Transcript of the Hearing 29 October 2013


           1                                       Tuesday, 29 October 2013

           2   (10.30 am)

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Right, thank you, we'll have the

           4       cameras off then, please, and ask the jury to come in.

           5                  (In the presence of the jury)

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you, members of the jury.

           7           Yes, Mr Underwood, who is your first witness?

           8   MR UNDERWOOD:  Mr Cundy, please.

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Right, let's have Mr Cundy.

          10          ASSISTANT CHIEF CONSTABLE STUART CUNDY (sworn)

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  Please have

          12       a seat, Mr Cundy.  Thank you very much.

          13                    Questions by MR UNDERWOOD

          14   MR UNDERWOOD:  Good morning, Mr Cundy.

          15   A.  Good morning.

          16   Q.  My name's Underwood, I'm counsel for the Inquest.  Can

          17       you give us your full name and your rank, please?

          18   A.  Yes, my name is Stuart Ian Cundy, I'm currently

          19       Assistant Chief Constable in Surrey Police and in

          20       August 2011 I was a Detective Superintendent responsible

          21       for Trident in the Metropolitan Police.

          22   Q.  Thank you very much.  I want to ask you about

          23       4 August 2011, as you know.  At that stage, what was

          24       your role in the Metropolitan Police?

          25   A.  So, I was the OCU Commander basically responsible for




           1       Trident, Trident being one of the many operational

           2       command units within the Metropolitan Police, which --

           3       in essence, my responsibility was -- the overarching

           4       responsibility of Trident was the prevention and

           5       investigation of shootings across London.

           6   Q.  I think we are getting used to acronyms and initials,

           7       I think "OCU" has cropped up for the first time here?

           8   A.  That's the Operational Command Unit.

           9   Q.  Thank you.  On 4 August were you on duty?

          10   A.  I was on duty, that's correct.

          11   Q.  At police premises somewhere?

          12   A.  I was, in south London within Wandsworth borough.

          13   Q.  Were you in company with anyone else?

          14   A.  I was.  That day I had had a senior management team

          15       meeting so I was with my Superintendents, one of them in

          16       particular was Detective Superintendent Fiona Mallon,

          17       who was the Strategic Firearms Commander in relation to

          18       this operation.

          19   Q.  If we could look, please, at CD6171?

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It should come up on the screen

          21       there or above you.

          22   MR UNDERWOOD:  You may have a hard copy, I don't know.

          23   A.  Could I refer to my original day book; is that okay,

          24       sir?

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Do you have it there?




           1   A.  Yes.

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, yes.

           3   MR UNDERWOOD:  It also answers my next question: this is

           4       from your day book, is it?

           5   A.  It is, sir, yes.  So this is the book I was using all

           6       the time during that period, so it is my original note

           7       and -- have I got the right page?  Yes, page 182 within

           8       my book.

           9   Q.  So if we run through it and I will ask you by reference

          10       to it, if I may, what happened.  We have an entry at the

          11       top of this page: 1820, Operation Dibri, from Fiona

          12       Mallon: "call from Z51".

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  "Subject" --

          15   A.  Forgive me, sir, that's my acronym.  That's:

          16           "Subject believed shot dead."

          17   Q.  Then you have "Mark Duggan" with a question mark.

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  What was that about?

          20   A.  So I was with Fiona Mallon when she received a phone call

          21       from Z51.  She took the phone call  and when she had

          22       finished the call she came straight to inform me -- we

          23       were in the same room in the police station -- she

          24       informed me exactly as it says there, that within

          25       Operation Dibri, which I knew it was an armed operation




           1       that Trident officers were involved in on that day, that

           2       there had been sadly a fatal shooting and it was

           3       believed that the deceased male was Mark Duggan, hence

           4       I have the question mark because it was not confirmed at

           5       that point in time to me.

           6   Q.  You happened to be in the same building as her when this

           7       occurred.  If you had not have been would you have

           8       expected her to tell you this?

           9   A.  I would certainly have expected Fiona Mallon to inform

          10       me of a situation like this, which is highly unusual for

          11       us, a tragic set of circumstances, I'm sure we all

          12       agree.  So, even if I had not been in the same room,

          13       I would have expected a phone call , yes.

          14   Q.  Then we see the next entry is four minutes later, 1824,

          15       there's an update from Z51.  Can you let us know what

          16       that says?

          17   A.  In fact, that wasn't an update from Z51.

          18           So at 1824, Fiona took another phone call , and this

          19       time, as you can see, this was an update from Mick Foote

          20       who was the Senior Investigating Officer for Operation

          21       Dibri.  Fiona informed me following that phone call  that

          22       police had found a gun and that a CO19 -- or now

          23       an SCO19, as we now call them -- armed officer had been

          24       shot by accident.

          25   Q.  Did you know anymore about that than is written here?




           1   A.  I didn't at that point, sir, no.  I mean circumstances

           2       such as this, it's very fast moving, the operation had

           3       obviously come to a situation such as this, so Fiona as

           4       the Strategic Firearms Commander -- as I say, this is

           5       two calls within a very short period of time where we

           6       knew very brief details of what exactly had occurred.

           7   Q.  Moving down: 1826, the next one?

           8   A.  1826, sir, that's correct, yes.

           9   Q.  Again this is Z51, is it?

          10   A.  So, yes, this was a phone call  from Z51.  As you can see,

          11       there's some more detail now beginning to become known.

          12   Q.  Again, is this your writing down what Fiona Mallon has

          13       told you or was this a phone call  of your own?

          14   A.  My recollection would be this would be another phone call

          15       to Fiona Mallon as the Strategic Firearms Commander that

          16       she has then relayed to me.  One of the things, if I may

          17       add, that I had done at this point already was notified

          18       then Commander Martin Hewitt, now Deputy Assistant

          19       Commissioner, who was Gold for this overall Metropolitan

          20       Police response, so it was important for myself to note

          21       down as much as I was made aware of.

          22   Q.  This is the first time in this history then that you

          23       started involving someone else is it, that DAC Hewitt

          24       comes --

          25   A.  Yes, in those first few minutes, yes.




           1   Q.  For those of us who are not familiar with who it is who

           2       goes to a scene like this and what roles they have and

           3       what oversight, can you help us about what was your duty

           4       in terms of informing other people at that stage?

           5   A.  So my role as the Operational Command Unit Commander for

           6       Trident, within the firearms operation itself, I don't

           7       have a dedicated command role within that, that stops

           8       with the Strategic Firearms Commander, who's responsible

           9       for the overarching operation.  But as the person

          10       responsible for Trident as a whole, so this operation

          11       plus lots of other activity, I do have the sort of

          12       overarching command role for everything that's going on.

          13           So I view my responsibilities at that point in time

          14       as (a) ensuring that the policing operation and our

          15       response to what had happened was going to be

          16       appropriate.  Within the Metropolitan Police Service we

          17       would appoint a senior officer from ACPO, who was

          18       Commander Martin Hewitt, as a Gold Commander for the

          19       overall police response, and at the same time I would be

          20       fully aware that this would lead to an independent

          21       investigation through the IPCC, and indeed through our

          22       professional standards department.  They would do

          23       a direct link in with the IPCC to ensure that the

          24       investigation into the shooting would run in parallel

          25       with our immediate responses as the police.




           1   Q.  What's the purpose of the Gold Commander that in fact

           2       turned out to be Mr Hewitt?

           3   A.  The purpose of the Gold Commander is to ensure that the

           4       overall response of the Metropolitan Police is as it

           5       should be, encompassing all of those elements, from

           6       engagement with the IPCC, our own internal enquiries in

           7       relation to what was happening at the scene, our

           8       subsequent response, the management of the staff

           9       involved connected to the operation and indeed our sort

          10       of communication plan, our engagement with the media,

          11       and indeed, particularly from my perspective, which was

          12       really important, the link with the communities across

          13       London, in particular, in this set of circumstances, the

          14       communities of Tottenham.

          15   Q.  All right.  So within, what, four or five minutes of

          16       learning of this, you got hold of Mr Hewitt?

          17   A.  I did indeed, sir, yes.

          18   Q.  He became the Gold Commander straight away, did he?

          19   A.  I certainly notified him and it would have been within

          20       a matter of minutes he did inform me that he had taken

          21       the role of Gold Commander.

          22   Q.  Sorry, I have taken you out of sequence now.  If we go

          23       back to the 1826 entry, can you decipher that for us,

          24       please?

          25   A.  Certainly.  So it starts off with -- again, this is my




           1       abbreviation, "V" is short for victim so that is:

           2           "Victim in cab."

           3           So this is a story, set of circumstances being

           4       relayed to me.  Then I have:

           5           "1730 [so that's 1730 hours] intel [which is short

           6       for intelligence] MD [my abbreviation for Mark Duggan]

           7       in cab ..."

           8           Then I've got:

           9           "... and collect 2 F/A [is short for firearms]."

          10           It again goes on, on the next line, to say:

          11           "CO19 briefed [so the armed officers in the

          12       operation] and deployed.  SCD11 being briefed."

          13           "SCD11" is the terminology which use internally for

          14       the dedicated surveillance teams within the Metropolitan

          15       Police.

          16           Then the next line you'll see there's an arrow,

          17       which then points to:

          18           "Ferry Lane, Tottenham."

          19           Again, that's my shorthand for this led to the fatal

          20       shooting in Ferry Lane in Tottenham.

          21           There's then a blank line and then the following

          22       line says:

          23           "Picked up and followed."

          24           So my understanding was that the minicab that Mark

          25       Duggan had been travelling in had been picked up by




           1       police officers involved in the surveillance and then

           2       followed.

           3           The following lines says:

           4           "MD [Mark Duggan] gets out of cab with F/A [F/A

           5       short for firearm]."

           6           The line below:

           7           "MD shot."

           8           Mark Duggan is shot.

           9           I have then got:

          10           "F/A firearm found nearby."

          11           Then the following line says:

          12           "CO19 officer by accident in leg."

          13           From my perspective there should have been another

          14       word in there, which is "shot by accident in leg".

          15   Q.  So what you gathered from Fiona Mallon or from

          16       a conversation with Z51 then, was that Mark Duggan had

          17       picked up two firearms, got out of the cab, was shot and

          18       an officer was shot accidentally in the leg?

          19   A.  Sorry, sir, that's not quite correct.  The two firearms

          20       relates to what I was told was intelligence, that he was

          21       to collect two firearms.  It does not automatically

          22       refer that he did have two firearms when he came out of

          23       the cab.

          24   Q.  It was a possibility, was it, that he had actually

          25       collected two firearms?




           1   A.  It could well have been, I didn't know at that point in

           2       time.

           3   Q.  The shooting of a police officer was still accidental by

           4       this stage, was it?

           5   A.  That's what I was told and I know subsequently there was

           6       a significant amount of confusion around what had

           7       actually occurred, which I'm sure I can cover later as

           8       we go through the day book.

           9   Q.  Sure.  Then did you have more conversations with

          10       Commander Hewitt or anybody else around this time?

          11   A.  Yes.  Not every single phone conversation between myself

          12       and Martin Hewitt is recorded in this book because there

          13       were a number.  Certainly Martin Hewitt was, at that

          14       point in time, based at New Scotland Yard, as you would

          15       expect was desperate for as much information as

          16       possible, as was I, and Fiona Mallon, Strategic Firearms

          17       Commander.  But as I say, the information was sort of

          18       coming through in drip feed and slightly altering as

          19       time went on, which isn't unusual in a fast-moving

          20       scenario such as this.

          21   Q.  Then, the next entry you have on this page is at 6.50.

          22       Where were you by that point?

          23   A.  By that point in time, I would have been en route.  So

          24       after those first few phone calls, before 6.50, I had got

          25       another Trident officer to drive myself and Fiona




           1       Mallon, Strategic Firearms Commander, to Ferry Lane,

           2       Tottenham, to get to the scene.  As we were en route in

           3       that car I was involved in a number of phone

           4       conversations.  You'll see this one here at 1850 I have

           5       in brackets "(Z51 direct)", so that was Z51 speaking

           6       direct to myself on the telephone.

           7   Q.  Above that we have "Brian Elliott, Inspector, CO19"?

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  What's the reference to that?

          10   A.  So Brian Elliott, who was an Inspector from CO19, this

          11       would have come from Z51 in the phone conversation to me

          12       that he was at the scene from a CO19 perspective.

          13   Q.  So this is a record of a conversation you had with Z51,

          14       it starts with him informing you that Inspector Elliott

          15       is at the scene?

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  Again, can you take us through the script, please?

          18   A.  Certainly.  The first line says:

          19           "1800 [so 1800 hours] intended briefing."

          20           So that was the time the operation was scheduled to

          21       brief or the Trident officers, the armed officers and

          22       the surveillance officers.

          23           The next line reads:

          24           "1720 [so 5.20 pm], intel update."

          25           So an intelligence update, which I haven't then




           1       specified what that was because, in my mind, I have

           2       referred to it earlier on within the book.

           3           Then I've got -- I do not know if you are able to

           4       see it -- three dots which, again, is my shorthand for

           5       "therefore", so therefore SCD8, which is an acronym we

           6       refer to Trident by internally.  It then says, if I did

           7       a long hand:

           8           "Surveillance out to location and cab."

           9           So it's:

          10           "Surv [short for surveillance] out to loc [again my

          11       shorthand] and cab."

          12           The next line then says:

          13           "CO19 catch up, pincer movement."

          14           So this is what I was being relayed by Z51 as to the

          15       sequence of events, which was Trident surveillance

          16       officers, who were unarmed, had gone to a location which

          17       I wasn't aware of, picked up the cab, the armed officers

          18       from CO19 -- CO19 have then caught up with the unarmed

          19       Trident officers and then there has been a pincer

          20       movement.  Again, that's my terminology rather than

          21       a formal set of words for an armed intervention.

          22           It then goes on to read:

          23           "MD out of car."

          24           So Mark Duggan out of car.  I have then got a hyphen

          25       and I have written:




           1           "Gun to officer (circumstances not known)."

           2           So that's my bracket as to what exactly occurred at

           3       that point in time wasn't known -- exactly known to Z51

           4       at that time which he was relaying to me within that

           5       phone conversation.

           6           The line below then reads:

           7           "CO19 shot at MD."

           8           So a CO19 officer has shot Mark Duggan.

           9           Then the line below:

          10           "CO19 officer shot - n/k [which for me is not known]

          11       if by CO19/MD."

          12           So that was a -- no one -- I certainly didn't know

          13       and Z51 is relaying to me how the CO19, the armed

          14       officer, had been shot, whether it was by another CO19

          15       officer or by Mark Duggan himself.

          16   Q.  Thank you.  If we go over the page we see much shorter

          17       entries on your book, no criticism of that.  The first

          18       of those is 1915; had you reached the scene by then?

          19   A.  No, not quite.  If you see the sort of third line down

          20       which shows "1930 TOA", so for me this is my note,

          21       according to my watch, at 1930 a time of arrival at the

          22       scene.

          23   Q.  Then we see a lot of references to individuals and

          24       times.

          25   A.  Yes.




           1   Q.  What happened when you got to the scene?

           2   A.  So, on arrival at the scene -- as I say, I had been

           3       driven up there with Fiona Mallon, the Strategic

           4       Firearms Commander in the car, I had left Fiona in the

           5       car itself once we got to the scene within the outer

           6       cordon, so not to what we would call the inner cordon

           7       where Mark Duggan was present when I got there.

           8           The first thing I did was go up to the senior

           9       officer present, which was the local Inspector, as well

          10       as speak to the Tactical Firearms Commander, Z51.

          11   Q.  I think the local Inspector was Caroline Saunders, was

          12       it?

          13   A.  I believe so, sir, I cannot remember her name,

          14       apologies.  So, yes, Caroline Saunders, who was the

          15       local duty officer from Tottenham Police, but as I say

          16       to also spoke to Z51, the Tactical Firearms Commander

          17       from Trident to establish, you know, more what we knew

          18       at that point in time.

          19   Q.  Can I just get a snapshot of who was there and what they

          20       were doing at that stage.  So you arrived with the Gold

          21       Commander -- sorry, the Strategic Firearms Commander --

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  Ms Mallon, the local uniformed Inspector --

          24   A.  Yes, uniformed Inspector, yes.

          25   Q.  -- Inspector Saunders, you still have the Tactical




           1       Firearms Commander on the ground -- had the CO19

           2       officers left by that stage?

           3   A.  I recall Inspector Brian Elliott was present for CO19

           4       but I do not recall seeing any of the actual armed

           5       officers here.  My understanding is that they had

           6       already been relocated to commence their post-incident

           7       procedures.

           8   Q.  Was there any other fairly senior officer there,

           9       Inspector or above?

          10   A.  I was the most senior officer present, so certainly from

          11       my recollection, the local duty officer, the local

          12       Inspector, was the most senior person, alongside Z51,

          13       who's a Detective Inspector, and that was the highest

          14       rank until I arrived.

          15   Q.  What's the protocol there?  Is it highest rank takes

          16       charge or is it a particular strand of authority takes

          17       charge like local Inspector or CO19 or what?

          18   A.  Okay.  A lot of people would view it that rank means you

          19       take charge, take responsibility, which, I hazard

          20       a guess, many years ago that was probably the case.  It

          21       does not quite work in the same way now.  The reason

          22       I went to the scene -- and it wouldn't happen in every

          23       circumstance where an operation had come to

          24       a conclusion, but I took the decision in this particular

          25       set of circumstances, which had led to a fatal police




           1       shooting, that it was important that I would go as the

           2       Trident commander.

           3           As I said earlier, I see my role -- saw my role at

           4       that point in time, to (a) -- it was about demonstrating

           5       leadership for those who were involved in the operation.

           6       So I had a responsibility to -- this isn't a priority

           7       order -- I had a responsibility to my staff that were

           8       involved, and indeed the other police officers involved

           9       in the operation.  Since this was a Trident led

          10       operation.

          11           I also had a responsibility to ensure that the

          12       investigation into the fatal shooting would commence as

          13       appropriate, which I can cover in more detail if

          14       required.  I also had a responsibility within Trident

          15       that we would also have an ongoing criminal

          16       investigation into -- certainly I was already being

          17       informed that a firearm had been recovered -- that we

          18       would have a criminal investigation into that firearm,

          19       why was it found at the scene and indeed, as

          20       subsequently proved to be the case, the supply of that

          21       firearm.

          22           I also had a responsibility within Trident to

          23       London's community, particularly London's black

          24       community, who are significantly affected by armed

          25       criminality.




           1           So my purpose there was to ensure that all of these

           2       things were being led and managed effectively.  The

           3       actual -- shall we call it the scene itself, at that

           4       point in time remained the responsibility of Z51, who's

           5       the Tactical Firearms Commander, until they would

           6       subsequently get relieved.  Indeed, one of the

           7       phone calls, which is within that page just referred to,

           8       I had spoken to Detective Superintendent Tony Nash, who

           9       was one of my Superintendents on Trident, to initiate

          10       how we could get the Trident officers involved in this

          11       operation relieved as soon as possible and someone step

          12       in and take over.

          13           So rank didn't automatically mean that I was

          14       responsible for everything but I certainly saw myself as

          15       having a key role there.

          16   Q.  I am going to take you out of order for a moment and ask

          17       you about Mr Nash and post-incident management for the

          18       Trident officers; did that involve a debriefing?

          19   A.  Subsequently?

          20   Q.  Yes.

          21   A.  To my knowledge, no debriefing has been conducted of

          22       this operation.

          23   Q.  So let's take, again, a snapshot.  When you arrive at

          24       the scene, as it were, with the responsibilities you've

          25       just described to us, you were conscious that there may




           1       possibly have been two illegal guns at the scene; would

           2       that be fair?

           3   A.  That was always a possibility, that's right, sir.

           4   Q.  You regarded Mark Duggan as a victim, we've seen.

           5   A.  Well, if someone has been shot then clearly they are

           6       a victim, whether it is a lawful shooting or not.  That

           7       is certainly my terminology.

           8   Q.  I am not suggesting you are alleging murder against

           9       a police officer here.  I'm just making it clear that

          10       you treated Mr Duggan has a victim of a shooting; is

          11       that clear?

          12   A.  Yes, in my mind, yes.

          13   Q.  You didn't know who shot the police officer who was

          14       shot?

          15   A.  No, I didn't know.

          16   Q.  Again, as far as you were concerned, the scene

          17       management, if you like, was the responsibility of the

          18       Tactical Firearms Commander; is that fair?

          19   A.  The scene management itself is an element of the

          20       investigation that would commence following that fatal

          21       shooting so when I arrived at, as you saw, about 7.30,

          22       so that's about an hour and a quarter after the fatal

          23       shooting, the scene was by then locked down.  So it was

          24       quite extensive with the police tape and there was

          25       nobody within it, apart from those who were entitled to




           1       be there.

           2           The person responsible for ensuring that scene was

           3       now sort of locked down and nothing was going in and out

           4       that shouldn't be, was the responsibility of the local

           5       duty officer, who was then running that element of it.

           6   Q.  Right.  What I'm going to ask you about is things that

           7       had got out and left the scene, in particular

           8       information.

           9           We know that the minicab driver told one of the

          10       police officers at the scene that Mr Duggan had picked

          11       up a box in the Vicarage Road area and we also know that

          12       the intelligence which was feeding into the operation

          13       had indicated that Mr Duggan had picked up a gun in the

          14       Vicarage Road area; did you know either of those things?

          15   A.  I certainly knew about the gun, that the intelligence

          16       was that a gun had been picked up.  At that point in

          17       time, I had no knowledge about a box and that came known

          18       to me on subsequent days, but certainly not at that

          19       point in time.

          20   Q.  The point I'm getting at really was: did anybody conduct

          21       any sort of, if you like, quick and dirty debrief of

          22       officers who were there to find out what information

          23       there may be, which would make sense of the scene?

          24   A.  Certainly my understanding is Brian Elliott, the

          25       Inspector from CO19, he was the one who had spoken to




           1       the armed officers.  The Tactical Firearms Commander

           2       Z51, had clearly spoken to the armed officers who, as

           3       I say, had left the scene before my arrival.  So there

           4       had been that initial -- call it a debrief if you will,

           5       speaking to the officers directly involved, to establish

           6       what we knew as the circumstances at that point in time,

           7       though there's always the balance between the formal

           8       post-incident procedures, which -- I already knew at

           9       this point in time the Independent Police Complaints

          10       Commission had formally taken ownership of the

          11       investigation and my recollection is that was within

          12       20 minutes of the fatal shooting actually occurring.

          13           That means, de facto, the Metropolitan Police at

          14       that scene is operating on behalf of the IPCC and I'm

          15       sure, if appropriate, I can give evidence later of where

          16       I might have decided to do certain things and yet,

          17       because it now wasn't my investigation to establish what

          18       had happened within the fatal police shooting, I would

          19       need to refer that back through to the IPCC before

          20       I made certain choices.

          21   Q.  Sure.  At the moment I am just interested in this box.

          22       To be clear, whatever Z51 might have known about the box

          23       and the possibility that it had contained a gun, nobody

          24       told you that?

          25   A.  I didn't know that at the time, no.




           1   Q.  If you had known that there was a box somewhere on the

           2       scene and that it was likely to have contained

           3       an illegally held firearm, would you have tried to make

           4       sure it was handled properly?

           5   A.  My priority would have been to just leave the box in

           6       situ wherever it lay at that point in time and make sure

           7       it had suitable control around it.  Certainly when

           8       I arrived I was made aware that there was a firearm that

           9       was discovered on the grass, so again I already knew

          10       that that was sort of located within a sterile

          11       environment, that no one could access that firearm.

          12           If I had been made aware of the box in relation to

          13       the circumstances as we now know, again similarly

          14       I would have ensured that it was kept secure as it could

          15       have been pending any formal recovery or examination.

          16   Q.  Thank you.  Then pending the IPCC's arrival did you set

          17       yourself some priorities?

          18   A.  I did set myself some priorities, yes.

          19   Q.  What were they?

          20   A.  Sir, they are not written in my day book but I go back

          21       to what I was talking about earlier.  The priorities for

          22       me would have been securing the scene, so basically

          23       preserving the evidence that did exist, about securing

          24       additional evidence, if it was known to be available.

          25       So the minicab driver which you referred to a moment




           1       ago, he was still present at the scene in a vehicle but

           2       within the outer cordon, not by the inner cordon where

           3       Mark Duggan was.  So it was about securing the scene,

           4       preserving evidence, about securing additional evidence,

           5       if available.

           6           Another priority for me was around the management of

           7       the staff involved to ensure that there was the

           8       appropriate post-incident procedures undertaken.  There

           9       was also be a priority around the investigation into the

          10       fatal police shooting to ensure that would be as

          11       effective as possible, and also, a priority for me is

          12       around my role as a Trident -- you know, responsible for

          13       Trident, in conjunction with the Commander responsible

          14       for Haringey borough, to ensure that we effectively

          15       managed community concerns as best we could, and what

          16       goes hand in hand with that is clearly communication,

          17       provided it was agreed with the Independent Police

          18       Complaints Commission as to what might have occurred.

          19   Q.  Did you see the firearm itself that was on the grass?

          20   A.  Not upon my arrival but, yes, subsequently, I did go and

          21       see the firearm, as it was at that point in time, yes.

          22   Q.  Would it be any help at all to show you on a map

          23       a location to see whether that --

          24   A.  Yes, please, if you could, yes.

          25   Q.  Again, this is the one in the jury bundle, the A3 map.




           1       It's page 12 in the jury bundle.

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Page 12, divider 1.

           3   A.  Thank you, sir.

           4   MR UNDERWOOD:  Assistant Chief Constable, what happened was

           5       that, as we know, a laser scan was taken at the scene on

           6       the 5th, the gun had gone by then.  There's a mark -- if

           7       we look in the roadway, there's a label:

           8           "Marker 03 (casing)."

           9           Just above a BMW.  If we go due south of that, we

          10       get "scene", "tent", "body", "wall", "plant pot".  We

          11       know that at the scene the plant pot was placed over the

          12       gun.

          13   A.  It was, yes.

          14   Q.  We also know, as I say, that the gun was then removed.

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  What we don't know yet from a witness is whether the

          17       plant pot was put back precisely on the spot where the

          18       gun was; can you assist?

          19   A.  I can assist, certainly at the point in time that I saw

          20       the firearm and if I just go back to my day book, yes,

          21       I made a note, so at 2140 hours, 9.40 pm, I viewed the

          22       firearm and indeed -- again, from recollection, where

          23       that plant pot is would be approximately where I went to

          24       see it at that point in time.  There was an upturned

          25       plant pot that I put to one side and there, on the




           1       grass, was what to me looked like a handgun that was

           2       within what I could best describe as a black sock.  It

           3       was quite dark at this point in time so this was done

           4       obviously with a torch and, if my recollection serves me

           5       right, there was also -- a police crime scene tent had

           6       been put over it as well.

           7   Q.  Right.  Thank you.  Did you take any steps about the

           8       minicab driver?

           9   A.  Yes, the decision I made in relation to the minicab

          10       driver was, firstly, he was clearly a significant

          11       witness to any subsequent investigation.  As I say,

          12       I was informed by Z51, the Tactical Firearms Commander,

          13       that the minicab driver was present with officers, not

          14       in his minicab but in a police vehicle just down the

          15       road.  I didn't speak to him directly myself, but it was

          16       clear such was the significance of him as a witness,

          17       that he would want to be spoken to by the Independent

          18       Police Complaints Commission when they arrived.  So

          19       officers basically stayed with the minicab driver,

          20       pending any formal handover to the IPCC subsequently.

          21   Q.  What about the Trident officers: were they allowed to

          22       leave the scene at this stage?

          23   A.  The Trident officers eventually did all leave the scene

          24       to go and commence their post-incident procedures but

          25       they were still present when I arrived at 7.30 pm.  I do




           1       not have, within my notes, knowledge of what time they

           2       left, that would be on various cordon logs.  But they

           3       were still present, some with the minicab driver,

           4       pending him being passed over to investigators.

           5   Q.  Did there come a point when you learned Mr Suggett from

           6       the DPS was on his way?

           7   A.  Yes, I spoke to Mr Suggett who was from the professional

           8       standards unit on the telephone and my notes -- well, he

           9       probably arrived at about 9 o'clock or thereabouts.

          10   Q.  Again, to go back to the splitting of roles and

          11       responsibilities, you told us earlier on that there

          12       would be a Gold Commander in charge of the police

          13       response, which is Mr Hewitt --

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  -- and in addition, there would be somebody from DPS as

          16       well as the IPCC.  What was the DPS function when

          17       an IPCC investigation was going on?

          18   A.  So the function of DPS, the Directorate of Professional

          19       Standards, is basically the interface between the

          20       Metropolitan Police and the IPCC.  Inspector Suggett was

          21       the sort of on-call, the duty, Inspector from DPS and

          22       I spoke to him on the telephone before he arrived at the

          23       scene, and indeed other staff from DPS did eventually

          24       arrive from the scene later on, including the head of

          25       DPS at that point in time.




           1   Q.  There were at least two senior officers from DPS there?

           2   A.  Subsequently.  It was some time before they arrived so

           3       apart from those directly connected to the operation or

           4       the local police, I was the first officer, the first

           5       senior officer to arrive who didn't have a direct

           6       connection to the operation itself.  From my

           7       recollection, the DPS staff along with the IPCC,

           8       probably arrived about two hours after I was there.

           9   Q.  Okay.  I think you had dealings with family liaison

          10       officers as well, did you?

          11   A.  Yes, I did, yes.

          12   Q.  With a view to dealing with the Duggan family and

          13       informing them of what was going on?

          14   A.  Yes, absolutely.  One of the things I was informed of

          15       when I spoke to Inspector Saunders, the local Inspector

          16       from Tottenham, was that they believed that Mark

          17       Duggan's brother, Marlon Duggan, was present at one of

          18       the outer cordon points, so the sort of outer perimeter

          19       where the police tape was.

          20           Having had a lot of experience myself with murder

          21       investigations and other inquiries, one of the

          22       priorities for me would always be to inform the family

          23       of things as soon as we possibly could or inform them of

          24       what we knew.  So the fact Mark Duggan's brother was

          25       there, it was a priority for me to inform him.




           1           I did take the decision that I didn't think it was

           2       appropriate that a Trident officer would go and speak to

           3       Marlon Duggan at the cordon, on the basis of this was

           4       a Trident-led operation that had led to Mark Duggan's

           5       death and clearly -- for obvious reasons, I didn't think

           6       it would be appropriate that Trident officers would

           7       speak to Marlon Duggan himself.

           8           That was one of the reasons that I spoke to

           9       Inspector Suggett on the phone, as well as Martin Hewitt

          10       who was Gold Commander, to get family liaison officers

          11       from our professional standards unit down to the scene

          12       as quickly as possible, so we could commence that

          13       engagement with the family.

          14   Q.  Okay.  I want to move on to the Crime Scene Manager.

          15       Now, where you've got a scene like this -- I say "like

          16       this", there may not have been many scenes like this in

          17       the history of the Metropolitan Police --

          18   A.  Fortunately not.

          19   Q.  -- but where you have a fatality and where there is

          20       a lot of unknowns and a lot of senior officers present,

          21       because this was a joint operation between Trident and

          22       CO19, what powers does the Crime Scene Manager have when

          23       they turn up?

          24   A.  When you say powers, sir, could you sort of --

          25   Q.  Can they tell you what to do?




           1   A.  The purpose of crime scene -- in relation to any

           2       investigation, whether it is a fatal police shooting

           3       like this or a murder inquiry, there is only ever one

           4       Senior Investigating Officer, so that would have been

           5       the IPCC within this case and, as the Senior

           6       Investigating Officer, you are responsible and

           7       accountable for everything that happens.

           8           A Crime Scene Manager's role is one of the experts

           9       which you would use, as a Senior Investigating Officer,

          10       to progress certain elements of the investigation.  So

          11       the Crime Scene Manager would have expertise in

          12       examining scenes such as this, forensic recovery of

          13       items that might have been present and to give informed

          14       professional judgments, as experts in their field, as to

          15       what could be done to maximise evidence or to secure

          16       further evidence.

          17   Q.  Let's get that back into context then.  When the SIO is

          18       there, the SIO is in charge; would that be fair?

          19   A.  It doesn't matter whether the SIO is actually present.

          20       So as soon as an SIO is appointed, in an independent

          21       investigation such as this, there is only one person

          22       who's responsible and accountable for the investigation

          23       in all of its rounds (?), as I call them.  So you don't

          24       need to be present to be responsible.

          25   Q.  The Crime Scene Manager is answerable only to the SIO;




           1       would that be right?

           2   A.  Within the this situation, the Crime Scene Manager would

           3       have been responsible to the SIO responsible for the

           4       post-incident investigation.

           5   Q.  Mr Sparrow was appointed the SIO quite early on,

           6       I think.

           7   A.  Yes, within the IPCC, yes.

           8   Q.  He didn't attend the scene until fairly late on on the

           9       4th; is that right?

          10   A.  I met Colin Sparrow later on that evening at one of the

          11       police stations where the post-incident procedures were

          12       being undertaken with the staff.  So certainly before

          13       I left Ferry Lane, which was at about 10.15 that

          14       evening, Mr Sparrow had not arrived at that point in

          15       time.

          16   Q.  But at 8.54, Ms Larrigan, the Crime Scene Manager turned

          17       up, did she?

          18   A.  I don't have a note of the time that they arrived but

          19       I would assume that's correct, yes.

          20   Q.  If it helps, we can look at her log, CD485.  This is her

          21       Crime Scene Manager's case notes log and if we look --

          22       this is the third page of it.  If we look at the bottom

          23       entry, 2054, I think:

          24           "Attend scene (cordon) meet DCS Stuart Cundy SCD8,

          25       info received."




           1           Then it gives an account of what apparently you told

           2       her; does that help you?

           3   A.  Yes, I certainly know I spoke to the Crime Scene Manager

           4       but, as I say, that must be the time that I did it, yes.

           5   Q.  It would follow, would it, that you would not have been

           6       able to tell her that the box in the car may have had

           7       some significance?

           8   A.  No, absolutely not.  I didn't know about the box at that

           9       point in time anyway.

          10   Q.  Did Acting Commander Bussey from DPS arrive?

          11   A.  So, yes, Carl Bussey, who was the Acting Commander, so

          12       basically the police officer responsible for the Met's

          13       professional standards unit, he arrived -- and I got

          14       a note in my day book -- at about 9.25 pm.  My

          15       recollection, he arrived not on his own but with others

          16       which included IPCC investigators.

          17   Q.  Right.  Did you brief them?

          18   A.  Yes, I did.  I have made a note that it was at 2210, so

          19       10.10 in the evening I briefed both Carl and other

          20       officers from DPS, as well as the IPCC investigators.

          21   Q.  By that stage, were you still unclear whether there were

          22       one or two illegally held firearms involved?

          23   A.  In my mind, by that stage, I had the view that it was

          24       one firearm.  Apart from that early phone call  which was

          25       at 6.26 pm, apart from that one point in time, no one




           1       ever mentioned two firearms to me and that was about

           2       an intelligence that -- possibly two firearms.  Beyond

           3       that I was only ever made aware of one firearm.

           4   Q.  Were you any the wiser by this stage about who had shot

           5       the police officer?

           6   A.  Yes.  Whilst en route to Tottenham in the police car,

           7       I had spoken to a number of people on the phone and

           8       certainly when I got there and I spoke to the TFC on my

           9       arrival, my understanding was that the armed police

          10       officer who had been shot in the radio had been shot as

          11       a result of one of his colleagues, and it wasn't

          12       an exchange of fire from Mark Duggan and the police.

          13           I sort of had -- whilst I couldn't say that for

          14       certain, because that would come through the

          15       investigation by the IPCC, my understanding was that

          16       there was no exchange of fire and this was a -- not

          17       an accidental shot but a shot that then led to

          18       a ricochet and then hit another police officer.

          19   Q.  Do you know how that information filtered its way to

          20       you?

          21   A.  It was through a number of people, so as we've already

          22       gone through, the first phone calls I received, you know,

          23       the one at 6.24 pm, does specify -- so this was

          24       a phone call  which the SIO, Mick Foote, had relayed to

          25       Fiona Mallon -- was that CO19 officer had been shot by




           1       accident.  So that was one of the phone calls.

           2           Speaking to the TFC, Z51, whilst I was in the police

           3       car going to Tottenham, he had explained to me that the

           4       circumstances of the actual shooting were not known and

           5       the armed officer, it was not known whether he had been

           6       shot by another armed officer or indeed by Mark Duggan.

           7           I also spoke to Alistair Sutherland, who at the time

           8       was the Chief Superintendent responsible for CO19, so

           9       responsible for all armed officers within London, and

          10       certainly the conversation I had with Alistair

          11       Sutherland was that this was what I would term as

          12       an accidental shooting from one police officer which has

          13       hit another.  No one was saying to me that Mark Duggan

          14       had opened fire on police.

          15   Q.  Thank you.  What time did you leave the scene?

          16   A.  I have made a note that I left the scene -- well, it

          17       would have been after I briefed the IPCC and DPS, which

          18       was at 10.10, so I would assume it would have been about

          19       10.30 that evening.

          20   MR UNDERWOOD:  Thank you very much.  If you stay there,

          21       Assistant Chief Constable.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, Mr Mansfield?

          23                    Questions by MR MANSFIELD

          24   MR MANSFIELD:  Good morning, officer, my name is Michael

          25       Mansfield, I represent the family.




           1   A.  Good morning, sir.

           2   Q.  If I may, I'll deal with matters chronologically.  Just

           3       one general point, first of all.  I think you would

           4       accept that the recovery of illegal firearms is one of

           5       the priorities of Trident, isn't it?

           6   A.  Absolutely correct, sir, it's one of the key priorities

           7       that, certainly in my tenure responsible for Trident,

           8       I ensured that all staff endeavoured to undertake.

           9   Q.  I am going to, if I may, focus on that aspect, as well

          10       as some other matters, as we go through.  So it may be

          11       easier for the jury, as well, if we do it in the order

          12       in which you have been speaking about it.  You have just

          13       done a little summary of your notes.  If we could have

          14       the notes back up on screen so the jury can see where

          15       we're going.  It's 669, please.

          16           The notes begin at 6.20 with the phone call  that goes

          17       to Fiona Mallon, as we see.  Then I want to, as it were,

          18       work down here.  The next one is 6.24 and the

          19       gentleman -- Senior Investigating Officer, Mr Foote, who

          20       the jury have seen, phones and says: "found gun".  Then

          21       "CO19 shot by accident", that's her note.

          22           You are with her at that time, that's the record you

          23       make of what she tells you; is that right?

          24   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.

          25   Q.  Then I just want to deal with this next note now in the




           1       context.  This is at 6.26, roughly.  I think in some

           2       statement or another, these are times you said you got

           3       from your watch, so they may not correlate with someone

           4       else.

           5   A.  That's correct, yes.

           6   Q.  There may be a few minutes either way?

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  Now, I want to take this a little more slowly because --

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Sorry, is this a different one from

          10       the one that was displayed earlier, exactly the same but

          11       in a different format, because we are on 6171 and you

          12       are on 669.  It's more or less redacted on this.

          13           But, just in case, there is no magic in this, we are

          14       not being shown another document; is that right?

          15   MR MANSFIELD:  It's the same document.  There have been

          16       different redactions at different times.

          17   A.  Sir, if I may assist on that?  Certainly, this version

          18       was my -- was the original redaction which I agreed, so

          19       you'll see that ZZ21, so that's the record at 6.24,

          20       which is Mick Foote, at that point in time was referred

          21       to through a pseudonym.  Obviously, that has

          22       subsequently changed and now referred to, so that's

          23       an additional redaction.

          24   MR MANSFIELD:  We are less concerned about the identity of

          25       people for the moment, because this is a -- I have moved




           1       to the 6.26 conversation by the Tactical Firearms

           2       Commander, Z51, to Fiona Mallon, who's in your presence,

           3       or you are nearby, and you note down on there, 5.30, and

           4       you also -- that's a time -- and "Mark Duggan in cab".

           5       What does it say under that redaction?  Can you read the

           6       actual words again, something about collecting two

           7       firearms, is it?

           8   A.  Sorry, yes, that's the element that's redacted.  It says

           9       underneath there:

          10           "... and collect two firearms."

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Can we have a look at the original

          12       one because we had up before, so we can see that too?

          13   MR MANSFIELD:  Certainly we can stick with that one if it's

          14       better because it's less redacted.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Who decided on that redaction?

          16   A.  Sorry, sir, the redaction?

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The "collect two firearms", I just

          18       wondered who it was that blanked that out and why.

          19   A.  It was in relation to the intelligence, sir.

          20   MR MANSFIELD:  That's what I wanted to ask you about.  The

          21       learned Coroner's question was: who decided to blot it

          22       out?  So can you help about that: to redact it?

          23   A.  The decision at that point in time would have been mine,

          24       on the basis of what I was then told the intelligence

          25       that had been passed through was at that point in time.




           1   Q.  What's the problem with knowing about two firearms?

           2   A.  (Pause)

           3           Sir, if -- if I may assist, it was in terms of the

           4       nature of the intelligence and what I believed I was

           5       entitled to disclose.  At that point in time, it wasn't

           6       to specify "and collect two firearms", that then

           7       subsequently changed, hence there's a different

           8       redaction.

           9   Q.  Yes, a lot has changed over months, if I may say so, in

          10       relation to intelligence.  We have been seeking since

          11       the beginning to get an accurate picture of exactly what

          12       the intelligence was; do you follow?

          13   A.  Indeed, sir, yes.

          14   Q.  I am not wanting sources but we need to know details

          15       because much of this planning of this operation depended

          16       on intelligence, didn't it?

          17   A.  Absolutely right, sir, yes.

          18   Q.  It's an intelligence led operation with decisions being

          19       made within the parameters of the intelligence you get?

          20   A.  That's absolutely right, yes.

          21   Q.  The intelligence in this case, we've been told --

          22       whether it's called "B2", "A1", "hot" or whatever -- is

          23       really accurate intelligence, wasn't it?

          24   A.  It was certainly -- I think it's been referred to as

          25       high grade intelligence.




           1   Q.  "High grade", I don't mind what the term is.  I want you

           2       to look at a document for the moment, I'm afraid it's

           3       going to be amended, but one the jury have at the

           4       moment.  It's C9 and I want to know whether you have

           5       seen it before.

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It's in that bundle behind

           7       divider 9.

           8   A.  Sorry, sir, is it behind divider 1.

           9   MR MANSFIELD:  I don't know the divider in that one, I think

          10       it's 2.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I think it's 9 in that one.

          12   A.  I've found it.

          13   MR MANSFIELD:  I have written divider 9 on mine.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It is.  What has happened is the two

          15       jury bundles have been put together in one, so there's

          16       a minor confusion but not much.

          17   MR MANSFIELD:  Could you just run your eye down that page?

          18       Sorry to ask you to do it now but just pause for

          19       a minute.  (Pause)

          20           I think that's it, it should only be the one page.

          21   A.  Yes, I've done that, sir.

          22   Q.  There's more to come on this but just for the moment,

          23       dealing the page as it stands, were you familiar with

          24       this intelligence?

          25   A.  No.  I wasn't familiar with any of the intelligence at




           1       that point in time.

           2   Q.  Would you just be kind enough to bear with me because if

           3       you look at the bottom of the page, 4 August, you will

           4       see that there's no mention there of two firearms; do

           5       you follow?

           6   A.  I do indeed, yes, that's correct.

           7   Q.  So I'm going to ask you, if you wouldn't mind: where did

           8       you get intelligence that it was two?

           9   A.  Sir, I've made a note of the conversation I have had

          10       with Fiona Mallon, who was getting a phone call  from the

          11       TFC, Z51, who would have received intelligence from

          12       whatever source and that was what was said to me at that

          13       point in time.  I now know it not to be correct but I've

          14       made a note of what the conversation was.

          15   Q.  Hang on a minute, you now know it not to be correct; why

          16       do you now know it not to be correct?

          17   A.  I'm only saying that based on the intelligence that I've

          18       been shown on that document at CD9 (?).

          19   Q.  Please be careful, that's not the totality of the

          20       intelligence.

          21   A.  Forgive me.

          22   Q.  There's more coming in.  So, please, you don't make

          23       assumptions like that, do you, lightly, that it's wrong?

          24   A.  Sorry, that was a figure of speech, sir, on the basis of

          25       what I recorded there.




           1   Q.  Was it?

           2   A.  But that's -- the record of "and collect two firearms"

           3       is what I made a note of the conversation at the time.

           4   Q.  You see, the intelligence is important, isn't it?

           5   A.  As you said earlier, intelligence in operations like

           6       this is vitally important.

           7   Q.  Vitally important.  As they sometimes say, the devil is

           8       in the detail, isn't it?

           9   A.  Well, that's a phrase that's often used in lots of

          10       scenarios, yes.

          11   Q.  You know what I mean.  So, as far as you're concerned,

          12       therefore, the intelligence about two firearms being

          13       collected comes via Fiona Mallon from the Tactical

          14       Firearms Commander.

          15   A.  That's correct, yes.

          16   Q.  That's the only way it gets to you.

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  As you have said, of course that would have been

          19       something that you would have registered on the day,

          20       that's the 4th, when you receive that, you have written

          21       it down, it's a significant detail, isn't it?

          22   A.  It is a significant detail, yes.

          23   Q.  Right.  Well then, I won't read out the rest of that

          24       particular entry, other than he gets out of the cab,

          25       that is MD, with a firearm.




           1           The Tactical Firearms Officer is telling you that

           2       according -- roughly 6.26, right?

           3   A.  Well, 6.26 is the time I'm having a conversation with

           4       Fiona Mallon, the Strategic Firearms Commander, who has

           5       just finished a phone call  with Z51.

           6   Q.  Do you know what -- I am not asking you to repeat it --

           7       do you know what the Tactical Firearms Officer has said

           8       in this Inquest about what he saw or didn't see?

           9   A.  Well, I read the transcript some time ago after he gave

          10       his evidence but in terms of the details, sir --

          11   Q.  You don't really know.  The learned Coroner is anxious

          12       we don't put what other people say, so I am not going to

          13       put it to you.  But you are familiar because you at

          14       least read it at the time he said it in this Inquest?

          15   A.  I certainly read the transcript at the time, yes.

          16   Q.  It comes to this, does it, all officers are following

          17       the evidence very carefully?

          18   A.  I would not say "all the evidence very carefully".

          19       Certainly from my perspective, Z51 was one of my staff

          20       one of the principal officers within this operation, so

          21       therefore I have made a conscious decision to observe

          22       what's occurred when he's given his evidence in Inquest,

          23       but not every -- sorry, sir.

          24   Q.  There is another reason for asking you because you

          25       eventually get to the scene and you speak to him




           1       directly.

           2   A.  Yes, that's after my arrival, yes.

           3   Q.  Yes, I appreciate.  Just going down the same page, if we

           4       can have the one with the less redactions, please.

           5           Now, 6.50, you're en route.  Before we get to the

           6       journey, as it were, with Fiona Mallon, I want to ask

           7       you about something else noted by Fiona Mallon before

           8       you set off on your journey.

           9           Could we have CD7203, please?  It's a little faint,

          10       I can read it to you, the jury have seen this before.

          11       There's a note in the middle of that page that she's

          12       made about phone calls that she's receiving; do you

          13       follow?

          14   A.  Yes, yes, I do, yes.

          15   Q.  It looks as though these are obviously phone calls being

          16       received by her in your presence?

          17   A.  Sir, again, I don't know the times.  This might well

          18       have been in the car.  If we were, that would have been

          19       in my presence.  Similarly, if we weren't en route,

          20       Fiona Mallon was also in the same room as me.  So it was

          21       in presence though I wasn't listening clearly to the

          22       conversation itself.

          23   Q.  You see this one here, at 6.30 -- that's how she's timed

          24       it -- do you see in the middle of the page "Mick Foote"?

          25   A.  Yes.




           1   Q.  "Just found a gun."

           2           You have a note that she received a phone call  from

           3       Foote, as we have just seen it, at 6.24 -- I am not

           4       quibbling about time -- "found gun".  So it looks as

           5       though it might be -- it might be -- the same

           6       conversation?

           7   A.  It's a possibility it's the same conversation, yes.

           8   Q.  A possibility, yes, and that it's Duggan's gun:

           9           "Think it's Duggan's gun."

          10           Did she tell you that that's what Foote was alleging

          11       at 6.30?

          12   A.  If it's the same conversation I recorded at 6.24, I've

          13       shown "Found gun.  CO19 shot by accident", which I do

          14       think is consistent with what Fiona Mallon has recorded

          15       there.

          16   Q.  Yes, it's not the consistency, it's the extra details

          17       I'm concerned with.  Were you told that the gun that had

          18       been found was thought to be Duggan's?

          19   A.  I've not made a note of it, sir, and I -- she may well

          20       have done or she might not have done.  In my mind -- I'm

          21       probably stepping further than the question -- we would

          22       not be able to say for certain a gun belonged to

          23       an individual person until an investigation had been

          24       completed --

          25   Q.  No, quite.




           1   A.  -- which is why I've made a note which says "Found gun".

           2   Q.  That's fair enough.  So just moving on in her note, you

           3       see, she talks about a "CO19 officer shot" and "another

           4       by accident" -- "by another CO19 officer"; do you see

           5       that?

           6   A.  Yes, I can see that, yes.

           7   Q.  Were you told that then by Fiona Mallon as a result of

           8       what the CIO (sic) was saying?

           9   A.  Yes, I was, because I believe that that is the same --

          10       the conversation on that page there is the one that I've

          11       recorded at 6.24 where I've written:

          12           "CO19 shot by accident."

          13   Q.  Well, that could mean anything because it could be shot

          14       by someone else.

          15   A.  Sir, I wouldn't be writing down "shot by accident" if it

          16       referred to a police officer being shot by anyone else

          17       but a police officer.

          18   Q.  Is that your reading of it, is it?

          19   A.  I wrote it and that's what I mean by it, sir.

          20   Q.  I see.  At that stage, in your note, 6.24, there's no

          21       suggestion so far that Duggan fired any shots, is there?

          22   A.  Not that anyone has made reference to -- referred to me,

          23       no.

          24   Q.  I appreciate you are not there, this is just how the

          25       scene is being described at different times.




           1           Going back to Fiona Mallon's note, she's written

           2       this as well:

           3           "Apparently MD came towards officers firing."

           4           Do you see that?

           5   A.  Yes, I can see that, yes.

           6   Q.  Did she ever tell you that that's what she'd been told?

           7   A.  I've got no record of that.  If she had told me that at

           8       the time I would have made a note, though equally the

           9       conversations that Fiona was having on the phone, some

          10       of them were quite lengthy and, as you can see, I've

          11       probably made two or three entries.

          12   Q.  Just pause for a moment.  Getting an accurate picture of

          13       what happened is extremely important, isn't it?

          14   A.  It is, sir, yes.

          15   Q.  Because you're going to have to face, or someone on

          16       behalf of Trident, is going to have to face the press,

          17       the media, the family, the community, so you need to be

          18       careful, don't you --

          19   A.  Yes, absolutely.

          20   Q.  -- about what's going to be said?  You don't have any

          21       record at this point of being told that Mark Duggan came

          22       towards the officers firing; do you remember being told

          23       that?

          24   A.  No -- the only thing that I have is --

          25   Q.  We are coming to that, the next entry.




           1   A.  Yes, 6.50, that's --

           2   Q.  But do you have any note -- sorry, you don't have any

           3       record.  Do you remember being told that Mark Duggan

           4       came towards officers firing?

           5   A.  I don't personally, no.

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I think you just said that if you

           7       had been told that you would have noted it down.

           8   A.  Absolutely, sir.  That's quite a significant bit of

           9       information if it had been relayed to me and I would

          10       have recorded it down so, as I say, the conversations

          11       that Fiona Mallon was having on the phone were -- some

          12       were longer than others, and I've made a very

          13       abbreviated note of what I viewed at that point of time

          14       in my mind as the significant piece of information and,

          15       as you say, sir, that would have been exceptionally

          16       significant for me.

          17   Q.  Exceptionally significant.  We have all seen Fiona

          18       Mallon and I hope she does not mind if I say in her

          19       absence that she is not an officer given to flights of

          20       fancy, is she?

          21   A.  No, Fiona Mallon, I have to say, sir, was one of the

          22       best Superintendents that worked for me.

          23   Q.  Exactly.  If we just move on to your note at 10 --

          24       roughly, I am not keeping you to times.  This is

          25       probably in the car, I think you said, on the way to the




           1       scene.  So we are back to your note at the bottom of the

           2       page where Mr Elliott is mentioned in this conversation.

           3       But this is again the Tactical Firearms Officer.

           4           Now, it may be an oversight, and I just want to

           5       check whether that's the case, could you just see in

           6       this note that you talk about:

           7           "MD out of car -- gun to officer."

           8           Is that what it says?

           9   A.  It does say that, yes, sir, "gun to officer".

          10   Q.  Could we just have a look at your statement explaining

          11       these notes, which was dated 3 August last year.  It's

          12       the -- sorry, the page number is 5 of the statement but

          13       I haven't got the -- sorry --

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  833.

          15   MR MANSFIELD:  833, sorry, my fault.  This is a page -- do

          16       you see "I then spoke" should be at the top.  Do you

          17       have that?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  The previous page indicates this is what you're speaking

          20       about.  The second paragraph "At Ferry Lane"; do you

          21       have that --

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  -- on there?

          24   A.  Yes, sir, yes.

          25   Q.  "... informed me that CO19 officers had stopped the cab




           1       contained Mark Duggan.  Mark Duggan had come out of the

           2       car and believed to have moved towards an officer,

           3       although the actual circumstances were not known.

           4       A CO19 officer had then shot Mark Duggan and a further

           5       CO19 officer had been shot, Z51 did not know whether

           6       this officer had been shot by an armed police officer or

           7       by Mark Duggan."

           8           First of all, that paragraph doesn't mention a "gun

           9       to the officer"; is that just an oversight?

          10   A.  No, sir.  If you can see, that paragraph refers to when

          11       I've arrived at the scene, so that's at Ferry Lane,

          12       Tottenham, Z51 is speaking to me, whereas at 1850 that

          13       is a phone conversation I am having with Z51.

          14   Q.  Then we'll have to go back to the previous page.  The

          15       previous page, which will be 832:

          16           "At 1850 I was informed that Inspector Elliott was

          17       in attendance at the scene.  I then spoke with Z51

          18       direct."

          19           So we go straight back over the page.  So what I'm

          20       suggesting to you there is that it looks as though, in

          21       the statement, you're dealing with the telephone

          22       conversation because it's on 834, the following page,

          23       that you deal with the arrival at Ferry Lane and talking

          24       to Z51?

          25   A.  Sorry, sir, when you posed the question, I thought you




           1       were referring to the second paragraph on that page but

           2       you're right, the first paragraph would be about myself

           3       speaking to Z51 on the telephone.

           4   Q.  Yes.  All right.  Just going to -- what I want to try to

           5       do is marry up what you've written down in your notes

           6       with what is in your statement.  So we'll take it

           7       a little more slowly.  Page 833:

           8           "I then spoke with Z51."

           9           That is a telephone conversation, is it?

          10   A.  That's correct, that's the phone conversation which

          11       I have noted at 6.50 pm.

          12   Q.  Right.

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The second paragraph, you think, is

          14       when you are at Ferry Lane?

          15   A.  That's correct, sir.  As you see, I've introduced it at

          16       Ferry Lane Tottenham and Z51 informed me.  So my --

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Further on, I do not want you to --

          18       because you are looking at a screen but, in fact, your

          19       statement later on goes back to telephone calls at 1915

          20       and over the page you come to 7.30 and you say "At 7.30

          21       I arrived at Ferry Lane".  So I do not want you to be

          22       misled by the way that the structure of your statement

          23       would seem to indicate that you haven't arrived at Ferry

          24       Lane yet, if you are going through it in chronological

          25       order.




           1   A.  Sir, if you take it in chronological order, no, but my

           2       statement isn't completely written chronologically, so

           3       that paragraph there -- in my statement I have basically

           4       written it as a -- the information as I was finally made

           5       aware -- so there is a series of phone calls and then

           6       I speak to Z51 direct when I arrive at Ferry Lane.

           7   MR MANSFIELD:  That's why I have gone slowly because I don't

           8       want any misunderstandings.

           9           The note that you have, at 6.50, is a note of

          10       a telephone conversation, is it?

          11   A.  It is, yes.

          12   Q.  Then if you look at the statement, where is the note

          13       reflected in the statement?

          14   A.  Well, it's evident.  It's is not referred to directly in

          15       there.

          16   Q.  No.

          17   A.  Well, I mean the phone call  is because I have introduced

          18       the first paragraph.

          19   Q.  Yes, but the detail isn't?

          20   A.  Not that specific detail there, no.

          21   Q.  No.  So the statement then, at the Ferry Lane Tottenham

          22       Z51, isn't part of the phone call  but is part of what you

          23       were told at the scene?

          24   A.  It's the totality of the information that's been relayed

          25       to me when I'm at the scene.




           1   Q.  Yes, well look at the paragraph there.  Is there any

           2       mention there, or in the previous one for that matter,

           3       that Duggan had or was in -- moved towards an officer

           4       with a gun, was pointing a gun?

           5   A.  There is nothing in my statement and nothing that I was

           6       ever told that Mark Duggan had moved to an officer with

           7       a gun; it was "moved towards an officer".

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Nothing you were ever told of Mark

           9       Duggan with a gun moving towards?

          10   A.  Sir, considering the sort of time since the incident to

          11       date, clearly, you know, a lot of people have spoken to

          12       me over time and when I was at the scene speaking, my

          13       recollection would be, with Brian Elliott, the CO19

          14       Inspector, I was informed that an arm had been raised

          15       with a gun -- as in Mark Duggan's arm -- with a gun in

          16       his hand.

          17   MR MANSFIELD:  Who told you that?

          18   A.  So that would have been Brian Elliott, the CO19

          19       Inspector.

          20   Q.  Is there a note of that?

          21   A.  No, I haven't made a note of that, sir, no.  There's

          22       quite a few things I have not made a note --

          23   Q.  I am only concentrating not on peripheral matters but

          24       fundamental matters.

          25   A.  My view on that is, fundamentally, I would not be able




           1       to give any evidence of what Mark Duggan had or hadn't

           2       done, that would be the evidence of those that were

           3       directly involved.

           4   Q.  Yes, that is for the purposes of any hearing but for the

           5       purposes of any public -- can I just pause for a moment?

           6           This area of London -- like many others, I have no

           7       doubt -- this area is an area that's sensitive with

           8       regard to community relations and police black community

           9       relations; it's a sensitive area, isn't it?

          10   A.  Yes, that's correct.  Haringey is a borough -- indeed

          11       from a Trident perspective, was one of the key boroughs

          12       we had lots of dealings with, both in terms of police

          13       action but also in terms of engagement with the

          14       community.

          15   Q.  The one thing you don't want to do, because you are

          16       going to have to say something to the public about what

          17       has happened, is it's extremely important to get it

          18       right, isn't it?

          19   A.  Absolutely.  But clearly this is already an IPCC

          20       investigation and I knew that I would not be saying

          21       anything to the public, anything to the communities of

          22       Tottenham, that wasn't agreed with the IPCC.  Hence, in

          23       terms of any factual elements that were put out, I know

          24       from my own personal experience, and indeed speaking

          25       with the IPCC in this set of circumstances, unless




           1       something was known, it wouldn't be shared with -- it

           2       wouldn't be shared with the public, whether it was

           3       through a media release or indeed through direct

           4       community interaction with the police.

           5   Q.  We'll come to what was said, in fact, in stages, and

           6       what was being thought about.

           7           This note you have, going back to that, if you

           8       wouldn't mind, the statement doesn't say anything about

           9       a gun in Mark Duggan's -- at this point.  So back to

          10       your notes, please.  So it says -- I am just dealing

          11       with the part:

          12           "MD [Mark Duggan] out of car."

          13           You read this note -- not in your statement, but

          14       this is what you've got here, does it say "gun to

          15       officer"?

          16   A.  It does, I said "gun to officer" and then in brackets,

          17       "(circs not known)", circumstances not known.

          18   Q.  This isn't a case of you not wanting to know, this is

          19       a case of you wanting to know and trying to get to the

          20       bottom of it as far as you can, isn't it?

          21   A.  Yes, certainly.  So speaking to Z51, the Tactical

          22       Firearms Commander, I'm trying to establish so I know

          23       what it is that we believe has actually occurred, so

          24       I can ensure that, as I have already discussed

          25       an appropriate response to it.




           1   Q.  I understand that.  Did you ask Z51 at the scene, since

           2       this part of the note seems to relate to what you were

           3       told at the scene -- so did you ask Z51 about that

           4       aspect of it:

           5           "MD gun to officer."

           6           Did you ask about that?

           7   A.  Sorry, sir, you conflated that with me being at the

           8       scene, are you on about during phone conversation?

           9   Q.  Oh, it was in the phone conversation?

          10   A.  So as is shown, this is a phone conversation at 6.50 pm,

          11       I don't arrive at the scene until 7.30 pm.

          12   Q.  All right.  Just continuing with the phone conversation.

          13       The phone conversation ends with the possibility that

          14       Mark Duggan actually did shoot a weapon, doesn't it?

          15   A.  You'll see I've concluded it with:

          16           "CO19 officer shot -- not known if by CO19 or Mark

          17       Duggan."

          18   Q.  Yes, it concludes with the possibility that Mark Duggan

          19       discharged a firearm, doesn't it?

          20   A.  Yes, but it also concludes with the possibility that it

          21       was an armed officer that shot their colleague.

          22   Q.  Of course.  Coming to what you said just moments ago to

          23       counsel for the Coroner, do you remember moments ago,

          24       about your understanding -- that's why I want to follow

          25       this through.




           1           The first indication you get is, from Z51's

           2       understanding, that he's not clear whether it is in fact

           3       by a CO19 officer or Mark Duggan.

           4   A.  Sorry, sir, is your question when Z51 first wasn't sure

           5       or when I was --

           6   Q.  No.  When you noted down the conversation with Z51, this

           7       is what he's telling you: unclear, unknown, whether it's

           8       a CO19 officer or Mark Duggan, correct?

           9   A.  Sir, yes, so that's the first time that I've been made

          10       aware that actually this might not have been

          11       an accidental shooting by police.  Previous phone calls

          12       have always referred to "The officer was accidentally

          13       shot by one of their colleagues".

          14   Q.  So that's an extremely important possibility, isn't it?

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  Now, before we leave this page, how would the earlier

          17       reference to two firearms have been intelligence

          18       sensitive that you had to redact it?

          19   A.  I was made aware of what intelligence could be

          20       disclosed.  That wasn't in the original provision of

          21       that intelligence, hence it was redacted in consultation

          22       with the Met's Directorate of Professional Standards as

          23       to what would go through in that first redacted version

          24       which subsequently changed, as we know.

          25   Q.  So somebody is telling you to redact it, are they?




           1   A.  No, I've been -- so I've made the decision as to what

           2       needs to be redacted, on the basis of I was shown the

           3       intelligence that was provided to the police, which

           4       I didn't have on the day, and neither would I do in

           5       an operation such as this.  So it's subsequently, when

           6       requested to provide my notes in a redacted format,

           7       I have requested, "So what is the intelligence that was

           8       given to the police operational team", and then made my

           9       appropriate redaction accordingly.

          10   Q.  That's, if I may say so, completely erroneous, isn't it?

          11       You are not supposed to redact because you have shown

          12       some other document which doesn't include two firearms

          13       so you conclude you have to redact it.

          14   A.  Sir, if I may --

          15   Q.  Sorry, I'm being -- did the intelligence you were given

          16       indicate two firearms?

          17   A.  The invitation -- the intelligence I was subsequently

          18       shown: is that the question?

          19   Q.  Yes.

          20   A.  No, it didn't state two firearms, no.

          21   Q.  How did you come to the conclusion -- are you quite sure

          22       about that?

          23   A.  As sure as I can be, yes.

          24   Q.  All right.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Might this be a moment that we can




           1       have a pause and scratch our heads about this?

           2   MR MANSFIELD:  Yes, there is something I want to raise

           3       anyway.  It might be a convenient time.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It might be a convenient moment.

           5           Members of the jury, we'll have our mid-morning

           6       break at this point, so I'll ask for the cameras to be

           7       turned off.

           8           Thank you very much.  If you [the witness] just

           9       remain there for the moment.



          25   (11.47 am)

           1                         (A short break)

           2   (12.02 pm)



          12                  (In the presence of the jury)

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  The jury are

          14       now in and settled.

          15           Mr Cundy you are still under the oath you took,

          16       obviously, at the beginning of your evidence and

          17       Mr Mansfield is still asking you questions.

          18   MR MANSFIELD:  I am going to move from the question of

          19       intelligence for the moment and just continue in the

          20       chronology.  We have gone through the note you made at

          21       6.50, about a conversation on the telephone with Z51,

          22       ending with the possibility of Mark Duggan discharging

          23       a firearm.

          24           Now, on the note -- we are now on the next page,

          25       please, if it can come up at the top, 6.20.  I think




           1       it's at the top, is it -- I'm so sorry, not 6.20.  1915,

           2       and so on.  You arrive at the scene in fact at about

           3       7.30; is that right?

           4   A.  That's correct, yes.

           5   Q.  You then do have a conversation with Z51, he's there.

           6   A.  That's correct, yes.

           7   Q.  One of the questions that must have been concerning you

           8       is whether in fact -- one of them, there may be

           9       a number -- was whether Mark Duggan had a firearm which

          10       he fired at police, even if he shot an officer by

          11       accident, how it was going to be put.  You were

          12       interested in that, weren't you?

          13   A.  That wasn't a question that I put to Z51 in that way --

          14   Q.  Sorry, take it in stages.  You were interested in that?

          15   A.  Well, I was interested to establish what the

          16       circumstances were and, as you say, that would have been

          17       a possibility.  So therefore, yes, I would have been.

          18   Q.  If you are going to talk -- not you personally -- if you

          19       are going to talk to family liaison officers and you are

          20       going to have them talking to the family or the press,

          21       you need to be clear, if you can be, about whether the

          22       person who's been shot dead, in a sensitive area of

          23       London, had a gun which he was firing at police or not,

          24       if you can establish that; that would be important,

          25       wouldn't it?




           1   A.  Certainly establishing if Mark Duggan had a gun or not

           2       was clearly very important.

           3   Q.  Very important, and firing at police would be very

           4       important, wouldn't it?

           5   A.  Yes, if that had been the case it would have been

           6       important, yes.

           7   Q.  You know, everybody knows now, what the press were

           8       saying the next day, in fact that night.  You know what

           9       they were saying, don't you?

          10   A.  I don't recall any press on that night saying there was

          11       exchange of fire but I might be mistaken on that.

          12   Q.  All right, early hours of the next morning?

          13   A.  Again, perhaps if I can assist on that.  Certainly, in

          14       my mind that night when I left, in the early hours of

          15       the morning, there was nothing in my mind that suggested

          16       that Mark Duggan had shot at police.

          17   Q.  Well --

          18   A.  The first time, subsequent to that, that it was sort of

          19       raised as an issue was in a Gold group the following

          20       morning at Scotland Yard when the IPCC within that Gold

          21       group posed a question to myself and Martin Hewitt, who

          22       was chairing the meeting, as to who would investigate

          23       the attempted murder on the police officer, which was

          24       quite a surprise for me because, in my mind, this was

          25       an officer who had been shot by accident.




           1   Q.  But had you clarified -- leaving aside what happened the

           2       following morning with the IPCC -- once you got to the

           3       scene, at 7.30, roughly speaking, you speak to Z51, who

           4       was at the scene all the time, wasn't he: he's in the

           5       control car, he gets out of the control car, he's there?

           6   A.  Z51 was present.

           7   Q.  Did you ask him basic questions: "First of all, Z51, did

           8       you see a gun in Mark Duggan's possession?"  Did you ask

           9       him that?

          10   A.  I didn't ask him that specific question, no.  My

          11       question was -- I would not give him a leading

          12       question -- it would be "Z51, can you tell me what

          13       happened?" and then he relays the account as he knew it.

          14   Q.  Where is the note of the account was that he gave?

          15   A.  I have not made a note of that, on the basis that -- my

          16       role in there, it would be not to -- sorry, sir, you

          17       were about to say something.

          18   Q.  I know what your role is and I don't want to interrupt.

          19       There is no note, on the page we were just looking at,

          20       of what you were told by Z51 that the circumstances

          21       were, when you got to the scene, is there?

          22   A.  No, there isn't, no.

          23   Q.  No.  Why not?

          24   A.  As I was about to explain, my role when I'm there --

          25       I am not leading the investigation into the shooting.




           1       The exact circumstances would now follow through the

           2       IPCC investigation.  Therefore -- and the nature of

           3       a situation like this, where there is so much happening,

           4       myself getting a direct involvement like that and

           5       writing something down for exactly the reason we are

           6       going through now, would just add confusion to it when

           7       I don't have an individual role within that independent

           8       investigation.

           9   Q.  I'm sorry, officer, just to interrupt on this.  We

          10       appreciate there's lots going on.  You have given

          11       a specific role.  One of your specific roles is dealing

          12       with the community and ensuring that the community are

          13       not wrongfully informed; that's very important, isn't

          14       it?

          15   A.  Absolutely.

          16   Q.  Right.  So one of the functions would be to ensure you

          17       keep a note of exactly what it is officers on the scene

          18       say happened; that's important, isn't it?

          19   A.  It would be but what I would be getting from Z51 would

          20       not be direct from the officers involved.

          21   Q.  He was involved: he's in charge, he's in the control car

          22       out, he gets out on the pavement.

          23   A.  Z51 was not one of the armed officers involved in the

          24       actual incident itself.  Z51 was behind the incident,

          25       which I would -- that's the whole point of the control




           1       car, they are not part of the actual stop itself.

           2       Therefore Z51 was telling me what they had been told by

           3       others, which would mean, at least, it was second-hand,

           4       if not third or fourth-hand.  Therefore, to me, that is

           5       not accurate information, that is what would come

           6       through an investigation.

           7           In terms of ensuring the community were made aware

           8       of what had gone on, I certainly would never go into the

           9       details of what had or hadn't happened because it would

          10       take some time to establish that.  That's why there's no

          11       note in terms of the -- the value a note would add there

          12       would be very little and I am not conducting that

          13       investigation.

          14   Q.  But you have made a note of telephone conversations,

          15       haven't you?

          16   A.  Absolutely, because this is a note for me before I get

          17       there so I can understand what I'm likely to be facing

          18       and, as I said earlier, phone conversations with Martin

          19       Hewitt, who was at Scotland Yard, to inform him what

          20       I was getting told.  By the time I arrived there,

          21       Detective -- the DPS, Directorate of Professional

          22       Standards, are already en route and, at that point in

          23       time, they are the liaison with the IPCC, not myself

          24       direct.

          25   Q.  You had gone there because you are in charge of Trident,




           1       you have a responsibility as the command officer, you

           2       want to show leadership; all of those points, yes?

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  So the one command leadership important facet would be

           5       I must establish what my officers, if I can, have done,

           6       in case my senior officers ask me?

           7   A.  Yes.  But if I were to do that, sir, I would be taking

           8       a role of -- within the post-incident procedures which

           9       I don't have a role in.  That's what is done through the

          10       Post-Incident Managers, in conjunction with the IPCC, to

          11       get those accounts from the officers direct.  I would

          12       only ever be getting it from at least second or possibly

          13       third or fourth-hand.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I thought part of your role was to

          15       help secure additional evidence through witnesses who

          16       may be available, you gave an example that the taxi

          17       driver was still at the scene when you were there.

          18   A.  Yes, that's correct.  As you say, sir, if there were

          19       things that were made aware to me -- so if there was

          20       another witness, aside from the minicab driver, that had

          21       been identified, then I would have ensured through

          22       officers present or indeed bringing other officers to

          23       the scene that they would take control of that witness

          24       with a view to obtaining evidence from them.  That

          25       situation didn't arise.  The only witness I was made




           1       aware of was the minicab driver at the scene.

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You were not made aware of any other

           3       witnesses?

           4   A.  Not when I was at the scene, no.

           5   MR MANSFIELD:  So it comes to this, does it, that, so far as

           6       the question of Mark Duggan firing a gun, which you had

           7       been led to believe was a possibility, you never asked

           8       a single question about that; is that right?

           9   A.  No, that's not what I said.  What I said is I didn't ask

          10       any leading questions.  I have asked Z51 to appraise me,

          11       and indeed spoke to Inspector Brian Elliott from CO19,

          12       to let me know the circumstances of that as they knew

          13       it --

          14   Q.  Yes?

          15   A.  -- which enables them to tell me if there was any

          16       evidence that they had, in terms of this is

          17       a possibility of Mark Duggan firing a gun, and no one,

          18       no one, said to me that Mark Duggan had fired a gun.

          19       Whilst it was a possibility, that wasn't what my

          20       understanding was going to be, which we were faced with

          21       at that point in time.  Everything suggested, speaking

          22       to the officers involved here -- as I mentioned, Chief

          23       Superintendent Alistair Sutherland, who was head of CO19

          24       at that time, we all believed that the officer had been

          25       shot following a ricochet from the officer who had fired




           1       the gun.

           2   Q.  You see, I just want to put it to you: as early as 6.45

           3       that night, before you ever arrived there, this

           4       possibility that he, Mark Duggan, had fired at officers,

           5       was being suggested between officers.  I will give you

           6       precisely whom: DCI Steve Williams; do you know him?

           7   A.  Steve Williams: I think he would be from Professional

           8       Standards.

           9   Q.  Yes.  He is telling, it would appear, DI Suggett -- you

          10       know him?

          11   A.  Yes, I mentioned I spoke to Peter Suggett on the phone.

          12   Q.  Did Mr Suggett ever say to you, "Look, the suggestion

          13       is, and I have it from DCI Steve Williams, that Mark

          14       Duggan had shot at the officers"?

          15   A.  No, he's never said that to me.

          16   Q.  Never said that to you?

          17   A.  No.

          18   Q.  I want to go just a little bit further with what you

          19       understood.  Did you -- if you understood, therefore,

          20       and it was your belief that he hadn't fired, but it was

          21       your belief he had a gun as he exited the van -- the

          22       minicab, sorry -- that was your belief?

          23   A.  That was my belief, yes.

          24   Q.  Yes.  So you must have asked early on about where the

          25       gun was?




           1   A.  Well, again, when I spoke to Z51 on arrival at the

           2       scene, they told me there and then that a gun had been

           3       found, pointed to where it was on the grass and we

           4       referred to that on the map earlier.  So I was told when

           5       I arrived that a gun had been recovered, and indeed

           6       we've seen Fiona Mallon's notes which talks about a gun

           7       found and the note I have made at 6.24 pm, which was the

           8       phone call  from the SIO, Mick Foote, to Fiona Mallon

           9       about a gun being found, so I knew a gun had been found.

          10   Q.  You knew a gun had been found.  By the time he got there

          11       you knew pretty well where it had been found?

          12   A.  I was -- it was pointed out to me where it was

          13       recovered, yes.

          14   Q.  So it must have crossed your mind, if he had got out of

          15       a cab with a gun and was shot almost immediately but

          16       fairly soon after he gets out, how has the gun got over

          17       there?

          18   A.  That's crossed my mind at the time and on many occasions

          19       since, that's absolutely right, yes.

          20   Q.  Did you ask any questions about that?

          21   A.  This will be from recollection, sir, I probably would

          22       have done, yes, as to how it got there.  As you heard

          23       earlier, I physically went and saw the gun myself.  I am

          24       no scientist when it comes to things but I have my own

          25       hypothesis as to how a gun might have got there.




           1   Q.  Did you start actually communicating that hypothesis

           2       that night?

           3   A.  To anyone in particular, sir, or to anyone?

           4   Q.  Yes, I'll come to who in particular.  Did you start

           5       communicating your hypothesis about how the gun got over

           6       the fence?

           7   A.  I would have had a discussion with a few people as to

           8       how it got there but, again, it's a hypothesis, it's

           9       conjecture.  It's not evidence.  That would come from

          10       the IPCC investigation.

          11   Q.  Were you prepared that night to communicate the

          12       hypothesis to other police officers?

          13   A.  Sorry, sir, could you -- would I?

          14   Q.  Were you that night, having seen where the gun ended up,

          15       prepared to tell other police officers what your

          16       hypothesis was?

          17   A.  Yes, I -- as a Senior Investigating Officer myself, in

          18       terms of how a scene looks in terms of an initial

          19       interpretation of it, I would have discussed that with

          20       people, yes.

          21   Q.  Yes.  What did you tell them that night?

          22   A.  I don't know who we are referring to, but one of my

          23       views has always been if Mark Duggan had been pointing

          24       a gun at a police officer, or indeed if Mark Duggan was

          25       coming out of a cab with the intention of throwing the




           1       firearm away, I think -- this is my view.  Again, it's

           2       not based on evidence -- perhaps if I could describe as

           3       I go along?

           4   Q.  No, do, because I'm going to ask you --

           5   A.  So if Mark Duggan was coming out of a minicab with the

           6       intention of throwing a gun, I think an arm going like

           7       that (indicates) with a gun in his hand could be

           8       interpreted by the officer that he's facing as a gun

           9       being pointed at them, and the nature of moving your arm

          10       to throw a gun, and then I know subsequently -- I

          11       obviously didn't know on the night -- that Mark Duggan

          12       had been shot in the arm, I have a view that the

          13       momentum of that could have carried a gun over the fence

          14       or the wall or whatever it was.

          15   Q.  Nobody of course that you spoke to ever said they saw

          16       such a thing, did they?

          17   A.  I didn't speak to any individual officers who --

          18   Q.  I appreciate that.  Given the way round you are doing

          19       it -- you are asking for explanations of

          20       circumstances -- no officer at the scene that you spoke

          21       to asking for a description of what had happened said

          22       anything to that effect, did they?

          23   A.  No, no officer did.  As I say, this was my own -- it's

          24       a hypothesis, it's simply conjecture.  No officer

          25       involved has ever said that to me.  In my mind, I've




           1       been trying to understand what are the different

           2       scenarios whereby a gun could get there.

           3   Q.  Yes.  It's one thing to internally conjecture, it's

           4       quite another to start perpetrating that as the way the

           5       gun got over the fence, isn't it?

           6   A.  You're absolutely right, which is why I never have

           7       perpetrated that, as to why the gun got over the fence.

           8   Q.  I want you to see a document, please -- just before we

           9       get to it, have a look at your note of that day.  You

          10       had a briefing with Family Liaison Officers, did you

          11       not?

          12   A.  Are we talking at the scene, sir?

          13   Q.  I don't know where you conducted it --

          14   A.  Yes, yes.  So this was the two Family Liaison Officers

          15       from DPS, from Professional Standards, who arrived some

          16       time after myself.

          17   Q.  What you actually said to the Family Liaison Officers

          18       isn't in your notes, is it?

          19   A.  No, it's not, no.

          20   Q.  I am going to suggest that a note was kept of a briefing

          21       that you provided at 2100 hours on the 4th.  So is that

          22       roughly right, the time, 9 o'clock on the 4th?  Roughly.

          23   A.  It could well have -- I am trying to see from my notes

          24       whether I've indicated when the Family Liaison Officers

          25       arrived.  I think they would have arrived before




           1       9 o'clock, so that would have been about right, yes.

           2   Q.  It's in that context, therefore, would you have a look

           3       at 5121, please.  This is a note kept by someone who

           4       attended the briefing, or at least was able to write

           5       down the briefing.  You see your name is at the top

           6       there?

           7   A.  Yes.  That's correct, yes.

           8   Q.  And a time and a date; do you see that?

           9   A.  Yes, 2100 hours on 4 August.

          10   Q.  I will just read this, if I may, because the jury have

          11       not seen this one before:

          12           "Operation Trident officers were holding a briefing

          13       regarding a preplanned operation.  During the briefing

          14       'hot' intelligence was passed stating that one nominal

          15       called Mark Duggan was on the move in possession of

          16       a handgun.  The briefing was stopped and officers were

          17       deployed to stop the subject.

          18           "A decision was made to stop the subject at the

          19       first safe opportunity, which was on Ferry Lane.  A hard

          20       stop was made on a minicab carrying Duggan and shots

          21       were fired.  A gun being carried by Duggan was thrown

          22       away from the stop site to a green area close by.  One

          23       officer was shot with a bullet lodged in his PR, no

          24       serious injury."

          25           Then over the page it goes on:




           1           "Duggan was dead at the scene."

           2           Then there's a diagram of the family there, which

           3       I am not going to read out.  Is that what you were

           4       saying that night?

           5   A.  No, I've never said that.  As I said earlier, this was

           6       conjecture of mine.  I have never said that Mark Duggan

           7       threw the gun over the fence.

           8   Q.  I would like you to explain how this officer, his name

           9       is DC Manse, how he came to read your thoughts?

          10   A.  Well, as I said, I would anticipate that within this

          11       I've given a view as to how the gun might have got over

          12       there --

          13   Q.  You have?

          14   A.  As I said earlier, I discussed it with a number of

          15       people, then and subsequently.

          16   Q.  Did you make clear, "This is just a theory, I really

          17       don't know"; did you say that?

          18   A.  Absolutely right.

          19   Q.  No, did you?

          20   A.  Yes.  Absolutely right, I would have done.

          21   Q.  So anybody listening would say, "You can discount that,

          22       that's just what he thinks happened"?

          23   A.  I would not say they would automatically think they

          24       would discount it.  Equally, anybody who was present

          25       there who knew the gun was found a distance away from




           1       Mark Duggan -- and we know, you know -- whether it's

           2       police officers or other witnesses will try and fill in

           3       gaps.

           4           Now, whether that has occurred in this situation,

           5       I cannot say.  But I have never said, and certainly

           6       didn't say to that officer or another, that Mark Duggan

           7       threw a gun.

           8   Q.  I would like you to look at another statement, this time

           9       Mr Suggett, who you've mentioned already.  This is

          10       a statement he made in 2011, in September.  The page

          11       number is CS584.

          12           Now, so you have the full picture rather than --

          13       this is his -- a recollection of a meeting, or several

          14       meetings, on Thursday 4 August.  That's what he's

          15       dealing with.  Do you see the paragraph: "Upon my

          16       arrival at the scene ..."

          17   A.  Yes, I can see that, yes.

          18   Q.  You can see that enlarged:

          19           " ... at 9.25 pm I met with the duty officer ...

          20       Caroline Saunders [you have mentioned her already], who

          21       gave me an overview of what had happened and explained

          22       to me what action she had taken to deal with the scene.

          23       I also received a briefing from the crime scene manager

          24       in relation to forensic issues concerning the scene, and

          25       I was then present at a briefing from Detective Chief




           1       Superintendent Stuart Cundy about the SCD8 operation,

           2       which had culminated in the shooting of Mark Duggan."

           3           So that's the context:

           4           "During one of these briefings ..."

           5           I want to pause there.  Two of them are really about

           6       the scene and one of them, that's yours, is about the

           7       circumstances of the shooting, is it not?

           8   A.  Sorry, sir, I've never seen this statement before.

           9   Q.  "During one of the briefings I believe I was told that

          10       following the shooting of Mark Duggan, CO19 officers had

          11       apparently thrown a firearm found in his possession over

          12       a fence so that it was out of his reach and he would no

          13       longer pose a threat ..."

          14           Did you say anything like that?

          15   A.  No, I didn't.

          16   Q.  Did you hear any other officer suggest anything like

          17       that?

          18   A.  I have never heard anyone suggest that a CO19 officer

          19       threw the firearm over the fence.

          20   Q.  I think you have accepted it's one thing for police

          21       officers at the scene to conjecture things, it's quite

          22       another for anything like that to be put about as

          23       a statement of fact, isn't it?

          24   A.  It would be quite different, yes, which is -- on this

          25       statement, I think Peter Suggett has introduced it as




           1       something he says "I believe I was briefed on this".

           2   Q.  He's coming to give evidence, we'll ask him a little

           3       more.

           4           Can I just go back again.  So that's dealing with

           5       the gun itself.  Of course, you had been led to believe

           6       that Duggan had gone to collect two firearms?

           7   A.  Well, that was -- when I received that phone call  at

           8       6.26, I was told of intelligence that he was in a cab to

           9       collect two firearms, yes.

          10   Q.  Yes, quite.  You have already accepted that's important.

          11       So I just want to ask you: once you get to the scene,

          12       one of the burning questions, I suggest, or at least

          13       ask, generally, is as to, "Have you searched for the

          14       second weapon?"

          15   A.  Well, as I said earlier, when I got there, in my mind,

          16       people -- people -- the officers at the scene via Z51

          17       have only ever talked about a single firearm.  Now the

          18       scene was basically in lock down, in terms of vehicles

          19       are still present, apart from police officers have left

          20       before my arrival who were directly involved.  The scene

          21       is now secured, which will enable a full and proper

          22       search to be undertaken.  So if there was another

          23       firearm, or indeed anything else, it could then be

          24       discovered and properly recovered.

          25   Q.  Sorry, the question was: did you ask anyone, as a senior




           1       officer, although you have delegated authority for the

           2       scene to the Tactical Firearms Commander, did you ask

           3       anybody, "Did you find a second weapon"?

           4   A.  Do you know, I don't think I did ask that question on

           5       the basis of -- what I was told at the scene was only

           6       one firearm had been seen, and that didn't mean to say

           7       that there might be another firearm in the car itself,

           8       but the car was now secured and therefore would be

           9       searched.

          10   Q.  Did you ask anyone whether they had looked in the

          11       minicab?

          12   A.  For a second firearm?

          13   Q.  Was that said?

          14   A.  No.  As I said, I don't believe I did ask anybody that.

          15   Q.  Did you look yourself in the minicab?

          16   A.  I never went anywhere near the minicab, sir, no.

          17   Q.  Right.  At the time you saw it, the door was open?

          18   A.  I don't recall.  I assume it would have been open,

          19       I don't know.

          20   Q.  So you didn't even get near enough to note whether the

          21       door was open or shut or anything?

          22   A.  I was within the outer cordon, never went into the scene

          23       by the minicab itself, on the basis that that is now

          24       secured, it has an officer in that inner cordon so

          25       no one can get in or out that isn't entitled to.




           1           As to the nature of what the minicab looked like,

           2       I'm sorry, sir, I don't personally recall.  My

           3       assumption would be it would be recorded by those that

           4       were managing the scene, which we've referred to

           5       earlier.

           6   Q.  I want to come on, finally, to the last stage of this.

           7       You are at New Scotland Yard the next day, and by then

           8       it is clear that the public allegation being made is

           9       that Duggan did discharge firearms and there was an

          10       exchange of fire, is how it was described in various

          11       reports (?), wasn't it?

          12   A.  As I say, I don't recall it being public discussion,

          13       although of course I may be wrong on that --

          14   Q.  In the newspapers.

          15   A.  I don't recall it the following morning about

          16       Mark Duggan --

          17   Q.  When did you recall it?

          18   A.  I think it was after that meeting because, as I was

          19       saying earlier, it was the surprise for me in that first

          20       Gold group, which was the following morning at Scotland

          21       Yard, when the IPCC representative made the request of

          22       the Metropolitan Police as to "who will investigate the

          23       attempted murder of the police officer".

          24           In my mind, there was no attempted murder because

          25       I was of the understanding that this was an accidental




           1       shooting of a police officer by one of their colleagues.

           2           It was put to us in the meeting that the initial

           3       assessment from the crime scene, whether it was --

           4       I cannot recall whether it was a bullet or the casing

           5       that was recovered, didn't appear consistent with police

           6       issued ammunition and therefore there was a -- again,

           7       this wasn't a final view from the IPCC, but there was

           8       enough doubt there to suggest that actually there might

           9       have been a further shot fired.

          10           So that was the first time I was aware.  I then

          11       noticed -- my recollection, sir, would be subsequent to

          12       that there then was the conjecture within the media, but

          13       that was certainly not the view of myself that

          14       Mark Duggan had fired a shot.

          15   Q.  You see, at the scene, the previous night, you had been

          16       anxious -- you have not given the evidence today but

          17       it's in your statement -- you had been anxious with the

          18       community representatives to ensure that the message got

          19       out that Duggan had a gun.  That was something that was

          20       important, wasn't it?

          21   A.  Yes, sir, perhaps if I can clarify that.  So, as the

          22       Head of Trident, I had an independent advisory group

          23       which was dedicated to Trident, drawn from across

          24       London, of individuals.  One of those individuals was

          25       from Haringey borough, who was a member of the




           1       community, who came to the scene at my request to speak

           2       with me.

           3           The view from him was that we, as the police, needed

           4       to get out some factual basis and, if a gun had been

           5       recovered at the scene, it would be important to share

           6       that with the community.

           7           So it is in my statement, again I have not given the

           8       evidence yet here today.  I knew at that point in time

           9       that it wasn't my investigation, this was an IPCC

          10       investigation, and release of information such as that,

          11       which is clearly very important in many respects, would

          12       be a decision for the IPCC.

          13           So I made the request of the IPCC for us to release

          14       that information through Haringey police to their

          15       trusted community contacts so members of the local

          16       community could understand a gun had been recovered.  It

          17       wasn't that that gun was pointed at police or anything

          18       like that, it was simply that a firearm had been

          19       recovered.

          20   Q.  In fact you were not in a position to say that that was

          21       the gun that belonged to -- sorry, was in the possession

          22       of Duggan, were you?

          23   A.  Well, as I have just said, it wasn't that this was a gun

          24       that Mark Duggan had possession of.  It was that a gun

          25       had been recovered at the scene.




           1           To be fair, as you have just said yourself, sir, we

           2       need to be very careful around that because an

           3       investigation would establish whether it was

           4       Mark Duggan's gun or not, and that was something we

           5       definitely didn't know at the night.  But what we could

           6       say was that a firearm had been recovered at the scene.

           7   Q.  Final question: when did you first discover that in fact

           8       the gun had come from the possession of a man called

           9       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster?

          10   A.  In terms of knowledge that he had definitely supplied

          11       it, sir, is that the question?

          12   Q.  When did you first gather, either intelligence or actual

          13       knowledge, whichever of the two, that

          14       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster was in a sense at the centre of

          15       this?

          16   A.  Okay.  In terms of -- it will assist in terms of the

          17       chronology of that.  As the Head of Trident, I would not

          18       be party to, and I wasn't party to, the intelligence

          19       which justified this operation.  That's those who are

          20       managing the operation itself.

          21           The first time the name Kevin Hutchinson-Foster

          22       became known to me was on 12 August when Colin Sparrow,

          23       from the IPCC, requested to meet me and he and one of

          24       his investigators, Gary Lidder, met myself and one of my

          25       Superintendents at Scotland Yard where I was informed




           1       that a forensic examination of the firearm that was

           2       recovered, and the sock that it was in, had established

           3       two DNA profiles based on blood, blood that was found on

           4       the sock and blood that was found on the gun.  I was

           5       told that the blood on the gun; a DNA profile had been

           6       obtained which came back to a male called Ken

           7       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.

           8   Q.  No one before that from within the Dibri operation,

           9       commanded essentially by Trident; no one had said to

          10       you, "Actually, the gun was sourced from a man called

          11       Hutchinson-Foster"?

          12   A.  They have never said that to me as the OCU Commander,

          13       no, and nor would I expect them to.  Trident runs

          14       a number of operations day by day all the way across

          15       London.

          16           My role as the OCU Commander is not to be

          17       individually involved in every single operation.  That's

          18       why we have commanders, so you have already heard from,

          19       in this case, Fiona Mallon, the SFC, and Z51, the

          20       Tactical Firearms Commander.

          21   Q.  I appreciate that, before the event.  Once you have got

          22       the event and a gun is involved, an officer has been

          23       shot, accidentally or whatever, and Duggan is dead, did

          24       you ever ask anyone at that point, back at New Scotland

          25       Yard, back at Trident, wherever you have your




           1       communication, "Where did the gun come from"?

           2   A.  I knew the nature of the intelligence, sir --

           3   Q.  Did you ever ask any questions about that?

           4   A.  I didn't specifically ask it of the individual officers

           5       involved in the operation on the basis I knew of the

           6       source of the intelligence and, therefore, because

           7       I don't have the -- I don't have a particular role

           8       within the operation itself.  They never raised with

           9       me -- and, as I say, nor would I have expected them

          10       to -- that Kevin Hutchinson-Foster, as I now know, was

          11       someone who had supplied the firearm to Mark Duggan.

          12       That became known to me subsequently.

          13   Q.  And stored guns?

          14   A.  Sorry, sir?

          15   Q.  And stored guns.

          16   A.  Well I now know that that was some of the intelligence

          17       that was received.

          18   Q.  When did you discover that intelligence?

          19   A.  That would be some time after the event, you know,

          20       a number of weeks after the event.

          21   Q.  Weeks after?

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   MR MANSFIELD:  Thank you.

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, Mr Thomas?

          25                      Questions by MR THOMAS




           1   MR THOMAS:  Good afternoon, Mr Cundy, just a handful of

           2       questions, if I may.

           3   A.  Sure.

           4   Q.  Can I just clarify one or two things with you in

           5       relation to the evidence that you have given this

           6       morning and the account that you've given in your

           7       witness statement.  Do you have your witness statement

           8       there?  If not, don't worry.

           9   A.  If it's in the binder I can refer to it.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It's not in that bundle, no.  If

          11       there's a passage, we will put it up on screen.

          12   MR THOMAS:  We will call it up on screen.  Can we go to

          13       page 834, that's the witness statement bundle, please.

          14       There we have you arriving at 7.30, as you have said, at

          15       Ferry Lane; do you see that?

          16   A.  Yes, I can see that, yes.

          17   Q.  So in this witness statement you deal with your

          18       discussions with Z51 and then we can see, in the fourth

          19       paragraph, you say "I recall asking Z51", and so it goes

          20       on.

          21   A.  Yes, that's right.

          22   Q.  Can you just help me with this -- we'll come back to the

          23       witness statement in a moment -- when you were making

          24       this witness statement, what did you think the purpose

          25       of this witness statement was?




           1   A.  The purpose of the witness statement was for exactly --

           2       for the purpose of Inquest.

           3   Q.  Yes.  So would I be right in thinking that at the time

           4       you made your witness statement you knew that you would

           5       be questioned, at this Inquest, specifically in relation

           6       to your account, your involvement in the post-incident

           7       stage of the shooting?

           8   A.  Yes, that would be part of the questioning, I would

           9       expect, yes.

          10   Q.  Therefore, would I be also right in thinking that when

          11       you made this witness statement you would have wanted to

          12       have refreshed your memory from any notes that you have

          13       made at the time; would that be fair?

          14   A.  Yes, that's right, and it was based on the notes which

          15       we've covered earlier.

          16   Q.  Well, that's what I want to ask you about.  Can we call

          17       up, please, the notes that you did make at the time,

          18       that's the notes we were looking at this morning.

          19       I have them at CD6171 but I am not sure if mine are the

          20       redacted or unredacted but it doesn't matter.

          21           Can we enlarge those?  Thank you.

          22           The things I would like to ask you about, just

          23       arising from this note are as follows: can we firstly go

          24       to the note that you make towards the bottom of that

          25       page at 6.50 in the evening?  You have already been




           1       asked about these notes but I have one specific question

           2       for you: you say that at 6.50 you are speaking to Z51

           3       direct, correct?

           4   A.  That's correct, yes.

           5   Q.  This is before you arrive at the scene, and I believe

           6       you said you believed this was on the telephone, perhaps

           7       on the way to the scene in the vehicle?

           8   A.  This was definitely on the telephone and my recollection

           9       would be this would have had to have been in the car on

          10       the way to the scene, yes.

          11   Q.  That's the evidence you have given so far?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  I am just interested in two aspects of this, the third

          14       line from the bottom, the last line, because you are

          15       saying, if I have understood your note correctly that

          16       Z51 is saying to you Mark Duggan got out of the car and

          17       "gun to officer", pointed a gun towards the officer

          18       before he got shot.  That's essentially what you are

          19       saying you were told, correct?

          20   A.  Yes, that's right, yes.

          21   Q.  Did you ask Z51 where he got that account from?

          22   A.  No, I don't think I did in that phone call , no.  I --

          23   Q.  Let's park the phone call  and park that question and

          24       we'll come back to that in a moment.  Then there's the

          25       last sentence, which is fairly fundamental, may




           1       I suggest, which is where you say this -- there was

           2       another officer shot, another CO19 officer shot, yes?

           3   A.  Yes, that's right.

           4   Q.  Just read out your note and your abbreviations again

           5       just one more time?

           6   A.  So:

           7           "CO19 officer shot ..."

           8           There is a hyphen, then it's got N/K, which is "not

           9       known":

          10           "... if by CO19/MD."

          11           So that's CO19 or Mark Duggan.

          12   Q.  Pause there.  How long had you been in Trident?

          13   A.  At this point in time, I think I had probably been the

          14       Commander for Trident for just over a year, 14 months.

          15   Q.  How long had you been in the Met?

          16   A.  It would have been 17 years within the Metropolitan

          17       Police.

          18   Q.  Can you help us with this: in your 17 years, how many

          19       CO19 officers have you known to be shot in a blue on

          20       blue situation?

          21   A.  My own personal knowledge is this is the only

          22       circumstance that I'm aware of.  But that is purely

          23       based on what I recall.  I have not had direct dealings

          24       with CO19 really until I became Superintendent --

          25   Q.  My question was you, I am not focusing on anybody else,




           1       I'm talking about you, what you knew --

           2   A.  Sorry, as I say, it's not what I knew, it's what

           3       I believed.

           4   Q.  Right, this is what you believed, let's run with that.

           5       So this would have been an absolutely fundamental

           6       situation to have arisen under your watch, as it were;

           7       would you agree?  If the possibility was that one

           8       firearms officer had shot another firearms officer in

           9       the course of duty, that would have been on your watch

          10       and it would have been fundamental to have got to that;

          11       would you agree or do you disagree?

          12   A.  No, clearly it would have been important to get to the

          13       bottom of what occurred within the shooting, yes.

          14   Q.  That's just one side of the coin.  The other side of the

          15       coin, as per your note, is that this officer could have

          16       been shot by the suspect?

          17   A.  That's right, which is why I have shown they are the two

          18       possibilities relayed to me.

          19   Q.  Exactly.  Again, I'll ask you the same question: on your

          20       watch, how often -- when was the last time you had known

          21       that a firearms officer had been shot by a suspect?

          22   A.  Firearms officer shot by a suspect?  There had been one

          23       other occasion, I cannot recall if it was before or

          24       after this event, in a very different scenario where

          25       a police officer had been shot at in Croydon.  But in




           1       terms of an operation that Trident had been leading,

           2       I don't -- certainly in my time as the OCU Commander of

           3       Trident there was not another occasion where an officer

           4       had been shot, whether it was a Trident officer or

           5       an armed officer.

           6   Q.  Again, this would have been a unique situation to have

           7       occurred?

           8   A.  It was a unique situation, yes.

           9   Q.  Thank you.  So whichever side of the coin you're looking

          10       at, a blue on blue situation or a suspect shooting

          11       an officer, these two events entirely unique, you would

          12       want to bottom out?

          13   A.  Well, I would want to be bottomed out.  It's not my role

          14       to conduct the investigation.

          15   Q.  I understand that.  Mr Cundy please do not get me wrong,

          16       I am not suggesting for one moment that you are the

          17       investigator.

          18   A.  You said that I would want them to bottom out.  I would

          19       want them to be bottomed out.  That's -- and hence the

          20       independent investigation needs to do that to establish

          21       the events that occurred.

          22   Q.  In any event, the one thing that you are clear about in

          23       your mind, this information, about the possibility, in

          24       other words the uncertainty whether the officer was shot

          25       by another officer or Mark Duggan fired shots, all of




           1       this information came from who?  Tell us.

           2   A.  In terms of this phone call ?

           3   Q.  Yes.

           4   A.  This was two possibilities that were relayed to me by

           5       the TFC, the Tactical Firearms Commander, Z51.

           6   Q.  So this is Z51 telling you this?

           7   A.  Telling me that there were two possibilities as to how

           8       the officer had been shot.

           9   Q.  So in your mind, at 1850 on 4 August, your evidence is

          10       Z51 clearly had in his mind the possibility that Mark

          11       Duggan may have been shooting at a police officer?

          12   A.  Well, as I say, I cannot say exactly what was in his

          13       mind but my interpretation would be that the TFC, Z51,

          14       would have to accept there are two possibilities.  Until

          15       the enquiries are conducted into the firearms recovered

          16       from the scene, whether it was the gun that was

          17       recovered or indeed the armed officers' firearms, that

          18       would establish which guns had fired and I certainly

          19       didn't know that at that time.

          20   Q.  You see, the reason why I put that to you, because Z51

          21       gave evidence in this Inquest and said that he didn't

          22       entertain that possibility.

          23   A.  Well, I can only go by what I was told on the phone.

          24   Q.  All right.  There it is.  Let me move on --

          25   A.  As I say, I cannot put myself in his mind.  As my




           1       evidence earlier today was, whilst it was a possibility,

           2       when I arrived at the scene that was not the option that

           3       I had the view had occurred because, apart from that one

           4       occasion, everyone was telling me that an officer had

           5       been shot accidentally.

           6   Q.  I'm dealing with the telephone call.  I'm going to come

           7       onto the scene in a moment.  I want to keep these

           8       separate.

           9   A.  Sorry, I was referring to the telephone calls

          10       beforehand.

          11   Q.  In relation to the telephone call, your evidence is

          12       clear: you say this is what you were told by Z51,

          13       correct?

          14   A.  Yes, that's what I made the note of.

          15   Q.  I'm going to move on.  Secondly, and this is my final

          16       point, you accept that the finding of the gun was

          17       an important part of this operation and the

          18       investigation.

          19   A.  Finding the firearm at the scene was clearly

          20       significant, yes.

          21   Q.  Clearly significant.  Help us: when you arrive, one of

          22       the people you do speak to, I think you indicated you

          23       spoke to several people, but one of the people you

          24       definitely spoke to was Z51.

          25   A.  Yes, that's correct, yes.




           1   Q.  Mr Cundy, can we just call up your witness statement

           2       again, please, the one that we were just looking at.

           3       I just want to read that paragraph to you so you can see

           4       we're at 19.30; can you see that?  It says:

           5           "At 19.30 I arrived at Ferry Lane."

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  Then you say you met Z51, that's in the next paragraph,

           8       met Brian Elliott; do you see that?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  Now, I am reading the paragraph that begins "I recall":

          11           "I recall asking Z51 whether the identity of the

          12       deceased male had been confirmed.  Z51 informed me that

          13       they believed the male to be Mark Duggan since he was

          14       a subject of Operation Dibri and was therefore well

          15       known to the police operational team.  Thus, his

          16       identity this was confirmed as much as possible without

          17       disturbing the body at the scene.  On this basis I was

          18       satisfied that it was Mark Duggan who had been shot,

          19       although a formal identification from a family member

          20       would later be required ..."

          21           You then go on to -- you made your way to the inner

          22       cordon; do you see that?

          23   A.  Yes, that was Inspector Saunders, yes.

          24   Q.  Then you deal with scene preservation and whether that

          25       was all in place, okay, and post-incident matters.  I am




           1       not going to go into them?

           2   A.  Sorry, I thought --

           3   Q.  Right.  I want to come back to this conversation that

           4       you had with Z51 because you were asking him questions,

           5       and certainly by the time you arrive at the scene you've

           6       had it in your head that there's a possibility that Mark

           7       Duggan may have been shot -- sorry, Mark Duggan may have

           8       shot at an officer because that's the previous

           9       conversation that you have had at 1850 with Z51?

          10   A.  That was a possibility, yes.

          11   Q.  Did you discuss that with Z51?

          12   A.  As I say, by the time I arrived at the scene I had

          13       spoken to a number of other people on the phone and

          14       indeed Brian Elliott himself and no one was saying that

          15       Mark Duggan had shot at a police officer to me.

          16   Q.  My question was: did you discuss that with Z51?

          17   A.  Yes, it would have been part of the conversation.

          18   Q.  Right.  So other parts of the conversation would have

          19       been the finding of the gun?

          20   A.  Yes.  As I said earlier, I indicated where the gun had

          21       been recovered.

          22   Q.  What did Z51 tell you about the finding of the gun?

          23   A.  I was told that a firearm had been discovered and I was

          24       indicated to where it was, it was nothing more than that

          25       to me.




           1   Q.  Did he tell you, "I was the one who found the gun"?

           2   A.  I don't recall.  I know what's been said within his

           3       evidence here but I don't recall him saying anything to

           4       me on the night.  Bearing in mind this is a statement

           5       I have made obviously some time after the event and

           6       within the notes itself I have not made particular

           7       mention of who found the gun.  What was important to me

           8       was a gun had been found, I knew the individuals who had

           9       found it would clearly record that as their evidence.

          10   Q.  Let's just be clear on this: you were speaking to Z51,

          11       you have made notes, you can confirm, nowhere in your

          12       notes do you record that Z51 identified himself as the

          13       finder of the gun, correct?

          14   A.  You'll see there's no note in there of the whole

          15       conversation I had with Z51 at the scene.

          16   Q.  My question is specific.  Nowhere in your notes does Z51

          17       identify himself as the finder of the gun; is that right

          18       or is that wrong?

          19   A.  That's right and, as I say, neither is anything else in

          20       in relating to that conversation.

          21   Q.  That's not in your witness statement either, is it?

          22   A.  In relation to Z51 identifying he found the gun?

          23   Q.  Yes.

          24   A.  No, it's not in my witness statement, no.

          25   Q.  Just one final matter, could you just turn to -- this is




           1       something I wanted to ask you about.  It's CD6173 and

           2       it's the very last line.  If that could just be -- this

           3       is where you're discussing -- let's look at -- let's

           4       read that whole paragraph.  If we start where it says:

           5           "[Something] might led by Mark Duggan ..."

           6           Can you read that section?

           7   A.  My book is a little bit clearer, can I know what page

           8       that is and I can refer to it in my day book.

           9   Q.  184.  Can you read that last paragraph to us,

          10       starting --

          11   A.  Starting with where it says "Wake"?

          12   Q.  Yes.

          13   A.  So that says -- this is some notes I was making in the

          14       meeting at Scotland Yard the following morning and it

          15       says:

          16           "Wake last night led by Marlon Duggan.

          17           "Niece of Marlon Duggan arrested early hours.

          18           "This W/E [which for me means weekend] party at

          19       leisure centre ... Jamaican ..."

          20           Then, again, my shorthand "CF", which for me would

          21       mean "similar":

          22           "... to a Ghana event last [week]."

          23           "WK" short for week.

          24           The next line down says:

          25           "Farm [which refers to Broadwater Farm] BBQ




           1       tonight."

           2           Then:

           3           "Plan ..."

           4           So this would be information we were being told

           5       within the Gold group:

           6           "No overt policing on the Farm."

           7           Again refers to Broadwater Farm:

           8           "TSG [the Met's Territorial Support Group] not being

           9       put onto [borough]."

          10           "BGH" is short for borough for me.

          11           Then I have written, this is my phrase:

          12           "Less is more."

          13   Q.  What do you mean by that: "less is more"?

          14   A.  This was my -- my recollection was this is Tottenham

          15       Police telling us what their response is to the events

          16       from the night before, based on what they knew was

          17       occurring that day and plans for the weekend.

          18           As the police will often know in scenarios similar

          19       to this, but clearly every scenario is unique,

          20       a heavy-handed police presence can often heighten

          21       community tensions rather than lessen them.  So the

          22       reason I have written "Less is more" would be this is

          23       what Tottenham Police were planning to do, which was to

          24       have as low a key presence as possible to prevent

          25       anything exacerbating the situation.




           1   MR THOMAS:  That's all I ask.

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you, Mr Thomas.

           3           I think now I have you, Mr Stern, now, as the next

           4       to ask questions.

           5                      Questions by MR STERN

           6   MR STERN:  Thank you, sir.

           7           I wonder if we could just look at 6171 again, I know

           8       you have looked at it several times.  It's, I think,

           9       been further reduced in its redaction from the copy that

          10       we have.  We can see just above Z51, Inspector Elliott,

          11       Brian Elliott?

          12   A.  Yes, sir, that's right.

          13   Q.  Why is his name in the book just above Z51 at that time,

          14       1850?

          15   A.  So, as I said earlier, the conversation I'm having with

          16       Z51 on the telephone, he's informing that Brian Elliott,

          17       who was an Inspector from CO19, was present at the

          18       scene.

          19   Q.  Right.

          20   A.  Sorry, present or at least en route, I don't know which

          21       one it would be at that time.

          22   Q.  We can tell you he was present.  The position is that at

          23       1850 he had completed a note, having had a discussion

          24       with V53, the officer who had fired the fatal shot?

          25   A.  I'm aware who V53 is.




           1   Q.  Were you aware of the note, or at least the substance of

           2       the note, from that discussion?

           3   A.  No, I wasn't aware and never have been aware.

           4   Q.  You have never been told?

           5   A.  Not in terms of that a note exists.  I certainly spoke

           6       to Brian Elliott at the scene.  He didn't say "This is

           7       a note I've made after a conversation with V53".

           8   Q.  You arrived at the scene at 7.30 in the evening.

           9   A.  That's correct, yes.

          10   Q.  At this point in time, we know that Inspector Elliott,

          11       who was originally given the acronym W55, had already

          12       spoken and got a signed note from V53 but you were

          13       unaware of that?

          14   A.  I was unaware of that, yes.

          15   Q.  He said that it was very unusual -- I cannot remember

          16       whether he said "very unusual" or "unique" -- very

          17       unusual to get a note directly from an officer within

          18       30 minutes of an incident like this; is that your

          19       experience?

          20   A.  I don't have direct experience of dealing with firearms

          21       officers following shootings.

          22   Q.  It's just that Mr Thomas was asking you some questions

          23       about firearms and incidents; do you have experience of

          24       those things or are you just relying on your general

          25       information and knowledge?




           1   A.  I've been a Strategic Firearms Commander.  Shootings by

           2       police, whether fatal or non-fatal, are thankfully

           3       extremely rare but in terms of the individual process

           4       from the role of Brian Elliott with his armed officers,

           5       that's something which I don't know the details of and

           6       what would be standard procedure and what wouldn't be.

           7   Q.  In any event, that had not come to you.  If we just look

           8       at the progress of your note, if we can, on the page

           9       again, we can see that the first information you had --

          10       and, again, obviously the times are not exact, you were

          11       presumably looking at your watch and then just writing

          12       down the time?

          13   A.  That's correct, these are all times based on my watch.

          14   Q.  We understand that.  At about 6.20, you were informed

          15       that police had, in fact, shot Mark Duggan and I think

          16       you have written:

          17           "... shot dead."

          18   A.  Are we talking about the first line there?

          19   Q.  Yes, I am.

          20   A.  So at 1820 I'm being -- relayed to me via Fiona Mallon,

          21       the Strategic Firearms Commander:

          22           "Subject believed shot dead."

          23   Q.  Then at 1824 there was an update and the two notes are

          24       that the gun had been found.  So you were told that

          25       a gun had been found at 1824 --




           1   A.  That's correct, yes.

           2   Q.  -- and that a CO19 officer had been shot by accident?

           3   A.  That's what I was told at 6.24 pm, yes.

           4   Q.  Then you have gone through at 1826, so just a couple of

           5       minutes later, and the situation about the firearm being

           6       found nearby, and the CO19 officer "by accident in leg".

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  We have been through that.

           9   A.  That's right, yes.

          10   Q.  At 18.50, you were told that Mark Duggan had got out of

          11       the car and had, as Mr Thomas put it, pointed a gun at

          12       the officer?

          13   A.  That's what I was told, that's correct, yes.

          14   Q.  Can I just ask you, on another matter that you've been

          15       asked about, which is information that eventually leaked

          16       out to the press, which obviously people know about, you

          17       would accept, I'm sure, that misinformation about

          18       an event such as this causes deep consternation to the

          19       public?

          20   A.  Absolutely right, as it certainly did on this occasion.

          21   Q.  Yes, and suspicion in the minds of the public as well?

          22   A.  Yes, indeed.

          23   Q.  Not just to the public, but also to the officers who

          24       have been involved in this incident?

          25   A.  Yes, and that's whether it was V53 themselves, other


           1       armed officers or the Trident officers, yes.

           2   MR STERN:  Thank you.

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, I think what we're going to do

           4       is stop there until 2 o'clock because there will be

           5       a few more questions and I think that will be

           6       a convenient time for us to stop.

           7           So thank you very much, members of the jury, if you

           8       would like to leave us and be ready for a 2 o'clock

           9       start.  I will ask for the -- the cameras are off.

          23   (1.02 pm)

          24                     (The short adjournment)

          25   (2.00 pm)




           3                  (In the presence of the jury)

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  I will ask

           5       Mr Cundy to come back into the witness box, please.

           6           (The witness returned into the witness box)

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much, Mr Cundy, you

           8       are still under the oath that you took before.  Can

           9       I return to you your day book, thank you for allowing me

          10       to just check through that.  (Handed)

          11   A.  Thank you, sir.

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much indeed.

          13           Now, we have reached the stage, I think, was it

          14       Mr Butt was about to ask some questions?

          15                       Questions by MR BUTT

          16   MR BUTT:  Mr Cundy, I ask questions on behalf of Z51.

          17   A.  Thank you, sir.

          18   Q.  Just to return briefly to your day book.  The entry at

          19       1826, this is no more than your note of what Fiona

          20       Mallon told you that Z51 had told her; is that right?

          21   A.  That's absolutely correct.  This is a conversation

          22       relayed to me by Fiona Mallon.

          23   Q.  You weren't yourself privy to precisely what Z51 said to

          24       Fiona Mallon, obviously, were you?

          25   A.  No, I wasn't, no.




           1   Q.  When you spoke to Z51 though, it was clear that he told

           2       you that the intelligence that he had was that a firearm

           3       was going to be collected by Mark Duggan and had been;

           4       is that right?

           5   A.  Sorry, sir, are you referring to the phone call  at 1850?

           6   Q.  Yes.

           7   A.  Yes, my recollection is it's a firearm, it's not

           8       referenced specifically in my notes.  I have written

           9       "1720 intel update".

          10   Q.  If we look at your statement at page 833, top paragraph,

          11       what you say there is:

          12           "I then spoke with Z51 direct.  He informed me the

          13       operational plan had been for a briefing at 1800 hours

          14       but at approximately 17.20, the intelligence picture had

          15       changed and that Mark Duggan was believed to be seeking

          16       to take possession of a firearm."

          17           Yes?

          18   A.  That's right.  That's my recollection, yes.

          19   Q.  Can I move to the conversation, again with Z51, at 1850.

          20       You have recorded in your day book that he said that

          21       a CO19 officer had been shot and it was unknown if that

          22       was by CO19 or by Mark Duggan; is that right?

          23   A.  That's correct, that's the note that I've made, yes.

          24   Q.  That, at the time, was factually correct, wasn't it?

          25       Because to determine who had fired the shot would




           1       require accounts to be taken and examined, it would

           2       require a count back of the CO19 ammunitions and it

           3       would require forensic evidence, wouldn't it?

           4   A.  That's absolutely correct: examinations, like I said

           5       earlier, of both the armed officers' guns to see who had

           6       fired shots and indeed the firearm that was recovered at

           7       the scene.

           8   Q.  As Mr Thomas was pointing out, either possibility, that

           9       a CO19 officer had shot another officer or that Mark

          10       Duggan had shot another officer, would be very

          11       significant; either would be, wouldn't they?

          12   A.  Absolutely.  Both would be significant, yes.

          13   Q.  For Z51, so soon after the incident, in a brief

          14       conversation with you on the phone, to say one or the

          15       other at that time, would have been hasty, wouldn't it?

          16   A.  It would.  I would have been surprised if one answer had

          17       been given one way or another, for precisely the reasons

          18       you have articulated.

          19   Q.  Did you think at that time, and when you spoke to him

          20       afterwards, that Z51 was trying to somehow give you the

          21       impression that Mark Duggan had in fact shot at the

          22       police?

          23   A.  Sorry, sir, could you just repeat that?

          24   Q.  Did you think that Z51 was somehow trying to give you

          25       the impression, by what he said, that Mark Duggan had in




           1       fact shot at the police?

           2   A.  No, I definitely never got that impression, and I think,

           3       if anything, Z51, and indeed other people I spoke to,

           4       were trying to give the impression that it was believed

           5       to be the other way round but no one could say for

           6       certain.

           7   Q.  The box that was in the minicab; you were asked some

           8       questions about that by Mr Mansfield.  Of course, you

           9       don't know if Z51 knew at the scene that the gun had

          10       come from a box or not, do you?

          11   A.  Certainly on the night itself, I was never made aware of

          12       a box.  I subsequently found out about that some time

          13       later.

          14   Q.  When you arrived at the scene, the minicab was, in any

          15       view, part of the crime scene, wasn't it?

          16   A.  It absolutely was.  It was within what I call the inner

          17       cordon, with officers restricting access as to who would

          18       be able to approach or certainly enter the minicab.

          19   Q.  So Z51 had ensured that the crime scene and the minicab

          20       were secure, had he?

          21   A.  Everything was secure when I arrived at 7.30, yes.

          22   Q.  That would be part of his responsibility under the

          23       Police Standard Operating Procedure for a what

          24       a Tactical Firearms Commander should do after a police

          25       shooting; is that right?




           1   A.  Indeed, it was part of the TFC's responsibility.

           2   Q.  He would secure the scene and the scene would then await

           3       the arrival of the Crime Scene Manager and the search

           4       officers who, under the direction of the IPCC, would

           5       search the scene and evidence the exhibits; is that

           6       right?

           7   A.  That's entirely correct, yes.

           8   Q.  The police wouldn't want the principal officers to be

           9       involved in that, in order to ensure the investigation

          10       into the shooting was independent; is that right?

          11   A.  That's right.  As I said a few times today, it needed to

          12       be an independent investigation, it has to be through

          13       law anyway, but certainly from my perspective, from a --

          14       as a Trident OCU Commander, I needed the investigation

          15       to be independent, and also to be seen to be independent

          16       as well.

          17   Q.  You were asked before lunch about your conversation with

          18       Z51 at the scene and it was put to you that nowhere in

          19       your day book do you record Z51 telling you that he

          20       found the gun; that is right, isn't it?

          21   A.  That's right, yes.

          22   Q.  I think you explain that as well that you made no notes

          23       at all about what Z51 told you at the scene, did you?

          24   A.  No.  As I was explaining earlier, my role when I'm at

          25       the scene, I am not leading the investigation, it is




           1       already the remit of the IPCC to conduct that

           2       investigation.  Therefore, I would not be delving into

           3       the detail of the facts because that's what the

           4       investigators will do.  That's not my role.

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Just on that point though, we have

           6       been referred to your witness statement, and let's just

           7       have it up, it's CS0834, towards the bottom.  It has

           8       been read out, but not this sentence, you see:

           9           "I made my way to the inner cordon and met the

          10       uniformed Police Inspector.  I informed them who I was

          11       and assumed responsibility for the investigation pending

          12       the arrival of DPS, et cetera."

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  So you assumed the responsibility

          15       for the investigation shortly after 7.30?

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Then the IPCC come at 22.10 --

          18   A.  It was about that time, yes, that's correct.

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- so for 2 hours and 40 minutes,

          20       you are responsible for the investigation --

          21   A.  Well --

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- do you agree?

          23   A.  Not quite, sir.

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You tell me where I'm wrong.

          25   A.  If I may.  As I said earlier, the IPCC had formally




           1       taken responsibility of the investigation with -- my

           2       understanding is within about 20 minutes of the shooting

           3       occurring.  As I said earlier in my evidence, whilst

           4       I am there present before -- whether it's DPS or IPCC

           5       investigators arrive, decisions I would take were always

           6       being referred back through to the IPCC, even before

           7       their arrival.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  When you say "I assumed

           9       responsibility for the investigation pending the

          10       arrival", that's not really what's right.

          11   A.  I think it's probably really a poor choice of words on

          12       my part.

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The wrong choice?

          14   A.  What I mean by that is that I am the person present at

          15       the scene who is in touch, through Martin Hewitt or

          16       indeed direct, with DPS, who are then in liaison with

          17       the IPCC, who are responsibility for the investigation

          18       and will make choices on what will and won't happen.

          19           So I will not unilaterally take a decision to

          20       progress a line of inquiry, for example to search the

          21       minicab, unless that was something which I would consult

          22       with the IPCC and say "This is what I intend to do".

          23       Clearly I didn't do that, but as a example.

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Then look at the bottom of 0837, the

          25       bottom paragraph there, then you have:




           1           "At 2210 I verbally ..."

           2           This is the IPCC, they arrive:

           3           "... I verbally briefed them what I knew brief

           4       actions I had undertaken at the scene and handed over

           5       responsibility to the IPCC."

           6   A.  Sir, yes, that's the physical responsibility.  So I've

           7       left the scene now --

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You are responsible from 7.30 until

           9       22.10; that's what you're saying there, isn't it?

          10   A.  It is but I'm probably not articulating myself very

          11       clearly.  The decisions about what will or won't happen

          12       in terms of examination of the scene, speaking to

          13       witnesses, is already the responsibility of the IPCC.

          14       So I would not do anything unilaterally without ensuring

          15       that they were consulted beforehand.  But in terms of

          16       a physical presence, I was there to try and ensure that

          17       everything was happening as it needed to be done.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  What did you actually do in those

          19       2 hours 40 minutes as investigator?

          20   A.  I think, as an investigator, the only key decisions

          21       I believe I made was, firstly, that the minicab driver

          22       would stay where he was with police, pending handover to

          23       IPCC investigators.  Most of my time and energy was

          24       spent trying to resolve getting the family of Mark

          25       Duggan notified of his death, because the scene itself




           1       was secured, locked down with the cordons, so nothing

           2       was coming into the scene or going out and, therefore,

           3       it was very much a holding position, pending their

           4       arrival, because the armed officers, the officers

           5       involved, had already left the scene, and that was

           6       already under the control under post-incident procedures

           7       with the IPCC.

           8           So in terms of progressing the investigation, there

           9       was very little that actually I added value to when

          10       I was at the scene.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  What about -- part of the

          12       investigation must be where the gun had come from,

          13       mustn't it?  Were you not really keen, strike while the

          14       iron is hot, as quickly as possible, to find out any

          15       information which could lead the trail back to anymore

          16       guns?

          17   A.  That clearly would be important but the people who could

          18       conduct those enquiries would clearly be -- were the

          19       officers involved in that operation.  Those officers

          20       were not at the scene.  They were at that point in time

          21       undergoing their post-incident procedures with the

          22       IPCC --

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Couldn't someone have talked to the

          24       taxi driver: "Where was the gun picked up?"; "When did

          25       you pick up Mr Duggan?"




           1   A.  The officers who are with him are not conducting the

           2       witness interview with him.  That would be the remit of

           3       the IPCC.  The Trident officers there may well have

           4       asked him questions in that initial -- you know, that

           5       initial time at the scene but nothing was fed back to

           6       me.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Could they have done that?  They

           8       could have done.

           9   A.  They could have done, sir and I don't know whether they

          10       did or they didn't.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  They might have got a description,

          12       which might have helped, of the person handing over the

          13       gun.

          14   A.  I don't know whether they did that or they didn't.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  They might have had a lead that you

          16       could go rushing off, within an hour or two of the whole

          17       incident, to find out where other guns possibly are

          18       being stored.

          19   A.  I think that's a valid line of enquiry, yes, and the

          20       decisions around what to do with that, they still rest

          21       with the Tactical Firearms Commander.  They are the

          22       one -- we still have, as well as an investigation into

          23       the shooting itself and what occurred, there is still

          24       a parallel investigation -- I call it the criminal

          25       investigation -- into the firearm for exactly the




           1       situation just explained.  But that is the

           2       responsibility of the Tactical Firearms Commander.

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That is back at Z51's door, is it?

           4   A.  The Tactical Firearms Commander remains responsible for

           5       that operation until it's been formally --

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Back to Mr Butt, then.  He'll ask

           7       you some questions about that.

           8   MR BUTT:  The Tactical Firearms Commander, after a fatal

           9       shooting, is responsible for a number of things and we

          10       can look at the SOP if necessary.  But in terms of

          11       managing the scene, his responsibility is to secure

          12       evidence and, in this instance, keep the scene cordoned

          13       off; is that right?

          14   A.  That's correct, yes.

          15   Q.  He would not be responsible for, for example, ordering

          16       a search of the minicab, would he?

          17   A.  No, as I have just explained, that would be the

          18       responsibility of the investigators investigating the

          19       death of Mark Duggan.

          20   Q.  Just to return to the question of what you were told and

          21       what information there was about the finding of the gun

          22       and who found the gun, if we could look again at your

          23       day book at 1824, "Update from Mick Foote", so this is

          24       information being given to you by Mick Foote; is that

          25       right?




           1   A.  No, sir.  This, again, is information which he has

           2       provided to Fiona Mallon and Fiona Mallon is relaying

           3       this to me.

           4   Q.  Can I see.  Do you know where Mr Foote got his

           5       information from?

           6   A.  I don't, sir, I didn't know, no.

           7   MR BUTT:  Thank you very much.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Ms Dobbin?

           9   MS DOBBIN:  No, thank you, sir.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Glasson?

          11   MR GLASSON:  No, thank you, sir.

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The IPCC have no questions, all

          13       right.  Ms Le Fevre?

          14                     Questions by MS LE FEVRE

          15   MS LE FEVRE:  Thank you, sir.

          16           My name is Sarah Le Fevre, I ask a few questions on

          17       behalf of the Metropolitan Police.

          18           Mr Cundy, I just want to clarify, so far as it's

          19       possible from your notes and the notes of others, your

          20       movements on the scene on the evening of 4 August.

          21           Can we first though establish this.  You have been

          22       asked some questions by Mr Butt as to the

          23       responsibilities of Z51, the Tactical Firearms

          24       Commander.  It's right that he remained in control of

          25       the scene until relieved in accordance with the ACPO




           1       guidelines; that is right, isn't it?

           2   A.  That's correct, yes.

           3   Q.  If we look now at your note at page CD6172, do we see,

           4       to the right of the entries at 1915 and 1917,

           5       a reference to Brian Lucas?

           6   A.  Yes.  That's correct.  So if it assists, you'll see the

           7       top line that emanates from the word "brother", it says

           8       "Brian Lucas en route".

           9   Q.  Thank you.  Who was Brian Lucas?

          10   A.  So Brian Lucas is a Trident officer, he's a Detective

          11       Inspector and he was requested to attend the scene to

          12       take over -- basically take over the responsibility from

          13       the TFC, Z51.

          14   Q.  Thank you.  Is it right that he arrived on the scene at

          15       about 7.30 that evening, about the same time that you

          16       did?

          17   A.  It was shortly after I arrived, yes.

          18   Q.  Is it right that he thereafter worked to the parameters

          19       that you set for the time that you were the senior

          20       officer present at the scene?

          21   A.  Yes, that would be correct, yes.

          22   Q.  By the time you arrived on the scene, at about 7.30, you

          23       were aware, weren't you, that the IPCC had primacy over

          24       and for the investigation?

          25   A.  I was fully aware of that, yes.




           1   Q.  That meant, as you have told us this morning, that you

           2       referred your decision making back to the IPCC?

           3   A.  Yes, that's correct.

           4   Q.  Can we have, please, CD444.  This, Mr Cundy, is a log

           5       that I don't think you've been referred to this morning

           6       yet.  This is the log of the uniformed Inspector, whose

           7       name you were unable to recollect when you wrote your

           8       statement, Inspector Saunders.  Do we see, towards the

           9       foot of that page, perhaps right at the bottom of the

          10       page, a reference to:

          11           "Stuart Cundy -- Trident.  Arrives on the scene

          12       (1940 hrs) and speaks to YRIL."

          13   A.  Yes, I can see that.

          14   Q.  Is YRIL the means or the manner in which Inspector

          15       Saunders refers to herself?

          16   A.  Yes, that's correct, yes.

          17   Q.  Thank you.  So we take it that one of your earliest

          18       actions on your arrival is to speak to Inspector

          19       Saunders?

          20   A.  That's entirely correct, yes.

          21   Q.  Thank you.  Can we pick up the reference to which you

          22       have been referred then, please, at CD485.  This is

          23       an extract from the log of Patricia Larrigan arriving on

          24       the scene, again towards the foot of the page, at

          25       2054 hours and at the cordon, is this right, a reference




           1       to her meeting and speaking to you?

           2   A.  Yes, that's correct, yes.

           3   Q.  Thank you.  You've been referred this morning by

           4       Mr Mansfield to page CD5121, a reference to you speaking

           5       to family liaison officers at 2100 hours, perhaps we

           6       need not turn that page up but if you want to remind

           7       yourself of it; you recall that conversation as well?

           8   A.  Yes, I certainly recall speaking to them as well.

           9   Q.  CD27183, and if we could turn this page up, please, if

          10       it assists your recollection.  Mr Cundy, there were IPCC

          11       officers, three of them, Omotosho, Mehaffey and

          12       Kirkpatrick at Ferry Lane between about 9 o'clock in the

          13       evening and 9.15 in the evening?

          14   A.  I recall them arriving about that time, yes.

          15   Q.  By 7.30 in the evening Mr Suggett of the DPS was on

          16       scene.

          17   A.  Not to my recollection, no: 7.30 or 9.30?

          18   Q.  9.30?

          19   A.  Sorry, by 9.30 that would be about right, yes.

          20   Q.  Thank you.  2140 -- can we return to your notes at

          21       CD6172 -- at 2140, that's your note of your viewing of

          22       a firearm in a black sock; is that right?

          23   A.  That's correct, yes.

          24   Q.  Reminding yourself of your entry immediately below that,

          25       Mr Cundy, why did you go, to the best of your




           1       recollection, to look at the firearm at 2140 hours?

           2   A.  So, as I mentioned earlier this morning, one of the

           3       members of the community from Tottenham, who was part of

           4       my advisory group, advised that if a gun had been

           5       recovered -- this was advice to myself and the Borough

           6       Commander for Haringey -- that we should endeavour to

           7       let that fact be known to the community.

           8           I spoke to the Directorate of Professional

           9       Standards, who in turn spoke to the IPCC, there was

          10       a view that actually we should release that as a fact.

          11       The IPCC, and rightly so, were very strong that we

          12       should not release a fact like that unless we could

          13       prove it to be the case.  I was requested -- well, I was

          14       asked "Have you physically seen the firearm yourself?"

          15       I said, no, I hadn't, this is what I had been told.  So

          16       it was agreed that I would physically have to go and

          17       satisfy myself personally that there was a gun found at

          18       the scene, which was then relayed back through to the

          19       IPCC and a decision made that, yes, that fact could be

          20       released to the community of Tottenham, which is why

          21       my -- the entry in my book at 2157 -- again, apologies

          22       for the poor writing -- it says:

          23           "Gun agreed -- IPCC.  Release fact F/A recovered at

          24       the scene."

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Above that at 2140, it has:




           1           "Viewed firearm in black sock."

           2           Then what do you write?

           3   A.  Sorry, so next to that again is my abbreviation, which

           4       is "decision", which then refers to --

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Oh, that's "decision"?

           6   A.  So "dec", and then with a line underneath that, is my

           7       shorthand, I'm afraid.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  No, it's all right.  I wondered what

           9       it was, that was all.  Thank you.

          10   MS LE FEVRE:  Thank you.  Staying on that page then, at

          11       22.10, you referred to a briefing of the IPCC and the

          12       DPS; is that a briefing administered by you.

          13   A.  That's right.  So that was when I spoke to the IPCC

          14       investigators present and the head of DPS, Carl Bussey.

          15   Q.  Thank you.  The final entry on that page, 0100 hours, is

          16       "Leave".

          17   A.  Yes.  So that was when I basically went off duty that

          18       night, having left -- I wasn't leaving the scene but

          19       that was leaving the police station where the officers

          20       had undergone their post-incident process.

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That's not you going off on leave?

          22   A.  Sadly not, sir, no.

          23   MS LE FEVRE:  Thank you.  If we could turn up CD23891, these

          24       are now Deputy Assistant Commissioner Hewitt's notes.

          25       Do we see, towards the top of the page, an entry at




           1       2217 hours:

           2           "Stu C leaving scene for Leman Street.  SL and JN in

           3       situ."

           4           Do we take it from that that you left Ferry Lane

           5       then at 2217?

           6   A.  Yes, that's entirely right.  I was in regular contact

           7       with DAC Hewitt, who knew -- clearly quite important

           8       when I left and that's the note he clearly made.

           9   Q.  Thank you.  Whilst we're in Mr Hewitt's notes, can we

          10       look, please, at CD23893.  Now, this is a decision made

          11       and recorded by Mr Hewitt.  Can you look, please, to

          12       start with at the top of this page.  We see there, do we

          13       not:

          14           "Decision DPA ..."

          15           What's that?

          16   A.  "DPA" stands for Directorate of Public Affairs, which is

          17       basically the Metropolitan Police's media department.

          18   Q.  "... to challenge line in draft IPCC statement that

          19       says: the officer was shot before the male was shot.

          20       This challenge to be made ... in a fashion that leaves

          21       an audit trail."

          22   A.  Yes, I can see that, yes.

          23   Q.  Beneath that, the box including the reason for that

          24       decision.  The reason for the decision, Mr Hewitt tells

          25       us is as follows:




           1           "This version of events is not my understanding of

           2       events and at no point has any comment from the scene

           3       suggested that MD fired a wpn.  This version will be

           4       difficult to pull back once out there.  Require audible

           5       comment by DPA to have clarity that we did this at

           6       a later stage."

           7           Is this then, Mr Hewitt (sic), the police seeking to

           8       ensure the press were provided with accurate

           9       information, so far as possible?

          10   A.  Yes, that's entirely right, yes.

          11   MS LE FEVRE:  Thank you very much.  Mr Stern reminds me, if

          12       we look at the foot of that page, back to CD32893, the

          13       date and time the decision is made: 2036 on

          14       4 August 2011 with the entry being made at 0130 on

          15       5 August 2011.

          16   A.  Yes, I can see that, yes.

          17   MS LE FEVRE:  Thank you, Mr Cundy.  No further questions.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Do you have any questions now,

          19       Mr Glasson?

          20   MR GLASSON:  No.

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Still no questions?

          22           Yes, Mr Underwood?

          23   MR UNDERWOOD:  Nothing from me, thank you.

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I have asked all the questions

          25       I wish to ask.  So thank you very much indeed, Mr Cundy,




           1       to coming along to assist the jury, that completes your

           2       evidence, you are free now to go back to Surrey.

           3   A.  Thank you very much indeed.

           4   MR UNDERWOOD:  May we have Shaun Dowe now, please.

           5                SUPERINTENDENT SHAUN DOWE (sworn)

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  Come and have

           7       a seat there, would you, please, thank you.

           8                    Questions by MR UNDERWOOD

           9   MR UNDERWOOD:  Good afternoon, Mr Dowe.  Can you give us

          10       your name and rank please?

          11   A.  Yes, Shaun Dowe, Superintendent.

          12   Q.  Are you still with the Metropolitan Police?

          13   A.  I am, yes.

          14   Q.  I want to ask you briefly about the 4 August 2011 of

          15       course.  Were you the on-call duty post-incident manager

          16       for CO19 then?

          17   A.  Yes, PIM 2 as we call it, not PIM 1.

          18   Q.  Right.  Help us with the difference.

          19   A.  Well, we have a main PIM, which in this case was

          20       Neil Evans, who you will hear from next, but I was the

          21       second tier PIM, if you like.  We always have two on

          22       call in relation to police shootings.

          23   Q.  Were you sent to the scene?

          24   A.  I was, yes.

          25   Q.  What was the purpose of that?




           1   A.  It really stems from a sort of historical tradition in

           2       relation to when PIP first was started, the

           3       post-incident procedure, whereby -- when we originally

           4       started the process off, if you like, firearms officers

           5       were maintained on the scene and investigators arrived

           6       and there were some difficulties in relation to what

           7       they were required to do, whereas over the years we have

           8       learned that -- we have a system in place now that looks

           9       after their welfare much better than it used to be so it

          10       is a historical sort of position.

          11           However, you are, in effect, the remote assistant to

          12       the main PIM 1, who was based sort of back at our base.

          13   Q.  So if the main post-incident manager at Leman Street for

          14       example wanted to know whether vehicles were still there

          15       or whether there was some kit left on the ground he

          16       could ask you?

          17   A.  Yes, exactly, yes.  This is all to do with the welfare

          18       of the officers, predominantly and also the facilitation

          19       of the investigation.

          20   Q.  I do not mean to be unkind about this, but presumably

          21       going there in a historically redundant role, you then

          22       had to make yourself useful as best you could; would

          23       that be fair?

          24   A.  Yes, I suppose that's one way of looking at it.  But you

          25       never really know what may come up and what assistance




           1       you can give.  Predominantly -- well, there were all

           2       sorts of reasons, I was quite late to the scene anyway.

           3       However, my role predominantly, and on this particular

           4       day, was assistance to the IPCC or whoever might be

           5       investigating at that point, specifically around what 19

           6       may have done and why the vehicles might have been in

           7       that position, just to facilitate the understanding of

           8       what may occur -- what may have occurred and what those

           9       firearms officers -- why they might have done things in

          10       the way that it was understood if that makes sense.

          11   Q.  One of the possibilities is that you could pass

          12       information back to the post-incident manager at Leman

          13       Street, the other is that you could be a sort of CO19

          14       sage at the scene, if you like; would that be fair?

          15   A.  Exactly, exactly right.

          16   Q.  What time did you get there?

          17   A.  2030 hours, I believe.

          18   Q.  You will appreciate, of course, that to most of us,

          19       an array of police officers turning up at a scene like

          20       this is confusing and I am trying to get the jury the

          21       best impression I can of who was doing what.  Who did

          22       you report to when you got there?

          23   A.  The first one, I think, was Brian Elliott actually who,

          24       in effect, had done my main role before I actually

          25       arrived because he was on scene.  So Brian Elliott,




           1       I think, was the first person I spoke to.

           2   Q.  How did you think was in charge of the scene?

           3   A.  Inspector Caroline Saunders was, in effect, in charge of

           4       the containment of the scene, if I can put it that way.

           5   Q.  Did you know Mr Cundy?

           6   A.  Yes, I did.

           7   Q.  Did you know he was there?

           8   A.  I saw him, yes.  I saw him.

           9   Q.  What did you believe his role to be?

          10   A.  He was head of Trident, therefore I would have almost

          11       have expected him to be there to support the officers

          12       that were involved.

          13   Q.  You didn't think he was there to manage the scene?

          14   A.  No.

          15   Q.  What did you do?

          16   A.  In effect, I got the information from Brian Elliott in

          17       relation to what had happened and, predominantly, if

          18       I had been first on the scene and arrived there before

          19       anybody else, if you like, I would have spoken -- or got

          20       the initial account, which I think Brian had got,

          21       obviously which is part of the facilitation, and

          22       basically ensured the welfare of the officers was being

          23       looked after and that they were taken from the scene as

          24       soon as possible, as soon as all of the investigative

          25       elements were in place, if you like.




           1   Q.  They had in fact gone of course, hadn't they?

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  So what did you do?

           4   A.  So I spoke to Brian Elliott to ensure those elements had

           5       been done basically, and then it was just a case of

           6       making myself useful or being available, if you like, to

           7       provide any other information that might be required.

           8   Q.  I think one of the things you did was do a sketch of the

           9       scene, did you not?

          10   A.  Correct.

          11   Q.  We find that at CD662.  On the left-hand side of that,

          12       of course, there's your sketch.  If I may say so,

          13       a large number of other notes.  Is this you finding out

          14       who's there --

          15   A.  Yes, basically I never know what I might be asked,

          16       I suppose, at the scene from the base and therefore

          17       I try and get as much as information as possible.

          18       However, bearing in mind that Brian Elliott had pretty

          19       much done most of the things I would have required,

          20       I was not really expecting anything in particular.  So

          21       I tried to reflect all of the things I had done and the

          22       names of people on scene, which is predominantly one of

          23       the things people want to know.

          24   Q.  Fair enough.  Did you have anything to do with the

          25       firearm, the non-police issue firearm that was at the




           1       scene?

           2   A.  I knew it was there because Brian had let me know that

           3       but it wasn't part of what I was particularly interested

           4       in, other than the fact that it existed.

           5   Q.  Did you have anything to do with it being made safe and

           6       taken away?

           7   A.  Yes, because I knew that would have to be part of the

           8       next process.  It wasn't necessarily my responsibility

           9       but obviously I know what happens and therefore

          10       I arranged for the ARVs to attend and for the forensic

          11       make-safe to be done.

          12   Q.  Were you there when that happened?

          13   A.  Yes, I was.

          14   Q.  Again, you will appreciate we're trying to find out

          15       whether the plant pot was put back where the gun was; do

          16       you know about that?

          17   A.  I don't remember or recall whether I knew about the

          18       plant pot on that particular night.  I knew about it

          19       subsequently but I'm not sure about the plant pot in

          20       hindsight.  I knew the gun was there and Brian made me

          21       aware of approximately where its location was but

          22       because I didn't breach the scene either it was just

          23       a case of "Well, it's over there" and, you know, so that

          24       was all I took --

          25   MR UNDERWOOD:  Thank you very much Superintendent.  If you




           1       wait there, please.

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, Mr Mansfield?

           3                    Questions by MR MANSFIELD

           4   MR MANSFIELD:  Good afternoon, officer, I represent the Mark

           5       Duggan family.  Just a few questions.

           6           I know you have been put in a historical context but

           7       I just want to -- having gone there, while you were

           8       there, did any questions cross your mind at all?

           9           Sorry, did any questions cross your mind while you

          10       were there about the scene?

          11   A.  Many questions probably, yes.

          12   Q.  I mean, were you in a position as to request that

          13       certain things are done while you're there before the

          14       IPCC actually get there?

          15   A.  No, that's not my role.

          16   Q.  You're checking that things have been done?

          17   A.  Yes, specifically based around facilitation of the

          18       investigation and also welfare of the officers.

          19   Q.  Right.  That's a phrase you have used already:

          20       facilitating the investigation of what?

          21   A.  Of the shooting itself.

          22   Q.  Right.  So that involves a firearm?

          23   A.  Correct.

          24   Q.  So to facilitate the investigation of the firearm, you

          25       don't have to breach -- I obviously realise that -- the




           1       area that's cordoned off.  Did you ask any questions of

           2       anybody about the firearm "over there"?

           3   A.  No.

           4   Q.  Did you ask anybody about whether they knew how it had

           5       got over there?

           6   A.  It may sound fairly unusual in relation to this, but

           7       I have been involved in a few other post-incident

           8       procedures.  As long as the firearm -- as long as the

           9       firearms officers have responded to, in this case, the

          10       firearm, as long as I know one exists, ie a non-police

          11       firearm has been found at the scene, I try not to

          12       involve myself any further in that type of information

          13       because, again, that isn't my role.  I just need the

          14       basic facts to try and facilitate the investigation

          15       that's taking place back at base.

          16   Q.  What is the basic investigation that you are

          17       facilitating?

          18   A.  Well, because I'm post-incident manager, and

          19       I understand what -- the post-incident management

          20       procedure back at the base, I understand what elements

          21       that they might need to know about, which is

          22       predominantly around the initial account, which

          23       obviously was delivered, and also the fact that the

          24       officers are involved and they're all secure and made

          25       safe and back at the base, and also that the gun exists,




           1       and that's as far as I'm interested, to be honest.

           2           Any further than that, you can confuse the situation

           3       because there are others involved in the investigation

           4       or security of the scene and the investigation,

           5       predominantly the IPCC, and also the investigation, ie

           6       the Trident one, in relation to why they are actually in

           7       that position, if that makes sense.

           8   Q.  As part of the initial account, did it say anything

           9       about how the gun got over the fence?

          10   A.  No, I don't think the initial account did, no.

          11   Q.  I would like to have on screen, please, CS119, please.

          12       This is not your statement, it's a statement of

          13       a firearms officer, R68; do you happen to know R68?

          14   A.  No, sir.

          15   Q.  It doesn't matter.  I think it's near the top, there's

          16       a passage where this officer is the one that spoke to

          17       the taxi driver.  Perhaps you could see that it's

          18       indicated to that officer how the gun had -- or at least

          19       apparently how the gun had been obtained, in a box; do

          20       you see that?  Just have a look.  (Pause)

          21           It's a few lines down from the top.

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  That's quite important information at the scene, isn't

          24       it?

          25   A.  (Pause)




           1           Quite important information from the scene that

           2       exists, is that?  What do you mean, sorry?

           3   Q.  Sorry, I'll be clear.  You know there's a gun over

           4       there?

           5   A.  That's correct, yes.

           6   Q.  You know there are people coming to look at the gun over

           7       there.  I'm just going back a step.  You are there with

           8       not a great deal to do at this stage.  Did you ask

           9       whether anybody discovered where the gun had come from

          10       in the first place, through your CO19 officers?

          11   A.  No, sir, I didn't ask that question, no.

          12   Q.  You didn't.  Is that the first time you have seen that

          13       information that I have just pointed out?

          14   A.  That's the first time I've seen that statement, yes, but

          15       obviously I was in the back of the court when you were

          16       questioning Stuart Cundy.

          17   Q.  That's very fair of you to say that.  You see, if

          18       firearms officers are at the scene and they've got

          19       a camera, which we know they did have -- did you know

          20       that?

          21   A.  Subsequently.  I didn't know that at the time.

          22   Q.  It's fairly commonplace for them to have with them, in

          23       one of the vehicles, some sort of photographic

          24       equipment, isn't it --

          25   A.  Correct, sir.




           1   Q.  -- standard?  There's no procedure suggesting that

           2       firearms officers can't use that sort of material, in

           3       other words a camera, to take photographs of the scene;

           4       there's nothing to stop them doing that, is there?

           5   A.  Yes, but we don't give them carte blanche to take any

           6       photos they wish because --

           7   Q.  No, to take photographs of a crime scene wouldn't be

           8       a problem, would it?

           9   A.  It wouldn't be something we would do, just because it

          10       was a crime scene, no, sir.

          11   Q.  But this man -- photographs were being taken of the

          12       crime scene; did you know that?

          13   A.  Who, sir?

          14   Q.  One of the officers had a still camera and took

          15       photographs.

          16   A.  But there was a reason for that, sir, from my

          17       understanding.

          18   Q.  The reason being?

          19   A.  First aid and proving that first aid was being

          20       administered.

          21   Q.  No, that was done by a movie camera.

          22   A.  I was not aware of any other photos.

          23   Q.  There's nothing to prevent a firearms officer with

          24       a still camera taking photographs of the inside of

          25       a minicab, is there?




           1   A.  Nothing to stop him doing that, no, sir.

           2   Q.  Because the real question is: where was the box?  Did

           3       you know that was an issue when you got to the scene?

           4   A.  No, sir.

           5   Q.  Nobody talked to you about that?

           6   A.  No, sir.

           7   Q.  One other matter: did you ever discover from anybody

           8       that there might be an issue about two guns rather than

           9       one?

          10   A.  No, sir.

          11   MR MANSFIELD:  Thank you.

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Nothing from Mr Thomas?

          13           Let's go down the list after that.  Mr Stern, now?

          14   MR STERN:  No, thank you, sir.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Butt?

          16   MR BUTT:  No, thank you, sir.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Glasson?

          18   MR GLASSON:  No, thank you, sir.

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Keith is not here anymore.

          20           Ms Le Fevre?

          21                     Questions by MS LE FEVRE

          22   MS LE FEVRE:  Thank you, sir, just a few questions, Mr Dowe,

          23       on behalf of the Metropolitan Police.  Can we have CD662

          24       back up, please.  Mr Dowe, is this a copy of a page from

          25       your day book?




           1   A.  Yes, ma'am.

           2   Q.  Are they notes that were taken by you whilst you were on

           3       the scene?

           4   A.  Yes, ma'am, yes.

           5   Q.  Would you accept that they are not the most readily

           6       comprehensible notes that you might have taken?

           7   A.  No, ma'am it's slightly embarrassing.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  They help you, do they?

           9   A.  They do, sir, yes.

          10   MS LE FEVRE:  Thank you, sir.  Top left-hand corner, 2030;

          11       do you see that?

          12   A.  Yes, ma'am.

          13   Q.  That's the time at which you arrived?

          14   A.  Correct, yes, ma'am.

          15   Q.  Moving your eye towards the right of that time then,

          16       please, do we see there the words:

          17           "Duty officer Caroline Saunders."

          18   A.  Yes, that's correct.

          19   Q.  That is the uniformed Inspector who you have told us was

          20       in charge of containment on your arrival?

          21   A.  That's correct, yes.

          22   Q.  Did you speak to her?

          23   A.  I did, ma'am, yes.

          24   Q.  Thank you.  If we look down the page now, and using one

          25       or two pointers to navigate, about halfway down the page




           1       we can see a redacted reference to DC ZZ46.  Below that,

           2       I think we see a reference, is this right, to

           3       Dr William Glazebrook?

           4   A.  Yes, ma'am, that's correct, yes.

           5   Q.  Beneath that, do we see "Forensic Larrigan"?

           6   A.  Yes, ma'am, that's correct, yes.

           7   Q.  Was that Patricia Larrigan, the Crime Scene Manager?

           8   A.  Yes, ma'am, that was, yes.

           9   Q.  Then if we look, please, very briefly at two pages from

          10       Patricia Larrigan's log.  Can we start, please, at page

          11       CD486.  Do we see here, Mr Dowe, about a third of the

          12       way down the page, a reference to you; do you see that?

          13       A list of officers:

          14           "DPS officers attend, DC Jon Payne, DCs Nic Jetwa,

          15       Bronwen Powell, DI Suggett and CI Shaun Dowe, CO19."

          16   A.  Yes, ma'am.

          17   Q.  Then we see a number of points recorded by Ms Larrigan

          18       immediately beneath that.  Point 1:

          19           "Vehicles at scene -- one minicab and three other

          20       vehicles ..."

          21           Then a reference, is this right, to you:

          22           "... CI Dowe all CO19 ... except minicab."

          23           What's that referring to?

          24   A.  All the other vehicles at the scene were CO19 vehicles

          25       at the time, ma'am, so that's what that reference is,




           1       I imagine.

           2   Q.  Thank you.  Point 4, the next reference to you:

           3           "Believed police fired two shots -- CI Dowe."

           4   A.  Yes, ma'am.

           5   Q.  Is that information that you are providing to Patricia

           6       Larrigan at this stage?

           7   A.  I imagine that was what Brian Elliott told me to -- as

           8       part of the information.

           9   Q.  Thank you.  Then the next reference to you is point 10:

          10           "Gun make safe?  Per CI Dowe -- not yet made safe.

          11       CI Dowe to arrange."

          12   A.  Yes, ma'am, correct.

          13   Q.  That is, as you have told us, precisely what you did.

          14   A.  Correct, ma'am, yes.

          15   Q.  If we move on in this log to page 488, we see further

          16       notes, further entries by Patricia Larrigan, under the

          17       heading "Issues".  Then further down at the initial

          18       action plan, points 1 to 5, then about halfway down the

          19       page:

          20           "Discuss with CI Dowe queries, ie locations of

          21       various personnel (CO19) and responses."

          22           There follow four points:

          23           "Which car was the officer who was shot in - front

          24       vehicle.

          25           "2) Position of deceased?  Where was he sitting?"




           1           In the previous:

           2           "Where was he when he got out?  Not yet established.

           3           "3)  How many shots were fired and by whom?  Officer

           4       who fired discharged several shots but not yet specific.

           5           "4)  Covert CO19 vehicles removal once scene

           6       recording complete."

           7           Does that accurately reflect your discussions with

           8       Patricia Larrigan at this point in the evening?

           9   A.  Yes, I imagine so, ma'am, yes.

          10   MS LE FEVRE:  Thank you.  No further questions, sir.

          11   MR UNDERWOOD:  I have no questions arising, thank you.

          12               Questions from THE ASSISTANT CORONER

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Just while we have the advantage of

          14       having you here, Superintendent -- is that right?

          15   A.  Yes, that's right.

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  In CO19, one thing that we've been

          17       hearing from the officers in the cars is that many of

          18       them, not all of them but many of them, are wired for

          19       sounds, they have microphones listening to what's going

          20       on in each of the cars and when the call comes in

          21       "Strike, strike", they are no doubt shouting that out,

          22       "Doors", getting out and then they are shouting or not

          23       as the case may be -- depending on which witness --

          24       "Armed police" and various things like that and then, of

          25       course, shots are fired, which would all be probably no




           1       doubt picked up on these microphones that they are

           2       wearing as they go out.

           3           But none of that's ever recorded and it wasn't in

           4       this case, why not?

           5   A.  That would be the radio transmissions, you mean?

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes.  Isn't there a way in which all

           7       of that could actually be recorded by audio recording,

           8       so that we, the jury -- in cases that I'm elsewhere

           9       involved in you would hear a 999 call and it's a piece

          10       of dramatic evidence in a case.  Now, if we could have

          11       this being recorded in such a case, then there wouldn't

          12       be any doubt about whether "Armed police" was shouted

          13       out, we would be able to hear the shots and we could

          14       work out what the distance is in time between them, we

          15       can hear all the various drama leading up in the events.

          16       It can't be beyond any technological problems for that

          17       to be recorded, can it?

          18   A.  No.  It could happen.  I mean, I think it's more to do

          19       with the expense -- well, a lot of it is to do with

          20       expense but also the practicalities of it because if you

          21       think -- there are a number of different channels that

          22       operate: there are main channels, there are back to back

          23       which our officers predominantly use.

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  None of it seems to have been

          25       recorded.




           1   A.  It's technically possible to record all of it, that's

           2       true, but if you can imagine how many transmissions

           3       there would be on a daily basis in the whole of the

           4       organisation and the storage of those facilities.

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mostly you would just wipe it clear,

           6       like you do, and then you get on and record on top.

           7   A.  There's no technical reason why you cannot do that.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The cost of one of your cars with

           9       all its armaments and such like inside must be immense?

          10   A.  We do record an awful lot of transmissions that take

          11       place but they are normally around specific events.

          12       After Stockwell, we introduced a system within the CT PR

          13       (?) world, whereby we can record certain transmissions

          14       that take place but that's only in specific

          15       circumstances.  But, yes, it's technically possible,

          16       it's just the fact we have not gone down that route

          17       because of the huge investment in money and also the

          18       practicalities behind that type of stuff.

          19           That's the only answer I can give you in relation to

          20       that, sir.

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I hadn't warned you I was going to

          22       ask you about that, I had not warned myself I was going

          23       to ask about that.  But at the same time it just seems

          24       very odd because that would be an evidential matter

          25       which would be very helpful for the jury to have, to




           1       have something played along that we could hear what was

           2       being said in the cars as they follow the cab along the

           3       road, we can hear someone shouting "Amber", "Red",

           4       whatever it may be, and then "Strike, strike" and then

           5       getting out and it would be very useful, as you can see.

           6       It cannot be actually that expensive to do, can it

           7       really?  But anyway you don't have to answer that

           8       because that's outside your technicality.

           9           The other thing you may be able to help me on,

          10       although I think perhaps the next witness will be the

          11       one who will be able to help us, in the post-incident

          12       management proceedings, did you play any part in the

          13       initial statements and the way the statements were

          14       taken --

          15   A.  No, sir.

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- with your officers?

          17   A.  No, sir, I didn't.  Obviously we make sure there's only

          18       one source of that -- for post-incident, and therefore

          19       that's why I'm subservient in that role to provide Neil,

          20       in this case, what he needs in relation to that type of

          21       stuff.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That was down to him, we'll hear

          23       from him.

          24           Mr Underwood, any other questions?

          25   MR UNDERWOOD:  No, thank you.




           1           Thank you very much, Superintendent.

           2                      (The witness withdrew)

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much indeed.

           4   MR STERN:  Just before the next witness, can I mention one

           5       matter.  Because although the witness was referred to

           6       part of R68's statement, R68 did not actually speak to

           7       that in his evidence, or wasn't asked any questions

           8       about the box in his evidence.

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Was he not?  I'm sorry, I had not

          10       recalled that part, I thought he was.

          11   MR STERN:  That's our view, looking at the note.  If I've

          12       got that wrong, obviously I apologise.  But that's

          13       a quick --

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Well, if we've got that wrong we

          15       might need to have R68 come back and see if that's

          16       right.

          17   MR UNDERWOOD:  I do not think there is any issue about this

          18       because the taxi driver himself said he told the

          19       officer.

          20   MR STERN:  He did.  I asked the taxi driver about the

          21       comment about the box.  So I am quite happy for it to be

          22       read, that part, if needs be.  But I just wanted to draw

          23       that to people's attention.

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you, Mr Stern, we'll look into

          25       that and see what the position is and no doubt correct




           1       it, if we need to.

           2   MR UNDERWOOD:  Of course, that's kind.  Mr Evans, please.

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I see the time.  How many other

           4       witnesses have you got?

           5   MR UNDERWOOD:  Just Mr Evans, then I'm reading two more.  So

           6       we could have the break now very conveniently.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It might be convenient if we have

           8       our afternoon break then we'll hear Mr Evans' evidence

           9       though.

          10           Can I just say to the members of the jury, just to

          11       confirm it, I know you have been told, but I want to

          12       confirm it in public that, for reasons you have

          13       conferred to me and which I accept, we will not be

          14       sitting on Thursday at all and, whilst we had looked to

          15       see whether we could sit on Friday, that too is not

          16       possible with this late notice.

          17           So this week we will not be sitting in this Inquest

          18       on Thursday or Friday, but I understand from you that

          19       you could sit on Monday morning -- the barristers don't

          20       know that yet -- so I'll suggest that we do.  If I hear

          21       any violent objections when you have left the room, I'll

          22       let you know.

          23           But at the moment, therefore, the plan is not to sit

          24       Thursday and Friday but sit 10.30 on Monday morning.

          25       All right.  Thank you very much.  If you would like to




           1       go for ten minutes.

           4   (2.54 pm)

           5                         (A short break)

           6   (3.08 pm)

           9                  (In the presence of the jury)

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you all very much, members of

          11       the jury.  We'll now hear from the next witness.

          12   MR UNDERWOOD:  Mr Evans then, please.

          13           DETECTIVE SUPERINTENDENT NEIL EVANS (sworn)

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much indeed.  If you

          15       would like to come and have a seat, please.

          16   A.  Thank you, sir.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you.

          18                    Questions by MR UNDERWOOD

          19   MR UNDERWOOD:  Good afternoon Mr Evans.

          20   A.  Good afternoon, sir.

          21   Q.  Can you give us your full names, please?

          22   A.  Yes, it's Neil Evans.

          23   Q.  Are you still a police officer?

          24   A.  Yes, I am.

          25   Q.  What's your rank now?




           1   A.  Detective Superintendent.

           2   Q.  In August 2011 were you a Chief Inspector in CO19?

           3   A.  Yes, I was.

           4   Q.  Were you the Post-Incident Manager number 1 on the 4th?

           5   A.  I was the PIM 1 on that particular evening, yes, I was,

           6       sir, yes.

           7   Q.  Help us, would you, with what the PIM 1's role was in

           8       an operation like this?

           9   A.  In the Metropolitan Police Service 24/7, 365, there is

          10       a PIM team, a post-incident team, that is on standby for

          11       any firearms operation within CO19.  So we only provided

          12       the post-incident procedure for CO19 firearms

          13       operations.  As my colleague previously had explained,

          14       there's two of us because one of the Post-Incident

          15       Managers would go to the scene and one would go to what

          16       we call the PIP location, which in this case had been

          17       predetermined as being Leman Street which was the

          18       default position.

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Can you get a little closer to the

          20       mic?

          21   MR UNDERWOOD:  Or move it closer to you, it's fine.  You

          22       share my quiet spokenness, so it's a good thing to be

          23       closer to it.

          24           Was the post-incident management process designed

          25       particularly for the assistance of the officers or was




           1       it for the assistance of an investigation?

           2   A.  In the Manual of Guidance, which is what I followed, it

           3       covers both.  It doesn't give either primacy, from my

           4       recollection.  It talks about facilitating the

           5       post-incident procedure to facilitate an investigation

           6       and the welfare of officers involved.

           7   Q.  It was, if you like, designed to be neutral to get the

           8       best evidence out?

           9   A.  To get the best evidence, certainly, and to ensure the

          10       welfare of officers and I guess that's based on

          11       historical incidents in the past around the welfare of

          12       police officers that were witnesses to events, as

          13       opposed to criminals, as it were, and to allow the

          14       Independent Police -- the IPCC -- and both the DPS to

          15       investigate and to enable that to happen.

          16   Q.  Help us with accounts.  We, of course, have heard a lot

          17       of evidence about initial accounts and then 48 hours

          18       plus and then full accounts and guidance that we have

          19       seen again and again about the reason for allowing

          20       officers time before they give a full account.

          21           What was the practice if the IPCC was not involved

          22       in post-incident management, was it to have any first

          23       account at all?

          24   A.  In practice in all occasions, whether IPCC or not, in my

          25       experience of doing post-incident procedures -- and




           1       I think from recollection I did five in total -- was

           2       that the same process, which was the Manual of Guidance,

           3       was followed to the letter, as best we could.

           4   Q.  Does that mean there would be a limited first account

           5       and then time before a second?

           6   A.  Absolutely, yes, and the first account was always given

           7       subject to legal advice, as per the manual, and then the

           8       practice was that one would wait 48 hours and then the

           9       more detailed account, subject to legal advice, was

          10       given then, as happened in this case.

          11   Q.  Again, we've heard snippets of what happened and who saw

          12       officers before they gave their first accounts.  Was it

          13       the procedure that they would get legal advice or have

          14       the facility of having legal advice before a first

          15       account?

          16   A.  Absolutely.  That's what the manual says.  It says first

          17       account be given subject to legal advice, it actually

          18       says that in the Manual of Guidance and in this occasion

          19       that's what occurred, I understand.

          20   Q.  Would they have access to a Police Federation

          21       representative before giving a first account?

          22   A.  On this occasion a police firearms representative was

          23       actually on duty and, therefore, I do believe, yes, they

          24       did.

          25   Q.  Was it the practice that if there had been any sort of




           1       violent incident, that there would be access to the

           2       Force Medical Examiner?

           3   A.  Yes, it was something that -- the base room would call

           4       on -- as soon as there had been a discharge of police

           5       firearm and a post-incident procedure was called, then

           6       the base room would call out the FME and the idea was,

           7       the concept was, by the time the officers got back from

           8       the scene that the support services were there -- the

           9       legal advice, the Federation and the medical -- should

          10       an officer require it.

          11   Q.  Was there a -- I don't mean to be rude in calling it

          12       this -- a script for the Post-Incident Manager to use in

          13       warning people about conferring?

          14   A.  Yes, it's not rude to say "script", it was words as per

          15       the Manual of Guidance, which is what I used on the

          16       occasion.

          17   Q.  It's not a memory test, you made a statement in which

          18       it's contained --

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  -- do you happen to have a version of it in front of

          21       you, otherwise we can pull the statement up?

          22   A.  I don't have my own copy I brought up with me.  I was

          23       reliant on the pack, if it's in there.

          24   Q.  Let's pull it up on the screen, it's CS05566.  It's the

          25       final paragraph.  Is this what was taken from the ACPO




           1       guidance:

           2           "As a matter of general practice, officers should

           3       not confer with others before making their indicates

           4       (whether initial or subsequent accounts).  The important

           5       issue is to individually record what their honestly held

           6       belief of the situation was at the time force was used.

           7       There should therefore be no need for an officer to

           8       confer with others about what was in their mind at the

           9       time force was used.  If, however, in a particular case

          10       a need to confer on other issues does arise, then, in

          11       order to ensure transparency and maintain public

          12       confidence, where some discussion has taken place,

          13       officers must document the fact this has taken place,

          14       the issues discussed, with whom, the reasons for

          15       discussion."

          16           Is that the script you would read to officers when

          17       conducting a post-incident procedure?

          18   A.  Yes, it is.

          19   Q.  That is, if I may say so, seems to draw a distinction

          20       between not conferring at all about what was in your own

          21       mind as an officer but conferring about other matters

          22       which you would then need to record; is that fair?

          23   A.  Yes, I'd say that's fair.

          24   Q.  Let's move to 4 August then.  Did you go into action as

          25       the Post-Incident Manager at about 6.30?




           1   A.  Yes.  I received the call on my mobile phone.

           2   Q.  Did you learn that V53 had given an initial account at

           3       the scene to Inspector Elliott?

           4   A.  No, I didn't.  The information -- I do apologise,

           5       I don't have my statement to hand -- but from

           6       recollection, is that I was phoned by the base room

           7       whilst I was on the train, they gave me very scant

           8       information, therefore I got off the train at the next

           9       train stop and came back into London, back to Leman

          10       Street.

          11   Q.  Did you learn about the first account there?

          12   A.  That's when I received the first account in person from

          13       the Inspector who --

          14   Q.  You kept a log, did you not, which we see a manuscript

          15       version of at CD630?

          16   A.  That's correct, sir.  Right at the beginning it was

          17       handwritten and then, after a couple of hours, I was

          18       able to sit down in front of a computer and start

          19       typing, because one of the things you'll see from my

          20       handwriting, it's quite flowery, it's very difficult for

          21       people to read.

          22   Q.  We see at CD621, do we, the computerised version of

          23       that?

          24   A.  Yes, that's correct, yes.

          25   Q.  If we look -- taking CD621 at the entry for 1940 hours,




           1       we see you there saying:

           2           "TST floor."

           3           That's a particular floor in Leman Street, is it?

           4   A.  That's correct.  That's where the particular team

           5       involved in this incident's operation, that is where

           6       they were based, that's where their team room was so

           7       that's where I went.

           8   Q.  Then:

           9           "Met V53."

          10           That's you meeting V53, is it?

          11   A.  That's correct.

          12   Q.  "Did not discussion actions nor did they make comment."

          13           Can you elaborate on that?

          14   A.  One of the things, as a Post-Incident Manager I was

          15       always very keen to point out I was not there to

          16       investigate, I was not there to ask them what they did,

          17       I wasn't there to judge or anything like that.  What

          18       I was there was to facilitate the investigation, to

          19       support them through their welfare, so therefore

          20       I always made a point of saying "How are you, are you

          21       okay?"

          22           I make a point of not talking about what exactly

          23       just happened because I knew they would obviously give

          24       a first account later on and a more detailed account,

          25       subject to legal advice, and anything they said to me




           1       obviously I would have to record and disclose.

           2   Q.  That is recording that you didn't discuss their actions

           3       and them not making any comment to you; is that it?

           4   A.  That's correct, yes.

           5   Q.  Then you record the phone call  from SFO Inspector BE, and

           6       that's Mr Elliott telling you the first account?

           7   A.  Yes, it is.

           8   Q.  Did you then see the other CO19 officers who were

           9       involved?

          10   A.  Yes, I did.  At this time, officers were still at the

          11       scene, still en route from the scene, in other parts of

          12       the police building and one of my jobs as Post-Incident

          13       Manager is to get all of those officers together, to

          14       identify principal officers or those that actually may

          15       not consider themselves to be a principal officer but

          16       may have been affected by this, and I would be able to

          17       look at them and say "Are you okay?" and to get them the

          18       appropriate support if it was required.

          19   Q.  That's a phrase we've heard, "principal officers"; what

          20       was your understanding of its application to this sort

          21       of situation?

          22   A.  If you looked at this particular situation you could

          23       argue -- it varies, there's not a definitive list --

          24       that the primary principal officer is the officer that

          25       was the most affected by what had just happened, ie the




           1       officer that discharged their firearm, in this incident

           2       the officer that had received a round into their radio,

           3       and the officers that had performed first aid on

           4       an individual that had been shot, to potentially the

           5       other officers turning up after that to see that trauma

           6       who may not have witnessed it before, and may have been

           7       adversely impacted by it.  It's not a definitive list

           8       but that's how I would prioritise it initially.

           9   Q.  What's it intended to mean, this phrase "principal

          10       officers"?

          11   A.  It's to identify those officers that the organisation

          12       needs to secure evidence from, be it forensic, be it

          13       statements, witness statements, that actually witnessed

          14       the actual incident itself and have a primary role

          15       within it, say following onto an investigation.

          16   Q.  We know that W70 was standing near V53 when the shots

          17       were fired and he says he saw the gun emerging from

          18       Mr Duggan's jacket.

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  Would that make him a principal officer?

          21   A.  Yes, it would, yes.

          22   Q.  Would his opinion about the use of force therefore be

          23       relevant?

          24   A.  Only from what he saw.  The actual use of force, the

          25       only person that could justify that is the person that




           1       used it.

           2   Q.  Looking at your CD621, picking it up at 2140 entry,

           3       you've got:

           4           "Met IPCC - Lidder/Sparrow - OCU commanders'

           5       office."

           6           Then:

           7           "TST office - introduced IPCC and DPS, Federation in

           8       attendance."

           9           Then you give the initials; that's the Federation

          10       representatives, is it?

          11   A.  That's correct, yes.

          12   Q.  "Conferring of notes explained.  Guidance given.

          13       IPCC/DPS content with explanation."

          14           Is that you saying that you gave your script to the

          15       officers in attendance and that the IPCC and DPS were

          16       content with that?

          17   A.  Yes, sir, they witnessed me giving the actual -- as per

          18       my statement, this is the wording around conferring,

          19       yes.

          20   Q.  Were you present on 7 August when the fuller accounts

          21       were given?

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  Again, did you give that script to the officers before

          24       they got together to write their statements?

          25   A.  Yes, I did.




           1   Q.  You weren't present while they were doing it; would that

           2       be right?

           3   A.  That's correct.  There was no requirement on me as

           4       a Post-Incident Manager to be present whilst the notes

           5       were being done because -- for various reasons: the

           6       first reason is that they were subject to legal advice

           7       and I would not be privy to that; that I actually wasn't

           8       aware of the actions that they had undertaken in any

           9       great detail and nor did I require to need; that there

          10       was a supervisor in there with them; and I was reliant

          11       on obviously the legal representative being there, the

          12       solicitor, the Police Federation.  If I had been there,

          13       it would have not perhaps have been as comfortable for

          14       them, as a senior officer being around, looking over

          15       their shoulder.

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You say a supervisor was there, who

          17       was that?

          18   A.  That would have been one of their Sergeants, sir.

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Right.

          20   A.  But what I did do was, every so often, I would go in,

          21       "Everything okay, do you need anything?"  Because at

          22       that point, when they are doing a detailed account, it's

          23       my job to look after their welfare, as opposed to the

          24       content of the notes they are writing.  I am not there

          25       to look at their statements or assess them for accuracy.




           1       I'm there to say "Do you need anything, can I help you,

           2       do you need transport home?" all those sorts of welfare

           3       issues, making sure they had legal advice, do they

           4       require to see a medic, a doctor, or anything like that.

           5   MR UNDERWOOD:  Thank you very much indeed.  If you wait

           6       there there may be some questions.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, Mr Mansfield?

           8                    Questions by MR MANSFIELD

           9   MR MANSFIELD:  Good afternoon, I represent the family of

          10       Mark Duggan.

          11           The problem over the years, I expect you're aware of

          12       historically, is the problem that you risk serious

          13       contamination of memory and recollection if you allow

          14       people too much opportunity to confer; that's been

          15       a regular problem over the years, hasn't it?

          16   A.  Yes, sir, I would agree with that, sir, yes.

          17   Q.  Yes.  So the objective should be to achieve

          18       an independent recollection, shouldn't it?

          19   A.  That's correct, yes.

          20   Q.  One of the problems with the system you've got at the

          21       moment -- no criticism of you, you understand -- the

          22       system you have at the moment is, of course, that's not

          23       exactly what happens, is it?  Because -- I'll give you

          24       the precise point I want to make.  To begin with,

          25       officers are kept together, aren't they?




           1   A.  That's correct.  The actual Manual of Guidance talks

           2       about officers shouldn't be isolated following the

           3       incident and common practice is as well, absolutely, and

           4       cultural practice is that people stick together -- stay

           5       together.

           6   Q.  Stick together.  One understands you don't want people

           7       isolated because they may feel abandoned or under

           8       pressure or all sorts of things, so you don't want them

           9       isolated but, on the other hand, knowing that you are

          10       dealing with a squad of officers that worked, often as

          11       a squad, comes back as a squad goes into a room as

          12       a squad, you are beginning to provide an environment in

          13       which the risk is that you get a corporate response;

          14       that's the risk, isn't it?

          15   A.  Yes.  There is a potential for that, yes.

          16   Q.  Yes.  Now, in the -- I wonder if it would be desirable

          17       for the jury just to have, unless anybody objects, the

          18       two pages of the ACPO manual that are relevant to note

          19       taking?

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I think it would be useful if they

          21       did.  What paragraphs are you referring to?

          22   MR MANSFIELD:  It's the paragraphs, providing accounts,

          23       which is 7.91, which has not yet been -- I have read it

          24       out to other witnesses --

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Page 117.




           1   MR MANSFIELD:  Yes, sorry, page 117 through to page 118,

           2       where the paragraph that this officer read out is there,

           3       that's 7.96.  We have copies here.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That would be very useful.  Thank

           5       you very much.  We can put that in the jury bundle

           6       behind our next divider.  We have enough, I think, for

           7       everybody.

           8   MR UNDERWOOD:  These will be C18, I think.

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.

          10   MR MANSFIELD:  Thank you very much.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  When we get them, we'll put them

          12       there.

          13   MR MANSFIELD:  There are eight there.  There are two pages.

          14       (Handed)

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  Is there one

          16       for the witness or not?  Actually, let the witness have

          17       mine because I have it open in front of me at the moment

          18       and I'll get it back.  (Handed)

          19           Mr Evans, if you require your statement, I have

          20       a mini bundle of them here in case, but see how we get

          21       on without.

          22   A.  Lovely, thank you, sir.

          23   MR MANSFIELD:  This is C18 for the jury in their bundles.

          24       I am just checking to see if anybody is without it.

          25           If you just kindly look at this so we can put it all




           1       together.  There's only three or four paragraphs I just

           2       want to go through.  In the margin is "Providing

           3       Accounts", at the bottom of page 117.  The paragraph

           4       there, 7.91:

           5           "Where an initial account is made by officers, it

           6       should, subject to any legal advice that they are given,

           7       be made as soon as practicable.  These accounts should

           8       be recorded in writing, timed, dated and signed."

           9           Next paragraph 7.92:

          10           "Each officer's initial account should only consist

          11       of their individual recollection of events and should,

          12       among other things, address the question of what they

          13       believed to be the facts and why, if relevant, they

          14       considered that the use of force and discharge of

          15       firearms was absolutely necessary."

          16           Then just going over the page, 7.93:

          17           "Detailed accounts should not normally be made

          18       immediately, but can be left until the officers involved

          19       in the shooting are better able to articulate their

          20       experience in a coherent format, normally after at least

          21       48 hours."

          22           Then I am not going to read out the next one at 7.94

          23       because you have just read it out today.  So those are

          24       the principal paragraphs relating to recording.

          25           Now, I have these questions.  Can you turn back to




           1       7.92:

           2           "Each officer's initial account should only consist

           3       of their individual recollection of events ..."

           4           Now, subject to the next one, 7.93, there's no real

           5       limit on events.  There's a question about how much

           6       detail, subject to either legal advice or your

           7       condition: you may not be fit enough to give it.  But

           8       other than that, it should only consist of their

           9       individual recollection of events.  I want to ask you

          10       about the next bit:

          11           "... among other things, address the question of

          12       what they believe to be the in facts ..."

          13           That's quite an important exhortation, isn't it, to

          14       somebody writing the note, what they believe to be the

          15       facts?  It goes on:

          16           "... and why, if relevant, they consider that the

          17       use of force and discharge of firearms was absolutely

          18       necessary."

          19           The learned Coroner will no doubt deal with those

          20       words later on.

          21           Now, that last part of this paragraph is really

          22       requesting the note maker to give a recollection of

          23       their belief as to what the facts were -- that's part

          24       one -- and part two is an observation, namely:

          25           "... they considered that the use of force and




           1       discharge of firearms was absolutely necessary."

           2           Two points on that: first of all, that isn't limited

           3       to their own use of force, is it?

           4   A.  (Pause)

           5           My understanding of it would be that that is.  My

           6       understanding is how I would interpret it.

           7   Q.  I appreciate that is an interpretation, and I am not

           8       suggesting you are wrong to have that interpretation,

           9       but that's not actually how it's worded, is it?

          10   A.  No.

          11   Q.  No.

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You agree that especially the word

          13       "each" seems to be indicating that each officer that's

          14       involved in the whole incident --

          15   A.  Absolutely, yes.  Absolutely, I totally agree.

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It just doesn't restrict itself to

          17       even principal officers, let alone the shooter.

          18   MR MANSFIELD:  I don't know, this may not come up, but do

          19       officers -- leave this case aside for the moment -- do

          20       officers ever ask you about that?  If they did, would

          21       you give advice or do you just leave that?  How is it

          22       dealt with?

          23   A.  I would never give advice as a Post-Incident Manager in

          24       relation to their initial account, which has been

          25       subject to legal advice.  The legal advice would --




           1       well, the legal advice comes first, in my opinion.  But

           2       we wouldn't always necessary use the post-incident

           3       procedures just for firearms incidents, I hasten to add,

           4       they are used for other police incidents of

           5       a significant nature where they would not be subject

           6       necessarily to legal advice.

           7           Maybe somebody who's died in a car accident, or

           8       something like that.  They can be used nationally, other

           9       forces use it differently.  But certainly in the Met we

          10       use it for firearms, predominantly, but I would never

          11       give advice around the content of the initial account at

          12       all and nor have I.

          13   Q.  Sorry, I'm not suggesting you ever would do that.  It's

          14       if an officer sat down -- we have had it in this

          15       particular case, some earlier witnesses who I asked

          16       about this -- some obviously thought it did apply

          17       generally to people using force in their presence,

          18       others restricted it to themselves using force.  So

          19       there's obviously a margin of appreciation or

          20       non-appreciation, do you follow --

          21   A.  I do, yes.

          22   Q.  -- in the way this is put?  If that question arose, as

          23       to "Am I supposed to be talking about myself or the

          24       whole group?" you wouldn't get involved even in that?

          25   A.  No, I wouldn't.




           1   Q.  No, all right.  We have read the next paragraph:

           2           "Detailed accounts should not normally be made

           3       immediately ..."

           4           I don't know whether you can help me, maybe again

           5       you don't get yourself involved in this, but this

           6       paragraph isn't prohibiting a detailed account, it's

           7       just recommending that, particularly in the case of

           8       somebody who may have been emotionally upset, disturbed,

           9       physically affected, might need more time.  But if you

          10       haven't been, you can still do your account then, can't

          11       you?

          12   A.  Very much so, and everyone is affected by different

          13       significant impacts differently, and certainly the

          14       national policing experience which formulates this

          15       document has come to and formed the opinion that

          16       48 hours is the normal time that officers would then go

          17       on to do their detailed accounts.

          18           I mean, you could flip it, I guess, I know it's not

          19       a question you have asked, in relation to what about the

          20       general public, if they have witnessed a significant

          21       effect -- event.  Certainly, those involved in serious

          22       sexual assault, victims, and the witnesses too, would

          23       often be ABE'd, which would be some time after the

          24       event.  So it's a similar thing.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  "ABE"?  Explain to the jury what




           1       that means.

           2   A.  Achieving Best Evidence.  You would sit down and talk

           3       through the incident and it would be done over a long

           4       period of time and, ordinarily, a time after the event,

           5       predominantly 48 hours, in my personal experience in

           6       dealing with such investigations.

           7           So 48 hours is a -- is based on experience over

           8       years, how many years I don't know, and that's the

           9       recommendation from ACPO and that's the guidance we are

          10       required to follow.

          11   MR MANSFIELD:  I understand it as a rule of thumb but it's

          12       not a rigid application, is it?

          13   A.  No, no.  I mean for example, depending on the time of

          14       the actual event, the 48 hours or there or thereabouts.

          15       So, for example, this happened on the Thursday, the

          16       evening of the Thursday and on the Sunday the officers

          17       came to give their detailed account.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Monday, actually, they did it on the

          19       8th, didn't they?

          20   MR MANSFIELD:  They did it on the 7th.  So there's a gap

          21       here.  What I'm trying to get -- I think you have

          22       agreed -- basically it's a guidance but actually, if

          23       somebody feels capable of writing it in a little more

          24       detail and there's no suggestion of what the parameters

          25       of a detailed account -- they are not there, are they?




           1   A.  No, that's right, yes.  If someone was so insistent --

           2   Q.  So it's a very subjective situation, even now?

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  Just one stage further on this, and again, if it's

           5       beyond your remit, I'm sure you'll say.

           6           Is there any manual that you're aware of that says

           7       you shouldn't specify -- I'll give you the example.

           8       An officer hears two shots and clearly only hears two

           9       shots.  There isn't a problem about putting that in

          10       an initial account, is there?

          11   A.  That would be dependent on the legal advice given --

          12   Q.  Well --

          13   A.  -- and the factors and circumstances, I guess -- I'm

          14       surmising here -- around what's actually happened.  So

          15       every circumstance would be different.

          16   Q.  Yes, but the whole point about an initial account is to

          17       give a truthful recollection at that point of what you

          18       can remember, isn't it?

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  Of course, you would be able to say to your legal

          21       advisor, "Look, I'm not up to it at the moment, in fact

          22       I haven't got a clue how many shots were fired so

          23       I think it's better I don't put anything in, in fact

          24       it's better I don't make a detailed" -- you know that

          25       sort of conversation could take place, can't it?




           1   A.  Yes, it could and it would do.

           2   Q.  It's a bit odd for somebody to write "2" and then cross

           3       it out, isn't it?

           4   A.  Yes, but -- if that was the case, yes.

           5   Q.  That's what's happened in this case.

           6   A.  I don't know the content of any initial accounts, so --

           7   Q.  What is being suggested, and we are yet to hear whether

           8       this exists, is that firearms officers in particular are

           9       given some sort of training/instruction that they

          10       actually in their initial accounts perhaps shouldn't be

          11       putting in that kind of detail; are you aware of

          12       anything like that?

          13   A.  No, no, I'm not a firearms officer, so I've never had

          14       that training to be -- to know if that's the case.

          15   Q.  Have you ever had that drawn to your attention?

          16   A.  No.

          17   Q.  Then could we have on screen, please, CD0054.  It isn't

          18       your EAB but I'm sure you're familiar with an evidence

          19       and actions book --

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  -- if you like, a police notebook.  Initial accounts in

          22       this case, probably in many other cases, are often

          23       written up into something like this, are they not?

          24   A.  They are, yes, that's correct.

          25   Q.  This is just an example, and so everybody knows whose it




           1       is, it's W56.  We have had his evidence, but this is

           2       a page from his book.  It's the printed paragraph, do

           3       you see:

           4           "It is essential that you record a complete

           5       account ..."

           6           Do you see that?

           7   A.  Yes, I see that, yes.

           8   Q.  "... of events.  It is intended to protect you from

           9       needless civil action or complaint investigation.  You

          10       must follow the following guidelines."

          11           Then they are set out:

          12           "Your notes will be subject to close scrutiny.  You

          13       may confer with other officers who were present for

          14       an overview, but these notes are to assist your

          15       recollection."

          16           You're obviously familiar with this because this is

          17       a general practice throughout the United Kingdom, to

          18       have a notebook like this.

          19           Now, how does that, if you're able to say, as it

          20       were, fit into the advice that's being given in those

          21       paragraphs from ACPO?

          22   A.  This question has been asked before of me.

          23   Q.  I'm sure it has.

          24   A.  The answer, from recollection that I gave, was that the

          25       EAB is used for everything from theft of sweets to this




           1       incident.  Therefore, whilst it's written on there, it's

           2       guidance and, in this occasion, the ACPO manual would

           3       supersede the EAB in this particular instance, but not

           4       in every case, is my understanding.

           5   Q.  Yes.  I appreciate that may be your understanding.  But

           6       again, since -- we are guided by what police officers

           7       are guided by, if you know what I mean: protocols

           8       guidelines and so on.

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  Is that actually in any kind of guidance for police,

          11       that when it comes to firearms officers, dealing with

          12       this kind of incident, the ACPO guidelines supersede

          13       what's at the front of their -- every single EAB in the

          14       country?

          15   A.  No, no, I've never seen that written down, no.

          16   Q.  You don't say anything in your warning when you see the

          17       officers at Leman Street --

          18   A.  No, not in relation to that, no.

          19   Q.  -- about the relationship between the two?

          20   A.  No, I don't.

          21   MR MANSFIELD:  Yes, thank you very much.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, Mr Thomas?

          23                      Questions by MR THOMAS

          24   MR THOMAS:  A few questions if I may.  Leslie Thomas,

          25       I represent the loved ones of Mark Duggan.




           1           I would like to go through, if I may, a little bit

           2       about the procedure that was followed that night.  You

           3       were the Post-Incident Manager.

           4   A.  That's correct, yes.

           5   Q.  So when all the officers got back to Leman Street Police

           6       Station, you were tasked with ensuring that they gave

           7       their first accounts?

           8   A.  To a point.  I wouldn't phrase it quite like that.  My

           9       job was to ensure and facilitate them going to one place

          10       to have their legal advice, have their welfare, to

          11       provide an environment that they could provide a first

          12       account.

          13   Q.  Exactly.

          14   A.  I wasn't there to say "Provide a first account or you

          15       are not going home".

          16   Q.  No.  What you did is, if they felt up to it --

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  -- you organised where they provided their -- the rooms

          19       where they provided their first accounts?

          20   A.  That's correct, yes.

          21   Q.  Okay.  A couple of questions arising out of that.

          22       Firstly, there is a franking machine, a time stamp

          23       machine, isn't there, at Leman Street, so when officers

          24       complete their notes, the notes are time stamped?

          25   A.  Yes.




           1   Q.  Can you explain to the jury, just so they understand,

           2       what is the rationale behind time stamping your notes?

           3   A.  Sir, the rationale for timing any notes, not just this

           4       instance but any instance is that after, for example,

           5       you bring a person you have arrested or you have dealt

           6       with in an incident, you have made your notes and it

           7       actually identifies the time, date and place where you

           8       actually physically made them, so you haven't made them

           9       three or four days down the line.  So it's open, honest

          10       and transparent in the investigative process.

          11   Q.  You time stamp your notes, the key word you used is

          12       "transparency", so that after you've completed your

          13       notes you should go and get them time stamped?

          14   A.  Yes, yes.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  They are stamped on top of the print

          16       you have written, not just on a blank page, either?

          17   A.  It's like an old fashioned -- when people used to book

          18       in and out, you push it in and --

          19   MR THOMAS:  It's like a franking machine?

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  I'm going to come back to the franking in one moment,

          22       I'm going to put that on the shelf, if I may.  The next

          23       question I want to ask you about -- again, with this

          24       process -- these officers, who went in to write their

          25       notes up, if they felt able to, if they were conferring




           1       on any issues, if they felt the need to confer, again

           2       use of your word "transparency" -- they should have

           3       document that had within their initial account,

           4       "I conferred on the following matters", correct?

           5   A.  Yes, that's correct.

           6   Q.  All right.  If we don't see that in the notebooks, if

           7       there's no mention of the fact that I felt the need to

           8       confer on X, Y and Z matters, then we can read into

           9       that, can we, if the process is meant to be transparent,

          10       that the officers didn't confer; would that follow?

          11   A.  Yes, that would follow.

          12   Q.  Right.  Now, you took the decision to put the firearms

          13       officers all in one room.

          14   A.  That's correct, I did.

          15   Q.  Why was that?

          16   A.  It followed on from the training I had received during

          17       my PIM manager's course.  That was what was instructed

          18       to us, and also in any CO19, or SCO19 as it is now,

          19       firearms operation Leman Street is always designated as

          20       part of the briefing -- would be the post-incident

          21       procedure station that people would go to.  It was

          22       recognised that note making was always made in the

          23       report writing room and that the SLT offices would be

          24       used by DPS --

          25   Q.  Sorry, the SLT?




           1   A.  The senior management team, senior leadership team

           2       offices would be used for doing the forensic or count

           3       backs of firearms.  So each office -- basically the

           4       police station, different offices that had normal

           5       daytime function, would suddenly have a post-incident

           6       function, where they cease being Chief Inspector of

           7       Operations office and become an office that DPS would

           8       use whilst they are doing the PIP.  Posters are put on

           9       the door, nothing more.

          10   Q.  Mr Evans, my question, you may have answered it, if you

          11       have, I apologise, but my question was: why was the

          12       decision taken to put all the firearms officers together

          13       in one room apart from V53, because we know he was kept

          14       separate?

          15   A.  The firearms officers are put into the briefing room

          16       once they all got back to Leman Street.  That was to

          17       enable me to speak to them in relation to conferring for

          18       the IPCC and DPS to see them as well.  It's a police

          19       station that also the SCD8, the Trident officers came

          20       back to as well and they were kept in the canteen.  It

          21       was also a 24/7 police station, there were other police

          22       officers around, carrying out other policing functions,

          23       not in relation to this policing activity.  So --

          24   Q.  Sorry, for interrupting you, I am not making -- my

          25       question is not clear: I'm talking about when they made




           1       their notes up.  Right.  We know that -- we have heard

           2       evidence from firearms officer after firearms officer

           3       that, between the hours of 11 to roughly midnight, they

           4       were all together writing up their notes.  My question

           5       is: why did you put all the firearms officers together

           6       to write up their notes?

           7   A.  Right, okay.  So obviously part of the issues of being

           8       a Post-Incident Manager is to make sure it's an open and

           9       honest, transparent process.  One of the ways for me to

          10       ensure that, because I don't have the ability to sit

          11       there watching over their shoulder while they are making

          12       their notes, was to ensure there is a supervisor, which

          13       there was -- in their presence, which there was --

          14   Q.  Their Sergeant?

          15   A.  -- yes -- their legal advisor was there, which he was,

          16       that the Federation was there, which they were --

          17   Q.  That's their trade union?

          18   A.  -- which they were, and reliance on the professionalism

          19       of the officers, who the public, the Commissioner,

          20       entrust to carry firearms in difficult circumstances and

          21       other police officers who don't carry firearms are

          22       trusted to do their notes together in other police

          23       stations and, in this particular instance, if you were

          24       saying -- or leading down the way of saying, well,

          25       actually by me putting them into the one room they are




           1       able to confer and make up a story, no I don't believe

           2       that to be the case.

           3   Q.  Sorry, my question was an open question, it wasn't

           4       a question that was leading anywhere, but it was

           5       a question you were asked in a different place, in

           6       a different trial -- at the Hutchinson-Foster trial.

           7       Can I remind you of the evidence you gave at that trial

           8       when you were asked that very same question?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  CHF page 3806, I wonder if that could be put up on the

          11       screen, if it could just be enlarged at letter D.  You

          12       see in questioning by Mr Denney, who was representing

          13       Mr Hutchinson-Foster, you were asked this question.

          14           He puts it to you:

          15           "Question: So the rationale is not to get

          16       everybody's heads together, is it?

          17           "Answer: No it's not.  (Pause)

          18           "Question: These officers are a close knit team, are

          19       they not?

          20           "Answer: Yes, they were.  But no more so than other

          21       police officers and it's normal practice in any policing

          22       incident that the officers would confer to a point

          23       following an incident to clarify important operational

          24       detail, such as these officers did, in relation to

          25       briefings, call signs, use of vehicles, as it's such




           1       a complex incident at the time, in relation to the

           2       policing matters."

           3           So this is the explanation that you are giving,

           4       you're saying it's a complex incident, they need to --

           5       there are certain things they need to confer upon and

           6       you mention those.  Mr Denney puts this to you:

           7           "Question: Such a complex incident?  Is that right?

           8           "Answer: That's correct, and what I mean by that is,

           9       at the time, there was not just one or two police

          10       officers that perhaps would attend, say a shoplifting,

          11       but this was a complex policing operation that involved

          12       SCD8 ..."

          13           That's Trident, isn't it?

          14   A.  That's correct, yes.

          15   Q.  "... SCD11 ..."

          16           That's the specific surveillance officers, correct?

          17   A.  That's correct, yes.

          18   Q.  "... CO19 ..."

          19           That's the firearms officers, yes?

          20   A.  That's correct, yes.

          21   Q.  "... various vehicles.  For a single officer to remember

          22       in their statement what they were doing in relation to

          23       call signs is very difficult.  So there is a need for

          24       them to check and confer details they'd be unaware of."

          25           Pause there.  So if I've understood your evidence




           1       that you were giving on oath in the criminal trial, you

           2       were saying the need to confer arises because you've got

           3       not just one division, firearms, you've got

           4       surveillance, you've got Trident, you've got all these

           5       different officers; they need to confer, they need to

           6       make sure they get these details, like call signs, and

           7       so forth, correct; is that what you were saying?

           8   A.  I can only go by what I said there, I was on oath and

           9       that's absolutely correct what it says there, yes.

          10   Q.  So, let me come back to my question.  Bearing in mind

          11       this complex operation involving many different

          12       divisions, I ask you again: why did you put just the

          13       firearms officers together in a room?  Why didn't you

          14       have, say, the surveillance officers with them or

          15       Trident officers with them.  Why just the firearms

          16       officers all together in one room.  Can you answer that,

          17       please?

          18   A.  Okay.  I guess I can, partly in way of answering that in

          19       context, I've never done a post-incident procedure

          20       that's involved other officers from other commands, so

          21       in every post-incident procedure that I had done,

          22       previously to this one, all the firearms officers had

          23       always been put in the same room, even when those

          24       officers weren't in the same room, and obviously looking

          25       at the evidence that was put before me there, I recall




           1       on the evening that at Leman Street it was very busy, it

           2       was very full, as I said previously, as you asked

           3       questions earlier on, but I would still, even if all

           4       those people were not there, the common practice was and

           5       the common practice I would have done would have still

           6       put them in the same room whether -- am I making myself

           7       clear?

           8   Q.  Well, that's for the jury to judge.

           9   A.  The rationale for that is because, yes, it's about the

          10       complexity, because that was the question that was asked

          11       at the time.  Yes, it was about making sure the officer

          12       isn't isolated.  Yes, it's about making sure that

          13       officers are supervised.  Yes, it's about making sure

          14       they have the legal advice that they need.  Yes, it's

          15       about the Federation, or trade union as you call them,

          16       are there to represent them, to do their detailed

          17       accounts, subject to legal advice, so it's all those

          18       things.

          19   Q.  Sorry.  Bearing in mind your own evidence about complex

          20       matters, why not have all of the officers, Trident,

          21       surveillance, firearms together?  Why have just the

          22       firearms officers together?  That's what I'm asking you.

          23   A.  Purely practically.  The room was far too small to do

          24       that, even if I had tried to.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The other thing is, which I'm sure




           1       Mr Thomas is -- you could always have them separate and

           2       apart, on their own, couldn't you?

           3   A.  What, the firearms officers, sir?

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes.  Each police officer on their

           5       own somewhere.

           6   A.  The practicalities of that would be very difficult.  For

           7       example, they wouldn't have, necessarily, the access

           8       they needed all the time doing their notes to legal

           9       advice.  I cannot recall how many officers there were

          10       but I think there was about 11, from memory.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Let me suggest this: you're the

          12       Post-Incident Manager, you have to say the words, you

          13       have told us, to these police officers, "As a matter of

          14       general practice, officers should not confer".  You have

          15       to say that.

          16   A.  That's correct, sir.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Not anybody else.  You say it

          18       because you're the manager.  But then you leave the

          19       room.

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Why didn't you stay in the room to

          22       make sure they follow your instructions through?

          23   A.  Well, sir, I had, as part of my remit as Post Incident

          24       Manager, there were other things I had to be doing as

          25       well as.




           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  What are these things you're doing?

           2   A.  To ensure -- for the DPS to make sure the firearms --

           3       the count back of firearms and rounds, the retrieval of

           4       any duty states, sorting out anonymity issues, if there

           5       were any, the -- ensuring the doctor turns up, liaising

           6       with the DPS, what they require of me, and the IPCC --

           7   MR THOMAS:  Can I jump in.  The doctor had turned up before

           8       and had seen V53 before this incident -- before they

           9       were writing up their notes.

          10   A.  It would not just be V53 that would have access to the

          11       medical opportunities, it would be other officers who

          12       would require it.

          13   Q.  Sorry, that doesn't work, forgive me, for this reason.

          14       Because all of the officers, all the firearms officers,

          15       were seeing -- were doing their notes together, so they

          16       weren't seeing the doctor then, were they?

          17   A.  No, no, no.  Going back to your question, sir, you were

          18       saying why couldn't they be in different rooms --

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  My question, not just to you: you're

          20       the manager, you have got this particular supervisory

          21       role whereby it's you, not anybody else, but you who

          22       reads out this "don't confer".  But then you say,

          23       "Right, I trust everybody, I'll leave the room", go off

          24       and do something else.

          25   A.  Which is what I did.




           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Why don't you, if you are concerned

           2       enough to say that in your position, "Stay in the room";

           3       you don't have to do anything, you just sit in a corner.

           4       It's a bit like, I suppose, on University Challenge, "No

           5       conferring, please", and, "Get on with your own

           6       account".  Why can't you do that?

           7   A.  Because I rely on the officers' responsibility and their

           8       professional -- the officer's personal individual

           9       professionalism, which is --

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Why do you need to say that then?

          11       Why don't you just say, "You know the ACPO guidance,

          12       follow it"?

          13   A.  Because it was important that I followed ACPO guidance

          14       as best I could --

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You had to read that out?

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   MR THOMAS:  This is just lip service then?

          18   A.  No, no.  I believe in the guidance in the manual, it's

          19       there for a reason, through tried and tested cases

          20       previously, and it was important I read it out.

          21   Q.  Mr Evans, you have just told us this process needs to be

          22       transparent.  You are the manager.  This is your

          23       responsibility, is it not?

          24   A.  Absolutely.

          25   Q.  So why did you leave the room?




           1   A.  Because I trusted those officers, I relied on their

           2       individual professionalism.  There was a supervisor

           3       there, there was a legal representative there and there

           4       was a member of the Police Federation and I was more

           5       than comfortable that those officers, if there was any

           6       conferring taking place, it would be accurately

           7       recorded.  And, part of that warning, and obviously that

           8       I have mentioned to the officers, is in relation to if

           9       any of them felt that any of the process wasn't

          10       transparent and wasn't okay, that they would raise it.

          11   Q.  Help me with this: whose responsibility, I'm going to

          12       ask you, is it yours, to ensure that the officers follow

          13       the correct procedures, for instance such as franking

          14       their notebooks, as soon as practicable after they've

          15       completed their notes.  Whose responsibility is that?

          16   A.  The supervisor, but ultimately it is the PIM; that would

          17       be me.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The supervisor, we have not put

          19       a name or number on him or her; who was it?  V56 or was

          20       it someone else?

          21   A.  I don't know, sir.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  V59, sorry.

          23           Might there be a difference as to whether the

          24       supervisor was also one of the officers who was involved

          25       in the incident or should the supervisor be someone




           1       who's completely separate from the incident?

           2   A.  No, no, it can be a person involved or it can be someone

           3       separate.

           4   MR THOMAS:  Can I be clear?  The supervisor -- in this

           5       transparent process, where you leave the room; the

           6       supervisor was one of the officers involved in the

           7       incident?  Is that what you're saying?

           8   A.  Potentially.  I know there was a Sergeant there, yes.

           9       I don't recall the detail of the individual, but there

          10       would have been a team supervisor there.

          11   Q.  You must have it noted who you had as supervisor because

          12       you are telling us that one of the reasons why you felt

          13       confident to leave the room was because there was

          14       a supervisor there.  So who was the supervisor, tell us?

          15   A.  I don't recall.

          16   Q.  Don't you have any notes with you?

          17   A.  No I don't, because I was relying on the pack.

          18   Q.  You will have it noted somewhere, won't you?

          19   A.  It would be on my log, if it's there.

          20   Q.  Right, so we can check that?

          21   A.  If I have noted it, yes.

          22   Q.  We can call you back to answer that if need be?

          23   A.  Yes, if it's in my notes.

          24   Q.  Your recollection is -- and we'll run with your

          25       recollection for the time being -- that the person you




           1       left to supervise them was one of the officers involved

           2       in the incident?

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  How is that transparent?

           5   A.  Well, again, I point out the fact that I have to rely on

           6       the officer's personal individual professionalism.  They

           7       are tasked in high risk environments to carry firearms

           8       and they are trusted by the public to do so, to do their

           9       job --

          10   Q.  I accept all of that, but the problem is, Mr Evans, do

          11       you not see the whole purpose about a transparent system

          12       is that, when something like this happens, so that the

          13       officers are said -- cannot be criticised, you don't

          14       have a barrister like me standing up saying, "Why did

          15       you do this", you have somebody outside the actual

          16       event, somebody who's said to be independent of the

          17       events carrying out the supervision.  Do you not see

          18       that?  Or did that not cross your mind?

          19   A.  No.  I see exactly where you're coming from but I was,

          20       and still am, content with the decision I made on the

          21       evening.

          22   Q.  You would do the same?

          23   A.  Yes, I would.

          24   Q.  Let me move on.  Again, looking at your transparent

          25       system, can I just run through just some times with you.




           1       If anybody wants to follow, I will give the page

           2       numbers, but I want to go through just some of the

           3       timings to see whether or not these timings trouble you.

           4           The first timing I want to go through is the one

           5       officer -- the one officer who writes his notes on his

           6       own is V53, the shooter, okay?  You accept that?

           7   A.  Yes, accept that, yes.

           8   Q.  All right.  Did you know that the shooter, who has the

           9       most to justify, because he's the one who actually uses

          10       the force, discharges the force, kills Mr Duggan; do you

          11       know how long it took him to write his notes up?  Do you

          12       have any idea?

          13   A.  His initial notes?

          14   Q.  This is his initial report, initial account, the EAB.

          15   A.  No, I have no idea, no.

          16   Q.  He started his notes, and I'll give the reference for

          17       those who wish to follow.  The reference is at CD

          18       page 5.  He starts his notes at 22.40 and finishes his

          19       notes at 22.50.  It took him ten minutes.  Do you

          20       follow?

          21   A.  Yes, yes.

          22   Q.  The person with the most to say, the most justification,

          23       right, he's on his own and it takes him ten minutes to

          24       write his notes up.  You know how long it took him to

          25       find the franking machine?  His notes are franked within




           1       two minutes.  We can see that at page 8.  Do you see

           2       that?  His notes are franked at 22.52, within two

           3       minutes of him writing his notes up.

           4           Now, that's because the franking machine is fairly

           5       near and easily accessible; correct?

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  That's how it should be, isn't it?  You write your notes

           8       up, they are not particularly long notes, you go and get

           9       your notes franked straight away; correct?

          10   A.  That's -- yes.

          11   Q.  That's the procedure?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  Let me run through.  The other officers, who all write

          14       their notes together, and let's look at the times they

          15       take.

          16           Let me start next with V59.  Now, he starts his

          17       notes at 23.22, and we can see that at page 11.  Yes?

          18       He says that he completes his notes at 00.10, we can see

          19       that right at the top of the page; do you see that?

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  So he's taken, what, nearly -- what's that, 50 minutes

          22       or so?

          23   A.  Yes, that's correct.

          24   Q.  His notes are stamped at 0.14, so within four minutes of

          25       him completing his notes.  That's the first thing.




           1           Let's look at the next officer, W39, page 14 of the

           2       bundle.  We can see that at page 16, at the top, he

           3       starts his notes at 23.00.  He finishes his notes at

           4       23.30.  It takes him 21 minutes to get to the franking

           5       machine, because he doesn't frank his notes until 23.51.

           6           It shouldn't take 21 minutes to walk to the franking

           7       machine, should it?

           8   A.  No.  No, it shouldn't do, but I can't --

           9   Q.  You see, what I'm going to suggest, one reason is maybe

          10       the officers were sharing their notes; do you follow?

          11       Do you understand what I mean?  "Have a look at my

          12       notes, here are my notes"; that is one reason that might

          13       explain delay.  Do you follow?

          14   A.  Yes, I understand what you're saying.

          15   Q.  Let's look at the next one, W70.  Sorry, forgive me,

          16       W42.

          17           Let's have a look at W42.  He starts his notes --

          18       this is page 22 in the bundle -- at 23.30.  Do you see

          19       that?

          20   A.  Yes, I see that.

          21   Q.  He hasn't put in his completion time.  That's not

          22       standard, is it?  The officers should put when they

          23       complete their notes, shouldn't they?

          24   A.  That's correct, that's an omission on his part, yes.

          25   Q.  You see, he doesn't get his notes franked until 0.15.




           1       It's upside down but it's 0.15; can you just about make

           2       that out?

           3   A.  Yes, I can.

           4   Q.  Let's look at W70.  We can see his witness statement at

           5       page 28.  Can you see this: he starts his notes at 22.58

           6       and finishes his notes at 23.55.  It takes him nearly

           7       an hour.  I've made this point with each of these

           8       officers, you know; I have put to them why did it take

           9       you nearly an hour to write eight sentences.  When it

          10       comes to franking his notes, he franks his notes at six

          11       minutes past.  It takes him 11 minutes to walk to the

          12       franking machine.

          13           Next officer, R31.  Again, R31, we can see at

          14       page 32, he hasn't filled in the start time.  Sorry,

          15       forgive me, he's filled in the start time on page 33.

          16       11.05, right at the top; do you see that?

          17   A.  Yes, I do, yes.

          18   Q.  He finishes his notes at 11.40.  We can see he's

          19       actually written it in in hand at the top of that page;

          20       do you see if we just zoom in on that, please.  Right at

          21       the top, it says "end" and he's written "11.40"; can you

          22       see that?

          23   A.  Yes, I can.

          24   Q.  But it takes him something like 35 minutes to make his

          25       way to the franking machine, because he doesn't get to




           1       the franking machine until 0.15.  What's that, 35

           2       minutes, something like that?

           3           Next officer, R68.  He starts his notes at 22.58; we

           4       see this at page 39.  He finishes his notes at 23.41,

           5       again three-quarters of an hour for a few sentences, and

           6       he doesn't get to the franking machine until 0.15.  We

           7       see that at page 41.

           8           I will just complete the picture.  Q63, page 42, he

           9       starts his notes at 11 o'clock and finishes his notes at

          10       11.30.  We can see this at page 44.  He gets to the

          11       franking machine at 23.36, so it takes him six minutes

          12       to get to the franking machine.

          13           Next one, page 47, which is V72, he starts his

          14       notes, on page 49, at 23.20 and finishes his notes at

          15       23.40.  It takes him -- he doesn't get to the franking

          16       machine until 0.16, so it takes him nearly 35 minutes to

          17       get to the franking machine.

          18           Nearly there.  W56, page 52, page 54; he starts his

          19       notes at 22.50 and finishes his notes at 23.10.  He gets

          20       to the franking machine at 23.36.  It takes him 26

          21       minutes to get to the franking machine.

          22           Then V48, he starts his notes at 23.00; we can see

          23       that at page 59.  He finishes his notes at 23.50.

          24           Sorry, Mr Scott, I know I'm going a bit fast.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Sorry, who is this one?




           1   MR THOMAS:  This is V48.  He gets to the franking machine at

           2       0.16.  We can see that on page 61, a little bit

           3       obscured, but it takes him 26 minutes to get to the

           4       franking machine.

           5           What is going on if you are supervising these

           6       officers?  Why is it taking all of these officers, apart

           7       from the odd one, so long to get to the franking

           8       machine?  What is happening?  Where is the transparency?

           9       Help us.

          10   A.  Sorry, is that a question or --

          11   Q.  Yes, it is a question.  You're the supervisor --

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That's your opportunity to tell us

          13       what you want to.

          14   A.  Thank you, sir.

          15           Mr Thomas, as I say, you have asked the question of

          16       the officers themselves, I am not privy to the answers

          17       they gave.  So I cannot tell you what they did and why

          18       there is a difference in the time, but you are quite

          19       right to point out that actually, as a Post-Incident

          20       Manager, should I have known, from the period of time

          21       they finished their notes to when they actually franked

          22       them, in hindsight potentially, but it depends on what

          23       I was doing at the time and I guess, if the officers

          24       have finished their notes, they maybe -- I don't know

          25       because I was not in that room -- talking to legal




           1       advice or the Federation.  I cannot give you the answer

           2       to say what they were doing because I don't know.

           3   Q.  Mr Evans, forgive me, how many police shootings have you

           4       supervised?

           5   A.  Five.

           6   Q.  Right.  So you know the importance of these?

           7   A.  Absolutely, yes.

           8   Q.  So you know, having -- if you understand the expression,

           9       this was certainly not something you were green to; do

          10       you understand what I mean by "green to"?

          11   A.  Absolutely.  I mean, I had been through the process

          12       before.

          13   Q.  You had been through the process.  This is completely

          14       unacceptable, isn't it?

          15   A.  Again, it would depend on the answer that they gave you

          16       when you asked them the question.

          17   Q.  I'm asking you as the supervisor, you have no

          18       explanation for this jury as to what those officers you

          19       were supervising are doing; is that right?

          20   A.  Currently, not knowing what their answer would be

          21       I cannot turn and say that was acceptable or not

          22       acceptable.  If I spoke to an officer who had

          23       potentially a half-hour delay and said "Okay, you

          24       finished your notes, then what did you do?" "Actually

          25       there was a delay for me leaving where I was to go to




           1       where I was, was because of this reason".  I might think

           2       "That's plausible, that's okay, that's fine".  They may

           3       have been spoken to by the IPCC, the DPS, the

           4       Federation, legal -- I don't know.  I can't give you

           5       that answer, I'm afraid.

           6   Q.  Forgive me.  If there was a good reason for there being

           7       a delay from when they end the notes until when they

           8       frank it, that should be recorded on the notebook

           9       itself; that's a transparent system?

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Do you agree with that?

          11   A.  Yes, in --

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I think that was a question put;

          13       would you agree with that?

          14   A.  Yes, I would, sir, yes.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Obviously you would agree that it

          16       would be quite wrong for, say, V53's notebook, which was

          17       finished so much earlier and franked, to be shown to

          18       other officers before they make their notes?

          19   A.  Absolutely.  In fact, no officers should be -- I cannot

          20       remember your exact comment, Mr Thomas, shown or

          21       conferring to show each other the notes.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That would be quite wrong?

          23   A.  That would not be proper, no.

          24   MR THOMAS:  That's all I ask.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Did you actually do a separate




           1       warning for V53 then?

           2   A.  I would have to refer to my -- I think I probably did

           3       a group one and an individual one, from memory, but

           4       I would have to check my notes.

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you, Mr Thomas.  Anything

           6       else?  No.

           7           Let's see, I think Mr Stern perhaps is next?

           8                      Questions by MR STERN

           9   MR STERN:  I will ask you one or two questions.  First of

          10       all, the time, 48 hours, from which an officer is

          11       entitled to take, bearing in mind there's been

          12       a traumatic incident, is that based on some expert

          13       medical evidence, as far as you're concerned?

          14   A.  I actually don't know the answer to that.  I can surmise

          15       and say it's through experience of policing nationally,

          16       through firearms incidents, that the people that are

          17       involved in putting together these manuals have come to,

          18       by looking at these various cases before and incidents,

          19       and come up with that 48-hour time period, that's all

          20       I can say.

          21           But I am aware that perceptional distortion issues

          22       around firearms officers has been undertaking some work

          23       and that would shed a greater light on it and I think

          24       potentially this Inquest may have some access to that,

          25       which would help in that particular question.  But




           1       overall, my understanding is it's been from police

           2       experience.

           3   Q.  You have told us that, obviously, the officers are

           4       professional individuals and they are entitled to make

           5       notes on their own and in the same room without causing

           6       you or any other senior officer any difficulty?

           7   A.  That's correct, sir, that happens all around the country

           8       in every policing incident, be it an incident such as

           9       this, or anything.  The officers will sit in what is

          10       called a report writing.  The police provide a report,

          11       called a report writing room, where you sit and write

          12       reports, yes.

          13   Q.  There are lots of ways of cheating, if one wants to

          14       cheat.  People manage in exams all the time, if they

          15       wanted to.  But you could write a time, get it franked

          16       and then write your notes later on, anything like that?

          17   A.  Absolutely.  In any situation, you could get any

          18       instance that any individual, be it a police officer or

          19       not, wants to confer or make up a story.  It isn't just

          20       officers put in one room with an supervisor, with

          21       a Federation rep, a legal advisor.  There are myriad of

          22       opportunities both before and afterwards.

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Usually we are talking about police

          24       officers being witnesses and we are not concerned with

          25       the Police Federation.




           1   A.  Absolutely.

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  But here, these particular

           3       paragraphs are concerned where there's an independent

           4       investigation, typically from the IPCC; that's what this

           5       particular --

           6   MR STERN:  It would not prevent them being witnesses,

           7       I don't think, if I may say so.  They are still

           8       witnesses.

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It's a halfway house, in a way,

          10       because they are a subject to an investigation, aren't

          11       they?

          12   A.  Not always, sir.  The process we follow here would be

          13       for every post-incident procedure, which may or may not

          14       be an investigation by the IPCC or DPS.  It might well

          15       be where there's been a accidental discharge of

          16       a firearm, for example, where there's been no fatality,

          17       no injury, but it's sufficient for us to think we need

          18       to call a post-incident procedure to seize items, to

          19       officers (?) who made the accidental discharge.

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  In every day life, police officers

          21       don't get legal advice before they make witness

          22       statements, do they?

          23   A.  No, they don't but they can access it if they so wish.

          24   MR STERN:  The procedure set out in the ACPO manual, and my

          25       learned friend Mr Mansfield has been through it and




           1       I don't want to go through it again, but that is

           2       a procedure that is decided by those who write the ACPO

           3       manual --

           4   A.  That's correct, yes.

           5   Q.  -- rightly or wrongly, for good or for bad?  Officers

           6       who are part of the police service or police force

           7       follow that procedure?

           8   A.  Yes, that's correct, sir, we do, we have to follow the

           9       guidance as we were given.

          10   Q.  Being in the police force is not a democracy, is it?

          11       You don't necessarily decide which bits you fancy and

          12       which bits you don't?

          13   A.  We are very much we are here to defend democracy not

          14       practise it.

          15   Q.  The other thing I wanted to ask you is part of this

          16       post-incident procedure that's happening, were there

          17       just firearms officers at Leman Street or were there

          18       other officers there as well?

          19   A.  No, due to the incident, there were surveillance

          20       officers there, from memory there were Trident officers,

          21       there were officers from CO19 that weren't involved in

          22       the incident, that were carrying on normal policing

          23       business, there were senior officers present.

          24   Q.  Are you responsible for them as well?

          25   A.  Not during the post-incident procedure, no.  But outside




           1       of that time, yes, I am, but 19 officers only, at that

           2       time.

           3   Q.  Do you know whether those other officers wrote notebooks

           4       at the same time?

           5   A.  I didn't really have anything to do with the procedure

           6       for the Trident officers and the surveillance

           7       necessarily.

           8   Q.  Right.  But you would expect them to write notebooks?

           9   A.  Yes, absolutely.  They weren't -- as far as I recall,

          10       they were not treated as principal officers, per se, by

          11       19.  I didn't really have anything to do with them.

          12   Q.  Would they have to get their notebooks franked as well?

          13   A.  Yes, they would, all police officers would, yes.

          14   Q.  It was not just in this instance in relation to firearms

          15       officers?

          16   A.  No, that's correct.

          17   Q.  All officers who were in that building, who would have

          18       written a notebook, would have had to get their notes

          19       franked?

          20   A.  Yes, that's correct.

          21   Q.  How many franking machines are there?

          22   A.  Obviously I'm aware of one.  I don't know.

          23   Q.  Thank you very much.

          24   A.  Thank you, sir.

          25   MR STERN:  Sorry, there is just one thing.  You were asked




           1       about various comments made during the course of the

           2       evidence that you gave at the Crown Court.  I think, in

           3       fairness to you, the comments that you were being asked

           4       about related to the 7 August not 4 August.

           5   A.  That's correct, sir, there were two Crown Court

           6       appearances I had: one at Snaresbrook and one at the Old

           7       Bailey.

           8   Q.  I was asking about -- the comments that you were being

           9       asked about by Mr Thomas referred to 7 August, in other

          10       words the officers sitting together on 7 August and not

          11       on 4 August?

          12   A.  That is correct, sir, yes.

          13   MR STERN:  Thank you.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, thank you.

          15   MR BUTT:  No, thank you, sir.

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Glasson?

          17   MR GLASSON:  No, thank you, sir.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Ms Le Fevre?

          19                     Questions by MS LE FEVRE

          20   MS LE FEVRE:  Thank you, sir.  Just one or two matters,

          21       please, Mr Evans.  You've been asked, I think in the

          22       alternative, why you didn't ensure that all the officers

          23       for whom you have post-incident management

          24       responsibility were together in one room, alternatively

          25       why they are not entirely separated, each officer the




           1       one from the other.

           2           Can you help us, please, with how many officers you

           3       were dealing with in total on the evening of 4 into

           4       5 August 2011?

           5   A.  From recollection, it was about 60.

           6   Q.  Thank you.  That's 60, made up of firearms officers --

           7   A.  Yes, all throughout the whole MPS family, yes.

           8   Q.  Other officers, Trident officers, surveillance officers?

           9   A.  Yes, senior officers, IPCC, DPS, the whole -- it was

          10       a very busy -- because of the time of day --

          11       ordinarily -- I do not mean this to come across as

          12       flippant -- but ordinarily a post-incident procedure,

          13       because of the operations that we conduct, are normally

          14       in what we would call the wee hours, so they tend to be

          15       at 4.00 or 5.00 in the morning.

          16           This was in late afternoon, working day, on

          17       a Thursday, so therefore there were lots of people in

          18       the police station who would do sort of day work, as it

          19       were.  So that complicates it even further.  There were

          20       more people about than ordinarily would be.  One of the

          21       reasons it took for the PIM 2 to get to the scene and

          22       all these other aspects was because of the traffic on

          23       the roads.

          24           Out of hours, it's a much more slick operation.

          25       That's not an excuse.  Just to put it in context this




           1       was during the working day, during a busy period in

           2       London, to get people together with lots of people

           3       around in a busy working station, just to add some

           4       context to it.  It was not 3.00 or 4.00 in the morning

           5       when actually I could have had the police station to

           6       myself, where I could have opened up offices and used

           7       different --

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  By the time they are making their

           9       notes it's 10 or 11 o'clock in the evening, of course.

          10   A.  But it's still very busy, because people have stayed on

          11       because of what's happened, so yes.

          12   MS LE FEVRE:  The jury have been given two pages of the ACPO

          13       manual, I want to ask you briefly about another

          14       paragraph of chapter 7 of that manual, paragraph 7.39,

          15       which is at our page CD10951.  At paragraph 7.39 then,

          16       is that the paragraph that indicates that officers

          17       should not, save in particular circumstances, be

          18       separated from other officers?

          19   A.  That is correct, yes.

          20   Q.  Does that provision rely, to the best of your

          21       understanding, to individual officers or to groups of

          22       officers or to both?

          23   A.  To both.

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  To be fair though, when we look at

          25       the top of that section, back a two pages, above 7.27,




           1       that's "Management at the scene".  Then below, at 7.39

           2       down is then "Post-incident management", isn't it?

           3   MS LE FEVRE:  Yes, of course, sir, that's absolutely right.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We are not talking about

           5       post-incident management practice?

           6   MS LE FEVRE:  Not at all.

           7           But Mr Evans, can I ask you this question: is there

           8       any section of this guidance which suggested to you or

           9       required you to ensure that officers should be

          10       individually separated in separate rooms once they were

          11       back at, in this case, Leman Street?

          12   A.  No, there's not, and it's not subject to any learning

          13       I've been given by colleagues or it was never mentioned

          14       on my training course either.

          15   Q.  Thank you.

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  In fairness to all, we see, and this

          17       is part of what the jury have, at 7.96, it says:

          18           "Where an officer has any concerns that the

          19       integrity of the process is not being maintained, they

          20       must immediately draw this to the attention of the

          21       person in charge of the post-incident process and ensure

          22       that this is documented."

          23           That would be you, would it?

          24   A.  Yes, that's correct, sir.  As I mentioned to Mr Thomas

          25       earlier on, I am reliant on the individual




           1       professionalism of officers that we entrust to carry

           2       firearms on the streets of London.

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  In relation to this, on 4 and

           4       7 August, did anyone come to you with concerns about the

           5       integrity of what was going on?

           6   A.  No, they didn't.

           7   MS LE FEVRE:  Sir, were those were almost word for word my

           8       next questions for this officer.

           9           Mr Evans, I have no further questions for you.

          10   A.  Thank you.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, Mr Underwood?

          12   MR UNDERWOOD:  No further questions from me, thank you.

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I have no other questions now, thank

          14       you.

          15           Thank you very much, Mr Evans, that concludes your

          16       evidence.  Perhaps just stay there for a moment.

          17           Is this a convenient moment, I know you talked about

          18       reading out some statements?

          19   MR UNDERWOOD:  Yes.  We don't have to do it tonight.

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It's just that the concentration at

          21       this time of night, listening to you reading it out,

          22       however well you do it, is not high.

          23   MR UNDERWOOD:  Apparently lullabies are now therapeutically

          24       welcomed.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I did get a note from you, members


           1       of the jury, that you wanted a statement of Mr Brennecke

           2       that was read out to you.  I will let you know that

           3       plans are in operation that when we get to the expert

           4       evidence, that you will have certain of the reports to

           5       follow in writing before you, because that will be much

           6       easier and more helpful.  At that stage, we'll get

           7       copies of Mr Brennecke's statement and attach it to that

           8       bundle.  So I am not ignoring what you write in, but

           9       we'll deal with that in due course.

          10           All right, so thank you very much, members of the

          11       jury, that concludes the proceedings for today for you.

          12       So I'll ask for the cameras to be turned off and then

          13       you can leave the court room.  So thank you very much.

          14           Thank you, Mr Evans, thank you.  You may now leave

          15       the witness box and that concludes your evidence.

          16                      (The witness withdrew)




           6   (4.24 pm)

           7       (The Inquest adjourned until 10.30 am on Wednesday,

           8                         29 October 2013)






















           1                              INDEX

           2                                                       PAGE

           3   ASSISTANT CHIEF CONSTABLE ............................1
                         STUART CUNDY (sworn)
                   Questions by MR UNDERWOOD ........................1
                   Questions by MR MANSFIELD .......................32
                   Questions by MR THOMAS ..........................84
                   Questions by MR STERN ...........................98
                   Questions by MR BUTT ...........................103
                   Questions by MS LE FEVRE .......................114
               SUPERINTENDENT SHAUN DOWE (sworn) ..................122
                   Questions by MR UNDERWOOD ......................122
                   Questions by MR MANSFIELD ......................128
                   Questions by MS LE FEVRE .......................133
                   Questions from THE ASSISTANT CORONER ...........137
               DETECTIVE SUPERINTENDENT NEIL EVANS ................143
          16             (sworn)

          17       Questions by MR UNDERWOOD ......................143

          18       Questions by MR MANSFIELD ......................155

          19       Questions by MR THOMAS .........................167

          20       Questions by MR STERN ..........................191

          21       Questions by MS LE FEVRE .......................196