Tackling Crime Effectively

Management Handbook

Volume 2
Foreword


A small project team drawn from the Audit Commission, HMIC and ACPO began the research in January 1994, and the finished folders were distributed in May the same year. In total, 1,500 were produced, with forces being supplied with sufficient copies to provide one to each BCU.

The objective was to provide advice to forces on the themes of *Tackling Crime Effectively*, with the Handbook going into greater detail than the initial report, and providing more case study examples. The project was a first in the public sector in providing joint advice from the professional body, auditors and Inspectorate.

It was always recognised that the Handbook could only provide a current summary. The Police Research Group’s ‘Police Operations Against Crime’ programme was already under way and would in due course provide more detailed, more thoroughly researched advice on many of the subjects covered by the Handbook.

Since May 1994 a range of projects and initiatives have appeared and continue to appear. Busy managers will be aware of each of them on publication but Crime Committee felt that bringing them all together either in full or in summary would provide a useful reference point at both BCU and force levels. Colleagues in HMIC, the Audit Commission and Police Research Group agreed and several contributors became involved in the project.

Volume 1 was researched and jointly written by an inter-agency team. Volume 2 is still a collaborative venture but was produced in a different way, each section being separately written either by the relevant project team, a single agency, or by a combination.

The following words from my Foreword to Volume 1 remain true and bear repetition:

This is not a set of commandments. The police service knows to its cost that a bright idea in one place does not always transfer to another with similar results. It is, however, the best advice presently available on how crime can be managed and deserves careful study.

I commend the Handbook to chief officers and police managers.

D C Blakey QPM MBA  
Chief Constable, West Mercia Constabulary  
Secretary, ACPO Crime Committee  
May 1996
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List of Abbreviations

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Summary of Contents

1. Good Practice in Crime Management: Case Studies

An update on the implementation of Tackling Crime Effectively, prepared by a joint team drawn from ACPO, HMIC and the Audit Commission. As well as an overview there are new case studies on responses to Tackling Crime Effectively at a force level, resource allocation, service level agreements, teamwork and supervision, crime desks/crime management units, crime analysis, intelligence, proactivity at BCU level, using informants, and performance management.

2. Crime Prevention

A paper providing advice on crime prevention and community safety, policy and strategy, prepared by the Crime Prevention Sub-Committee of ACPO Crime Committee, in liaison with the Home Office Crime Prevention College.

3. House Burglary

An overview of advice prepared by ACPO Crime Committee's Burglary Working Group, drawing very heavily on recent Police Research Group (PRG) work and providing cross-references to appropriate PRG reports. There are sections on investigation, prevention, intelligence, publicity and performance measurement.

4. Drugs

An overview of advice prepared by Crime Committee's Drugs Sub-Committee, including enforcement, intelligence, demand reduction, harm reduction, partnership, technology and performance measurement.

5. Armed Criminality

Advice prepared by Crime Committee's Armed Criminality Working Group.

6. Major Crime Investigation: the BCU Commander's Role

The Crime Faculty at Bramshill currently has a major project to develop advice on the investigation of serious crime. This section has been produced to provide advice to BCU commanders on their responsibilities with reference to serious crime.
7. Using Forensic Science Effectively

A summary of advice produced by the joint ACPO/Forensic Science Service (FSS) project team.

8. Administrative Efficiency

The Trials Issues Group has provided this overview of recent developments including the PA Consulting Group's report, Government Efficiency Scrutiny, abbreviated files and records of taped interviews.

9. Work by the Home Office Police Research Group

Summaries of some recent studies forming part of the PRG’s ‘Operations against Crime Programme’ are enclosed together with details of the Help Desk, PRG publications and how to obtain copies.

Contact Points

The APCO Crime Committee Secretariat will be able to advise on the most appropriate person to answer questions on sections of this Handbook.

The Secretariat can be contacted at West Mercia Constabulary (01527 583789) until 19 July 1996 and at Kent County Constabulary (01622 690690) from then on.
1. Good Practice in Crime Management: Case Studies
1. Good Practice in Crime Management: Case Studies
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Introduction

The publication of *Helping With Enquiries* in November 1993 and the subsequent publication of the Management Handbook *Tackling Crime Effectively* was a catalyst for change in police approaches to crime. Forces have developed more effective approaches to crime. This Volume 2 to *Tackling Crime Effectively* is a further collaboration between the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) and the Audit Commission, with financial support provided by the Home Office. This introductory section restates the main features of proactive crime management, and illustrates these with results from a range of force initiatives. This is followed by a series of detailed good practice case studies.

The work was undertaken by Chief Inspector David Spencer on ACPO’s behalf, Chief Inspector Bernard Lawson from HMIC and John Burrows for the Audit Commission, with additional contributions from Kate Flannery and Donald Hirsch.

Thanks are due to the various forces which hosted members of the team and assisted in developing these case studies. This work, and the co-ordination of the other contributions to Volume 2, was overseen by a Steering Group chaired by Mr David Blakey, Chief Constable of West Mercia and Honorary Secretary to ACPO Crime Committee.
1. Developing Proactive Crime Strategies

The local audits of forces and HMIC inspections have shown that forces generally are adopting the main recommendations in *Helping with Enquiries* (Exhibit 1). In particular, forces are beginning to implement the following six principles:

- a strategic approach to crime management, co-ordinating the work of uniformed officers as well as CID;
- a balance between reactive and proactive policing;
- action targeted against prolific offenders;
- improved management of information and use of intelligence data;
- devolution of as much crime management as practicable to local command units; and
- ensuring that prevention of crime is an integral part of the strategy.

These principles are discussed further in the remainder of this section, and some aspects developed in the form of case studies in following pages.

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**A strategic approach to crime management**

There has been a move towards a more planned approach, which has been given further impetus by the Police and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1994. This requires every police authority, in conjunction with its force, to draw up an annual plan – the Local Policing Plan – setting out its priorities and stating objectives against which performance can be measured. These objectives should include the Home Secretary's five Key Objectives for policing, three of which relate to crime – increasing the number of detections for burglaries and violent crime, and targeting and preventing crimes of local concern, notably drug-related criminality. This statutory obligation, while building on existing practice in setting objectives and monitoring achievement, has extended awareness of crime strategies beyond CID and throughout each force.

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**Balancing reactive and proactive work**

The most common tangible response to *Tackling Crime Effectively* has been the introduction of crime desks and crime management units. By mid-1994, according to a Home Office survey, 30 out of the 43 police forces in England and Wales used crime desks or similar systems to manage demand. Half of these had been introduced over the previous year, and most forces without crime desks were planning to introduce them or were reviewing their policy. Processing most crime through a crime desk allows a force to decide what level of resources to deploy in proactive work, and how much to use on response to incidents. Proactive policing is characterised by intelligence-based efforts to identify offenders, to complement the collection of evidence from the scene of the crime. In practice, the level of resources deployed proactively has varied greatly.
 Forces are implementing solutions.

Throughout the country and even within forces. Some forces continue to adopt the same response to reported crime no matter what the circumstances; others have started to deploy resources to scenes of crime on a more selective basis.

Targeting and other proactive techniques may have a more discernible effect on the incidence and clear-up of types of crime in particular localities than on force-wide total figures. Comparing results from different areas within one force can reveal clear links between proactive policing and clear-up rates (Box A, overleaf).
Since April 1994 West Yorkshire has been implementing a force-wide crime policy, one aim of which is to put more resources into proactive work. A recent audit showed that the division which put the most effort into proactive work achieved the greatest improvement in the detection of burglaries and decrease in the number of offences.

Proactive policing in three divisions and impact on domestic burglary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>% of officers who spent the majority of duty time in the previous 3 months on proactive work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Division A</td>
<td>1506</td>
<td>1337</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division B</td>
<td>1507</td>
<td>1649</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division C</td>
<td>2939</td>
<td>2870</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force average</td>
<td>24,939</td>
<td>23,898</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Leicestershire Constabulary encourages the development of local proactivity by making centrally held resources available for local initiatives which meet agreed quality criteria. The force's five policing areas each have a Crime Management Group, which brings together at regular intervals intelligence officers, community liaison officers and crime prevention specialists as well as detectives. These groups can bid for money from a Crime Initiative Fund to resource proactive operations. Bids must set out a 'case profile' of aims, methods and costs; on conclusion of initiatives funded from this source, a detailed report on the outcome is sent to HQ.

Targeted action against prolific offenders

Police forces throughout the country have been making efforts to identify, arrest and secure the conviction of persistent criminals (Box B). Operation Bumblebee, pioneered by the Metropolitan Police Service, has inspired similar operations in many other forces. The most common target has been those who commit large numbers of burglaries and car crimes, but their arrest can also have an impact on other crimes that the same people commit.
Box B
TARGETING BURGLARS – NORTH YORKSHIRE, LINCOLNSHIRE AND WEST MERCIA

• A ‘sting’ operation in York led to 49 arrests for burglary and the recovery of stolen property.

• Lincolnshire’s initiative to secure the arrest and conviction of prolific burglars had a pronounced effect. In the 12 months to June 1995, house burglaries fell by 13 per cent in the force as a whole. Even better results were obtained where significant resources were deployed – a drop of 25 per cent in Lincoln and 33 per cent in West Lindsey.

• West Mercia’s Operation Bumblebee reduced offences by 19 per cent and increased detections by 30 per cent. Because burglars often commit other types of crime, the targeting approach contributed to a reduction in other categories of offence – eg, deception fell by almost 40 per cent.

Many forces are increasing the priority they give to the gathering of intelligence, an essential tool in efforts to track down and secure the conviction of criminals, especially persistent offenders. But collection of intelligence is pointless unless it is effectively analysed and used (Box C). Many forces are moving towards more systematic use of intelligence and other information, but others have a long way to go. Auditors of police forces found that in 1993/94, over 80 per cent of forces had computerised the recording of crime or planned to do so. But only 11 per cent had an integrated system of crime recording, crime pattern analysis and criminal

Box C
USING CRIME DATA TO DEVELOP CRIME ANALYSIS – HAMPSHIRE

Hampshire now has a computerised crime-recording system with the potential for integrated crime analysis. As a means of exploring the system’s capacity for crime pattern analysis, research officers reviewed shoplifting arrests in Southampton city centre over a four-month period. A distinct age and gender profile of offenders emerged – arrests were clustered in certain groups, the largest being the unemployed and schoolchildren. The analysis identified some key factors to take into account in developing successful prevention strategies, such as:

• over 80 per cent of shoplifters were caught by store detectives;

• over half of all shoplifting referrals were made by just five stores;

• interviews with offenders indicated that the stores from which most arrests came were not necessarily those that suffered the most shoplifting. Other stores appeared to experience regular shoplifting that was either undetected or not referred to the police; and

• interviews with schoolchildren highlighted a small number of problem schools which could usefully be a focus for police/schools liaison.
intelligence, with a further 33 per cent planning to develop such systems. At a national level, the National Strategy for Police Information Systems (NSPIS) is developing the capacity to exchange information more easily across forces.

Devolution of crime management to basic command units (BCUs)

Many forces have restructured their divisions and sub-divisions, to create BCUs capable of taking on significant investigations and co-ordinating the management of crime at a local level (Box D). A crime management model, developed at the University of Kent with support from the Home Office's Police Research Group, has been piloted at two sites in Kent and Northumbria. The model is based on local commanders making regular deployment decisions based largely on intelligence analysis. In Kent, the capacity of local police managers to take on responsibility has been built up over a number of years, influenced by parallel developments elsewhere in the county council. Some forces with a tradition of more centralised management have so far taken only cautious steps towards BCU-based decision-making.

Prevention of crime as an integral part of the strategy

Police forces see crime prevention as more than mounting extra patrols, encouraging householders to fit better locks and local authorities to improve street lighting. Enhanced intelligence systems and the targeting of persistent offenders, in particular, are used to prevent future crime as well as to detect past offenders. The relationship between prevention and detection is well illustrated by the use of closed-circuit television (CCTV) (Box E, overleaf). CCTV also symbolises the importance to crime prevention of multi-agency partnerships, since it is often financed partly by contributions from businesses, local authorities and others. ACPO is formulating a national crime prevention strategy which expands upon the partnership principle.

* * *

These principles for tackling crime more effectively are now well understood in police forces, and real progress has been made in implementing them during the short period since the publication of Tackling Crime Effectively. But the changes in structures, competencies and approach that are required cannot take root everywhere within the space of two years. Many forces still have some way to go, especially in building up the capabilities of BCUs and entrusting them with the management of crime at a local level. To help facilitate further improvement, the remainder of this section describes how particular changes are being implemented, drawing on examples of innovation in various forces. By continuing to build on these positive trends, police forces can secure continuous improvement in the prevention and detection of crime.
A key approach to delivering Cheshire’s crime strategy is its devolution of responsibility and resources to its nine local commanders, who are accountable for the achievement of both local and corporate priorities, together with a trimming of HQ functions. To implement the crime strategy, BCU managers ensure that:

- proactive teams work closely with uniformed teams to develop and, as appropriate, action intelligence packages;
- ‘crime cars’ operated by uniformed officers are widely deployed to execute arrests and deter crime at high-risk locations, targeting travelling criminals;
- repeat offences are identified so that steps can be taken to prevent further crimes against vulnerable people or locations; and
- BCUs, usually paired, share certain joint activities such as child protection, scenes of crime, youth justice, dog-handling and training facilities.

Results in recent years have been encouraging:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>% change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All crime</td>
<td>77,465</td>
<td>71,513</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary, dwelling</td>
<td>10,501</td>
<td>8,551</td>
<td>-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft of vehicles</td>
<td>8,953</td>
<td>6,622</td>
<td>-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All detections</strong></td>
<td>19,875</td>
<td>22,329</td>
<td>+12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary, dwelling</td>
<td>1,428</td>
<td>2,150</td>
<td>+51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three senior detectives provide a link between HQ and BCUs. They ensure that crime operations across the force are co-ordinated and consistent with force strategy, by means of a consultancy role and by monitoring key performance indicators. They also assess the need for technical or scientific support and officer training. Perhaps most significantly, they have access to funds to support well-planned proactive initiatives.
**Box E**

**CRIME PREVENTION USING CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISION**

There is clear evidence where these crime prevention initiatives are properly managed and evaluated that crime is effectively reduced. A good local example of this is Swansea city centre where CCTV has been introduced and monthly reductions in reported crime as high as 51 per cent have been recorded. – South Wales Constabulary

Following the launch of CCTV in Bedford town centre in April 1994, the initiative has resulted in dramatic reductions in burglaries, public disorder, criminal damage and auto crime. – Bedfordshire Police

The provision of closed-circuit television in the town of Darlington has not only reduced crime, but has enabled the local commander to deploy officers from the town centre to the suburban housing estates. – Durham Constabulary

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Crime Types Reduced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 1994</td>
<td>Bedford town centre</td>
<td>Burglaries, public disorder, criminal damage and auto crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Darlington</td>
<td>Reduced crime, local commander deploys officers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2. Resource Allocation

A key step in developing an effective crime management strategy is to determine what share of police resources should be devoted to tackling crime. The Audit Commission's national report said that 'all forces could benefit from assigning more resources to crime management'. Given the competing demands for police resources, it is not surprising that this issue has proved difficult to address for many forces, in two respects:

- **Agreeing the overall allocation of resources to crime management**: the national report recognised that, for the foreseeable future, any additional resource would probably have to be generated internally, by redeploying existing resources, civilianising more posts or scaling down any top-heavy management structures. Such sources have been tapped many times before, and each change implicitly involves other areas of work or parts of the force losing resources.

- **Agreeing the internal allocation of resources**: the report also endorsed the use of objective models to allocate resources within forces, while recognising the difficulty of developing them. Allocation models often require the generation of a significant amount of data, and the manipulation of such data requires technical expertise not available to many forces. In addition, there has to be an element of professional judgement in applying a quasi-mathematical model to reflect force priorities, service standards, tasks that cannot be measured and any exceptional factors relating to individual BCUs.

One issue such models may not address is whether the allocation of specialist crime management resources is best determined centrally, or alternatively left to the discretion of BCU commanders. Few forces pose the choice so starkly – most have gone for a compromise in which BCU commanders exercise control within centrally set parameters. Clearly, there is no single model that would be suitable for every force, but the approach used by Hampshire, combining workload and socio-economic data, is noteworthy (Case Study 1, overleaf).
CASE STUDY 1: Hampshire's 'Composite Workload Index'

New police resources in Hampshire are distributed according to an allocation model that addresses policing needs across the county. It incorporates an assessment of future workload, rather than simply applying historical workload data.

This method of allocating resources has been introduced gradually, after lengthy negotiations with BCU commanders and community representatives. The full effects have been dampened to ensure that resourcing is consistent with force priorities, and to take some account of the concerns raised by 'losers' under the formula. But these measures have not compromised the overall objectivity of the approach, and resources are now applied according to the same criteria on a force-wide basis.

The model has evolved through three stages:

(i) Building the model
The force's Research and Development Department has created a database, holding two sets of data about each of the local command areas of the force. The first stores data about actual police workloads going back a number of years, covering four of ACPO's five key operational areas – calls for service, crime, public order and traffic offences. Workload indices on the fifth area, community relations, have also been established but, as outlined below, are applied separately from the model.

The second data-set, derived from County Council sources, covers socio-economic characteristics such as population, age structure, unemployment rates and ethnic minority communities. The research established links between socio-demographic variables and workload variables – for example, urban density and social deprivation are associated with high workload. Multiple regression is then used to predict workload at the local command level. This overcomes the flaw of conventional allocation models based on historical data, which is that they reward areas with high workloads that may in fact be high partly due to poor management. Also, these models can penalise success by withdrawing resources from areas that, through good management and a proactive approach, have reduced the level of reactive demand.

A Composite Workload Index (CWI) is derived from both actual and predicted workload data, plus force-derived activity weightings. Crime is assigned a weighting of 49 per cent (actual crime x 0.75 plus predicted crime x 0.25), public order 26 per cent, traffic 13 per cent and call management 12 per cent.

(ii) Applying professional and pragmatic judgement
The application of any resource model often involves some subjective judgement, and the Hampshire model is no exception.
The four policing functions considered within the CWI had to be weighted according to their relative importance – this was done using activity-analysis information together with professional judgement. The need to incorporate an appropriate allowance for community-oriented work is covered by top-slicing an agreed number of relevant posts before sharing out resources. A dampening mechanism limits the more severe changes that pure application of the CWI formula would bring about. For example, it protects policing of some rural communities which historically attracted a share of police resources out of proportion with the demand they generated. Importantly, these ‘overrides’ of the pure model are applied transparently and consistently, which helps ensure that the overall approach is very different from traditional special pleading and ‘decibel planning’ (he/she who shouts the loudest gets the most resources).

(iii) Implementation
Hampshire's CWI is applied to the allocation of new uniformed posts and to civilian establishment – not yet to detectives and other specialists. At present the model is still driven by historical workloads – which receive 75 per cent of the weighting – rather than predicted workloads, which are used to distribute the remaining 25 per cent. Changes to police establishment are therefore quite gradual. But as the model is developed, the option of a more needs-based approach – perhaps a 50/50 weighting of historical and predicted workload – opens up.

Uniformed officers in Hampshire, as elsewhere, undertake a considerable amount of crime investigation – current estimates suggest up to 75 per cent of crime is investigated by them. Therefore the model is impacting on the resources available to tackle crime. The next major step will be to apply the model to CID resources. This will require more data to be gathered on, for example, detective workloads and the use of centrally based squads. Extending the model in this way will be made easier by the growing acceptance among police managers and local communities of this more systematic and transparent way to share out resources.
3. Service Level Agreements (SLAs)

*Tackling Crime Effectively* recommended that, when reviewing the changing roles of headquarters and BCU staff, forces should incorporate the changes into job descriptions, targets, appraisal procedures and formal terms of reference. Service level agreements (SLAs) could, it was suggested, be a useful tool for clarifying roles and working relationships between support functions and front-line service providers. SLAs have not penetrated police forces as widely as local government – some forces consider that SLAs are either not required to regulate relationships, or that they may be too bureaucratic and formal a solution. Others have introduced a limited form of SLA, but without investing the time and effort needed to realise the full benefits.

Some forces, however, have made SLAs work (Case Study 2), clarifying the nature and scope of the services offered by both administrative support units and operational units such as specialist squads. Significantly, these successful SLAs also spell out the reciprocal actions required from BCUs to help support departments deliver their services as effectively as possible. Few would deny the need for such co-ordination. Force drug squads, for example, cannot act on all reports related to drugs and need to concentrate on certain categories of dealers. But where this is poorly understood, drug squads are deluged by reports of small-scale drug use, which should be handled by BCU-level teams. The delay involved in re-routing such reports to the appropriate BCUs may mean that it is then too late to take action, or worse, drug squads are not kept informed of major dealers when their advice and expertise can be critical to success. The appropriate use of SLAs can reduce both risks.

Because SLAs were initially developed in a commercial environment, some agreements incorporate a type of sanction whereby failure by either party to meet agreed standards can result in a financial or other penalty. Without this, it is argued, SLAs are little more than a memorandum of understanding between the service provider and receiver. Where SLAs regulate the purchasing of services by BCUs, a form of sanction may be a good discipline, but this is rarely the case and thus financial sanctions are uncommon. They may in fact erode the partnership principle implicit in the development of SLAs. If service providers lack the necessary resources or relevant information, they cannot guarantee to meet their commitments to recipients and should not be penalised unfairly. However, SLA users do stress the importance of mechanisms to monitor compliance with agreed standards, if SLAs are to maintain credibility. Review sessions should be built into the timetable so that standards can be scrutinised and agreement reached on any revisions required.
CASE STUDY 2: Nottinghamshire’s Service Level Agreements

The experience of Nottinghamshire and some other forces suggests that, while SLAs can deliver much needed clarity, significant time and effort is required to develop them successfully. SLAs should not be viewed as a one-off initiative, but a continuing process of monitoring and improving services. SLAs relating to support for operational activities at BCU level, such as investigation of fraud or stolen vehicles, may be easier to establish than those addressing corporate needs such as public relations work, where the benefit to individual BCUs is less tangible. Nottinghamshire asks two questions to gauge whether an SLA is appropriate:

- Is the activity recognised as a SERVICE by provider and recipient, with the latter viewing themselves clearly as clients?
- Is it feasible to set an appropriate LEVEL of service, agreed by both parties?

If both conditions can be met, the parties should proceed to an AGREEMENT.

The force is putting in place a range of SLAs relating to Headquarters CID activities. Officers from the Performance and Planning Department meet with the squad or team providing the service to document their core business – their objectives and the methods used to deliver them. A working group is set up, with a facilitator from Performance and Planning, to:

- draw up a comprehensive list of objectives and primary responsibilities;
- for each responsibility, detail the information or support required from the recipient of the service; and
- state what initial service the HQ unit will provide and any subsequent follow-up.

Once the squad has agreed a statement of service, it moves on to establishing targets – ‘providing the preconditions are met, then in x per cent of cases the squad will respond within y hours/days (as appropriate)’. These draft service agreements are then discussed with those using the squad’s services – typically BCU managers – to negotiate and agree mutually acceptable levels of provision and target standards.

Nottinghamshire is introducing SLAs to multi-agency work carried out by its Child Abuse Investigation Unit and the County Council’s Social Services Department. The vital need for clear remits and effective co-ordination between police and social services departments was highlighted by an inquiry in 1994 into an abuse case where co-operation had been inadequate. Clearly, SLAs in this area of work must incorporate the national guidelines by which both agencies are bound. Demand is difficult to predict as the number of referrals is influenced by perceptions held by others of the quality of service offered by police and social services. The growing number of child abuse referrals – 3,200 last year, more than the number dealt with in many large metropolitan forces – suggests that the perceptions are positive, but spiralling demand can threaten the standards offered.
EXAMPLE OF THE SLA FORMAT USED BY NOTTINGHAMSHIRE

A standardised format for SLA documentation is applied.

HQ (CID) Child Abuse Investigation Unit

Service Level Agreements

The negotiation and setting of agreed standards of service is an important part of the child abuse investigation unit's (CAIU) service programme. It also enables us to evaluate our performance of core tasks against the agreed needs and expectations of the 'customers' of our service.

Such agreements allow us to:
- focus on the most important part of service delivery;
- introduce consistency into working practices;
- address, at the right time, those issues which directly affect the level of service we provide; and
- disclose to our 'customers' what is expected of them before we provide the service.

### Core tasks

1. Evaluate referrals from social services as to the necessity for a 'joint investigation'.
2. Secure/preserve child witness evidence (especially video interviews) on behalf of division, HQ (CID) major crime units, and foreign forces.
3. Participate in 'joint investigations' with social services.

### Preconditions & actions

The agreement lists the CAIU's requirements from its 'customers' and the CAIU's actions on receipt of requests.

### Standards applied

If preconditions are met then in 90% of all occasions we will endeavour to:

1. Complete our evaluation and provide a reply:
   - immediately - if there is a risk of imminent danger to the child or
   - within 24 hours of receipt of the request.
2. Secure and preserve the child's witness evidence in the most appropriate format:
   - within 48 hours if circumstances require urgent action
   (this may also be based on an assessment of the child's needs)
   or
   - within 2 weeks if 'non-urgent'.
3. Participate in planning for a 'joint investigation':
   - within 24 hours of receipt of the request or
   - within 72 hours of receipt of the request - where there is no likelihood of immediate danger to the child.
4. Teamwork and Supervision

One of the problems of crime investigation explored in the first Handbook was that most investigative work was allocated to individual officers, either CID or uniformed. This increased the likelihood that links between offences and offenders were missed, as officers ploughed lone furrows. It also reduced the capacity for managers to accommodate the strengths and weaknesses of individual officers, who took on all aspects of an investigation rather than specialising in different activities. The Handbook recommended that forces address these weaknesses by adopting a teamwork approach, with the added benefit of enhanced supervision by DSs.

The Handbook was, deliberately, not prescriptive about how teamworking might be introduced. Initiatives by various forces include:

- **the establishment of larger teams** to replace the convention of one DS to three or four DCs. Supervisors can then more easily assign work according to individuals’ particular strengths (rather than expecting each officer to cover all aspects of each investigation), information is shared more easily and there is greater continuity in managing long-running enquiries;

- **closer supervision of investigations**, with a greater emphasis placed on the managerial role of sergeants, spelt out in job descriptions and appraisals. This needs to be accommodated in training for first-line supervisors. In some forces, crime desk officers play a key role in monitoring the standard of investigations and advising officers on the conduct of investigations; and

- **the use of computerised case-monitoring systems**, which has not only enabled supervisors to monitor case progress, but ensures more equitable workload.

Improvements in interviewing standards are one sought-for outcome of teamworking, with interviews allocated to more experienced or expert officers. Prompted by the Home Office Circular 22/92 on investigative interviewing and the development of the PEACE\(^1\) model by a joint ACPO/Home Office team, this issue has a high priority in many forces, as illustrated by Lincolnshire (Case Study 3, overleaf).

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1 The national training package for investigative interviewing has five modules: Preparation and planning; Engage and explain; Account; Closure; Evaluation.
CASE STUDY 3: Developing teamwork and strengthening supervision in Lincolnshire

As is now the case in many forces, Lincolnshire has ended dual accountability and has devolved responsibility for the bulk of crime management to local commanders. The force is committed to the development of team-based investigation and to this end has:

• changed the job descriptions of detective sergeants to emphasise the management of operational resources and supervision of DCs. Team-management responsibilities take precedence over DSs’ individual caseloads;

• improved computing facilities to help sergeants monitor their team’s workload on a day-to-day basis and channel work accordingly. The use of the free-text field on the force’s crime information system, which notes the steps taken in the course of an enquiry, provides sergeants with a form of investigation log. This avoids duplication of work or missed steps if cases have to be reallocated;

• set a target of training all detectives on the PEACE method as part of a drive to raise interviewing standards. Sergeants, both uniformed and CID, are required to monitor at least one interview tape each week. The resulting appraisal forms are reviewed by a full-time training officer attached to each BCU, and action such as remedial training or enhanced supervision for individual officers is agreed at monthly review meetings; and

• insisted that detectives and other CID officers participate in briefings of uniformed officers, to reinforce ownership of shared goals in respect of crime, and ensure a flow of information and ideas between CID and uniformed officers on local crime problems.
5. Crime Desks and Crime Management Units

The Audit Commission report was critical of the traditional response to reported crime, in which control rooms determined the initial response – usually the prompt dispatch of a uniformed constable. Responsibility for supervision of subsequent action, such as deployment of detectives and SOCOs, then fell to DSs and shift sergeants. This fragmented response made it difficult to share information and intelligence on crime in the area, and often failed to provide victims with a single, accessible, reference point.

The Commission recommended that forces consider the use of crime desks to rationalise the initial response to crime and provide a higher-quality initial investigation. Crime desk staff could, it was suggested, co-ordinate the analysis of crime patterns, exercise quality control and track progress, and provide a focal point for victims wanting information on the investigation. The report further highlighted the value of telephone-based investigations in situations where the attendance of a police officer was unlikely to prove fruitful. The Management Handbook then provided examples of different crime desk models, together with some evaluation. These showed the success of crime desks in terms of victim satisfaction, deployment patterns of operational officers and trends in detections.

The Handbook also made a case for the expansion of crime desks into crime management units (CMUs), adding to the conventional crime desk remit a range of related activities such as scientific support, help desks, intelligence and crime pattern analysis, liaison with Victim Support groups and administration. Bringing all of this work under the control of one manager would enable CMUs to set and monitor standards for the whole crime management function at BCU level. At that stage, however, few forces had gone down this route. Reference was made to Gloucestershire, which reported much improved co-ordination of crime-related work and earlier identification of problems that required preventive initiatives.

There has been an expansion of CMUs since the Handbook was published two years ago, although forces have taken quite different approaches according to factors such as BCU size, a key determinant of CMU feasibility. Some BCUs are too small to sustain crime desks, let alone CMUs. In response to this problem, some forces set up crime desks or CMUs serving several small BCUs. For example, Devon and Cornwall’s central crime bureau offers economies of scale to a large and predominantly rural force (Case Study 4, overleaf). An example of how the CMU model can be applied in a busy urban environment is furnished by West Midlands Police; its approach is also notable for the emphasis on civilianisation of key functions (Case Study 5, page 22).
CASE STUDY 4: Crime Management Units in a large, geographically dispersed area - Devon & Cornwall

Devon and Cornwall Constabulary was an early proponent of the crime desk approach. In the late 1980s crime desks operated at each of the force's 23 sub-divisions, albeit with restricted working hours. Elimination of the sub-divisional command tier provided opportunities to develop a sophisticated, force-wide crime recording and intelligence system; this in turn prompted a different model for crime management.

The force now has one crime management unit or Crime Bureau operating from four sites, but offering the same standard of service to both police officers and members of the public wherever they may be located in the force area (Exhibit 3). The services offered by the Bureau are available 24 hours a day - there is always one site operating at night, selected on a rota basis by the four teams. This sharing of workload is also a familiar feature of daytime operation as the facility exists for one team to help others with backlogs. It is made possible by a computer system that offers immediate, on-line access to all aspects of crime, intelligence and incident response throughout the force area.

The two main elements of this system are:

- **Operational Information System (OIS)** - a resource-management system providing incident logs on all calls for assistance, current operations and information received. Logs are created promptly by operations rooms, help desks, station enquiry officers and the Force Intelligence Bureau;

- **Crime Information System (CIS)** - records and updates crime reports; officers at the scene use a freephone link to the Central Data Input Bureau, which inputs details and logs intelligence items.

Dedicated staff examine current OIS logs in order that links between crimes and intelligence can be established quickly, allowing prompt intervention rather than retrospective action when the trail is cold. For example, officers are able to identify more quickly whether suspect vehicles have in fact been stolen; or, during a stop and search process, can identify property that may have been stolen only a short time before. Other features include:

1. Crime desk officers assess all crime reports for investigative potential, and allocate them to divisional officers (using agreed guidelines). They also link each report to other OIS and CIS records and suggest appropriate action to investigating officers.

2. SOCOs are part of the operational team and are tasked to identify crime series or patterns, which are then notified to the appropriate crime desk staff.

3. Analysts search for information on offenders held in custody, to provide interviewing officers with details of previous convictions, current and previous MOs, known associates, and any forensic matches. A recent innovation is that all positive scenes of crime and forensic
identifications go first to the analysts, rather than to the investigating officer, to avoid interviews taking place without this essential preparation.

4. Intelligence officers based at each of the four Bureau sites search the crime database and publicise items of interest to all officers via the IT network.

5. Custody Liaison Officers are being introduced at the force’s six custody centres to provide detective expertise in support of investigators to ensure that all possible intelligence and evidence is exploited to the full.

Exhibit 3
THE CRIME BUREAU STRUCTURE IN DEVON AND CORNWALL
The Crime Bureau has a range of functions.
CASE STUDY 5: Crime management – West Midlands

Following the successful piloting in 1994 of crime bureaux in three of West Midland's nine command units, called divisions, it was decided to extend the approach to other divisions during 1995. The largest division covers central Birmingham, a high-crime area with an establishment of nearly 1,000 police and civilian staff and a resident population of around 500,000. Its crime bureau deals with some 55,000 crimes a year, and is probably one of the largest such units currently operating.

The force has outlined certain mandatory requirements for the operation of each bureau to ensure a consistent approach across the force area. But within this framework, each divisional commander has scope to customise the approach to meet local needs. The common procedural features (Exhibit 4) of the crime bureaux are:

1. The switchboard routes non-emergency calls to a help desk staffed by civilians. This help desk is the ‘front end’ of the crime bureau and deals directly with all non-crime matters.

2. Reports of crime are referred to the crime receiving desk, staffed primarily by civilians under police direction, who complete crime reports. The crime receiving desk can activate immediate dispatch of police officers if emergency calls have been inadvertently routed through to them.

3. All crime reports are then reviewed by police assessors, who decide whether any follow-up action is merited by applying ‘solvability factors’ which have been agreed on a force-wide basis. As well as allocating crimes to CID and uniformed officers, most assessors have the facility to allocate burglaries to one officer on the shift who is tasked to undertake ‘one-stop’ visits. Typically, 60 to 70 per cent of calls are resolved over the telephone without police attendance.

4. Completed crime reports are forwarded to a civilian administration section for input into the microcomputer-based crime recording system.

5. Assessors also decide whether reports should be passed to the bureau’s intelligence section. If so, intelligence logs are created, initially by civilian staff; thereafter, follow-up action and the development of intelligence packages fall to local intelligence officers (LIOs) and field intelligence officers (FIOs).

The initiative is still in the developmental phase. The IT infrastructure, for example, needs further improvement to enhance the efficiency of the bureaux. Furthermore, although the channelling of all crime reports through crime receiving desks has helped in the identification of linked offences, crime pattern analysis remains fairly rudimentary. Evaluation of the pilot scheme has focused debate on:

- the need to publicise to operational officers the benefits of the crime bureaux system;

- the need to ensure that time freed up by reducing the reactive workload of patrol officers is used for proactive tasks – this will not happen without positive action by managers and supervisors;
how to increase awareness amongst operational staff of crime bureaux procedures so that they make full use of the facility. Unfortunately, station layouts and space requirements mean that bureaux are usually located apart from CID offices and briefing rooms, which impairs close working relationships;

• the need to improve the connections between the enhanced intelligence system (made possible by the bureaux) and the force’s crime prevention function; and

• the feasibility of extending bureaux cover beyond the current core hours of 7am to 11pm, probably by one division’s bureau covering for others on a rota basis.

Exhibit 4
FLOW CHART OF WEST MIDLAND’S CRIME BUREAU PROCESSES
The bureaux have a common procedure.
6. Crime Analysis

The Management Handbook recommended that crime pattern analysis (CPA) be integrated with the crime desk function, reflecting its increasingly important role in the fight against high-volume crimes such as burglary. CPA has developed considerably from its early beginnings of coloured pins in large maps. The generic term 'crime analysis' now includes:

- **general profile analysis** – aiming to identify the typical characteristics of the perpetrators of certain categories of crime;
- **case analysis** – seeking to establish the course of events immediately before, during and after a serious offence;
- **comparative case analysis** – looking for similarities between crimes that point to the same perpetrator(s); and
- **offender analysis** – which aims to establish connections between individuals on police records and their possible involvement in criminal activities.

One force that is gaining good results through high-quality analysis facilities on its crime recording system is North Yorkshire Police, which has invested considerably in IT for its crime strategy (Case Study 6).
CASE STUDY 6: Crime Pattern Analysis - North Yorkshire

North Yorkshire is working towards the point when each of its 1,400 officers can access and analyse almost every aspect of the force-wide crime and intelligence data from a single terminal. The force has installed 1,000 terminals, linked to the mainframe and providing access to a huge volume of data. Offender data go back to 1983 and intelligence indices to 1990, covering over 42,000 nominal records and three times that number of intelligence logs - and yet responses to all but the most demanding enquiries are available within seconds.

In common with other forces, the query fields in the database are arranged in a hierarchical structure, with a top-level menu for the force database and a range of enquiry options on 16 enquiry fields at second-tier level (Exhibit 5, overleaf). Much effort has been invested to ensure that the enquiry facilities span the widest range of operational requirements, a commitment that requires regular upgrading of the facilities. Particular features of the system are:

- enquiry/analysis facilities on each sub-menu are tailored to specific operational requirements - for example, searches within the firearms index are designed to allow officers to key in parts of serial numbers and obtain the range of possible matches. Or, using the electoral register, the system counts the number of houses on a given road, allowing a senior investigating officer on a major enquiry to calculate the time required to conduct house-to-house enquiries;

- enquiries on the PNC vehicle log automatically flag up if the target vehicle is also recorded on any intelligence log and notify where the entry can be found; and

- the system logs all enquiries made and constantly updates a 'history of interest' record. Thus, even if enquiries about a particular vehicle, address or alias do not provide the information sought, the system directs the enquirer to other officers who have shown a similar interest.

The system can download data from a variety of other sources, such as other forces' data on 'New Age' travellers, the electoral register and the national stolen MOT index. This avoids lengthy routines to access such data and the need to key in data to the North Yorkshire system. It is particularly useful because the force is vulnerable to travelling criminals - nearly a quarter of the offenders dealt with in 1994 lived outside the force area.

To carry out more sophisticated analyses North Yorkshire uses a specialist package ('Watson'), the value of which was illustrated by a recent investigation into burglaries of computer equipment. A police informant pointed to a suspect who, it was alleged, was using hired cars to carry out burglaries. Analysis of the suspect's telephone account enabled detectives to identify the car-hire firm concerned, which provided details of the transactions made by the suspect and the mileage covered during each hire period. All burglary incidents involving the theft of computer equipment within each hire period and the mileage covered were traced, and a clear link was revealed which provided sufficient grounds for arrest. The suspect
initially denied involvement, but was persuaded by the strength of the analysis to make a full confession.

Another example of North Yorkshire’s computerised analysis concerned an enquiry into the activities of a suspected major drug dealer. Officers were advised that a person suspected of dealing in drugs was contacted by clients via a pager, and access was gained to details of these paged messages. Instead of constructing a time-consuming log of the source of incoming calls and the messages left, a printer port on the pager was wired into a personal computer to log the details directly into the software. By ‘event charting’ the many hundreds of calls made to the pager, the system mapped them diagramatically according to their source and frequency. Many calls were from individuals known to the police and their intelligence files were accessed by the investigating officers. They decided to intercept a deal being made at one of the many public phone boxes used by the dealer’s clients. The time of intervention was decided by mapping the days and times at which calls were made from the phone boxes used most regularly. This enabled an arrest to be made without substantial time having to be spent on surveillance at the scene.

Exhibit 5
ENQUIRY FIELDS IN NORTH YORKSHIRE’S CRIME ANALYSIS SYSTEM
The query fields are arranged in a hierarchical structure.
7. The Intelligence Function

Good intelligence systems are central to proactive policing. But a number of obstacles have traditionally impaired the effective use of intelligence:

- a lack of recognition on the part of patrol officers and others of how seemingly trivial items of information can be useful;
- an unwillingness by some officers or squads to share the information they do accrue;
- under-resourcing and low status of the intelligence function; and
- inadequate IT facilities.

These factors have in the past led to intelligence work being seen as a marginal activity. Forces have worked extremely hard in recent years to redress this position and make operational activity more intelligence-driven, as exemplified by work undertaken by Merseyside Police (Case Study 7, overleaf).
CASE STUDY 7: Putting intelligence at the centre of operational activities – Merseyside

Merseyside has tackled the problem of poor sharing of intelligence data by creating a Force Intelligence Bureau (FIB). The networked computer system controlled by the FIB pools the intelligence logs created by LIOs and other officers in the force's 15 districts (BCUs), and makes them available to all operational officers.

The basic principle underpinning the FIB system is that all intelligence related to an individual - whether a known criminal, a suspect or an associate - is held on just one file which can be cross-referenced to other intelligence files. Importantly, the system records the original source of all intelligence logs; an officer making a later enquiry can then identify other officers who may be able to help further. It also offers a managerial tool to assess which officers are most active in gathering intelligence.

The FIB has had to deal with a massive growth in the amount of data held by the force, fuelled by an emphasis on intelligence-gathering at the local level, improved partnerships between LIOs and operational officers, and the high profile of the FIB itself. Success breeds success - tangible benefits in terms of arrests encourage officers to put more intelligence items into the system, which then becomes a more powerful tool for these officers to make further arrests.

Creating an environment where crime management units (CMUs) and operational officers work together as a team has been crucial. The CMU in South Sefton, for example, is located in a connecting office between CID and the briefing room. This allows a high degree of contact between uniformed officers, detectives and the CMU team, and helps to keep intelligence on everyone's agenda. The team of three LIOs has an input into every shift briefing, either attending in person or preparing a short video on current concerns.

Success in raising the profile of intelligence has enabled South Sefton to take the proactive approach forward and focus the intelligence-gathering efforts of operational officers on target criminals or crimes. This in turn helps LIOs and proactive teams develop actionable packages. Through formal and informal contacts with operational officers, the LIOs continually prompt the accumulation of information on key suspects and emerging crime trends. And when intelligence packages have been developed and actioned, care is taken to ensure that all units either have an opportunity to participate or are kept informed of outcomes.
8. Developing Proactivity

A central theme of *Tackling Crime Effectively* was encouraging proactivity – co-ordinated work aimed at identifying and apprehending offenders, especially the more serious and prolific criminals. The Handbook noted that proactivity would be sustainable only if forces enhanced their existing capacity to target criminals – the intelligence function, crime pattern analysis, surveillance and the use of informants. In addition, it was stressed that managers and supervisors within BCUs would need to incorporate a proactive focus into training and job descriptions, as well as carving out time for this work. Many elements of this approach are apparent in the recent strategy developed by the Hartlepool district of Cleveland Constabulary (Case Study 8, overleaf).

One development following the Audit Commission report in 1993 was the formulation of a Crime Management Model, developed by the Home Office and Kent University and piloted in Kent and Northumbria (Case Study 9, overleaf). Initial evaluation of the model sheds some light on the requirements for successful proactive strategies at the local level. Northumbria was keen that its Gateshead East pilot initiative should be free-standing – it had to succeed or fail on its own resources and did not benefit from additional resources. (Injecting pilot schemes with extra resources does not provide a good test of whether an initiative will succeed when extended across the force.)
CASE STUDY 8: BCU-level proactivity – Cleveland (Hartlepool)

The crime strategy being pursued by Hartlepool focuses on:

- crime reduction, especially in the categories of domestic burglary, violence and auto crime;
- increased arrests, especially of prolific burglars – based upon a significant enhancement of the intelligence function, a drive to recruit informants, the development of CPA and a positive encouragement to apply stop and search powers; and
- a reduction in the fear of crime through active marketing of the district’s aims and successes through local press and media.

These are objectives shared by BCUs across the country, but not all have secured the successful outcomes that Hartlepool has achieved.

Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>% change</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arrests</td>
<td>4,408</td>
<td>6,276</td>
<td>+42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stop &amp; searches</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>+95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complaints against police officers</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>+8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payments to informants</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>+139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total crimes</strong></td>
<td>13,314</td>
<td>10,797</td>
<td>-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. detected</td>
<td>2,317</td>
<td>2,204</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>% detected</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>House burglaries</strong></td>
<td>2,325</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. detected</td>
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<td>286</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% detected</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The procedures adopted to achieve these results include:

- strengthening the intelligence team, which now numbers seven officers, including two FIOs, out of a district strength of 190 officers;
- CID officers attending every shift briefing possible, with a lot of information-sharing;
- officers knowing they will be supported in pursuing a robust approach to stop and searches (looking especially for ‘going equipped’) as long as they stay within the rules;
- targeting burglary, because of public concern but also because burglars commit many other crimes; and
- holding weekly meetings between uniformed staff and CID to review progress on the crime strategy and generate operational orders for patrol officers.
CASE STUDY 9: Proactivity at BCU-level; the Crime Management Model - Northumbria (Gateshead East)

Gateshead East's starting point was to put an efficient crime desk in place to grade reported crimes and rationalise the police response. This was followed by:

- the establishment of a sizeable intelligence unit, the hub of the Crime Management Model, which has 11 staff (out of a BCU establishment of 206) led by an Inspector. Considerable emphasis was placed on recruiting respected and credible officers to fill the posts, not least because of the need to cultivate and task informants;

- a system for prioritising target criminals, by creating three categories of active offenders. Category A targets, the top priority, are those about to be the subject of police action; Category B targets are those suspects on whom further intelligence is required before police action can be initiated; and Category 1 targets are suspects on whom intelligence is limited and who are less well-known to patrol officers. This categorisation operates in parallel to the 4 x 4 matrix for evaluating intelligence items and is used to identify the area's target criminals. The Intelligence Unit uses the categorisation to focus detectives and patrol officers' information-gathering efforts on criminals whom they judge to merit targeting;

- the creation of both CID and uniformed units dedicated to proactive work. A CID tactical team of one DS and eight DCs co-ordinates the investigation of serious crime and crime series. The uniformed support team of one sergeant and four PCs focuses on less serious crimes and crime series; each uniformed relief is expected to undertake proactive as well as reactive work, during both day and night duties; and

- the establishment of a Tasking and Co-ordination Group to oversee implementation of the strategy. This group meets twice a week, chaired by the area commander and involving the operations manager, head of the intelligence unit, the crime manager and his deputy.

The principal benefit of the proactive approach in Gateshead East has been an improvement in the quality of arrests. Work is now under way to apply crime weightings and other objective measures to evaluate the approach. One operation in late 1994 illustrates the quality of arrests that have been secured. Here, officers followed up reports that a team of five men were trying to establish themselves as main players in the drug-dealing and protection fields. But informants and other contacts would make statements about these criminals' activities only when arrests had been made. Gateshead East mounted an intensive intelligence-gathering operation, with tasks shared out between operational units, to build up a full picture of the suspects' activities. This intelligence was in turn used to target surveillance operations. The operation eventually resulted in the arrest of all five criminals, who were charged with offences ranging from threats to kill, armed robbery, aggravated burglary and rape.
9. Using Informants

The Management Handbook underlined the value of informants as a cost-effective means of detection and recommended that forces exploit the full potential of informants – not just through CID efforts, but by assisting all operational officers to cultivate such contacts. The critical issue for managers to decide is whether the intelligence gained from informants is of sufficient calibre, relevance and timeliness to justify payment from public funds. Intelligence gathered from informants is not necessarily different in either quality or quantity from that obtained from other contacts who do not seek payment. Efficient systems for monitoring and evaluating the contribution of informants are essential.

There is a wide variation in the use made of informants – some forces make considerable use of them, while others call on them relatively infrequently. Such differences derive in part from the type of crime problems faced and the characteristics of the local community. It is, however, probable that variations in the level of use also flow from different views about the cost-effectiveness and the ethical issues of using paid informants. Merseyside's experience of cultivating informants highlights both potential benefits and key lessons in informant management (Case Study 10).
CASE STUDY 10: Cultivating and managing informants - Merseyside

In trying to expand the use of informants, Merseyside, like other forces, has had to overcome a reluctance towards informants fuelled by a few notorious cases where police officers' integrity had been compromised. Building a robust framework to ensure control and accountability, and to minimise the risk of malpractice, has been critical to the approach. The dividends are tangible; in 1994/95 the force as a whole attributed around 900 arrests (including one for murder), the recovery of stolen property valued at £1.15 million, the discovery of 140 illegal firearms and the seizure of £3.3 million worth of controlled drugs to officers' use of informants. The cost in terms of payments to informants was £129,000.

The force currently has just over 1,400 registered informants, an increase of 35 per cent on the number registered at the same point last year. Interestingly, a significant minority of registered informants are now run by uniformed officers (35 per cent force-wide, up from 27 per cent in the preceding year). The active encouragement to recruit and use informants by the Force Intelligence Bureau (FIB) has been a major impetus, but officers on the ground emphasise that devolution of authority to pay informants has been crucial. Officers at BCU level can now make prompt payments of the small sums which form the bulk of informant payments. Payments of up to £75 - £50 as reward and £25 as expenses can be approved by inspector rank or above, and up to £250 by BCU crime managers. Larger sums require approval from the FIB.

Clear guidance on informant-handling procedures is circulated to all officers running informants; it emphasises that payments to informants represent not only rewards but also incentives to maintain or increase the flow of information from proven sources. The training course developed by the FIB for informant controllers is increasingly attended by officers from other forces.

Supervision and monitoring of informants' contributions can be time-consuming. The task of monitoring work with informants across the whole force is carried out by a DI, supported by three detective sergeants, two analysts and one clerk. In addition, the force has recently piloted the role of a dedicated informant manager at BCU level, to extend the control standards maintained at force level. The post-holder also offers mentoring for less experienced officers in cultivating and handling informants.

This investment in managing and monitoring informants is needed to sustain follow-up action on informants' reports, so that there is no un-actioned intelligence and to avoid informant sources drying up. But the force is confident that the cost of this effort has so far been outweighed by the benefits derived from informants.
Performance management systems help police forces monitor the achievement of both force and BCU-level objectives. Ideally, the system should be well supported by IT, but the key task for managers is to promote a culture of performance management. There are several preconditions for this:

- force objectives should be clear, and translated into measurable targets;
- management information should be widely available through appropriate IT; and
- such information should be ‘sold’ well to its users, be attractively presented, and contain both advice on interpretation and the possible implications for different users.

Three key dimensions were addressed in the Management Handbook. The first is the need to provide routine workload and productivity measures on an ongoing basis – covering both inputs such as crimes recorded, officer-hours worked, or intelligence forms submitted, and outputs such as crimes cleared up. One force that has considerable experience in developing corporate and personal PIs is Durham (Case Study 11).

The second dimension is to monitor activities to ensure quality, for example by mechanisms such as case-tracking or dip-sampling interviews. Significant progress has been made in this area, as reflected in the section on Teamwork and Supervision above.

The third dimension recommended by the Handbook was outcome analysis – subjecting a sample of completed investigations to thorough analysis in order to identify the most productive investigative practices. Hampshire Constabulary has recently extended this approach to undertake retrospective analyses of prolific offenders whom the force has arrested. Such analyses aim to identify effective (or ineffective) techniques used within the investigation, and also whether crime pattern analysis might have identified links between the offences at an earlier point, and thus brought forward the arrest of the offender.
CASE STUDY 11: Performance measurement at the BCU level - Durham

BCU commanders in Durham receive a performance information bulletin each month which details key aspects of local performance against force averages, for example:

- patterns in recorded crime, detections, detection rates and primary detections for all crime types;
- numbers of arrests and their disposals; and
- a range of workload indices, from the number of 999 calls through to a public order index.

In each case the information is presented in both statistical and graphical form, with identification of exceptional trends that require urgent attention. These performance statistics are a focal point of review meetings held each month between the Chief Constable and each BCU commander, and then at meetings held every two months involving all BCU commanders.

In keeping with the force's principle of devolved management, the analysis of why statistical trends occur and what should be done in response lies with the individual BCU. Otherwise, BCUs may be inhibited from developing local performance criteria that address their particular objectives.

While there are common PIs to which all BCUs work, different approaches are positively encouraged, as illustrated by follow-up contacts with crime victims. Some BCU supervisors attend a random sample of scene visits and check the subsequent paperwork. Others require completion of a quality control enquiry form on at least one incident dealt with by each officer per month. The Management Services Department (MSD) dip samples the different practices of BCUs and circulates details, to share ideas and (it is hoped) raise standards across the force.

In order to ensure that both input and output data lead to action, MSD encourages BCUs to:

- use crime analysis and intelligence to target particular problem areas, by specifying precise location, time and whether these are repeat offences;
- identify other agencies which could have an impact on the problem in question; and
- set up short-term, multi-agency steering groups to devise counter strategies.

These strategies will typically involve a community awareness programme, proactive initiatives or reactive tactics (or a combination of all three). Formal evaluation mechanisms are built into each strategy and the results fed back into their subsequent development.
2. Crime Prevention
2. Crime Prevention
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Introduction

‘Prevention and detection are often perceived as separate strands of activity when they should be inextricably linked; effective crime prevention enhances relationships with the community and should therefore help to create a climate for co-operation with the police on crime detection.’

The Audit Commission, Helping with Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively

The term 'crime prevention' is often narrowly interpreted by members of the police service, who may perceive it as the responsibility of specialist departments, rather than as an issue for the service as a whole.

This view is becoming increasingly inappropriate, and prevention needs to be seen in a wider context, extending beyond crime into most areas of operational policing. Indeed, action to prevent crime and nuisance complaints will reduce demand and, therefore, make scarce police resources available to target other police priorities.

Ownership of crime prevention by every member of the service is crucial to its success. Only then can the active involvement of a wide range of agencies, groups and individuals be harnessed to work with the public towards a common goal.

This section will highlight the background to the police involvement in crime prevention and describe the reasons why a strategic approach is required. Examples will be given to highlight the advantages that can be gained by adopting a preventative approach.

This advice has been prepared by the Home Office Crime Prevention College at Easingwold, York, in liaison with the Crime Prevention Sub-Committee of APCO Crime Committee.
Background

'It should be understood at the outset that the principal object to be attained is the prevention of crime. To this great end every effort of the police is to be directed. The security of person and property, the preservation of the public tranquillity and all other objects of a police establishment will thus be better effected than by detention and punishment of the offender after he has succeeded in committing crime.'

Metropolitan Police 1829

As far back as 1829 with the establishment of the Metropolitan Police, crime prevention was espoused as a priority of the service. In 1986 ACPO, in response to the attention being given to crime prevention by the Home Office, set up its Crime Prevention Sub-Committee.

In 1990 the importance of crime prevention was reiterated by ACPO in the following statement;

The primary object of the police service is the prevention of crime. It is to this aim that the efforts of all police officers are directed. The Association of Chief Police Officers is committed to provide a quality of service which contributes towards the creation of an environment within which people may pursue their lives and interests in safety, free from victimisation and the fear of crime.

In 1994 the ACPO Crime Committee strategy identified crime prevention as one of its key priorities. The goal for crime prevention was

To make crime prevention a priority and promote it by influencing those within the police service and outside to see it as a responsibility of each individual.

To achieve that goal, the Crime Prevention Sub-Committee identified seven strategic areas for the police service to address:

- Change of culture
- Partnership
- Public responsibility
- Identification of causes
- Improving the information base
- Developing the situational approach
- Communications and marketing.

These seven areas are described more fully later in this section, where they are used as a framework to illustrate how crime prevention can be developed.
Why Crime Prevention?

Crime prevention has been defined as:

‘The anticipation, recognition and appraisal of a crime risk and the initiation of action to remove or reduce it.’

_Preventive Policing_, The Home Office Crime Reduction Centre CPO Manual

Crime prevention addresses crime risks and needs to be an integral element of overall crime management strategies. It is suggested that a strategic approach to crime prevention, which leads to an awareness and ownership by every member of the organisation, will produce the best results.

Although crime detection rates are often the focus of police performance, an investment in crime prevention will produce long-term improvements in the level of recorded crime. To achieve this will require a change of culture within the service, similar to that needed if intelligence-led policing is to replace the reactive ‘fire-brigade’ style which is so resource-intensive.

Three contributory factors to a crime are the offender, victim and opportunity.

**Offender:**

The removal of a potential offender from a situation will prevent a crime being committed. A preventative approach makes crime more difficult and risky for the criminal, and reduces the rewards of crime.

**Victim:**

Raising the awareness of all sections of the community to the possibility of becoming a victim without unduly raising the fear of crime will empower individuals to take appropriate steps to protect themselves and their property.

**Opportunity:**

The traditional arena for the crime prevention officer (CPO) is with situational crime prevention techniques such as locks, bolts and bars. The role now also includes giving advice in relation to Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), otherwise referred to as ‘designing out crime’.

By addressing any one of these factors, crime can be prevented or reduced. Thus crime prevention is an essential ingredient in a crime management strategy complementing the efforts applied to detection.
Crime Prevention or Community Safety?

The term 'crime prevention' is often narrowly interpreted and this reinforces the view that it is solely the responsibility of the police. On the other hand the term 'community safety' is open to wider interpretation and could encourage greater participation from all sections of the community in the fight against crime.


In the booklet issued by the Metropolitan Police Service entitled 'Crime Prevention and the Partnership Approach' the following definitions were outlined.

**Crime Prevention**

'Crime prevention is an activity which positively reduces crime and the number of victims.'

Hence crime prevention incorporates issues such as law enforcement, investigation, schools involvement, environmental and social improvement, in addition to physical security. The definition is intended to move the service away from the notion that crime prevention is solely concerned with physical security, and to invite the full participation of investigative and other specialist departments.

**Community Safety**

'Community safety is a broader concept that embraces crime prevention and any activity which increases public security, safety and reassurance.'

It is now widely recognised that crime cannot be prevented by the exclusive reliance on the police and other criminal justice agencies, the bodies to which the community traditionally delegated responsibility.

'A partnership approach is needed to promote, co-ordinate and oversee involvement in effective crime prevention in an area, which will often lie beyond the competence of any single agency.'


The police have a key role in partnerships to prevent crime.

'Many successful examples of the multi-agency approach to crime prevention occur where the police Operational Commander with responsibility for a local area is clearly identified as playing a major part and is prepared to commit police operational resources.'


Crime prevention has been included within the police model since at least 1829. The most recent examination of the role was carried out as part of the Review of Police Core and Ancillary Tasks, when the integral nature of crime prevention was once again confirmed. In particular the role of the CPO was examined and described as follows:
The CPO acts as an advisor to the local commander on crime prevention matters and how these should be implemented, often through a multi-agency or partnership approach. The CPO must therefore liaise, advise and work with local authorities (Housing, Social Services, Lighting, Civil Engineering, Planning and Highway Departments), voluntary sector, medical profession/Health Authority, other police forces, Crown Prosecution Service, courts, architects, surveyors, housing associations, churches and local/national business. Most forces have a specialist CPO trained as an architectural liaison officer. There is a very strong link between crime prevention advice and community safety. In taking forward initiatives with other agencies the local commander and CPO will not wish to concentrate solely on situational measures but seek to prevent a whole range of crime such as domestic violence, drug abuse, crime problems of large housing estates, racial tension and repeat victimisation.

Methodology

Crime prevention activity needs to be prioritised to maximise results. Many initiatives are solution rather than problem based. The need for such initiatives can be identified through the following stages:

i) Audit of Problems
   BCU commanders will be able to ascertain the major time-consuming activities on their area and the policing costs involved. It is suggested that this is a management task and not for the CPO, whose skills lie elsewhere.

ii) Identify the Causes
    Having identified what the major problems are, it is the role of the CPO to explain why they are happening.

iii) Prepare an Action Plan
    The CPO should be in a position to draw up a series of costed action plans with recommendations as to which to implement. The action plan ought to describe how the project will be evaluated.

iv) Implementation of the Action Plan
    BCU commanders will wish to direct the implementation as part of the crime management strategy. The involvement of the CPO should be restricted to technical advice.

v) Evaluation
    It is suggested that the performance of the project should reflect the resource savings accrued.
Repeat victimisation is one of the key elements of a crime prevention strategy. Previously seen as a victim support issue, it now sits firmly within the sphere of operational crime management.

Work on repeat victimisation is best viewed as one tool in the analysis of crime patterns. Knowing that victimised people and places are likely to be victimised again, often within a short time, can help to target limited police resources most effectively. At the same time, victims perceive that the police are making an informed, rapid and effective response to their needs.

The reference to repeat victimisation by the Home Secretary within the national framework of key performance indicators highlights its importance. The following elements are central to tackling repeat victimisation:

- an overall crime strategy where work to reduce repeat victimisation is one element in a proactive approach;
- a fast and accurate means of identifying repeat victims;
- a planned, managed and rapid response for victims, which is integrated into day-to-day operational policing; and
- appropriate and robust partnerships where there is a common understanding of, and practical commitment to, an agreed strategy.

It is suggested therefore that BCU commanders may like to raise the profile of crime prevention within their own crime management strategy and address the following points:

- Make crime prevention a priority.
- Involve the CPO in the crime management team.
- Positively market crime prevention.
- Explore and encourage partnerships.
- Be proactive; eg, tackle repeat victimisation.
- Take ownership of crime prevention.

The remainder of this section is arranged under the seven strategic areas identified by the ACPO Crime Prevention Sub-Committee and contains, where appropriate, examples of successful initiatives and other advice which are commended to the service.
Strategic Areas for Development

Change of Culture

'Seek to change the culture of the police service so that crime prevention enjoys a higher status and is accepted as a responsibility of all officers.'

ACPO Crime Prevention Sub-Committee

Police managers communicate priorities, values and concern by their choice of issues to ask about, measure, comment upon, praise and criticise. Only by positively focusing on crime prevention can a change of culture be achieved and only then with commitment and perseverance.

A Home Office policy guidance note sent to forces in November 1992 addresses the culture of crime prevention and the role of CPOs in the service. It is outlined below for the information of BCU commanders.

The Home Office approach, in collaboration with HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, is to encourage:

(i) the development in each force of a crime prevention strategy (taking account of Home Office Circular 44/90);

(ii) the consolidation and expansion of crime prevention activity through:
    • the maintenance of effective crime prevention departments at headquarters;
    • the integration of CPOs into the local command unit management structure in such a way that the use of the full range of skills of the trained CPO is maximised particularly in support of objectives (iii) and (iv);

(iii) greater co-ordination of crime prevention and operational policing activities with particular emphasis on the use of crime data analysis;

(iv) the involvement of officers other than specialist CPOs in crime prevention through, for example:
    • devolving domestic security surveys and the servicing of Neighbourhood Watch schemes to beat constables and/or to the Special Constabulary;
    • encouraging every police officer to regard himself or herself as responsible for crime prevention, with the CPO as the source of expert advice;

(v) greater evaluation by forces of all major crime prevention initiatives;

(vi) police support for and involvement in:
    • the multi-agency approach to crime prevention at the local level as outlined in Home Office Circular 44/90 and booklet 'Partnership in Crime Prevention' with the aim of achieving...
co-ordination of effort and resources in ways to reduce crime and fear of crime;

- other community based and led crime prevention initiatives and activities (e.g., Neighbourhood Watch, crime prevention panels);

(vii) the development of a more systematic approach to reducing multiple victimisation based on the research evidence;

(viii) the effective use of the wide range of crime prevention publicity material issued by the Home Office.
Partnership

'To identify and work in partnership with agencies who can assist in the achievement of our aims.'

ACPO Crime Prevention Sub-Committee

The agencies with whom partnerships can be formed are innumerable, although effective initiatives typically include the local authority, probation service, business community and the voluntary sector.

The following three examples illustrate what can be achieved.

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**CASE STUDY 12: Luton Crime Reduction Programme (Hockwell Ring)**

Begun in 1989, this is one of the longest running crime reduction programmes in the country. It has a full-time co-ordinator who works to a borough-wide multi-agency steering committee. Among its achievements has been the comprehensive improvement of one of the town's housing estates, involving:

- improved physical security
- a concierge system
- design improvements
- provision of community rooms
- playgroup and nursery facilities
- a youth work project
- an employment initiative.

Most significantly, there has been a fall in recorded crime.
CASE STUDY 13: Operations Barford and Cruiser

Between June and October 1994 the High Wycombe area experienced a steady increase in burglaries despite regular successes against known burglars. In October 1994 the Area’s crime management team met to discuss possible strategies, including enforcement and long-term crime reduction. The Area’s staff were new to the concepts of crime reduction as promoted by the Home Office Crime Prevention Course, but were keen to explore what was an alien philosophy to many police officers.

In November 1994 an experimental initiative, code-named Operation Barford, commenced on the Downley estate; this covers about a quarter of the town and is predominantly owner-occupied with some council-rented accommodation.

The operation consisted of:

- Crime reduction survey
- High-profile policing
- Targeting of criminals
- Marketing the operation (including flyers to 8,000 homes).

As a result of the operation there was a 45 per cent reduction in burglary dwellings.

Operation Cruiser was the next phase, building on lessons learnt from Operation Barford. The area concerned showed signs of social and physical deprivation. A crime reduction survey led the local authority to develop a maintenance strategy, based around:

- the removal of rubbish and abandoned vehicles, which was achieved with the assistance of the probation service using offenders on community service orders;
- the refurbishment of houses, which was already under way and included replacement of doors and locks;
- the requirement of tenants to comply with their tenancy agreements to ensure they kept their houses and gardens clean, tidy and in good order;
- improved parking facilities; and
- the removal of existing and future graffiti when notified by police.

The police enforcement response was a zoning system, focused on access routes and thoroughfares leading to crime hot spots identified by crime pattern analysis. It also included:

- a business pager system initiated and linked to a CCTV initiative;
- marketing of the operation; and
- exhibitions and full involvement of local neighbourhood watch schemes.

The mixture of prevention and detection resulted, by the end of April 1995, in an overall reduction of burglary dwellings of 32 per cent compared with the last four months of 1994.
CASE STUDY 14: Cleaning up King’s Cross

The King’s Cross area in central London is a deprived inner city area with a resident population of some 16,000. It falls within the borough boundaries of Islington and Camden and spans four police divisions. The area is dominated by the main railway termini which handle about 100,000 passengers each weekday. The business community consists largely of small shops, offices and workshops, plus a few larger organisations. Investment has been held up for some time pending a decision on the location of the north London terminus for the Channel Tunnel link.

The area has long been notorious for street prostitution problems dating back to the 1840s, but around 1990 it began to suffer from an influx of drug dealers and more prostitutes on the streets around the railway station.

The area had effectively become a market place for the purchase of crack cocaine, heroin and sex, with far-reaching effects on the community. Local children were particularly at risk from discarded syringes and other drug paraphernalia.

In 1991 and 1992, the police mounted two separate operations to combat drug dealing, making 174 arrests. Local authorities and other agencies were also active but the overall impact was diminished by a lack of co-operation and mutual understanding.

In October 1992, prompted by pressure from the local community, agreement was reached to build a partnership between the two local authorities Islington and Camden, the Metropolitan Police, British Transport Police, other agencies such as Islington Safer Cities and local community representatives. The following aim was agreed:

Through partnership, to bring about a fundamental and positive change to the present image of King’s Cross and to improve the quality of life for those who live or work or travel through the area.’

Following a sophisticated police intelligence operation against the 150 or so dealers operating in the area, the King’s Cross partnership was officially launched on 15 February 1993 with large-scale arrests of drug dealers supported by highly visible uniformed patrols. This time, however, the police were not working alone. The partnership had helped to create a long-term joint strategy uniting a number of key agencies committed to sharing information and expertise in pursuit of a common goal.

After co-ordinated representations from police and local residents, Camden restricted the licences of fast food outlets that had afforded night-time cover to drug dealers and prostitutes. Police and Camden together targeted a hotel in which suspected drug dealing took place. Camden served a notice under the Housing Act prohibiting its further use as a hotel, while the police dealt with the misuse of drugs. Through combined action with the police, Islington served an eviction order on the tenant of a flat allegedly used for drug dealing.

Police crime prevention officers are now working with the two councils and the private sector to ‘design out’ places where drug dealing and prostitution
takes place, securing doorways and alleys, improving lighting, designing a closed circuit television system to meet the area's needs, and removing street furniture known to provide cover for dealing.

Islington agreed to fund a Partnership Co-ordinator, whose remit includes the Camden area of King's Cross – a major step towards cementing the partnership. Both councils have worked hard to improve the area's appearance by better refuse collection and a scheme to clear away discarded syringes.

As a result of joint efforts, King's Cross already 'feels' better to those who live and work there. Residents now believe that the blight can be overcome. Robust enforcement continues, with over 400 suspected dealers arrested since the start of the partnership and a conviction rate of 96 per cent. The average sentence is two and a half years imprisonment.

Specialist training has been given to all officers who deal with drug education in local schools. A free King's Cross newspaper funded by Safer Cities, Islington and Camden Councils and the Metropolitan Police has been circulated to homes and businesses in the area, giving details about the partnership aims and action. Further editions are planned, to be sponsored through partnership with business.

Still in its infancy, partnership in King's Cross holds out the promise of dealing with the root causes of drug misuse within an inner city area, as well as its more obvious symptoms.
Public Responsibility

'To seek to encourage the public to take responsibility for crime prevention in areas within their control.'

ACPO Crime Prevention Sub-Committee

Despite surveys which show that the public continues to have a high fear of crime, there is little evidence that crime prevention measures are being pursued. Indeed, even those who request domestic security surveys are predominantly middle class owner-occupiers from low-crime areas. The majority of neighbourhood watch schemes are based in similar low-crime areas.

The greatest opportunity for crime prevention is, however, in high-crime areas. Neighbourhood Watch is an ideal vehicle for the public to use to take responsibility for crime prevention in a way which is focused on local needs.

CASE STUDY 15: Cefncaeau Home Watch near Llanelli, Dyfed, and the Cefncaeau Community Centre

A few residents on a council estate in Cefncaeau recognised a need to set up a Home Watch scheme to reduce crime and vandalism in their area. The group decided that they would tackle the roots of the problem and targeted their concern at the young people who, with no local facilities, had time on their hands that was spent on street corners.

Four temporary cabins at a local police station had outlived their usefulness and the Home Watch Group spent time raising funds from sponsored walks, football matches, etc. to transport the cabins to the estate. Residents dug trenches for sewerage, water, electricity and gas and the cabins themselves were completely renovated by the group with the assistance of local young people.

The Cefncaeau Community Centre was officially opened in August 1994 and over 280 young people benefit from activities at the centre. Home Watch members went on courses of youth training and first aid and they have involved the young people in the day to day running of the centre as members of the Community Centre Committee.

Local police report a 50 per cent reduction in crime on the estate, which has a large elderly population and high rates of unemployment. Community spirit has led to an improvement in the quality of life for residents, who now take much more pride in their area. The co-ordinator of the scheme was recognised for his outstanding individual contribution in reducing crime and the fear of crime in local communities by the award of a Neighbourhood Watch medal in 1994.
Identification of Causes

'To identify the causes of crime to assist in definition of crime reduction strategies.'

ACPO Crime Prevention Sub-Committee

The causes of crime are diverse and encompass social and situational reasons. The illustration which follows is an excellent example of dealing with a causal factor of crime.

CASE STUDY 16: Guide to Gating Alleys

Alleyways, entries, ginnels, to name but a few alternatives, are found throughout the country, providing access to the backs of terraced houses. Their use by residents is limited, and deliveries and refuse collection are more often undertaken at the front of a house. Many alleyways have fallen into disrepair or become blocked by rubbish, and are perceived as unsafe.

However, a network of alleys providing access to the rear of properties also give the thief with local knowledge a choice of escape routes if needed. An analysis of a particular area in west London showed a large number of burglaries concentrated in a relatively small area served by a network of alleys.

Here, a group of residents decided to take steps to reduce their vulnerability to burglary. In co-operation with the Crime Prevention Design Adviser they paid for and erected three strong gates to block off access to rear alleys. These gates were quickly followed by others and soon there was a total of eleven gates. The effect on burglary was dramatic, with an immediate reduction in access burglaries. Other benefits were reductions in fly-tipping, littering, dog fouling and unruly behaviour, making the alleys more useful for the residents. The installation of gates proved so worthwhile that residents in another area of the estate are doing the same.

With groups of residents joining together, the cost of the gate, installation, maintenance, insurance, fees (solicitor, Planning Department, Highways Authority) and possible alleyway clearing can be split between those able to pay. In some cases sponsorship has been obtained.

An actual reduction in burglaries, less fear, less litter, less hassle, combined with more private space, more control, road safety and access has led to a cleaner, safer environment. The gating of alleys has been done in several areas around the country, but in this particular case, the residents, the local Crime Prevention Design Adviser and local authority combined to make the implementation trouble free. The experience and best practice has been written up by the Crime Prevention Design Adviser so that other residents groups will know what to expect and how to solve any potential problems along the way. (The Alleygater’s Guide to Gating Alleys—ACPO approved good practice.)
Improving the Information Base

'To improve the information base for crime prevention by integrating the technology and expertise on a local, national and international basis.'

ACPO Crime Prevention Sub-Committee

A national electronic database of crime prevention information is being pursued by the National Crime Prevention Agency Board and the Crime Prevention Sub-Committee.

However, a number of methods are currently employed to disseminate good practice, for example:

| **PRG Information Desk** | Home Office-based facility which offers guidance on good policing practice and police related research, providing a national co-ordination and dissemination service. Further details of the Information Desk are included in Section 9. |
| **PRG Research Papers** | Periodically published papers in the Crime Detection and Prevention series present research material on both crime prevention and detection in a way which informs policy and practice throughout the service. A full list of papers is included in Section 9, together with details of how to get copies of them and an order form. |
| **PSDB EPI Centre** | The European Police Information Centre based at the Police Scientific Development Branch is a computer bulletin board for the police service which caters for special interest groups, including crime prevention. |
| **HOCPC Information Service including publication of Digest** | The Home Office Crime Prevention Centre provides relevant crime prevention information to the service and through the publication of a quarterly Digest allows for an interchange of information on policing initiatives, related commercial activities and crime problems. |
| **Home Office publicity including Crime Prevention News** | The Home Office publicity unit produces a catalogue of available leaflets and other material. |

All ACPO regions have regular meetings of force Crime Prevention Officers to enable national, regional and force issues to be addressed and developed.
Situational Approach

'To continue to develop the situational approach to crime prevention including target hardening through architectural liaison, design and technology.'

ACPO Crime Prevention Sub-Committee

CPOs are ideally qualified to advise on a range of situational crime prevention measures. The following example highlights the concept of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) or 'Designing Out Crime'.

CASE STUDY 17: Wendover Public House, Wythenshawe, Manchester

The Pear Tree public house, part of the Scottish and Newcastle brewery chain, was a typical large urban pub, sited close to large council housing estates. Its size and location marked it as a community pub, with mixed-age drinking. The pub was a focus for youngsters through its pool and darts but, sited close to a row of shops and post office, it was also a suitable and popular stopping place for older members of the community.

However the pub was increasingly blighted by disturbances, many drug-related. The complicated layout of the pub lent itself to closet corner drug deals, many organised from the phone box directly outside. The pub car park gave direct access back on to the nearest estate for ease of escape. In one raid, drugs worth many thousands of pounds were abandoned under tables as a 25-strong police team moved in.

Incidents involving firearms added up to a climate of fear that stopped many people using not only the pub but also the nearby shops. Last orders were called in October 1993 after a police raid uncovered drugs and weapons. The pub was closed down and local petitions opposed its re-opening.

Re-licensing conditions stressed the need for an emphasis on safety and security, with early input on broad-based CPTED principles from Greater Manchester Police. The result was a total re-design of the pub, now named The Wendover, that has transformed it from problem pub into a model of a community local.

Features included the use of better car park perimeter fencing to create defensible space, reduced access points to the car park and lounges, better lighting, use of CCTV (with full signage to alert customers), better visibility of seating areas from the bar, and the designing-out of lobby areas so that toilet access doors are direct from pub lounges. Even the exterior shrubs and trees are restricted to a height of four feet to prevent use as hiding places/camouflage.
 Costs were £340,000 for the total refurbishment to Secured by Design (SBD) standards. Most SBD/CPTED requirements had no cost implications, such as the revised internal layout, but dealt with design elements in a different way.

The extra requirements (mainly CCTV) that completed the Wendover's SBD status cost an estimated £25,000 – comparatively small beer for a rejuvenated, thriving public house able to call itself Britain's first Secured by Design pub.

The pub went from being the brewery's second worst performer to one of its best. It is as safe and secure as any public building can be, allowing a thriving and profitable trade for the brewery, and requiring less by way of police resources.

Secured by Design is part of the ACPO national strategy for designing out crime.
Communications and Marketing

'To create an effective communications/marketing strategy for crime prevention issues.'

ACPO Crime Prevention Sub-Committee

Marketing is telling people what you have to offer and making them want it enough to obtain it – stimulating demand. It is the essential element of supplying any product or service because until something is marketed potential users will be unaware of its existence. This may deny them an available benefit or encourage the use of unsuitable or less effective alternatives.

Marketing of crime prevention needs to be appropriate and targeted to those who can best benefit from crime prevention advice. Such targeting requires making contact and promoting the service which can be provided.

The ACPO Crime Prevention Marketing Manual, launched in spring 1996, aims to introduce police officers to some of the basic marketing disciplines that will help them to identify and implement such appropriate means of 'selling' crime prevention. It is being circulated to all force CPOs.

CASE STUDY 18: Doorstoppers Campaign

As part of the service-wide campaign against burglary in London, Operation Bumblebee, the Metropolitan Police set up a working party to explore ways to tackle the problem of bogus callers. With a large number of these offences committed in the area, the resulting campaign, based on a voluntary Code of Practice for the major public service organisations, was appropriately launched in the European Year of the Elderly (the elderly are invariably the targets of bogus callers).

The Code of Practice sought to highlight and eliminate work practices that could facilitate the offence. It was launched with other publicity to raise awareness of this type of crime and the measures to prevent it. Publicity included:

- official formal launch of the Code of Practice;
- distribution of 420,000 leaflets to the elderly collecting pensions at Post Offices;
- a short Post Office video shown to queuing customers urging them to pick up an advice leaflet from racks placed by the queue;
- Metropolitan Police video explaining distraction burglaries/bogus officials;
- bogus caller scenarios with positive crime prevention messages appearing in The Archers radio programme and The Bill TV programme.
Doorstoppers is well known and the Code of Practice general enough to be adopted by other organisations. Other forces have taken Doorstoppers on board since its launch in 1993 and its success is in no small part due to an excellent marketing strategy.
Further Reference Material

A Watching Brief: A Code of Practice for CCTV in Public Places (£75)
Local Government Information Unit, 1-5 Bath Street, London. EC1V 9QQ

CCTV Operational Requirements Manual
PSDB Publication no. 17/94

CCTV – Looking out for you
A guide for those considering closed circuit television in public places.
Home Office Crime Prevention Unit, Room 583, 50 Queen Anne's Gate, London. SW1H 9AT

A Practical Guide to Crime Prevention for Local Partnerships & Executive Summary
Home Office Crime Prevention Unit, Room 583, 50 Queen Anne’s Gate, London. SW1H 9AT

Your Practical Guide to Crime Prevention (PG1)
Home Office Crime Prevention Publicity, Room 151, 50 Queen Anne’s Gate, London. SW1H 9AT

Bombs, Protecting People & Property (PPI)
Home Office Publicity, Room 153, 50 Queen Anne’s Gate, London. SW1H 9AT

Home Office Police Research Group Crime Detection & Prevention Series Nos:
46 Once Bitten, Twice Bitten: Repeat Victimisation and its Implications for Crime Prevention
52 Inter-agency Crime Prevention – Organising Local Delivery
53 Crime Prevention & Inter-agency Co-operation
52 & 53 (Supplement) Inter-agency Crime Prevention – Further Issues
54 Crime on Industrial Estates
56 Preventing Vandalism: What Works
58 Biting Back: Tackling Repeat Burglary and Car Crime
65 Local Crime Analysis
66 The Nature and Extent of Heavy Goods Vehicle Theft
68 CCTV in Town Centres: Three Case Studies
Home Office Police Research Group, 50 Queen Anne’s Gate, London. SW1H 9AT

Home Office Leaflets
Home Office Crime Prevention Publicity, Room 151, 50 Queen Anne’s Gate, London. SW1H 9AT

The National Board for Crime Prevention:
Wise after the Event – Tackling Repeat Victimisation
Preventing Burglary: A Guide for Retailers
Preventing Robbery: A Guide for Retailers
Preventing Violence against Staff: A Guide for Retailers
(Preventing External Fraud: A Guide for Retailers) due June 96
Home Office Crime Prevention Unit, Room 583, 50 Queen Anne’s Gate, London. SW1H 9AT.

Preventing Customer Theft: A Guide for Retailers
Home Office Crime Prevention Publicity, Room 151, 50 Queen Anne’s Gate, London. SW1H 9AT.

Designing out Crime Manual
Home Office Crime Prevention Centre
Secured by Design literature on:
Commercial
Refurbishment
New Homes
Available from Home Office Crime Prevention Publicity, Room 151, Queen Anne’s Gate, London. SW1H 9AT

Shop Front Security Report (£10)
British Retail Consortium, Bedford House, 69/79 Fulham High Street, London. SW6 3JW

Retail Crime Costs 1993/1994 Survey
The impact of crime and the retail response (£25), (1996)
British Retail Consortium, Bedford House, 69/79 Fulham High Street, London. SW6 3JW.

Counter Action
Metropolitan Police

Counting the Cost
A briefing paper on financial losses arising from crime.
Crime Concern & Thames Valley Partnership, (1994)

Theft Prevention Guide (Commercial Vehicle Security) – £10
Freight Transport Association. Tel: 01892 526171

Which? reports:
Car Security
Alarms
Locks, etc
Consumers’ Association

Code of Practice for the Protection of Unoccupied Buildings (£15)
Loss Prevention Council, Melrose Avenue, Borehamwood, Herts. WD6 2BJ.
Tel: 0181 2072345

Prevention and Control of Arson in Retail Premises (£10)
Also produced a summary leaflet
Arson Prevention Bureau, Melrose Avenue, Borehamwood, Herts. WD6 2BJ.
Tel: 0181 236 9700
Home Office Research Studies – Nos:

145 Young People and Crime

146 Crime against Retail and Manufacturing Premises:
Findings from the 1994 Commercial Victimisation Survey.

147 Anxiety about Crime
Findings from the 1994 British Crime Survey.

Home Office Research and Planning Unit, Room 278, 50 Queen Anne’s Gate, London. SW1H 9AT.
Tel: 0171 273 2084 (Answer Machine)

Shopping Centres and their Future, Volume 1. ISBN 010 020744 8
Available from HMSO
3. House Burglary
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Summary

Key elements of a successful house burglary strategy are:

- clearly defined, internally consistent objectives;
- a proactive, intelligence-based approach;
- adequate targeted resources;
- appropriate structures and acceptable work practices;
- an effective publicity campaign and positive media coverage;
- multi-agency co-operation;
- a crime management system which ensures an appropriate, co-ordinated response to reported burglaries and an efficient, supportive service to victims; and
- local flexibility.
Introduction

Entry into the home makes burglary a particularly sinister offence. To the victim, violation of their home is akin in many cases to violation of their person. The knowledge that a stranger has roamed freely through their home, invading privacy and handling treasured possessions, can have a deep psychological effect. The fear of burglary can consume them. Many victims lose the love of their home, others cannot sleep, or will not leave their home for fear of another burglary. The mental scars for some victims may never heal. It is for these reasons that house burglary is one of the crimes that people fear most.

House burglary has been identified as one of the most important problems facing the police and the public because of its intrusive nature and prevalence. The importance has been recognised nationally with the setting of a key objective and a key performance indicator by the Home Secretary, and indeed the preparation of this advice by ACPO emphasises the priority given to the problem by the police service. It is also recognised as being a significant part of the growth in volume crime, resulting in detection rates falling below 25 per cent, causing public concern and some criticism of the police.

Recognition of the seriousness of the problem has led to many local and some national initiatives. Operation Bumblebee within the Metropolitan Police area readily springs to mind, and most other forces have adopted Bumblebee or some other initiative to tackle house burglary. There have been some notable successes, resulting nationally in a slight drop in the burglary rate and a rise in detections. The work to tackle house burglary has not just been confined to the police; numerous other organisations have been involved, including many local authorities. The Police Research Group in their Police Operations against Crime Programme have conducted important research in an attempt to provide solutions to the many aspects of the problem. An overview of some of the group's work is included in Section 9. This work continues, and the group's work on burglary is due to be published in a handbook style in the summer of 1996.

In its crime strategy for 1995/6, the ACPO Crime Committee wished to take forward previous good work by providing a concise package of advice to be used by police forces in the continuing development of house burglary initiatives.

This paper from the Crime Committee Burglary Working Group draws together and builds on the lessons learned from the earlier initiatives and research. It provides advice and guidance on the key elements of a successful house burglary strategy. It supplements the Tackling Crime Effectively: Management Handbook and puts into one document all the necessary information to operate a local burglary strategy. The paper provides references to other material where more detailed information can be obtained. It is a significant step forward in the attempt for continuous improvement in tackling house burglary and is intended to lead to a more effective and co-ordinated approach to the problem.
Investigation

To ensure the effective investigation of house burglary, forces need to develop strategies to support effective evidence-gathering, by:

- increasing the opportunities for evidence to be gathered during house burglary investigations and raising the likelihood of detection;
- co-ordinating the response to house burglary; and
- maximising the effective use of forensic science.

Response to Initial Report of House Burglary

The initial response to the report of a house burglary is crucial to the success of an investigation.

The response should ensure a thorough and professional investigation providing the best chance of identifying and convicting the offender. This will be achieved by:

- Preserving the evidence available and making arrangements for its collection. This includes the identification of witnesses.
- Taking the appropriate action to prevent a recurrence of the crime to the same victim.
- Collecting information for intelligence and analysis purposes.
- Taking appropriate action to meet the needs of the victim.

It will be a matter for individual forces how this service is delivered. Many of the decisions will be made at BCU level and will depend upon the nature and extent of the local house burglary problem.

House burglary is a high priority nationally, and forces will need to consider carefully the use and deployment of resources if the identified aims are to be achieved. Officers and resources will need to be targeted towards those activities at scenes which are most productive. It may be necessary to consider diverting additional resources to tackling the problem, but this should be considered only after analysing how effectively existing resources are being used to investigate burglary.

In-Progress House Burglaries

Recent research in one force suggests that up to 90 per cent of offenders escape from house burglary scenes where the public report ‘in progress’ offences. The opportunity exists for forces to examine their response to such calls to make maximum impact on primary detection rates in a most cost-effective manner. The research suggests that in order to increase

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1 Solving Residential Burglary, Coupe and Griffiths.
(Police Research Group Crime Detection and Prevention Series)
arrests made at such scenes, attendance needs to be within five minutes by at least two officers.

**Attendance at House Burglaries Generally**

When implementing a house burglary strategy, forces should consider the following points:

- Fear of house burglary and current expectations of the public may well dictate that all house burglaries should be physically visited. Where possible, attendance at the crime scene should be dealt with in a single visit. The attitude of the person attending and the timeliness of the response are influential on the victim’s confidence in the service.

- Whoever attends the scene should have the skills and training to make decisions on progressing the investigation. Officers either need to be multi-skilled to enable them to conduct the whole investigation, including the scenes of crime search, or be able to assess the task and identify the need for the attendance of other specialists.

- It is important that investigative efforts are concentrated upon those offences where there is most likelihood of arresting and prosecuting offenders. Forces may need to identify the critical factors involved and consider providing guidance to decision makers on the extent of investigations.

- Research and experience has shown that a dedicated team of officers can have an impact on the investigation of house burglary. Where possible, the same team of officers should be responsible for scene visits, investigation, arrest and subsequent interviewing of offenders. Ownership of the problem will then be with one group of officers whose ability to identify patterns and produce intelligence will be greatly enhanced.

- Adequate resourcing is essential.

- Any burglary strategy should form part of a crime management model within an overall crime strategy.

- To ensure sufficient resources are available to meet the reactive demand from burglary consideration should be given to dealing with more minor crimes by telephone.

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2 *Intelligence, Surveillance and Informants: Integrated Approaches*, Maguire and John (Police Research Group Crime Detection and Prevention Series Paper 64)
Forensic science is an expensive commodity and research indicates that only 1 per cent of searches by SOCOs lead to a primary detection.\(^1\)

The following factors need consideration to ensure that forensic examination increases the chance of finding evidence:

- concentrate on scenes most likely to produce evidence, reducing the number of scene visit examinations if necessary or the scope of particular examinations;
- be more selective in the submission of physical exhibits for forensic analysis but do not prevent the collection of physical evidence found at the scene;
- focus forensic submission policy to take advantage of current developments such as AFR, DNA and the footwear index. Whilst there have been some difficulties, early results indicate that DNA will have a significant impact on linking crime scenes and identifying offenders;
- use scene of crime examination to facilitate proactive investigations by identifying patterns of offences and develop forensic intelligence;
- define the crime scene to include the offender and ensure that good practice in custody blocks supports this position; and
- allow flexibility and set different collection plans for particular operations.

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CASE STUDY 19: The ‘One-Stop’ Visit; Dudley Division – West Midlands Police

The concept of the one-stop visit was introduced following publication of the Audit Commission report in 1993.

Between the hours of 7am and 11pm dedicated teams of a detective and a SOCO together visit the scene of all house burglaries. Their visit is co-ordinated and arranged through a crime bureau, who agree with the complainant the most appropriate response. Bureau staff have been trained to identify those offences where the visit of a SOCO is likely to be most productive to avoid unnecessary deployments.

Once at the scene, the one-stop team conduct all necessary enquiries and carry out the scene of crime search, resulting in less inconvenience to the victim caused by several visits and a considerable improvement in the quality of investigation to that previously undertaken.

\(^1\) *Solving Residential Burglary*, Coupe and Griffiths, op. cit.
The result is a much improved initial investigation, a higher standard of initial report, providing more complete information upon which a decision can be made as to what further enquiries are needed which might lead to the arrest of the offender.

The Division achieves a substantially higher return on fingerprint identifications per 1,000 scene visits than any other division in the force, at considerably less cost.

Only three out of 440 scene visits were assessed as being unnecessary, whereas generally 15 per cent is the average. Checks on scenes not visited showed the decision made not to visit to be correct on all occasions.

**Victims**

Other than the general standards contained within the Victims’ Charter, national service agreements with victims of house burglary have not been developed. This should not detract from the importance of the issue. Such agreements would need considerable consultation, but there is an opportunity to provide victims with identified and consistent standards of service and send a message to police officers about the priority of house burglary.

A carefully considered agreement would enhance the public image of the service and help remove the differences between standards of service provided to house burglary victims nationwide. This is particularly true of the differences between rural and urban areas.

The following items of good practice identified by the Police Research Group$^1$ might form the basis for the development of local agreements with victims.

- an appropriate response to all reported house burglaries;
- prompt attendance in cases where the victim is elderly or infirm, alone or distressed;
- sympathetic and caring behaviour by the first officer at the scene and by other persons involved in the investigation;
- advice about local Victim Support services and contact arrangements;
- a realistic assessment of the chances of recovering property and apprehending the perpetrators;
- crime prevention advice to avoid repeat victimisation; and
- follow-up contact to advise the victim of what the police action has been and the outcome of investigations.


Police Research Group Crime Detection and Prevention Series, Paper 59
Police officers responding to reports of house burglary should ensure that account is taken of the possibility of intimidation. Witness evidence accounts for a significant proportion of the burglaries that are detected, and forces may wish to make some relatively minor changes which can help in reducing intimidation, especially on high-crime housing estates¹.

In a large number of cases intimidation begins after police contact with the witness, and forces should consider:

- giving minimal information about witness identities over police radios;
- not visiting non-victim witnesses on the day of the offence and always giving them the option of visiting a police station to give statements;
- whether a street identification should be conducted immediately following an incident;
- using screened facilities as a matter of course in identification parades;
- avoiding the release of the suspect while the witness or victim is in the vicinity of the police station;
- providing the witness with a contact besides the officer in the case;
- utilising Victim Support services to provide an early warning system to identify potentially vulnerable witnesses;
- issuing of rapid response alarms to vulnerable witnesses;
- working more closely with local authorities; for example, considering the use of civil injunctions where this represents a viable alternative to criminal proceedings; and
- increasing use of informants, surveillance, and other intelligence operations in high-crime areas where intimidation is thought to be widespread.

Relationships with other agencies should be reviewed and strengthened. Those who have a role to play in improving the treatment of witnesses include the courts, the crown court witness service, the CPS, the prison service, Victim Support and local authorities.

¹ Witness Intimidation: Strategies for Prevention, Maynard.
CASE STUDY 20: Vulnerable Witness Scheme – Northumbria Police

On the Newcastle West Area an experiment is being conducted to separate vulnerable witnesses in the absence of two waiting areas. These witnesses are identified by Victim Support, who provide preparatory counselling and accompany the witness throughout proceedings.

The witness is provided with a paging device; on the day of the hearing, he or she will be available in reasonable proximity to the court with the pager switched on. As the witness is about to be called, the court usher telephones the contact number to activate the pager and summon the witness to court.

The experiment suggests that where the provision of separate waiting areas is impracticable, innovative devices such as pagers should be tried. After some initial expense, it is a relatively cheap solution to the problem of witness intimidation around the court.
Prevention

To maximise opportunities for the prevention and reduction of house burglary forces will need to identify effective reduction and prevention strategies for house burglary by:

- developing a focused and co-ordinated approach to crime prevention for house burglary;
- encouraging the development and promoting the use of partnerships to tackle house burglary; and
- establishing robust links between agencies to ensure that long-term crime prevention is effective.

Roles and Responsibilities

The police play a central role in crime prevention – providing an effective policing service is one of the most fundamental contributions to reducing crime.

Operational commanders must play a major part and be prepared to commit operational resources to a multi-agency approach to the prevention and reduction of house burglary. This approach has led to considerable success, as illustrated by the case study overleaf.

While all officers have some responsibility for crime prevention, the work of the specialist crime prevention officer should receive increased recognition; forces may wish to consider the priority given to their duties and responsibilities in relation to house burglary. Forces may also wish to consider the status of CPOs, who must be able to deal effectively with both external agencies and the public, and gain access to police resources.

Local Focus – Using Repeat Victimisation

Police officers investigating burglaries collect much of the information vital to the identification of trends and patterns. This is an essential element in the development of a profile of house burglary problems occurring at a local level. Other agencies and local residents can assist in completing the profile. The development of the profile will also involve reviewing existing responses to house burglary and, once developed, priorities can be decided and action plans prepared.

The identification of repeat victims focuses on local ‘hot-spots’ and is an effective tool in targeting prevention measures for house burglary, as well as offering possibilities for investigation. An example of this is provided in West Yorkshire, where a scheme of graded response is provided to repeat victims, with the level of response increasing with victimisation.
CASE STUDY 21: Biting Back – Huddersfield, West Yorkshire Police

The initiative was commissioned as part of the PRG's Operations Against Crime Programme, with the purpose of developing and implementing a strategy for preventing repeat burglary in the Huddersfield division of West Yorkshire Police.¹

The approach involved a collaboration between the police, Kirklees Metropolitan Council, Victim Support and Huddersfield University. It comprised graded responses to victims based on the number of prior victimisations (reported and unreported) related to the officer investigating the most recent reported crime.

The responses were termed bronze, silver and gold. Bronze occurred after a first victimisation, silver after a second, and gold after a third or subsequent victimisation. For example, a silent (Home Office) alarm was installed for six weeks in premises subject to a gold response. A crime prevention officer would visit burgled premises as part of the silver response. The bronze-to-gold response progression reflects a change of emphasis from crime deflection to detection. The bronze level aims to deflect opportunist offenders away from repeating the crime.

The main achievements² in the first nine months were:

- reduced levels of repeat domestic burglary;
- 24 per cent decrease in domestic burglary, 5 per cent decrease in other burglary;
- no evidence of displacement for domestic burglary;
- increased arrests from temporary alarms rising from 4 per cent to 14 per cent of alarm installations;
- improved quality of service to victims; and

While essentially a matter for individual forces, it is considered that the formulation of repeat victimisation strategies should be set at force level with implementation being a local responsibility set at BCU level³.

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² Police Research Group Briefing Note 4/95

³ Enquiries in relation to repeat victimisation should be addressed to the Operational Policing Policy Unit at the Home Office (0171 273 2504)
Closer working relationships between CPOs, crime managers and specialist units are essential to ensure that crime prevention initiatives arising from the strategy are co-ordinated with other activities within the force and the BCU.

**Partnership**

A local partnership is needed to promote, co-ordinate and oversee involvement in effective crime prevention for house burglary in areas which will often lie outside the competence of any single agency. Excellent examples are provided in architectural liaison and the designing-out crime initiatives, where considerable progress has been made.

Individual forces should consider their role in the identification and co-ordination locally of those voluntary agencies, businesses, criminal justice agencies and local authorities which have the resources, responsibility or the ability to impact upon the situational or social problems identified. There is a need for the police to increase the awareness of other agencies about the seriousness of the problem and of their responsibility to contribute.

The prevention strategy will require forces to continue the development of partnerships. Local authorities have a particularly important role to play tackling house burglary on council estates. Any strategy for house burglary will struggle to succeed without their co-operation.

The successful multi-agency approach to community safety requires the formulation of a local burglary reduction strategy and structure within which agencies can co-operate as well as deliver their own particular contribution. The objectives of strategies may vary for high and low crime areas, to take account of their very different needs, but by the adoption of a systematic approach to problem-solving it will be possible to develop clear strategies tailored to local problems.

Recommended reading is the guidance provided in the Home Office paper, *A Practical Guide to Crime Prevention for Local Partnerships*.

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1 Prepared for the Home Office by Crime Concern in September 1993
CASE STUDY 22: Partnerships with Local Authorities – Coventry City Council and the London Borough of Hackney

Through the Safer Estates Scheme, Coventry agreed a ‘get tough’ approach to persons convicted of crime where council premises were connected in some way with the crime.

Once a tenant has been convicted, the council holds an eviction hearing; if evicted the local authority has no obligation to re-house. This clearly illustrates a positive inter-agency approach to tackling crime and has received favourable comment from the media and the general public.

A further example is provided by the London Borough of Hackney, which has a policy of issuing injunctions against individuals or families on high-crime estates who have a record of intimidating potential witnesses. The council will also evict tenants who ignore the injunctions.

CASE STUDY 23: Use of Neighbourhood Watch Schemes – Telford (West Mercia Constabulary)

Within West Mercia what was once a unique scheme was set up that uses local volunteers to help prevent burglary repeat victimisation within their own community. It was launched in October 1994 in the Leegomery area of Telford, which comprises 2,000 houses and 5,500 residents. There is a mix of housing tenure with over 27 per cent belonging to the local authority, and the remainder being privately owned or rented.

The volunteers all live in the area and have been trained in inter-personal skills by Shropshire Probation Service, and in the use of domestic crime prevention surveys by West Mercia Constabulary.

Each morning the Watch co-ordinator telephones the crime desk at Wellington and is given information about burglaries that have occurred in the last 24 hours. A volunteer is alerted who visits the burglary victim and carries out a crime prevention survey. If the home is local authority or housing association owned, the required devices are fitted by these agencies. For those privately owned or rented, discount cards are given for use at local stores where a discount of 25 per cent has been negotiated.

Community Responsibility

The problem of house burglary should be seen as a community problem and not solely a police responsibility. It is essential that the public should be made aware that they have a responsibility to protect their own property. The public must necessarily include all owners of property, local authorities, housing associations etc. Neighbourhood watch schemes have an important role to play, and this is an area where forces may consider that a more directive approach to their work could be adopted.
The volunteers hold regular support and training meetings.

Following the start of the project, house burglaries across Telford fell by about 7 per cent while those on the Leegomery Estate fell by 27 per cent. There were 18 attempted repeat victimisations but only four were successful. The repeat victimisation rate fell from 12.7 per cent to 3.6 per cent.

Property marking, especially of goods most likely to be stolen such as electrical goods¹, is cheap and easily carried out. Forces should consider adopting a more high-profile and proactive approach to such initiatives, using their influence to encourage manufacturers and retailers to accept their responsibility to ensure that identification marks are not easily removable.

The overall strategy should aim to identify ways of increasing the identification of property stolen.

National Focus

The Home Office Crime Prevention Centre has national responsibilities to develop partnerships with industry, government departments and other national bodies. The Centre ensures that information is collated and disseminated; its quarterly digest circulated to all forces contains a range of good ideas and practice.

The Centre should have a particular responsibility for the identification and resolution of long-term crime prevention issues. Continued representation on the Crime Prevention Agency Management Board and other national committees will ensure that the voice of the service continues to be heard.

¹ Disrupting the Distribution of Stolen Electrical Goods, Kock, Kemp and Rix
Police Research Group Crime Detection and Prevention Series, Paper 69
Intelligence

To develop the best use of intelligence to tackle house burglary, forces need strategies on the use of good quality intelligence and crime analysis to encourage a proactive approach. Such strategies should:

- optimise the use of intelligence and crime analysis in tackling burglary;
- encourage the use of crime prevention/reduction techniques, in parallel with targeting efforts; and
- encourage the development of the appropriate information technology systems.

Proactivity

Proactive policing is set to be a key theme for the future. Proactivity is the common link between prevention and detection of burglary and brings them together in operational tactics. Responsibility for directing proactive work locally must lie with the BCU commander; in non-emergency policing forces need to consider giving it priority over reactive policing. The central aim is to relieve some officers of demand-led work, and identify and tackle house burglary problems in a more targeted way.

The Police Research Group identifies that proactivity will require an enhanced system for the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence. These will be the driving force for a house burglary strategy in a properly resourced intelligence unit. Investment will be required in briefing processes to ensure that all police officers are made to feel a valued part of the drive against burglary and keep their knowledge up to date.

The development of a sound intelligence system and the use of up-to-date technology is vital to a successful proactive strategy. The management of intelligence on burglary requires the same disciplines as the management of all other kinds of intelligence. Concentration must be given to developing actionable intelligence, which will require a technical capability, and forces may need to consider providing guidance on how much and what kind of material should be recorded and kept.

A proactive approach to the prevention and investigation of house burglary MUST accompany an effective response to reports of house burglary. Proactivity should target resources on the basis of criminal intelligence and crime analysis, with the level of resources recognising the fact that intelligence must be acted upon. If successful, proactivity will identify prolific offenders, burglars and handlers. It will identify patterns

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1 Combating Burglary: An Evaluation of Three Strategies, Stockdale and Gresham
Police Research Group Crime Detection and Prevention Series, Paper 59

Intelligence, Surveillance and Informants: Integrated Approaches, Maguire and John
Police Research Group Crime Detection and Prevention Series, Paper 64
or series of burglary offences, providing information upon which to base reduction tactics.

A coherent targeting regime enabling prolific and developing burglars to be identified and decisions made, on a factual basis, about which offenders will be subject to intensive police action, is an essential ingredient of sound intelligence management. Offenders should be targeted constantly – officers must know who they are and informants deployed against them. Analysis of association, offending patterns, drug abuse and the disposal of stolen property should be undertaken as part of the plan to ‘manage the offender’. The link between drugs and acquisitive crime¹ should be considered by forces when identifying burglars and handlers.

The use of informants is a cost-effective method of investigating burglary. Guidance on their use is contained in ACPO guidelines² circulated to forces by the Crime Committee. The use of surveillance is an essential proactive tool but its high cost means forces will need to consider carefully its use to ensure effectiveness and efficiency.

Forces will need to consider carefully the collection of forensic intelligence. This is a relatively untapped source of material which could be invaluable in the identification of offenders and offence patterns. Examples of forensic intelligence include inconclusive fingerprint and DNA identifications³.

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¹ Drugs and Crime, Bond and Morgan
² ACPO National Guidelines on the Use and Management of Informants and Related Issues (Unpublished)
³ Police Use of Forensic Science: An Analysis of SOCIMS, Police Research Group
Neighbourhood Watch Schemes

These schemes have an important role to play as a source of good intelligence and there is some evidence they can reduce crime, notably burglary. Forces should consider how such schemes can be better targeted and directed towards this problem.

Schemes have been implemented in widely differing contexts, but most commonly in areas of relative affluence and low crime rates. Areas with high crime rates, where burglary is prevalent, pose particular problems in introducing and maintaining such schemes. Forces might consider relating the purpose of these schemes to the crime rate and vary their characteristics and police involvement accordingly.

In high-crime areas, a priority would be to reduce crime and fear, with considerable multi-agency support being required to introduce and maintain such schemes, police leadership being less overt. The schemes would be tailor-made to reflect the sensitivities of the community.

In low-crime areas Neighbourhood Watch might aim to keep the crime rate low, while maintaining public confidence and police/public relations.

Secondary Detections

One of the main aims of the house burglary strategy must be an increase in primary detections, but sight should not be lost of the value of lesser aims which have a valuable contribution to make. Failure to interview offenders about past offences has clear implications for detection rates and the ‘value for money’ approach enunciated nationally. It also has a number of other benefits:

- satisfaction of the victim knowing that the offender has been caught and is in prison;
- the provision of intelligence ie, which burglar committed what offence(s); and
- bringing investigations to a conclusion rather than looking for an offender in the community.

Of particular relevance to this issue is the stance taken by individual forces in relation to post-sentence visiting. It is a legitimate and important weapon in the investigation of house burglary. Forces need to consider their own policy in this area and make the best possible use of this opportunity.

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1 Policing and Neighbourhood Watch Schemes: Strategic Issues, Laycock and Tilley
Police Research Group Crime Detection and Prevention Series, Paper 60
Crime Analysis

House burglary is a volume crime amenable to crime analysis to aid both prevention and detection tactics. It is an essential tool for tackling the problem and requires investment in the development of information technology systems. Repeat victimisation is an example of the need to develop information technology to facilitate analysis of information already routinely collected.

The future development of police information technology is outlined in the National Strategy for Police Information Systems (NSPIS). Crime analysis is seen as a medium-term priority ultimately linked to the development of a national crime and incident recording system.

In the interim, the work of the Police Research Group on local crime analysis\(^1\) provides guidance which forces should consider on the issues to be addressed and the facilities required from a computer system to undertake crime analysis especially in relation to high-volume crime.

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CASE STUDY 24: Crime Pattern Analysis System (CPAS and SHOP) – South Tyneside (Northumbria Police)

A computer package developed from a joint project run by Northumbria Police and the University of Newcastle has been fully operational since 1993 and offers the following main features providing a scientific approach to tackling high-volume crime:

- selection of crimes: viz. times of day, crime type, and modus operandi;
- point map showing where each crime occurred, allowing easy access to detailed crime reports;
- high/abnormal risk map showing areas subject to unusually high or low levels of criminality;
- predicted risk map illustrating areas likely to suffer high crime rates;
- map overlays showing streets, locations, symbols, railways and area boundaries;
- bar charts; and
- clustering ability to manually place together related crimes.

The CPAS system has been combined with a system developed on a Lotus 123 Spreadsheet. This system essentially has been designed to collate data on known burglary offenders (Statistical House Offender Profile – SHOP).

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\(^1\) Local Crime Analysis, Read and Oldfield
Police Research Group Crime Detection and Prevention Series. Paper 65
It is now possible to identify a pattern of burglaries through CPAS and subsequently establish those offenders who reside, have been sighted, offended or have associates or handlers in the same area.

The combined effect has been to facilitate resource deployment and the targeting of burglary offenders, which has led to a 29 per cent reduction in burglaries on South Tyneside. This reduction has been maintained over two years during which time primary detections have risen to 20 per cent.

Two other forces have purchased the product and in April 1996 geographical mapping will be added, further enhancing its capabilities.

Investment is required in dedicated civilian analytical staff who will routinely bring the best techniques of crime pattern analysis and ANACAPA to bear against core offenders within a properly focused intelligence unit. Many forces have already derived considerable benefits by this investment.
Publicity Strategy

To make best use of publicity when tackling house burglary, forces will need to promote strategies which recognise the importance of publicity and optimise its use.

Although this advice is aimed at providing guidance for force press officers and officers involved in the prevention and detection of house burglaries, the principles could be applied to any publicity campaign. The effective use of publicity will mean that any house burglary strategy will bite more quickly and the publicising of successes will keep the momentum going both within the organisation, and in the eyes of the public.

The Aims of the Campaign

Before embarking on any campaign, forces will need to identify its aims and objectives and agree them with all other parties involved.

Forces may wish to consider the following objectives as the focus of a burglary publicity campaign:

- to increase the offender's fear of arrest and conviction;
- to increase public awareness of appropriate prevention measures;
- to reduce the fear of house burglary;
- to demonstrate to the public that the police care about this type of crime and are having an effect.

A well planned, imaginative and forceful campaign is vital to attract and maintain high-profile media coverage, which should in turn help to achieve the key objectives.

Target Audience

Police officers and civilian staff are an important audience for any public relations activity, as their attitude to the organisation is often reflected in their dealings with the public and other key external audiences. Although a publicity strategy is aimed mainly at the media, the campaign must be marketed well internally and to other organisations and agencies involved in the partnership. Influential opinion-formers could play a key role in supporting the campaign and should form part of the target audience, in addition to members of the criminal justice system.

Preparation

Planning and preparation are vital to keep the campaign in the public spotlight. Consideration should be given to adopting a thematic
approach, designed to prolong media attention and to maintain interest and commitment, both internally and externally.

Forces should also consider adopting a readily identifiable slogan or logo which will automatically link the force and the campaign in the public’s minds. An example is Bumblebee, developed by the Metropolitan Police and used elsewhere. Forces which have adopted this logo have rapidly built campaign publicity on existing public awareness.

A high-profile campaign will undoubtedly generate a demand for information and forces must be able to meet expectations by, for example, supplying data, literature and posters.

Attracting Media Coverage

To attract and maintain media interest the campaign must be imaginative, timely and forceful. At the same time, care should be taken to achieve a balance so as to release matters of interest to the media without increasing the public’s fear of crime.

The launch must have a new and stimulating news angle and forces might consider that it is led by a senior ACPO officer to add authority and importance. It should be accompanied by appealing photo opportunities and other publicity techniques such as videos.

Sponsorship

Financial or 'in kind' sponsorship from the public and private sector is an important aspect of project development which needs consideration by forces. With increasing demands being made on businesses, it is necessary to plan carefully and produce a written proposition clearly outlining the potential benefits to the proposed sponsor and their level of involvement.

CASE STUDY 25: Sponsorship – Operation Bumblebee

Metropolitan Police

Substantial sponsorship was obtained from Yellow Pages to enable the distribution of anti-burglary Crime Prevention Literature direct to households in London. In 1994, Yellow Pages Directories contained crime prevention literature, including two stickers – one to warn off potential bogus callers and the other to remind householders to check the identity of callers at the door.

General Publicity

Although much of the campaign publicity will be driven by the media, consideration should be given to other means of attracting the public’s attention. Forces might consider such things as officers attending car boot sales, crime prevention displays in shopping centres and paid-for
advertising. Properly managed and targeted, this form of publicity should attract high returns.

Evaluation

Evaluating the effectiveness of a campaign is difficult, and often media evaluation can be carried out only in 'column inches' and 'opportunities to see'. Some form of objective evaluation is vital, to measure the contribution of publicity to the success or otherwise of the campaign. In addition, a positive evaluation should increase the interest of potential future sponsors.

Maintaining the Campaign

The campaign should not end with the last press release. It is important to carry the theme on whenever possible and revitalise the campaign by adopting new strands, for example by expanding into small businesses.
Performance Measurement

In developing the use of performance measurement forces will wish to promote consistent common standards for evaluating house burglary initiatives by:

- the identification of suitable critical success factors;
- the identification of performance measures which can be adapted to changing situations as initiatives develop.

It is essential that the primary outputs of any house burglary strategy are identified and subject to performance measurement, both quantitative and qualitative. This will give direction to the personnel involved and ensure they are making the planned contribution to identified targets which should be achievable yet challenging.

Any performance measures must include the key performance indicators set by the Home Secretary. Appendix A provides suggestions of other measures which may be considered. Where appropriate, the indicators should be ratios, for example per 100 officers or per 1,000 population. The list provided is not comprehensive and the service must continue to develop relevant performance measures. Managers must also be aware of the financial cost of resources and outcomes achieved.

Forces should consider the appropriate levels of a performance indicator required not only for internal use but also externally.
### Appendix A

#### Investigation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL</th>
<th>QUALITATIVE</th>
<th>QUANTITATIVE</th>
<th>MAINTENANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior Management</td>
<td>– Perception of the quality of service</td>
<td>– Number recorded</td>
<td>See below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Media comment</td>
<td>– Number detected</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Complaints</td>
<td>– Number primary detections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Conviction rates</td>
<td>– % change in numbers over a given period</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Proportion of cautioned offenders who re-offend</td>
<td>– Property recovered</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Proportion of searches that lead to arrest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Management</td>
<td>– Perception of the quality of service</td>
<td>– As senior management above</td>
<td>Emphasis on one geographical area may reduce performance in another.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Compliance with service delivery standards</td>
<td>– Number detected per officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Proportion of arrests leading to charge</td>
<td>– Property recovered from Sec 18 PACE searches</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Proportion of files accepted by the CPS</td>
<td>– % SOCO visits yielding marks and identification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Number of offenders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Delivery</td>
<td>– Perception of the quality of service</td>
<td>– No. of TICs not previously reported</td>
<td>See above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Compliance with standards:</td>
<td>– No. of target suspects arrested</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– crime desk procedures</td>
<td>– No. of targets yielding detections (including post-sentence visits)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– control room service</td>
<td>– Arrests from marked property</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– identificationsuites procedures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Quality of data collected from house to house enquiries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Quality of crime reports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Quality of initial decision-making</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>– Quality of interviews</td>
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</tbody>
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See above

Emphasis on one geographical area may reduce performance in another. Indicators should:
- measure detections by geographical area
- measure public perception
- measure displacement
### Intelligence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL</th>
<th>QUALITATIVE</th>
<th>QUANTITATIVE</th>
<th>MAINTENANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Senior Management | – Value of stolen property recovered through informants compared with total stolen property recovered | – Budget spent on informants  
– Number of detections directly attributable to intelligence | See below                                                                   |
| Area Management   |                                                                               | – Number of detections directly attributable to intelligence  
– Number of intelligence items identifying target criminals  
– Number of offenders identified | An emphasis on collecting information on the criminal may divert attention from routine gathering of intelligence. Indicators should monitor:  
– routine submission numbers  
– quality of submissions  
– payout to informants |
| Service Delivery  | – Level of intelligence that reaches the highest level                      | – Number of arrests as a result of intelligence  
– Amount of stolen property recovered  
– Number of detectives with informants  
– Number of intelligence forms submitted | See above                                                                   |

An emphasis on collecting information on the criminal may divert attention from routine gathering of intelligence. Indicators should monitor:
- routine submission numbers
- quality of submissions
- payout to informants
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL</th>
<th>QUALITATIVE</th>
<th>QUANTITATIVE</th>
<th>MAINTENANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior Management</td>
<td>– Impression of victims&lt;br&gt;– Letters of complaint and thanks&lt;br&gt;– Media comment</td>
<td>– Reduction in burglary per 1,000 dwellings&lt;br&gt;– Burglary per 1,000 dwellings inside NHW schemes&lt;br&gt;– Burglary per 1,000 dwellings outside NHW schemes&lt;br&gt;– Number of repeat victims</td>
<td>See below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Management</td>
<td>– Arrests from alarm activations</td>
<td>– Attempts as a proportion of full commission of offence&lt;br&gt;– Take-up rate of crime prevention advice and purchase&lt;br&gt;– Number of repeat victims</td>
<td>Such an example relates to repeat victims who are impossible to reduce to nil. Therefore the top priority must be the service we give them:&lt;br&gt;– response time&lt;br&gt;– scenes of crime response&lt;br&gt;– crime prevention advice given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Delivery</td>
<td>– Arrests from alarm activations</td>
<td>– Increase in number of prevention surveys&lt;br&gt;– Attendance at crime prevention meetings&lt;br&gt;– Amount of marked property returned to owners</td>
<td>See above</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See below

Such an example relates to repeat victims who are impossible to reduce to nil. Therefore the top priority must be the service we give them:
– response time
– scenes of crime response
– crime prevention advice given
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Introduction

The misuse of drugs is a problem which has become particularly evident in our generation. No longer can it be seen in isolation, but as a problem that has connections with other crime, particularly acquisitive crime.


After careful consideration of the Government White Paper, in September 1995 the ACPO Crime Drugs Sub-Committee produced a paper, *ACPO Drugs Strategy*, which was intended to assist forces in the development/review of their individual strategies.

This section of *Tackling Crime Effectively – Volume 2* has been prepared by the Drugs Sub-Committee, and is intended to supplement the strategy document by giving further advice and examples.
Enforcement

The Government wishes to see carefully targeted and effective action to reduce the incidence of drug-related crime. A fundamental part of its strategy is to see that the law is effectively enforced, especially against those involved in the supply and trafficking of illegal drugs. Street level policing, such as the disruption of street dealing, has an important part to play in containing the extent of drug misuse and in reducing harm to the individual and the community. A range of approaches tailored to local circumstances should be developed, upon which local communities can be consulted and informed.

The principal aim of increasing the safety of communities from drug-related crime will require multi-agency co-ordination, at both national and local levels. Multi-agency working challenges much of the practice and thinking of all concerned but it is worth investing in what is seen as an essential ingredient in tackling drug misuse.

The police and HM Customs and Excise share responsibility for enforcing anti-drugs legislation. The White Paper states that the police have a particular responsibility for dealing with offences of manufacture, supply and possession of drugs. Customs have primary responsibility for preventing and detecting the illegal import and export of controlled drugs, the investigation of organisations and individuals engaged in international drug smuggling and their prosecution. There is, inevitably, overlap in both operational activity and intelligence-gathering.

Enforcement should operate in these key areas:

- force and community level – focus on disruption of markets at street level. Street level dealers are a source of intelligence on the activities of ‘higher’ and more sophisticated dealing and trafficking networks;

- international, national and regional operations – dedicated Drugs Units of Regional Crime Squads, working in close co-operation with HM Customs and Excise, should target activity at these levels. Individual forces should support this, primarily through the provision of intelligence.

Key points in the area of enforcement are to:

- gather data on trends and methodology of drug dealing;
- ensure targets for enforcement operations are identified;
- mount effective enforcement operations against targets;
- identify intelligence to be passed to NCIS;
- ensure effective exchange of information between agencies;
- increase the awareness of all operational officers;
- disrupt markets and stop new markets forming;
• conduct financial investigations;
• utilise scientific support; and
• utilise Crimestoppers.

Gather Data on Trends and Methodology of Drug Dealing

NCIS gathers information of this nature, which is published as 'The United Kingdom's Drug Trends Report'. At each level of policing, audits should be used to formulate policing plans, prioritise resource allocation and to measure performance. For example the Greater Manchester Police commissioned a drugs audit on each of its territorial divisions, and then utilised the results to assist in formulating business plans. In addition, drug-related local objectives were identified for the Local Policing Plan.

Ensure Targets for Enforcement Operations are Identified

Crime management units are recommended as the most effective means of generating, analysing and disseminating intelligence. The use of informants should be maximised. Criteria should be developed to ensure the identification of targets at both the Basic Command Unit (BCU) and the force level. (For more information on targets refer to page 101.)

Greater Manchester Police

The Force Drug Unit define their particular target as being 'a major distributor, supplier or manufacturer of Class A or Class B-controlled drugs and includes those individuals acting on their behalf in the capacity of courier or buyer'. A list of indicators that an individual conforms to that definition, for example previous convictions for drug dealing, has been drawn up and is applied to each target application prior to target status being awarded.

Mount Effective Enforcement Operations Against Targets

Force and community level operations should contribute to the containment of a drug-dealing problem, and its eventual reduction or elimination. Where possible, communities should be consulted during the planning stage of operations. This consultation may be with specific community members eg, community or youth leaders, local authority officials, or may be with the wider community in the form of the exploration of alternatives to address a drug-dealing problem in an area.

Crime managers should have access to a full range of tactical options including:

• surveillance;
• technical evidence-gathering;
• covert operations;
• financial investigation;
• drug searches; and
• pharmacy inspections.

The capacity to mount operations across BCU boundaries is important, as is the provision of resources when the sophistication or scale of operation calls for greater resources than are available to BCU commanders.

**CASE STUDY 26: 'Sting' Operation**

Definition: 'An independent long-term undercover operation designed, by virtue of the manner in which it is established within the environment, to attract members of the criminal classes to freely resort to a particular place or premises, in order to provide evidence or intelligence against themselves or others of their fraternity.'

A storefront operation (Operation Herring) conducted within the Metropolitan Police against street robbers and involving an undercover jewellery shop is a prime example of this type of operation. The fact that the commodity offered for trade in this example is jewellery has little relevance inasmuch as the object of the exercise is to provide reference guidelines only.

There are many key areas to consider when setting up a sting operation:

• training;
• working practices;
• officer welfare;
• authority levels;
• legal basis;
• performance indicators;
• financing; and
• test purchase operations.
Identify Intelligence to be Passed to NCIS

Forces should ensure compliance with the guidelines in the Service Level Agreement between NCIS and ACPO relating to intelligence to be passed to NCIS. Periodic audits should be carried out to ensure that this is the case.

Ensure Effective Exchange of Information Between Agencies

Ensure there are facilities for effective exchange of information and intelligence among law-enforcement agencies.

Train all Operational Officers on Drug Matters

Forces should take steps to ensure that ALL officers are made aware, through regular training, of the links between drug misuse and other forms of criminality, particularly acquisitive crime. Great potential exists for investigating other forms of criminality when dealing with drug offenders. In this respect consideration could be given to using posters in custody areas, targeted questions within custody records, or for developing procedures which automatically link drugs with crime if the arrest is for one of the common acquisitive crimes.

Disrupt Markets and Stop New Markets Forming

The disruption of street dealing, or ‘bottom-up’ approach, can prove extremely effective. Street-level policing may be used towards achieving this. Early response to street-level dealing to prevent the establishment of a drug marketplace should take precedence over surveillance except in exceptional circumstances.

At clubs and similar venues where large numbers of young people are dancing, drugs are a common problem. Harm minimisation measures at such venues need to be balanced by vigilant efforts to control the supply or possession of drugs on the premises (refer to Harm Reduction section below).

Financial Investigations

A strategy on financial investigation is essential to complement criminal prosecutions in order that optimum utilisation can be made of the funds available within the terms of Home Office Circular 10/1994. Important elements in such a strategy and its implementation include increased proactive investigation, more vigorous implementation of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and Drugs Trafficking Act 1994, and improving the quality of financial disclosures.
Financial investigations are also vitally important in obtaining information and intelligence about drug-related crime. Money is a major part of the drug problem – it causes people to traffic in drugs and funds the distribution networks.

Scientific Support

Clear guidelines should be developed for the appropriate use of scientific support in the investigation of drug offences, ranging from drug-testing kits through to the evidence required to support importation and supply charges, so that the most cost-effective approaches can be established.

Forces should ensure that all officers are made aware of scientific advances which can support the identification of controlled drugs and the linking of drugs items in order to combat low-level street dealers through to major traffickers.

Forces should take steps to ensure a mechanism is in place for regular discussions with forensic science providers so that clear guidelines for scientific support can be established and implemented. This would lead to a user requirement.

Crimestoppers

Crimestoppers is a valuable source of gathering information from the public. Forces are encouraged to support the initiative and make the fullest possible use of the information that is forthcoming.
Intelligence

To make optimum use of resources and ensure that those engaged in trafficking of controlled drugs are discovered and pursued to the point of arrest and prosecution, drug enforcement initiatives should be intelligence based. This can be divided into three areas:

- intelligence;
- targeting; and
- informants.

The objective of NCIS is to assist police forces and Customs by providing them with intelligence to help them target major criminals. NCIS has an active part to play as it is responsible for the collection, analysis, research and dissemination of intelligence relating to major criminals involved in the distribution and trafficking of drugs.

There are substantial overlaps with others working in this field; it is necessary therefore to refer to the more general examination of the criminal intelligence process being conducted by the Criminal Intelligence Steering Group. In the meantime, in the context of drugs there is a specific area to mention, that of prisons.

As measures to prevent drugs being smuggled into prisons take more effect, prison officers may find themselves in an ever-increasing evidential role, particularly when dealing with visitors. There is a clear need for support to be provided. Forces with prison establishments in their area should ensure liaison arrangements with local prison establishments covering issues such as:

- the supply and exchange of intelligence;
- the disposal of drugs seized or found in prison;
- prosecution and cautioning policy in relation to drugs; and
- advice and training on evidence-gathering.

Targeting

There are a number of proven areas of investigation which should be considered when researching a subject prior to taking the decision to target that particular individual. The information/intelligence obtained may be able to corroborate the original information which identified the suspect as a possible target. In addition, areas of weakness may be revealed which can be exploited if it is decided to adopt the suspect as a target.

Areas to be examined prior to a decision to target might include:
• transport – identify all vehicles to which the subject has access;
• property, which the subject has access to;
• criminal associates;
• communication – identify all means used by the suspect. Use the potential to draw intelligence from this, eg, by analysis of mobile phone print-outs; and
• finance – identify bank accounts, credit facilities. Carrying out proactive investigations may reveal significant information about the criminality of the subject.

The enquiries conducted will vary upon the level of criminality involved. In the selection of targets there should be a full analytical assessment of the intelligence. (See also the Technology section below on Management Information Systems.)

The success of any target operation is based on the quality of intelligence, and its subsequent development and analysis. Intelligence must be seen as being able to inform and direct targeting decisions.

When working with other agencies it is important from the outset to identify and agree, without ambiguity, the roles each party will play.

Informants

The ACPO manual, National Guidelines on the Use and Management of Informants, is a reference to assist forces in their informant capability. In addition to this consideration may be given to:

• increasing the number of informants;
• optimising performance;
• training packages for informant management; and
• ways to increase informant payment budgets.

Increasing the number of informants

It is recommended that forces have effective systems to monitor their informant capability. It is advantageous not only to have the ability to easily quantify the number and location of registered informants but also the actual number, location and proportion that are considered active. Valuable management information can be obtained to evaluate performance and identify areas for improvement.

 Drug misusers provide a route to dealers, dealers provide a route to traffickers. The ‘bottom-up’ approach towards identifying dealers and traffickers is encouraged.
Sussex Police

To raise awareness among officers of the value of informants, the force issued to all officers a booklet entitled ‘A Simple Guide to Handling Informants’, which gives practical guidance on how to recruit and cultivate informants.

Optimising performance

The ability to task informants proactively, whether this be geographically, by offence type, association type or by some other means is considered good practice. Computerised databases can be used to record details, provide feedback and quantify success rates.

Merseyside Police

The force embarked on a programme to change the culture, throughout all ranks, to one in which the value and effectiveness of informants are constantly emphasised. It included one-day seminars for all crime managers and co-ordinators, and shorter presentations to all superintendents and members of area management. Skill profiles express the desirability that prospective candidates for specialist CID posts should have informant-handling skills.

Training packages

The need which exists for specific training in handling and controlling informants is currently being addressed by the Criminal Intelligence Steering Group.

Ways to increase informant payment budgets

Most forces have a dedicated and identifiable budget from which to reward informants. However, it is also important to be able to separate and identify running costs as opposed to rewards. It is equally important to be able to quantify sums received from outside sources, such as insurance companies, to ensure opportunities are maximised; potential untapped resources are available if the effort is taken to pursue them.

Authority levels for authorising and supervising rewards should be focused at an appropriate level commensurate with reducing bureaucracy and lines of communication, increasing empowerment and speeding up the decision-making process while maintaining a high degree of consistency and integrity.
Demand Reduction and Education

In developing their response to drug misuse, forces should consider both internal and external education. Recent surveys of children and young people indicate that more are experimenting with drugs and a greater percentage are becoming regular drug misusers. Emphasis must be placed on reversing this trend, thereby reducing the demand for drugs.

A range of issues can be considered:

- training our own staff;
- providing a consistent and effective approach to the content of external police presentations;
- training of other drug-related agency staff and identified public groups in 'police specific' matters;
- drug-prevention training of young people, particularly in schools; and
- development of drug-related incident policies within schools.

Training of Police Staff

Forces must recognise the need for a minimum level of understanding on drug misuse required for all operational police officers. Besides practical training of officers in relation to legislation and powers, habits of drug misusers, identification of drugs and associated paraphernalia, staff should also be made aware of the level of involvement we have with other agencies.

Content of External Presentations

The police have traditionally given presentations on drug-related issues to diverse audiences, including teachers, parents and community groups. Consistency and relevancy are vital, as is the need to adhere to those issues that are 'police specific' such as:

- drug offence statistics;
- law and procedure relating to drugs;
- cautioning policy;
- drug agency referral; and
- identification of drugs and paraphernalia.

Training of Other Agencies

Drug Reference Groups (DRGs), having a broad membership, may be useful to identify agencies who can deliver drug-prevention training to a wider community. The police role should be part of the training...
programme co-ordinated through DRGs. The aim should be to offer a co-ordinated package based on consistent police participation.

Drug Education in Schools

The White Paper proposes a partnership approach allowing individual agencies responsibilities within their role. While education authorities have responsibility for teaching children within the school, the use of other agencies, including the police, is an optional part of structured drug education programmes. Guidance to schools has been given in DFE Circular 4/1995. Any police input as visiting speakers should be part of a co-ordinated approach with other agencies, and should have been planned as part of an overall programme. It should complement other teaching, the tone and substance should match the age and maturity of the pupils involved, and teachers should always be involved so that they are able to deal with any follow up questions or concerns. The content of the presentation should follow the above advice for external presentations.

A flexible police approach is necessary to enable an effective input to be made to different types of schools, eg, pupils with special needs. The input must be tailored to meet the school’s specific circumstances.

Teaching about drug misuse is unlikely to have a lasting effect if a lesson is given in isolation or as a one-off response to a drug-related incident in a school. Teaching approaches which set out to shock or to frighten may actually increase interest and encourage experimentation.

The delivery of drug education is best led by classroom teachers. Access to good quality training and information will help to build teacher confidence. The police, alongside other professionals, can assist in the provision of such training and information about drugs.

CASE STUDY 27: Metropolitan Police – ‘Project Charlie’

This initiative was piloted in Hackney and involved specialist education staff. ‘Chemical Abuse Resolution Lies in Education’ is a drug abuse prevention programme for primary schoolchildren based on building self-esteem, teaching social competencies and discouraging the use of drugs as a way to avoid problems. It has been evaluated by an independent researcher on behalf of the Home Office Drug Prevention Initiative, and found to have been positively received by children and teachers. A follow-up evaluation is planned for children who have progressed to secondary schools.
CASE STUDY 28: Strathclyde Police – ‘Drugwise’

This is a drug-education programme designed to enable young people to consider some of the issues related to drugs which might impact on their lives. It aims to provide opportunities for exploring issues which relate to young people’s involvement with drugs, therefore exploitation and criminality receive attention in the programme. It builds on effective practice in education for personal development yet focuses on drug-related issues in the context of a health education programme.

NOTE:

In 1993 a document entitled ‘Police School Liaison: Guidance on Good Practice’ was produced; in the light of the White Paper and DFE Circular 4/1995 it is recommended by the ACPO Working Group that this should now be ignored.

School Drug-Related Incident Policies

The White Paper and the DFE Circular direct schools towards the creation of a drug policy (although there is no statutory obligation to have such a policy). The fact that a school has such a policy should be a demonstration of good practice rather than a statement that it has a drug problem.

The police role should involve more than merely offering help on the policy, and must include a commitment to appropriate action which should be consistent across the force. All officers who may come into contact with schools, including operational officers, must be aware of these policies.

CASE STUDY 29: Hertfordshire Constabulary

The force provides a clear outline of its response to schools, including the provision of training to staff and use of peer-led programmes. These are supported by clearly identified resource commitments. Each division has a schools liaison officer who has received extensive training. The partnership principle is utilised in an agreement between the health authority, education authority and police. The force uses drug-testing kits for incidents within schools.
Harm Reduction

Harm reduction can be seen as a range of measures designed to minimise the harm caused to all members of society, directly or indirectly, through drug misuse, including initiatives to:

- promote health and well-being;
- reduce the potential harm caused to individuals through criminalisation (case disposal);
- minimise the risk of infection and disease;
- address the wider social consequences caused through drug-related crime and behaviour.

These measures, invariably involving other agencies, hinge on the key theme of partnership.

Health and Well-Being Through a Tiered Approach

The police rarely address issues of health and well-being when dealing with drug-related incidents, and in this respect forces should consider adopting a tiered model of referral. A key concept of harm reduction is referral to treatment programmes, the process whereby an individual drug user receives information or guidance, enabling them to interact with an accredited caring agency as a source of advice, counselling and treatment. Referral can be mandatory or non-mandatory, and can be used in conjunction with cautioning or prosecution arrangements.

A number of forces, including Avon and Somerset, use a tiered referral system to cater for varying levels of drug problems and work actively in partnership with statutory and voluntary agencies.

A tiered approach can be progressively implemented, accommodating individuals in the tier appropriate to the seriousness of their actions or needs. It can also be adopted by forces a tier at a time, as and when a force can put schemes in place with partners from the caring sectors who will need to provide the care workers and expertise to support effective referral.

This is based on the provision of advisory literature about drugs, and information about the existence, location and availability of agencies for advice and counselling. It should not suggest that drug misuse is tolerated or understate the legal or health risks.

There are health and legal implications to a programme of testing drugs on premises such as dance venues and, as such, these schemes should not be supported.
CASE STUDY 30: Greater Manchester Police

Working in partnership with the LIFELINE charity, the force supports Lifeline workers in the adoption of the ‘Safer Dancing’ initiative. This encompasses a range of issues to reduce the risk of harm in clubs and dance events by the issue of guidelines and safety information to clubs (e.g., advice on the provision of cool areas and free drinking water). In addition, informative literature and advice tailored for the young is given out by Lifeline outreach workers actually within clubs and dance venues.

Tier Two – facilitated referral

This escalates the response by facilitating contact between sources of care and advice, and an individual known to be at risk of harm.

CASE STUDY 31: South Wales Constabulary

Since 1992 the force has operated an arrest referral scheme in conjunction with local drug agencies. Offenders suitable for caution are bailed to a predetermined caution event where a voluntary drug agency worker is available to offer confidential advice and information; take-up of the optional service is high.

CASE STUDY 32: Greater Manchester Police (at Wigan)
West Mercia Constabulary (at Hereford)

Both forces have schemes whereby psychiatric nurses work within custody centres in order to offer early referral advice and information on drugs and other issues. The services are provided in liaison with the local health trust in partnership initiatives to break the cycle of drugs and crime. The schemes provide specialist intervention in any appropriate case, not only where offenders are cautioned. Follow-up appointments are available after release from custody.

Tier Three – mandatory referral

It is paramount that forces recognise there are no powers available to the police to mandate any kind of referral. The requisite powers for a Tier Three Referral Scheme are those of the courts alone. Detailed negotiations and agreements between the courts, the legal professionals and the Crown Prosecution Service will be required before the tier could become operational.

The basis for this is a partnership scheme in which serious drug-related offenders, after charging, can be assessed in depth by probation and health service professionals to discover the existence of a genuine drug addiction or related condition.

The offender can potentially be diverted from a custodial sentence (which may otherwise result) into a Probation Order with an enforceable
CASE STUDY 33: Devon and Cornwall

Co-operating with a Probation Service-led initiative in Plymouth, the force is actively targeting prolific burglars and directly confronting them with their drug-inspired criminality. Probation and health service professionals then assess offenders suitable for diversion into mandatory treatment programmes.

condition of completion of an appropriate programme. Non-compliance would be a breach of the order and may result in imprisonment.

Case Disposal

Although the need for a positive approach to drug law enforcement is acknowledged, forces should be sensitive to the likely effects of entering an individual into the court system. An enforcement policy is therefore supplemented by the promotion of issues of health and personal development, supported by the efforts of other agencies.

Cautioning is a recognised method of diverting suitable people away from the courts and does not imply that drug misuse is tolerated or condoned. However, a consistent approach is necessary, which should be monitored and evaluated.

CASE STUDY 34: Avon and Somerset

The force has a programme of training for officers responsible for administering cautions, and a central caution message to ensure consistency in the content and delivery of cautions to offenders.

Minimise the Risk of Infection and Disease

ACPO supports needle-exchange schemes, which can have tremendous benefits. Active lobbying for their continuation and expansion is to be encouraged. Any action that may compromise the activities or credibility of schemes, or of the overall ethos of harm reduction, should be expressly prohibited. Action contrary to this should be taken only where serious need exists, and then only after appropriate consideration and authority.

Police surgeons should be encouraged to achieve a common and consistent approach to prisoners in custody who are believed to be suffering the effects of drugs or withdrawal. Surgeons are guided clinically by a Department of Health document, Substance Misuse – Detainees in Police Custody: Guidelines for Clinical Management. While respecting clinical independence, forces should recognise the apparent advantages of, for example, methadone programmes and should do nothing that would interrupt existing courses of treatment simply because an individual is in
custody. This issue could be raised through Drug Action Team structures to improve 24-hour access to the information needed to confirm/deny a prisoner's claim of drug or methadone dependency, and a means sought to fund equitably any such police action. In addition, use should be made of the Home Office Addicts Index and the requirements placed on police surgeons by the relevant regulations.

Addressing the Wider Social Consequences

The presence of drug dealers and drug misusers in a community can affect all aspects of community life, breeding crime, antisocial behaviour and dangers to public health. Forces should work in partnership with other agencies on local strategies for prevention and minimisation of drug-related harm through the co-ordinating arena of DRGs and DATs.
Partnership

A major theme of the Government strategy is to encourage organisations to work in partnership to tackle the drug problem, which in essence entails finding local solutions to local needs. Partnership can be defined as an association between a number of individuals, groups and agencies to pursue a common goal.

Partnership should not be seen in isolation but as forming an integral part of our efforts to tackle the drug problem. The starting point of a shared agenda must be a common understanding of the philosophies underlying the work of the different agencies.

The Government's plans are assisted by:

- Drug Action Teams;
- Drug Reference Groups;
- Home Office Drug Prevention teams.

**Drug Action Teams (DATs)**

One of the key features in the Government strategy is the establishment of DATs generally being coterminous with district health authority areas. These teams comprise senior representatives from health, education, probation, police, prison, local authority and social services. In addition, HM Customs could be included where the geographical boundaries include major ports and airports.

DATs are strategic bodies and their members should look creatively at multi-agency approaches to the wider issues involved. Police representatives are encouraged to take a full active role.

**Drug Reference Groups (DRGs)**

These are advisory groups to DATs and consist of local experts from a wide variety of backgrounds. Police membership is a matter for local decision but the police representative should be empowered to make tactical decisions.

**Home Office Drug Prevention Initiative**

This initiative established teams which work closely with local communities in finding effective ways of preventing the spread of drugs misuse. Forces are encouraged to work with these teams and DATs should use this resource as an integral part of their local plans in developing and promoting drug prevention activities.

Within **PARTNERSHIP** there are various facets to consider:

- using other agencies in assessing problems;
- designing out crime;
- use of licensing /civil powers;
- youth involvement;
- funding.
CASE STUDY 35: Bradford – A Drug Prevention City

During the latter part of 1992 the police and other agencies became aware of an increasing drug problem involving young people in the city centre public houses and clubs. It was against this backdrop that the ‘Bradford – A Drug Prevention City’ and ‘Drugwatch’ campaigns were launched. The project had a multi-agency management committee including Rotary, Soroptimists, local education authority, probation, local authority, schools, Home Office Drug Prevention Initiative, police, magistrates and others. It targeted experimental and recreational drug misuse by providing a free telephone information line, information literature, posters on local public transport and a publicity campaign in the local press. The initial information campaign has been evaluated and was well received, particularly by young people.

Using Other Agencies in Assessment of Problems

Each organisation will have a different experience of drug misuse within its area of responsibility. Police will have information on street dealing and trafficking networks, while health authorities will have statistics on drug use and health needs. Similarly, school surveys often reveal previously hidden or neglected aspects of misuse. Other specialist drugs organisations will also hold unique insights into the drug problem locally. An audit of all agencies and resources locally, and not just the obvious services, is therefore a prerequisite to good planning. Better information leads to better decision making, both at organisational and strategic levels.

Audits could include sample surveys and questionnaires conducted by local authorities or drug agencies through to full-scale multi-level academic reviews. Gaps in services can be identified and recommendations on policy development made. The police service can contribute by way of arrest statistics, information on types of drugs in circulation, locations frequented or similar background data.

Designing out Crime

Police crime prevention officers and architectural liaison officers have expertise which can be applied to places persistently used for trafficking or misuse of drugs, for example:

- security surveys on premises and public areas;
- crime pattern analysis;
- locking or blocking off hidden or disused areas;
- improved lighting;
- access control systems;
- CCTV.
These methods are particularly useful in high risk/low police access situations such as housing estates, public houses, clubs and rave venues.

**CASE STUDY 36: Operation Welwyn**

Launched in 1993 in London's King's Cross area, which had become well known for prostitution and the supply of crack cocaine and heroin. The area spans Camden and Islington Council boundaries and four police divisions. The Metropolitan Police formed a partnership with the two councils, Islington Safer Cities and other local agencies. Police action included the use of undercover officers and sophisticated video surveillance equipment. The local authorities carried out environmental changes, improved street lighting, cleanliness and traffic management, and also improved the appearance of the area by designing out crime in the local council estates.

Large-scale arrests of drug dealers in the area have resulted in a conviction rate of 96 per cent due largely to the quality of the evidence adduced. A long-term strategy is being developed that will unite the key agencies, sharing expertise and information, to continue the momentum.

**Use of Licensing / Civil Powers**

Local authorities have many regulatory responsibilities which can be used effectively to prevent or control drug misuse. For example:

- restrictions on, or special conditions attached to, late-night eating houses, dance venues or licensed premises;
- local authority tenancy agreements and eviction policies can increase safety for the whole community;
- use of civil injunctions prohibiting anti-social behaviour.

Other agencies may have regulatory powers which could reveal new opportunities that can be used.

**Youth Involvement**

The White Paper specifically targets young people who are at risk of taking drugs. One area of particular concern is drug dealing at youth events such as raves; in this respect conditions attached to licences, staff training and basic health care provisions at such venues should be examined. Young people should be encouraged to participate in seeking solutions.
CASE STUDY 37: Operation Lifestyle

In 1989 Humberside Police developed an initiative which is financed through business sponsorship and is a partnership not only with the sponsors but also with the local authorities, the Education Department, voluntary and statutory agencies, the High Sheriff, local press and radio, and other organisations. The aim was to encourage better relationships between young people and the police and to encourage a partnership approach to dealing with community problems.

In order to counteract boredom during summer holidays, young people are encouraged to get together and carry out a project that will benefit the local community. Prizes are awarded. Other areas have since adopted the scheme.

Funding Opportunities

Some funding has been provided for the DATs by Government. However, the partnership principle recognises the greater impact of sharing problems and actions together and using resources more effectively. This may on occasions lead to joint funding of initiatives. Further funding may be sought by partnership applications for specialist funding.

CASE STUDY 38: Trafford Community Drug Team – ‘Next Step’

Trafford Community Drug Team and Manchester TEC operate a free and confidential service for unemployed people who have a drug problem and offer information, advice, guidance and support on training, education and job opportunities in the Trafford District. Leaflets are available within public places including police stations. It is supported by the European Social Fund and the Single Regeneration Budget.
Central to the improvement of performance is the development of systems which produce a more effective deployment of resources and provide accurate and comprehensible measurement of results achieved. It is desirable that a standard system is developed for use by all forces, adapted to meet local needs. This is a long-term project being conducted by the ACPO TARC Computer Group.

CASE STUDY 39: HM Customs and Excise

The Investigation Division use a computerised data collection system for activity analysis. Officers are required to record manually daily activities, using designated codes, which are then input to a computer. The same system also incorporates a methodology for determining the category and value of each investigation, using a simple questionnaire which is prepared at the commencement of an investigation and updated thereafter. By coupling the two blocks of information the manager is provided quarterly with an analysis of the work undertaken and the deployment of staff.

To be fully effective, such activity information needs to be aligned with target assessment.

CASE STUDY 40: South Eastern Regional Crime Squad

A system was devised which allocated points to prioritise intelligence packages and requests for assistance from forces. A minimum score for acceptance of an operation was set, the form being completed in all circumstances, including internally-generated operations. The system represents a powerful management tool to ensure that operations are directed at top-level criminals, and that work is equitably distributed. The evaluation system has been circulated by the National Co-ordinator of Regional Crime Squads as best practice. The form is easily adaptable to the needs of local proactive crime and drugs units.
Technical Support

Technical support is an essential ingredient of many drug operations and all forces should hold a range of suitable equipment. It is important that such equipment, which may be sensitive and costly, is deployed efficiently and within legal requirements. To achieve this an effective managerial control is necessary.

Force Technical Support Units should be staffed with suitably qualified civilian personnel, supported by police liaison if necessary.

Regional Technical Support Units, incorporated within the organisation and funding structures which apply to Regional Crime Squads, should take account of the operational needs and requirements of constituent forces and the RCS.

A centrally funded National Technical Support Unit is maintained within the Police Scientific Development Branch at Sandridge. This assists Regional Technical Support Units and other law-enforcement agencies by providing facilities, expertise and equipment which is not otherwise readily available. It also monitors and co-ordinates developmental projects within Technical Support Units, thus preventing expensive and unnecessary duplication.
Performance Measurement

The Government proposes to assess progress towards the aim of increasing community safety from drug-related crime by the use of a key performance indicator for the police of:

- the number of arrests and disposals of offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 per 1,000 population.

In the collection of statistics forces are urged to exercise care when recording arrests to ensure all are recorded, not just those by specialised squads.

Additional indicators are being developed in the light of work on drug-related crime. In order to develop effective drug strategies, it is important that forces use performance indicators which monitor the impact of the strategy and the ways in which it might be improved. To assist forces work is currently being carried out by the ACPO Crime Drugs Sub-Committee.

In this respect, while recognising the autonomy and individuality of the different forces, it is essential that the principle of ‘consistency in construction’ should apply in all instances. The proposed framework which has been developed was based on:

- the principles involved in measurement of performance;
- the definition of drug-related crime as given in the White Paper;
- a three-tier system of measurement.

Arrangements are in hand for the following three forces to pilot an evaluation of the system, commencing 1 April 1996 for 12 months: Metropolitan Police (South West Area), Nottinghamshire Constabulary and West Yorkshire Police.

CASE STUDY 41: Greater Manchester Police

The force, in conjunction with the Henry Fielding Centre of Manchester University, has been involved in the production of a PRG document, which is a source of research-based knowledge, to reach a workable proposal in this complex and difficult area. It has proved technically complex to draw up simple and measurable systems. (*Performance Indicators for Local Anti-Drugs Strategies: A Preliminary Analysis. PRG Paper No. 62.*)

Principles of Performance Measurement

The following principles have been adopted by the ACPO Performance Measurement Working Group:

- any system for measurement must be based on a realistic and objective assessment of the scale of the problem;
it should use only those factors that are capable of being measured in terms of input, output and outcome;

all the indicators should be standardised, to allow for direct comparisons between areas and over time;

the systems adopted must be capable of passing the acid test of being understood by the general public;

they must also be comprehensive and useful to police staff, ensuring that they are of direct benefit to the decision-making process.

Three-Tier System of Measurement

The proposed system relies on three tiers of indicators, of which only the first is mandatory. The first tier consists of indicators at force level to:

• measure the size of the drug problem;
• produce a measure of enforcement activity;
• produce a measure of harm-reduction activity;
• produce a measure of preventative action.

The second tier consists of indicators to measure activity at specialist unit level:

• produce a measure of enforcement activity;
• produce a measure of harm-reduction activity;
• produce a measure of preventative action;
• produce a measure of education action.

The final tier consists of indicators to measure enforcement activity at BCU level.
Research

Drugs are an endemic feature of crime. Any attempt to propose a solution to the problem should be founded on progressive, articulate and objective knowledge.

The Government White Paper *Tackling Drugs Together* is a key source document for any drug strategy. Similarly, the ACMD's report *Police, Drug Misusers and the Community* is recognised as a definitive statement in support of any strategic response by the police.

There is a vast amount of literature and opinion that is directed towards the subject. A series of questions is therefore suggested which, if answered, will serve to promote the role of research as a vital contributor to a modern police strategy. The questions are:

- What research is available?
- What can it produce?
- What are the possible areas that may be considered in the future?

**What Research is Available?**

A great deal of work has been done in this area; the Institute for the Study of Drug Dependence has an internationally recognised drug reference library, the Home Office Police Research Group produce relevant material in this area and there are many others.

The availability of research may be best increased if it is set within a joint agenda. This can be illustrated by the role of research that may be sponsored under the auspices of the local Drug Action Teams. There has been debate concerning the compatibility of Health Authority drug misuse databases with other sources of information, in an assessment of the scale and extent of local drug problems and initiatives undertaken to deal with them. The issue of confidentiality may best be addressed by the inclusion of a joint initiative in this area under the guidance of the local DAT.

Where forces commission research they are encouraged to convey details to the ACPO Crime Drugs Sub-Committee and also to the Home Office Police Research Group, in order to monitor developments and disseminate information.

**What Can Research Produce?**

The value of research is in its ability to focus understanding, reach agreement about the complexity of the problem, and finally to initiate activity to deal with it. There can be no more powerful sponsor than the need to have research in any police strategy.
What Possible Areas May be Considered in the Future?

The following have been suggested:

• The issue of drivers driving while under the influence of drugs, legal or illegal.

• Are current police tactics capable of dealing with the immediacy of change within current drug markets?

• Is there a role, of whatever nature, for police within drug education at schools?

• Can the 'Business Intelligence Model' lead to better understanding of, and effectiveness against, organised crime within the drug arena?

There are many more.

Conclusion

The complex nature of the drug problem calls for a sophisticated and objective approach in attempting to deal with it. Research can perform a vital role in shaping that response. If these questions can be placed within the consciousness of strategic thinkers within the police service, then the potential to produce a policy that will have real effect will be greatly increased.
5. Armed Criminality
5. Armed Criminality
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Introduction

In 1995/96 the ACPO Crime Committee designated armed criminality as one of the three operational priorities (the other two relating to drugs and burglary) in its strategy. The choice of this as a priority is in recognition of the fact that we live in an increasingly violent society where the number of incidents involving the criminal use of firearms continues to rise, posing a threat to both the general public and to police officers. Such is the concern within the police service that at their 1995 Annual Conference the Police Federation took a vote on whether police should be armed. An overwhelming majority voted against. That may well have been because the UK does not mirror New York, Washington and those other cities of the world where indiscriminate killings are commonplace. At least not yet.

However, the trend does sound alarm bells. The most recent Home Office statistics (1993) show that the police recorded almost 14,000 offences in which firearms were used – a 5 per cent increase on the previous year and a 75 per cent increase over the last ten years. A total of 140,000 firearms and shotgun certificates were issued in 1994 – an increase of 1 per cent on the previous year – and only 1 per cent of new applicants were refused, which is a smaller proportion than in previous years. Alongside that there were 80 more registered firearms dealers than the year before, taking the total to over 2,500.

Add to this the unknown number of weapons smuggled into the country which go direct to criminal hands and the number of de-activated weapons which are subsequently re-activated, and there emerges a patently obvious conclusion that more firearms are available for criminal use. This is likely to be reflected in an increase in armed robberies, aggravated burglaries, violence associated with drug dealing and other crimes, extortion and protection within some ethnic and crime groupings, and contract shootings associated with organised crime. Clearly all of this puts the public and police at greater risk.

There are several sources from which criminals can acquire firearms. One of the most obvious means is theft. In 1993 there were 3,108 offences of burglary and theft recorded by the police in which firearms were reported to have been stolen – a 78 per cent increase on the number of similar offences five years previously. Almost half were air weapons, but well over a third were shotguns, pistols and rifles, with just under 2,000 of the total being stolen from residential premises. These weapons went literally straight into the hands of criminals who most probably went on to commit even more serious offences and/or sold them, lent or hired them to others for no other purpose than the commission of criminal offences. There are several examples of criminal armourers who eagerly buy stolen weapons, adapt them for criminal use, and then hire them to would-be armed robbers and the like.
What can the police do about this problem? The answer has to be a more consistent approach within the police service to reduce the opportunity of firearms getting into criminal hands. This can be achieved by:

• better intelligence;
• an exemplary system of firearms registration and control; and
• the promotion of crime prevention measures to reduce criminal opportunity.

The above should run in tandem with the remorseless detection of armed offenders, supported by the criminal justice system.

It is in everybody’s interest that this area of criminal activity is addressed and that the police service has a consistent approach to reduce armed criminality, before the cure becomes more painful than the disease.

The following advice on tackling armed criminality has been prepared by the Armed Criminality Working Group of the ACPO Crime Committee.
Operations

The operational response of the police service should be a key component of any strategy. Forces may wish to consider:

- issuing all officers with a personal copy of the ACPO document *Staying Alive*, which details the response to be taken when attending firearms incidents;

- ensuring that the number of armed officers is reviewed to reflect the ever-increasing demand placed upon them by the major growth in the number of firearms incidents over the past few years;

- the availability of body armour to operational patrol officers; and

- the development of a suitable intelligence database recording details of target criminals suspected of having access to firearms, and all firearms incidents including reports of ‘shots heard’ and incidents where shotgun cartridges are discovered in suspicious circumstances (particularly in urban environments). This should be used to identify firearms ‘hot spots’ to assist in the deployment of armed response vehicles.

CASE STUDY 42: Greater Manchester Police

The need to develop a proactive firearms strategy was recognised following a growing gun/drug culture in the Moss Side district of the city. Young teenage gang members are known to have access to guns and are attracted to the macho image associated with such possession. Intelligence suggests that unless this is dealt with positively the time will come when the gangs involved in such criminality will be prepared to fire upon police.

In January 1993, Greater Manchester established the Major Armed Crime Unit as part of the Major Crime Investigations Section, commanded by a detective chief inspector and employing two operational syndicates each headed by a detective inspector with a detective sergeant and five detective constables. The syndicates are supported by a dedicated research unit who develop operations against nominated targets. Planned operations to arrest targets are always carried out with the support of the force firearms department.
The effective use of intelligence is vital to policing operations.

- The gathering of intelligence should be prioritised as a principal method of investigation.
- Forces should consider utilising computerised data systems to assist in the analysis of incidents involving firearms.
- Intelligence packages should be developed to task operational teams.
- A multi-agency approach to the gathering of intelligence is recommended.
- The potential for intelligence-gathering during the process of scientific examination should be fully utilised.

The Identification of ‘Hot Spots’

The identification of ‘hot spots’ relating to the criminal use of firearms in a force area will in part be a subjective exercise based on the amount of illegal firearms activity in a location and the threat posed to the unarmed officer tasked with the daily policing of such areas.

Other factors to be taken into account will include:

- the amount of drug dealing in an area;
- the number of illicit drinking dens in an area;
- the number of ‘blues parties’/raves that take place;
- the number of violent street robberies;
- the movement of target criminals;
- the staging of an annual carnival; and
- economic and social factors such as high-density council dwellings, the number of unemployed males aged between 16 and 30, single parent families and the number of opportunities presented to the armed criminal by ‘soft’ targets such as cash collectors, betting shops, off-licences, chemists, etc.

The identification of such ‘hot spots’ will of course be a matter for each force but the exercise should inform decisions regarding ARV deployment.
Prevention and Illegal Supply

It is essential that substantial efforts are made to prevent the illegal importation of firearms and legally held firearms passing to the criminal market. The following provide scope for initiatives:

• Every effort must be made to prevent the diversion of firearms from legal sources such as firearms dealers and military establishments to the criminal fraternity. This may be assisted in some areas by the development of liaison with local officers of the Ministry of Defence Police.

• Registered firearms dealers – forces should provide appropriate crime prevention advice to promote high standards regarding security of personnel and premises.

• It is suggested that standard information packs be issued to prospective firearms dealers to promote their understanding of the registration system.

• Forces may wish to strengthen the supervision of firearms dealers. Consideration could be given to employing officers with a background of firearms training to undertake regular, as opposed to ad hoc, inspections of firearms dealers; ideally, they should be part of the force criminal intelligence bureau or a pertinent operational unit. In Greater Manchester Police, for example, trained inspection officers are attached to the operational armed crime squad.

• It is recommended that crime prevention advice on security of firearms is made available and distributed to firearms-certificate holders.

• It is important to emphasise that legitimate shooting organisations are potentially valuable sources of information. In recognition of their important role, they should be encouraged to participate jointly in the preparation of guidance notes and assist in circulating details to their membership.

• Armed robbery – consideration should be given to issuing advice in the form of booklets or information packages to shopkeepers, bank staff, building society staff and those at premises likely to be vulnerable and targeted by armed criminals. The Metropolitan Police and South Wales Constabulary have both produced excellent packages in conjunction with local industry.

• Vulnerable premises should be encouraged to install closed-circuit TV which accords with ACPO-approved standards.

• An emphasis should be made on increasing public awareness in respect of the growing number of firearms thefts and the need for crime prevention measures.

• Firearms amnesties should be considered periodically and co-ordinated by ACPO Crime Committee in consultation with the Home Office.
Assistance from other Agencies

Assistance can be sought from the following sources:

Forensic Science Service Laboratories

The following laboratories specialise in the field of firearm and ballistic examination. An 'unsolved crimes' index is maintained to assist investigators.

Huntingdon – tel 01480 450071
Lambeth – tel 0171 230 6319
Glasgow – tel 0141 204 2626
Belfast – tel 01232 359000

Proof Houses

These establishments issue certificates in respect of de-activated firearms and may assist in identifying weapons which have been re-activated. They also hold indices with records of proofing.

London – tel 0171 481 2695
Birmingham – tel 0121 643 3860

Department of Trade and Industry

This agency deals with the granting and issuing of import licences and may assist where there is suspicion that a firearm may have been imported illegally.

Cleveland – tel 01642 364333

Military

The following may assist in establishing whether a particular firearm was issued to military personnel.

Ministry of Defence Police, Sussex – tel 01371 854000
6. Major Crime Investigation: the BCU Commander's Role
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Introduction

The investigation and management of serious or major crimes involves many complex issues, ranging from the use of informants and covert surveillance to the effective application of logistical factors, funding, and local, divisional and force policies.

It is vital that BCU commanders understand all the issues that affect this process as well as appreciating where the issues fit into their own role as the local commander. They do not need to have an in-depth knowledge of the role of the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO).

It is acknowledged that forces structure their response to the investigation of major crime in a variety of ways. This can mean that responsibility is vested absolutely with the BCU commander, supported by centrally-based SIOs. Other forces treat these crimes as a force-level responsibility, for which an SIO is responsible and who will need a BCU commander’s support and co-operation. This chapter identifies issues which all BCU commanders will wish to consider, but it may be necessary for some forces to adapt the management emphasis of the chapter to suit their own approach to major crime investigation.

BCU commanders must have an understanding of the issues because they are both accountable and responsible for the investigation of all crimes occurring on their own divisions.

They provide 'support for' the investigation, in that they are responsible for providing a policy that enables the allocation of sufficient relevant logistics, personnel, accommodation, local training, etc. This responsibility stays with the BCU commander, as does the ownership of the crime.

They also provide 'support in' the investigation, which relates to that part of a serious crime management policy which enables the senior investigating officers to receive support through consultation with other senior detectives. This then allows the SIOs to utilise all their experience and knowledge.

This guide has been prepared by officers in the Crime Faculty at Bramshill. It raises factors that will need to be considered in the formulation, amendment or development of any local or force policy on the three distinct phases of major crime investigation:

1. Before the Investigation.
2. During the Investigation.
3. After the Investigation.
Phase One:  
Before the Investigation

It is essential that an effective, dynamic policy exists that enables all those with key management responsibilities to support those tasked with managing and investigating what is likely to become a high-profile crime. The investigation of these crimes is also likely to be protracted and can affect the contingency funds and budgets of any BCU and force.

For BCU commanders new to their role, this guide will identify areas which a local crime management policy ought to cover. For experienced BCU commanders, or those with previous experience in the role of major or serious crime investigation, this guide will serve as an opportunity to re-examine whether existing local policy needs amending, updating or developing.

Each of the following points needs to be considered when developing the pre-event elements of a local major crime policy. They are posed in the second person to encourage your direct involvement in considering each point.

**Force Policy**

- What is your understanding of current force policy on the management and investigation of serious and major crimes?
- How up to date is that policy?

**Logistical Support**

- How well does your policy provide logistical support for the SIOs in the investigation of major or serious crimes?
- How do you know how well it supports the SIO?
- What arrangements exist on the BCU which would enable a major crime investigation to be set up and managed with the minimum disruption to normal policing activities? These factors might include logistical factors as well as staffing and other human resource implications.
- What arrangements would you want to be in place to enable a medium-sized major incident room to be set up at a moment’s notice? This may require thought to be given to establishing a physical resource away from the local police station.
- What central logistical support systems exist to support major crime investigations?
- What guidance does your policy give to those who would need to implement such an action?
• How have you provided for administration during the investigation? In practical terms, what policy guidance exists for the establishment of suitable administrative support and what effect does this have on local ‘normal business’?

• During a major crime investigation, the investigation team will need to be equipped with a significant amount of equipment and resources. What is your policy for making available any such extra equipment to enable both the investigation team and the normal or routine staffing functions to operate?

• What possible local sponsorship arrangements might assist in providing the extra resources and equipment that a major crime investigation would demand? How does your policy allow for this type of initiative to be implemented?

• At both the scene of a major crime and in the major crime investigation room, there will be a need for appropriate catering arrangements which comply with the various Health and Safety Act requirements. How does your policy ensure this?

• The establishment of an effective and efficient investigation team relies on having an up-to-date personnel information system. How does your policy ensure that the most appropriate staff are available, for roles such as HOLMES indexer, at short notice?

• Apart from those persons actively involved in the major investigation team, what policy exists to support those 'left behind', whose workloads will inevitably increase?

• What policy arrangements exist to establish connections between your force’s personnel unit and the local management team?

• How does your BCU or force training policy ensure that sufficient properly trained personnel exist from which an appropriate number can be used in a major crime investigation? For example, there is a national requirement to ensure that only properly trained personnel operate the HOLMES system. Does your policy ensure that sufficient reserves of trained personnel are available? What aspects of your policy ensure that personnel who are transferred, promoted or resign are replaced and trained to the required standard?

Financial Management Support

• How does your policy deal with the aspects of overall and day to day financial control in advance of a major crime investigation? How is this actually structured? Who oversees the financial management of the SIO and the investigation?

• How does your force finance policy support a major crime investigation?

• How is your (and your force’s) financial policy made known to all those with a management responsibility so as to ensure a clear understanding of fiscal factors?
• What financial checks and balances exist to monitor the effect a major crime investigation will have on existing force finance policy?

• How does your policy ensure that negative fiscal lessons learned from previous major crime investigations will not be repeated in the next investigation, while also ensuring that all positive lessons and economising factors are incorporated too? In other words, how do you ensure that all good value for money factors relevant to your BCU and to the force as a whole are included? What criteria are you using to judge VFM? If you conclude that lessons have been learned which could benefit future major crime investigations, how will you ensure that the rest of the force also benefits from these?

• How do you keep abreast of developments in the financial efficiency of major crime investigations across the force?

**Communication with other Parties**

High-profile major crimes and series of crimes are likely to impact in a variety of ways. There will be the inevitable media and press interest. There will be an increase in interest in your BCU from force headquarters. There will also be an increase in perspective from the police authority and local consultative groups, committees and panels. Each of these elements can be better dealt with if they are covered in a local policy, or when it is ensured that existing force policy on these factors is well known and seen to be effective.

**Press and Media Policy**

• How does your local policy on major crime investigation co-ordinate with your own local press strategy, or that of your force?

• How can you best assist the SIO? You may consider placing a uniformed officer at the SIO’s disposal to act as the contact point for the media. If so, how will you be sure that this person is adequately trained to handle sensitive media interest? Best practice suggests that a Press Relations Officer should be appointed. The BCU commander would not normally become involved in press conferences about crimes being dealt with by an SIO, but you will need to liaise with the Press Relations Officer and SIO to discuss press and media policy.

• Be sure that local practices in relation to the media and press concur with your force policy. Contact your press officer at regular intervals, and most certainly at the first stage of a major or serious crime enquiry.

• Establish what is your force policy about communicating with the police authority. This will normally be undertaken by a chief officer if considered appropriate.
• Develop a line of communication for general information with your local consultative groups and ensure that the SIO is aware of local and force policy so as not to create confusion and/or animosity.

• Does your local policy ensure that all members of your staff (both police and civilian support staff) know not to speak independently to any person about any aspect of a major crime investigation?

A declared local policy on major or serious crime investigation incorporating all these factors provides a useful framework which will minimise confusion and bad practice. Such considerations also provide ample opportunities to create a dynamic policy which draws on good practice from previous investigations and may generate relevant performance indicators.

Linked Series of Major Crimes

The BCU commander retains ownership of a major crime investigation occurring within that BCU. This is so even if the major crime is found to be one of a linked series of other similar crimes. However, overall command of a linked series would rest with the officer appointed by the chief constables concerned as the Officer in Overall Command. Any local major crime investigation policy must consider how the above points would be affected by the discovery of a linked series.

Does your local major crime investigation policy provide continuity with all other local major crime policies and the force policy so that, in the event of a linked series being identified, there would be no conflict between local policies?
Phase Two: During the Investigation

Once a major crime investigation has been set up, the role of the BCU commander must be to provide support to the SIO in line with the individual force policy. Policy may differ between forces – some will devolve that support responsibility to the divisional commander, while other forces will have a policy structured around a centralised support system. Whatever is the case in your force, one thing remains constant – you will retain accountability and responsibility for any crime occurring on your BCU.

It will be necessary therefore to ensure that your local major crime policy reflects the ongoing elements associated with any major crime investigation which has been set up on your BCU.

- How does your policy identify for the benefit of others in the investigation what your responsibilities are? (ie, your responsibility for having an involvement in the management of the investigation, and not being seen to be 'staying away' from it.)
- How do you ensure that your policy identifies the link between your role as the BCU commander and that of the SIO?
- How does your policy ensure that there is no conflict between the two roles, and how have you communicated that to all relevant parties?
- How do you intend to provide ongoing moral support to those involved in the investigation?
- There may be occasions when you are carrying out your own specific role in an incident which will precipitate your overall responsibility as the divisional commander. For instance, you may be involved as the 'Gold' or 'Silver' commander in a public disorder incident which results in a major crime (eg, a murder). Have you considered how this might affect the relationship between yourself and the SIO appointed to investigate the major crime element of the incident?
- Does your local major crime investigation policy deal with any conflicts that might be created by the existing identified responsibility areas?
- What policy instructions do you have for reviewing an undetected major crime investigation in accordance with force policy and national agreements (ie, at what stage, by whom, terms of reference, etc.)?
Phase Three: After the Investigation

Most major crime investigations have a clearly defined end point, after which members of the investigation team return to their units. However, some aspects of the local major crime investigation policy require action beyond the end of any individual investigation.

Consequential Support

- Support arrangements may often be needed both for individuals involved in the investigation and some who were not. Some members of staff may be affected, professionally or personally, by disruption to normal working arrangements. These people may be able to help ensure that future investigations do not lead to similar difficulties. Others, even senior members of the investigation, benefit from the offer of support, especially from other members of the local management team.

- Does your local policy cover support for persons outside the service? (eg, witnesses, victims, etc.?)

Debriefs and Reviews

Every major crime investigation will be followed by a debrief. Your local policy should detail how such debriefs will take place. These debriefs may identify a need to make changes to the local policy in the light of experience, therefore you need to have a system of post-debrief implementation and communication of any such changes. Additionally, certain crimes may warrant a review at some stage or stages of the investigation in accordance with force and national policies. For example, the nationally agreed period for a review of an ongoing enquiry is between 7 and 28 days from its commencement. These reviews are restricted to the particular investigation in question; however, they too may indicate that an aspect of local major crime investigation policy needs to be re-examined.

- Which debrief model have you identified in your policy and agreed to use following the end of a major crime investigation?

- Whose responsibility is it to set the debrief?

- What is your responsibility in this debrief?

- Does your policy identify the differences between a debrief of the investigation and a separate examination of the effects of the investigation on the local management arrangements? (ie, how it affected projected budgeting?)

- Does your policy identify the value of frequent examination on the wider issues created by the nature of the major crime? (eg, what effect will it have on local police issues?)
- Does your local policy allow for assistance in the debriefs and/or reviews from external sources (ie, the National Crime Faculty, local Consultative Groups, etc.)?

- How is your policy affected by the fact that a particular major crime investigation remains undetected?

- What arrangements exist to review the local and force policies on major crime investigation in the light of the debriefs that follow each investigation, and any reviews that may be conducted during a major crime investigation?

- How do you disseminate post-debrief/review information about changes in policy? How do you get the information out to those who will need to know it?

- What arrangements exist in your local management structure to deal with any changes? This is an important area and it should be management structured. It needs to be planned and introduced as 'future action' oriented, rather than as reactive.

- How do you ensure that aspects of intelligence are actioned following debriefs?

* * *

These guidance notes have been prepared to clarify the practical aspects of policy-making as they relate to major crime investigations. They provide those BCU commanders who have either not been involved recently in detective work, or who are newly promoted, with some useful pointers when seeking to establish, update or develop a local major crime investigation policy. Each of the points and questions posed apply equally to those who determine force policy, as well as local policy.

Although it has been set out in three phases, no phase is independent of the others. When reviewing local policy there is value in going over every one of the points raised herein.
7. Using Forensic Science Effectively
7. Using Forensic Science Effectively
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Background

An exhaustive examination of the use and provision of forensic science services in 12 representative police forces was undertaken for 12 months from mid-1994 to mid-1995. Further data-gathering exercises were conducted with a range of suppliers and subsequently workshops were held at which all the provincial forces of England and Wales were represented.

The research was carried out by a team* drawn from the Forensic Science Service (FSS), the Police Service and the Home Office. An ACPO/FSS steering group oversaw the project. Full details of the findings can be found in *Forensic Science and Crime Investigation* (published by Police Research Group) and in *Using Forensic Science Effectively* (published by ACPO/FSS), which contains the complete recommendations and guidelines for good practice.

The Project Team are keenly aware of the marked differences between forces, and these guidelines are not to be seen as constraints but as positive messages about possible ways forward.

The guidelines address national policies, force strategy and management issues and mechanisms, roles and responsibilities throughout the investigative process. They have two main aims:

1. To stimulate police forces to analyse their own arrangements for forensic science support in the investigative process.

2a. To provide principles, guidelines and practical models aimed to facilitate whatever improvements individual forces deem necessary.

2b. To provide principles and requirements which will guide suppliers in meeting forces’ investigative and other needs.

In order to assist consideration of these issues, ACPO/FSS will also publish three working documents targeted at ACPO ranks, scientific support staff and BCU managers respectively.

However, the present summary concentrates primarily on those issues most relevant to the operational needs of those responsible for crime investigation.

* This research was performed on behalf of the ACPO/FSS Joint Consultative Group by:

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Professor Nick Tilly (Nottingham Trent University) and Andy Ford (Home Office) also made significant contributions to this work.
Introduction

Forensic science must be examined in its context as a servant of the investigation of crime and, ultimately, of the achievement of criminal justice.

Its usefulness to police forces depends primarily on its appropriate integration into their investigative processes, and subsequently on the proper understanding of its findings within the criminal justice system.

Forensic science has the following potential contributions:

a) it can be used to eliminate suspects;

b) it can be used to link incidents;

c) it can inform enquiries, for example by reducing the range of possible suspects or by clarifying circumstance;

d) it can corroborate suspicions by linking suspects to scenes; and

e) it can, more rarely, directly identify an 'unknown'.

Though results may conclusively eliminate suspects, most techniques provide associative evidence short of conclusive proof. This is why forensic science has been (and still is) mainly used reactively to support existing evidence, or to link scenes after the event, especially in volume crime.

However, new techniques like the DNA database will provide similar benefits to fingerprint evidence, allowing 'cold' identifications from spilled bodily fluids. The increasing importance of physical intelligence, the use of unique markers, and the assemblage of forensic evidence against targets are all examples of an emerging trend towards proactive use of scientific techniques, in support of a change to intelligence-driven investigations.

Forensic science evidence always involves consideration of the circumstances of the case, not only the test results. The expertise of the forensic scientist lies in interpreting the significance of those results in the light of case circumstances as known to him or her. It is crucial, then, that the needs of the investigating officer are correctly understood, that the information about the case is complete, and that the most appropriate items for analysis are available.
Principles to Maximise the Benefits from Forensic Science in Crime Investigation

The successful use of forensic science in police work depends on the following linked aims, based on the principle that operational police officers, scientific support staff and forensic scientists are all an integral part of the same continuous investigative process.

a) Good communication between all those involved from initial investigation, through scene examination, item collection, case submission, and scientific analysis and interpretation, to the presentation of cases in court.

b) Sound and effective management mechanisms based on maximising teamwork, ownership, focus and direction and fitness for purpose, and supported by role-related training and relevant performance indicators.

c) An appropriate and adequate level of understanding of forensic science, the law and the investigative process for the role held to be performed successfully and for informed decisions to be made.

d) Partnership between police and forensic suppliers based on trust that both are working together in the pursuit of shared aims:

- the efficient investigation of crime, leading to the identification and prosecution of the guilty; and
- the rapid elimination of the innocent from investigation.

During the course of its research, the project team identified a number of fundamental areas where the effectiveness of forensic science in the investigative process may be adversely affected. These include:

- communication of information;
- mixed ownership of what should be an integrated process;
- understanding of fitness for purpose;
• inappropriate performance indicators; and
• focus and direction of activities.

One major area of concern is that the scientific support structure within forces is often managed separately from, and may have separate aims to, the investigation process.

During the course of the study it also became clear that the use of forensic science is not an interactive process except in the most major crimes.

This results in the real support requirements of investigating officers (IOs) being obscured, and this is compounded by a lack of appreciation of forensic science capabilities even within traditional methods of use.
Key Themes

During the course of the research it became clear that a number of key themes are necessary to create the right environment for maximising the effective use of forensic science. These key themes should not only form the bedrock of good practice but should influence the style of working and be present throughout the entire investigative process.

These key themes are:

- Teamwork
- Ownership
- Focus and direction
- Fitness for purpose
- Proactivity
- Performance.

Teamwork

Operational police officers, scientific support department personnel and forensic scientists are all an integral part of the same continuous investigative process. That process, therefore, from the initial report of a crime to its final disposition involves teamwork.

However, irrespective of the mechanisms in place in individual forces, this study found that scene of crime officers (SOCOs) in many forces do not feel part of the investigative team, are not always attending the 'right' scenes and receive little or no feedback on the results of their endeavours.

Similarly, the exclusion of forensic scientists from the team also precludes them from proposing solutions to investigative or policing problems, nor are they able to make a proactive contribution to planned operations.

Greater awareness of what can be done may be helpful, but a team approach could provide a more fundamental solution.

Ownership

'Ownership' here means caring about the success of actions or, at a management level, having accountability for the effective deployment of resources. The study found that the ownership by individuals of their contribution to the team efforts, and by management of the roles and resources themselves, was often weak or unclear.

The investigative process is complex and has different natural owners for different roles. In order to maximise the benefits of an integrated approach to the use of physical evidence, local ownership must be engendered.
Focus and Direction

If activities can be focused on to specific areas and directed to the overall aim of the investigation or enquiry, then substantial increases in cost-effectiveness and the overall utility of the evidence produced can be made. The earlier that decisions not to attend, not to collect evidence or not to proceed with an active investigation can be made, the greater will be the resources available for more promising cases, or for initiatives designed to meet current local problems.

Fitness for Purpose

The activity of all individuals involved in the investigative process should be directed at specific objectives and undertaken by those properly fitted to do so.

For example, a basic level of awareness is needed for all officers so that they can protect evidence, understand the basic concepts behind procedures, and where appropriate make informed decisions on calling SOCOs. In many forces uniformed officers also provide the bulk of the investigative effort against volume crime but an awareness survey demonstrated that their basic knowledge was often insufficient.

Proactivity

Currently, in volume crime, physical evidence is used primarily in a reactive way for corroboration on the basis of an existing suspect. The collection of evidence is often unstructured, and only a small proportion of the items taken are utilised. Within existing resources, directing efforts proactively against burglary (by assembling evidence against targets) might well pay dividends in increased utility.

Performance

Performance indicators should drive that behaviour which is most effective, for example by measuring how much scientific support has contributed to the objectives of the investigation. Each case is unique, and it is the utility of the evidence to the IO that should be the primary criterion.

The present mainly activity-based PI.s will still be required for the internal management of departmental activities, budgeting and activity planning at BCU level.
Additional Factors

Underlying management factors common to most organisations, such as communication and training, will play a major role in optimising these key themes and in establishing good practice.

Communication

One worrying finding of this study was that the level and scope of communication between police officers, SOCOs and forensic scientists is low.

There seemed little thought about the purposes for which information would be required by others and far too much reliance on written instructions.

Only where there was close contact and small units allowing formal lines of communication to be supplemented by personal contact was communication generally satisfactory. It was also only in these areas that communication was driven by the purpose eg, the passing of intelligence from SOCOs to the IO.

Mechanisms are also needed to bring forward investigative or policing problems and to explore ways of solving them using scientific methods. Measures which increase understanding of the various roles included in the investigative team may improve matters. However, what is really needed is to create an environment where investigators routinely raise scientific support queries with SOCOs and scientific support units (SSUs).

Training

For all officers, physical evidence procedures should be part of their basic skills, and their knowledge should be tested and recorded at regular intervals. Unfortunately, however, there is an almost complete lack of probationer or refresher training in forensic science. It is considered that a forensic-awareness training package similar to that of GMP/FSS, with expanded sections on 'the suspect as a scene', 'packaging', 'labelling and continuity' would be adequate for operational PCs.

For all other officers, including detective constables (DCs) and detective sergeants (DSs), training should be specific and role directed.

While the provision of relevant training is an HQ or even national issue, it is important that its importance to the effectiveness of BCU crime operations is recognised and fully supported.
SOCOs' skills are crucial to the whole system of gathering, collecting and analysing physical evidence. Unless the right items are collected from the right scenes in the right way, accompanied by the right information, subsequent analysis will at best be inefficient and at worst misleading.

The SOCO should not only act as a professional adviser and collector, but also as a provider of intelligence and evidence and as a member of the local investigative team.

Summary

In constructing the guidelines, and proposing the models of good practice which are included in the main document, the key themes of teamwork, ownership, fitness for purpose and focus and direction have been borne strongly in mind. Put simply, the choice between two courses of action should not be based entirely on short-term local or financial grounds, but should also include consideration of the effect on teamwork, communication and ownership.
The Investigative Process:
(a) Reporting, Attendance and Collection

1. Incident Occurs / Incident Reported

The initial actions of the recipient of a report of a possible crime having been committed can have a major influence on the subsequent effectiveness of forensic science. There should be an early warning to the victim/witness to maximise scene preservation and thus the availability of contact trace material. Such advice on scene preservation should be part of the basic duties of all those receiving incident reports from the public.

Advise caller to 'think preservation' by:

- Preserving the scene for forensic examination, disturbing as little fingerprint/forensic evidence as possible.
- Protect items where open to the elements, e.g., place broken glass under cover (handle other than on the face surfaces, but only if that can be done safely).
- Protect blood or other bodily fluids.
- Protect potential footmark impressions, especially at point of entry or on hard surfaces.

The caller should be informed not to:

- Leave any item outside to be spoilt by rain.
- Expose themselves to any health risk.
- Walk over evidence, e.g., broken glass.
- Handle items unless necessary to protect them from the elements.

2. Incident Reported / Initial Police Assessment

Control room policies should take into account the need to make the correct response to the different demands for services. Where there is clearly no need for an immediate response, the call should be redirected to a centre of excellence such as a crime desk, where trained staff can evaluate/assess the most appropriate response in the light of force policy and SOCO resources. Eliciting from the caller the likely presence of contact trace materials should become a key feature in making informed decisions as to whether SOCO resources should be sent to a crime scene. Correct resource allocation will maximise the potential physical evidence,
although appropriate fast response is more likely to enhance detection rates directly.

3. Crime Scene Attendance

Operational officers commonly think of a crime scene as a physical location, e.g., a piece of land, an area within a street, a vehicle, a building or a specific room within a building. However, the term 'crime scene' is properly used in a far wider sense and includes:

- the suspect;
- the victim;
- any witness to be interviewed/eliminated from the investigation; and
- the homes of suspects, victims and witnesses.

These are all potential crime scenes and can be sources of contact trace material. This is well recognised in serious crime, but considering the possible relevance of these extended scenes will be particularly important in series offences, or in planning operations against volume crime.

4. Crime Scene Attendance by SOCOs

Three principles of good practice are that:

- Where SOCO resource is a limiting factor, an informed assessment process should be used to deploy them to those scenes offering the greatest prospect of fingerprint or other physical evidence.
- The use of SOCOs should be tailored to support the overall and BCU strategy for crime management.
- SOCOs should receive a verbal briefing wherever possible; they should always be informed of the arrest of a suspect.

In the majority of forces, the first officer attending (FOA) is required to determine which scenes SOCOs attend. Unfortunately, there are serious inherent flaws in all SOCO deployment systems which depend primarily on the discretion of the FOA. These include: insufficient forensic awareness of individual officers; subjective and individual application of force procedures and policy, and an inconsistent policy approach across BCUs.
A comment from one FOA illustrates this point:

‘Because of my (short) length of service I tend to be cautious and call SOCO to almost every burglary I attend. I do exercise discretion, though, in assault cases, car crime and criminal damage.’

Bringing all PCs up to a sufficient standard of forensic awareness adequately to perform this assessment would be impracticable in the present situation and require that basic training in these matters is provided by the force.

Two alternative mechanisms currently used are:

1) Allow SOCO to attend and examine all scenes in high-profile categories such as house or office burglaries (plus a proportion of other volume crime) and empower them to abandon examinations which seem pointless – perhaps 10 per cent of visits.

Interestingly, one force which implements this policy recovers usable footwear marks from around 30 per cent of all burglaries (and over 90 per cent of such cases provide strong or conclusive evidence on laboratory analysis). Since footwear marks are of particular value in volume crime, and can also be used proactively, it seems that this approach might well form an effective part of an intelligence-driven or targeted approach to volume crime.

2) Apply some form of detailed pre-assessment in order to ‘select in’ only worthwhile scenes. Such pre-assessments may be made either by trained ‘crime desk’ assessors acting on detailed information or by specialist crime visitors such as those used at Thanet in Kent, where the emphasis is on intelligence-driven operations.

Models for crime desk/crime management unit (CMU)-based alternatives to the FOA system.

Model 1: Crime desk basic

In those basic command units (BCUs) where a crime desk function exists, all requests for SOCO scene attendance made by FOAs should be directed to this location.

Basic crime desk functions are extended by the introduction of dedicated scene visitors. These officers, working in uniform, are first to attend. They reduce the need for a succession of visits by specialist officers and call SOCO only to fruitful scenes.

The basic crime desk functions can be implemented within a CMU which includes other investigative and operational functions. The integration of SOCOs within the CMU provides local ownership and co-ordination of SOCOs, and enhances their position as part of the investigative team. SOCOs are deployed either as the sole response (‘one-stop’ visit), eliminating the need for a police officer to attend, or by being paired with a CID officer.
Briefing SOCOs

In volume crime, SOCOs are rarely briefed verbally – they commonly attend the crime scene with little or no prior information. Since the types of evidence likely to prove useful will depend, in part, on factors such as the arrest of a suspect, a lack of information can prevent the SOCO from making informed decisions, thus reducing effectiveness.

5. Scene Examination and Recovery of Evidence by SOCOs

The aim of a scene examination is to maximise the collection of relevant evidence and this should be seen as an integral part of the investigative process. There are clear benefits if forces can collect the strongest evidence types in the most appropriate circumstances.

SOCOs will be aware of the likely intrinsic strength of various evidence types, and should make decisions based on this knowledge, the circumstances of each case and any force collection policies. Any criteria used should be seen clearly as such and not as 'rules', to allow the exercise of SOCOs’ professional discretion in the light of investigative needs.

6. Collection of Evidence - Good Practice

Collection should be intelligent and purpose directed. In addition, it should be guided, not prescribed, by evidence-type criteria.

- Collection decisions should be based on knowledge of the 'strength' of evidence types and the circumstances in which they are most useful. Force policy can be implemented here by issuing guidelines, perhaps within a national framework. These would also be useful in informing scene selection and laboratory submission decisions.

- It will be good practice for forces to ensure that they have adequate equipment and procedures for continuity, storage and preservation (including drying) of items. There should be separation of victim and offender samples.

7. Suspect and Victim Sample Collection

Crime scenes are not limited to the site of the offence, but can include suspects, their vehicles and domiciles and sometimes of course victims.

Treating the suspect as a crime scene is an important concept but has a variable profile within forces at present. It is likely to be an important success factor in proactive and other volume crime initiatives.
The custody suite

All custody suites should be equipped with the necessary equipment, packaging and access to SOCO advice to support this concept. Actions which minimise the time between offence and contact trace material collection can contribute further in realising the evidential value. The same considerations apply to victims and victim suites.

Custody officers are often best placed to take the clothing and samples from suspects in custody, thereby reducing the likelihood of contamination and ensuring the integrity of the evidence. To fulfil this role they require basic training in the potential problem areas of contamination, packaging and continuity and forensic awareness of the usefulness of different evidence types.

Treating the suspect (even if arrested for other matters) as a crime scene will facilitate, for example, the taking of covert shoemarks for linking to current and subsequent burglaries.

Under PACE the direct involvement of SOCOs in custody suites is minimal, but they do represent a source of advice which should be utilised by those directly responsible.

8. Communication of Scene-Examination Findings

Whatever the resources expended on collection of evidence, if forces do not have systems and procedures in place for the dissemination of SOCO scene-examination findings, many of the benefits will be lost.

However good their systems and procedures are, forces should take every opportunity to develop informal lines of communication between SOCOs and investigators. This can be achieved by locating SOCOs geographically as close to the investigative process as possible. This will encourage a team approach and interchange of information. It will also make SOCOs available to provide advice to the IO on all aspects of forensic evidence.

Physical items collected from a crime scene can provide both intelligence and evidence. As far as IOs are concerned, the provision of intelligence is a high priority, and may come above the provision of evidence, if only because evidence will not be required unless a suspect can be identified. However, gaining and disseminating local intelligence is not always seen as a core SOCO function.
(b) Submission of Cases and Items for Forensic Examination

1. Item Selection

The initial police decision regarding what items to send to the laboratory for forensic analysis is a vitally important one.

‘One case recently involved an allegation of forced oral sex by a male upon a male child. Only mouth swabs were sent to the FSS in the belief that this would give sufficient evidence. I needed the T-shirt and other clothing because from experience I know that this is where semen would splash and stay there for a longer period than it would in the mouth. The police had clearly screened the items before submission but made the decision upon financial grounds.’

The best place to assess the analytical potential of individual items and their possible evidential value is in the laboratory, where the quality of marks, quantity of blood and availability of other evidence types can be assessed in context.

It is important that the decision to send potential evidence for analysis is taken on entirely objective grounds following consideration of the existing evidence and the objectives of the enquiry. (There are of course other reasons to submit material, such as for intelligence, or to direct an ongoing enquiry.)

In each case the investigator should answer the following questions:

1) Is the probative value of the evidence already available to the inquiry sufficient to implicate/eliminate; is it anticipated to be so for charging/proceeding/court purposes?

2) If not, and should a forensic examination be positive, will the total amount of evidence then be sufficient, or justify further enquiries?

3) Are the costs involved justified in the light of the circumstances and force priorities?

2. Assessing the Value of Evidence

Assessing the value of evidence and potential evidence is a fundamental activity for investigators. Their involvement ensures that the value of physical evidence is assessed logically and objectively according to the needs of the case at any given time, but advice should always be sought from SOCO on the scientific potential of the case material before submissions.
3. Authorisation of Case Submissions

At present most forces authorise submissions locally, with very few having a specific central authorisation unit.

It is considered that the most appropriate individual to authorise the submission of physical evidence to the laboratory is a supervisory officer who is close to the investigation process, but who is also able to ensure that the questions outlined above have been answered satisfactorily. In the case of crime this might be a BCU crime manager, whereas in drugs and traffic cases it might be a nominated supervisory officer on a drug squad and in the traffic department, respectively.

The devolution of a forensic budget to BCUs, for use in the first instance in tackling local crime, would reinforce this decision-making process. This would provide a real appreciation of the costs and benefits of laboratory analysis and would provide a driver towards better quality, cost-effective submissions.

Any police officers authorised to make submissions would need to be assisted in their decision-making by advice from a scientific support unit (SSU) concerning the discriminatory power of the contact trace materials and their potential usefulness in the context of other available evidence. The authorising officers should receive adequate training to fulfil both the role of making assessments concerning the cost-effective use of forensic submissions and the management of a budget.

The scientific support manager (SSM) would act as an advisor to the BCU and other budget holders concerning the use of forensic science and suppliers, and adequate central monitoring and line management systems would need to be provided to the SSM. The establishment of a central submissions unit has advantages even under local authorisation.

While this system would provide benefits in local ownership, communication and teamworking, the smaller the budget unit the more difficulty there is in predicting, resourcing and funding major enquiries and managing fluctuations in demand.

Fingerprints, DNA and other forensic work fall within one integrated process and should be managed as such. However, forces with a small scientific support budget may find devolved budgets difficult to control, and for the smaller forces the practical difficulties may well outweigh the theoretical benefits.

In the short term a centrally controlled budget for the investigation of serious and organised crime should remain.

**Guidelines on good practice for submission of evidence to a laboratory**

- SOCOs and IOs should review the circumstances, evidence and needs together, with SOCOs advising on the potential of physical evidence.
• Submissions should be selected on a case, rather than item, basis following a review of the likely benefits of analysis to the investigation.

• Forces should implement strategic priorities, for example in respect of volume crime initiatives, as well as individual case criteria and priorities.

• Once a case submission is approved:
  – All relevant items should be submitted (plus a list of other physical items held).
  – Full circumstances should be communicated to the forensic supplier and objectives agreed.

4. Information Supplied to the Laboratory

This is an important area where current practice leaves room for improvement, and which can be directly influenced at BCU level.

The information supplied to forensic scientists is extremely important. Scientific evidence (as opposed to analytical results) is not 'objective' but is an interpretation of the significance of the results in particular circumstances. In order to work efficiently and to interpret the scientific evidence to the police and the court, forensic scientists need to have a full understanding of the whole case, the issues raised and the detailed circumstances in which their results are to be set. Supplying full information also enables the scientist to point to any avenues open to the defence, to suggest further lines of enquiry and help to prevent 'ambush' defences, increasing the cost effectiveness of the investigative process.

The HOLAB 3 form

It is essential that the HOLAB 3 form is completed accurately and fully. It should summarise the full circumstances of the case and explain what it is desired to establish expressed in broad terms. The requests should not be prescriptive eg, ‘compare fibres from taping to red jumper’, but open, eg, ‘establish whether or not there is evidence to link suspect to scene’. The form should contain a list of all appropriate items that have been seized by the police, not just those submitted for analysis. Additionally, the reasons why certain items have not been submitted should be given (if relevant). Any explanations provided by the accused in relation to contact trace materials should be included in the circumstances.

There were very varied practices across forces in the extent of additional documentation supplied to the scientists.
Good Practice

The HOLAB 3 form should be accompanied by:

- directly pertinent statements;
- the SOCO scene examination form;
- relevant photographs; and
- sexual offence forms (victim and accused).

Of these, the SOCO report should be available even in volume crime and will almost always be relevant.

On receipt of the HOLAB 3 form by the laboratory, the objectives should be formally agreed in each case, albeit this may often be as part of a standard service such as drug identification. More often, however, some consultancy dialogue will help to define the requirement and suggest other possibilities.

It is important that both the police and the forensic provider do not see the HOLAB 3 form as a constraint on information. Work is under way to revise the HOLAB 3, but in the interim, forces are encouraged to use supplementary text.

Most forces provide a number of scientific examinations (usually called devolved processes) in-house; submissions for these should be on the same criteria and basis as those to external suppliers.
(c) Proactive Use of Forensic Science

At present, most police officers think of using forensic science only reactively. However, its scope is far greater than this and existing examples of innovative proactive uses of forensic science need to be disseminated and their effectiveness assessed by forces.¹

ACPO ranks, local commanders, investigating officers and SSMs all have an interest in helping to meet force objectives as efficiently as possible. It is possible that the existing, largely reactive, ways of using forensic science may not be the most cost-effective. Forensic science could be used as part of a police crackdown on particular crimes over short periods, partly as an aid to detection, but also for crime prevention purposes.

The proactive use of forensic science may be particularly valuable in volume crime. For example, the incidence of repeat victimisation in burglaries provides an opportunity to set forensic ‘traps’ such as covert marking devices of various types. Using these where and when offences are anticipated may lead to improved detection, apprehension and clearance rates. Some success has already been achieved in commercial premises. The FSS holds an international database of one system of marker fluids, Probe FX, each issue of which is unique.

SOCOs and forensic scientists are substantially underused in proactive work. In planning proactive operations, a scientist or SOCO should be involved in an advisory role (indeed, it would seem sensible to seek the advice of SOCO before most pre-planned initiatives). Subsequently, it may be cost-effective to use a scientist actively as part of the operation if required eg, in sifting large numbers of footwear marks, clothing, etc.

Proactive work can be divided into four different areas:

- Surveillance
- Crime intelligence
- Crime pattern analysis
- Targeting the criminal.

1. Surveillance

During a surveillance/targeting operation by trained and specialist personnel, the collection of physical items and the use of unique markers can have benefits. These include the provision of independent and conclusive evidence, for example by sprays or drive-over pads containing unique markers, and the confirmation of observations by physical evidence.

¹ The term ‘proactive’ is used to refer to measures taken to assemble evidence/intelligence prior to the commission of offences or the arrest of targeted criminals.
The recovery of evidence/intelligence that has the potential for linking crime scenes and offenders to scenes, either directly or through the use of crime pattern analysis, is an area under utilised by most forces. In some circumstances the provision of intelligence alone provides sufficient justification for laboratory submissions, especially in support of planned operations.

At present, most investigative effort is directed at solving individual offences, yet there is persuasive evidence that a high proportion of offences are committed by a small group of persistent offenders. It would seem cost-effective to attempt to charge them with multiple offences, which might not only improve primary detections but lead to more realistic sentencing. This means linking a series of offences by means of physical evidence and ultimately to a suspect, perhaps by fingerprints or DNA.

It is possible to accomplish this within existing scientific support expenditure by targeting areas, repeat offences or criminals. The use of DNA and footwear evidence is likely to prove particularly valuable in this respect.

The aim here is not to increase volume crime submissions to laboratories (unless that is justified by success) but to direct them better. There can be no doubt that better focused evidence which provides a closer match to changing investigative needs can be achieved at the same analytical cost, while making substantial savings in SOCO and police time.

The first choice targets are:

1. Those arrested nearby or on suspicion.

2. Target individuals/teams using Bumblebee-style operations, including physical evidence, Crimestoppers and proactive actions like covert footmarks.

3. Area targeting and offence linking, surveillance, unique evidence traps (marking fluids, paints) in repeat victimisations.

The information recorded by SOCOs is a valuable source of information/intelligence and should be utilised to the full by forces. However, the research revealed striking differences in emphasis across forces in this area.

- It is recommended that forces should consider physical evidence in the same light as other intelligence and take proactive measures to obtain it.

- It is good practice to encourage SOCOs to submit formal intelligence reports where they identify crime linking or other information.
In serious crime, physical evidence is commonly used for intelligence and interview purposes, where it is considered by SIOs to be extremely valuable. Similarly, in volume crime, experience has shown that physical evidence is particularly valuable in the course of interviewing suspects. The ACPO Crime Committee-sponsored National Footwear Mark Project includes the provision of such local and immediately available intelligence as part of its core requirement.

In the course of the research, diverse but infrequent examples of adventitious links were mentioned. These include:

- Paper wrappings from drug deals separated by twenty miles in location and four months in time conclusively identified the assailant in a case of near-fatal assault on police.
- Footwear marks from a burglary team matched across three force areas.
- A police surveillance photograph of an unknown drug dealer later identified by means of the carrier bag containing the drugs, submitted by a different force.
- Tool marks found at burglaries at four force areas culminating in recovery of the tool itself.

It is worthy of note that an enabling factor (in these and other adventitious links made) was full communication of the facts of the case and the presence of an interested scientist who was regarded as part of the team.

At least one Area in the Metropolitan Police and some provincial forces use forensic science in this way, and also for clarifying which members of a loose team of burglars is connected with which offences in preparing for planned interviews.

Investigators do not need to be told how powerful a weapon the possession of a few nuggets of solid information can be at the time of interview. Moreover, there is anecdotal evidence from some SSMs and SIOs that scientific evidence used in this way has a strong multiplier effect on offences admitted.

3. Crime Pattern Analysis

Crime pattern analysis (CPA) is used to link a series of crimes by MO, location, time, etc.

The use of physical evidence is a primary means of linking offences and provides a method for ascribing more than one offence to an offender. The Northumbria 'CPAS' IT system, with its use of detailed scientific intelligence as part of the MO, is a good example of how this can be achieved.

Its main purpose, however, is to provide the additional benefit of predicting offence locations so that resources can be directed most
effectively. This would also allow the implementation of proactive scientific measures such as linking a target suspect to a series of offences currently being committed (e.g., by footwear marks), use of forensic trap materials on targets or at burglaries likely to be subject to repeat victimisation.

Better use must be made of local forensic intelligence as part of crime pattern analysis. Databases accessible to BCUs should be maintained, with links to both force and national databases.

The DNA Database will also allow linked scenes to be tied to an individual suspect if bodily fluids are eventually spilt, thus providing a useful support to the current use of fingermarks for this purpose.

There are few forces with fully implemented CPA systems as yet, and comments were made that this currently constrains the full use of intelligence. As such systems become more widespread there will be opportunities to assess their benefits in a variety of investigative initiatives.

4. Targeting the Criminal

The controlled use of unique markers such as fibres, greases and index solutions are cost-effective means of

- proving associations;
- identifying a vehicle; and
- identifying a person.

They can be particularly effective in police 'sting' operations, proactive burglary operations such as 'Bumblebee' and in surveillance operations as outlined earlier.

There is also potential for forensic scientists to be used in a consultancy role in the planning of operations. Furthermore, they can be cost-effective in terms of mass screening (e.g., footwear), in arranging for prompt analysis of items that yield the best evidence potential and may improve the quality of the evidence presented to the court.

An example of targeting criminals by intelligence which may then be used as evidence is the covert taking of footwear marks from prisoners in custody. The importance of such activity should not be underestimated since footwear marks can be
useful for linking to current and subsequent burglaries. This process should be greatly simplified and enhanced when the National Footwear Mark System becomes available. Linkage would be completed by, for example, treating the suspect's house as a scene, recovering any footwear for comparison, and by treating the suspect (even if arrested for other matters) as a burglary scene. Forces should review their approach to this method of gaining intelligence.

The DNA Database

Policies for the use of the DNA Database are likely to be set by force HQ, rather than at BCU level, for the foreseeable future. The case for its early, proactive use in serious crime is manifest but it is unlikely to be cost-effective for volume crime in the short-term until a substantial proportion of offenders are on the system. There may eventually be some deterrent effect, since the spilling of blood at burglaries is accidental and therefore uncontrollable by the offender.
(d) Organisational Structure and Roles of Scientific Support

The roles, responsibilities and duties of all those involved in scientific support are discussed at length in the main guidelines, where additional concepts such as quality assurance/control (QA/QC) and the role of performance indicators is also covered.

Many of these issues are most appropriately considered at chief constable or national level.

This summary concentrates exclusively on the SOCO/BCU relationship.

It is proposed that SOCOs should work from operational bases on area or BCU rather than centrally. This arrangement facilitates the provision of advice, support service and liaison with operational officers and the integration of SOCOs to the investigation process, resulting in better overall effectiveness. It allows SOCOs to attend briefings to discuss co-operation, operational difficulties and the promulgation of good practice, and encourages the formation of local intelligence collections.

As an example, in one small force where the SOCOs share accommodation with local investigative staff as their base stations, there was constant informal feedback on case work. This was found by the police and SOCOs to be extremely important and effective; it led directly to the creation of local collections and SOCOs feeling an integral part of the investigative process. This force has one of the highest crime-clearance rates in England and Wales.

For some forces this option may be more costly in terms of accommodation and equipment, and may make the provision of force-wide intelligence more complex.

SOCOs should, however, be co-ordinated and managed centrally through the SSM. Devolution of SOCOs to direct BCU control is likely to present forces with serious operational and managerial difficulties, two of which are the creation of units which are too small to be operationally viable and difficulty in the co-ordination of activities. Service level agreements (SLAs) have been used in some forces as an alternative means of achieving the benefits of devolution while maintaining strategic and tactical control.

SOCO Working Patterns

There was a consensus that the core working hours for SOCOs should be between 7am and 11pm. Substantially more resource is required for the morning shift and most force arrangements took this into account.

Forces should have flexible procedures in place which allocate the work of SOCOs in ways which assist meeting local and force priorities.
Many forces have systems which require authorisation by the duty inspector before a SOCO can be called out. There was, however, little evidence of the provision of guidance as to the criteria which should be applied by the authorising officer.

In larger forces, there is considerable merit in the provision of a 24-hour SOCO presence. For example, one SOCO with force-wide responsibility could act as scientific advisor to night duty personnel regarding call out of SOCOs and general scientific advice. He/she could also provide a response to those scenes where, in the judgement of the SOCO, an early visit would be beneficial. This might include, for example, taking initial control of a serious scene, or where evidence might be lost before a routine visit.

SOCOs should not operate in isolation from the investigation process. They are an integral part of the investigative team. They are collectors of evidence and gatherers of information about patterns of crime and MOs. In addition, SOCOs are first-line scientific advisers. Their status in a force should reflect their professional role within, or close to, the investigative process. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to consider them as investigators, albeit in respect only of physical scenes. It is clear from the responses during the interviews that many SOCOs do see themselves as such and many forces do not.

It is proposed that the job title should be changed from SOCO to 'Scientific Support Officer' to reflect this wider role.

In summary, there are four main areas where the role of SOCOs should be enhanced:

1) The provision of intelligence should become a core function and should be subject to PIIs and resource allocation.

2) Their investigatory role should be recognised.

3) There should be empowerment to use professional judgement in attending and examining scenes; with this goes accountability.

4) SOCO integrity should be protected, not by separating them from IOs but by implementing standard QC/QA procedures and high standards of professionalism.
8. Administrative Efficiency
8. Administrative Efficiency
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Introduction

During the first half of this decade there have been a number of working groups, committees and reports on efficiency both in the police and in the criminal justice system as a whole. This section, prepared by Superintendent Haverly of the Trials Issues Group, summarises those which influence the way the police service will conduct its business within the criminal justice context.
Pre-Trial Issues Working Group
(now known as the Trials Issues Group)

In November 1989 under the auspices of the Ministerial Trilateral, the
Pre-Trial Issues Working Group (PTIWG) was formed under the
chairmanship of a representative of the Lord Chancellor’s Department.
The group comprised representatives of the Crown Prosecution Service,
Home Office, Justices’ Clerks’ Society, police and the Legal Secretariat to
the Law Officers, who remained only until the report was published.

The PTIWG’s terms of reference were:

To consider specific matters relating to the preparation of cases for
consideration by the court which involve relations between the police, the
Crown Prosecution Service and the Courts, and any other matter relating to
court proceedings which may be remitted to it and which concern these three
services; and to make recommendations to the Senior Liaison Committee,
chaired by the Director of Public Prosecutions.

The group examined four areas:

i) the quality and timeliness of files;

ii) delays in processing cases in the criminal justice system;

iii) arrangements for warning witnesses; and

iv) the provision of case results and antecedent information.

The report was published in November 1990 and made 165
recommendations. It concluded that the future effectiveness and
efficiency of the criminal justice system would depend to a significant
extent on the use of computer and other systems which meet nationally
agreed standards for the interchange of information.

Some of the main recommendations were as follows:

a) the police should prepare files in accordance with national standards
   as set out in the report;

b) the police should prepare dual files (one to be forwarded to the CPS
   and a copy to be retained by the police) for all indictable-only
   offences, either-way offences and summary offences which carry a
term of imprisonment;

c) in circumstances where the defence have not requested disclosure in
   either-way cases, the CPS should serve the advance information at
   the first hearing;
d) national time guidelines should be adopted for the preparation, review and listing of cases. These guidelines set maximum periods which can realistically be achieved in the progress of most cases;

e) all cases committed to the Crown Court should be listed for a Plea and Direction Hearing;

f) the CPS, within 18 months, should assume responsibility for warning witnesses by letter and within this period a research project should examine:

(i) whether the independence of Crown Prosecutors would be affected if the CPS were to warn witnesses by telephone;

and

(ii) any improvements which could be achieved in the system by transferring further responsibilities to the CPS for monitoring witness acknowledgements and warning witnesses by telephone;

g) the courts should be responsible for the communication of case results to the National Identification Bureau; and

h) court staff should order print-outs direct from the DVLA.

The Manual of Guidance for the preparation, processing and submission of files introduced in October 1992 provided for the first time a national standard for file content, thereby ensuring that core material was present to enable informed and consistent decision-making. It also introduced time guidelines to ensure adequate time to prepare cases properly without compromising the quality of the content and reducing the risk of delay and adjournment.

The phased introduction of Plea and Directions Hearings nationally by early 1996 has led to proactive case management by the court at an early stage, identifying the issues, the witnesses required and contributing towards a focused trial whilst reducing the number which ‘crack’ at the last minute.

It is notable that, to date, two areas of recommendation – CPS warning witnesses and Courts passing results to Phoenix – have been frustrated by the absence of appropriate computer systems. Despite this, the PTIWG can be credited with achieving standard practice and making a significant contribution to improving efficiency.

**PA Consulting Group's Report: Opportunities for Reducing the Administrative Burdens on the Police**

Against a background of rising concerns about the level of police paperwork following arrest, in May 1993 the Home Secretary commissioned a study to determine the facts about the administrative
burdens faced by the police in this area and to make recommendations for reducing them.

The purpose of the study was to assess the extent to which the administrative burdens on the police could be reduced without adversely affecting the rights of suspects, changing the main division of responsibilities between the police and other agencies, or changing the current legal requirements. The overall terms of reference of the study were: ‘to advise on how to reduce to a minimum the paperwork faced by the police service in handling a criminal case from arrest to final disposal’.

Their report, published in October 1993, made 16 recommendations covering the following areas:

1. improved management and organisation, including increased civilianisation;
2. removing some work elements entirely;
3. improving paperwork flows and form design;
4. changing the treatment of taped summaries;
5. increased IT support.

PA considered that the witness liaison function should remain with the police for the time being, at least until an integrated IT system was available. This view was subsequently endorsed by management consultants Touche Ross in their report on the feasibility of witness warning being transferred to the CPS.

In recent years, increased civilianisation has been frequently recommended as an efficiency measure; PA endorsed the value of civilians being employed in tape summarisation and file preparation. Many forces have or are in the process of developing Administrative Support Units which will employ civilian staff in this way.

The content of files, the redesign of forms and the removal of some forms from the file were examined as part of a project which concentrated on abbreviated files.

**Abbreviated Files Project**

In the light of comments made by PA, a decision was made in July 1994 by the Home Office, Lord Chancellor’s Department and the CPS to commission consultants (Price Waterhouse) to evaluate proposals made by a PTI Working Group for revising the content of abbreviated files. The working group proposed that some forms be merged or dropped and, importantly, that statements should no longer be included but the evidence supplied instead in the summary.
The pilot project ran for five months between October 1994 and February 1995 and involved all or part of six forces and their respective CPS branches. Participating forces were:

- Cumbria (all divisions);
- Dyfed-Powys (all divisions);
- Essex (all divisions);
- Hampshire (approx. two-thirds of divisions);
- Lancashire (approx. two-thirds of divisions); and
- Metropolitan Police (13 divisions).

The project was to study files where a guilty plea at the magistrates’ court was anticipated, and differed from the existing definition of an abbreviated file by including certain categories of assault which previously required full files. The new project covered three offence types with minor variations in file content. These were:

- non-assault;
- common assault (contrary to Section 39 Criminal Justice Act 1988) and assault on police (contrary to section 51 (1) Police Act 1964); and
- assault occasioning actual bodily harm (contrary to section 47 Offences Against the Person Act 1861).

The pilot files adapted the original abbreviated file procedure as follows:

- a revised front sheet (MG1A) providing defendants’ details, antecedent information, offence and court information replaced forms MG 1, 2 and 3;
- form MG9 (witness list), form MG10 (witness non-availability) and MG12 (exhibit list) were no longer required;
- a Summary of Evidence (MG5) was still required, but had to be more detailed than that previously prepared. In the absence of statements, it was envisaged that it would be the only source of information on which the CPS could judge the evidential sufficiency and public interest and prosecute the case; and
- the Record of Taped Interview (MG15) could be incorporated in the summary rather than appear separately.

There were two exceptions to the no-statement proposal: first, in assaults where victim statements were required, together with medical evidence where the injury was latent; and second in offences of actual bodily harm, eye-witness statements were also required.
The project team found that the new form MG1A was warmly welcomed and that the absence of MG forms 9, 10 and 12 had no significant impact. Rather more surprising was the reluctance of officers to refrain from taking witness statements. This occurred across the pilot, the training method the forces had employed having no bearing. This prompted a more detailed study to establish why officers preferred to continue taking witness statements. The reasons officers gave were generally the same in all areas:

- statements provided a safer basis for arrest;
- note-taking was not a good substitute and offered little saving;
- difficulty in predicting guilty plea at complaint stage;
- unavailability or unwillingness of witnesses to make statements at a later date;
- problems caused if witness resides outside the area;
- taking statements was felt to demonstrate better witness/victim care; and
- reduced likelihood of requests for further work – better to get it right first time.

The project accepted these reasons as valid and, together with concerns expressed by CPS and defence lawyers, effectively removed the possibility that summaries could replace statements on abbreviated files.

Removal of some forms and amendment to others offered some savings but they were far less than had been hoped for. This led to a review of the data and feedback gathered during the project to identify where, other than at the statement-taking stage, significant savings in officer-time could be made.

The second most time-consuming procedure was found to be the preparation of the summary of evidence. The project team concluded that in simple and straightforward cases a summary was not essential to the file and that, in more complex cases, a guide to the prosecution case was all that was required and that was equally applicable to abbreviated and full files. The team recommended accordingly and those recommendations formed part of 19 which were accepted by the PTI Steering Group.

While outside the remit of the project and therefore not a recommendation, the team questioned whether a record of taped interviews, the most time-consuming element of the file, was necessary in all simple and straightforward guilty plea cases at the magistrates’ court.

The PTI Steering Group tasked the Manual of Guidance Editorial Board with developing the Abbreviated File Project recommendations into Operational Guidance and to incorporate within that guidance a one-year
national field trial involving the replacement of records of taped interviews (ROTIs) with short descriptive notes (SDNs), to cover admissions, mitigation, aggravating factors and any other useful information. This would be by way of brief notes in the third person and would represent a significant time saving for the police.

New style abbreviated files were introduced nationally by way of Home Office Circular 47/1995 dated 4 September 1995 with implementation from 1 November 1995 or as soon as possible after that date. (Efficiency Scrutiny implementation target date is 31 March 1996, see below.)

While for some forces the new style abbreviated file meant increased typing, overall, the saving in terms of resources and efficiency is considerable. The Efficiency Scrutiny estimated a saving in the region of £6.5 million.

Evaluation of short descriptive notes of tape-recorded interviews will be conducted during 1996.

**Records of Taped Interviews**

PA's recommendation to change the treatment of taped summaries was taken forward in two ways.

First, the Home Office revised the Police and Criminal Evidence Act Codes, removing the requirement that the officer should prepare the record (summary) of the interview. This opened the door to more widespread use of civilian staff to assist in this area.

Second, the Home Office commissioned consultants to undertake research into the quality and resource costs of preparing ROTIs as a benchmark against which alternative methods might be compared while at the same time identifying areas of good or best practice.

The research conducted by Price Waterhouse began in December 1994 and their report was published in May 1995.

The six police forces which participated - Bedfordshire, Greater Manchester, Kent, Merseyside, Northamptonshire and South Yorkshire - employed a variety of methods to produce taped summaries.
The methods employed by forces were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>MAIN POLICE INPUT</th>
<th>MAIN CIVILIAN INPUT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Police summary</td>
<td>Prepare manuscript summary of interview</td>
<td>Typing summary only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Transcript (A)</td>
<td>Instructions to typists, checking</td>
<td>Full verbatim transcript of interview (very complex and serious cases only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Transcript (B)</td>
<td>Instructions to typists, checking</td>
<td>Full verbatim transcript of interview (short interviews only, less than 15 mins)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Civilian summary</td>
<td>Written guidance to civilian summariser</td>
<td>Prepare summary according to officer’s guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Edited tape</td>
<td>Audio guidance to civilian typists inserted on copy of tape</td>
<td>Prepare according to tape guidance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The research examined not only the cost of ROTI production but also the quality of the finished product. Quality evaluation was conducted by police and CPS teams and was judged against a template which had been agreed by the project managers.

As a general statement, the quality was higher and the cost lower where ROTIs were prepared by trained civilian staff.

Price Waterhouse concluded:

‘There are clear resource advantages in using civilians over police officers to prepare ROTIs. The use of a specialist civilian summariser appears to be more efficient than the routine production of transcripts for short interviews and the use of a specialist tape editing machine.’

In addition to the research into Short Descriptive Notes as described above, the Trials Issues Group (formerly the PTI Steering Group) together with the Home Office are examining alternative methods of producing ROTIs including voice-recognition computers, transcription (to identify optimum length for cost-effectiveness) and the use of the private sector.
PA’s first recommendation proposed the establishment of performance criteria for all parts of the system which are openly acknowledged and agreed by all parties. The performance criteria should be capable of translation into measurable indicators against which targets could be set. They saw the advantage of such indicators absorbing some HMIC performance indicators.

In June 1994, a working group was formed to develop proposals that would turn PA’s broad recommendation into a procedure that would work in practice. The group, comprising representatives from the police, the CPS, HMIC, the Home Office and the Justices’ Clerks’ Society began by examining apparent rubbing points between the organisations. This led the group to conclude that:

- the overall aim of joint performance management (JPM) should be to promote a closer relationship between the CPS and the police to achieve common objectives without increasing administrative burdens;
- the JPM initiative should concentrate initially on arrangements to improve performance in the following areas:
  - timely delivery, completeness and quality of files;
  - discontinuance of cases at the magistrates’ court; and
  - acquittals at the Crown Court.
- shared systems, common definitions and agreed procedures should apply to all JPM initiatives;
- the local area for JPM purposes should be the CPS branch;
- quarterly meetings should be established between police and CPS to discuss and analyse findings, agree common action and create targets to measure improvements in performance;
- Chief Constables and Chief Crown Prosecutors must accept a leading role for JPM initiatives to be successful; and
- a pilot project should be set up to test the recommendations prior to national implementation and systems put in place to study trends and success criteria nationally.

The JPM Pilot Project

The Trials Issues Group accepted the working group’s recommendations and agreed that a pilot be conducted at six sites for a period of five months commencing 3 July 1995.
The branches were chosen to represent the broad spread of conditions likely to be found in rural, urban and metropolitan areas. They were:

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<th>CPS branch</th>
<th>Police force</th>
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<tr>
<td>Cleveland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preston</td>
<td>Lancashire</td>
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<td>Coventry</td>
<td>WestMidlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>Newport</td>
<td>Gwent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guildford</td>
<td>Surrey</td>
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<tr>
<td>Richmond/Kingston</td>
<td>Metropolitan</td>
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The Home Office appointed independent management consultants to evaluate the pilot and particular regard was to be given to the balance of results against resource costs. The project was managed jointly by representatives from the police and CPS.

It was recognised that five months would be too short a time for any meaningful improvement in performance to be achieved but would be sufficient to assess the practicability of the JPM forms, analysis and meeting procedures proposed. All pilot sites have chosen to continue the JPM process beyond the pilot period pending evaluation by the consultants.

The consultants have submitted their report to the Trials Issues Group.

In June 1995 membership of the working group was extended to include representatives from the Lord Chancellor's Department and the Court Service (and for a short time, HM Magistrates' Courts Service Inspectorate) with the aim of examining opportunities for extending JPM activity to encompass the courts with a view to further improving performance and efficiency across the criminal justice system.

Working with the new members, the group developed a witness monitoring project for both the Magistrates' Court and the Crown Court.

The Crown Court project was conducted at six court centres, one in each circuit, and started on 6 November 1995. The Magistrates' Court project started at four pilot sites in December 1995.

Court Service pilots were conducted at:
Carlisle Peterborough
Teesside Truro
Mold Inner London

Magistrates' Court pilots were at:
Barrow in Furness/Kendal
Bradford
Wrexham
Bromley

(Both projects link to Action Points 14 and 17 of the Action Plan of the Prime Minister's Seminar on 'Criminal Justice and the Citizen' and
concern service to witnesses. The seminar was held in June 1995 and focused on: police responsiveness, services to victims and witness care.)

Each pilot was designed to examine all cases listed for trial during a sample week. It is intended to draw statistically sound conclusions from material gathered on:

- the number of witnesses called to attend court;
- the number of witnesses who actually attend;
- of those, the number who give evidence;
- reasons for witness non-attendance; and
- the time witnesses are kept waiting to give evidence.

It is likely that the exercise will be repeated two or three times over the course of a year at the pilot sites and, subject to evaluation, rolled out nationally to gather information from a more representative sample of courts.

It is intended that the JPM data be discussed at Court User Group meetings.

A Strategy Group has now been formed from membership of the Trials Issues Group and will be responsible for developing proposals for further JPM initiatives.

### Charging Standards

The PA recommendations concerning ‘the provision of guidance to officers on the appropriateness of different types of early disposal and the factors which affect the decision making process’ was addressed in Home Office Circular 18/1994 on cautioning. This was followed by advice from ACPO Crime Committee on the development of cautioning guidelines and gravity factors. The second part of that recommendation that ‘guidance should also ensure the appropriateness of the charge made at the point of decision’ was addressed by a joint police and CPS working group. It was tasked with developing charging standards for those offences where a variety of charges may be preferred dependent upon the individual circumstances.

Charging standards aim to ensure that individual defendants are dealt with consistently and that administrative burdens on the police, the CPS, the courts and the defence are lessened by reducing the need to amend or substitute charges during the course of proceedings.

Assaults are amongst the most common offences encountered by the police and CPS. It is their duty to select the appropriate level of charge from a wide range of statutory provisions and it was for this reason that the first ‘standard’ to be developed was for offences against the person.

This standard was introduced on 31 August 1994 and despite reservations in some quarters concerning the use of Section 39 Criminal Justice Act
1988, recent HMIC research indicates that this charge is used far more frequently than prior to the introduction of the ‘standard’. This in turn has led to a big drop in the frequency with which the CPS, having applied the Code for Crown Prosecutors, have amended charges to those which they consider are more appropriate and reflect the seriousness of offending - a clear improvement in efficiency.

ACPO Crime Committee has requested that this standard be reviewed in the light of the experience gained from one year’s operation. All forces have been consulted in an extensive questionnaire and the results will be known early in 1996.

In the meantime a ‘standard’ for certain categories of driving offence has been developed in extensive consultation with ACPO Traffic Committee, the Police Federation and the Superintendents’ Association. This will be circulated to forces and CPS branches during spring 1996.

A standard covering sexual offences is being prepared and will be presented to ACPO Crime Committee and the staff associations, for views and comments in 1996.

The Efficiency Scrutiny on Administrative Burdens on the Police in the Context of the Criminal Justice System

This Efficiency Scrutiny was one of three commissioned by the Prime Minister in autumn 1994 to examine key areas of public service. It focused on ways to reduce administrative burdens on operational police officers in the context of the criminal justice system.

The team, which comprised representatives from the police, CPS, Home Office and Lord Chancellor's Department, published its report in June 1995.

The team concluded that essential steps to effect radical improvements included:

• stopping unnecessary paperwork;
• improving business processes and systems;
• introducing more information technology;
• clarifying roles and responsibilities;
• strengthening performance management; and
• promoting joint problem-solving between agencies, nationally as well as locally.

In following the path of the prosecution process, the report highlighted five strategic areas where the team believed critical attention should be focused:

• reducing burdens by improving current procedures;
• sharing responsibility for services to witnesses;
• support for case management in the courts;
• the use of information technology; and
• performance management.

The scrutiny made a total of 44 recommendations and endorsed 29 initiatives already under consideration or actually under way.

The following are arguably among the more significant issues from the scrutiny report:

• **Reducing police paperwork.** The report endorsed the implementation of the new abbreviated file standard (see above) seeing substantial efficiencies and savings flowing from the reduced content while not compromising quality.

• **Dual files.** The report strongly endorsed the PTI Working Group recommendation concerning dual files, urging all police forces to implement such a system.

• **Charging standards.** The team attached great importance to the charging standard for assaults and considered that a series of 'standards' should be developed as soon as possible.

• **Service to witnesses.** The team saw the quality of service to witnesses and other court users as important. It recommended that a national model agreement be prepared which could be adopted by local practitioners in the form of service level agreements. The team pointed to the importance of: timely and accurate witness availability; the CPS ensuring that only essential witnesses are called to give evidence; listing officers taking account of the availability of police and civilian witnesses, and the courts adhering to the PTI time guidelines for the progress of cases.

• **Joint performance management.** The scrutiny endorsed the JPM initiative and trusted there would be ‘no undue delay in its extension and in the addition of other areas of performance to these arrangements.’

• **Listing and case management.** The team concluded that it was generally accepted, both by magistrates and court staff, that listing in the magistrates' court was an administrative function but the granting of adjournments was a judicial decision. In particular, the scrutiny recommended regular local inter-agency discussions on how days and court rooms are best allocated, taking into account, among other factors:
  – current and future demands and current performance;
  – the expectations and needs of each agency (leading to service level agreements);
  – arrangements for dealing with priority cases;
  – problems associated with the delivery of prisoners; and
  – the application of PTI time guidelines.
• **Crown Court.** The number of witnesses who are warned but who are not called to give evidence was identified as a critical issue. Monitoring will be conducted under JPM (see above). The scrutiny team welcomed the introduction of plea and direction hearings, but advocated that the courts should take a proactive case management role in the two or three weeks before the trial date. For example, listing officers having a progress or progress-chasing function. Disapproval was expressed regarding the practice of transferring cases between Crown Courts without the parties being consulted.

• **IS/IT.** The report highlighted the importance of introducing more IS/IT systems and proposed the establishment of an IS/IT Board to replace the CCCJS. The team felt it would be vital for the new Police IT Organisation (PITO) to be represented on the board in order to provide the essential impetus to effect change on the police side.

• **Trials Issues Group.** A wider representational base was recommended for the TIG including the appointment of a senior person with extensive private sector experience. Importance was also attached to the creation of a full-time project support team.

• **Simplified procedure for road traffic cases.** The team was concerned about the large number of adjournments in minor road traffic cases. A new simplified procedure was proposed which would involve the service of statements with the summonses. Indications from Leeds and elsewhere suggest that the adoption of the proposed system would result in about 75 per cent of these minor cases being proved at the first hearing. Substantial savings could also be achieved if police forces made greater use of the existing fixed-penalty provisions.

• **Local service level agreements.** The report recommended the development of local service level agreements between agencies (the police, CPS and courts) to clarify their respective roles and responsibilities.

The Trials Issues Group is responsible for co-ordinating the implementation of the scrutiny recommendations and endorsements, and an Action Plan has been prepared and circulated to all forces and relevant agencies. The plan will be revised periodically over the next two years.

The scrutiny will clearly provide the focus for a range of efficiency initiatives over the next two years. This will go hand in hand with work being taken forward following the Prime Minister's Seminar on Criminal Justice and the Citizen.

The Prime Ministerial interest will ensure that these issues remain in the political spotlight with all agencies committed to making significant progress against a challenging timetable.
National Strategy for Police Information Systems (NSPIS)

Two of the first tranche of five applications in the NSPIS Programme, case preparation and custody, will provide significant support to the objectives, functions and business processes within the criminal justice system.

The case preparation project aims to enable the service to electronically store, cross reference and retrieve documents associated with prosecution files and process them through to disposal. The project will have the dual benefits of reducing the administrative burden on the police and improving information exchange with other professional agencies within the criminal justice field.

The custody project aims to provide an application which ensures the legal requirements of prisoner handling are met and the efficiency in processing improves the exchange of information with other applications and systems in addition to reducing the administrative burden on the police.
Co-ordination of Computerisation in the Criminal Justice System (CCCJS)

The work of the CCCJS Unit is clearly focused on making a positive contribution to improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the criminal justice process, in particular through the building of electronic inter-agency links. The use of e-mail between agencies is one example, which enables better informed decisions to be taken. The project is already having a positive impact on the criminal justice system and is demonstrating clearly the benefits to be derived from close inter-agency partnerships.
9. Work by the Home Office
Police Research Group
9. Work by the Home Office Police Research Group
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**Introduction**

In 1992, the Home Office established a small research and development group within the Police Department to help the police develop practice and policy in relation to social science and management issues. This includes all crime-related work and particularly burglary.

Shortly after its establishment, the Police Research Group in collaboration with ACPO Crime Committee implemented a five-year programme of research and development on police operations against crime. Phase 1 was launched in 1993 and involved the establishment of almost 20 research and development projects across the country. One of the main themes of this work was tackling burglary.

In the following year phase 2 initiated a slightly smaller programme of work covering repeat victimisation, forensic science, drugs and crime analysis. Phase 3, launched in 1995, led to the funding of a further 17 substantial projects, although the focus has now moved from the volume crimes of burglary and car theft to violence.

The results of all this work are published by the Police Research Group in the form of research reports, and each is accompanied by a briefing note. Most of the research reports are published in either the Police Research Series, which covers management/organisational issues, or the Crime Detection and Prevention Series, which builds on earlier work published by the Home Office Crime Prevention Unit.

By 1994 it was felt appropriate to combine these series into the Crime Detection and Prevention papers; taking the two series in combination, almost 70 papers have now been published. One of the reasons for merging detection and prevention in this way was to reflect the growing realisation that crime prevention and detection worked together in managing crime – they were in effect opposite sides to crime control. Many of the earlier papers were circulated to crime prevention officers, but an implication of the development of the concept of crime management is that all information on both detection and prevention should be relevant to a far broader range of police officers and particularly to sub-divisional commanders and to CID.

Provided within this section of the Handbook are a selection of Police Research Group briefing notes. These notes are now written to accompany all the full research reports and provide a short summary of the research with suggested points for police action. They have been selected on the basis of their relevance to burglary, which is a main theme of this Handbook, but the whole of the PRG research programme on burglary will be summarised in the form of a manual and published by PRG in mid-1996.
The Burglary Manual will provide detailed advice on the management and investigation of burglary, based on the accumulated research evidence from the police operations against crime programme and other relevant work from other agencies, including the Audit Commission. The information provided in this section of the Handbook therefore is intended to provide a taster for what is to come.

One of the purposes of this section is to draw the reader’s attention to the existence of the body of research knowledge, all of which has been carried out with the support of senior police management. At the end of the section you will find a short statement of the mandate of the Group and its background, and a description of the PRG information desk, followed by a list of all Home Office Police Research Group publications. The papers, and use of the desk, are available free of charge. A form is provided which can be photocopied locally if you wish to order. Papers 1-9 of the Crime Prevention Unit Series are now out of print, but photocopies can be made available if police officers need them.
The following briefing notes are included:

**Crime Prevention Unit Series Papers**


**Crime Detection and Prevention Series Papers**


**Police Research Series Papers**


- The Information Desk – Briefing Note
- Police Research Group Publications List and Order Form
provides the police service with a central social science/management resource for research and development.

It is mandated to:

- Sponsor and undertake research and development to improve and strengthen the police service, taking account of Police Department strategy.
- Identify and disseminate good policing practice in consultation with Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary.
- Provide an information service which will
  - offer guidance on good policing practice and police related research,
  - provide a national co-ordination and dissemination service on police initiated research, and
  - publish and otherwise disseminate research results from externally funded studies and those carried out by the Group’s own staff.
Summary

Drawing on work within the Safer Cities programme, this paper examines first, the vulnerability of small businesses to crime; second, the consequences of crime against business; and third, the effectiveness of some crime prevention schemes which have attempted to reduce the susceptibility of small businesses to certain crimes, most notably commercial burglary.

Producing results which are consistent with the small number of previous studies which have investigated small businesses' experiences of crime, three local Safer Cities business crime surveys have uncovered high rates of victimisation. For example:

One study revealed a burglary rate of 30% over the previous year, and another a rate of 50%. The third, looking individually at three main streets, found overall crime rates of 42%, 57% and 65%.

A study looking at recorded commercial burglary in Hartlepool found high rates of reburglary against businesses. The estimated overall rate of commercial burglary is 22%.

40% of businesses which suffered a first burglary were reburgled at least once within the following twelve months, and of those which suffered a second burglary 48% suffered a third. It is clear that vulnerability to burglary is very unevenly distributed amongst businesses.

Vulnerability to reburglary was found to be highest in the first few weeks following an incident.

Safer Cities surveys revealed considerable concern about crime amongst those running small businesses:

One study found that 64% were either very worried or worried about the risk of crime, greatest concern being expressed about burglary and drugs.

In another study 28% saw crime as a 'very big or big problem', with 24% finding it 'a bit of a problem'. There is a shortage of systematic information on the wider impact of crime against businesses.

Safer Cities schemes have most commonly attempted to address the problem of commercial burglary. Some have offered financial support in upgrading the physical security of premises meeting specified criteria across the whole city, while others have focused on particular areas within the city, supporting security upgrading of businesses within them. Some schemes have supported security upgrading alongside other measures also, and some schemes have aimed to facilitate increased co-operation between businesses in an effort to reduce vulnerability.

Security upgrading schemes were found to be effective in stemming revictimisation of
individual businesses, though there was less evidence that they had led to overall reductions in local rates. Area rates can only be expected to fall with more co-operation between businesses, though there was evidence that this is difficult to sustain.

Points for action

- More needs to be learned about the nature of crime against business and about its impact. There is much scope for further research, including a national business crime survey.
- Crime against business appears to be very common. It is a potentially fruitful area for crime prevention activity.
- Planning business related crime prevention initiatives could be facilitated if, in addition to other details of incidents, police and other computers held records of coded crimes against business, the sector from which the business came, and the postcodes of the address.
- Clear guidance about ways of reducing vulnerability to business crime could usefully be made available to victims either through the police or through insurance companies.
- Crime prevention efforts in relation to commercial burglary can be effectively targeted by focusing on those who have been victimised and are at risk of revictimisation.
- Well evaluated projects, which attempt to encourage constructive co-operative crime prevention efforts between businesses but are sensitive to the difficulties in creating and sustaining these, are needed.
- Large companies could helpfully use their philanthropic resources to fund demonstration small shops in high crime areas. They could experiment with and then publicise successful ways of reducing vulnerability to crime.

Other related CPU papers

CPU Paper 1: Reducing Burglary: a study of chemists’ shops
CPU Paper 9: Preventing Robberies at Sub-Post Offices: an evaluation of a security initiative.
CPU Paper 11: Retail Crime: prevention through crime analysis
CPU Paper 27: Making Crime Prevention Pay: initiatives from business
Summary

This paper traces the development of repeat victimisation as a recognised criminological problem and explains how it may be used to inform effective crime prevention practice.

Examples of a small number of people or properties experiencing a disproportionate amount of crime were found in the last three British Crime Surveys and in local studies on:

★ residential burglary
★ racial attacks
★ domestic violence
★ school burglary

Forthcoming research on car crime, fraud and neighbour disputes suggest the pattern is widespread.

Problems associated with the accurate measurement of repeat victimisation are discussed and possible criticisms, such as low prevalence and the dangers of victim blaming are also addressed.

The research reported upon in the paper shows that once victimised there is an increased probability of a repeat offence relatively soon. This suggests that preventive measures need to be put in place soon after an offence and that temporary arrangements, such as rapid response alarms, might be particularly effective during the high risk period.

The report highlights the need for victim support and crime prevention and detection activities to work in harmony in controlling offending.

The authors suggest that an implementation strategy for preventing repeat victimisation could include:

• establishing patterns of repeat victimisation by using police command and control information;
• prioritising prevention efforts by taking into account the probability of a repeat crime, the seriousness of repeated offences and the cost of preventive effort per crime;
and,
• measures should be agreed and available locally.

They also suggest that the police review their response to multiple victims and consider:

• closer liaison between police officers receiving information on incidents from the public and those officers with prevention responsibilities;
• expanding the role of the Special Constabulary to include the prevention of repeat victimisation;
• increasing the contact between Specials and Victim Support;
and,
• adopting the prevention of repeat calls for service as a measure of police performance.
Points for action

- Ensure recording systems of reported incidents are capable of identifying repeat victimisation.

- Establish, locally, the pattern of repeat victimisation and jointly prioritise, with other agencies, which multiple victims should be targetted.

- Review the tasks and responsibilities of personnel to enable an effective response to multiple victims, aimed at stopping the next offence.

- Ensure procedures are in place for prompt communication between police officers receiving information from the public on repeat incidents and those responsible for taking preventive action.

- Fully investigate repeat incidents to stop the next offence against the same victim by closely coordinating prevention and detection activities.

- Respond quickly to repeat victims with temporary crime prevention measures, where appropriate.

- Consider the possibility of adopting the prevention of repeat victimisation as a police performance indicator.

Other related Crime Prevention Unit Series Papers

- CPU Paper 23: The Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project: Phase II.
AFTER KIRKHOLT – THEORY, METHOD AND RESULTS OF REPLICATION EVALUATIONS

Police Research Group - Crime Prevention Unit Series Paper No 47

by Nick Tilley

Summary

The focus of this paper is on the replication of projects. Replication is important to all those concerned with the dissemination of good practice. Practitioners, policy-makers, social researchers and evaluators all need to understand what is involved in replication if appropriate transferable lessons are to be learned from projects.

The Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project has been highly influential. Its results indicated that significant reductions in burglary were sustained for several years. Given its apparent success, there were strong grounds for replicating it and for evaluating the success or otherwise of replications. This paper takes three putative replications of the Kirkholt project within the Safer Cities Programme, and uses them as a focus for discussion of what is meant by replication and how those with an interest in it can most usefully ensure that effective practice is understood and can be reproduced.

The analysis showed that none of the candidate Kirkholt replications within the Safer Cities Programme exactly matched the original project. Moreover, it was also shown that no replication could ever be exact. There is, however, a way of examining how projects work which suggests an approach to replication which does not require precise copying. This is provided by 'scientific realism'. According to this initiatives should be understood always to include four components:

- those measures introduced - this means a precise statement of what exactly is done, for example particular improvements in the physical security of burgled dwellings;
- the context in which they are to operate - this means spelling out the conditions needed for the measures to work, for example a high crime housing estate with specific, identified characteristics;
- the change-inducing mechanisms which are triggered by the measures in the given context - this means that there needs to be a statement of how, in the circumstances, the measures introduced are expected to effect change, for example by increasing the perceived difficulty of forcing an entry to otherwise vulnerable properties; and
- the outcome-patterns which are actually brought about by the operation of these mechanisms - this means indicating those changes deemed to follow from an intervention, which might include, for example, a reduction in rates of re-burglary.

Points for action

- Those undertaking demonstration projects need to do the following in order that sensible conclusions about practice and policy can be reached. They must make clear the measures they have implemented, the significant aspects of the context in which this has been done, the mechanisms through which they believe their measures have their effects, and the patterns of outcome that seem to have resulted.
- Practitioners and policy makers need to think through the following when reading reports of apparently successful projects and considering what can be learned from them for the future. They should reflect on the contextual conditions in which the schemes were run which may have been necessary for the measures implemented to trigger those causal mechanisms which produced changes in the form of the outcome patterns identified.
- Evaluators of what may at first sight pass for replications needs to ensure that they are matching like with like, which will involve checking on the salient features which are identified in this paper.
- Social scientists can learn much from replications of projects, since they offer a way of testing conjectures concerning the operation of causal forces in society.

Whilst the focus of the paper is on replication of crime prevention projects and on Kirkholt in particular, the conclusions are equally applicable to any area of innovation in which it is hoped that lessons for practice and policy will be learnt.

Other related Crime Prevention Unit Series Papers

CPU Paper 13: The Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project, Rochdale
CPU Paper 23: The Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project: Phase II

Papers in the Police Research Group Crime Detection & Prevention Series and Police Research Series are available free of charge from:
Home Office, Police Research Group Publications, Room 455, 50 Queen Anne’s Gate, London SW1H 9AT
Facsimile no. 0171 273 4001.

A publication of the Home Office Police Department Police Research Group
50 Queen Anne’s Gate London SW1H 9AT
BURGLARY REDUCTION:
FINDINGS FROM SAFER CITIES SCHEMES
Police Research Group - Crime Prevention Unit Paper No. 51
by Nick Tilley and Janice Webb

Summary

This report examines eleven Safer Cities schemes which attempted to reduce burglary in relatively high crime areas. The schemes operated in Birmingham, Bradford, Hull, Nottingham, Rochdale, Sunderland, Tower Hamlets and Wolverhampton.

Part One gives an overview of the range of burglary prevention measures adopted, the management and implementation of the schemes, and the outcome-effectiveness of the work done.

On the outcome-effectiveness of burglary prevention measures the main findings were:

1. Target hardening covering all or as many as possible in a given high crime area can reduce local burglary rates, certainly in the short term, where there is continuous publicity which will be received by prospective offenders. Without publicity the effect of this approach appears to be simply to contain the problem.

2. Victim-centred target hardening reduces the risk of individual revictimisation, but may not on its own affect overall area rates.

3. Target hardening those not hitherto victimised but deemed to be vulnerable to burglary appears neither to reduce area rates nor risks to individuals.

4. Area-based packages of measures aimed at reducing burglary rates appear to be successful only where small areas receive fairly high dosage interventions.

5. The social context is important in affecting the success or failure of packages. For example, special attention needs to be paid to areas with high ethnic minority populations.

6. Comprehensive approaches to target hardening taking advantage of specialist police advice are especially effective, preventing displacement to a changed mode of entry.

On the implementation of burglary prevention initiatives, the main conclusions were:

1. Schemes simply providing target hardening, however it is allocated, are straightforward to implement and do not require large, formal multi-agency groups.

2. Packages entailing multi-agency collaboration are complex and in practice often problematic to implement.

3. Multi-agency work can be seriously jeopardised by the non-co-operation of key personnel.

4. Scheme success often turns on the personal qualities of project workers.

5. Without clear leadership multi-agency groups are apt to drift.
Part Two of the report summarises what happened in each scheme individually, in terms of: characteristics of the areas chosen for the scheme; the burglary rate prior to the work undertaken; the background to the scheme implemented; other initiatives operating in the area at the same time; the burglary prevention work actually undertaken; the outcomes achieved; the information sources used for the report; and the overall costs.

Points for police action

The following should be considered:

- Those at risk of burglary can most efficiently be found and protected by channelling efforts to those already victimised.
- The police have an important part to play in victim centred target hardening, first as the agency that receives reports of burglary and second in making available expertise in risk reduction.
- Area wide target hardening requires appropriate publicity to maximise the effectiveness of the work. The police may be well placed to arrange publicity.
- Though they can often be helpful, large multi-agency groups need not always be established for effective burglary prevention schemes. Police participation will, however, normally be necessary.
- Where multi-agency groups are formed, success is unlikely without clear, appropriate leadership. Co-operative police participation is essential, though not necessarily in the lead position. Consistency and regularity of membership is important in ensuring credibility within the group and the scheme area.
- Though much can be learned from others' experience, individual burglary prevention schemes need to be carefully tailored to local community circumstances.

Other related Crime Prevention Unit Papers

CPU Paper 3: Property Marking: a deterrent to domestic burglary?
CPU Paper 23: The Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project: Phase II.
CPU Paper 47: After Kirkholt - Theory, Methods and Results of Replication Evaluations
Preventing repeat victimisation: a report on progress in Huddersfield

by David Anderson, Sylvia Chenery and Ken Pease

Summary

The initiative was commissioned as part of PRG’s Police Operations Against Crime Programme in October 1993 and will run until March 1996. The purpose of the project is to develop and implement a strategy for preventing repeat burglary and motor vehicle crime, in Huddersfield division of West Yorkshire Police. It aims to identify the advantages, problems and compromises involved in translating the prevention of repeat victimisation from a project-based technique to the standard mode of crime prevention delivery across a large police division.

The first project report, which was published in March 1995, described the process whereby the project moved from conception to implementation in October 1994 (Anderson et al, 1995). This update describes progress to summer 1995.

The main achievements of the first nine months of the strategy are:

• reduced levels of repeat burglary, particularly domestic burglary;
• a 24% decrease in domestic burglary and a 5% decrease in other burglary;
• there is no evidence that domestic burglary, where the project has been most successful, has been displaced to adjoining divisions;
• arrests resulting from temporary alarms have increased from 4% of installations to 14%;
• improved quality of service to victims;
• continued support for the strategy from divisional officers.

The data highlights the need to focus more effort on schools, which suffer significantly from repeat crime. The strategy to date has had little impact on vehicle crime. A final evaluation document will be prepared at the end of the project, and a document for practitioners on day-to-day decisions associated with the approach is also envisaged.

Preventing repeat victimisation as a crime control strategy

Knowing when and where crime will occur is the most powerful aid to its prevention. Concentrating on those who are already victims of crime is one way to deploy effort on high-risk people and places. The following assertions about repeat victimisation can be made with reasonable confidence:

• Crime victimisation is a good predictor of subsequent crime victimisation;
• The more prior victimisation, the higher the likelihood of future victimisation;
• Certain areas have high crime rates not because more people are victimised, but because there is more victimisation of the same people;
• If victimisation recurs, it tends to recur quickly;
• The same perpetrators seem to be responsible for the bulk of repeated offences against a victim;
• A variety of factors, from police shift patterns to information systems, mask the true contribution of repeat victimisation to the crime problem.

What happened in Huddersfield?

In brief, the approach in Huddersfield involved collaboration between the police as lead agency, and Kirklees Metropolitan Council, Victim Support and Huddersfield University as key players. It comprised graded responses to victims based on the number of prior victimisations (reported and unreported) related to the officer investigating the most recent reported crime. These responses were termed bronze, silver and gold. Bronze occurred after a first victimisation, silver after a second, and gold after a third or subsequent experience. For example, a silent (Home Office) alarm was to be installed for six weeks in premises subject to a gold response. A Crime Prevention Officer would visit burgled premises as part of a silver response. The complete list of measures envisaged as part of the three responses is
included in the first project report. The bronze to gold progression reflects a change of emphasis from crime deflection to detection. At the bronze level it aims to deflect opportunist offenders away from repeating the crime, but at the gold level it aims to detect those more determined repeat offenders. A prompt response is sought at all three levels because research has shown that the greatest risk of a repeat comes immediately after the crime, and that this risk diminishes over time.

A section on implementation will be included later in this report. However, one point should be stressed here. In the research phase, repeat vehicle crime was defined as crime against the same vehicle anywhere in West Yorkshire. In the project, previous offences deemed relevant were those against the same vehicle and in the same place. This led to a much lower level of repeats than would have been the case under the research definition, and hence a lower level of silver and gold interventions.

Another point to be stressed is that projects such as this do not occur in a vacuum. Policing involves constant change and varying priorities. In the present context, the repeat victimisation project came into a division which already had a burglary squad. Collaboration between the project and the burglary squad is excellent. It may be that the effect of both burglary squad and project together is greater than had they been separate. It is of particular importance to show that any change in overall burglary rate was at least in part a function of reductions in the number of repeats, so that success is not claimed solely on the basis of the burglary squad's efforts.

What did police officers think of the project?

On October 1st 1995, all 293 officers in Huddersfield were asked to complete a questionnaire concerning the project, need for further training, presumed success, and suggestions for the future. From the 156 questionnaires returned by late October, 97% of officers said they understood what the project was about, and 92% said it had been successful. The two most common reasons cited for success were crime figures and the increased awareness of risk among officers and victims. 85% of officers said commitment to the project was steady, and 7% said it was increasing. 68% said they had been kept up to date. 30% said they could think of ways of improving the project but only 7% had passed suggestions for improvement to the project team. Ways to improve primarily concerned feedback on successes and continual pushing of the underlying ideas. Some officers suggested that the central good idea would be compromised by lack of resources to implement it properly.

What did crime victims think of the project?

One of the pleasant surprises for the project team was the large number of letters of appreciation from crime victims dealt with by the project. It is the firm view of the project team that, whatever its effect on crime figures, the project has improved the quality of service to the victim. The effect on crime victims’ attitude to the police in Huddersfield will be covered as part of West Yorkshire’s routine monitoring of such attitudes. The monitoring form used in this exercise has been appropriately modified for this purpose.

Did repeat victimisation go down?

The basic data about prior victimisation came from the victim. The police officer attending an offence was to ask how many times the same thing had happened in the previous twelve months. (For vehicle crime, the question was to how many times the same thing had happened in the same place). The crucial reason for this was that it would capture crimes of which the police had not been notified. Although the project formally started in October 1994, it was some three months before officers were routinely asking the question. Thus the data in Table 1 refers to the period January - September 1995.

Table 1 shows the average number of prior victimisations reported by victims. For purposes of tabulation, if somewhere suffered four or more crimes during the previous year, the number entered was three. This was to avoid the distortion of a particular month figures by the inclusion of a few places burgled very many times (but not in immediately preceding months). In practice, this makes little difference for domestic burglary or motor crime, but it does when considering other burglary. The point will be elaborated later. For domestic burglary, it will be seen that the monthly average fell from .26 prior victimisations per month in January to .12 in September 1995. Thus, the number of repeat victimisations by domestic burglary fell markedly during the first nine months of the project. A reduction is also in evidence for other burglary. One would have to be an optimist to discern a reduction in the rates of repeated vehicle crime.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Domestic burglary</th>
<th>Other burglary</th>
<th>Vehicle crime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
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<td>.79</td>
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<td>Mar</td>
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<td>.21</td>
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<td>May</td>
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<td>Jun</td>
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<td>Aug</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The decline in other burglary masks a more complex trend. If the range of previous offences reported by the victim was not truncated, figures in April, May and June would be shown to have been exceptionally high. Closer inspection shows that this was almost wholly due to burglaries of schools which reported up to twenty-three such incidents in the previous year (although relatively fee?? in the immediately preceding winter months). The special problems of burglaries concentrated on a few schools...
Given that the project team has been assiduous in following up crime reports which do not contain this victimisation to crime rates. Similar levels of concentration change in the force generally. Theft from vehicles fell by 11% in Huddersfield compared with no (including Huddersfield) fell by 4%. Other types of the year before. The rate in the force as a whole from October 1994 to June 1995 inclusive, domestic burglaries fell by 24% relative to the comparable period for the decline, there is no suggestion that it is a real reason. The point will, however, be pursued in the final report of the project.

An alternative method of presenting data on changes in rates of repeat victimisation is to list the number of silver and gold responses to crime, month by month. This is presented in Table 2. It is not a precise statement of trends, because it lists response, rather than number of previous victimisations, and there was discretion about which level of response to choose. It does, however, support the picture from Table 1 that repeat victimisation is decreasing.

In passing, the possibility that the decline in repeats is spurious must be addressed. This could occur if officers were less often (or less conscientiously) asking victims the crucial question about the number of prior victimisations. Given that the project team has been assiduous in following up crime reports which do not contain this information, and police officers report their support for the project to be at least steady, this is thought very unlikely. Further, if it were the reason for the declines, it should show itself equally in all offence types. It does not. Thus, while changes in officer report is a theoretical reason for the decline, there is no suggestion that it is a real reason. The point will, however, be pursued in the final report of the project.

Did crime go down?

During the first nine months of the strategy, that is from October 1994 to June 1995 inclusive, domestic burglaries fell by 24% relative to the comparable period of the year before. The rate in the force as a whole (including Huddersfield) fell by 4%. Other types of burglary fell by 5% in Huddersfield compared with no change in the force generally. Theft from vehicles fell by % in Huddersfield, but this was less than the Force reduction of 6%. Theft of vehicles fell by 11% in Huddersfield, equal (after rounding) to the force reduction. These recorded crime figures provide basic grounds for optimism that the strategy has had a significant impact on reducing burglary offences within the Division. They also afford grounds for believing that the strategy has to date had little impact on vehicle crime. Other methods of analysis, involving rough seasonal adjustments, and indexing changes from January 1994, yield comparable results.

Displacement

The prevention of crime in one place is of limited use if it is simply moved elsewhere. Reviews of the issue of displacement suggest that it is not the curse on crime reduction it has often been thought to be. Indeed, its opposite often occurs, whereby crime reductions occur at the margins of project areas, i.e. it is the good effect that is spread. As a preliminary test of displacement correlations were calculated between changes in rates of domestic burglary in the project division, each of the three divisions with a common boundary with the Huddersfield division, and the remainder of the force. Domestic burglary was chosen since it is here, where the project has so far been most successful, that displacement might be most likely to have occurred. This analysis was done for the project period (October 1994 to June 1995) and separately for a seasonally equivalent pre-project period (October 1993 to June 1994). Nothing in the preliminary analysis suggests any spatial displacement of domestic burglary to adjoining divisions. Indeed, it is possible that there may have been a diffusion of benefits effect. This will be explored in the final report.

Victimisation as a predictor of risk

The value of repeat victimisation in focusing police work on places of highest risk in areas of high risk is illustrated by temporary alarm statistics. It will be recalled that the temporary installation of a silent alarm formed one component of a gold response to burglary. Insofar as prior victimisation is a better predictor of future offences than the factors which conventionally lead to alarm installation, the number of arrests and genuine misses from alarms installed as

| Table 2: Number of silver and gold responses, by month and crime type |
|---------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
|                        | Domestic burglary | Other burglary | Vehicle crime |
|                        | Silver | Gold | Silver & Gold | Silver | Gold | Silver & Gold | Silver | Gold | Silver & Gold |
| 1995  |       |       |                |       |       |                |       |       |                |
| Jan   | 42    | 17   | 59             | 19    | 35   | 54             | 22    | 7    | 29             |
| Feb   | 42    | 7    | 49             | 17    | 33   | 50             | 18    | 8    | 26             |
| Mar   | 36    | 11   | 47             | 14    | 29   | 43             | 3     | 3    | 6              |
| Apr   | 29    | 6    | 35             | 17    | 22   | 39             | 25    | 14   | 39             |
| May   | 32    | 7    | 39             | 18    | 29   | 47             | 21    | 5    | 26             |
| Jun   | 14    | 13   | 27             | 22    | 31   | 53             | 15    | 5    | 20             |
| Jul   | 18    | 4    | 22             | 15    | 29   | 44             | 23    | 7    | 30             |
| Aug   | 25    | 4    | 29             | 12    | 19   | 31             | 20    | 2    | 22             |
part of the gold response should be higher than those installed for other reasons.

Table 3 below compares Huddersfield’s experience with that of the remainder of the force, in terms of the number of installations of temporary alarms, the number of arrests which resulted, and the number of genuine misses, ie occasions where an offence occurred but the offenders were not found. It contrasts experience before and during the initiative. The Huddersfield figures include some temporary alarms installed other than through the repeat victimisation initiative. To exclude them would mean that comparison with the remainder of the force would not be comparing like with like. However the bulk of installations (119 of 171) formed part of the gold response, and arrests and genuine misses from the non-gold installations occurred at a much lower rate than from gold installations, so the effect of including other installations is to make the Table less dramatic than it would be otherwise.

It is not strictly proper to combine outcomes (arrests and true misses) because more than one arrest may result from a single alarm activation. However, this calculation provides the most readily comprehensible rough guide to success. In the pre-project period, outcomes ran at 6% of installations in Huddersfield, compared with a figure of 12% in the rest of the force. In the project period, outcomes were 21% of installations in Huddersfield, and 7% in the remainder of the force. This analysis provides a neat demonstration of the predictive power of prior victimisation. Clearly, the conventional allocation of alarms is itself reasoned, so what is being demonstrated is performance relative to an already intelligent allocation system.

A similar story could be told of the work of the force’s technical evidence gathering (TEG) team. Ten CCTV installations by the team in Huddersfield have resulted in five arrests at four incidents. Seven other offences were admitted by the offenders arrested at a targeted garage, and eight other offences were admitted by the offender at a sweetshop. These fifteen other offences produced a total of nineteen detected crimes from the ten installations.

Implementation

The programme described in the first project report has been unevenly implemented. This is not surprising given that the measures were written on a blank sheet of paper with very limited awareness of what would be involved in the practicalities of the project. Some elements, such as scenes of crimes officers’ attendance at gold vehicle crime, and the application of microdots, have not been implemented. Others, such as search warrants issued against offenders responsible for earlier crimes against the same target, have also rarely been used. The implementation shortfall has been greatest in regard to vehicle crime. This (and the overly restrictive definition of a repeat used) are reflected in the lack of impact made upon the problem. The project has clarified what has been possible within the constraints imposed. A more thoroughgoing concentration on repeat victims would no doubt yield greater effects. For instance, the problem of school burglary is overwhelmingly a problem of frequent repeats against a few targets, which would yield to adequate levels of human or technical surveillance. The project database has now been developed to the point at which it can be used to refine understanding of the nature of the problem, and fine-tune the strategy.

| Table 3: Result of temporary alarm installation, before and during project |
|--------------------------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
|                                                  | Pre-project period (Oct 93-June 94) | Project period (Oct 94-June 95) |
|                                                  | Huddersfield | Rest of force | Huddersfield | Rest of force |
| Installations | 104 | 616 | 171 | 713 |
| Arrests | 4 | 50 (8.1%) | 24 (14%) | 31 (4.3%) |
| True misses | 2 | 21 (3.4%) | 12 (7%) | 19 (2.7%) |

References


WITNESS INTIMIDATION: STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTION
Police Research Group – Crime Detection & Prevention Series Paper No. 55
by Warwick Maynard

Summary

This study was commissioned because of concern that the development of a constructive partnership between the police and the public was being hampered by the intimidation of witnesses. The type of life-threatening intimidation dealt with by the police by means of formal witness protection schemes, such as those run by the Metropolitan and Greater Manchester Police, was not looked at. The purpose of the study was to estimate how widespread less severe intimidation actually was, and to advise on how its incidence might be reduced.

The lack of any comprehensive existing data on either the extent or the circumstances of intimidation dictated the need to carry out a large scale survey to estimate the former, and in-depth interviews to build up an accurate picture of the latter.

The main findings of the research can be grouped into two areas.

Firstly, on the extent of intimidation:
- on high crime housing estates, 13% of crimes reported by victims and 9% reported by witnesses lead to subsequent intimidation. However, 6% of crimes not reported by victims and 22% not reported by witnesses go unreported due to fear of intimidation.

Secondly, on the circumstances in which intimidation occurs:
- in many cases, before a suspect is apprehended, intimidation of the victim is difficult to prevent where the offender knows the identity of the victim;
- minor changes in the way the police respond to an incident or proceed with the investigation would greatly reduce the incidence of intimidation of (non-victim) witnesses. This conclusion was reached only after ascertaining that in a large number of cases, intimidation began immediately after police contact with the witness;
- disclosure may be a problem in very serious cases, but this study found no evidence to support the commonly held view that disclosure is the cause of "low-level" witness intimidation found on high-crime estates. In none of the cases for which in-depth interviews were conducted was the timing of the intimidation linked to the disclosure of case material to the defence;
- other agencies - such as the courts, the Crown Court Witness Service, the Crown Prosecution Service, the prison service, Victim Support, and local authorities - have roles to play in reducing the incidence of intimidation. Effective working relationships between these agencies and the police service must be strengthened, and good practice must be disseminated and adopted.
Points for action

Forces should consider:

- giving minimal information about witnesses’ identities to officers over police radios;
- not visiting non-victim witnesses on the day of the incident, and always giving them the option of visiting a police station in order to give a statement;
- whether a street identification should be conducted immediately following an incident;
- using screened facilities as a matter of course in identification parades in police stations;
- ensuring that the custody officer never releases a suspect when the victim or a witness is in the vicinity of the police station;
- warning victims and witnesses of the possibilities of reprisals at the time of taking statements in a way that will not deter them from agreeing to give evidence;
- providing a contact other than the officer dealing with the case to all victims and witnesses, so that any intimidation can be reported immediately;
- utilising Victim Support’s services as an early warning system so that potentially vulnerable witnesses can be identified;
- utilising knowledge about the likelihood of repeat victimisation to increase detection of subsequent crimes and/or intimidation on the same victim;
- increasing the use of informants, surveillance operations and other intelligence gathering in high crime areas where intimidation is thought to be widespread, in order to reduce the necessity of gathering evidence from witnesses;
- working more closely with local authorities to bring and enforce civil injunctions, particularly with regard to their powers as landlords, where this represents a viable alternative to investigating and pressing criminal charges.

The prison service could consider:

- placing restrictions on telephone calls made by prisoners on remand to prohibit them from contacting victims or witnesses;
- making local police aware of the attitude of all prisoners on any type of release in order to identify potential reprisals or attempts to intimidate witnesses.

The courts could consider:

- increased use of a live television link or screened facilities for vulnerable witnesses;
- re-designing courtrooms so that the witness box is not sited opposite either the dock or the public gallery;
- providing separate entrances and waiting facilities for prosecution and defence witnesses in all court buildings;
- experimenting with pagers or similar devices where the physical separation of prosecution and defence witnesses is not practicable;
- facilitating a uniformed presence in all court buildings, by the deployment of private security personnel.
Summary
The project contributes to a Home Office programme of work on repeat victimisation. Previous work has established the potential scope for reducing crime by preventing repeat victimisation. The purpose of this two-year project is to consider how forces might tackle repeat victimisation as part of their crime management strategies for burglary and car crime, and to provide guidance on how the current obstacles to this might be overcome.

The project is being conducted by staff from the University of Manchester, who are working with the police on Huddersfield Division of West Yorkshire Police to develop and implement a strategy for preventing repeat burglary and motor vehicle crime as part of the operational policing of a police division.

The project has been running for over a year and development of the strategy has involved a wide range of local agencies, including the police, local authority, victim support, the university and the media. This report documents the research and events leading up to implementation of the strategy on 1 October 1994. A further report next year will describe how the strategy has developed and what it has achieved in terms of crime reduction and detection.

Key research findings so far
The examination of data from the force crime information system found that:

• there were many repeat burglary and car crimes, and that they tended to occur quickly after a prior offence;
• there were problems in always recognising repeats as such, and in measuring the true extent of repeat victimisation; and,
• the risk of repeat burglary of the same house is significantly higher than the risk of burglary of an adjacent house.

Interviews with domestic burglary repeat victims established:
• the profound impact of repeat victimisation on people’s lives; and,
• the fact that repeat victims identified from crimes reported to the police constitute a substantial underestimate of their true rates of victimisation.

The strategy
The strategy involves grading responses to victims according to the number of times they have been victimised in the last year. Conventional ‘bronze’ level measures such as property marking and security upgrading are received by all first-time victims. Repeat victims receive more resource-intensive ‘silver’ and ‘gold’ measures, for example, focused patrolling of victimised places, and the use of high technology devices such as vehicle tracking and silent alarms. In general, the strategy moves from fairly conventional preventive measures through to innovative detective tactics. The precise composition of measures will vary with time, further research and experience.

Data are being collected to monitor and evaluate the strategy and will be documented in the final project report.

Points for action
The experience of the project so far suggests that in developing strategies to tackle repeat victimisation, forces need to ensure:

★ crime recording systems can accurately identify repeat victimisation. Systems need to be developed which are capable of both measuring and monitoring victimisation patterns. Reported incident data are likely to provide an underestimate of true rates of repeat victimisation for all offences; measurement problems are least substantial for domestic burglary, which may provide a good starting point for tackling repeat victimisation;
★ procedures are in place for a prompt response to repeat victims; and,
★ the allocation of resources, including the co-ordination of prevention and detection activities, reflects local victimisation patterns. A graded response to victims on the basis of the number of previous victimisations may facilitate a cost-effective targeting of resources.
Other related PRG research papers

CPU Paper 23: The Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project: Phase II.
CPU Paper 47: After Kirkholt - Theory, Method and Results of Replication Evaluations.
CPU Paper 48: Preventing Domestic Violence to Women.
CDP Paper 57: Thinking about Crime Prevention Performance Indicators.
Summary

This paper reports the results of an evaluation of three force strategies for combating burglary, and identifies the implications for good practice.

- Operation Bumblebee, adopted by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), is a high profile anti-burglary strategy;
- Operation Gemini, introduced by Gloucestershire Constabulary, is directed at both burglary and motor-vehicle crime. Some of its features are similar to those of Operation Bumblebee;
- Hampshire Constabulary has not adopted a high profile strategy for dealing with burglary, but has implemented organisational and procedural changes which are designed to affect its response to burglary and other crime.

Key findings

The introduction of each of the three strategies is associated with improved performance with respect to burglary. All three forces have seen a reduction in the incidence of recorded burglary. The results associated with Operation Bumblebee are particularly striking and appear to be being sustained. Improvements in detection rates arose from a combination of a decrease in the number of burglaries and an increased number of clear-ups, particularly secondary detections. The increased number of secondary detections reflects the effort going into post-sentence visits, but may also indicate that more prolific offenders, who have more offences to admit to, are being arrested.

Comparisons across the three strategies suggest:

- a targeted, proactive strategy is likely to be more effective in an urban environment;
- a more global focus on crime investigation - with flexibility in priorities and the focusing of resources but still emphasising a more proactive, intelligence-based approach - although slower to take effect, can be equally effective, especially where the range of problems and policing contexts are heterogeneous.

Key elements of a successful anti-burglary strategy include:

- clearly defined, internally consistent objectives;
- a proactive, intelligence-based approach;
- adequate, targeted resources;
- appropriate structures and acceptable work practices;
- an effective publicity campaign and positive media coverage;
- multi-agency co-operation;
- a crime management system which ensures an appropriate, co-ordinated response to reported burglaries and an efficient, supportive service to victims;
- local flexibility.

Implications for good practice

Publicity

The experience of both the MPS and Gloucestershire Constabulary suggests that a high profile, named operation can bring a number of advantages. A 'brand name' is an important feature in that:

- it provides a unifying focus to a range of activities - it helps to illustrate how they can be linked and co-ordinated to achieve defined objectives and can have a beneficial effect on police morale;
• it makes police operations understandable to the public - it helps to reassure the public that the police share their concerns and are seeking to improve their performance.

There is, however, an important caveat. Publicity should not be over-optimistic; care should be taken to ensure that expectations are not raised beyond the level that can reasonably be met. Care should also be exercised in the use of a 'brand name' so that its impact is not dissipated. It should be borne in mind that people can grow contemptuous of the familiar. Thus, the brand name of a high profile operation should be kept under review and the attitudes of both police officers and the public should be monitored. The fact that officers perceive the high level of media publicity to make a major contribution to the success of both Bumblebee and Gemini implies that, if the operations fail to attract such publicity in the future, then the commitment of officers may be diminished. If a brand name loses its impact it should be relaunched, or abandoned and replaced.

A high profile campaign, emphasising a partnership between police and public, may attract support, including sponsorship from the private sector. Subject to current legal constraints, anything which adds to public service without cost to public funds must be welcome but such relationships could prove embarrassing if the probity of the company were to be called into question. Sponsorship should only be accepted when potential sponsors have satisfied the necessary conditions.

An improvement in public relations is inherently valuable but is not an end in itself. Care should be taken to ensure that an enhanced public image of the police leads to concrete benefits. Both the MPS and Gloucestershire have exploited the 'image' of their respective high profile operations to raise public awareness of crime and the contribution the public can make to both its prevention and detection. Local initiatives involving partnerships with local authorities and other agencies and organisations have proved invaluable. Such work is not entirely dependent upon a named strategy, as Hampshire has demonstrated, but having a 'brand name' provides a framework. The advantage of Bumblebee and Gemini is that they provide a convenient label for the socially acceptable face of crime prevention and detection, with which both the public and other agencies wish to be associated.

The yield from this activity has been to encourage action by others to support the police in their crime prevention and detection work. Local housing authorities, builders and housing associations have begun to look at ways of 'designing out' crime by improving estate layouts, lighting and security, and ordinary citizens have been brought together to form more Neighbourhood Watches. Improved public goodwill can also make a valuable contribution to intelligence gathering. If the public have faith and trust in the police, and recognise both the efforts being made and the results achieved, they are more inclined to provide useful information.

Internal communication

An effective communication and consultation system is vital in ensuring the successful implementation of any strategy and in encouraging officers' commitment and support. It is apparent from the research that strategies - high profile or otherwise - can only be effective if they are adequately communicated. Where there were communication deficiencies, the research team encountered a degree of disaffection and cynicism.

Officers are likely to be more committed and effective when they are fully informed about the objectives and methods of an operation and, most important of all, about their individual roles and responsibilities within it. A strategy must be clearly set out and its implementation should be preceded by a carefully prepared internal communications exercise to ensure that each and every officer is fully aware of what is expected of her or him. Informal briefings are not adequate for this purpose: not all officers, even those with command experience, are expert communicators. A communications exercise which is both centrally devised and executed must be supported at a local level, especially where there are potential conflicts between central and local power and control.

Care should also be taken to provide opportunities for consultation, so that officers have the chance to contribute at the planning stage. Good ideas often originate at the lower working levels of organisations and those who have contributed to strategy development are more likely to be enthusiastic about its implementation. Continued involvement is more likely if officers at all levels are kept informed of progress and the information provided not only highlights successes but also recognises difficulties. Regular printed material, such as newsletters, is a useful addition to traditional, informal methods, but it must be attractively presented and widely circulated.

Training

The research identified a number of areas in which further training could be valuable in ensuring the success of an anti-burglary strategy. Consideration should be given at the planning stage to training needs. Members of dedicated teams, particularly those seconded from shifts or sectors, would benefit from training in surveillance methods and the recruitment and handling of informants. Officers with responsibilities for the recording and analysis of criminal intelligence and identification of crime patterns should be trained to use available IT. The responsibilities of the first officer at the scene of a crime need emphasis. First officers at the scene, often uniformed constables, should be aware that their role is to initiate an investigation, not simply to note and report. Appropriate action by these officers, such as scene preservation and local inquiries, can make a useful contribution to the detection of a crime, and reassures victims that action is being taken.

Service to victims of burglary

There have already been improvements in the quality of service provided to victims. These need to be sustained and should not be eroded by pressures to improve more tangible performance indicators.

Common elements of good practice include:

• a prompt response to all reported burglaries - not necessarily attendance;
• prompt attendance in cases where the victim is elderly or infirm, alone or distressed;
• sympathetic and caring behaviour by the first officer at the scene and by other officers involved in the investigation;
• advice about local victim support services and contact arrangements;
• a realistic assessment of the chances of recovering property and apprehending the perpetrator;
• crime prevention follow-up to avoid repeat victimisation;
• follow-up contact to advise the victim of what police action has been taken and the outcome of any investigations.

Another practice worthy of wider use was first officers at the scene supplying householders with telephone numbers of a selection of reputable locksmiths, carpenters and glaziers to help victims, who often feel vulnerable and uncertain whom to trust, take immediate steps to resecure their property.

**Crime prevention**

One aim of an anti-burglary strategy is to stimulate public interest and encourage crime prevention measures. To meet the demand thus generated, and to ensure the take-up of crime prevention advice, attention should be paid to the status, location and integration of the crime prevention service. Crime Prevention Officers (CPOs) should be of sufficient status to deal effectively with both external agencies and the public, and to gain access to police resources. Closer relationships among CPOs, crime managers and specialist units are essential to ensure crime prevention initiatives are co-ordinated with other activities. Crime prevention must not be seen as the ‘poor relation’ but as an integral part of an anti-burglary strategy.

**Equipment and support services**

The value of adequate and appropriate equipment, especially for specialist teams and covert operations, cannot be overemphasised. The ready availability of scanning equipment makes encrypted radios essential. ‘Covert’ vehicles are often recognisable as police vehicles - especially if they are the same make and colour and have sequential registration numbers. Frequent changes of vehicles, by means of interchange within forces, or by short-term leasing, could help to overcome this problem.

Information technology remains problematic. A more proactive approach requires greater availability of both computer hardware and software for the recording, analysis and dissemination of criminal intelligence and crime trends and of appropriate officers trained in its use. More standardisation of systems, both within and across forces, would facilitate the sharing of information. Modern computer systems are generally easy to use and knowledge of their use should not be restricted to specialist officers. Those who gather intelligence, including uniformed officers, are likely to be more effective if they understand how the information is stored, accessed and manipulated. Furthermore, the return on investment in IT is reduced if only a handful of officers are trained to use a system and it stands idle during periods of abstraction, leave or sickness.

An increase in the number of burglary offences solved is heavily dependent upon the contributions made by SOCOs and forensic science units. A sufficient number of SOCOs must be available, and this raises the question of whether their skills should be more widely disseminated so as to offer a more streamlined service to victims. Also, forensic science units must have the capacity for coping with the required number of forensic identifications and offering the necessary speed of response. Automated fingerprint identification is an essential element in this process.

**The proactive approach**

For a proactive, intelligence-based approach to play an increasing role in combating crime, more than a mere statement of policy is required. Increased proactivity requires enhanced collection, analysis and dissemination of criminal intelligence and crime patterns, and appropriate structures and support systems to ensure that proactive capacity is not eroded by reactive demands.

**Criminal intelligence**

Identification and targeting of active criminals requires an integrated and well-supervised intelligence system. Officers should be fully briefed about the features of the proactive approach and regularly reminded of the system for recording and passing on intelligence information. The ‘adopt a burglar’ scheme, whereby beat/sector officers are asked to take a particular interest in a criminal, enables uniformed officers to contribute to the collection of intelligence. Intelligence gathering can also be enhanced by increased reliance on informants but their use is dependent upon the availability both of officers trained in their recruitment and handling and of funds for payment.

**Crime pattern analysis**

Crime pattern analysis (CPA) can yield useful information about the likely locations and times of high volume crime. In many cases CPA has been used to guide the deployment of resources, but its potential value has not been fully exploited; staffing levels and distribution of resources sometimes fail to reflect patterns and amount of criminal activity. However, in some locations, especially metropolitan areas, the volume and distribution of crime is such that the resources are insufficient to target all high risk areas. Targeting active criminals and high risk areas is dependent upon the generation of actionable intelligence and a well-resourced surveillance capability. Until these requirements are met, the policy of an intelligence-led, proactive response will not be achieved in practice.

**Specialist squads**

The establishment of specialist squads is generally seen as good practice and as fundamental to taking a more proactive approach. The primary benefits come from the concentration of specialist knowledge, skills and related expertise. In principle, a squad can provide a committed resource, protected from day-to-day
concerns which might, otherwise, distract attention from the targeted crimes. A major question is whether there should be dedicated burglary squads - as with Bumblebee - or whether specialist teams should deal with more than one category of crime, for example, burglary and motorvehicle crime - as with Gemini - or whether burglary should be dealt with by a general crime, or crime and drugs, unit - as in Hampshire. The decision is affected by the priority given to burglary in the overall crime strategy, and it is unlikely that a high profile anti-burglary strategy could be successful without specialist units for whom burglary is a major responsibility.

Specialist teams whose responsibilities cover both proactive and reactive work face an obvious difficulty. The pressures of responding to reported crime all too often result in a lack of balance, with the reactive demands taking precedence over a proactive response. There is evidence to favour a separation of proactive and reactive responsibilities. The level within the organisation at which this separation occurs will depend upon organisational and administrative structures in individual forces. The creation of separate proactive and reactive units demands, however, close co-operation in the exchange of information and liaison on operational matters.

There are disadvantages associated with specialist squads. Crimes which lie within their remit may be seen solely as the squad's responsibility, with other officers taking little or no interest. Long term service on a squad can lead to elitism. There should be rotation of officers to ensure that squads are seen as an integral and accountable part of the service, and close liaison with both CID and uniformed officers. In some cases, specialist units may not be the most appropriate structure. It may be more productive to create local CID teams, to work closely with uniformed officers to both facilitate local service provision and encourage the view that dealing with crime is the responsibility of all officers, not just specialist squads. However, such a structure can be vulnerable to the impact of abstractions.

Setting objectives and levels of control

The setting of policing objectives, both by the Home Secretary and by individual forces, has tended to stress tangible performance indicators, such as speed of response to incidents and minimum clear-up targets. Not only are national and local objectives not always congruent with each other, but also an emphasis on the more obvious and most easily measured aspects of police performance can be seen to conflict with the requirement to give the best quality of service to victims. Officers therefore receive mixed messages about what are the 'real' priorities. Senior management must recognise these concerns and give guidance and support to local management and those involved in service delivery. They must also ensure that pressure for performance with respect to targeted crimes, such as burglary, does not lead to a reduction in performance with respect to other offences or in the co-operation with other forces in dealing with cross-border crime. Furthermore, performance targets, while encouraging administrative efficiency in recording offences and clear-ups, can promote changes in recording and other work practices which may be open to question. Both policy statements and quality control mechanisms are necessary to ensure that integrity is a not a casualty of the pursuit of improvements in performance.

There is also a conflict between a centrally directed strategy and devolution of operational control. A centrally generated strategy for combating burglary needs to be flexible enough to respond to local priorities and to incorporate local initiatives. It should act as a framework for innovation rather than constrain local commanders' ability to respond to local concerns. Freedom to respond to neighbourhood issues helps to ensure that such a strategy is not perceived as over-prescriptive.

Crime management

An effective anti-burglary strategy needs to be coupled with an efficient system of crime management, for example, by establishing crime management units or crime desks, to ensure effective deployment of resources and a co-ordinated response. The criteria which determine the extent of an investigation need to be explicit and consistent but their application will reflect individual circumstances, local community priorities and resource levels. These structures and systems enable crime managers/evaluators to ensure an appropriate initial response and to monitor the progress of an investigation. Crime managers also have a key role to play in ensuring that victims receive appropriate support and information. Such a system of crime evaluation and allocation, allied with the establishment of specialist squads, is an effective use of resources and can help to sustain the level of proactivity necessary for the success of an anti-burglary strategy.

Other related PRG research papers

CPU Paper 23: The Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project: Phase II.
Background

The number of Neighbourhood Watch schemes and the proportion of households covered by schemes has grown dramatically in the United Kingdom over the past decade. All schemes involve local police forces to some extent, and at a time of rising crime and constant pressure on these resources the nature and extent of police involvement in Neighbourhood Watch needs to be kept under review.

The report makes a series of proposals for the way in which Neighbourhood Watch might be developed, which it is hoped will stimulate local debate. The social and policing context within which these proposals are made is important and these are discussed fully in the report as is the research literature on the effectiveness of Neighbourhood Watch.

Report summary

The report discusses the way in which the definition of Neighbourhood Watch has developed from its initial inception as 'the eyes and ears of the police' to a more community-based movement operating with police support. It then provides a brief review of the research literature on the effectiveness of Neighbourhood Watch as a crime reduction measure, but also considers the many other effects Neighbourhood Watch can have on community life. The review shows that:

- Neighbourhood Watch has attracted widespread support, but low levels of commitment for involvement from members, although high commitment from many coordinators.

A comprehensive review of the published literature is provided in an appendix.

Against this background, the report suggests that the police should adopt a strategic approach to developing Neighbourhood Watch and proposes how this might be done.

Proposals

The report suggests that the purpose of Neighbourhood Watch, its characteristics and the extent of police involvement should be related to the crime rate in the area.

In low crime areas, covering about 60% of households, Neighbourhood Watch might aim to keep the crime rate low; maintain public confidence and good police/public relations; reduce fear of crime; guard against vigilantes, and reinforce the community commitment to a set of crime free standards. Police involvement in such schemes might be on the basis of requests from the public rather than being positively promoted by forces, with the consequent demand on resources. Schemes in these areas might, amongst other things, be self-funded with an emphasis on volunteering.

In medium crime areas, which cover about 25% of households, attempts might be made to reduce the crime rate and the fear of crime; to increase informal neighbourhood control by residents of minor incivilities and general nuisance, and to improve police/public relations. In reflection of these different aims, the characteristics of schemes may also differ from the low crime areas. They would, for example, involve other agencies, particularly the local authority; plan initiatives in collaboration with local community groups and tenants’ associations where they exist, and establish
local mechanisms for a prompt response to vandalism and neighbour disputes. All this may require the more active involvement of police forces particularly in providing crime data and encouraging schemes on ‘at risk’ estates.

Finally, in high crime areas, which according to British Crime Survey data may be either relatively poor local authority housing or gentrified inner-city areas, a priority would be to reduce crime and fear; increase community control and public confidence, and in the economically poorer areas particularly to increase public confidence in the police. The characteristics of schemes in poorer areas when compared with gentrified areas may be different. For example, considerable multi-agency support may be needed in poorer areas to introduce and maintain schemes. It may even be difficult for the police to do so in the most disadvantaged areas and, in any event, ‘tailor-made’ schemes would be required to reflect the sensitivities of the community.

In the relatively affluent gentrified areas, schemes might be easier to launch and maintain and can be overtly police-led without the risk of community conflict.

**Points for police action:**
You may like to consider:

- whether you have, or are developing, a strategic approach to the operation of Neighbourhood Watch;
- whether the proposals in the report are appropriate to your area or whether you could modify them to become so;
- how to manage resources in relation to Neighbourhood Watch to achieve the goals you have agreed with the neighbourhoods you serve.

**Other related Police Research Group papers:**

CPU Paper 12: Neighbourhood Watch in England and Wales: a locational analysis
CPU Paper 13: The Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project, Rochdale
CPU Paper 18: An Evaluation of Domestic Security Surveys
CPU Paper 23: The Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project: Phase II
CPU Paper 46: Once Bitten, Twice Bitten: Repeat Victimisation and its Implications for Crime Prevention
CPU Paper 47: After Kirkholt - Theory, Method and Results of Replication Evaluations
CPU Paper 50: Vehicle Watch and Car Theft: An Evaluation
CPU Paper 51: Burglary Reduction: Findings from Safer Cities Schemes
CPU Paper 58: Combating Burglary: An Evaluation of Three Strategies
CPU Paper 59: Biting Back: Tackling Repeat Burglary and Car Crime

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND INFORMANTS: INTEGRATED APPROACHES
Police Research Group - Crime Detection & Prevention Series Paper 64
by Mike Maguire & Timothy John

Summary

This report provides an account and analysis of developments at local level in the use of proactive methods of crime control, particularly criminal intelligence systems, surveillance and informants. The study identifies the practical difficulties faced by forces in trying to move away from a predominantly reactive approach to crime, and illustrates how the use of intelligence, surveillance and informants can be integrated into the work of a command unit to make a more substantial contribution to policing at the local level.

The study examined 8 forces (3 in depth) and involved interviews with detectives and intelligence officers, surveys of criminal investigations, analysis of files and illustrative operations. The forces varied in the extent to which their commitment to proactivity had been accompanied by organisational and managerial changes. Such reforms were found to be vital to support and develop the use of proactive techniques at the local level. For example, a survey of all crime reports in a division without an intelligence-orientated organisational structure found that only a small proportion (less than 15%) of the 832 investigations involved a proactive element such as the use of a local intelligence officer, intelligence system or a registered informant. The report examines in detail forces which have implemented more radical approaches to proactive policing. Some of these forces had made a substantial investment in one form of proactivity (for example, a dedicated surveillance team) though still within an essentially reactive organisational framework. Others had fundamentally reorganised the structure and management of policing at local level.

The report concludes that:

Without an intelligence-driven organisational structure and culture, individual proactive techniques (surveillance teams, tasked informants, intelligence systems) will make only a marginal impact on crime operations at a local level. All resources and information flows need to be fully and strategically integrated to provide an effective proactive system.

Such major organisational reforms can be successfully implemented only if there is wholehearted commitment to them from the most senior officers in the force.

Given the interdependence of different specialist roles within an integrated proactive system, it is vital that every officer understands the overall purpose and expected benefit of the system and how they personally contribute to it. Ideally, ‘re-education’ programmes would be combined with specialist training to ensure that all individuals are properly equipped and aware of their part in
the overall intelligence gathering strategy. It also requires the clear tasking of officers. For example, if it is decided to focus upon a restricted set of 'targets', it should be made clear to officers at all levels that they should seek intelligence on these suspects, rather than gather 'irrelevant' information on numerous others.

**The influence of 'cultural' factors needs to be addressed.** Supportive management is required to overcome the resistance found in this study to the 'sharing' of informants with other officers. Officers need to be rewarded - if only by official praise - for their own early contribution to operations which are eventually completed by others.

**Once the system is in operation, it needs to be continually monitored and reviewed.** This is necessary to identify areas in which it is failing, or in which undue pressure is being put upon officers, for example through undermanning or shortage of resources. The key objectives and strategies of the system should also be reviewed at intervals, informed wherever possible by evaluations of outcomes. The report contains ways in which surveillance teams, the use of informants and intelligence systems might be monitored.

**Access to resources, such as surveillance teams, which are supposed to be 'owned' by the whole force should be seen to be equitable.** Resources should be allocated in accordance with declared objective guidelines, rather than on the basis of personal contacts.

**Points for action**

The study suggests a number of points for action by forces to support the development of proactive police work at local level.

The current use and contribution of proactive investigative methods should be assessed. This report indicates ways in which this might be done.

The extent to which the organisational structure and management of local policing supports the development of proactivity should be reviewed. This report provides examples of supportive organisational structures.

The implications for staff training of moving to an intelligence-driven approach should not be overlooked. Forces need to ensure that staff understand their role in the force strategy and keep them informed of the successes such an approach can bring about.

Forces should introduce performance indicators for individual proactive investigative methods and monitor the effectiveness of the overall system so as to identify any problems as they occur. For example, surveillance operations can be evaluated in regard to charges brought, intelligence gains and property recovered, against operational costs.

**Other related PRG research papers**

Home Office Police Research Group Briefing Note.

*Development and evaluation of a national crime management model: progress to date, February 1995.*
LOCAL CRIME ANALYSIS
by Tim Read and Dick Oldfield

Summary
Recently both the Audit Commission and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) have been encouraging police forces to undertake Crime Pattern Analysis (CPA). There is, however, some confusion amongst police forces about precisely what is meant by CPA, and little guidance exists for forces about how they should undertake it.

The report aims to provide the police with guidance on one particular area of CPA: Local Crime Analysis (LCA). The term 'Local Crime Analysis' has been coined to describe the analysis at a local level (typically divisional or sub-divisional) of high volume crime - including burglary, theft of/from motor vehicles and criminal damage. In particular, the report

* identifies and describes the forms of analysis which are relevant to the local treatment of high volume crime:

Crime patterns  - the nature and distribution of crime within an area:
Crime trends  - significant change in an area's crime pattern over time:
Crime clusters  - groups of crimes linked through similar characteristics:
Crime series  - crimes with common offenders.
* considers LCA in relation to specific areas of police work; crime prevention, repeat victimisation, problem oriented policing, and proactive policing.

The report also provides guidance to forces about the practical issues they need to consider before undertaking LCA. These include:

* data issues: the type of data that may be used for analysis, possible sources for this data (both inside and outside the police force), problems that may arise in ensuring its quality, and the necessity of being able to exchange data between LCA systems at both an intra- and inter-force level.

* analysis: time and space as variables in the analysis of high volume crime, and the difficulties posed by their use. In particular the report examines the use of geographical information systems (GIS), the mapping of data, and how this should be tailored to meet specific analytic requirements.

* the training and support needed by individuals developing LCA systems, and how the output of LCA is to be disseminated.

The report contains a number of detailed questions to assist forces in the development of a user specification for an LCA system, and to allow them to evaluate the extent to which commercial LCA systems meet their requirements. For convenience, this checklist of questions is provided as an appendix in the report.
Points for action

• In order to produce a robust user specification for LCA the force or (sub)division needs a clear perception of the type of crime analysis it wishes to undertake, the purpose of the analysis, who the users of the output will be, and what their output requirements are. All these decisions need to be clarified long before they approach the manufacturers of LCA systems.

• The type of data collected for LCA should always be dictated by the type of analysis required, rather than the reverse. Too often in the past the form of analysis done by the police has been determined by the form of data held on existing IT systems.

• Data taken from crime recording systems may not be sufficient to allow the force to undertake LCA. Links to alternative data sources, both within and outside the police force, should be established where necessary.

• LCA systems must have the potential to down-load data from existing data sources. The manual input of LCA data should be avoided wherever possible.

• Police forces should seek to develop conventions to govern the recording of data used for crime analysis to minimise problems in its inputting and subsequent analysis.

• It is essential that data can be interchanged between LCA applications, at an inter- and intra-force level. As a result the police, even at a local level, must take account of data standards and the emergent national IS/IT strategy in the procurement of LCA systems.

• Prior to the purchase of a GIS application, police forces need to identify their purpose in mapping crime data, and the level of resolution required as a result. These considerations will have repercussions in terms of the costs of the system. Where resources for mapping are limited links with local authorities, who may already have access to high-resolution digitised maps, may provide a solution.

• In purchasing an LCA system police forces should recognise that the area is relatively new and is still developing. Requirements from LCA systems are likely to evolve. In these circumstances it is crucial that the LCA suppliers are able to provide a high level of support for the package, to ensure its continued operation and development.

• It is important that police forces identify the training requirements needed to undertake LCA. This training should go beyond instructions on how to operate the LCA system, and must include training on the type and purpose of analysis required.

Other related Police Research Group papers

CPU Paper 10  Getting the Best out of Crime Analysis.
CPU Paper 11  Retail Crime: Prevention through Crime Analysis.
CPU Paper 46  Once Bitten, Twice Bitten: Repeat Victimisation and its Implications for Crime Prevention.

CCTV IN TOWN CENTRES:
THREE CASE STUDIES

Police Research Group - Crime Detection and Prevention Series Paper 68
by Ben Brown

Summary

Results from earlier studies published in this series suggest that CCTV can, in certain circumstances, make a useful contribution to crime control. However, very few evaluations of town centre schemes have been carried out, and those that have only look at the effect of cameras in the short term.

This paper examines how the police are using CCTV systems to deal with crime and disorder within three different town centres in England - Newcastle, Birmingham and King’s Lynn. It examines the effect in the medium term of the use of cameras on local patterns of offending for different types of offence within these different types of town centre. It also attempts to provide some indication of the mechanisms through which CCTV has its effect.

Key findings

One of the main benefits of CCTV systems for the police is as an aid for managing resources more effectively. Within the study areas, the police use CCTV to ‘patrol’ town centres and discover incidents as they occur, and use the information to co-ordinate appropriate and effective responses. Radio links between shop staff, police officers and camera operators can also be used very successfully in conjunction with camera systems to improve communication. In relation to false alarms, the information provided by CCTV can liberate police resources by providing better information on whether or not a police response is necessary.

Filmed evidence of an incident can also benefit the police considerably. It can play an extremely important role in directing the investigation of an offence and ensuring the swift detection of an offender.

Analysis of crime and incident data indicates that in the short term, the presence of CCTV can have a strong deterrent effect on a wide range of offences. For example, in the area of central Newcastle covered by the cameras, the number of burglaries fell by 56%, cases of criminal damage by 34%, and non-motor vehicle theft by 11% after CCTV was installed. Commensurate figures for the whole force area were a fall of 2% for burglary, and rises of 8% for both criminal damage and for theft. However, the effect of cameras may begin to fade after a certain period of time. In order to sustain the effect, the use of the cameras must be seen to increase the risk of arrest.

The evidence suggests that CCTV is most effective in reducing property crime, particularly burglary, in town centres. Personal crimes such as robbery, theft from the person and assault are more difficult to control using CCTV. In relation to assault the value of cameras may lie less in preventing such offences than in co-ordinating a swift police response to incidents and collecting evidence should it be required.

It appears that CCTV has most effect on crime levels in town centres with geographically simple layouts where the extent of camera coverage is high. In a geographically complex town centre a high degree of camera coverage can be more difficult to achieve and displacement of crime may take place.
Points for action

The findings show that CCTV is most effective when it is used by the police as an integral part of a command and control strategy, to assist the deployment of officers. To sustain any deterrent effect of CCTV, the police must also use the system to make arrests. With the assistance of other agencies, police forces, therefore, must aim to:

• ensure that information can pass swiftly from CCTV operators to officers on the ground and vice-versa, thus allowing the swift deployment of officers to deal with incidents. Most arrests are made when the system is used to coordinate timely responses to incidents as they occur. Attempting to use recorded information to identify suspects retrospectively is more time consuming and much less effective.

• maximise the possibility of arrest for offenders by making sure that camera operators are informed about local crime patterns. Camera operators can direct their patrols by using local intelligence information. For example, they can keep an eye out for persons wanted on warrant. They can also 'patrol' problem areas, either in the short term in response to spates of offences, or in the longer term, for example checking on the entrances to certain nightclubs and public houses, or transport facilities where the potential for trouble at certain times may be high.

• minimise the potential displacement of offending by selecting camera sites very carefully and making sure that camera views are not obstructed. Moreover, police forces must pay special attention to surrounding areas within the town centre area, for example car parks, that are routinely used by members of the public but may have little or no camera coverage.

Other related PRG papers

CPU Paper 35 Closed Circuit Television in Public Places
CPU Paper 42 Understanding Car Parks, Crime and CCTV: Evaluation lessons from Safer Cities
MANAGING DEMAND ON THE POLICE:
AN EVALUATION OF A CRIME LINE

Police Research Group – Police Research Series Paper No 8
by Chloë Jolowicz and Tim Read

Summary

The level of reported crime rose considerably in the 1980s and early 1990s. Police resources have not kept pace with this increase. As a result, forces have begun to introduce schemes which differentiate between the types of demand that they face, and which allow them to tailor their response. The establishment of crime line and crime desk schemes by police forces is an example of this. For many forces, these schemes have been introduced reluctantly, only after recognising that the current situation offers no alternative to the prioritisation of their response to the demand.

The report provides an evaluation of a crime line scheme (the Norwich Crime Reporting/Advice line - NCRAL) introduced by Norfolk Constabulary in September 1991. The main feature of this scheme is that, in cases of minor crime, the police completed a crime report via the telephone rather than deploy a police officer to visit the crime victim. In addition, the unit offers a free advice service to members of the public.

The Police Research Group (PRG) evaluated the NCRAL in the first quarter of 1993. The study included a three week 'self-reporting' exercise which examined the operation of the crime line: the level of demand, time taken to complete the crime line's various functions, type of advice given by the crime line, characteristics of callers and how the call was received. A comparative study of response time was undertaken in a neighbouring division not operating a crime line where police officers were deployed to most offences. Members of the public who had used the crime line were asked in a postal survey to provide their views on the service they had received. Details of alternative crime desk and crime line schemes operated by other police forces are also provided in the report.

The NCRAL was staffed by police officers but the report suggests that, from an operational point of view, civilians could be used providing they were given the necessary training. The report stresses the need for staff to deal with members of the public sensitively. It also emphasises the public's preference for dealing with the same member of staff if they contact the NCRAL more than once. The use of an answerphone by the crime line did not appear to deter members of the public from reporting crimes (either when the crime line was shut, or when the operators' telephones were engaged), although the evidence suggested that people who called the unit for advice were relatively more reluctant to leave a message than callers who wanted to report a crime.

The research indicated that the introduction of the crime line diverted just under ten thousand calls annually from members of the public away from the control room. In addition, the time taken to process each minor crime reported was halved on average. The survey of members of the public using the crime line found that the majority were satisfied with the service. They were happy to report minor crimes by telephone and did not require a police officer to attend them in person. However, these findings have to be weighed against the fact that one-quarter of respondents felt that the police should have visited them.

Points for action

The report offers an example of one model which has been adopted within a police force for dealing with minor crime and requests for advice. Police forces may find the report useful when considering how to manage the demand they face.

Aims of this study

The aims of the study were to assess:

- the way control room operators grade calls to police;
- how resources are allocated to different grades of call;
- how resources respond to calls, based on the information provided by the operator, and
- the outcome of calls.

Information was taken from:

- a small unpublished consultancy study;
- a survey of telephone demand in four forces during two weeks in March 1994; and
- an observational study of call management and response in four police forces during August and September 1994.

Findings

Calls on the 999 emergency line were found to represent no more than 30% of the total calls for police assistance. The use of the 999 emergency line was also not indicative of the urgency or grade of a call. Thus 999 calls are distinct from calls graded immediate, as all immediate calls necessarily require a rapid response, whereas, not all 999 calls do.

The percentage of all calls graded immediate by 42 forces (one force is still implementing a grading system) ranged from 0.5% – 47%. Possible explanations for this disparity were variations in:

- the type of incidents dealt with;
- the definition of immediate;
- the workload;
- operator practice;
- target setting; and
- measurement differences.

There were found to be so many anomalies in the way calls were graded, recorded and measured, that comparisons between forces were impossible. Even comparisons over time within the same force were shown to be unreliable.

Thus the percentage of calls graded immediate and PIs relating to the number of 999 calls are not, at present, reliable comparable measures of force performance in meeting emergencies.

Little evidence was found of over-resourcing of calls. Where excess resources did respond, they were quickly redeployed. Occasionally calls were under-resourced, particularly in special resources such as dog-handlers and SOCOs.

As reported in previous studies the outcome of the majority of police responses was that no further police action was required. In only 11% of incidents was an arrest made.

Much police work goes un-recorded and is often self-generated. Thus the logged records do not accurately reflect the amount of work that officers on duty undertake.

Points for action

Before call grading information can usefully be compared over time or between forces, clarity, continuity and consistency of definitions and working practice are needed.

Training control room staff in keyboard skills would improve the speed of their service and accuracy of logs. This could easily be done by installing typing courses onto computers, to be used during troughs in activity.

The supporting role of the supervisor is vital to ensure operators are given tasks appropriate to their ability and to offer advice. This can greatly improve the assurance with which operators fulfil their roles.

Allowing operators greater experience of policing, by sending them on patrol with officers, and more frequent visits to control rooms by operational officers would improve the relationship between those ‘on the ground’ and those in the control room. This is increasingly necessary as control rooms are aggregated and become further removed from locations that they oversee.

Patrol officer time not spent responding to logged calls could be more focused by using pre-shift briefings, possibly with CID input.
The Information Desk
Tel: 0171 273 4015/3324/3133

Role

To provide an information, advisory and publications service to police forces on current and planned developments within the Home Office Police Research Group.

To provide a reference service for individual forces to ascertain common areas of research within other forces.

To monitor the development of police requirements with the object of avoiding duplication within forces and between the Home Office; spreading good practice and securing value for money.

The Information Desk

Sited within the Police Research Group, the Information Services Section consists of one police sergeant, two civil servant Administration Officers and two Administration Assistants.

The service began in 1978 when the Home Office realised that there was a pressing need to co-ordinate research being separately conducted through the Home Office and UK police forces. The intention has never been to discourage originality nor to make any kind of judgment on work carried out, but to provide an opportunity for anyone starting a project on a police topic to have access to previous work in the same area.

While the bulk of PRG activity is related to established programmes, the brief of the Information Desk is much wider. Since it is virtually the only central non-specialised information service on police topics, it tends to receive not only enquiries from those concerned with every aspect of research but also from those seeking best practice or those simply seeking a helping hand through the maze of government departments.

The Information Desk collects its information in six main ways:

1. Receiving project lists and copy reports from forces. This is the most important source. We encourage forces to provide the information in any format (computer disk, paper reports etc).

2. Logging all enquiries received. This is a major source of information since the researcher will often indicate that he/she is currently researching a particular subject by asking about it, even though the force has not formally notified the Information Desk.

3. Abstracting potentially useful articles from a selection of police publications from across the English speaking world.

4. Receiving information on developments on the continent of Europe.

5. Receiving information from ACPO committees and working groups.

6. Scanning force annual reports and HMI's inspection reports.
The database contains:

1. Home Office circulars and letters to chief officers.
2. Research conducted by the Police Research Group and intended work by or for PRG.
3. Articles from PRG magazine Focus, and former PRSU magazine The Bulletin.
4. Good practice recommendations from HMI
5. Force project lists.
6. Force completed projects
7. ACPO minutes of meetings, areas of responsibility.
8. Projects and reports from outside sources, eg universities and colleges.
10. Projects and reports from foreign police forces
11. Information on Repeat Victimisation from the PRG Task Force.
12. Enquiries received which indicate a research project.

The Database

The information is stored on a computer database and is searched using a free text retrieval program.

The program has the ability to search for individual words and phrases and uses a thesaurus to search for alternative words where expressions can have a similar meaning, eg prison, cell, lockup.

Information is entered either manually, by disc or by being scanned using an optical character reader.

To ensure that the database is kept up to date it is important that project officers keep the desk informed of their projects. There are many areas of research which are carried out away from the normal research departments such as traffic and training. It is in these areas where contact with Information Desk staff is even more important.

Supply of Information

There is one main way in which the Information Desk distributes its information - by providing an enquiry service open to all officers and staff of UK police forces and government departments, and to anyone else subject to security considerations.

If the matter is simple and brief then the enquirer will receive a direct answer over the telephone. Otherwise staff will send a printed copy of the request, normally on the same day. Normally the reply will contain a printout of the information on the database often with references to publications obtainable from elsewhere.

For more specific information on a particular project we would normally direct the enquirer to the originator of the project to ensure that only up to date information is obtained.
The Police Research Group was formed in 1992 within the Home Office Police Department to provide the police service with a central science/management resource for research and development.

The Group is mandated to:

- Sponsor and undertake research and development to improve and strengthen the police service, taking account of Police Department strategy.
- Identify and disseminate good policing practice in consultation with Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary.

Provide an information service which will
- offer guidance on good policing practice and police related research
- provide a national co-ordination and dissemination service on police initiated research, and
- publish and otherwise disseminate research results from externally funded studies and those carried out by the Group's own staff.

The Police Research Group publishes work within the Crime Detection & Prevention Series (CDPS), previously known as Crime Prevention Unit (CPU) Series, and the Police Research Series papers.

The object of the CDPS of occasional papers is to present research material in a way which should help and inform practitioners, whose work can help reduce crime. The Police Research Series presents results of externally funded studies and those carried out by the Police Research Group to inform policy and practice throughout the police service.

In 1995 PRG commenced a series of numbered briefing notes with a view to providing a summary of research reports and where information would not normally be made available. Five such briefing notes were distributed in 1995.

Papers which have been published so far are listed on the following pages. These are available from the Home Office Police Research Group free of charge.
Crime Prevention Unit Series papers

Crime Detection and Prevention Series papers

64. Intelligence, Surveillance and Informants: Integrated approaches. Mike Maguire and Timothy John. 1995
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**List of abbreviations**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFR</td>
<td>Automatic Fingerprint Recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCU</td>
<td>Basic Command Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCCJS</td>
<td>Co-ordination of Computerisation in the Criminal Justice System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>Closed-circuit television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Crime intelligence system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMU</td>
<td>Crime Management Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Crime pattern analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPO</td>
<td>Crime Prevention Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPS</td>
<td>Crown Prosecution Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Crime recording system</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTM</td>
<td>Contact trace material</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAT</td>
<td>Drug Action Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRG</td>
<td>Drugs Reference Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>Deoxyribonucleicacid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOA</td>
<td>First officer attending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSS</td>
<td>Forensic Science Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOLAB</td>
<td>(Home Office) Laboratory submission form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>Investigating officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPM</td>
<td>Joint performance management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIO</td>
<td>Local intelligence officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>Modus operandi</td>
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<td>MPFSL</td>
<td>Metropolitan Police Forensic Science Laboratory</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCIS</td>
<td>National Criminal Intelligence Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCSS</td>
<td>National Conference on Scientific Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSPIS</td>
<td>National Strategy for Police Information Systems</td>
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<td>NTCSS</td>
<td>National Training Centre for Scientific Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>NVQ</td>
<td>National vocational qualification</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Officer-in-the-case</td>
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<td>PI</td>
<td>Performance indicator</td>
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<td>PITO</td>
<td>Police IT Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTIWG</td>
<td>Pre-trials Issues Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRSU-SST</td>
<td>Police Requirements Support Unit - Scientific Support Team</td>
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<td>QA</td>
<td>Quality assurance</td>
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<td>Quality control</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCCJ</td>
<td>Royal Commission on Criminal Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROTIs</td>
<td>Records of taped interviews</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLA</td>
<td>Service level agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOCIMS</td>
<td>Scenes of crime information and management system</td>
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<td>SOCO</td>
<td>Scene of crime officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSM</td>
<td>Scientific Support Manager</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSU</td>
<td>Scientific Support Unit</td>
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<td>TIG</td>
<td>Trials Issues Group</td>
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<td>Unique reference number</td>
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<tr>
<td>VFM</td>
<td>Value for money</td>
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