Transcript of the Hearing 26 September 2013


           1                                    Thursday, 26 September 2013

           2   (10.30 am)

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I will ask the witness to come back

          16       into court, please.

          17        DETECTIVE SUPERINTENDENT FIONA MALLON (continued)

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Good morning.  You are still under

          19       the oath you took yesterday.  Make sure you have all the

          20       paperwork back you had with you there.

          21   A.  Thank you.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  I think just

          23       before we ask some more questions, there's -- is it now

          24       that we are going to put in that blank document for the

          25       jury?




           1   MR UNDERWOOD:  Yes, please.  You raised a point yesterday.

           2       The form FA5 which we had photocopied -- I think it had

           3       probably been photocopied so many times that some boxes

           4       which started with some colour in had gone black and the

           5       Metropolitan Police Service have very kindly, at your

           6       suggestion, come up with a blank form on which we can

           7       see the headings.  So what we are going to suggest is

           8       a copy of that is put behind the form FA5 in the bundles

           9       at tab 7.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It's a document at C7, isn't it?

          11   MR UNDERWOOD:  That's right.  Behind your divider, members

          12       of the jury, at C7, we have this document form called

          13       the FA5 and at CD0330, we had a number of black lines

          14       and you could not see what the headings were and things

          15       of that nature so what's going so happen is you are

          16       going to be able to put behind that completed document

          17       a blank document which shows what those words are,

          18       otherwise you might think there is some secrecy there,

          19       there isn't.  Just in case there are some questions

          20       about it, it will just help you understand what's

          21       involved.

          22           Thank you.  Thank you very much indeed.  Right then,

          23       before we hear Mr Stern.  Mr Thomas?

          24                Questions by MR THOMAS (continued)

          25   MR THOMAS:  Just one small final matter.  Ms Mallon, good




           1       morning.  Can I just clarify one point with you.

           2       Yesterday, I asked you if you were still in your role,

           3       and you explained, as per standard procedure, during the

           4       IPCC investigation into the death you were asked to

           5       stand aside.

           6   A.  (Nods)

           7   Q.  Can I just make it clear that I accept what you say

           8       about that as being normal and standard procedure

           9       pending such an investigation and nothing should be read

          10       into that.

          11   A.  Yes, that's right.

          12   MR THOMAS:  Okay.

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much, Mr Thomas,

          14       that's absolutely right.

          15           Yes, then Mr Stern.

          16                      Questions by MR STERN

          17   MR STERN:  Thank you, sir.

          18           Detective Superintendent Mallon, thank you very much

          19       for coming back.  Can I ask please that everybody looks

          20       at the FA3A, which I'm told for the jury is in

          21       divider 8.  It's page 111, CE111.  It's up on the

          22       screen.  I don't know if you prefer a hard copy.

          23   A.  I've got one, thank you, sir.

          24   Q.  I will wait for everyone to get to it.  Now, this is the

          25       first page of the document and it's described as the




           1       Strategic Firearms Command Log Protracted Operations,

           2       FA3A.  You were the Strategic Firearms Commander --

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  -- so this is your document, effectively?

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  If we look in the lower half of the page, we can see

           7       helpfully, the various individuals who are involved in

           8       the command structure.

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  There's yourself as the Strategic Firearms Commander:

          11       Z50 as you are described there.

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  We can put in your name if anybody wants to:

          14       Detective Superintendent Mallon.  The Tactical Firearms

          15       Commander, that's Z51.

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  Then the Tactical Advisor, Inspector Nick Bennett.

          18           First of all, there's a hierarchy, a proper

          19       structure in place for firearms operations.

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  I know it may be obvious to you because you are dealing

          22       with it every day but obviously not everybody is

          23       involved in it.  It's not a question of saying to CO19

          24       "I will just grab a few guns and go out and try to

          25       arrest somebody".




           1   A.  No.

           2   Q.  As we have seen from the documents, there is a very

           3       clear structure in place.

           4   A.  Yes, there is.

           5   Q.  Now, for yourself -- Z50, the Strategic Firearms

           6       Commander -- you do not see the armed officers prior to

           7       them going out on duty.

           8   A.  No, I don't.

           9   Q.  So you have no contact or connection with them.

          10   A.  I speak to the Tactical Advisor.

          11   Q.  I'll come to those in a minute.  But the actual firearms

          12       officers, save for the Tactical Advisor, you have no

          13       contact with?

          14   A.  That's correct.

          15   Q.  Right.  I'm going to come onto the Tactical Advisor, but

          16       let's keep it piece by piece.  The Tactical Firearms

          17       Commander, Z51, he is not a firearms officer.

          18   A.  No.

          19   Q.  You are not a firearms officer.

          20   A.  No.

          21   Q.  Z51 will give the operational briefing, as I think it's

          22       called --

          23   A.  That's right.

          24   Q.  -- to the firearms officers.  The Tactical Advisor,

          25       Mr Bennett in this case, was also not at the scene at




           1       the time of the events.

           2   A.  That's right.

           3   Q.  But his strategy that he sets out and we have looked at

           4       it -- I am not going to look at it again -- is

           5       implemented by the Operational Firearms Commander --

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  -- and in this case that was V59.

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  He is a firearms officer, a member of CO19, and indeed,

          10       in fact, the team leader.

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  Can I ask, please, that we turn on in the same document

          13       to page 117.  That is now on the screen as well.  This

          14       is what's described as "Threat & risk".  It says:

          15           "Who has the Tactical Firearms Commander identified

          16       as being at risk?"

          17           You were asked, I think by Mr Michael Mansfield --

          18       or Mr Underwood, I think actually, about this particular

          19       page.

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  I want to just look at it with you, if I may, because

          22       you have the risk to the public being low risk --

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  -- surveillance police officers, who are armed, as

          25       medium risk --




           1   A.  Yes.

           2   Q.  -- cO19 armed officers as high risk --

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  -- unarmed officers as a low risk --

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  -- and subjects as a medium risk.

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  Now, I want to just explore that with you because, on

           9       the face of it, people might think that those who were

          10       at the lowest risk are those who are actually carrying

          11       firearms but I want to explore that with you.

          12           First of all, the public, they are at a low risk

          13       because the armed officers are trained to be able to do

          14       the stop in a place that causes the minimum risk to the

          15       public.

          16   A.  That's right, yes.

          17   Q.  The surveillance police officers are a medium risk, and

          18       the reason that their risk is reduced from high is

          19       because what happens is that once they notify that there

          20       is sufficient evidence against an individual, the armed

          21       officers take over and effect the arrest.

          22   A.  That's right.

          23   Q.  Subjects are a medium risk because, again, the armed

          24       officers are highly trained and can be taken to reduce

          25       the risk to those individuals as much as possible.




           1   A.  Yes.

           2   Q.  Again, it may be obvious, there is always a risk when

           3       individuals are holding guns whoever they are --

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  -- that is why CO19 armed officers are so highly

           6       trained.

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  That is why their training is maintained on a very

           9       regular basis.

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  Now, the reason you gave for a high risk being

          12       associated, or linked to, the CO19 armed officers is

          13       because, you said and I'm paraphrasing it, "We know what

          14       the armed officers would do, but the actions of the

          15       suspect is unknown".

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  Armed officers, if we can take the two equations, follow

          18       well tried and tested routines.

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  The tactics have been set out, they train on those

          21       tactics on a very regular basis.

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  Stopping a vehicle as part of what is described as

          24       a MASTS operation is a regular occurrence.

          25   A.  Yes.




           1   Q.  But the one unknown, or variable, in these best laid

           2       plans, which cannot be accounted for, is the actions of

           3       the suspect.

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  How the suspect reacts to an attempt to arrest him, and

           6       it is usually "him" --

           7   A.  Mm.

           8   Q.  -- will dictate the tactics that are required by the

           9       firearms officers.

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  Experience has shown -- this is not an exact

          12       percentage -- that 99.9 per cent of the time,

          13       individuals comply with the commands of the firearms

          14       officers --

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  -- and so that does not require any more show of force

          17       than the show of force of the guns themselves --

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  So that is why you have put as a risk as "high" the risk

          20       to the firearms officers.

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  The second area that I want to ask you about is

          23       a different document.  That's the briefing document.

          24       That can be found at CD274.  I don't think that the jury

          25       have looked at this in any detail.  I am not going to




           1       look at it in any detail with you now, simply because

           2       you were not present, were you?

           3   A.  No, I wasn't, no.

           4   Q.  I just want to ask you about a few things that emerge

           5       from it, not that many.  It's page 274 and the reason

           6       that we have it typed in this way is because the

           7       briefing was recorded.

           8   A.  That's right, yes.

           9   Q.  That's a transcript of it.

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  This is a briefing for Operation Dibri, as we can see,

          12       and it's dated 3 August 2011.

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  It took place, I think if we look at the fourth line

          15       down, on Wednesday at 6.10 in the evening.  It starts

          16       off with an introduction by Z51, who we haven't heard

          17       from yet but we've already seen where he fits into play.

          18           It then carries on with ZZ17 giving information or

          19       intelligence to the armed officers.

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  He goes through, as we can see, various suspects on that

          22       page, 274.  There's U1; over the page, there's U8; U13;

          23       U14; and then U15.  Obviously, if you look halfway down

          24       275, we can see the name "Mark Duggan".  ZZ17 says:

          25           "... I will come back to in a minute because he may




           1       well become more relevant for this evening's activity."

           2           As I say, I am not going to look at it in any great

           3       detail but if you look at 276, we can see that what he

           4       does is describes some addresses in relation to

           5       Mark Duggan:

           6           "All of the subjects on here have access to

           7       firearms, there's nothing specific to say any of them

           8       keep firearms at their home addresses or they are armed

           9       today.  There's intelligence to suggest Mark Duggan is

          10       currently in possession or control of about three

          11       firearms, looking to take possession of a firearm,

          12       perhaps this evening.  He's been trying to do it for

          13       a few days.

          14           "There are some photos coming round of a guy called

          15       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.  Intelligence would suggest

          16       he's got control of the firearms and from 9 o'clock this

          17       evening there may well be a plan for Duggan to somehow

          18       get these firearms from Hutchinson-Foster."

          19           So it goes on in that way.

          20           As it turned out, that intelligence presumably was

          21       as reliable as the intelligence you got on the 4 August?

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  But as it turns out, the operation in relation to the

          24       firearms officers, who were on duty until quite late

          25       into the night, actually ended with nothing happening.




           1   A.  Correct.

           2   Q.  So intelligence sometimes bears fruit, even if it's

           3       reliable intelligence --

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  -- because reliable intelligence doesn't mean that the

           6       individuals are going to be reliable in following what

           7       it is that they've already decided to do.

           8   A.  True, very true.

           9   Q.  Then if we look, please, at page 277, we can see that

          10       V59, who introduces himself, effectively as the

          11       Operational Firearms Commander and providing, obviously,

          12       tactical advice at the scene, because Mr Bennett is not

          13       there.

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  Again, we will look at it in more detail when V59 comes,

          16       but what he does is he sets out in the various headings

          17       what the position is.  He describes eight surveillance

          18       officers armed, and they identify themselves:

          19           "Surveillance officers will be armed for their own

          20       protection and to respond to any life threatening events

          21       which cannot be dealt with by the firearms team."

          22           Then he says:

          23           "The intention: CO19 unit officers will provide

          24       Mobile Armed Support To Surveillance and provide

          25       an armed arrest capability should intelligence or




           1       information warrant this action."

           2           Then he describes the tactics or strategy that's

           3       going to be deployed for that day.

           4   MR MANSFIELD:  I wonder if my learned friend would forgive

           5       me for -- since his questions -- I am not objecting to

           6       that -- are intended to summarise the intelligence

           7       available on the evening of the third, via the briefing,

           8       comparing it to other intelligence -- I would just ask

           9       him to bear in mind what the A10 intelligence was on the

          10       3rd.  The jury have it and everyone else has it.

          11   MR STERN:  I'll certainly bear it in mind, and indeed we can

          12       look at it because I don't want anybody to think I am

          13       not looking at something that is required to be looked

          14       at.

          15           It's C9, divider 9 in your bundle.  Halfway down we

          16       can see on 3 August 2011 it says:

          17           "... I received further intelligence that

          18       Mark Duggan still wished to collect the firearm from the

          19       male, whom I now believe to be Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.

          20       There was still insufficient intelligence to identify

          21       where the firearm was being stored beyond the premises

          22       of the female associate probably in the Leyton area.

          23       The intelligence indicated that Kevin Hutchinson-Foster

          24       intended to travel out of London later that evening."

          25           Now, if we pause there for a moment, because the




           1       rest of it was subsequently received, was it not?

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  If one looks at the briefing and looks at that

           4       intelligence, if we look at just the rest of it, it

           5       says:

           6           "I subsequently received intelligence that indicated

           7       that Mark Duggan would not be in a position to collect

           8       the firearm because he was attending a family BBQ."

           9           That does not feature in the briefing.

          10   A.  No.

          11   Q.  At the time of the briefing it would appear -- obviously

          12       we may hear other evidence but, if Mr Mansfield wants me

          13       to look at it, it's that first part of it that appears

          14       to be in the initial briefing.

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  Can I just ask you now, finally in this regard, to look,

          17       please, at page 281.  It's in the same briefing.  Again,

          18       I am not going to go through it in detail with you, but

          19       you will see there that the firearms officers are

          20       informed, as they must be, of the Human Rights Act and

          21       the need to justify any shots being fired.

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  That is something, am I right in saying, that is

          24       provided to firearms officers at every single briefing

          25       where they are going out on an operation?




           1   A.  Yes, it is.

           2   Q.  So they hear it day in, day out?

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  Now, the briefing -- as I say, the purpose of this is

           5       not to say what exactly the intelligence was -- but the

           6       purpose of it is, the point I want to just make to you:

           7       the firearms officers obviously only know what they are

           8       told at the briefing.

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   MR STERN:  I am much obliged.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  If you feel, on reflection because

          12       you have referred to it so much, that the jury might be

          13       benefited from having some of those pages before them in

          14       print in their bundles, please let us know.

          15   MR STERN:  I think it probably would help because they are

          16       going to hear officers and they are going to go through

          17       it with those officers.  I think it was planned that we

          18       would call V59 on Monday but it may be that's not going

          19       to happen, I don't know.

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Anyway, that could be done in due

          21       course.  But it seems to me rather helpful.  It's very

          22       good to have the screen and we can read it off the

          23       screen but it's even better to have it in hard copy.

          24   MR STERN:  I respectfully agree.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much, Mr Stern.




           1           Who wants to go next.  Mr Butt?

           2                       Questions by MR BUTT

           3   MR BUTT:  I appear on behalf of Z51.  Staffing in June 2011:

           4       there was a Senior Investigating Officer for Dibri, that

           5       was Mr Foote, yes?

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  In this firearms operation, you are at the top as the

           8       Strategic Firearms Commander, yes?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  There was a Tactical Firearms Commander, Z51, who is in

          11       command of the tactical operation; is that right?

          12   A.  That's right.

          13   Q.  That structure was as per national guidance at the time;

          14       is that right?

          15   A.  That's right, yes.

          16   Q.  Before 2009, the Tactical Firearms Commander would, in

          17       fact, also be the Senior Investigating Officer, wouldn't

          18       he or she?

          19   A.  They could be the investigating officer, the deputy SIO,

          20       yes.

          21   Q.  But there was a debate in 2008 and 2009 and experts

          22       nationally decided the safest way to conduct these

          23       dangerous firearms operations was to separate the

          24       investigation role and the Tactical Firearms Commander

          25       role; is that right?




           1   A.  That's right.

           2   Q.  That resulted in the guidance that was current at the

           3       time that Mark Duggan was tragically shot?

           4   A.  That's right.

           5   Q.  Can we just look at the guidance document.  It's at

           6       document page 10908.  If we zoom into paragraph 5.19,

           7       please, this is the Association of Chief Police Officers

           8       Guidance, which is issued to all police forces and it

           9       says:

          10           "In operations involving the deployment of AFOs

          11       (Authorised Firearms Officers) the function of the

          12       Tactical Firearms Commander must not be undertaken by

          13       the Senior Investigating Officer or a person

          14       significantly involved in the investigation of the

          15       offences for which that firearms operation is being

          16       conducted."

          17           Is that right?

          18   A.  That's right.

          19   Q.  Z51 was not so involved in June 2011; is that right?

          20   A.  That's right.

          21   Q.  In fact, in June 2011, he was moved to fill a DI post on

          22       Trident and he primarily had two roles, didn't he?  One

          23       was the very demanding role of being a Tactical Firearms

          24       Commander, yes?

          25   A.  Yes.




           1   Q.  The second role he had was to do all the other things

           2       that an Inspector, who's also just a manager, has to do;

           3       is that right?

           4   A.  That's right.

           5   Q.  So admin, human resources and a lot of work on training

           6       and staff development; is that right?

           7   A.  That's right, yes.

           8   Q.  Because this team involves some of the most demanding

           9       roles police officers might perform --

          10   A.  That's right.

          11   Q.  -- and it was part of Z51's job to make sure they could

          12       do it and do it at the best of their ability.

          13           Can I ask about how that works in practice because

          14       a number of questions have been asked about, perhaps

          15       understandably, people saying "Well, why wasn't there

          16       a control room with a map on the wall and somebody in

          17       a general supervisory role?"  Can I look at who might

          18       perform such a hypothetical role?

          19           First of all, you couldn't perform that role, could

          20       you, because as Strategic Firearms Commander you must

          21       not get involved in Z51's tactical command; that's

          22       right, isn't it?

          23   A.  That's right.

          24   Q.  That's per the national guidance?

          25   A.  Yes.




           1   Q.  Certainly, the SIO cannot perform that role, can he,

           2       because, as per paragraph 5.19 we have just seen, he

           3       cannot be involved in the tactical command either, can

           4       he?

           5   A.  No.

           6   Q.  In terms of the tactical firearm commander, perfectly

           7       properly, on the 3rd and on the 4th he was at the

           8       briefing and he deployed in the control car to be in

           9       tactical command of the operation, yes?

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  Will it, in fact, be dangerous to have some other

          12       general supervisor in a control room looking at a map

          13       and interfering in the tactical command?

          14   A.  In my view and experience, the fact that we've got

          15       a control car, which we've got the Tactical Firearms

          16       Commander in, the team leader in from 19, you've got all

          17       the resources you need in that car, all the phones, IT

          18       systems, in fact that control car in itself is like the

          19       control room, if you like, for that particular incident.

          20           So communication, as I explained yesterday, is the

          21       amber traffic light system of communication.  Everyone

          22       knows what they are doing, you have the people within

          23       that car who have contact with everybody, the IT with

          24       them, the phones, the advice either side, physical

          25       personal advice is all the better than the phone.




           1       I think that's much more suitable and safer than having

           2       another system.  I have never heard, in this type of

           3       fast moving scenario, of having a big -- different type

           4       of room with other people involved.  I think it would be

           5       dangerous because communications will get crossed.

           6   Q.  Can we look at the FA5 and a question Mr Underwood asked

           7       you yesterday, document CD0339, please?  If you look at

           8       the bottom paragraph, please.  You were asked by

           9       Mr Underwood whether the intelligence updates that ZZ17

          10       was receiving, in particular on the 3rd and the 4th,

          11       would require further tactical advice along the lines

          12       that this paragraph is suggesting.  There could be

          13       sometimes a need to gain further tactical advice and

          14       I think what you said was "Well, no, not that sort of

          15       intel, because Kev Hutchinson-Foster arranging to supply

          16       a firearm was precisely the sort of event the plan was

          17       designed to tackle"; you recall saying that?

          18   A.  Yes, I do, yes.

          19   Q.  I think Mr Underwood was saying "Well, how do you square

          20       that with the conflict management model?"  Can I give

          21       an example to see if you agree with this, the sort of

          22       intelligence update that might require further tactical

          23       advice to be sought.  If, for example, there was intel

          24       that one of the subjects planned to take a hostage, for

          25       example, would that be the sort of thing that requires




           1       further tactical advice --

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  -- or, for example, intel that a subject planned to harm

           4       or kill an associate of his: again, that would require

           5       further tactical advice?

           6   A.  Yes, it would.

           7   Q.  But the simple fact that a named person is going to

           8       arrange to supply a gun doesn't require further advice

           9       because that is precisely the plan that had been put in

          10       place to safely deal with it?

          11   A.  Exactly, yes.

          12   Q.  Just finally, in terms of this document, if we just

          13       continue through to page CD0339 and just something

          14       Mr Stern was asking you about.  Just zoom in again on

          15       the final paragraph.  It says here, towards the last

          16       line:

          17           "All CO19 supervisors are trained and accredited

          18       Tactical Advisors.  If additional advice is required

          19       during a deployment the Operational Firearms Commander

          20       should be consulted.  Any advice given in these

          21       circumstances will be recorded in the OFC's log."

          22           Yes?

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  So the structure allows to have a Tactical Advisor from

          25       CO19 that produces a tactical plan, yes?




           1   A.  Yes.

           2   Q.  Then on the ground further tactical advice to come from

           3       the CO19 OFC who is also a Tactical Advisor, in this

           4       case V59; yes?

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  Can I deal, finally, with the conversation you had with

           7       Z51 at about 5.30, you thought, on 4 August 2011.  Can

           8       we look, please, at your day book, at page 7202 in

           9       documents.  If we just zoom in to the left of the two

          10       shapes, that's the note you made of that conversation

          11       just on the left there; is that right?

          12   A.  Yes, it is, yes.

          13   Q.  Please understand that I am not being critical at all

          14       but you have not actually noted in the day book what Z51

          15       said to you at that time.  What you said is, unless I am

          16       missing something:

          17           "Z51 called, 5.30 pm, intel update."

          18   MR UNDERWOOD:  (speaker?) It's been redacted.

          19   A.  In that --

          20   MR BUTT:  (indicates) The part we are missing there, is that

          21       what Z51 told you?

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   MR MANSFIELD:  Could I just ask whether we do have that

          24       gisted because I had specifically not asked for it.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You have the left and the right-hand




           1       pages, don't you?

           2   A.  Yes, I have the redacted version.

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Does your copy still have that?

           4   A.  Yes, mine is yours, sir.

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, it's just the same as I have.

           6   MR BUTT:  There is not much point in my asking questions if

           7       there's any possibility that we might see what's

           8       underneath that or a gisted version of that.  I think

           9       I can probably leave it there.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I think you probably can.

          11   MR BUTT:  Thank you very much.

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you, Mr Butt.

          13           I think it's Ms Dobbin, is it?

          14   MS DOBBIN:  I have no questions.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  All right, Mr Keith?

          16                      Questions by MR KEITH

          17   MR KEITH:  Just a handful of areas, please.  You've been

          18       asked about the national standards --

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  -- which applied to the training of firearms operations

          21       commanders.  You've told us how you were trained as

          22       a Tactical Firearms Commander in November 2004,

          23       Strategic Firearms Commander in July 2007, and the

          24       refresher training.

          25           We've only really scratched the surface, haven't we,




           1       of the documents and the rules and the procedures which

           2       are set out for firearms operations?

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  There is a vast tract of documentation prepared by the

           5       Association of Chief Police Officers, the National

           6       Policing Improvement Agency and so on, which guides all

           7       firearms operations; is that right?

           8   A.  Yes.  That's right.

           9   Q.  The Metropolitan Police has then thereafter its own

          10       standard operating procedures.

          11   A.  That's right, yes.

          12   Q.  You have just been shown a page out of the National

          13       Policing Improvement Agency document, I think it runs to

          14       135 pages.

          15   A.  Mm.

          16   Q.  Does it deal with everything from weapons, their

          17       operational use, command, armed deployment,

          18       post-deployment, scene management: everything?

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  Can we please look back at 10908, the page that the jury

          21       looked at a moment or two ago, which is an extract from

          22       that guidance.  You were just shown paragraph 5.19 but

          23       can we just briefly look at some of the other

          24       paragraphs.  Paragraph 5.16, please, there's a reference

          25       there to the command structure offering flexibility.  Is




           1       that the point that you were making yesterday about the

           2       command structure and the plans that are put in place

           3       having to deal with a wide range of possibilities or

           4       eventualities?

           5   A.  Yes, yes.

           6   Q.  At 5.18, the jury will have seen the reference to

           7       article 2, the Right to Life in the European Convention

           8       of Human Rights, and the need for that to take

           9       precedence.  Is that reflected basically in your notes,

          10       your decision making and the briefing?

          11   A.  Yes, it is.

          12   Q.  In relation to your position as Strategic Firearms

          13       Commander, we can see at the bottom of the page at 5.20,

          14       the demands that you must comply with.

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  So you have overall strategic command, you must set,

          17       review, communicate and update the strategy.  Did you

          18       set the strategy on 2 August with your form, the FA3A?

          19   A.  Yes, I did.

          20   Q.  You should consider consulting a Tactical Advisor; did

          21       you in fact consider his form, the FA5 and, moreover,

          22       call him?

          23   A.  Yes, I did.

          24   Q.  That's Inspector Bennett.

          25   A.  Yes.




           1   Q.  Over the page, please, 10909, at the top of the page,

           2       first bullet point: did you consider any tactical

           3       parameters to be placed on the police response?

           4   A.  Yes.  I placed one.

           5   Q.  Was that the parameter in relation to no entry to

           6       a building without them coming back to you and

           7       discussing it with you?

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  You must ensure that this strategy is recorded; was that

          10       your form FA3A?

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  You must authorise the deployment of AFOs; is that what

          13       the form was designed to do, to give authority?

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  You must ensure all decisions are recorded in order to

          16       provide a clear audit trail; did you record, of course,

          17       the FA3A?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  When you had to apply the CMM, the review, the

          20       reconsideration, at 5.30 on the 4 August, did you take

          21       a note?

          22   A.  Yes, I did.

          23   Q.  Just on that, you mentioned yesterday that there are

          24       sensitivities in being able to write down intelligence.

          25       By operation of law you are not allowed, in certain




           1       circumstances, to make reference to intelligence that

           2       you receive.

           3   A.  That's right.

           4   Q.  On this occasion, did you nevertheless make a note but

           5       we are not allowed to see it?

           6   A.  That's right.

           7   Q.  You must ensure that the firearms strategy complies with

           8       the wider strategic aims; did you do that?

           9   A.  Yes I did.

          10   Q.  Did you test the tactical plan against the established

          11       strategy, in particular by having in mind to what the

          12       Tactical Advisor, Inspector Bennett, had said about all

          13       the tactical options?

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  Towards the bottom of the page, you must be able to be

          16       contacted by the Tactical Firearms Commander; did you

          17       remain in communication throughout?

          18   A.  Yes, I did.

          19   Q.  At paragraph 5.40, which is on page 10914, the authors

          20       of this wise document make the point:

          21           "The strategy must be based on all the information

          22       available at the time.  It is rare for a complete or

          23       perfect picture to exist."

          24           Is that in the nature of planning operations based

          25       on intelligence?




           1   A.  Yes.

           2   Q.  At 5.50, page 10916, to do with command location, does

           3       paragraph 5.50 demand that the Strategic Firearms

           4       Commander should be in a control room?

           5   A.  No.

           6   Q.  What does it provide?

           7   A.  The essence of it is: as long as you are contactable

           8       24/7 and you have access to your Tactical Firearms

           9       Commander and a Tactical Advisor, that is how you can

          10       run your operation.

          11   Q.  Even the Tactical Firearms Commander, paragraph 5.51,

          12       can be in a variety of locations, can he not?

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  Then, turning please to 10922, the conflict management

          15       model, paragraph 6.5 says this:

          16           "It will not always be possible in a dynamically

          17       evolving incident ..."

          18           Is that a way of saying "in an incident in which

          19       information is changing all the time"?

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  "... to segregate thinking or response according to each

          22       phase of the model.  In some circumstances it may not be

          23       practical or possible, given the speed at which some

          24       incidents evolve, to articulate each decision and

          25       rationale when the overriding requirement is for




           1       immediate decision making and action."

           2           On 4 August, when you received the information about

           3       the, now for the first time, much more specific

           4       intelligence about the location, was that an immediate

           5       decision making and action procedure --

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  -- in other words, did you have to make a decision very

           8       quickly?

           9   A.  It was a very fast phonecall, a dynamic conversation, it

          10       was short, and automatically I assessed what I was being

          11       told and then confirmed that I was satisfied with the

          12       tactical plan and what we had in place with the TFC.

          13       So, yes.

          14   Q.  Then you made a note.

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  5.6:

          17           "In those circumstances it will be necessary and

          18       appropriate for officers undertaking both command and

          19       tactical response to use the professional knowledge

          20       skills and experience which they have developed across

          21       their police service and life experience."

          22           You have a vast wealth of experience, it appears

          23       from what you said yesterday; did you draw upon that in

          24       making your decision?

          25   A.  Yes, I think that's invaluable, of course I did.




           1   Q.  Turning please just to the paperwork for a moment.  The

           2       FA1, which was the application for the firearms

           3       authority, was prepared on 25 July.

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  We know it was sent to the Tactical Firearms Commander

           6       on 1 August.  The FA2A, prepared by the Tactical

           7       Firearms Commander, was sent to the Tactical Advisor on

           8       1 August and it was also signed by the Tactical Firearms

           9       Commander on 1 August, and Mr Bennett, the Tactical

          10       Advisor's FA5, his form, was signed on 1 August as well.

          11           They were all sent to you on 2 August, we have

          12       heard, but were the forms, all those forms, prepared on

          13       1 August or on 2 August?

          14   A.  They were prepared on the 1st and I actually opened them

          15       up in the morning on the 2nd.

          16   Q.  Was that the email that we saw at 09.58?

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  Now, are you entitled, as the Strategic Firearms

          19       Commander, to make a decision to authorise an operation

          20       based solely upon the written documents that you

          21       receive; could you have done that?

          22   A.  I could have done it, yes.

          23   Q.  But you knew actually a great deal more about Operation

          24       Dibri and these subjects, didn't you --

          25   A.  Yes.




           1   Q.  -- because you had been responsible for the previous

           2       directed surveillance, authority on 27 June, you

           3       authorised the MASTS operation on 22 June --

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  -- and you had been discussing Dibri generally?

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  That's why you had the meeting with Mr Foote on the

           8       morning of 2 August: it was to discuss the general

           9       direction of the operation.

          10           But you went and spoke, because you were in his

          11       building, with the Tactical Firearms Commander, Z51, on

          12       the afternoon of the 2nd.

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  Was that before or after you signed the authority?

          15   A.  I arrived at the building on the 2nd about 8 o'clock in

          16       the morning, my usual time, and in between 8.00 and 3.20

          17       I was in discussion with the TFC around that operation.

          18       We were floors apart, because we were in each other's

          19       offices the whole morning, and I authorised it at 3.20

          20       so --

          21   Q.  Did you have to go and speak to Z51 to further explore

          22       the basis of the operation and whether you should give

          23       authority and the intelligence and command structure and

          24       the objectives?

          25   A.  It's my personal style to go and speak to the TFC and




           1       ask more every time.  I didn't have to but, yes, I did.

           2   Q.  The rules don't demand it, do they?

           3   A.  No, they don't.

           4   Q.  You called Inspector Bennett personally.

           5   A.  Yes, I did.

           6   Q.  Do the rules demand you call the Tactical Firearms

           7       Commander personally in addition to considering what he

           8       says on the form?

           9   A.  No.

          10   Q.  But you did it nevertheless.

          11   A.  Yes, I did.

          12   Q.  You also asked for a meeting with intelligence managers

          13       on the Wednesday.

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  Did you have to do that?

          16   A.  No.

          17   Q.  Do the forms demand it?

          18   A.  No.

          19   Q.  You called Z51 before the briefing --

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  -- on 3 August --

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  -- in the evening, the briefing at 6 o'clock; did you

          24       have to?

          25   A.  No.




           1   Q.  Why did you do it?

           2   A.  It's good practice and it's part of my role as the

           3       commander in charge to know the staff are ready and the

           4       assets are in place.

           5   Q.  Turning to the changing position, you said yesterday

           6       that you had a gist on the 1st or 2nd, that there was

           7       somebody called "Kev" or "Kevin" who might be involved

           8       in the passing over of a gun.

           9   A.  No.

          10   Q.  No intelligence, of course as we know, as to who

          11       actually would do it.  You didn't know until the 3rd

          12       when you spoke to Z51 that the person was a man called

          13       Hutchinson-Foster, or likely to be Hutchinson-Foster.

          14       That intelligence wouldn't have been available from the

          15       forms --

          16   A.  No.

          17   Q.  -- but you found out by going the extra mile; is that

          18       right?

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  You didn't speak to A10 --

          21   A.  No.

          22   Q.  -- the person at SOCA.

          23   A.  No.

          24   Q.  So although the schedule of what A10 has said in his

          25       witness statement was put to you yesterday, you would




           1       never have spoken to A10?

           2   A.  No.

           3   Q.  You got your intelligence from Z51 and those other

           4       persons you spoke to on 3 August because that's how the

           5       structure works.

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  As the Strategic Firearms Commander, were you meant and

           8       were you expected to be told of every change in the

           9       intelligence picture?

          10   A.  No.  That's why we have -- sorry, that's why I use

          11       experienced staff who know what they are doing, they are

          12       the Tactical Firearms Commander on the ground and

          13       there's an intelligence holder in place.  They are there

          14       to develop that intelligence, to manage it and I am

          15       informed if there is any significant change in the

          16       intelligence which would affect my tactical plan and, as

          17       I have sort of explained throughout the process, there

          18       has not been any change to that intelligence which

          19       affected that plan.  So they did what was expected.

          20   Q.  Can we look at CD339 again -- I'm sorry to go back to

          21       this -- this is the extract from the FA5 and the bottom

          22       paragraph.  You have been asked about various sentences

          23       in it.  Could I throw my hat into the ring and please

          24       ask you about another sentence in that paragraph.  It's

          25       the top line:




           1           "If any material changes to the intelligence ..."

           2           Between 2nd and 3rd, when the intelligence was

           3       concerned solely with who "Kev" or "Kevin" might be and

           4       turned out to be, was that, in your opinion, material

           5       change in intelligence as to require a complete review?

           6   MR MANSFIELD:  Sorry to get to my feet again, in fact she

           7       said she didn't know what happened before the 3rd.

           8       I went through it very carefully.  She had no

           9       information about the information that was coming

          10       through intelligence on the 31st, the 1st and the 2nd;

          11       it was only on the 3rd.

          12   MR KEITH:  The evidence, Detective Superintendent, that you

          13       gave yesterday, in response to Mr Underwood, was that

          14       you had a gist about "Kev" or "Kevin" --

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  -- and on the 3rd at the meeting you were told that it

          17       was likely to be Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.

          18   A.  That's right.

          19   Q.  Was that change, that development, a material change as

          20       to require a tactical or strategic review?

          21   A.  Not at all.  This operation was set up exactly for that

          22       purpose, for any of those six subjects or associates to

          23       supply or possesses firearms, and that's exactly what

          24       this was set up for, so there was no need.

          25   Q.  What was the first time that the change of intelligence




           1       was so material that you had to apply a CMM, note it and

           2       reconsider?

           3   A.  It was when we -- I ascertained that Mark Duggan was in

           4       possession of a firearm.

           5   Q.  What was it about that piece of intelligence and the

           6       information about the location, that required you to

           7       reconsider following Z51's phonecall?  (Pause)

           8   A.  It was the fact that we now had one of those subjects

           9       was in possession of a firearm and it was a dynamic

          10       decision and it related to the need just to confirm with

          11       the Tactical Firearms Commander that the authority was

          12       ongoing.

          13   Q.  Before that time, did you know the location of the

          14       possible handover?

          15   A.  No.

          16   Q.  Was that a significant change?

          17   A.  Yes.  It was -- yes.  I needed to know.

          18   Q.  Finally, please, in relation to Mr Hutchinson-Foster, he

          19       wasn't part or the subject of the MASTS operation

          20       authorised for 3 to 6 August, was he?

          21   A.  No.

          22   Q.  The possibility was put to you, "Why didn't you make him

          23       the subject of the MASTS?"  If for whatever reason --

          24       and you have explained why no purpose would have been

          25       served -- but if you had decided to put him in




           1       a position where he was the object of the operation,

           2       would you have had, or would somebody have had, to fill

           3       out an FA1, a spontaneous or near spontaneous FA1,

           4       an FA2 or 2A, an FA3, FA3A or FA5 in order to bring out

           5       a MASTS operation specifically addressed to him?

           6   A.  Yes, we would start again.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  So you would have to have a separate

           8       whole process, because yesterday you were talking about

           9       the six and Hutchinson-Foster being an associate, but if

          10       you needed armed surveillance you needed to have a whole

          11       form filling exercise run through in relation to him?

          12   A.  Yes.  With the directed surveillance authority you can

          13       add an associate or they can be implicit and added onto

          14       the surveillance activity.  For the authority for

          15       a firearms operation, that is something separate.  So

          16       you would reconsider "This is now a specific operation

          17       and let's look at it on its own in isolation and start

          18       again."

          19   MR KEITH:  You might not be criticised for not filling out

          20       every part of a new form because, obviously, the

          21       background and circumstances would have been reflected

          22       in the original MASTS operation directed at Mr Duggan

          23       and the six subjects, but something would have had to

          24       have been done.

          25   A.  Yes.




           1   Q.  Given that Mr Duggan, who was collecting the gun,

           2       according to the intelligence, and who was the subject

           3       of a MASTS, because he was one of the six, was there any

           4       need to put Mr Hutchinson-Foster under a MASTS when the

           5       intelligence didn't say that he was the person actually

           6       delivering?

           7   A.  No.  I personally think that would be reckless to do

           8       that.  You've got intelligence on those six subjects

           9       which is reliable and credible and you are following and

          10       reacting to it at that time.  In my view, if we had have

          11       used another team to then move on to

          12       Mr Hutchinson-Foster, we had no intelligence around him,

          13       no specific intelligence around where he was and what he

          14       was doing and, from my point of view, if we had a team

          15       doing surveillance, for example, with no intelligence

          16       feed, he could come out of a house with shopping bags

          17       with a gym kit and we wouldn't know what he was

          18       carrying.

          19           So then my point of view, you take it back to those

          20       six people you've got really good intelligence on and

          21       you work on them and you follow them and control them

          22       and you act and in that way everybody, part of that

          23       operation, is a safeguarded as best as possible.  That's

          24       what I always do and I think that's the best way forward

          25       with it.




           1   Q.  The intelligence centred around Mr Duggan, not

           2       Mr Hutchinson-Foster.

           3   A.  That's right.

           4   Q.  Lastly this: the material change in intelligence that

           5       you've described came in from SOCA, 5.10, 5.15.  That's

           6       common ground.  It was before the start time that the

           7       operation was meant to commence at 6 o'clock.

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  So the teams were going to Quicksilver to get their

          10       briefing, plan for 6 o'clock, and then go on their way.

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  But the intelligence came in, as I say, before the

          13       briefing, before the operation was due to start.  Do you

          14       know when intelligence is going to come in?

          15   A.  No.

          16   Q.  ZZ17 appears to have been told about 5.20, he says, or

          17       we'll hear; the Strategic Firearms Commander, yourself,

          18       told around 5.30; there was a dynamic briefing at 5.45;

          19       and officers got to the Vicarage Road area just before

          20       6.00, so about half an hour after Trident got the

          21       intelligence.

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  For an operation that was suddenly forced to start

          24       before its start time based on the new intelligence, was

          25       that half an hour, to get everything into place and to




           1       start, slow, moderate or fast, in your experience in

           2       terms of being able to redirect something as complex as

           3       a MASTS operation?

           4   A.  This is what we do all the time.  You are starting on

           5       an operation, you react to the intelligence as it comes

           6       in.  Yes, within half an hour, it's perfectly reasonable

           7       to react.  We had those assets that were trained

           8       experienced, they do that all the time and I was quite

           9       comfortable that that could be done as per the plan.

          10   MR KEITH:  Thank you very much.

          11   A.  Thank you.

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Underwood?

          13                Further questions by MR UNDERWOOD

          14   MR UNDERWOOD:  A couple of matters, Ms Mallon, if I may.  We

          15       had several exchanges yesterday about the way you picked

          16       up the intelligence between 1 and 4 August.  I suggested

          17       to you at one point that you had said something to

          18       contradict yourself about whether you picked up a gist

          19       on the 1st or 2nd or 3rd.  Will you take it from me that

          20       you didn't contradict yourself?

          21   A.  Oh, good.

          22   Q.  So the position is, is it, to get this completely clear:

          23       in relation to the intelligence picture emerging on the

          24       1st and 2nd, you had a gist about it being "Kevin" or

          25       "Kev" --




           1   A.  Yes.

           2   Q.  -- and on the 3rd I think you learned it was

           3       Mr Hutchinson-Foster?

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  Can I just very carefully go through the note on the

           6       left-hand side of your record, your day book, our

           7       CD7202.  You remember Mr Butt asked you about it about

           8       ten minutes ago?

           9   A.  Yes, yes.

          10   Q.  There's that piece which I think has a Post-it note or

          11       something over it?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  You have the original there, have you?

          14   A.  I haven't.

          15   Q.  Can I just ask about it in general terms.  You get some

          16       information at 5.30 which you wrote down behind that

          17       blank piece, did you?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  Did I understand you saying to my friend Mr Keith that

          20       that information was so significant that you applied the

          21       conflict management model to it?

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  I do not want to do what I did yesterday and mishear

          24       something.  Did I hear you say that that information was

          25       to the effect that Mr Duggan had a gun --




           1   A.  Yes, was in possession of a firearm, yes.

           2   Q.  -- at 5.30?

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  You are quite sure?

           5   A.  Yes -- I have not got my original with me, yes.

           6   Q.  You are just doing this from memory?

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  All right.  I don't think we can take it any further.

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Underwood, I have already decided

          10       in relation to this point that, before allowing this

          11       witness to leave the building I will have to rise and

          12       make sure I can comply with my duties in relation to

          13       this.  She has just said, in answer to Mr Keith, that

          14       she did make some notes.  I don't think -- it's not my

          15       job but she has admitted that she was not really allowed

          16       to do that, as a matter of law, but whatever notes she

          17       did make I must make sure that I see.

          18   MR KEITH:  Can I assist in finding a way through this

          19       intelligence related thicket.  We don't have the

          20       unredacted document here.  It was, I understand,

          21       redacted quite a long time ago by the IPCC, perhaps with

          22       input from SOCA.  But we can certainly call for the

          23       original, wherever it may be, and then it can be handed

          24       to you, sir, as you know, as a matter of law, you're the

          25       only person in a position to be able to determine




           1       whether or not it can be, to any extent at all, put into

           2       the public domain.  But it may take a bit of time

           3       because we don't have the document.  For the reasons

           4       that you know, the document has to go back as well.

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Well no, I'm surprised the way this

           6       has come out, that I had not actually been offered this

           7       document by somebody at some stage.  But I can say quite

           8       candidly that I haven't.

           9           So that's why -- I didn't want to have a great

          10       crisis at the moment.  I was just proposing to rise just

          11       while I could work out what the position was.  It may

          12       be, without going too much -- that we can just put that

          13       to one side and it may be that we will have to ask you

          14       to come back once I've been able to make sure and

          15       satisfy myself that there is nothing new about it and if

          16       there is then I will have to deal with it as best I am

          17       able by law.

          18   MR MANSFIELD:  May we just make the indication that this was

          19       a document we specifically asked for months ago, at

          20       least in gist form.  We say there are other documents.

          21       We would ask that the review process of documents

          22       relevant to this Inquest takes place regularly.

          23           This was foreseeable.  I didn't ask any questions

          24       because it had been redacted.  I assumed somebody had

          25       looked at it and decided that we could not even have




           1       a gist of it.  But we don't want to keep coming to

           2       a situation in which a document --

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I am very sensitive and careful

           4       about what my position is and Mr Glasson wants to say

           5       something.

           6   MR GLASSON:  Can I explain that, in relation to the IPCC, we

           7       do not have an unredacted version of that document.  Our

           8       understanding is that it was redacted by the

           9       Metropolitan Police.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  All right.  We are not going to go

          11       through all this, members of the jury, we'll have a --

          12       you will have to just rely on me making sure that, in

          13       the very near future indeed I get hold of this document

          14       in its original form and see whether there's any

          15       excitement that could be generated from it, or probably

          16       not, but at the same time I do need to comply and make

          17       sure that that is something which I have seen.

          18   MR UNDERWOOD:  Can I just perhaps leave it this way with

          19       Ms Mallon: is that a note you are likely to have taken

          20       very accurately?

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   MR UNDERWOOD:  So whatever it turns out to say, it will

          23       properly reflect the information given to you at 5.30;

          24       is that right?

          25   A.  Yes.




           1   MR UNDERWOOD:  That is all I ask.

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  That does

           3       conclude your evidence.  As you have heard me say, it

           4       may be that I might be asking you to come back and see

           5       us at some future occasion --

           6   A.  No problem.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- once we resolve this issue.

           8   A.  Thank you.

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Apart from that, thank you very

          10       much.  You are free to go.  As I am saying to all

          11       witnesses, please do not discuss your evidence with

          12       other people likely to give evidence before this

          13       Inquest.

          14   A.  Thank you.

          15                      (The witness withdrew)

          16   MR UNDERWOOD:  Detective Inspector Lilburn, please.

          17   MR KEITH:  Sir, perhaps mistakenly I had assumed you were

          18       going to rise for five minutes so we could address

          19       straight away the practical issues --

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It may be better.  Noticing the

          21       time -- I am going to rise in the morning.  I had

          22       thought that that was going to be done after the witness

          23       and the next witness, for practical reasons.  But at the

          24       same time, as an hour has already elapsed and this

          25       particular witness may be a little longer than




           1       20 minutes -- I look around for indications --

           2   MR UNDERWOOD:  She will.

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- I think perhaps if I have a short

           4       break at this point, then we'll get that witness in and

           5       see how the timings go.  So perhaps you are right, I'll

           6       follow the suggestion and I'll rise for a short time.

           7   (11.33 am)

           8    (A short break, during which time the jury left the court)

           9   (11.49 am)

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We will have the jury in then,

          11       please.

          12                  (In the presence of the jury)

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much, members of the

          14       jury.  What's the position then now, Mr Underwood?

          15   MR UNDERWOOD:  Sir, we'll make further investigations into

          16       the document with the Post-it note in due course.

          17       Meanwhile we will crack on and call Detective Inspector

          18       Lilburn, please.

          19   THE WITNESS:  I'm Detective Inspector Katie Lilburn from the

          20       Directorate of Professional Standards of the

          21       Metropolitan Police.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Just before that, we had better have

          23       you sworn or affirmed.

          24            DETECTIVE INSPECTOR KATIE LILBURN (sworn)

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  Please have




           1       a seat and make yourself comfortable.  You have

           2       documents before you.  Then perhaps we'll get you to

           3       repeat who you are now and then Mr Underwood will ask

           4       you some questions.

           5                    Questions by MR UNDERWOOD

           6   MR UNDERWOOD:  Good morning Detective Inspector.

           7   A.  Good morning.

           8   Q.  My name is Underwood, I think you know, and I act for

           9       the Inquest and I have the questions for you in the

          10       first place.  Would you mind repeating your full name?

          11   A.  It's Katie Lilburn, I'm a Detective Inspector and I work

          12       within the Directorate of Professional Standards in the

          13       Met.

          14   Q.  I think you were given the task of looking into what

          15       I keep calling the anonymous letter that was received by

          16       the Commissioner for the Metropolitan Police.  You nod

          17       your head; can I ask you to say yes or no?

          18   A.  Yes, that's correct, yes.

          19   Q.  Can we just set out what you did.  Did you break that

          20       letter down into component parts?

          21   A.  Yes, I did.  I set myself a terms of reference and

          22       parameters which I was going to work to and then I set

          23       26 actions to assess the validity of the claims within

          24       the letter.

          25   Q.  We are getting used to police language now, by "action"




           1       you mean a task, do you?

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  Thank you.  First of all, can we have a look at the

           4       letter and then we'll set out the actions that you

           5       looked at for yourself or set for yourself.  It's at

           6       CD1514 and hard copies are coming up to the jury now to

           7       go into their bundle.  There's one for you.  It will be

           8       C10.  (Handed)

           9           In fact, we see from the covering note at 1513 this

          10       particular copy was addressed to the Commissioner

          11       Bernard Hogan-Howe, received in the Commissioner's

          12       private office on 26 September 2012.

          13   A.  Yes, that's right.

          14   Q.  If you will forgive me, I will read it quite briefly so

          15       that everybody has a grip on what it actually asserts:

          16           "Dear Mr Hogan-Howe,

          17           "Re: Report into corruption within ... 'Operation

          18       Trident'."

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Can I make sure that we have all

          20       been given the right copy of this letter?

          21   MR UNDERWOOD:  I take it from that you haven't, sir.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  No.

          23   MR UNDERWOOD:  It should start at number CD1513.

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It's not the number it's the

          25       content.  Do you have one with holes in, members of the




           1       jury?

           2   MR UNDERWOOD:  This started life with some names in it and

           3       it's been --

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That's the point.  This is a copy

           5       which still has those names in it.  I wonder if we

           6       collect those up for the moment.

           7   MR UNDERWOOD:  Sorry, members of the jury, could I just

           8       check one of those and see what we're looking at.  Thank

           9       you.

          10                  (The documents were returned)

          11   MR UNDERWOOD:  I'm so sorry members of the jury, we'll get

          12       the proper copy to you in due course.  Can you look at

          13       the screen for the moment?

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you.  That's why the first

          15       person to get a copy going to the jury should be the

          16       judge all the time now.

          17   MR UNDERWOOD:  Yes, and it will happen in future.

          18           So taking it from 1514, inspector:

          19           "Dear Mr Hogan-Howe,

          20           "Re: Report into corruption within ... 'Operation

          21       Trident'.

          22           "I'm an investigative journalist currently

          23       investigating corruption within the Met Police's

          24       Operation Trident.

          25           "I was passed some information from a gentleman




           1       claiming to be a Trident officer, the info has not all

           2       be verified and authenticated yet however in light of

           3       the current court case involving Mark Duggan, I have

           4       felt it prudent to send this information to you to

           5       launch your own internal investigation.

           6           "I have not yet sent this report to the press;

           7       however I have made the information available to the

           8       family of Mark Duggan.

           9           "In light of the damning press the Met have received

          10       over the killing of Sean Wriggs, Jean Charles De

          11       Menezes, and Ian Tomlinson I think it fair to share the

          12       information I have come by to allow you to manage the

          13       media backlash I am sure this report will generate as

          14       and when it's revealed in the public arena.

          15           "As you can imagine the reports contains the names

          16       and details of some very dangerous individuals and my

          17       anonymity at this stage is very important, so I am going

          18       under the alias of Richard Chamberlin for the time

          19       being.

          20           "I will be in contact with you in due course.

          21           "Regards

          22           "Richard Chamberlin."

          23           Then it reads:

          24           "Introduction:

          25           "The following information was obtained from




           1       an officer claiming to be from Operation Trident.

           2       Trident is a unit within the police force that deals

           3       primarily with gun crime in the black community.  My

           4       team were investigating corruption within Trident, after

           5       the death of Mark Duggan.  We were given a flash drive

           6       containing information about Trident and several of

           7       their operations.

           8           "We have not verified or authenticated all of the

           9       information on the leaked drive; however after our own

          10       extensive research we have found much of the information

          11       to be true.

          12           "The drive contained a list of 'paid' informants

          13       that work directly with Trident, most of which are

          14       former and current offenders.  One of the names that

          15       continued to reoccur was that of a Mr U1, aka [some

          16       aliases].

          17           "U1 stood out for a number of reasons (which we will

          18       go into later in this report) but mainly because of his

          19       alleged involvement in the Mark Duggan case.

          20           "Background:

          21           "U1's profile was one of the longest on the leaked

          22       drive, according to police he was considered the

          23       'leader' of a gang based in Tottenham North London,

          24       called 'North Star'.  He had taken over leadership from

          25       U2, (U2 was one of the suspects in the killing of




           1       PC Blakelock in the Broadwater Farm riots).  North Star

           2       under the leadership of U1, were infamous for drug

           3       dealing, robbing footballers for their watches and

           4       jewellery, and for the gangland killings of their East

           5       London gang rivals 'Mash Town' and 'London Fields' both

           6       based in Hackney.

           7           "The drive shows that U1 himself was the prime

           8       suspect in at least six of these gangland murders, and

           9       was involved with another four incidents for conspiracy

          10       to commit murder.

          11           "U1 was approached by DI U3 of Operation Trident,

          12       after U3 arrested U1 on a conspiracy to commit murder

          13       offence.  U1 was connected to several high profile

          14       'persons of interest' to the police.  Getting U1 on

          15       board as an informant was seen as a 'higher priority'

          16       rather than putting this known criminal behind bars.  It

          17       was quite simple U1 would give U3 information or face

          18       charges.  U1 agreed and a deal was made between them for

          19       U1 to become a paid informant.

          20           "Trident had a list of individuals that were

          21       associated either directly or indirectly with U1 that

          22       they were interested in.  Some of the names on the list

          23       were U4 ... known for a string of protection rackets,

          24       drug dealing and the supply of firearms to his (U4)

          25       'street soldiers'.  Initially U1 was reluctant to give




           1       any decent intelligence on U4, until the middle of 2012

           2       after U4 was doing busy with one of U1's drug runners.

           3       U1 was furious that while he was away on a cruise, U4

           4       had done a drug deal with U5.  U1 was quoted to have

           5       said to his handlers at Trident 'If I wasn't on that

           6       fucking cruise I could have given you (U4)'.

           7           "Other names on the list were that of U6 aka ...

           8       a known drug dealer armed robbery and major supplier of

           9       guns in the Peckham area.  This is someone U1 was known

          10       to dislike.

          11           "Also on the list was U7 aka ... brother of

          12       convicted murderer ... and a known South London Boss of

          13       a gang closely affiliated to U1's North Star gang called

          14       'Shower Posse'.  The Shower Posse was based in London's

          15       New Cross area and had a criminal network that spread as

          16       far as Jamaica, Miami and New York.  U7 was of interest

          17       for drug import and supplying guns and ammunition.  U1

          18       was a close ally of U7.

          19           The whistle blower who supplied the drive, whom we

          20       will call officer 'X', said U1 would spend up to

          21       12 hours per week with his handlers at Trident answering

          22       questions on crime figures of varying degrees in the

          23       London area.  Although a lot of the information U1

          24       supplied could not be used in court without U1 having to

          25       attend court (something he would not do) U1's




           1       intelligence acted as a guide to 'point us in the right

           2       direction'.

           3           "Along with names of informants and persons of

           4       interest the drive also contained an extensive profile

           5       on U1 himself.  According to his psychological profile

           6       Trident consider U1 to be a sociopath and a man who

           7       would do anything to survive.  It spoke of a man 'void

           8       of loyalty and emotion' a fact that made him the perfect

           9       informant but also not to be trusted.  The fact that U1

          10       was the prime suspect of his former brother-in-law's

          11       murder and was willing to supply information to police

          12       that led to the shooting (but not killing) by police of

          13       one of his own gang members, U9 aka ... And the supply

          14       of information that led to the arrest and imprisonment

          15       of long time gang associate and right hand man U10

          16       aka ... over a nightclub stabbing U10 was involved in

          17       further displayed his cut throat survival instincts.

          18           "The police profile also showed U1 saw himself as a

          19       'celebrity gangster' frequenting some of the most

          20       exclusives nightclubs and bars.  He also had a roster of

          21       celebrity friends which included premiership footballers

          22       ... to name but a few.  U1 even had a celebrity

          23       girlfriend ... whom he lives with, in the leafy suburb

          24       of ... a world away from the ghettos of Tottenham, where

          25       he made his name as a ruthless gangster.




           1           "In late 2010, U1 seemed to change direction because

           2       of the lack of actual convictions resulting from his

           3       intelligence; U1 along with DI U3 began 'setting up'

           4       members of U1's own gang in a bid to catch them with the

           5       so-called 'smoking gun'.  The plan was quite simple U1

           6       would arrange either the delivery or picking up of

           7       a firearm and supply DI U3 and his team with all the

           8       information so they would catch the perpetrators in the

           9       act.  The minimum charge would be possession.

          10           "One of these elaborate setups would involve

          11       a Mark Duggan.

          12           "Duggan was a friend and North London associate of

          13       U1 and one of the few that still trusted U1 because so

          14       many of U1's criminal associates were getting arrested

          15       U1 seemed immune to the police.  Many of his former

          16       friend's allies and North Star no longer trusted him.

          17           "U1 contacted Duggan asking him to get hold of

          18       a 'strap' (sleet slang for a gun) Duggan was having

          19       difficulty acquiring the firearm but U1 continued to

          20       pressure Duggan to get the firearm for him.  Duggan was

          21       told by U1 it was to be used in a revenge killing of

          22       their East London gang rivals one of which had stabbed

          23       U1 ... nearly killing him.

          24           "U1 managed to convince Duggan to get the firearm

          25       and to deliver it to one of U1's delivery boys, who in




           1       turn would get it to U1.  U1 arranged the time and place

           2       where Duggan was to meet his delivery boy he even

           3       suggested to Duggan to 'take a cab'.  U1 then informed

           4       his handlers at Trident where Duggan would be, the route

           5       he would take and the fact that he would be in

           6       a minicab.  Duggan informed U1 when he was on route.

           7       Little did Duggan know that he was being set up by U1

           8       and Trident and was being driven towards his death.

           9           "If the information given by officer 'X' indeed

          10       proves to be true then it shows that Trident had no

          11       plans of taking Mark Duggan alive as it would have been

          12       blown U1's cover and it would have been apparent that

          13       Duggan was subject of a setup.  Although not directly

          14       said the information points towards the fact that the

          15       police could not afford to take Duggan alive and risk

          16       their involvement being exposed.  It leans heavily

          17       towards the fact that Duggan was assassinated by the

          18       police in order to protect the identity of a known

          19       criminal and a suspected murderer.

          20           "The drive shows a range of options were discussed

          21       by Trident including a random stop and search of the

          22       minicab Duggan was travelling in by uniformed police.

          23       But this was considered too dangerous again from

          24       intelligence gained from U1.  U1 was asked 'if Duggan is

          25       cornered by police is he likely to pose a risk to




           1       members of the public or the police?'  U1's quoted

           2       response was 'if you're asking me would he bust his gun

           3       then the answer's yeah'.

           4           "Based on U1's intelligence and the police response

           5       to that intelligence Duggan was killed by a single

           6       gunshot to the chest.  Officers claim that Duggan had

           7       shot at them but this was proven to be untrue.

           8       A handgun inside a sock was recovered at the scene.

           9       Some could argue a handgun the police themselves put

          10       there through their informant U1.

          11           "The death of Mark Duggan sparked the 2011 riots

          12       that started in Tottenham then spread across London and

          13       the entire country.  U1 was among the attendees at

          14       Mark Duggan's after funeral celebrations.

          15           "Again if all the information on this drive proves

          16       to be true then the police were directly responsible for

          17       the riots of summer 2011 which resulted in millions of

          18       pounds' worth of damage to property and businesses and

          19       thousands of arrests but more importantly the death of

          20       a young man.

          21           "The drive shows that even after the death of

          22       Mark Duggan and the riots it didn't stop there.  U1 was

          23       still being used to set up members of his own gang.

          24       A year on from the setup that led to the death of

          25       Mark Duggan and sparked the London riots U1, DI U3 and




           1       the other Trident officers embarked on yet another setup

           2       of men's of his inner circle.  U5 aka ... was known to

           3       police and was considered one of U1's enforcers.  Guns,

           4       knives U5 was associated with all levels of criminal

           5       activity.  He was also on the watch list as a potential

           6       'Muslim extremists' after his conversion to Islam in

           7       prison.  U1 had arranged for U5 to collect a firearm

           8       from another of his (U1's) South London associates.  U11

           9       was little known to the police however U1 informed

          10       police that U11 was a go to guy and had the right

          11       connections to get anything.  U1 also sent U12 aka ...

          12       to transport U5 with the firearm U12 was not known by

          13       the police having no criminal record however U1 had

          14       informed police that U12 had been involved in an attempt

          15       on the life of one of their East London gang rivals

          16       weeks before outside of Radio 1 headquarters in Central

          17       London.

          18           "U5 and U12 were instructed by U1 to collect the

          19       firearm in Dartford Kent.  U1 informed U3 of times and

          20       where the pickup would take place.  Again Trident shot

          21       at the vehicle that U12 and U5 were driving in and

          22       arrested all three.  A handgun was retrieved from the

          23       vehicle inside a sock, the story made the local

          24       newspapers.

          25           "Officer 'X' said, 'U1 began using us as his own




           1       personal enforcers if U1 wanted to get rid of a rival or

           2       he wanted to rob one of his own associates he would

           3       contact DI U3 to arrange another setup'.  He added

           4       'every time we met U1 he was driving another flash car

           5       X5's, X6's, convertible Mercedes it sickened me how he was

           6       swaggering around and being funded this lifestyle by the

           7       tax payer'.

           8           "When I asked officer 'X' if U3 or any other members

           9       of Trident were benefitting financially from U1 and his

          10       criminal exploits he responded 'no comment'.  When I

          11       asked him if he had benefitted from U1 or any other

          12       police informant financially he said 'no but it wouldn't

          13       be difficult'.

          14           "I went on to ask why officers like U3 would be

          15       working with the likes of U1.  Instead of placing him

          16       firmly behind bars, where it would seemed he belonged.

          17       He said we have been faced with huge cuts over the last

          18       18 months which has led to less manpower.  On top of

          19       that members of our unit have been re-assigned to

          20       Olympic duties yet we are still required to bring in the

          21       results.  The job is getting harder so some officers see

          22       working with the likes of U1 a necessary evil.  It is

          23       a classic case of the ends justifying the means.

          24       Working with informants brings results even if sometimes

          25       those results are not genuine.




           1           "We performed a basic Google search on Mr U1 under

           2       his many aliases' and uncovered a treasure trove of

           3       information including the alleged stabbing of Dizzie

           4       Rascal.  It showed an endless list of criminal activity

           5       by U1.  It begs the question why would DI U3 and

           6       Operation Trident show such poor judgment in working

           7       with or even being associated with someone of U1's

           8       infamy?  Can this be placed at the feet of the Coalition

           9       Government and their cuts or does it show a level of

          10       laziness and complacency by the officers of Trident?  Or

          11       is there a more sinister edge to this story.  Does it

          12       boil down to plain outright corruption?  No matter which

          13       way you look at this damming report it shows at best

          14       professional incompetence and at worst it displays

          15       blatant criminal activity on behalf of the police force.

          16       Either way DI U3 or his co-workers must be subject to an

          17       internal investigation into their use of informants.

          18           "Summary:

          19           "As previously stated not all the information

          20       contained on the flash drive has been verified or

          21       authenticated however we have confirmed and verified

          22       much of the information contained on the drive, through

          23       our own investigations over the last year.

          24       An investigation that is still ongoing.  We are also

          25       investigating two other Trident officers who will remain




           1       unnamed in this brief report.  However we aim to expose

           2       that Trident display a culture of entrapment and the use

           3       of informants that are deeply unreliable.  U1 is clearly

           4       the living embodiment of why Operation Trident was set

           5       up in the first place but instead of enforcing the law

           6       and protecting the public from this dangerous individual

           7       DI U3 among others at Operation Trident have instead

           8       shown a rampant disregard for the safety of the public

           9       and the very principles of the law and put their own

          10       selfish needs wants and desires ahead of their jobs,

          11       their morality and the public at large."

          12           Is that the letter that you were investigating?

          13   A.  Yes, that's the letter.

          14   Q.  Tell us more about the Department of Professional

          15       Standards; what does that do?

          16   A.  It is essentially an internal affairs.  It's

          17       a department within the Met that looks at the behaviour

          18       and standards of police officers, so it could encompass

          19       corruption or other serious malpractices of police

          20       officers.

          21   Q.  So if a suggestion arises that there is some sort of

          22       corruption within the police force anywhere, you are the

          23       go-to department, are you?

          24   A.  Yes, that's correct.

          25   Q.  At what level was this letter handled and then given to




           1       you?

           2   A.  A very high level.  It first went to DAC Hewitt, and

           3       then it was passed down to me.  So I received it on

           4       4 October.

           5   Q.  A DAC is what?

           6   A.  Deputy Assistant Commissioner.

           7   Q.  Thank you.  What terms of reference did you then set

           8       yourself?

           9   A.  I set myself three terms of reference.  The first one

          10       was to establish or to prove or disprove whether there

          11       was a corrupt relationship between U3, which is the

          12       police officer, who was named within the letter, and the

          13       alleged informant who was referred to, or we are

          14       referring to, as U1.

          15           My second term of reference was to see whether

          16       I could identify the officer X that gets referred to.

          17       So the author of the letter had said that a serving

          18       police officer was leaking information out about

          19       informants and operations.  So my second objective was

          20       to try to find that person.

          21           My third objective was to see -- once I concluded

          22       the first two -- was to see if I could identify the

          23       author of the letter and to see whether any offences had

          24       been committed by sending that letter.

          25   Q.  Did you have any preconceived views about whether this




           1       letter was true or false before you started this?

           2   A.  No, I went into this with an open mind.

           3   Q.  You kindly told us you set yourself these, I think, 26

           4       tasks --

           5   A.  That's correct.

           6   Q.  -- which in police terminology you call "actions".  Was

           7       the first of those actions "What is known about the

           8       Detective Inspector U3"?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  Did you discover that he had joined the police force,

          11       that is the Metropolitan Police Force, on

          12       12 February 1990?

          13   A.  That's correct, yes, he did.

          14   Q.  He became a Sergeant then moved to Surrey police in

          15       1999 --

          16   A.  Yes, that's right.

          17   Q.  -- and rejoined the Metropolitan Police in

          18       October 2000 --

          19   A.  That's correct.

          20   Q.  -- and became an Inspector in January 2008.

          21   A.  That's right.

          22   Q.  That's the point at which he began working with Trident,

          23       is that right --

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   Q.  -- when he was a Detective Inspector at the central




           1       intelligence unit?

           2   A.  That's correct.

           3   Q.  In September 2010, he joined the Murder Investigation

           4       Team in Clapham?

           5   A.  That's right.

           6   Q.  Did you discover that he had been said to be an asset to

           7       the Trident command and someone who was held in high

           8       regard by his managers?

           9   A.  I did find that, yes.

          10   Q.  Had he previously been commended by the Assistant

          11       Commissioner for work on a particular operation?

          12   A.  That's correct.

          13   Q.  Was action 2, your second task: "Can an audit be

          14       completed of MPS officers who are able to download

          15       material on flash drives?"

          16   A.  Yes, it was.

          17   Q.  What was the result of that?

          18   A.  The end result is that, unfortunately I could not

          19       identify that, so I found out that, for an officer to

          20       use a flash drive on a computer, they need enhanced user

          21       rights but also an enhanced terminal, and within that

          22       audit process it didn't show any historical enhanced

          23       rights.  So I wasn't able to do any backtracking to see

          24       whether any individual officers had that enhanced right

          25       previously.




           1   Q.  Right.  So the second of your terms of reference, trying

           2       to identify officer X, was going to grind into the dust,

           3       was it?

           4   A.  That's right, I couldn't do it.

           5   Q.  Let's go on to action 3 then.  Was that whether U1, as

           6       we are calling him, was a paid police informant?

           7   A.  So I have conducted checks both with the Met Police and

           8       national databases and the results of those checks have

           9       demonstrated that U1 is not, and has never been,

          10       a registered police informant.

          11   Q.  While we are on this topic, is the position of the

          12       Metropolitan Police and every other police force that

          13       they will never normally admit or deny whether somebody

          14       is an informant?

          15   A.  That's right.  The policy guidance on a national level

          16       is that we should neither confirm nor deny somebody's

          17       status in relation to a query about informants.

          18   Q.  But in this case, as a result of a ruling by the

          19       Coroner, you've been released to do that; is that right?

          20   A.  I have.

          21   Q.  Thank you.  Then was action 4 this: is U1 associated

          22       with U2 or the North Star, Mash Town and London Fields

          23       gangs and was he a suspect in a killing that's mentioned

          24       in the letter?

          25   A.  Yes, that was my fourth action.  I found that that was




           1       essentially true, that there was an association and

           2       I could find a number of things that backed that

           3       assertion up.  But I also found that they were available

           4       in open source searches, so it didn't further my

           5       investigation into objective 2, which was to see if this

           6       had been a leak.  That association was documented on the

           7       Internet, so it didn't take me further to show that

           8       there was a leak of information.

           9   Q.  Then if we go to action 5, was that whether U1 had been

          10       a suspect for murder and conspiracy to murder and

          11       whether he had been arrested by Trident officers for

          12       such offences?

          13   A.  That was the action, yes.

          14   Q.  What was the outcome of that?

          15   A.  I found out that U1 has been arrested for the offence of

          16       murder and conspiracy to murder but he had never been

          17       arrested by anybody in the Trident command.  So in

          18       answer to the whole question, it was a no, but he had

          19       been arrested for those offences, but it had always been

          20       by officers from the murder command, which is a totally

          21       separate command to the Trident command.

          22   Q.  So that's quite fundamental to the truth or falsity of

          23       the letter, isn't it --

          24   A.  It is.

          25   Q.  -- because the allegation is that U3 had, as it were,




           1       got him on the hook because he had been arrested by

           2       Trident for murder.

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  Then was the sixth action whether, specifically, U3 had

           5       arrested U1 for conspiracy to commit murder?

           6   A.  I interrogated the custody systems which essentially log

           7       who arrests individuals and there is no record that the

           8       police officer arrested U1.  I also checked Surrey

           9       Police because he had had a stint in Surrey

          10       Constabulary, and there's no record of any arrest or

          11       being involved in the arrest of U1.

          12   Q.  How reliable is that system for that sort of

          13       information?

          14   A.  It's very reliable.

          15   Q.  Then was action 7 whether U3 had come into professional

          16       contact with U1 through crime investigation?

          17   A.  Yes, that was my 7th action.

          18   Q.  What did you do about that?

          19   A.  I looked for this against crime report systems, which

          20       logs every crime report that's alleged, and also our

          21       intelligence systems, and I found that there was no

          22       contact, that U3 had never created any crime report or

          23       created any intelligence record that was to do with U1.

          24           I then took it a stage further, because of the

          25       letter's assertions that U1 was an informant.  I checked




           1       to see whether U3 ever had the extra training that it

           2       takes to manage informants and I found out that he has

           3       never been trained in that and he is not currently

           4       a registered handler of informants.

           5   Q.  I hate to use yet more jargon, does the phrase "sterile

           6       corridor" mean anything to you?

           7   A.  It does, yes.

           8   Q.  Can you help the jury what that means?

           9   A.  A sterile corridor would be to create a system that with

          10       people that -- for instance in this scenario, that are

          11       dealing with informants, that have no -- have -- that

          12       they are not, in the general sense, dealing with other

          13       crimes, so that their higher status would come out

          14       within the public.

          15           So the people that deal with informants are

          16       necessarily having to be a covert entity that don't have

          17       to go public with that role.  That's probably not

          18       very --

          19   Q.  To put it bluntly, nobody in Trident is going to be let

          20       loose on informants, is that it --

          21   A.  That's right, yes.

          22   Q.  -- because you keep the investigating teams well away

          23       from those who have contact with informants?

          24   A.  Yes.  It's a separate location, a separate system of

          25       logging onto computers.  It's a completely away from the




           1       reactive and pro-active officers within Trident.

           2   Q.  Thank you.  Was the eighth action whether U3 had had any

           3       phone contact with U1?

           4   A.  That's right, it was.

           5   Q.  What did you do about that?

           6   A.  I found out that U3 had two phones that he used, so one

           7       was a police issue phone and one was his personal mobile

           8       phone.  I obtained billing -- so incoming and outgoing

           9       calls -- for the officer for a two-year period, from

          10       September 2010 to September 2012, and we had three

          11       telephone numbers that were attributable to U1.

          12       I cross-referenced those and there is no record of any

          13       calls between the police officer and any of the numbers

          14       that are attributable to U1.

          15   Q.  Okay.  Was action 9 whether U1 could be linked to the

          16       person we're calling U4 from open source research --

          17   A.  That's it.

          18   Q.  -- u4 and U1 being both mentioned in that letter as

          19       being linked, yes?

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  What did you do about that?

          22   A.  There was a sort of two pronged attack to see whether

          23       that association was on open source intelligence checks,

          24       which it wasn't.  We didn't find it by doing Google or

          25       anything on the Internet that would be available to the




           1       public.  But on our Met intelligence systems there was

           2       an association between the two individuals.

           3           So although it supported an association, it didn't

           4       show necessarily that it had been a leak because it may

           5       have been known to other people within that associated

           6       group.  It didn't show that this information had to come

           7       from a police officer, it could have been a member of

           8       the same fraternity.

           9   Q.  Understood.  Then action 10, this is the reference to

          10       the cruise.  Did you ask yourself whether there was any

          11       evidence that U1 did indeed go on a cruise in 2012?

          12   A.  I did, yes.

          13   Q.  What was the outcome of that?

          14   A.  I found there was no intelligence in the Met Police

          15       that, at the time of receiving this letter, that U1 had

          16       gone on a cruise in -- some time in 2012.  Subsequently

          17       to September 2012, so that's when the Met Police

          18       received the letter, there has since been intelligence

          19       which says that he did go on a cruise.

          20   Q.  So the allegation was true, it's just that the Met

          21       Police didn't know it; is that it?

          22   A.  Yes, yes.

          23   Q.  Then action 11, is U1 associated with U6 by open source

          24       research?

          25   A.  Yes, it was two.




           1   Q.  Again, that's another connection that's --

           2   A.  That was U6 and U7 within the same action.

           3   Q.  Sorry, yes.

           4   A.  But, yes, again it was another association check and

           5       there weren't anything on open source to say that those

           6       individuals were associated, but there was intelligence

           7       within the Met Police that they were associated.  But my

           8       conclusion, again around that, was that that fact would

           9       have been known to other people within a group or

          10       fraternity and didn't prove that there had been a leak

          11       of information.

          12   Q.  Right.  Then we move on to action 12.  In the letter

          13       there's a description of U1 as being a sociopath and of

          14       being void of loyalty and emotion according to police

          15       understandings.  Did you check under action 12 whether

          16       that indeed did appear on any police reports?

          17   A.  Yes.  There was claim in the letter that there had been

          18       a psychological profile done on U1 with those terms

          19       encapsulated within that report.  I found that we don't

          20       have a psychological profile conducted on U1 and those

          21       terms don't appear on any intelligence record that could

          22       be linked.

          23   Q.  Right.  Action 13, this relates to U9, was the action

          24       whether U9 was shot by police and whether U1 supplied

          25       information that led to the arrest and imprisonment of




           1       U10 for a nightclub stabbing?

           2   A.  Yes, that was the action.  I found that U9 was somebody

           3       that had been shot by police in an armed operation.  So

           4       the element -- the answer to the first part of the

           5       question is that is correct.

           6           In relation to the U10 and the supply of

           7       information, I can again say that U1 is not and has

           8       never been a police informant, and I found out that the

           9       subject who's referred to as U10 was arrested on the

          10       basis of CCTV evidence on identification.  So I find

          11       that part of the question to be false.

          12   Q.  Right.  Action 14 -- we have seen some references to

          13       celebrity connections in the letter, much of which has

          14       been blanked out for obvious reasons here, so it's going

          15       to be a bit of a sparse action -- it's whether U1's

          16       celebrity connections to a number of blanked out people

          17       were documented; was that the action?

          18   A.  That was the action.

          19   Q.  How did it go?

          20   A.  So I checked both on open source and Met intelligence

          21       and, to summarise really, I found that there was more on

          22       open source than we held.  So the Met Police didn't know

          23       about some of those associations but they were available

          24       on open source.  So to conclude, that information was

          25       found to be correct, that association was there, but it




           1       was more proved via open source material rather than

           2       anything that the Met held.

           3   Q.  So Hello Magazine knew more about it than the Met?

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  Action 15: does U1 know Mark Duggan?

           6   A.  Yes.  I found that there were 89 intelligence reports

           7       that showed an association between U1 and Mark Duggan

           8       and these ranged from uniformed police officers giving

           9       information to more covert sources, but there is records

          10       that the two individuals are known to each other.

          11   Q.  Then action 16: did U1 contact Mark Duggan asking him to

          12       get a firearm?  That was a discrete task you set

          13       yourself, was it?

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  What did you discover under that?

          16   A.  For this, I liaised with Operation Trident and the

          17       officers that had led the prosecution into Kevin

          18       Hutchinson-Foster, and the circumstances around Mark

          19       Duggan's alleged possession of the firearm on 4 August

          20       led to the trial of Kevin Hutchinson-Foster and, within

          21       that, I asked -- I actioned, I set a task, to see

          22       whether the intelligence around U1 asking or

          23       pressurising Mark Duggan to get him a firearm, whether

          24       that featured, and the result of it was that there

          25       wasn't any intelligence.




           1   Q.  Then action 17, is there any record of U1 getting

           2       stabbed?

           3   A.  That's -- yes, the 17th action, and there is a record of

           4       him being stabbed and it was widely reported in the

           5       national media as well.

           6   Q.  Then action 18: did U1 contact Mark Duggan while he was

           7       in the minicab just prior to being stopped by police and

           8       fatally shot?  So that's somewhere between 6 o'clock and

           9       6.15 or so on 4 August.

          10   A.  I looked into all the calls, incoming and outgoing, made

          11       by Mark Duggan whilst he was in the minicab and there

          12       are no records -- and they were cross-checked with the

          13       numbers that we had for U1 -- and there is no record of

          14       any contact between those two individuals.

          15   Q.  Action 19, was that: was U3 involved in the arrest or

          16       intelligence gathering in relation to Mark Duggan on

          17       4 August?

          18   A.  Yes, I did a check to see whether the officer featured

          19       in those two stages, both the intelligence gathering and

          20       the arrest phase, and I have found no intelligence at

          21       all that the officer named within this letter had

          22       anything to do with that operation.  I checked his

          23       duties for the 4 August to see what he was doing and he

          24       was interviewing a prospective applicant for a post, so

          25       he was in no way involved with the events of 4 August.




           1   Q.  Where was he doing that interview?

           2   A.  Down in his offices within south London.

           3   Q.  Was action 20: was U1 involved in the intelligence that

           4       led to the stop of Mark Duggan on 4 August?

           5   A.  I'm able now to say that U1 is not a police informant

           6       nor has ever been.  From the assertions made in this

           7       letter, the claim is that U1 provided information to the

           8       Met Police.  I know that the intelligence that led to

           9       the operation on 4 August originated from SOCA.

          10   Q.  Then turning to action 21, was that: what were the

          11       tactical options for the stopping of Mark Duggan and did

          12       they include a random stop and search?

          13   A.  The tactical logs of the firearms commanders were

          14       checked and -- to see if that was an option and it

          15       wasn't an option.  In the scenario where somebody is

          16       allegedly carrying a gun, it wouldn't be a correct

          17       option.  So it was found that the tactic of a random

          18       stop and search wasn't incorporated.

          19   Q.  Then we've looked at phrase "bust his gun" in the

          20       letter.  Was action 22: does the phrase "bust his gun"

          21       appear on any police database?

          22   A.  I checked that and I found it was on one intelligence

          23       report but that report had nothing to do with the

          24       parties here.  It was a domestic incident, completely

          25       unrelated.  So although it did feature it doesn't bear




           1       any significance to this.

           2   Q.  Right.  Then under action 23, did you check links

           3       between U1, on the one hand, and U5, U11 and U12?

           4   A.  I did, and I found out that during the trial of U11, U12

           5       and U5, there had been telephone contact that had been

           6       brought out as evidence which showed that U1 was linked

           7       and associated with those three people.

           8   Q.  In the letter -- it's unfortunate we don't have the hard

           9       copy for all of us -- the allegation there is that U1

          10       was involved in setting up those three people after

          11       Mark Duggan's death; is that right?

          12   A.  That's right.

          13   Q.  Then action 24, goes back to this gentleman, the person

          14       called U5 for our purposes.  The letter alleges that

          15       that's a person who was converted to Islam.  Was action

          16       24 to see whether that was recorded, that conversion, on

          17       the MPS databases?

          18   A.  It was and we did -- the Met Police did hold

          19       intelligence in relation to U5 converting to Islam.

          20   Q.  Then, again, the letter deals with an attempt on

          21       someone's life near to the Radio 1 headquarters was

          22       action 25 about whether there was any record of such

          23       an attempt?

          24   A.  It was and we could find no record of that particular

          25       incident.




           1   Q.  Then the final action, was this, was it: were U11, U5

           2       and U12 arrested simultaneously for the offence of

           3       possessing a firearm in 2005 and did any officers fire

           4       at the vehicle carrying U12 and U5?

           5   A.  Yes, that was my action.  I found out that it was not

           6       the case.  U12 and U5, two of the individuals, had been

           7       arrested initially on 21 June and it was some days later

           8       when U11 was arrested.  So the first part of the

           9       question was it was a wrong statement.  The second part

          10       was that, allegedly, officers had fired and, on the

          11       checks I've done, they didn't fire there's no record of

          12       any firearm being discharged.

          13   Q.  When police officers discharge firearms does a record

          14       have to be made?

          15   A.  Yes, there's a post-incident procedure that is initiated

          16       and it would be known if an officer fired a firearm.

          17   Q.  Does the IPCC have to become involved?

          18   A.  Yes, they do.

          19   Q.  If a firearm is discharged and nobody keeps a record,

          20       what happens on the count-back; do you know about that?

          21   A.  Yes.  The count-back procedure is counting literally the

          22       ammunition within a firearm.  So if -- in these

          23       situations, if a firearm or a round had been let off,

          24       that we would have, on a count-back procedure it would

          25       have been evident, because there would have been




           1       ammunition missing.  So if the Professional Standards

           2       Department hadn't been told, nor the IPCC, there would

           3       be misconduct of an officer.  But in this case that

           4       hasn't happened.

           5   Q.  Right.  That's what happened to your 26 actions, is it?

           6   A.  That's right.

           7   Q.  Did you look into what happened in the prosecution of

           8       those three men subsequent to 2011 -- U11, U5 and U12 --

           9       to see what their defence was?

          10   A.  Yes, I did.  The letter to the Met Police had been

          11       received on 26 September last year.  On 21 September, so

          12       five days previously, defence case statements had been

          13       lodged by these men in relation to their trial.  In

          14       their defence case statements they raised strikingly

          15       similar points to the points that were included within

          16       this letter.  So it raised my suspicions that the author

          17       of this letter may be trying to alter or have some

          18       effect over the trial of U5, U11 and U12.

          19   Q.  Was U3 involved in that trial at all?

          20   A.  U3 was involved in that.  He was a Tactical Firearms

          21       Officer within that.

          22   Q.  Moving on then to the third part of your terms of

          23       reference, attempting to identify the author of the

          24       letter: as a result of your consideration of those

          25       defence statements, did you begin to think it might be




           1       one of those three men?

           2   A.  I did.  As soon as the letters were received into the

           3       Met Police, the letters -- so there were three letters

           4       actually sent in to the Commissioner, but also to two

           5       Assistant Commissioners.  All three letters, and all

           6       three envelopes were submitted to a forensic laboratory

           7       for testing for DNA and fingerprints.  On the envelope

           8       of the first letter that got sent to the Commissioner,

           9       I found -- or the scientist found, and brought it back

          10       to me -- that there was a mixed DNA profile on the

          11       inside adhesive strip of the envelope and that there

          12       were two or more individuals present on that profile.

          13           More work was done and it was established that all

          14       the components of the individual referred to as U11 was

          15       in that profile.  Then the scientist was able to offer

          16       a statistic probability around that.  So she said that

          17       the likelihood of U11 and another was 1 billion times

          18       more likely to be their DNA, rather than two unrelated

          19       individuals.

          20   Q.  Okay.  So 1 billion to 1 chance it was U11 that had got

          21       his DNA on that envelope somehow?

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  Was U11 then investigated further?

          24   A.  I did.  Would you like me to explain?

          25   Q.  I am going to put to you the suggestion you found a USB




           1       stick.  Did you?

           2   A.  I did.  I conducted search warrants, a total of three

           3       search warrants, at a number of addresses and at his

           4       flat I found a USB stick which contained an exact copy

           5       of the letter that had been sent to the Commissioner.

           6   Q.  Have you submitted a report or have you had a report

           7       submitted to the Crown Prosecution Service with a view

           8       to prosecuting U11?

           9   A.  Yes, I have.  I put a case to the CPS requesting charges

          10       for an attempt to pervert the Court of Justice around

          11       sending that letter.

          12   Q.  That's in their hands now, is it, the CPS's hands?

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   MR UNDERWOOD:  Very well, thank you very much

          15       Detective Inspector, that's all I have to ask.  It may

          16       well be there are other questions for you.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes.  Mr Mansfield, anything you

          18       would like to ask?

          19   MR MANSFIELD:  No questions, thank you.

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Thomas?

          21   MR THOMAS:  No thank you.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Stern?

          23   MR STERN:  No.

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Butt?

          25   MR BUTT:  No.




           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Ms Dobbin?

           2   MS DOBBIN:  No thank you.

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Keith?

           4                      Questions by MR KEITH

           5   MR KEITH:  Can I just ask you about a handful of areas,

           6       please?

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  Your department which is the Specialist Investigation

           9       Department of Professional Standards investigates police

          10       officers?

          11   A.  That's right.

          12   Q.  You have no connection to Trident --

          13   A.  No.

          14   Q.  -- or any of the people concerned in this inquiry into

          15       the death of Mr Duggan?

          16   A.  That's correct.

          17   Q.  It seems from what you said that this allegation was

          18       taken very seriously when it arrived.

          19   A.  That's right.

          20   Q.  A decision was taken at the highest level to get at the

          21       bottom of whether anything in this letter was true --

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  -- because if anything in this letter was true, it

          24       obviously revealed an exceptionally serious matter,

          25       didn't it?




           1   A.  That's correct.

           2   Q.  Did you approach the issue with an open mind?

           3   A.  I did.

           4   Q.  How long did it take you to carry out the research and

           5       investigation you have summarised for Mr Underwood?

           6   A.  Many months.  It began in October and I received the DNA

           7       results in the February and the search warrants were

           8       conducted in the March, and it's still an ongoing

           9       investigation because it's with the CPS.

          10   Q.  Did you look at hundreds or thousands of records, pieces

          11       of information --

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  -- and speak to countless people?

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  Can we just look at the letter?  Could we have CD1514,

          16       please, on the screen.  If you could just zoom in,

          17       please, on the first sentence, "I am".  Whoever wrote

          18       this letter to the Metropolitan Police claimed to be

          19       an investigative journalist; is that right?

          20   A.  That's what the letter says, yes.

          21   Q.  He didn't reveal his real name --

          22   A.  No, he used a pseudonym.

          23   Q.  -- nor the organisation for whom he worked if he worked

          24       for one?

          25   A.  That's correct.




           1   Q.  Throughout the letter, he uses the expression "my team"

           2       and the word "our".

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  Was any indication given as to who his team was or, if

           5       there was more than one person, whom they were?

           6   A.  No, not at all.

           7   Q.  He says at the bottom of that page, CD1514:

           8           "I will be in contact with you in due course."

           9   A.  That's correct.

          10   Q.  There can hardly be anybody in this country who does not

          11       know the Inquest into the death of Mark Duggan has

          12       started and this letter is, if it's true, directly

          13       concerned with the events that are under investigation.

          14   A.  That's right.

          15   Q.  That's why you're giving evidence.  Has anybody been in

          16       touch "in due course"?

          17   A.  No, nobody's been in touch.

          18   Q.  Did it strike you as likely that somebody claiming to be

          19       an investigative journalist would not reveal their name,

          20       their organisation or be willing to splash whatever they

          21       had in every possible publication?

          22   A.  It's odd, yes.

          23   Q.  It's odd.  Whoever wrote this letter, neither named the

          24       officer X, from whom he claimed to have received all

          25       this information, nor disclosed anything more about




           1       himself.

           2   A.  No.

           3   Q.  The reason he gave, fourth paragraph on that page,

           4       CD1514:

           5           "I think it fair to share the information I have

           6       come by to allow you to manage the media backlash."

           7           So if this person was telling the truth, that they

           8       were an investigative journalist exposing the most

           9       serious gross corruption at the heart of the

          10       Metropolitan Police, he claimed to have shared it with

          11       the Met so they themselves could manage the information.

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  Did that seem to you to be very likely?

          14   A.  No.  It -- it didn't.

          15   Q.  You investigated, to the extent you could, those

          16       assertions in the letter that were capable of objective

          17       validation.

          18   A.  Yes, I did.

          19   Q.  At the heart of it is the suggestion that an informant,

          20       U1, who is privy to the affairs of organised criminal

          21       networks, gangs, perhaps an associate, provided

          22       information to a corrupt Trident officer -- poor U3, who

          23       has been accused of this -- who then essentially set up

          24       Mr Duggan by, together with the informant U1,

          25       pressurising Mr Duggan to pick up a gun so that he could




           1       be shot dead; that's basically what it amounts to?

           2   A.  Yes, that's right.

           3   Q.  But U1 has not been, has never been, a registered

           4       informant with the Metropolitan Police or any police

           5       force, as far as you can tell?

           6   A.  That's correct.

           7   Q.  He's never been arrested for murder or attempted murder

           8       by anyone in Trident?

           9   A.  No, that's correct, as well.

          10   Q.  So there was no link there.  He's never been arrested by

          11       that Trident officer, I would suggest, so unfairly

          12       blamed in this letter?

          13   A.  That's correct, never arrested by him.

          14   Q.  There's no evidence that he's even investigated him?

          15   A.  No, there's no evidence of that.

          16   Q.  There's no evidence of phone contact?

          17   A.  That's right.

          18   Q.  You checked mobile phones, Metropolitan Police phones?

          19   A.  I did as well, yes.

          20   Q.  All the phones, and you had a few numbers that you were

          21       provided with, in relation to U1 and U3 were checked --

          22   A.  That's right.

          23   Q.  -- and there's no connection?

          24   A.  There's no connection at all.

          25   Q.  U3, this DI, has no ability to look after registered




           1       informants because he doesn't even have access to the

           2       informant computer system?

           3   A.  No, he's never been trained.

           4   Q.  Although he's a Trident officer, he cannot have access

           5       because, as you have said, there's a sterile corridor

           6       preventing operational police officers from ever running

           7       informants?

           8   A.  That's correct.

           9   Q.  The phrases in the letter to the fact that Trident

          10       allegedly holds a description of U1 as a sociopath is

          11       wrong; there is no such entry?

          12   A.  There is no such entry.

          13   Q.  There are no calls from this man U1 to Mr Duggan?

          14   A.  That's correct.

          15   Q.  There is no evidence of any type, description or form

          16       that U1, this gang member, alleged to have been

          17       an informant, pressurised Mr Duggan to get a gun at all?

          18   A.  None at all.

          19   Q.  So all the factual assertions which could be proved were

          20       disproved?

          21   A.  That's right.

          22   Q.  The only assertions in this letter which seem to you to

          23       be true were those which relied upon publicly available

          24       information or might have been known to another member

          25       of a gang?




           1   A.  That's right.

           2   Q.  For the plot to have worked, the informant U1, who was

           3       apparently setting all this up, the Rasputin-esque

           4       figure who inveigled the DI at Trident, would have had

           5       to have got Trident to set up the MASTS operation to

           6       trap Mr Duggan.

           7   A.  That's right.

           8   Q.  But the operation wasn't planned, or authorised rather,

           9       until 2 August; did you know that?

          10   A.  I didn't, no.

          11   Q.  Of course, if this was a plot to trap Mr Duggan, it's

          12       rather curious that, if whoever planned it had the

          13       ability to set up the operation, the intelligence came

          14       in before 6 o'clock before the teams were even ready to

          15       go out; did you know that?

          16   A.  No, I didn't.

          17   Q.  In the letter, CD1517 at the bottom of the page, the

          18       author, having thoroughly besmirched U3, the DI, and U1,

          19       turns to another incident, doesn't he?

          20   A.  Yes, he does.

          21   Q.  He starts to say that it didn't stop there, this corrupt

          22       arrangement carried on, and in essence it was used to

          23       set up, to trap, three other people, the three you have

          24       mentioned: U12, U5, U11?

          25   A.  That's right.




           1   Q.  So what the author is, in a sense, saying is he's trying

           2       to set out an explanation for how U11, U5 and U12 were

           3       similarly set up.

           4   A.  That's right.

           5   Q.  These were three men, two of whom were arrested on

           6       21 June 2012 for being in possession of a firearm and

           7       the third, U11, arrested on 12 July 2012.

           8   A.  That's right.

           9   Q.  So before the letter was sent --

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  -- but after Mr Duggan was tragically shot.  That

          12       person, U11, was therefore on trial or awaiting trial at

          13       the time the letter was sent --

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  -- for possession of a firearm.  That person knew U1,

          16       the man that he has accused of being an informant,

          17       doesn't he?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  Indeed, U11, the person who was arrested subsequently,

          20       wrote to the judge in that trial accusing U1 of being in

          21       a corrupt arrangement with U3, exactly the same

          22       allegation.

          23   A.  That's correct.

          24   Q.  His co-defendants made the same allegation --

          25   A.  Yes.




           1   Q.  -- against U1, this gang member, accusing him of being

           2       a registered informant.  But U11, the person who was

           3       accused of possession a firearm, who had accused U1 and

           4       U3 of being in a corrupt arrangement to set up Mr Duggan

           5       and himself, U11, it was his DNA that was found on the

           6       envelope sent to the Metropolitan Police.

           7   A.  That's right, it was his DNA.

           8   Q.  There's only a 1 in 1 billion chance that it wasn't him?

           9   A.  That's correct.

          10   Q.  So you searched his address and the addresses of the

          11       people around him.  In his ex-partner's address, you

          12       found an Apple laptop, didn't you --

          13   A.  That's right.

          14   Q.  -- and a USB stick at another address used by his

          15       ex-partner, U11's?

          16   A.  At his own flat.

          17   Q.  Oh, at his own flat?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  In essence, and I am not going to go through it in

          20       detail, the Apple laptop had a document fragment in

          21       it --

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  -- which contained the name Richard Chamberlin --

          24   A.  That's right.

          25   Q.  -- the same name as this letter?




           1   A.  The same alias.

           2   Q.  Did it have anything in it in terms of typographical

           3       errors, which would indicate that whoever had the Apple

           4       laptop wrote the same letter that we have here, the

           5       anonymous letter?

           6   A.  Yes.  There were identical misspellings in the fragment

           7       found on the girlfriend's computer that we seized that

           8       were evident throughout this letter so there are

           9       identical misspellings.

          10   Q.  CD1514, please, the second line of that first page of

          11       the letter.  How is the word "operation" spelt?

          12   A.  It had double P.

          13   Q.  Is that the same typo found on the fragment in the Apple

          14       laptop found at U11's girlfriend's address?

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It becomes one P in the next page,

          16       at the beginning of the report it's spelled correctly.

          17   MR KEITH:  Yes, the first line of the following page has the

          18       word "operation" but that typo --

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Did you come to conclusions about

          20       that?

          21   A.  No.

          22   MR KEITH:  But it was an unusual and distinct typographical

          23       error.  Also in that Apple laptop were there Google

          24       searches for names in this anonymous letter like De

          25       Menezes, Tottenham gangs and even the address for New




           1       Scotland Yard.

           2   A.  Yes, that is right there were several Google searches on

           3       the individuals who had been named within this letter.

           4   Q.  On a USB stick found at his ex-partner's address was

           5       there an identical copy of the anonymous letter?

           6   A.  That's right.

           7   Q.  At his ex-girlfriend's mother's address there was

           8       another computer and laptop, which had on it a covering

           9       letter addressed to an MP, along the same lines as the

          10       letter sent to the Metropolitan Police Commissioner?

          11   A.  Yes, that's right.

          12   Q.  That person, U11, was obviously interviewed by you --

          13   A.  That's right.

          14   Q.  -- but denied writing the anonymous letter.

          15   A.  Yes, he denied being the author.

          16   Q.  He told you, didn't he, that an anonymous male had

          17       contacted him -- did he provide the name --

          18   A.  No, he didn't.

          19   Q.  -- and showed him and letter and by accident he had

          20       handled the envelop, which is why his DNA must have been

          21       on the adhesive slip.

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  He purported to give an explanation in relation to all

          24       the other points you put to him.

          25   A.  Yes.




           1   Q.  But that man, U11, pleaded guilty, didn't he, to the

           2       possession of a firearm offence --

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  -- for which he had been originally arrested and which

           5       it looks like this letter was designed to set up

           6       a defence for.

           7   A.  That's correct, he pleaded guilty on that.

           8   Q.  Did you reach any conclusions as to why you haven't

           9       received any more contact, although the letter said

          10       there would be further contact, now that U11 has pleaded

          11       guilty to the possession of a firearm offence, which

          12       this letter tries to set out a defence for?

          13   A.  Yes, I have, because that person is still receiving

          14       a custodial term.

          15   Q.  You wouldn't have sent this case to the Crown

          16       Prosecution Service for consideration of whether or not

          17       U11, "B" I'll call him, should be prosecuted for

          18       attempting to pervert the court of the justice, unless

          19       you believed that that was the position?

          20   A.  That's correct.

          21   Q.  Do you have any real doubt at all that this letter is

          22       false, a complete fabrication and an outrageous slur

          23       from start to finish?

          24   A.  I have no doubt.  It's -- I find it overwhelming the

          25       amount of evidence that proves it to be false.




           1   MR KEITH:  Thank you very much.

           2   MR UNDERWOOD:  Nothing arising, thank you.

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much for coming along

           4       to assist us with that letter, thank you.

           5   A.  Thank you.

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much,

           7       Detective Inspector Lilburn.

           8                      (The witness withdrew)

           9   MR UNDERWOOD:  Sir, I am going to call U3 next, so that he

          10       can very briefly tell you his side of this.  He is, of

          11       course, an anonymised witness and we would have to

          12       ensure --

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It takes a little time to set the

          14       court up for that.  It might be better to do that

          15       briefly at 2 o'clock --

          16   MR UNDERWOOD:  Certainly.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- then we will hear from him and

          18       then the court can be opened up for the remainder of the

          19       witnesses.

          20   MR UNDERWOOD:  We have two witnesses dealing with GPS and

          21       mobile phone siting after that who will be, I hope,

          22       fairly short.

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  All right.  Let's reward ourselves

          24       with a slightly longer lunch break.  So what we'll do

          25       then is stop now and start again at 2 o'clock.  So would




           1       you -- thank you very much, members of the jury, if you

           2       would like to leave first.


           9   (12.56 pm)

          10                     (The short adjournment)

          11   (2.00 pm)

          12                      (Proceedings delayed)

          13   (2.06 pm)

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We'll have the jury in then, please.

          15                  (In the presence of the jury)

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The next stage of this process is --

          17       before we put on any cameras upstairs, please, no

          18       cameras should be on at this very moment.  We will now

          19       ask the next witness, who I believe, Mr Underwood, is

          20       going to be known to us as U3.

          21   MR UNDERWOOD:  Indeed.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We will ask him to come into court,

          23       please.

          24                            U3 (sworn)

          25                   (The witness was anonymised)










           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Before you say anything would you

           2       just have a seat there, please, and make yourself

           3       comfortable?

           4   A.  Thank you, sir.

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Then I can indicate that the cameras

           6       can now be switched on in the court above for the public

           7       and the press.  There we are.

           8                    Questions by MR UNDERWOOD

           9   MR UNDERWOOD:  Good afternoon.  My name is Underwood and I'm

          10       counsel for the Inquest.  I hope you understand we are

          11       calling you "U3" for the purposes of this Inquest.

          12           Are you an Inspector in the Metropolitan Police

          13       Service?

          14   A.  I am, sir, yes.

          15   Q.  Are you aware of what we are calling the anonymous

          16       letter received by the Commissioner on

          17       26 September 2012?

          18   A.  Yes, I am.

          19   Q.  Are you the officer referred to in there as the

          20       Inspector, the Trident Inspector?

          21   A.  Yes, I am.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Can I just confirm, because you have

          23       a list, I think, of the U numbers in front of you.

          24       Could you just look at that list and see the name given

          25       to U3 and confirm that that's your name?




           1   A.  It is, sir, yes.

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you.

           3   MR UNDERWOOD:  Looking at that list, can you look at U1,

           4       please?

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  Is that a name you recognise from the letter?

           7   A.  It is, yes.

           8   Q.  Do you know that person?

           9   A.  No.

          10   Q.  Have you ever had any dealings with him?

          11   A.  No, I haven't.

          12   Q.  Have you ever arrested him?

          13   A.  No.

          14   Q.  We have heard this morning that you are not authorised

          15       to handle informants; is that correct?

          16   A.  That is correct.

          17   Q.  We have also heard that there's something called

          18       a sterile corridor which keeps working officers, such as

          19       you, away from those who handle informants; is that

          20       correct?

          21   A.  Yes, that's correct, yes.

          22   Q.  You had the opportunity to read this letter carefully

          23       I imagine; is that right?

          24   A.  I read the letter when I was presented with it some time

          25       ago but, yes, I have read the letter.




           1   Q.  If I could just put to you the heart of it, that the

           2       allegation made in it is that you ran an informant --

           3       the name is given -- and that you and that informant put

           4       together a plan by which that informant would give you

           5       information which he -- had in a sense created

           6       by encouraging people to get guns so that you could

           7       catch those people with guns and that one of those

           8       people was Mark Duggan; you understand that?

           9   A.  Yes, that was the heart of the allegation.

          10   Q.  Is there any truth at all in that?

          11   A.  None whatsoever.

          12   MR UNDERWOOD:  Thank you very much.  I have no more

          13       questions for you.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you.  Let's see if anyone has

          15       any questions.  Mr Mansfield?

          16   MR MANSFIELD:  No thank you.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Stern?

          18   MR STERN:  No.

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Butt?

          20   MR BUTT:  No.

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Keith.

          22   MR KEITH:  No.

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Well, I have no questions either,

          24       thank you very much U3.  That concludes your evidence.

          25       You are now free to go.  Thank you very much for




           1       assisting us.  If you would like to go the way you came.

           2       I will ask for the cameras to be turned off upstairs,

           3       which are they are.  We will remain here.

           4                    (The witness withdrew --)

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you.  I think in the

           6       circumstances we can go straight into being fully open

           7       court now, can we not --

           8   MR UNDERWOOD:  We can indeed.

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- without needing to rise or go

          10       out.  I will indicate therefore to those in the courts

          11       above that the cameras will be fully restored and you

          12       are entitled now to come down from Court 76 down to

          13       Court 73 if you so wish to.  But I think that that will

          14       be the quick and speedier way.

          15           What will need to happen is that someone will need

          16       to attend to the technology by formally removing the

          17       cardboard box which covers the camera over there.

          18   MR UNDERWOOD:  While that's being attended to I have, in

          19       fact, a couple of statements to read, so I wonder if

          20       it's convenient for me to do that.

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes.  Perhaps I could just indicate

          22       to you then, members of the jury, now we are back in

          23       usual form, that clearly, as you understand, there are,

          24       in advance of this hearing, a number of witness

          25       statements taken by witnesses -- I say given by




           1       witnesses taken often by police officers writing down

           2       the evidence that the witness can give.  Most of these

           3       are all in these files behind me.

           4           In advance of that, those statements are

           5       scrutinised, and indeed all those who are given

           6       interested party status are asked whether they would

           7       like to ask questions of those witnesses.  If they say

           8       yes and I agree, then the witnesses are then called and

           9       asked questions.

          10           But there are occasions, and this is going to be one

          11       or two of them, where the witnesses are not required to

          12       answer any more questions from anybody either from my

          13       team or indeed any other interested party, so their

          14       evidence can be read over to you.  You don't actually

          15       get copies of the statements, so please don't ask for

          16       them because in fact it's going to be read over to you,

          17       it becomes part of the evidence, it's on the transcript

          18       anyway.  So that's the way we are going to deal with

          19       that should you need to refresh.

          20           Quite often, read evidence goes quite quickly and

          21       you may think "Hang on a minute, I have missed

          22       something".  Don't worry about it, as I promised you

          23       yesterday, part of my task at the end of all this is to

          24       sum the case up and bring many of these loose strands

          25       together and indeed, as you know, you have access if you




           1       wish in due course to the transcript of the evidence as

           2       it accumulates during the course of this hearing.

           3           So that's a very long explanation, I know.  I am not

           4       just filling in time to allow people to come down from

           5       the court above but and I am not going to be saying this

           6       every time.  It's just now to introduce the fact that

           7       some evidence can be read to you, this is what's going

           8       to happen: Mr Underwood is going to read the statement

           9       to you.  He will tell us all who it is and the system

          10       there.  It is all part of the evidence that you're going

          11       to have to be considering.  That's the main important

          12       thrust, it's all part of the evidence that you can

          13       consider in due course.

          14           All right then, Mr Underwood.  Who is it you are

          15       going to read?

          16   MR UNDERWOOD:  I am going to read a statement of Mr Mir.

          17       Before I do that, can I just explain what we are doing.

          18           There are two types of evidence I want to give you

          19       this afternoon.  One is to do with the GPS recording in

          20       the minicab that was taken by Mr Duggan to show where it

          21       was going, where it went and, in particular, what

          22       happened in Vicarage Road.

          23           Secondly, we are going to look at cell site analysis

          24       which deals with telephone numbers attributed to

          25       Mr Duggan he was using on that day, 4 August, and also




           1       to Mr Hutchinson-Foster to see whether they came

           2       together, and also to see what can be gleaned from cell

           3       site analysis to how precisely you can locate people.

           4           So dealing first with the GPS we have two statements

           5       from people who are to do with the minicab office

           6       itself, so Mr Mir to start with.

           7           MR AJAZ MIR (statement read by MR UNDERWOOD)

           8   MR UNDERWOOD:  He gives a statement on 20 October 2011. He

           9       says:

          10           "I am Ajaz Ahmad Mir and I work as a cab driver for

          11       Hoxton Cars of 56 Hoxton Square, London.  I also work as

          12       a controller for the company taking calls for cabs.

          13       I have been working on and off as a controller for about

          14       12 months.  I have been asked if I remember receiving

          15       a call from a woman ordering a cab from 48 Micawber

          16       Court to Vicarage Road, Leyton on 4 August 2011.  I do

          17       not recall receiving this call or despatching the job

          18       details to my colleague [redacted].  I have been asked

          19       by the IPCC about the process of receiving calls and

          20       despatching jobs.  When a new customer calls the company

          21       for the first time the controller takes all their

          22       personal details.  This includes the caller's name,

          23       address, phone number and the address to which the

          24       caller wants to go to.  When the customer calls again to

          25       order another cab the system recognises the phone number




           1       and their address comes up automatically on the screen.

           2       All the information the controller needs is there

           3       already so the only other information to input is the

           4       caller's destination.  This then despatched to the

           5       driver's PDA.

           6           "I don't know if the person who called is a regular

           7       customer but it is possible that they have used this cab

           8       company before.  I have to take sometimes over

           9       100 telephone calls a day and I am often in contact with

          10       both the driver and the customer at the same time.  This

          11       is why it is difficult to remember just one call out of

          12       many.

          13           "I have printed off a copy of the call details on

          14       4 August 2011 from out computer system.  This shows that

          15       call was received at 17.12 hours on 4 August from

          16       a telephone number [redacted].  The printout shows the

          17       name 'Akeel'.  This is my boss's son, Akeel Asif and

          18       I was using his log on.  As his log on was already on

          19       screen and I used his instead of changing it to mine."

          20           Obviously, you will get that in the transcript but

          21       that just sets the scene.

          22           If we go next to the statement of Mr Asif.

          23        MR MOHAMMAD ASIF (statement read by MR UNDERWOOD)

          24   MR UNDERWOOD:  He makes a statement of 15 September 2011, in

          25       which he says:




           1           "I now produce marked by me MAS/01 the printout

           2       showing the GPS transmissions from the company's PDA

           3       which was issued to [the taxi driver]."

           4           Then he gives a further statement of 11 May 2012, in

           5       which he says:

           6           "Further to my previous statement dated

           7       15 September 2011, I have been asked by Gareth Jones of

           8       the IPCC to explain how our operating system and PDA

           9       system works.

          10           "The system Hoxton Cars had at the time, and still

          11       operates is call Cab Master.  When someone calls to book

          12       a cab their number is displayed on screen.  If they have

          13       called before their address will also appear.  The

          14       minicab controller will take the details from the

          15       customer including where they want to go et cetera and

          16       enter the details on the booking page of Cab Master.

          17       Once the details have been completed the controller

          18       presses 'enter' and the job is moved onto the 'dispatch'

          19       page.  The controller will look to see who is the

          20       nearest free driver, or who is next for a job.  This

          21       screen also shows all of the other current jobs and

          22       where the drivers are.  The controllers select a car and

          23       presses the [plus] sign, the job is then transferred to

          24       the driver's PDA.  The system uses SIMs in the PDA to do

          25       this and uses the text message system.  The driver will




           1       then get a message appear on his PDA giving him the

           2       details of the job which he can either accept or reject.

           3       If he accepts it then the computer in the office shows

           4       he is en route.  When he arrives at the address he

           5       presses another button on his PDA called 'text back'.

           6       This sends an SMS message to the customer advising them

           7       the cab is waiting outside.  If the customer does not

           8       come out the driver would use his personal mobile to

           9       call them.  Once the passenger is in the cab the driver

          10       presses another button 'passenger on board' which lets

          11       us know they are en route to the customer's

          12       destinations.  Once they arrive the driver presses

          13       another button showing us that they have arrived and

          14       they are ready to accept another job.

          15           "The PDAs are uploaded with Cab Master software and

          16       all the messages use the SMS text system.  We can see

          17       where any cab is as the system also uses GPS, this is

          18       feedback from the PDA constantly, we can even see on

          19       a map on Cab Master where the driver is at any time."

          20           So I will now call Mr Johnstone to deal with his

          21       analysis of that MAS/01 data.

          22           Mr Johnstone, please.

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Could you assist me by giving me the

          24       page reference for him?

          25   MR UNDERWOOD:  This is CS599.




           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you.

           2                MR NEIL JOHN JOHNSTONE (affirmed)

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  Have a seat.

           4   A.  Thank you, sir.

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you.

           6                    Questions by MR UNDERWOOD

           7   MR UNDERWOOD:  Are you Neil John Johnstone?

           8   A.  Correct.

           9   Q.  I think you are employed by the IPCC, is that right --

          10   A.  That's correct, yes.

          11   Q.  -- as an intelligence analyst?

          12   A.  That's right, yes.

          13   Q.  You know my name's Underwood and I'm acting on behalf of

          14       the Inquest and I'll start the questions.

          15           I want to ask you about analysis you did on data

          16       from what we have just heard is exhibit MAS/01, which is

          17       a download from the activity log of the PDA that was in

          18       the minicab on 4 August containing Mr Duggan; do you

          19       understand?

          20   A.  Yes, I do, yes.

          21   Q.  Did you conduct an analysis of that?

          22   A.  I did, yes.

          23   Q.  Did you produce what you call a "snail trail" audit

          24       trail analysis --

          25   A.  Indeed so, yes.




           1   Q.  -- and also some PowerPoint slides and a Microsoft Excel

           2       workbook?

           3   A.  Yes, I did.

           4   Q.  Can we have a look, please, at page CE170 on the screen.

           5       Do you recognise that?

           6   A.  I do, yes.

           7   Q.  What is it?

           8   A.  It's a graphical representation of the route taken by

           9       the minicab.

          10   Q.  Right.  We see towards the right-hand side, what I think

          11       we will probably all recognise by now as the

          12       Vicarage Road area.  You've got some times starting at

          13       17.55.11 and ending at the bottom at 18.54.00.  What do

          14       those times represent?

          15   A.  They are the times that, on the activity log of MAS/01,

          16       that the minicab was in that location.

          17   Q.  On the left-hand side of the page we see a box talking

          18       about movement of car 36, and take it from me that

          19       car 36 is the minicab we are concerned with.

          20           You've got written in there is:

          21           "17.30.50, journey starts at easting ..."

          22           You give a number and then a northing number:

          23           "... near 550 Kingsland Road, E8.  Car 36 travels in

          24       a north-easterly direction driving along Lea Bridge

          25       Road.  It turns right onto Vicarage Road, E10, one-way




           1       street.  Whilst travelling down Vicarage Road, E10, car

           2       36 would appear to stop.  This is because it takes 4

           3       minutes 22 seconds to travel from ..."

           4           You give eastings and northings:

           5           "... located near 164 Vicarage Road to [more

           6       eastings and northings] near 4 Park Road.  This is

           7       a distance of 112 metres."

           8           Then you deal with it turning right.

           9           Was that your analysis in broad terms of what

          10       happened in Vicarage Road?

          11   A.  That's correct, yes.

          12   Q.  Then if we look at page 173, if we focus on the part two

          13       thirds of the way down, that's got text on the

          14       right-hand side, I know it's very fine detail; can you

          15       read it?

          16   A.  I can, yes.

          17   Q.  Between entries 53 and 62, are you dealing with the

          18       times in which the minicab was either on Lea Bridge

          19       Road, Vicarage Road or Park Road?

          20   A.  That's correct, yes.

          21   Q.  Is this the northings, eastings, et cetera, that you

          22       were talking about in that map?

          23   A.  You refer to PDA.  PDA is personal digit assistant,

          24       which is sat in the front of the minicab.  It's in fact

          25       a kind of mobile phone that's being used by the cab




           1       company.  Also in the previous statement she talks about

           2       a GPS transmitter.  It doesn't transmit GPS, GPS is

           3       a global positioning system that assists -- has signals

           4       that come down from satellites and satellites pick up

           5       your position and give you it in latitude and longitude.

           6           What happens in these kind of tracking systems is

           7       that that information will be taken by a device, a PDA,

           8       a mobile phone, and then subsequently dialled back, like

           9       we're talking about the texting and the SMS, back to

          10       a control room.  So that's how minicabs work -- lorries

          11       get tracked it's that kind of thing -- and that raw data

          12       was then passed to me as MAS/01.

          13           It's in the form of eastings and northings, which is

          14       a grid reference.  What I did was redid it using just

          15       calculations to put latitude and longitude.  The main

          16       reason was that when you get eastings and northings and

          17       you put them into Google or in a search engine, it does

          18       not pick it up, it works on latitude and longitude.  So

          19       to the investigations team there was just a set of

          20       numbers.  They didn't recognise what those numbers were.

          21       They were, in fact, just grid points in a tradition flat

          22       map that might be displayed electronically.  So I have

          23       added value to that by putting it so that anybody can type

          24       in these numbers and find out what the locations were.

          25   Q.  Let me ask you a number of things about the data on




           1       here.  If we look in the left-hand column you have

           2       a number and on this page it's 1 to 83 and if we -- for

           3       example, pick up number 53, you have a time against that

           4       in the next column: 17 hours 53 minutes and 47 seconds?

           5   A.  Correct.

           6   Q.  Then you've got an easting and a northing, a grid

           7       reference latitude and longitude.  That's what you did,

           8       was it, translate those eastings and northings to the

           9       grid references to the latitude and longitude?

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  Can you ask you how accurate that is, how specific, if

          12       you like?  If you have got, for example, the easting

          13       that's there, and the northing that's there, does that

          14       describe something that's a metre circle or a ten-metre

          15       circle or what?

          16   A.  It depends on the number of squares -- yes, if you have

          17       on a grid reference, a six-figure reference, it

          18       identified a square of 100 metres, 100 metre squared.

          19       An eight figure reference would identify a 10-metre

          20       square and a 10 digit reference a one-metre square.

          21   Q.  So what do we have here, six?

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  So that's 100 metres?

          24   A.  Then you add it to the other one and it gives you

          25       a cross point and then that reads into the traditional




           1       grid reference that we are all away from our school

           2       geography days and, if we went hill walking we would

           3       have a flat geographer map and you could work out where

           4       you were and that's what the grid reference is.  It's

           5       an identifiable grid, it sits on top.  It's a British

           6       grid that sits on top, that different points are on.

           7   Q.  Fine.  If I were to want to go to that grid reference --

           8   A.  You could.  That is in a sense the import into the

           9       system, the geographical information system that then

          10       plots that onto the map.

          11   Q.  Is that what spot on the ground or is it an area?

          12   A.  Well, that's a spot on the ground on a map,

          13       two-dimensional.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I think we are asking if, in real

          15       life, if you were on that spot would you actually be on

          16       a tiny little spot on the road or would actually be

          17       within a circle that's, say, 25 metres diameter or --

          18   A.  You would be on that spot, sir, because I've translated

          19       it back into its physical point on the ground.

          20   MR UNDERWOOD:  So a grid reference you got here is a spot on

          21       the ground not just a spot on a map; yes?

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  The next thing I want to ask you about is the

          24       differences between the times.  So if we take line

          25       number 53 for example, the time is, as I said, 17.53.47,




           1       the next is 17.54.07, so that's 20 seconds later.  Then

           2       you get 17.54.22, 15 seconds after that, et cetera.  Is

           3       there a regular gap or irregular gap between these

           4       times?

           5   A.  On that analysis, on the 94 points of the reference that

           6       was given from the taxi company, the references appear

           7       to be relatively random, some long gaps, some short

           8       gaps.  It must be to do with how their system works and

           9       how it sends information back to the control room.

          10           There is no real -- it was not every four seconds,

          11       it wasn't every ten seconds.  It just appeared to be --

          12       not random, random but, you know, not a fixed amount of

          13       time.  It didn't do it automatically every set number of

          14       seconds.

          15   Q.  Picking up line 56, we see towards the right-hand side

          16       that that's the first point at which the minicab clocks

          17       itself as being in Vicarage Road at number 259 or near

          18       259, and the last one is number 60 where it clocks

          19       itself in the region of 164 Vicarage Road.  That's what

          20       you told us about earlier on, was it, that you infer

          21       that the minicab must have stopped there somewhere

          22       because it takes so long to get from there to there?

          23   A.  That's when I was doing the analysis.  I mean, the

          24       reason that there's blank gaps and it only focuses on

          25       Lea Bridge Road to Park Road was I didn't go through the




           1       94 points, because most of it was just a taxi moving in

           2       a steady flow in the traffic in a defined route.

           3           I mean, then the route that plots -- I didn't do it

           4       at individual points.  It was one kind of import that

           5       you can perhaps input crime data to look at burglaries

           6       and hot spots and I just put it all in the system and it

           7       comes out in a kind of trail that you can add -- it's

           8       called a snail trail or a breadcrumb trail -- to focus

           9       it but the gap was what highlighted that there must be

          10       something.

          11   Q.  Sure.  So if we look at page CE172, is this a close up

          12       created by you of --

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Do you have this in your jury

          14       bundles, I think, at page 8; is that right?

          15   A.  Yes, this is a close up of the work that I produced.

          16   MR UNDERWOOD:  Are we there looking at a dotted line on Park

          17       Road?

          18   A.  No, that's Vicarage Road.

          19   Q.  Sorry, Vicarage Road rather.  Is the road going off at

          20       the right, towards the top, Burchell Road?

          21   A.  That's correct, yes.

          22   Q.  So just before Burchell Road, you've got a timing of

          23       17.56.02.

          24   A.  Correct.

          25   Q.  Then at 18.00.24 you've got it at the junction with Park




           1       Road; is that right?

           2   A.  That's correct, yes.

           3   Q.  Are you able to say from the information that you've

           4       analysed whether the minicab turned into Burchell Road?

           5   A.  I'm not able to say, no.

           6   Q.  So is this as good as we can get from the information,

           7       that that minicab spent four minutes or so in that area

           8       between Burchell Road and Park --

           9   A.  From the PDA, yes.  In terms of it was at the point at

          10       the top at 17.56.02 and it took four minutes to travel

          11       112 metres -- or between those two points when there was

          12       a transmission back to the taxi firm.

          13   Q.  Can we go back then to CE173?  Looking at just the times

          14       when the minicab was on your right-hand column in the

          15       Vicarage Road area, do the northings and eastings and

          16       grid references there help you with whether, at any

          17       stage of those timings, the minicab was out of

          18       Vicarage Road?

          19   A.  It's very difficult to tell.

          20   Q.  If these are spots on a map and spots on the ground, as

          21       you say, where are these spots?  Are these spots in

          22       Vicarage Road or are they in Burchell Road?

          23   A.  That's the approximate location but that's -- where

          24       those spots are is the grid references that are supplied

          25       by the taxi firm.




           1   Q.  Sorry, are they in Burchell Road or Vicarage Road?

           2   A.  These are in Vicarage Road.

           3   Q.  Right.  If the minicab had gone into Burchell Road at

           4       a time when one of these numbers, 53, 54, et cetera,

           5       came up, that would represent a northing and easting in

           6       Burchell Road, would it?

           7   A.  Correct.

           8   Q.  If the minicab went into Burchell Road, it must have

           9       been at a time when the minicab wasn't throwing up one

          10       of these numbers; is that fair?

          11   A.  Yes, I'm unable to tell what happened in that

          12       four-minute period.

          13   Q.  Let's break that down.  You are unable to tell what the

          14       minicab was doing between the time it threw up one of

          15       these numbers and the next number; is that right?

          16   A.  Correct.

          17   Q.  What's the greatest time difference between these

          18       numbers?

          19   A.  The greatest time difference was before the incident

          20       when there was a 20-minute gap, I think it was.

          21   Q.  While it's in Vicarage Road?

          22   A.  4 minutes 22 seconds.

          23   Q.  No, what's the greatest distance between 53 and 54, or

          24       54 and 55, or 55 and 56?

          25   A.  The greatest distance?




           1   Q.  The greatest time, sorry.

           2   A.  The longest -- do you mean between -- 4 minutes 22,

           3       isn't it?

           4   Q.  Yes, I've got that.  Let's go through it.  It gets into

           5       Vicarage Road, according to this, at your entry number

           6       56; yes?

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  That's at 17.54.56; yes?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  The next time the GPS throws up a figure is your number

          11       57; yes?

          12   A.  But it's not from GPS, it's the system that's gone back

          13       to the taxi.

          14   Q.  Very well.  The next time this system, which is not

          15       a GPS, throws up a figure it's your number 56; yes?

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  Sorry, 57.  That is how many seconds later?

          18   A.  34, is it?  Between 55 and 56.

          19   Q.  I make it 15 seconds.  What do you make it?  (Pause)

          20   A.  Between what points?

          21   Q.  Between 56 and 57.

          22   A.  Yes, sorry, yes, I thought you said --

          23   Q.  15 seconds difference.  The next difference is between

          24       11 seconds and 26, so another 15 seconds difference,

          25       yes?




           1   A.  Yes.

           2   Q.  With the next between 26 seconds and 47 seconds so a

           3       21-second difference, yes?

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  The next is between 47 seconds and 02 seconds, yes,

           6       a 15-second difference?

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  The next between 02 and 24 so a 22-second difference?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  So sorry, 4 minutes.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That's the four-minute break.

          12   MR UNDERWOOD:  So sorry, yes.

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It's nicely highlighted really on

          14       our page 7, members of the jury, no doubt you are also

          15       looking at that, that we can see Vicarage Road, where we

          16       all went for that view, the first view, on page 7 you

          17       see it marked, and we can see some of those plots of the

          18       taxi coming down in the direction of the green arrows,

          19       down Vicarage Road.  It's travelling in the way that

          20       Mr Underwood has just been painting to you of the

          21       picture and then at 17.56 it's almost to Burchell Road.

          22       Then the next we know of it is really four minutes and

          23       a bit later when it's just further down Vicarage Road

          24       turning into Park Road.  We all remember when we went

          25       back to Burchell Road when we didn't have our lunch on




           1       the view day, then following the route along Park Road

           2       and then the green arrows going back up off to the north

           3       of that map.

           4           But the point being that really there's a period of

           5       four minutes or so where the taxi is between those two

           6       points.  We cannot say exactly where it was it might

           7       have gone into Burchell Road it might not have gone into

           8       Burchell Road but there was a period of time.

           9   MR UNDERWOOD:  Does that suggest whether the PDA was turned

          10       off for that period or whether the minicab was not

          11       moving for that period?

          12   A.  I couldn't tell from the detail.

          13   Q.  In your experience, would a PDA like that be throwing up

          14       data while it was turned on, whether the vehicle was

          15       moving or not, or what?

          16   A.  I honestly don't know.  I couldn't answer that question.

          17   MR UNDERWOOD:  That's all I ask.  Thank you.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Let's see if anyone has any

          19       questions.

          20   MR MANSFIELD:  No thank you.

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Stern?

          22   MR STERN:  No thank you.

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Keith?

          24           I think we go in a different order now.

          25       Ms Le Fevre?




           1                     Questions by MS LE FEVRE

           2   MS LE FEVRE:  Yes.  Thank you sir my name is Sarah Le Fevre

           3       and I'm asking questions on behalf of the Metropolitan

           4       Police Service and, in fact, you have answered the first

           5       question that I wanted to clarify with you, which is

           6       simply this: it is, I think, right, you've told us, that

           7       it is very difficult, if not impossible, based on the

           8       data that you were provided with and your analysis of

           9       that data, to establish whether or not, in that

          10       four-minute or thereabouts gap, the minicab remained in

          11       Vicarage Road or turned into some part of Burchell Road;

          12       that's it, isn't it?

          13   A.  That's correct.

          14   Q.  Thank you.  Then I think you've got a jury bundle in the

          15       witness box with you.  Can I ask you to open it?

          16       I don't know what colour it might be.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  What page are you asking him?

          18   MS LE FEVRE:  Page 7.

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That's the one he has in front of

          20       him now.

          21   A.  This one, sir?  (Indicates)

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, that's it.  That's the map you

          23       want, isn't it?

          24   MS LE FEVRE:  If I hold it up to you, that might indicate to

          25       you precisely.




           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It's on the screen as well.

           2   MS LE FEVRE:  Page 7, bottom right-hand corner.  Simply

           3       this, please, Mr Johnstone.  As we look at this map,

           4       which is part of your snail trail, upon which you've

           5       helpfully indicated some of the fruits of your analysis

           6       in the small white boxes, and then have gone on to mark

           7       a green line, which is indicative of the route the

           8       minicab took; that's your work, isn't it?

           9   A.  It is indeed, yes.

          10   Q.  I do not think you are suggesting to us in any way that

          11       the green line shows us precisely at any stage where the

          12       minicab was.  It's just your best assessment based on

          13       the fruits of your analysis?

          14   A.  Yes, particularly because it's a personal digital

          15       assistant that maybe then phoning back to the control

          16       room and there's all sorts of issues relating to how

          17       that would happen.  If it's taking in the GPS straight

          18       into if it's receiving it, and then it's effectively

          19       dialling it back on the mobile phone network, the cellar

          20       network, and I think we are going to talk about later on

          21       radio frequency surveys and a how all of that works, so

          22       there are still errors that may be occurring with the

          23       inherent data.

          24           But in terms of basic analysis, from what I was

          25       provided by the taxi company to chart that and then




           1       graphically represent it, and that's -- the reason why

           2       I put it into a PowerPoint was it was not just stuck on

           3       my screen, it wasn't just put in a hard map, it was for

           4       our investigators to then use and use the other, you

           5       know, location provided for it.

           6   Q.  So is this right: you are asking us to recognise that

           7       there are inherent potential inaccuracies in the data

           8       being received into the PDA, into the raw data that you

           9       then analyse and do your very best to help us with

          10       translating it into this graphical representation?

          11   A.  There are going to be errors that are coming in from

          12       anywhere, from GPS, there's dead spots, there's all

          13       sorts of -- you know, the waves that are coming down,

          14       there are also going to be potential errors.  But

          15       a further analysis, more technical engineering, would

          16       have to be done to find out what the inherent issues

          17       were and surveys done.  But from my actual analysis of

          18       numbers provided to me, then that's the best I can do.

          19   Q.  Of course.  Thank you very much for that, Mr Johnstone.

          20       If we turn back to this page 7 and to this green line

          21       with all the potential inaccuracies, recognising all

          22       that you have just told us, is it fair to say this: the

          23       green line might just as easily be shown passing from

          24       Vicarage Road, in and out of Burchell Road and then

          25       moving back down to Park Road; would that be right?




           1   A.  I have only really put a green line between certain

           2       points that were on the map.

           3   Q.  Exactly.

           4   A.  There were no -- during the analysis, there was no, you

           5       know, random spots or analysis that appeared in another

           6       part of Leyton generally.  When the maps were plotted it

           7       was on a road and that was the minicab, so I would

           8       anticipate the taxi stayed on the road.

           9   MS LE FEVRE:  Thank you very much, Mr Johnstone.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you, Ms Le Fevre.  Anyone

          11       else?  Mr Glasson, he's your witness?

          12   MR GLASSON:  No.

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you.  Mr Underwood, anything

          14       that you want to ask Mr Johnstone?

          15   MR UNDERWOOD:  Nothing arising, thank you.  Thank you

          16       Mr Johnstone.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much then

          18       Mr Johnstone for coming forward to assist the jury you

          19       are free now to go.

          20                      (The witness withdrew)

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.

          22   MR UNDERWOOD:  Mr Arkless, please, CS769.

          23                     MR GARY ARKLESS (sworn)

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  Would you be

          25       kind enough to have a seat.




           1   A.  Thank you.

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Make yourself at home and answer

           3       questions from Mr Underwood, thank you.

           4                    Questions by MR UNDERWOOD

           5   MR UNDERWOOD:  Mr Arkless, my name's Underwood and I'm

           6       counsel to the Inquest.  I will be starting off the

           7       questioning.  Are your full names Gary Paul Arkless?

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  Are you employed by the Metropolitan Police Service?

          10   A.  No longer, I was at the time of this particular inquiry.

          11   Q.  I think you are an expert in analysing communications

          12       data call records; is that right?

          13   A.  Yes, that's correct.

          14   Q.  You attended a number of courses in the acquisition, use

          15       and presentation of communications data.

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  I think you were responsible for producing and

          18       delivering training courses to police officers from 2007

          19       onwards.

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  You were tasked in particular to look at cell siting for

          22       two mobile telephones in relation to the 4 August 2011;

          23       is that right?

          24   A.  Yes, that's correct.

          25   Q.  One of those telephones was connected to, if you like,




           1       Mr Duggan and the other to Mr Hutchinson-Foster?

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  You can, by all means, give the full number for each but

           4       the one concerned with Mr Hutchinson-Foster ends with

           5       567; is that so?

           6   A.  Yes, it is.

           7   Q.  The one concerned with Mr Duggan ends with 2706, yes?

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  So if we look, for the moment, at the 567 and in the

          10       period between 2 o'clock or so and 19.58 on 4 August.

          11       Do you have those figures to hand?

          12   A.  Bear with me a second.  (Pause)

          13           Yes.

          14   Q.  So here we are dealing with Mr Hutchinson-Foster's

          15       telephone call in the afternoon and early evening of

          16       4 August 2011; yes?

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  Did it connect to the Slades Tower cell ID?

          19   A.  Yes, it did connect to the Slades Tower cell on 64

          20       occasions during that time period.

          21   Q.  We'll look at a map in a minute to see where these are.

          22       Did it connect to a cell ID at 31 Dunton Road?

          23   A.  Yes, that was on two occasions.

          24   Q.  Did it connect to any other cells that day?

          25   A.  Yes, there was one other cell also at Dunton Road.




           1   Q.  Is there an overlap of those cells?

           2   A.  Yes, there was an overlap of coverage of those cells.

           3   Q.  How small is the area of overlap on the ground?

           4   A.  On the ground, probably from memory, about 300 or

           5       400 metres circumference.

           6   Q.  If we look at CD423 -- it will come up on the screen --

           7       it's your GPA/01, page 10 of 11, if you are looking at

           8       it in hard copy.  Does that show that cluster of calls?

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Is this the one you want?

          10   A.  Probably going onto the next page, page 11, will be

          11       a bit more indicative.  Yes, that's a close up view of

          12       the address on Burchell Road and you see the three

          13       different colours there, the green, the light blue and

          14       the red.  You can see there is an area of overlap of

          15       probably -- in the general area of that particular

          16       address.

          17   Q.  What do those colours represent?

          18   A.  Those colours represent where I've taken measurement

          19       equipment, which has made test calls, and at the

          20       particular location that's where it's connected to that

          21       particular cell.

          22   Q.  So have you got one colour for Slades Tower, for

          23       example?

          24   A.  Well, for Slades Tower, yes, there is one colour for

          25       Slades Tower and that is the red colour.




           1   Q.  31 Dunton Road?

           2   A.  There are actually two sectors on 31 Dunton Road.  One

           3       is the green colour and one is the light blue colour.

           4   Q.  Right.  We see 31 Dunton Road and Slades Tower on the

           5       map; is that the actual site of them?

           6   A.  Yes, that's the physical location of the cell itself.

           7   Q.  So Slades Tower tower was actually quite close to

           8       Burchell Road, was it?

           9   A.  Yes, it's probably, going from memory, about sort of 300

          10       or 400 metres away.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Is that marked on your plan that we

          12       are looking at now?

          13   A.  Yes, it is, if you look right at the bottom of the

          14       centre of the plan you can see where Slades Tower is

          15       indicated.  There's a black triangle just to the left of

          16       that.  That's the physical location of the cell.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  What actually happens?  Help me a

          18       little bit because I'm a bit simple on this.  You walk

          19       around these roads north of Slades Tower and there's

          20       a way by which you can make a call or press a text and

          21       find out that your phone is connecting with Slades

          22       Tower?

          23   A.  Yes, we have a piece of equipment that acts exactly as

          24       a mobile phone would act but it does it across all the

          25       different networks and the different technologies.  It




           1       effectively repeatedly makes telephone calls and as it

           2       makes those calls, it notes the cell which it connects

           3       to.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  So you can just walk around and see

           5       what you're connecting to.

           6   A.  Yes, eventually you will go back and extract the

           7       information from the equipment.  The equipment works

           8       automatically without any interaction from me.

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  All right.

          10   MR UNDERWOOD:  Following on from that, that's how you did

          11       this work?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  Can we just work out what happens with the rest of us?

          14       We have a mobile phone?

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  We are standing, let's say, at the junction of

          17       Burchell Road and Vicarage Road, first of all, let's

          18       take the phone that's turned off; is that doing anything

          19       electronically at all?

          20   A.  No.

          21   Q.  So it's not connecting, it's not registering?

          22   A.  No.

          23   Q.  Turn it on, then what happens?

          24   A.  When you turn it on your phone will then interact with

          25       the network, authenticate itself and then it will




           1       effectively clamp onto a particular cell and say "Right,

           2       this is the best cell I can see here now" and if it

           3       needs to make a call then it will go through that

           4       particular cell to make that call.

           5   Q.  I am standing at the corner of Burchell Road and

           6       Vicarage Road, I turn my phone on and it finds the best

           7       mast?

           8   A.  Yes, the best signal that it can see at that point.

           9   Q.  If I stand still will it only look at that particular

          10       mast or consider that particular mast as the best or

          11       might it flicker between different masts?

          12   A.  It depends -- all the cells are designed to effectively

          13       provide overlapping coverage, so you could find yourself

          14       in an area where two cells or even three cells would

          15       provide service and it's at the point where you actually

          16       press the green button that your phone will then make

          17       the decision as to which cell it's going to connect to.

          18   Q.  You come along later and look at my phone, if I hand it

          19       over to you and you want to find out where I've been.

          20       If I was just doing no more than standing at that

          21       junction with my phone on and not making a call, could

          22       you tell from looking at my phone or looking at the

          23       subscriber records or whatever where I had been?

          24   A.  No.  Your phone has to interact with the network for

          25       a record to be generated so that we can make a judgment




           1       as to where your phone is at that point.

           2   Q.  Right, so I'm only on the radar when I'm making a call

           3       or receiving a call or a text; is that right?

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  I'm still standing there, my phone on, I receive a call

           6       for, say, three or four minutes?

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  During that period, how likely is it that that call will

           9       only be routed through one site?

          10   A.  It very much depends on what you are doing.  If you

          11       remain static, theoretically you will probably stay on

          12       the same cell but not always.

          13   Q.  Sorry, not?

          14   A.  Not always.  It could be that the network is saying

          15       actually we need to move you onto another cell because

          16       the capacity of this cell is increasing, so we need to

          17       move you.  That particular cell over there, you can see

          18       is a good signal, so I'm going to move you onto that

          19       cell.

          20   Q.  Right.  Does it follow then that if, still standing

          21       there, I finish that call and half an hour later there's

          22       another call, that may go through a different site?

          23   A.  It depends what -- because what happens when you receive

          24       a call is the network actually pages your phone and your

          25       phone says "I'm here" and then they will root the call




           1       through to you through the cell that you have answered

           2       the page on.

           3   Q.  It's using that, is it, basically, that you were able to

           4       pin down where Mr Hutchinson-Foster's phone was during

           5       particular use?

           6   A.  Yes.  Whenever a phonecall is made or received or a text

           7       is sent or received a record is generated with the

           8       networks.  Initially it was for billing purposes but

           9       obviously for monitoring their own networks they wanted

          10       to know what cells were being used.

          11           So that information is attached to your call, so

          12       almost like a normal billing but there's extra

          13       information attached there saying where you were or

          14       which cell you used when you made that call.

          15           So what we actually do is we look at the call data

          16       records and we can then test those call data records

          17       against the survey that we've conducted.

          18   Q.  Presumably this could be done live as well, could it?

          19   A.  Live?  As in?

          20   Q.  If you had access to the telephone company and I was

          21       making a call, could you ask the telephone company where

          22       I was?

          23   A.  I presume you could, yes.

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Whilst the call is going on?

          25   A.  I presume so, it's not something that's within my




           1       knowledge to be honest with you.

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Your expertise is acting after the

           3       event, is it?

           4   A.  This is -- this particular case is acting purely after

           5       the event.

           6   MR UNDERWOOD:  I am not suggesting otherwise.  But the

           7       telephone system knows where I am, if I'm making my call

           8       at the junction.

           9   A.  Certainly the network itself will know where you are,

          10       yes.

          11   Q.  If the telephone network was prepared to talk to

          12       somebody else it could pass that information on?

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  You told us earlier on that there was an overlap of

          15       these three cells in the general area of just into

          16       Burchell Road.  Have I got this right that you could

          17       only pin that down to about a 300 or 400-metre radius?

          18   A.  You can see where, on that particular document we were

          19       looking at, that there is an area where those three

          20       cells overlap.

          21   Q.  We'll go back to that.  Page 11 of your --

          22   A.  Yes.  There's an area there where the red, the blue and

          23       the green overlap and, looking at it, it's probably --

          24       if you draw a circle round there, probably a 200 or

          25       300-metre circle.




           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You are drawing it round the north

           2       part of Slades Tower.  Can you just help the jury about

           3       towers, whether you have just one or a number of cells

           4       pointing at different directions?

           5   A.  Yes.  If you look at Slades Tower you can see there's

           6       a dotted arrow that points straight up, in effect.

           7       That's the direction in which the antenna faces from

           8       Slades Tower.  It doesn't just cover along a straight

           9       line, it will cover either side of that.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  But the 300 metres isn't going south

          11       of Slades Tower, it's from the north and 180 degrees.

          12   A.  Yes.  If you look towards the centre of this particular

          13       picture, you will see there's an area where there are

          14       red, blue and green dots all intermingled and that is

          15       the area of overlap that I found with these three

          16       particular cells.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You might have been in -- right over

          18       on the left of this, below Lea Bridge Road, let's say

          19       down on the left hand there and still be on Slades

          20       Tower.

          21   A.  Yes, you could indeed, yes.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Right, thank you.

          23   MR UNDERWOOD:  Right.  That's Mr Hutchinson-Foster then.

          24       Can we move on to Mr Duggan's phone, the one that ends

          25       in 2706?  Were you asked to see whether the cell siting




           1       was consistent with a particular vehicle journey?

           2   A.  Yes, I was.

           3   Q.  Was that journey from the junction of Kingsland Road and

           4       Ball's Pond Road along Dalston Lane, from Dalston Lane,

           5       Pembury Road, Cricketfield Road, Downs Road, Lower

           6       Clapton Road, then turning into Lea Bridge Road then to

           7       Vicarage Road towards the junction of Burchell Road and

           8       then off there into Park Road?

           9   A.  Yes, that's the journey I was asked to look at.

          10   Q.  Were you asked to consider that between 17.34 and 18.43

          11       on 4 August?

          12   A.  Yes, also continued after that to the area of

          13       Ferry Lane.

          14   Q.  Just for the moment dealing with that period between

          15       just after 5.30 and 5.45 -- sorry, 6.43 -- were your

          16       findings and (in?) the cell site inconsistent (sic) with

          17       that telephone having made that journey?

          18   A.  Yes, it was.

          19   Q.  Have you, if we look at page 10 for example, going back

          20       a page, have you represented that with a cluster of

          21       dots?

          22   A.  I don't think this is the map we should be looking at.

          23       I think it's -- yes, it's that one and the one before

          24       it, I think.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  On page 8 of 11?




           1   A.  Yes.

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Have a look at page 7 as well --

           3   A.  No, page 8.  Yes.  Yes, you can see that at 17.34 the

           4       phone connects to Downes Court.  If you look towards the

           5       bottom left of the diagram, you can see where the cell

           6       of Downes Court is.  The red dots that you see on there

           7       is the route that was outlined to me.

           8   MR UNDERWOOD:  Right.

           9   A.  At 17.34, Mr Duggan's phone connects to that particular

          10       cell at Downes Court.  The only place that I found that

          11       cell covering on that whole route was where those two

          12       green dots are.  Thereafter the phone migrates in the

          13       general direction -- it then ends up connecting to the

          14       cells that are coloured blue then the cells that are

          15       coloured brown then the cell that's coloured black and

          16       then the cell that's coloured yellow.

          17   Q.  Right.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yellow again is Slades Tower, is it?

          19   A.  That's at Slades Tower, but it's located at the same

          20       place however it's a different technology to the one

          21       that Mr Hutchinson-Foster was using.  It's --

          22       Hutchinson-Foster was using 2G, this is a 3G.

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Right.

          24   MR UNDERWOOD:  Mr Arkless, that's very kind.  That's all the

          25       questioning I have for you.  Thank you very much.




           1   A.  Thank you.

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, Mr Straw?

           3                      Questions by MR STRAW

           4   MR STRAW:  Thank you.  I'm Adam Straw, I represent the

           5       Duggan family.

           6           You were taken to a picture on D423, which was,

           7       I think, Kevin Hutchinson-Foster's cell site analysis.

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  We know that Desiré Cox, Mr Hutchinson-Foster's friend,

          10       had a house in the middle of Burchell Road --

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  -- is that picture, showing those analyses of

          13       Mr Hutchinson-Foster's phone during the afternoon of the

          14       4 August, consistent with him having sat in a house in

          15       the middle of Burchell Road during that period?

          16   A.  Yes, it would be.

          17   Q.  Could you have a look, please, at CD20776?  It should

          18       come up on the screen in a moment.  I think at the top

          19       of that it should have call schedule on 4 August 2011

          20       between 17.50 and 18.12 hours; is this a schedule you

          21       recognise?

          22   A.  Yes, I believe this was one that was produced by

          23       an analyst.

          24   Q.  Having a look from the bottom there, the bottom line, do

          25       you see, of the table, it says: 141 --




           1   A.  Yes.

           2   Q.  -- and, at the time 18.12.43, minicab stops in

           3       Ferry Lane, N15?

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  Did you ascribe times to the calls made by the phone

           6       attributed to Mark Duggan?

           7   A.  No.  The calls come from the network, the timing comes

           8       from the network.

           9   Q.  In your analysis did you work out what those times were?

          10   A.  They were assigned by the network.  The times that are

          11       provided by the network are the ones that I rely upon.

          12   Q.  Okay, great.  So going up one line there then, on that

          13       diagram, 140, call number 140, do you see there it says

          14       that the call was attributed to and then has a number

          15       which ends 984?

          16   A.  Yes, I do see that.

          17   Q.  Does that indicate that that was the phone number that

          18       was making the call?

          19   A.  It does, yes.

          20   Q.  What time was that made, please?

          21   A.  18.09.35.

          22   Q.  How long did it last?

          23   A.  3 minutes and 2 seconds.

          24   Q.  Was it a call made to Mark Duggan's phone?

          25   A.  Yes.




           1   Q.  Using those two times, the start time and the duration,

           2       can you tell us what time it ended?  (Pause)

           3   A.  18.12.37.

           4   Q.  Okay.  So that ended just six seconds before, what it

           5       says on the bottom line there, the minicab stops at

           6       18.12.43?

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   MR STRAW:  Thanks very much.

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you Mr Straw.

          10           Yes, Mr Stern?

          11                      Questions by MR STERN

          12   MR STERN:  What we've got is maps and plans that relate to

          13       the sat nav and the telephone evidence and they are

          14       coupled together.

          15           Sir, there are copies for the jury.  My learned

          16       friends know that I'm producing these.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I was going to suggest we might all

          18       be helped if we could have some copies.

          19   MR STERN:  I hope these will help --

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Are they in colour?

          21   MR STERN:  -- in showing what happened and where the minicab

          22       went and the phonecalls along the road.

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Marvellous.  If you have them, let

          24       me look at them first.  (Handed)

          25           Thank you.  I will just make sure firstly we are all




           1       all right and this is going to help us.  That looks as

           2       though it might.  Certainly, I'm content.  Let the jury

           3       have that and put that in their document behind the

           4       latest divider.

           5   MR STERN:  Mr Arkless, I hope that you were provided with

           6       a copy before we broke for lunch.

           7   A.  No.

           8   Q.  I asked that you be given a copy.

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Members of the jury, can you make

          10       sure, please, that you keep this in the order.  What's

          11       the next one that we have available?  We have gone

          12       behind number 10, have we yet?  I think we are number

          13       10, aren't we, because we have got behind the A10.  Put

          14       it at the back and we will get more dividers as we go.

          15   MR STERN:  C11, I'm told.  Mr Arkless, do you not have

          16       a copy of this?

          17   A.  No.

          18   MR STERN:  Perhaps you can be given this one.  (Handed)

          19           I am told by Mr Scott you were given a copy but

          20       I don't know.

          21   A.  No, I have not been given anything.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Any copies for the witness?  We have

          23       to be careful because I think they may not be overtly

          24       numbered.

          25   MR STERN:  They are numbered, they should be numbered.




           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The numbers are at the top, sorry,

           2       top right.

           3   MR STERN:  They should actually run at the top, from

           4       CD020773 consecutively through to 20778.  If anybody

           5       does not have those pages, perhaps they could just let

           6       us know and we'll try and provide them to you.

           7           Mr Arkless, I'm sorry that you hadn't seen this

           8       because I asked specifically they be given to you at

           9       1 o'clock so you would have an hour to look through them

          10       before you came to give evidence and that didn't happen,

          11       so I don't know what the problem is.  But in any event,

          12       that hasn't happened, so I'm sorry.  So perhaps you will

          13       bear with us; if you need time, but I do not think you

          14       will, bearing in mind your level of expertise.

          15           Which brings me onto the first thing I really want

          16       to ask you about because you've been very modest and you

          17       have not actually told us about your expertise and how

          18       it is that you come to be an expert in this area.

          19   A.  No, I was led by counsel, obviously.

          20   MR STERN:  Always a mistake!

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Now is your opportunity to tell us

          22       all about yourself.

          23   MR STERN:  If you tell us, please, yes, something about

          24       yourself.

          25   A.  In essence, I've been in -- looking at




           1       telecommunications investigations since 2003 --

           2   MR STERN:  If you could look at the jury.

           3   A.  -- sorry, my apologies -- since 2003.  I was at that

           4       time a police officer in Nottinghamshire, in a murder

           5       team, and I have conducted that full-time ever since.

           6       Looking at not only acquiring the data but assessing the

           7       data, mapping it, realising the relevance of it and then

           8       actually going out and conducting cell site surveys to

           9       establish whether the data fits in with the

          10       circumstances that are being put to me you.  Again,

          11       that's something I've been performing since 2003.

          12   Q.  Have you done courses?

          13   A.  Yes, I've done a number of courses provided by

          14       independent companies, which are for investigators, and

          15       also for, actually -- for telecoms engineers.

          16   Q.  Thank you very much.

          17           Could you just help us, before we look at the detail

          18       of these documents, and just explain what a cell site

          19       is.  What does that actually mean?

          20   A.  Yes.  A cell site is a locally based, fairly low powered

          21       mast to which a mobile phone will connect to, to either

          22       make a telephone call, send or receive a text or to kind

          23       of connect to the Internet.

          24   Q.  Right.  We don't necessarily know where they are.  Well

          25       I don't, but you may know where they are.  But they are




           1       at various addresses.  One of which, I think you

           2       referred to: Slades Tower?

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  At Slades Tower, there is a cell site mast, is there?

           5   A.  Yes.  There's a cell site mast physically located, as I

           6       remember -- going from -- it is from memory.  It's quite

           7       a tall building, a multistorey building, with a cell on

           8       top of it.

           9   Q.  I am not going to ask you to describe the mast.

          10   A.  What the networks do to increase capacity is that they

          11       will not only locate one antenna on there, so it

          12       broadcasts in a big circle around it; they will locate

          13       normally three.  And they will array them in particular

          14       directions.  So there will be one cell that covers

          15       probably north from Slades Tower, there will be one that

          16       covers south-east and one that covers south-west.  So

          17       you get an all round coverage but it is actually split

          18       up into three to increase the capacity (inaudible).

          19   Q.  Depending where you are, your mobile phone will pick up

          20       one of those sites in order to be able to use your

          21       phone?

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  It may be that, standing in one particular spot, you

          24       might pick up more than one site?

          25   A.  You will definitely pick up more than one site.




           1   Q.  You will definitely pick up more than one site, right.

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  I think you told us in relation to 15 Burchell Road

           4       there were three cell sites that were relevant.

           5   A.  There were three cell sites used by Mr Hutchinson-Foster

           6       that are relevant, yes.

           7   Q.  Right.  They were Slades Tower and then two, perhaps

           8       unhelpfully, both at 31 Dunton Road --

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  -- with two separate numbers.

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  So any call that he made during the course of the day,

          13       4 August, which is all we are concerned about, at the

          14       time that you looked at, his mobile phone attracted one

          15       of those three cell sites?

          16   A.  Yes.  By far the majority of them were using Slades

          17       Tower: 64, I think.  Whereas the other, I think there

          18       was perhaps two and then one on the other one.  So by

          19       far --

          20   Q.  So 64 calls Slades Tower, two in relation to one at

          21       Dunton Road and one in relation to the other at Dunton

          22       Road?

          23   A.  Yes, I believe so.

          24   Q.  That's very helpful.  Can we just look at page 2773,

          25       which is the first page in this little bundle.  This




           1       just gives us the overview before we descend into the

           2       detail.  You obviously did not look at the sat nav, did

           3       you?

           4   A.  No.

           5   Q.  But we have just heard from Mr Johnstone who did and,

           6       obviously combining the sat nav with the phone, I am

           7       just dealing with it with you and I hope you don't mind.

           8   A.  Okay.

           9   Q.  What we can see is that the bottom, in the middle, it

          10       says:

          11           "Sat nav recording starts on 4 August 2011 at

          12       17.15.18."

          13           Yes?

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  Then there's a blue arrow pointing towards the sat nav

          16       recording stopping at 17.18.24.

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  Obviously something went wrong with it and we can see

          19       that's very near Micawber Court where the minicab picked

          20       up Mr Duggan and took him initially to Vicarage Road and

          21       then on to Ferry Lane.

          22   A.  Okay, yes.

          23   Q.  There's a break, as we can see, in the sat nav and it

          24       recommences at 17.30.50.

          25   A.  Yes.




           1   Q.  Yes?

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  Then we can see it passes, on the blue line with the

           4       arrows in the right direction, along Vicarage Road and,

           5       bearing in mind the answers that we just got from

           6       Mr Johnstone about whether it went into Burchell Road or

           7       not, we can see the home address of Desiré Cox, whose

           8       name was just mentioned a moment ago, at Burchell Road,

           9       and the sat nav point at that time being 18.00.24.  Then

          10       we can see that it does a circle almost -- well, it's

          11       a square actually, more than a circle -- and then goes

          12       on towards Ferry Lane and, as my learned friend Mr Straw

          13       just pointed out, it ceases recording at 18.12.43.

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  That is a general picture of where things went.

          16           Now, if we look and take the next two pages

          17       together, so if you have 775 at the top and you hold,

          18       underneath it 774, you will be able to follow both of

          19       these, I hope.  774 is a call schedule, on 4 August,

          20       between 16.57 and 17.49.

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  What we can see, if we start in the bottom left-hand

          23       corner of the page of 775, is a call made by Kevin

          24       Hutchinson-Foster to Mark Duggan at 16.57.01.

          25   A.  Yes, that's correct.




           1   Q.  That is indeed the first entry, at page 20774.

           2       Mr Hutchinson-Foster is in red, Mr Duggan in blue, or

           3       some such colour like that.

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  That is a call that lasts for 49 seconds.

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  We can see that all the red calls on that day are made

           8       from Slades Tower.

           9   A.  All in this period, yes.

          10   Q.  In this period, yes, just this page I am looking at,

          11       774.

          12   A.  Yes, that's correct.

          13   Q.  If we look at page 775, we can see that the cell site of

          14       Mr Duggan's phone is Rahere House, is it?

          15   A.  Yes, that's correct.

          16   Q.  So that is the cell site not of Mr Hutchinson-Foster but

          17       of Mr Duggan?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  I think you didn't actually carry out an analysis, did

          20       you, of that particular --

          21   A.  Of that particular call, no.

          22   Q.  So I won't ask you.  But we can see Micawber Court just

          23       above it.

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   Q.  Then the sat nav recommences, as we have already




           1       discovered, at 17.30, which we can see in the middle of

           2       page 16.  Along the route, the next call is at 17.34.47.

           3       That is a call made to Mark Duggan, if we look down in

           4       2774, from the phone that ends 833.

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  That's a call of 25 seconds.

           7           The next call, on page 775, is a call at 17.48.11,

           8       and again that's in a cell site called Pleaters or

           9       Burwell Road.

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  That is a call, again from a number 984, to Mark Duggan.

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  We now know that that number relates to Marlon Duggan.

          14   A.  Okay.

          15   Q.  We have been recently told of that number.  That call

          16       lasts 31 seconds to Mark Duggan when he was travelling

          17       on that road, Lea Bridge Road.

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  On the right-hand side of page 775, we can see the box

          20       with the red calls and the Slades Tower reference and

          21       the number of calls made by Mr Hutchinson-Foster between

          22       that time, 17.57 and 17.45?

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  If we put those two pages away and go to the next two

          25       pages, again if we can hold them one above the other,




           1       you will be able to follow the calls and the locations

           2       at the same time.

           3           This is between 17.50 and 18.12 on 4 August.

           4   A.  (Nods)

           5   Q.  Yes?

           6   A.  Yes, that's correct.  Well, it's 18.09.

           7   Q.  I'm sorry -- I'm looking at the top of page 776?

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  The first call in this period is the call, as you say,

          10       at 17.50 and 29 seconds.  That is a call from

          11       Mr Hutchinson-Foster to Mr Duggan for 41 seconds.

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  We can see that's the first entry in the block at

          14       page 776?

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  Then the next call is again from Mr Duggan to

          17       Mr Hutchinson-Foster, this time at 17.55 and 14 seconds.

          18       That's for 23 seconds, that call.

          19   A.  Yes, it is.

          20   Q.  We can see approximately where that was.  That is on the

          21       31 Dunton Road site.

          22   A.  Yes.  As far as Mr Duggan is concerned.

          23   Q.  As far as Mr Duggan is concerned, but the Slades Tower

          24       so far as Mr Kevin Hutchinson-Foster is concerned?

          25   A.  Yes.




           1   Q.  If you look at page 776, the sat nav has at 17.56.02 --

           2       the sat nav is on Vicarage Road near the junction with

           3       Burchell Road.  Then there's a call, in that period, at

           4       17.56 and 45 seconds for ten seconds to

           5       Mr Hutchinson-Foster.

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  Could we just, whilst we are doing that, look to the

           8       right-hand side of page 777.  In the middle, we can see

           9       the cell ID, Slades Tower, the block on the right, and

          10       we can see the various red entries which are

          11       Mr Hutchinson-Foster's phone and cell site.  Yes?

          12   A.  Yes, that's correct.

          13   Q.  If we look, he makes calls at 17.50 and 17.55 -- I am

          14       not bothering with the seconds there -- then at 17.56

          15       and 45 seconds, but his next call is not for -- well,

          16       four minutes?

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  18.00 hours and 54 seconds.

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  At the same time as there are no calls from

          21       Mr Hutchinson-Foster, we can see that the minicab --

          22   A.  No, there is.

          23   Q.  Sorry?

          24   A.  There is.

          25   Q.  What do you mean "there is"?  There is what?




           1   A.  If you look below that, there is the --

           2   Q.  18.01.

           3   A.  -- 17.56.

           4   Q.  Yes.  Are they calls, because they are zero seconds?

           5       They look like SMS, if you look in the left-hand side of

           6       776?

           7   A.  We are talking about call 134, aren't we?

           8   Q.  Yes --

           9   A.  That's a call.

          10   Q.  Sorry, 117 we are looking at, which is an SMS?

          11   A.  Sorry, my apologies, I thought we were looking at that

          12       one.  But, yes, you are correct.

          13   Q.  The next one is a call, at 138?

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  That's at 18.01.26.

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  The one before is an SMS.

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  And so is 136 -- 136 is an SMS and 137 is an SMS.  Yes?

          20   A.  Yes, that's correct.  136 and 137 are text messages.

          21   Q.  I was going to say, "What is an SMS"; I'm sure everybody

          22       knows what an SMS is but just in case --

          23   A.  Short Message Service; it's a text message.  Then 138 is

          24       a call.

          25   Q.  Yes.  We are now into 18.01, so I need not trouble you




           1       about that.

           2           Moving on, we can see, going back to page 777, in

           3       the right-hand corner of the page, there's an entry at

           4       18.04.05.

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  With a cell site of South Grove.  And that is a call

           7       that is made by a phone, 865, to Mark Duggan?

           8   A.  Yes, that's correct.

           9   Q.  The next call is at 18.09.35, on -- Forest Road I think

          10       it is -- just before the car gets into Ferry Lane.  And

          11       it starts at a cell site 154 Blackhorse Road?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  And concludes at the cell site right over on the far

          14       left hand corner; we can see Warren Court?

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  That, as we know, as my learned friend Mr Straw just

          17       indicated, is a call for 3 minutes and 2 seconds?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  Which we are told was Marlon Duggan.

          20   A.  Okay.

          21   Q.  The last page, which is 778, shows the sat nav -- I am

          22       not sure that that's something that you can actually

          23       help us with?

          24   A.  No.

          25   Q.  Two things, please.




           1           First of all, you've already indicated that the

           2       phone evidence is consistent, so far as

           3       Mr Hutchinson-Foster is concerned, with him being at the

           4       address in Burchell Road?

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  The phone evidence, so far as Mr Duggan is concerned, is

           7       consistent with the journey that's set out on this plan?

           8   A.  Yes, it is.

           9   MR STERN:  Thank you.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you Mr Stern.  Yes, Mr Keith

          11       or Ms Le Fevre?  Any questions on behalf of the

          12       Metropolitan Police.  Yes?

          13                     Questions by MS LE FEVRE

          14   MS LE FEVRE:  Thank you.  Mr Arkless, my name is Sarah

          15       Le Fevre and I am asking questions on behalf of the

          16       Metropolitan Police Service.

          17           Just very briefly indeed, please, is this a fair

          18       summary, that: as Mark Duggan's telephone reaches the

          19       Vicarage Road area, what we see is constant

          20       communication between the Mark Duggan and

          21       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster telephones?

          22   A.  There is a period of communication between the two

          23       phones, yes.

          24   Q.  Thank you.  You are not able to help us, I think, with

          25       the precise location of Mark Duggan's telephone?




           1   A.  No.

           2   Q.  That's because, I think, the Slades Tower cell site

           3       covers the broad area including Vicarage Road and the

           4       Burchell Road area?

           5   A.  Yes, it does.  It could have been made anywhere within

           6       that cell.

           7   MS LE FEVRE:  Thank you very much.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Butt?

           9   MR BUTT:  No, thank you.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Glasson?

          11   MR GLASSON:  No.

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Anyone else?  Mr Underwood?

          13   MR UNDERWOOD:  No, there is nothing arising out of that.

          14       Thank you, Mr Arkless.

          15   A.  Thank you.

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much, Mr Arkless, for

          17       coming to assist us.  It's very helpful, thank you.

          18   A.  Thank you.

          19                     (The witness withdrew)

          20                           Housekeeping

          21   MR UNDERWOOD:  Those are the witnesses for today.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Those are the witnesses we lined up

          23       for today.  So it must mean we have been working very

          24       hard indeed because we managed to exhaust all the

          25       witnesses and we still are in good time.  So we'll bring




           1       proceedings to an end.

           2           Members of the jury, a very long weekend.  As you

           3       know, whilst the lawyers are working away on Friday and

           4       Monday morning, your duties will begin again at

           5       2 o'clock on Monday.

           6           It may help us, Mr Underwood, if you could just give

           7       us an idea of the sort of area of evidence we hope to be

           8       hearing from next week.

           9   MR UNDERWOOD:  Yes.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Without putting you too much on the

          11       spot.

          12   MR UNDERWOOD:  No, no.  I am hoping we will start next week

          13       with ZZ17, who's been variously described by witnesses

          14       so far, but was at the very least the intelligence

          15       officer.  Then I am hoping we are going to call A10, the

          16       intelligence officer from SOCA.  We'll see how we go

          17       from there, I'm afraid.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I think we are making good progress

          19       and so I think matters will develop.  You can understand

          20       how we've been dealing with witnesses dealing with the

          21       planning and now we are getting a little bit nearer and

          22       nearer the actual operation.  So next week we will be

          23       progressing, hopefully, onto that area.

          24           Can I thank you very much, members of the jury, for

          25       all your concentration this week.  Have a good




           1       weekend -- I know it sounds rather odd saying that at

           2       3.30 on a Thursday -- but please also remember the

           3       warnings I have given you.  Please not to discuss the

           4       case with anyone else and really just put it to one side

           5       in your mind.  Do no more thinking/working on it; I'm

           6       sure you've got lots of other things you can be doing

           7       over the next three days and then come back fresh and

           8       ready to go Monday at 2 o'clock and we'll see what's in

           9       store for you then.

          10           Thank you very much.

          11   CORONER'S OFFICER:  May I issue the jury now with C10, which

          12       is the redacted --

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We had it taken back from them.

          14       Might this be a moment.  All right, members of the jury,

          15       we took a document back because it was wrongly prepared.

          16       Now it has holes in it and it's properly prepared.

          17       Perhaps you can put that in.  Where is it going to go

          18       in?  C10?

          19   MR UNDERWOOD:  Indeed, it is C10.

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Perhaps whilst you have your files

          21       with you and, as the Coroner's Officer has got copies

          22       for you, this might be an opportunity for you to put

          23       them in your file.  You will take them with you.  All

          24       right, thank you very much.  If you would like to go.

          25       Thank you very much.



           7   (3.28 pm)

           8         (The Inquest adjourned until 2.00 pm on Monday,

           9                        30 September 2013)

               DETECTIVE SUPERINTENDENT FIONA .......................1
          11             MALLON (continued)

          12       Questions by MR THOMAS (continued) ...............2

          13       Questions by MR STERN ............................3

          14       Questions by MR BUTT ............................16

          15       Questions by MR KEITH ...........................23

          16       Further questions by MR UNDERWOOD ...............40

          17   DETECTIVE INSPECTOR KATIE LILBURN ...................46
                   Questions by MR UNDERWOOD .......................47
                   Questions by MR KEITH ...........................81
               U3 (sworn) ..........................................94
                   Questions by MR UNDERWOOD .......................95
               MR AJAZ MIR (statement read by MR ..................101
          23             UNDERWOOD)

          24   MR MOHAMMAD ASIF (statement read by ................102
                         MR UNDERWOOD)
               MR NEIL JOHN JOHNSTONE (affirmed) ..................105







                   Questions by MR UNDERWOOD ......................105
                   Questions by MS LE FEVRE .......................118
               MR GARY ARKLESS (sworn) ............................121
                   Questions by MR UNDERWOOD ......................122
                   Questions by MR STRAW ..........................134
                   Questions by MR STERN ..........................136
                   Questions by MS LE FEVRE .......................150
               Housekeeping .......................................151