Tackling Crime Effectively

Management Handbook

Association of Chief Police Officers

H.M. Inspectorate of Constabulary

AUDIT COMMISSION
Foreword

The idea for this handbook came from a wish by the Police Service, the Home Office, HMIC and the Audit Commission to take forward the excellent work of the Audit Commission’s report *Helping with Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively*.

A seminar for senior detectives and chief officers was held at Bramshill and a small team was set up to produce a guide for managers. The handbook is the result.

This is not a set of commandments. The Police Service knows to its cost that a bright idea in one place does not always transfer to another with similar results. It is, however, the best advice presently available on how crime can be managed and deserves careful study.

The advice is unlikely to be the last word. There is substantial research presently ongoing in forces and within the Home Office Police Research Group into many of the areas covered in this document. That work will refine the advice; in my view it is unlikely to alter its direction radically.

This is a first – ACPO, the Audit Commission, Home Office and Inspectorate coming together to give practical guidance and help to police managers. The subject could not be more important because crime has never been so high on the agendas of police, public and politicians as it is presently.

I commend the handbook to chief officers and police managers.

D C Blakey QPM MBA
Chief Constable, West Mercia Police
Secretary of ACPO Crime Committee
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Introduction

This handbook is the product of a collaborative piece of work undertaken by the Association of Chief Police Officers, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and the Audit Commission. The project also benefited from close consultation throughout with the Home Office Police Department. Its aim is to offer practical advice and guidance primarily to police managers on the management of crime.

The impetus for this initiative was the availability of research published in the Audit Commission’s recent national report *Helping with Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively*¹, whose recommendations these agencies generally endorsed.

The Audit Commission’s national report presents a package of good practices observed in forces across the country and has been welcomed by police officers. This handbook gives further guidance on the report’s recommendations, by means of case studies and reflections on the experience of forces trying to implement change. Where thinking has developed or been fine-tuned since the Audit Commission’s national report, this has been reflected in the handbook.

The fieldwork for the handbook was undertaken between January and April 1994 in a large number of forces, drawing on available research as well as asking forces for ideas about where good practice initiatives might be found. The handbook does not purport to be an exhaustive list of existing good practice, but attempts to illustrate paths to implementation through selected case studies. The project team is grateful to those forces that invited visits and to chief constables for giving their permission to name their forces in the case studies.

The project team comprised Chief Inspector David Spencer from West Mercia on behalf of ACPO, Chief Superintendent Mel Deacon from HMIC and Laura Hawksworth from the Audit Commission. Their work was guided and supervised by a Steering Committee consisting of Deputy Chief Constable David Thursfield from West Mercia on behalf of ACPO, David Purkiss from HMIC, Kate Flannery from the Audit Commission and Martha Wooldridge and Brenda Hawkyard from the Home Office Police Department.

How to use the Handbook

The project team would like to emphasise that, although the document is written primarily for police managers tasked with implementing changes within forces, it is hoped that interested officers of all ranks, both uniformed and CID, will have the opportunity to read the handbook and

¹ See Appendix 1 for an executive summary of this report.
consider its contents. The circulation list enclosed with the handbook might be useful for this purpose.

The handbook is divided into seven sections for ease of reference (see Exhibit opposite). It is not, however, intended that these sections should be considered in isolation of one another. The value of the handbook lies in the fact that it advocates a comprehensive, corporate approach to tackling crime. Piecemeal adoption of selected items from the menu may simply continue the incremental pattern of adjustment rather than secure a sea change in performance.

The layout of the handbook is user-friendly, and allows for notes in the margins and local customising. Appendix 6 contains A4 overhead-style exhibits that draw out the key messages of the handbook for presentation purposes (about two exhibits per section).

At the end of each section in the handbook is a grid entitled CHECKLIST FOR ACTION. Police managers might find this a useful starting point to gauge the force or BCU's position in relation to those principles discussed in the text. In particular, senior managers might find the grid a useful reference document from which to plan the change process and monitor its impact. They may also find it appropriate to highlight on the grid any resource implications of the proposed changes.
Exhibit

STRUCTURE OF THE HANDBOOK

Although the handbook is divided into sections, these should not be considered in isolation of one another...

1. The strategic framework
2. HQ structure and specialist squads
3. Crime desks and crime management units
4. Teamwork and supervision
5. Intelligence and proactivity
6. Investigation of burglary and other high-volume crime
7. Performance management

What is meant by a crime strategy?
Key decision points
Role of HQ crime staff
- change in senior detectives' role
- resourcing major enquiries
- commissioning/decommissioning squads
Management of squads
- tenure
Role of BCU crime staff
Crime desks
- assessment of initial response
- resourcing
- evaluation
Crime management units
- integration
- administrative support
Other issues to consider
Effective teamwork
Role of the supervisor
- skills
- training
- time
Structure and roles
- national/regional level
- force level
- local level
- role of FIOs
- profile of intelligence officers
Computerisation
- weeding
- CPA
Proactivity
Surveillance teams
- selection & training
- management
Use of informants
- registration
- extent of use
Initial response to burglary
Raising investigative standards
Burglary initiatives
Car crime initiatives

Tackling Crime Effectively
I. The strategic framework
1. The current range of investigative practices used by the police to combat crime has evolved over many years, but in an incremental way—the engine has been fine-tuned and repaired rather than stripped down and rebuilt. This approach has not been without success. Clear-up rates for the most serious crimes have remained high, and the number of detections per officer has increased over the last decade (though it has recently levelled off\(^1\)). But the steep rise in the volume of crime recorded by the police has left many officers looking for a new approach that could help them to make a quantum leap in improving performance, and thereby restore public confidence in the police’s ability to tackle crime.

2. The conjunction of events, such as the setting by the Home Secretary of key objectives, the review of core functions and continuing public concern about crime levels, has given the police response to crime a sharp focus. Increasingly, chief constables are making explicit statements that, rather than being treated as one of a myriad of responsibilities, crime is the top priority for police officers. Inevitably, there are variations in approach which reflect local circumstances; for example, some forces are emphasising strategies to secure a reduction in crime, rather than focusing on detection.

3. Another theme highlighted by the Audit Commission’s report is that crime is the responsibility of all police officers: uniformed officers must be resourced to carry out their role as investigators, and the investigations they conduct should be accorded the status given to those of detectives.

**What Is Meant by a Crime Strategy?**

4. The Audit Commission’s national report states that ‘forces need a corporate approach to exploit the best ideas and inspire the commitment of the entire force’. It identifies five elements for force management teams to address (Box A, overleaf).

**Key Decision Points**

5. Putting these elements into practice will throw up a series of decision points for the force management team, some of which will require consultation with the police authority and most of which present options rather than single solutions. As an illustration of how forces might plot

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\(^1\) Total clear-ups divided by total police strength in England and Wales stood at 9.54 in 1983, and at 10.41 in 1993, having peaked at 11.64 in 1991.
Box A
ELEMENTS OF A CRIME STRATEGY

- The definition of the specific problems to be tackled
- An order of priority for their resolution
- A clear statement about roles and accountabilities
- The rational allocation of resources
- Appropriate structures to deploy resources/meet objectives

their route through this potentially difficult terrain, some key decision points and possible options are laid out schematically below in Box B. (These are not intended to be either prescriptive or exhaustive, and many of the elements of a strategy are developed further in later sections of this handbook).

Box B
KEY DECISION POINTS IN DEVELOPING A CRIME STRATEGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DECISION POINTS</th>
<th>POSSIBLE OPTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definition of scope of the crime strategy</td>
<td>1. Use the broadest definition of crime, encompassing public order, preventative patrol and elements of traffic, to draw a wider spectrum of officers under the crime strategy banner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Restrict the crime strategy to the definition of crime in Home Office offence classifications; this focuses attention on CID.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition of force priorities</td>
<td>1. State explicitly that tackling crime is the top priority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Identify main priorities, but do not rank them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Determine local objectives to add to the five key national objectives; consider how many of these will be non-crime objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>1. Consult officers and civilian staff on the issues of priorities and roles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Extend this consultation to other agencies within the criminal justice system and the public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification of categories of offence to be prioritised (major, serious, etc.)</td>
<td>1. Use conventional classification of major/serious.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Highlight local concerns/problem areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigation of major crime</td>
<td>1. Use HQ-directed permanent squad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Put together major enquiry teams on an ad hoc basis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tackling Crime Effectively
Box B /cont...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment of less serious crimes</th>
<th>1. Strive to attend all crime incidents.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Investigate some incidents over the telephone; formalise this assessment of crimes by defining criteria and also possibly introduce crime desk arrangements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition of the role of detectives</td>
<td>1. Allocate 'serious' crime only; if serious crime load is not high this could lead to a reduction in CID strength.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Identify specialist CID role but retain flexibility and joint working with uniformed officers. <em>(Whatever approach is adopted, it is essential to stress the joint responsibility for investigation).</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarification of the role of BCU crime manager</td>
<td>1. Assign to crime manager the oversight of all crime response and investigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Make principal role of crime manager that of senior detective; the issue of DI and DS caseloads needs to be addressed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. There is no single blueprint for success in developing and implementing crime strategies: the wide variation in force size, structure and demands on the police militate against this. And some forces have decided to phase the changes over a period of several years whilst others are going for a 'big bang' approach. Two elements of good practice in strategy implementation, which are commended to all forces, are the **analysis of current workload and performance**, to ensure that forces know where they are starting from (see Section 7), and **internal consultation**.

7. Changing organisations (especially complex ones such as police forces) can rarely be limited to issues of structure and processes, although these tend to absorb managers' time and energies. Often the biggest challenge is winning the hearts and minds of the workforce, and in particular those at the sharp end who may only receive garbled messages about the purpose of the changes, coupled with exhortations to do better. The fieldwork undertaken for the Commission's study entailed a significant proportion of interviews at constable and sergeant level (both CID and uniformed), which generated many perceptive analyses of strengths and weaknesses and a wealth of ideas for improving investigative performance. Good managers tap into this store of experience and expertise, and one technique for doing this force-wide is through a questionnaire such as that used by Suffolk (Appendix 2).
8. It is important that forces have mechanisms to ensure that the crime strategy is effectively implemented. This will involve both monitoring of outputs through quantitative and qualitative indicators and ongoing supervision of the process. The evaluation role of both headquarters staff and local crime managers is discussed in Section 2, Headquarters Structure and Specialist Squads, and Section 7, Performance Management.

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CHECKLIST FOR ACTION – The Strategic Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prepare strategy for crime, considering five elements in Box A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advise on crime strategy; consider consulting workforce, or using survey to identify starting point</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop local crime strategy in line with force strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. HQ structure and specialist squads
2. HQ Structure and Specialist Squads

Introduction

9. The reorganisation into basic command units (BCUs), which has removed the middle (divisional) tier of operational command in most forces, has created two centres of staff resources to tackle crime: (i) headquarters staff and (ii) staff at basic command units under the control of BCU commanders. This substantial reorganisation, together with the ending of dual accountability, has in some forces led to tension, confusion or duplication of role and a risk that some crimes fall into the 'gap' between the two centres. The Audit Commission's national report recommends that forces 'clarify the accountabilities of officers for crime management; in particular, resolve any ambiguities arising from new force structures and the ending of dual accountability'.

10. This section covers the relationship between headquarters and BCU, examining ways of clarifying accountabilities and making the most effective use of those resources which are managed at HQ. The structure of the section is as follows:

Role of HQ crime staff – functions to be based at HQ; change in role for senior detectives; resourcing major enquiries; commissioning squads.

Management of squads – effective management of central operational resources; monitoring systems; tenure.

Role of BCU crime staff – clarifying respective accountabilities; use of service level agreements.

Checklist for action – areas for review by different parts of the force.

Role of HQ Crime Staff

11. The role of crime staff at HQ is principally to fulfil one or more of the following functions:

- formulation, together with chief officers, of a force-wide strategy to tackle crime;
- professional quality assurance of force-wide investigative standards, evaluation of different procedures and determination of appropriate resource allocation;
- provision of crime investigation expertise and consultancy advice;

1. Resources include detectives, uniformed officers, plain-clothes officers, SOCOs, intelligence officers and CPOs.

2. These functions might be performed in conjunction with HQ departments possessing the relevant technical expertise (such as personnel, force inspectorate, management services or research department, depending on the force). In any case, input by senior detectives in these activities is desirable.
provision of contingency resources for major enquiries, such as senior investigating officers (SIOs) and HOLMES support;
planning the approach to force-wide, cross-BCU crime problems, including, where appropriate, defining the role of, setting up and managing specialist standing squads, such as fraud and drugs.

12. The new role of senior detectives contrasts with their traditional role as CID command, which was primarily operational and controlled all detective resources. Many DCIs and Det. Supts were previously based at divisions, overseeing investigations, leading major enquiries and undertaking some line management functions, such as detectives’ appraisals. Interviews conducted during fieldwork for *Helping with Enquiries* indicated that many senior detectives were unhappy or unsure about their new roles, preferring to act as an SIO wherever possible, rather than as non-operational, desk-bound ‘experts’. The case study below details how one force changed the role of HQ, addressing the deployment of senior detectives, and describes some officers’ reactions during the change.

**CASE STUDY: Change in senior detectives’ role**

West Yorkshire moved in 1993 from a structure of 8 divisions and 26 sub-divisions to 17 BCUs. Removal of the divisional tier in such a large force created the need for a large-scale review of the role of headquarters detectives. Detective Superintendents formerly had line command of all detectives in their area but moved after reorganisation to the role specified below, covering several BCUs and reporting to the Detective Chief Superintendent Divisional Operations (Crime):

1. Investigation of homicide and other major crime within the nominated area.
2. Identification of patterns of serious criminal activity across the boundaries of BCUs within the area and, after consultation with BCU commanders, the appointment of multi-BCU teams to address the investigation.
3. Performance of role of crime advisor and consultant to BCU commanders.
4. Monitoring adherence to force crime policy.
5. Provision of senior detective cover for serious crime.
6. Close liaison with BCU commanders.

The recent formulation of a more detailed set of crime policies has provided these senior officers with a more explicit role in testing how effectively they have been implemented at BCU level.

13. The strategy formulation role establishes the force approach to tackling crime and any policy which has a bearing upon the central allocation of resources (crime screening, deployment criteria etc.), and sets standards to which BCUs will be held accountable. The absence of, for example, a crime screening (crime evaluation or assessment) policy, or the inconsistent application of criteria, can lead to resources being
deployed in a low-priority area at the expense of a high-priority area. Exhibit 1 below shows the consequences in one force where no force-wide screening policy exists and inconsistent decisions are made. In that force, BCU's complained that resources were not fairly distributed, since each BCU had set its own aims and objectives but resources were allocated centrally.

Exhibit 1
THE EFFECT OF NOT HAVING A FORCE-WIDE SCREENING POLICY
In BCU F just under 20% of crimes are screened in for further investigation, whereas in BCU J 60% of crimes are screened in for further investigation...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% recorded crimes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BCUs: A B C D E F G H J K L M N P

% Detected when reported
% Screened out
% Screened in for further investigation

Source: A provincial force, May 1993

14. Whilst some variation in screening practice and officer deployment might be expected in different BCUs (owing to, for example, a different mix of crimes) the force should set broad guidelines on what types of incident to screen in or out, and state what degree of variation is acceptable. This should be synchronised with decisions on central resource allocation in order to allow BCU commanders the resources to put the policy into practice. In this situation, senior HQ detectives or the force inspectorate should monitor variations (see Section 7, Performance Management, for examples) and advise the BCU commander of departures from force criteria. Section 3, Crime Desks and Crime Management Units, discusses common guidelines on assessing the response to crimes.

15. HQ CID provides support to BCUs for major crime or crime which crosses BCU boundaries. At the minimum this could be in the form of an SIO to manage resources on a major enquiry based at a BCU. Forces are adopting different approaches. In West Yorkshire, the six HQ Detective Superintendents with territorial responsibility for an area are to act as ‘floating SIOs’ as part of their role; in Thames Valley, three Detective
Inspectors are to act in a similar capacity. In large forces, where major enquiries are more common, the problems arising from the constant abstraction of resources from BCUs may justify a dedicated squad for major crime operations.

16. In many forces a convention exists that the BCU crime manager may, in the event of a major enquiry, be designated SIO. This makes fulfilment of the local crime manager role difficult. Clearly a small or medium-sized force hit by a succession of major enquiries may have to resort to using BCU crime managers in the SIO role, but this should be exceptional rather than routine.

17. Every force should have a clear rationale for both the commissioning and decommissioning of a squad, which should reflect the force's intention to provide the most effective and cost-efficient response to crime. The two principal reasons for establishing a squad are:

- the need for specialist expertise that it is not possible to develop and sustain at BCU level (fraud, child protection, etc.);
- the need to counter crime problems which cross BCU boundaries.

The case study below describes a situation in which clear criteria were used to decide whether to keep a squad running.

**CASE STUDY: Reviewing the continuing need for a squad**

Merseyside set up a Bogus Official Section in 1986 in response to the growing number of bogus official offences. After initial success, the squad was gradually reduced in size, and was absorbed into the Serious Crime Squad (SCS) in 1990 as a stand-alone section. In 1993, the Force Inspectorate conducted a detailed review of the section to consider whether it was the most efficient response to the problem. The review's main findings were:

- the number of bogus official offences is a small percentage of all burglary dwellings (around 3%);
- some divisions had a worse problem with this kind of offence than others;
- communication was poor between the section and divisional staff;
- the section's status had been eroded due to a lack of clarity of line management responsibility for the section within the SCS;
- the detection rate of the section was impressive (around 70% for bogus official burglaries);
- the section had a dedicated SOCO with an above-average success rate for obtaining marks.

Discussions ensued between the head of the section and the Detective Superintendent over the future of the section. Whilst problems were

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1 The seriousness of the enquiry as well as the availability of resources will dictate the seniority of the SIO and this is a matter for local force discretion.
experienced with the section, notable successes had also been achieved. It was concluded that the section was able to offer an effective response to the offences which could not be sustained at divisional level. However, to address the problems, the following steps were recommended:

- to improve communication, all offences of burglary including those with elderly victims should in future be reported to the section, if not actually investigated by them;
- joint divisional/section interviewing of prisoners should be encouraged; and,
- a DI should be appointed full-time to oversee the section and ensure its effective management henceforth.

18. In deciding whether to decommission a permanent squad, the force should consider whether it has a viable alternative means to combat the types of problems squads usually face. It may be the case that a squad is still the most effective configuration of resources, but that the management of those resources could be improved (see paragraph 20).

19. A more flexible alternative to a standing squad is to set up an ad hoc team or squad. This is particularly useful in small forces, where a permanent squad requires a large abstraction from BCU resources. Once again, these squads need to be set clear terms of reference, with specified tasks and a finish date. The case study below describes how Dyfed-Powys has clarified and formalised this procedure.

**CASE STUDY: Commissioning an ad hoc squad**

Dyfed-Powys has developed the following pro formas for justifying setting up an ad hoc squad and for subsequent evaluation:

**Justification**

1. Nature of problem
2. Over what period?
3. Category of CPA conducted (indices searched)
4. Facts identified by CPA
5. % incidence of type of crime compared with other force areas
6. Year on year increase in type of crime
7. Detection rate for crime type compared with other force areas
8. Any other problems?
9. Remarks
10. Submitted to DCS

**Evaluation**

1. Problem addressed
2. Duration of exercise
3. Manpower deployed during operation
4. Additional expenses (e.g. vehicle hire)
5. Any other resources (e.g. surveillance)
6. No. of arrests; means of detection
7. Change in crime trends since operation.
8. No. of and details of surveillance operations.
9. Any linked crimes detected.
10. No. of warrants executed.
11. Details of property recovered.

The pro formas are in future to be submitted to HQ to enable a review of the success or otherwise of each operation.

Management of Squads

20. The retention of any resource at HQ level represents an abstraction from front-line operations. Thus it is imperative that those resources are properly managed and that squads work to agreed objectives and performance measures. If the output of squads is not specified and then measured, accountability is weakened and resources may be used inefficiently. Objectives for squads should cover:

- workload;
- output (e.g. clear-ups, arrests, property recovered);
- quality standards.

The case studies below illustrate good practice in monitoring squads.

CASE STUDIES: Ways of monitoring a squad – 1

Warwickshire has developed a diagnostic approach to monitoring the work of its fraud squad. Included in the squad’s terms of reference is a commitment to providing data on its workload, costs and outputs (see the pro forma below, which is an adaptation of Warwickshire’s diagnostic approach). This enables the force to monitor the squad’s productivity through various ratios which enable managers to weigh effectiveness against cost. The terms of reference emphasise that the monitoring will be conducted over a period of time to enable the force to address any abnormal results (for audit purposes, either of good or poor practice).
Ways of monitoring a squad – 2

Gloucestershire has developed an approach for evaluating target packages and then testing the productivity of its surveillance squad. Called ‘R.O.C.E.’ (from the accounting ratio: return on capital employed) the technique monitors outputs (arrests, property recovered, detections) on a monthly basis and assigns them a cash value. This is then set against the total costs for the squad, and the squad is required to break even over time in order to justify its continued existence.

Ways of monitoring a squad – 3

Good examples of simple monitoring sheets for a surveillance squad are those used as monthly returns in Dorset:

![Monitoring Sheet](image)

21. Tenure is now used in many forces as a way to ensure regular interchange between specialist and mainstream crime work. HMIC has set guidelines for tenure in specialist posts, but these should also be taken together with considerations of value for money. If forces set tenure policies, they should ensure that the ‘investment’ of time and training is reflected in the minimum tenure period. Exhibit 2 opposite illustrates the results of estimating how long it takes on average to become fully effective in each post and applying a rule that staff should overall have been 90% productive during their time in the post. Clearly the estimates of the time

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1 The 90% rule is chosen as a suitable expectation for overall productivity: if forces desire greater or lesser overall productivity, the corresponding minimum tenure can be calculated by using the following equation:

\[
\text{Minimum tenure} = \frac{\text{Lost time (see Exhibit 2)}}{100\% - \text{desired } \% \text{ overall productivity}}
\]

Tackling Crime Effectively
taken to become fully productive vary according to the level of expertise required in the job, and reflect a 'learning curve', where officers are at less than 100% productivity within the learning period.

**Exhibit 2**

**MINIMUM TENURE IN SELECTED SPECIALIST POSTS**

The tenure period for specialist duties should take account of the time taken in learning the job...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specialist attachment</th>
<th>Total time lost due to training and low productivity whilst learning the job</th>
<th>Time taken to become fully productive</th>
<th>Minimum tenure period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>20 weeks</td>
<td>12 months</td>
<td>4 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOLMES</td>
<td>20 weeks</td>
<td>12 months</td>
<td>4 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance</td>
<td>10-15 weeks</td>
<td>6-9 months</td>
<td>2-3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Abuse</td>
<td>10 weeks</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stolen Vehicles</td>
<td>10 weeks</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>10 weeks</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheque Fraud</td>
<td>5 weeks</td>
<td>3 months</td>
<td>1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>5 weeks</td>
<td>3 months</td>
<td>1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious Crime</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Audit Commission analysis; estimates informed by discussions with Northamptonshire Police*

**Role of BCU Crime Staff**

22. The BCU is now for most forces the main unit for resourcing the response to crime, but forces may experience tensions between corporate and local priorities. It is vital that HQ CID and BCUs clarify respective accountabilities and then incorporate these into job descriptions, targets, appraisal and formal terms of reference. For this purpose, job/role
descriptions should be drawn up, and service level agreements (SLAs) can serve as a useful tool for resolving any uncertainties about respective roles.

**CASE STUDIES: How to develop service level agreements – 1**

Humberside has drawn up comprehensive SLAs which detail roles, responsibilities, clients of units, standards of service, client responsibilities, costs of the unit and how to resolve any grievances:

**How to develop service level agreements – 2**

Thames Valley has taken the approach to a detailed level with its fraud squad, specifying:

- who its customers are;
- basic areas of service;
- standards to which the service will be provided;
- targets for achieving the standards;
- customer responsibilities;
- review date for targets.
The review date has enabled the force to set and adjust realistic targets for the squad.

**How to develop service level agreements – 3**

Surrey has produced service standards and a set of standard operating procedures to reflect the new role of HQ crime as primarily providing support to BCUs. The force started by asking the central units’ customers (BCUs) what services and standards they required of the units, and then to estimate, based on current staffing, in what percentage of cases that standard could be met (see examples below). This percentage was then agreed as a target for the unit, and customer obligations to facilitate the service were stated. Standard operating procedures for each unit have since been drawn up to inform the BCUs in more detail of the services they can expect from the unit, and the force is now moving towards a model in which BCUs buy in central support from HQ crime using their overtime budgets. The HQ head of crime monitors how BCU commanders use their budgets to ensure that they make the best use of central resources and tackle force-wide crime concerns.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>STANDARD</th>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>CUSTOMER OBLIGATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAJOR CRIME SUPPORT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of Senior Investigation Officer at request of Division.</td>
<td>To arrive at scene or other location as agreed within 90 minutes from receipt of call.</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>Provision of suitable accommodation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of HOLMES equipment to incident room at request of S.I.O.</td>
<td>To install onsite, fully operational within 4 hours of request.</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>Provision of major incident room.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of HOLMES equipment on site to ensure operability.</td>
<td>To maintain uptime for 90% of required operating time.</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>Nil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management of forensic examination of crime scene, at request of S.I.O. or Senior S.O.C.O.</td>
<td>Attending at scene within 2 hours of request.</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>Provision of exhibits room.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of assessment of scale of enquiry and resource implications.</td>
<td>1st: - Within 36 hours of appointment of S.I.O. 2nd and subsequent: - Weekly after 28 days by A.C.P.O.</td>
<td>90% 100%</td>
<td>To take active part in review process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Define role of central units - consider use of SLAs to clarify roles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set crime strategy and objectives for BCUs - ensure compliance with these</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop clear criteria for commissioning of squads; draw up terms of reference and performance criteria (link to SLAs, if they exist)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consider use of tenure; set minimum periods to ensure optimal effectiveness and value for money</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supply 'customer' requirements to central units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manage squad according to specified requirements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Crime desks and crime management units
24. In forces without crime desks, control rooms determine the initial response to reported crimes, deciding what priority should be given, whether an officer should attend and, if so, who should attend. Quality control and progress-tracking of crime investigations is then done by DSs and shift sergeants. Consequently, many people may be managing the response to crimes, making it difficult to share information efficiently, co-ordinate responses, gain an overview of patterns in an area or provide a central information point for victims. The risk of uncoordinated effort is illustrated by a snapshot survey in one force, which found that on a single beat there were 49 undetected crimes being investigated by a total of 43 different officers. Crime desks can help to overcome these problems.

25. The Audit Commission’s national report states that ‘Effective crime management requires an appropriate and efficient initial response; prompt identification of cases meritng further investigation by detectives; integration of investigation, intelligence and scientific support inputs; and a high quality of communication with victims of crime. This represents a substantial task of co-ordination and progress-monitoring, and an increasing number of forces have adopted the crime desk mechanism to undertake it, especially in urban areas with a large volume of crime’. It goes on to recommend that forces ‘consider the establishment of crime desks or their expansion into crime management units, as appropriate’. This section addresses these matters, and the structure is as follows:

- Crime desks – principles of crime desks; assessment of the initial response to crime; benefits, local suitability; resourcing; evaluation.
- Crime management units – expanding the crime desk concept; integration of functions involved in crime; administrative support.
- Other issues to consider with crime desks or crime management units – issues to address when implementing.
- Checklist for action – areas for review by different parts of the force.

Crime Desks

26. The activities with which the crime desk is tasked and the form of crime desk vary from one example to another, but essential features include:

- consistent decisions are made on the form of initial response to all reports of crime, other than those requiring an immediate response;
- all crime reports are routed through the crime desk for analysis, quality control and progress tracking;
Assessment of the initial response to reports of crime

- the crime desk acts as a focal point for local crime work and notifies victims of crime about the progress of investigations;
- the crime desk is staffed with experienced personnel for peak periods of crime reporting.

27. In very small BCUs these functions could be performed by a single officer without the need for the formalised structure provided by the crime desk.

28. The fundamental objective should be to deal with less serious crimes in the most efficient way, without compromising the commitment to detect as many crimes as possible. More rational use of officer time can allow greater concentration of time and effort on more serious crimes, those crimes (including minor crime) with greatest potential for detection and those where the needs of the victim are high. This objective can benefit greatly from a crime desk, applying a consistent and efficient approach to allocating resources.

29. Many forces are now being more selective in deploying officers to scenes of crime, deciding in some cases not to send an officer where this is neither necessary to further the investigation nor required by the victim. The control room transfers less urgent calls to a crime desk for evaluation and decision as to the most appropriate form of response. This process, often called ‘telephone investigation’ or ‘crime evaluation/assessment’, is designed to maximise the use of resources by sending officers only to those scenes where there are any of the following features:
- traumatised victim;
- crime in progress or offenders at or near the scene;
- known leads at the scene to follow up;
- crime of a serious nature.
30. Forces using this method generally find at least **one third of crimes**
can be handled appropriately without deploying an officer to the scene,
though local circumstances will dictate what is appropriate and this figure
should not be treated as a target. The process works in a town centre
BCU in one force as shown in Exhibit 3.

**Exhibit 3**

**CRIME DESK RESPONSE TO CRIMES IN A TOWN CENTRE BCU**

The crime desk handles initial deployment to and recording of 63% of crimes...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial Assessment</th>
<th>% of recorded crimes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Crime recorded by crime desk; no deployment to scene.</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Deployment decision by crime desk of officer to scene.</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Deployment by control room of officer to scene; either urgent response or crime desk closed.</td>
<td>37%*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Second Assessment**

| A. Allocated for further investigation | 37% |

*This includes an estimated 2% of incidents requiring urgent response (see paragraph 47) and other crimes dealt with out of crime desk hours.

Source: Dorset Police (Poole): a typical monthly return

31. This selective approach can be applied to any deployment decision
during the investigative process in an attempt to make best use of scarce
resources, for example on:

- initial response (usually instant response vehicle or uniformed attendance);
- SOCO visit;
- area beat or community constable visit;
- CID involvement.

32. The concept of telephone investigation should not be misconstrued as
meaning that no police action will be taken in relation to that crime. In
fact, crime desks are able to offer an excellent level of service to the victim
without any perceptible deterioration in investigative outcomes. For
example, subject to the needs of the case and the victim, action taken may
include any or all of the following:

For the victim:

- provision of a crime number (for further contact and insurance purposes);
- crime prevention advice or literature;
- referral to Victim Support;

---

1 Recent research in one force has indicated that in some BCUs this figure could be as high as 70%.
• details of local watch schemes (e.g. Neighbourhood Watch, Horse Watch);
• an explanation of what investigative action will take place;
• progress reports.

For the investigation:
• leads followed up;
• details of stolen property circulated;
• beat officer alerted to crime;
• collation with other similar or connected crimes for proactive investigative and/or crime reduction measures.

33. Exhibit 4 below details the activities and information flows centred around the crime desk in West Mercia. The example also illustrates one approach to dealing with crimes out of crime desk hours. Paragraph 49 later in this section expands on this and other options.

**Exhibit 4**

**CRIME DESK ACTIVITIES AND INFORMATION FLOWS IN WEST MERCIA**

Forces will require a detailed understanding of how the crime desk is to be used...

---

**Source:** West Mercia Constabulary
34. The decision as to which, if any, types of crime may be suitable for telephone investigation, and under what circumstances, is one which should be made by individual forces. There is, however, a common theme emerging from those forces that are using the method. The types of crime which forces find suitable for telephone investigation generally include:

- theft of and from motor vehicles;
- criminal damage;
- other miscellaneous thefts.

35. More serious crimes are always visited, including all burglary dwellings – though some crime desks find that the most minor burglaries of, for example, sheds may not require a visit. In all cases, however, the criteria set out in paragraph 29 are applied, and crime desks make a decision based on the needs of the particular victim and crime. The case studies below illustrate how crime desks have worked in three forces. Case study 1 addresses the effect telephone investigations will have upon public satisfaction levels; case study 2 addresses what effect the handling of crimes by crime desks will have upon patrol officers’ workloads; case study 3 addresses the effect of crime desks on recorded crime rates and detection performance.

**CASE STUDIES: Impact of crime desk approach – 1**

In late 1992 South Yorkshire Police conducted a postal survey of people making reports of crime by telephone to crime management units, and then compared the results with those from people making reports of similar crimes in a sub-division without a unit and where each victim of crime was visited (sub-division X). The results showed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of people saying that….</th>
<th>CMUs</th>
<th>Sub-div. X</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speed of response to call very/fairly good</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The officer identified him/herself</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They were given method of further contact</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The crime was dealt with very/fairly well</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They had been kept well informed of progress of enquiries</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The survey results indicated that, by the established criteria, crime management units were able to offer a better quality of service to victims of crime in appropriate cases than more traditional methods. The survey also revealed aspects of the CMU service which could be improved further and these were incorporated in the force’s best practice model.

**Impact of crime desk approach – 2**

In March 1992 Greater Manchester Police evaluated a Public Assistance Desk (PAD) which was then operating in one division. The PAD, while not having all the elements of a crime desk/crime management unit, had as one of its primary aims the ‘resolution’ of incidents by telephone, including telephone
investigation of minor crime. During the study period 25% of reported crime was dealt with by telephone in addition to the handling of other non-crime related messages.

A public perception survey was conducted and the results showed that overall the scheme had been well received, and in particular there had been no adverse effects on satisfaction levels. Members of the public were found to accept that certain reports of crime and other incidents can be dealt with over the telephone and the attendance of a police officer is not always necessary. A small number, however, expressed dissatisfaction with the method, the majority of whom were in the age range of 55 and upwards.

A survey was also conducted to evaluate officers’ perceptions of the scheme. The results included the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception of respondents that...</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>No Change*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Officers' workload has decreased</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 More time to deal with incidents</td>
<td>40.1%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>46.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Attended fewer crimes</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Progressing fewer crimes</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Ability to respond to incidents improved</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>78.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Uncommitted time increased</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>70.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* For each question there is a small % who did not respond, hence the figures may not add up to 100%

The response to questions 1 to 4 above, showing that a significant number of officers felt their workload had reduced and they had more time to deal with incidents, appears at first sight to conflict with the responses to 5 and 6, where approximately 70% of officers did not feel they had more uncommitted time or a better ability to respond to incidents. However the force examined some other measures of performance which showed that officers had been undertaking more work, both crime and non-crime, than in the previous year; and a key message appears to be the need to ensure that officers’ freed time is targeted on appropriate crime-related work.

**Performance in Division with PAD**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mar-Aug 1991</th>
<th>Mar-Aug 1992</th>
<th>% increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Persons arrested</td>
<td>4420</td>
<td>5043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process offences</td>
<td>3484</td>
<td>4117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Impact of crime desk approach – 3

In an attempt to evaluate the effect of crime desk methods on recorded crime rates and detection performance, a study was made of three BCUs with crime desks in Warwickshire. Crime figures and arrest rates for a six month period, October 1992 to March 1993, were compared with the same six months the previous year (before the introduction of crime desks). As a further control the same figures were produced for a neighbouring force, which did not utilise crime desks in either period. Performance in dealing with more serious crime was not significantly different in Warwickshire, but the effect upon those types of crime most likely to be subject to telephone investigation (i.e. minor crimes) was impressive:

EFFECTS OF CRIME DESK ON RECORDED AND DETECTED CRIME IN MINOR CRIME CATEGORIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in recorded crime</th>
<th>Change in detections (all methods)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft of motor vehicle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft from motor vehicle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>-18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other thefts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>-13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: project team analysis with cooperation from Warwickshire Constabulary

The force is reluctant to draw firm conclusions at this stage but feels that the higher reporting rates may have been because the public regard the method as acceptable, and reporting minor crime is now easier than before. Such a rise in recorded crime is often a feature of introducing these methods. The precise cause of increased detections is more difficult to pinpoint. During the 1992/93 period Warwickshire processed more offenders in custody admitting series of offences than in the previous year. However, even allowing for this, there was still some improvement.

36. Since the crime desk is, in effect, organising in one place tasks previously undertaken by several individuals, it should not require additional resources over and above those currently involved in performing those tasks. In fact, there is potential for considerable resource saving when telephone investigation techniques are adopted. One DS can perform the tasks which previously took up a proportion of the time of several DSs and shift sergeants, and constables can deal with many more crimes per officer by phone than by attending each one in person. The expansion of the crime desk into a crime management unit
should thus require no additional resources, merely the re-siting of existing personnel to work more closely together.

37. The number of personnel required to staff a crime desk will depend on factors such as crime levels and peak times of crime reporting, which should first be researched. The viability of a crime desk will further depend on how broadly its terms of reference are drawn. Most crime desks need a strength of between three and five constables as telephone investigators to cover the typical opening hours.

38. In very large BCUs (with, say, 30,000 crimes per year) these officers may be fully employed purely on telephone investigation, and additional staff will be required to perform the full array of functions. In smaller BCUs (up to 10,000 crimes per year) the officers may provide the full array of additional support to patrol officers, including further enquiries which can be made by telephone, circulating details of stolen property, liaising with complainants, CPA, briefings, etc. The case studies below show different staffing configurations.

### CASE STUDIES: Staffing levels for crime desks – 1

North set up an Advice Line and Crime Reporting Unit in 1992 in the Norwich BCU, which at the time had a crime level of 29,000 crimes per annum, 340 officers, and a population of 250,000. The unit does not have all the features of a crime desk, but is an offshoot of the communications room; its terms of reference include the investigation of minor crimes by telephone and the provision of a non-crime advice line facility to resolve matters that can be dealt with without resource deployment. Five constables are assigned to the unit, with two typically on duty at any one time, and it opens:

- 7.00 am – 7.00 pm Monday to Friday
- 8.00 am – 6.00 pm Saturday
- 8.00 am – 5.00 pm Sunday.

In 1993 the unit investigated 9,200 crimes by telephone (i.e. 32% of all crimes). The average time spent dealing with reports over the telephone is 17 minutes, compared with 60 minutes when an attendance is involved. The Home Office Police Research Group estimates that the BCU saved 2,600 officer hours per annum through having the unit (not all crimes previously received a visit).

### Staffing levels for crime desks – 2

South Yorkshire Police, with an establishment of 3,030 and a 1993 crime rate of 153,160, has a crime desk on each of the 14 BCUs in the force. Most crime desks have a total strength of two constables and two civilians covering the hours 7 am to 11 pm. The recording of crime is fully computerised.

A typical arrangement is that to be found on the Attercliffe sub-division in Sheffield:

- 1993 crime level: 3,000
- Police establishment: 138
Crime desk opening hours: 7 am to 10 pm, 7 days a week
Crime desk staff (total):
1 Detective Sergeant
2 Constables and 2 civilians
1 Local Intelligence Officer
1 Neighbourhood Watch Officer

Crimes dealt with by crime desk: 33%

In addition the Crime Prevention Officer and Victim Support liaison function are housed nearby. The crime desk is not merely recording crimes – its functions include:

- Investigation by telephone/ further enquiries.
- Deployment management.
- Crime-recording computer input.
- Providing information for briefings and management.
- Circulation of details of stolen property to VSS, CPO or Neighbourhood Watch.
- Crime pattern analysis.
- Administration/telephone enquiries for patrol officers.

Staffing levels for crime desks – 3

The crime desks in each of Warwickshire's five BCUs have been developed to include many of the features of crime management units and are tasked wherever possible to relieve patrol officers of enquiries which the desk can complete by telephone. Staffing levels are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual police strength</th>
<th>Desk staff</th>
<th>1993 crime</th>
<th>% crimes dealt with by the desk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bedworth 153</td>
<td>1 DS</td>
<td>9,389</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 PCs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 CPO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LIO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 FIOs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Clerks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rugby 114</td>
<td>1 DS</td>
<td>7,933</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 PCs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 CPO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 LIO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 FIO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Clerk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual police strength</td>
<td>Desk staff</td>
<td>1993 crime</td>
<td>% crimes dealt with by the desk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stratford</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1 DS, 3 PCs, 1 CPO, 1 FIO, 2 Clerks, 1 LIO</td>
<td>6,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leamington</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>1 DS, 4 PCs, 1 CPO, 2 LIOs, 1 FIO, 2 Clerks</td>
<td>11,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuneaton</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>1 DS, 4 PCs, 1 CPO, 1 Community Liaison Officer, 1 School Liaison Officer, 1 FIO, 3 Clerks</td>
<td>10,052</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Staffing levels for crime desks – 4**

Hampshire set up a crime desk in 1991 in the Basingstoke sub-division (which at the time had around 10,000 crimes per annum and 190 officers), staffed by 1 DS and 1 DC over the hours 0800-2200 for 6 days a week. Attached to the desk was an 'enquiry unit' of 6 plain-clothes officers who were tasked with targeting property crime but who also helped to cover the crime desk during the DS's or DC's periods of absence.

The crime desk had the objectives of improving the information flow to victims of crime and improving the performance of the sub-division on property crime. Success at meeting these objectives was measured in two ways:

- Levels of customer satisfaction rose and expectations were managed in spite of sending fewer officers to scenes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% agreeing with statement...</th>
<th>Pre</th>
<th>Post</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>that the police did all that was reasonable</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>that information was given</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>follow-up visit from police expected</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
received a personal visit from police officer 43% 33%

- Reported crime rose, but the number of detections rose more steeply, and the enquiry unit had very high productivity:
  - reported crime increased by 23% (some due to effect of crime desk);
  - detections increased by 31%;
  - the clear-up rate rose from 24% to 25.5%.

In addition, the setting up of the crime desk yielded the following benefits:
- the identification of trends and crime patterns;
- the ability to use the enquiry unit to target crime categories as needed;
- tightening the supervision and accountability of operational officers for their performance as a result of monthly monitoring.

Hampshire has subsequently tried to extend the approach across the force, but has experienced difficulties in effecting a consistent approach due to the exercise of local discretion by BCU commanders.

39. Circumstances vary and not all BCUs are of sufficient size to justify a crime desk or crime management unit. In smaller BCUs with fewer crimes and officers there are two options: for a single officer to perform the main functions of a crime desk without the attendant structure; or the sharing of a crime desk by more than one BCU. There are advantages and disadvantages to each approach, as shown in Exhibit 5.

Exhibit 5

TWO OPTIONS FOR CRIME DESKS IN SMALL BCUs
The advantages and disadvantages of each option should be weighed up...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Small crime desk within BCU</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• keeps crime management local</td>
<td>• has limited range of expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• provides local contact for all officers</td>
<td>• needs restricted opening hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• is in line with devolution principle</td>
<td>• cannot tap economies of scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• crime desk will know local officers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Larger crime desk serving more than one BCU</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• enables cross-BCU view of crime</td>
<td>• takes an element of crime management from BCU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• desk can provide a wider range of services for longer hours</td>
<td>• is less accessible to some officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• facilitates force-wide application of common standards</td>
<td>• will have less local knowledge</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
40. There are clearly some roles within the crime management unit which will be suitable for civilianisation, for example, clerical support, watch scheme liaison, etc. There is, however, no consensus about whether the telephone investigation function can be performed effectively by civilians. Many forces consider contact with a police officer to be vital, and that what is required is in fact an investigation, at arms length, in which a police officer asks the questions which would traditionally have been asked in person at the scene. A decision is then reached by that officer based on investigative experience as to further steps towards detection. Other forces, however, consider that this role can be quite adequately performed by civilians, given careful selection, training and access to police expertise where needed.

41. Evaluation of the impact of the crime desk is essential as a means of testing the appropriateness of the approach. Many forces have failed to gather sufficient information before implementation to enable robust ‘before-and-after’ evaluation. Some have managed some form of assessment by using BCUs without crime desks as control sites. The key elements which the force should monitor and compare over time, where appropriate, are:

**Inputs**
- time spent by officers making the initial response to crime incidents;
- time formerly spent by supervisors on tasks taken over by the crime desk.

**Activities**
- number of crimes dealt with and other work undertaken by the crime desk.

**Outputs**
- levels of customer satisfaction with the police response;
- levels of recorded crime and detections (broadly by crime type and method of detection: see Section 7, Performance Management).

**Crime Management Units**

42. There are a number of functions which sit naturally alongside the crime desk and which can be brought together under one overall manager in a crime management unit. These functions may include:
- Crime prevention;
- Watch scheme liaison (e.g. Neighbourhood Watch, Vehicle Watch);
- SOCOs/fingerprint specialists;
- Crime pattern analysis;
- Intelligence;
• Development of target packages for BCU and HQ proactive teams;
• ‘Help’ desks for the general public;
• Victim Support liaison;
• Administration including prosecution files;
• Witness liaison.

Exhibit 6 shows how Gloucestershire has brought together all these functions into a crime management unit.

Exhibit 6
CRIME MANAGEMENT UNIT STRUCTURE IN GLOUCESTERSHIRE
A crime management unit brings together all functions involved in responding to crime...

Source: Gloucestershire Constabulary

43. Gloucestershire is finding that the benefits are greatest where officers are located together. The advantages of this grouping of functions within a crime management unit include:

• a more effective co-ordination of effort and co-operation between all functions involved in dealing with crime (i.e. detectives, uniformed officers and support functions);
• early identification of crime problems and instigation of preventive and investigative, proactive and reactive initiatives.

44. It is an explicit aim of a crime management unit to encourage this greater integration of the work of staff involved in the different crime functions. Integration can fail to occur for reasons of culture, geography and even shift patterns. The provision of shared accommodation, at least in the same building if not on the same floor, and a single line of command can help to overcome these problems.

45. Links between the different functions can be further strengthened by giving officers specific responsibility for liaison. One option, introduced
in West Yorkshire, is to nominate a detective as 'CID link officer' attached to each uniformed shift. In Cumbria, two schemes are encouraging integration. Firstly, each fingerprint officer at HQ is given responsibility for liaison with SOCOs in a given geographic area of the force. Once every six weeks that fingerprint officer spends a day out on visits with SOCOs, learning about mark-collection and giving feedback on mark quality for searches. Secondly, a scheme of three-month 'experiential aideships' to the CID has been running for some time. This enables uniformed officers to be attached to CID for a short period, quickly increasing the number of officers who have spent time in the CID.

46. The Audit Commission’s report recommends that forces ‘consider whether Pre-Trial Issues require adjustments to current ASU and file management systems, in particular the provision of administrative support within local CID offices’. Due to tighter deadlines for the submission of files, the requirement that more documents be typed and that the investigating officer sign the completed file, forces where ASUs are not located in the BCU may find that detectives will require local support to help with non-standard files. These staff might then come under the control of the crime management unit.

Other Issues to Consider with Crime Desks or Crime Management Units

47. Forces will need to plan for the change in procedures entailed in routing the majority of crime calls through to the crime desk. Very few crime calls (2% according to research in Kent) require immediate response and so the control room operators will either have to transfer a lot of calls to the crime desk, or a separate DDI (direct-dial-in) number may be advertised to the public.

48. The effectiveness of the crime desk is dependent upon the quality of staff running it. Enthusiasm is vital but sometimes difficult to sustain. Some
forces, such as Hampshire, have tried rotating staff on the crime desk, but this may result in a lack of commitment, continuity and expertise. This human resource issue should be addressed by BCU commanders in a positive way, stressing the importance of the role and ensuring that it is perceived as a key post in policing.

49. **BCUs must make provision for dealing with crimes outside the opening hours of the crime desk.** The issue is how or whether to provide a similar level of service to victims outside these hours. Options which forces have tried, together with their relative merits and drawbacks, are described in Exhibit 7.

**Exhibit 7**

**OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH REPORTS OF CRIME OUT OF CRIME DESK HOURS**

Forces need to decide how to handle calls out of normal hours...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control room deploys officer to all crime scenes</td>
<td>• Easy for control room and deployed officer to manage</td>
<td>• customers receive different levels of service at different times of day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• may be inefficient use of deployed officer’s time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• incoming information on crimes not flowing through a common point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Maintains level of service through hours when desk is closed</td>
<td>• crime desk will not have local knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least one crime desk in force covers for all desks in force</td>
<td></td>
<td>• incoming information on crimes not flowing through a common point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• customers receive different levels of service at different times of day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control room transfers non-urgent calls to crime desk answer-phone or asks to phone back</td>
<td>• Efficient way of dealing with non-urgent calls</td>
<td>• requires training of control room staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• requires significant training of control room staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control room provides the telephone investigation service</td>
<td>• Allows for consistent deployment decisions</td>
<td>• incoming information on crimes not flowing through a common point</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

50. There should be freed time earmarked among sergeants, who now have a reduced supervisory role in the allocation and progress-tracking of crime reports. This freed-up time should be redeployed by crime managers in accordance with their own crime priorities.

* * * * *
## CHECKLIST FOR ACTION – Crime Desks and Crime Management Units

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decide with BCU commanders on optimal format of crime desks/CMUs</td>
<td>Measure pattern of crime demand per BCU (see para. 37)</td>
<td>Consider staffing implications including local admin. support; ring-fence freed resources for redeployment</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set force objectives for crime desks – discuss with control room any changes in procedures</td>
<td>Undertake pre- and post-evaluation (see para. 41)</td>
<td>Accommodate new guidelines on routing of crime call to crime desks</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Review local crime strategy with BCU commander to maximise opportunities for redeployment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure compliance with objectives of crime desk – encourage flow of information</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Tackling Crime Effectively
4. Teamwork and supervision
4. Teamwork and Supervision

Introduction

51. Traditionally detective constables have received little supervisory attention from their sergeants. This is largely because officers are relatively experienced by the time they enter the CID and close supervision is considered unnecessary. However, individual forces have increasingly been placing more emphasis on the supervision of work undertaken by both uniformed and CID officers, and this was one of the recommendations of the Metropolitan Police's Crime Investigation Priority Project (CIPP). Supervision and the management of investigative work have also been the subject of much national attention. The report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (1993) recommended that detective sergeants take a greater role in supervising investigations; whilst the Audit Commission’s national report recommends that forces ‘strengthen the supervision of investigations at BCU level, through appropriate training, adjustments to caseload, establishment of larger investigative teams and case monitoring systems’. This section covers the topics of teamwork and the supervision of work at the BCU level. The structure is as follows:

- Effective teamwork – role and benefits of teamwork; examples in action.
- Role of the supervisor (both CID and uniformed) – skills; tools and training for supervisors; making time to supervise.
- Checklist for action – areas for review by different parts of the force.

Effective Teamwork

52. Existing practice with BCU-level crime management is usually that allocation of work is to an individual rather than a team. This contrasts sharply with the approach to the investigation of major crime and can cause problems because:

- work is allocated routinely on the basis of availability rather than expertise;
- linkages in offences may not be identified;
- different officers may unwittingly be working on crimes committed by the same individual;
- individual officers tackling a heavy caseload with limited supervision may experience higher levels of isolation and stress;
- if an investigating officer is absent, for example, due to sickness, his/her work is not picked up, unless the absence is prolonged.

53. This will lead to a poor level of service to victims, a degree of discontinuity in the investigation, and a lack of communication and supervision within the department. Some of these problems could be alleviated by a greater emphasis on team-based investigation.
54. Teamwork facilitates the sharing of information and allows the team leader to utilise the individual strengths of team members. Rather than doing everything on one investigation, officers can develop specialisms such as interrogation, intelligence-gathering etc. A team could be tasked more directly to target offenders, which is often more resource-intensive than undertaking investigation at the scene of a crime and requires a high degree of co-ordination. Finally, there are fewer continuity problems of the type which arise when an officer is on leave, sick, or abstracted. The case study below shows a large team in action in one force.

**CASE STUDY: Large-scale teamwork at a BCU**

Cleveland has commenced implementation of its Efficiency Scrutiny into Crime Management by moving to a proactive intelligence-based team approach, initially in Hartlepool. DSs supervise larger teams of DCs and CID aides; these teams ‘strategically’ target criminals. The two proactive teams are of sufficient size to accommodate usual abstractions and work to meet local objectives prioritised by the divisional/BCU commander through the DCI. The role of the DS includes:

- output quality control checks;
- monitoring procedural and legal compliance;
- quality of service;
- monitoring ethical standards and integrity;
- monitoring effectiveness.

An assessment of the first three months working under the new system has shown that Hartlepool CID managed to:

- treble its number of arrests for crime;
- execute over a hundred search warrants, resulting in arrest or the recovery of property in 65% of cases;
- arrest a targeted offender and charge him with 19 brace-and-bit burglaries.

In addition, the division has been able to absorb a number of investigations of serious offences, including armed robbery, a burglary which included the theft of 25 weapons and 10,000 rounds of ammunition, and a fatal hit-and-run road traffic incident involving a stolen vehicle. Hitherto, the division would have had to call upon assistance from other force resources.

55. The typical BCU is organised into teams of detectives: one DS and three or four DCs. Such teams are likely to prove too small for proactive investigative work on the scale outlined above, for reasons of abstraction mentioned in paragraph 52. Teams of this size can, however, still gain benefits from teamwork, since:

- supervisors can play to the strengths of individual officers;
- supervisors can monitor progress at a glance on individual cases more easily since the whole team is involved in the investigation;
- officers can develop specialisms where beneficial;
• working as a team provides a more structured framework for officers to share information and experience;
• teams can undertake large-scale proactive work at short notice;
• continuity problems caused by leave or abstraction can be reduced;
• team spirit can enhance commitment and job satisfaction.

56. In the Metropolitan Police’s CIPP project, teams of seven officers were considered to be the optimal size, comprising one DS, four DCs and two trainee investigators. The trainee investigators were PCs, but given more training and responsibility than CID aides.

Role of the Supervisor

57. The traditional role of DS has evolved into a blend of senior investigator and supervisor, with the latter typically being carried out in an informal and unstructured way. Operational demands of ever-increasing workload have produced an imbalance, with too much investigation and too little supervision. DSs are skilled, experienced officers, often the linchpins of detective operations, and the question is how best to harness their talents. A critical point in improving supervision is to ensure that the personal caseload of DSs reflects the fact that the supervision of other officers’ work is a key part of their role. In some instances this would entail a reduction of DSs’ personal caseloads and more direction of team-based investigations. Some complex cases will still require the expertise of a DS; where forces move to larger teams some DSs no longer running teams could thus be nominated as senior investigators.

58. In addition, the uniformed branch in many forces is increasingly becoming involved in the response to crime, and uniformed sergeants should perform a similar role in supervising the investigative and other crime work of uniformed constables. Again this will involve a realignment of workload and training for uniformed sergeants.

59. Making the best use of resources should be regarded as a key responsibility of supervisors in both uniformed and CID functions and it is essential to identify the key supervisory skills required for the role of supervisor. Key supervisory skills are likely to include:
• leadership and motivation;
• understanding the principles of delegation;
• an understanding of project management;
• performance monitoring and appraisal.
60. The following elements of the supervisory role are critical:

- officer appraisal;
- monitoring of workload and productivity;
- development of officers' skills;
- quality assurance of work;
- training (see paragraph 64).

61. In practice this represents a shift for many supervisors, from primarily monitoring the end product to monitoring both the process and product of the investigation. They should oversee elements of the investigative process, such as interrogation and use of intelligence sources, interviews with witnesses and suspects, monitoring both the conduct and outcome of investigations. This will include monitoring evidence-giving in court, directing, guiding and training where appropriate. The sergeant might also undertake systematic selected reviews of prosecution files. Dip-sampling of interviews by other officers, including DIs and above, should be conducted systematically, using a pro forma to record the assessment, and should address both compliance with PACE and the quality of the interrogation.

62. Forces should enshrine any changes in the role of both detective and uniformed sergeants through appropriate revision of job descriptions, selection procedures and appraisal criteria.

63. Sergeants will need management information to direct attention to areas where it is needed (see Section 7, Performance Management). Useful information to monitor activity can be gleaned in a number of different ways, as the examples below illustrate.
CASE STUDIES: Examples of supervisory tools – I

There are few forces with a formal policy concerning the direct supervision of investigative interviews conducted by junior officers. One study found that sergeants were rarely, if ever, present at interviews and were never present for the purpose of supervision. (Source: Police Research Group, Paper 5, Janet Stockwell). One method of monitoring and supervision is the dip-sampling of tapes of investigative interviews and to this end a number of forces have devised an interview appraisal system. The pro forma sheet used by Dyfed-Powys is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DYFED-POWYS POLICE INTERVIEW APPRAISAL FORM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A INTERVIEW REF. NO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B OFFENDER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C OFFICER 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C OFFICER 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D QUALITY OF INTERVIEW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allegation put: YES/NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explanation/Detail given: YES/NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change(s) of story present: YES/NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence gathered: YES/NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Points to prove: COVERED/NOT COVERED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E MANNER OF OFFICER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search/Shallow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F QUALITY OF SUMMARY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caution accompanied by a clear and complete introduction, in the third person: YES/NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admissions and questions leading to admissions in direct speech: YES/NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitigation, remorse, other salient points covered adequately: YES/NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary: TOO LONG/TOO SHORT/SATISFACTORY Contains relevant information: YES/NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G OVERALL QUALITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excellent/Good/Fair/Poor: YES/NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More training needed: YES/NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advice given/not needed:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H RESULT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charged/Reported/T.I.C.R.V.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I ACTION TAKEN IF WEAKNESSES IDENTIFIED: (e.g. nature of advice given, training courses arranged etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action taken by:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tackling Crime Effectively
Examples of supervisory tools – 2

An Investigation Log has been developed by the Audit Commission to enable supervisors to track progress on individual cases assigned to officers. It could be completed for each job, recording at a general level activities undertaken on that particular investigation, time spent, elapsed time and use of informants. Even without IT support, these sheets will enable supervisors, at a glance, to see what work has been undertaken and how much time has been spent on an investigation.

![Investigation Log diagram]

Examples of supervisory tools – 3

Northamptonshire Police has issued guidelines to officers on the supervision of crime activities. Each process (e.g. attending scenes of crime – see Section 6, Investigation of Burglary and Other High-Volume Crime) is addressed under the headings of why, when and how to supervise the process.

64. DSs themselves should receive training in the supervisory role, and be appraised according to how effectively they perform this role. A survey conducted by the Audit Commission in 1993\(^1\) indicated that 89% of DSs had attended the sergeants’ course. In his report on crime investigation training, the National Director of Training acknowledges that changes required to tackle crime more effectively have implications for training. Better criminal investigation training is required for all roles in the service and training programmes will have to be adjusted accordingly.

\(^1\) Questionnaire completed by 35 forces, July 1993, for ‘Helping with Enquiries’.
A ‘Standard Interview Skills’ package and a Foundation Training Course for detective constables have been introduced but there is no national work currently progressing the general area of crime investigation. Training in the investigative process must not be restricted to detectives. Future work needs to address the training of uniformed constables in elementary crime investigation, uniformed supervisors in the management of crime enquiries, advanced training for CID managers, and awareness training for all in crime prevention and specialist skills such as surveillance, fraud, drugs, Special Branch work etc.

65. There is some concern that, where sergeants spend a greater proportion of their time supervising, constables will then take on the more serious and complex cases previously investigated by sergeants, which may impact on the quality of the investigation. Clearly there will be some adjustment in caseloads to allow sergeants time to supervise, but this can be phased in gradually – it represents a change in emphasis rather than a reversal of role.

66. One force has produced a conceptual model to assist in explaining how workload will be redistributed to allow sergeants more time to supervise (Exhibit 8, overleaf). The detective sergeant will delegate some of his/her work to either the crime desk (e.g. checking of crime reports, co-ordination of effort) or to detective constables (investigation of more serious crimes). In turn, DCs will transfer work, such as the initial response to burglaries and processing of prisoners for minor crime, to uniformed constables. Finally, uniformed constables’ attendance at scenes will be prioritised by the crime desk. Certain reports of crime will be dealt with by the desk over the telephone, thereby avoiding the need to deploy an officer to the scene.
Exhibit 8
REDISTRIBUTION OF DS CASELOAD
Some of the investigative work of the DS can be re-routed to other areas...

**Detective Sergeant**
- Change of emphasis in role away from 'senior investigator' towards a more supervisory function with greater role distance and objectivity.

**Management**

**Investigative Workload**

**Crime Desk**
- Conserve patrol resources and keep officers informed.
- Provide a focal point for crime.
- Record crimes which do not require initial deployment.
- Conduct those enquiries which can be done by telephone.
- Identify patterns of crime and brief patrol officers.
- Keep victims informed.

**Detective Constable**
- Numbers already depleted when CAST* formed and will now take on some investigations formerly done by detective sergeants.
- Will concentrate on serious and series of crimes and those where specialist skills needed.
- Should not take on work which could and should be done by uniformed officers.

**Police Constable**
- Conduct all initial enquiries at the scene of most crimes.
- Interview and process the majority of prisoners held for non-serious crime.

*Source: provincial force*

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Tackling Crime Effectively
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consider role of teams at local level with BCU commanders</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consider role of teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>Allow for teamwork in case allocation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review role of supervisor – amend job descriptions and appraisal and selection criteria; address training needs</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make allowance in local strategy for supervisory time for sergeants</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Supervise cases more actively</td>
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Tackling Crime Effectively
5. Intelligence and proactivity
5. Intelligence and Proactivity

Introduction

67. Much emphasis has been placed in recent years on the intelligence function and its importance in enabling police managers to target operations towards serious and prolific criminals. A number of reports commissioned by the Association of Chief Police Officers – Baumber, Pearce and Ratcliffe – have led to a tiered structure for intelligence work at national/regional, force and local (BCU) level. The Audit Commission’s national report recommends that forces ‘enhance the resourcing of the intelligence function; if not with additional resources, then with higher calibre staff and improved technological support, as appropriate’; and ‘generate a capacity at both force-wide and BCU level for a greater degree of proactive work, targeting prolific and serious criminals and encouraging the use of informants’. This intelligence-led approach is increasingly being used by forces to deploy their resources in order to maximise effectiveness. This section will deal with the intelligence function and the role of proactive work in actioning intelligence. The structure is as follows:

- Structure and roles of the intelligence function – organisation; roles of LIO/FIO; duties; evaluation of intelligence.
- Computerisation – organisation; weeding; crime pattern analysis.
- Proactivity – definition and relationship with reactive approaches; BCU-level approaches.
- Surveillance teams – maximising effective use of surveillance teams.
- Use of informants – informant-handling; registration; management.
- Checklist for action – areas for review by different parts of the force.

Structure and Roles of the Intelligence Function

68. The National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) provides a network of intelligence at both regional and national/international level. Its role is principally to gather, evaluate and disseminate intelligence from overseas and within the UK; to set national standards for intelligence and monitor the effectiveness of the national system; and to provide services such as strategic analysis, training and advice to local police forces. A copy of the NCIS Strategic Aims is contained in Appendix 5.

69. NCIS has five regional offices – in London, Bristol, Birmingham, Manchester and Wakefield – which work to the Detective Chief Superintendent Heads of Region, and units based at NCIS HQ. The

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1 Baumber: Report of the ACPO Sub-Committee on Criminal Intelligence, 1975.
regional offices are at the heart of NCIS work, collecting and disseminating intelligence on cross-border and serious crime from a variety of police and other sources, including informants. Networking and analysis of information is supported by the NCIS 'INFOS' computer system, CLUE computerised administration system, the Police National Computer System (PNC) and the Customs and Excise computer system (CEDRIC). Staff also have responsibility for undertaking crime pattern analysis of serious crimes from the forces in the region.

70. Exhibit 9 outlines the structure of the intelligence function at national, regional, force and local level.

Exhibit 9

STRUCTURE OF THE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION

Intelligence resources are located at national, regional, force and local level...

71. At force headquarters level, there is typically a Force Intelligence Bureau (FIB) headed by a Force Intelligence Officer, whose core role is:

- to co-ordinate the force-wide approach;
- to provide an infrastructure for communication between different BCUs, and maintain the central computer system;
- to provide intelligence support to major enquiries;
- to analyse patterns and develop packages on force-wide problems;

and, in some cases:

- to control the register of informants;
- to evaluate packages competing for surveillance resources;
• to provide specialist expertise in different areas of intelligence, such as drugs, antiques, etc.

72. The principal specialist roles at BCU level are the Local Intelligence Officer (LIO) and the Field Intelligence Officer (FIO).

73. The core role of the LIO, formerly called the collator, is:
• to encourage all officers to contribute to the intelligence database;
• to evaluate information received from police officers and other sources, with the assistance of the officer and his/her supervising officer where appropriate, and transfer this information to the intelligence database;
• to analyse and disseminate information back to operational staff in a way that enables them to act upon it.

74. Officers are encouraged to submit intelligence forms to the LIO. This is done with varying degrees of enthusiasm, as Exhibit 10 illustrates. Many police officers hold a wealth of information but sometimes need prompting to share it; they do not always see the value of what may seem to be a mere detail, such as a nickname given to a local villain, or assume that the LIO already knows it.

Exhibit 10
NUMBER OF INTELLIGENCE FORMS SUBMITTED PER OFFICER IN ONE YEAR
The number of intelligence forms submitted varies considerably...

Source: Audit Commission questionnaire, July 1993 – figures from latest available year

75. Methods of gathering information vary in formality and structure, from patrol officers noting suspicious activities to managed intelligence-gathering operations, as shown by the case studies below.
CASE STUDIES: Intelligence gathering – 1

North Wales has a number of intelligence-gathering initiatives, including an unmarked crime car, double-crewed by uniformed officers, which operates on the main arterial roads, carrying out stop checks. In addition to detecting offences such as stolen vehicles, driving whilst disqualified, etc., information is gathered on the movements of mobile criminals. When individuals are from another force area, checks are made with that intelligence bureau and disseminated accordingly. Where appropriate, an individual’s nominal record on PNC is ‘tagged’ using one of 13 new force codes established for this purpose. The codes identify certain interested parties – local intelligence officers, drugs unit, RCS and the force intelligence bureau. When the individual is checked on the system, ‘active intelligence’ (i.e. high quality intelligence) is passed to the interested party by the person doing the check.

Intelligence gathering – 2

Forces with computerised intelligence systems, particularly where they are networked across the force, are finding that the added ability to store, analyse and share intelligence is paying operational dividends. One specific illustration comes from Lancashire. Two youths were stopped and questioned, one of whom was wearing a baseball cap with a distinctive and unusual logo; this was noted on the intelligence form submitted by the patrol officer. Some two weeks later a robbery was committed and the only distinguishing feature noticed by the victim was a word on a baseball cap worn by one of the assailants. The investigating officer searched the computer intelligence database and the earlier intelligence report was retrieved, leading to an immediate arrest and detection. Without this facility the offence may have remained undetected and would certainly have taken considerably more time, effort and resources to investigate. Such examples help to ensure that officers value the system and make more intelligence submissions.

76. The quantity and quality of incoming information, as gauged by evaluation, are equally important. The role of evaluating information is crucial, as this quote illustrates:

Raw intelligence needs to be analysed properly so that bits and pieces of information from diverse sources show some pattern and meaning. Without being analysed, information will not become intelligence…

Lord Denning

77. Raw information is analysed and evaluated to develop it into more usable intelligence. This is usually done using a 4x4 matrix, scoring A, B, C or X for the reliability of the source and 1, 2, 3 or 4 for the degree of certainty concerning the information. Thus A1 information is highly reliable, whereas an X4 rating would signal that the information should be treated with caution. Cleveland is currently evaluating a third dimension on the actionable quality of the intelligence, because under the current...
system information can receive maximum scores on reliability of source and certainty but be purely of historic value.

78. It is essential that the force has good lateral and vertical communication so that intelligence is not just held within the LIO's office but is available to all who need it. As well as being a focal point for enquiries about suspects, crime patterns etc., the LIO prepares daily or weekly bulletins to keep officers briefed about local crimes and criminals. These are circulated widely within the BCU and copies sent to other LIOs and headquarters. They are often well-produced and useful documents, but if they are too long, turgid in style and produced at irregular intervals, their impact will be minimal. Some good examples of briefing sheets are shown in the case study below.

**CASE STUDY:** Examples of topical briefing sheets

Lincolnshire uses a microcomputer to generate single sheet briefings which are eye-catching and contain concise, specific information about topical crimes in the immediate BCU area.

---

**TRAILER THIEVES**

Information was received that a trailer was to be attacked on Sunday evening on a car park in XXXX

Observations were kept on Kwik Save/XXXX Street car park by PCs Dixon & Dock

Checked at 2020hrs that night were:

1. Stan XXXX bn 26/01/52 @ XXXX
2. The Sanders XXXX
3. Harry XXXX bn 12/05/65 @ XXXX

FN Gary XXXX

3, Saltash House, XXXX, XXXX

Both questioned and gave different reasons for being there!

XXXX was driving a white Fiat Fiorinno Van XXXX

He stated he owned the vehicle although it is currently registered to XXXX Ltd, and has been since 1990
Role of field intelligence officers

79. One of the key recommendations of the Ratcliffe Report was that operational officers should not have a primary role in the development of intelligence but that this should be undertaken by specially trained, dedicated officers. The role of the Field Intelligence Officer (FIO) was created to meet this recommendation. The FIO role is still relatively new in some forces, and few forces have FIOs based in every BCU; more typically an FIO will serve two or more BCUs.

80. An FIO's principal role is to develop the intelligence gleaned on local criminals by the LIO and compile 'packages' on target criminals. Such a package would contain details of that criminal's record, physical description and photograph, known accomplices, vehicles used, MO, daily routines etc., plus a tactical plan for arrest. This is used by detectives – or in some cases a surveillance team – to plan an initiative either to catch the person in the act of committing an offence or otherwise to gather sufficient information to sustain a charge. The package may take anything from three days to three weeks to compile and may entail observations, contact with informants, liaison with operational officers familiar with the individual concerned, and close collaboration with the LIO. Unlike the
LIO, the FIO is expected to spend a considerable amount of time out of the station.

81. Despite having a stated commitment to high-quality intelligence work, some forces still use these posts, and especially LIO posts, to deploy officers who are on light duties or approaching retirement. Some of these will use their experience to good effect, even without specialist training, but many lack the particular attributes that Ratcliffe and others have identified as critical to the success of the LIO and FIO roles, such as dynamism, good communication skills, investigative experience and an analytical approach.

82. Forces should ensure, where possible, that the flow of intelligence is not impeded by a lack of technical support. To make the most effective use of intelligence records, they should be readily available to officers, accessible by computer from each BCU and available 24 hours a day. Forces should aim for one person: one record on a nominal index and ensure that databases are properly maintained; this will require adherence to the Data Protection Act 1984 and necessitate a force policy on weeding.

83. The following Data Protection Act principles should always be borne in mind when considering retention of information:

- relevance – what can the information be used for?
- volume – how much information needs to be stored?
- accuracy – how certain or speculative is the information?
- currency – how up to date is the information?

These criteria are weighed against:

- the nature of the information;
- the person to whom it relates;
- the prevailing circumstances.

84. If information does not accord with these principles it should be weeded. Weeding can be time-consuming, particularly in forces which still have manual systems, but intelligence databases must be managed to ensure that only useful information is being kept. The case studies below describe aspects of computerised systems.
CASE STUDIES: Computerised intelligence databases – 1

The Lancashire Intelligence Service ‘LANCON-INTL’ is replacing a long-established card system which has operated at BCUs, and which has no networking facility. Operational intelligence is now directly input via a terminal by the submitting officer, who grades the information using the 4x4 system, aided by the following screen prompts:

![Image of computer screen](image)

The new information, though accessible throughout the force from that moment, is then held centrally in a holding file for researching, vetting, validating and evaluation by the LIO when next on duty. The database will increase in quality and quantity and information is then weeded annually (phased alphabetically, doing one to three letters per month), using the following guidelines:

- Information relating to a nominal record will normally be reviewed for weeding after being held for one year;
- Nominal records will be weeded when their subjects are thought to be inactive because no information has been recorded on them in the previous five years.

Computerised intelligence databases – 2

North Yorkshire’s intelligence systems are linked to other forces in the region, facilitating the sharing of information across force boundaries. Links are also available to the Police National Computer (PNC), allowing PNC checks to be stored and mapped against intelligence. The use of ANACAPA analysis packages, such as i2: WATSON, HARLEQUIN (trademarks) etc. allows geographical and higher level analytical work by specialist analysts.
Crime pattern analysis

Most forces are now working with or towards computerised crime recording; this places intelligence units in a strong position to use the information to analyse crimes and identify patterns. In the past, officers were able to identify patterns of crime only from local knowledge and personal memory. However, the massive increase in reported crimes, together with the development of sophisticated computer-based crime-recording systems, providing real-time but remote data entry, have pushed CPA systems to a new level of sophistication. (In addition, many forces are exploring the use of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to assist with CPA and other areas of police work). Crime pattern analysis can now achieve:

- the statistical analysis of crime throughout the force area or BCU, to show when and where crimes are being committed and so allow resources to be deployed appropriately;
- the identification of patterns of crime in BCUs and across BCU boundaries where, for example, the same MO may have been employed, thus indicating that an offence forms part of a series;
- assistance (when linked to criminal intelligence) in the identification of criminals committing a specific type of crime on a regular basis;
- the formation of a basis for targeting criminals.

The case studies below illustrate successful CPA initiatives of differing degrees of sophistication.
CASE STUDIES: Crime pattern analysis – 1

The Oldham division of Greater Manchester developed an in-house CPA system on a micro-computer. The data is input by a clerk but will eventually be taken from the force’s computerised crime recording system and down-loaded electronically. The Oldham CPA computer system is now being extended to all GMP divisions. Analysis is strictly related to operational information requirements, as follows:

i. key crimes by beat – a simple print-out showing the number of key crimes by beat for a specified period;

ii. trends over time by key crimes – a bar chart, showing the frequency of key crimes, by type, going back over a number of weeks. This allows officers to identify emerging problems;

iii. crime analysis – a focus on any key crime group, showing five relevant pieces of information, e.g. for burglary: time of day; day of week of an occurrence; entry points; MOs and repeat locations;

iv. risk of crime by beat – a summary for a given period of the degree of a beat’s exposure to the commission of key crime groups;

v. patrol planner – setting out times and places of greatest exposure to crime by type of crime and beat, to inform directed patrol.

The Commander at Oldham used these five analyses every week in crime planning meetings to which the CID, LIO and analyst were invited. The simplicity of the system, and the willingness to act upon the information have been cited as the main reason for success. Crime was reduced by 15 per cent in that division compared with the previous year.

Crime pattern analysis – 2

Lincolnshire has developed a crime information retrievable, review and scheduling package (CIRRaS), which enables crime data captured by the force Criminal Information System Mainframe (CIS2) to be searched, sorted and compiled into whatever format is desired. The information is then displayed and printed. Graphics representing the time and date of each offence are also available. The initial capture is made by carrying out a search or searches of CIS2, and then the information is down-loaded onto a personal computer. Any further analysis is then done in a ‘Windows’ environment. This results in a user-friendly package, which produces attractive output with minimal operator training. This system was developed in Gainsborough by the LIO and the civilian crime allocator/analyst and is being implemented force-wide.

Proactivity

87. The Audit Commission study highlighted that the ratio of officers whose role is predominantly proactive (FIOs and surveillance teams) to other officers could vary widely: in the five study forces the range was from 1:92 to 1:380. A commitment to intelligence-driven, more proactive strategies is sustainable only if forces create more capacity for proactive work. It is important to note that there are many different forms of
proactive work, not all of which require full-scale, resource-intensive surveillance. Exhibit 11 illustrates this point by showing different proactive approaches.

**Exhibit 11**
**ILLUSTRATION OF DIFFERENT LEVELS OF PROACTIVE APPROACH**
Not all proactive work requires full-scale, resource-intensive surveillance...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prolific offenders</td>
<td>Mobile surveillance aimed at catching 'red-handed'</td>
<td>Fully trained and equipped surveillance squad – about £2,500 per 10-hour shift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force-wide burglary problem</td>
<td>Operation Bumblebee</td>
<td>Large number of (BCU) detectives; intelligence resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spate of car thefts</td>
<td>Static surveillance to gain intelligence</td>
<td>Four officers on an observation point overlooking a car park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spate of burglaries in sheltered housing</td>
<td>Crime prevention initiative Checking dealers/handlers</td>
<td>Multi-agency CCTV programme Single patrol officers; detectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspicious behaviour around a factory</td>
<td>Vigilant patrol officer notes details; submits to LIO</td>
<td>Single patrol officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: project team fieldwork*

88. Proactive and reactive work, i.e. responding to reports of crime, are two sides of the same coin. One is gaining facts about offenders, the other about offences. It is therefore essential that one is not pursued to the exclusion of the other, and detectives in particular should see proactive work as an integral part of their role. To effect this, supervisors and managers should earmark time for proactive work, and training and job descriptions should incorporate a proactive style of working.

**Surveillance Teams**

89. Surveillance teams play a key role in proactive policing, tracking target criminals with a view either to catching them 'in the act' or providing sufficiently convincing details of suspected criminal activity to direct other police action which will lead to an arrest, e.g. obtaining a warrant to search premises where it is believed that stolen property is concealed.

90. Even the smallest forces will benefit from access to surveillance resources to action target packages produced by the intelligence system. When it is not feasible to have dedicated resources, forces might consider setting up a temporary or part-time resource. To be most effective, these officers will still need appropriate skills and training. There is also the option of 'mutual aid' – purchasing surveillance resources from a
neighbouring force – or, in particularly serious cases, calling upon the Regional Crime Squad.

91. It should be emphasised that, whilst they may be both necessary and useful, local, ad hoc surveillance teams run the risk of compromising the cover of the individual officers and force and regional surveillance teams. Each force should develop a policy on circumstances under which such teams are appropriate.

92. Surveillance officers require extensive, and expensive, training, much of it conducted in simulated exercises. Apart from driving, the skills needed for this type of work are often untested in ordinary duties and therefore the training itself is the practical mechanism for selection; surveillance training typically has a high failure rate. It is of advantage to forces to use standard, national training schemes so that surveillance officers from different forces can work together. Most recruits are drawn from the uniformed branch as the work does not require specialist investigation skills. The team would, however, always be headed by a senior detective, usually a DI or a DCI.

93. Because of the cost of training, the length of tenure should not be too short (see Section 2, HQ Structure and Specialist Squads for a discussion on tenure). On the other hand, the work entails long spells of observation and can often be tedious, and forces should ensure that tenure policies reflect the risk of staleness creeping in.

94. The management of surveillance work is focused upon discrete operations and requires clear targets and objectives. It is important to ensure that records of operations, including detailed surveillance logs, are maintained, together with information on outcomes and other indicators of performance, which should be used to evaluate the added value of the surveillance effort (see Section 2, HQ Structure and Specialist Squads on the monitoring of squads).

95. Selecting the right targets to make the most effective use of surveillance resources is the key management decision. Target selection is usually undertaken by a senior detective at headquarters, based upon packages on serious and/or prolific criminals submitted by FIOs. There are almost always many more packages submitted than the team have the capacity to action; forces should therefore consider how to deal with packages which are not actioned, to avoid FIOs becoming disillusioned with the process.

Use of Informants

96. The police service has always placed importance on informants, who provide information, usually in exchange for money, to help in the detection of crimes. This information may help the police identify a suspect, or recover stolen goods; in some cases where the information is
highly specific, the criminals might be caught whilst committing the offence. The development of informants is an important role for all operational officers, but traditionally has been seen as the domain of detective officers, who have the responsibility for the investigation of serious crimes. Properly cultivated and used, informants can be a most cost-effective means of detection – a study undertaken by one force showed the cost per detection through informants to be as little as £57 per detected crime. However, all dealings with informants must be conducted under supervision, both to safeguard the interests of the informant and to ensure that the integrity of the police officer is not compromised. Current rules on the disclosure of an informant’s identity to the defence have also made it necessary for investigating officers to consider very carefully whether the informant’s evidence is worth the risk of retribution.

97. Existing national guidelines on the use of informants are contained in Home Office Circular 97/1969 and 9/1992 on resident informants (i.e. those in custody). This is presently under review and the subject of an ACPO report to be published later this year. In addition, forces have developed their own guidelines on the cultivation of informants; an example is given in the case study below.

**CASE STUDY: Example of advice on informant-handling**

The following is an extract from Surrey’s Informants Guide:

'In general terms, the motivations of informants are based around three categories: financial reward; revenge; assistance. An example of the last category may be where an offender is charged with an offence and is willing to give information in an effort to minimise sentence. Every prisoner coming into custody is therefore a potential informant and subjective consideration should always be given towards their cultivation and at the conclusion of an interview, officers should not be afraid to ask if the prisoner is willing to provide information. Similarly, the importance of prisoners serving sentences for crimes such as those under investigation should not be overlooked, as they will often have knowledge of offenders operating who commit offences of a similar nature'.

98. Some informants are active criminals and their use needs to be carefully regulated to prevent abuse. All forces apply the national guidelines which require:

- that every informant has a named handler, usually the officer who recruited the informant and maintains contact with him or her;
- that details of each informant are recorded centrally in a register of informants; names and addresses are confidential and the informant is usually referred to by a register number;
- each handler has a controller; payments to an informant require sanction by the controller, and can only be made to informants who have been registered;
that the force draws up a policy on authorisation levels for payments, specifying, for example, that payments above a certain level must be approved by an ACPO rank officer.

Despite the note of caution which officers often sound about the use of informants, there is no doubt that they are a highly cost-effective source of arrests and detections. However, there is significant variation in the extent of their use. In the average force each DC and DS has 2.7 registered informants, whereas in the most active force this number rises to 10.3 registered informants. As well as numbers of informants registered, forces should monitor the frequency of use. Exhibit 12 shows the range of performance among forces in the proportion of registered informants who actually received payment for information in the last 12 months.

Exhibit 12

**PROPORTION OF REGISTERED INFORMANTS RECEIVING PAYMENT FOR INFORMATION IN THE PRECEDING 12 MONTHS**

There is wide variation in the extent of use of informants, once they are registered...

---

Source: Audit Commission questionnaire, July 1993 – figures from latest available year

1 Source: Audit Commission questionnaire – July 1993.
100. Forces should seek to encourage officers to cultivate informants but need resources to provide them with:

- adequate budgets for informants;
- supervision and advice on informant-handling;
- training in informant-handling;
- mechanisms for monitoring the extent and frequency of use of informants.

The case study below describes the approach in one force, where informant activity is closely monitored.

**CASE STUDY: Informant-monitoring**

Northamptonshire has developed and introduced a computerised informant management system capable of providing both in-depth performance indicators and operational tasking information. The following are sheets to be completed by officers registering informants, together with guidelines on informant-handling (see below and overleaf).
The system monitors and provides reports at both force and area level on the following:

- Status of informants (number, % active/inactive).
- Details of how informants were met and motives for informing.
- Details of handlers (including uniformed/CID split).
- Informant activity (contracts, payments, results).
- Balance sheet for force account.
- Cost-effectiveness (given arrests, detections, drugs and property recovered).

In the first eight months of operating this system the total number of active informants \(^1\) in the force increased by 37%.

\[**(**\]

\(^1\) Informants who have been registered in the past two years and/or have been paid for information within the past year and/or have submitted intelligence to the system within the past year.
<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ensure intelligence function is adequately resourced</td>
<td>Review structure and role of intelligence staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Review effectiveness of collation and dissemination at local level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage use of informants; develop surveillance policy; programme proactive work at force level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Monitor use of informants; programme proactive work at local level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure intelligence system is geared to proactive work; consider computerisation and CPA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Encourage development of packages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Investigation of burglary and other high-volume crime
6. Investigation of Burglary and Other High-Volume Crime

Introduction

101. The refocusing of detective resources on more serious crime should not be interpreted as a withdrawal by the police from investigation of other crimes. Property crimes represented 94% of all reported crimes in 1993, and declining performance in the prevention and detection of volume crime has brought the overall clear-up rate nationally down to 25%. This section explores the application of principles stated in earlier sections to the investigation of high-volume crime. The structure is as follows:

- Initial response to burglary – avoiding duplication of effort.
- Raising investigative standards – ensuring a quality approach by first officer at the scene.
- Burglary initiatives – force-level and BCU-level examples of proactive approaches.
- Car crime initiatives – an example of a successful approach directed at car crime.
- Checklist for action – areas for review by different parts of the force.

Initial Response to Burglary

102. Burglaries typically comprise the majority of crimes in detectives’ caseloads, but these officers have been deployed in most forces in a way which often duplicates work done by the first officer at the scene, the reporting officer. The traditional response to burglary can comprise up to four separate visits on the part of different officers before any follow-up investigation of the crime. There is no evidence to suggest that most victims either expect this level of service – the Audit Commission survey of victims of burglary shows that only 21% of victims expected to see a detective – or that this approach is effective, when the national overall clear-up rate for burglary was 20% in 1993.

103. Forces should consider whether their current response to reported high-volume crimes, such as burglary, could be streamlined to provide an equally effective response which requires fewer resources. The first officer at the scene should take down all the necessary information, conduct preliminary house-to-house enquiries, assess that there is no forensic potential at the scene and offer reassurance and crime prevention advice.

104. Many forces now consider that the role of conducting initial enquiries at the scene of most burglaries should be a task solely for uniformed officers, thereby avoiding duplication of effort and allowing detectives to concentrate on enquiries more demanding of their expertise,
such as series of burglaries and other crimes and more serious crimes. This requires a change in the role of the first officer at the scene from being a recorder of information to being an investigator and evidence-gatherer.

105. The principle lying behind a streamlined approach is to carry out the necessary investigative tasks as far as possible within a minimal number of visits. In a minority of cases more than one visit will be justified to reassure and support the victim; elderly people living alone in a high-crime area are a case in point. This additional visit should, however, occur only after assessment of all the circumstances and not simply as a 'checklist' response. Exhibit 13 illustrates the steps in the process.

Exhibit 13
GETTING IT RIGHT ON THE FIRST VISIT
In the majority of burglaries, the tasks required at the scene can be conducted by one officer in one visit...

Source: Audit Commission report: 'Helping with Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively'

106. Different models can accommodate this principle whilst providing an effective response, as shown in the case studies below.
CASE STUDIES: Streamlined responses to burglary – 1

In West Yorkshire, an initiative was set up using a ‘crime car’ to attend all reports of burglary, using a detective where possible to undertake the initial visit. This officer was charged with a thorough initial investigation and reassurance of the victim as well as assessment of the need for subsequent SOCO visits. In divisions where the approach was adopted, the following benefits were experienced:

- uniformed officers had more time for other matters;
- the public felt they received a better service;
- crime patterns were more easily identified since the same people were visiting all the scenes;
- there were improvements in the quality of the initial crime report;
- there was more selectivity in requests for SOCO visits.

The force experienced three subsequent problems:

- a lack of evaluation of public satisfaction prior to the initiative, which made subsequent measurement less useful;
- variation in the take-up of the approach in certain divisions, including redeployment of officers from the crime car;
- a concern that detectives were being used for work which should be within the skills and competence of uniformed officers.

Streamlined responses to burglary – 2

In Surrey, business consultants were brought in to help streamline and improve the effectiveness of the burglary investigation process. They formulated an approach in which detectives and SOCOs work in teams as the first officers on the scene, thus avoiding duplication of non-specialist visits.
Liaison between these two specialists and networked intelligence and CPA have enabled the pilot division to make great inroads into the burglary problem. To date the division has experienced:

- an improvement in response times to scenes, thereby providing a better service to victims;
- an increase in stolen property recovered, and the arrest of a 'smash-and-grab' gang believed to be responsible for about 100 offences;
- an increase in the overall detection rate of 2%.

**Streamlined responses to burglary – 3**

In Dyfed-Powys some rural PCs and DCs have been trained in basic scenes of crime techniques, to enable them to offer a 'one-stop' approach in respect of auto crime and minor crime scenes, allowing specialist SOCOs to devote time to more serious/urgent crime scenes. This has enabled the force to increase its detection rate on thefts of motor vehicles by 4%, without deploying SOCOs to all reports of this type of crime.

**Streamlined responses to burglary – 4**

In Gloucestershire leaflets were left at the homes of neighbours of burglary victims who were not in at the time of the initial visit, asking them to contact the police with any information they could supply, thereby avoiding the need for a repeat visit for house-to-house enquiries.

107. In order to gain the full benefits from the streamlined approach, the following important points need to be considered:

- **Officers on the initial visit must be allowed sufficient time at the scene to conduct a quality investigation.** This will require a change in practice at the point of deployment – either the control room or the crime desk. Command and control room operators should be given guidelines as to the likely duration of attendance at a scene and appropriate training to avoid calling uniformed officers away from their visit unnecessarily quickly. Crime desks and telephone investigation of minor crime may assist in creating the additional time which is needed.

- **The officer making the initial visit should be appropriately trained** and given guidelines, such as an aide memoire, on what tasks are to be undertaken at the scene.
The streamlined approach should free time which could then be earmarked for redeployment on other crime-related duties.

An evaluation should be made of the approaches pre- and post-implementation to ascertain the benefits.

The force should consider the degree of latitude allowed to BCU commanders over whether or not to adopt the approach since variations in practice between different areas of the force may confuse or be unacceptable to the public.

Raising Investigative Standards

108. Where the streamlined approach has been adopted and detectives tasked with more serious crime and proactive targeting of criminals, then it is likely that uniformed officers will conduct the initial enquiries at most crime scenes, including burglaries. A number of forces have produced training materials and performance standards which emphasise the new role as an evidence-gatherer and not just a recorder of details. Extracts from some of these are reproduced in the case studies below.
CASE STUDIES: Raising investigative standards – 1

South Wales produced a ‘Guide to Crime Investigation’ which was issued to all officers and supervisors. The booklet covers all aspects of crime investigation and an extract covering burglary is shown below:

### Extract from the Guide to Crime Investigation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scene of Crime Number</th>
<th>3, 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case No.</td>
<td>3445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of Crime</td>
<td>12/03/1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time of Crime</td>
<td>23:15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of Crime</td>
<td>Burglary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Flat 5, 15th Floor, 230 Oxford Street, Cardiff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Details of Burglary</td>
<td>The front door was forced open using a crowbar.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Evidence at the Scene:

- **Be aware of possible fingerprints**
- **Be aware of possible footprints**
- **Be aware of possible glass adherent**

#### Tackling Crime Effectively

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scene of Crime Number</th>
<th>3, 5</th>
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<tbody>
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#### Evidence at the Scene:

- **Be aware of possible fingerprints**
- **Be aware of possible footprints**
- **Be aware of possible glass adherent**

---

*Note: The extract above is a simplified representation of the actual content in the Guide to Crime Investigation.*
### Raising investigative standards – 2

Sussex produced 'Streetwise', described as 'a no-nonsense guide to professional policing', which covers a range of policing skills, including investigating the scene, investigation skills, crime reporting, interview techniques, statement writing, traffic accidents and stop and search. An extract of part of the section covering scene investigation is shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scene investigation unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scene examiners are there to assist you and they will exercise wherever you ask them, providing, of course, that it is in their best interest to do so. The points of entry and exit are vital in your investigation and whilst it is right for you to establish the route an offender took through the premises (like the lights on/off, are there any footprints, broken glass etc.) the scene examiner will not thank you for a layman's examination which harms his own professional expertise.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House to house enquiries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remember that the officer may unintentionally leave behind and take away more than stolen property, such as fingerprints, hairpins, fibres, glass etc. Cover outside cards if not recoverable and look to see if the officer used his own or the victim's or neighbour's tools to commit the crime. HELP PEOPLE TO HELP YOU – DON'T TOUCH.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the majority of cases, you will find that written statements will be taken, even from the victim. If, in the case of a stolen motor vehicle, it remains outstanding at the conclusion of your investigation, it may be prudent to obtain a statement. The vehicle may be recovered later with a suspect when the victim is away on holiday. This also applies to cheques, credit or pre-authorized crime enquiries. Written witness statements remember that you must get all the information, even from the victim. If, in the case of a stolen motor vehicle, it remains outstanding at the conclusion of your investigation, it may be prudent to obtain a statement. The vehicle may be recovered later with a suspect when the victim is away on holiday. This also applies to cheques, credit or pre-authorized crime enquiries. Written witness statements remember that you must get all the information, even from the victim. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Are CID requested?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The officer must call at all houses with a direct view of the scene. Also consider how the officer got there and call at the approach to the scene as well. Consider assistance on house to house enquiries from the Neighbourhood Watch coordinator. Often people</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime prevention advice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is more to crime prevention than just telling the victim to fit an extra bolt on the front door. Make yourself aware of all aspects of crime prevention, lighting, security. Neighbourhood Watch, posting signs and the latest Home Office guidance. Remember every police officer has the specific responsibility to advise on crime prevention. Crime Prevention Officers can give specialist advice.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime prevention means less crime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>You should not wait until you attend a scene. Look for opportunities to STOP CRIME ALL THE TIME. Pay attention to detail when compiling property lists. Always ask for serial numbers but just because it doesn't have one, don't change it as &quot;other property&quot;:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does it have any damage/repairs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there a photo available?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many diamonds in the ring?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Raising investigative standards – 3

Northamptonshire produced a crime investigation manual which provides guidance notes and identifies 16 investigative tasks, for each of which there is a ‘Performance Standard’ (for appraisal purposes) for investigators and guidance to supervisors as to how that standard should be supervised and monitored. A copy of the performance standard and supervisors’ guidelines for one investigative task (attending scenes of crime) is shown below.

ATTENDING SCENES OF CRIME

WHY DO I SUPERVISE THIS PROCESS?

Because members of the public will often only have direct contact with the service due to becoming a victim of crime. It is therefore important that the appropriate support and support is given. Good supervision should ensure this.

To ensure the full investigation of all crimes, using specialist skills to the full.

To ensure performance standards are achieved.

WHEN DO I SUPERVISE THIS PROCESS?

When attending scenes of crimes with officers.

By the reading of crime reports.

By the reading of crime files.

By monitoring of the Area control room.

Prior to officers attending known scenes of crimes by briefing.

On their return from scenes of crimes by debriefing.

HOW DO I SUPERVISE THIS PROCESS?

By attending scenes of crimes with officers. You can assist performance, initiate further action if required, and identify good practice. Training needs can be noted and the appropriate action taken.

By the detailed reading of crime reports. This will indicate the actions taken on attendance and identify good practice.

By the reading of crime files. Look for evidence of investigative skills by the officer.

By briefing officers prior to their visiting selected scenes of crime.

By debriefing on their return.

ATTENDING SCENES OF CRIME

LEVEL I

Fails to attend scenes of crime as required

Fails to take action as required or seek assistance

Fails to show the appropriate concern and support for victims and witnesses

Allows unnecessary delays in attending scenes of crimes

LEVEL II

Attends scenes of crime as promptly as possible

Gives appropriate reassurance to the victim and witnesses

Arranges support as required for the victim

Searches premises (both inside and out), while considering the use SOC0 or Dog Section, and preserving evidence

Takes steps to secure premises where appropriate

Requests appropriate specialist advice and assistance

Makes a search of the surrounding area

Completes house to house enquiries

Traces witnesses and records their details

Receives property as appropriate

Makes appropriate and possible arrests

Issues the “Crime Pledge”

Ensures accurate completion of the crime report

Circulates crime details as required following authorisation from a supervisor

LEVEL III

Develops house to house enquiries and questioning

Where appropriate records details of persons at or near the scene of crime

Develops enquiries to cover local traditions, etc

Makes a reasoned assessment of the need for SOC0 attendance

Makes active use of FIS, both in obtaining and providing information.
Raising investigative standards – 4

GMP has developed a video and training package, together with the Forensic Science Service, on how to preserve forensic evidence for SOCOs and gather basic clues at crime scenes. The short video is aimed at the first officer at the scene and uses vivid examples, from how to deal with scenes from a domestic burglary to a potential major incident in a night club.

Proactive Initiatives Against Burglary

109. Many forces are developing specific proactive initiatives to combat burglary. The case studies below describe successful initiatives.

CASE STUDIES: Burglary initiatives – 1

The Bumblebee concept was initiated in Number 1 Area of the Metropolitan Police on 1st June 1991 and has since been adopted throughout that force and by several provincial forces.

The value of crime pattern analysis and a targeted approach is illustrated by Operation Bumblebee, a burglary initiative launched by the Metropolitan Police and later adopted by several provincial forces. The operation is driven by intelligence and CPA, and a combination of tactics are used – targeting of handlers, regular searches of the houses of known active burglars, cultivation of informants and so on. The initiative has been publicised across London to get over the message that, far from giving up on burglary, the police have launched a powerful attack on it.

The results are impressive. In the first year, an increase in burglary reports of 18% over the previous year was stemmed to a 2% rise, and the following year burglaries dropped by 7%. The clear-up rate has more than doubled. Whilst aware of the risk of displacement, the force does not believe there has been a significant shift of criminal activity over divisional boundaries.

Burglary initiatives – 2

One provincial force which has successfully adopted Bumblebee is Sussex. The initiative was launched in October 1993, a time of year when burglary rates typically increase, and ran until the end of the year. Prior to the initiative, for the 9 months until the end of September, reported burglaries for the force had reduced by 3%. With Operation Bumblebee this improved
to a 12% reduction by the year end (and so decreased by far more during the last three months). Offences detected had increased by 31% during the Bumblebee period, giving an overall detection rate for burglary dwelling of 16% (11% primary). Further details of the Sussex initiative are set out below.

1. The Detective Chief Superintendent presented statistics showing the worsening burglary situation county-wide and divisional commanders agreed to a force-wide Bumblebee campaign. It was decided to build on existing public awareness from the Metropolitan Police and other Bumblebee initiatives rather than develop a separate identity through a new campaign. The objectives were to:
   • reduce the rate of reported burglary;
   • increase the number of detections;
   • improve quality of service to victims.

2. The operation was to be in three phases:
   (i) Planning - divisional commanders each drew up local plans in line with force burglary strategy.
   (ii) Intelligence gathering; preparation of publicity and press campaign; co-ordination by HQ of central resources to meet divisional requests.
   (iii) Implementation.

3. The items below give examples of the way in which many departments of the force were co-ordinated for this operation. Some features, notably intelligence, response and dedicated teams, had the additional benefit of providing a catalyst for change which was necessary and has outlived the operation.

A. Intelligence
   - The formation of 'Divisional Intelligence Cells' providing CPA and target file development.
   - Patterns for reduction and prevention methods.

B. Response
   - The 'One Hit Approach'.
   - An obligation on responding officers to investigate, not just record.
   - Aide memoire guide to investigation produced for officers ('Streetwise').
   - Early submission of crime reports for analysis.

C. Dedicated
   - On each division to investigate burglaries, teams concentrating on criminals rather than crime scenes.

D. Surveillance
   - Force surveillance team concentrating on targeted burglars.
   - Divisional teams undertaking observations and simple foot surveillance.

E. Informants
   - Cultivation and use of informants as a means of obtaining up-to-date intelligence.

F. Co-ordinated arrests
   - Force-wide co-ordination of arrests on certain days to capture media attention with the aim of showing the public that action
was being taken and "transferring the fear of crime from victim to offender".

G. Traffic
- Officers tasked to support initiative through stop checks/high-profile work etc.

H. Drugs unit
- Close liaison with intelligence cells to improve burglary detections arising from drugs work.

I. Post-arrest
- Burglary team officer to interview burglars.

J. Publicity
- External media publicity of prevention/success.
- Internal publicity campaign aimed at raising officers' awareness of intelligence and investigation.
  - 'Crimestoppers' – greater emphasis on existing programme.
  - Prevention campaign.
  - Press co-operation gained in advance and aligned to sponsorship from the media and local business.

K. Courts/CPS
- Extra efforts to secure remands in custody of burglary suspects.
  - Bail curfew enforcement.

L. Vehicles
- Old, unmarked vehicles kept on to provide a pool of vehicles for use during the campaign.
  - Insurance arranged through the force for sponsored vehicles.

M. Equipment
- Commitment from HQ to endeavour to supply divisional needs.

N. Measurement
- Weekly returns from divisions collated by Headquarters to monitor progress/success and spread best practice.

O. Inspection
- Inspection of divisional response carried out by Force Inspectorate department.

**Burglary initiatives – 3**

Cheshire conducted an initiative within one BCU – Wilmslow – in response to a 70% increase in the number of offences of burglary dwelling. Operation Beano, based on an ad hoc squad, was commissioned to run for two months (October-December 1993). Wilmslow suffers from travelling criminals, and so assistance was sought from neighbouring forces in sharing intelligence. The operation utilised 16 officers taken from the serious crime squad, divisional CID and uniformed branch, one FIO and unmarked cars, with standby assistance from the traffic branch. CPA was reviewed on a daily basis and patrol and surveillance resources deployed accordingly.

During Operation Beano, the squad made 21 arrests, executed 7 search warrants, stopped and checked 135 people who were not subsequently arrested, performed 820 vehicle checks and achieved a 27% reduction in recorded crime year on year for the same period in the division.
110. While Bumblebee-type burglary initiatives, though not by any means universal, are well-known and becoming more widespread, it is unusual to find similar methods being devoted to car crimes. These offences, though not having the same traumatic effect on victims as house burglaries, do however account for a high proportion of recorded crime. One example of a car crime initiative is the 'Impact' project launched by Avon and Somerset in late 1993. Although this unusual project is still in its infancy, the early results are promising.

**CASE STUDY: Car crime initiatives**

In 1992 in Avon & Somerset 173,000 crimes were recorded, of which 52,000 were vehicle-related (20,000 vehicles were stolen and 32,000 vehicles were broken into). During the first 9 months of 1993 the situation continued to worsen, with theft of vehicles rising by 25% and theft from vehicles by 8%.

A scrutiny of traffic policing released 61 posts for redeployment to other duties (1 x C/I, 2 x Insp, 6 x PS, 52 x PC) specifically to address the overall crime problem. It was decided to utilise the freed posts to establish a crime reduction unit (named Impact) tasked with attacking crime and its roots, rather than allocating the officers to BCUs, where it was felt their effect may have been diluted. The teams operate from a number of bases throughout Avon and Somerset, using a combination of investigative and preventive measures to combat crime.

Car crime is their main focus of attention, though by focusing on car crime it is hoped also to have a positive impact on other offences such as ram raids, drug trafficking, fraud and burglary. The unit does not deal with individual reports of crime or offenders, unless they form part of a wider picture, and BCUs are expected to conduct routine investigations. Close liaison is required between the unit and BCUs, however, and details of crime trends and offenders are forwarded to Impact for collation and analysis.

The intention is to reduce overall crime levels by focusing on the largest bulk (i.e. car crime) by:

- detecting regular offenders, with the aid of improved specialist intelligence and targeting;
- improving situational crime prevention;
- deterring future (young) offenders;
- diverting persistent offenders.

Methods used include:

- **Overt** - high-profile patrols;
- leafleting in vulnerable areas.
- **Prevention** - partnership action with local authorities, businesses and the community.
- **Covert** - observations/foot surveillance.
Investigative - salvage companies/second-hand parts dealers.
Intelligence - in relation to regular offenders for targeting;
SOCOs - a global view of CPA for preventive measures.
Media - selective targeting of resources.

Recorded car crime figures for the first three months of the initiative (November 1993 to January 1994) show a significant reduction by comparison with the previous year:

**DECREASE IN CAR CRIME IN AVON AND SOMERSET SINCE 'IMPACT' 1993/94**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Thefts from vehicles</th>
<th>Thefts of vehicles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>-21%</td>
<td>-31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>-17%</td>
<td>-28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>-13%</td>
<td>-25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-17%</td>
<td>-28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Avon and Somerset Constabulary*

If the momentum can be sustained, the effect of a reduction of 21.5% on the (1992) annual car crime rate of 52,000 would be 11,180 fewer crimes per annum. This would represent a 6.4% reduction in the overall crime rate for the force, using only 2.6% of the force’s officers.

* * * * *
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consult on model for streamlined approach to burglary</td>
<td>Evaluate impact pre-and post-implementation; identify resource savings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devise guidelines with Command and Control for deployment to burglary scenes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ring-fence resource savings; identify opportunities for using freed time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devise guidelines for first officer at scene and provide training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Discuss guidelines. Ensure corresponding training given to control room staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consider use of force-wide proactive initiatives for high-volume crime; liaise with BCU's</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure compliance with guidelines on streamlining</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Consider involvement in force-wide initiatives; consider local proactive initiatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Performance management
7. Performance Management

Introduction

111. This section covers a number of approaches to managing performance in tackling crime. Performance indicators are only one set of tools to use in performance management (see Section 4, Teamwork and Supervision), but in many forces their full potential for informing managers has not yet been realised. The structure of the section is as follows:

• Performance management – what it means; how it can be applied within forces.
• Developing useful management information – what to measure; how often; who needs information; activity analysis; making the clear-up rate more informative.
• Case tracking – continuous monitoring of workloads and progress on cases.
• Case reviews and outcome analysis – learning from past cases to inform future investigations.
• Cautionary points – things to consider when implementing the approach.
• Checklist for action – areas for review by different parts of the force.

Performance Management

112. A comprehensive performance management system should be based upon the force’s crime strategy and reflect the roles of the different staff involved in tackling crime. It should comprise:

• indicators of success or otherwise of meeting force objectives on crime (e.g. number of target criminals arrested per year, number of primary clear-ups per officer);
• a cascade of indicators supplying management information of appropriate detail and frequency to each level of manager. (For example, ACPO-level officers will want a few high-level and comparative indicators, related to force and national objectives, whereas a crime desk sergeant will need more detailed information on local crime trends and individual officer caseloads);
• a mix of both qualitative and quantitative indicators to avoid distortion of behaviour towards any one activity at the expense of another. Thus, monitoring the number of detections or prosecutions as a percentage of arrests, or percentage of arrests resulting in a ‘refused charge’, should help avert over-zealous arrest patterns.
• monitoring of all parts of the process of tackling crime in order to identify strengths and weaknesses in approaches – e.g. a review
of detected crimes to ascertain where detections are most likely to come from.

113. For many forces, the move towards such a system must be planned in phases, and is heavily dependent upon the state of development of IT systems. However, even without IT, there is some measurement which managers can undertake.

114. Managers should distinguish between the objectives of different forms of measurement:

- to monitor workload and productivity on an ongoing basis – input and output measures, such as crimes, officer hours, overtime cost, payments to informants, intelligence forms submitted and crimes cleared up, convictions, etc.;

- to monitor activities within the (investigative or other) process to ensure quality and productivity – case-tracking, dip-sampling of interviews, monitoring the turnaround-time of investigations;

- to test hypotheses in a sample of cases about the effectiveness of certain approaches – outcome analysis, case reviews.

115. It should be stressed that the use of performance measures is not a substitute for the quality control and quality assurance roles of supervisors and managers, but rather a complementary tool to help those performing these roles to identify problems and successes more effectively.

Developing Useful Management Information

116. The Audit Commission's national report states that forces need 'a suitable mix of qualitative and quantitative indicators to allow internal evaluation of performance at all stages of crime prevention and investigation'. Such information is used principally to indicate whether a unit is meeting objectives, but managers will need not only headline indicators, but also measures which will give an idea of the amount of an activity. Exhibit 14 gives examples of the types of measurable indicators which managers might consider, and an approach for ordering them. These are not intended to be exhaustive.

117. These and other indicators will then be required for use in varying degrees of detail and frequency by different levels of the organisation – more detail on day-to-day work is needed by supervisors and less detail in an overview and comparative format by policy-makers such as ACPO-level officers (see Exhibit 15).
Exhibit 14
ILLUSTRATIVE MANAGEMENT INFORMATION
Managers will find it useful to have an indicator of workload and outcome at several different stages in the investigative process...

Exhibit 15
WHO NEEDS WHAT MANAGEMENT INFORMATION AND WHEN?
Although there will be some common indicators, different levels of manager need different types of management information and with different frequency...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Type of indicator</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior management</td>
<td>Strategic overview of performance/setting policy</td>
<td>Aggregated indicators covering main areas of the organisation which test success at meeting policy objectives. Also comparisons between major units (e.g. crime rates, detections, resources).</td>
<td>Monthly/quarterly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(DCS/ACPO)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>BCU resource deployment</td>
<td>Indicators required for taking decisions on resource deployment, identifying where and how performance can be improved (e.g. abstracts, training, time spent, arrests, prosecution file quality).</td>
<td>Weekly/monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(DCL/D1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervision</td>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>Indicators which focus on potential weaknesses in the process and enable officers to evaluate different approaches (e.g. interview dip-sampling, no. of post-arrest searches, intelligence form submissions).</td>
<td>Daily/weekly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sergeants)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Audit Commission report: 'Helping with Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively'
118. The case studies below describe the approaches taken in three forces to the provision of management information to BCU's. Appropriate packages of detailed information for crime managers and crime desk managers are still in the early stages of development, but Exhibit 14 includes examples of indicators which, together with the use of crime pattern analysis, would assist crime desk managers.

**CASE STUDIES: Management information packages – 1**

Avon and Somerset has developed a quarterly bulletin for BCU commanders using information on the performance of each BCU as compared with the force average and over time. Production of the 'ASMIS' (Avon & Somerset Management Information System) bulletin is a core function of the Performance Review Unit and contains the following data on inputs and outputs:

- reported and detected crime, by main grouping of crime type;
- allocation of crime by officer type – uniformed or CID;
- number of incidents by type and urgency;
- persons arrested and outcomes, means of disposal;
- manpower deployment: percentage on duty, abstracted, sick or off duty.

The bulletin is attractively presented, with graphical representation where possible and aims to provide information to operational managers. The force has experienced some transitional problems in encouraging BCU commanders to use the information, but the high profile of performance measurement needs has resolved this problem to a great extent.

**Management information packages – 2**

Kent has developed a monthly management information package which focuses upon each BCU's success at meeting force objectives in five key performance areas, compared with the force average. These are reviewed each year, and for 1993/94 they were:

- time spent by constables on patrol and public perception of police visibility;
- attendance time to immediate response incidents and public satisfaction with attendance;
- primary detections per officer and victim satisfaction, measured by satisfaction surveys;
- case file submission – timeliness and quality;
- speed and quality of telephone response.

At the bottom of each page it offers suggestions as to how to improve performance in the stated area. The document then goes into more detail on that BCU's performance. The first indicators are intended for policy makers and senior management levels, and the second for commander level.
Management information packages – 3

South Wales sends a very comprehensive monthly bulletin to BCU commanders covering the following indicators, divided into demand, proactive work, process and outcomes:

DEMAND
- crimes/1000 pop. by area, over time;
- violent crime/1000 pop. by area, over time;
- burglary/1000 households, by area, over time;
- auto crime/1000 car-owning households, by area, over time.

PROACTIVE WORK
- intelligence submissions to force bureau, by area.

PROCESS
- 'screening' practice, by area;
- allocation to CID/uniformed officers, by area;
- stolen property items input and recovered, by area;
- actionable calls and arrests per month from 'Crimestoppers';
- drug arrests per month (force);
- drug warrants executed, by area, over time;
- SOCO requests and attendance, over time.

OUTCOMES
- total detection rates, over time;
- primary/secondary detection rates, by area;
- as above, for violent crime, burglary, auto crime.

119. Most forces are at least at the stage of piloting activity sampling, in order to gauge more precisely how officers spend their time. The exercise will produce a large amount of data which, when grouped and analysed, will be useful to managers. It is important to be clear about the key questions to which managers want answers:

- how much time is spent on different functional areas e.g. crime, non-crime, patrol?
- how much time is spent on different activities, e.g. interviewing, preparing tape summaries, travelling?
- how much time is spent on different crime categories?
- what is the average length of time spent per investigation?
- with all of the above questions, what variation is there in how time is spent between different officers, e.g. CID/uniformed officers?
120. More detailed data by incident category and activity category can be analysed in response to subsequent questions, but the key questions and variations between units should be established first.

121. The Audit Commission’s national report makes a recommendation that forces ‘consider methods of weighting crime clear-ups within the context of a more comprehensive performance management system’. The rationale behind weighting crime statistics is to make the headline clear-up rate more meaningful to managers who need an overview of performance. In traditional crime statistics, each clear-up has the same statistical value but reflects very differing degrees of complexity, time, seriousness, etc. Whilst performance within crime categories can be viewed in isolation of one another it may still be useful to combine these figures to enable the force to compare its progress over time against set objectives. Thus, for example, an overall declining clear-up rate may be explained in terms of diversion of activity into crimes which require more intensive investigation.

122. The first step in this process is to divide crimes into coherent and meaningful categories. Many forces already have broad categories of crimes for which they monitor performance statistics. In order to arrive at categories for weighting, crimes must be grouped in a way which, as far as possible, places crimes of like seriousness and complexity of investigation in the same category. Possible groupings on this basis are:

1) Murder;
2) Very serious crimes – attempted murder, manslaughter, rape, wounding endangering life;
3) Serious crimes – other wounding, unlawful sexual intercourse, arson, robbery, supplying controlled drugs;
4) Fraud by company director and false accounting, etc;
5) Burglary of dwelling – including aggravated burglary but not, where practicable, attempted burglary (i.e. a failed attempt to burgle);
6) Theft, other (non-dwelling) burglary, other fraud and forgery – including handling stolen goods;
7) Vehicle crime – theft of and from cars and aggravated vehicle-taking;
8) Shoplifting;
9) Other crimes – including attempted burglary.

123. Whilst clearly these groupings still contain mixes of different crimes, to break down groupings further may create unhelpful complexity. Having arrived at groupings, the headline figure is then achieved by...
applying weightings which assign a value to crimes and clear-ups according to seriousness and complexity. By applying weights the force is then able to reward performance in priority crime areas and look beyond the simple clear-up rate, which might conceal an over-reliance on clearing up minor crimes. At the local level, managers might be more tempted to put more resources into the investigation of more serious crimes since the effort will be rewarded in the crime statistics.

124. Gloucestershire has already conducted an exercise asking experienced detectives to assign relative weights to different crime types based on the amount of work involved to complete an investigation. Forces may wish to conduct a similar exercise to arrive at weighting reflecting local variation between forces.

125. The worked example below shows how weighting might work in practice. For the purpose of illustration, it compares two BCUs that have the same crime levels but have put different amounts of effort into clearing up the various crimes. BCU 1 has a simple clear-up rate of 48.4%, and appears not to be doing as well as BCU 2, which has the same crime mix and level, and has a simple clear-up rate of 61.6%. If, however, weightings are applied to both crimes and clear-ups, BCU 1 appears to be performing better, since it is placing greater emphasis on clearing up crimes considered by the force to be more serious and which take more resources to investigate. Thus, the weighted clear-up rate for BCU 1 is 61.9%, and that of BCU 2 is 59.4%.

WORKED EXAMPLE
Weighting crime statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime category</th>
<th>Weighting</th>
<th>Crimes</th>
<th>Clear-ups</th>
<th>Clear-up rate</th>
<th>Weighted Crimes</th>
<th>Weighted Clear-ups</th>
<th>Weighted Clear-up rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>7500</td>
<td>1125</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoplifting</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>16000</td>
<td>15200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>15000</td>
<td>10000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1215</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
<td>63500</td>
<td>39325</td>
<td>61.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime category</td>
<td>Weighting</td>
<td>Crimes</td>
<td>Clear-ups</td>
<td>Clear-up rate</td>
<td>Weighted Crimes</td>
<td>Clear-ups</td>
<td>Clear-up rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
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<td>-----------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>4000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>800</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Auto</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>7500</td>
<td>2250</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Shoplifting</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>16000</td>
<td>15200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>15000</td>
<td>7000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>10000</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>1215</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>61.6%</td>
<td>63500</td>
<td>37750</td>
<td>59.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Case Tracking**

126. Few forces have in place formal and systematic case-tracking systems which help supervisors to monitor the work and progress of individual officers. This could assist in assuring the quality of investigation and customer service and effecting a fair allocation of workload amongst staff. Such a system would record details of:

- current workload of individual officers;
- time elapsed on unfiled crimes;
- progress made in investigation: tasks performed, etc.;
- contact with victims;
- status of crime – undetected/detected; with ASU; with CPS; at court; court result.

The case studies below outline the benefits two forces are currently reaping from computerised crime-recording systems.

**CASE STUDIES: Case tracking – 1**

West Yorkshire has a computerised crime-recording system which allows supervisors to track the progress made on any report of crime from the point of reporting to the eventual outcome (court result, filing, etc.). By interrogating the computer, supervisors can also look at individual officers’ current caseloads and how long they have spent on investigating particular crimes.

**Case tracking – 2**

South Yorkshire is able to interrogate its crime-recording system to track progress from crime commission to court result. Crime desk supervisors are able to use it to establish officers’ workloads, supervise progress on cases and answer victims’ queries.
Case Reviews and Outcome Analysis

127. Few forces have exploited to the full the potential management information they have at their disposal in the form of case reviews of completed investigations. This is done routinely for major enquiries and many valuable lessons have been learned, but it rarely occurs at BCU level. Outcome analysis can be undertaken at many levels, from one-off initiatives at the local level to force-wide reviews by the force inspectorate, but is most useful if performed systematically as part of the investigative process. The objective is to learn from both successes and mistakes and identify for the future the most productive investigative practices and the best use of resources. The case studies below provide some examples.

**CASE STUDIES: Outcome analysis – 1**

In Devon and Cornwall the scientific support department analysed a sample of all crimes over the course of a year from which fingerprint identifications resulted, and listed common characteristics of these scenes. They then developed a list of screening criteria for deploying SOCOs more selectively to those scenes most likely to produce marks. Marks collected and fingerprint identifications per SOCO increased whilst SOCOs made fewer visits to crime scenes.

**Outcome analysis – 2**

As part of its research base for the report *Helping with Enquiries*, the Audit Commission reviewed, with the help of an experienced detective, a sample of detected, serious crimes to attempt to identify the primary source of detection. The research showed that, whilst it is often possible to identify the principal factor contributing to a successful outcome, many factors could play a part. Among the findings were:

- the most important sources of detection were arrests by uniformed officers and identification evidence from a witness or victim; together these accounted for 55% of cases;
- in 51% of cases, interviews by CID officers unearthed information leading to the detection, though this was not necessarily the primary source of detection;
- 41% of detections occurred within two days of the offence being reported.

128. Systematic review of cases is currently performed by some forces, usually by a headquarters department in conjunction with HQ CID on an annual basis. The case studies below illustrate that this can yield great benefits.

**CASE STUDIES: Case reviews – 1**

In South Wales, the HQ Crime Management Review Team conducted an inspection process in each of the 14 divisions. They spent one month in each division, and as part of the inspection selected a random sample of 15 crimes
to review what had happened. Findings from these reviews highlighted areas where officers needed advice or supervision and led to the formulation of a 'Guide to Criminal Investigation' manual for all officers to improve the quality of investigations.

**Case reviews – 2**

Warwickshire has for the past two years conducted audits of all crime departments on an annual basis using a team of DCS Crime, DI, Administration of Justice Officer and Superintendent (Crime). The process is as follows:

- crime reports are checked for quality and completeness;
- crime files are reviewed;
- clear-up methods are reviewed;
- the intelligence system is reviewed.

Examples of findings are:

- in one BCU, 17 additional detections were found as a result of the review; 15 out of 17 reviewed crime files were for offences which could have been subject to a caution;
- in another BCU a review of intelligence records indicated that 58% of offenders were from outside the BCU boundary, and 40% were from outside the force; subsequently the secondment of an LIO to a nearby force was recommended to improve the cross-border intelligence flow.

At the end of the audit process a report is written and discussed with the BCU commander. The audit team initially encountered some resistance to its recommendations, but the future plan is to involve commanders in the audits to generate more commitment to the findings.

**Case reviews – 3**

West Midlands Fingerprint Department reviewed 200 identifications to see whether they had been followed up at BCU level. This exercise unearthed a breakdown in communication – only 50% of the identifications had been matched up with their crime reports. The department then set up procedures to notify LIOs of identifications, and sent out a note two weeks later to follow up on what had happened to the identification. These procedures enabled them to reduce the proportion of identifications which had not been matched to crime reports down to 10-20%.

**Case reviews – 4**

Northamptonshire Fingerprint Department has been using AFR to monitor reasons for rejection of marks from the fingerprint bureau and originating officers. Rejections are traced and actioned, and the officers responsible are notified.
129. Forces should recognise the need to assist managers in using management information. It is no good simply issuing bulletins; there are training needs to address and the concept needs to be 'sold' to managers. The best management information will offer some interpretation of the data, and advice on how to remedy problems or highlight where there might be a good practice initiative.

130. Useful management information must be up-to-date. Although manual systems can be used to collect much data, they are labour-intensive and time-consuming, and computerisation will enable a faster processing of information. A trade-off may need to be made between detail/relevance and timeliness.

131. **Performance indicators are only 'indicators' of performance**: they may flag up a problem, but not explain it. In many cases, follow-up work is required to establish how to rectify a problem; for example, why one BCU is under-performing. Care should be taken not to use them in a negative way, as this will damage officer morale and may cause cynicism about their use.

132. The HQ management information department (Inspectorate, R & D, etc.) can often only supply a core set of information. Local management information needs can often be best served with local analytical resources to supplement the core data. Local crime pattern analysis will cater for most detailed information requests, but each BCU will need access to a fully-trained analyst for this.

* * * * *
**CHECKLIST FOR ACTION – Performance Management**

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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decide with managers on appropriate force-wide PIs</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure systems can deliver information efficiently</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consider local mgt. information needs; relay to HQ departments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply force-wide PIs regularly to BCU's and units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop system for force-wide case reviews</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Undertake local case reviews</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide analytical expertise to support BCU's in use of data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix I

Review of Helping with Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively
SUMMARY

The police and the rest of the criminal justice system are locked into a vicious circle in which the volume of crime threatens to become overwhelming. A change of approach is needed, focusing on serious and prolific criminals rather than just responding to crimes.

Recorded crime has risen by 74% in the last decade whilst the proportion of crimes cleared up has fallen from 37% to 26%, but this is not because of declining police efficiency. In fact, the police have been detecting more crimes per officer. Improving police performance is only part of the solution to the crime problem. Changes are also required by other agencies such as the courts, but the police can and will need to do better if they are to break out of the vicious circle.

In its report, the Commission recommends three broad areas of change:

- **target the serious and prolific criminals** who are inflicting the greatest damage upon communities, by using intelligence-based strategies such as surveillance and crime pattern analysis, and enhancing scientific support functions such as fingerprinting;

- **make better use of resources.** In responding to crimes such as burglary the police often duplicate effort and thus waste resources – the report advocates a 'right first time' approach. Paperwork needs to be streamlined and officers need to be better equipped with essential equipment such as computers and secure radios;

- **make police priorities more explicit.** As the role of the police has expanded, priorities have become blurred and the thin blue line is being stretched ever thinner. Forces need to spell out the priority to be given to tackling crime in relation to other objectives.

Along with changes elsewhere in the criminal justice system, implementation of the report's recommendations would help to increase detections, raise clear-up rates significantly, and move into a virtuous circle in which ultimately crime could be brought under control.

This Review develops these points in more detail, but if you want to know more, the back cover gives information on how to obtain the full report, Helping with Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively.
IF YOU WANT TO KNOW MORE ...  
The Audit Commission's findings and recommendations are contained in its recent report, *Helping with Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively*, price £9, ISBN 011 886 101 8. Complimentary copies have been sent to each local authority.  
This and other Commission publications can be obtained from:  
HMSO,  
PO Box 276,  
London, SW8 5DT  
(Mail and telephone orders only)  
Telephone orders: 071-873 9090  
General enquiries: 071-873 0011
The investigation and management of crime – questionnaire

Please complete this questionnaire as frankly as possible. The aim is to find out the facts in relation to investigation and management of crime. At the end of the questionnaire you have the opportunity to sign your name, if you wish, but I undertake to treat all information confidentially.

Detective Chief Superintendent

1. Please give the following details of your position and service by putting ‘x’ where appropriate (more than one box may apply).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Det. Sgt.</th>
<th>Uniform Insp.</th>
<th>0-5 yrs service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Det. Con.</td>
<td>Uniform Sgt.</td>
<td>6-10 yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialist CID post</td>
<td>Uniform Con.</td>
<td>11-15 yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialist uniform post</td>
<td>Civilian staff</td>
<td>16-20 yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Based on Sub-Div</td>
<td></td>
<td>21-30+yrs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. What do you believe should be the role of a Sub-Divisonal Detective Constable? (Put ‘x’ where applicable – more than one answer may apply).

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>To deal with serious crime (e.g. Burglary upwards)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>To deal with minor crime (e.g. Thefts, criminal damage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>To investigate all types of crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>To target linked crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>To target suspected offenders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>To try to keep a high detection rate because of organisational pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g</td>
<td>To try to keep a high detection rate to provide public satisfaction Other (please specify)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3(a) If you are a Sub-Divisional Detective Officer, do you believe that your answer in question 2 adequately reflects the current position in your Sub-Division?

YES/NO (delete as appropriate)

If NO please give a brief explanation

3(b) If you are a Sub-Divisional uniformed or civilian member of staff, do you believe that your answer in question 2 adequately reflects the current position in your Sub-Division?

YES/NO (delete as appropriate)

If NO please give a brief explanation

3(c) If you are not within the categories of 3(a) or 3(b) please ignore question 3.

4 What do you believe should be the role of a Detective in a specialist post? (put 'x' where applicable – more than one answer may apply)

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>To investigate serious crimes (e.g. Burglary upwards)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>To investigate minor crime (e.g. Theft, criminal damage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>To investigate all types of crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>To target linked crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>To target suspected offenders who operate beyond Sub-Divisional boundaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>To try to keep a high detection rate because of organisational pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g</td>
<td>To try to keep a high detection rate because of public demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h</td>
<td>To support Sub-Divisions and Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>Other (please specify)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5(a) If you are a Detective in a specialist post, do you believe that your answer in question 4 adequately reflects the current position in your specialist department?

YES/NO (delete as appropriate)

If NO please give a brief explanation.

5(b) If you are a uniformed or civilian member of staff, do you believe that your answer in question 4 adequately reflects the current role of specialist departments?

YES/NO (delete as appropriate)

If NO please give a brief explanation.

6 Please rank the following in your order of priority (indicate 1, 2 or 3 beside each answer, 1 = most important)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Detecting crime</th>
<th>Preventing crime</th>
<th>Reducing crime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
7. How do you rate the following as being important in the investigation of serious crime? (e.g. Burglary and upwards) on a scale of 5 (very important) to 1 (not very important). Please circle the relevant number.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Attendance at the scene of a crime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Recording as much detail as possible</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>House to house enquiries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>Scenes of crime examination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>In-putting full data to CIS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>Researching CIS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g</td>
<td>Effective use of intelligence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h</td>
<td>Effective use of informants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>Use of technical support equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j</td>
<td>Use of surveillance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k</td>
<td>Crime pattern analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l</td>
<td>Effective interviewing of suspects</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>m</td>
<td>Keeping the victim informed</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. In relation to crime which is screened in, in your opinion by whom should further enquiries be made? (put 'x' where applicable)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>By detective officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>By uniformed officers if duties permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>By civilian staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>By a dedicated minor crimes unit where the offence is not serious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>Other (please specify)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. In your opinion, is Information Technology within the Force adequate for the investigation and management of crime?

YES/NO

If NO please give a brief explanation
10 Do you consider that activity analysis is a useful method of determining precisely how detective time is used?

YES/NO

If NO please briefly indicate any alternative

11 Please indicate which of the following statements you believe applies to the Community First programme in relation to crime investigation (put 'x' where applicable)

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>It is very relevant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>It is irrelevant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>It hinders crime investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>It has a positive part to play in the way crime investigations are conducted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12 If you have any further comments, not already expressed, which you consider relevant to the investigation and management of crime, please record them on a separate sheet and attach them to this questionnaire.

13 Would you be willing to discuss any of these matters if it was considered by me to be an advantage?

YES/NO (delete as appropriate)

If you have answered "NO" you do not have to identify yourself on this form. If, however, you would be willing to identify yourself would you please print your name and station below.

Name ..........................................................

Station ..........................................................

Thank you for your assistance – please return the questionnaire in the envelope provided not later than 16th May 1994. I emphasise that the information will be treated confidentially.
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in actioning intelligence
initiatives to combat burglary
intelligence-based teamwork approach
different levels of
role of
Progress-tracking
Property crimes

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Quality control
Questionnaires

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guidelines
Senior detectives
case study
new role of
Senior investigating officers (SIOs)
Serious Crime Squad (SCS)
Service level agreements (SLAs)
Service standards
SOCOs
'Streetwise'
Supervision
adjustment in caseloads
critical elements of
dip-sampling
guidelines to officers
improving
Investigation log
monitoring activities
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Contact points
## Contact Points

The following people are available to answer questions on specified sections of the handbook:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Tel:</th>
<th>Section</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Kate Flannery
Audit Commission | (071) 828 1212      | 1       |
| Laura Hawksworth
Audit Commission | (071) 828 1212      | 2, 7    |
| Chief Insp. David Spencer
West Mercia (ACPO Crime)   | (0527) 583789       | 3, 6    |
| Chief Supt. Malcolm Hart
HMIC                      | (071) 273 2413      | 4, 5    |
Appendix 5

NCIS Strategic Aims

To process the raw material of information into a high quality intelligence product by:

- gathering, collating, developing, evaluating, analysing, and supplying relevant intelligence;
- maintaining relevant intelligence databases;
- liaising and consulting with other agencies in the United Kingdom and overseas.

To give direction in the intelligence process by:

- setting standards for users in the processes of handling intelligence;
- establishing nationally agreed systems and practices to ensure greater integration and effectiveness of the intelligence process;
- co-ordinating and monitoring the effectiveness of criminal intelligence to avoid duplication of effort by law enforcement agencies.

To provide services and strategic analysis by:

- utilising the channels of communication between foreign countries and the United Kingdom to take advantage of the intelligence opportunities;
- being the lead agency for Interpol and Europol;
- assessing, processing, and facilitating applications under the Interception of Communications Act 1985;
- providing strategic analysis to Her Majesty's Government, law enforcement and other relevant agencies so that policy and resource allocations can be matched to changing trends and patterns;
- providing training and advice.
Appendix 6
THE STRATEGIC APPROACH TO CRIME MANAGEMENT REQUIRES ...

- The definition of the specific problems to be tackled
- An order of priority for their resolution
- A clear statement of roles and accountabilities
- The rational allocation of resources
- Appropriate structures to deploy resources/meet objectives
ROLE OF HQ AND BCU CRIME STAFF

HQ
- Formulate force-wide crime strategy
- Quality assure force investigations
- Ensure appropriate resource allocation
- Provide expert crime advice
- Provide and control contingency resources for major enquiries
- Manage force-wide crime resources, e.g. squads

BCU
- Implement force-wide crime strategy
- Formulate and implement local crime strategy
- Provide resources for major crime incidents in consultation with HQ
- Adhere to force strategic goals
ELEMENTS OF A SERVICE LEVEL AGREEMENT

• Definition of "customers"

• Definition of service to be provided on both sides

• Standards of service

• Target % occasions on which that standard should be achieved

• Customer responsibilities

• Sanctions - grievance procedures

• Review date
ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF A CRIME DESK

• Consistent decisions are made on the initial response to all reports of crime (excluding those requiring immediate response)

• All crime reports pass through the crime desk for analysis, quality control and progress tracking

• The crime desk is the focal point for local crime work and notifies victims about progress of investigations

• The crime desk is staffed with experienced personnel for peak periods of crime reporting
CRIME MANAGEMENT UNIT - EXPANDS THE CRIME DESK APPROACH

BCU Commander

BCU Management Team

Crime Management

Other Operations

Crime Management Unit

- Crime recording
- Management & assessment of scene visits
- Crime pattern analysis
- Progress monitoring
- Liaison with victim

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Proactive investigation</th>
<th>Administration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>By teams of detectives,</td>
<td>Co-ordination of case file</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCO/fingerprinting</td>
<td>uniformed officers or</td>
<td>submission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime prevention</td>
<td>joint operations</td>
<td>Witness liaison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>General clerical support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BENEFITS OF TEAMWORK

- Supervisors can play to the strengths of individual officers
- Progress monitoring is more structured
- Officers can develop specialisms
- There is a more structured framework for officers to share information and experience
- Teams can undertake large-scale proactive work at short notice
- Continuity problems caused by leave or abstraction are reduced
- A team spirit can enhance commitment and job satisfaction
KEY SUPERVISORY SKILLS

• Leadership and motivation

• Understanding the principles of delegation

• Effective project management

• Performance monitoring and appraisal
STRUCTURE OF THE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION

NCIS

REGIONAL OFFICE

FORCE

FIB

BCU CRIME DESK/CRIME MANAGEMENT UNIT

FIO

LIO

Operational Information

Overseas information

Force Intelligence Bureau
ILLUSTRATION OF DIFFERENT LEVELS OF PROACTIVE APPROACH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prolific offenders</td>
<td>Mobile surveillance aimed at catching “red-handed”</td>
<td>Fully trained and equipped surveillance squad - about £2,500 per 10-hour shift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force-wide burglary problem</td>
<td>Operation Bumblebee</td>
<td>Large numbers of (BCU) detectives; intelligence resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spate of car thefts</td>
<td>Static surveillance to gain intelligence</td>
<td>Four officers on an observation point overlooking a car park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spate of burglaries in sheltered housing</td>
<td>Crime prevention initiative</td>
<td>Multi-agency CCTV programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Checking dealers/handlers</td>
<td>Single patrol officers; detectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspicious behaviour around a factory</td>
<td>Vigilant patrol officer notes details; submits to LIO</td>
<td>Single patrol officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GETTING IT RIGHT ON THE FIRST VISIT

Telephone call to report burglary

Control room

Crime desk

Detective, only if appropriate

Scenes of crime officer, only if appropriate

Scene visit officer
## Elements Encompassed in Operation Bumblebee in One Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Intelligence</th>
<th>Post-arrest</th>
<th>Monitoring</th>
<th>Publicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;One-hit&quot; approach</td>
<td>Informants</td>
<td>Burglary interview team</td>
<td>Weekly returns</td>
<td>Crimestoppers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedicated teams</td>
<td>Surveillance</td>
<td>CPS/courts co-operation</td>
<td>Thematic inspection</td>
<td>Prevention campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement of traffic branch</td>
<td>Drugs Unit liaison</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-ordinated arrests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of old, unmarked vehicles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION IN THE POLICE SERVICE

SHOULD BE:
- One tool among many for use by effective managers
- A package of indicators to focus management effort
- A more objective means of appraisal
- A mechanism for accountability
- A key to diagnosing good or poor practice
- A prompt to further questions or need for research

SHOULD NOT BE:
- An "end in itself"
- The only measure of performance
- An exact, "production-line" science
- Used in a critical, unconstructive way
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Type of indicator</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior management</td>
<td>Strategic overview of performance/</td>
<td>Aggregated indicators covering main areas of the organisation which test success</td>
<td>Monthly/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(DCS/ACPO)</td>
<td>setting policy</td>
<td>at meeting policy objectives. Also comparisons between major units (e.g. crime</td>
<td>quarterly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>rates, detections, resources).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>BCU resource deployment</td>
<td>Indicators required for taking decisions on resource deployment, identifying</td>
<td>Weekly/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(DCI/DI)</td>
<td></td>
<td>where and how performance can be improved (e.g. abstractions, training, time</td>
<td>monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>spent, arrests, prosecution file quality).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervision</td>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>Indicators which focus on potential weaknesses in the process and enable officers</td>
<td>Daily/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sergeants)</td>
<td></td>
<td>to evaluate different approaches (e.g. interview dip-sampling, no. of post-arrest</td>
<td>weekly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>searches, intelligence form submissions).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>