Transcript of the Hearing 2 December 2013


           1                                        Monday, 2 December 2013

           2   (9.30 am)


           8                  (In the presence of the jury)

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Very good to see you early in the

          10       morning, members of the jury, thank you for attending

          11       early for our morning, which consists of the view.

          12           You will have been aware that the lady who is juror

          13       number 3 is not with us.  You, I'm sure, are as aware as

          14       any of us that she has been having difficulty with her

          15       very ill mother, who I am told sadly died on Saturday.

          16           We have been in contact with her and it's quite

          17       clear that she feels unable to continue and give her

          18       full concentration to continuing as a juror in this

          19       case.  In those particular circumstances, we are all

          20       agreed that the thing is for me to discharge her from

          21       playing any more part in the jury and we will press

          22       ahead with the ten of you.  That's the position.

          23           Can I just indicate this: it is going to be my

          24       intention to write to her later today to express the

          25       condolences of all the legal teams and myself on her


           1       loss but also to say to her that she must now try to put

           2       the whole of her jury thoughts to one side in her mind.

           3       She may have heard nearly all the evidence in the case

           4       but I am afraid she is now no longer able to play a part

           5       as a juror.

           6           So if some of you, which may be perfectly natural,

           7       contact her or know her or keep in touch with her,

           8       please feel free to talk about all sorts of other things

           9       but what you must not do is involve her in your jury

          10       discussion remotely.  I'm sure you understand the

          11       position.  I will also say that as tactfully as I can in

          12       the letter that I write to her, that sadly she can now

          13       play no longer any part as a juror in this case.

          14           All right?  So let's move on to happier things, the

          15       plans for the rest of today.  In a few moments' time,

          16       I will ask the jury officers or the ushers to be sworn

          17       in the way that they were right at the beginning, to

          18       make sure they look after you whilst you are away from

          19       this court building.  Please take with you -- you can

          20       take all your file if you wish.  It may be that you want

          21       to cannibalise it a little bit so we only have one or

          22       two plans or fewer things that might have arisen in the

          23       trial.  I, for my part, and you don't have to copy me at

          24       all, have my plans, the central photographs and some of

          25       the ones we have had marked on, such as Mr Bell and V53




           1       and those matters, but it's entirely a matter for you

           2       what you take with you.

           3           I will continue to act in the same way so that if

           4       you have any particular questions that you want to ask

           5       me, I will then note them down and see if we can answer

           6       them.  Evidence is still open, as they say, there will

           7       come a time, we think hopefully tomorrow, whereby

           8       evidence will be completed and once evidence is

           9       completed, that's it, the bar comes down and you will

          10       have had all the evidence, you may think you have had

          11       quite enough evidence actually, but you will have had

          12       all the evidence that you are going to have and so if

          13       there are any things that are unanswered, you have to

          14       then look back into the transcripts and into the

          15       documents to see whether it can be answered by that,

          16       rather than getting further evidence from outside.  So

          17       that's what will happen today.

          18           The purpose of the view is really to continue your

          19       investigations into those core issues which are in the

          20       front of your jury bundle, which Mr Underwood opened to

          21       you -- we are into Week 12, I think -- a long time ago

          22       in this Inquest.

          23           So we are still concerned with matters which may or

          24       may not have happened in Vicarage Road and Burchell

          25       Road, but it seems that there is no need -- this is




           1       certainly my view but you can always tell me

           2       otherwise -- for you to walk around in Vicarage Road and

           3       Burchell Road, but I think it's only right that what we

           4       will do is have the coach travel across Lea Bridge Road

           5       and come down north to south, the proper way down

           6       Vicarage Road, we can go very slowly past the mouth of

           7       Burchell Road, then follow the route around taken by the

           8       taxi driver with Mr Duggan as his passenger up Park

           9       Road, up to the Tube station then across towards Ferry

          10       Lane.

          11           At Ferry Lane, then you will be able to get out.

          12       Hopefully, at this very moment, the vehicles are -- or

          13       shortly will be -- being put into position as much as

          14       can be reconstructed.  We have some geometrical help to

          15       try to make exactly the premise position as to where the

          16       gun was found on the grass.  That can be measured from

          17       the plans and hopefully that will be done for us too, so

          18       that when you get there, there will be certainly the

          19       positions of the A, B, C cars, the taxi will be back in

          20       position again, and the gun on the grass.

          21           You will have been told during the hearing about how

          22       we've all had to feel the weight of the gun and talked

          23       about whether we are going to throw it around or not.

          24       I have had a lot of talk about that from my learned

          25       friends over here, who are concerned -- and I do share




           1       their concerns -- that if we were all there playing

           2       a game of throwing the gun over the fence, alternatively

           3       someone is bound to be filming it and putting it on

           4       YouTube or something of that nature and I think perhaps,

           5       in the circumstances, I am going to discourage you from

           6       throwing the gun over the fence.

           7           We will have the gun there, you will be able to

           8       weigh it, you will be able to see the difference.  You

           9       have heard evidence from Dr Seaman and others about how

          10       it can be thrown and obviously you yourselves cannot

          11       know how fit, strong or athletic Mr Duggan was on the

          12       day, in any event.  So there may be only very limited

          13       value for you to actual throw the gun over there.  So

          14       I am just going to discourage you from that but we can

          15       talk about that when we get to the site there at that

          16       stage.

          17           So that's really the purpose of the view, to go

          18       there to Ferry Lane for you to use all the knowledge

          19       that you have gained over the past 11, 12 weeks to see

          20       what you want to see.  As I say, the police cars will be

          21       there, you will be able to sit in the seats of the

          22       police cars if you wish to, so that you can look from

          23       the seats of the cars to see what views you have.  You

          24       all know where the particular officers were seated and

          25       I will be reminding you when I come to my summing-up,




           1       which hopefully will be later this week, the evidence

           2       that they gave as well.  But that will be the position.

           3           So I do not think there's anything else I need to

           4       say to you at the moment.  If issues arise as we go

           5       along, then you can raise them with me in the usual way

           6       and we will deal with them back in court as is proper,

           7       later on this afternoon or tomorrow.

           8           All right.  So what I will now ask to happen then is

           9       for the jury bailiffs and the ushers to be sworn.

          10                      (Jury bailiffs sworn)

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  Let me just

          12       indicate to you, members of the jury, because last time

          13       I think the view took much longer, all day, then we were

          14       talking about whether you wanted to go home directly

          15       from Ferry Lane or not.  We hope that we are going to be

          16       much more efficient.  We are not going to go driving

          17       round that little recreation ground to see whether we

          18       can stop for lunch for a start, that will be part of the

          19       trip that will be omitted.  We hope to get this all

          20       finished and done so that we can have lunch, if

          21       necessary in the coach, but come back here by 1 or

          22       2 o'clock because this afternoon there are one or two

          23       witnesses to give some comparatively short evidence, but

          24       important evidence, that we have lined up for you.

          25           So I am afraid we have quite a packed day, and




           1       indeed there will be some more evidence tomorrow as

           2       I have already indicated to you to complete the evidence

           3       in this case.

           4           So thank you very much for your attention.  What

           5       I will ask you then to do is for the cameras to go off

           6       and for you to leave court.  I will indicate to the

           7       press that the same rules apply, please, that there is

           8       to be no photographing of the jurors whilst on the view

           9       and I'm sure that they are all well aware that that is

          10       the continuing rules that I laid down at the beginning

          11       of this Inquest.  Thank you very much, if you would like

          12       to leave.

          19   (9.45 pm)

          20               (The court adjourned until 2.00 pm)

          21   (2.00 pm)

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Right.  Are we ready for the jury?

          23   MR UNDERWOOD:  We are.

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We'll ask for the cameras to be off

          25       and for the jury to come in, please.



           1                  (In the presence of the jury)

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  Just for the

           3       formal record, we have had our view, the jury bailiffs

           4       have returned the jury in accordance with their oaths

           5       and they are safely back here and now we are ready to

           6       continue with further evidence.

           7   MR UNDERWOOD:  Thank you, sir.

           8           I have promised to call Colin Sparrow and I will do

           9       that now.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Would Mr Sparrow come forward then,

          11       please.

          12                     MR COLIN SPARROW (sworn)

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  Have a seat

          14       then, please, Mr Sparrow.  Make yourself comfortable.

          15                    Questions by MR UNDERWOOD

          16   MR UNDERWOOD:  Good afternoon, Mr Sparrow.  Can you tell us

          17       your full names please?

          18   A.  My name's Colin David Sparrow.

          19   Q.  I think you work at the IPCC; is that right?

          20   A.  Yes, I do.

          21   Q.  What's your role in relation to Mark Duggan's death?

          22   A.  I was the lead investigator from the 4 August until now.

          23   Q.  What's your background?

          24   A.  My background is that I was in the police service for

          25       30 years.  I retired after having served 30 years and




           1       then I joined the IPCC in 2009.

           2   Q.  Were you with the Metropolitan Police?

           3   A.  No, I wasn't, no.

           4   Q.  When you were appointed as the senior investigator on

           5       4 August, where were you?

           6   A.  I was at home.

           7   Q.  Where did you go?

           8   A.  I went to Leman Street which is where the post-incident

           9       procedures were and I arrived there at 21.40.

          10   Q.  Did you visit the scene?

          11   A.  I did, yes.

          12   Q.  When was that roughly?

          13   A.  Around about -- I have noted it was 2.40 but I actually

          14       think it was more like 2.25/2.30.

          15   Q.  On the morning of the 5th?

          16   A.  That's correct, yes.

          17   Q.  In terms of the IPCC's role, who did the buck stop with?

          18   A.  The buck stopped with me, as far as the IPCC were

          19       concerned.  I was the lead investigator so it was all --

          20       it was my responsibility.

          21   Q.  If anything was done wrong on the part of the IPCC on

          22       the 4th or 5th whose responsibility is that?

          23   A.  It's down to me.

          24   Q.  Did you have Crime Scene Managers available to you?

          25   A.  The IPCC don't have Crime Scene Managers so we rely upon




           1       the home force, in this case the Metropolitan Police

           2       Service, to provide Crime Scene Managers.

           3   Q.  We know that on the 5th the minicab was intended to be

           4       taken to Perivale for forensic science work.  It was

           5       brought back on your instructions --

           6   A.  That's correct.

           7   Q.  -- and then it was subjected to a PolSA search --

           8   A.  It was.

           9   Q.  -- and then it went back to Perivale after that; is that

          10       right?

          11   A.  Yes, that's correct.

          12   Q.  Was it your decision in the first place to send it to

          13       Perivale?

          14   A.  Yes, it was.  Yes, it was Mr Mehaffey, Chris Mehaffey,

          15       who's a DSI from the IPCC, a deputy senior investigator,

          16       he was at the scene.  He was constantly in contact with

          17       me and it was agreed that the taxi cab would be removed

          18       from the scene and taken to Perivale.

          19   Q.  What was the purpose of it going to Perivale in the

          20       first place?

          21   A.  Well, it would have been taken to Perivale for,

          22       certainly in the first instance, an external visual

          23       search for any ballistic damage or ballistic material or

          24       any other significant evidence and then subsequently

          25       a decision would be made as to what exactly, what




           1       forensic opportunities there could possibly be inside

           2       the vehicle.

           3   Q.  All right.  Why was it brought back?

           4   A.  I brought it back because I was aware that on 5 August

           5       the taxi cab driver was becoming very -- increasingly

           6       unhappy.  He was making -- he was stating that this was

           7       his means to a living, he was certainly very upset with

           8       the Metropolitan Police Service, and I thought if there

           9       was a way in which we could turn the taxi around in

          10       terms of its evidence, then it seemed to me to be

          11       a reasonable thing to do.

          12           I was aware that if there was going to be a PolSA

          13       team to search it, it could possibly take days to get

          14       a PolSA team to Perivale, I don't know about the MPS but

          15       I think that it would take some time to get the skilled

          16       officers to do that.

          17           I was aware that there were PolSA officers at the

          18       scene and it seemed to me to be a good opportunity to

          19       have the taxi cab searched at the scene while there were

          20       the trained staff there.

          21   Q.  Did you think there would be any harm done by that?

          22   A.  I didn't at the time, I have to say in retrospect.

          23       Could I just -- I would like to say that I asked when

          24       the vehicle was returned to the scene was there any --

          25       anything on the exterior of the vehicle and I was told




           1       from a visual -- from having looked at it, there was

           2       nothing on there.

           3           Had I have known that there was any blood spatter on

           4       the vehicle then I just would not have even considered

           5       taking it back to the scene.  It would have gone to

           6       Perivale and then, I think, everything would be

           7       different, but certainly that was a decision I made.

           8           On reflection, it was the wrong decision frankly

           9       and, on reflection, the best thing I could have done was

          10       taken the taxi cab back to Perivale, we would have

          11       completed the visual search of the vehicle, established

          12       the blood spatter and then carried out whatever extra

          13       work that we needed to do and I would also add that

          14       I wouldn't have returned the taxi cab at any point and

          15       I should have retained it for the period of this up

          16       until the Inquest.

          17   Q.  Is that a lesson learned, as far as you're concerned?

          18   A.  Well, it is a lesson learned.  It was something I did,

          19       I thought I was doing it for the right reasons, on the

          20       information I had at that time, and, quite frankly,

          21       I would do it differently now.

          22   MR UNDERWOOD:  All right.  Thank you very much.  If you wait

          23       there no doubt there will be more questions.

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you.  Anyone from the family

          25       to ask questions.  Mr Mansfield?




           1                    Questions by MR MANSFIELD

           2   MR MANSFIELD:  Good afternoon, Mr Sparrow.

           3   A.  Sir.

           4   Q.  My name is Michael Mansfield, I represent the family of

           5       Mark Duggan.  May I deal with the crime scene, first of

           6       all, I have some other topics but just dealing with

           7       that.

           8           Having been in the police for as long as you had by

           9       that stage before you retired, 30 years, you were well

          10       aware of the need/priority to preserve a crime scene,

          11       aren't you?

          12   A.  Yes, sir.

          13   Q.  Sometimes it's called a cordon sanitaire, but you throw

          14       around a crime scene a cordon to ensure it is preserved,

          15       so far as is humanly possible?

          16   A.  That's correct.

          17   Q.  There are many obvious reasons, I won't go through them

          18       all, but they're plain to you, that if you disturb

          19       a scene and you disturb the position in which trace

          20       evidence may be discovered, you may alter the whole

          21       course of an investigation.

          22   A.  It is possible, yes.

          23   Q.  The first question is this, and it may be a matter of

          24       policy rather than anything else, but why is it that the

          25       IPCC do not have Crime Scene Managers?




           1   A.  The IPCC is a relatively small organisation.  The

           2       investigations directorate that we have is growing but

           3       at that time was small.  We don't have the particular

           4       skill sets that the police have so we rely on the police

           5       to provide Crime Scene Managers, Scene of Crime

           6       Officers, photographers, search officers.  So that's --

           7   Q.  At the end of the day, you're supposed to be, are you

           8       not, an Independent Police Complaints Commission?

           9   A.  Yes, that's correct, and I suppose the independence

          10       comes, sir, with the fact that I'm the lead investigator

          11       and I'm agreeing the strategies, the forensic

          12       strategies.

          13   Q.  Yes, but it's not a complaint as such but you're

          14       an ex-police officer with a lot of experience and you're

          15       relying for an independent investigation upon the

          16       agencies of the Metropolitan Police, aren't you?

          17   A.  Yes, sir.

          18   Q.  From the beginning, therefore, it does give

          19       an appearance, doesn't it, that independence may be

          20       compromised if you're going to have to use agents of the

          21       very force that may have made serious mistakes.

          22   A.  I can see what the perception would be but, as I say, we

          23       don't have the skill sets that the Metropolitan Police

          24       have.

          25   Q.  How long -- by this stage of the Duggan case how long




           1       had the IPCC been in existence?

           2   A.  I think it was 2004, so 2011, six years, six and

           3       a half years.

           4   Q.  As far as you're aware, had there ever been any

           5       recommendation by the IPCC that really if they're going

           6       to maintain independence there ought to be independent

           7       Crime Scene Managers?

           8   A.  I wasn't certainly in 2011, and I'm unsure exactly what

           9       work is carrying on at the moment.

          10   Q.  Are there any now?

          11   A.  Are there --

          12   MR GLASSON:  Sir, can I just intervene at this point.

          13       Mr Underwood did explain this is not an investigation

          14       into the investigation.  Mr --

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Could you put your microphone on,

          16       otherwise we won't be able to record completely.

          17   MR GLASSON:  Mr Mansfield is asking questions about the

          18       policy, the history of the IPCC.  If the questions could

          19       be confined to the circumstances by which Mark Duggan

          20       came by his death, then those would be relevant.  I'm

          21       concerned that this is straying far outside the proper

          22       ambit of the Inquest.

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I hear what you say but I'm quite

          24       interested to hear the answers myself, so I am not going

          25       to interrupt Mr Mansfield at the moment.  I know he




           1       won't go very far on this but there may be just a few

           2       things that might be of use for us to hear.

           3   MR MANSFIELD:  Just on this topic, the question I think

           4       I asked, I am not sure you answered it, is: are there

           5       any Crime Scene Managers now independent of the police

           6       employed by the Commission?

           7   A.  No, sir.

           8   Q.  Now, so that my learned friend can understand, the

           9       reason I'm asking you these questions is of course

          10       whether the investigation in this case has been

          11       compromised on important areas, not going all the way

          12       through it, I am dealing just with the 4th and the 5th,

          13       that area of time; do you appreciate that?

          14   A.  Yes, I do.

          15   Q.  Now, when you were contacted, did you begin some kind of

          16       record of your own?

          17   A.  Yes, I did.

          18   Q.  Have you got them here today?

          19   A.  Yes, I have.

          20   Q.  It's right to say -- I don't have, unless somebody else

          21       does -- you have not made a statement for the purposes

          22       of this hearing, have you?

          23   A.  No, I haven't.

          24   Q.  No.  Have you been asked to make a statement for the

          25       purposes of these proceedings?




           1   A.  No, I haven't.

           2   Q.  Then I have to ask it in this fashion therefore: when

           3       you were first contacted, what were you told?

           4   A.  Well, I was first told that there was a fatal shooting

           5       in Ferry Lane, that it had taken place at 18.15, that

           6       there was scant detail known.  I was given the telephone

           7       number of a professional standards -- DPS, Directorate

           8       of Professional Standards police officer, who I phoned

           9       at 19.32 that evening.  He basically told me that there

          10       had been an exchange of fire between police --

          11   Q.  Just go slowly, please.  An exchange of fire?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  Yes?

          14   A.  Between the police and the subject of the operation and

          15       the -- and Mr Duggan was fatally shot.

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Can you remember who that person

          17       was, the name?

          18   A.  Yes, sir, it was DCI Williams.

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  DCI Williams, thank you.

          20   MR MANSFIELD:  So that's your first more detailed bit of

          21       information, that there's this exchange of fire.  Now,

          22       this word "exchange of fire", found its way into the

          23       media, didn't it?

          24   A.  I don't know, sir -- sorry, whether you're asking me

          25       those specific words, whether they were used, I don't




           1       recall, but I know the point you are making that, yes,

           2       there was a press release, yes.

           3   Q.  I'll come straight to it because one of the problems at

           4       the very beginning was a false impression was being

           5       given, wasn't it?

           6   A.  There was an account that was being given, that was

           7       being -- that was being relayed.  It was merely in its

           8       early -- in the infancy of the investigation and

           9       certainly that would develop as time went on but, yes,

          10       you're quite right that was at the beginning.

          11   Q.  Who was putting out the false impression?

          12   A.  When you say "putting out the false impression", are you

          13       talking about in terms of media, sir?

          14   Q.  Yes.

          15   A.  I think the IPCC put out an inaccurate news release.

          16   Q.  You're the lead investigator, did you know before they

          17       put it out what they were putting out?

          18   A.  No, sir, I did not.

          19   Q.  How soon after they put it out did you recognise it was

          20       false?

          21   A.  Well, I was -- I can recall very well what I was doing.

          22       I was at Leman Street.  I was engaged within the PIP

          23       process and there was a television that was on in the

          24       corner of the office and I saw that the IPCC, I think it

          25       said, had confirmed that there had been an exchange of




           1       fire and I was very surprised that it had come up like

           2       that.

           3   Q.  Did you do anything about it?

           4   A.  Yes, I did.

           5   Q.  What did you do?

           6   A.  I believe I spoke to the senior investigator who was on

           7       call, who was Mr John Cummins.

           8   Q.  Mr Who?

           9   A.  Mr John Cummins.

          10   Q.  I dare say you have records here, but about what time

          11       was it therefore that you saw what was being put out

          12       publicly and then you spoke to Mr Cummins; what time was

          13       that?

          14   A.  I don't know, something around 10.00 pm, 10.30.

          15   Q.  Have you got a record?

          16   A.  No, I haven't.

          17   Q.  Why not?

          18   A.  Because it was something that appeared on the

          19       television.

          20   Q.  It was a rather important assertion, was it not, that

          21       was false, wasn't it?

          22   A.  Yes, which is why I phoned the senior investigator.

          23   Q.  So why is there no record of all this?

          24   A.  I made no record of it.

          25   Q.  That's not the question.  The question is: why is there




           1       no record?

           2   A.  I would say that I was inundated with information at

           3       that time and it was something that wasn't directly to

           4       do with the specific -- the investigation itself, and

           5       I made a call to the senior investigator to try to

           6       address the issue as soon as possible, because I was so

           7       surprised that it had been released.

           8   Q.  You see, it does go directly to the investigation, or

           9       might do if it were true, mightn't it?  Well, if there's

          10       an exchange of fire, that's what you're dealing with,

          11       a shoot-out in Tottenham, that's one thing, isn't it,

          12       that has to be investigated?

          13   A.  And it was.

          14   Q.  Yes, well, I'll come to that.  You have to be extremely

          15       careful what public statements are put out before you

          16       verify the facts, don't you?

          17   A.  I would say that's absolutely right.

          18   Q.  Yes.  What I want to ask you is the extent to which you

          19       yourself tried to verify facts that night.  When did you

          20       discover that it wasn't an exchange of fire?

          21   A.  I think it's based on the evidence that was supplied by

          22       the ballistics expert.  So, on the night, for instance,

          23       I was certainly of the opinion that the bullet that was

          24       found in the radio was not a Metropolitan Police Service

          25       round, and then that during the afternoon of the




           1       5 August, probably around about 4.30, something like

           2       that, I was informed that it, in fact, was an MPS round

           3       and not a non-police issue round.  So the answer to your

           4       question --

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Can you give me the time when that

           6       was informed?

           7   A.  It was around about 4.30 on 5 August.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  On the 5th?

           9   MR MANSFIELD:  Up until 4.30 on the 5th, how many people had

          10       you told that you thought that the round in the police

          11       radio wasn't a police round?

          12   A.  It's possible that I would have informed the IPCC staff

          13       at the briefing, which I had on 5 August, but I was --

          14       that was based on the information that I was being

          15       given, and certainly that was what the ballistic expert

          16       had said.

          17   Q.  You see, this particular area, that is the IPCC putting

          18       out a statement of this kind, this is another --

          19       alongside the moving of the mini van, in retrospect,

          20       this is another serious error, isn't it?

          21   A.  I think it was an error and I believe that it was dealt

          22       with by the IPCC subsequently.

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Who was this Mr John Cummins then;

          24       what position does he have?

          25   A.  I was the Deputy Senior Investigator on-call and the




           1       senior investigator on-call was Mr John Cummins so he is

           2       in receipt of the initial call and he then cascades --

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Down to you?

           4   A.  -- that information down to me and then I -- yes, sir.

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  When you saw this piece of

           6       information, you spoke to him --

           7   A.  Yes, I believe I did, yes.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- about the exchange.

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That was, you say, about 10.30 on --

          11   A.  Something like that.  It was when it flashed up on

          12       the -- I think it was Sky, actually.

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  On the news?

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   MR MANSFIELD:  As a senior investigator -- this is just

          16       dealing with this aspect of it, first of all -- did you

          17       track down where this had come from, this exchange of

          18       fire account, in the first place?

          19   A.  No, I did not.

          20   Q.  Why not?

          21   A.  Because it was a case of trying to find out whether

          22       there was any substance to it and there was no substance

          23       to it, as the investigation continued on.  I fully

          24       understand that information in the early stages of this

          25       type of investigation can be confused and therefore it




           1       didn't surprise me that it was confused.

           2   Q.  Yes.  It can be confused or, of course, it can be

           3       a smokescreen being put up to cover something else; do

           4       you follow?

           5   A.  I do follow.

           6   Q.  Right.  Did that occur to you?

           7   A.  I don't think it did, no.

           8   Q.  No.  You see, we have a note -- we'll have it on screen

           9       if we may -- 7203, CD7203.  This is a note made by

          10       a senior officer, Fiona Mallon, you may or may not know

          11       her.  She made it -- it's in her handwriting at about

          12       6.30 -- talking to a senior officer.  His name is there,

          13       Mr Foote.  You will see there that there's reference to

          14       finding a gun and shots and so on:

          15           "Apparently Mark Duggan came towards officers

          16       firing."

          17   A.  Yes, I can see that.

          18   Q.  Have you seen that before?

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  When did you see it?

          21   A.  Not until some long time afterwards, once I think

          22       I received the -- if that's the SFC's day book, it was

          23       some time after.

          24   Q.  I promise not to go some time after, I'm sticking to the

          25       time.  So on the 4th and the 5th, did you try, at that




           1       early stage, before things become too confused, to find

           2       out who or how it was being said that Duggan may have

           3       fired at police, either an exchange of fire or come

           4       running?

           5   A.  No, I did not.

           6   Q.  What's the reason for not investigating that at the

           7       earliest opportunity?

           8   A.  Because it was found to be false so --

           9   Q.  Later.

          10   A.  Well, on 5 August.

          11   Q.  Yes, later, by which time it's out there, isn't it, in

          12       the public domain?

          13   A.  It was put out there in the public domain, yes.

          14   Q.  You do appreciate that tracking down as early as

          15       possible how false stories arise is very important,

          16       isn't it?  Finding that they're false on the 5th is one

          17       thing, finding out how it came about in the first place

          18       is quite another; do you see the distinction?

          19   A.  I do see the distinction but, as I said to you, I think

          20       that there was always confusion in the early stages of

          21       any investigation, and particularly one as serious as

          22       this, and when there are so many people involved, that

          23       it does not surprise me that there was this confusion.

          24   Q.  Yes.  I'm not dealing with the confusion, it's how the

          25       confusion arises and whether it was intentional, do you




           1       follow: whether it was.

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  Yes.  Would you do things differently next time -- if

           4       there is a next time, hopefully not, for people shot --

           5       would you do things differently?

           6   A.  Are you talking about this specific issue?

           7   Q.  The issue of tracking down the source of accounts which

           8       turn out to be false within 24 hours?

           9   A.  No, I wouldn't.  No, no, no, I wouldn't -- as far as I'm

          10       concerned, it was proven to be incorrect, I worked to

          11       terms of reference and I -- that wouldn't be -- at that

          12       time wasn't part of my terms of reference.

          13   Q.  Your terms of reference, as an Independent Police

          14       Commissioner, if I put it like that, although you are

          15       not a Commissioner as such --

          16   A.  No.

          17   Q.  -- I appreciate, is to ensure, for public reasons of

          18       public confidence that an event is thoroughly and

          19       transparently investigated; do you agree?

          20   A.  I agree with that.

          21   Q.  So that if there is any wrongdoing, by anyone, but

          22       particularly, obviously, police officers, that matter

          23       has to be brought to light, doesn't it?

          24   A.  Yes, it does.

          25   Q.  Right.  Now, I want to -- since you went to Leman




           1       Street -- how much did you know, therefore -- while you

           2       were at Leman Street, before you went to the scene, did

           3       you know about a gun being found?

           4   A.  At Leman Street, yes.

           5   Q.  What did you know about a gun being found while you were

           6       at Leman Street?

           7   A.  Simply that, that they -- a non-police issue firearm had

           8       been found at the scene.  I didn't know where at the

           9       scene but it was --

          10   Q.  You didn't know where?

          11   A.  No, I did not.

          12   Q.  Where did you find out where it had been found?

          13   A.  In the immediate following days after 4 August.

          14   Q.  When you went to the scene?

          15   A.  I don't think the gun was in situ at that time.

          16   Q.  No, did you find out where it had been when you got

          17       there?

          18   A.  I didn't specifically ask, no.

          19   Q.  Why not?

          20   A.  Because it would become apparent in -- as a result of

          21       the investigation.  It's -- part of the investigation

          22       would be to find out where things were at the scene so

          23       for instance JMA/1, the shell casings, bullets, all of

          24       those sorts of things, and I would find that out in due

          25       course.




           1   Q.  Yes.  You see, you're going to the scene in order to get

           2       first hand acquaintance ship with the scene, aren't you?

           3   A.  I'm going to the scene to visit it so that I can

           4       understand it, but also to actually go through what is

           5       in place in terms of the scene and the recovery of the

           6       evidence.

           7   Q.  Before you get there, having heard that a gun was found,

           8       and certainly weapons had been discharged -- you were

           9       under the illusion then that maybe two had been

          10       discharged -- the collection of forensic evidence takes

          11       place, obviously, at the scene, but also back at Leman

          12       Street, doesn't it?

          13   A.  It does, yes.

          14   Q.  At that stage, at Leman Street, as a post-incident

          15       procedure, but as an independent investigator, you're

          16       entitled to consider independent investigations that

          17       might take place at Leman Street, aren't you?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  Yes.  I want to ask you whether, in fact, at Leman

          20       Street you considered taking any independent forensic

          21       decisions while you were there?

          22   A.  As far as the scene is concerned, decisions were made by

          23       my colleague, Mr Mehaffey --

          24   Q.  Sorry to interrupt, I'll come to the scene, I should

          25       have made it clear.  About the officers at Leman Street:




           1       did you consider taking any independent forensic

           2       decisions about the officers at Leman Street?

           3   A.  In terms of what was known at that point, I went with

           4       what was known at that point.  So the most important

           5       part of that really is around the countback and ensuring

           6       that the particular weapons are associated -- tied up,

           7       effectively, to the individuals.  The principal officers

           8       had seen the doctor, the force surgeon/FME, whichever

           9       term is used, and clothing had been to be taken also

          10       from V53 and I think R68 and W70 at that time.

          11   Q.  What clothing had been taken?

          12   A.  Outside clothing.

          13   Q.  Because, of course, you appreciate, do you not, that the

          14       clothing of officers may be extremely important for

          15       discerning (1) who may have fired the shot --

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  -- or shots, number 1; number 2, who may have been in

          18       the vicinity when the shot was fired --

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  -- and also, of course, if there was another gun being

          21       fired, discovering residue from the other gun that might

          22       be upon various people's clothing; do you follow?

          23   A.  I do follow.

          24   Q.  Yes.  Did you consider asking for the clothing of all

          25       the police officers at the scene, the CO19 officers, to




           1       be retained for examination?

           2   A.  I did not.

           3   Q.  Did you at any time suggest that all that clothing

           4       should be compared with other items at a later date?

           5   A.  I did not.

           6   Q.  Why didn't you do any of these things?

           7   A.  I was following the information that I had from the --

           8       from how the investigation had started, commenced, and

           9       I took the decision around what to seize on the basis of

          10       the information that I had then.

          11   Q.  Is it not your job to question carefully whether what

          12       information you are getting is accurate?

          13   A.  Of course.

          14   Q.  Did you?

          15   A.  Yes.  Yes.  I was always examining the evidence that

          16       I was in possession of in terms of whether it was

          17       physical evidence or -- I mean it was difficult to have

          18       forensic evidence at that time because it was so early.

          19       But, yes, always.

          20   Q.  That's the important point, is getting clothing early

          21       because traces disappear very quickly, don't they?

          22   A.  They do.

          23   Q.  Now, in this particular case, when did you discover that

          24       the gun that had been found before you got there was in

          25       fact inside a sock?




           1   A.  (Pause)

           2           I think it may have been on the night but I'm not

           3       absolutely sure.

           4   Q.  Well, you haven't looked at any records, you are welcome

           5       to do so.  Will there be any record of any of this in

           6       your policy book or any other record?

           7   A.  Specifically in relation to the sock?

           8   Q.  Yes, and the gun itself.  Any notes you made about the

           9       gun and the sock?

          10   A.  If you're asking me specifically when I knew the gun was

          11       in the sock, I can't answer that question now.

          12   Q.  Are there any notes which will help you as to when you

          13       knew that?

          14   A.  Well, I can certainly have a look.

          15   Q.  Yes, have a look, please.

          16   A.  (Pause)

          17           Yes, thank you.

          18   Q.  Yes?

          19   A.  At 23.15 I've got a comment that is recorded and I think

          20       it's from Mr Mehaffey, I have it attributed to.  Then in

          21       the margin I've got that it was "a common conversion" --

          22       so this is reference to the gun -- and "the gun is still

          23       in the sock, holes lining to muzzle". I cannot read what

          24       I have written just underneath that so, yes, I have made

          25       that comment at 23.15.




           1   Q.  At that stage, where did you believe the gun was: at the

           2       scene, because you hadn't got there yet?

           3   A.  I didn't know exactly where it was.

           4   Q.  The reason I'm asking you about this of course is gives

           5       rise to other questions.  Did you realise, by 23.15,

           6       that it hadn't been found by the body?

           7   A.  No, I didn't.

           8   Q.  When did you realise that?

           9   A.  I couldn't say exactly.

          10   Q.  Could you have a look in your notes to see if it helps?

          11   A.  I have actually looked for this and I don't know exactly

          12       when it was.  It was in the days immediately after the

          13       4th and the 5th.

          14   Q.  In the days immediately after?

          15   A.  Possibly the 5th, possibly the 6th but I'm not

          16       absolutely sure.  There is no note and I have looked for

          17       it.

          18   Q.  Why have you not made a record of where you discovered

          19       where the gun was?

          20   A.  I've made no note, that's all I can say.

          21   Q.  Why not?  As officer lead investigator, these -- I'm not

          22       dealing with the weather, I'm dealing with -- although

          23       that might be important in some circumstances -- I'm

          24       dealing with, I hope you appreciate, core items in this

          25       case.




           1   A.  No, I understand exactly your point.

           2   Q.  You understand also, do you, that of course one of the

           3       questions that arises is how the gun got where it was

           4       found.

           5   A.  Yes, core.

           6   Q.  When did that occur to you?

           7   A.  As soon as I realised that it was not immediately

           8       proximate to Mr Duggan.  But as I have said, I can't

           9       tell you exactly when that was.

          10   Q.  You cannot tell us when you discovered that because one

          11       of the questions that you would want, back to the

          12       clothing at Leman Street, is the possibility of the

          13       transfer of fibres; you're aware of that possibility,

          14       aren't you?

          15   A.  Yes, I am.

          16   Q.  That's another reason why you might want all the

          17       clothing not just the ones of those who fired; do you

          18       follow?

          19   A.  I do follow.

          20   Q.  Is yes.  So that you can then examine that clothing to

          21       see whether fibres can be found, before it's too late.

          22   A.  Yes, I follow.

          23   Q.  But you didn't do that, did you?

          24   A.  I did not do that.

          25   Q.  Why not?




           1   A.  As I say, I was following the information that was

           2       available to me at that time.

           3   Q.  Is that how you approach these matters: you just follow

           4       the information that's available to you as opposed to

           5       taking an independent overview?

           6   A.  I think what I have to do is I also have to hypothesise

           7       and theorise about what the issues there could be but at

           8       that time, and with the information that was available

           9       to me, that's what I was going with.

          10   Q.  So did you -- because the officers were at Leman Street

          11       themselves, weren't they?

          12   A.  Yes they were, yes.

          13   Q.  You would have been entitled to ask them questions of

          14       senior officers, wouldn't you?

          15   A.  Ask questions of senior officers?

          16   Q.  Yes.  Involved in this -- to get more information?

          17   A.  Yes, yes of course.

          18   Q.  So did you ask a single police officer at Leman Street

          19       whether, in fact, police had fired or Duggan had fired

          20       back or what the position was?

          21   A.  Well, the position was, on my first briefing there was

          22       a question as to whether the bullet that was -- that had

          23       hit W42, the police officer, was either fired by suspect

          24       or whether it was, in fact, a ricochet.  So that was the

          25       first point that I was -- that arose --




           1   Q.  Yes.

           2   A.  -- when I arrived at Leman Street.

           3   Q.  Sorry, the question is different, please listen to the

           4       question.  The question was: did you ask a single

           5       question of any police officer at Leman Street -- there

           6       they all were -- to find out whether, first of all,

           7       Mr Duggan had fired a shot?

           8   A.  Well, yes, that was the -- certainly the question that

           9       I first --

          10   Q.  What was the answer you got?

          11   A.  Sorry, if I can just finish, please.  That was the first

          12       question that I asked when I spoke to DCI Williams at

          13       19.32 and then I was given this account when I arrived

          14       at Leman Street for a briefing from the police and so

          15       that came from the police at that point.

          16   Q.  Which police officers were telling you at that point

          17       that he had fired -- Duggan?

          18   A.  I think it was -- it may have been Detective

          19       Superintendent Tony Evans.

          20   Q.  Tony Evans?  Of course all the ones you were mentioning

          21       were not at the scene.  Really what I'm trying to get at

          22       is whether you asked any of the senior officers from the

          23       scene because they were there, weren't they, senior

          24       officers?  Z51 was at Leman Street, wasn't he?

          25   A.  He was, that's correct.




           1   Q.  Did you ask him whether in fact Duggan had fired

           2       a single shot?

           3   A.  No, I didn't.

           4   Q.  Why not?

           5   A.  He was undergoing the PIP process.  The PIP process is

           6       that, as I have said to you, that they will go through

           7       the count back process, the principal officers will see

           8       the police surgeons and then I would be given initial

           9       accounts, which was, in the case of the CO19 officers,

          10       their initial accounts, and then I would have

          11       an understanding.

          12   Q.  So you saw the initial accounts, did you?

          13   A.  The EABs on the night?

          14   Q.  Yes.

          15   A.  Yes, I did.

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  When did you see those?

          17   A.  I -- (Pause)

          18           Well, I took possession of V53's EAB at 0120 so --

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  0120?

          20   A.  Yes, sir.  So I would have read it at that point.

          21   MR MANSFIELD:  Just take that.  Does that suggest that

          22       Duggan fired a shot?

          23   A.  Definitely not.

          24   Q.  No.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Did you also have possession of




           1       V53's statement that he made within 40 minutes to

           2       Inspector Elliott?

           3   A.  No, sir.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  When did you first see that?

           5   A.  Quite some time after.  I was aware that an initial

           6       account had been given but I didn't see it at Leman

           7       Street.

           8   MR MANSFIELD:  You must have recognised, in the early hours

           9       of the morning, that V53 was talking about -- well,

          10       certainly to this extent, he wasn't mentioning

          11       Mark Duggan firing any shots, you knew that?

          12   A.  I did.

          13   Q.  Yes.  So far as he's concerned, he was talking about

          14       seeing a gun-shaped item in a sock, wasn't he?

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  Gradually you're getting to realise, you say later you

          17       cannot tell us where, that the gun was found elsewhere?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  Now, the gun and its origin is of some importance, isn't

          20       it?  That is the gun related to Mark Duggan is of

          21       importance, is it not?

          22   A.  Yes, it is.

          23   Q.  So I want to ask you this: did you know at the time, at

          24       Leman Street or back at the scene on that day, how this

          25       operation came into being?




           1   A.  Yes, I did.

           2   Q.  What did you know about it?

           3   A.  I was informed that there was a preplanned operation,

           4       that Mr Duggan was the subject of that preplanned

           5       operation, that he was a senior member of the Tottenham

           6       Man Dem, that it was an authorised operation by the SFC,

           7       that it related to Operation Dibri and had been going

           8       for 18 months/2 years, and that information had been

           9       received that Mr Duggan had taken possession of

          10       a firearm and consequently CO19 had intercepted.

          11   Q.  Right, that's of some interest.  Have you written all

          12       that down somewhere?  Because I don't want any mistakes

          13       made about what you were being told --

          14   A.  (Pause)

          15   Q.  -- and also who told you all that?

          16   A.  That was Detective Superintendent Stuart Cundy.  I've

          17       got a time of 23.33 attached to the start of that.  It

          18       was a rather truncated conversation because I was

          19       continually receiving phone calls, but it carried on

          20       through a period of time.

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The starting time was?

          22   A.  Yes, sir, 23.33.

          23   MR MANSFIELD:  Nowhere in that account is there a single

          24       mention of anyone called Kevin Hutchinson-Foster, is

          25       there?




           1   A.  No, not at any point, no.

           2   Q.  Were you ever told that, in fact, the person who was

           3       supplying guns, or a gun, was in fact Kevin

           4       Hutchinson-Foster?

           5   A.  Yes, I was.

           6   Q.  When did you discover that?

           7   A.  Quite some time after.

           8   Q.  How long after, roughly speaking?

           9   A.  In October 2011.

          10   Q.  Months later, a couple of months later.

          11   A.  It was as a result, I think, of being in receipt of the

          12       transcribed briefing from 3 August.

          13   Q.  So it's clear to the jury, this is a briefing given to

          14       CO19 that -- that was the first indication that this

          15       exercise, this particular operation, arose out of the

          16       supply or transfer of a gun from Kevin

          17       Hutchinson-Foster?

          18   A.  I believe so, yes.

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That's the briefing that we actually

          20       have in our jury bundles at C12, isn't it?

          21   A.  That's right.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You've been sitting in the back of

          23       court for some of the Inquest?

          24   A.  Absolutely.  I've been chasing the briefing note and

          25       I think I received it -- I would have to check if you




           1       want to be accurate -- but I think that I received that

           2       in October --

           3   MR MANSFIELD:  Yes.

           4   A.  -- 2011.

           5   MR MANSFIELD:  So on the night -- just going back to the

           6       night -- did you ask any questions about that night

           7       before they arrived at Ferry Lane, where they had been,

           8       what had happened?

           9   A.  I asked DCS Cundy whether there would be any compromise

          10       with a criminal investigation that they would carry out,

          11       so they would carry out the investigation into the

          12       supply of the firearm.  We agreed that there wouldn't be

          13       any compromise, so that side of it, if there's

          14       a criminal investigation, that would be carried out by

          15       the MPS.

          16   Q.  Well, certainly I understand that side of it?

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  But one side of it that you would be interested in,

          19       plainly for an intelligence led operation, and making

          20       assessments about an intelligence led operation, is what

          21       was the intelligence that led to this operation.

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  Do you follow?

          24   A.  Yes, I do.

          25   Q.  Did you find that out on the 4th or the 5th?




           1   A.  No, I did not.

           2   Q.  Did you ask?

           3   A.  I asked what the operation was about, I was told that.

           4       I wasn't told what the source of the intelligence was.

           5   Q.  So I'm going to ask you to look at something that the

           6       jury themselves have in their jury bundle.  It's a sheet

           7       of paper which has upon it various items.  I am just

           8       going to get my copy of it.  Bear with me one moment.

           9       I think it's C9 in the jury's bundle.  Yes, C9.

          10           This was provided to the jury much earlier in the

          11       Inquest.  It's a series of items at the stage that it

          12       was drawn up.  There have been some matters added to it

          13       since but if you just run your eye down this --

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  -- you will see Kevin Hutchinson-Foster features a great

          16       deal in all this.

          17   A.  Yes, he does.

          18   Q.  Yes.  So you weren't told any of this on the night?

          19   A.  No, I wasn't.

          20   Q.  Were you told where the minicab had been before it got

          21       to Ferry Lane?

          22   A.  I don't think I was.

          23   Q.  Did you ask?

          24   A.  I'm sorry, I haven't got a note of that so --

          25   Q.  I appreciate, but if you're making -- I know things




           1       develop over time --

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  -- but you need to know pretty soon how a hard stop was

           4       necessary in Ferry Lane; that's quite an important

           5       question, isn't it?

           6   A.  Yes, and it forms part of the terms of reference, which

           7       is something that you would --

           8   Q.  Exactly.

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  So you have no record of ever asking where the minicab

          11       had been before it got to Ferry Lane; is that right?

          12   A.  I don't think that's right.

          13   Q.  Have a look and see --

          14   A.  But if you're asking me whether I did on 4th or

          15       5 August, I think -- I don't have a note of that but

          16       certainly it was part of the investigation.

          17   Q.  I appreciate.  But, of course, the longer time elapses,

          18       the more difficult it may be to unravel the truth; you

          19       appreciate that?

          20   A.  Yes, I understand.

          21   Q.  You have to act -- I think in police parlance -- within

          22       the golden hour; do you know about that?

          23   A.  Yes, I'm aware of the golden hour.

          24   Q.  You're aware of the golden hour.  I know it cannot be

          25       literally an hour but within a very short space of time?




           1   A.  Yes.

           2   Q.  Right.  You must have been aware that it was

           3       a minicab --

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  -- on the night --

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  -- and that there was a driver of the minicab.

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  Where was he, did you know, on the night?

          10   A.  He was at the scene and he was going to be removed from

          11       the scene.  We would make contact with him and we did

          12       make contact with the taxi driver early on 5 August,

          13       with a view to obtaining a full account from him.

          14   Q.  Yes, but it might help to get an earlier account from

          15       him, if at all possible.  Did you know one had been

          16       gained at the scene, for example --

          17   A.  No, I did not know.

          18   Q.  -- that a police officer had spoken to him at the scene

          19       while he was sitting by the minicab waiting?

          20   A.  I was aware that -- subsequently that R68 had spoken to

          21       him but I didn't have that information until 8 August

          22       when we took possession of the statements.

          23   Q.  Yes.  I'm dealing with this early stage to find out

          24       where the cab had come from and what had been seen and

          25       so forth.  So none of that occurred to you on the 4th or




           1       the 5th?

           2   A.  No, it did occur to me as to where the taxi cab had come

           3       from, but I'm not -- you're asking me whether I made

           4       a note of it and I'm saying, no, I haven't made a note

           5       of it.

           6   Q.  No, because, you see, one would need to then work back,

           7       if this is an intelligence led operation, into what was

           8       known about the transfer before it happened and so

           9       forth; you see all the questions that arise?

          10   A.  Yes.  The -- I think everybody has understood the

          11       difficulties around the intelligence and I have had

          12       access to the intelligence, but that wasn't until some

          13       time after.

          14   Q.  Yes.  Asking the minicab where he'd been wouldn't be

          15       a problem, would it?

          16   A.  It may not have been a problem but that's not how it

          17       happened.  The taxi driver, he had got his own

          18       difficulties, he was removed from the scene and my

          19       Urdu-speaking investigator contacted him on 5 August.

          20   Q.  One of the things that the officer discovered at the

          21       scene was that a box was concerned in this case; when

          22       did you first know about that?

          23   A.  I first knew about that on 8 August.

          24   Q.  The 8th?

          25   A.  Yes, at 17.35.




           1   Q.  You see, if some enquiries had been made by you, lead

           2       investigator, either at Leman Street before you got to

           3       the scene or at the scene, the box would then have had

           4       some significance, wouldn't it?

           5   A.  Well, it did have significance.

           6   Q.  The significance being that it looks as though, appeared

           7       as though, the gun in the sock had been in the box.

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  So, again, it would be important to know, from a very

          10       early stage, where the box had come from, where it ended

          11       up in the minicab and the continuity of the box would be

          12       important, wouldn't it?

          13   A.  Yes, it would.

          14   Q.  Yes.  Did you take control of that aspect of this case?

          15   A.  Well, to some degree, yes, and then to some degree, no.

          16       Because the situation was that the PolSA team were

          17       tasked with searching the inside of the taxi cab.

          18       I would have expected that the taxi cab, the inside of

          19       the taxi cab, would have been fully photographed at the

          20       scene, and I would have expected the actual box itself

          21       to have been seized by the PolSA team at the scene.

          22   Q.  But you now appreciate, do you not, that the box has

          23       been moved around in inexplicable ways, has it not?

          24   A.  Yes, it has.

          25   Q.  That also is unfortunate, isn't it?




           1   A.  It's very unfortunate.

           2   Q.  Because, again, just coming back to the minicab itself,

           3       it's best to leave everything in situ to do as much

           4       investigation as you can in situ; do you agree?

           5   A.  No.  Because otherwise we wouldn't be moving vehicles to

           6       Perivale or --

           7   Q.  Yes, I appreciate, coming to that.  To begin with, you

           8       do as much investigation as you can at the scene because

           9       if you start to drive things away, cartridge cases on

          10       the ground get moved --

          11   A.  Yes, they do.

          12   Q.  -- and of course that may indicate where the firer was,

          13       where the cartridge case ends up?

          14   A.  Could do, yes.

          15   Q.  You appreciate all these finer details?

          16   A.  Yes, I do.

          17   Q.  That's why you keep it as static as possible --

          18   A.  Yes, that's right.

          19   Q.  -- for as long as possible?

          20   A.  Yes, that's right.

          21   Q.  Why were you asking for the minicab to be moved late on

          22       the evening of the 4th?

          23   A.  I think I have already given that account to

          24       Mr Underwood but, as I said, I considered and felt that

          25       there was an opportunity to turn around any forensic




           1       investigation of the taxi cab, bearing in mind -- and

           2       I think this is an important issue -- that I was not

           3       told that there was any blood spatter on the outside of

           4       that vehicle.  I now know that blood spatter was found,

           5       and there should have been an external examination of

           6       that vehicle, and there was one, because it was agreed

           7       that that would happen.

           8           There was an external examination and they found

           9       blood spatter around about, I don't know, 1.30 on

          10       5 August.  That wasn't conveyed to me.  It again wasn't

          11       conveyed to me when I asked was there anything on the

          12       outside of the vehicle -- external view, nothing.

          13           Had I have known that, I would never have attempted

          14       to do what I did.  I was trying to be -- I don't know,

          15       thoughtful.  It was foolish.  What I should have done is

          16       let the vehicle be removed to Perivale, as it -- as had

          17       been arranged and had been agreed.  But unfortunately

          18       I wasn't supplied with the information necessary.

          19   Q.  In fact, all these decisions, or a large number of them,

          20       were being made by you when you were not even at the

          21       scene?

          22   A.  Inevitable, sir.  It's not possible as a lead

          23       investigator to be everywhere.

          24   Q.  No, I appreciate that.  What you do is you cannot take

          25       decisions at a distance if they can wait until get




           1       there; there's nothing wrong with that, is there?

           2   A.  No.  I think that's true.

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Your choice -- you could have gone

           4       straight to the scene but you chose to go to Leman

           5       Street?

           6   A.  Sir, it's a really difficult decision, that is.  I've

           7       dealt with one previous fatal police shooting, I was

           8       a lead investigator on a shooting in Brighton and my

           9       choice there was to go to the scene and a colleague went

          10       to the post-incident process.

          11           Now, I think it's, to some degree, six of one, half

          12       a dozen of the other, but in this case I would have been

          13       far better off going to the scene and my colleague,

          14       Mr Mehaffey, going to the PIP.  But I think that that's

          15       certainly on reflection.

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That's just on hindsight?

          17   A.  But I think that I would have been better served being

          18       at the scene.  I think that's probably true.

          19   MR MANSFIELD:  Thank you, sir, I have no further questions.

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much, Mr Mansfield.

          21           Yes, Mr Thomas?

          22                      Questions by MR THOMAS

          23   MR THOMAS:  Good afternoon Mr Sparrow, I represent the loved

          24       ones of Mark Duggan.

          25   A.  Hello, sir.




           1   Q.  You do accept that hindsight should never be used as

           2       an excuse for that which is reasonably foreseeable?

           3   A.  If I understand --

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Hang on, that's an interesting

           5       debate.

           6           All right, and your next question?

           7   MR THOMAS:  30 years in the police force: which force?

           8   A.  Hertfordshire.

           9   Q.  So quite close to the Metropolitan Police area?

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  Whilst you were in the Hertfordshire police force in

          12       your 30 years, how much dealings did you have, as

          13       a Hertfordshire officer, with the Metropolitan Police?

          14   A.  I had dealings with the Metropolitan Police on occasion

          15       but not on a regular basis.

          16   Q.  Help me with this: what exactly were you doing in the

          17       Hertfordshire police; what rank did you get to and in

          18       what area?

          19   A.  I was -- I was a Temporary Detective Superintendent in

          20       charge of the major crime task force within

          21       Hertfordshire.  So I ran a major crime team for four and

          22       a half years.  I was a Senior Investigating Officer

          23       throughout that period of time and I retired as

          24       a Substantive Detective Chief Inspector, as deputy head

          25       of professional standards.




           1   Q.  All right.  So by the time you went across, retired and

           2       started to work for the IPCC, the one thing we can agree

           3       on is that you knew about the significance of good crime

           4       scene management?

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  All right.  Would you accept this: as part of good crime

           7       scene management, particularly on a death in custody, it

           8       is vitally important that the investigator approaches

           9       the investigation with an open mind?

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  Now, can you help me with this: you've told us that, in

          12       response to a number of questions that Mr Mansfield was

          13       just asking you, that you didn't do certain things

          14       because of information that was coming to you.  May

          15       I ask this question: where was that information coming

          16       from?

          17   A.  The information that was coming to me, certainly from

          18       the scene, whilst I was at Leman Street, was coming from

          19       my colleague, Mr Mehaffey.  But that information,

          20       I suppose, would have been coming from the police.

          21   Q.  Yes.  Just so we're absolutely crystal clear about this,

          22       your colleague who was at the scene was gleaning

          23       information from the CO19 officers?

          24   A.  No, that's not correct.  I was at Leman Street and

          25       that's where the CO19 officers were.




           1   Q.  In terms of what had taken place, although the CO19

           2       officers had made their way to Leman Street --

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  -- that was the original source of the information that

           5       your colleague was picking up, was it not?

           6   A.  Sorry, I may have misunderstood your question.  I was at

           7       Leman Street so I was obtaining information indirectly

           8       from CO19 officers but I was also obtaining information

           9       from the Directorate of Professional Standards.

          10   Q.  So my question is: the information that you were

          11       receiving, which is why you went off in a particular

          12       direction and not in another direction, was essentially

          13       because you were being provided with information from

          14       the police in relation to what had taken place earlier

          15       on; would that be fair?

          16   A.  Yes, but what I would also say is that I have never

          17       taken anything that the police have said on face value.

          18       I've always challenged it in terms of however that may

          19       be, by trying to obtain independent evidence from

          20       witnesses or from the ballistics or from forensics.  So

          21       I have never -- I do not think I have ever taken, on

          22       face value, anything that the police have said.

          23   Q.  All right.  You know in this case that one of the

          24       issues -- I appreciate that you might not have realised

          25       this immediately on the night or in the day




           1       afterwards -- I think you have some difficulty

           2       pinpointing exactly when, but let's put that to one

           3       side?

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  You know one of the big issues in this case is how the

           6       gun ended up where it did?

           7   A.  Absolutely.

           8   Q.  Help me with this: did you instruct anybody to take

           9       fingerprint evidence from any of the CO19 officers?

          10   A.  No, I did not.

          11   Q.  Did you instruct anybody to take DNA evidence from any

          12       of the CO19 officers?

          13   A.  No, I did not.

          14   Q.  You have already told us you didn't take fibre evidence

          15       from any of the CO19 officers.

          16   A.  I didn't say from "any of the CO19 officers".

          17   Q.  But from the majority of them?

          18   A.  That's correct.

          19   Q.  It's right isn't it that, because there was a real

          20       issue -- and it would be right to say this, you would

          21       agree this: everybody was scratching their heads in

          22       relation to how the gun ended up over the fence when

          23       they realised where Mark Duggan was said to be standing,

          24       correct?

          25   A.  Yes.  It was certainly core to the investigation as to




           1       how the gun got where it got.

           2   Q.  Did anybody think about seizing individual mobile phones

           3       of the police officers to have a look at their text

           4       messages?

           5   A.  No, sir.

           6   Q.  Open mind, was there?

           7   A.  I certainly had an open mind but I certainly -- that

           8       kind of action would not enter my head at that stage

           9       to --

          10   Q.  No: 30 years a police officer?  Let me ask you some

          11       other questions, if I may.

          12           You were there at Leman Street the night when the

          13       officers were doing their initial accounts?

          14   A.  I was.

          15   Q.  You saw some of the initial accounts in the EABs, if

          16       I heard you correctly; is that right?

          17   A.  I certainly read V53's that night.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  His initial account, not the note

          19       that he made --

          20   A.  Sorry, sir, the EAB.  I think there's a slight confusion

          21       about --

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The achieving best evidence booklet

          23       that we have seen up on our screen, that first

          24       statement.

          25   MR THOMAS:  The initial accounts, the EAB, the notebooks in




           1       the notebook forms, yes.

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  You see, can you just tell me this: in relation to those

           4       initial accounts, I don't know if you were sitting in

           5       court when I was going through the EABs with a whole

           6       range of the police officers; were you in court when

           7       I was doing that?

           8   A.  I was, sir.

           9   Q.  There was all the discrepancies in relation to the

          10       timings, some of them not being franked, some of the

          11       officers writing five or six sentences taking a hour?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  Who was meant to be supervising all of that?

          14   A.  Well, the role of the Post-Incident Manager is the

          15       person who actually manages the actual process.  I was

          16       present at the process and I ensured that I went to all

          17       of the officers, I went to the CO19 officers, and I was

          18       with Chief Inspector Neil Evans, who provided

          19       appropriate warnings to the officers regarding

          20       conferring, and I did that also with the SCD8 and SCD11

          21       officers.

          22   Q.  Mr Sparrow, we've been told that the officer who was

          23       meant to be supervising the officers -- the vast

          24       majority of the CO19 officers, who were all in one

          25       room -- I am not talking about V53 because he made his




           1       statement earlier on -- he wasn't in the room keeping

           2       an eye on the officers.

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I am not sure whether we were told

           4       that?

           5   MR THOMAS:  We were told that, sir.

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  There was more than one

           7       Post-Incident Manager.

           8   MR THOMAS:  Sir, you will remember that there was an issue

           9       in relation to the Post-Incident Manager leaving the

          10       room and I put it to him who was supervising the officer

          11       and he said he trusted the officers because they were

          12       police officers and he had given them a warning.

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  But is the post-incident

          14       procedure -- you're there to observe it, are you, as

          15       much as you can, but you're not the manager of it?

          16   A.  I am not the manager of it, sir, but I'm there to make

          17       sure that the ACPO guidance is followed, essentially,

          18       which is certainly what I was there -- the Post-Incident

          19       Manager, Mr Evans, I think took his role very seriously.

          20       He delivered the conferring very professionally --

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Delivered the warning about not

          22       conferring?

          23   A.  Sorry, yes, of course.

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Just remember to get it absolutely

          25       right.  Then you are bound by the ACPO guidelines, so,




           1       as you told us, you then wait until you then receive the

           2       fuller statements which came out on 7 August?

           3   A.  Yes.  So I agreed on the night that the CO19 officers

           4       would provide the IPCC with EABs, initial accounts, and

           5       then, subsequent to that, within 48 hours/72 hours, they

           6       would provide detailed the accounts to me and that's in

           7       line with the ACPO manual of guidance that was in -- the

           8       2010 --

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That we've been talking about in

          10       this case?

          11   A.  That's correct.

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That's what happened here?

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   MR THOMAS:  Can I cut to the question that I would like to

          15       ask you: the process, the deaths in custody are

          16       extremely serious; you accept that?

          17   A.  Yes, of course.

          18   Q.  You accept that the whole process, post-incident, should

          19       be as transparent as can be so that there's public

          20       confidence in what's going on; you accept that?

          21   A.  Of course.

          22   Q.  You have a situation where all the officers -- they have

          23       been given their warning, "Officers, don't confer with

          24       one another, make sure the initial account is your own

          25       account", would you accept, if you have the manager




           1       there, that there's absolutely nothing stopping the

           2       manager from just sitting in the room, is there?

           3   A.  I don't think that's -- I don't think that's possible

           4       for a Post-Incident Manager to necessarily do that.

           5       I have not been in that role but he has a number of

           6       functions to perform and he's servicing a number of

           7       different aspects --

           8   Q.  There's not another officer who he can deputise to sit

           9       in the room?  That's beyond the wit of the Post-Incident

          10       Manager, is it?

          11   A.  I think you had better ask the Post-Incident Manager

          12       that.

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I think we did.

          14   MR THOMAS:  You think it's all right, do you, for the

          15       officers to be left unsupervised in the room?

          16   A.  No, I don't.  I think ideally -- I think the landscape

          17       around conferring is probably changing all the time --

          18       and quite rightly, in my view, and -- so in terms of

          19       your point around confidence and reassurance, I can

          20       fully understand your point.

          21   Q.  Just help me with this, these are the last points I want

          22       to ask you about.  You accept what we heard about the

          23       franking is unacceptable?

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We are not going to ask you to

          25       comment about that.




           1   MR THOMAS:  Sir, that's all I ask.

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much Mr Thomas.

           3           Mr Stern?

           4                      Questions by MR STERN

           5   MR STERN:  I do have some questions, thank you, sir.

           6       Mr Sparrow, did I understand your evidence to be that

           7       you were, or at least you believe you were, informed by

           8       DCI Williams from the Directorate of Professional

           9       Standards that there had been an exchange of fire;

          10       that's what he said to you?

          11   A.  Yes, sir, that's correct.

          12   Q.  You didn't know that that was going to be put out by the

          13       IPCC, you said?

          14   A.  I did not know that.

          15   Q.  So nobody from the IPCC consulted you, the lead

          16       investigator, in relation to putting out information

          17       before the media?

          18   A.  That's correct.  I would say that it -- in terms of

          19       media issues, that's something that Mr Cummins may have

          20       been dealing with but I'm fairly sure, sir, that he did

          21       not have a conversation with the individual around that.

          22   Q.  Can we take it by 10.30, which is the time you said you

          23       saw it on the news, that you said you were very

          24       surprised that that had been put out into the public

          25       domain?




           1   A.  Absolutely I was, yes.

           2   Q.  You were presumably very surprised because, by that

           3       time, you had realised that that was a false picture?

           4   A.  No, I don't think that's true.  Because there was

           5       always -- there was still the doubt as to whether there

           6       had been an exchange of fire but I just thought that it

           7       was an inappropriate -- it was inappropriate that that

           8       was released.

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  At that time you didn't know that

          10       the bullet was -- the one in the radio was in fact

          11       a police issue bullet, are you saying; is that right?

          12   A.  Well sir, the initial briefing was that he was -- W42

          13       was either shot by Mr Duggan, through an exchange of

          14       fire, or there was a ricochet.  So that was my

          15       understanding in the initial phase of me attending Leman

          16       Street.

          17           That was further enhanced, if you like, by the

          18       ballistics expert attending the scene and making comment

          19       that the --

          20   MR STERN:  Sorry to interrupt you, can we do this stage by

          21       stage.  You didn't go to the scene until 2.30 in the

          22       morning, did you?

          23   A.  That's correct.

          24   Q.  I'm just on 4 August so, if I can just take you back so

          25       we can just follow it through.  Could you please have up




           1       on the screen CD621.  We don't have a log from you, but

           2       this is a log from the PIM, from the Post-Incident

           3       Manager --

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  -- the gentleman you have just been asked questions

           6       about?

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  "7.40 [19.40] TST floor.  Met V53.  Did not discuss

           9       actions nor did they make comment.  I informed them that

          10       I was here to support the officer not investigate.

          11           "They gave me a verbal initial account they had

          12       received from V53."

          13           The jury have seen this.  That's the note that he

          14       had given or the comment he had given to W55 at 18.50 at

          15       the scene that very evening?

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  You are now familiar with that?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  19.45:

          20           "I went to my office -- 4th floor.  Our Commander

          21       present and IPCC -- Gary Lidder, Colin Sparrow."

          22           That's you, isn't it?

          23   A.  I'm certainly Colin Sparrow, yes.

          24   Q.   Obviously, I was not asking if you were both of them.

          25   A.  I'm confirming -- I am not agreeing with that entry,




           1       because it's incorrect.

           2   Q.  You didn't meet them?

           3   A.  Not at 1945 hours I didn't, no.

           4   Q.  Was it somebody pretending to be you at 1945?

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  He cannot answer that.

           6   A.  Sorry, the IPCC weren't in attendance at Leman Street at

           7       1945?

           8   Q.  Right.  So Gary Lidder wasn't there either?

           9   A.  No, he wasn't.

          10   Q.  Then we have:

          11           "DPS DCI Williams informed that DPS and IPCC teams

          12       going to the scene.  Also informed that as of 1920 this

          13       was an independent IPCC investigation:

          14           Then we can perhaps skip down a little bit, 21.40,

          15       a little further down, ignore the handwriting on there,

          16       that's not mine, but it's not relevant:

          17           "Met IPCC -- Lidder/Sparrow."

          18           Perhaps I ought to ask you whether that's you,

          19       obviously not Lidder, Sparrow?

          20   A.  It is me, sir, and that would be when I arrived at 2140.

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That's your first attendance?

          22   A.  It is, sir, yes.

          23   MR STERN:  Then, as you have just told us:

          24           "Conferring of notes explained-guidance given.

          25       IPCC/DPS content with explanation.




           1           " ... SCD8/11 officers introduced to DPS/IPCC ..."

           2           Then if we look at the foot of that page:

           3           "PIM 2 confirm initial make safe, that weapon is

           4       a viable firearm, believed Bruni, one homemade round in

           5       a magazine."

           6           Presumably you were aware of all this?

           7   A.  As I explained earlier, I was informed of this

           8       information at 23 -- sorry, pardon me -- 23.15.

           9   Q.  Where do we see that?  Do you have a schedule of some

          10       sort?

          11   A.  This is a notebook, sir (indicates).

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  This is the notebook you've been

          13       looking at?

          14   MR STERN:  We have not seen it, so forgive me.  At least

          15       I don't think we've seen it.

          16   MR GLASSON:  They've all been disclosed to your Inquest team

          17       it's simply a matter of whether or not they have been

          18       called for, but they have been disclosed.

          19   MR STERN:  In any event, whatever the time, whether it's

          20       2140 or 23-something or other, you learnt that that was

          21       the position, that on the very evening, on 4 August.

          22   A.  Yes, sir.

          23   Q.  Were you given that initial account by V53 that we can

          24       see in the -- you're now very familiar with it, you

          25       don't need to look at it in the document.  Were you




           1       given that, were you told it?

           2   A.  I think the point that I was asked, had I seen that

           3       document on the night, I think is true, but when I look

           4       at my notes I think it's possible that it had been

           5       summarised by Detective Superintendent Evans.

           6   Q.  Right.

           7   A.  So --

           8   Q.  So the PIM --

           9   A.  No, no, no.  A different Mr Evans.

          10   Q.  Sorry, two Evanses.  So he had, whatever you say,

          11       summarised it, again, forgive me, I have not seen your

          12       note, but you were aware then that he, V53, had said

          13       something in relation to what had taken place?

          14   A.  Well, I think that's the point.  I know that W55 had

          15       taken an account --

          16   Q.  53 --

          17   A.  55 --

          18   Q.  Oh, had taken an account, I beg your pardon, sorry?

          19   A.  -- had taken an account from V53, I know that now, but

          20       I am not sure I knew that on the night but I think it's

          21       summarised in by briefing.  So what I'm saying is it

          22       wasn't read out.  I'm trying not to confuse you.

          23   Q.  Don't worry, you won't confuse me, about that anyway.

          24       But, as far as I can see, whether it was read out or it

          25       was summarised, may not matter very much.  The point is:




           1       were you informed that there was an account which is

           2       similar to that that we can see written down there?

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  Right.  So were you aware that there was a gun in a sock

           5       on the evening of 4 August?

           6   A.  Yes, at 23.15.

           7   Q.  Whatever the exact time it may not matter very much but

           8       it was certainly that evening --

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That's your evidence, 23.15.

          10   A.  23.15, yes.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You said it a number of times, yes.

          12   MR STERN:  Thank you very much, so far as that is concerned.

          13           Can I please ask you to look at page 20 in the jury

          14       bundle, and I don't know whether or not you have it to

          15       hand.

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You have a jury bundle there.

          17   MR STERN:  It's a photograph.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It's a photograph at the front part.

          19   MR STERN:  Perhaps it could go up on the screen.  Yes, it's

          20       on the screen.  Perhaps people need not turn it up.

          21       There is a better quality one but perhaps I need not

          22       trouble you with that.  That was taken, as we understand

          23       it, about midnight on 4 August --

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   Q.  -- you agree?




           1   A.  Yes.

           2   Q.  When you arrived at the scene at about it 2.30 in the

           3       morning, was the box in a similar state to that?

           4   A.  I didn't approach the taxi cab.

           5   Q.  Did you go to the taxi cab?

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You can't say?

           7   A.  I can't say.

           8   MR STERN:  You did not go to the minicab at all when you

           9       arrived at 2.30 in the morning?

          10   A.  No, I didn't, sir.

          11   Q.  That was the central feature of the entire case, wasn't

          12       it?

          13   A.  The taxi cab itself?

          14   Q.  Yes.

          15   A.  It was certainly a part of the case.

          16   Q.  Well, Mark Duggan had --

          17   A.  But I wasn't going to walk through a scene.  I was

          18       perfectly happy to stand on the outside of the inner

          19       cordon.

          20   Q.  All right.  You didn't look at it or approach it?

          21   A.  No, I didn't.

          22   Q.  So far as the -- yes, the cab had not been moved at that

          23       time, had it?

          24   A.  No, it hadn't.

          25   Q.  So any movement of the box, as far as you know, and the




           1       cab came after that period of time; as far as you know?

           2   A.  As far as I'm aware, yes.

           3   Q.  Right.  Now, there was a considerable amount of contact

           4       by somebody from the IPCC -- forgive me if I have his

           5       name long, Adil Jamil?

           6   A.  That's correct.

           7   Q.  He had a lot of contact with the taxi driver right from

           8       5 August --

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  -- in the evening of the 5 August, and had a number of

          11       conversations with him.

          12   A.  He did, yes.

          13   Q.  He did, yes.  During the course of that time, did he

          14       discover, on 5 August or 6 August -- did he take any

          15       initial statement from him or comments from him?

          16   A.  No.  There was nothing taken from him.  I considered

          17       that Mr -- the taxi driver had gone through

          18       a particularly traumatic event and, in a similar way to

          19       CO19 officers, they would be given an opportunity to

          20       have 48 hours/72 hours to recall events.  I gave exactly

          21       that --

          22   Q.  You afforded him the same opportunity?

          23   A.  In terms of the taxi driver, yes.

          24   Q.  Right.  So far as dealings with him were concerned, they

          25       were extensive interviews, were there not, on 8 August?




           1   A.  There were, yes.

           2   Q.  Obviously by 8 August, those extensive interviews

           3       revealed the box and the importance of the box?

           4   A.  Yes, that's correct.

           5   MR STERN:  Thank you very much.

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you.

           7           Yes, Mr Keith?  Will you be long because sometimes

           8       we have an afternoon break for those in front of me

           9       and --

          10   MR KEITH:  I do not believe I will be very long.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We'll see how we go.

          12                      Questions by MR KEITH

          13   MR KEITH:  I want to ask some questions, please, on behalf

          14       of the Metropolitan Police Service.

          15   A.  Yes, sir.

          16   Q.  As you have explained, your colleagues at the IPCC went

          17       to the scene?

          18   A.  They did.

          19   Q.  Mr Mehaffey --

          20   A.  Mehaffey.

          21   Q.  Mr Mehaffey, Mr Omotosho and Mr Kirkpatrick?

          22   A.  That's correct.

          23   Q.  We know that they arrived from a log kept by

          24       an Inspector Saunders who was there, at 21.41; does that

          25       seem to you to be about right?




           1   A.  I would have thought it would have been earlier than

           2       that but I'll accept that.

           3   Q.  They wouldn't have arrived much earlier than the time

           4       you arrived at Leman Street.  They were sent out on the

           5       scene, you went to Leman Street --

           6   A.  No it was about proximity, sir, because I think the

           7       other individuals were far closer to the scene than

           8       I was to Leman Street.

           9   Q.  All right.  Take it from me 21.41 is the time accorded.

          10           What was their duty, their primary obligation when

          11       they arrived at the scene, as far as you, the senior

          12       investigator was concerned?

          13   A.  Mr Mehaffey would take responsibility for the scene on

          14       my behalf to ensure that the appropriate strategies were

          15       put into place in order to secure and preserve evidence.

          16   Q.  We heard from Ms Larrigan, who was a Crime Scene

          17       Manager, that the proper course to adopt would be to

          18       take some basic steps to see what the scene consisted

          19       of, to preserve evidence and to preserve the area, and

          20       then await the arrival of the IPCC for further direction

          21       and information; is that right?

          22   A.  Yes.  That's correct.

          23   Q.  So when they arrived, your colleagues arrived, an action

          24       plan was put into place, a broad forensic strategy was

          25       agreed.




           1   A.  That's correct.

           2   Q.  It dealt with cordons, how best to go about

           3       photographing the scene --

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  -- how best to do 360-degree photography --

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  -- what to do about the gun, placing of tents, and so on

           8       and so forth?

           9   A.  That's correct.

          10   Q.  At that stage, is the priority to preserve or is it to

          11       find out immediately every aspect of what has happened?

          12   A.  It's to preserve.

          13   Q.  In your experience, is it common for all the facts to be

          14       plain at the beginning of an investigation?

          15   A.  No, it's not.

          16   Q.  You were asked about the need to speak to police

          17       officers.  Is it at all surprising that in an incident

          18       involving firearms officers and the police that you

          19       should have to speak to police officers?

          20   A.  It isn't surprising, no.

          21   Q.  They are the primary source, aren't they?

          22   A.  That's correct.

          23   Q.  That's quite normal?

          24   A.  It is.

          25   Q.  But they are not always there at the scene, are they,




           1       when you, the IPCC, arrive?

           2   A.  In this case, certainly not.

           3   Q.  Why were they not there?

           4   A.  The CO19 officers were at Leman Street and being

           5       conducted -- conducting the post-incident process.

           6   Q.  Was that quite normal?

           7   A.  Yes, it was.

           8   Q.  Is there a standard operating procedure whereby primary

           9       witnesses, those who are most intimately involved in

          10       an incident, are actually taken away from the scene,

          11       placed somewhere else?

          12   A.  Yes, principal officers, yes, sir.

          13   Q.  So it's not uncommon to arrive at the scene and find

          14       that there's no one present with first hand knowledge?

          15   A.  That would be correct, yes.

          16   Q.  What you have to do is to find out bit by bit, from

          17       various sources, different directions, what has

          18       happened?

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  The most central feature was that a man was dead.

          21   A.  That's correct.

          22   Q.  No doubt one of the first questions that had to be

          23       answered is: who shot him?

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   Q.  Were you concerned in those initial hours with where the




           1       gun had come from originally or were you concerned with

           2       finding out who had shot who?

           3   A.  I was certainly more focused on how, as it turns out,

           4       V53 had shot Mr Duggan.

           5   Q.  Of course, whether or not Mr Duggan had fired was also

           6       an essential issue, wasn't it?

           7   A.  It was an essential issue.

           8   Q.  There was a very plain concern expressed by the police

           9       to you in relation to the draft statement that the IPCC

          10       proposed disseminating, in relation to what the IPCC

          11       were saying, as to whether or not there was any proper

          12       suggestion that Mr Duggan had fired.

          13   A.  I'm sorry, I am not following that question, could you

          14       repeat it again?

          15   Q.  Do you remember discussing with senior police officers

          16       their concern that what the IPCC said in public should

          17       be right and accurate?

          18   A.  Not necessarily on the night, no.  I took the

          19       responsibility to raise it within the IPCC.

          20   Q.  When the news came out, you have referred to the news

          21       that you were watching, that suggested that there had

          22       been an exchange of shots.  Police officers expressed to

          23       you directly their concern that that was not right; do

          24       you recall?

          25   A.  I don't recall that.




           1   Q.  Could we just have, please, on the screen, CD32893.

           2       Just tell us, please, whether or not, just for the

           3       moment -- this is a decision recorded by DAC Hewitt,

           4       from whom we heard earlier in the proceedings.  Can you

           5       just scroll to the bottom of the page, please, and there

           6       is a reference there, "Date and time decision made,

           7       2036, 04/08".

           8           Then, to go at the top of the page, please, he was

           9       concerned that had there should be a challenge to

          10       a draft IPCC statement suggesting that the officer was

          11       shot before the male was shot.  Do you recall that being

          12       raised with you?

          13   A.  No, I don't.

          14   Q.  All right, I cannot pursue that?

          15   A.  I think it's a different --

          16   Q.  The matter didn't proceed very much further, did it,

          17       because, of course, once you became aware of this

          18       suggestion, steps were taken to correct it.

          19   A.  Yes, that's correct.

          20   Q.  Yes.  Your team remained at the scene, of course, for

          21       the rest of that day and the rest of the following day,

          22       5 August?

          23   A.  I think there was a point where the IPCC weren't in

          24       attendance because of resources, but, yes, you're

          25       absolutely right, the intention was to maintain




           1       a presence in terms of making sure that the various

           2       search and forensic strategies were carried out.

           3   Q.  At no stage did they report back to you that they were

           4       being hindered in any way by a lack of police resources,

           5       by a lack of Crime Scene Managers in attendance or in

           6       any way that the forensic steps that they wished to

           7       carry out were not being carried out?

           8   A.  That's true, yes.

           9   Q.  In relation to the Crime Scene Managers, you

          10       anticipated, didn't you, that they would discuss with

          11       your representatives on the scene matters such as areas

          12       that should be searched, whether cordons should be

          13       reduced, whether or not phones should be returned to the

          14       taxi driver, as turned out to be the case; is that

          15       right?

          16   A.  Yes, yes, of course.

          17   Q.  In relation to the PolSA search and the Toyota, did they

          18       discuss with you what initially was anticipated to be

          19       done with the Toyota?

          20   A.  I was aware that it was going to be forensically

          21       lifted -- to Perivale.

          22   Q.  Could we have CD480, please, on the screen.  From very

          23       early on, we can see here -- this is an extract from the

          24       search advice file kept by Ms Larrigan and subsequently

          25       Mr Cockram.  If we look at the bottom of page 480, three




           1       or four points from the bottom:

           2           "Toyota minicab to be lifted to Perivale once

           3       photography complete (Exhibits Officer will arrange

           4       this)."

           5           From very early on in the investigation those

           6       present at the scene, including your own investigators,

           7       anticipated that the Toyota would go to Perivale?

           8   A.  That's correct.

           9   Q.  Because, of course, it needed to be examined

          10       forensically.

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  That was the whole point.

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  There was no other reason for it to go to Perivale, was

          15       there?

          16   A.  Yes, for searching.

          17   Q.  What facilities are at Perivale that are not at the

          18       scene?

          19   A.  I don't know, sir.

          20   Q.  You're responsible for all the forensic issues that go

          21       on.

          22   A.  I -- unfortunately I get called to 43 different forces

          23       and I don't know what all the facilities are in every

          24       force around the UK.

          25   Q.  All right.  In any event, it was plain to all those at




           1       the scene on the night of the 4th and throughout the

           2       night that the Toyota would go to Perivale for a full

           3       forensic examination; do you recall that?

           4   A.  Yes, that's correct.

           5   Q.  The reason that it didn't was that you decided that the

           6       car should stay at the scene and be searched there.

           7   A.  That was my decision, yes.

           8   Q.  Did you discuss with any of the police officers at the

           9       scene, in particular those engaged in the forensic work,

          10       the fingertip searching going on on the road, whether or

          11       not that was a sensible course to take?

          12   A.  I don't think a search officer doing fingertip searching

          13       would have that kind of knowledge, so I wouldn't ask

          14       them.

          15   Q.  Did you speak to the Exhibits Officers who were there?

          16   A.  No, I didn't.

          17   Q.  Did you speak to your own colleagues who were there, in

          18       advance of you taking the decision?

          19   A.  No, I didn't.  If I may, the reality is that my request,

          20       I think, was fired indirectly to the Exhibits Officer

          21       via DCI Williams.  So I think it went to DC Payne who

          22       was the Exhibits Officer, in any event.

          23   Q.  I think it's fair to say that most of the officers there

          24       were quite surprised by the decision, as you now know,

          25       because you heard them give evidence.




           1   A.  I have heard them give evidence but nobody raised it at

           2       all with me at the time.

           3   Q.  The point about the Toyota going to Perivale was that

           4       that was where the forensic tests could best be carried

           5       out; that's right, isn't it?

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  The work that had actually been done on the morning of

           8       the 5th, by the PolSA teams that were there -- there

           9       were two PolSA teams -- was actually concerned primarily

          10       with the roadway, doing the fingertip searches for

          11       ballistics; do you recall all that?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  They weren't told, were they, to go and look inside the

          14       minicab?

          15   A.  No, they weren't.

          16   Q.  No.  No one anticipated an inside search because

          17       everybody was anticipating it would be done at Perivale?

          18   A.  That's correct.

          19   Q.  All right.  In relation to the box, was there anything

          20       about the box that initially would have brought itself

          21       to anybody's attention as being significant?  Did it

          22       look like it had a connection with ballistics or

          23       firearms?

          24   A.  I think, in my view, you've shown the still -- I think

          25       it was Mr Stern showed it had earlier -- with the box in




           1       the cab.  I would have thought it was obvious that it

           2       was significant just by its -- by its presence.

           3   Q.  Because it was in the car?

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You didn't see it in that way, did

           6       you?  You didn't see it --

           7   A.  I didn't see it, no, sir.  But my view was -- had I have

           8       seen that, I would have expected it to have been seized.

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes.

          10   MR KEITH:  There was photography, of course, of the car.

          11       We've seen the box in the photograph, we have seen it in

          12       the photograph.  Did your staff, or did any of your IPCC

          13       colleagues, discuss with you the contents of the Toyota

          14       on the night of the 4th or the morning of the 5th?

          15   A.  No, they didn't.

          16   Q.  Finally, you were asked questions about

          17       Mr Hutchinson-Foster.  Could you put, please, this issue

          18       of where Mr Duggan got the gun from into its context, in

          19       terms of your investigation on 4, 5 and 6 August.  We

          20       know subsequently, of course, that DNA was found --

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  -- that allowed you to draw certain conclusions as to

          23       where the gun had come from.  That was all in the

          24       future.  To what extent did you consider it necessary to

          25       examine the genesis, the origin, of the gun, as opposed




           1       to who shot who?

           2   A.  My focus at that time was on the actual shooting.

           3       I raised it with DCS Cundy on the night as to who would

           4       be carrying out the criminal investigation -- that they

           5       would be carrying out a criminal investigation and that

           6       there would be no compromise between their criminal

           7       investigation and the IPCC investigation.  So my focus

           8       was around the shooting.

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  So your belief was, on that night,

          10       that the Metropolitan Police would be investigating the

          11       supply of that gun?

          12   A.  Yes, sir.

          13   MR KEITH:  Of course, DNA tests were done, that led to

          14       certain investigative steps being taken, it became plain

          15       who had been the supplier of the gun and we now know the

          16       investigation continued and resulted in

          17       Mr Hutchinson-Foster's own prosecution and conviction.

          18   A.  Yes.  As soon as I was aware of the DNA evidence on the

          19       12 August, I made it aware -- sorry, I made DCS Cundy

          20       aware of that evidence.

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes.  But you yourself didn't know

          22       anything about Kevin Hutchinson-Foster until October,

          23       you say?

          24   A.  I believe so, sir, yes.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You were leaving it all to the




           1       Metropolitan Police?

           2   A.  The criminal investigation, in terms of the supply and

           3       transfer of the firearm, sits with the Metropolitan

           4       Police.

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Not part of the IPCC's terms of

           6       reference at all?

           7   A.  No, sir.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you.

           9   MR KEITH:  Thank you very much.  I have no further

          10       questions.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Ms Leek?

          12   MS LEEK:  No, thank you, sir.

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Butt?

          14   MR BUTT:  No, thank you, sir.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Glasson?

          16   MR GLASSON:  No, thank you, sir.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Back to you, Mr Underwood.

          18                Further questions by MR UNDERWOOD

          19   MR UNDERWOOD:  Just one question about the ballistics

          20       information at the scene.  While you were at Leman

          21       Street, were you aware that the first ballistics

          22       scientist, Mr Vaughan, had attended the scene?

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  Were you aware that he was saying that, on a provisional

          25       view, the metal work inside the radio appeared to be




           1       from a bullet that was not a police issue bullet?

           2   A.  Yes, sir.

           3   MR UNDERWOOD:  That's all I want to ask.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much, Mr Sparrow, for

           5       coming forward.  That completes your evidence.  Thank

           6       you for your assistance.

           7                      (The witness withdrew)

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We'll have a short break, I think,

           9       in the circumstances.

          10           Thank you, members of the jury, I can't allow you to

          11       go home yet, I'm afraid, but if you would be kind enough

          12       to leave us for five to ten minutes.  Thank you.

          19   (3.39 pm)

          20                         (A short break)

          21   (3.58 pm)

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Right.  We're now sitting in closed

          23       session, in as much as we have an anonymous witness, so

          24       the cameras are not working upstairs.  I ask for the

          25       cameras to be turned off for the moment while the jury


           1       are asked to come back into court, please.

           2                  (In the presence of the jury)

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much, members of the

           4       jury.  Yes, Mr Underwood?

           5   MR UNDERWOOD:  Sir, I promised I would recall ZZ17 just to

           6       deal with something else that A10 said when he was

           7       recalled.  I hope I can stop the loop there.

           8           So ZZ17, please.

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We'll ask for ZZ17 then to come into

          10       court, please.

          11           I will ask for him to be either sworn or affirmed

          12       again, please.

          13                        ZZ17 (re-affirmed)

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  Have a seat

          15       then, please.

          16   A.  Thank you, sir.

          17                    Questions by MR UNDERWOOD

          18   MR UNDERWOOD:  ZZ17, thank you for coming back.

          19   A.  No problems.

          20   Q.  A very short point: since you last gave evidence, A10

          21       has given further evidence.

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  I think you know about this.

          24   A.  Yes, I do, yes.

          25   Q.  Very shortly, it's to the effect that on 3 August there




           1       was some intelligence available to him about

           2       Mr Hutchinson-Foster --

           3   A.  Yes, sir.

           4   Q.  -- and the question is whether that was passed to you

           5       and what you did do with it or what you might have done?

           6   A.  Yes, sir.

           7   Q.  So first of all, on 3 August, were you aware that there

           8       was intelligence in the hands of SOCA that

           9       Mr Hutchinson-Foster was somewhere in the Leyton area?

          10   A.  Yes, sir.

          11   Q.  Were you aware he was with a female?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  Were you aware that a gun or more than one gun was

          14       present there?

          15   A.  I think that was inferred, sir, certainly, yes.

          16   Q.  By the time the intelligence reached you, do you know

          17       whether he was still at that place?

          18   A.  I'm not 100 per cent sure, sir.

          19   Q.  Can you now say, from your recollections, what you were

          20       told that day about Mr Hutchinson-Foster's plans for

          21       later that day?

          22   A.  Sorry, in what way, sir?

          23   Q.  Sorry, was what was passed on to you covering his

          24       intentions for later that day: was he going to stay

          25       there, was he going to move around?




           1   A.  No, he wasn't going to stay there, was my understanding.

           2   Q.  Had you any idea about timescales?

           3   A.  Sir, as I say, I cannot remember -- I've tried to

           4       remember, I cannot rather exactly now when I was --

           5       sorry, feedback there, I'll move back a little bit.

           6           I can't remember exactly when I was told during the

           7       afternoon.  I've tried to think about this: whether he

           8       was still there and was due to be leaving imminently or

           9       whether he would have already left, but certainly the

          10       information, as I understood it, was that he had either

          11       left or would be leaving imminently, put it that way.

          12   Q.  We know that you have no records of this now; is that

          13       fair?

          14   A.  That's correct, yes.

          15   Q.  You are doing the best you can with your recollection

          16       from this time on, are you?

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  Are you aware of evidence given in the Hutchinson-Foster

          19       trials about his movements and the cell siting that was

          20       done subsequently to show where he was that day?

          21   A.  To a certain extent, sir, yes.

          22   Q.  Are you able to disentangle now your memory of what

          23       happened from your memory of what you learned in the

          24       Hutchinson-Foster trials?

          25   A.  Sorry, I am not sure of what you're saying.




           1   Q.  Firstly, you were told things on 3 August.

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  You are trying to remember those?

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  Secondly, you will have learned things in the

           6       Hutchinson-Foster trial about his actual movements; is

           7       that fair?

           8   A.  (Pause)

           9   Q.  Or not?  If it's not true, tell me?

          10   A.  I'm not sure, no.

          11   MR UNDERWOOD:  Very well.  I'll leave it there, thank you

          12       very much.

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Questions, Mr Mansfield?

          14   MR MANSFIELD:  Sir, I have a number but I really don't want

          15       to waste time.  It's a very unsatisfactory situation in

          16       which a witness comes, he can't remember, he hasn't got

          17       any records.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  He has not got any records.

          19   MR MANSFIELD:  He ought to have access -- I'm sorry, I have

          20       raised this before -- we should have and should have had

          21       at the beginning a proper gist of exactly what was being

          22       conveyed between A10 and ZZ17.  I have some questions

          23       I can ask tonight but I really think, before I ask the

          24       questions --

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You ask those few questions that




           1       you've and then we'll --

           2   MR MANSFIELD:  Yes, I'm much obliged.

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- see whether if that satisfies.

           4                    Questions by MR MANSFIELD

           5   MR MANSFIELD:  Good afternoon, my name's Michael Mansfield.

           6       We have been introduced before, so I don't take time on

           7       that.

           8   A.  Yes, sir.

           9   Q.  Just so the jury will be reminded of the occasions on

          10       which you have imparted intelligence, you did so at

          11       a briefing on 3 August.  That's the day before,

          12       obviously.

          13   A.  Yes, sir.

          14   Q.  The jury have it in their bundles.

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  Then you came to make a series of written statements,

          17       didn't you?

          18   A.  Yes, sir.

          19   Q.  There are, in fact, seven of those and you have just

          20       made another one recently which makes eight.

          21   A.  If you say so, sir.

          22   Q.  I'll leave out the eighth one, that's the most recent

          23       one, dated last month in November, I think it's 29th so

          24       towards the end of the month.

          25   A.  Okay, sir.




           1   Q.  So seven statements, you gave evidence here before the

           2       jury, answered questions from Mr Underwood in front of

           3       me, do you remember --

           4   A.  Yes, sir.

           5   Q.  -- and you answered questions from me?

           6   A.  Indeed, sir, yes.

           7   Q.  They were careful questions which took you through the

           8       detail of intelligence, in so far as it could be imparted;

           9       do you remember?

          10   A.  Yes, sir, of course.

          11   Q.  In the jury file that they have -- and they can turn it

          12       up if they wish at this moment -- C9, divider 9, it is

          13       in fact A10's gisted account of information passed to

          14       you?

          15   A.  Yes, sir, sorry, do you want me to find that?

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, it might be helpful because if

          17       you have C9, behind divider 9 -- that's right, you find

          18       that.

          19   A.  I have that.

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Just make sure we have the one in

          21       the right order.  Does it have, numbered down the side 1

          22       to 8 paragraphs or not?

          23   A.  There seem to be two copies here, sir, one with printed

          24       numbers and then one with handwritten numbers.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  They are probably exactly the same.




           1       The bottom of paragraph 5, if you have it there, is the

           2       little bit you have just been telling us about, do you

           3       have that, where A10 says:

           4           "I subsequently received intelligence that indicated

           5       that Mark Duggan would be not in a position to collect

           6       the firearm."

           7           Above that, about the firearm:

           8           "Kevin Hutchinson-Foster intended to travel out of

           9       London later that evening."

          10   A.  Yes, sir.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That was the agreed --

          12   A.  The one with the handwriting on seems to have had

          13       a couple of words inserted, but I see those are inserted

          14       into the typed version.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  All right.  We'll look at the typed

          16       version, that's what we are concentrating on.

          17   A.  Thank you.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Back to Mr Mansfield.

          19   MR MANSFIELD:  My first question is this: why is it in none

          20       of those accounts -- seven statements,

          21       evidence-in-chief, cross-examination -- why did you

          22       never mention having information on the 3rd about Kevin

          23       Hutchinson-Foster being at an address with a woman

          24       holding the firearms; can you explain?

          25   A.  Yes, sir, certainly.




           1   Q.  Why did you not?

           2   A.  Sir, as you know, I've been trying to tread with these

           3       statements a careful legal line between what I can say

           4       and what I can't say.  I know you have been with your

           5       questions, and I've been very careful with my answers.

           6   Q.  I'm sorry that doesn't explain it at all.

           7   MR KEITH:  My learned friend won't comment, please.  We have

           8       had a great deal of commentary in relation to the

           9       difficulties that have been faced by everybody, not

          10       least the Metropolitan Police, in relation to the

          11       iterative way in which the information has been

          12       provided.  There are constraints under which everybody

          13       operates and I would ask my learned friend not to

          14       comment in that way.

          15   MR MANSFIELD:  I'm sorry, but I'm going to comment because

          16       we have not been given the full intelligence picture.

          17       I am going to suggest to you that there is no good

          18       reason why, on all of those occasions, you did not say

          19       the simple thing, that on the 3rd you had information or

          20       intelligence to the effect that Kevin Hutchinson-Foster

          21       was at an address with a woman holding firearms.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Now it's your chance to answer that.

          23   A.  Thank you very much, sir.

          24           Sir, as I said before, everyone is agreed, I think

          25       there is a difficulty with this legal line as to what




           1       can be said and what cannot be said and it seems to be

           2       we have some of the most experienced and eminent lawyers

           3       in the country in this room and still there seems to be

           4       no agreement.  I'm trying to chart what for me is a very

           5       difficult line as to what I can say and what I can't

           6       say.

           7           I've answered every question that's been asked of

           8       me, I have done that truthfully and, as far as I can

           9       push that line, as far as I dare push that line, without

          10       landing myself in hot water and potentially going to

          11       prison, it's very difficult for me to know what I can

          12       say to you and what I cannot say to you, sir.  Even now,

          13       it seems that there's no agreement as to where that line

          14       should be drawn.

          15   MR MANSFIELD:  Well, there is an agreement but I am not

          16       going -- it will be objected to as another comment --

          17       there's a clear line as to where it can be drawn.

          18   A.  I'm sorry, sir, if you know where that line is, I don't.

          19   Q.  I'm going to suggest to you where the line is drawn.

          20       Provided you do not reveal, all right, the precise

          21       source, the actual intelligence, provided it doesn't

          22       reveal the source, can be imparted.

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I think that's a matter of law for

          24       me, probably really, how to interpret a particular Act

          25       which even I cannot name openly.  So I think we cannot




           1       take that matter any further.

           2   MR MANSFIELD:  Sir, I'm sorry to persist --

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Not with this witness.  You can take

           4       it further with me, if you wish, but I think ZZ17 has

           5       said all he can say, hasn't he?

           6   MR MANSFIELD:  Sir, he said nothing other than he doesn't

           7       remember the detail.  If he's going to say -- if he

           8       is -- he's made a statement which, if I may say so -- of

           9       course the importance of this --

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Ask him about that, if you want to

          11       for the moment.

          12   MR MANSFIELD:  I do not want to because it's entirely vague.

          13       He doesn't really know --

          14           All right, I'll ask you.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Ask him about the statement.

          16   MR MANSFIELD:  Yes, I'll ask you about the statement.  In

          17       this statement you indicate that he was at a female's

          18       address on the 3rd --

          19   A.  Yes, sir.

          20   Q.  -- but was leaving imminently; where does that come

          21       from?

          22   A.  Sir, that is my recollection --

          23   Q.  Is it?

          24   A.  Yes.  As I say, I cannot remember exactly when

          25       I received that information but certainly my




           1       understanding of the intelligence that SOCA received and

           2       that was passed to me, was that Kevin Hutchinson-Foster

           3       was at the address and that he would be leaving

           4       imminently.

           5   Q.  Yes.  You see, that's not what A10 has told us.

           6   A.  I can't help that, sir.  That's what I recall being

           7       told.

           8   Q.  Do you?

           9           Well, sir, I cannot take it further unless we get to

          10       see what it is that is at the root of this, the actual

          11       information and intelligence.  Sir, I make it clear,

          12       this is significant, because if they had that detail on

          13       the 3rd, an entirely --

          14   MR KEITH:  I'm so sorry to rise to my feet again.  I'm sure

          15       my learned friend is far too experienced to have found

          16       himself delving into what sounds suspiciously like

          17       a speech to the jury in front of the jury.  We are all

          18       operating under the same constraints.  You have heard

          19       numerous submissions in relation to this issue, we all

          20       know where we stand.

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes.  That's your evidence about

          22       this particular point, is it, then, ZZ17?  To make sure

          23       I've got it right, your recollection is that the

          24       information you received was that Kevin

          25       Hutchinson-Foster was at the female's address and was




           1       leaving imminently?

           2   A.  Yes, sir, absolutely, that's my recollection.  What

           3       I cannot recall is whether I received that information

           4       when he was still believed to be at the address and

           5       would be leaving imminently or whether I received it

           6       after he was likely to have left the address.  But

           7       certainly my recollection of the intelligence is that he

           8       was there -- was going to be there for a short period

           9       and then leaving, if I can put it that way.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Can you give us an idea of the

          11       timing that you received that?

          12   A.  I can't say.  During the afternoon, certainly before the

          13       briefing at 6 o'clock, as I said in the statement.

          14       I have given it some thought and after this time I would

          15       be guessing to be honest with you.

          16   MR MANSFIELD:  Sir, may I pursue it?

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That sounds as though that's the

          18       best he can do, but you ask your next question and find

          19       out.

          20   MR MANSFIELD:  This information/intelligence is significant,

          21       isn't it?

          22   A.  It's significant, sir, yes.

          23   Q.  Why is it significant?

          24   A.  Well, you tell me, sir, sorry.

          25   Q.  No, I'm sorry, you're the intelligence officer who was




           1       in charge, essentially, of much of the organisation, if

           2       I can put it that way, were you not?

           3   A.  Yes, sir.

           4   Q.  Yes, taking, with others, decisions, operational

           5       decisions, weren't you?

           6   A.  Yes, sir.

           7   Q.  Yes.  It's an intelligence led operation, start to

           8       finish, isn't it?

           9   A.  Absolutely, yes.

          10   Q.  With intelligence coming from A10?

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  Absolutely red hot information?

          13   A.  Sir, you used the words "red hot" --

          14   Q.  All right, B2?

          15   A.  This was one strand of information amongst many others

          16       that I was receiving at that time about the subjects of

          17       Operation Dibri being in possession of firearms.

          18   Q.  This was top quality intelligence, wasn't it?

          19   A.  As was all the other intelligence, yes.

          20   Q.  I dare say.  You have agreed on a previous occasion that

          21       one of the objectives must be to remove firearms from

          22       whoever has them?

          23   A.  Absolutely, sir, that's always our priority, yes.

          24   Q.  If you could get to them before anyone else, like Mark

          25       Duggan, you would do so?




           1   A.  Yes, sir --

           2   Q.  Right.

           3   A.  -- and, in fact, during the afternoon of the 3 August,

           4       I received some information along those lines about one

           5       of the other six subjects of this operation being in

           6       possession of a firearm and we responded to that

           7       information on the afternoon of the 3rd, sir.

           8   Q.  Yes.  Did that preclude you from acting on this

           9       information?

          10   A.  Well, to a certain extent, sir, we can't --

          11   Q.  Well, did it?

          12   A.  There was nothing we could act on in relation to this

          13       information.

          14   Q.  Yes, I'm sorry, we'll come to that.

          15   A.  This information was not actionable, the other

          16       information was actionable and that's why we acted on

          17       that information and not this.

          18   Q.  You mean you went to watch Mark Duggan who wasn't doing

          19       a --

          20   A.  No, sorry, sir, I'm talking about another piece of

          21       information about one of the other six subjects of this

          22       operation, a man known to this Inquest as U13.

          23   Q.  Did you consider the significance of this information,

          24       the information about Kevin Hutchinson-Foster, on the

          25       3rd?




           1   A.  Yes, sir.

           2   Q.  Did you discuss it with anyone?

           3   A.  Sir, I certainly discussed with Z51, the TFC, before the

           4       briefing what the intelligence picture was at that time.

           5       Whether I would have mentioned that Kevin

           6       Hutchinson-Foster was believed to have been at this

           7       address earlier but we didn't know the address, I'm not

           8       sure.

           9   Q.  This changes the complexion, you see, if you look back

          10       at the intelligence that happened before this day.  The

          11       picture that was painted to this jury was he -- he,

          12       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster -- could not get access to the

          13       address; do you remember?

          14   A.  Yes, sir.

          15   Q.  This information shows -- that's before the evening and

          16       the woman comes home from work, that's the picture

          17       that's being painted, yes?

          18   A.  Sir, the information was that he couldn't -- nothing

          19       could happen until she came home from work.  Obviously

          20       he could get access before she goes to work.  I don't

          21       know what time that is.

          22   Q.  On this day, if what you have just said is right about

          23       this information, that he was only there for a short

          24       time, first of all it shows that he has access to the

          25       place where the guns are stored, in the middle of the




           1       3rd, correct?

           2   A.  At lunchtime, sir, yes.

           3   Q.  Yes, he has access to the place where the guns are

           4       stored.

           5   A.  Yes, sir.

           6   Q.  Right.  Did you have any intelligence to suggest,

           7       therefore, having got access, he wasn't removing a gun

           8       from that store?

           9   A.  Sorry, could you say that again, sir?

          10   Q.  Yes.  If he has access to the store on the 3rd, he might

          11       have left the premises with a gun, might --

          12   A.  Sir, the information remained throughout, and indeed

          13       after that, that the transfer couldn't happen until

          14       after 9 o'clock, when she came home from work.  So there

          15       was no intelligence to suggest the gun was being moved

          16       from that address.  The information remained, after

          17       lunchtime on the 3rd, that this transfer couldn't happen

          18       until the female came back from work after 9 o'clock,

          19       and, in fact, the fact that it didn't happen, there was

          20       no plan for the transfer at lunchtime on the 3rd,

          21       supports that, in my view.

          22   Q.  The information clearly suggests the presence of weapons

          23       at an address.

          24   A.  Yes, sir.  The difficulty was we didn't know the

          25       address.




           1   Q.  The question is not so much transfer, the question is

           2       removing the guns from the address; do you agree?

           3   A.  Sorry, I didn't -- removal by who, sir: by him or by us?

           4   Q.  No, by you, the police, as your objective, rather than

           5       chasing round north London; do you follow?

           6   A.  Absolutely, sir, and the other piece of information that

           7       I referred to, that came in during the day on the 3rd,

           8       was a similar type of information about a firearm

           9       potentially being at another address and we executed

          10       a search warrant during the afternoon on the 3rd to

          11       achieve exactly that in relation to that other

          12       information.  With this information, we didn't know

          13       where it was.

          14   Q.  I'll come to that.  So one of the points would be that,

          15       if you have intelligence that guns are at an address,

          16       the obvious thing is to get a search warrant.

          17   A.  If we know the address, sir, yes.

          18   Q.  If you know the address.  Now, I want to deal with the

          19       address.  The address you could have known -- there are

          20       two routes to this -- the first one is --

          21   MR KEITH:  I'm so sorry, sir.  As you know, this witness was

          22       recalled by your counsel in order to deal with A10's

          23       note about the intelligence on the 4th as to the fact

          24       that Hutchinson-Foster was at the same address he was at

          25       yesterday lunchtime, that is to say on the 3rd.




           1           I cannot begin to record the number of occasions

           2       that we've heard evidence in relation to whether or

           3       not -- I put it neutrally -- there was a reasonable

           4       prospect of an address for Hutchinson-Foster being

           5       verified, checked, found, whatever.  The time has come

           6       where this witness must deal, as he has done, with the

           7       single point for which he's been recalled, which is his

           8       understanding of what A10 said in his, A10's, own

           9       ex post facto notes, made on the night of 4 August and

          10       there it must remain.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Right.  Mr Mansfield, Mr Keith is

          12       right, that we have now dealt with that.  ZZ17 has given

          13       his answer and that's really the end of the matter.

          14       I understand what you're doing, you are wanting to put

          15       a wider picture, but we have been all round this and the

          16       jury have it and I may be summing it up to them.

          17   MR MANSFIELD:  Sir, if I had known this information that

          18       came from A10, verified by ZZ17, earlier on in the

          19       Inquest, these questions, about a search warrant,

          20       call-out and containment, would have been asked of

          21       several senior witnesses, Z51 for a start off: "If you

          22       knew on the 3rd" --

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We had this from Ms Mallon too, you

          24       asked her all about it.

          25   MR MANSFIELD:  But I didn't have the intelligence that we




           1       now have, that on the 3rd -- this is before the 4th --

           2       there was an opportunity, never mind Duggan, to go to

           3       the address.  I know that my friend is saying there's

           4       not an address.  I'll come to that, if I may.  That's

           5       the key to this, we say, and why, I'm sorry, I'm

           6       persisting with this witness because, very late in the

           7       day, we get a -- I am not going to make any further

           8       comments about it, but I want to ask more questions of

           9       this witness about the repercussions of an address, not

          10       a transfer.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  All right, I want to keep it within

          12       bounds, as you understand it.  So you've got five

          13       minutes.

          14   MR MANSFIELD:  You knew that the address was on the Leyton

          15       side of the Lea Bridge Road, didn't you?

          16   A.  That general area, sir, yes.

          17   Q.  Yes.  You also knew that, in fact, the address could

          18       be -- well, how shall we put it -- defined within

          19       a matter of hundreds of yards, didn't you?

          20   A.  I'm not sure I would put it that specifically, sir,

          21       I knew it was in that general area, I am not sure

          22       I would put it as tightly or specifically as that.

          23   Q.  Well, how tight would you put it: half a mile?

          24   A.  I am not sure I could put a number on it, sir, but the

          25       Leyton area, the -- as you say, the Leyton side of Lea




           1       Bridge Road sounds like a fair assessment.

           2   Q.  It's more specific than that, isn't it?

           3   A.  Not that I had, sir, maybe somebody else had.

           4   Q.  You knew how A10 operated, didn't you?  I am not asking

           5       for actually how they did it, but you knew.  You knew

           6       how they did it?

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  You also knew, available to you, if you wanted it, was

           9       the probation hostel where Kevin Hutchinson-Foster

          10       lived, didn't you?

          11   A.  I don't see how that would have helped us, sir, sorry.

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Did you have that information or

          13       not?

          14   A.  Did we have the address, sir?  No.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You didn't.  That's what I thought

          16       you said last time.

          17   MR MANSFIELD:  So the other way of getting to the address in

          18       Leyton on the 3rd or on the 4th -- I am going to come to

          19       the 4th in one second, I've only got five minutes -- is

          20       surveillance that tracks him from an address where he's

          21       supposed to be some of the time across to Leyton.

          22       That's not difficult, is it?

          23   A.  Sir, with the greatest respect, I think you've got it

          24       the wrong way round.

          25   Q.  I see.




           1   A.  It wasn't that we couldn't follow him because we hadn't

           2       got that address from the probation service.  It's the

           3       other way round.  It's that we hadn't gone further in

           4       seeking to get the address from probation where he was

           5       supposed to be staying because following

           6       Hutchinson-Foster, to anybody with experience of this

           7       kind of work, would not be the appropriate plan.

           8   Q.  I am not going to argue with you, for a moment.  Could

           9       we have another sheet of paper, the jury have it, C9,

          10       the A10 note of what he passed to you.

          11           Would you look, please, at the first sheet, before

          12       we come to A10's, the one that has numbered paragraphs.

          13       Do you see the one dealing with the 4th, some time

          14       between 17.10 and 17.15 --

          15   A.  Number 7, sir?

          16   Q.  Yes, that's it.  What's missing in that paragraph?

          17       What?

          18   MR KEITH:  What sort of question is that?

          19   MR MANSFIELD:  I can point out what's missing but I just

          20       would like you, as an intelligence officer, to read

          21       paragraph 7 and see if there's anything missing there or

          22       was that the extent of the intelligence.

          23   A.  I'll read it, sir, at least.

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, please take your time.

          25   A.  (Pause)




           1           I've read it, sir.

           2   MR MANSFIELD:  Is that the extent of your intelligence on

           3       the 4th?

           4   A.  Sorry, sir, perhaps you would be more specific?

           5   Q.  When you received a phonecall at about 5.20 from A10,

           6       did he tell you anything else?

           7   A.  (Pause)

           8           Sir, obviously this is gisted.  I think that more or

           9       less covers it, unless you can explain --

          10   Q.  Yes, I can.  Now, look at the document that A10 has

          11       provided as to what he says from his note made on the

          12       day he told you.  Do you have the sheet there?

          13   A.  I do not think I have, sir, no.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  No you haven't.

          15   MR MANSFIELD:  I wonder if the sheet -- it has the date of

          16       4 August at the top, "Notes made at 18.40", the jury

          17       have it at C9, the same divider.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I do not know whether they have,

          19       actually.  We should have put it in.  Have a look at

          20       mine, to save time, because we've only got two minutes

          21       left.  (Handed)

          22           Have you seen that before, have a look at that?

          23   A.  Yes, sir.  (Pause)

          24           Sir, yes, I have that.

          25   MR MANSFIELD:  Right.  Now, you will see there some




           1       important additional intelligence on the 4th.

           2   A.  Sir, I see it's gisted slightly differently.  Perhaps

           3       you can explain to me.  I'm not following.

           4   Q.  No, all right, I'll do it for speed.  First of all,

           5       you're being told that he, Duggan, is at his

           6       girlfriend's address; were you told that?

           7   MR KEITH:  Sir, my learned friend is now putting to the

           8       witness points made in relation to A10's own subsequent

           9       note -- he told us in evidence how he made this note

          10       afterwards -- by comparison to or to contrast with A10's

          11       own earlier gist, which is of course the document at C9

          12       containing all A10's observations on the various issues.

          13       That is not a permissible way of cross-examining

          14       a witness in relation to the only point for which he's

          15       being recalled.

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I'm a little bit concerned.

          17       Mr Mansfield, I have often been saying that comparing

          18       one witness against the other is a difficult exercise

          19       but it's even particularly more difficult where we are

          20       talking about gisted evidence, people being recalled,

          21       people being asked under legal provisions can you just

          22       say a little bit more and they are just saying "Well,

          23       can I say this" and you know the background and the

          24       difficulty, so it's actually a little bit unfair to

          25       conduct this sort of pitting ZZ17 against A10, unless




           1       there's a specific point.  Let's come to the specific

           2       point you want now we have one minute left.

           3   MR MANSFIELD:  Well, sir, this is not of our making.  We've

           4       asked for the intelligence from the beginning.  I'll

           5       carry on.  It says:

           6           "MD will be catching a cab over to KFH ..."

           7           That is to Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.  That isn't in

           8       the other gist, is it?

           9   A.  It's not, sir.

          10   Q.  No, and further that:

          11           "KHF is ... at the same address he was at yesterday

          12       lunchtime ..."

          13           That's not in the other A10 gist, is it?

          14   MS LEEK:  Sir, A10 has dealt with this.  This is not

          15       a matter for this witness.

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  No, it's not really a matter for

          17       ZZ17.  I am quite happy for you to ask him if there's

          18       anything of this which refreshes his memory.

          19   MR MANSFIELD:  A10 has said that this is the

          20       information/intelligence that he gave, gisted, to this

          21       witness on the 4th.  This case is about the

          22       intelligence.

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We know that.  But it's right to say

          24       that obviously you can ask this witness, now he's here,

          25       can he recall that, but what you can't do is strike




           1       against A10's own recollection.  So please ask ZZ17 if

           2       he can recall being told this by A10, that would be

           3       permissible in the last 15 seconds.

           4   MR MANSFIELD:  Well, do you recall it?

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Have a look at that.  Tell us what

           6       you can recall being told.

           7   A.  Sir, if I can put it this way, as I've said in my latest

           8       statement, now that this issue has arisen, I was told on

           9       the 3rd that Hutchinson-Foster was at the girl's address

          10       and, yes, certainly it was inferred, if not said, that

          11       we're talking about the same address on the 4th.

          12       I don't really see the --

          13   Q.  Don't you?

          14   A.  No.

          15   MR MANSFIELD:  If I may address you when we rise, please.

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We may or may not need you tomorrow,

          17       all right.

          18   A.  Thank you, sir, yes.

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you for that.

          20   MR KEITH:  Am I entitled to ask one or two questions arising

          21       out of that.  I'm afraid I thought my learned friend

          22       wished to continue his observations perhaps in the

          23       absence of the jury this time.

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Shall we see if we can finish ZZ17,

          25       firstly then, if you will wait with us just for a few




           1       moments --

           2   A.  Of course, yes.

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- and see if other barristers have

           4       other things they want to put to you and then we will

           5       see if you need to come back tomorrow.

           6   A.  Yes, sir.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Stern, do you have any questions?

           8                      Questions by MR STERN

           9   MR STERN:  One matter, if I may, as a result of something

          10       that has arisen, it's a completely different topic.

          11   A.  Yes, sir.

          12   Q.  Could you just have a look -- I'll try to short circuit

          13       it -- at the bus KEL/10.  You'll remember, just to put

          14       the picture in context, so that I can do it more

          15       quickly, that you were asked about a gentleman who runs

          16       across --

          17   A.  Yes, sir.

          18   Q.  -- behind the minicab and then comes across shouting at

          19       people to move?

          20   A.  Yes, sir, yes.

          21   Q.  I do not think -- you may not have been shown the bit

          22       where that person ends up at the bus or shown by the

          23       CCTV from the bus.  Perhaps you could be shown that now.

          24              (CCTV footage was played to the court)

          25           Can you see the man running there?  It's being




           1       helpfully pointed on the screen.

           2                  (The CCTV video footage ended)

           3           Did you see that?

           4   A.  Sorry, no.

           5   Q.  Perhaps you can play it again so the witness can see it.

           6         (CCTV footage was played to the court and ended)

           7           Is that you?

           8   A.  I wonder if I could see it again.  I think it probably

           9       is.

          10         (CCTV footage was played to the court and ended)

          11           I think so, sir, it's hard to tell from that.

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  With your arms out?

          13   A.  That's where I was, so I would say so, yes.

          14   MR STERN:  Can I ask you two questions about that: did you

          15       enter the minicab, drivers side or any side?

          16   A.  Not at all, sir, no.

          17   Q.  Did you have anything in your hands at that point?

          18   A.  I don't think so, sir, no.

          19   MR STERN:  Thank you.

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Keith, do you have one or two

          21       questions.  I'm very conscious that I brought the jury

          22       here early this morning.  I know they have had the

          23       excitement of a trip along the coach but I am not going

          24       to sit any later with this.  If necessary, we are going

          25       to have to come back tomorrow.  Let's see how we go for




           1       a minute or two.

           2                      Questions by MR KEITH

           3   MR KEITH:  You've been recalled to answer questions, ZZ17,

           4       about notes that A10 provided us all with after he had

           5       initially given evidence.

           6   A.  Yes, sir.

           7   Q.  So let me ask you this: did you, as a Metropolitan

           8       Police Service officer, have any hand, or any role

           9       whatsoever, in the drafting by A10 of what you've

          10       called -- you have called and we have called -- the

          11       gists?

          12   A.  None at all, sir.

          13   Q.  So that page at C9 which has a combined account from

          14       A10's viewpoint of his summary or gist of what he

          15       understood, as far as he's allowed to say by law --

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  -- of what the intelligence is; did you have a hand in

          18       that?

          19   A.  Not at all, sir, no.

          20   Q.  Were you asked for your opinion on that?

          21   A.  No.

          22   Q.  Were you asked for your view as to whether it accorded

          23       with your recollection?

          24   A.  No, sir.

          25   Q.  Were you asked for your legal opinion on whether this




           1       was a permissible summary?

           2   A.  Of course not, sir, no.

           3   Q.  A10 then made notes after the event, he told us, when he

           4       was recalled, the note that you have just seen.

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  Had you ever seen these notes before?

           7   A.  No, sir.

           8   Q.  Were you asked by A10, when he made his notes on

           9       4 August, for your opinion as to whether this was

          10       an accurate summary of A10's own recollection?

          11   A.  No, I didn't know he was making those notes, sir.

          12   Q.  The second area concerns what you were asked by my

          13       learned friend Mr Underwood about Mr Hutchinson-Foster's

          14       whereabouts.

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  Do you now have any information, based on the material

          17       at the Hutchinson-Foster trial itself, on where

          18       Mr Hutchinson-Foster spent the night of 3 August?

          19   A.  Yes, sir.  I understand he spent that in the CM1 area.

          20       I understand that's Chelmsford in Essex.

          21   Q.  Because we saw reference, and the fault was mine in not

          22       asking directly, whether he was in Chelmsford or

          23       Romford.  Your understanding is there was evidence that

          24       he was in Chelmsford; is that right?

          25   A.  I understand that night he was in Chelmsford another




           1       night he was in Romford, sir.

           2   MR KEITH:  All right, hence perhaps the confusion.  Thank

           3       you very much.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, Ms Leek?

           5   MS LEEK:  No, thank you.

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Butt?

           7   MR BUTT:  No, thank you.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Glasson?

           9   MR GLASSON:  No, thank you.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Underwood?

          11   MR UNDERWOOD:  No, thank you.

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You may be required tomorrow.  Thank

          13       you for coming back to help us, and thank you for

          14       offering to give at that back, otherwise I will wonder

          15       where it has got to.  (Handed)

          16                      (The witness withdrew)

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Members of the jury, thank you for

          18       your attention on this long day.  We'll meet again

          19       tomorrow morning at 10.30 and I hope to have some better

          20       idea about the timetable for the rest of the week then.

          21           So thank you very much indeed if you would like to

          22       leave us then.  10.30 tomorrow then, please.




           3   (4.45 pm)

           4        (The Inquest adjourned until 10.30 am on Tuesday,

           5                         3 December 2013)

               MR COLIN SPARROW (sworn) .............................9
                   Questions by MR UNDERWOOD ........................9
                   Questions by MR MANSFIELD .......................14
                   Questions by MR THOMAS ..........................48
                   Questions by MR STERN ...........................58
                   Questions by MR KEITH ...........................67
                   Further questions by MR UNDERWOOD ...............79
               ZZ17 (re-affirmed) ..................................81
                   Questions by MR UNDERWOOD .......................81
                   Questions by MR MANSFIELD .......................85
                   Questions by MR STERN ..........................106
                   Questions by MR KEITH ..........................108
               Submissions by MR MANSFIELD ........................111