

           2       something could have been done earlier.

           3                Intelligence leading up to 6.00 pm

           4           Now, we move on up until 6.00 pm and what was

           5       happening then at Vicarage Road and Burchell Road.

           6           We start again with Mr Foote's evidence (24/9,

           7       page 51), when he was saying that whilst he was not

           8       involved at all on 4 August really directly, that Z51

           9       had informed him that there was some fast time

          10       intelligence and that Mark Duggan was probably taking

          11       possession of a firearm.  Based on what A10's statement

          12       sets out, about what ZZ17 was told, he, Foote, would be

          13       looking to deploy some surveillance officers around the

          14       Vicarage Road area.  That's indeed what Z51 was looking

          15       for and approved and ZZ17 did.

          16           Ms Mallon said that if specific information came in

          17       about a subject it would not have triggered a review of

          18       the options because the plan was exactly set up for

          19       MASTS operations.  The intelligence did not change

          20       because intelligence was six subjects had possessions of

          21       firearms and that somebody else was coming in to give

          22       a firearm.  That would not change the picture, it would

          23       mean it would be not necessary to revisit the CMM and

          24       the intelligence that Mark Duggan was in possession of

          25       the gun did not affect the operation, as everything was




           1       in place.

           2                  Intelligence at around 6.00 pm

           3           So now we move towards 6.00 pm.  ZZ17, as we know,

           4       was receiving intelligence from SOCA that Mark Duggan

           5       was now in the vicinity of Vicarage Road.  It took ZZ37

           6       ten minutes on blues and twos to get to Vicarage Road

           7       from Quicksilver, he parked halfway down Vicarage Road

           8       (3/10, page 5).  On a hunch he parked between the two

           9       major roads and he could have missed Mr Duggan, he had

          10       no intelligence about Burchell Road at that time.

          11           ZZ50 was driving a green VW van (4/10, page 85).  On

          12       4 August he went to Quicksilver about 5.30.  He met ZZ17

          13       in the yard, when ZZ17 tasks him and Q63 to go to

          14       Vicarage Road.  It was en route that he was informed

          15       that Mark Duggan was going to collect a gun he didn't

          16       know where Mark Duggan was coming from and he drove on

          17       blues and two along Lea Bridge Road and parked in

          18       Melbourne Road or Whitney Road those two roads parallel

          19       to Vicarage Road that we went to in the view.

          20           He chose there as he was to deploy as an observation

          21       point van if there was to be a static surveillance.  He

          22       was the man in that VW van with, no doubt, a hole in the

          23       side so he could look through it if he needed to.

          24           ZZ17 did not know precisely where the Trident

          25       officers had parked near Vicarage Road but sent them




           1       into that general area.  ZZ17 had no information about

           2       the destination of the minicab before ZZ37 saw the

           3       minicab (1/10, page 9).

           4           ZZ37 saw the minicab go past him on Vicarage Road --

           5       that was at about 5.55 now, we're getting close to the

           6       6 o'clock handover -- which he identified due to the

           7       sticker in the back window.  He could see it contained

           8       the driver and a passenger.  The minicab turned left

           9       into Burchell Road, that's what he said (3/10, page 7),

          10       and the minicab then reappeared approximately five

          11       minutes later and he only mentioned Burchell Road in the

          12       second statement because the purpose of the second

          13       statement was to give that detail.

          14           The cab then left Burchell Road, which he

          15       transmitted over the radio, and the other Trident car

          16       picked it up as it turned into Park Road.  He then moved

          17       in behind the other Trident cars and he got intelligence

          18       that Mr Duggan had picked up a gun when he was on Park

          19       Road following the taxi.

          20           ZZ75 said, on arrival in the Leyton area, and from

          21       information supplied by ZZ37, ZZ75 and ZZ46, that he

          22       began to follow the bronze-coloured Toyota Lucida in

          23       Park Road, this vehicle was a minicab with two

          24       occupants, and then ZZ17's request to ZZ46.  He ZZ46

          25       said how he had gone to the Leyton area with ZZ75 and he




           1       was updated by ZZ17 as they were in that area.  She

           2       parked outside the school in Farmer Road and was told

           3       that the minicab had turned left into Burchell Road, she

           4       heard that over the radio, and was told the number of

           5       the minicab.

           6           So ZZ46 didn't know where the others in Trident were

           7       around Vicarage Road but they chose that area, Farmer

           8       Road as a sensible place to sit.

           9           You will all remember, we have the plans in our jury

          10       bundle, about these four particular vehicles coming into

          11       this area -- four officers in three vehicles, I'm

          12       sorry -- all observing and being in touch with each

          13       other on the radio and also being updated with

          14       intelligence from ZZ17.  So that was the developing fast

          15       picture right up until 6.00 pm.

          16           So ZZ17 received intelligence indicating that

          17       Mark Duggan had then taken possession of a firearm and

          18       was heading towards Broadwater Farm Estate.  ZZ17 let

          19       the intelligence picture continue to develop, Trident

          20       officers arriving and letting him know what was going

          21       on.

          22           ZZ17 and Z51 left Quicksilver themselves with the

          23       firearms team shortly before 6 o'clock.  He, ZZ17,

          24       believed the surveillance team left a short while after.

          25       They set off to get behind the minicab.  At this stage




           1       ZZ17 did not know that the gun had been picked up

           2       initially.  En route he heard that and en route he heard

           3       that Duggan was thought to be going to Broadwater Farm.

           4           So there was a formation, really, of a convoy, as we

           5       know, with ZZ17 and Z51 being in the control car, the

           6       CO19 officers being in three cars in front and in front

           7       of them were the surveillance officers, and in front of

           8       them was the taxi going along with Mark Duggan in it,

           9       initially blissfully unaware of the other vehicles

          10       following.

          11           When ZZ17 was recalled, you remember he came back to

          12       give some more evidence (2/12, page 101-105), he

          13       confirmed that he was aware of information about

          14       Mr Hutchinson-Foster.  He said that the information in

          15       Dibri wasn't actionable at that stage.  They had

          16       received information about one of the other six

          17       suspects, they had actually done some work on another

          18       suspect and the police had not gone further in seeking

          19       to get the address from probation, where he was supposed

          20       to be staying, the point of following

          21       Mr Hutchinson-Foster, because anyone with experience of

          22       this kind of work would know that that would not be the

          23       appropriate plan.

          24                 Intelligence just after 6.00 pm

          25           So we are just after 6 o'clock now.  ZZ17 is now




           1       following to catch up with the taxi and ZZ17 says that

           2       he felt, looking back on it, when he was cross-examined

           3       in court, that there was really nothing that the

           4       Metropolitan Police could have done in any way better

           5       than they did on 4 August.

           6           Mr Foote said that if the four cars containing those

           7       officers had arrived in Vicarage Road, the whole

           8       situation could have been compromised very quickly.  V59

           9       said that if the CO19 teams had been at Leyton Police

          10       Station in advance they would not have left the yard, if

          11       that intelligence had come in that Mr Duggan was on his

          12       way to pick up the gun.  They would have waited.  Their

          13       preferred option would always be to let the car leave

          14       the area and then follow and take the gun by using

          15       a stop.

          16           So Z51 himself believed that the safest option in

          17       the circumstances was to intercept the moving vehicle

          18       with surprise and domination, to try to surround it on

          19       the street.  That would be the best because he would be

          20       worried of risk of hostage-taking if armed officers were

          21       in the cul-de-sac.  You will remember that debate going

          22       on.

          23           That's part, really, of the question you have to

          24       answer in question number 1 and then when you look at

          25       question number 2 about the stop being the right place.




           1           So we come on then, finally, and I just really take

           2       the matter on to calling amber.  Z51 would have called

           3       amber in Vicarage Road if he had had intelligence that

           4       Mr Duggan had a gun but he wouldn't have called it if he

           5       was not with the CO19 team.  The suitability of the

           6       location of the stop was for the CO19 team and he could

           7       not delegate V59 to act as Tactical Firearms Commander

           8       whilst he moved into location.

           9           V59 said that stopping the vehicle near to where the

          10       transaction had just taken place, that's the handover

          11       the gun would in fact be a higher risk, a higher risk

          12       than the stop, and that allowing the vehicle to leave

          13       that location and stop it at a timely location of CO19's

          14       choice would be the better option.  Then the team could

          15       choose where the roads are wide enough and where it is

          16       easy then for the hard stop to be put in.

          17           ZZ17's experience, when asked about this, is that

          18       where a transaction or a deal of handing over the gun

          19       takes place, then people are at their most alert (1/10,

          20       page 32).  So that therefore sometimes makes it more

          21       difficult, rather than a hard stop which takes people by

          22       surprise.

          23           If Z51 had been in his car away from the CO19 team

          24       and an intervention took place, that would have been

          25       risky and reckless (2/10, page 188).




           1           Finally, Mr Foote did not think that Vicarage Road

           2       was a good location for a stop based on the schools,

           3       residential areas and narrow streets anyway.  He said

           4       that cul-de-sacs are useful for interceptions sometimes

           5       due to limited exit routes (24/9, page 55).  Burchell

           6       Road at 17.50 on a Wednesday afternoon is not

           7       necessarily a deserted cul-de-sac, and Vicarage Road

           8       could have been an ideal place for him to have sat,

           9       blocking off roads so the minicab with the gun in it

          10       does not go anywhere, but that really has not been

          11       looked into.

          12           So that was really the evidence.  I know it has come

          13       out in bits and pieces but hopefully you will put it

          14       together in the jigsaw puzzle and get the picture of

          15       what was going on there for the police acting on the

          16       intelligence being given and assembling their team

          17       earlier than they had planned to do so.  But at the same

          18       time to intercept and try to take that gun away from

          19       Mark Duggan.

          20           That's what brings us back to that first question on

          21       your sheet.  As you know:

          22           "In the period between midday on 3 August and when

          23       state amber was called at 6.00 pm on 4 August, did the

          24       MPS and SOCA do the best they realistically could have

          25       done to gather and react to intelligence about the




           1       possibility of Mr Duggan collecting a gun from

           2       Mr Hutchinson-Foster?  If not, what more could have been

           3       expected of them?"

           4           All that I would say to you, it's quite open-ended,

           5       we are not asking here, or I am not asking within that

           6       question, about any causative link, ie if only the gun

           7       had been taken away would that have prevented one thing

           8       or another.  You are just being asked to say could they

           9       have done more, realistically.

          10           Beware of hindsight.  Looking back on a fluid

          11       operation, it may be easy to say why not this and why

          12       not the other but of course we are operating in real

          13       time, to use the police officers' evidence, when they

          14       talk about what they did and didn't do.

          15           Having said that, at the same time you can be

          16       critical, if you feel it is right to be so, if you feel

          17       it's more likely than not that the MPS and SOCA could

          18       have realistically done more.  We have had questions

          19       about Kevin Hutchinson-Foster being a quarter master of

          20       three or so guns and whether, in fact, the police should

          21       have actually put more energy, resources and such like

          22       into their work from midday of 3 August.

          23           You have heard some suggestions being put to the

          24       witnesses in the hearing.  For example, could more have

          25       been done to locate Kevin Hutchinson-Foster, through




           1       getting in touch with his probation officer, through

           2       working out where his bail hostel was and perhaps

           3       learning of his mobile phone or other information about

           4       him.

           5           If Kevin Hutchinson-Foster had been located, then

           6       could he or should he have been put under armed

           7       surveillance?  Might action have been taken to locate

           8       the address where the gun was indeed being stored, and

           9       then obtain a search warrant for it?  Could the

          10       intervention of the CO19 have been relocated to Vicarage

          11       Road?

          12           Those are all matters that have been put forward.

          13       That was the reason why, on the very first day of

          14       evidence, and almost on the very last day of evidence,

          15       not quite, but you and I went to that area -- the first

          16       day we walked around it a little bit, the second time we

          17       just looked at it from the coach -- just to see whether

          18       that is an area which could have been used to stop and

          19       intercept an operation or whether the evidence that you

          20       heard from the officers, that I have just reminded you

          21       of, that they would be very concerned to have carried

          22       out the operation there, unless they had done much

          23       fuller work in advance to work out that location, the

          24       things that could have gone wrong if they were doing

          25       a static operation, such as hostage taking in a house,




           1       or whether they could have got search warrants or other

           2       armed back up.

           3           All those matters have been explored at quite some

           4       length in this hearing and I think it's best for me

           5       really to leave it there and for you to consider all

           6       that evidence and to see what answers that brings you to

           7       in relation to that first question.

           8                             The Stop

           9           So let's look at the second question:

          10           "Was the stop conducted at a location and in a way

          11       that minimised to the greatest extent possible recourse

          12       to lethal force?"

          13           This is put there for you to consider what we have

          14       been calling the hard stop or the non-compliance stop,

          15       which did take place in Ferry Lane.  Was that a location

          16       and was that done in a manner which minimised, to the

          17       greatest extent possible, the use of the weapons that

          18       were being carried, lethal force?

          19           Again, don't look at what actually happened because

          20       we know that lethal force was used, but was that in fact

          21       the best location, given all the various details?  Was

          22       the way in which the three cars boxed in the taxi in

          23       order to surprise the occupant, in fact, the proper way

          24       to carry out what was being targeted?

          25           Firstly, of course, you will remember the taxi




           1       driver's evidence.  He was working for Hoxton cars on

           2       4 August, he had a silver Toyota Lucida, which was the

           3       same car as we have been looking at in Ferry Lane, and

           4       indeed down in the yard here, almost in every detail.

           5       I do not think the taxi driver was able to say anything

           6       in particular that was significantly different.

           7           He agreed that the windows were the same, they were

           8       darkened windows as you saw, they only opened an inch or

           9       two backwards from the back, there was just the one door

          10       on the pavement side, not on the offside, and indeed

          11       even the orange bag that we placed on the middle of the

          12       gap between the front seats was in about the same place

          13       as the one he believed on 4 August, and you have your

          14       photograph about that in any event (14/10, page 3

          15       onwards).

          16           The windows on the minicab were, as I say darkened,

          17       as they were, but he had the view from the driver's seat

          18       and looking over his shoulder that he told you about of

          19       the incident that we will deal with later.

          20                        Firearms Training

          21           So what was V53's training and history about such

          22       stops?

          23           Well, he joined the police, he told you, in 1997,

          24       spent four years on the beat and in 2001 he joined the

          25       Territorial Support Group, which is the public order




           1       unit, where he spent four years.  During that time he

           2       became a firearms officer and in 2005 he applied to

           3       CO19.  For four years he was then an uniformed ARV

           4       (armed response vehicle) officer (15/10, page 6).  Then,

           5       after that, he applied to become a TST officer (15/10,

           6       page 7).

           7           V53 said that to become a firearms officer, the

           8       officer has to apply, have medical, then a physical, do

           9       a two-week initial firearms course to learn how to use

          10       a Glock then he had to do assessment on application to

          11       join CO19.  Then there was a seven week armed response

          12       vehicle course.  The first two weeks is firearms

          13       training, a further three weeks is tactics, last two

          14       weeks is how to execute warrants or search buildings.

          15           That course has a 50 per cent pass rate.  Part of

          16       the training is to shoot and don't shoot scenarios which

          17       includes watching an scenario unfold on the screen and

          18       then determining whether to shoot or not to shoot and we

          19       had an example from that from Mr Dobinson.  One of the

          20       most important things is threat assessment.  Officers

          21       need to be tactically sound, making good judgement calls

          22       and split second scenarios.

          23           To become a TST officer they have to do a two-day

          24       assessment on their current skills.  If they pass that

          25       assessment they go on to a further seven-week course.




           1       That course is more to deal with covert carriage of

           2       firearms and that they would be trained in mobile armed

           3       support operations.

           4           Once trained, they are continually assessed.  If

           5       someone is not up to the mark they could lose their

           6       authority to carry a firearm.  Simon Dobinson was the

           7       gentleman who was the former Chief Firearms Instructor

           8       for the MPS (6/11, page 99).  He stated that all

           9       firearms training is set nationally.  There are several

          10       stages of training, there's a foundation, basic skills

          11       are learnt, refresher, and the TST officer undergoes

          12       20 days of training each year.

          13           The objective of training is to expose the officers

          14       to recognise what factors may affect their decision

          15       making, rather than actually tell them whether they are

          16       right or wrong in the choices they have taken.

          17       Mr Dobinson said all TST officers are operationally

          18       competent, they undergo a process of assessment and

          19       training.  So the foundation course is seven weeks long,

          20       as we have heard.

          21           Now, there are several tiers of firearms officers in

          22       the CO19, they start with the armed response officers,

          23       Tactical Support Teams, Specialist Firearms officers.

          24       Overall, it was quite clear, as we heard the evidence,

          25       becoming a firearms officer is a very difficult process.




           1       V59 told us that when he applied there was a two-day

           2       selection process initially to get through onto the

           3       courses themselves.  The courses are very hard to get

           4       through.

           5                    Role of Firearms Officers

           6           So each firearms officer has a role in the car

           7       during the stop.  Three drivers are tasked to put the

           8       vehicles obviously into position.

           9           The front seat passenger of the Alpha vehicle would

          10       initially be the first person to stop and get out of the

          11       vehicle and initially place firearms cover, ie point his

          12       firearm, towards the stopped vehicle.

          13           The rear seat passenger of the Alpha car is

          14       initially providing firearms cover and looking to fill

          15       in a role around that stop, but has the additional task

          16       of being in possession of a Hatton gun if the vehicle

          17       were to attempt to move off.

          18           The front seat passenger of the Bravo would be

          19       looking to provide firearms cover and place his weapon

          20       at the driver of the subject vehicle, in order to

          21       respond to any threat that that poses.

          22           The Bravo rear seat passenger has a Hatton gun, if

          23       necessary, but would be looking to exit the vehicle as

          24       soon as possible to remove the occupants of the vehicle

          25       from that side.




           1           The Charlie front seat passenger will be looking to

           2       make their way as fast as possible to the front of the

           3       subject vehicle to remove the subject from within.

           4           The rear seat passenger of the Charlie vehicle will

           5       be looking to help with the extraction and deploying

           6       a Hatton gun there, if necessary, and the object of the

           7       hard stop is to quickly isolate, detain a subject within

           8       the target vehicle, both physical and psychological

           9       domination.  A hard stop is very flexible in a way,

          10       a fluid situation, but they have to be highly

          11       (inaudible).

          12           You will remember that marvellous little bit of

          13       video whereby the three cars came round, stopped, and

          14       there was lots of shouting and firing of hatton guns and

          15       flattening of tyres, and that operation.

          16           V53 said he had been to excess of 50 MASTS

          17       operations where they intercepted a vehicle, no shots

          18       had been fired in any.  V53 said the tactical and

          19       non-compliance stop aims to prevent the subject from

          20       escaping and from doing any violence.

          21           We have all got that very clear picture.  The whole

          22       idea is there is a lot of noise, shouting, action and

          23       the idea is that the person, if they are in the vehicle,

          24       front or back seat, should really freeze, should be

          25       surprised and freeze and then the armed officers can go




           1       round and capture them within their vehicle.

           2           Although clearly, you would understand, sitting

           3       here, hearing all the evidence, that there is an element

           4       of the evidence whereby the question is raised about

           5       whether the subject is a likely escape option and what

           6       they should do for that, if that is the case.  Indeed,

           7       that then relies on the briefing that is given before

           8       the operation, as to the individual being targeted.

           9           So that is the question then in question number 2.

          10                        The Stop Location

          11           You are looking at the location.  We have been there

          12       twice, it is quite a wide piece of road.  There may be

          13       more ideal locations if they had been able to get to

          14       a car earlier.

          15           You will remember the evidence I have already

          16       referred you to, because what was happening as we went

          17       up Park Road up to the Tube station and then across to

          18       Ferry Lane, that the CO19 officers were following.  They

          19       were able to overtake the surveillance vehicles when

          20       they got nearer the faster piece of road, but there were

          21       other vehicles in the way, other members of the public

          22       driving there too, and so they had to speed along, some

          23       of them going along the inside, to get to the taxi.

          24           But at the same time, they cannot obviously put on

          25       their blue flashing lights and clear traffic out of the




           1       way because that would then alert those in the taxi to

           2       the fact that the police were following.  So there has

           3       to be an element of surprise, and yet also to get

           4       through the traffic to catch up with the taxi.

           5           Then we have got our plans, our photographs.  We

           6       know exactly how the stop ended.  I know that many of

           7       you, when you went to see the view last week, were

           8       interested in particular to see how close those three

           9       cars were around the taxi, because they had been

          10       positioned in their original positions, as far as

          11       Mr Clive Burchett could ascertain from all the

          12       information that he had.  That showed a very close stop

          13       of that taxi to prevent it from escaping.

          14           You may have thought too, from what we have heard,

          15       that if that taxi had been able to make it over the hill

          16       and come down to the roundabout by Tottenham Hale

          17       station then gone on to Broadwater Farm, that that might

          18       have been too late then for there to be any hard stop at

          19       all.

          20           We have not really looked at all the roads after

          21       that, but there is very clear evidence from the police

          22       that that was really the last, but a very good place, to

          23       stop the vehicle.  In fact, I think it was V59 who said

          24       it was really one of the best places that he had known

          25       for such a stop in that area of London.




           1                     Mark Duggan in the Taxi

           2           So now we come to the third question:

           3           Did Mr Duggan have the gun with him in the taxi

           4       immediately before the stop?

           5           Again, back to the taxi driver's evidence.  He

           6       picked up Mr Duggan to take him to Leyton (10/10,

           7       page 4).  Mr Duggan only had a phone in his hand at the

           8       time.  He was wearing a jacket.  He sat in the middle of

           9       the rear seat facing forwards.  He took his jacket off

          10       at the time and put it on the seat by his side.  On the

          11       way to Leyton, Mr Duggan was mostly speaking on his

          12       mobile phone.  We know that he also had a BlackBerry as

          13       well with him.

          14           As far as the taxi driver was concerned, his

          15       evidence was that Mr Duggan seemed quite normal and

          16       nothing exceptional or unusual about him as a passenger.

          17           He noted that, as Mr Duggan approached Vicarage

          18       Road, there was quite a period of communication on the

          19       phone, and indeed we see from what happened after the

          20       event that there was, indeed, a number of contacts on

          21       the telephone between him, Mr Duggan, and Kevin

          22       Hutchinson-Foster.

          23           As they got closer to Vicarage Road, Mr Duggan told

          24       the taxi driver to go towards Vicarage Road.  He was on

          25       the phone and clearly asked the person on the other end




           1       of the phone where he was (14/10, page 6).  Then the

           2       taxi stopped on Vicarage Road and not Burchell Road.

           3           The police officer said they were going to Burchell

           4       Road, the taxi driver said, no, he stopped on Vicarage

           5       Road by Burchell Road and he marked it really on his

           6       plan as being in the mouth of Burchell Road.  He said

           7       that the traffic could pass him where they had stopped

           8       because he was just into the mouth of Burchell Road, on

           9       the corner of Vicarage Road.

          10           He then said that someone came to the car after

          11       about two or three minutes, it wasn't immediate, and

          12       then from the front left-hand side of the car, that

          13       person came carrying a box.  Mr Duggan opened the door

          14       fully to take the box, which was a square box, described

          15       by the taxi driver.  Mr Duggan opened the door fully to

          16       take the box and then the man and he had a conversation

          17       through that open door.

          18           He said they talked for about five minutes and he

          19       gave Mr Duggan the box and then went away.  Mr Duggan

          20       put the box on the seat opposite him from where he was

          21       sitting.  The taxi driver has a GPS satellite system, as

          22       we know, that provides feedback to the base, and we have

          23       the details within our jury bundle as to the movement of

          24       the taxi down Vicarage Road and the timings, which you

          25       can refer to, if you wish to.




           1           But the position is that Mr Johnstone thought the

           2       minicab stopped between 17.56 and 18.00, because it took

           3       four minutes to travel just that 100 metres.  He could

           4       not be sure from the GPS system as to whether the taxi

           5       had turned into Burchell Road or not.

           6           Mr Hutchinson-Foster, as I already referred to, gave

           7       his evidence.  He is serving his prison sentence for,

           8       amongst other things, being convicted of transferring

           9       the gun to Mr Duggan and Kevin Hutchinson-Foster said,

          10       on 4 August shortly before 6.00 pm, that he was there

          11       but he did not transfer a gun in a box to Mark Duggan.

          12           He may have pleaded guilty, he told us, to hitting

          13       Peter Osadbey with a gun in the Lagoon salon and he,

          14       Mr Hutchinson-Foster, accepted that the gun found in

          15       Ferry Lane had his DNA and Peter Osadbey's blood on it.

          16       He said that he only ever touched one gun and that was

          17       the gun he hit Peter Osadbey with.  He could not account

          18       for the gun that he had on 29 July getting into

          19       Mr Duggan's hands at all.

          20           He said that the box with his fingerprints on it

          21       that was found in the minicab could have been one that

          22       he gave to Mr Duggan before and he denies he came out to

          23       the minicab and handed a box to Mr Duggan at all.  He

          24       agrees that he was in a house in Burchell Road.

          25           He said that the reasons for the phone contact




           1       between him and Duggan was that Mr Duggan wanted him to

           2       follow him to Tottenham.  Kevin Hutchinson-Foster said

           3       that he had other arrangements so he was not going to do

           4       that.  When Mr Duggan was in Burchell Road, quite simply

           5       as far as he was concerned, Kevin Hutchinson-Foster did

           6       not go out to meet him.  In none of the phone calls of

           7       4 August did he and Mr Duggan discuss directions, he

           8       said.

           9           So that is his evidence.  But, as I said, there is

          10       very strong feature of the conviction in relation to

          11       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster, as well as his fingerprint on

          12       the box in the cab and indeed Mark Duggan's print as

          13       well.

          14                    Taxi Journey to Ferry Lane

          15           What else was going on around that time in the taxi?

          16       The taxi driver said that between Ferry Lane and

          17       Vicarage Road, Mr Duggan seemed all right, he talked

          18       about buying the car and he wasn't talking on the phone

          19       all the time.  In Blackhorse Road he put his jacket on.

          20       He was sitting there quite happily not wearing his seat

          21       belt.

          22           Around about some time after 6 o'clock or about

          23       6 o'clock, Mr Duggan sent a BlackBerry message saying

          24       "Watch out for a green VW van, it's Trident and they

          25       have just jammed me".  As you asked about what jamming




           1       was, I will remind you that Mr Underwood told us that

           2       jamming means having an activity or pursuit

           3       intentionally or unjustly hindered or prevented by

           4       someone else.  I am sure we all know really what was

           5       going on there.

           6           We also heard actually some evidence from Marlon

           7       Duggan about this time.  He had spoken to his brother at

           8       6.09 on 4 August in a call that lasted three minutes or

           9       so.  Mr Duggan seemed normal, just like any other day,

          10       he said (3/10, page 72).  Marlon Duggan said that he did

          11       not get any impression that Mark had brought the call to

          12       an end in a hurry, he couldn't hear any police sirens in

          13       the background and, as far as he was concerned, his

          14       brother seemed perfectly normal.

          15           That call seemed to have ended really within seconds

          16       of the whole incident happening, and obviously that may

          17       be something that you all want to bear in mind when

          18       considering other matters.  That is that evidence.

          19                           The Shoe Box

          20           We tie in, when you're considering the questions,

          21       something of the expert evidence that we have too in

          22       this case, because we are all aware of the contact

          23       between the box and the expert evidence and the

          24       fingerprint evidence from Jacqueline Landais (12/11).

          25           She told that you Mark Duggan's prints were on the




           1       outside of the box.  You can remember with that box that

           2       it has obviously been over-exhibited, if I can put it

           3       that way.  It has obviously been used in a court of law

           4       quite a bit but it was looking rather tired and falling

           5       apart.  But she was able to try to reconstruct it and

           6       hold it and she felt able to say the print that

           7       Ian Richards on the same day -- the forensic

           8       photographer -- had taken the photographs of, the print

           9       that she was looking at was consistent with Mark Duggan

          10       holding the box, but nothing from the actual position of

          11       it would necessarily mean that he actually opened the

          12       box, he could have just held it without opening it.

          13       That was the best that she could do from the condition

          14       of the box that was now in.

          15           We do have Kevin Hutchinson-Foster's prints on that

          16       box too.  We have the position of the gun ending up on

          17       the grass and, of course, there was some fibre transfer

          18       evidence which looked as though it was expectation that

          19       there were some fibres.  This is the evidence of

          20       Anna-Marie O'Connor (13/11), we have her report at C27

          21       in the jury bundles.

          22           There were two fibres in that box from the cab.

          23       They are very common fibres, they are indistinguishable,

          24       or one that they put under particular harsh scrutiny was

          25       undistinguishable between the sock that was on the gun




           1       and the one in the box, but they were from a very common

           2       black sock, so it is not perhaps as compelling as it

           3       might otherwise have been.  But that might be enough to

           4       establish something of a link between the box.

           5           As we know, and I will have to deal with this in due

           6       course, the management of the scene and the exhibits and

           7       the searching of the taxi was not done to perhaps the

           8       standard that people looking back on the whole incident

           9       would have hoped that it had been done.  So the

          10       significance of the box was overlooked at first and the

          11       box was thrown by a searching officer, probably into the

          12       boot of the vehicle, and so there may have been other

          13       forensic links which have been lost.  But as I shall be

          14       saying to you when we look at the expert evidence

          15       further, the expert evidence is there really just to

          16       prove, if it can, actual positive links between

          17       an object and a person, or an object and another object.

          18           In this case, much of the forensic evidence does not

          19       have that compelling strength.  It does not prove

          20       negatives, it cannot say that something didn't come into

          21       contact with another thing, all it can say is there is

          22       nothing to show that it did.  The link, the forensic

          23       link, between the box, the gun and its sock around it is

          24       really as much as just outlined.

          25           But you may think, with the conviction that




           1       Mr Hutchinson-Foster has and the other evidence,

           2       principally from the taxi driver obviously, as I already

           3       outlined, is sufficient to help to you answer that third

           4       question, about whether Mr Duggan had the gun with him

           5       in the taxi immediately before the stop.

           6           Let's turn then on to the next question.  I am going

           7       to stop in about quarter of an hour for a little break,

           8       I know it's getting quite intense.  We will just start

           9       on this area and then we will have a stop and a pause

          10       and then come back to it then.

          11                           The Shooting

          12           Question 4 is of course:

          13           "How did the gun get to the grass area where it was

          14       later found?"

          15           The first part of question 5, before we come to the

          16       legal boxes is:

          17           "When Mr Duggan received the fatal shot did he have

          18       a gun in his hands?"

          19           So these very important questions are answered on

          20       the evidence which really deals with the whole shooting

          21       incident.

          22           As we approach this incident, I want us to come to

          23       it very calmly and dispassionately.  We need to analyse

          24       the evidence that has been put before you and at all

          25       times remembering, as that is done, the factual




           1       conclusions are for you, you alone, and not for me.

           2           In the hearing, many questions were asked of the

           3       CO19 officers.  Their statements were put to them,

           4       sometimes in great long chunks, and reading the

           5       transcript back again, it is not particularly easy for

           6       you to work out the statements being put and the

           7       agreements to it.

           8           So, after the break this afternoon, I am going to

           9       have you provided just with very small files, but they

          10       have just got the initial statements of each of the CO19

          11       officers and the core of what was put to them in their

          12       evidence, so you have that as a reference point.  It was

          13       not the evidence that they necessarily completely gave.

          14       I shall have to go through that with you, but it is the

          15       beginning of their evidence and it I think will be

          16       a helpful form for you to have.

          17           I am not going to read them out because, as I say,

          18       they are in the transcripts, but it seems better for you

          19       to have them in this way.

          20           What I will firstly do is go through V53's first

          21       account, the account he gave you, of the shooting.  Then

          22       we will have the break, get those files and take up that

          23       part of the evidence from there on.

          24                          V53's Account

          25           So V53 told you that he had received briefings that




           1       the Tottenham Man Dem had been involved in numerous

           2       fatal and non-fatal shootings, kidnappings and supply of

           3       class A drugs within London.  They had been involved in

           4       stops and had actually made determined attempts to

           5       escape and discarded firearms.

           6           V53 thought, on the basis of those briefings, that

           7       there was a strong possibility that Mr Duggan would try

           8       to escape but he also thought they may actually use

           9       firearms to help them escape or to prevent arrest.

          10           So he had no briefings or experience from Tottenham

          11       Man Dem members, he had no information about them

          12       threatening an officer with a firearm (15/10, page 29),

          13       and indeed he added (page 13), that he and the team did

          14       not know exactly what type of firearm they would have on

          15       4 August, but it could be anything between a handgun up

          16       to a Mac 10 sub-machine gun.

          17           So that is what he thought.  He said that his

          18       experience was that gangs carry firearms in socks.  One

          19       of the reasons, not just to prevent DNA or fingerprints

          20       going on the socks, but also that it means that the

          21       cartridge case is not released and left behind, it's

          22       released into the sock.

          23           So he has this full briefing.  We have been referred

          24       to it already and you have it in your file.  So I am not

          25       going to read that through.  That involves a photograph




           1       of Mark Duggan and the black and white photograph of

           2       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.

           3           What did V53 say?  He said that as the strike

           4       happened Mark Duggan was sat behind the driver.  As the

           5       CO19 vehicles came to a halt, he, V53, saw Mr Duggan

           6       adores across the back seat from right to left at pace.

           7       That made V53 believe that Mr Duggan was looking to

           8       escape.  He, V53 believed Mr Duggan realised that

           9       something was going on at that point (15/10, page 131).

          10           V53 started to get out of his vehicle and put on

          11       a blue baseball cap.  As he opened his car door he saw

          12       W42 by the front seat passenger with his MP5, a police

          13       baseball cap on and shouting armed police into the

          14       structure of the minicab where Mark Duggan still was.

          15       (page 40).

          16           When he got out of the car, his MP5 would be in off

          17       aim ready position with select lever to fire and his

          18       finger would be outside the trigger guard (page 24).

          19           As V53 started to get out, he could see the minicab

          20       door slide open, Mark Duggan jumping out at pace.  This

          21       also convinced V53 that Mr Duggan was looking to escape.

          22       When Mr Duggan jumped out, he then was facing W42.  He

          23       did not move.  Initially Mr Duggan was facing towards

          24       W42.  V53 takes a couple of steps towards him with his

          25       MP5 in the off aim ready position and W42 shouts "Armed




           1       police, stand still, stand still".  At the same time V53

           2       shouted "Armed police".  Mr Duggan was out of the

           3       minicab and then pivoted to face V53.

           4           Mr Duggan had a gun in his right hand (page 45).

           5       Mr Duggan had a gun from the moment he turned to face

           6       V53 (page 54).

           7           V53 could not remember Mr Duggan taking any steps

           8       towards him after he had pivoted.  V53 could see the

           9       handle of the weapon, which was side-on to his body.  He

          10       could make out the trigger guard and he made out from

          11       the sock where the guard would be, the barrel, and he

          12       saw the black sock covering the weapon.

          13           I have to be very careful about me reconstructing it

          14       because you can remember it, but he then gave

          15       a demonstration whereby he said that Mr Duggan's right

          16       arm was close in by the chest, the elbow bent, right

          17       hand across the stomach, parallel to the floor, his

          18       knees were slightly bent and he was slightly turned,

          19       looking to the left of V53.

          20           He said he was, broadly speaking, upright and square

          21       to him.  The only thing V53 focused on was the gun

          22       (15/10, page 48).  Mr Duggan started to move the gun

          23       away from his body by moving his arm, not his wrist or

          24       elbow, by a couple of inches.  V53 now says that he had

          25       an honest belief that Mr Duggan was going to shoot.




           1           V53 brought his weapon up and discharged one round

           2       aiming for the central body mass (15/10, page 50).  The

           3       round impacted on Mr Duggan's right chest and caused

           4       a flinching movement where Mr Duggan's right shoulder

           5       moved back and then he brought the gun round to point

           6       directly at V53.

           7           V53 reassessed, believed Mr Duggan was going to

           8       fire, so he discharged a second round which appeared to

           9       impact on the right bicep.  A split second later, when

          10       he reassessed, the gun wasn't there.  Mr Duggan was

          11       falling backwards and that was the end of the shooting.

          12           During that incident, V53 said he was completely

          13       concentrating on the gun, he was not looking away or

          14       blinking (15/10, page 55).

          15           So that was his account to you.  You will remember

          16       it well, I know.  If you need to go through it question

          17       by answer by question, it is 15/10 through those pages,

          18       46, 48, 50, which has the core of his account.

          19           So V53 was asked some further questions.  He said he

          20       could not be sure whether the first round impacted on

          21       Mr Duggan's chest and the second round impacted on the

          22       arm.  He said there was room for confusion in his

          23       recollection about that because he never actually saw

          24       the rounds penetrate the body but he certainly still

          25       believes that it was in that order that those shots took




           1       place.

           2           As you know, he then gave some accounts.  He said

           3       that he did not know how the gun got over the fence.  He

           4       never saw the gun after Mr Duggan had collapsed down to

           5       the ground having been shot.  When the gun was shown to

           6       him as part of his evidence in this court, he said,

           7       "Yes, I last saw it when Mr Duggan was holding it, I had

           8       never seen that gun except when he was" (page 142).

           9           So that is his account, one for you very much to

          10       remember and think about.

          11           After our break, I hope that I have then got these

          12       little files together and you will be able to just look

          13       at the accounts that V53 then gave to Inspector

          14       Brian Elliott, and then as part of the post-incident

          15       procedures and then his witness statement.

          16           All right.  Thank you very much for your hour of

          17       concentration.  Let's all have a quarter of an hour

          18       break and then I will take up after that.  I will ask

          19       for cameras to be turned off.

          22   (2.58 pm)

          23                         (A short break)

          24   (3.46 pm)

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  We'll have the






           1   jury  in  then,  please.  Thank  you.

           2                  (In the presence of the jury)

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much, members of the

           4       jury.  I am sorry about that delay.  It was a bit longer

           5       than we thought.  It is all down to me and the

           6       photocopier.  One of us broke down, I think it was the

           7       photocopier not me.  The other reason was that one

           8       document was put in there which should not have been

           9       there.

          10           So I think what we have now is going to be a file

          11       which is going to be handed out to you, a little red

          12       file like this (indicates).  If you would like to have

          13       that and I will ask you to look at the front and I will

          14       tell you all about it.  (Handed).

          15           Just look at the very front sheet of it.

          16   MR STERN:  Sorry to rise, I do not know whether there is

          17       a copy so we can follow.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I am sure there should be.  If not,

          19       if you listen very carefully, you will be able to hear,

          20       Mr Stern.  The front sheet, members of the jury, is the

          21       list of all the witnesses who are in the car.  So V48 is

          22       the Alpha driver; W42 the Alpha front seat; W56, the

          23       Alpha rear seat.  Those are the three in the Alpha car.

          24           Then Q63, the Bravo driver; R31; and then W39.

          25           This is all really in your jury bundle.




           1           Then we have the Charlie driver, R68; then V53,

           2       Charlie front seat; W70 is the Charlie rear seat.

           3           Then we have the control driver, V72; then V59; then

           4       in the back Z51 and ZZ17.

           5           So that enforces what you have already seen on the

           6       view, that second time that we placed in the seats where

           7       each witness was.

           8           In the next line across, what I have written in

           9       there is where you will find their evidence in the

          10       transcript.  So for the top one, you have V48, then

          11       Alpha driver, then 22/10, pages 1-41.  That's what's

          12       happened there.

          13           If you go down to W42, Alpha front seat, you will

          14       see that his transcript evidence is 23/10, page 136 to

          15       the end at 24/10, 1-112.  Then what you have got there

          16       then if you carry on on W42, is his initial statement,

          17       do not worry about the reference but in fact you will

          18       find it is CS125, we have had it up on the screen and

          19       I have it printed out for you there so you can

          20       understand that.  Then his detailed statement, that's

          21       the part of the detailed statement that he has been

          22       questioned about, CS120 to 122.

          23           So that is what has happened here.  If we look at

          24       W42, if we look at that divider, the green one, second

          25       one in, you have there then copy of his initial




           1       statement that has been put before you in evidence of

           2       4 August 2011 and then the second part is the part of

           3       his main statement which was read out to him in

           4       questions in the Inquest hearing.  So that is what this

           5       is a little file about.

           6           Why I wanted you to have that for you now at this

           7       point is because I had started dealing with V53's

           8       evidence.

           9           If we look at this, we have V53.  If you go to the

          10       divider with V53, you have the first statement that we

          11       know and you had before you, that was made by V53 at

          12       18.50.  He gave this account to Inspector Brian Elliott

          13       saying:

          14           "I got out of Charlie car, subject got out of rear

          15       nearside of taxi holding gun shaped item in sock in

          16       hand.  Began to raise it up in my direction.  I fired

          17       several shots."

          18           That's signed V53 and he gave evidence about that on

          19       15/10, page 71.

          20           So that is all that is there.  It's only a little

          21       file but it just helps you to put that into some area as

          22       we just look at the accounts of the CO19 officers, which

          23       are obviously an important or very important part of

          24       this Inquest hearing.

          25           V53's notebook from 4 August says:




           1           "The vehicle stopped, I deployed from my covert

           2       armed response vehicle.  The subject got out of the rear

           3       nearside of the target vehicle.  I shouted 'Armed

           4       police'.  He turned in my direction.  My focus

           5       immediately then turned to an object which I honestly

           6       believed to be a firearm.  He began to raise it up and

           7       having an honest held belief that he was about to shoot

           8       me or my colleagues I discharged a number of rounds

           9       hitting the subject."  (15/10, page 75)

          10           V53 said that the gun in the sock was the gun that

          11       he saw.  As I already said, he did not know how it got

          12       over the fence.

          13           Then what you have in this same divider at the next

          14       page is his full statement that he was cross-examined

          15       about.  Bits have been crossed out, not for any secrecy

          16       reasons just because it's a very long statement and we

          17       have just put in those bits that he was asked about,

          18       about the incident, and you see there are those two

          19       pages starting up when he could see the person in the

          20       minicab and what happened when he got out from the

          21       minicab in his statement.

          22           So that is the start with V53.  What I want to go on

          23       then to deal with is the account we got from the other

          24       officers.

          25                          V59's Account




           1           V59 is the control front seat person, as we know,

           2       and he gave his account to the jury, yourselves, when he

           3       gave his evidence.  He is further on down in that same

           4       little bundle.  He told you that he felt that the people

           5       carrier did not yield to the Alpha car straight away but

           6       within half a second or so it had.  The Alpha car

           7       pinched across in front of the car, bringing it to

           8       an abrupt stop.  The Bravo pulled alongside the people

           9       carrier and the Charlie car drove right to the rear of

          10       it.

          11           The control car in which he was, stopped

          12       fractionally behind the Charlie vehicle.  Well, we saw

          13       it in position at the view, the control vehicle was

          14       further down by the bus stop, you will remember.  He

          15       could see the officers getting out.

          16           He saw Mr Duggan exit the vehicle and move forward

          17       like a runner coming out of sprinters blocks and run

          18       towards the Charlie vehicle.

          19           So this is V59, the Sergeant we saw giving evidence

          20       again towards the end of last week, his account of what

          21       he saw.

          22           He said that, as he saw Mr Duggan moving forward

          23       like a runner coming out of sprinters blocks and run

          24       toward the back of the taxi, the Charlie vehicle, he

          25       lent forward to pick up his MP5 (8/10, page 139), then




           1       turned to the left to go round the door to get out and

           2       as he turned he saw quite a lot of feathers coming from

           3       the rear of Mr Duggan's jacket.

           4           Mr Duggan was caught by W70 who then pushed him over

           5       backwards onto his back and took him down to the floor.

           6       Mr Duggan had moved two or three metres.  As Mr Duggan

           7       was facing him, V59 could only see Mr Duggan's top left

           8       quarter (8/10, page 140) from the shoulders up.

           9           V59 ran towards the other officers.  W42 shouted out

          10       that he had been shot.  V59 was aware that Mr Duggan had

          11       been shot and shouted to Z51 for a medi pack and called

          12       for the London Ambulance Service, LAS and HEMS,

          13       helicopter medical service (8/10, page 141).

          14           In the first place, Mr Duggan was in a sort of

          15       running stance.  When the feathers flew V59 could only

          16       see the top quarter of Mr Duggan so could not say how

          17       his stance had changed.  He was coming forward until

          18       caught by W70.  At no stage did Mr Duggan come up,

          19       having gone down in the way that he had described.

          20       Mr Duggan ended up on the pavement between the rear of

          21       the minicab and the front of the Charlie car.

          22           V59 did not hear shouting but the sirens were on in

          23       his vehicle and he heard the shots.  V59 saw Mr Duggan

          24       reaching across his waist when he first came out of the

          25       cab.  As V59 saw feathers fly, he could see the top




           1       quarter of Mr Duggan.  As the vehicle stopped, the side

           2       door was open and V59 saw Mr Duggan exit.  Very rapidly

           3       from the side door, he was inclined towards the

           4       sprinting pose, moving rapidly towards the Charlie car.

           5       Mr Duggan was then reaching across his body towards his

           6       waistband area.

           7           V59 lent down to collect his MP5, lifted the it up

           8       and turned slightly to his left.  At this stage all V59

           9       could see was the top left quarter of Mr Duggan's body.

          10       At that point, V59 heard two gunshots and then from the

          11       rear of the jacket a load of feathers appeared.  V59

          12       said the shots were in fairly quick succession.

          13           As you can see, you have then his initial account in

          14       that little file and the part of the main part of what

          15       he saw and described in his witness statement at CS099,

          16       as I have put there for you.

          17                          Q63's Account

          18           Let's go to another officer, Q63.  I am dealing with

          19       them in the way we heard them, actually, but you know

          20       where they were seated, you can refer both to the jury

          21       bundle and indeed to this.

          22           Q63 is the Bravo driver (9/10, page 149 to 10/10,

          23       page 104).

          24           He thought the stop went very well.  At the point

          25       when Q63 was alongside the minicab, someone in his




           1       vehicle said something along the lines of "I think he's

           2       going to leg it".  At that point he believed that the

           3       subject inside the car, Mr Duggan, was aware that they

           4       were police officers.

           5           Q63 put on the two tones to alert the minicab driver

           6       in the hope that they would actually allow him to

           7       realise who the police were and safely stop the vehicle

           8       so that they could deploy.

           9           Q63 said that the windows were down and he heard

          10       shouts.  He heard people shouting that someone should

          11       stop.  He distinctly remembered W42 shouting commands of

          12       "Stop" and identifying himself as a police officer

          13       (9/10, page 156).

          14           When Q63 left his car he did not take his MP5 and he

          15       had his Glock in his holster.  He ran down the offside

          16       of his vehicle towards the boot then round between the

          17       Charlie and the Bravo car, towards the back of the taxi.

          18       He saw Mr Duggan who was upright but bent slightly

          19       forward.  Q63 could not see his arms.

          20           As Q63 was in front of the Bravo's number plate, at

          21       the rear between the Bravo and Charlie car, he heard two

          22       shots and saw Mr Duggan buckle slightly at the waist as

          23       though he had been winded.  He did not come back up,

          24       having buckled down.

          25           Q63 then heard W42 shouting to Mr Duggan whilst he




           1       was still in the Bravo car and Q63 would have waited

           2       half a second to a second to deploy after the other

           3       members of his car.  But when Q63 saw Mr Duggan, he was

           4       in the area of the slid open rear door and he was moving

           5       towards the rear bumper of the minicab (10/10, page 99).

           6           Q63 was at the front offside bumper of the Charlie

           7       car.  His view was not obscured in any way by the

           8       vehicle Mr Duggan was moving towards the wall, he said.

           9           Q63 said that the shots fired were two distinctive

          10       shots but were very close together (9/10, page 160), but

          11       there was a significant pause between the two shots.  He

          12       believed that there was enough time between the shots

          13       capable of supporting a reassessment of risk and

          14       a reassessment before the second shot should be fired.

          15           The box marked A on the plan, which he put on his

          16       plan as you have, represents both where Mr Duggan was

          17       when Q63 first saw him and the general area where he

          18       ended up.  When Q63 was between the Bravo and the

          19       minicab, there would have been two officers between

          20       those cars in front of him.  Q63 would not have been in

          21       a position to see whether or not Mr Duggan had a gun in

          22       his possession.  At that time, he did not see a gun.

          23           As you know, Q63's evidence was contentious because

          24       he was later cross-examined on the way that he moved

          25       around the scene.  I will come onto that when I deal




           1       with that in due course.  But it is right for you to be

           2       reminded that one of the last items you had put into

           3       your jury bundle affected Q63.

           4           These were documents put in by agreement between

           5       those involved representing CO19 and the family of

           6       Mr Duggan, which show that Q63 had been involved in

           7       a firearm discharge, and the IPCC was involved, back in

           8       a 2005 incident.

           9           How should you approach that here in this Inquest?

          10       Does it make any difference at all?

          11           What I want to do is ask you to be very, very

          12       careful about putting too much or any weight on this,

          13       but at the same time it is there.  Again, in the spirit

          14       of transparency and openness, just so that there should

          15       not be anything hidden from you, because you know now

          16       there was this incident, no disciplinary action was

          17       taken in relation to Q63, no prosecution was brought in

          18       relation to him.  But the IPCC took the view that it had

          19       a guardianship, to use its words, oversight, over him

          20       and reached a view about him which you have and which

          21       was given before you (4/12, page 66).

          22           In short, the IPCC came to the view that if Q63

          23       became involved in an incident such as a police shooting

          24       again, either as a witness or as a principal officer,

          25       then his testimony, his evidence, would have to be




           1       treated with caution, or indeed, in one word, "extreme

           2       caution".  The IPCC said that their concern lies in the

           3       actual level of his perception distortion shown due to

           4       this incident.

           5           Now, all I would say there, you have those

           6       documents, it does not go as to any issues of honesty or

           7       dishonesty, it goes as to whether he can reliably be

           8       really assessed when you consider his evidence as to

           9       what he did and what he saw.

          10           As I say, those papers are there, they are in your

          11       jury bundles.  All I would say is that in some ways one

          12       could say his evidence comes with a little bit of

          13       a health warning, on the other hand, since 2005, as we

          14       know, Q63 has been through all these various assessments

          15       that all the other firearms officers go through on

          16       a very regular and frequent basis, and it has been

          17       accepted that he has been a firearms officer and can

          18       continue to be such.  He was the driver of the Bravo car

          19       on this day.

          20           So it's right that you should be aware of that, but,

          21       please, as I say, put it into proportion and perspective

          22       and just put it as another factor when assessing the

          23       weight and accuracy and reliability of evidence.

          24                          R31's Account

          25           Well, R31 is the next officer I want to deal with.




           1       He was in the Bravo front seat.  He said that after the

           2       strike was called, the car, Alpha, in front of him,

           3       veered a couple of times to indicate to the driver to

           4       stop.  The Bravo pulled alongside, the Charlie car came

           5       in behind, once the vehicle was in mobile containment,

           6       they put the sirens on and tried to ease the vehicle

           7       into the side of the road, as we can see happened, and

           8       it is very evident on the view as to how that happened

           9       and resulted in the taxi being stopped.

          10           As they pulled alongside, they could see silhouetted

          11       figures, said R31, in the minicab but no detail (10/10,

          12       page 110).  He saw Mr Duggan who appeared to be leaning

          13       forward from the rear kerbside of the minicab towards

          14       where R31 thought that door handle would be in the taxi.

          15       R31 could see him then from the shoulders and head.

          16           He thought he was going to make a run for it.  He

          17       did not have time to say that over the radio but let his

          18       colleagues in the Bravo know.  He did not see the door

          19       slide of the taxi.

          20           R31 told you, members of the jury, that he had done

          21       tens of stops of this sort.  He had never known somebody

          22       try to escape brandishing a firearm.  But in any event

          23       he, R31, got out of the passenger seat of Bravo turned

          24       left towards the back of the minicab.  He turned right

          25       between that car and the front of Charlie and then saw




           1       Mr Duggan appear directly in front of him in that box A

           2       that we know very well from our plans.

           3           R31's impression was that Mr Duggan was running to

           4       where the wall was in that diagonal area across the

           5       pavement.  R31 could see the left-hand side of

           6       Mr Duggan's body from the back.  He could not see his

           7       hands.  Mr Duggan's stance was as if he was running.  He

           8       was fairly upright and running forwards.

           9           Between the time that R31 saw Mr Duggan and the

          10       shots being fired, it was a maximum of a second, he

          11       thought.  He thought Mr Duggan wasn't running at full

          12       speed.  R31 said he intended to stop Mr Duggan running.

          13       He had his pistol out pointing up.  His threat

          14       assessment was Mr Duggan had a firearm so he could not

          15       put his weapon away (page 117).

          16           R31 counted two shots but it was difficult whether

          17       people fired simultaneously or it could have been more

          18       than two shots.  The shots were not instantaneous, there

          19       was a slight gap between them.  When the shots were

          20       fired, he saw Mr Duggan's jacket ballooning at the back,

          21       wadding coming out of it.  Mr Duggan had started to go

          22       forward and down.

          23           R31 said he did not see any perceptible change in

          24       Mr Duggan's stance between the first and second shot.

          25       He did not know how the jacket could have bunched up,




           1       when he was asked about the bunching up, whether he was

           2       able to see that from where he was.

           3           So then, R31, you have within that file that I have

           4       just handed out to you his initial account made on

           5       4 August that was read out from the screen in front of

           6       you during the Inquest hearing, and then again the

           7       cross-examination and the part of the statement that was

           8       cross-examined about, giving his account at CS0177 from

           9       the main incident of the shooting.

          10           Now, I will go to W42 and then I think that what we

          11       will do is deal with him and W56 and then that will be

          12       enough for today for you, I think.

          13                          W42's Account

          14           So W42, as we know, we know where he was, he is the

          15       front seat of the Alpha car.  He said there was no way,

          16       when he was watching what was going on, as the car came

          17       in to stop, that Mark Duggan could have thrown the gun

          18       from the minicab.  He could not see it because he would

          19       have had to have done as the cab was in motion.  He said

          20       he focuses on the vehicle at all times when he does this

          21       stop.  He did not see the door open either.

          22           W42 shouted out "He's reaching" to warn his

          23       colleagues (24/10, page 74).  W42 said at the time

          24       everything went in slow motion.  He heard the first

          25       shot, then his body told him that he then felt pain.




           1       Within the same period his mind told him he had heard

           2       another shot.  That is how he said how he knew that he

           3       was receiving the shot.

           4           When W42 heard the shots he did not see any

           5       alteration to Mr Duggan's position.  Then there was this

           6       measurement of height to try to work out where the

           7       bullet had struck him, W42.  He told you that he was

           8       around 5'7", 5'8".  He measured with the aid of what he

           9       was provided with, about 4" from the floor to his left

          10       armpit, where the holster was that received the bullet

          11       in it.

          12           He added that when he was by the railings, the major

          13       part of his upper body was then put down without a shirt

          14       and he was then looked after by others.

          15                          W56's Account

          16           The other person within the Alpha car was, as we

          17       know, W56, in the Alpha rear seat.  He had a Hatton gun,

          18       he had a Glock, an MP5 as well (24/10, page 112

          19       onwards).

          20           W56 said that the surveillance officer relayed over

          21       the radio that it was a gold-coloured minicab.  He first

          22       saw it at the junction of Blackhorse Road and Forest

          23       Road.  When the stop went in W56 deployed and went to

          24       cover the front offside tyre.  He did not see anything

          25       of the stop until he was alongside the front tyre.  He




           1       heard sirens from a vehicle behind him, he could hear

           2       "Armed police!" but not anything more specific.

           3           He did not hear anyone shout "He's reaching" and

           4       when he was alongside the wheel he saw the driver who

           5       was looking over his left shoulder towards the rear of

           6       the taxi, that was the driver of the taxi looking over

           7       his left shoulder as to what was going on.  W56 said he

           8       followed his gaze through the open door of the nearside

           9       taxi but he did not see Mr Duggan or anything else

          10       through the gap.

          11           Moments after he reached the car, R68 came and

          12       together they were with the driver, and R68 got the

          13       driver out and put him on the ground.

          14           W56, again, you have for your information, the

          15       evidence about that.  His statement put within this

          16       bundle.  You have his first statement taken from his

          17       notes that were put up on the screen of the initial stop

          18       written at 23.10 on 4 August.  His statement is the only

          19       one that seems never to have been typed up, as far as

          20       I could find a copy.  Anyway, it is in handwriting but

          21       it talks about what he could see and what he was

          22       questioned about during the Inquest hearing.

          23           So there we are.  We are making some progress,

          24       members of the jury.  We are going through the core

          25       evidence now of the CO19 officers, what they told you




           1       they did, what they saw and their reactions to it.

           2           As I say, the statements that you have here will be

           3       of further importance when we come to deal with their

           4       accounts after the event as well.

           5           So what I am going to do then is to say well done to

           6       you today for your concentration and listening to me.

           7       We have got through and we have got through together

           8       a lot of the evidence, hopefully in a form that is not

           9       too slow and dilatory but will be able to be transcribed

          10       so it will be available to you if you wish to re-read it

          11       once you retire.  Hopefully, also in some sort of

          12       semblance of order that you can understand the different

          13       headings or paragraphs and the witnesses that I refer

          14       to.

          15           So thank you for today.  What I would ask you to do

          16       is to go and have a relaxing evening somewhere to

          17       refresh your batteries.  I am sorry that you have to

          18       listen to me for such a long time.

          19           Tomorrow, hopefully, we will be able to go through

          20       the remaining accounts then deal with the rest of the

          21       evidence.  It may even be, we will see how it goes, but

          22       perhaps some time later on tomorrow afternoon that

          23       I will have concluded my summing-up remarks to you.  We

          24       will just have to see how we go.  If that is the case,

          25       then you will be able to then to start considering your




           1       roles and answering the questions that have been put to

           2       you in that document which you have.  All right.

           3           Thank you very much for your concentration.

           4       Remember all those warnings not to discuss this case

           5       with everyone.  It is a very important time we are

           6       reaching now with this hearing.

           7           Thank you very much.  10.30 tomorrow, please.

          11   (4.13 pm)

          12        (The Inquest adjourned until 10.30 am on Tuesday,

          13                        10 December 2013)




           1                              INDEX

           2                                                       PAGE

           3   Summing-up ...........................................1

           4   Legal Directions .....................................2

           5       Findings ........................................13

           6   Summary of Evidence: Background .....................24

           7       Mark Duggan .....................................25

           8       V53 .............................................29

           9       History .........................................30

          10       Intelligence ....................................36

          11       Operation Dibri .................................37

          12   Planning ............................................39

          13       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster .........................55

          14       Intelligence ....................................59

          15       Briefing Note ...................................60

          16       Intelligence at around 5.30 pm ..................72

          17       Intelligence leading up to 6.00 pm ..............77

          18       Intelligence at around 6.00 pm ..................78

          19       Intelligence just after 6.00 pm .................81

          20   The Stop ............................................87

          21       Firearms Training ...............................88

          22       Role of Firearms Officers .......................91

          23       The Stop Location ...............................93

          24       Mark Duggan in the Taxi .........................95

          25       Taxi Journey to Ferry Lane ......................98



           1       The Shoe Box ....................................99

           2   The Shooting .......................................102

           3       V53's Account ..................................103

           4       V59's Account  .................................112

           5       Q63's Account ..................................115

           6       R31's Account ..................................119

           7       W42's Account ..................................122

           8       W56's Account ..................................123