Transcript of the Hearing 2 October 2013


           1                                      Wednesday, 2 October 2013

           2   (10.30 am)


          14                          Z51 (affirmed)

          15                   (The witness was anonymised)

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  Have a seat,

          17       please.  I will indicate the cameras can be turned on.

          18       We'll press on and see what happens in any event.

          19           Can I just ask you, firstly, to have a look at --

          20       there's a list of those officers who have Z numbers.

          21       Against your number, Z51, do you see your name?

          22   A.  It's not on this particular one.

          23   MR BUTT:  Because that's a MPS list, it's not there.

          24       I think was being been written down.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We will make sure that proper form
















           1       is kept so I will have a note of your true name but we

           2       will press on, please, thank you.

           3                    Questions by MR UNDERWOOD

           4   MR UNDERWOOD:  You appreciate we are calling you Z51 for the

           5       purposes of this Inquest.

           6   A.  I do, yes.

           7   Q.  My name's Underwood and I'm counsel for the Inquest and

           8       I'll start the questions.

           9   A.  Good morning, sir.

          10   Q.  We've heard you were the Tactical Firearms Commander to

          11       do with Operation Dibri; is that right?

          12   A.  That's correct, yes.

          13   Q.  How long had you been in that position in August 2011?

          14   A.  Approximately eight years.

          15   Q.  Had you been in Trident before that or was that your

          16       entire time at Trident?

          17   A.  No, that was -- I went to Trident eight years ago on

          18       promotion to a DI so that's when I started as Detective

          19       Inspector.

          20   Q.  When did you qualify for Tactical Firearms Commander?

          21   A.  2004.

          22   Q.  By 2011, had you conducted a number of armed operations?

          23   A.  I had indeed, sir, yes.

          24   Q.  I want to ask you about firearms in general and the way

          25       Trident works with them.




           1           It was an offence to hold a firearm of a certain

           2       type, was it not?

           3   A.  It is indeed, yes.

           4   Q.  So the pistol we are talking about here that was capable

           5       of firing live ammunition, it was automatically

           6       a criminal offence to be in possession of it, was it

           7       not?

           8   A.  That's correct, yes.

           9   Q.  What sort of prison sentence would you attach to holding

          10       one?

          11   A.  It depends on previous convictions, obviously, but you

          12       would expect somebody with a loaded firearm around about

          13       five years for a first offence.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Isn't there a statutory minimum of

          15       five years?

          16   A.  Yes.  Sometimes that's not always given but there is

          17       a --

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That's what the press say but, in

          19       fact, it's very exceptional for it not to be given.

          20       It's a five-year minimum for possession of a firearm.

          21       It can be more, of course, if someone has previous

          22       convictions that are relevant.

          23   A.  That's correct.

          24   MR UNDERWOOD:  You used the words "loaded firearm" there.

          25       Can I just ask you about the way firearms were passed




           1       around?  I am not talking about Mr Duggan here just

           2       talking about gangs in general.

           3   A.  Yes, sir.

           4   Q.  People who want to have illegally held firearms.

           5       Would people hang onto to them or pass them around from

           6       time to time or what?

           7   A.  They tend to pass them around, so they are not as easy

           8       to get hold of as you would think.  So you will find

           9       that when we recover a firearm, there's every likelihood

          10       it's been used in numerous offences.

          11   Q.  What would happen?  Would people sell them to each other

          12       or one person, as it were, own it and hire it out?

          13   A.  It could be -- a whole multitude of different -- you

          14       know people can sell them to different gangs, people can

          15       pass them about among the gang members.  It really

          16       depends on who's supplying it to who.

          17   Q.  The importance of getting a gun off the street then

          18       would be that, first of all, you might well have

          19       somebody in prison for at least five years for being in

          20       possession of it and, secondly, because one gun might be

          21       involved in a number of offences you might actually

          22       prevent a whole number of shootings by getting one gun

          23       off the street; would that be fair?

          24   A.  That's correct.  Obviously, a firearm in itself is

          25       a lethal weapon so they're very dangerous to have in




           1       anybody's hands.

           2   Q.  Again, you used the words "loaded firearm"; how easy was

           3       it for people to get ammunition in 2011, as opposed to

           4       guns?

           5   A.  It's also difficult to get ammunition for firearms.  But

           6       when I think about the amount of firearms that we've

           7       recovered, a lot of them do come loaded armed with --

           8       armed with ammunition.

           9   Q.  This one, as I understand it, had one round in it in the

          10       magazine and that was a reloaded round, reused round,

          11       was it?

          12   A.  That happens quite often as well, yes.  People make

          13       their own rounds or modify rounds so that they can fire

          14       from certain weapons and, yes, there's a lot of people

          15       make their own ammunition.

          16   Q.  Right.  Dibri, as a whole, was involved in trying to

          17       deal with guns and drugs, as we understand it, in

          18       relation to the particular gang.

          19   A.  That's correct.

          20   Q.  This particular four-day operation that we've been

          21       hearing about, that was due to run from 3 to 6 August,

          22       came from a form FA1 and then a FA2A from you; is that

          23       right?

          24   A.  That's correct, yes.

          25   Q.  There are two bundles there, if we can work off the




           1       bundles that everybody has.  There's the larger of the

           2       two has a whole load of documents in it.  At C6,

           3       tab 6 --

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Just make sure the screens all start

           5       springing to life again.  I am not quite sure what's

           6       gone wrong with them, because we'll need them shortly.

           7       They seemed to be all right earlier on this morning.

           8   MR UNDERWOOD:  It's obviously important we're getting

           9       relayed to Court 76.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes.  It's rather odd.  It looks as

          11       though we are but we are not coming up in here.

          12   MR UNDERWOOD:  We can work off the basis of the documents

          13       we've got for the moment, at least.  Do you have tab 6

          14       there?

          15   A.  I do indeed, sir, yes.  Thank you.

          16   Q.  FA2A: is that the FA2A you prepared for this operation?

          17   A.  It is indeed, yes.

          18   Q.  Let me just get clear, I've asked Detective

          19       Superintendent Mallon about this.  This is, as it were,

          20       a two part document.  One is it's a policy file and also

          21       there's a decision log at the back.

          22   A.  Yes.  It's an extremely badly designed document, in my

          23       opinion, but what we do is we use the first part of it

          24       to get the authority and the tactical advice and then

          25       the majority of the TFCs and SFCs use their day book to




           1       record the policy (?).

           2   Q.  That's what happened here, is it, so we don't find

           3       anything in the log?

           4   A.  That's correct.

           5   Q.  Can I just ask you about the way logs deal with

           6       intelligence?  We've seen various versions of documents

           7       called day books, note books, whatever you like, in

           8       which people have, if I may say so, a very coy reference

           9       to intelligence, because they are not supposed to write

          10       that intelligence down in available documents; is that

          11       fair?

          12   A.  That's correct, yes.

          13   Q.  Was there any provision in August 2011 for you to have

          14       sensitive books so that if you had to write intelligence

          15       down somewhere you could do it and keep it locked away?

          16   A.  The type of intelligence that we were dealing with we

          17       were not allowed to record it.

          18   Q.  At all?

          19   A.  No.

          20   Q.  Was that a Metropolitan Police standard operating policy

          21       that you were not allowed to record it?

          22   A.  I think it's legislation.

          23   Q.  So it follows, does it, that where in a log or in

          24       a policy document you're actually operating on the basis

          25       of that sort of intelligence, that log, that policy




           1       record, simply won't reflect that?

           2   A.  That's correct, yes.

           3   Q.  Still in that bundle, I want to move to 3 August.  If we

           4       go to divider 12, C12, we see a transcript of the

           5       briefing that we've heard took place a bit after

           6       6 o'clock, we think, on 3 August?

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  You were present at that, I take?

           9   A.  I was indeed, sir, yes.

          10   Q.  Can I just run you through the parts of it that appear

          11       to relate to you?

          12   A.  Certainly, sir.

          13   Q.  Conveniently we have it on screen now.  So the first

          14       paragraph on page CD274 has you saying:

          15           "Rights ladies and gents, I'm Z51 I'm a DI from

          16       Trident.  We are all here today on Operation Dibri.  The

          17       date is Wednesday the 3rd of August and the time by my

          18       watch is ten minutes past six in the evening.  This is

          19       the operational briefing for the deployment of armed

          20       CO19 and SCD11 officers in relation to Operation Dibri.

          21       The briefing is being hold at YDQ."

          22           That's a police station, is it?

          23   A.  Yes, Quicksilver.

          24   Q.  "The persons present at the briefing are all the

          25       firearms officers employed in this operation and other




           1       officers from SCD8.  The command structure for the

           2       operation is as follows: Gold is Z50 ..."

           3           That's Ms Mallon, isn't it?

           4   A.  That's correct.

           5   Q.  "... the operation was authorised by her on the 2nd of

           6       August at 3.20 pm and I'm going to be the TFC.  ZZ17 is

           7       the DS on the operation and he will go through the

           8       information with you."

           9           Then you hand over, do you, to the intelligence

          10       officer?

          11   A.  To ZZ17, yes.

          12   Q.  Is that the standard form of bringing everybody together

          13       and making sure everyone has the same information?

          14   A.  Yes.  In that opening introduction there, the command

          15       structure is given out and the time it was authorised

          16       and the names of the commanding officers.

          17   Q.  Right.  So what then happens is we get a whole lot of

          18       intelligence from ZZ17 and if we go to CD277, third line

          19       down, you hand over to V59 --

          20   A.  That's correct.

          21   Q.  -- for the method.  By the "method" you mean there what

          22       the CO19 firearms officers are likely to do?

          23   A.  Yes.  It goes through all the tactics and contingencies

          24       and --

          25   Q.  Okay.  In summary, the idea was, was it, that once the




           1       surveillance team had got control of anyone and that

           2       person was thought to be in possession of a firearm,

           3       then the CO19 officers would go in and detain that

           4       person, either on foot or in premises or (inaudible).

           5   A.  Yes, once I'd authorised an interception, yes.

           6   Q.  The notion was, was it, that you would be the one

           7       authorising that interception?

           8   A.  That's correct, yes.

           9   Q.  If we then jump to CD280, please.  Right at the bottom,

          10       there are no questions then V59 hands back to you and we

          11       have you saying:

          12           "Right.  Just a couple of things that the

          13       authorising officer -- Gold wanted me to mention in the

          14       briefing.  Hatten rounds have been authorised for

          15       stopping vehicles but not for entering premises."

          16           Hatten rounds are pretty much solid lead shotgun

          17       shots, are they?

          18   A.  They use those just to take the tyres out of some

          19       vehicles if they feel the need to do it.

          20   Q.  Or you could also blow a door off with them, off its

          21       hinges?

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  There is the parameter there that you can use them for

          24       blowing tyres out but not for entering premises without

          25       asking Gold, yes?  Then:




           1           "If we need to enter premises we've got to go

           2       through Gold before we do that.

           3           "Right, human rights.  Proportionate, the objective

           4       is the disruption and removal from the public domain of

           5       those willing to indiscriminately use firearms for

           6       criminal enterprise.  This operation is wholly

           7       proportionate to this and to what it seeks to achieve.

           8       There is a legitimate legal aim to prevent further

           9       firearms offences.  All relevant authorities have been

          10       sought and granted and documented.  All records will be

          11       retained, accessible and correctly audited.  The

          12       operation is necessary to seize illegally held firearms

          13       and arrest those willing to use them and remove them

          14       from the public domain.

          15           "I just have to remind you of the legal restraints

          16       and provisions on the use of reasonable force are

          17       contained within the Common Law, Section 3 of the

          18       Criminal Law Act 1967, Section 117 of PACE 1984 and

          19       nowadays further constrained by the Human Rights Act

          20       1998 which I've covered above.  This incorporates the

          21       European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law in

          22       particular Article 2 which is the right to life.

          23           "Right, strict reminder for the firearms officers.

          24       A firearms is to be fired only as a last resort.  Other

          25       methods must have been tried and failed or must because




           1       of circumstances, be unlikely to succeed if tried for

           2       example a firearm maybe fired when it's apparent that

           3       the police cannot achieve their lawful purpose of

           4       preventing loss or further loss of life by any other

           5       means.

           6           "Individual responsibility, the responsibility for

           7       the use of a firearm is an individual decision which may

           8       have to be justified in legal or disciplinary

           9       proceedings.  Are there any factors you feel may affect

          10       your operational response?

          11           "All:  No.

          12           Then you deal with communications and then you ask:

          13           "Does everybody understand their role and individual

          14       responsibilities discussed?"

          15           Then you ask for any questions.

          16           Were the firearms officers, to your knowledge,

          17       separately briefed as well?

          18   A.  Yes, they usually have a briefing before they come from

          19       their team leader, the Operational Firearms Commander.

          20   Q.  What would your understanding be in August 2011 of the

          21       nature of that separate briefing?

          22   A.  Sir, I've never been involved in one of those, I would

          23       be guessing.

          24   Q.  So you regarded it as your responsibility then, did you,

          25       to remind the firearms officers of their legal




           1       obligations?

           2   A.  I do indeed, sir, yes.  It's very important.

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It's recorded too, is it?

           4   A.  It is indeed, yes, sir.

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  But it's not just being said for

           6       court purposes should anything go wrong, it's a genuine

           7       direction?

           8   A.  No, it is.  It's a direction that I've -- through

           9       experience of doing this over the years, I make sure

          10       I give right at the end of the briefing, so it's the

          11       last thing officers hear before we go out and do

          12       whatever we're doing.

          13   MR UNDERWOOD:  Very well.  On 3 August I think, in fact, the

          14       firearms officers didn't leave Quicksilver, did they?

          15   A.  That's correct, they didn't, no.

          16   Q.  Again, can I just try to work out how this worked?  On

          17       3 August, we know, there was intelligence that Mr Duggan

          18       was hoping to pick up a firearm from

          19       a Mr Hutchinson-Foster.

          20   A.  That's correct, yes.

          21   Q.  Two things happened: the first is surveillance officers

          22       followed him when he was in the vehicle but lost him

          23       quite quickly; the other thing is that we know that he

          24       didn't go off and pick up a firearm because he went off

          25       to a barbecue.




           1   A.  That's correct, yes.

           2   Q.  Can you explain to us what was going on?  When the

           3       firearms officers were staying in the police station,

           4       the surveillance officers were following him; was that

           5       the plan?

           6   A.  No, sir, obviously it was very accurate and reliable

           7       intelligence that we were getting.  Intelligence was

           8       coming in every -- regularly.  At the time that

           9       I deployed the surveillance team, Mark Duggan looked

          10       like he may be the most likely, but there was

          11       intelligence that it may not happen tonight but it still

          12       hadn't been confirmed.  So I sent a surveillance team,

          13       the directed surveillance, et cetera, was all in place

          14       so, rather than just have them sitting at the police

          15       station, I sent them to the address where Mark Duggan

          16       was, and then as it developed later on, it became

          17       apparent that he wasn't going to do any criminality that

          18       night.

          19   Q.  Right.  I want to move on to 4 August now then.  We

          20       don't want to know where you live.  We now know that you

          21       were coming from the area where you did live --

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  -- towards Quicksilver when you received some

          24       intelligence from ZZ17; is that right?

          25   A.  That's correct, yes.




           1   Q.  About 5.25, we've heard.

           2   A.  Around about that time, yes.

           3   Q.  Can I just get you to look at a map, still in this

           4       bundle, it's at C5.  It happens that this shows where

           5       a whole load of people were at 5.15.  Ignore the times

           6       for the moment.

           7   A.  Okay.

           8   Q.  At the top we have 17.15 where ZZ17, ZZ37, et cetera

           9       were; that's Quicksilver.  Then if we go to the

          10       right-hand side, again the time is not important for the

          11       moment, but at 17.15 "Kevin Hutchinson-Foster was

          12       here" --

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  -- and "was here" is Vicarage Road, the Vicarage Road

          15       area.  Now, you were coming from somewhere when you got

          16       intelligence that something may well happen in the

          17       Leyton area, I think.  Is that right --

          18   A.  That's correct, yes.

          19   Q.  -- or was it as specific as "the Vicarage Road area" by

          20       that point?

          21   A.  No, it was basically that Mark Duggan was looking to

          22       take possession of a firearm imminently in the Leyton

          23       area.

          24   Q.  Right.  What you decided to do was carry on to

          25       Quicksilver where you'd already been intending to go; is




           1       that right?

           2   A.  That's correct yes.

           3   Q.  Can you help us from which direction you were coming?

           4   A.  I was coming from the opposite direction from the CO19

           5       officers, so I was coming from the west.

           6   Q.  Right, okay.  Would it have been an option for you to go

           7       straight to the Leyton area?

           8   A.  I could have gone straight to the Leyton area, sir, but

           9       the best option for me, for -- as a -- the commander of

          10       the firearms operation was to go to Quicksilver where

          11       some of the staff were ready there.  I made sure that

          12       ZZ17 got the firearms officers to come there and the

          13       surveillance team to come there.

          14   Q.  Would you, in essence, have had to go past Quicksilver

          15       anyway if you had gone straight to Leyton?

          16   A.  Well, I was in a vehicle on my own.  I was trying to

          17       get -- I knew how to get to Quicksilver, so I was

          18       getting there with the blue lights and two tones on as

          19       quickly as I could get there.  To get to Leyton, which

          20       is an area I don't know, would have been a lot more

          21       difficult.

          22   Q.  Okay.  So as we understand it, you had gone to

          23       Quicksilver, within about five minutes of the CO19

          24       officers; is that right?

          25   A.  Yes.  I believe I got there around about 5.40.




           1   Q.  So you had at that stage CO19 officers at your disposal,

           2       you had ZZ17 there, you had, I think, a few of the SCD11

           3       officers; is that fair?

           4   A.  Yes, that's correct.

           5   Q.  Trident officers were, by that stage, at Vicarage Road,

           6       did you know?

           7   A.  Yes, they were -- I'm not sure exactly where they were

           8       but I know they were in the vicinity, trying to locate

           9       and identify the vehicle that Mr Duggan was in.

          10   Q.  Right.  Now, at that stage, we know that you waited for

          11       some while for the other SCD11 officers to attend.

          12       Would it have been an option at that stage, at say 5.40,

          13       to get in your vehicles and go to the Leyton area?

          14   A.  Well, no.  What I wanted to do -- obviously, there was

          15       a plan in place that had gone through a command

          16       structure.  Most of the surveillance team were there,

          17       I was -- by the time I got to Quicksilver and I had

          18       updated Ms Mallon it was 5.45.  I went into the briefing

          19       room with ZZ17 to brief the surveillance team and it

          20       wasn't long after that that I got intelligence that the

          21       minicab had been spotted in the Vicarage Road area.

          22   Q.  That's a little before 6 o'clock, is our understanding.

          23   A.  I can't be sure exactly of the time but I think

          24       I left -- I think we left Quicksilver at about 5.55,

          25       around about that time.




           1   Q.  You appreciate I'm dealing with possibilities here --

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  -- and just to see what else might have happened to see

           4       whether events might have turned out differently.

           5           I know this is hypothetical but can you consider

           6       this suggestion: if you'd had the intelligence about

           7       Mr Duggan imminently going to pick up a gun, say, half

           8       an hour earlier, would it have made any difference?

           9   A.  No, sir.  It wouldn't have, no, because everybody had

          10       been rushing to get there just as they were.

          11       Like I've said, there was a tried and tested plan in

          12       place to try and deal with somebody taking possession of

          13       a firearm.  I wouldn't have wanted -- you know, I needed

          14       to be there and command that situation with the firearms

          15       officers so I can't see it making any difference half

          16       an hour earlier.

          17   Q.  Would it have made any difference if you had known where

          18       the firearm was being stored?

          19   A.  Absolutely.  If we had intelligence where the firearm

          20       was being stored we would have looked to recover that

          21       firearm.

          22   Q.  Even though you were also getting intelligence that

          23       somebody was on their way to pick it up from there?

          24   A.  Even though, sir -- you know, in Trident we -- the

          25       priority is to take firearms off the street.  Whether we




           1       have convictions with that or not, it's -- getting the

           2       firearm off the street is the priority.

           3   Q.  Right.  Sorry, I was interrupting the flow of the

           4       narrative here.  We have you at Quicksilver.  CO19 is

           5       there, you've got a few of the SCD11 armed surveillance

           6       officers there.  The Trident officers were out trying to

           7       find what's going on on the ground.  What did you

           8       actually do?

           9   A.  I made sure -- I spoke to V59, made sure he was updated

          10       with intelligence, made sure he gave his staff the

          11       warnings that I'd given in the briefing the day before,

          12       just to make sure they were aware of the firearms

          13       warnings.

          14   Q.  Just pause there.  To remind ourselves, he's the team

          15       leader of the firearms officers?

          16   A.  That's correct yes.

          17   Q.  Was he a Sergeant?

          18   A.  He was indeed, I think.

          19   Q.  Let's go back over that carefully.  You ensured that he

          20       gave a similar firearms warning to the one you had given

          21       on the 3rd, is that right --

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  -- so about use of force being the last resort,

          24       et cetera?

          25   A.  Yes.




           1   Q.  Okay.  Sorry, do go on.

           2   A.  Obviously they are getting their equipment on, so they

           3       were in the yard.  So I left them to get ready.  I then

           4       went in to do the same to the surveillance team.  The

           5       surveillance team leader was there, so I asked him how

           6       long he estimated the rest of his team to come and he

           7       wasn't quite sure.  They were waiting for their firearms

           8       to turn up, so I gave him the same -- he got the

           9       intelligence update from ZZ17 who was with me and I gave

          10       him the same "Can you give the warnings to your team

          11       when they get here and join us whenever you can" because

          12       while I was talking to him the intelligence came that we

          13       needed to -- I felt as if we needed to go.

          14   Q.  Right.  So the armed surveillance team were not in fact

          15       armed, is that right --

          16   A.  They weren't then, no.

          17   Q.  -- whereas, as we understand it, the CO19 team brought

          18       their arms with them from Leman Street?

          19   A.  That's right.

          20   Q.  When you say they were getting ready, kitted up, you

          21       mean with bullet-proof vests and things?

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  In terms of what armament they had -- so for example

          24       whether they had Tasers, whether they should use Tasers

          25       rather than guns, et cetera -- was that a matter for you




           1       or a matter for the firearms team?

           2   A.  No, that would be a matter for the firearms team.  They

           3       had that equipment but, you know, I couldn't tell you

           4       what exact guns they had, and stuff.  I know they had

           5       Tasers, but it's a decision for them to make.

           6   Q.  Okay.  So there came a point then when you decided with

           7       the continuing intelligence and not knowing when the

           8       SCD11 team were going all to assemble that you decided

           9       to go, yes?

          10   A.  Yes.  The priority in a firearms operation is to try and

          11       locate and identify the threat, which the SCD officers

          12       had done that, and then it's to try and contain that

          13       threat and then neutralise the threat that poses,

          14       and that's the sort of priority in a firearms operation.

          15       That's what I was trying to do.

          16   Q.  We have heard yesterday from one of the Trident officers

          17       that ZZ37, who was in Vicarage Road, got sight of the

          18       minicab, got the registration number of it, said over

          19       the radio that the minicab was turning left into

          20       Burchell Road and he passed that over the radio.

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  Did you get that information?

          23   A.  Yes, I did, yes.

          24   Q.  You were still at Quicksilver, were you?

          25   A.  Yes.




           1   Q.  Is that what made you leave?

           2   A.  It was, yes.

           3   Q.  Did you go off in the convoy of Alpha, Bravo, Charlie,

           4       control car?

           5   A.  I was in the control vehicle with V59, ZZ17 and the

           6       driver.

           7   Q.  You were in the back, I think, behind the driver?

           8   A.  That's correct, yes.

           9   Q.  Did you receive more intelligence about the pick up of

          10       the gun and where Mr Duggan was going while you were in

          11       the car?

          12   A.  Yes.  I did indeed.  Around about 6 o'clock, I asked

          13       ZZ17 if he could confirm whether he believed Mark Duggan

          14       was in possession of a firearm, and that he was in that

          15       vehicle and he confirmed that and I went to amber.

          16   Q.  What was the effect, in terms of the control of the

          17       operation, of going to amber?

          18   A.  Basically going to amber means that I've authorised the

          19       interception of that vehicle under the direction of the

          20       Operational Firearms Commander at the safest possible

          21       opportunity they can do it.

          22   Q.  So the dye is cast then, is it?  You've said "Right, my

          23       job is to decide when the interception could should go

          24       in, I've made my decision, which is that I now hand it

          25       over to the firearms team" and that's what happened?




           1   A.  The die is never cast because I'm in command of the

           2       whole operation, so if the intelligence changed then,

           3       you know, we could say, "Well, you know, change that, I

           4       don't want that to happen".  If there was some -- you

           5       know, they had taken a hostage or something like that,

           6       it could change but I have said, at that time with the

           7       intelligence, that I would like that vehicle intercepted

           8       at the safest possible opportunity.

           9   Q.  So subject to any change --

          10   A.  Any significant change, yes.

          11   Q.  Okay.  But subject to that significant sort of change

          12       that may get you to reverse your decision, the decision

          13       having been made, the responsibility for what happened

          14       next passes to the firearms team, doesn't it?

          15   A.  That's correct, yes.

          16   Q.  Specifically to V59?

          17   A.  Well, V59 is the team leader but, no, it can -- when the

          18       actual interception goes in, it's the lead car that

          19       takes the -- that decides when to put the interception

          20       in.  I think that was --

          21   Q.  That's W42?

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  Let's get this clear: V59 is the one would who would

          24       call red, is that it?

          25   A.  No.  I believe red was called by W42.




           1   Q.  Did you in fact hear red being called?

           2   A.  I did indeed, sir, yes.

           3   Q.  By the time red was being called did you have your eyes

           4       on the minicab?

           5   A.  I did.  Actually, there was a good five minutes before

           6       red was called that we had our eyes on the minicab,

           7       because it was caught in very heavy traffic, so I can

           8       remember the firearms officers were able to identify

           9       exactly where it was because the surveillance -- the

          10       surveillance officer's commentary on the radio was

          11       excellent and she was able to say "It's behind this

          12       particular vehicle and three in front of my vehicle" and

          13       we had time to sit behind it.

          14   Q.  Okay.  Then we understand that the final command for

          15       a stop like this is "Attack, attack, attack" or "Go, go,

          16       go", whatever the phrase might be used on the day?

          17   A.  That's correct.

          18   Q.  Did you hear that being called?

          19   A.  I did indeed, yes.

          20   Q.  Did you see the stop?

          21   A.  I did, yes.

          22   Q.  How good was your view of it; was it interrupted by

          23       anything?

          24   A.  Well, I had quite a good view because I was in quite

          25       a high vehicle, the control vehicle -- I cannot remember




           1       exactly what it was but it was -- so I had quite a good

           2       view, I wasn't that far away.

           3   Q.  Okay.  We have heard that the Alpha car went round,

           4       stopped in front --

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  -- Bravo car alongside, Charlie car bringing up the rear

           7       boxing in the minicab; is that what you saw?

           8   A.  Yes.  Sir, it was exactly as training would have -- you

           9       would have expected it to happen.

          10   Q.  Then, in your own words, what did you see happen?

          11   A.  I saw Mr Duggan very quickly coming -- going to his left

          12       to come out of the taxi.  I saw him -- he momentarily

          13       looked right and then he looked left towards where

          14       I was, and very quickly he was surrounded by CO19

          15       officers.

          16   Q.  Did you see a gun in his hand?

          17   A.  I didn't, no.  I didn't see his hand, sir.  I could just

          18       see the top of his head.

          19   Q.  Can you estimate how many officers you saw surround him?

          20   A.  I would say six or seven.  There was certainly two

          21       officers between me and Mr Duggan from the Charlie

          22       vehicle, and there was two officers from my vehicle that

          23       got out, I believe, and there was other officers round

          24       the other side.  So I would say six or seven officers.

          25   Q.  Did you hear any shouting?




           1   A.  Yes, I did indeed, yes.

           2   Q.  What sort of words were said?

           3   A.  "Stand still" or "Hands up", I can't remember exactly

           4       but I remember -- commands that I would expect to hear

           5       from when this sort of interception was in a -- exactly

           6       what I had heard in numerous others.

           7   Q.  "Put the gun down"?

           8   A.  I cannot remember.  I just remember a lot of shouting.

           9   Q.  Would it have stood out to you if you heard somebody

          10       shouting a command that would have made it obvious that

          11       the man was armed?

          12   A.  I believe it would, sir, yes.

          13   Q.  So let me be completely clear about this: if you heard,

          14       "Put the gun down", that's something that would have

          15       stuck in your mind?

          16   A.  I would have remembered that, yes.  I didn't hear that.

          17   Q.  Did you hear shots?

          18   A.  I did, yes.

          19   Q.  Can you say how many?

          20   A.  A number of shots.  Two or three shots, I thought it

          21       was.

          22   Q.  Can you help us with how far Mr Duggan had got by the

          23       time you heard the shots?

          24   A.  In my memory, he hadn't got very far, not much further

          25       from you to this gentleman.  (Indicates)




           1   Q.  So six feet, something like that?

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I didn't see what you were saying.

           3       Between the two?

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Give us a measurement.

           6   A.  About two metres maybe, a metre and a --

           7   MR UNDERWOOD:  After you heard shots, could you see

           8       Mr Duggan still?

           9   A.  I saw him -- he was on the ground.  We stayed in the

          10       control vehicle until we were told to come out of the

          11       vehicle but I saw officers very quickly giving him first

          12       aid.

          13   Q.  Did you see him go down?

          14   A.  Did I see him go down?

          15   Q.  Yes.

          16   A.  No, I didn't.  I didn't see him actually going onto the

          17       ground, I just saw -- you know, the officers had blocked

          18       my view.  I could just see a lot of officers and the

          19       whole sort of -- everybody went down a bit.

          20   Q.  Okay.  Then what did you do?

          21   A.  Well, eventually I came out of the vehicle, not long --

          22       very quickly, actually, I got out of the vehicle.  My

          23       priority was to make sure that first aid was being

          24       given, which it was.  I knew that an officer had been

          25       shot, so I went to make sure he was getting first aid




           1       and that he was all right.  I moved away from the area

           2       of -- let them get on with the first aid.  I made sure

           3       that LAS was called, HEMS was called --

           4   Q.  LAS is London Ambulance Service?

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  HEMS is Helicopter Emergency Medical Service?

           7   A.  Yes.  The priority there for me is to make sure the area

           8       is kept sterile, as much as you possibly can.  So I had

           9       officers put in cordons and made sure -- as quickly as

          10       I could that the place -- the area was surrounded by

          11       officers.

          12   Q.  Okay.  So cordons to make sure the area is sterile, make

          13       sure medical assistance is urgently called for --

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  -- and contacting other officers?

          16   A.  Yes, I was on the phone an awful lot.  I phoned

          17       Ms Mallon at 14 minutes past -- so it must have been

          18       very close after the incident happened -- and updated

          19       her.  I phoned the SIO to update Mr Foote, and my phone

          20       then -- obviously we made sure that the local police --

          21       a CAD message -- basically what that means is that the

          22       local police know that there's an incident going on

          23       that's a serious incident, so we can get officers to

          24       come and help us.

          25   Q.  In terms of who has to take command where there's been




           1       a shooting like this, you were the senior person on the

           2       ground, I think?

           3   A.  That's right, yes.

           4   Q.  So immediately you were the one responsible for all the

           5       things you have just told us.

           6   A.  That's correct, yes.

           7   Q.  But who is due to take over command where there's been

           8       a shooting like this?

           9   A.  Obviously, when there's a shooting that results in the

          10       death of somebody, the IPCC are going to get involved

          11       eventually, the DPS, which is our internal complaints

          12       branch and it's going to -- senior officers from both

          13       Trident, the local borough -- you know, it's --

          14   Q.  Lots of senior officers?

          15   A.  It's going to escalate quite quickly.

          16   Q.  Was it your job to involve those?

          17   A.  No.  I had to concentrate on what I was doing.  My job

          18       was to make sure that any first aid that could be given

          19       was being given and that the scene was preserved.

          20       Eventually people came and took over from me and I knew

          21       I was going to be a principal officer so --

          22   Q.  Okay.  So you did all those things, did you?

          23   A.  I tried my best to make sure everything was -- yes,

          24       that's -- everybody was contacted that I could think of

          25       that needed to be contacted.




           1   Q.  Right.  A gun was found; how did that come about?

           2   A.  That's right.  Well, at some stage, I am not sure

           3       exactly how long after it, I was on the phone to the SIO

           4       and I could hear one of the firearms officers saying

           5       that they hadn't located the firearm, and I remember

           6       thinking "I wonder if anybody's looked to the left of

           7       the wall where it happened", and I just took a couple of

           8       steps down to the left -- there's a little alleyway

           9       there and the gun was just on the ground on the grass

          10       right there.

          11   Q.  What did you do?

          12   A.  Well, I was on the phone.  My first priority was to get

          13       it covered and secured.  I also was worried about the

          14       fact that there were people in the vicinity of the

          15       firearm, so I got officers to move those people back,

          16       and I made sure that one of my detectives was going to

          17       cover it up and preserve it.

          18   Q.  Right.  We've got the advantage of having some footage

          19       that was taken from flats opposite.  Have you had

          20       a chance to look at that?

          21   A.  I have, yes.

          22   Q.  I'll play it now.  What we have had done is have it

          23       stabilised because it's very jerky footage.  The

          24       stabilising helps to centralise it somewhat on the

          25       screen.  We have also put arrows over people's heads.




           1       If we have a look on the screen now.  First, as it

           2       starts off, we start picking people up.  The yellow

           3       arrow is, take it from me, likely to be R31.

           4   A.  Yes, sir.

           5             (Video footage was played to the court)

           6   Q.  The purple arrow, we think, is V59.

           7           The blue arrow, I suggest, is you; can you help us

           8       with that?

           9   A.  I think you're probably correct.  It's very difficult to

          10       see, but it looks like I'm on the telephone.

          11   Q.  So whoever that figure is is on the telephone an awful

          12       lot.

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  Would you have been talking to V59 at any point there?

          15   A.  Yes, I would indeed, yes.

          16   Q.  Were you going up there for a purpose or was that just

          17       somewhere where you could be quietly on the phone?

          18   A.  No, I was going there for a purpose.  I was wanting to

          19       make sure -- I didn't realise that vehicle that came in

          20       there, I don't know if it was a police vehicle or not,

          21       but I wanted to make sure there were cordons at the

          22       bottom of the road.  It was quite a busy junction down

          23       there and I wanted to make sure that no vehicles came.

          24   Q.  We watch you coming back there.  There you go onto the

          25       grass.




           1   A.  That's it.

           2   Q.  Then R31 comes over to you and you go back off the

           3       grass.

           4   A.  I didn't actually see R31 at the time, I didn't realise

           5       he was down there.

           6   Q.  And --

           7   A.  That will be me speaking to one of my staff to try and

           8       make sure that the firearm's covered.

           9   Q.  Okay.  Let's pause it there.

          10                    (The video footage ended)

          11           Can I show you a still from that on the same screen

          12       as a photograph taken from the other side of the grass.

          13           The still on the right-hand side is from what we've

          14       just been looking at and it's when you have just gone

          15       onto the grass to the area where we can see R31,

          16       according to the yellow arrow, is fairly close to you.

          17       But on the left-hand side we see a photograph taken back

          18       over from the Jarrow Road area.  There's a civilian,

          19       nothing to do with this, with his back to us, and then

          20       there's a person --

          21   A.  That's me.

          22   Q.  That's you, what, pointing down at on the gun?

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Let's look at it a bit closer.

          25   A.  I'm actually on the phone to Mr Foote and that was




           1       exactly when -- I remember it because that's exactly

           2       when I saw the firearm and I've said to him "I think

           3       I've found the firearm".

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You are giving a gesture?

           5   A.  Yes.  As you do on the phone, I'm sort of (indicates).

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Arm straight out and pointing down

           7       with your finger on your left hand.

           8   MR UNDERWOOD:  Did anybody alert you to the presence of the

           9       gun on the grass before you walked on there?

          10   A.  No, not at all.

          11   Q.  As far as you're concerned then, was the gun kept safe?

          12   A.  It was.  I checked later on.  I also found a casing in

          13       the road which I made sure that was preserved and

          14       checked that both of them had been properly covered and

          15       they were both sitting in the same location as where

          16       they had been when I found them.

          17   Q.  Only one other thing I want to ask you about: it's about

          18       the security of the scene.

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  You told us you put cordons there and you took steps to

          21       make sure that nobody breached the cordons, did you take

          22       any steps to secure, as it were, the evidence, the

          23       inside of the minicab, for example?

          24   A.  Well, you know, I'm dealing with experienced officers

          25       here I would have hoped they would know how to preserve




           1       evidence.  But certainly I didn't see anybody -- there

           2       was obviously -- you know, due to the circumstances

           3       there were people near the minicab because that's where

           4       the first aid was being done, and stuff like that but

           5       most of the officers that didn't need to be there for

           6       some first aid purposes were kept away from it.

           7   Q.  Just to be clear, would you regard the inside of the

           8       minicab as something that should be kept secure?

           9   A.  Absolutely.

          10   MR UNDERWOOD:  Thank you very much, Z51.  That's all I ask.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.

          12           Yes Mr Mansfield?

          13                    Questions by MR MANSFIELD

          14   MR MANSFIELD:  Yes, good morning officer, my name's Michael

          15       Mansfield, I represent the family of Mark Duggan.

          16   A.  Good morning, sir.

          17   Q.  I have a number of questions to ask you about the period

          18       we're dealing with, the jury is dealing with: 2, 3,

          19       4 August.

          20           If I may, I want to start, not with the scene of the

          21       shooting but another scene all together.

          22   A.  Yes, sir.

          23   Q.  For these purposes, I would like you to see, please --

          24       it's in the jury bundle, the jury have it -- a plan of

          25       the Vicarage Road area, please, and some photographs.




           1       Now, the plan is at tab 1 and it's number 7.

           2   A.  Have I got the wrong bundle?

           3   Q.  Perhaps it's the other bundle.

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  Also, if you can have your finger in -- it should be the

           6       same bundle -- a couple of pages on, there are two

           7       photographs, 9 and 10.

           8   A.  Yes, sir.

           9   Q.  Now, I'm going to put, if I may, the photographs in

          10       context for a moment because they come from a much

          11       bigger bundle.  So we will have the full bundle copied

          12       so that everybody has hard copies but I have the

          13       electronic numbering.  The jury will see on their

          14       bundles, for example on the photograph numbered 9, at

          15       the top right-hand corner, there's numbering, 20687.

          16       Then the next one is 20689.  They come from a bigger

          17       bundle, so what I would like to do electronically, just

          18       for the moment, so that you can get a picture of the

          19       context of those two, could we have CD20682, please, up

          20       on screen.

          21           You'll notice there's a blue van there.  That's the

          22       blue van that's in photograph 9, it's the same one, so

          23       you can marry them up.  That is a view from Vicarage

          24       Road into Burchell Road, which I want to come to in

          25       a moment.  So that's the view.




           1   A.  Yes, sir.

           2   Q.  The next photograph in the bundle, 20683, is a view down

           3       Burchell Road.  The jury have been here so they know the

           4       vicinity.  Have you ever been to this road?

           5   A.  I haven't been to Burchell Road, no.

           6   Q.  Have you been to Vicarage Road?

           7   A.  I have, yes.

           8   Q.  When?

           9   A.  I drove down there about a month and a half ago.

          10   Q.  You went to have a look?

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  Did you go down Burchell Road?

          13   A.  I didn't, no.  I had a quick look down Burchell Road but

          14       I was just driving past it.  I am not familiar with the

          15       area.

          16   Q.  No.  Of course, it's often the case that you are

          17       directed to an area you are not familiar with in a city

          18       as large at London.

          19   A.  That's correct, yes.

          20   Q.  So at 20680, down Burchell Road.  Sir, I'm going to be

          21       careful but I want to put something so that it's safely

          22       put anyway.  The house of the woman linked to Kevin

          23       Hutchinson-Foster is in the terrace on the left.  I am

          24       not going to say which one but I do know which one.  If

          25       there's no objection I can point it out but I'm assuming




           1       there might be objections to pointing it out in public.

           2       So --

           3   A.  I'll take your word for that, sir, yes.

           4   Q.  So this is by agreement.  If we get to the next

           5       photograph, 20685, that's looking in the reverse

           6       direction back up to Vicarage Road.  Vicarage Road is up

           7       the far end; do you follow?

           8   A.  Yes, sir.

           9   Q.  It's the same terrace of houses, this time of course

          10       it's on the right?

          11   A.  Yes, sir.

          12   Q.  So the house is in this terrace on the right.

          13           Now, could we have the next photograph, 20686.

          14       That's as you reach the junction with Vicarage Road,

          15       coming up Burchell; do you follow?

          16   A.  I do indeed, sir, yes.

          17   Q.  You're coming along.  I'm going slowly in case you

          18       haven't seen it.  Now, 20687, the jury already have --

          19       we might as well put it up so we have it in sequence.

          20       20687, the jury have a copy in their bundle and here it

          21       is on the screen.  There is the blue van and this is

          22       a view down Vicarage Road from the Lea Bridge Road end

          23       but going down.  Can I just point out at this stage

          24       it's -- did you know it was a one-way road?  Having been

          25       there, I suppose you do.




           1   A.  I do now, sir.

           2   Q.  It's one way at this stage in the road.  So the next

           3       photograph is 20688.  That's just another view of the

           4       same junction, there's not a great deal to add to that.

           5           Then the next one is 20689; the jury do have that

           6       one in their bundle.  That's looking back up Vicarage

           7       Road with Burchell Road on the right; do you see that?

           8   A.  That one there, sir, yes (indicates).

           9   Q.  Yes, on there, it's not in the bundle, 20689.  Then

          10       there's 20690, which is a bit further down Vicarage

          11       Road -- not very far -- down Vicarage Road with Burchell

          12       Road on the right.  So it's looking back up to Lea

          13       Bridge Road and in fact you can see a vehicle coming

          14       down towards you?

          15   A.  Yes, sir.

          16   Q.  Right.  So that's the immediate vicinity of Burchell

          17       Road and Vicarage Road.  Now, we've heard, from evidence

          18       yesterday, that surveillance officers from Trident had

          19       already arrived before the minicab?

          20   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.

          21   Q.  You knew that on the day, obviously?

          22   A.  I knew they were on their way to try and locate the --

          23   Q.  Perhaps if you accept from me, they got there between --

          24       because there's a number of them who get there -- there

          25       are at least three vehicles, one parks up in Vicarage




           1       Road and another down on Farmer Road.  Now, if you go

           2       back to the plan for a moment, that's number 7, tab 1;

           3       do you have that?

           4   A.  I do indeed, sir.

           5   Q.  Farmer Road you will see to the right-hand side further

           6       down the plan -- as you look at the plan it's on the

           7       right-hand side.  As you work your way up Vicarage Road

           8       from Farmer Road you come to Burchell Road.

           9   A.  That's correct.  I see that, sir.

          10   Q.  So there was a car in Farmer Road by about 5.30/5.35.

          11       ZZ37, another officer, was parked on the left-hand side

          12       as you come down Vicarage Road, just before Sophia Road;

          13       do you follow that?

          14   A.  I do indeed, sir, yes, I see that.

          15   Q.  So some of these have yet to give evidence about this.

          16       Then, as you go up the plan, to the right-hand side of

          17       Vicarage Road you see Whitney Road and then Melbourne

          18       Road; do you see those?

          19   A.  I do, sir, yes.

          20   Q.  There's more surveillance officers got to that area, not

          21       knowing exactly which of the roads, but one of those

          22       roads there, again in the same time zone, 5.30/5.35; do

          23       you follow?

          24   A.  I do indeed, sir, yes.

          25   Q.  Have you got a grip on the area now I've taken you round




           1       it?

           2   A.  I believe I do, sir, yes.

           3   Q.  Now the question I want to ask you is this: if you had

           4       managed, with your team of CO19 officers, to get there

           5       at around the same time or shortly -- even shortly

           6       before, but let's put it at the 5.30 zone -- if you had

           7       got there at the 5.30 zone, first of all -- and you had

           8       the intelligence that Duggan was on his way, intending

           9       to go to Vicarage Road -- I'll put it in "vicinity" for

          10       the moment -- and you got to the vicinity of

          11       Vicarage Road with your squad; what would you have done?

          12   A.  Depends on who all had their -- obviously available to

          13       me, how much sort of time we had to brief and --

          14   Q.  Just assume for the moment -- I'll come back to how this

          15       could have happened, how it could have happened, okay;

          16       do you follow?

          17   A.  If I'm assuming that he's picked the firearm up -- is

          18       that what we are assuming?

          19   Q.  I'll take it in stages.  I have started with 5.30.

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  He hasn't picked anything up.

          22   A.  No.

          23   Q.  There's active reliable intelligence coming through --

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   Q.  -- from SOCA.




           1   A.  Yes.  5.30, I'm eight miles away.

           2   Q.  We'll come to where you were.

           3   A.  Sorry, sir, I thought that's what you were --

           4   Q.  Supposing you got there --

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  -- before the CO19 team --

           7   A.  I understand, yes.

           8   Q.  All right.  I'll make it 5.30 to 5.40, if you want.  If

           9       you got there, your CO19 team in their convoy of four

          10       vehicles, and you in another vehicle; supposing you got

          11       there --

          12   A.  Yes, sir.

          13   Q.  -- within that time zone, knowing that Duggan, from the

          14       intelligence, was intending to go to Vicarage Road area,

          15       SOCA -- I just pause there, SOCA was a very reliable

          16       source, wasn't it?

          17   A.  It was indeed, yes, sir.

          18   Q.  Particularly on this day, wasn't it?

          19   A.  It was, sir, yes.

          20   Q.  Yes.  In fact, it was, as we've heard, the most reliable

          21       information category you can get, B2; right?

          22   A.  I agree, sir, yes.

          23   Q.  Now, if you'd got there in that time zone, 5.30 to 5.40,

          24       knowing Duggan is on his way, because there's no

          25       intelligence that he's actually arrived yet, what would




           1       you have done?

           2   A.  Well, sir, even though SOCA is very good intelligence,

           3       it doesn't tell you who he's with in the cab, if he's

           4       with somebody.  It doesn't tell you exactly who's going

           5       to -- where the firearm is going to be transferred to

           6       Mr Duggan, who's going to do it, if there's more than

           7       one person, if that person's armed.

           8           So in my capacity as a firearms commander, I would

           9       want to have surveillance officers to survey that area

          10       to see what -- (1) identify the vehicle, identify how

          11       many people are in it and, if possible, if we've got

          12       time, to get evidence of the transfer of the firearm.

          13   Q.  Yes.

          14   A.  But then, sir, what I would have done was I would have

          15       let the vehicle come away.

          16   Q.  Right.  Again, the premise for this is you would have,

          17       would you not, a rendezvous point for your team, if you

          18       got there, you know, before, 5.30 to 5.40; you would

          19       have a rendezvous point?

          20   A.  You could have a rendezvous point but you could be

          21       talking about 20 vehicles if everybody is coming to the

          22       rendezvous point so --

          23   Q.  Of course.  So you need to be in close liaison,

          24       communication with others?

          25   A.  That's exactly correct, yes.




           1   Q.  So you don't want to be parked up at exactly the same

           2       place as surveillance?

           3   A.  No, you don't want 20 vehicles trying to get to an area

           4       where you are not sure where the subject is, so that you

           5       could drive past them and the covert nature of the

           6       operation would be --

           7   Q.  I follow that.  The sensible thing would be to have

           8       a rendezvous point which is not on top of Vicarage Road

           9       but with access to Vicarage Road because Vicarage Road

          10       is quite a long road, isn't it?  You've been there.

          11   A.  I don't agree with you there, sir.  I think the sensible

          12       thing was to have the rendezvous point at Quicksilver.

          13   Q.  Do you?

          14   A.  Yes.  Because there's plenty of parking there,

          15       off-street parking for the vehicles, everybody knows how

          16       to get there, there's already some officers there

          17       already and that's what I --

          18   Q.  Obviously you appreciate where I'm going with it because

          19       what I want to suggest to you was a lot of time was

          20       wasted on this day when CO19 could have got to Vicarage

          21       Road, either about the time or not long after the

          22       surveillance -- I don't mean in Vicarage Road but the

          23       vicinity of Vicarage Road.  I'll take it in stages.

          24           First of all could you look at the map -- not this

          25       map, the other one that you were shown, of where people




           1       were at 5.15.

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It's in the.

           3   MR MANSFIELD:  You have it at C5.  You have looked at it

           4       already.  I'm going to take it in stages.  First of all,

           5       you have seen the map.  You will see that, at the bottom

           6       of this map, at 5.15, CO19 are leaving Leman Street.

           7   A.  I see that, sir, yes.  That mark there (indicates).

           8   Q.  Did you know that?  Were they in touch with you to say

           9       that they were leaving?

          10   A.  No, sir.  I'd asked ZZ17 to contact them to get them to

          11       come to Quicksilver.

          12   Q.  I'll deal with that in a minute.

          13   A.  Sorry.

          14   Q.  It's all right, I appreciate that what actually happened

          15       is you all went to Quicksilver but I am just wanting to

          16       examine --

          17   A.  I understand, sir, yes.

          18   Q.  -- another option in order to minimise the risk of the

          19       use of lethal force; do you follow?  That's why I'm

          20       asking the question.

          21   A.  I do indeed, sir, yes.

          22   Q.  So, question: did you know on the 4th that the CO19 team

          23       as a whole -- that's the team leader and all the

          24       vehicles, that's four of them -- had left Leman Street

          25       at 5.15?




           1   A.  I didn't, sir, no.

           2   Q.  No, you didn't know.  You see, it would help for

           3       everyone to know exactly where everybody else is, as you

           4       said just a moment ago.  Liaison is very important,

           5       isn't it?

           6   A.  Sir, yes, that's why I wanted everybody to come

           7       together --

           8   Q.  Wait a minute.  I appreciate you want everybody to come

           9       together.  We'll deal with where they could have come

          10       together.  So CO19 leave Leman Street at 5.15.  You

          11       don't know that but you are in touch with them with your

          12       vehicle, you could have been?

          13   A.  No -- well, I wasn't at that time, sir, no.

          14   Q.  The vehicle you are using -- I don't want to know the

          15       details of it, nor for the moment exactly where you

          16       were -- does your vehicle have radio contact?

          17   A.  It does, yes.

          18   Q.  Now, if your eye comes up the plan, you see where Mark

          19       Duggan was at 5.15 --

          20   A.  Yes, sir.

          21   Q.  -- the minicab having been ordered.  He doesn't actually

          22       leave precisely at that minute but a little bit later --

          23       it's all on a timeline -- heading towards, it is

          24       thought, Vicarage Road.

          25           Now, you can see where Vicarage Road is marked, with




           1       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster at 5.15.

           2   A.  I do indeed, sir.

           3   Q.  That's where he is at 5.15.  Now, pausing there for just

           4       one moment.

           5   A.  Yes, sir.

           6   Q.  We don't know precisely where CO19 is, but it's five

           7       minutes -- at the time you get and they get information.

           8       They get information at about 5.20.  That's CO19, all

           9       right?

          10   A.  Yes, sir.

          11   Q.  You're a bit later.  If at 5.20 someone had been in

          12       overall charge and said, "Vicarage Road collection of

          13       gun", they could have gone, CO19, straight across to

          14       Vicarage Road area, couldn't they?

          15   A.  They could have, sir, yes.

          16   Q.  Yes, thank you.  You will appreciate that they have

          17       already had a briefing the day before, the 3rd.

          18   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.

          19   Q.  On what they can do.  They've had another briefing on

          20       this day, at 4 o'clock, I don't know whether you knew

          21       that.

          22   A.  Well, it's a normal practice for them.

          23   Q.  It's normal practice.

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   Q.  Now, I'll come back to your position in one minute,




           1       where you were.  But I want to deal with standard

           2       practice.  One of the things that the CO19 officers,

           3       including yourself, for that matter, are practised in,

           4       is interception.

           5   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.

           6   Q.  Because -- I don't want to know in exact numbers --

           7       before this day you had done, what, hundreds?

           8   A.  No, not hundreds, but I would have done 20 -- 20 to 30,

           9       maybe a bit more.

          10   Q.  Fine.  After this day, have you done similar ones?

          11   A.  I haven't, sir, no.

          12   Q.  At all?

          13   A.  No.

          14   Q.  Have you been on firearms duty?

          15   A.  I haven't, no.

          16   Q.  When did you stop being on firearms duty?

          17   A.  Since -- for the IPCC investigation.

          18   Q.  So all the experience I'm drawing on then comes before

          19       this day?

          20   A.  From 2004 until 2011.

          21   Q.  Now, in addition to actual on the ground stops, you

          22       obviously train for interceptions?

          23   A.  Yes, the firearms officers are very well trained in

          24       that, yes.

          25   Q.  There's a training ground -- I don't want to know where




           1       it is, please understand, I just want to get the

           2       principle of this -- there's a training ground

           3       somewhere?

           4   A.  Yes, there is, yes.

           5   Q.  You take videos of how to do it?

           6   A.  I'm sure they do, sir, yes.

           7   Q.  Yes.  We've asked if we might see one or two just to get

           8       a feel of how you operate but we haven't seen them.

           9       Have you seen them?

          10   A.  I have, yes.

          11   Q.  What a training officer is to do, particularly in

          12       a built-up city like London, is be ready for any

          13       eventuality.

          14   A.  Yes.  Be flexible, that's right, yes.

          15   Q.  Be flexible.

          16   A.  I would agree with that, yes.

          17   Q.  You would agree, yes.  Because the target, if you like,

          18       the place where you have to do something, could be

          19       a residential street, it could be a main road, it could

          20       be a shopping precinct, it could be almost anywhere, so

          21       you've got to be ready for any eventuality, haven't you?

          22   A.  That's correct, yes.  Obviously you're going to try and

          23       do it in the safest possible place.

          24   Q.  The safest possible place and if possible at the

          25       earliest opportunity, if a gun is involved.




           1   A.  Well, certainly it's not -- you know, it's -- it's going

           2       to be as safe as you can get to get the firearm back.

           3       So safety is very -- is paramount.  The whole idea of

           4       a firearms officer is to try and protect life, that's

           5       the overarching aim so -- it would be lovely to get

           6       a very safe location to do it, in a very quick time;

           7       that would be ideal.

           8   Q.  Do you agree that actually, so far as an interception --

           9       I use the term generally -- is concerned, that if you

          10       have a static situation, in other words -- I'll take it

          11       in stages, again.  If you've got a situation that is

          12       happening inside a building, a house -- let's take

          13       a house -- inside a house, that that is something you're

          14       familiar with?

          15   A.  Containment call out is what would happen there, is

          16       where you call people out of the house.

          17   Q.  Because you contain the house?

          18   A.  Yes, that's correct.

          19   Q.  You're familiar with how to do that --

          20   A.  I am indeed, yes.

          21   Q.  -- and your CO19 officers on this team would be familiar

          22       with how to do that?

          23   A.  You would have to ask them individually but I'm sure

          24       they are trained.

          25   Q.  I can do.  I do not want to go through each officer but




           1       just to do it generally with you.

           2           Containment, that's one thing.  Of course, the next

           3       thing is it's not inside the house, it's outside the

           4       house on the street --

           5   A.  Yes, sir.

           6   Q.  -- but it's not in a moving vehicle it's on the street?

           7   A.  Sir, the safest -- in my experience, the safest option

           8       is in a moving vehicle, to intercept it with surprise

           9       and domination, not to try and surround people on the

          10       street.  That would be a reckless movement, in my

          11       opinion.

          12   Q.  Because?

          13   A.  Well, at the exchange of firearms: (1) you don't know if

          14       somebody else is armed, if there's other people in the

          15       vicinity there can be hostages taken.  They are very

          16       alert at the time when they are exchanging firearms,

          17       experience has shown, and I would -- I do not think that

          18       would be a safe option, sir.

          19   Q.  So containment in a house is a safer option?

          20   A.  If you had a -- if you had intelligence that there was

          21       a firearm in the house then you would go round and try

          22       to recover that firearm, yes.

          23   Q.  But after that, once it's been transferred to somebody

          24       and they're into a vehicle, you say intercepting the

          25       vehicle, in your view, is the safest option?




           1   A.  It is, sir, yes.

           2   Q.  Right.  So the question then is where to intercept it.

           3   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.

           4   Q.  I want to come back therefore -- freeze frame that for

           5       a moment, where to intercept.

           6           Go back to the map, please.

           7   A.  Which?

           8   Q.  I'm going to suggest to you so that it's clear, as you

           9       said, CO19 could have gone straight over to Vicarage

          10       Road.  In fact, it would have taken them, from whenever

          11       they were at about 5.20, 15 to 20 minutes to get to

          12       Vicarage Road; do you follow?

          13   A.  In the vicinity of Vicarage Road?

          14   Q.  Yes.  I'm so sorry, when I say that, I mean the

          15       vicinity.

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  Can we just work up the plan?  Wood Green, of course, is

          18       up towards the north.  One appreciates you use your

          19       blues and twos, as you have called it, so you can go

          20       quite fast.  You get a call at 5.25.

          21   A.  That's correct, sir.

          22   Q.  I just want to pause on what you're told at that point.

          23   A.  I got a call from ZZ17 who said that Mark Duggan was

          24       looking to take possession of a firearm imminently.

          25   Q.  Is that all?




           1   A.  He may have said in the Leyton area.

           2   Q.  I want to deal with this because it's a question of,

           3       again, intelligence and planning and response.  Who's in

           4       charge at 5.15?  Is he in charge, Z15 (sic), or you?

           5   A.  No, he's in charge until he rings me and tells me --

           6       like, if it had gone normally, I would have got there at

           7       6 o'clock for the briefing, I would be in charge.  But

           8       up until he rings me to say that there's a development,

           9       then he's in charge of that.

          10   Q.  He's in charge?

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  Just a couple of points on that.  I mean, you've got

          13       a briefing at 6.00, surely you have to be at the

          14       briefing by 5.00 if you are really going to prepare for

          15       what you have to do?

          16   A.  Well, no, sir.  As you've said, they've already been

          17       briefed the night before.  I would get there and the

          18       briefing room would be set up for me and I would go

          19       through the briefing --

          20   Q.  So you can do it in double quick time?

          21   A.  Yes, you can.  You can with a dynamic briefing, which is

          22       what we had on the 4th.

          23   Q.  Dynamic?  I will come back to that.  The actual briefing

          24       the jury have got on the 3rd took 15 minutes-odd.

          25   A.  That's around about --




           1   Q.  So a dynamic briefing is, what, five minutes?

           2   A.  Yes, around about that, yes.

           3   Q.  You can do a dynamic briefing in about five minutes on

           4       the move, can't you?

           5   A.  I don't know -- if you're all in the same vehicle?  What

           6       do you --

           7   Q.  Let's just take this position: you haven't got time to

           8       get to Wood Green --

           9   A.  Right.

          10   Q.  -- which you have emphasised where you were going and so

          11       on.  You haven't got time to get there but you've got

          12       a squad, they've got their arms, they have had

          13       a briefing on that that very day and they have had one

          14       the day before.  So they know what the operation is,

          15       they know what tactics can be employed.  A dynamic

          16       briefing taking five minutes can be done over a radio

          17       channel, can't it?

          18   A.  Sir, I would -- personally, as a commanding officer of

          19       the operation, I would want to be there for -- to brief

          20       them.  I wouldn't want to do it over the radio.

          21       Something might have been lost -- I knew the

          22       intelligence officer was also ready at Quicksilver.

          23   Q.  Yes, I appreciate that.

          24   A.  You could do it on the radio but experience has shown me

          25       that I would like to be there face to face if I could,




           1       at least with the firearms team leader.

           2   Q.  In fact, you could do a face-to-face if you had gone to

           3       the Vicarage Road area, you could do a face-to-face

           4       there if you had really needed to.

           5   A.  Absolutely, yes.

           6   Q.  You could have done it there, right.  So, back to the

           7       conversation at 5.25.  ZZ17, you are not sure anymore

           8       that he even told you it was Leyton?

           9   A.  I think he said Leyton, sir.  I would have to look at my

          10       statement and refresh my mind but I think it was --

          11   Q.  Did he say to you, "Get here as fast as you can", that's

          12       Wood Green?

          13   A.  He told me that he had intelligence that Mark Duggan was

          14       taking possession of a firearm.  I didn't need him to

          15       tell me to get there as fast as I can.  I knew I had to

          16       do that.

          17   Q.  Would it be fair to say that neither you nor he at that

          18       point even considered the possibility or option of going

          19       to the Vicarage Road -- sorry, I'll leave that out

          20       because you didn't know it was Vicarage -- going to the

          21       Leyton area, if he told you that?

          22   A.  I may have considered it briefly.  He told me that he'd

          23       sent SCD8 officers to try and --

          24   Q.  Yes.

          25   A.  I agreed -- well, actually I asked him to contact the




           1       team leader of the firearms team and the surveillance

           2       team to get them to Quicksilver.

           3   Q.  Quicksilver, yes.  So would it be fair to say -- I'll

           4       deal with you anyway, I've asked him already -- that you

           5       did not consider telling him to get the firearms team,

           6       if he hadn't already done it, to go to the Leyton area?

           7   A.  Sir, I agreed with exactly what he had done.  I agreed.

           8   Q.  Right.  So the answer is you did not consider that

           9       option at 5.25?

          10   A.  Sir, consider -- I'm constantly considering what the

          11       intelligence is, through the conflict management model.

          12       So I would have considered it but, in my opinion, the

          13       best place for everybody to brief was Quicksilver.

          14   Q.  Yes.  It's not so much a matter of what you would have

          15       done.  Would it be fair to say you did not actually

          16       consider that option and you continued with the plan of

          17       Quicksilver?

          18   A.  Sir, as I've said, I would have considered it in my

          19       head, but I would have quickly dismissed it.

          20   Q.  Did you talk to anyone about it?  Did you say to, for

          21       example ZZ17, "Look, wait a minute, if he's on his way

          22       to collect a gun and this is good intelligence we had

          23       better get over there"; did you say anything like that?

          24   A.  No, as I've already said, the priority is to try and

          25       safely locate the threat and identify the threat.  ZZ17




           1       had sent surveillance officers down to that area.

           2       I agreed with that, and I was satisfied that that had

           3       been done.  The next thing is to get the firearms

           4       officers and myself, that's the commanding officer, in

           5       a position where we can contain that threat.

           6   Q.  The earlier you can do that, contain the threat, the

           7       better.

           8   A.  Well, as I said, sir, in this safest environment, but

           9       the ideal situation would be a very safe environment,

          10       very quickly.

          11   Q.  Exactly.  Now, you do understand I don't want to know

          12       where you were buying the sandwich.  I just want to know

          13       if you had gone from the place you were buying the

          14       sandwich at 5.25 -- now, you've been to Vicarage Road

          15       and know where it is -- and gone straight to Leyton, you

          16       could have been there, would this be fair, inside

          17       20 minutes?

          18   A.  Well, sir, I got to Wood Green at 5.40 and I know how to

          19       get there.  So it would take me a bit longer than that

          20       because I was on my own with a map book and trying to

          21       drive.  I'm not sure -- I could only guess what time

          22       I would have got there, but I don't know, it would have

          23       taken me a while because I don't know the area.

          24   Q.  I don't know where exactly you are coming from.  Without

          25       knowing, it's a bit difficult to --




           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You are coming from the west, you

           2       told us.

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   MR MANSFIELD:  It might have taken you a bit longer to come

           5       in from the west -- sorry, can I just ascertain at least

           6       this: is it south-west of Wood Green where you're coming

           7       from?

           8   A.  Yes, it would be round about that.

           9   Q.  Yes, it would?

          10   A.  Well, no, actually.  It would be more north-west.

          11   Q.  There's a bit of difference here, so I am not going to

          12       take up too much time if you say north-west of Wood

          13       Green.  Because once the blues and twos are on, of

          14       course you can drive relatively fast through traffic.

          15   A.  You can, sir, yes.  That's the whole idea.

          16   Q.  Right.  Of course, one of the things you want to try to

          17       avoid, because you will have appreciated the time of day

          18       all this is happening, is that -- and other officers

          19       described it as sort of rush hour conditions in London.

          20   A.  That's correct.

          21   Q.  The problem with rush hour conditions, it makes it

          22       difficult, in some circumstances, to catch up, because

          23       you get stuck, and you certainly don't want to have

          24       blues and twos on all the time because that might

          25       disrupt the very vehicle you're after.




           1   A.  That's correct.  Sometimes it helps you, sir, like it

           2       did on the 4th because we can get through traffic,

           3       whereas the minicab can't get through traffic, so we

           4       were able to catch up.

           5   Q.  Of course, you knew from a fairly early stage that it

           6       was a minicab, did you not?

           7   A.  I am not sure exactly when I knew, sir.  I certainly

           8       remember sitting behind it for five minutes and was

           9       able --

          10   Q.  No, no, before it got to -- "it", that is the minicab --

          11       got to Vicarage Road, you knew it was -- you were with

          12       ZZ17 by this stage?

          13   A.  He was with me the whole -- once I got to Quicksilver --

          14   Q.  You knew it was a minicab --

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  -- with a minicab driver?

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  That in itself, because it's not necessarily going to do

          19       racing past traffic, is another dimension in this case,

          20       isn't it?

          21   A.  It is indeed, sir, yes.

          22   Q.  Because it just might make it easier to intercept a car

          23       being driven by a cab driver as opposed to an associate;

          24       do you follow?

          25   A.  It's certainly something I made sure the firearms




           1       officers were aware of, that it was a cab driver.  Yes,

           2       that's correct.

           3   Q.  Again, I have to go back to a situation that didn't

           4       happen because you -- you say you thought of it in your

           5       head but you went to Wood Green.  Suppose you had

           6       managed to get to the Vicarage Road area --

           7   A.  Yes, sir.

           8   Q.  -- just after your CO19 officers -- which is exactly

           9       what happened in Wood Green, you got to Wood Green just

          10       after they did.

          11   A.  That's correct, yes.

          12   Q.  Suppose you got to Vicarage Road vicinity just after

          13       they did, so you are in the Vicarage Road area, the

          14       minicab does not arrive -- and you can go back to see

          15       the times on that other plan if you want to refresh your

          16       memory as to times -- until about 5.55; do you follow?

          17       Do you have the plan still on front of you?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  On the left you have the timings on

          20       it, you can see on it your 1800 hours at the bottom

          21       of --

          22   MR MANSFIELD:  Do you have it in front of you, tab 1 --

          23   A.  I have it, yes.

          24   Q.  There are little boxes showing just gone 5.55.

          25           If you got there, had a dynamic briefing either on




           1       the way or face to face because you had met in a nearby

           2       vicinity, what we know actually happened was that the

           3       running commentary went on, so if you look at the plan

           4       here, you, that is your squad, or at least ZZ17, was

           5       able to communicate the fact of when the minicab entered

           6       the road.  He got that from SOCA.

           7           Then we pick up Mr ZZ37 sitting in the road, he

           8       picks it up as well.

           9   A.  Yes, sir.

          10   Q.  This is all being transmitted.

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  So if you had been there, you would have known the cab

          13       is in Vicarage Road.

          14   A.  That's right, yes, sir.

          15   Q.  So you're beginning to think quick response.

          16   A.  Everything's -- well, from when I got the intelligence

          17       from ZZ17 when I was getting my sandwich, I went to

          18       amber within 30 minutes.

          19   Q.  I appreciate that.  Well, you went to -- as soon as you

          20       got the intelligence about the gun -- I am just coming

          21       to that in a second -- we have not quite got to Burchell

          22       Road.  I am just, as it were, taking you through what

          23       was available and had you been there.

          24           So the minicab is known to be in Vicarage Road.

          25       Now, number 37 -- I'm calling him that for the moment,




           1       will, I think, say he saw -- he not only saw the cab,

           2       but he saw it go into Burchell Road.

           3   A.  Yes, sir.

           4   Q.  This is important, if I may say so, so you see the full

           5       picture.  The surveillance officer, ZZ46 -- who gave

           6       evidence yesterday -- down in Farmer Road recorded that

           7       intelligence into Burchell Road.  So if he'd have been

           8       there you would have been able to have that

           9       intelligence, wouldn't you?

          10   A.  I would have, yes, sir.

          11   Q.  It just goes a stage further.  Into Burchell Road, SOCA

          12       is able to inform everybody about the fact just after

          13       6 o'clock, and you will see on this plan that just after

          14       6 o'clock the vehicle is moving down Vicarage Road.  Do

          15       you see the box at the junction there, 6 o'clock and 24

          16       seconds; do you see that?

          17   A.  I do see that, sir, yes.

          18   Q.  I cannot put a precise time on it but it's just after

          19       6 o'clock that ZZ17 receives intelligence from SOCA that

          20       he, Duggan, has the gun.

          21   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.

          22   Q.  So, had you been there, you would have known that too.

          23   A.  That's correct.

          24   Q.  Because that allowed you to call state amber?

          25   A.  That's right, yes.




           1   Q.  At the point you call state amber, essentially the

           2       dynamics of the operation is handed over to another

           3       officer, V59, and he in turn, down to W42 in the lead

           4       vehicle; that's how it goes down?

           5   A.  That's right.

           6   Q.  If you had been there and called state amber, as you

           7       would have done with the information that the gun is in

           8       Duggan's possession -- these following questions may not

           9       be for you but I just want to ask you.

          10           If you had been in that vicinity and you had that

          11       information, would you have indicated what to do or

          12       would you have left it to V59 to decide how to intercept

          13       the minicab with Duggan inside and a firearm?

          14   A.  I'm not sure I understand the question, sir.

          15   Q.  Sorry, my fault.  I don't want to ask you questions when

          16       it's not your responsibility.

          17   A.  I understand, yes.

          18   Q.  Your responsibility, you call amber.

          19   A.  That's correct.

          20   Q.  Had you been in the vicinity of Vicarage Road calling

          21       amber, would you have left the decision to intercept

          22       from that moment onwards to V59?

          23   A.  Sir, I wouldn't have called amber in Vicarage Road but

          24       in a hypothetical -- is that the way you want me to --

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, hypothetical: you are in




           1       Vicarage Road, it's 6 o'clock, you are told Mark Duggan

           2       is in the taxi with a gun; you would not have called

           3       amber?

           4   A.  I wouldn't have called amber, no.

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Tell us why not.

           6   A.  Are we saying he's picked the gun up yet?

           7   MR MANSFIELD:  Yes, it's just after 6.00.

           8   A.  No, if I got the intelligence that he had the gun in the

           9       vehicle and he was moving off, yes, I would have gone to

          10       amber.  I think it did go to amber at 6 o'clock.

          11   Q.  I appreciate that.

          12   A.  Sorry, I misunderstood.

          13   Q.  No, it's my fault, I think you understand that it's

          14       a construct I am trying to pose to you as a realistic

          15       viable option, that's what I'm asking you about.

          16           At the point you call amber, supposing you had been

          17       in the vicinity -- and I don't mean in Vicarage Road but

          18       nearby -- would you then really leave it to V59 to

          19       decide when to do the intercept?

          20   A.  Yes, sir.  Once I called amber it's over the CO19

          21       officers to do it in the safest possible place.

          22   Q.  I am not going to ask you further questions about the

          23       hypothesis since the scene shifts to V59 at this point.

          24           I want to pause -- I wonder if --

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  If that's a time for a break, it




           1       might be the time for the break.

           2           Members of the jury, we will then have a break.

           3       I will ask for the cameras to be turned off and if you

           4       would like to have a five or ten-minute break, members

           5       of the jury, thank you very much.

          15   (12.01 pm)

          16                         (A short break)

          17   (12.16 pm)


          21                  (In the presence of the jury)

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  I'll ask the

          23       witness to come into court then, please.

          24                (The witness returned into court)

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  Is that the
















           1       piece of paper that contains your name?  If you give it

           2       to the usher, she can then hand it on to me.  Thank you

           3       very much.  Have a seat and we can have the cameras back

           4       on again.

           5           Then we will continue with the questions from

           6       Mr Mansfield.  (Handed)

           7   MR MANSFIELD:  Thank you.  Just before we go to the day

           8       before, that's the 3 August, for a moment, just finally

           9       on this general situation about firearms deployment.

          10       Would you agree that the earlier that a firearms team

          11       can get control -- by which I mean sight of and be

          12       within access of a vehicle with a gun in it -- the

          13       better?

          14   A.  Yes, sir, I would agree with that.

          15   Q.  Yes.  What I would like to do is go back one day, to the

          16       3rd, still considering, as it were, options.  For these

          17       purposes --

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Sorry, the mic, please.

          19   MR MANSFIELD:  It's me, again, sorry.

          20           Going back to the 3rd, you'll need a couple of

          21       documents so you'll see what I want to ask about.  First

          22       there in in the jury bundle is C9.  This is a document

          23       with intelligence on it, although not all the

          24       intelligence has been amplified since this was drawn up

          25       by evidence.  I can indicate the amplifications if




           1       necessary.

           2           Then I would like you also to have your finger in

           3       a copy of the transcript of the briefing that was

           4       recorded.  That's at C12 on the 3rd.

           5   A.  Yes, sir.

           6   Q.  Right.  Have you seen -- I'll take it in stages -- the

           7       C9 document, the compilation document, before?

           8   A.  No, sir.

           9   Q.  Well then, would you first of all just read quickly

          10       through the paragraphs that relate to the period up to

          11       the 3rd, not 7 and 8 at the bottom which deal with the

          12       4th, but the previous six -- they should be numbered;

          13       are they numbered on yours?

          14   A.  They are indeed, sir, yes.

          15   Q.  Could you just quickly cast your eye down those --

          16       I will just pause while you do that -- to refresh your

          17       memory, if that's what's needed.  (Pause)

          18   A.  Yes, sir.

          19   Q.  All right.  Now, do you agree that the thrust of that

          20       intelligence from SOCA is that Mark Duggan is intent on

          21       collecting a weapon from Kevin Hutchinson-Foster?

          22   A.  He's arranging to collect one, yes, sir.

          23   Q.  Yes, but from the thrust of the intelligence, it appears

          24       that the obtaining of the weapon would be done in

          25       person, in other words a meeting between Duggan and




           1       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster, that's the thrust of it?

           2   A.  If -- it could change, as they do rapidly.  But, yes,

           3       I take your point.

           4   Q.  All right.  The second question is: how much of the

           5       first five paragraphs did you know at the time?

           6   A.  On the 3rd?

           7   Q.  By the 3rd -- by the time of the briefing on the 3rd,

           8       did you know everything that's on that page?

           9   A.  Not everything, sir, no.  ZZ17 would have given me what

          10       he thinks I need to know to command the firearms

          11       operation.

          12   Q.  The reason I'm asking you is, in this period, that's the

          13       1st, 2nd, 3rd -- well, it starts 31 July.  So 31 July

          14       through to 3 August; who's in charge?

          15   A.  Sir --

          16   Q.  Which officer is in charge?

          17   A.  Well, the SIO is Mr Foote.

          18   Q.  Yes.

          19   A.  ZZ17 works for Mr Foote, or is the IO.  So you have the

          20       SIO then the IO would be ZZ17.

          21   Q.  ZZ17, the intelligence officer, is the IO?

          22   A.  Yes, or case officer for Dibri.

          23   Q.  What was your position?

          24   A.  I'm brought in especially to do Tactical Firearms

          25       Commander.  So I will do -- if it's an authorised -- if




           1       it needs to be an authorised firearms operation, then

           2       either myself or some other --

           3   Q.  Or did you take over at some point from an officer who

           4       left and you became a DI in the Dibri operation?

           5   A.  No, sir.  No, I'm a DI on the pro-active team, but my

           6       role there is to deal with training and development and

           7       sickness and complaints; all the mundane bits that come

           8       with that rank.

           9   Q.  All right.

          10   A.  But I'm a Tactical Firearms Commander that's used for

          11       the whole command, if required.

          12   Q.  I don't want to spend a long time on it, but just to get

          13       the division of labour right.  So far as you're

          14       concerned, were you at any stage before 31 July, in this

          15       particular operation developing, were you involved in

          16       investigative actions for the Dibri --

          17   A.  Not at all, sir, no.

          18   Q.  No, you weren't?

          19   A.  No.

          20   Q.  So the officer, you say ZZ17 -- we are back to ZZ17?

          21   A.  The overall SIO is Mr Foote.

          22   Q.  Yes, I appreciate that.  We've had him.

          23           Can I come back then to your position.  By 3 August,

          24       you were aware of a person called Kevin

          25       Hutchinson-Foster.




           1   A.  That's correct, yes.

           2   Q.  You were aware that the intelligence suggested

           3       an intended collection of a firearm from him.

           4   A.  I was aware that he had control of a firearm, yes.

           5   Q.  Yes.  More than one.

           6   A.  Yes, I believe that's the case.

           7   Q.  Yes.  The intelligence that's not on that sheet, but

           8       that we've ascertained yesterday is intelligence to the

           9       effect that he did have control of more than one.  Can

          10       we just switch, for these purposes, to the briefing,

          11       C12, at which you were present.

          12   A.  That's correct.

          13   Q.  276, it's the third page of the briefing, reference is

          14       there made to Hutchinson-Foster.  You will see -- just

          15       cast your eye down that page -- when you get to "a guy

          16       called Kevin Hutchinson-Foster"; do you have that?

          17   A.  Yes I have yes.

          18   Q.  "Intelligence would suggest that he's got control of the

          19       firearms ..."

          20   A.  I see that, sir, yes.

          21   Q.  If you go back up a few lines, you see that they're

          22       talking about Mark Duggan being in control or possession

          23       of about three firearms; do you see that?

          24   A.  I see that, sir, yes.

          25   Q.  So the implication is Hutchinson-Foster has control of




           1       the three firearms:

           2           "... and from 9 o'clock this evening there may well

           3       be a plan for Duggan to somehow get those firearms ..."

           4   A.  That is correct, sir, yes.

           5   Q.  How long before the 3rd, if you can now remember, and

           6       I appreciate it's a long time, did you know that Kevin

           7       Hutchinson-Foster was storing weapons, plural?

           8   A.  I only knew that on the 3rd, sir.

           9   Q.  On the 3rd?

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  Now, the storing of weapons is something of great

          12       interest to you, isn't it?

          13   A.  Well, obviously, you know, absolutely we'd try to

          14       recover firearms if we can.

          15   Q.  One of the ways of recovering firearms is to find out:

          16       (1) who the person is, if you can, that's Kevin

          17       Hutchinson-Foster -- just taking you through the stages.

          18       You accept this: find out who he is?

          19   A.  Well, yes, do some research.

          20   Q.  That may not be your responsibility, but you can suggest

          21       it if you want to, can you?

          22   A.  I could.  If I wanted to, yes.

          23   Q.  Yes.  Because you have the job of reviewing the whole

          24       operation on the model, don't you?

          25   A.  That's right, yes.




           1   Q.  So you have to make sure you are reacting properly to

           2       intelligence that's coming through.

           3   A.  That's correct.

           4   Q.  You might, as an initiative, want a little more

           5       information to help plan an operation; would that be

           6       fair?

           7   A.  Yes, obviously I was aware that the accurate and

           8       reliable intelligence we were getting was around the six

           9       subjects of the operation.  I was aware of that.

          10   Q.  Yes, but you were aware also that the reliable

          11       information wasn't just about the six subjects, was it?

          12   A.  No, that's where the most accurate intelligence would

          13       have been.

          14   Q.  No, I'm sorry.  This intelligence on this sheet is the

          15       most accurate information or intelligence because it's

          16       coming from SOCA, and half of it -- I just do it

          17       generally -- half of it concerns Hutchinson-Foster,

          18       doesn't it?

          19   A.  Yes, I believe the intelligence from Hutchinson-Foster

          20       comes through intelligence around Mark Duggan.

          21   Q.  Well, wherever or however it gets to you, half of it is

          22       about Hutchinson-Foster, isn't it?

          23   A.  It is, sir, yes.

          24   Q.  So --

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It gets to you through ZZ17 telling




           1       you?

           2   A.  Yes, that's exactly correct, sir, yes.

           3   MR MANSFIELD:  So, I'm putting to you that these are

           4       reasonable steps, which you involved in all of this as

           5       you are at that stage, a preplanned operation for these

           6       days, starting on -- in fact, the 3rd was the first day,

           7       wasn't it?

           8   A.  It was, yes.

           9   Q.  3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th, so this very first day.  The

          10       second thing, having discovered who he is, it might

          11       help, since the information was he didn't store them

          12       with himself but with a woman in the Leyton area; did

          13       you know that?

          14   A.  I did, sir, yes.

          15   Q.  Yes.  So, again, it would help to try to find out one

          16       way or another, where the woman might be?

          17   A.  Absolutely, sir, yes.

          18   Q.  Yes.  There are a number of ways in which you could do

          19       that.  First of all, obviously, you can say to somebody,

          20       "Can you just find out everything on our files, by which

          21       I mean police files, Crimint and all the other ones on

          22       our systems, as much as you can about them?"

          23   A.  That's correct.

          24   Q.  That might throw up all sorts of things.

          25   A.  That is correct, sir, yes.




           1   Q.  Did you know any research like that was going on?

           2   A.  Yes, I knew -- I've worked with ZZ17 before and he's

           3       a very experienced and good officer, so I knew he would

           4       carry out research.

           5   Q.  Did you know the product of the research?

           6   A.  I'm not sure I exact -- I knew that Kevin

           7       Hutchinson-Foster -- that Kevin Hutchinson-Foster had

           8       been identified, I knew that.

           9   Q.  Yes.  But --

          10   A.  I wasn't sure exactly how they got to that

          11       identification, no.

          12   Q.  You didn't know that.  It's not a criticism.  Have you

          13       been sitting in court yesterday?

          14   A.  I have, yes.

          15   Q.  So you were listening to the very point I'm on about?

          16   A.  Yes.  Some of it.

          17   Q.  Some of it.  It's not a criticism.  So, anyway that's

          18       one avenue, is you actually look up what you know

          19       already?

          20   A.  That's right, sir, yes.

          21   Q.  But then another one is to say to yourself, or someone

          22       else, "Well, I think it might be rather advantageous if

          23       we could just follow him to see where he goes and if he

          24       goes to Leyton and a woman -- or goes to Leyton, that

          25       might help us, mightn't it"?




           1   A.  Sir, I know ZZ17 had discussed Kevin Hutchinson-Foster

           2       with Mr Foote because we had a conversation before the

           3       briefing and I agreed with what they had said, was the

           4       intelligence was around Mr Duggan and the firearm was

           5       being held by a third party that they couldn't identify.

           6   Q.  Yes, I know what the intelligence said.  Mr Foote

           7       himself has said -- so you know -- that he didn't even

           8       consider this possibility of following

           9       Hutchinson-Foster.  He didn't consider it, did you?

          10   A.  I certainly had a conversation with ZZ17, so yes, I did.

          11   Q.  About following him, did you?

          12   A.  About Kevin Hutchinson-Foster and what we knew about him

          13       and he told me that -- certain intelligence about him.

          14       I don't think --

          15   Q.  Where is there any record of a discussion, just even

          16       a trigger note, discussed following Hutchinson-Foster;

          17       where is there a note about that?

          18   A.  Sir, it didn't significantly change the operation.

          19   Q.  No?

          20   A.  The operation was a MASTS type operation and this didn't

          21       change.  Plus there is sensitivities around what I can

          22       record on certain intelligence.

          23   Q.  I appreciate that.  Trigger notes, just headings.

          24       "Follow Foster" wouldn't actually upset anybody, would

          25       it?




           1   A.  No, it wouldn't upset anybody, sir, no.

           2   Q.  You see, if -- I will come straight to the point here --

           3       on the 3rd, and it may not be your responsibility,

           4       you're saying it's ZZ17's, took a decision, "We'll put

           5       tabs on" -- however you put it -- "we'll keep an eye on

           6       Hutchinson-Foster" -- because the exchange hasn't

           7       happened by the 3rd -- "for the next day, we'll have

           8       a surveillance the next day"; if you're following it

           9       through.

          10           If that had happened, it would have trailed him all

          11       the way to Leyton, possibly in a car, parked outside, or

          12       nearby, a house in the terrace we've been through, at

          13       a much earlier time, 2 o'clock in the afternoon.

          14   A.  Sir, I understand.  But you wouldn't know what he was

          15       doing.  You wouldn't know whether that is the premises

          16       where he stores firearms.

          17   Q.  No, you wouldn't then.  You see, you wouldn't then.

          18       This is just the surveillance point, armed surveillance.

          19   A.  Okay.

          20   Q.  Because you've got authority for that.

          21   A.  I understand, yes.

          22   Q.  You would not have to keep going back to somebody.

          23       You've got armed -- the jury have it in their bundles.

          24       You have armed surveillance authority.

          25           You wouldn't know at that point and you would not do




           1       any drastic at that point because it could be terribly

           2       wrong.  So you wait and what you would have discovered

           3       later on is that Mark Duggan is making his way, to

           4       collect the gun, to Leyton.  This would be of interest,

           5       wouldn't it?

           6   A.  It would be of interest, yes.

           7   Q.  Yes.  So, just going back to the 3rd,

           8       Hutchinson-Foster's one of the aspects of the

           9       intelligence there.  Now, the other aspect of this,

          10       which you have emphasised, is that it's coming through

          11       Duggan.

          12           Now, on the evening of the 3rd, who authorised the

          13       surveillance of Duggan?

          14   A.  Me, sir.

          15   Q.  So you were taking decisions like that --

          16   A.  Yes, once I know I've come on at 6 o'clock, I'm in

          17       command of that operation, so it's a MASTS type

          18       operation, which encompasses surveillance.  So I've got

          19       the assets available to me to deal with --

          20   Q.  When you authorised it -- or whatever word you used, you

          21       said you directed it -- had you got all the intelligence

          22       that is there?

          23   A.  Sir, I cannot remember exactly but I knew at the time

          24       when I asked the surveillance team to go to that -- to

          25       the premises, there was still some -- it wasn't clear




           1       whether he was going to take possession of the firearm

           2       or not that night.  It gradually went along in the

           3       evening to the stage where I was informed that he wasn't

           4       going to be involved in any criminality.  I can't

           5       remember the exact timing.

           6   Q.  No, we haven't been given times, other than that it was

           7       after something and before something else.  All right.

           8           There's no secret about the address, we've got all

           9       the documents that relate to the surveillance that

          10       night.  You went to Micawber Court, didn't you?

          11   A.  That's correct.

          12   Q.  Not you, the surveillance team.  At about 8.30?

          13   A.  Around about that time, sir, yes.

          14   Q.  It waited there somewhere?

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  He comes out around 10.30?

          17   A.  Yes, sir.

          18   Q.  He's lost within a few minutes?

          19   A.  That's correct, sir.

          20   Q.  Yes.  Now, who stood the operation down that night?

          21   A.  I did, sir.

          22   Q.  You did.  So you are still on duty and in charge.  So

          23       actually at that point during that evening whilst you're

          24       sitting in the patrol base or wherever you are -- are

          25       you in the patrol base?




           1   A.  Yes, sir.

           2   Q.  You're in the patrol base.  Did it occur to you during

           3       that time, since you're in charge, "Well, maybe it's now

           4       a time to focus on Hutchinson-Foster for a bit, we've

           5       lost Duggan".  Did you then think, "Maybe we should

           6       focus on Hutchinson-Foster tomorrow"?

           7   A.  Sir, I believe the intelligence was that

           8       Hutchinson-Foster wasn't in London at that time.

           9   Q.  That night.  But the next day?

          10   A.  No.  The intelligence was -- the intelligence picture,

          11       if I'm remembering correctly, was that this was probably

          12       going to happen the following night at around about

          13       9 o'clock.

          14   Q.  Where is the intelligence that it was probably going to

          15       happen the following night around 9 o'clock?

          16   A.  I'm not sure, sir, that's just what I recall.

          17   Q.  We're interested in precisely what was known because --

          18       do you understand we have not been shown precisely what

          19       is known?

          20   A.  Sir, absolutely it was -- like I said, it was two years

          21       ago I cannot remember exactly.

          22   Q.  Your observation is of interest because of the briefing

          23       which I'll come to.

          24   A.  That's probably where I've got it.

          25   Q.  Yes, I appreciate that.  You see on the sheet there's no




           1       intelligence on the 3rd that it's probably going to

           2       happen the following night after 9 o'clock.

           3   A.  Yes, sir.

           4   Q.  All right.  Now, look at the briefing, please, C12.  The

           5       same passage, effectively, CD276, the Kevin

           6       Hutchinson-Foster passage, would suggest he's got

           7       control of the firearms and from 9 o'clock this evening

           8       there may well be a plan for Duggan to somehow get those

           9       firearms.  Was that the intelligence that you had on

          10       the --

          11   A.  That was, sir, yes.

          12   Q.  It was that.  So from 9 o'clock that night was the

          13       intelligence?

          14   A.  I'm not sure if it was as specific but I knew it was

          15       later in the evening, before the exchange was going to

          16       take place.

          17   Q.  So it didn't happen because you know that they went to

          18       Duggan's address that he was staying at and nothing

          19       happened.

          20   A.  That's correct.

          21   Q.  But this good intelligence was telling you that it was

          22       going to happen from that time onwards.

          23   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.

          24   Q.  So the sole question is whether, while you are sitting

          25       in Wood Green, having lost him at 10.30, you who were




           1       then in charge, not ZZ17, thought we'll refocus on

           2       Hutchinson-Foster tomorrow.

           3   A.  Sir, I don't see what the advantage of that would be.

           4   Q.  You might find where the guns are?

           5   A.  Sir, the intelligence was that Mr Duggan was going to

           6       take possession of the gun.  That was one thing we did

           7       know.  We didn't know who was going to supply the gun to

           8       him.

           9   Q.  Let's just deal with Duggan then if you are going to

          10       concentrate on him.  Same page, 276, please --

          11   A.  Yes, sir.

          12   Q.  -- at the top.

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  This is what the officers -- you were there so you

          15       know -- talking about Duggan, all right.  It comes from

          16       the previous page, at the bottom, I will just read:

          17           "He does frequent that address on a daily basis.  We

          18       believe where he's staying at the moment ..."

          19           Do you see that?

          20   A.  Yes, sir.

          21   Q.  "... is the address ..."

          22           Part of it's crossed out, but it's Micawber Court.

          23   A.  Yes, sir.

          24   Q.  "... just by Shoreditch Police Station."

          25   A.  Yes, sir.




           1   Q.  You knew that?

           2   A.  I didn't know that, sir.  Obviously I was told it on the

           3       night but I haven't remembered.

           4   Q.  That's quite important, since you're focusing on Duggan,

           5       that night, because that's the address you go to, that

           6       night?

           7   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.

           8   Q.  Shoreditch Police Station, as we've seen on the map

           9       which you've been looking at earlier on -- you can

          10       refresh your memory and the jury can see it -- the map

          11       shows that Leman Street -- and Duggan is just above that

          12       on that map -- Duggan is in fact therefore situated

          13       quite -- not very far from Leman Street, and certainly

          14       very close to Shoreditch Police Station.  Now, that

          15       night, having lost him at 10.30/10.35, did you consider

          16       that night -- that night -- we had better put tabs on

          17       Duggan tomorrow?

          18   A.  On Duggan, sir?

          19   Q.  On Duggan, the man you keep saying is at the centre, the

          20       intelligence is coming, essentially through that route

          21       and you didn't think about Hutchinson-Foster

          22       particularly; how about Duggan?

          23   A.  Sir, there's six subjects of this operation, and in fact

          24       I believe another subject became more appropriate to

          25       follow before Mr Duggan would have been.




           1   Q.  I appreciate all sorts of intelligence is coming in --

           2   A.  So we have to go with the intelligence.  That's

           3       something I've learnt through --

           4   Q.  That's what I'm putting to you.  You've got to go with

           5       the intelligence, and the intelligence here -- one

           6       strand, I appreciate, got lots of other cases, six other

           7       subjects -- the strand of the best intelligence coming

           8       through to you from SOCA is that Duggan's keen to pick

           9       up a gun from Hutchinson-Foster.  That's the thrust of

          10       it.

          11   A.  Yes, sir.

          12   Q.  So did you consider, as you did that night -- putting

          13       surveillance onto Duggan that night, did you consider

          14       putting surveillance onto Duggan the following day, the

          15       4th?

          16   A.  Well, obviously the intelligence was that it was going

          17       to happen after 9 o'clock.  The briefing was going to be

          18       at 6 o'clock.  If I had got intelligence that when I got

          19       to the briefing that Mr Duggan was looking to do it

          20       then, yes I would have deployed a surveillance team.  It

          21       depends on what the intelligence was at the time.

          22   Q.  You had the intelligence that from 9 o'clock on the

          23       evening of the 3rd, there might be a transfer.

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   Q.  You have to make intelligent guesses and anticipate,




           1       don't you?

           2   A.  Absolutely, sir, yes.

           3   Q.  That's the job.  Having, as it were, nothing come to

           4       fruition, 31st, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, by the 4th, that's

           5       a strongly possible day -- of course anything could

           6       happen -- but a strongly possible day, isn't it?

           7   A.  I suppose it is, sir.  It's four days that it hasn't

           8       happened, so -- you know, they are very unpredictable

           9       I have to say.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Looking at the 4th, are you still

          11       thinking about 9 o'clock as being the --

          12   A.  Yes, that was what the intelligence I was being told was

          13       pointing at.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Because the gun was kept --

          15   A.  If I had -- I think if I understand your question

          16       properly, if I had come in at 6 o'clock and the

          17       intelligence was still saying that there was going to be

          18       an exchange at around about 9 o'clock, yes, I would have

          19       put a surveillance team on Mr Duggan.

          20   MR MANSFIELD:  Of course.  It may not always be possible to

          21       pinpoint precise premises at a precise time, but you get

          22       a gist of intelligence coming through.  The gist was,

          23       from 9 o'clock on the 3rd -- that's how it's expressed:

          24           "... from 9 o'clock this evening ..."

          25   A.  Yes.




           1   Q.  Not only in the evening, from 9 o'clock in the evening;

           2       do you follow?

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Is that how you read it?

           4   A.  No, sir.  I believed that it was in a certain premises,

           5       that he couldn't get access to that until after

           6       9 o'clock in the evening.

           7   MR MANSFIELD:  Of course he might want to get access there

           8       before 9 o'clock.

           9   A.  He may want to sir, yes, but that's what the

          10       intelligence was.

          11   Q.  That's why I started with Hutchinson-Foster rather than

          12       Duggan; do you follow?

          13   A.  I understand what you're saying, sir, yes.

          14   Q.  When intelligence is coming through -- just switch back

          15       to the 4th for a moment, on the 4th, that Duggan is in

          16       a minicab going to Vicarage Road, it wouldn't have taken

          17       a lot to anticipate that he's left Micawber Court the

          18       very address you'd been at the night before; that would

          19       be a reasonable --

          20   A.  It could be, sir, yes.

          21   Q.  So, just going back to the 3rd, Hutchinson-Foster isn't

          22       followed and no surveillance is directed towards Duggan

          23       before you get on duty at 6 o'clock.

          24   A.  No, sir.  As I've tried to explain it, the intelligence

          25       was that the likely time of any transfer was going to be




           1       after 9.00.

           2   Q.  Yes, I see.  Now, I just want to get clear, during the

           3       time -- you stand down the operation in the early hours

           4       of the 4th.

           5   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.

           6   Q.  From that moment, that you stood it down, until you come

           7       back on at 6.00; who's in charge?

           8   A.  Of the intelligence?

           9   Q.  No.  Who's in charge of anything that's coming in and

          10       are necessary to deploy forces to deal with it?

          11   A.  ZZ17.

          12   Q.  ZZ17 comes back into the picture for that time zone, not

          13       you?

          14   A.  That's correct.  I'm there for the firearms side of --

          15   Q.  All right, I understand.  Now, I want to just -- that's

          16       the 3rd and that's the 4th in terms of planning.  I want

          17       to deal with something a bit more specific --

          18   A.  Yes, sir.

          19   Q.  -- on the 4th: you're in the control vehicle and it's

          20       that section of time.  Are you clear what I want to deal

          21       with?

          22   A.  Yes.  Yes, sir.

          23   Q.  When you arrived at the place where the stop, hard stop,

          24       took place --

          25   A.  Yes, sir.




           1   Q.  -- you describe where you were in a following vehicle

           2       and so on.  But the stages are this: you see officers

           3       out of their vehicles before you see Duggan?

           4   A.  That's very -- I saw Duggan move within the cab.  It was

           5       all happening around about the same time.

           6   Q.  But the officers are on the pavement before Duggan is

           7       out of the minicab?

           8   A.  I couldn't answer that, sir, I -- looking back now,

           9       I believe -- yes, they were on the pavement when he was

          10       at the door maybe.

          11   Q.  Yes, all right.  I think the way you have described it

          12       is that what you could see from where you were in the

          13       back of the control vehicle, through the people in front

          14       of you, the windscreen and then onto the pavement,

          15       was -- the top of Duggan's head is how you put it?

          16   A.  No, I could see -- when he came out of the taxi he was

          17       a bit higher up, as far as I could remember, and I could

          18       see -- I knew it was Mark Duggan.

          19   Q.  You are actioning, so it can be recorded, head and

          20       shoulders?

          21   A.  Yes, head and shoulders.

          22   Q.  Head and top of shoulders?

          23   A.  Yes, that's correct.

          24   Q.  You said, quite fairly, that you didn't see him holding

          25       a gun.




           1   A.  No, sir.

           2   Q.  You didn't see him throwing a gun anywhere, did you?

           3   A.  No, sir.

           4   Q.  But you were clear before you got to the scene, from the

           5       intelligence, that he had a gun?

           6   A.  I believed, sir, that he was in possession of a firearm,

           7       yes.

           8   Q.  So that was the intelligence?

           9   A.  That's correct, yes.

          10   Q.  Right.  You made contact with a number of people after

          11       the shooting and I just want to ask you what you may

          12       have said.  Now, did you keep a record of what you said

          13       to various people or not?

          14   A.  No, sir.  I got one of the Constables that was with me

          15       to keep -- to note down some times that I thought might

          16       be important, ZZ50.

          17   Q.  ZZ50, right?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  Could we have, please, CD -- just before we do.  Have

          20       you ever seen the note that was taken?

          21   A.  I did see it, sir, but it was a long time ago.

          22       I haven't seen it --

          23   Q.  Since?

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   Q.  I'm going to ask you to have a look at it.  I'll take it




           1       in stages.  If the original note is here perhaps you

           2       could see that.  I've only got a typed version of it:

           3       CD663, please.  Sorry, it's not in there, it's coming on

           4       screen.

           5           As it's typed, it may be less easy because there are

           6       redactions and it may be, I know not, that there's other

           7       things in the day book beyond what's here.  But does

           8       this help?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  We haven't seen this before so I just take you through

          11       it so you see it.  ZZ50 is another Trident officer who

          12       happened to be there.

          13   A.  He happened to be there and I grabbed hold of him and

          14       asked him to stay with me to jot down some times.

          15   Q.  It looks as though -- I have to ask you, he obviously

          16       must have been there before 6.14 to begin the noting?

          17   A.  Yes, I believe he was -- he would have been there very

          18       shortly after the --

          19   Q.  Shooting itself?

          20   A.  Yes, yes.

          21   Q.  We know that's 12 minutes past, so he's there from

          22       roughly 12 minutes past.  There's a 999 call, CAD, I'm

          23       going to zoom through them:

          24           "Z50 informed about shooting."

          25   A.  Yes.




           1   Q.  Now, Z50 --

           2   A.  Is Fiona Mallon.

           3   Q.  Fiona Mallon.  What did you tell her?

           4   A.  I can't remember exactly, sir, but it would have been

           5       along the lines of there had been a shooting, somebody

           6       had been shot, probably Mark Duggan had been shot,

           7       something like that.

           8   Q.  Well, I would like you to see on screen CD7203.  Has

           9       that come up?  Yes.  Now, this is Mr Foote at 6.30, so

          10       obviously after you.  Can I get from you -- you are the

          11       only one really communicating with Mr Foote about what's

          12       happened, aren't you?

          13   A.  I'm not sure, sir, I certainly did communicate with him.

          14   Q.  You certainly did.  Well, the note here -- it's not

          15       a note about what you said, but about what Mr Foote is

          16       telling Fiona Mallon at 6.30.  Because he wasn't --

          17       Mr Foote wasn't at the scene then was he?

          18   A.  No, he wasn't, sir.

          19   Q.  So it's reported language:

          20           "Just found a gun and think it's Duggan's gun."

          21           Then there's reference to an officer being shot:

          22           "... by accident by another CO19 officer."

          23           Then:

          24           "Apparently MD came towards officers firing."

          25           Did you tell Fiona Mallon that --




           1   A.  Not at all, sir, no.

           2   Q.  -- or anything like it?

           3   A.  No.  No.

           4   Q.  Was anybody around you at that time, which is some time

           5       before 6.30, so within that 15-minute time zone, was

           6       anybody going around saying that Duggan came out firing?

           7   A.  No, sir, no.  Because I remember -- I remember later on,

           8       when I heard that on the news, I couldn't believe that

           9       that was quite -- you know, I -- it was new to me.  If

          10       you were there, what I saw -- I certainly didn't think

          11       that, for one minute.

          12   Q.  And you never said it?

          13   A.  No.

          14   Q.  And you didn't hear anybody else say it?

          15   A.  I didn't, sir, no.

          16   Q.  Just going back to the ZZ50 day book, please.  We've got

          17       to -- he's put it not in chronological order, so it may

          18       be when we hear from him maybe some of this is wrong

          19       but.  This is how he's got it.

          20           Then he's got, after the "Z50 informed" he's got

          21       HEMS, that's the helicopter, on the scene.  Then he goes

          22       back to 5.50 and so on.  Then 5.40, 5.45 and then:

          23           "18.13 -- strike."

          24           So can we come back to the chronological order here,

          25       18.30:




           1           "Strike by CO19."

           2           Then you speak to a senior officer at 6.55; is that

           3       right?

           4   A.  Yes, that's Mr Cundy, sir.  He was commanding officer

           5       for Trident at the time.

           6   Q.  Then we've got a different time -- it's out of order --

           7       about intelligence, I don't go back on that, I've been

           8       over that time.

           9           So trying to keep it in some sort of order, at

          10       19.20, 7.20:

          11           "Z51 informed that brother of Duggan at cordon."

          12           And so on.

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  So 7.20 you are still there?

          15   A.  I am, sir.  It's not long after that, I think, Mr Cundy

          16       arrives at the scene and I'm relieved.

          17   Q.  You've asked this officer to note down significant

          18       occurrences; is that fair?

          19   A.  That's correct -- well, this times --

          20   Q.  Times that things happen, that you're involved in

          21       particularly?

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  One of the things that you say you're involved in is

          24       finding the gun.

          25   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.




           1   Q.  There's no mention there of that.

           2   A.  No there's not, sir, but it's in my statement.

           3   Q.  We'll come to what's in the statement.  There's no

           4       mention in the day book by the officer who's really your

           5       aid memoir, standing next to you or near you --

           6   A.  That's correct, yes.

           7   Q.  -- noting your actions, even right down to telephone

           8       calls?

           9   A.  Yes.  So there's -- there's obviously some -- there's no

          10       mention of me contacting the SIO either in there.

          11       There's just certain things -- I took some numbers

          12       off -- some timings off my phone and it was just things

          13       that I wanted to make sure I got right at the time.

          14   Q.  Finding the gun is pretty important, isn't it?

          15   A.  Yes, sir, absolutely.

          16   Q.  Have you got any explanation as to why he didn't note

          17       down the fact that you saw the gun and went to it and

          18       found it, as it were?

          19   A.  I haven't sir, I -- I don't know whether he knew I had

          20       found it or not.

          21   Q.  I'll come to what you eventually said about it.  You

          22       kept a day book of your own, did you not?

          23   A.  I did, sir, yes.

          24   Q.  Could we have that, CD320, please.  It's coming up on

          25       screen now.  There we are.  Now, you haven't been taken




           1       to this here with the jury so just refresh your memory.

           2       Is this all your writing?

           3   A.  Yes it is, I apologise for the --

           4   Q.  No, don't worry about the writing -- I mean the nature

           5       of it.

           6           It's Operation Dibri and then it's -- what is it --

           7       something "planned operation" -- "preplanned", is it?

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  That's just the heading.

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  Then there's various dates, the 1st, the 2nd and you

          12       deal with FA forms, and so on, and the 3rd?

          13   A.  Yes, sir.

          14   Q.  Something about V59, briefing at 6.10 and so on.

          15       Surveillance, that's where I got the date -- so sorry,

          16       the time, 8.30 -- we've been over that.

          17           Then we get to the 4th.

          18   A.  Yes, sir.

          19   Q.  "Dynamic briefing at 5.45."  So you obviously had the

          20       day book with you at that time.

          21   A.  I did, sir, yes.

          22   Q.  Did you take the day book with you on the 4th?  Yours,

          23       I mean.

          24   A.  It would have been in my briefcase.

          25   Q.  Yes.  In the control vehicle?




           1   A.  Yes, sir.

           2   Q.  Now, of course you would have had access to the day

           3       book -- your day book, never mind ZZ50's -- when it was

           4       all over.

           5   A.  Yes.  I would have my (inaudible) day book, yes.

           6   Q.  I'm sorry, I just want to -- so you would have your

           7       briefcase?

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  You go somewhere; Leman Street?

          10   A.  That's correct, yes.

          11   Q.  At Leman Street -- we have not really dealt with this

          12       side of it -- that's where many officers go, firearms in

          13       particular, to record the events of the day.

          14   A.  Yes.  Well, after an incident like this, you go to

          15       Leman Street for post incident procedure, which is --

          16       you get legal advice, seen by a doctor; that's what

          17       happens after an incident like this.

          18   Q.  Yes.  And of course you would then be in a position, if

          19       you wanted to, to enter up your day book.

          20   A.  Well no, sir, I would not -- after this had happened,

          21       I knew that it was going to -- I was going to be

          22       a principal officer in this, so I wouldn't have written

          23       anymore in my day book.  I knew I was going to make

          24       a statement.

          25   Q.  Right.  So did you make a statement that evening of the




           1       4th?

           2   A.  I made a very short statement, sir, yes.

           3   Q.  Statements -- I'm sure you know what -- I don't want to

           4       be pernickety about rules, but they are supposed to be

           5       as full as you can make them without overdoing it.  In

           6       other words, you need to give as full an account as you

           7       can at an earliest possible time?

           8   A.  Sir, I have to say I've never been involved in an

           9       incident like this before, so I was taken -- you know,

          10       I was doing what I was asked to do.  And what I was told

          11       to do was -- the initial statement was just to set out

          12       my role on that evening.  And that's what I did.

          13   Q.  Who told you just to set out your role?

          14   A.  I can't remember exactly who told me.

          15   Q.  I would like you to think carefully who it was back at

          16       Leman Street.  If you can just put yourself back to that

          17       moment.

          18   A.  Sir, there was an awful lot of people there.

          19   Q.  Yes, I appreciate that.  But you're a senior officer

          20       with experience, aren't you?

          21   A.  Yes.  But I've never been involved in a --

          22   Q.  I appreciate that.  You have made statements before?

          23   A.  Absolutely.

          24   Q.  Yes.  So you know what they look like.  But did anybody

          25       say, "I don't want to know what you did, just what your




           1       role was"?

           2   A.  I think if you look in the SOP, I think it might say

           3       something like you do an initial statement, a brief

           4       initial statement, and then, within 48 hours, you do

           5       your full statement.

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You say in what?  Where does that

           7       come from?

           8   A.  I think it may be in either the ACPO guidelines or the

           9       Met Police SOP -- sorry, Standard Operating Practice for

          10       the Met; they have their own booklet that tells you --

          11       helps you to try and deal with these types of ...

          12   MR MANSFIELD:  Yes.  Do you know what the guidelines are

          13       about statements, ACPO guidelines?

          14   A.  I can't --

          15   Q.  Association of Chief Police Officers.  You know the --

          16   A.  I cannot tell you exactly what it says, sir, no.

          17   Q.  No, no, I do not expect you to carry it round in your

          18       head.  But as a senior officer you will at some stage

          19       have appreciated what you are supposed to do.

          20   A.  Yes, sir.

          21   Q.  Is that fair?

          22   A.  Yes, sir.

          23   Q.  An initial account, subject to legal advice -- did you

          24       get legal advice?

          25   A.  I did, sir, yes.




           1   Q.  Yes, you did.  They are given -- it should be made as

           2       soon as practicable; that's the initial account?

           3   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.

           4   Q.  That's correct.  It should be recorded in writing, timed

           5       dated and signed; all that's fairly straightforward.

           6           I want to just read you this, so it can be clear

           7       where it's coming from -- in fact, it may be easier if

           8       I ask for it to come on screen: CD010958.

           9           I'm reading from the bottom of the page, just an

          10       extract.  You'll see ACPO, I think, is just mentioned at

          11       the bottom there, very bottom.  It says: "Not

          12       protectively marked."

          13           I have just read part of paragraph 7.91; do you see

          14       that?  I have just read that bit.

          15   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.

          16   Q.  I'm now moving to 7.92.  I'll read it out with you so

          17       you can follow it:

          18           "Each officer's initial account should only consist

          19       of their individual recollection of events and should,

          20       among other things, address the question of what they

          21       are believed to be the facts and why, if relevant, they

          22       considered that the use of force and discharge of

          23       firearms was absolutely necessary."

          24           Then 7.93, over the page:

          25           "Detailed accounts should not normally be made




           1       immediately, but can be left until the officers involved

           2       in the shooting are better able to articulate their

           3       experience ..."

           4   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.

           5   Q.  I see the time.  Perhaps I could ask the questions to

           6       that after lunch?

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Would you like to do that now or

           8       after the break?

           9   MR MANSFIELD:  After lunch.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Of course at the end of 7.93 is

          11       where the 48 hours is mentioned that you mention in your

          12       evidence.

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  All right then, we will stop then

          15       for lunch break hour.  So I'll ask for the cameras to be

          16       turned off, please.  Then, when the jury are ready, they

          17       can leave us and be ready for a 2 o'clock start.  Thank

          18       you very much.













           2   (1.04 pm)

           3                     (The short adjournment)

           4   (2.00 pm)

           8                  (In the presence of the jury)

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Could we have Z51 then, please.

          10                 (The witness returned to court)

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We will have Z51 back in the box so

          12       the cameras can now come on.  You are still under the

          13       affirmation, Z51, that you took this morning and you are

          14       still continuing to answer questions from Mr Mansfield.

          15           Yes?

          16   MR MANSFIELD:  We were just dealing, before lunch, with the

          17       records that relate to you.  Just to remind you, the day

          18       book you kept has no reference to finding a gun.  The

          19       day book that was kept -- or note -- by ZZ50 has no

          20       record, and finally this: as far as your very first

          21       statement on the 4 August -- you can see it if you

          22       wish -- but that does not have any reference to the gun

          23       either, does it?

          24   A.  No, sir.

          25   Q.  It would simply have been one sentence in the initial









           1       statement:

           2           "I found a gun on the grassy area."

           3           That would be quite sufficient, wouldn't it?

           4   A.  It would be, sir.  I was actually on the phone to the

           5       SIO when I found it.

           6   Q.  No, the first statement that you made, which has no

           7       reference to a gun being found by you.  All it required

           8       in that initial statement, which I suggest is certainly

           9       in accordance with the rules, is just to say -- or

          10       guidance -- it's just to say "I found a gun on the

          11       grassy area near the wall".

          12   A.  Sir, as I said, that initial statement was just to give

          13       my role in the day.  I was coming back within 48 hours

          14       to do the full statement, which does have the fact that

          15       I found the gun.

          16   Q.  The way -- the full statement is made on 7 August.

          17   A.  That's right, yes.

          18   Q.  I'll read it for brevity:

          19           "I noticed what I believed to be a handgun wrapped

          20       a dark cloth material, lying on the grass area behind

          21       the wall, not far from where the intervention took

          22       place.  I requested officers to cover this to preserve

          23       it."

          24   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.

          25   Q.  Of course, the finding of a gun, as I think you have




           1       agreed before lunch, is a very significant event.

           2   A.  Absolutely, sir, yes.  Yes.

           3   Q.  There's no indication in the fuller statement that you

           4       noticed what you believed to be a handgun because

           5       somebody had said "We can't find the gun".

           6   A.  No, sir.  At some stage, somebody had said they hadn't

           7       located the firearm and that was why I walked down

           8       there, to see if it had gone over the wall.

           9   Q.  We will see some film in a minute.  You walk straight to

          10       where the gun is, don't you?

          11   A.  Yes, I do go straight down there, yes.

          12   Q.  This is not a case of an officer, meaning you, walking

          13       around the grass area looking or anything like that.

          14   A.  No, sir.  It was actually -- it was just off the path.

          15       So it was just there, as you walked down, it was just on

          16       the grass.

          17   Q.  Just there?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  I want to ask you carefully about this post-incident

          20       period before the process is taken up by others; do you

          21       follow?  It's in this interval of time.  Just to assist,

          22       so people can see, so people can see the frame here,

          23       there's a timeline in the jury bundle, if you could

          24       kindly turn that up.

          25   A.  What page is it behind?




           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It's right at the back.

           2   MR MANSFIELD:  I think it's tab 2 of that bundle.

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, sorry, it's in tab 2 of the

           4       thinner one.

           5   MR MANSFIELD:  Tab 2 and then -- there are several pages

           6       here.  Page 6 has timings that relate to the shooting

           7       itself, entry 37; have you got that?  It's at the top of

           8       the page.

           9   A.  Yes, sir.

          10   Q.  Then a series of other things and then entry 41 relates

          11       to you:

          12           "18.20.52."

          13           You're next to the gun.

          14   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.

          15   Q.  The references there, so you jury know, refer to

          16       an exercise conducted with film in order to time when

          17       you're seen standing next to the gun?

          18   A.  I understand, sir, yes.

          19   Q.  That's where the time comes from.  So there's a window

          20       there of roughly eight minutes -- do you follow -- from

          21       the shooting --

          22   A.  Yes, sir.

          23   Q.  -- to you being next to the gun?

          24   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.

          25   Q.  Now, it's that eight-minute period I want to ask you




           1       about carefully.  At some time in the eight-minute

           2       period, you say, you are alerted to the fact they can't

           3       find a gun.

           4   A.  Yes, sir, it was shortly before I went down to have

           5       a look.

           6   Q.  Shortly before?

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  Who told you?

           9   A.  It was one of the firearms officers, I can't remember

          10       exactly which one.  It may have been V59 but I can't be

          11       sure.

          12   Q.  Right.  Was it R31?

          13   A.  No, sir.  I don't know which one R31 is.

          14   Q.  I am not going to anticipate --

          15   A.  It could have been -- I don't know who R31 is.

          16   Q.  He's on the list there?

          17   A.  Yes, but I don't know those officers.

          18   Q.  Sorry, have you got the list there?

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  He's not on it, sorry.

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Is he on that list?

          22   A.  No, he's not.

          23   MR MANSFIELD:  He's not on the list.  I don't want there to

          24       be any mistake in future, so would it be possible to

          25       have R31's name written down and shown to him.




           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, I think that would be a much

           2       better way of dealing with it, absolutely.  I will

           3       ensure there's a fuller list; I hadn't realised that

           4       they weren't all down on the list there.

           5           I have a full list but I have not actually got it in

           6       court with me so if we want it, I'll have to rise.

           7   MR MANSFIELD:  I think it might be -- sorry to -- no one

           8       else seems to have it.

           9   MR STERN:  I don't have it, sir.  I make the point of just

          10       trying to maintain the ciphers, so that I don't make --

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Before I give anonymity I have to

          12       know who they are, for obvious reasons.  I have a list

          13       of everybody but I haven't actually got it with me in

          14       court.  So if I'm the only person who's got one -- I'm

          15       sure there must be someone else.  Oh, there's another

          16       list.

          17   MR STERN:  Ms Kemish has it.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The solicitor to the Inquest has it.

          19       Well done, thank you very much, Ms Kemish.  (Handed)

          20           Do you have the note for R31?  Does that name mean

          21       anything to you?

          22   A.  No, sir.

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  There we are, thank you very much.

          24   MR MANSFIELD:  Well, I'm not going to pre-empt the evidence

          25       but we are going to hear evidence from R31 about the




           1       gun; do you follow.

           2   A.  Yes, sir.

           3   Q.  I'm asking you that if you don't know him, by that name

           4       or any other name, there's not much I can do about that.

           5           So somebody, you think it might have been V59,

           6       alerts you to the fact they haven't found a gun.

           7   A.  That's correct.

           8   Q.  This is on your account then, towards the ends of the

           9       eight-minute window there.

          10   A.  Yes, it would have been shortly before I found the gun.

          11   Q.  On your account, is this right, you're unaware that

          12       anybody else has seen it or found it?

          13   A.  No, sir -- that's exactly what I said, yes.

          14   Q.  Because in the account that you do give in the second

          15       statement, the one dated the 7th, you don't mention

          16       anyone else --

          17   A.  No.

          18   Q.  -- either alerting you to the fact they hadn't found the

          19       gun or saying "I found it"?

          20   A.  I believe I found the gun first, I don't think anybody

          21       found it before me.  I'm not sure but that certainly was

          22       my belief on the day.

          23   Q.  In relation to, obviously, the scene in that period,

          24       that's the eight-minute window --

          25   A.  Yes, sir.




           1   Q.  -- you're in charge.

           2   A.  I am in charge, yes.

           3   Q.  You've already been asked about it but I want to just go

           4       through this area with you and then I'm going to ask you

           5       to look at some film and photographs; do you follow?

           6   A.  I do, sir, yes.

           7   Q.  Your prime responsibility is obviously to ensure that

           8       any injured people are attended to.  You have mentioned

           9       that.

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  Almost at the same level, but not quite, you have to

          12       preserve the scene.

          13   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.

          14   Q.  I've been calling it a "cordon sanitaire" but it doesn't

          15       matter what you call it, the preservation of the scene.

          16   A.  As much as I can, yes.

          17   Q.  You don't want people, anybody really, including police

          18       officers, contaminating the scene in any way.

          19   A.  No, obviously -- you know, if they've got to give first

          20       aid to somebody then contamination goes out the window.

          21   Q.  Certainly, but that's the limit of it.

          22   A.  It's obviously a priority to try and secure evidence.

          23   Q.  Well, part of the evidence, prime evidence, in the case

          24       is the minicab itself, isn't it?

          25   A.  That's correct, yes.




           1   Q.  You don't want officers, as it were, trampling or doing

           2       anything else, going into the minicab or leaning into

           3       the minicab, moving anything; you don't want that, do

           4       you?

           5   A.  Absolutely not, no.

           6   Q.  Did you yourself ever look inside the minicab?

           7   A.  I don't believe I did, sir, no.

           8   Q.  You didn't?  So you can't help us as to whether you saw

           9       a box in the minicab?

          10   A.  No, I cannot help you with that.

          11   Q.  Now, most of the time, after the shooting, you're on the

          12       pavement area.

          13   A.  Yes, sir.  Most of the time I'm on the pavement area on

          14       the phone.

          15   Q.  On the phone, yes, near the bus stop.

          16   A.  That's correct, yes.

          17   Q.  We've all been there so we've seen where everything is,

          18       roughly speaking.

          19   A.  Yes, that's correct.

          20   Q.  You would have been, obviously on the phone, but keeping

          21       an eye on the scene?

          22   A.  Absolutely, sir.  I'm trying to do a whole lot of things

          23       at once.

          24   Q.  So if somebody did go into the minivan in this period

          25       you would have noticed it.




           1   A.  I certainly didn't see anybody going into the mini --

           2   Q.  No, if somebody had --

           3   A.  I wouldn't have noticed it if I'm facing the wrong way.

           4   Q.  Well, of course, but --

           5   A.  If somebody had gone in the minicab in front of me

           6       I would certainly have had something to say.

           7   Q.  Did anybody indicate that somebody had gone in the

           8       minicab?

           9   A.  No, sir.

          10   Q.  So as far as you're concerned, throughout this period --

          11       obviously if you have your back for a moment away, but

          12       throughout this period you didn't, at any stage, in this

          13       period, see anybody, either get in or lean into the

          14       minicab?

          15   A.  Absolutely not, no.

          16   Q.  I am going to ask if a section of film can be shown to

          17       you.

          18   A.  Certainly, sir.

          19   Q.  Perhaps before it is actually played, sorry, there are

          20       stills, which we've had bundled up, taken from this

          21       film.  I say straightaway that the stills are not every

          22       second because otherwise there would be a lot of stills,

          23       but they are stills that show periods of this same film.

          24       Now, they're available for the jury and one for you,

          25       sir, and obviously one of the witness.




           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  In that case

           2       please distribute them.  (Handed)

           3   MR MANSFIELD:  If, when they've arrived --

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes.

           5   MR MANSFIELD:  -- if this could be marked up by the jury

           6       kindly as C13.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  There should be 14 pages.

           8   MR MANSFIELD:  I think it should be actually 15, unless

           9       there's been a mistake.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  All right, I think we've only got

          11       14; have you got 14?  14.

          12   MR MANSFIELD:  In mine there's a repeat, sorry.  So 14

          13       photographs, sorry, mine has a repeat photograph.

          14           14 photographs, these are all stills taken from this

          15       film you're going to see.  You've already seen a bit of

          16       it.

          17   A.  I have, sir, yes.

          18   Q.  There's another bit to come.

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I am not sure but just in case the

          20       jury are puzzled about it, is there any significance at

          21       all in the numbers at the top left hand of the

          22       photographs, the 4.46.20?

          23   MR MANSFIELD:  Yes.  The digitalised numbers there are

          24       indicating, as it were, distance into a film.  So it's

          25       identifying the portion of a film in terms of seconds,




           1       of course, but they don't -- real time has to be worked

           2       out from other film, and that is why I have gone to the

           3       timeline.  We know that at 6.20 this officer is by the

           4       gun.  So this is all film taken before 6.20.  But the

           5       timing, like 4.46, it isn't 46 minutes past 4 or

           6       anything like that.  So it just gives an indication of

           7       the order.  These numbers appear on the moving film.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes.

           9   MR MANSFIELD:  So the jury could, if they had the time or

          10       ability to do it, marry them up as the film goes

          11       through.  So 14 photographs here, the back half of these

          12       you have seen in moving form.

          13           What I would like to do is to show you -- we're

          14       calling it a slightly different name but it comes from

          15       the same film -- a stretch of the same film which starts

          16       before -- the jury have already seen, sir, and you will

          17       already have, a digitalised time of 5.02, that's what

          18       Mr Underwood showed this witness, 5.02 onwards on the

          19       digitalised version.  But this stretch comes before that

          20       numerical stage, 5.02.  It is in fact 4.46.20 onwards;

          21       that's the number in the top left-hand corner.

          22           So could this stretch be played, the one that hasn't

          23       so far been played, and would you kindly look at it as

          24       we go through --

          25   A.  Yes, sir.




           1   Q.  -- I have some questions to ask you.

           2             (Video footage was played to the court)

           3           It goes on and on but it's passed the time at which

           4       Z51 is near the gun.  I wonder if it could be stopped.

           5                    (The video footage ended)

           6           We do not need to watch it from this point.  It

           7       didn't start early enough, and I understand it is

           8       possible to play it from the --

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Where does it start?

          10   MR MANSFIELD:  It starts much earlier, but the time that

          11       would be convenient is 4.30 -- I mean the digitalised

          12       version 4.30.  If we can go back to -- that's actually

          13       4.31.  That'll do.  Could it be played again?

          14             (Video footage was played to the court)

          15           Yes, it can stop at this stage.  It was just the

          16       early part.

          17                    (The video footage ended)

          18           Now, if you turn to the stills taken from this

          19       stretch.  In fact, the first still isn't the 4.31 where

          20       we started a moment ago.  Just so you familiarise

          21       yourself with it, there it is, 4.46 and the white arrow

          22       is there, 4.47, 4.58, 4.59, 5.04.  Then it goes on with

          23       the white arrow above that particular individual.

          24   A.  Yes, I understand, yes.

          25   Q.  Now, first of all, who is the one -- the man in the




           1       white shirt?

           2   A.  Sorry, I couldn't tell from that who that is.

           3   Q.  I'm going to put a name to you of who at present has

           4       been identified as that person.

           5   A.  Okay, sir, yes.

           6   Q.  I want to put to you that it's a name -- I can put the

           7       name, it's not an acronym: Dempsey; does that mean

           8       anything?

           9   A.  DS Dempsey is one of my Sergeants.

          10   Q.  Yes, one of your Sergeants.  In fact, I don't need to go

          11       through it, in the early email traffic that was going on

          12       in relation to this operation, he was often copied in,

          13       wasn't he?

          14   A.  Yes, he is part of that team, sir.

          15   Q.  Part of that team?

          16   A.  I don't think that's DS Dempsey.

          17   Q.  You don't?

          18   A.  No.

          19   Q.  Who do you think it is?

          20   A.  I don't know but I don't think it's -- he hasn't got the

          21       same body shape as DS Dempsey.

          22   Q.  Was he there that day?

          23   A.  Yes he was, yes.

          24   Q.  How were you dressed?

          25   A.  A navy blue long sleeved t-shirt on and jeans.




           1   Q.  Yes.  The position here is that, to begin with, you were

           2       saying you couldn't tell, then you say it's not Dempsey.

           3   A.  Well, I cannot tell from -- obviously who's face it is,

           4       but that looks like a very tall chap, compared to most

           5       of the other people there, that's what I'm --

           6   Q.  I would like you just to consider for a moment on this,

           7       because I have some questions since you know Dempsey as

           8       such, the DS on your squad, and he was there that day,

           9       what is your recollection of when you first saw him?

          10   A.  I think he was catching up with the operation that

          11       I first saw him at the scene.

          12   Q.  Soon after it had happened?

          13   A.  I cannot be -- I remember speaking to him.

          14   Q.  You do?

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  What did you talk to him about?

          17   A.  He's one of the supervising officers that's there.

          18   Q.  Supervising what?

          19   A.  He's a Sergeant so he's a supervisor of staff so --

          20   Q.  Doing what?

          21   A.  When I spoke to him?

          22   Q.  Yes.  If he's a supervisor -- sorry, never mind what you

          23       said at the moment -- I did ask you that -- but what was

          24       he doing at the scene as a supervisor of staff?

          25   A.  You'll have to ask him that, sir.  I know he was at the




           1       scene, I just spoke to him at one stage -- at least

           2       once -- to just check everything was in place that had

           3       to be in place and to see what -- you know, if there's

           4       anything else that needed to be doing.  But I do

           5       remember speaking to him.

           6   Q.  Did he say anything about a gun to you?

           7   A.  Not at all, sir, no.

           8   Q.  After you found the gun -- I mean, did you ask anybody

           9       if they could conceive of how it got to where it is --

          10       was found?

          11   A.  No, sir.

          12   Q.  Did you ask anybody about that?

          13   A.  No, sir.

          14   Q.  No.  I just want to go back to the white shirt --

          15   A.  Yes, sir.

          16   Q.  -- because Mr Dempsey himself says it is him.

          17   A.  Oh, does he, sir?

          18   Q.  Yes.

          19   MR KEITH:  Sorry to interrupt, before we spend a great deal

          20       more time on this interesting discussion, the photograph

          21       that was put to ZZ17, CE310, shows two people with white

          22       or off-white shirts and the person who was identified to

          23       ZZ17 and whom he thought might be Mr Dempsey is not, it

          24       would seem, the person in these stills and in the film.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Not with the white arrow above his




           1       white shirt?

           2   MR KEITH:  There are two people with white or off-white

           3       shirts.  If my learned friend looks at CE310 he'll see

           4       that.

           5   MR MANSFIELD:  I have already covered that with another

           6       witness, namely there are two with white shirts one is

           7       on the pavement taking photographs, Q63.

           8   A.  Right.

           9   Q.  I am not dealing with Q63 who's taking photographs.

          10   A.  Right.

          11   Q.  Now, just continuing with the man with the white shirt,

          12       who you initially thought wasn't Dempsey, right?

          13   A.  Well -- yes, sir, that's certainly my initial thought,

          14       that it wasn't --

          15   Q.  Now, I'm going to ask you to look at this because --

          16       have you seen this stretch that has just been shown?

          17   A.  No, sir, I've never seen that.

          18   Q.  You've never seen it before?

          19   A.  No.

          20   Q.  So the point I can make to you is clear, on the stills

          21       you will see 4.46.20.

          22   A.  Got that, sir, yes.

          23   Q.  I'm going to ask for the film to run from 4.31 in

          24       a moment.  So it's before this frame, all right, 4.46

          25       frame.  Then, 4.47, the arrowed white shirt has




           1       disappeared; do you see?

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  It goes through -- you haven't got all the stills here,

           4       but if you look at the next one, 4.58, there is still no

           5       white shirt.  4.59, the white shirt appears.

           6   A.  Yes, sir.

           7   Q.  So that is roughly 11 seconds.

           8   A.  Yes, sir.

           9   Q.  I'm going to ask you to look at it again because what

          10       I want to suggest to you is that this man -- I'm

          11       suggesting at the moment on identification, unless it

          12       changes, is called Dempsey -- has actually done

          13       something, we can't see, either got inside or looked

          14       inside the minicab; do you follow?

          15   A.  I follow, sir, but I'm not sure what you want me -- what

          16       the question is.

          17   Q.  I would like you to look at this again and see whether

          18       you remember seeing anything like this, a white-shirted

          19       officer who walks around -- when it starts in a minute,

          20       if you don't mind -- could you just pause it a minute?

          21           If you watch, he walks all the way round and we can

          22       place you on this, if it's necessary, just pausing it

          23       there, are you near the bus shelter at this point?

          24   A.  Sir, I believe I am -- I think, if that is a person

          25       besides the lamp post there, that might be me there




           1       (indicates).

           2   Q.  The middle lamp post of the three on the far side?

           3   A.  Where the arrow is, yes.

           4   Q.  We have some other ones with a blue arrow.  If you watch

           5       the white arrow, actually before it goes onto the

           6       pavement side with the passenger door, it walks -- "it",

           7       the white arrow, forgive me -- walks round the minicab.

           8       So just watch it carefully, please.

           9             (Video footage was played to the court)

          10           Right, pause there.

          11                    (The video footage ended)

          12           The first point is: did you see anything like that?

          13   A.  I did not see anybody going into the cab, if that's what

          14       your question is.

          15   Q.  Yes, that is my question.

          16   A.  No, I didn't see anybody going into the cab, no.

          17   Q.  Did you see this white-shirted person around the cab?

          18   A.  Sir, there was a lot of people around the cab, there was

          19       a lot of first aid equipment on the ground beside the

          20       cab.  I cannot remember exactly what everybody was

          21       wearing but I don't remember anybody going in the cab.

          22   Q.  No, but the one thing -- of course, the people attending

          23       to first aid, which was near -- just further away

          24       further from the cab slightly, your concern would have

          25       been to ensure in this time, since they are doing first




           1       aid, that nobody, I suggest, would do what this person

           2       in the white shirt appears to do.

           3   A.  Sir, you're assuming he does something.  He may be

           4       helping them do first aid.

           5   Q.  No, not at that place because the first aid is further

           6       away from the passenger's door?

           7   A.  Yes, but the first aid bags and bits and pieces, if

           8       I remember rightly, were on this side, so he might have

           9       been opening a first aid bag or a bandage, I don't know

          10       what he's doing.

          11   Q.  Yes, all right.  I don't want to take up unnecessary

          12       time but we do have film of the first aid because

          13       somebody was there doing it, and in fact some stills

          14       from the first aid, so you can see, are in the jury

          15       bundle.

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Page 13, behind divider -- the small

          17       jury bundle, divider 1.

          18   MR THOMAS:  Sorry, sir, just before anything is put on the

          19       screen, some of the first aid --

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I am not asking for anything to be

          21       put on the screen.  I know exactly --

          22   MR THOMAS:  You can understand why I rise to my feet.

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Absolutely right.  I am not asking

          24       for that to be done.  It just shows the officer with the

          25       white shirt on taking photographs, who is not the one we




           1       are looking around apparently; is that right, is he

           2       known to you.  It shows a scene of first aid.

           3   A.  Sir, that's -- those bags there, you see to the right of

           4       the -- are the sort of bags I'm referring to.

           5   MR MANSFIELD:  Yes, I appreciate that.  But there's the

           6       other white-topped person with the camera --

           7   A.  Yes, sir.

           8   Q.  -- Q63.

           9   A.  Yes, sir.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You know Q63?

          11   A.  I don't know him, no.

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Back to the other ones that we've

          13       been looking at just now, could you just help the jury

          14       because we'll be told, I think, that, obviously, there's

          15       a police officer, W42, who is hit --

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- and needs attention.  Whereabouts

          18       is he on this scene?

          19   A.  He's -- from my recollection, he's (indicates) at this

          20       vehicle.

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Towards the front of the end

          22       vehicle.  There's also a taxi driver somewhere; where is

          23       he?

          24   A.  He's probably between the Bravo vehicle, the vehicle on

          25       the -- beside the taxi -- and the taxi.




           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The taxi itself, out of the taxi?

           2   A.  Yes, he's sitting --

           3   MR MANSFIELD:  Sitting on the floor, on the street, roughly

           4       where the white-shirted man went as he went round the

           5       front and he then stopped and then he went back.  That's

           6       roughly where the driver was being held on the ground?

           7   A.  Yes, from recollection he was there, near that front

           8       wheel of the taxi.

           9   Q.  You see, because what I want to -- if you wouldn't mind,

          10       we will just continue -- that's the beginning of the

          11       white -- the person in the white top.

          12   A.  Yes, sir.

          13   Q.  Could we now have the bit of film that you saw before

          14       lunch, which started at 5.02.  I want you to watch in

          15       particular what -- the yellow arrow there is the officer

          16       you say you don't know, that's R31.  If we just go on,

          17       on this section again, this is going on, with particular

          18       reference to the white-shirted man.

          19             (Video footage was played to the court)

          20           Pause there if you wouldn't mind.  He's talking to

          21       you, isn't he?

          22                    (The video footage ended)

          23   A.  He could well be, sir.  Yes, he could be.

          24   Q.  I wonder if it's possible just to replay 5.02 to this

          25       point again.  I want you to watch what the white-shirted




           1       man is doing as he appears to be approaching you.

           2             (Video footage was played to the court)

           3   A.  Yes, sir, I see that.

           4                    (The video footage ended)

           5   Q.  Thank you very much.  What is he doing?

           6   A.  Sir, you will have to ask him but it looks like he's

           7       pointing over to the --

           8   Q.  Pointing to the grass?

           9   A.  No, I think he's sort of pointing -- there's a big wall

          10       there he's walking by so he would have to be -- he's

          11       pointing in that direction.

          12   Q.  About 5.46, in terms of where it comes here, but could

          13       you just play that -- so sorry, because we have not seen

          14       it before -- 5.02 again, through to 5.14.

          15        (Video footage was played to the court and ended)

          16   A.  Yes, sir.

          17   Q.  Keep your eyes as well on the yellow arrow, R31, and

          18       I'll come back to that.

          19           As we will see in a moment, that after he's

          20       apparently talked to you, he goes to talk to R31, who's

          21       the one with the yellow arrow; do you follow?

          22   A.  I do, sir, yes.

          23   Q.  Can we pick it up from 5.14 and move on?

          24             (Video footage was played to the court)

          25           Purple is V59.  Pause it there if you wouldn't mind.




           1                    (The video footage ended)

           2           It's a little easier even than the stills.  It seems

           3       by 5.54 on the digital, the white-shirted man is

           4       together with V59, that's the purple one, and R31,

           5       that's the yellow one?

           6   A.  Yes, sir.

           7   Q.  Did you see anything like that: a gathering of officers

           8       like that?  They are nothing to do with first aid; do

           9       you follow?

          10   A.  Sir, there's an officer injured there, I don't know

          11       which one he is or where he is but I would not be

          12       surprised at the officers being together like that.

          13       I don't know what they're doing but --

          14   Q.  Did you see anything like that?

          15   A.  Exactly what, sir?

          16   Q.  Well, the question I have for you is: was the topic of

          17       the day "Where on earth is the gun?"

          18   A.  No, sir, not at that stage.  The topic of the day was

          19       first aid --

          20   Q.  Did you see an officer with a gun?

          21   A.  What sort of gun, sir?

          22   Q.  The gun that was found.

          23   A.  No.  No, I didn't.

          24   Q.  I can only ask you this: did a officer, when a gun

          25       wasn't found on the pavement, look in the minicab and




           1       remove the gun from the minicab?

           2   A.  Sir, I can only say what I saw, I didn't see anybody

           3       going anywhere near the minicab or going into the

           4       minicab.

           5   Q.  I wonder if we could just play on this section, please,

           6       from 5.54, I think it stopped.

           7             (Video footage was played to the court)

           8           If you watch the yellow arrow, pause there.

           9                    (The video footage ended)

          10           Again, this is 6.06.01, and the jury, if they want

          11       to marry it up, or, sir, you would like to marry it up,

          12       we do have a still just after this.  I hope I have the

          13       right numbering.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Page 10, right-hand side?

          15   MR MANSFIELD:  It's page 11 actually.  The one before has

          16       a sort of compendious -- the one before has got split

          17       screen with the white arrow in one position and then --

          18       you're the blue arrow so if we look at page 10, the

          19       Coroner is perfectly right about this.  Look at page 10

          20       in the stills.

          21   A.  Yes, sir.

          22   Q.  You are the blue arrow on the left.  The purple arrow is

          23       V59 and R31 is by the third lamp post in the screen, as

          24       it were, on the screen on the right; do you follow that?

          25   A.  I do, yes.




           1   Q.  We will go on with the stills.  The next one, 11, again,

           2       it's a further shot, 6.07.  Sorry, some of us have got

           3       arrows on some and some not.

           4           On number 11 that you have, the 6.07, this is the

           5       point on the video which is just about to come up where

           6       R31 climbs over the fence near the lamp post.

           7   A.  Right, sir.

           8   Q.  Did you see that?

           9   A.  No, I didn't, sir, no.

          10   Q.  All right.  Could we play it forward, please: number 11

          11       on the stills.

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  This the moving image with him

          13       climbing over the lamp post?

          14   MR MANSFIELD:  Yes, the moving image has got him doing it.

          15             (Video footage was played to the court)

          16           Just pause again at 6.38.

          17                    (The video footage ended)

          18           So R31 is on the grassed area having climbed over

          19       the fence; do you follow?

          20   A.  Yes, sir.

          21   Q.  Now, there's another stage to this.  I think you've

          22       already mentioned it but we can play it in one second.

          23       The man in the white shirt waves over a marked police

          24       car -- you'll see it in a moment -- and somebody says

          25       something to the white, marked police car, which then




           1       drives off.  So you have it as a total picture --

           2   A.  Yes, sir.

           3   Q.  -- the car drives off and drives round into the road

           4       beyond the grassy area and then comes onto the grassy

           5       area; did you see that?

           6   A.  No, sir.

           7   Q.  Did anybody give directions -- you're in charge of the

           8       scene -- did you give directions that a police car

           9       should go round, as it were, the other side and come

          10       onto the grassy area --

          11   A.  Are you talking about down here, down this grassy area?

          12       (Indicates)

          13   Q.  Where the white arrow is.

          14   A.  What I did ask was for officers to push people back

          15       further, I didn't ask for a vehicle but I asked for

          16       officers down there to push the cordon back a bit.

          17   Q.  I follow that, that's further down the same road, Ferry

          18       Lane.

          19   A.  No, right round, sir.

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  At the top there?

          21   MR MANSFIELD:  This is a white car that drives all the way

          22       round, comes up on the other side where the white arrow

          23       was a minute ago in the road behind the grassy green and

          24       then comes onto the grassy green.  Did you know anything

          25       about that.




           1   A.  I don't recall that, sir.

           2   Q.  Did you give any instructions to, as it were, prevent

           3       photography happening on the green --

           4   A.  Not at all, sir.

           5   Q.  -- keep the public away?

           6   A.  No, I gave instructions to keep the public away from

           7       that area because we've got a crime scene there.

           8   Q.  Perhaps we could play on from -- is it 6.39?

           9             (Video footage was played to the court)

          10           You see the white shirt with V59.  There's the car?

          11   A.  Yes, sir.

          12   Q.  There's you in the blue arrow coming past the bus

          13       stop -- sorry for the commentary, it's just so it's

          14       easier.

          15           You go straight across there.  Now, there's the

          16       police car coming round.

          17   A.  Yes, sir.

          18   Q.  Do you need it played again?  Then you come back out.

          19   A.  Not at all, sir, no.  I see that.

          20   Q.  Did somebody tell you that a gun was there?

          21                    (The video footage ended)

          22   A.  No, sir.

          23   Q.  Did you put a gun there?

          24   A.  That's absolutely outrageous, sir.

          25   Q.  I'm asking you.




           1   A.  No, but you're asking me and it's outrageous.

           2   Q.  You didn't put a gun there.  You didn't see anyone

           3       else --

           4   A.  I found a gun on the grass where it was, sir, and it

           5       stayed there until the IPCC took over the scene.

           6   Q.  How long did you remain at the scene?

           7   A.  Until about 7.30, I believe, sir.  It might have been

           8       a bit later.

           9   Q.  During that time, before you go to Leman Street, is that

          10       right --

          11   A.  That's right, sir, yes.

          12   Q.  -- did you hear any suggestion amongst police officers

          13       or others that a police officer had thrown the gun over

          14       the fence?

          15   A.  No, sir.

          16   Q.  Did you ever hear that?

          17   A.  No, I don't know how the gun got there, sir.

          18   Q.  No, I appreciate --

          19   A.  No, I didn't, sir, no.

          20   Q.  You know that was being suggested by somebody that

          21       evening?

          22   A.  I'm not sure sir, I certainly didn't hear that.

          23   Q.  You didn't hear that?

          24   A.  No, sir.

          25   Q.  Back at Leman Street that wasn't something that was




           1       the -- amongst any of the officers there?

           2   A.  No, sir.

           3   Q.  Just going back -- we can use the still for this

           4       purpose, photograph 1 in the bundle you have.  Another

           5       way in which, obviously, these can be timed, so it's

           6       just clear, plainly no ambulance service has turned up,

           7       has it?

           8   A.  Not at that time, sir.  I'm not sure what time that is.

           9   Q.  I'm suggesting to you it's in the eight-minute window

          10       before your appearance on the grass, which we know is

          11       6.20.52; do you follow?

          12   A.  Yes, I do, yes.

          13   Q.  It was before that?

          14   A.  I'm not sure when the ambulance arrived.

          15   Q.  It's also after a time at which the lead car has been

          16       moved onto the pavement?

          17   A.  Yes, sir.

          18   Q.  Yes.  Then we have the Bravo car, as you pointed out,

          19       right next to the minicab, and then another car -- it's

          20       slightly obliterated by the hoarding there -- is right

          21       behind?

          22   A.  Yes, sir.

          23   Q.  So those are the three cars.  Then your control car is

          24       back by the bus shelter?

          25   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.




           1   Q.  It appears that most of the time, would this be fair, of

           2       the film that we've been watching -- and you can watch

           3       it again -- most of that time you are primarily in the

           4       area between the bus shelter and the fence.

           5   A.  About that area, yes, sir.

           6   Q.  Could you see ZZ50, the one who's keeping your day book;

           7       is he in these photographs?

           8   A.  It's hard to tell, sir, I cannot remember what he was

           9       wearing but I don't think he's with me at that stage.

          10   Q.  When is your recollection of his being with you?

          11   A.  It was a bit later on, sir, when I asked him to write

          12       down some times.

          13   Q.  Times of what?

          14   A.  Well, it's on the -- the times he's written down on his

          15       day book.

          16   Q.  As we know, one of the times not on the day book is --

          17   A.  Sir, what I was doing was I was taking times off my

          18       phone about when I had phoned people before I lost the

          19       data on my phone.  So the time I found the gun wasn't on

          20       my phone.

          21   Q.  Well, it was because you were on the phone?

          22   A.  Yes, the times that I -- they wrote down specifically

          23       were from the phone --

          24   Q.  You were on the phone to the SIO at that time.

          25   A.  Yes, when I found the gun I was on the phone.




           1   Q.  All you need to find to ZZ50 a bit later when he comes

           2       on the scene is "I found the gun when I was on the phone

           3       to the SIO at ... and I have the time on my phone."

           4   A.  I was on the phone at the time to the SIO and I told him

           5       I found -- he was talking to me when I found the gun.

           6   Q.  Did you tell the SIO "Look, I've just found a gun"?

           7   A.  I said "I believe I've found a gun".

           8   MR MANSFIELD:  Yes, thank you.

           9                      Questions by MR THOMAS

          10   MR THOMAS:  Good afternoon.

          11   A.  Good afternoon, sir.

          12   Q.  My name's Leslie Thomas, I'm representing the loved ones

          13       of Mark Duggan.

          14           Can I take you back a little bit to the afternoon of

          15       the 4 August?

          16   A.  Yes, sir.

          17   Q.  You had arranged the briefing to take place at 6 o'clock

          18       that afternoon, that evening?

          19   A.  That's correct, sir, that was the arrangement.

          20   Q.  Can I just ask you generally, in terms of these

          21       briefings, the situation over the operation is fluid

          22       isn't it?

          23   A.  It is, yes.

          24   Q.  The intelligence can change.

          25   A.  That's correct, yes.




           1   Q.  This is a fast moving situation.  Because of the nature

           2       of the intelligence that we're not permitted to discuss,

           3       you know it's a very fluid situation, correct?

           4   A.  It can be, sir, yes.

           5   Q.  All right.  Because of that, when you plan a briefing,

           6       say, the day before -- so you had agreed to have this

           7       briefing and you had given the indication the day

           8       before; that's correct, isn't it?

           9   A.  Yes, the briefing was arranged for 6.00, yes.

          10   Q.  But the agreement had -- the meeting at 6 o'clock on the

          11       4th had been notified to your officers the day before.

          12   A.  Actually, they knew before that.

          13   Q.  All right.  But you knew that anything could happen

          14       before that briefing.  For instance, to take one

          15       example, there may be new intelligence that comes in?

          16   A.  Absolutely, yes.

          17   Q.  Would you agree with this: you would need to -- before

          18       you had the briefing, if new intelligence did come in,

          19       you would need to give yourself the opportunity to

          20       consider and assess that new intelligence; would that be

          21       fair?

          22   A.  Yes.  Well, ZZ17 would assess the intelligence.

          23   Q.  Yes, but you personally, being -- because your role is

          24       different to ZZ17's, isn't it?

          25   A.  Yes, it is, yes.




           1   Q.  You're the Silver of the firearms operation?

           2   A.  That's right, sir.

           3   Q.  You are the one who has to ensure overall safety.  If

           4       you forgive the expression, in terms of the firearms

           5       operation, the buck stops with you, not with ZZ17; is

           6       that fair?

           7   A.  Absolutely, I'm overall commander --

           8   Q.  Let me repeat the question then and see if you can

           9       answer it.  In a fast-moving situation such as this,

          10       when you plan a briefing in advance, because you know

          11       and you can anticipate that new intelligence may be

          12       coming in, you need to give yourself an opportunity to

          13       assess that new intelligence if and when it comes in;

          14       would that be fair?

          15   A.  Is that a question, sir?

          16   Q.  Yes, it is a question.

          17   A.  I would get to the briefing and I would get updated by

          18       ZZ17 before the briefing, yes.

          19   Q.  Can I be clear on this then?  Are you saying that you

          20       factor in no time, when you've planned a briefing,

          21       knowing the nature of this information, that there might

          22       be the possibility of new intelligence coming in that

          23       you would need to think about, maybe consider whether

          24       the plan needs to be changed?

          25   A.  When are you talking about, sir?




           1   Q.  I'm talking about before the 6.00 pm meet.

           2   A.  Obviously, if ZZ17 wanted me there earlier, he would

           3       ring me up and --

           4   Q.  Yes.  But being the overall commander, this is something

           5       that you anticipate, isn't it -- isn't it?

           6   A.  I'm not sure -- when, on the 4th or -- obviously

           7       intelligence can change.

           8   Q.  Forgive me.  Z51, forget about dates, I am not talking

           9       specifically about dates, I'm talking generally.

          10   A.  Okay.

          11   Q.  You have a meeting and brief arranged.

          12   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.

          13   Q.  It could be any briefing.  You know, because of the

          14       nature of this intelligence, it's a fast moving

          15       situation.  All I'm suggesting to you is, before any

          16       briefing, because of the nature of this intelligence,

          17       you need to factor into that, your timings, that the

          18       intelligence might change, therefore you need to be

          19       available in advance of the briefing just in case new

          20       intelligence comes in so you can consider it and brief

          21       your troops; that's all I'm putting to you.

          22   A.  Yes, sir, I'm always available for new intelligence.

          23   Q.  All right.  Secondly, you would need to factor into your

          24       timings, if new intelligence did come in, and that's

          25       something that you could reasonably anticipate given the




           1       nature of this intelligence, you would need to review it

           2       and reconsider the conflict management model if

           3       necessary.

           4   A.  Absolutely, sir, yes.

           5   Q.  You would also need to factor into whether or not the

           6       tactical plan needed to be reconsidered.

           7   A.  Absolutely, yes.

           8   Q.  You would also need to factor in time to see whether or

           9       not you needed to consult the Tactical Advisor, if

          10       necessary, before the briefing.

          11   A.  If there's a significant change in the intelligence,

          12       I would, yes.

          13   Q.  Yes.  Next, you would need to factor in time to consider

          14       whether you needed to consult the Strategic Firearms

          15       Commander; that was Mallon in this case, wasn't it?

          16   A.  It was, sir, yes.

          17   Q.  So far, is there anything I've said that you disagree

          18       with?

          19   A.  It depends on intelligence, sir.  All that depends on

          20       the intelligence.

          21   Q.  I appreciate that.  But these are all things that you

          22       can reasonably anticipate before the date.  You don't

          23       just turn up on the day.  These are things that you

          24       factor into and that you have in mind as real

          25       possibilities before the actual briefing itself, agreed?




           1   A.  Absolutely, yes.

           2   Q.  Just to finish the point, should the intelligence

           3       change, before the actual briefing itself, you would

           4       need to factor into, if there were changes in the plan,

           5       what troops you had, if the intelligence affects your

           6       troops and who and when and how they may be deployed.

           7   A.  Yes, sir.

           8   Q.  Now, let me come to the question.  Bearing all of that

           9       in mind, and everything you have just agreed with, you

          10       have told us that, at about 5.20ish, you were buying

          11       a sandwich; is that right?

          12   A.  I was in Tesco Express, yes, sir.

          13   Q.  You have also told us, from where you were buying your

          14       sandwich, that it took you, what, another 15/20 minutes

          15       to get to Quicksilver --

          16   A.  That's correct, yes.

          17   Q.  -- thereby giving you something like 20 minutes before

          18       the actual briefing time which had been scheduled.

          19   A.  Yes, sir.

          20   Q.  Z51, I'm going to suggest to you that was wholly

          21       inadequate planning on your part.  You needed -- bearing

          22       in mind all the considerations and all the changes

          23       you've just accepted, you needed to give yourself at

          24       least an hour to prepare yourself properly for the

          25       briefing; do you accept that?




           1   A.  No, sir.

           2   Q.  Very well.  Let me move on.  Can I move on to

           3       a completely different topic?

           4   A.  Yes, sir.

           5   Q.  The options that you could have had, had you and your

           6       team arrived in the Vicarage Road area earlier, that's

           7       what I want to consider.

           8   A.  Yes, sir.

           9   Q.  Do you accept this, that in terms of the options that

          10       were available to you to recover an illegal firearm

          11       which is on the street, a containment and call out is

          12       a much safer option than a mobile hard stop?

          13   A.  It may be, sir, yes.  It depends on who's in the house

          14       and what the situation is.

          15   Q.  Well, firstly, containment and call out is static.  You

          16       don't have moving vehicles -- when you conduct a hard

          17       stop it's very difficult to predict what the subject

          18       driver might do, what oncoming traffic might do, whether

          19       there might be other pedestrians around; do you follow?

          20   A.  I do, I do follow, yes.

          21   Q.  You don't have those problems with a static call out, do

          22       you?

          23   A.  Well, you sometimes could have.  I've had a situation

          24       where somebody took a hostage in a containment call out.

          25       So it depends on who you're dealing with, what the




           1       intelligence is and what the situation you're in.

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Help me and the jury, what do you

           3       mean by a "containment call out", what does that

           4       actually involve?

           5   A.  Basically, sir, they would contain a premises and call

           6       the occupants out.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You hope they would come out?

           8   A.  So they wouldn't actually enter the premises -- it's

           9       probably better to go through it with the CO19 officers

          10       because they're more -- they are more experienced.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  They are the ones who really have

          12       the decision as to how to tackle the particular position

          13       at the time?

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  All right, thank you.

          16   MR THOMAS:  You say that, you say it would be better to go

          17       through it with the CO19 officers.  I understand that

          18       they are the officers on the ground, but you are the one

          19       with the Silver hat on, with the overall responsibility,

          20       and you have the responsibility to consider the options.

          21   A.  Absolutely, sir, yes.

          22   Q.  So although you say it may be better, I'm asking you,

          23       because this is your responsibility and, as you have

          24       already indicated, the buck stops with you in terms of

          25       the safety of the operation.




           1   A.  Absolutely, yes.

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  But as I understood it earlier on,

           3       there comes a time whereby you call amber, in this case

           4       when you had the information that Mark Duggan has got

           5       the gun.

           6   A.  That's right, yes, sir.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Then you call amber and then it's

           8       over to the C019 --

           9   A.  Over to CO19 to carry out the --

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- in whatever way they feel is the

          11       best in the circumstances?

          12   A.  Yes.  But --

          13   MR THOMAS:  Sorry, you were going to say?

          14   A.  I was just going to say -- I cannot actually remember

          15       what I was going to say.

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  When two people ask questions at the

          17       same time, it's very difficult, I know.

          18           Back to you, Mr Thomas, I won't say anymore for

          19       a while.

          20   MR THOMAS:  The reality is this: even though the tactical

          21       firearms officers on the ground, you hand over to them

          22       when you call the state of amber --

          23   A.  Yes, sir.

          24   Q.  -- I understand that, but before you do that -- I'm

          25       focusing on the operation and the planning.




           1   A.  Yes, sir.

           2   Q.  In terms of the operation and the planning, you would

           3       agree with this, you cannot turn a blind eye to the

           4       various options, particularly if there is a safer

           5       option; would you agree?

           6   A.  Absolutely, sir.  If I had intelligence that there was

           7       a firearm on the premises I would go and get that

           8       firearm.

           9   Q.  Right.  Therefore, when you are considering your

          10       options --

          11   A.  Yes, sir.

          12   Q.  -- one of the things that you must look at is "Do we

          13       have any intelligence as to where the firearm may be?"

          14   A.  Absolutely, yes, that's very important.

          15   Q.  Let me build on that, if I may?

          16   A.  Yes, sir.

          17   Q.  In that consideration, what we do know in this case is

          18       there was intelligence, and I appreciate -- I am not

          19       going to go through all the stuff Mr Underwood has asked

          20       you; Mr Mansfield has already asked you about

          21       Mark Duggan and focusing on that, I've heard your

          22       answers in relation to that.  This is a slightly

          23       different theme.

          24           But in relation to your options, would you agree

          25       with this: certainly, given the intelligence that had




           1       been coming through -- and the jury have got the A10

           2       intelligence on the sheet, I am not going to take them

           3       to it -- you knew essentially this gun could come

           4       from -- you could retrieve the gun from either Mr Duggan

           5       or Mr Hutchinson-Foster.  Those are the options really.

           6   A.  Well, sir, slightly different because I knew Mr Duggan

           7       was going to pick the gun up, so I didn't know where

           8       Mr Hutchinson-Foster had the gun.

           9   Q.  I understand that.  I understand that at the point in

          10       time you didn't know where Mr Hutchinson-Foster was

          11       going to pick the gun up.  I appreciate that.  But

          12       those -- when you stand back --

          13   A.  Yes, sir.

          14   Q.  -- and you consider your plan --

          15   A.  Yes, sir.

          16   Q.  -- when you are at the planning stage and the thinking

          17       stage --

          18   A.  Yes, I understand.

          19   Q.  -- at the thinking stage, the two options that you had

          20       for retrieving the gun off the street, and you have

          21       already indicated that was your priority --

          22   A.  Yes, sir.

          23   Q.  -- was either the Duggan route or the Hutchinson-Foster

          24       route, agreed?

          25   A.  There are other options available as well.




           1   Q.  Those were the prime options, weren't they, bearing in

           2       mind the intelligence that you had, that

           3       Hutchinson-Foster was going to supply the gun, there was

           4       going to be a meet and Duggan was going to get the gun

           5       from him?

           6   A.  I might be able to answer it like this.  If I knew where

           7       Hutchinson-Foster had the gun I would have got the gun,

           8       I would have gone for the gun.

           9   Q.  That comes down to the next phase though.  Let's not

          10       jump ahead of ourselves.

          11   A.  I thought that was the question you were asking.

          12   Q.  No, the question is clear.

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Your answer is clear too, so that's

          14       what it was.

          15   MR THOMAS:  So, we'll move onto the next stage.  You say you

          16       didn't have intelligence as to where Hutchinson-Foster

          17       had the gun.

          18   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.

          19   Q.  That comes down to seeing if you can secure the

          20       intelligence.  Securing the intelligence on

          21       Hutchinson-Foster might involve putting him under

          22       surveillance, agreed --

          23   A.  That could be a way, sir, yes.

          24   Q.  -- using SOCA in the same way that you used SOCA on

          25       Mark Duggan.  That was an option, to use SOCA on Kevin




           1       Hutchinson-Foster, agreed?

           2   A.  Sir, that's not something I can answer.  You would have

           3       to ask SOCA.

           4   Q.  Well, it's something that you could consider, isn't it?

           5       It's something that you could suggest, isn't it -- isn't

           6       it?

           7   A.  I'm not sure it is, sir.

           8   Q.  So let's get this straight: you're saying "It's not

           9       something I can discuss with ZZ17: 'Have you considered

          10       this?'"  Is that what you're saying?

          11   A.  Sir, what, asking SOCA to get intelligence on him?

          12   Q.  Yes.

          13   A.  I didn't consider it --

          14   Q.  No, no, no.  The question is: it's something you could

          15       have done, isn't it?

          16   A.  Sir, you're getting into realms -- I'm finding it

          17       difficult to answer because you would have to ask

          18       somebody from SOCA if they could have got intelligence

          19       on him.

          20   Q.  No, I'm asking --

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  But you're doing the answering.  If

          22       it's something which you cannot answer, fair enough, you

          23       just say I cannot answer and that's it.

          24   MR THOMAS:  Forgive me, perhaps the question is badly put.

          25       Let me approach the question from a different way.




           1           You didn't have the intelligence on Kevin, you told

           2       us that.

           3   A.  That's correct, sir.

           4   Q.  Your team, and ZZ17 -- you don't work in isolation, do

           5       you; you work as a team, don't you?

           6   A.  Yes, sir.

           7   Q.  Simple question: there was nothing stopping you from

           8       suggesting to ZZ17, "Have we considered obtaining the

           9       best intelligence we can on Kevin Hutchinson-Foster?"

          10       Simple question.

          11   A.  I could suggest that, sir, yes.  I'm not sure how easy

          12       that would have been to obtain.

          13   Q.  That's a different question, isn't it?

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  Next question is: did you suggest that?

          16   A.  No, sir.

          17   Q.  Would you accept that was a missed opportunity?

          18   A.  Sir, again, it's -- I don't know what intelligence SOCA

          19       could have got around Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.

          20   Q.  My question is: do you consider that now a missed

          21       opportunity?

          22   A.  I don't, sir, no.

          23   Q.  No.  Let me move on.

          24           Had you got to Vicarage Road earlier -- time is

          25       important on an operation such as this; would you agree?




           1       Having the space to think is important?

           2   A.  As I said earlier, from 5.25 until I went to amber was

           3       just over 30 minutes, so I didn't have a lot of time to

           4       think.

           5   Q.  I understand that.  My question is a broader one.

           6       Having the time to think is a valuable --

           7   A.  It would be lovely, sir, to have time, lots of time,

           8       but, you know, we've got to work, we have a collapsing

           9       timeframe here from --

          10   Q.  Can I look at and explore with you why it would be

          11       "lovely", as you put it, and valuable, as I suggest: it

          12       would give you more options to find quieter roads around

          13       the Vicarage Road area had you got there earlier?

          14   A.  Sir, I have to say, in my eight years experience,

          15       I haven't seen a better location for an interception

          16       than the one that was used in Ferry Lane.

          17   Q.  Now can you answer the question that I asked you?

          18   A.  Could I find a safer place?

          19   Q.  No.  My question was: it would give you more options to

          20       find a quieter location where you could position your

          21       team, had you got there earlier, agreed?

          22   A.  It may have sir, it may have.

          23   Q.  Secondly, had you got there earlier, it would have given

          24       Mark Duggan less time get the gun out without being

          25       observed by your firearms officers, who subsequently




           1       played catch up?

           2   A.  No, sir.  I've heard that catch up -- there was five

           3       minutes at least when we were behind that taxi in heavy

           4       traffic because I was in the control vehicle.  So

           5       there's plenty of time for the surveillance officer to

           6       describe exactly where the taxi was.  In fact, I can

           7       remember the taxi -- she described the vehicle in front

           8       of it, where her vehicle was, how many vehicles it was

           9       in front.  There was plenty of time to get yourself --

          10       we're in a situation where -- I would say at least five

          11       minutes before we actually went to red.

          12   Q.  Z51, I wonder if you can help me with this.  I wonder if

          13       we can call up on the screen the plan which showed the

          14       larger plan, please?

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  C5, the one that shows what happens

          16       at 5.15 pm?

          17   MR THOMAS:  Yes, yes.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Do you have that, it's behind C5 in

          19       the larger bundles.  It's also now on the screen.

          20   A.  Yes, sir, thank you.

          21   MR THOMAS:  It may well be me that's missed it.  If it is me

          22       that's missed it, I apologise.  Can you just help me

          23       with this: when you and the other cars with the firearms

          24       officers eventually got close to the Leyton area,

          25       because you got the information that Mark Duggan has now




           1       got the gun --

           2   A.  Yes, sir.

           3   Q.  -- at that point, where was it -- where exactly was it

           4       when you first -- where were you in your vehicle --

           5       because you were in the Land Rover, I believe?

           6   A.  Yes, I was at the back of the other three --

           7   Q.  Don't worry about the other three, don't worry about the

           8       other three.  The question is where: were you when you

           9       first had sight of the minivan -- the minicab that Mark

          10       Duggan was travelling in?

          11   A.  I am not sure exactly, sir.

          12   Q.  Roughly?

          13   A.  I remember we went past a Tube station, I think it

          14       was -- have you got a map of the route?

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  If you blow up the top half of that

          16       map a little bit, see if we can do it, just a little

          17       bit.

          18   A.  Is it Blackhorse Road Tube station?

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Hang on a minute.  Let's all see --

          20       can we just go back so we just have the top half, so we

          21       have Quicksilver as well.  Mr Stern is going to be

          22       helpful.

          23   MR STERN:  I hope so.

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I was saying if we could just

          25       increase the size of the top half for a moment, perhaps




           1       not.

           2   MR STERN:  It does not involve technology, the help I'm

           3       going to give you.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We'll let the technology carry on --

           5       what's your help, Mr Stern?

           6   MR STERN:  C11, you'll remember there's the sat nav route,

           7       it shows the route the minicab took.  I don't know where

           8       it is in the bundle in front of the officer but I hope

           9       he's got it -- I think he's got it there.

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   MR THOMAS:  That's very helpful.

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It does not actually show

          13       Quicksilver, which is the one of the points I wanted to

          14       make.

          15   MR STERN:  Back to the technology, I think.

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It doesn't matter.  We have a lot of

          17       things about these documents.  Just have a look at that

          18       on the screen now, would you please, Z51.  What is the

          19       blue square and the arrows going along is the cab, all

          20       right?

          21   A.  Yes, sir.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Now, you come in your team, as

          23       I understand it, four cars and more, from bottom left,

          24       across Lea Bridge Road, then you pick it up where the

          25       van was then, then you go up the road to the Tube




           1       station.

           2   A.  Yes, sir, I see that.

           3   MR MANSFIELD:  Page 5 of the jury bundle has the whole

           4       route.

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes.  Thank you.  The point I wanted

           6       you to just help, it may help -- that's why I was trying

           7       to blow up the top half --

           8   A.  Is that Blackhorse Road?  Yes, I think it was around

           9       about there, somewhere.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Then there's a nice, long straight

          11       bit of road.  The jury and I were on a coach together

          12       looking at it the other day.  Hang on a minute, from

          13       Quicksilver though, you must have gone pretty fast to

          14       get right from Quicksilver right there and follow them

          15       within about ten minutes.

          16   A.  Well, there was a lot of traffic -- so the minicab was

          17       caught in the traffic.  I can remember that --

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I am not worried about the actual

          19       timing that you left.  You left Quicksilver just before

          20       6 o'clock.

          21   A.  Yes, we were travelling --

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We know you're at Ferry Lane by

          23       6.12, having gone all the way round that route.

          24   A.  They were travelling very fast, yes.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Right.




           1   MR THOMAS:  You see, by the time you get into position

           2       you're on, I think you indicate, the Blackhorse Road --

           3   A.  I have to say, I am not familiar with the area but I can

           4       remember going past the Tube station, I think it was

           5       Blackhorse Road.

           6   Q.  That's when you had your first sighting of the minicab?

           7   A.  I'm not sure if that's where I had first sighting of it

           8       but it was around that area.

           9   Q.  Around that area?

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  We can see for ourselves on the plan how far that is

          12       from the Vicarage Road area.

          13           I've nearly finished, can I just move on to another

          14       topic, if I may?

          15   A.  Yes, sir.

          16   Q.  Sorry, I should make the point, I'm going to suggest to

          17       you, as I have with the other officers, that had the

          18       planning been more thought through, you could have

          19       positioned yourself in the Vicarage Road area much

          20       earlier on without having to play this catch up.  It

          21       would have been safer; do you accept that?

          22   A.  Not at all, sir, no.

          23   Q.  All right I'll move on.

          24           Can we show the video that we were looking at this

          25       afternoon with the white t-shirt man?




           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The one with the white arrow?  It's

           2       the same video but different coloured arrows.

           3   MR THOMAS:  Let's look at the one with the different

           4       coloured arrows.

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The one with the white arrow or the

           6       other one?

           7   MR THOMAS:  The other one.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Let's see.

           9   MR THOMAS:  Can we start the video, that video, at about

          10       4.30.  So 4 -- that one doesn't, so let's look at the

          11       other one then, let's look at the white arrow video.

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You'll be able to see this video

          13       lots of times, members of the jury, so don't worry about

          14       it at the moment.

          15   MR UNDERWOOD:  I should say that the experts have it at the

          16       moment so that we have the whole lot with all the arrows

          17       on covering the whole period but it's taking time.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We'll do the best we can to make

          19       sure you can see a lot of it.

          20   MR THOMAS:  That's great.  As we can see, we can see who I'm

          21       going to describe as "white t-shirt man" there and you

          22       can just see the arrow over his head.

          23   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.

          24   Q.  Just before we play the video, I want to ensure you

          25       accept this: Z51, you will accept that, apart from the




           1       parameters of contamination that you have suggested

           2       today, namely to give somebody first aid, to come to

           3       somebody's help and, you know, to try to save life --

           4   A.  That's right, sir.

           5   Q.  -- strictly speaking, that scene should have been kept

           6       as sterile as possible; do you accept that?

           7   A.  I agree with that, sir, yes.

           8   Q.  Secondly, you also accept, do you not, that once

           9       Mr Duggan was out of the vehicle, as you say you saw him

          10       come out of the vehicle -- and then you said you heard

          11       shots, you knew he had been shot and you saw your men

          12       were working on him, yes?

          13   A.  That's correct.

          14   Q.  You saw all of that.  But that was on the pavement,

          15       quite close to -- if we look at the still at the

          16       moment -- quite close to where that arrow is, just out

          17       of scene, just slightly to the right as we look at the

          18       photograph, yes?

          19   A.  I think it's just -- I think it's more there, sir

          20       (indicates).

          21   Q.  Where are you pointing.  Stand up and point?

          22   A.  (Indicates) This.

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It's okay for you.

          24   A.  Sorry, sir.  It's that (indicates).

          25   MR THOMAS:  I wonder if Mr Scott could indicate with the




           1       mouse where the officer just indicated --

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.

           3   MR THOMAS:  -- so we can all see where the officer

           4       indicated.  Thank you.

           5           You accept this, do you not: there can be no good

           6       reason whatsoever for any officer to have entered that

           7       minicab; do you accept that?

           8   A.  Yes, I don't see why anybody would go into the minicab.

           9   Q.  No, and indeed, you being the -- for the moment that you

          10       were there in charge of what I'm going to call the

          11       "crime scene" -- I'm using the expression "crime scene"

          12       and I am not particularly focusing on the fact that Mark

          13       Duggan was shot, but this was the crime scene because

          14       there was the recovery of a firearm, you were on

          15       a criminal operation to seize firearms, so it was a --

          16   A.  I understand what you're saying.

          17   Q.  You understand what I'm saying, okay.  So there's no two

          18       ways about this.  This was a crime scene, right.  The

          19       minicab, bearing in mind the intelligence that you had

          20       been privy to about he's got into the minicab with a gun

          21       and all the rest of it, if this case was to go to court,

          22       and I'm thinking about things like Kevin

          23       Hutchinson-Foster and all the rest of it, yes --

          24   A.  Yes, sir.

          25   Q.  -- it would be of the utmost importance to ensure that




           1       the minicab, which was said to have a firearm inside it,

           2       remained sterile?

           3   A.  Absolutely, sir, yes.

           4   Q.  To be clear about this, none of your officers -- it's

           5       not your evidence, is it, that any of your officers

           6       approached you and asked for permission to go into the

           7       minicab, is it?

           8   A.  No, nobody approached me and asked for permission, sir,

           9       no.

          10   Q.  In fact, so far as you are aware, nobody has given any

          11       good reason for having entered the minicab?

          12   A.  Not to me, sir, no.

          13   Q.  Now, I just want to play that short footage?

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Play it on, yes.

          15             (Video footage was played to the court)

          16   MR THOMAS:  If you just focus on white t-shirt man/white

          17       shirt man, he walks around.  Pause it there.

          18                    (The video footage ended)

          19           He's in between the Bravo car, which was involved in

          20       the hard stop, and the minicab?

          21   A.  Yes, sir.

          22   Q.  That is where -- just to make sure that we all

          23       understand your evidence -- that is where you say the

          24       taxi driver was on the floor?

          25   A.  Certainly he was on the floor there, yes.




           1   Q.  I am not challenging that, I'm just making sure that

           2       I've understood your evidence.

           3   A.  Yes, that's where I saw him.  He was sitting at the --

           4   Q.  So, white shirt man, when he goes to that side, the

           5       first thing that he would see, if he wanted to enter the

           6       vehicle on that side, would be the taxi driver there?

           7   A.  Sorry.

           8   Q.  The first thing that white shirt man would see, as he is

           9       standing there, would be the taxi driver?

          10   A.  On the ground, sir?

          11   Q.  Yes.

          12   A.  Yes -- well -- or the officer that's with him.

          13   Q.  Let's play on.

          14             (Video footage was played to the court)

          15           He comes back, he goes round to the other side.  You

          16       see, I'm going to suggest that, at this point in time,

          17       the clear inference is white shirt man -- there you go

          18       he's just come out he's gone into the minicab and come

          19       out again.  Now, you were there on that side of the

          20       pavement, and here he is, he's going -- look, pause it

          21       there.

          22                    (The video footage ended)

          23           He's having a nice cosy chat with you, what are you

          24       talking about?

          25   A.  Sir, he's certainly talking to me.  He could be talking




           1       about anything, cordons --

           2   Q.  You are not talking about the weather.

           3   A.  I didn't see him in the minicab, sir, if that's what

           4       you're asking.  I cannot remember exactly what I'm

           5       talking about but I'm sure it's something to do with the

           6       scene and preserving the scene and making sure

           7       everything's being done that should be done.

           8   Q.  Z51, I'm going to ask you this question once and I am

           9       not going to repeat it: you were on the pavement right

          10       on the side of the minicab where white t-shirt man,

          11       I suggest, went in.  He comes over and he has

          12       a conversation with you.  Tell us what you were

          13       discussing.

          14   A.  Sir, this is two years ago.  How am I going to remember

          15       exactly what I was discussing with -- I would imagine it

          16       was something to do with preserving the scene.  It

          17       certainly wasn't to do with anybody telling me they'd

          18       been in the minicab, if that's what you're asking me.

          19   Q.  Can I be specific and make some suggestions to you to

          20       see whether or not I prompt your memory?

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  No, I think that you've asked him

          22       enough really.  I think he says he's got no memory.

          23   MR THOMAS:  Let me move on.

          24           Can we play on a bit more?

          25             (Video footage was played to the court)




           1           So he leaves you, he walks back to where V59 is, and

           2       R31 is.  Just pause there.

           3                    (The video footage ended)

           4           The one thing we can be clear about, he's not

           5       offering any first aid to anybody, is he?  You can see

           6       that; would you agree?

           7   A.  Yes, sir.  The first aid is being done by two other

           8       officers.

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Where he is now, that's really where

          10       W42 is?

          11   A.  He's talking with the officer with W42, that's correct.

          12   MR THOMAS:  Let's play on.

          13             (Video footage was played to the court)

          14           Again, there's a discussion there.  We saw this on

          15       the other video with the multiple coloured arrows.

          16       Let's just pause it there.

          17                    (The video footage ended)

          18           Let me ask you this: you see, as Mr Underwood

          19       indicated earlier on today, and Mr Mansfield took up

          20       subsequently, very shortly after this, this is when the

          21       gun was found.

          22   A.  I found the gun, sir, yes.

          23   Q.  Was the gun planted?

          24   A.  Sir, I've already said to Mr Mansfield that --

          25   Q.  Forgive me for asking --




           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  No, let him answer.

           2   A.  Are you going to let me answer, sir, because it's

           3       an outrageous allegation.  I'm under oath here, I know

           4       you are not but I am under oath and I am under oath to

           5       tell the truth to this jury and the truth is I found

           6       that firearm exactly when it was when the IPCC got

           7       there, sir.

           8   MR THOMAS:  So you cannot help us with how the gun got

           9       there?

          10   A.  No, sir.

          11   Q.  All right.  Help me with this -- help me with this --

          12       you have your water.

          13           You told us, Z51, I want to take you back to the

          14       point where you have arrived at Ferry Lane.  The hard

          15       stop has been performed, so you've got the Alpha car,

          16       the Bravo car and the Charlie car boxing the minicab in.

          17       The hard stop occurs, the officers run out, shouting

          18       "Attack, attack", or whatever the phraseology is, and

          19       then there comes a point when Mark Duggan gets out of

          20       the minicab.  That's the point I'm taking you to, right?

          21   A.  I understand, sir, yes.

          22   Q.  You were sitting in the rear passenger seat of the Land

          23       Rover.

          24   A.  Correct, sir.

          25   Q.  Right.  But you could see Mark Duggan.  You couldn't see




           1       all of him, but you could see some of him.

           2   A.  I could see from his shoulders up.

           3   Q.  Right.  Then you see -- you hear shots and you see Mark

           4       Duggan go down and then he's out of your view, correct?

           5   A.  It was more everybody sort of went down, not just

           6       Mark Duggan.

           7   Q.  Not just Mark Duggan, everybody goes down.  So you see

           8       him from the shoulders up?

           9   A.  Yes.  The last time I saw him, sir, was as he came out

          10       of the cab.

          11   Q.  You can see him from the shoulders up, you hear shots

          12       and then everybody goes down, correct?

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  That's the point in time I want to ask you about.  At no

          15       stage, is this right, do you see, before Mark Duggan

          16       goes down, his arms being raised as if he's thrown

          17       anything; would that be fair?

          18   A.  I didn't see his arms, sir.

          19   Q.  I appreciate that, and you probably answered my

          20       question --

          21   A.  They weren't above shoulder height, put it like that.

          22   Q.  You certainly don't see it from your vantage point, any

          23       objects going over that -- being thrown over that fence,

          24       do you?

          25   A.  I didn't see anything over that fence, no.




           1   MR THOMAS:  Just bear with me one second.  (Pause)

           2           Thank you very much.  That's all I ask.

           3   MR UNDERWOOD:  Could I intervene on one thing?

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes.

           5   MR UNDERWOOD:  These photographs Mr Mansfield kindly handed

           6       out which had some timings on, we can give you the real

           7       times, give the jury the real times for them.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That would be really useful.

           9   MR UNDERWOOD:  In case anybody else has further questions on

          10       them.  These are the ones behind C13.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Let's write on them the proper

          12       times.

          13   MR UNDERWOOD:  Number 1 is 6.18.08.

          14           Number 2 is 6.18.09.

          15           Number 3 is 6.18.20.

          16           Number 4 is 6.18.21.

          17           Number 5 is 6.18.26.

          18           Number 6 is 6.18.31.

          19           Number 7 is 6.18.36.

          20           Number 8 is 6.19.14.

          21           Number 9 is 6.19.20.

          22           Number 10 is -- they are both the same time there --

          23       6.19.29.

          24           Number 11 is the same, 6.19.29.

          25           Number 12 is 6.20.09.




           1           Number 13 is 6.20.16.

           2           Number 14 is 6.28.50.

           3           I hope everyone will take that from me for the

           4       moment.

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That's very helpful.  Thank you very

           6       much.

           7           As you've heard, members of the jury, we will

           8       hopefully be able to get the whole of that video

           9       enhanced as best we can.  This may be the best we can

          10       but we're trying to see if we can get it any better and

          11       it will be available to you in full.

          12           Right.  I believe -- Mr Stern, please go next.  I've

          13       been given a list which puts Mr Keith before you this

          14       time but I don't know if there's -- but you go first.

          15                      Questions by MR STERN

          16   MR STERN:  Thank you.  I'm grateful to my learned friends

          17       for that timing, it's very helpful, thank you.

          18           Officer, unfortunately we live in a society where

          19       armed police are necessary, as we know.

          20   A.  That's correct, yes.

          21   Q.  But nevertheless, as you have told us, you provide

          22       a warning to the officers and make sure that the

          23       officers have a warning at any briefing that you carry

          24       out.

          25   A.  That's right, yes.




           1   Q.  Presumably over the eight years that you've been

           2       involved in doing this, that has been your practice?

           3   A.  That's right, yes.

           4   Q.  It's not just a matter of speaking the words of the

           5       warning, that they must obviously use their

           6       weapons/firearms as a last resort, but those are words

           7       that are taken seriously by the firearms officers?

           8   A.  Absolutely, sir, yes.

           9   Q.  They take very seriously the safety of not only the

          10       public but the suspect and, of course, their colleagues?

          11   A.  That's right, yes, indeed.

          12   Q.  Can I ask you about the location, and I promise I'm

          13       going to do this quickly because you've been asked a lot

          14       of questions about it?  Can we not deal with it in

          15       a hypothetical sense, but just with the information that

          16       you had at that particular time, on 4 August?

          17   A.  Yes, sir.

          18   Q.  I think what's been put to you is that at 5.40 it would

          19       have been possible or, I think the way it was put,

          20       "a realistic viable proposition" that at that time you

          21       and all the armed officers and the surveillance officers

          22       all meet in the vicinity of Vicarage Road.

          23   A.  Yes, sir.

          24   Q.  What do you say about that proposition?

          25   A.  Sir, I've thought about this an awful lot over the last




           1       two years and I honestly can't think we could have done

           2       anything better than we did on the day.  I think the

           3       surveillance officers did a excellent job to locate and

           4       identify the taxi.  I think the CO19 officers did

           5       an excellent job to get in the position to put

           6       an interception in.  I think they picked the location

           7       for the interception as well as any location I've seen

           8       in my eight years, and I think the reason that the

           9       outcome wasn't different was because of Mark Duggan.  He

          10       chose not to comply with the orders he was given and

          11       that's honestly what I believe.

          12   Q.  Well, what I was going to say to you is this -- ask you,

          13       I should say, rather than say to you -- is the location

          14       critical for the end result or is it the threat that is

          15       the most significant factor in relation to the end

          16       result?

          17   A.  It depends on the threat, sir.  You know, it's very nice

          18       to get a location that's safe for everybody, for police,

          19       subjects and the public, which is what we achieved.

          20           Obviously, if I got intelligence that somebody was

          21       going to go and kill somebody, then the location goes

          22       out the window really and it's a matter of putting the

          23       interception in straightaway and probably a lot more --

          24       you know, in quick time.

          25   Q.  Would the risk have been the same if Mark Duggan had




           1       acted as he did, if it had been in a different location?

           2   A.  I'm not sure I get your --

           3   Q.  Well, if somebody poses a threat with a firearm, is that

           4       threat any different depending on which location it's

           5       in?

           6   A.  No, no, absolutely not.  I see your point, sir.

           7   Q.  Now, you say it was the best location you had seen in

           8       your eight years.  Why in your view did you come to that

           9       conclusion?

          10   A.  Sir, I've seen a lot in locations that -- the problem is

          11       it's London, isn't it, and you get an awful lot of

          12       people in areas that -- and the roads are busy, the

          13       roads are narrow in places, it just depends where you

          14       can do it.  But that particular one, that was the best

          15       one I can remember.

          16   Q.  At 5.40, did you have information as to a particular

          17       address at which you could carry out what's called

          18       a containment?

          19   A.  Sir, I never had information of any address I could have

          20       carried out a containment.

          21   Q.  In any event, did you have any information as to who may

          22       be at a particular address or how many people may be at

          23       a particular address?

          24   A.  No, sir, no.

          25   Q.  At the scene on 4 August, you said you heard a lot of




           1       commands that you would expect to hear?

           2   A.  Yes, sir.

           3   Q.  You said you just remember a lot of shouting.

           4   A.  Yes.  Sir, I couldn't say exact words but it was

           5       commands that I would expect to hear, so -- it's hard to

           6       paraphrase that any better but --

           7   Q.  Yes, I completely understand.  But the position really

           8       is this, is it, that you would not expect to hear or

           9       recall every single word that was spoken?

          10   A.  Not at all, no.

          11   Q.  But the general impression you got was "Stop, armed

          12       police", words to that effect?

          13   A.  Yes -- commands.

          14   Q.  If you had have heard someone say "Put the gun down",

          15       you said you would expect to remember that, but you

          16       can't say, as I understand it, that no one said that?

          17   A.  Well, no, absolutely, sir, if you look at the

          18       photographs, I'm in a Range Rover, I think it is, and

          19       I'm -- you know, quite a bit away but I could hear

          20       commands and shouting.  I couldn't make -- I can't tell

          21       you any of the commands.

          22   Q.  Now, you stayed in the vehicle and the reason you stayed

          23       in the vehicle, just in case anyone doesn't understand

          24       this, is because you are not an armed officer?

          25   A.  No, absolutely.  We're told to stay until we're called




           1       out of the vehicle.

           2   Q.  So it would be dangerous for you to go because you are

           3       unarmed --

           4   A.  That's right.

           5   Q.  -- and it's right that the armed officers take control

           6       of the situation?

           7   A.  Absolutely.

           8   Q.  Next, let me ask you this: did you at any time prior to

           9       finding the gun, see anyone go into the minicab?

          10   A.  No I didn't, sir.

          11   Q.  You were there or thereabouts?

          12   A.  Yes, I was.  As I've said, I'm in command of the whole

          13       situation at that time, so I was there or thereabouts.

          14   Q.  Yes.  Could you please have a look at CD664.  You looked

          15       at it a little while earlier.

          16   A.  Which one is that?

          17   Q.  CD664.  Now, I think you told us that this is you on the

          18       right-hand side of the photograph, yes?

          19   A.  Yes, sir.

          20   Q.  That is you pointing.  Is that the point at which --

          21       pardon the pun -- you found the gun?

          22   A.  Absolutely, sir, yes.

          23   Q.  At that time, that photograph was taken by a civilian

          24       who we're going to hear from.  Did you know that anyone

          25       was taking a photograph at that time?




           1   A.  No, not at all, sir, no.

           2   Q.  Was it a charade that you were pointing to something on

           3       the ground there?

           4   A.  No, sir, as I said, I was on the phone and it's sort of

           5       an automatic reaction when you're talking to someone, as

           6       if they're there with you.

           7   Q.  You told us that what caused you to go and look for the

           8       gun and finding it, as we can see in that picture, was

           9       that you heard one or more firearms officer -- I presume

          10       you cannot say who --

          11   A.  I can't honestly remember which one.

          12   Q.  -- saying that they couldn't find the gun.

          13   A.  They hadn't located it, yes.

          14   Q.  They hadn't located the gun.  Were they talking to you

          15       or just speaking amongst themselves?

          16   A.  I just heard it -- you know, I don't think it was

          17       directed direct at me but I heard somebody say that.

          18   Q.  So it follows, does it, to your understanding of that

          19       time, that they were expecting to see a gun --

          20   A.  They were, yes.  That was my understanding.

          21   Q.  -- that they hadn't found it on Mark Duggan --

          22   A.  Yes, sir.

          23   Q.  -- and that caused you to go and carry out the

          24       expedition we can see, that ended up with you just round

          25       the back of the wall there.




           1   A.  That's correct.

           2   Q.  The jury have been there so they know where it is.

           3           Did you ever hear an officer say that Mark Duggan

           4       had fired a shot at any officer?

           5   A.  No, sir.

           6   Q.  You said you were shocked, I think, to hear it on the

           7       news in the evening.

           8   A.  Yes, sir.

           9   Q.  By that time, I think the IPCC were in control of both

          10       the scene and indeed the investigation.

          11   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.

          12   Q.  So, just in case anybody were to think otherwise, this

          13       was not information that had been put out, as

          14       I understand it, by the Metropolitan Police?

          15   A.  I'm not sure how the information got out, sir.

          16   Q.  All right, that's very fair.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  When you pointed at the gun in that

          18       picture that we see, did you -- you then instructed

          19       someone to -- obviously aware of it.

          20   A.  Yes, I went straight back to one of my officers and said

          21       can you get a box or something to put over there because

          22       I know we carry equipment in the back of the cars for

          23       exhibits and stuff like that.  So what I was asking was

          24       to get an exhibit box or something to cover the gun.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You didn't want the gun moved, did




           1       you?

           2   A.  No, I knew I had to preserve it.

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  And keep it in the same place?

           4   A.  The gun never moved, because I checked before I handed

           5       the scene over that the gun was still -- or certainly it

           6       was underneath a plant pot --

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Who did you hand the scene over to?

           8   A.  Another SCD8 Detective Inspector who was on call.

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you.  Sorry.

          10   MR STERN:  No, no, thank you, it's helpful.

          11           Can I ask that we look at a photo, but before it's

          12       put up, it's CE310, it's a slightly sensitive photo, so

          13       anyone who wants to leave --

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Not the jury, certainly.

          15   MR STERN:  I don't mean the jury and I don't mean my learned

          16       friends -- there doesn't seem to be anybody else here.

          17       That makes it even easier.  CE0310, thank you very much.

          18           The reason I've asked just to look at this, although

          19       there's a number of photographs, we can see that

          20       an officer in a white shirt is taking a film,

          21       a camcorder, of the first aid?

          22   A.  Yes, sir.

          23   Q.  That camcorder film is in existence?

          24   A.  Yes, sir.

          25   Q.  Have you seen it?




           1   A.  I haven't sir.

           2   Q.  You know there was one and you know it exists.

           3   A.  I remember that officer taking the footage, yes.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We have seen him on our

           5       photograph 13 -- sorry to interrupt you, Mr Stern.

           6           In the jury bundle behind divider 1 at

           7       photograph 13.  We have looked at that.  That shows that

           8       officer.  While we just have that photograph open in

           9       front of us, do we see in the background the D vehicle

          10       that you were in, the control vehicle?

          11   A.  Can you show that again?

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  No, sorry, the one on the jury

          13       bundle not on the screen.

          14   A.  Number 13?

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes.  We see your vehicle that

          16       you're travelling in.  I just want to get a picture, you

          17       are the one -- when you're giving your evidence about

          18       what you see Mark Duggan, head and shoulders, you are

          19       sitting in the back of that vehicle looking towards the

          20       cameraman of this photograph.

          21   A.  That's right, sir.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That's your view.

          23   A.  I think what happened was, when he came out of his cab,

          24       the cab is higher up.  That's when I saw him and when

          25       I stepped on the pavement I lost sight of him.




           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That's why I wanted to ask you about

           2       this.  When you look at the photograph, we can see your

           3       vehicle that you're in, the Range Rover, or whatever it

           4       may be there, and you're behind the driver, aren't you?

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  So the roof of the cab does not get

           7       in the way at all, does it?

           8   A.  No, not the roof of it.  That's what I say, when he

           9       steps out of the cab I can see his head and shoulders,

          10       when he comes out of the cab.  But when he gets onto the

          11       pavement, if he notice there, the step on the cab is

          12       higher up, you see the floor of the cab?  So when he was

          13       just coming out of the cab he was higher up and I saw

          14       his face then.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I see, stepping up, but when he

          16       comes down on the pavement, he comes lower down.  That's

          17       when you lose him.  Obviously, the car between yours and

          18       the cab, their doors are opening and people are coming

          19       out of the C car.

          20   MR STERN:  There are people coming out of the front of your

          21       car while the vehicle is there.

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  At the same time, although it's not that clear on this

          24       picture, it's right, isn't it, that there is a slight

          25       gradient in that road leading --




           1   A.  That's correct --

           2   Q.  -- to the minicab.  I'm sure people will remember that.

           3       The reason I was looking at the other photo, interesting

           4       though that one is, CE310, is because from this photo

           5       you can see virtually nothing that's going on behind the

           6       minicab, you can see just a few people down on the

           7       ground.

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  When we look at the film as we will have to I'm afraid,

          10       in a moment or two, that activity is carrying on behind

          11       the minicab, although it cannot be seen.

          12   A.  Yes, sir.  Just if it helps the Inquest, I believe that

          13       is Dempsey beside me there in that photograph.

          14   Q.  Yes.  That's the other reason I wanted to ask you about

          15       that photograph.  That's Mr Dempsey, DS Dempsey, it

          16       looks like a long sleeved shirt, does it?  Anyway,

          17       another white shirt.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  So that looks

          19       more like his body shape, does it?

          20   A.  It does, yes.

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I think you were being very polite

          22       about it.  We are not looking forward to seeing him but

          23       anyway that, you believe, is him.

          24   A.  That's who --

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It may be that it glides (?) in when




           1       we see the film.

           2   MR STERN:  Just before that picture disappears, you are

           3       holding something in your hand, which is the other

           4       reason I wanted to ask you about this picture.  What is

           5       it you are holding?  Just so people remember, you are

           6       next to the people with the white top, next to the Bravo

           7       car, just in front of the ambulance car.

           8   A.  I've done a statement regarding that.  I believe that's

           9       the intelligence log that ZZ17 handed to me to sign

          10       before he handed it back to SOCA.

          11   Q.  Right.  So you've got some papers in your hand --

          12   A.  It's actually a booklet.

          13   Q.  All right.  It's a booklet made of paper.

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  Right.  In your left hand, are you holding a phone or

          16       radio or something like that, as well?

          17   A.  I've probably got my phone in my hand.

          18   Q.  So you've got that black item of the phone and then on

          19       top you've got the white book.

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  Now, the way you described it in your statement, of the

          22       exit of Mark Duggan, you said:

          23           "I then saw Mark Duggan exit the rear nearside door

          24       and run towards the armed officers who were running

          25       towards the rear of the taxi."




           1   A.  That is correct, yes.

           2   Q.  Does that give you a better recollection of what

           3       happened?

           4   A.  Yes.  It all happened -- they came out of their vehicle,

           5       I would imagine it was the two in the Charlie vehicle,

           6       but I'm guessing there, but from where they were, as he

           7       was coming out of the taxi.  So they it sort of

           8       converged on each other about a metre and a half, maybe,

           9       he might have got a metre and a half from --

          10   Q.  We'll hear, of course, that the whole incident,

          11       basically from the vehicle stopping to Mark Duggan going

          12       to the ground was a maximum of ten seconds.

          13   A.  Yes, sir, it was all very, very quick, yes.

          14   Q.  Q63: do you have the name of Q63 on a piece of paper in

          15       front of you?

          16   A.  No, sir.

          17   Q.  I thought Ms Kemish had given you a list?

          18   A.  Sorry.  Sorry, I had another list, didn't I?

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You have two lists there.

          20   A.  Let's see if I can find it.  Yes, I have it, yes.

          21   MR STERN:  It's not one I want you to lose so perhaps that

          22       can be taken --

          23   A.  I see Q63, sir, yes.

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You see the name there?

          25   A.  Yes.




           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Do you recognise the name?

           2   A.  No, sir.

           3   MR STERN:  You don't recognise the name?

           4   A.  No, sir.

           5   Q.  R31, you have already told us that you have looked at

           6       that name and you don't recognise that person.

           7   A.  Yes, I don't know that person.

           8   Q.  Can we look at the DVD again?  I'm afraid not all of us

           9       have had an opportunity to see it with the arrows on

          10       many times.  It would be helpful if we could have it

          11       from 4.46, in other words the chime in with my learned

          12       friend's Mr Mansfield's stills.

          13           4.41 would be perfectly ample.  Thank you very much.

          14       Just play it, yes, that would be very helpful.

          15             (Video footage was played to the court)

          16           Now, there it is.  I think the position is, or is

          17       being mentioned, that because the man in the white shirt

          18       goes out of sight of the camera, therefore he must have

          19       gone into the cab.  I think that's what was being put to

          20       you, and that then he goes up to you --

          21   A.  Yes, sir.

          22   Q.  -- and that somehow something happened whereby he gave

          23       you the gun, you then put it down on the grass.  I think

          24       that's essentially what it must come to.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I think a number of different




           1       scenarios have been suggested.

           2   MR STERN:  I think that's one of them, that I'm interested

           3       in, there may be others as well.

           4   A.  Sir, that's nonsense, absolute --

           5   Q.  Then you've pre-empted my question.  Can we just play

           6       on, please, because we can see what happens here.  Just

           7       tell us where you are, please?

           8   A.  Is that me wandering about on the phone there, just gone

           9       behind that sign, I think?

          10   Q.  So we cannot see you behind the sign.

          11   A.  You can usually see me by my head.

          12   Q.  I didn't want to make a personal comment, but also it's

          13       quite difficult to see anything in this, for me.  You're

          14       the gentleman apparently with the blue arrow --

          15   A.  I think I'm back over there now.

          16   Q.  -- in the other film.  Leaving you aside for the moment,

          17       just keep pointing to where you are if you will?

          18   A.  I think that's (indicates) here.

          19   Q.  When you say here, where is that?

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Where the other arrow has been put

          21       on the computer.

          22   MR STERN:  Where the mouse is, thank you.  You think that's

          23       not DS Dempsey?

          24   A.  I don't think that is, sir, I think that man's got blue

          25       jeans on, I've got a feeling Dempsey hasn't.




           1   Q.  I mean I don't want to give evidence but I think it

           2       could be Q63.

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  All right.

           4   MR STERN:  I say could be, that's all.  I'm saying no more.

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Was that a question?

           6   MR STERN:  No.  I'm just providing assistance, that's all.

           7   A.  The priority here is to try and get the cordons in and

           8       to stop -- as you can see down in the bottom corner

           9       there's quite a lot of people gathering.

          10   Q.  Yes.  Is it unusual for people to go over and, I think

          11       as Mr Thomas puts it, "have a cosy chat" amongst each

          12       other?

          13   A.  Sir, certainly as the commanding officer I would expect

          14       people to come and chat to me.  I need to know exactly

          15       what's going on and who has been informed and who else

          16       needs to be informed.  At one stage, I was asked where

          17       the helicopter could land, I remember that, and we were

          18       trying to work out exactly where, where we were not

          19       going to -- because there were people gathering and we

          20       didn't want to cause any more --

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  If you are trying to keep a cordon

          22       and keep the public away and not disturb the crime

          23       scene --

          24                    (The video footage ended)

          25           -- the man in the white shirt does a very good job




           1       of walking around all over the place, doesn't he?

           2   A.  That's exactly right.  Obviously, we did a right job

           3       because a man got convicted for the -- so we secured

           4       evidence around the crime scene, because a man has been

           5       convicted of supplying that firearm.

           6   MR STERN:  I was going to say, you were asked about keeping

           7       this crime scene secure for a criminal trial of

           8       Mr Hutchinson-Foster.

           9   A.  That's correct.

          10   Q.  But all that evidence was used before the trial of

          11       Mr Hutchinson-Foster?

          12   A.  Yes, sir.

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I mean, to be quite direct, if

          14       Mr Duggan had survived then he might have been facing

          15       a trial and there may have been a lot of important

          16       evidence --

          17   A.  Absolutely, sir.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- around the minicab on the

          19       pavement and everywhere, which might have been important

          20       in that trial.

          21   A.  There would have been, sir, definitely.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  So marching up and down in that way

          23       might have disturbed that, might it not?

          24   A.  It depends.  The minicab is a crime scene itself so, you

          25       know, I'm not sure exactly what he was doing, whether he




           1       was helping with the first aid or --

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  There we are.

           3           Mr Stern?

           4   MR STERN:  Thank you.  Did you see a man climb over the

           5       fence --

           6   A.  I didn't, sir, no.

           7   Q.  You didn't see that on the film?

           8   A.  I saw it on the film.  I didn't actually see him --

           9   Q.  That's R31, we'll hear, again I don't want to give

          10       evidence but I think we've already heard that, someone's

          11       already indicated that.  It's R31 going over the

          12       fence --

          13   A.  Yes, sir.

          14   Q.  -- and I think we can see that you come round the other

          15       side --

          16   A.  Yes, sir.

          17   Q.  -- and find the gun and he's looking along the bushes

          18       along the way?

          19   A.  Yes, sir, yes.

          20   MR STERN:  Thank you very much.

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you, Mr Stern.

          22           Yes, Mr Keith?

          23                      Questions by MR KEITH

          24   MR KEITH:  Just a handful of points, please?  These

          25       questions are on behalf of the Metropolitan Police




           1       Service.  You were asked about the benefits of

           2       recovering, intercepting firearms, removing them from

           3       the streets.  It's fair to say, isn't it, that tackling

           4       gun crime is a huge priority?

           5   A.  It is.  It is a priority, sir, yes, indeed.

           6   Q.  There are a number of ways in which gun crime can be

           7       tackled, but one of them, in which you play a very

           8       important part, is the preparedness to undertake armed

           9       operations to intercept and recover guns.

          10   A.  That's correct, yes.

          11   Q.  They require a great deal of preparation, work, effort,

          12       no small risk to the officers themselves --

          13   A.  No, sir, that's right.

          14   Q.  -- but they have to be done.

          15   A.  They do indeed, sir, yes.

          16   Q.  You were asked about the intelligence to which you were

          17       privy and the way in which you recorded it.  You said

          18       that there is a type of intelligence that cannot be

          19       recorded.  You do not set those parameters, do you?

          20   A.  No, sir, I don't.

          21   Q.  They are set by people more senior than us and in

          22       particular, in this case, the intelligence with which we

          23       are concerned came from another organisation --

          24   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.

          25   Q.  -- SOCA.  In relation to the planning for the operation,




           1       you sent the form FA2A that we've seen, along with the

           2       FA5 to the Strategic Firearms Commander, Ms Mallon, on

           3       2 August --

           4   A.  That's correct.

           5   Q.  -- at around about 10 o'clock in the morning, 0958.

           6   A.  That's correct.

           7   Q.  We've heard from her that that provided her with

           8       sufficient information, in fact, to make her decision.

           9       But did she contact you, nevertheless, again later that

          10       day on 2 August and again on the 3 August?

          11   A.  Yes, sir, I had a meeting with her and we went through

          12       everything, yes.

          13   Q.  What did you understand to be the purpose of her request

          14       to meet you face to face on the 2nd and again to call

          15       you on the 3rd?

          16   A.  She wanted to make sure that everything was -- you know,

          17       she was authorising an operation and she wanted to know

          18       more about it.  That's normal.

          19   Q.  It was, I think, suggested to you that you should be at

          20       the base every time you go out in advance of the start

          21       date, perhaps to prepare yourself or in case

          22       intelligence changes.

          23   A.  Yes, sir.

          24   Q.  Your day-to-day operational duties depend, to a very

          25       large extent, on intelligence changing all the time?




           1   A.  That's exactly correct, sir, yes.

           2   Q.  Could you possibly hold yourself at Quicksilver base

           3       24/7 in case intelligence changes on a minute-by-minute

           4       basis?

           5   A.  No, sir.  I have to say the team that deal with this

           6       type of criminals, who are very is unpredictable and

           7       chaotic, do an awful lot of hours to try and do the best

           8       they can to take firearms off the street but you cannot

           9       be working 24/7.

          10   Q.  I think we've seen in the ACPO and the National Police

          11       Improvement Agency document, that we looked at a few

          12       days ago, that intelligence is rarely complete, the

          13       picture was rarely clear, but decisions simply have to

          14       be made on the information available at the time.

          15   A.  That's right, sir, yes.

          16   Q.  It's the whole purpose of a plan, isn't it, to cater for

          17       eventualities and possible contingencies?

          18   A.  That's absolutely correct.

          19   Q.  You cannot stay at a base or stay in a perpetual state

          20       of readiness in case something changes?

          21   A.  No, sir.  What happened on the 4th happens quite often

          22       on Trident type work.

          23   Q.  If you all had to go in advance of an operational start

          24       date, start time, in order to prepare for something that

          25       might or might not happen, that would make rather




           1       a mockery of the start time of the operation?

           2   A.  Correct, sir, yes.

           3   Q.  You called, of course, the Strategic Firearms Commander

           4       around about 5.30 because, as you've perceived it, there

           5       was an obligation to inform her of the change in

           6       intelligence and to check that the authorisation

           7       continued.

           8   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.

           9   Q.  Even though you were under very real time constraints

          10       that was an important thing to do and you did it.

          11   A.  Absolutely, sir, yes, there is a chain of command and it

          12       was very important I keep the Strategic Firearms

          13       Commander up to date.

          14   Q.  Did she ask you any questions or did she just listen to

          15       what you had to say?

          16   A.  I think it was a very quick phone call, sir.  We had

          17       a quick conversation, I gave her the update of

          18       intelligence and checked that it was still -- authorised

          19       and the operation hadn't significantly changed, so the

          20       tactics that we had discussed at length on the 2nd were

          21       still the same.

          22   Q.  For exactly the same reason, you called her again after

          23       the shooting because she was and remained the Strategic

          24       Firearms Commander.

          25   A.  That's correct, yes.




           1   Q.  The note that you've been shown broadly reflects what

           2       you told her.

           3           In relation to the propositions repeatedly put to

           4       you as to what alternative steps you might have been

           5       able to take, is this the position: when the minicab and

           6       Mr Duggan were going to pick up a gun you didn't know of

           7       course where the car was, the minicab was; you didn't

           8       know the location of the destination?

           9   A.  No, sir.

          10   Q.  You didn't know the place of the handover --

          11   A.  No, sir.

          12   Q.  -- if there was to be one?  You didn't know if it would

          13       be in a house or in a street?

          14   A.  That's correct, sir.

          15   Q.  You didn't know who would hand it over?

          16   A.  No, sir.

          17   Q.  You didn't know how many people would be present?

          18   A.  No, sir.

          19   Q.  You didn't know whether they would be armed?

          20   A.  We didn't know, sir, no.

          21   Q.  You didn't know whether there would be public

          22       surrounding them?

          23   A.  Correct, sir.

          24   Q.  You knew very little?

          25   A.  That's right, sir.




           1   Q.  So was it safe or sensible to consider doing a hard stop

           2       or a containment there and then, as opposed to waiting

           3       to locate and track the vehicle?

           4   A.  It wouldn't have been safe to do it there, sir, at all,

           5       no.

           6   MR KEITH:  Thank you very much.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you, Mr Keith.

           8           Yes, Ms Leek?

           9   MS LEEK:  No thank you, sir.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Ms Dobbin?

          11   MS DOBBIN:  No thank you.

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Glasson?

          13   MR GLASSON:  No thank you, sir.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Butt?

          15                       Questions by MR BUTT

          16   MR BUTT:  Z51, the lawyers in this case have had the facts

          17       about 4 August 2011 for many months or, in fact, years.

          18       How long did you have between the intelligence update,

          19       which you got from ZZ17, and going to amber on the

          20       4 August?

          21   A.  I think it was about 30 minutes, around about that.

          22   Q.  In that time, you made the decisions that you did based

          23       on your training and your experience; is that right?

          24   A.  That's correct, yes.

          25   Q.  In terms of training, first of all, how do you become




           1       a Tactical Firearms Commander; are you trained for that

           2       role by the police?

           3   A.  That's right, yes, I have done numerous courses because

           4       I have -- training has developed over the years so I've

           5       kept myself up to date with the development training.

           6   Q.  There's regular refresher training for Tactical Firearms

           7       Commanders; is that right?

           8   A.  That's right.  I did my latest refresher training just

           9       on the March before this, in 2011.

          10   Q.  In terms of experience, you have told the jury you've

          11       been a Tactical Firearms Commander for eight years; is

          12       that right?

          13   A.  That's right, yes.

          14   Q.  Nationally, there are lots of Tactical Firearms

          15       Commander in the Met and in different forces; is that

          16       right?

          17   A.  That's correct, yes.

          18   Q.  How many of those commanders are actually dealing as

          19       often as you were with situations like this: armed

          20       interventions/interceptions?

          21   A.  Not many, sir.  I would say the Met, between Trident

          22       SCD8 and SCD7, the flying squad, would be the busiest

          23       Tactical Firearms Commanders in the country.

          24   Q.  Having performed 20 or 30 of these sort of operations,

          25       is that a comparatively high number or a low number,




           1       nationally compared to firearms commanders?

           2   A.  That's a high number, sir.

           3   Q.  Can we turn then to 17.20 or so on 4 August 2011 and the

           4       suggestion that has been put to you and other officers

           5       is that CO19 should have been sent straight to Leyton or

           6       to a rendezvous point nearby; you're aware of that,

           7       aren't you?

           8   A.  I'm aware of that, yes.

           9   Q.  Mr Keith has covered with you all of the things you

          10       didn't know about the taxi, its occupants, where it was

          11       going and when things would happen.  You said it

          12       wouldn't be safe to send CO19 straight there at that

          13       time; is that right?

          14   A.  Absolutely, yes.

          15   Q.  In terms of your position, if you had done that which it

          16       is now suggested you should have done, and set off from

          17       where you were at 17.20, straight to Leyton, you would

          18       be going to an area you weren't familiar with; is that

          19       right?

          20   A.  That's correct, yes.

          21   Q.  You would have to be driving using your sirens and your

          22       lights; yes?

          23   A.  Yes, that's right, yes.

          24   Q.  It is obviously not safe to do that at great speed and

          25       try to read a map at the same time, is it?




           1   A.  No, that's very true.

           2   Q.  You would have to work out where you were going, learn

           3       the route and then set off or drive more slowly and

           4       check the map as you go; is that right?

           5   A.  That is right, yes.

           6   Q.  CO19, by contrast, would have been going with special,

           7       trained drivers who would know the routes in advance.

           8   A.  That's correct, yes.

           9   Q.  Is it safe to assume that CO19 would have got there

          10       before you?

          11   A.  Yes, they would have, yes.

          12   Q.  Could you have been sure, at 5.20, that you would have

          13       got there before 6 o'clock?

          14   A.  I couldn't be sure, sir.  I don't know that part of

          15       London at all, so there would have been a lot of

          16       stopping and reading the map to get there.

          17   Q.  Of course, in the real world, you wouldn't have any idea

          18       if something was going to happen at 6 o'clock or earlier

          19       or later, would you?

          20   A.  Absolutely, no.

          21   Q.  Let's imagine a situation in which CO19 get there before

          22       you and there's a need for urgent action and it's been

          23       suggested that, well, you could give a briefing over the

          24       radio or you could perform your job in your car.

          25           Can we look at page CD10916, this is the ACPO




           1       manual.  CD010916, 5.51:

           2           "Tactical Firearms Commanders should be located

           3       where they can best actively monitor events and direct

           4       police actions; this may require them to be near to the

           5       scene, in a command vehicle, or in the control room,

           6       thereby enabling them to maintain an effective command

           7       function."

           8           5.52:

           9           "Operational Firearms Commander should, as far as

          10       practicable, be located close to the officers that they

          11       are commanding."

          12           Did you think you would be complying with that

          13       guidance if you ended up in a situation in which you

          14       were stuck somewhere in between your destination point,

          15       and the CO19 officers in Leyton, in your car with the

          16       radio?

          17   A.  Not at all, sir, no.  That wouldn't be acceptable.

          18   Q.  What do you think would happen if there had been

          19       an intervention near Vicarage Road with you not present

          20       but trying to work out what's happening on the radio and

          21       Mr Duggan was shot?

          22   A.  Sir, I think there would be an awful lot of questions

          23       for me on why I would have commanded an operation in

          24       that -- such a risky and reckless manner.

          25   Q.  If you had your time again, would you prefer the




           1       interception to have taken place on Burchell Road or on

           2       Vicarage Road or on one of the streets very nearby

           3       there?

           4   A.  No, sir, as I say, I've given this a lot of thought over

           5       the last two years and the location where the

           6       interception was done was as good as any I've witnessed.

           7   Q.  What's unsuitable about Burchell Road and Vicarage Road?

           8   A.  Sir, it's a residential street, it's a dead end,

           9       there's -- it might have been school holidays, but there

          10       were schools in that area, it's just not a suitable --

          11       plus Vicarage Road is a one-way street, which most of

          12       the time means it's very narrow, because that's why they

          13       make them one-way streets.  It's just not a suitable

          14       area to do an interception.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Make sure your microphone is on,

          16       apparently you are not being picked up.

          17   MR BUTT:  What's the main difference between Ferry Lane,

          18       where the interception took place, and Vicarage Road or

          19       Burchell Road?

          20   A.  Well, (1) we know Mr Duggan is in the cab on his own,

          21       we've got the cab under control, we've got -- we've got

          22       a street with a bus lane so you can get past the vehicle

          23       and box it in in a safe environment.  You have to be

          24       able to get a vehicle in front to be able to box it in

          25       and that was easily done in Ferry Lane.




           1   Q.  In terms of armed surveillance on Kevin

           2       Hutchinson-Foster, the jury are now well aware that Mark

           3       Duggan was just one of six people who were targeted in

           4       Operation Dibri, yes?

           5   A.  That's right, yes.

           6   Q.  The intelligence that's coming in to ZZ17 isn't just

           7       concerning Mark Duggan --

           8   A.  Absolutely --

           9   Q.  -- it's Mark Duggan and the others, isn't it?

          10   A.  That's right, yes.

          11   Q.  Kevin Hutchinson-Foster might have been identified as

          12       an associate who might be involved in the supply of

          13       firearms with Mark Duggan but were the other people with

          14       the other subjects who were being identified as being

          15       possibly involved in the supply of firearms?

          16   A.  Yes, there was, sir, and I think the 4th is a good

          17       example where ZZ17 came in because somebody else was

          18       trying to take possession of a firearm.  He came in

          19       early to try and deal with that.

          20   Q.  It's been suggested there should have been armed

          21       surveillance put on Mr Hutchinson-Foster because there

          22       had been an aborted attempt or a plan the day before, to

          23       supply a firearm to Mr Duggan.  Would the police be able

          24       to put armed surveillance on everybody who falls into

          25       that category?




           1   A.  No, sir, not at all.

           2   Q.  Is that because they are woefully under-resourced or

           3       because that would be completely impractical due to the

           4       sheer number of people in that category?

           5   A.  It would be impractical to do that.  You couldn't do

           6       that.

           7   Q.  The whole point of Operation Dibri was to pick the six

           8       subjects who seemed most likely to take a firearm and

           9       direct the surveillance at them; is that right?

          10   A.  Yes, and it was also the six that we had the best

          11       intelligence on.

          12   Q.  Let's just say you had put armed surveillance on Kevin

          13       Hutchinson-Foster on 4 August.  Mr Mansfield suggested

          14       it could have been begun at 2 o'clock in the afternoon,

          15       for example.  Would you have begun the surveillance at

          16       that time?

          17   A.  No, sir.  The intelligence right up until it changed on

          18       the 4th at 5.20, was that the firearm was going to be

          19       transferred after 9 o'clock.  That was quite specific

          20       around that.

          21   Q.  It was then said "Well, why not follow Mr Duggan earlier

          22       in the day on the 4th to see where he went?"  Did

          23       Mr Duggan try to take a gun on 22 June 2011?

          24   A.  Yes, he was arranging to take possession of a gun, yes.

          25   Q.  Did it necessarily follow that you had to keep him under




           1       24/7 surveillance, because he would definitely do it the

           2       next day?

           3   A.  No, sir.  Nothing happened after that day until

           4       4 August.

           5   Q.  Can I ask you about making your witness statement on

           6       4 August?  Are the police trained and aware of the fact

           7       that when you've been in a dramatic incident such as

           8       this the advice is not to make a statement immediately

           9       afterwards?

          10   A.  That's correct, yes.

          11   Q.  That's why we saw the ACPO manual, and it's the same in

          12       the MPS, the Metropolitan Police, Standard Operating

          13       Procedure for firearms, to give it about 48 hours or so

          14       afterwards.

          15   A.  That's correct, yes.

          16   Q.  Is that because experts in the field have identified

          17       something which I think is called "selective

          18       recollection", or something like that?

          19   A.  Yes.  Yes, sir, like -- I know we're police officers but

          20       we're human beings and when you're in an incident like

          21       that it's a traumatic incident for anybody.  So they

          22       recommend that 48 hours is the best time when your brain

          23       can remember better what happened.

          24   Q.  Nonetheless, you made a statement on 4 August and was

          25       the purpose of that statement to make sure there was




           1       a written record of who the Tactical Firearms Commander

           2       was, what your role was, so they could identify who was

           3       in charge of the firearms operation?

           4   A.  That's correct, yes.

           5   Q.  You could have picked lots of individual facts to have

           6       put in as well, could you not --

           7   A.  I could have, sir, yes.

           8   Q.  -- one of which could have been finding a firearm?

           9   A.  That's correct, yes.

          10   Q.  I don't know if the significance of this is being

          11       suggested that you made that detail up afterwards.  Did

          12       you tell someone as soon as you found the firearm that

          13       you found it?

          14   A.  Sir, I was actually on the phone at the time I found it

          15       to the SIO, so yes, I did.

          16   Q.  If you had seen a police officer take a gun out of the

          17       minicab, what would you have done?

          18   A.  Sir, I -- I would have certainly asked him what he was

          19       doing.  I -- I would have, you know -- I don't know what

          20       I would have done, but I wouldn't have been very happy

          21       if I saw somebody in -- around the minicab.  If I had

          22       seen somebody taking a gun out of the minicab I would

          23       have remembered that and I didn't see that.

          24   Q.  Mr Thomas put to you on a number of occasions that on

          25       the video someone can be seen taking a gun out of the




           1       minicab.  Now, Mr Thomas of course wasn't there, he is

           2       not here now.  When you looked at the video, could you

           3       see someone taking a gun out of the cab or going into

           4       the cab?

           5   A.  Absolutely not, no.

           6   Q.  When you're at the scene, could you see that happening?

           7   A.  No, I didn't see that.

           8   Q.  Can I deal with what has been hinted at, either darkly

           9       or explicitly, that there's been a plant and

          10       a conspiracy involved here?

          11           Did you know V53, the officer who shot Mark Duggan

          12       before 4 August?

          13   A.  No, I didn't, no.

          14   Q.  Did you know Q63, who, it appears, was probably white

          15       shirt?

          16   A.  No, I didn't know him.

          17   Q.  Are you likely to get involved in a conspiracy to

          18       pervert the course of justice a few minutes after a man

          19       has been shot dead in order to help a firearms officer

          20       you don't know?

          21   A.  Sir, it's an absolute -- outrageous suggestion, as

          22       I said.  It's something that has to be put, I suppose,

          23       but it's absolute nonsense and there's not an iota of

          24       truth in any of it.  Of course I wouldn't be involved in

          25       something like that.  25 years' service in the




           1       Metropolitan Police and I'm proud of that and it's just

           2       nonsense.

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Just before Mr Butt concludes his

           4       questions on this area of what could or couldn't be, can

           5       I ask you to help me with this background to the whole

           6       case?

           7   A.  Yes, sir.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  What we've got is a picture of

           9       a firearm possession.

          10   A.  Yes, sir.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You have told us that anyone in

          12       possession of a gun, simple possession, gets a minimum

          13       of five years in prison.

          14   A.  Yes, sir.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We know Mark Duggan hasn't been to

          16       prison and he is very lightly convicted.  So on the

          17       public face of it, he's a young man with two offences

          18       before the courts for which he was fined.

          19   A.  Yes, sir.

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  So, on the face of it, he would not

          21       want to go to prison.  But everyone knows about this in

          22       this underworld, that's why guns are not kept by the

          23       people who want the guns, they get other people to keep

          24       the guns for them or hide them.

          25   A.  That's correct.




           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  In this way, the picture is being

           2       built up that perhaps Kevin Hutchinson-Foster was using

           3       a girlfriend to hold onto the guns and when the gun was

           4       needed then he would go and get it and hand it on --

           5   A.  Absolutely, yes.

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- because everyone knows you don't

           7       want to get caught in possession of a gun.

           8   A.  It might even be more than five years because if you get

           9       caught in possession of a gun that's loaded, we would

          10       try for the CPS to get possession with intent to danger

          11       life.  So it could be --

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Very significant sentences can be

          13       handed out by judges.

          14   A.  Correct.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Let me just carry on from there.  So

          16       if we've got Mr Duggan in a cab with a gun, suddenly

          17       aware of police coming around him to stop him, he would

          18       want to distance himself from the gun.

          19   A.  He may well do, sir, that's certainly -- in my

          20       experience of doing this over the years, that's quite

          21       often the case.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  One way has been suggested, I think,

          23       that he might have got out of the taxi and leaving the

          24       gun behind.  That might not have been quite so

          25       effective.  Another effective way would be to throw the




           1       gun into the bushes, as he got out of the taxi.

           2   A.  Absolutely, sir, an effective way would also be to point

           3       it at somebody.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Surrounded by armed police.

           5   A.  Well, if he knew they were armed police.

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  All right.  You can't help me

           7       anymore about that.

           8           Mr Butt, any further questions you want to ask?

           9   MR BUTT:  Just a few, sir.  Mr Thomas gave you a long list

          10       of things you might have to do if an intel update came

          11       in.  Contact the Tactical Advisor, contact the Strategic

          12       Firearms Commander, et cetera.  As it happened, in this

          13       case, the intelligence came in 40 minutes before the

          14       briefing, didn't it, the time set for the briefing?

          15   A.  Yes -- yes, sir.

          16   Q.  The point I think Mr Thomas was making was: if you had

          17       gone to Quicksilver as planned, you wouldn't have had

          18       much time before the briefing in order to do those

          19       things you might have to do; you recall that?

          20   A.  Yes, sir.

          21   Q.  But of course it's just a coincidence, isn't it, that

          22       intelligence came in 40 minutes before the briefing?

          23   A.  Yes, sir, absolutely.

          24   Q.  It could have come in at 5 in the morning?

          25   A.  It could have, sir, yes.




           1   Q.  It could have come in during the briefing?

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  Whenever it comes in, you have to comply with the

           4       procedures and the rules and act in accordance with your

           5       training?

           6   A.  That's correct, yes.

           7   Q.  Is that what you did at 5.20?

           8   A.  Absolutely, indeed.

           9   MR BUTT:  Thank you very much, sir.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.

          11           Yes, Mr Underwood?

          12                Further questions by MR UNDERWOOD

          13   MR UNDERWOOD:  Just a couple of matters, if I may.

          14           Can I try and disentangle your opinions of the

          15       suitability of Vicarage Road for a stop from the fact

          16       you were nowhere near it.

          17           Assume for the moment that, at about 6 o'clock on

          18       the evening of 4 August, you and CO19 were around the

          19       Vicarage Road area --

          20   A.  Yes, sir.

          21   Q.  -- and you had got the intelligence that you actually

          22       got at about 6 o'clock that he picked up the gun and was

          23       on his way, Mr Duggan, to Broadwater Farm.  Would you

          24       have still called amber?

          25   A.  Yes, I would have called amber, yes.  If I was in a




           1       position, you know, where I've got intelligence to say

           2       he's now got possession of the gun, it's in his -- yes,

           3       I would have.

           4   Q.  The question of the suitability of Vicarage Road or

           5       Burchell Road or anywhere round there was not really

           6       a factor for you; that was a factor for whether CO19

           7       implemented the stop (inaudible)?

           8   A.  That's correct.

           9   Q.  Likewise, imagine CO19 had got to the Vicarage Road area

          10       but you were still a couple of miles away for some

          11       reason and you got the intelligence you got at 6 o'clock

          12       that Mr Duggan had become armed and was on his way to

          13       Broadwater Farm but, on that scenario, CO19 weren't

          14       (were?) actually nearby him.  Again, would you have

          15       called amber?

          16   A.  No, sir, not at all.  Definitely not.

          17   Q.  Why is that?

          18   A.  Well, sir, they've got no commanding officer there,

          19       they've got no intelligence officer.  If there's no

          20       update/briefing, they have had no plan, it would be

          21       sending them into the unknown really and they would have

          22       to deal with whatever's -- happens around them.  That

          23       wasn't -- that wouldn't be something that I would do,

          24       sir.

          25   Q.  Isn't there provision for you to nominate somebody else




           1       as the commanding officer in that case?

           2   A.  No, sir, I'm the commanding officer and that wouldn't be

           3       an option.

           4   Q.  Can we just look at ACPO manual 5.53 up on the screen.

           5       You were shown 5.51 and 5.52 by Mr Butt:

           6           "In situations where a Strategic or Tactical

           7       Firearms Commander does not have access to

           8       communications, current intelligence or other support,

           9       for example, if they need to move location, they should

          10       ensure that another commander is in a position to

          11       temporarily undertake their role."

          12   A.  Yes, sir, it would have to be another Tactical Firearms

          13       Commander.

          14   Q.  Could not V59 have done that for you?

          15   A.  No, he's not a Tactical Firearms Commander.

          16   MR UNDERWOOD:  Very well, thank you very much.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you.  Thank you very much.

          18       I know it's been a long day for you but thank you for

          19       coming and assisting the jury and answering all those

          20       questions.

          21           If you just remain there for a moment, I'll ask that

          22       the cameras are switched off.

          23           Members of the jury, thank you for a very long day

          24       and concentration.  I'll let you go and come back fresh

          25       and ready to go tomorrow morning at 10.30.  Thank you




           1       very much.


















          17   (4.29 pm)

          18       (The Inquest adjourned until 10.30 am on Thursday,

          19                         3 October 2013)

               Z51 (affirmed) .......................................1
                   Questions by MR UNDERWOOD ........................2
                   Questions by MR MANSFIELD .......................34
                   Questions by MR THOMAS .........................130
                   Questions by MR STERN ..........................160
                   Questions by MR KEITH ..........................178




















                   Questions by MR BUTT ...........................184
                   Further questions by MR UNDERWOOD ..............198
               Housekeeping .......................................201