Competition Act 1998

Decision of the Office of Fair Trading

CA98/02/2013

Distribution of Mercedes-Benz commercial vehicles (vans)

Case CE/9161-09

27 March 2013

Confidential information in the original version of this Decision has been redacted from the published version on the public register. Redacted confidential information in the text of the published version of the Decision is denoted by [C].

The names of individuals mentioned in the description of the infringement in the original version of this Decision have been removed from the published version on the public register. Names have been replaced by a general descriptor of the individual’s role.
COMPETITION ACT 1998

Distribution of Mercedes-Benz commercial vehicles (vans)

Decision No. CA98/02/2013

Ciceley Commercials Limited and Ciceley Limited

Northside Truck & Van Limited and S.A.H. Limited

27 March 2013

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SECTION I  INTRODUCTION

A.  The purpose of this document

I.1 By this decision (the 'Decision'), the Office of Fair Trading ('OFT') has concluded that:

- Ciceley Commercials Limited and its ultimate parent Ciceley Limited (together, 'Ciceley') and
- Northside Truck & Van Limited and its ultimate parent S.A.H. Limited (together, 'Northside')

(each a 'Party', together the 'Parties') have infringed the prohibition imposed by section 2(1) (the 'Chapter I prohibition') of the Competition Act 1998 (the 'Act').

I.2 The Chapter I prohibition provides that agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices which may affect trade within the United Kingdom (the 'UK') and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the UK are prohibited unless they are excluded by or as a result of, or exempt in accordance with, the Act.

B.  Summary of the infringement and the OFT's enforcement action

I.3 The OFT has concluded that the Parties infringed the Chapter I prohibition by participating between 15 January 2008 and 26 January 2010 in an agreement and/or concerted practice which had the object of preventing, restricting or distorting competition for the sale of vans to customers based in the Parties' areas (the 'Infringement' or 'Infringement 2').

I.4 The Infringement took the form of an agreement and/or concerted practice between Ciceley and Northside to each include what has been described as a 'good' or 'substantial' margin in quotations to customers based in the other Party's areas. They also agreed that they would contact each other in relation to customers based in the other Party's areas in order to give the local Party an opportunity to win the sale.¹

I.5 By this Decision, the OFT is imposing financial penalties under section 36 of the Act, subject to the application of the OFT's leniency policy.

¹ See Section VI (The Conduct of the Parties and Legal Assessment).
I.6 Northside applied for, and was granted, full immunity from financial penalties under the OFT’s leniency policy. Northside is not therefore required by this Decision to pay a penalty under section 36 of the Act.

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2 OFT Guidance 423 OFT’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty (December 2004) (the ‘2004 Penalty Guidance’). This guidance was replaced in September 2012 by OFT Guidance 423, OFT’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty (September 2012) (the ‘2012 Penalty Guidance’). See also paragraphs VII.5 to VII.6 (The OFT’s Action).
SECTION II COMPANY PROFILES

A. Introduction

II.1 This section sets out the details of the undertakings which the OFT finds liable for the Infringement, including where applicable the joint and several liability of the parent company or companies within the undertakings involved in the Infringement.

II.2 This section describes each of the Parties’ primary activities and corporate structure. It also sets out the Parties’ total turnover and profit/loss figures (including consolidated turnover, where applicable) relating to each business year spanning the Relevant Period, as well as the latest available total turnover and profit/loss figures. This section also lists the Parties’ directors for each of the years spanning the Relevant Period. Finally, this section sets out, for each Party, the OFT’s conclusions on liability for the Infringement.

B. The OFT’s approach to assessing liability

II.3 The Chapter I prohibition applies to agreements or concerted practices between ‘undertakings’, which is a concept used to designate an economic unit. As such, it is distinct from that of legal personality and may consist of several persons, natural or legal. In determining who is liable for an infringement and, therefore, who can be subject to any financial penalty which the OFT may impose, it is necessary to identify the legal or natural persons who form part of the undertaking involved in the Infringement.

II.4 In certain circumstances, the conduct of a subsidiary may be imputed to the parent company where the parent company and its subsidiary form a single undertaking for the purposes of the Act. In such circumstances, a decision may be addressed to the parent company without having to establish its direct involvement in the infringement.

---

3 The Relevant Period corresponds to the duration of Infringement 2, that is, between 15 January 2008 and 26 January 2010, see paragraph VI.19 (The Conduct of the Parties and Legal Assessment).
4 See paragraph V.9 (Legal Background).
5 Case C-170/83 Hydrotherm Gerätebau GmbH v Compact del Dott Ing Mario Andreoli & C Sas [1984] ECR 2999, paragraph 11.
6 C-628/10 P Alliance One International and Standard Commercial Tobacco v Commission Alliance judgment of 19 July 2012 (not yet published) (‘Alliance One’), paragraphs 43 to 44.
II.5 In order for the parent company to be liable, it must have exercised decisive influence over the subsidiary. In determining this, the economic, organisational and legal links which tie the subsidiary to the parent company are taken into consideration.\(^7\)

II.6 Where a parent company has a 100 per cent shareholding in a subsidiary, this establishes that the parent company has the ability to exercise a decisive influence over the conduct of the subsidiary. It also creates a rebuttable presumption that the parent company does, in fact, exercise a decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiary.\(^8\)

II.7 In order to rebut the presumption that it exercises decisive influence over a subsidiary, a parent must adduce evidence relating to the economic and legal organisational links between the two legal entities, in order to demonstrate that the subsidiary operates autonomously on the market.\(^9\)

II.8 In order to establish the exercise of decisive influence, additional indicia other than the parent’s shareholding in the subsidiary, may be relied on.\(^10\) Such indicia have been found to include a parent being active on the same or adjacent markets to its subsidiary,\(^11\) direct instructions being given by a parent to a subsidiary\(^12\) or the two entities having shared directors.\(^13\)

II.9 Financial penalties that are imposed both on a parent and a subsidiary may be imposed jointly and severally.\(^14\)

II.10 In this case, for each Party which the OFT has found to have infringed the Act, the OFT has first identified the legal entity directly involved in the Infringement during the Relevant Period. It has then determined

\(^7\) Alliance One (fn6), paragraph 45.
\(^8\) Case C-97/08P Akzo Nobel v Commission [2009] ECR I-8237 (‘Akzo Nobel’), paragraphs 60 to 61 and Alliance One (fn6), paragraphs 46 and 47.
\(^9\) Akzo Nobel (fn8), paragraphs 73 to 74.
\(^12\) Case T-48/69 Imperial Chemicals Industries v Commission [1972] ECR I-619 (‘Dyestuffs’), paragraphs 132 to 133.
whether liability for the Infringement should be shared with another legal entity on the basis that both form part of the same undertaking.

II.11 The OFT considers that both Parties constitute undertakings for the purposes of the Chapter I prohibition.

II.12 The Parties to whom the Decision is addressed are set out in paragraph I.1 (Introduction). They comprise:

- the companies which the OFT considers had direct involvement in the Infringement and
- the legal entities (if any) which the OFT presumes exercised decisive influence over the companies during the Relevant Period.\(^\text{15}\)

C. Ciceley Commercials Limited and Ciceley Limited

II.13 The OFT considers that Ciceley Commercials Limited was directly involved in the Infringement. However given that its parent company, Ciceley Limited, can be presumed to have exercised decisive influence over its subsidiary, this Decision is also addressed to Ciceley Limited. The OFT considers that Ciceley Limited forms part of the same undertaking and therefore is jointly and severally liable with Ciceley Commercials Limited for the Infringement.

\(^{15}\) See paragraphs II.26 to II.27 and II.40 to II.41.
II.14 The registered company details of Ciceley Limited\textsuperscript{16} and Ciceley Commercials Limited\textsuperscript{17} and their corporate relationship, are outlined below:

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{diagram.png}
\caption{Company Diagram}
\end{figure}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{Ciceley Limited}
\begin{itemize}
\item Ciceley Lane
\item Blackburn
\item Lancashire
\item BB1 1HQ
\end{itemize}
\item Company number 00365714 (100\% ownership)
\end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{Ciceley Commercials Limited}
\begin{itemize}
\item Ciceley Lane
\item Blackburn
\item Lancashire
\item BB1 1HQ
\end{itemize}
\item Company number 02762560
\end{itemize}

\end{itemize}

\textbf{Ciceley Commercials Limited}

II.15 Ciceley Commercials Limited's principal activity is that of a dealer of Mercedes-Benz commercial vehicles\textsuperscript{18}. It operates from regional offices based in Bolton, Blackburn, Carlisle and Dumfries\textsuperscript{19}.

II.16 Ciceley Commercials Limited is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Ciceley Limited\textsuperscript{20}. In its Directors' Report and Financial Statements for the year ended 31 December 2011, it states that '[t]he company is controlled by Ciceley Limited'

---

\textsuperscript{16} Ciceley Limited Financial Analysis Made Easy ('FAME') Report containing financial accounts to year-end 31 December 2011 ('Ciceley Limited FAME Report 2011'), OFT Document Reference 5045. FAME is a database for company information. The company number was recorded at Companies House (\url{www.companieshouse.gov.uk}) as at 26 March 2013.

\textsuperscript{17} Ciceley Commercials Limited FAME Report containing financial accounts to year-end 31 December 2011 ('Ciceley Commercials Limited FAME Report 2011'), OFT Document Reference 5046. The company number was recorded at Companies House (\url{www.companieshouse.gov.uk}) as at 26 March 2013.


\textsuperscript{19} Ciceley Commercials Limited's website, OFT Document Reference 4045, pages 3 to 6.

[...] In the opinion of the directors this is the company's ultimate parent company'.

**Ciceley Limited**

II.17 The principal activities of the group (Ciceley Limited and its subsidiaries) comprise that of dealers in Mercedes-Benz commercial vehicles, the sale of used vehicles, the sale of accessories and the supply of commercial vehicles on contract hire, including as an approved repairer of Mercedes-Benz passenger vehicles.

II.18 During the Relevant Period, the shares in Ciceley Limited were held by the following individuals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Shares held</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russell Ian Morgan</td>
<td>6,000 ordinary shares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian Morgan</td>
<td>5,500 ordinary shares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorothy Morgan</td>
<td>4,700 ordinary shares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sally Ann Morgan</td>
<td>3,800 ordinary shares</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II.19 Ciceley Limited has two other wholly-owned subsidiaries, Ciceley Contracts Limited and Ciceley Continental Limited, the latter of which is not currently trading. Previously, it also wholly-owned Ciceley Chrysler Limited, which ceased trading in 2009. The OFT has no evidence that any of these subsidiaries were directly involved in the Infringement.

---

**Turnover and profit/loss of Ciceley Commercials Limited**

II.20 Ciceley Commercials Limited’s turnover and profits for the financial years 2008 to 2011 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year ending</th>
<th>31/12/11&lt;sup&gt;26&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>31/12/10&lt;sup&gt;27&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>31/12/09&lt;sup&gt;28&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>31/12/08&lt;sup&gt;29&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turnover</td>
<td>£54,249,218</td>
<td>£57,042,987</td>
<td>£59,603,716</td>
<td>£47,462,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross profit (loss)</td>
<td>£7,676,633</td>
<td>£8,131,522</td>
<td>£8,130,795</td>
<td>£8,573,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating profit (loss)</td>
<td>£397,893</td>
<td>£565,428</td>
<td>£86,520</td>
<td>£225,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit (loss) on ordinary activities before taxation</td>
<td>£303,316</td>
<td>£425,977</td>
<td>(£196,267)</td>
<td>(£34,483)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit (loss) for the financial year</td>
<td>£216,294</td>
<td>£292,518</td>
<td>(£160,716)</td>
<td>£20,175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26 Ciceley Commercials Limited Report 2011, OFT Document Reference 5047, page 8. Page 10 states that ‘turnover comprises revenue recognised by the company in respect of goods and services supplied during the year, exclusive of Value Added Tax and trade discounts’.


**Consolidated turnover and profit/loss of Ciceley Limited**

II.21 Ciceley Limited’s consolidated turnover and profits for the financial years 2008 to 2011 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year ending</th>
<th>31/12/11</th>
<th>31/12/10</th>
<th>31/12/09</th>
<th>31/12/08</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turnover</td>
<td>£57,694,248</td>
<td>£60,956,994</td>
<td>£65,210,721</td>
<td>£57,289,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross profit (loss)</td>
<td>£7,455,895</td>
<td>£7,602,742</td>
<td>£6,231,426</td>
<td>£8,050,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating profit (loss)</td>
<td>(£273,597)</td>
<td>£658,159</td>
<td>(£873,667)</td>
<td>(£64,968)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit (loss) on ordinary activities before taxation</td>
<td>(£336,519)</td>
<td>£541,315</td>
<td>£301,134</td>
<td>£6,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit (loss) for the financial year</td>
<td>(£484,863)</td>
<td>£485,257</td>
<td>£415,872</td>
<td>(£458,802)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II.22 According to its published accounts, Ciceley Limited’s entire turnover during the Relevant Period arose within the UK.34

**Appointments**

II.23 The directors of Ciceley Commercials Limited during the Relevant Period were as follows:35

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Appointment</th>
<th>Position in January 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russell Morgan</td>
<td>02/01/2008</td>
<td>In post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian Morgan</td>
<td>Prior to 2008</td>
<td>In post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colin Briggs</td>
<td>02/01/2008</td>
<td>In post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Lewis</td>
<td>01/01/2009</td>
<td>In post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon Wilson</td>
<td>02/01/2008</td>
<td>In post</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


32 Ciceley Limited Report 2010, OFT Document Reference 3992, page 8 as the figures for 2009 were restated to correct the fact that certain interest charges between group companies had not been eliminated in the group financial statements. In addition, the overall turnover figure is broken down into £63,631,880 for continuing operations and £1,578,841 for discontinued operations.


II.24 The directors of Ciceley Limited during the Relevant Period were as follows:\(^{36}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Appointment</th>
<th>Position in January 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russell Morgan</td>
<td>Prior to 2008</td>
<td>In post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian Morgan</td>
<td>Prior to 2008</td>
<td>In post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colin Briggs</td>
<td>Prior to 2008</td>
<td>In post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon Wilson</td>
<td>Prior to 2008</td>
<td>In post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorothy Morgan</td>
<td>Prior to 2008</td>
<td>In post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sally Ann Morgan</td>
<td>Prior to 2008</td>
<td>In post</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Liability**

II.25 Ciceley did not apply for leniency.

II.26 The OFT considers that Ciceley Limited, as 100 per cent owner of Ciceley Commercials Limited, can be presumed to have exercised decisive influence over Ciceley Commercials Limited’s commercial policy during the Relevant Period. The OFT notes that it has not received any representations to the contrary. The OFT relies, as additional evidence of the exercise of decisive influence, on the fact that there were four directors in common between Ciceley Limited and Ciceley Commercials Limited throughout the Relevant Period.

II.27 The OFT, therefore, considers that Ciceley Limited and Ciceley Commercials Limited form part of the same economic entity. As such, they are jointly and severally liable for Ciceley Commercials Limited’s participation in the Infringement and for the payment of the financial penalty being imposed by the OFT for this Infringement. This Decision is therefore addressed to Ciceley Commercials Limited and Ciceley Limited.

D. **Northside Truck & Van Limited and S.A.H. Limited**

II.28 The OFT considers that Northside Truck & Van Limited was directly involved in the Infringement. However given that its parent company, S.A.H. Limited, can be presumed to have exercised decisive influence over its subsidiary, this Decision is also addressed to S.A.H. Limited. The OFT considers S.A.H. Limited forms part of the same undertaking and

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therefore is jointly and severally liable with Northside Truck & Van Limited for the Infringement.

II.29 The registered company details of S.A.H. Limited\textsuperscript{37} and Northside Truck & Van Limited,\textsuperscript{38} and their corporate relationship, are outlined below:

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzcd}
S.A.H. Limited \arrow{d}
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Wilson Road Garage} \\
\text{Newhouse} \\
\text{Lanarkshire} \\
\text{ML1 5NB}
\end{array}
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Company number SC242901} \\
(100\% \text{ ownership})
\end{array}
\end{tikzcd}
\begin{tikzcd}
\arrow{d}
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Northside Truck & Van Limited} \\
\text{Wilson Road Garage} \\
\text{Newhouse} \\
\text{Lanarkshire} \\
\text{ML1 5NB}
\end{array}
\text{Company number SC275307}
\end{array}
\end{center}

\textbf{Northside Truck & Van Limited}

II.30 Northside Truck & Van Limited is a dealer in Mercedes-Benz commercial vehicle services\textsuperscript{39} operating out of four locations in Bradford, Leeds, Sheffield and Doncaster.\textsuperscript{40} At the end of 2011, it became the Mercedes-Benz commercial vehicle dealer in Hull and Immingham following the administration of H & L Garages Limited.\textsuperscript{41} It also established operations


\textsuperscript{40} Northside Truck & Van Limited Report 2011, OFT Document Reference 4607, page 1.

\textsuperscript{41} Although not a Party to this Decision, H & L Garages Limited was a Party to the OFT’s Investigation. See paragraphs III.1 to III.4 (The OFT’s Investigation).
in York following the closure at the end of 2011 of H & L Garages Limited's location there.\textsuperscript{42}

II.31 Northside Truck & Van Limited is a wholly-owned subsidiary of S.A.H. Limited.\textsuperscript{43}

**S.A.H. Limited**

II.32 S.A.H. Limited's principal activity comprises that of a holding company and consequently the company did not trade during the Relevant Period.\textsuperscript{44}

II.33 During the Relevant Period, the shares in S.A.H. Limited were held by the following individuals:\textsuperscript{45}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Shares held</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peter Anderson</td>
<td>27,066 ordinary shares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Stewart Anderson</td>
<td>27,066 ordinary shares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helena Anderson</td>
<td>16,656 ordinary shares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jillian Anderson</td>
<td>8,328 ordinary shares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jayne Anderson</td>
<td>8,328 ordinary shares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Irvine Anderson</td>
<td>8,328 ordinary shares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jennifer Anderson</td>
<td>8,328 ordinary shares</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II.34 In addition to Northside Truck & Van Limited, S.A.H. Limited has the following wholly-owned subsidiaries: Sam Anderson (Newhouse) Limited, T McMillian (Transport) Limited and F Short Limited (all haulage contractors) and Anderson Commercial (Newhouse) Limited (property investment).\textsuperscript{46} The OFT does not have any evidence that any of these subsidiaries were directly involved in the Infringement.

Northside Truck & Van Limited's turnover and profits for the financial years 2008 to 2011 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year ending</th>
<th>31/12/11</th>
<th>31/12/10</th>
<th>31/12/09</th>
<th>31/12/08</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turnover</td>
<td>£97,595,660</td>
<td>£76,213,500</td>
<td>£62,812,361</td>
<td>£95,048,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross profit (loss)</td>
<td>£11,278,048</td>
<td>£10,292,955</td>
<td>£9,094,375</td>
<td>£12,136,542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating profit (loss)</td>
<td>£794,929</td>
<td>£210,754</td>
<td>(£747,599)</td>
<td>£836,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit (loss) on ordinary activities before taxation</td>
<td>£159,165</td>
<td>(£280,531)</td>
<td>(£1,230,898)</td>
<td>£32,543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit (loss) for the financial year</td>
<td>£12,006</td>
<td>(£309,009)</td>
<td>(£1,053,804)</td>
<td>(£37,889)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

47 Northside Truck & Van Limited Report 2011, OFT Document Reference 4607, page 7. Page 9 states that '[t]urnover comprises revenue recognised by the company in respect of goods and services supplied, exclusive of Value Added Tax and trade discounts. Turnover derives from the principal activity of the company'.


Consolidated turnover and profit/loss of S.A.H. Limited

II.36 S.A.H. Limited’s consolidated turnover and profits for the financial years 2008 to 2011 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year ending</th>
<th>31/12/11 52</th>
<th>31/12/10 53</th>
<th>31/12/09 54</th>
<th>31/12/08 55</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turnover</td>
<td>£109,635,344</td>
<td>£86,758,665</td>
<td>£72,482,171</td>
<td>£107,215,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross profit (loss)</td>
<td>£12,428,376</td>
<td>£11,214,897</td>
<td>£5,915,827</td>
<td>£13,209,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating profit (loss)</td>
<td>£1,429,122</td>
<td>£924,737</td>
<td>(£74,494)</td>
<td>£1,542,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit (loss) on ordinary activities before taxation</td>
<td>£524,925</td>
<td>£115,763</td>
<td>(£917,650)</td>
<td>£603,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit (loss) on ordinary activities after taxation 56</td>
<td>£183,051</td>
<td>(£90,667)</td>
<td>(£849,787)</td>
<td>£237,991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II.37 According to its published reports, S.A.H. Limited’s entire turnover during the Relevant Period arose within the UK. 57

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52 S.A.H. Limited Report 2011, OFT Document Reference 4609, page 7. Page 12 states that the report comprises the audited financial statements of the company and its subsidiary and associated undertakings. It also states that ‘[t]urnover comprises the invoiced value of goods and services supplied during the year, net of value added tax and trade discounts’. Page 15 states that turnover from motor vehicle, service and parts sales was £97,595,660.


Appointments

II.38 The directors of Northside Truck & Van Limited during the Relevant Period were as follows:58

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Appointment</th>
<th>Position in January 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jennifer Anderson</td>
<td>Prior to 2008</td>
<td>In post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Irvine Anderson</td>
<td>Prior to 2008</td>
<td>In post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Stewart Anderson</td>
<td>Prior to 2008</td>
<td>In post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fergus Leitch</td>
<td>Prior to 2008</td>
<td>In post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timothy Ward</td>
<td>Prior to 2008</td>
<td>In post</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II.39 The directors of S.A.H. Limited during the Relevant Period were as follows:59

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Appointment</th>
<th>Position in January 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jennifer Anderson</td>
<td>Prior to 2008</td>
<td>In post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Irvine Anderson</td>
<td>Prior to 2008</td>
<td>In post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Stewart Anderson</td>
<td>Prior to 2008</td>
<td>In post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fergus Leitch</td>
<td>Prior to 2008</td>
<td>In post</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Liability

II.40 The OFT considers that S.A.H. Limited, as 100 per cent owner of Northside Truck & Van Limited, can be presumed to have exercised decisive influence over Northside Truck & Van Limited’s commercial policy during the Relevant Period. The OFT notes that it has not received any representations to the contrary. The OFT relies, as additional evidence of the exercise of decisive influence, on the fact that all the directors of S.A.H. Limited during the Relevant Period were also the directors of Northside Truck & Van Limited. Furthermore, of the five directors of Northside Truck & Van Limited, three were also shareholders of S.A.H. Limited.

II.41 The OFT considers that Northside Truck & Van Limited and S.A.H. Limited form part of the same economic entity. As such, they are jointly

and severally liable for Northside Truck & Van Limited’s participation in the Infringement and for payment of the financial penalty being imposed by the OFT for this Infringement.

II.42 However, Northside applied to the OFT for immunity and was the first to do so where the OFT had already commenced its investigation. Northside was granted full immunity from financial penalties on that basis. Northside is therefore not required by this Decision to pay a penalty under section 36 of the Act.\(^6^0\)

\(^{60}\) See OFT Guidance 803, *Leniency and no-action, OFT’s guidance note on the handling of applications* (December 2008).
SECTION III  THE OFT’S INVESTIGATION

A.  Introduction

III.1 This Decision follows the Statement of Objections ('Statement') issued on 28 June 2012. The Statement was addressed to Ciceley and Northside along with:

- Enza Motors Limited, its parent Enza Holdings Limited and its ultimate parent Enza Group Limited (together, 'Enza')
- H & L Garages Limited and its parent Dusted Powder Limited (together, 'H & L')
- Mercedes-Benz UK Limited, its parent Daimler UK Limited and its ultimate parent Daimler AG (together, 'Mercedes') and
- Road Range Limited ('Road Range')

all six undertakings together, the 'Parties to the OFT's Investigation'.

III.2 The Statement set out five separate alleged infringements concerning separate agreements and/or concerted practices, involving varying parties, different products (vans or trucks) over different areas and timeframes. They were:

- An agreement and/or concerted practice between Northside, H & L and Mercedes which had the object of preventing, restricting or distorting competition for the sale of vans between 23 March 2007 and 26 January 2010 ('Infringement 1')

- An agreement and/or concerted practice between Northside and Ciceley which had the object of preventing, restricting or distorting competition for the sale of vans between 15 January 2008 and 26 January 2010 ('Infringement 2')

- An agreement and/or concerted practice between Ciceley and Road Range which had the object of preventing, restricting or distorting competition for the sale of vans between 1 February 2008 and 26 January 2010 ('Infringement 3')

Note however that in its decision in relation to Infringement 1 the OFT concluded that the totality of the evidence does not support a finding that Mercedes participated in Infringement 1. The OFT therefore considers that it has no grounds for action against Mercedes in relation to Infringement 1.
• An agreement and/or concerted practice between Northside and H & L which had the object of preventing, restricting or distorting competition for the sale of trucks between 13 June 2008 and 26 January 2010 ('Infringement 4') and

• An agreement and/or concerted practice between Ciceley, Enza, Mercedes and Road Range which had the object of preventing, restricting or distorting competition for the sale of trucks between 8 December 2009 and 26 January 2010 ('Infringement 5').

III.3 This Decision solely concerns Infringement 2 ('Decision 2').

III.4 Although the Statement was also addressed to Enza, H & L, Mercedes and Road Range, they were not parties to Infringement 2 and this Decision, therefore, is not addressed to them. This Decision, however, refers to evidence obtained from all Parties to the OFT's Investigation in relation to their products and businesses as well as background on the industry. In addition, where appropriate this Decision refers to evidence in relation to the other infringements set out in the Statement.

B. Infringements 3 (vans) and 5 (trucks)

III.5 In addition to this Infringement, Ciceley was involved in Infringement 3 and Infringement 5.

III.6 The OFT has concluded that Ciceley, along with Road Range, infringed the Chapter I prohibition by entering into an agreement and/or concerted practice which had the object of preventing, restricting or distorting competition for the sale of vans between 1 February 2008 and 26 January 2010. The OFT's decision concerning that infringement ('Decision 3') is being issued at the same time as this Decision.

III.7 In addition, the OFT has concluded that Ciceley, Enza, Mercedes and Road Range infringed the Chapter I prohibition by entering into an agreement and/or concerted practice which had the object of preventing, restricting or distorting competition for the sale of trucks between 8 December 2009 and 26 January 2010. The OFT's decision for the infringement ('Decision 5') is being issued at the same time as this Decision.

III.8 The financial penalties imposed by the OFT for Ciceley's involvement in Infringements 3 and 5 have been taken into consideration in setting the
C. The types of evidence in this case

Section 28 inspections of premises in January 2010

III.9 The OFT obtained warrants to enter and search the premises of Northside and H & L on 26 and 27 January 2010, using its powers under section 28 of the Act.

III.10 During these inspections the OFT also employed forensic IT techniques to seize and subsequently sift images of the electronic devices (desktop and laptop hard drives, server folders, mobile phones, BlackBerries, CDs and USB sticks) at or accessible from Northside and H & L’s premises, using the seize and sift powers conferred by the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 (the ‘CJPA’).

III.11 Following these inspections, on 29 January 2010 the OFT received an application for Type B immunity/leniency from Northside. Northside was granted full immunity from financial penalties on 11 April 2012.

III.12 The section 28 inspections and the subsequent leniency application revealed evidence of suspected breaches of the Chapter I prohibition in the distribution of Mercedes-Benz commercial vehicles involving dealers other than Northside and H & L, and also involving the manufacturer, Mercedes. Following the section 28 inspections in January 2010, the OFT also obtained witness evidence from some of the customers whom it considered may have been affected by some of the suspected infringements.

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62 See paragraphs VII.37 to VII.40 (The OFT’s Action).
63 Section 50 of the CJPA empowers the OFT to seize electronic material from premises and to sift through such material at a later date, in circumstances where it believes that the electronic material contains data relevant to an investigation, and either it is not reasonably practicable to determine on the premises the extent to which that is the case and/or it is not reasonably practicable to separate out the relevant data on the premises without compromising its evidential value.
64 Signed Northside immunity agreement, OFT Document Reference 4580.
Section 28 inspections of premises in September 2010

III.13 As a result of this additional evidence, in September 2010 the OFT obtained warrants to enter and search the premises of the following undertakings, using its powers under section 28 of the Act, which were executed on the following dates:

- Mercedes – 14 and 15 September 2010
- Ciceley – 16 and 17 September 2010
- Enza – 16 and 17 September 2010 and
- Road Range – 16 September 2010.

III.14 These inspections also included the use of forensic IT and the OFT’s seize and sift powers referred to in paragraph III.10 above. The inspections provided the OFT with further evidence of suspected breaches of competition law.

Interviews conducted

III.15 Following the inspections and initial analysis of the evidence, in October 2010 the OFT requested to interview certain members of staff of the Parties to the OFT’s Investigation.65

III.16 Ciceley66 and Road Range67 refused the OFT’s request to interview its employees during the investigative stage of the case. The OFT interviewed staff from H & L, Enza and Mercedes in November and December 2010. Further interviews were conducted with certain customers and former employees of the Parties to the OFT’s Investigation during the course of 2011 and 2012. The OFT notes that the interviewees were all informed at the start of the interview that it would be an offence knowingly or recklessly to provide the OFT with information that is false or misleading in a material particular.

65 Email from OFT to Addleshaw Goddard dated 12 October 2010 re Ciceley - interviews, OFT Document Reference 1165; email from OFT to Walker Morris dated 12 October 2010 re H & L Garages, OFT Document Reference 1166; email from OFT to Enza dated 12 October 2010 re OFT investigation - interviews, OFT Document Reference 1167; email from OFT to Road Range dated 12 October 2010 re OFT interviews, OFT Document Reference 1168 and email from OFT to Mercedes dated 12 October 2010 re OFT interviews - Competition Act interviews, OFT Document Reference 1169.

66 Email exchange between OFT and Addleshaw Goddard dated 27 September to 22 October 2010 re Ciceley - interviews, OFT Document Reference 1207.

67 Letter from Brabners Chaffe Street to OFT dated 22 November 2010 re cooperation by Road Range with OFT investigation, OFT Document Reference 1423.
III.17 Witness statements have been obtained from those employees of both Northside and Enza who were interviewed by the OFT and provided evidence of material relevance to the investigation.

III.18 Given that Mercedes and H & L did not provide witness statements, for the employees of Mercedes and H & L that were interviewed, the OFT asked for the interview transcripts to be signed by the interviewees, with a declaration that the content of the transcripts is an accurate record of what was said at interview and that the evidence given in the interview and recorded by the transcript is the interviewee’s true and faithful recollection of events. H & L complied with this request. Mercedes did not, at that time, stating that it wanted to preserve its opportunity to request that the interviewees provide witness statements following receipt of the Statement. Subsequently, Mercedes provided the OFT with witness statements from [Mercedes Sales Manager B] and from [Mercedes Sales Manager A].

III.19 When quoting from interview transcripts, witness statements and documents, the OFT has not corrected any matters such as typographical or grammatical errors, or spelling mistakes.

Section 26 notices and information obtained without use of formal powers

III.20 During the course of its investigation, the OFT sent the Parties to the OFT’s Investigation a number of notices requiring the production of documents and information under section 26 of the Act, as well as letters requesting documents and information without recourse to the OFT’s formal powers.

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68 Note of a meeting between the OFT, Nabarro and Mercedes dated 23 November 2011, OFT Document Reference 4583, page 4.
Forensic IT output

III.21 As discussed above in paragraphs III.10 and III.14, the OFT conducted searches of the electronic material obtained from the Parties to the OFT’s Investigation using its seize and sift powers conferred by the CJPA. The analysis of the material produced relevant contemporaneous electronic evidence from each undertaking, which was collated on to one disc and sent to each Party to the OFT’s Investigation.

D. Issue of Statement of Objections

III.22 As outlined in paragraph III.1, on 28 June 2012, the OFT issued the Statement, giving Ciceley and Northside notice under section 31(1)(a) of the Act and rules 4 and 5 of the OFT’s procedural rules (the ‘OFT’s Rules’\(^\text{71}\)) of its proposed infringement decision.

III.23 As required under the OFT’s Rules, the OFT gave all the companies to which the Statement was addressed a reasonable opportunity to inspect the documents on the OFT’s file that relate to the matters referred to in the Statement.\(^\text{72}\) They were also notified of the period for making written representations and of the possibility of making oral representations to the OFT on the matters referred to in the Statement.\(^\text{73}\)

III.24 As part of the settlement agreement entered into between Ciceley and the OFT, as set out in paragraphs III.26 to III.30, Ciceley has agreed to a streamlined procedure.\(^\text{74}\) Ciceley agreed not to request an oral hearing in respect of the Statement. Ciceley also agreed not to provide any written representations on the Statement with the exception of a memorandum indicating any material factual inaccuracies. Ciceley has not provided such a memorandum.

III.25 Northside did not provide any written representations on the Statement, nor did it request the opportunity to make oral representations.


\(^{72}\) OFT’s Rules (fn71), Rules 5(3) and 1(1).

\(^{73}\) OFT’s Rules (fn71), Rules 6(2)(c) and 5(4).

\(^{74}\) See paragraph III.29.
E. Settlement agreements

III.26 When the OFT issued the Statement it advised all the addressees\(^{75}\) that it was open to the possibility of discussing settlement.\(^{76}\)

III.27 On 20 February 2013, the OFT announced that it had concluded settlement agreements (each a 'Settlement Agreement', together the 'Settlement Agreements') with:

- Ciceley, in respect of Infringements 2, 3 and 5
- Enza, in respect of Infringement 5
- Mercedes, in respect of Infringement 5 and
- Road Range, in respect of Infringements 3 and 5.\(^{77}\)

III.28 The Settlement Agreements are substantially identical in form, save in relation to the infringements being settled (as set out in paragraph III.27) and the penalty being imposed on each undertaking. In addition, for the dealers the Settlement Agreements provided that the OFT would offer the dealers the option of paying the penalty in instalments (with interest) over a period of three years. A copy of the Settlement Agreement with Ciceley can be found at Annex A.

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\(^{75}\) With the exception of Northside which was granted immunity on 11 April 2012, see Signed Northside immunity agreement, OFT Document Reference 4580.


III.29 Ciceley admitted liability for the infringements being settled. It also admitted the facts set out in the relevant sections of the Statement. In addition, Ciceley agreed to a streamlined procedure\(^{78}\) and to co-operate with the OFT in expediting the conclusion of its investigation.

III.30 As part of settlement, only 85 per cent of the penalty determined for Ciceley for Infringement 2 is payable on the date specified in paragraph VII.51 (The OFT’s Action).\(^{79}\)

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\(^{78}\) For details on what this included, see paragraph III.24.

\(^{79}\) See paragraphs VII.17 to VII.18 (The OFT’s Action).
SECTION IV   INDUSTRY OVERVIEW AND THE RELEVANT MARKET

A.   Introduction

IV.1   This section comprises three parts:

•   'Industry Overview' describes the products affected by the Infringement and provides an overview of the commercial vehicle industry
•   'Mercedes and its Dealership Network' describes the key features of Mercedes' selective distribution system and of its relationship with the dealership network
•   'Relevant Market' sets out the market affected by the Infringement for the purposes of penalty calculation.

Industry Overview – Commercial Vehicles

IV.2   The Parties sell commercial vehicles manufactured by Mercedes through its dealership network to end customers.80 There are at least three categories of commercial vehicles: i) vans (also known as light commercial vehicles or 'LCVs'), ii) trucks (also known as heavy goods vehicles or 'HGVs') and iii) buses and coaches. The Infringement concerns the sale of vans and so this section focuses on this category.

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80 This includes the Fuso Canter model manufactured by Mitsubishi and distributed by the Mercedes dealership network. Daimler AG had, at the end of 2010, an 89.29 per cent controlling interest in the Mitsubishi Fuso Truck and Bus Corporation. Daimler AG Statement of Investments as of 31 December 2011, OFT Document Reference 4610, page 12 and Daimler Annual Financial Report 2010, OFT Document Reference 4053, page 251.
B. Vans

IV.3 Based on the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders ('SMMT') data, sales of vans and trucks comprised 257,373 registrations in 2010. Vans make up the largest sector of this market. As shown in Table 1, around 230,000 vans were registered in the UK in 2010. This represented a decline from 347,087 vans registered in 2007.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total van registrations</td>
<td>230,358</td>
<td>193,930</td>
<td>299,489</td>
<td>347,087</td>
<td>333,282</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SMMT

---

82 The SMMT collates industry statistics for registrations of all commercial vehicles from the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Authority, broken down by model and certain weight bands. These data (the 'SMMT Databases') are used to estimate van registrations based on the characteristics of the listed commercial vehicle models which identify them as vans or trucks. Email exchange between OFT and SMMT dated 16 May to 19 September 2011 regarding annual sales data for vans and trucks, OFT Document Reference 3632; SMMT Spreadsheet, OFT Document Reference 3633; email from SMMT to OFT dated 20 September 2011 attaching data on vehicle weights, OFT Document Reference 4356 and SMMT Spreadsheet (light 4x4 utility, pick-ups, microvans), OFT Document Reference 4357. See also SMMT Newsletter January 2011, OFT Document Reference 4375; SMMT Newsletter January 2010, OFT Document Reference 4376; SMMT Newsletter January 2009, OFT Document Reference 4377; SMMT Newsletter January 2008, OFT Document Reference 4378 and SMMT Newsletter January 2007, OFT Document References 4379. Note that the SMMT reports vehicles of 3.5 tonnes (t) and above as trucks and below 3.5t as vans, even though some modern vans can weigh up to 7.5t. See Note on Customer Segmentation prepared by Mercedes for the OFT dated 5 July 2011 ('Mercedes Customer Segmentation Note'), OFT Document Reference 2782, paragraph 3.2.
Mercedes’ van models

IV.4 Mercedes’ van product range comprises vehicles of various body types and load capacities, but the vans category is typically broken down by gross vehicle weight (‘GVW’). Vans are categorised by the SMMT according to their GVW as ‘small-sized’ (below 2.5t), ‘medium-sized’ (2.5 to 3.5t) and 'large-sized' (over 3.5t), with some vans weighing up to 7.5t (for example the Mercedes-Benz Vario model). Mercedes does not produce small-sized vans.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>GVW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vito</td>
<td>medium-sized</td>
<td>Panel model</td>
<td>2.7t to 3.2t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sprinter</td>
<td>medium-sized &amp; large-sized</td>
<td>Panel &amp; Chassis model</td>
<td>2.8t to 5.0t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vario</td>
<td>large-sized</td>
<td>Panel &amp; Chassis model</td>
<td>5.9t to 7.5t</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mercedes

IV.5 The vast majority of Mercedes’ registrations are for its medium-sized models, with the medium-sized Sprinter being the most popular van in the range.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sprinter</td>
<td>14,852</td>
<td>11,876</td>
<td>7,308</td>
<td>17,597</td>
<td>13,333</td>
<td>14,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vito</td>
<td>5,321</td>
<td>5,548</td>
<td>7,281</td>
<td>8,141</td>
<td>7,869</td>
<td>7,827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22,183</td>
<td>19,433</td>
<td>26,597</td>
<td>27,745</td>
<td>23,208</td>
<td>24,262</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SMMT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sprinter</td>
<td>1,621</td>
<td>1,236</td>
<td>1,427</td>
<td>1,159</td>
<td>1,278</td>
<td>1,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vario</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,838</td>
<td>1,481</td>
<td>1,957</td>
<td>1,772</td>
<td>1,681</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SMMT

84 SMMT Databases. Email exchange between OFT and SMMT dated 16 May to 19 September 2011 regarding annual sales data for vans and trucks, OFT Document Reference 3632 and SMMT Spreadsheet, OFT Document Reference 3633.
### Shares of supply

#### IV.6

Tables 5, 6 and 7 show shares of supply for vans in the UK.

#### Table 5: Share of supply - all vans in the UK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total registrations</td>
<td>230,358</td>
<td>193,930</td>
<td>299,489</td>
<td>347,087</td>
<td>333,282</td>
<td>330,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vauxhall</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VW</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercedes-Benz</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citroen</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renault</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peugeot</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiat</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 6: Share of supply - medium-sized vans in the UK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total registrations</td>
<td>149,359</td>
<td>127,255</td>
<td>205,182</td>
<td>237,124</td>
<td>218,609</td>
<td>209,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercedes-Benz</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VW</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renault</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vauxhall</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitsubishi</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citroen</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toyota</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 7: Share of supply - large-sized vans in the UK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ford</th>
<th>Mercedes-Benz</th>
<th>Fiat</th>
<th>Iveco</th>
<th>Peugeot</th>
<th>VW</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Source: SMMT85

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### C. Types of van customers

**IV.7** There are a number of different types of commercial vehicle customers. The OFT notes that since some customers require larger volumes of vehicles than others, this can impact on an individual dealer's capacity to supply that particular customer.

**IV.8** According to the SMMT, sales made to customers operating a fleet of 25 or more vehicles should be designated as fleet sales.86

**IV.9** In relation to vans, Mercedes splits customers as follows:87

- **Direct account customers**: these are very large accounts, which are generally dealt with by Mercedes directly
- **National fleet customers**: Mercedes' criterion for classifying a customer as a national fleet customer is that it has in excess of [C] vehicles. For these customers, the Mercedes fleet team will engage directly with the end user including the provision of quotations (together with dealers) for vehicles. All of these deals are then

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**Note:**

85 SMMT Databases. These data were used to estimate van shares of supply according to the weights which typically correspond to small-, medium- and large-sized vans. The figures in Table 5 include sales for all three segments. Email exchange between OFT and SMMT dated 16 May to 19 September 2011 regarding annual sales data for vans and trucks, OFT Document Reference 3632; SMMT Spreadsheet, OFT Document Reference 3633; email from SMMT to OFT dated 20 September 2011 attaching data on vehicle weights, OFT Document Reference 4356 and SMMT Spreadsheet (light 4x4 utility, pick-ups, microvans), OFT Document Reference 4357.


87 Mercedes Fleet and ZoI Submission, OFT Document Reference 2739, pages 2 to 3.
transacted by the dealer. The dealer sets the final price but is assisted by financial support (known as contingency) provided by Mercedes.\(^{88}\)

- SME fleet customers: customers with fleets of between [C] and [C] vehicles
- Retail customers: customers with fleets of fewer than [C] vehicles.

IV.10 Mercedes indicated that approximately [C] per cent of van customers are fleet customers (that is, customers with more than [C] vans).\(^{89}\)

D. Supplementary products

IV.11 In addition to selling vans and trucks, the Parties are also active in the sale of after-sales services and financing options.

After-sales services

IV.12 Both Mercedes and its dealers have indicated that a significant contribution to dealer profitability is derived from after-sales services. Mercedes stated that on average over [C] per cent of a vehicle’s profitability for the dealer is derived from servicing,\(^{90}\) and consequently a dealer may choose to make a low margin (or even sell at a loss) if significant ongoing after-sales revenue is likely to be generated by a sale.\(^{91}\)

IV.13 For vans, some standard Mercedes-Benz after-sales packages are available to retail and fleet customers at the time of purchase of the vehicle. The purchase price of all Mercedes-Benz retail vans includes an integrated service package (‘ISP’),\(^{92}\) covering basic servicing costs for five years or 60,000 miles. Fleet customers can choose from various servicing packages which are paid for in addition to the purchase price.\(^{93}\) Northside stated that the majority of van customers (whether retail or fleet) do not purchase full repair and maintenance contracts, that is,

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\(^{88}\) Annex 3 to Mercedes Fleet and Zol Submission, OFT Document Reference 2742.
\(^{89}\) Mercedes Fleet and Zol Submission, OFT Document Reference 2739, page 3.
\(^{90}\) Mercedes Response, OFT Document Reference 1506, question 5.
\(^{91}\) Mercedes Response, OFT Document Reference 1506, question 5, paragraph 5.5(a).
\(^{92}\) Northside Supplementary Response dated 7 April 2011, OFT Document Reference 2663, question 4, page 2.
\(^{93}\) Enza Response, OFT Document Reference 1499, question 8(ii).
contracts covering repair and maintenance of all electrical and mechanical components.94

Financing

IV.14 Mercedes dealers also provide finance packages. Mercedes stated that a dealer may choose to make a low profit on a vehicle sale, but a good return on financing (either through a commission for the sale of a third party financing arrangement or through finance income from the dealer’s own products).95 Mercedes-Benz Financial Services, the commercial vehicle financial services arm of Daimler AG, provides a range of financing and contract hire options.96

Mercedes and its Dealership Network

E. Selective distribution system and franchise agreements

IV.15 At the beginning of 2011, Mercedes’ dealership network in the UK comprised 26 dealers for vans and 23 dealers for trucks.97 In common with the majority of the Mercedes dealership network, both Parties supply vans and trucks. All of Mercedes’ dealers also provide spare parts and after sales services.98 Each dealer is a separate undertaking and does not form a single economic entity with Mercedes.

IV.16 Mercedes, in common with many manufacturers of commercial vehicles, operates a selective distribution system involving franchise agreements with its dealers. According to Mercedes,99 its selective distribution network meets the requirements of the Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation.100 Article 1(1)(i) of the Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation defines a selective distribution system as 'a distribution system where the supplier undertakes to sell the contract goods or services, either directly or indirectly, only to distributors selected on the basis of specified criteria and where these distributors undertake not to

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95 Mercedes Response, OFT Document Reference 1506, question 5, paragraph 5.5(b).
97 Since then H & L Garages Limited has gone into liquidation.
100 461/2010/EU Commission Regulation of 27 May 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices in the motor vehicle sector, OJ 2010 L129/52, 28.05.2010 (the 'Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation').
sell such goods or services to unauthorised distributors within the territory reserved by the supplier to operate that system'.

IV.17 Mercedes employs both quantitative and qualitative criteria in its selective distribution system. In determining and keeping under review the number of dealers in its network, the quantitative criteria employed by Mercedes include location and travel habits of existing and potential customers, required investment level of dealers,\textsuperscript{101} return on investment for dealers and synergies of scale. According to Mercedes, there is no restriction on the minimum or maximum number of vehicles sold,\textsuperscript{102} and the qualitative criteria include site and location, management structure and selection, business management and controls, marketing and planning and corporate identity.\textsuperscript{103}

IV.18 According to the Commission’s Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, the possible competition risks associated with selective distribution systems are a reduction in intra-brand competition and, especially in the case of cumulative effect, the foreclosure of certain types of distributors, softening of competition and facilitation of collusion between suppliers or buyers.\textsuperscript{104}

IV.19 The benefit of the exemption under the Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation\textsuperscript{105} does not extend to selective distribution systems where the manufacturer restricts its distributors from making either active or passive sales.\textsuperscript{106} According to Mercedes, its franchise agreements do not incorporate any restrictions either on active or passive sales.\textsuperscript{107} The OFT does not make any findings in this Decision in relation to the

\textsuperscript{101}Mercedes uses the term ‘partners’ and ‘franchise partners’, see Mercedes Supplementary Response dated 29 September 2011 (‘Mercedes Supplementary Response’), OFT Document Reference 3717.
\textsuperscript{102}Mercedes Response dated 7 October 2011 outlining its selective distribution system criteria, OFT Document Reference 3726.
\textsuperscript{103}Mercedes Supplementary Response, OFT Document Reference 3717.
\textsuperscript{105}The conditions for exemption under the Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation (with some additions) are those set out in 330/2010/EU Commission Regulation of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, OJ 2010 (the ‘Vertical Agreements Block Exemption Regulation’).
\textsuperscript{106}Vertical Agreements Block Exemption Regulation, Article 4(c). ‘Active’ sales mean actively approaching individual customers, whilst ‘passive’ sales mean responding to unsolicited requests from individual customers including delivery of goods or services to such customers.
\textsuperscript{107}Mercedes Margin Model Paper, OFT Document Reference 1406, paragraph 2.4.
compatibility of Mercedes' selective distribution system with the Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation.

**F. Zones of Influence**

**IV.20** Each of Mercedes' dealers is allocated a ‘Zone of Influence’ ('ZoI') by Mercedes. The ZoI is an area surrounding the dealer's premises. At the time of the Infringement, the ZoIs did not overlap with one another – a customer’s premises would always have fallen within the van or truck ZoI of only one Mercedes dealer. This position, however, has now changed and currently a customer’s premises could fall within one or more Mercedes dealer’s ZoI.

**IV.21** Mercedes stated that, when determining a dealer’s ZoI, Mercedes works on the principle that a customer is most likely to go to the nearest dealership and therefore postcodes are generally allocated to the nearest dealership (although the ZoIs may not strictly conform to postcode areas).

**IV.22** According to Mercedes, the allocation of the ZoIs to dealers is ‘merely a tool which assists MB [Mercedes] to benchmark the potential market opportunities available to its dealers and measure the dealer’s performance’.

**IV.23** Mercedes stated that dealers can sell anywhere in the UK (or indeed the European Union), and that there is nothing in its system of rewards and incentives that favours sales within the ZoI over those outside the ZoI (or vice versa). However, active marketing within the ZoI is encouraged by Mercedes, on the basis that sales opportunities both in respect of vehicles and repair and maintenance contracts are likely to be greater in the dealer’s own ZoI. Mercedes explained that it will 'normally expect the dealers to demonstrate that they have an effective sales and marketing plan to target opportunities (referred to as “conquest customers” in the dealer development standards) within the ZoI. However, MB does not take any steps to prevent or discourage dealers from making sales outside the ZoI. On the contrary, it is MB's

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112 Mercedes Margin Model Paper, OFT Document Reference 1406, paragraph 7.3.
policy to quote the same price ... to dealers which are known to be quoting to the same customer ... ’ (emphasis in the original).  

IV.24 Nevertheless, Mercedes stated that 'dealers are commercially driven to maximise sales opportunities in and around their selling locations'.  The OFT was also told that dealers generally tend to add lower margins to sales of vehicles inside their area in comparison with out-of-area sales because local sales are more likely to generate the more profitable after-sales business. Costs involved in visiting a potential customer and delivering the vehicles are also a consideration when dealers are quoting to customers.

IV.25 The OFT was told that customers also take into account the physical proximity to the dealer when choosing where to buy a commercial vehicle. Customers very often prefer to buy trucks and vans locally in view of the convenience of returning to a local dealer for repair and maintenance.

IV.26 However, customers do also buy commercial vehicles from dealers in a different ZoI. Mercedes stated that reasons for this include:

a. 'Customers may have historic relationships which are maintained even after they change location.

b. The customer may award the vehicle contract to one dealer and the aftersales contract to another (or MB itself).

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113 Mercedes Margin Model Paper, OFT Document Reference 1406, paragraphs 7.3 and 7.4.
114 Mercedes Margin Model Paper, OFT Document Reference 1406, paragraph 2.5.
116 See for example [C] Interview Transcript, OFT Document Reference 4372, pages 11 and 32 to 33; [C] Interview Transcript, OFT Document Reference 4374, pages 9 to 10; [C] Interview Transcript, OFT Document Reference 4371, pages 13 to 15 and 17; [C] Interview Transcript, OFT Document Reference 2536, page 5 and [C] Witness Statement, OFT Document Reference 3777, paragraph 5. Mercedes stated that, on average, more than [C] per cent of a vehicle’s profitability is derived from servicing (Mercedes Response, OFT Document Reference 1506, paragraph 5.5).
118 Mercedes Margin Model Paper, OFT Document Reference 1406, paragraph 2.5.
c. There are also major national fleet customers which may place business with a number of different dealers in order to service their national requirements.

d. MB also negotiates directly with some major fleet customers to provide new vehicles and aftersales services'.

IV.27 Indeed, a sizeable proportion of each Mercedes dealer’s sales are made outside its Zol. Mercedes stated: ‘across the UK as a whole on average approximately [C]% of MB dealer truck sales and [C]% of van sales are to customers situated outside the dealer’s Zol...'

G. Mercedes’ pricing, commission and bonus structure

IV.28 The dealer bonus scheme for truck and van sales (referred to by Mercedes as the 'margin model') rewards volume of sales and the achievement of certain qualitative targets (such as customer satisfaction, facilities, training, customer information and data management). [C]. In addition to the margin model, Mercedes offers reward and incentive schemes for sales executives based on the volume of vehicles and complementary products such as repair and maintenance packages sold.

IV.29 Mercedes has a list of recommended retail prices for its van products and provides all of its dealers with a standard off-invoice discount of [C] per cent for van sales. In addition, as outlined in IV.28, Mercedes offers a further bonus which rewards volume of sales and the achievement of certain qualitative targets. However, Mercedes stated that it does not seek to determine, control or influence the dealer’s price and that a dealer can discount below the recommended margin, and also accept a loss on the vehicle price.

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119 Mercedes Margin Model Paper, OFT Document Reference 1406, paragraph 2.9.
121 Mercedes Margin Model Paper, OFT Document Reference 1406, paragraphs 3.1 to 3.7.
122 Mercedes Response dated 7 October 2011 outlining its selective distribution system criteria, OFT Document Reference 3726.
124 Mercedes Margin Model Paper, OFT Document Reference 1406, paragraph 3.2.
125 See also Mercedes Margin Model Paper, OFT Document Reference 1406, paragraphs 3.3 to 3.7.
Table 8: Average retail prices (£) – Mercedes-Benz vans in the UK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vito</td>
<td>[C]</td>
<td>[C]</td>
<td>[C]</td>
<td>[C]</td>
<td>14,941</td>
<td>15,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sprinter</td>
<td>[C]</td>
<td>[C]</td>
<td>[C]</td>
<td>[C]</td>
<td>18,941</td>
<td>18,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sprinter C</td>
<td>[C]</td>
<td>[C]</td>
<td>[C]</td>
<td>[C]</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vario</td>
<td>[C]</td>
<td>[C]</td>
<td>[C]</td>
<td>[C]</td>
<td>31,773</td>
<td>32,286</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mercedes

H. Key roles and individuals

IV.30 Within Mercedes-Benz dealers, the general manager is known as the Dealer Principal. Generally sales managers and financial and/or other managers report to the Dealer Principal. Dealers generally have distinct teams of people dealing with truck sales and van sales, and these are typically headed by a Truck Sales Manager and a Van Sales Manager respectively. Each Sales Manager has a team of sales executives reporting to them.

IV.31 This division between van sales and truck sales teams is also reflected in the roles of Mercedes' Regional Sales Managers ('RSMs'), who have day-to-day responsibility for liaising with dealers. This means that the dealers communicate with two RSMs, one on vans and one on trucks. The RSMs provide the primary route of communication between Mercedes and its dealers. Each RSM is responsible for a group of dealers.

Relevant Market

I. Introduction

IV.32 The objective of this section is to identify the relevant market affected by the Infringement, in order to assess the appropriate level of the financial penalty. The 'Relevant Turnover' for penalties purposes is the

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127 Average prices by year calculated using quarterly data provided by Mercedes based on sales figures (total number of sales and total value of sales) submitted by its dealers on a monthly basis. See Mercedes Response, OFT Document Reference 1506, paragraph 5.2 and Annex 1, page 12.

128 2004 Penalty Guidance (fn2).
IV.33 When applying the Chapter I prohibition, the OFT is only obliged to define the relevant market where it is not possible, without such a definition, to determine whether the agreement and/or concerted practice is liable to affect trade in the UK and/or between Member States, and whether it has as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition.\(^{130}\) No such obligation arises in this case because the Infringement involves an agreement and/or concerted practice which had as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition and was by its very nature liable to affect trade and competition in the UK.\(^{131}\)

IV.34 The Competition Appeal Tribunal ('CAT') and the Court of Appeal have accepted that it is not necessary for the OFT to set out the precise relevant market definition in order to assess the appropriate level of the penalty.\(^{132}\) Rather, the OFT must be 'satisfied on a reasonable, and properly reasoned basis, of what is the relevant product market affected by the Infringement'.\(^{133}\) To this end, it is also relevant to consider the 'commercial reality', insofar as it 'can reasonably be shown that the products so grouped were "affected" by the Infringement'.\(^{134}\) The OFT considers that this principle also applies when assessing the relevant geographic market.

IV.35 The OFT is not bound by market definitions adopted in previous cases, although earlier definitions can on occasion be informative when considering the appropriate market definition. Equally, although previous cases can provide useful information, the relevant market must be identified according to the particular facts of the case in hand.

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\(^{129}\) 2004 Penalty Guidance (fn2), paragraph 2.7 and 2012 Penalty Guidance (fn2), paragraph 2.7.


\(^{131}\) Based on its assessment that the restrictive arrangements did not have any appreciable effect on inter-State trade (see Section VI (The Conduct of the Parties and Legal Assessment)), the OFT considers that it has no grounds for action under Article 101; see paragraphs V.88 to V.91 (Legal Background).


\(^{133}\) Argos, Littlewoods and JJB (fn132), at paragraph 170.

\(^{134}\) Argos, Littlewoods and JJB (fn132), at paragraphs 170 to 173 and 228.
IV.36 In the present case, the OFT has adopted a conservative (narrow) approach to market definition. The OFT considers that this approach is appropriate in this case because, bearing in mind that the OFT is identifying the relevant market solely for the purposes of determining the level of financial penalties, it considers that the financial penalties based on this narrow definition will be sufficient in this case to meet the twin objectives of the OFT’s policy on financial penalties. These objectives are: (i) to impose penalties which reflect the seriousness of the infringement; and (ii) to ensure that the threat of penalties will deter undertakings from engaging in anti-competitive practices.

J. Product market

IV.37 The OFT considers that the key product affected by the Infringement is new Mercedes-Benz vans. The Parties do not supply other marques of vans and, although the Parties sell both vans and trucks, this Infringement does not concern trucks. It was not necessary in this case to consider whether trucks and vans were in the same relevant market (see paragraph IV.36).

Segmentation by van size

IV.38 The Parties sell Mercedes-Benz medium- and large-sized vans. The Parties do not sell new small-sized vans.135 It would appear from the evidence in the OFT’s possession, addressed in Section VI (The Conduct of the Parties and Legal Assessment), that the Infringement applied to both medium- and large-sized vans. Given that the Parties have turnover in both segments, the Relevant Turnover is not affected by whether the relevant market for medium- and large-sized vans is combined or comprises two separate segments. The OFT therefore has not concluded on whether medium- and large-sized vans form part of the same relevant market or whether there are two separate relevant markets.

After-sales

IV.39 The OFT has considered whether after-sales services for vans should be included within the product market. As described at paragraph IV.13, the sale price of vans for retail customers includes an ISP.136 Therefore the OFT considers that the sale of ISPs for retail customers, which are

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135 Mercedes Customer Segmentation Note, OFT Document Reference 2782, paragraph 2.4.
136 SME and national fleet customers can choose from a number of servicing packages, but they are not included in the price of the vehicle.
included in the sale price of the van, should be included in the relevant market since they form part of the van purchase price. It was not necessary in this case to consider whether other after-sales services were in the same relevant market as vans (see paragraph IV.36).

K. Geographic market

IV.40 The Infringement refers to an arrangement to restrict competition in the areas (Zols) of the Parties.137

IV.41 The OFT considers that the relevant geographic market is at least as wide as the Zols of the Parties, although it may be wider depending on the intensity of sales cross-Zols. It was not necessary in this case to consider whether the geographic market is wider than the Zols of the Parties (see paragraph IV.36).

L. Conclusion

IV.42 In summary, for the purposes of calculating financial penalties in this case, the OFT considers that the Relevant Turnover138 is that achieved with the sale of new Mercedes-Benz vans within the combined Zols of the Parties. In respect of retail customers, this includes sales of services packages which are included in the sale price of the vehicles.139

IV.43 The OFT is identifying the relevant product and geographic market in this case for the sole purpose of determining the level of the applicable financial penalty. It does so without prejudice to the OFT’s discretion to adopt a different market definition in any subsequent case in light of the relevant facts and circumstances in that case, including the purpose for which the market is defined.

137 See paragraph IV.20 and Section VI (The Conduct of the Parties and Legal Assessment).
138 See paragraph IV.32.
139 For the avoidance of doubt, Relevant Turnover does not include sales to direct account customers (which are generally dealt with by Mercedes directly, see paragraph IV.9).
SECTION V  LEGAL BACKGROUND

A.  Introduction

V.1  This Section sets out the legal framework against which the OFT has considered the evidence in this case.

V.2  The legal provisions prohibiting agreements, concerted practices and decisions by associations of undertakings which prevent, restrict or distort competition are contained in the Chapter I prohibition and Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ('Article 101'). The relevant parts of both provisions are set out below, followed by an explanation of the key concepts contained within each, as is the law on the burden and standard of proof.

V.3  As discussed in paragraphs V.88 to V.91, the OFT considers that it has no grounds for action under Article 101. However, Article 101 is still relevant in view of section 60 of the Act, and references to it will therefore be made where appropriate.

B.  The Chapter I prohibition

V.4  The Chapter I prohibition provides that agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices which may affect trade within the UK and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the UK, are prohibited unless they are excluded by or as a result of, or exempt in accordance with, the Act. The Chapter I prohibition applies in particular to agreements, decisions or practices which directly or indirectly fix selling prices or any other trading conditions and/or share markets.

140 See paragraphs V.5 to V.7.
141 Throughout this document, whenever appropriate in light of section 60 of the Act, when referring to the case law of the Court of Justice (formerly the European Court of Justice) and General Court (formerly the Court of First Instance), we interpret statements as to the rights and obligations of the Commission as statements as to the rights and obligations of the OFT.
142 Under section 2(3) of the Act, subsection (1) applies only if the agreement, decision or practice is, or is intended to be, implemented in the UK, and under section 2(7), 'United Kingdom' means, in relation to an agreement which operates or is intended to operate only in a part of the UK, that part.
144 Sections 2(2)(a) and 2(2)(c) of the Act.
Application of section 60 of the Act - consistency with EU law

V.5 Section 60 of the Act provides that, so far as is possible (having regard to any relevant differences between the provisions concerned), questions arising in relation to competition within the UK should be dealt with in a manner which is consistent with the treatment of corresponding questions under EU competition law.

V.6 Section 60 of the Act also provides that, when determining a question arising under Part 1 of the Act, the OFT must act (so far as is compatible with the provisions of Part 1 of the Act) with a view to securing consistency with the principles laid down by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) and the Court of Justice and the General Court (collectively the 'European Courts'), and any relevant decision of the European Courts, as applicable at that time in determining any corresponding questions arising in Union Law. Under sections 60(3) and (4) of the Act, the OFT must, in addition, have regard to any relevant decision or statement of the Commission.

V.7 The provision of EU competition law equivalent to the Chapter I prohibition is Article 101, on which the Chapter I prohibition is modelled.

C. Undertakings

V.8 The Chapter I prohibition applies to agreements and concerted practices between 'undertakings', as well as to decisions by associations of undertakings.

V.9 The term 'undertaking' is not defined in the Act or in the TFEU. It is a broad term which the European Courts have held to cover 'every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed'.

D. Agreements and concerted practices between undertakings

Agreements and/or concerted practices

V.10 The Chapter I prohibition applies to 'agreements' as well as to 'concerted practices'. ¹⁴⁶

V.11 The European Courts have confirmed that it is not necessary, for the purposes of finding an infringement, to characterise the arrangement exclusively as an agreement or as a concerted practice. ¹⁴⁷ Both the European Courts and the CAT have stated that the concepts of agreement and concerted practice are not mutually exclusive and there is no rigid dividing line between the two. On the contrary, they are intended 'to catch forms of collusion having the same nature and only distinguishable from each other by their intensity and the forms in which they manifest themselves'. ¹⁴⁸

V.12 This reasoning has been expressly cited by the European Courts and the CAT in several recent cases. ¹⁴⁹ The Court of Justice in T-Mobile Netherlands, referring to the opinion of Advocate-General Kokott, ¹⁵⁰ held that:

'the criteria laid down in the Court’s case law for the purpose of determining whether conduct has as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition are applicable irrespective of whether the case entails an agreement, a decision or a concerted practice'. ¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁶ Section 2(1) of the Act and Article 101(1) of the TFEU.
¹⁴⁸ Anic (fn147), paragraph 131; followed in HFB Holding (fn14), paragraph 190. See also Argos, Littlewoods and JJB (fn132), at paragraph 21(iii) and Apex Asphalt and Paving v OFT [2005] CAT 4 ('Apex Asphalt'), at [206(iii)] (followed in Makers UK v OFT [2007] CAT 11 ('Makers'), at [103(iii)]).
¹⁵⁰ Opinion of Advocate-General Kokott in T-Mobile Netherlands (fn149), paragraph 38.
¹⁵¹ T-Mobile Netherlands (fn149), paragraph 24.
While there is a particular overlap between the concepts of agreements and concerted practices in the case of single complex infringements of long duration,\textsuperscript{152} the same principle applies to discrete infringements of short duration. The CAT has confirmed in its judgments in the JJB Sports/AllSports and Argos/Littlewoods cases, both of which involved discrete infringements of comparatively short duration that:

'It is trite law that it is not necessary for the OFT to characterise an infringement as either an agreement or a concerted practice: it is sufficient that the conduct in question amounts to one or the other'.\textsuperscript{153}

This position was upheld by the Court of Appeal.\textsuperscript{154}

The OFT therefore considers that it is not required to come to a conclusion as to whether the conduct of the Parties should be specifically characterised as an agreement or as a concerted practice, provided that it finds that the conduct amounts to one or the other, in order to demonstrate an infringement of the Chapter I prohibition.

\textbf{Agreements}

An agreement does not have to be a formal written agreement to be caught by the Chapter I prohibition. Nor does an agreement have to be legally binding or contain any enforcement mechanisms.\textsuperscript{155} The Chapter I prohibition is intended to catch a wide range of agreements, including oral agreements\textsuperscript{156} and 'gentlemen’s agreements',\textsuperscript{157} since anti-competitive agreements are, by their nature, rarely in written form.\textsuperscript{158} An agreement may be express or it may be implied from the conduct of the


\textsuperscript{153} JJB/Allsports (fn149), at [644] and Argos/Littlewoods (fn149), at [665].

\textsuperscript{154} Argos, Littlewoods and JJB (fn132), at paragraph 21.


\textsuperscript{156} Case 28/77 Tepea v Commission [1978] ECR 1391 (‘Tepea’), paragraph 41.

\textsuperscript{157} Case 41/69 ACF Chemiefarma v Commission [1970] ECR 661, paragraphs 106 to 114.

\textsuperscript{158} See also OFT Guidance 401, Agreements and concerted practices (December 2004) (the ‘Agreements and Concerted Practices Guidance’), paragraph 2.7.
parties. It may also consist of an isolated act, a series of acts or a course of conduct.

V.17 The key question is whether there has been 'a concurrence of wills between at least two parties, the form in which it is manifested being unimportant so long as it constitutes the faithful expression of the parties' intention'.

V.18 The intention of the parties must be to conduct themselves on the market in a specific way, for example by adhering to a common plan that limits or is likely to limit their individual commercial freedom by determining lines of mutual action or abstention from action on the market.

Concerted practices

V.19 An infringement through concerted practice does not require an actual agreement (whether express or implied) to have been reached. As the Court of Justice held in Dyestuffs, a concerted practice is:

'a form of coordination between undertakings which, without having reached the stage where an agreement properly so-called has been concluded, knowingly substitutes practical cooperation between them for the risks of competition'.

V.20 The concept of a concerted practice must be understood in light of the principle whereby each economic operator must determine its policy on

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159 See for example Tepea (fn156).
160 Anic (fn147), paragraph 81.
162 Joined Cases 209/78 to 215/78 and 218/78 Heintz Van Landewyck and Others v Commission [1980] ECR 3125, paragraph 86; Hercules Chemicals (fn147), paragraph 256; Limburgse Vinyl (fn147), paragraph 715 and Bayer (fn161), paragraph 67. See also JJB/Allsports (fn149), at [156] and [637] and Argos/Littlewoods (fn149), at [151] and [658].
164 Dyestuffs (fn12), paragraph 64 (followed in Case 40/73 Suiker Unie v Commission [1975] ECR 1663 (‘Suiker Unie’), paragraph 26; Joined Cases 89/85 etc. Alhström Osakeyhtiö v Commission [1993] ECR I-1307, paragraph 63; Anic (fn147), paragraph 115 and Case C-199/92 P Hüls v Commission [1999] ECR I-4287 (‘Hüls’), paragraph 158). See also JJB/Allsports (fn149), at [151]; Argos/Littlewoods (fn149), at [146]; Argos, Littlewoods and JJB (fn132), at paragraph 21(i) and Apex Asphalt (fn148), at [196] and [206(iii)] (followed in Makers (fn148), at [101] and [103(iii)]).
the market independently. The Court of Justice explained this in its judgment in Suiker Unie in the following terms:

'[t]he criteria of coordination and cooperation laid down by the case-law of the Court, which in no way require the working out of an actual plan, must be understood in light of the concept inherent in the provisions of the Treaty relating to competition that each economic operator must determine independently the policy which he intends to adopt on the common market including the choice of the persons and undertakings to which he makes offers or sells'.

V.21 In its judgment in Anic, the Court of Justice re-affirmed its earlier interpretation of the requirement of independence in Suiker Unie, and further expanded on it as follows:

'[a]ccording to [the Court's] case-law, although [the] requirement of independence does not deprive economic operators of the right to adapt themselves intelligently to the existing and anticipated conduct of their competitors, it does however strictly preclude any direct or indirect contact between such operators, the object or effect whereof is either to influence the conduct on the market of an actual or potential competitor or to disclose to such a competitor the course of conduct which they themselves have decided to adopt or contemplate adopting on the market, where the object or effect of such contact is to create conditions of competition which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the market in question, regard being had to the nature of the products or services offered, the size and number of the undertakings and the volume of the said market'.

V.22 In order to prove a concerted practice, it is therefore not necessary to show that the competitor in question has formally undertaken, in respect of one or several others, to adopt a particular course of conduct or that the competitors have expressly agreed a particular course of conduct on the market. It is sufficient that the exchange of information should have

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165 Suiker Unie (fn164), paragraph 173; Anic (fn147), paragraph 116 and Hüls (fn164), paragraph 159. See also Apex Asphalt (fn148), at [198] and [206(iv)] (followed in Makers (fn148), at [102] and [103(iv)]).
166 Suiker Unie (fn164), paragraph 174.
167 Anic (fn147), paragraph 117 (followed in Hüls (fn164), paragraphs 159 to 160 and HFB Holding (fn14), paragraph 212). See also Apex Asphalt (fn148), at [198] and [206(v)] (followed in Makers (fn148), at [102] and [103(v)]).
removed or substantially reduced uncertainty as to the conduct on the market to be expected on each participant’s part.  

V.23 Moreover, in Cimenteries the General Court held that reciprocal contacts are established 'where one competitor discloses its future intentions or conduct on the market to another when the latter requests it or, at the very least, accepts it [...] it is sufficient that, by its statement of intention, the competitor should have eliminated or, at the very least, substantially reduced uncertainty as to the conduct to expect of the other on the market'.

V.24 Thus, the mere receipt of information concerning competitors may be sufficient to give rise to a concerted practice, as is reflected in the following statement by the CAT in JJB/Allsports:

'Cimenteries (at paragraphs 1849 and 1852) and Tate & Lyle (at paragraphs 54 to 60) [...] show that even the unilateral disclosure of future pricing intentions can constitute a concerted practice if the effect of disclosure is in fact to reduce uncertainty in the marketplace'.

V.25 Where it is established that an undertaking participates in a meeting of a manifestly anti-competitive nature, it is for the undertaking to adduce evidence to establish that it indicated its opposition to the anti-competitive arrangement to its competitors.

V.26 According to the case law of the European Courts, the concept of a concerted practice requires, in addition to undertakings acting in concert with one another, conduct on the market pursuant to such collective practices and a relationship of cause and effect between the two.

V.27 However, where an undertaking participating in a concerted arrangement remains active on the market, there is a presumption that it will take

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169 Cimenteries (fn168), paragraphs 1849 and 1852. See also Apex Asphalt (fn148), at [206(vii)] and [206(viii)] (followed in Makers (fn148), at [103(vii)] and [103(viii)]).
171 Hüls (fn164), paragraph 155 and Anic (fn147), paragraph 96.
172 Anic (fn147), paragraph 118 and Hüls (fn164), paragraph 161. See also Apex Asphalt (fn148), at [206(ix)] (followed in Makers (fn148), at [103(ix)]).
account of information exchanged with its competitors. In Anic, the Court of Justice held that:

'subject to proof to the contrary, which it is for the economic operators concerned to adduce, there must be a presumption that the undertakings participating in concerting arrangements and remaining active on the market take account of the information exchanged with their competitors when determining their conduct on that market, particularly when they concert together on a regular basis over a long period, as was the case here'.

V.28 In T-Mobile Netherlands, the Court of Justice held that this presumption of a causal connection applies even where the concerted action was the result of a meeting held by the participating undertakings on a single occasion.

V.29 Furthermore, although the concept of a concerted practice presupposes conduct of the participating undertakings on the market, it does not necessarily require that such conduct produce the concrete effect of restricting, preventing or distorting competition. As the Court of Justice observed in Hüls, a concerted practice which has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition will infringe competition law even where there is no effect on the market.

Participation and commitment to an agreement or concerted practice

V.30 The fact that a party may have played only a limited part in establishing the agreement or concerted practice, or may have participated only under pressure from other parties, does not mean that it is not party to the agreement or concerted practice.

V.31 The CAT has stated that 'acts of any employee may be attributed to his or her corporate employer with whom they comprise the same

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173 Anic (fn147), paragraph 121; Hüls (fn164), paragraph 162 and Cimenteries (fn168), paragraphs 1865 and 1910. See also Apex Asphalt (fn148), at [206(x)] (followed in Makers (fn148), at [103(x)]).
174 T-Mobile Netherlands (fn149), paragraphs 58 to 59.
175 Anic (fn147), paragraph 124. See also Apex Asphalt (fn148), at [206(xi)] (followed in Makers (fn148), at [103(xi)]).
176 Hüls (fn164), paragraphs 163 to 164 and Anic (fn147), paragraph 123. See also Apex Asphalt (fn148), at [206(xii)] (followed in Makers (fn148), at [103(xii)]).
177 Agreements and Concerted Practices Guidance (fn158), paragraph 2.8. See for example also Anic (fn147), paragraph 80; Cimenteries (fn168), paragraphs 1389 and 2557 and Case T-28/99 Sigma Tecnologie di Rivestimento v Commission [2002] ECR II-1845, paragraph 40.
undertaking’.\textsuperscript{178} An agreement or concerted practice may be made on an undertaking’s behalf by its employees acting in the ordinary course of their employment, despite the ignorance of more senior management.\textsuperscript{179} Even if the employees were acting contrary to instructions, this does not affect the liability of the undertaking.\textsuperscript{180}

V.32 The parties may show varying degrees of commitment to the common plan and there may well be internal conflict. The mere fact that a party does not fully abide by an agreement or concerted practice which is anti-competitive does not relieve that party of responsibility for it.\textsuperscript{181} Equally, the fact that a party may come to recognise that in practice it can 'cheat' on the agreement or concerted practice at certain times does not preclude a finding that there was an infringement.\textsuperscript{182}

V.33 Where an undertaking does not publicly distance itself from an agreement or concerted practice (for example, where it attended meetings with an anti-competitive purpose or received information by participating in meetings), thus giving the impression to the other participants that it subscribes to and will act in accordance with it, it may be concluded that it has participated in the agreement or concerted practice.\textsuperscript{183} The rationale for this principle of law is that:

'a party which tacitly approves of an unlawful initiative, without publicly distancing itself from its content or reporting it to the administrative authorities, effectively encourages the continuation of the infringement and compromises its discovery. That complicity constitutes a passive

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{178} Tesco Stores Ltd, Tesco Holdings Ltd and Tesco plc v OFT [2012] CAT 31 (‘Tesco Stores’), at [74(a)].

\textsuperscript{179} Joined Cases 100/80 to 103/80 Musique Diffusion française v Commission [1983] ECR 1825 (‘Musique Diffusion française’), paragraph 97.


\end{footnotes}
mode of participation in the infringement which is therefore capable of rendering the undertaking liable in the context of a single agreement’.\textsuperscript{184}

V.34 The General Court has held that 'the notion of public distancing as a means of excluding liability must be interpreted narrowly'.\textsuperscript{185} In considering how a party could publicly distance itself from the agreement or concerted practice, the General Court in Westfalen Gassen noted that the applicant could have written to competitors and to the secretary of the professional association to indicate that it did not in any way want to be considered to be a member of the cartel or to participate in meetings of a professional association which served as a cover for unlawful concerted actions.\textsuperscript{186}

V.35 The CAT in Replica Kit also considered the concept of public distancing and the requirement that a party publicly distance itself or report the matter to the relevant competition authority. The CAT considered that, in order to meet the requirement of publicly distancing itself from the agreement or concerted practice, a party should take the following steps:

'[a]t the very least, in order for A to distance itself from the continuing arrangement between B and C, what in our view is required is that A should genuinely and explicitly state to B and C that as far as A is concerned they are entirely free to disregard any previous arrangements there may be restricting competition, and that A wishes to play no part, tacitly or otherwise, in any such arrangements'.\textsuperscript{187}

V.36 The CAT also noted that '[r]eporting what transpired to the OFT puts the matter beyond doubt'.\textsuperscript{188}

\textbf{Liability}

V.37 In \textit{Anic}, the Court of Justice commented that:

'the agreements and concerted practices referred to in [Article 101] necessarily result from collaboration by several undertakings, who are all co-perpetrators of the infringement but whose participation can take

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{184} \textit{Aalborg Portland} (fn183), paragraph 84.
\item \textsuperscript{185} Case T-303/02 \textit{Westfalen Gassen Nederland v Commission} [2006] ECR II-4567 (‘\textit{Westfalen Gassen}’), paragraph 103.
\item \textsuperscript{186} \textit{Westfalen Gassen} (fn185), paragraph 103.
\item \textsuperscript{187} JJB/Allsports (fn149), at [1046].
\item \textsuperscript{188} JJB/Allsports (fn149), at [1046].
\end{itemize}
different forms according, in particular, to the characteristics of the
market concerned and the position of each undertaking on that market,
the aims pursued and the means of implementation chosen or
envisaged'.

V.38 The Court of Justice went on to state that 'the mere fact that each
undertaking takes part in the infringement in ways particular to it does
not suffice to exclude its responsibility for the entire infringement,
including conduct put into effect by other participating undertakings but
sharing the same anti-competitive object or effect'.

V.39 This approach was followed in AC Treuhand, where the General Court,
citing Anic, held that 'the fact that an undertaking did not take part in all
aspects of an anti-competitive scheme, or that it played only a minor role
in the aspects in which it did participate, is not material to the
establishment of an infringement on its part'. It went on to state that:

'[...] the case law recognises the joint liability of the undertakings which
are co perpetrators of an infringement under Article 81(1) EC and/or
which have played an accessory role in such an infringement, in so far
as it has been held that the objective condition for the attribution of
various anti competitive acts constituting the cartel as a whole to the
undertaking concerned is satisfied where that undertaking has
contributed to its implementation, even in a subsidiary, accessory or
passive role [...]'.

V.40 In addition, the General Court held that:

'the attribution of the infringement as a whole to the participating
undertaking depends on the manifestation of its own intention, which
shows that it is in agreement, albeit only tacitly, with the objectives of
the cartel. That subjective condition is inherent in the criteria relating to
the tacit approval of the cartel and to the undertaking having publicly
distanced itself from the content of the cartel [...] , in that those criteria
imply a presumption that the undertaking concerned continues to

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189 Anic (fn147), paragraph 79.
190 Anic (fn147), paragraph 80.
192 AC Treuhand (fn191), paragraph 133.
endorse the objectives of the cartel and to support its implementation'. 193

E. Prevention, restriction or distortion of competition 194

The law on anti-competitive object

V.41 The Court of Justice has identified 'infringements by object' by reference to the fact that certain agreements or concerted practices can be regarded 'by their very nature' as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition. 195

V.42 The Court of Justice has also noted that the object of an agreement or concerted practice is not assessed by reference to the parties' subjective intentions when they entered into it, but rather is determined by an objective analysis of its aims. 196 The fact that legitimate objectives or aims are pursued in tandem with objectives or aims which infringe the Chapter I prohibition cannot justify or supersede the infringing objectives or aims. 197

V.43 Nonetheless, although proof of subjective intention is not a necessary pre-condition to the finding of an infringement, there is nothing to prevent the OFT from taking such intention into account when determining whether an agreement or concerted practice had as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. 198

V.44 However, no agreement or concerted practice is automatically restrictive by object. Instead, the objective analysis of whether an agreement or

193 AC Treuhand (fn191), paragraph 134.
194 As set out in Section VI (The Conduct of the Parties and Legal Assessment), the OFT considers that the agreement and/or concerted practice which constitutes the Infringement had the object of preventing, restricting or distorting competition. The agreement and/or concerted practice had the purpose of dampening competition and contained to varying degrees at least some element of market sharing, price coordination and/or the exchange of commercially sensitive information. In its assessment, the OFT has therefore taken into account the existing case law regarding these types of anti-competitive agreements and concerted practices, to the extent appropriate in view of the facts and evidence pertaining to the Infringement.
195 Case C-209/07 Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society and Barry Brothers (Carrigmore) Meats [2008] ECR I-8637 (‘BIDS and Barry Brothers’), paragraphs 17 and T-Mobile Netherlands (fn149), paragraph 29.
197 Case C-551/03P General Motors v Commission [2006] ECR I-3173 (‘General Motors’), paragraph 64.
198 Cityhook v OFT [2007] CAT 18, at [270]; General Motors (fn197), paragraphs 77 to 78 and T-Mobile Netherlands (fn149), paragraph 27.
concerted practice is contrary to the Chapter I prohibition 'by its very nature' must take account of the actual framework and, therefore, the legal and economic context in which the arrangement (to which the restriction is imputed) was deployed.199

Examples of market sharing, price coordination and the exchange of commercially sensitive information

V.45 Section 2(2) of the Act contains a non-exhaustive, illustrative list of the types of agreement and concerted practice which may infringe the Chapter I prohibition.200

V.46 Section 2(2)(c) of the Act provides that the Chapter I prohibition applies to agreements and concerted practices which 'share markets or sources of supply'.201 Firms may agree to share markets in a number of different ways. For example, market sharing may take the form of an agreement to divide markets on a territorial basis, with each participant agreeing not to compete within the others' agreed territory.202 In a number of cases the Commission and the European Courts have found market sharing occurring through the allocation of customers on the basis of existing commercial relationships to be a restriction of competition by object.203

V.47 In the Pre-Insulated Pipe case, the Commission stated that market sharing by its very nature restricts competition. In that case, suppliers agreed to respect each others' 'existing' customer relationships. For each supply contract, the existing supplier would inform other participants in the arrangement what price they intended to quote, and


200 Agreements and Concerted Practices Guidance (fn158), paragraphs 2.2 to 2.3.

201 Agreements and Concerted Practices Guidance (fn158), paragraph 3.10.


the other suppliers would quote higher prices to ensure the maintenance of the existing customer relationship.204

V.48 All of the arrangements within the Choline Chloride case, including the arrangement whereby participants quote elevated prices so as to avoid drawing customers away from agreed supply relationships were said to be a method of market sharing by customer allocation, which had the object of restricting competition.205

V.49 The illustrative list contained in section 2(2) of the Act also refers to those agreements which 'directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions'.206 The case law is clear that the Chapter I prohibition applies to any form of agreement which might restrict or dampen price competition, either directly or indirectly. This will include, for example, an agreement to adhere to published price lists, not to quote a price without consulting potential competitors,207 or an agreement not to charge less than any other price in the market, which the Court of Justice found had the objective of restricting competition.208 An agreement may restrict price competition even if it does not eliminate it entirely.209

V.50 In certain circumstances, exchanges of pricing information among competitors may also amount to a restriction of competition by object. In Tate & Lyle, the General Court held that an exchange of information regarding future pricing allowed the parties to 'create a climate of mutual certainty as to their future pricing policies' and amounted to a restriction of Article 101 by object.210

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207 Cast Iron and Steel Rolls (fn203).


209 Agreements and Concerted Practices Guidance (fn158), paragraph 3.6.

210 Tate & Lyle (fn170), paragraphs 58 and 60. See also Rhône-Poulenc (fn170), paragraphs 122 to 123.
In its Bananas decision,\textsuperscript{211} the Commission referred to Tate & Lyle, noting that 'according to case-law conduct whereby an undertaking discloses to its competitors the conduct which it intends or contemplates to adopt in the market concerning its pricing policy is considered as conduct concerning price fixing'.\textsuperscript{212} In that case, the collusion involved communications, which took place between parties before they set their weekly quotation prices, covering price setting factors, price trends and/or indications of quotation prices. According to the Commission '[b]y these practices the parties coordinated the setting of their quotation prices instead of deciding on them independently. These arrangements have as their object the restriction of competition within the meaning of Article [101]'\textsuperscript{213}

The sharing of pricing information reduces uncertainties inherent in the competitive process and facilitates the co-ordination of the parties' conduct on the market.\textsuperscript{214} The Commission has explicitly stated that '[i]t is contrary to the provisions of Article [101] [...] for a producer to communicate to his competitors the essential elements of his price policy'.\textsuperscript{215}

Where competitors share information other than pricing information, which they would otherwise keep secret as confidential business information, this can also amount to an infringement of competition law by object, as it is likely to increase transparency on the market regarding the undertakings' competitive behaviour, thereby substituting practical cooperation for the risks of competition.\textsuperscript{216}

\textsuperscript{211} Bananas (fn182).
\textsuperscript{212} Bananas (fn182), paragraph 292.
\textsuperscript{213} Bananas (fn182), paragraph 263. The Commission’s position was upheld by the General Court, which stated: '[t]he Commission was therefore right to conclude that the pre-pricing communications which took place between Dole and Weichert concerned the fixing of prices and that they gave rise to a concerted practice having as its object the restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 81 [...]'. Case T-587/08 Fresh Del Monte Produce v Commission Judgment of the General Court of 14 March 2013 (not yet published), paragraph 585.
\textsuperscript{215} Commission Decision 74/292/EEC of 15 May 1974 relating to proceedings under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/400 – Agreements between manufacturers of glass containers) (OJ 1974 L 160/1), paragraph 43. In paragraph 45 of that decision, the Commission states '[...] the agreement to exchange information on prices has the object of restricting or distorting competition between the parties within the common market'.
\textsuperscript{216} For example Hercules Chemicals (fn147), paragraphs 259 to 260 (in addition to pricing information, the information exchanged included sales volume restrictions, profitability
Finally, regardless of whether the subject matter of the information exchange would, in any event, change as a result of market conditions, the Court of Justice has held that an exchange of information which has the potential of removing uncertainty as regards 'the timing, extent and details of the modifications to be adopted [...] must be regarded as pursuing an anti-competitive object'.

**No need to prove anti-competitive effect where anti-competitive object is established**

In the context of Article 101, the European Courts have held that 'there is no need to take account of the concrete effects of an agreement once it appears that it has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition'. The European Courts have also held that this is equally the case where the conduct in question concerns a concerted practice.

The European Courts have held that, although the concept of a concerted practice presupposes conduct of the participating undertakings on the market, it does not necessarily require that the conduct produce the concrete effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition. Under Article 101, concerted practices are therefore prohibited regardless of their effect, when they have an anti-competitive object.
It follows that, when applying the Chapter I prohibition, the OFT is not obliged to establish that an agreement or concerted practice had an anti-competitive effect where it is found to have had as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition.\footnote{Argos/Littlewoods (fn149), at [357].}

The Court of Justice has made clear that, in order to find an 'object' infringement, it is sufficient, having regard to the legal and economic context, that it has the potential to have a negative impact on competition.\footnote{T-Mobile Netherlands (fn149), paragraph 31.} The OFT is therefore not required to conduct a competitive analysis to demonstrate an actual prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in any particular case.\footnote{T-Mobile Netherlands (fn149), paragraph 43.}

**F. Appreciable prevention, restriction or distortion of competition**

An agreement or concerted practice will infringe the Chapter I prohibition only where it has as its object or effect the appreciable prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. An agreement will fall outside the Chapter I prohibition if its impact on competition is insignificant. As the Court of Justice held in Völk:

>'an agreement falls outside the prohibition in Article [101(1)] when it has only an insignificant effect on the markets, taking into account the weak position which the persons concerned have on the market of the product in question'.\footnote{Case 5-69 Franz Völk v S.P.R.L. Ets J. Vervaecke [1969] ECR 295 (‘Völk’), paragraph 5/7.}

In determining whether an agreement is capable of having an appreciable effect on competition, the OFT will have regard to the Commission's approach as set out in the *Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance*.\footnote{Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty of the European Community (2001/C 368/07) (the 'Notice on Agreement of Minor Importance'), paragraphs 7a and 7b.} This sets out that an agreement or concerted practice will generally have no appreciable effect on competition if the aggregate market share of the parties to the agreement does not exceed ten per cent on any of the relevant markets affected by the agreement where it is made between competing undertakings\footnote{Competing undertakings are undertakings which are actual or potential competitors on any of the markets concerned.} or exceed 15 per cent on any of the relevant
markets affected by the agreement where the agreement is made between non-competing undertakings.\textsuperscript{228}

V.61 However, that approach does not apply to an agreement or concerted practice containing certain hardcore restrictions set out in the \textit{Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance}. These include any agreement or concerted practice which has as its object the direct or indirect fixing of prices or the allocation of markets or customers.\textsuperscript{229}

V.62 In \textit{North Midland Construction}, the CAT said the following in relation to the appreciability test in object cases:

'[i]t is clear that an agreement having as its object a restriction of competition could nevertheless be so trifling as to fail the appreciability test. On the other hand, it may also be the case that the nature of specific collusive conduct is such that, given the individual circumstances, the potential effects on competition of the conduct in question are inherently likely to be significant. In the latter case the burden of establishing appreciability may be more easily discharged'.\textsuperscript{230}

V.63 The OFT also notes the recent decision by the Court of Justice in \textit{Expedia}:

'It must therefore be held that an agreement that may affect trade between Member States and that has an anti-competitive object constitutes, by its nature and independently of any concrete effect that it may have, an appreciable restriction on competition'.\textsuperscript{231}

V.64 In \textit{North Midland Construction}, the CAT confirmed that, in object cases, the appreciability requirement may be satisfied by potential as well as actual effects on competition.\textsuperscript{232}

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{228} Non-competing undertakings are undertakings which are neither actual nor potential competitors on any of the markets concerned.
\textsuperscript{229} \textit{Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance} (fn226), paragraph 11.
\textsuperscript{230} \textit{North Midland Construction v OFT} [2011] CAT 14 (‘\textit{North Midland Construction}’), at [53].
\textsuperscript{231} C-266/11 Expedia Inc. v Autorité de la concurrence and Others, judgment of 13 December 2012 (not yet published), paragraph 37.
\textsuperscript{232} \textit{North Midland Construction} (fn230), at [56] to [61]. See also \textit{Apex Asphalt} (fn148), at [251].
G. Effect on trade within the UK

V.65 By virtue of section 2(1)(a) of the Act, the Chapter I prohibition applies only to agreements and concerted practices which ‘may affect trade within the United Kingdom’.

V.66 For the purposes of the Chapter I prohibition, the UK includes any part of the UK where an agreement or concerted practice operates or is intended to operate.233

V.67 By their very nature, agreements and concerted practices which are capable of appreciably restricting competition within the UK are inherently capable of affecting trade.234

V.68 It should be noted that, in order to infringe the Chapter I prohibition, an agreement or concerted practice is not in fact required to affect trade provided it is capable of doing so. Moreover, the test is not read as importing a requirement that the effect on trade should be appreciable.235

H. Burden and standard of proof

Burden of proof

V.69 The burden of proving an infringement of the Chapter I prohibition lies with the OFT.236 However, this burden does not preclude the OFT from relying, where appropriate, on evidential presumptions. In Napp the CAT stated that:

“That approach does not in our view preclude the Director, in discharging the burden of proof, from relying, in certain circumstances, from inferences or presumptions that would, in the absence of any countervailing indications, normally flow from a given set of facts, for example […] that an undertaking’s presence at a meeting with a

233 Section 2(7) of the Act provides that ‘the United Kingdom’ means, in relation to an agreement which operates or is intended to operate only in a part of the United Kingdom, that part.
234 Agreements and Concerted Practices Guidance (fn158), paragraph 2.25.
236 Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings v Director General of Fair Trading, [2002] CAT 1 (‘Napp’), at [95] and [100]. The CAT has confirmed this approach in JJB/Allsports (fn149), at [164].
237 References to the ‘Director’ are to the Director General of Fair Trading. From 1 April 2003, Section 2(1) of the EA02 transferred the functions of the Director General of Fair Trading to the OFT.
manifestly anti-competitive purpose implies, in the absence of explanation, participation in the cartel alleged’.238

**Standard of proof**

V.70 The applicable standard of proof is the civil standard. The OFT is therefore required to demonstrate that an infringement has occurred on the balance of probabilities.

V.71 This was recently confirmed by the CAT in Tesco Stores, as follows:

' [...] the standard of proof is the civil standard of balance of probabilities [...]. We have also, of course, taken account of the principle of the presumption of innocence, enshrined in Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Treaty Series No. 73 (1953) Cmd 8969), in the context of alleged infringements of the 1998 Act, which may result in the imposition of financial penalties. Any doubt in the mind of the Tribunal as to whether a point is established on the balance of probabilities must operate to the advantage of the undertaking alleged to have infringed the competition rules [...]'.239

**Evidential weight**

V.72 In considering whether the evidence obtained demonstrates an infringement of the Chapter I prohibition, the OFT will assess the extent and weight of that evidence.

V.73 It is well established that, in cases involving infringements of the Chapter I prohibition, the evidence available may be limited. As the Court of Justice stated in Aalborg Portland:

'55. Since the prohibition on participating in anti-competitive agreements and the penalties which offenders may incur are well known, it is normal for the activities which those practices and those agreements entail to take place in a clandestine fashion, for meetings to be held in secret, most frequently in a non-member country, and for the associated documentation to be reduced to a minimum.

'56. Even if the Commission discovers evidence explicitly showing

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238 Napp (fn236), at [110].
239 Tesco Stores (fn178), at [88]. See also Quarmby Construction Company and St James Securities Holdings v OFT [2011] CAT 11 ("Quarmby"), at [81].
unlawful contact between traders, such as the minutes of a meeting, it
will normally be only fragmentary and sparse, so that it is often
necessary to reconstitute certain details by deduction.

'57. In most cases, the existence of an anti-competitive practice or
agreement must be inferred from a number of coincidences and indicia
which, taken together, may, in the absence of another plausible
explanation, constitute evidence of an infringement of the competition
rules'.

V.74 In a number of more recent judgments, the European Courts have
reiterated the principles set out in Aalborg Portland and confirmed that
while 'the Commission has to provide sufficiently precise and consistent
evidence' to support a finding that an infringement took place, 'it is
important to emphasise that it is not necessary for every item of
evidence produced by the Commission to satisfy those criteria in relation
to every aspect of the infringement; it is sufficient if the body of
evidence relied on by the institution, viewed as whole, meets that
requirement'.

V.75 The General Court has also confirmed that there is no principle
precluding reliance on a single item of documentary evidence, provided
that there are no doubts as to its probative value and that it definitely
attests to the existence of the infringement in question.

V.76 The CAT in JJB/Allsports, referring to the principles outlined in Aalborg
Portland, noted that:

cartels are by their nature hidden and secret; little or nothing may be
committed to writing. In our view even a single item of evidence, or
wholly circumstantial evidence, depending on the particular context and
the particular circumstances, may be sufficient to meet the required
standard: see Claymore Dairies at [3] to [10].

240 Aalborg Portland (fn183), paragraphs 55 to 57. See also Joined Cases T-44/02 OP etc.
paragraphs 257 to 258, citing Volkswagen (fn130), paragraph 43 and Limburgse Vinyl (fn147),
paragraphs 513 to 520. See also Case T-191/06 FMC Foret v Commission, judgment of 6 June
2011 ('FMC Foret'), paragraphs 105 to 108.
242 FMC Foret (fn241), paragraph 122, citing Cimenteries (fn168), paragraph 1838.
243 JJB/Allsports (fn149), at [206].
V.77 Most recently, in Quarmby,\textsuperscript{244} the CAT (drawing on JJB/Allsports) noted that circumstantial evidence may be taken into account and held that:

'we consider that the prevalence of this conduct was a factor which the OFT was entitled to take into account in coming to a view on the likelihood of an individual company participating in a specific infringement. This Tribunal may take into account circumstantial evidence, particularly in connection with secret cartel behaviour where little or nothing may be committed to writing (JJB Sports plc v Office of Fair Trading [2004] CAT 17 at paragraph 206). This is also true of evidence described by the Appellants as fragmentary. Ultimately, the totality of evidence, viewed as a whole, must be sufficient to convince the Tribunal in the circumstances of the particular case, and to overcome the presumption of innocence to which the undertaking concerned is entitled (JJB at paragraph 204)'\textsuperscript{245}

V.78 The question of evidence obtained from an undertaking which has made an application for leniency has been specifically considered by the European Courts and the following principles emerge from the case law:

- Admissions by a leniency applicant do not, by their nature, lack evidential value; 'the mere fact that the information was submitted by an undertaking which made an application for leniency does not call in question its probative value'\textsuperscript{246}
- Reliance may be placed, as against an undertaking, on statements made by other incriminated undertakings, including leniency applicants.\textsuperscript{247} However, where the accuracy of a statement by a leniency applicant is contested by several other undertakings who are similarly accused, it cannot be regarded as constituting

\textsuperscript{244} Quarmby (fn239).
\textsuperscript{245} Quarmby (fn239), at [86]. See also Durkan (fn10), at [95] to [96].
\textsuperscript{246} FMC Foret (fn241), paragraph 115. In particular, although statements of admission may need to be treated with caution (in case they downplay the contribution of the undertaking making the admission), the leniency process 'does not necessarily create an incentive to submit distorted evidence as to the other participants in a cartel' since this would put the applicant's cooperation in question and risk the loss of its leniency discount (FMC Foret (fn241), paragraph 117 (citing Case T-120/04 Peróxidos Orgánicos v Commission [2006] ECR II-4441, paragraph 70 and Case T-54/03 Lafarge v Commission [2008] ECR II-120 (published in French) (’Lafarge’), paragraph 58). See also Case T-133/07 Mitsubishi Electric v Commission, judgment of 12 July 2011 (not yet published) (’Mitsubishi’), paragraph 107 as regards statements made by employees of a leniency applicant.
\textsuperscript{247} FMC Foret (fn241), paragraph 116 (citing Limburgse Vinyl (fn147), paragraph 512).
adequate proof as against those other undertakings unless it is supported by other evidence.248

- In accordance with the principle outlined above, a statement by a leniency applicant in itself may be sufficient proof if it is particularly reliable. In particular, if a body of consistent evidence corroborates the existence and certain specific aspects of the collusion referred to in a statement by a leniency applicant, that statement may in itself be sufficient to evidence other aspects of the collusion.249

V.79 While the above principles are of particular relevance in assessing the weight to be attached to statements made by or on behalf of a leniency applicant,250 as with any evidence obtained in an investigation, ‘the sole criterion relevant in evaluating the evidence adduced is its reliability’, which must be understood in light of the ‘prevailing principle of Community law [of] the unfettered evaluation of evidence’.251

V.80 As regards the Chapter I prohibition, the CAT has taken a similar approach. In Claymore Dairies, it stated that:

'[i]n our view, there is no rule of law that, in order to establish a Chapter I infringement, the OFT has to rely on written or documentary evidence. The oral evidence of a credible witness, if believed, may in itself be sufficient to prove an infringement, depending on the circumstances of a particular case. Of course, if the OFT is relying primarily on a witness rather than on documents, it will no doubt look for support in the

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248 FMC Foret (fn241), paragraph 120 (citing Joined Cases T-67/00 etc. JFE Engineering [2004] ECR II-2501 (‘JFE Engineering’), paragraph 219; Case T-38/02 Groupe Danone v Commission [2005] ECR II-4407, paragraph 285; Bolloré (fn241), paragraph 167; Lafarge (fn246), paragraph 293 and Case T-337/94 Enso-Gutzeit v Commission [1998] ECR II-1571, paragraph 91). Other evidence can take many forms, including contemporaneous documentary evidence (whether originating from the same undertaking or another), statements of other undertakings alleged to have participated in the cartel and the evidence of employees of the alleged participants (see FMC Foret (fn241), paragraphs 183 to 186 and 232 and Bolloré (fn241), paragraphs 168 to 184).

249 FMC Foret (fn241), paragraph 120 (referring to JFE Engineering (fn248), paragraph 219). The OFT notes the view of the CAT panel in the Construction appeals as to the evidential weight it considered should be given to material which a leniency applicant creates after the event and which is based on evidence relied on by the OFT (see AH Willis v OFT [2011] CAT 13 (‘AH Willis’), at [49]).

250 See, for example, JFE Engineering (fn248), paragraph 205, and on appeal Joined Cases C-403/04 P and C-405/04 P Sumitomo Metal Industries and Nippon Steel v Commission [2007] ECR I-00729, paragraphs 50 to 51, 70 to 74 and 103 for a discussion of evidence given on behalf of a leniency applicant. See also Mitsubishi (fn246), paragraphs 87 to 89.

251 Mitsubishi (fn246), paragraphs 81 and 85 (citing Case T-50/00 Dalmine v Commission [2004] ECR II-2395, paragraph 72).
surrounding circumstances, for example, the dates and timing of price increases. It will no doubt ask itself whether there is reason to believe that the witness may be untruthful or mistaken but, as at present advised, we do not think there is any technical rule that precludes the OFT from accepting an oral statement of a witness at face value if it thinks it right to do so’. 252

V.81 In terms of the value of evidence from witnesses which is contrary to the interests of their employers, in JFE Engineering Corp, the General Court noted that 'statements which run counter to the interests of the declarant must in principle be regarded as particularly reliable evidence'. 253

V.82 As regards evidence obtained in the context of a leniency application, in Quarmby, a claim that evidence provided by a witness 'was "tainted" because it was given in the context of [a] leniency application' was dismissed by the CAT as 'unsubstantiated'. In particular, the CAT noted that the undertaking providing the underlying evidence to the OFT and the witness commenting on that evidence were under a duty of continuous and complete cooperation (as a condition of leniency) and were aware of the criminal sanctions which they faced if they provided false or misleading information to the OFT. 254

I. Exclusion and exemptions

Exclusion

V.83 Section 3 of the Act provides that certain cases are excluded from the Chapter I prohibition. None of the exclusions from the Chapter I prohibition provided for by section 3 of the Act applies to the Infringement.

Exemption pursuant to section 9 of the Act

V.84 Agreements and concerted practices which satisfy the criteria set out in section 9 of the Act benefit from exemption from the Chapter I

252 Claymore Dairies and Express Dairies v OFT [2003] CAT 18, at [8].
253 See JFE Engineering (fn248), paragraph 211.
254 Quarmby (fn239), at [114]. However, as referred to in fn249, the OFT notes the view of the CAT panel in the Construction appeals as to the evidential weight it considered should be given to material which a leniency applicant creates after the event and which is based on evidence relied on by the OFT (see AH Willis (fn249), at [49]).
prohibition. It is for the parties to demonstrate that the four conditions for exemption under section 9 of the Act are satisfied.

V.85 The Parties have not submitted any representations to the effect that the criteria as set out in section 9 of the Act are met. The OFT considers it most unlikely that the arrangement covered by the Infringement is exempted from the Chapter I prohibition by virtue of section 9 of the Act. In particular, it is difficult to envisage how the Infringement could be said to have contributed to improving the production or distribution of goods, promoting technical or economic progress or how consumers could be said to have benefitted. In the circumstances, it is not necessary for the OFT to consider whether any of the remaining requirements for exemption under the relevant provisions would have been met.

Parallel exemption

V.86 Section 10 of the Act provides that an agreement is exempt from the Chapter I prohibition if it is covered by a finding of inapplicability by the Commission or an EU block exemption regulation, or would be covered by an EU block exemption regulation if the agreement had an effect on trade between EU Member States.

V.87 The Infringement is not covered by a finding of inapplicability by the Commission or by an EU block exemption regulation and would not be covered by such a regulation if it had an effect on trade between EU Member States.

J. Article 101

V.88 Where the OFT applies national competition law to agreements or concerted practices which may affect trade between EU Member States, the OFT must also apply Article 101.256

Effect on trade between Member States

V.89 For Article 101 to be engaged, the agreement or concerted practice must affect trade between EU Member States to an appreciable

255 The Commission may find that Article 101 is inapplicable to an agreement either because the conditions of Article 101(1) are not fulfilled or because the conditions of Article 101(3) are satisfied.

256 1/2003/EC Council Regulation of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty OJ 2003 L1/1, Article 3.
extent. This is a jurisdictional requirement demarcating the boundary between EU competition law and national competition law. Appreciability may be assessed by reference to the market position and importance of the undertakings concerned, and it will be absent where the effect on the market is insignificant because of the undertakings' weak position on the market.

V.90 For the purposes of assessing whether an agreement or concerted practice may affect trade between EU Member States the OFT has regard to the approach set out in the Commission's published guidance. Agreements which cover only part of an EU Member State are not likely to affect trade between EU Member States appreciably, unless they have the effect of hindering competitors from other EU Member States from gaining access to part of the EU Member State, which constitutes a substantial part of the internal market. The guidance also provides that agreements that are local in nature are in themselves not capable of appreciably affecting trade between Member States.

V.91 The Infringement was not cross-border in nature, but rather took place in a limited area within the UK. During the Relevant Period, the Parties made no sales to customers in other Member States and the evidence in the OFT's possession does not suggest that the Infringement had the effect of hindering competitors from other Member States from gaining access to part of the UK. The operation of the agreement and/or concerted practice was local in scope. On the basis of the foregoing, the OFT considers that it has no grounds for action under Article 101.

258 Case 22/78 Hugin Kassaregister and Hugin Cash Registers v Commission [1979] ECR 1869, paragraph 17. See also Aberdeen Journals (fn235), at [459].
260 Commission Notice Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (2004/C101/07) (the 'Notice on the Effect on Trade').
261 Notice on the Effect on Trade (fn260), paragraphs 89 and 92.
262 Notice on the Effect on Trade (fn260), paragraph 91.
263 See paragraphs II.22 and II.37 (Company Profiles).
264 See paragraph IV.42 (Industry Overview and the Relevant Market).
265 In finding no grounds for action under Article 101 against the Parties, the OFT has not made a non-infringement decision. In Case C-375/09 Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów v Tele 2 Polska, now Netia SA w Warszawie, the Court of Justice clarified that, given the risk of undermining the uniform application of Articles 101 and 102, only the Commission is empowered to make a finding that there has been no breach of these provisions.
V.92 SECTION VI THE CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES AND LEGAL ASSESSMENT

Conduct of the Parties

A. The OFT’s analysis of the evidence and findings

VI.1 The OFT has concluded, on the basis of the evidence viewed as a whole, that the Parties infringed the Chapter I prohibition. The main sources of evidence are summarised in this sub-section A by reference to the corresponding paragraph numbers in this Conduct Section, but the OFT’s conclusions are reached in light of the totality of the evidence.

VI.2 On or around 15 January 2008, [Northside Manager A] and [Ciceley Manager A] contacted each other and entered into an agreement and/or concerted practice whereby Northside and Ciceley would each include what has been described as a ‘good’ or ‘substantial’ margin in quotations to customers based in the other Party’s areas and that they would contact each other in relation to quotations to customers based in the other Party’s areas in order to give the local Party an opportunity to win the sale. The details of the agreement were subsequently confirmed in a follow-up email from [Ciceley Manager A] to [Northside Manager A] on 15 January 2008.

VI.3 It does not appear from the evidence available to the OFT that the Parties set specific figures for the margins to be included in quotations to out-of-area customers. However, the Parties had a shared understanding of what constituted a ‘good’ margin for a van, which gave them the ability to put the anti-competitive arrangement into practice.

VI.4 The OFT considers that this constituted an agreement and/or concerted practice which had the object of preventing, restricting or distorting competition for the sale of vans to customers based in the Parties’ areas.

and that national competition agencies can only decide that there are no grounds for action on their part.

References to the ‘Conduct Section’ are to paragraphs VI.1 to VI.19.

See paragraphs VI.6 to VI.12.

See paragraphs VI.13 to VI.14. The term ‘good’ margins is being used for consistency and covers all characterisations of the proposal referred to in witness evidence as to ‘good’ and ‘substantial’ margins.
VI.5 The OFT notes that Ciceley has admitted liability for the Infringement, and the facts as set out in the relevant sections of the Statement (insofar as they are relevant to its involvement in the Infringement). 269

B. Evidence of the Infringement

Ciceley’s conduct in relation to van sales to out-of-area customers and relationships with surrounding dealers

VI.6 [Ciceley Manager A] 270 stated:

‘There were no agreements with other dealers on how to deal with approaches from customers from adjoining areas. However, I have had separate conversations with both [Road Range Manager] and [Northside Manager A] 271 on the subject. From these separate conversations with [Road Range Manager] and [Northside Manager A], it was understood by both parties that there was no point in selling a van out of area for a low profit margin if there is no possibility of after-sales revenue. I estimate that the topic came up two or three times separately with both [Road Range Manager] and [Northside Manager A].

‘In practice this meant that if a customer approached us from Road Range or Northside’s area we would respond to the customer’s request but would leave a good margin in the deal on the basis that if the customer wants it at that price, that would be fine but we would not put much more effort into the quote and not chase it up. My expectation from my conversations with [Road Range Manager] and [Northside Manager A] was that they would do the same if a customer based in Ciceley’s area approached them.

269 See paragraphs III.26 to III.30 (The OFT’s Investigation). Ciceley’s admission is expressed to be subject to any representations made by it in relation to any material factual inaccuracies in the Statement, but no such representations have been made by Ciceley.

270 The OFT notes that Ciceley refused the OFT’s request to interview its employees during the investigative stage of the case. However, the OFT has interviewed and obtained witness statements from certain former Ciceley employees, including [Ciceley Manager A who was] at Ciceley during the Relevant Period, and whom the OFT considers entered into the arrangement on Ciceley’s behalf. Following the issue of the Statement, Ciceley has admitted liability for the Infringement and the facts set out in the relevant sections of the Statement. Northside is a leniency applicant and has also admitted its involvement in the Infringement. In light of these admissions, the OFT has not considered it necessary in the particular circumstances of this case to renew its request to Ciceley to provide the OFT with access to any witnesses.

271 Road Range is not a party to this Infringement. The contacts between [Ciceley Manager A] and [Road Range Manager] are considered in Decision 3.
'I did not however discuss or agree a set margin, price or any specific figures with [Road Range Manager] and [Northside Manager A] but we all understood from the nature of our role, what constituted an average and reasonable margin for a van. In other words, we would all know how to pitch the deal. For example, for a competitive deal we may make £[C] profit; whereas a good profit would be generally understood to be about £[C]. This still represented a percentage reduction from the list price for the customer.

'I cannot pin-point exactly when and where these separate conversations with [Road Range Manager] and [Northside Manager A] took place but I’m sure that the topic arose in conversations early on in my employment with Ciceley ([Ciceley Manager A] started at Ciceley on 3 December 2007), probably when I first met [Road Range Manager] and [Northside Manager A]. This sort of thing was not discussed to my recollection in front of [Mercedes Sales Manager A] or any other [C] or anyone else in the main body of regional sales meetings. I cannot state for certain as to whether [Mercedes Sales Manager A] or anyone else from Mercedes was aware of these discussions. […]

'I do not recall any direct contact between myself and [Road Range Manager] or [Northside Manager A] over any particular customers who had sought quotations from Ciceley and Road Range and/or Ciceley and Northside. Although we border each other’s area of influence, the occasions where Ciceley would directly compete with Road Range or Northside were few and far between. My recollection is that our understanding most likely effected occasional quotations from sole traders rather than fleet customers. Despite my expectation on how we would deal with out-of-area customers we would sometimes do the opposite and compete vigorously against each other for the same customer'.

Contact on or before 15 January 2008

VI.7 On 15 January 2008 at 09:37 am [Ciceley Manager A] sent an email headed ‘Deals out of area’ to his sales executives, which read:

'Please make sure that if you are involved in deals with customers out of our area, you call me to discuss before a deal is done.'
'Although it is perfectly legitimate for us to deal out of area from time to time, I may need to speak to the relevant sales manager in that region in order to maintain our relationship with them.

'We must value our relationships with other dealers, especially if we need to call on their help in the future.

'If you need to discuss this further, please call me'.

VI.8 On the same day at 10:19 am [Ciceley Manager A] set out the terms of the agreement and/or concerted practice in an email to [Northside Manager A]. In this email [Ciceley Manager A] copied [Mercedes Sales Manager A] and blind-copied [Ciceley Director]. The email read:

'To follow up our conversation earlier, I want to assure you that it is not our intention to deliberately undercut your sales guys on deals within your area.

'I have instructed my guys to inform me in all instances when they are in communication with customers out of area, so that I can speak to you, or any other sales manager.

'If we are asked to quote, we will ensure that a substantial margin is left in the deal in order to give you the opportunity to keep the customer in your area.

'I am conscious that we have now had two cases in a very short space of time which have slipped through the net, primarily because of their timing.

'I am aware of the excellent relationship between Ciceley and Northside and I am very keen to maintain that going forward.

'I look forward to meeting you next week (assuming you let me in!!)'.
The contact on or before 15 January 2008 between [Ciceley Manager A] and [Northside Manager A] whereby they reached the agreement and/or concerted practice seems to have occurred after Ciceley sold a vehicle into Northside’s area.275 [Ciceley Manager A] stated:

'I recall receiving a telephone call from [Northside Manager A] in which he asked me why one of my sales executives had quoted a customer within Northside’s area. [...] I wanted to get off on the right foot with [Northside Manager A] and maintain a good relationship with him. I also believed it was the right thing to do. [...] This email [his email to [Northside Manager A] dated 15 January 2008 quoted in paragraph VI.8] confirms the understanding I reached with [Northside Manager A] regarding out of area sales’. 276

Evidence from Northside in relation to the agreement and/or concerted practice

VI.10 The terms of the agreement and/or concerted practice are confirmed by [Northside Manager A]’s witness evidence:

'[Ciceley Manager A started] at Ciceley about two years prior to March 2010. I cannot remember how I came to meet with him, however I remember having a conversation with him along the lines of “Let’s help each other, if we do get enquiries in each other’s area, let’s speak to each other”. The expectation was that if a customer from Ciceley’s area enquired about a quote, I would contact Ciceley and ask what they would like me to quote. [...] I do not recall having a similar arrangement with [Ciceley Manager B], [Ciceley Manager A]’s predecessor’. 277

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275 Ciceley’s sales information shows that Ciceley’s sales executive [Ciceley Sales Executive A] sold a Sprinter 311 van to [individual/sole trader] in postcode [C] (within Northside’s area) in 2008 (see Ciceley Margin Summary 2006 to 2010 dated 17 January 2012, OFT Document Reference 3750, page 65). [individual/sole trader] is the customer named in the subject line of the email referred to in fn274.
276 [C] Second Witness Statement, OFT Document Reference 2772, paragraphs 1 to 2. The OFT notes that [Northside Manager A] stated that he had no recollection regarding customer [individual/sole trader] ([C] Witness Statement, OFT Document Reference 3868, paragraph 58), although this is less surprising given that it was Ciceley rather than Northside which succeeded in selling a vehicle to the customer on this occasion. The fact that [Ciceley Manager A] and [Northside Manager A] had been in contact with each other around that period is further supported by a crossed-out entry in a notebook belonging to [Ciceley Manager A] dated 8 January 2008, which reads: ‘Phone [Northside Manager A] to arrange a date in diary’ (Notebook of [Ciceley Manager A] (first entry dated 2007), OFT Document Reference 1122, page 6).
VI.11 Although [Northside Manager A] had not remembered the email quoted in paragraph VI.8 until it was shown to him, he confirmed in his witness statement that the email accorded with his recollection of his understanding with [Ciceley Manager A].278

VI.12 [Northside Manager A] highlighted the existence of an agreement with local dealers to one of Northside’s sales executives in an internal memorandum dated 6 June 2008:

‘Following our conversation yesterday I would like to clarify the following points:

‘1. With reference to the quote you did for [a contact at B Webster & Sons], you undercut H and L’s quote by over £[C] that was completely unnecessary. We have an agreement that we do not undercut local dealers279 although I do accept that you thought he was in Doncaster. Even if you were to go in cheaper why not undercut them by £[C]? […] It is my opinion that you would never win this deal as the customer gave you a copy of H and L’s quote. Obviously he will then show them your quote’.280

Meaning of ‘good’ margins

VI.13 The evidence before the OFT does not suggest that the Parties set specific figures for the margins to be included in quotations to out-of-area customers. However, it is clear from the witness evidence of both Parties that they understood what level of margins should be included in quotations to customers in each other’s areas under their anti-competitive arrangement. [Northside Manager A] stated:

278 [C] Witness Statement, OFT Document Reference 3868, paragraph 58. The fact that there was an agreement and/or concerted practice between Northside and Ciceley is further supported by the witness evidence from [Northside Director] (see [C] Witness Statement, OFT Document Reference 3869, paragraph 45).

279 The OFT notes that this memorandum refers specifically to a quotation given in H & L’s area. However, [Northside Manager A] stated that the reference to ‘local dealers’ meant H & L, Mertrux and Ciceley ([C] Witness Statement, OFT Document Reference 3868, paragraph 48).

'[t]he email refers to “leaving a good margin in the deal” and from experience I know this meant leaving in the region of £[C] profit margin for a van’. 281

VI.14 The same point was made by [Ciceley Manager A], who mentioned the same figure as being a good margin for the purposes of the agreement and/or concerted practice:

'I did not […] discuss or agree a set margin, price or any specific figures with […] [Northside Manager A] but we all understood from the nature of our role, what constituted an average and reasonable margin for a van. In other words, we would all know how to pitch the deal. For example, for a competitive deal we may make £[C] profit; whereas a good profit would be generally understood to be about £[C]. This still represented a percentage reduction from the list price for the customer’. 282

Manifestations of the agreement and/or concerted practice

VI.15 [Northside Manager A] stated that he may have been in touch with [Ciceley Manager A] between 12 and 20 times over two years as a result of the understanding with [Ciceley Manager A]. 283 [Ciceley Manager A] stated he recalled three or four occasions when he and [Northside Manager A] would have contacted one another in relation to particular customers, 284 but he said that these contacts were ’only in terms of getting vehicles’, not in relation to particular quotations. 285

VI.16 [Northside Sales Executive D] stated that she was contacted by [Ciceley Sales Executive A] in March 2010. [Northside Sales Executive D] had provided a quotation to a customer in Northside’s area, including in the price a certain level of fleet support obtained from Mercedes. The customer forwarded the quotation to Ciceley and [Ciceley Sales Executive A] telephoned [Northside Sales Executive D]. [Northside Sales Executive D] stated:

284 [C] First Witness Statement, OFT Document Reference 1403, paragraph 17. [Ciceley Manager A] also stated that the shared understanding that ’there was no point in selling a van out of area for a low profit margin if there is no possibility of after-sales revenue’ was discussed two or three times with [Northside Manager A] ([C] First Witness Statement, OFT Document Reference 1403, paragraph 12).
"[Ciceley Sales Executive A] said he had been asked by the customer as to whether he could beat our price and the customer had sent my email to him. [Ciceley Sales Executive A] asked me how I’d reached my price because it would have been a lower price than Ciceley would have been able to quote. I explained that I had seen the customer and obtained fleet support.

"[Ciceley Sales Executive A] then said to me he would just quote the normal price [i.e. without price support] so in effect his price would be more expensive than mine, to which I said "thanks very much" and that was the end of the call. He was obviously making it clear to me that he wasn’t going to pursue a customer in my area."

VI.17 The OFT considers that this contact between sales executives of the two Parties was in accordance with the terms of the agreement and/or concerted practice. Although the contact was outside the period in which the OFT has found the Infringement to have taken place, the OFT notes that it further evidences the collusive nature of the relationship between the two Parties and the existence of an open channel of communication between them to discuss quotations to customers. On this occasion, the Ciceley sales executive felt sufficiently comfortable to contact Northside and openly discuss their future price to a particular customer. This contact also suggests that in March 2010 Ciceley still considered the agreement and/or concerted practice to be in place.

C. Evidence relating to termination of the Infringement

VI.18 It would appear from the evidence regarding Ciceley contacting Northside described in paragraph VI.16 that Ciceley considered the agreement and/or concerted practice with Northside still to be in place on 10 March 2010. The OFT has no evidence of the termination of this Infringement. The OFT similarly has no evidence of either of the Parties distancing themselves from it at any time before the OFT’s inspection at Northside. Indeed, [Northside Manager A] stated that ‘as far as I was

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287 See paragraph VI.19.
288 See paragraph III.9 (The OFT’s Investigation).
concerned the arrangement with Ciceley continued until Northside was visited by the OFT in January 2010’. 289

VI.19 On 26 January 2010, the OFT used its powers under section 28 of the Act to inspect the premises of Northside and H & L. Ciceley was only visited by the OFT in September 2010. On 29 January 2010, Northside made an application for Type B immunity/leniency and was granted a marker by the OFT. One condition for the grant of immunity is that Northside ceased its participation in the reported activity. In light of this, the OFT considers that the Infringement ended with the inspections at Northside and H & L on 26 January 2010.

Legal Assessment

D. Introduction

VI.20 From the evidence presented in the Conduct Section, the OFT draws the following conclusions concerning its legal assessment of the conduct of the Parties. Note that references to specific paragraph numbers are included in this section for ease of reference to the primary sources of evidence, but the conclusions are reached in light of the totality of the evidence.

VI.21 In assessing the evidence in this case, the OFT has applied the requisite standard of proof as described in paragraphs V.70 to V.82 (Legal Background) of this Decision. The OFT is satisfied that the evidence set out and referred to in this Decision meets the requisite standard and is sufficient to discharge the burden of proof.

E. Agreement and/or concerted practice

VI.22 The OFT has concluded that the Parties infringed the Chapter I prohibition by entering into an agreement and/or concerted practice which had as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition.

VI.23 The agreement and/or concerted practice was that Northside and Ciceley would each include what has been described as a 'good' or 'substantial' margin in quotations to customers based in each other’s areas and that they would contact each other in relation to quotations for customers.

based in the other Party's area in order to give the local Party an opportunity to win the sale.

**Classification of the Infringement as an agreement and/or concerted practice**

**VI.24** The OFT notes that including a 'good' margin in quotations to out-of-area customers may constitute a legitimate unilateral commercial decision by dealers. Indeed, the case law recognises the right of economic operators to adapt intelligently to market conditions.\(^{290}\) However, the law prohibits contacts which have the object or effect of influencing the conduct of an actual or potential competitor on the market or of disclosing an intended course of conduct, where such contact has the object or effect of distorting conditions of competition on the market. As is evident from the Conduct Section, this Infringement did not concern unilateral behaviour but rather conduct which was the result of discussions between the Parties regarding their respective commercial strategies and subsequent contacts between them in respect of that matter.\(^{291}\)

**VI.25** The OFT has concluded, on the basis of the evidence set out and referred to in the Conduct Section, that the Parties engaged in an agreement or at least a concerted practice within the meaning of the Chapter I prohibition. In summary, the evidence shows that:

- On or before 15 January 2008, [Ciceley Manager A] and [Northside Manager A] contacted each other and reached a common understanding regarding their approach to out-of-area sales (which the OFT considers amounted to an agreement and/or concerted practice for the purposes of the Chapter I prohibition).\(^{292}\)

- In an email sent on 15 January 2008, [Ciceley Manager A] confirmed to [Northside Manager A] that Ciceley did not intend to undercut Northside in quotations to customers based in Northside’s area. In addition, he said that he would inform [Northside Manager A] about communications with customers in Northside’s area and that, if Ciceley was asked to provide a quotation, it would include a substantial margin in the quotation in order to give Northside the

\(^{290}\) See paragraph V.21 (Legal Background).

\(^{291}\) See paragraph V.21 (Legal Background).

\(^{292}\) See paragraphs VI.6 to VI.9.
opportunity to win the business. 293 [Ciceley Manager A] stated that this email confirmed the understanding he had previously reached with [Northside Manager A]. 294

- The fact that there was a concurrence of wills between Ciceley and Northside is confirmed by the witness evidence of [Northside Manager A]. In particular, [Northside Manager A] verified that, following a conversation between himself and [Ciceley Manager A], there was an expectation between the Parties that they would contact each other and discuss quotations to customers based in each other’s areas, with the objective that each dealer would sell to customers based in its own area. 295

- In an internal memorandum to one of his sales executives, [Northside Manager A] noted that Northside had an agreement not to undercut local dealers, and explained to the OFT that his reference to local dealers included Ciceley. 296

VI.26 The OFT notes that [Ciceley Manager A] and [Northside Manager A] both said that they did not have agreements with other dealers on how to deal with approaches from out-of-area customers. 297 However, the concept of an agreement under the Chapter I prohibition is sufficiently wide to catch a broad range of arrangements, going beyond legally binding agreements. 298 Indeed, for there to be an agreement under the Chapter I prohibition, it is sufficient that the Parties have expressed their joint intention to conduct themselves on the market in a specific way. 299

VI.27 In this case, both Northside and Ciceley expressed their intention to include what has been described as a 'good' or 'substantial' margin in quotations to customers based in the other Party’s areas and to contact each other in relation to quotations to customers based in the other Party’s area, in order to give the local Party an opportunity to win the sale.

293 See paragraph VI.8.
294 See paragraph VI.9.
295 See paragraphs VI.10 to VI.11.
296 See paragraph VI.12.
298 See paragraph V.16 (Legal Background).
299 See paragraph V.18 (Legal Background).
VI.28 The OFT has also concluded that the common understanding constituted at the very least a concerted practice. The OFT notes that reciprocal contacts are established where one competitor discloses its intentions or future conduct on the market and the other requests or at least accepts the information. By communicating their commitment that they would include 'good' margins in quotations to customers in each other’s areas and contact each other in relation to quotations in each other’s areas, Northside and Ciceley gave each other assurance that they would be competing less vigorously for customers in each other’s areas.

VI.29 The mutual disclosure between Northside and Ciceley of their commercial strategy removed uncertainty as to their future conduct on the market, with the result that competition between them was restricted (or had the potential to be restricted). The OFT notes that, following that mutual disclosure of future commercial strategy, each Party would have been able to behave on the market in accordance with the objective of the arrangement without necessarily contacting the other about specific customers, due to their shared understanding of what constituted a 'good' margin. In any event, it is not necessary for the OFT to arrive at a definite conclusion as to the characterisation of the Parties’ conduct as either an agreement or a concerted practice in order to demonstrate an infringement of the Chapter I prohibition.

VI.30 Where an undertaking participates in a meeting of a manifestly anti-competitive nature, it will be taken to have participated in an agreement and/or concerted practice unless it adduces evidence to establish that it had indicated its opposition to the anti-competitive arrangement to the other participants.

VI.31 The OFT has not received any evidence that either of the Parties made clear to the other that they did not wish to take part in the agreement and/or concerted practice, nor has it received any evidence that, following the email of 15 January 2008, the Parties took active steps to clearly distance themselves from the anti-competitive arrangement.

VI.32 Throughout the Relevant Period, Northside and Ciceley were actively involved in the sale of vans distributed by Mercedes. If the Infringement

300 See paragraph V.23 (Legal Background).
301 See paragraph V.22 (Legal Background).
302 See paragraphs V.10 to V.15 (Legal Background).
303 See paragraph V.25 (Legal Background).
is to be classified only as a concerted practice, the OFT is entitled to presume that, since the Parties remained active on the market, there was a causal connection between the concerted practice and their conduct on that market.  

VI.33 The OFT considers that the existence of an agreement and/or concerted practice is not precluded by the possibility that the Parties may occasionally have competed for particular customers in each other’s areas (and, as such, might not have adhered to the agreement and/or concerted practice for each and every sale). That the arrangement may also not have applied to all categories of customer and/or sale does not preclude the finding that an anti-competitive agreement and/or concerted practice existed.

F. Anti-competitive object

VI.34 This Infringement concerns an agreement and/or concerted practice whereby Northside and Ciceley would contact one another before providing a quotation to a customer based in the other’s area and would each include what has been described as a ‘good’ or ‘substantial’ margin in quotations to customers based in the other Party’s area. The OFT considers that this arrangement amounts to conduct which can be regarded by its very nature as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition.

VI.35 There is no evidence that the Parties agreed on the specific margins which should be included in quotations to out-of-area customers. Rather, they agreed to include a ‘good’ margin in those quotations and the evidence before the OFT shows that the Parties had a shared understanding of what constituted a ‘good’ margin (as opposed to a competitive margin). The OFT notes that Mercedes stated that its policy is to quote the same price to dealers which are known to be quoting to the same customers, so that the principal cost associated with the sale of vans (the cost of buying the vehicle from Mercedes)
was the same for both of the Parties. The OFT therefore considers that, in the commercial context in which the Infringement took place, 'good' margins constituted a sufficiently clear focal point for collusion between the Parties. The stated objective of this arrangement was to give the local Party an opportunity to keep the customer without competing on price with the other.

VI.36 In view of the foregoing, the OFT has concluded that the agreement and/or concerted practice between the Parties had as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition for customers based in the Parties' areas. Having found that the agreement and/or concerted practice constitutes a restriction or distortion by object under the Chapter I prohibition, the OFT is not required to demonstrate an actual prevention, restriction or distortion of competition.

G. Appreciability

VI.37 The OFT considers that the agreement and/or concerted practice, which amounts to a restriction or distortion of competition by object, had (or had the potential to have) an appreciable impact on competition.

VI.38 An agreement and/or concerted practice will not meet the appreciability criterion if it has only an insignificant impact on the market.

VI.39 In determining whether the agreement and/or concerted practice meets the appreciability requirement, the OFT has had regard to the Commission’s Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance. The OFT considers that the Infringement contained to varying degrees at least some element of market sharing, price coordination and/or the exchange of commercially sensitive information, which are 'hardcore' restrictions of competition. Therefore, even if the market shares of the Parties are below the threshold set out in the Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, the approach set out in the Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance would not apply to the Infringement.

310 See paragraph V.44 (Legal Background).
311 See paragraphs VI.8 and VI.10 and paragraph V.43 (Legal Background).
312 See paragraph V.58 (Legal Background).
313 See paragraphs V.59 and V.62 (Legal Background).
314 See paragraphs V.60 to V.61 (Legal Background).
VI.40  The OFT has had regard to the approach to the appreciability test in object cases set out by the CAT in North Midland Construction.\textsuperscript{315} The OFT considers that the nature of the agreement and/or concerted practice is such that, given the circumstances of this case, its potential impact on competition is inherently likely to be appreciable.

VI.41  The agreement and/or concerted practice concerned the sale of vans distributed by a major manufacturer, Mercedes, which holds a sizeable share of the total sale of vans in the UK.\textsuperscript{316} Moreover, to the extent (if at all) that competition between Mercedes dealers is limited by the selective distribution system, the OFT considers that firms should not engage in conduct which will further limit the residual scope for competition.\textsuperscript{317}

VI.42  The agreement and/or concerted practice potentially deprived customers of the benefits of obtaining competitive quotations from the Parties and of playing them off against each other. As such, the arrangement had at least the potential for enabling the Parties to secure deals within their own areas at a higher price, and to enjoy further profits from any after-sales business associated with the sale.\textsuperscript{318}

VI.43  In addition, the Parties could potentially be giving customers the impression that there was competition between them by providing quotations which contained higher but credible margins, which could dissuade customers from seeking further alternative quotations.

VI.44  The anti-competitive arrangement between the Parties also had the potential for opening, reinforcing or maintaining the channels of communication between them, which could facilitate collusive conduct on other markets where both Parties are active (such as trucks).

VI.45  Finally, the OFT notes that there could potentially be an impact on the wider vans market to the extent that the Infringement enabled Mercedes dealers to raise prices, thereby reducing the competitive constraint on dealers of other brands.

\textsuperscript{315} See paragraphs V.62 and V.64 (Legal Background).

\textsuperscript{316} See paragraph IV.6 (Industry Overview and the Relevant Market).


\textsuperscript{318} See paragraph IV.12 (Industry Overview and the Relevant Market).
VI.46 The OFT therefore considers that the nature and the circumstances of the Infringement mean that the agreement and/or concerted practice is appreciable and not so insignificant as to fall outside the scope of the Chapter I prohibition.

H. Effect on trade within the UK

VI.47 As set out in paragraphs V.65 to V.68 (Legal Background), the OFT considers that it is likely that an agreement and/or concerted practice which appreciably restricts competition within the UK also affects trade within the UK.

VI.48 The agreement and/or concerted practice appreciably restricted competition, or at least had the potential to do so, and operated in a part of the UK. The Parties' conduct is therefore considered by the OFT to have affected trade within the UK, or a part of it, or to have been capable of doing so.

VI.49 The requirement of an effect on trade within the UK is therefore satisfied in respect of the Infringement.

I. Conclusion on the application of the Chapter I prohibition

VI.50 In view of the foregoing, the OFT has decided that the Parties infringed the Chapter I prohibition by participating between 15 January 2008 and 26 January 2010 in an agreement and/or concerted practice with the object of preventing, restricting or distorting competition for the sale of vans to customers based in the Parties' areas.

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319 See paragraphs VI.37 to VI.46.
SECTION VII  THE OFT’S ACTION

A.  Introduction

VII.1  This Section sets out the enforcement action which the OFT is taking and its reasons for taking that action.

B.  The OFT’s decision

VII.2  The OFT finds, for the reasons set out in Section VI (The Conduct of the Parties and Legal Assessment) and on the basis of the evidence set out and referred to in that section, that Ciceley and Northside infringed the Chapter I prohibition by participating between 15 January 2008 and 26 January 2010 in an agreement and/or concerted practice which had the object of preventing, restricting or distorting competition for the sale of vans to customers based in the Parties’ areas.

C.  Directions

VII.3  Section 32(1) of the Act provides that, if the OFT has made a decision that an agreement infringes the Chapter I prohibition, it may give to such person or persons as it considers appropriate such directions as it considers appropriate to bring the infringement to an end. As the OFT considers that the Infringement has already come to an end it is not issuing directions in this case.

D.  Financial penalties

General points

VII.4  Section 36(1) of the Act provides that on making a decision that an agreement or concerted practice has infringed the Chapter I prohibition, the OFT may require an undertaking concerned to pay the OFT a penalty in respect of the infringement.

VII.5  In accordance with section 38(8) of the Act, the OFT must have regard to the guidance on penalties being in force at the time when setting the amount of penalty. The OFT's revised guidance on penalties, which came into force in September 2012, states that when determining the penalty in a given case, regard will be had to the calculation mechanism contained in the penalty guidance in force at the time the Statement of
Objections in the case was issued.\textsuperscript{320}

VII.6 As the Statement was issued on 28 June 2012, before this revised guidance came into force, the OFT had regard to the calculation mechanism set out in the 2004 Penalty Guidance.

Previous OFT decisions

VII.7 The OFT is not bound by its decisions in relation to the calculation of financial penalties in previous cases.\textsuperscript{321} Rather, the OFT makes its assessment on a case-by-case basis\textsuperscript{322} having regard to all relevant circumstances and the objectives of its policy on financial penalties.

VII.8 Provided the penalties it imposes in a particular case are within the range of penalties permitted by section 36(8) of the Act and the Competition Act 1998 (Determination of Turnover for Penalties) Order 2000 (the ‘2000 Order’) as amended by the Competition Act 1998 (Determination of Turnover for Penalties) (Amendment) Order 2004 (SI 2004/1259) (the ‘2004 Order’), and having regard to its guidance on penalties under section 38 of the Act, the OFT has a margin of appreciation when determining the appropriate amount of a penalty under the Act.\textsuperscript{323}

VII.9 Each case is specific to its own facts and circumstances and it cannot be assumed that the level of penalty appropriate for a particular party in one case (or the manner in which the guidance on penalties has been applied) will necessarily be the same in respect of another party in another case. The OFT considers that, subject to the above, it is free to adapt its policy as appropriate having regard to all relevant circumstances and its overall policy objectives on financial penalties, as set out in its guidance on penalties.\textsuperscript{324}

\textsuperscript{320} 2012 Penalty Guidance (fn2), paragraph 1.11.
\textsuperscript{321} For example, Eden Brown and Others v OFT [2011] CAT 8 (‘Eden Brown’), at [78].
\textsuperscript{322} For example, Kier Group and Others v OFT [2011] CAT 3 (‘Kier’), at [116] where the CAT noted that ‘other than in matters of legal principle there is limited precedent value in other decisions relating to penalties, where the maxim that each case stands on its own facts is particularly pertinent’. See also Eden Brown (fn321), at [97] where the CAT observed that ‘[d]ecisions by this Tribunal on penalty appeals are very closely related to the particular facts of the case’.
\textsuperscript{323} Argos/Littlewoods (fn149), at [168] and Umbro Holdings and Manchester United and JJB Sports and Allsports v OFT [2005] CAT 22, at [102].
\textsuperscript{324} Musique Diffusion française (fn179), paragraphs 101 to 110 and Dansk Rørindustri (fn14), paragraph 169.
Statutory cap on penalties

VII.10 No penalty which has been fixed by the OFT may exceed ten per cent of the turnover of the undertaking, calculated in accordance with the provisions of the 2000 Order as amended by the 2004 Order. This is considered further at paragraphs VII.47 to VII.49.

Small agreements

VII.11 Section 39(3) of the Act provides that a party to a 'small agreement' is immune from the effect of section 36(1) of the Act and as such no penalty can be imposed. The combined applicable turnover of the Parties involved in the Infringement exceeds £20 million. Accordingly, neither of the Parties will benefit from immunity from penalties under section 39(3) of the Act.

Intention/negligence

VII.12 The OFT may impose a penalty on an undertaking that has infringed the Chapter I prohibition only if it is satisfied that the infringement has been committed intentionally or negligently. The CAT has stated that:

'an infringement is committed intentionally for the purposes of the Act if the undertaking must have been aware that its conduct was of such a nature as to encourage a restriction or distortion of competition [...] an infringement is committed negligently for the purposes of section 36(3) if the undertaking ought to have known that its conduct would result in a restriction or distortion of competition'.

VII.13 This is consistent with the approach taken by the Court of Justice which has confirmed:

'that condition [of intentionality] is satisfied where the undertaking concerned cannot be unaware of the anti-competitive nature of its conduct, whether or not it is aware that it is infringing the competition rules of the Treaty (see Joined Cases 96/82 to 102/82, 104/82,

325 Section 36(8) of the Act.
326 'Small agreement' is defined, pursuant to section 39(1) and the Competition Act 1998 (Small Agreements and Conduct of Minor Significance) Regulations 2000 (SI 2000/262), as an agreement between undertakings, the combined applicable turnover of which, for the business year ending in the calendar year preceding the one during which the infringement occurred, does not exceed £20 million.
327 Section 36(3) of the Act.
328 Napp (fn236), at [456] to [457].

VII.14 In the present case, the OFT considers that the very nature of the Infringement means that the Parties could not have been unaware that the agreement and/or concerted practice in which they were involved was, or was likely to be, restrictive of competition. The OFT has therefore decided that each of the Parties committed the Infringement either intentionally or negligently.

E. Northside’s application for immunity

VII.15 As set out in paragraph I.6 (Introduction), Northside benefits from full immunity from the financial penalties being imposed by the OFT.

VII.16 The OFT has not calculated the penalty that would otherwise be imposed on Northside had it not benefitted from such immunity. The OFT does not consider that it needs to calculate Northside’s penalty since Northside benefits from full immunity from the financial penalty under section 36 of the Act.

F. Settlement

VII.17 As set out in paragraphs III.26 to III.30 (The OFT’s Investigation), the OFT has entered into a Settlement Agreement with Ciceley. As provided for in the Settlement Agreement, only 85 per cent of the penalty determined for Ciceley is payable on the date specified in paragraph VII.50 (the ‘Settlement Penalty’). The remaining 15 per cent (the ‘Settlement Discount’) will only become payable in the event that Ciceley’s Settlement Agreement is terminated in accordance with its terms.

VII.18 In determining the level of the settlement discount, the OFT took into account the administrative efficiencies and resource savings from early resolution of the case.

G. Calculation of Ciceley’s penalty

Turnover

VII.19 For the purpose of penalty calculation, the OFT considers that the Relevant Turnover\(^{330}\) or total turnover applicable is the turnover of the undertaking which comprises the relevant single economic entity, as defined in paragraph II.27 (Company Profiles).

Step 1 – calculation of the starting point

VII.20 Under the Penalty Guidance, the starting point for determining the level of penalty for the Infringement is calculated having regard to the seriousness of the Infringement and the Relevant Turnover of the undertaking.\(^{331}\)

Relevant Turnover

VII.21 As set out in paragraph IV.32 (Industry Overview and the Relevant Market), the Relevant Turnover is the turnover of the undertaking in the market affected by the Infringement in financial year preceding the date when the Infringement ended.

VII.22 In the case of the penalty for Ciceley, this is the financial year ending 31 December 2009 as the Infringement ended during the financial year ending 31 December 2010.\(^{332}\)

Seriousness of the infringement

VII.23 Under the 2004 Penalty Guidance, the starting point which the OFT applies may not exceed ten per cent of Ciceley’s Relevant Turnover.\(^{333}\)

VII.24 The actual percentage which is applied to the Relevant Turnover depends upon the nature of the infringement. The more serious and widespread the infringement, the higher the likely percentage rate.\(^{334}\)

\(^{330}\) As defined in paragraph IV.42 (Industry Overview and the Relevant Market).
\(^{331}\) 2004 Penalty Guidance (fn2), paragraphs 2.3 to 2.5.
\(^{332}\) As set on in paragraphs VI.18 to VI.19 (The Conduct of the Parties and Legal Assessment), the OFT considers that the end date for Infringement is the OFT’s visit to Northside on 26 January 2010.
\(^{333}\) 2004 Penalty Guidance (fn2), paragraph 2.8.
\(^{334}\) 2004 Penalty Guidance (fn2), paragraph 2.4.
When making this assessment, the OFT will consider a number of factors, including the nature of the product, the structure of the market, the market shares of the undertakings involved in the infringements and the effect on competitors and third parties. The damage caused to consumers, whether directly or indirectly, will also be an important consideration.335

VII.25 In assessing the seriousness of the Infringement, as indicated in paragraph IV.37 (Industry Overview and the Relevant Market), the OFT notes that it is a restriction of intra-brand competition and that the Parties are therefore to a certain extent constrained by dealers of other marques.

VII.26 However, the starting point also reflects the fact that the Infringement is an infringement of the Chapter I prohibition 'by object' and can be regarded, by its very nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition and is, therefore, a serious infringement of competition law.336 In a case where there is an infringement by object, there is no need for the OFT to determine or quantify any actual anti-competitive effects of the conduct in question when assessing the seriousness of an infringement, and the absence of evidence of actual effects in relation to a particular infringement is not a mitigating factor in this respect.337

VII.27 Taking these factors in the round, the OFT has decided that a starting point of six per cent is appropriate.

**Step 2 – adjustment for duration**

VII.28 At Step 2, the starting point under Step 1 may be adjusted to take into account the duration of the infringement.338 Penalties for infringements which last more than one year may be multiplied by no more than the number of years of the infringements. The 2004 Penalty Guidance states that '[p]art years may be treated as full years for the purpose of calculating the number of years of the infringement'.339

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335 2004 Penalty Guidance (fn2), paragraph 2.5.
336 2004 Penalty Guidance (fn2), paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4, and paragraph VI.36 (The Conduct of the Parties and Legal Assessment).
337 Francis/Barrett and Others v Office of Fair Trading, [2011] CAT 9, at [88].
338 2004 Penalty Guidance (fn2), paragraph 2.10.
339 2004 Penalty Guidance (fn2), paragraph 2.10.
VII.29 The OFT has concluded that the Infringement occurred between 15 January 2008 and 26 January 2010. The OFT’s approach in this case, for the purposes of calculating penalties, is to round up each part year to the nearest quarter of a year. The OFT has therefore applied multiplier of 2.25 to the penalty at this step in the calculation.

**Step 3 – adjustment for other factors**

VII.30 The penalty may be adjusted, after Step 2, to achieve the twin objectives of the OFT’s policy on financial penalties: to impose penalties on infringing undertakings which reflect the seriousness of the infringement and to ensure that the threat of penalties will deter both the infringing undertakings and other undertakings generally from engaging in anti-competitive practices. Adjustment to the penalty at Step 3 may result in either an increase or a decrease in the financial penalty.

VII.31 In considering whether any adjustment to the penalty is required for the purposes of deterrence, the OFT considers the need specifically to deter the infringing undertaking from engaging in such behaviour in future (‘specific deterrence’) as well as the need more generally to ensure that other undertakings are deterred from engaging in similar behaviour (‘general deterrence’). In assessing whether and in what amount a deterrence adjustment is necessary, the OFT may take into account – among other things - the need to send a clear message of deterrence to the industry in question (in this case, the commercial vehicles distribution industry) and more generally, including in particular to companies involved in the supply of products which are brought to the market through a selective distribution system.

VII.32 Other considerations at this stage may include the OFT’s estimate of any economic or financial benefit made by the infringing undertakings from the infringements, and the special characteristics, including the size and financial position of the undertakings in question. These can result in either an increase or a decrease of the financial penalty resulting from the application of Steps 1 and 2.

VII.33 When assessing whether an adjustment is required, the OFT will consider a number of indicators of each undertaking’s size and financial position. For example, the financial penalty calculated at the end of Step 2 of the calculation may represent a relatively low proportion of an

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340 2004 Penalty Guidance (fn2), paragraph 2.11.
undertaking’s total turnover because it may have significant activities in other product and/or geographic markets.

VII.34 In this case, the OFT carried out detailed cross-checks by reference to certain relevant indicators of the Ciceley’s size and financial position when considering whether the proposed level of the penalty was appropriate and, in particular, whether it was necessary and proportionate.\(^{341}\)

VII.35 This cross-check was carried out by considering the financial indicators in the round. The OFT has not applied specific thresholds in relation to the indicators or taken any one indicator in isolation as determinative in setting the appropriate penalty; different indicators may point in different directions and some indicators may be more or less meaningful for a particular party. Instead, the OFT has applied a common set of principles consistently to ensure that the penalty arrived at was proportionate and achieved the objectives of the OFT’s policy on financial penalties.\(^{342}\)

VII.36 Ciceley’s penalty calculated after Steps 1 and 2 resulted in a penalty that constituted multiples of Ciceley’s average profits after tax\(^{343}\) and relatively high proportions of other indicators of Ciceley’s financial position, such as average gross profits and average total turnover.\(^{344}\) The OFT therefore considered that a downwards adjustment was required and applied a reduction of 50 per cent.

VII.37 As stated in paragraphs III.6 to III.7 (The OFT’s Investigation), on the same day as this Decision is adopted, the OFT is adopting Decision 3 and Decision 5, imposing financial penalties on Ciceley for its involvement in Infringement 3 and Infringement 5. The OFT has therefore taken a step back and carried out a cross-check across the penalties to ensure that, taken together, they do not lead to the imposition of a total penalty across all infringements that is excessive or disproportionate. The OFT notes the findings of the CAT in Kier that:

\(^{341}\) When assessing Ciceley’s financial position, the OFT considered in particular its (i) three-year (2009, 2010 and 2011) average total turnover, average gross profits and average profits after tax, (ii) net assets in 2011 and (iii) net assets in 2011 plus two years of dividends (2010 and 2011).

\(^{342}\) Kier (fn322) at [177].

\(^{343}\) The penalty at the end of Step 2 amounted to around 200 per cent of Ciceley’s average profits after tax.

\(^{344}\) The penalty amounted to just above ten per cent of its average gross profits and just below two per cent of its average total turnover.
'In our view, if more than one discrete infringement is being pursued then whatever deterrent element is appropriate for each infringement should be included in the specific penalty for it. This should not result in an excessive overall penalty provided that the “totality” principle is respected and any necessary adjustments are made to each separate penalty'. 345

VII.38 The OFT considered on this basis that a further reduction of 40 per cent was required. Without further adjustment, the sum of the three penalties would have amounted to over three years of Ciceley’s average profits after tax and to just under 20 per cent of its average gross profits.

VII.39 Following this further discount, whilst the sum of the three penalties constitutes around 185 per cent of Ciceley’s average profits after tax, it represents between five to ten per cent of Ciceley’s net assets and its net assets plus dividends in the last two financial years,346 and just over one per cent of Ciceley’s average total turnover. In view of this, and considering in particular the need to deter future anti-competitive behaviour and to reflect the seriousness of the three infringements (including two of longer duration which would have had a bigger actual or potential impact), the OFT is satisfied that, in the round, the resulting penalty is necessary and proportionate to achieve the twin policy objectives in all the circumstances of the case.

VII.40 This further ‘totality’ adjustment of 40 per cent for overall proportionality is only appropriate in the circumstances as set out in this Decision and in Decision 3 and Decision 5. In particular, the OFT considers this discount is only appropriate if the respective penalties at the end of Step 3 amount to £433,814 for Infringement 3 and £417,571 for Infringement 5 without the further 'totality' adjustment. If there are changes to the penalties imposed on Ciceley for its involvement in any of the infringements, this further 'totality' adjustment would need to be re-assessed.

**Step 4 – adjustment for aggravating and mitigating factors**

VII.41 The OFT may increase the penalty where there are other aggravating

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345 *Kier* (fn322), at [180].

346 The OFT notes that Ciceley’s net assets are significantly higher than that of the other two dealers that have settled, Road Range and Enza. OFT also notes that Ciceley has distributed much higher dividends in the past two years than those two dealers.
factors, or decrease it where there are mitigating factors.347

VII.42 Aggravating factors can include the involvement of senior management in the infringement, repeated infringements by the same undertaking or other undertakings in the same group, and the intentional, rather than negligent commission of the infringement. These factors are not exhaustive.

VII.43 Mitigating factors can include adequate steps having been taken to ensure compliance with the Chapter I prohibition, and cooperation by a party which enables the enforcement process to be concluded more effectively and/or speedily, although undertakings benefiting from the leniency programme would not normally receive additional reductions in financial penalties under this head to reflect general cooperation.348 These factors are also not exhaustive.

VII.44 The OFT considered increasing the penalty at Step 4 for the involvement of [Ciceley Manager A] in this Infringement but has concluded, in light of [Ciceley Manager A]'s responsibilities, that an uplift for senior management involvement at Step 4 was not required in for his involvement in the particular circumstances of this case.

VII.45 The OFT considers that an uplift is of five per cent is appropriate for the involvement of a director the company, [Ciceley Director], in this Infringement, as outlined in paragraph VI.8 (The Conduct of the Parties and Legal Assessment).

VII.46 Apart from the commitments made as part of the Settlement Agreement, the OFT does not consider that it has received cooperation from Ciceley above and beyond its legal obligations which has enabled the process in this case to be concluded more effectively and/or speedily, and which would warrant a penalty reduction at Step 4.

**Step 5 – adjustment to prevent the maximum penalty from being exceeded and to avoid double jeopardy**

VII.47 The OFT may not fix a penalty for the Infringement that exceeds ten per cent of the worldwide turnover of the undertaking in its last business year before the date of the OFT’s Decision, calculated in accordance with the provisions of the 2000 Order, as amended (the 'section 36(8)

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348 2004 Penalty Guidance (fn2), paragraph 2.16 and footnote 19.
turnover’).\textsuperscript{349} The section 36(8) turnover is not restricted to a party’s turnover in the relevant market.

VII.48 In addition, the OFT must, when setting the amount of penalty for a particular agreement and/or concerted practice, take into account any penalty or fine that has been imposed by the Commission or by a court or other body in another Member State in respect of that agreement or concerted practice.\textsuperscript{350} There have been no other penalties or fines imposed in relation to the Infringement.

VII.49 The OFT has assessed the Parties’ penalties against these tests (as applicable). No reduction was required at Step 5 of the penalty calculation because the penalty after Step 4 is below the maximum penalty that the OFT may impose.

H. Payment of penalty

VII.50 The total penalty, without the Settlement Discount, for Ciceley’s involvement in Infringement 2 is £265,257. The Settlement Penalty is £225,468.\textsuperscript{351}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Penalty component</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Penalty after each step</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1</strong></td>
<td>Relevant turnover of £[C]</td>
<td>[C]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Starting point</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 2</strong></td>
<td>Duration multiplier</td>
<td>x2.25</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Step 3</strong></td>
<td>Proportionality/deterrence</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Overall proportionality</td>
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<td><strong>Step 4</strong></td>
<td>Aggravating factors</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mitigating factors</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 5</strong></td>
<td>Statutory maximum</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Penalty for Infringement 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>£265,257</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{349} Section 36(8) of the Act and the 2000 Order, as amended by the 2004 Order.
\textsuperscript{350} Section 38(9) of the Act and 2004 Penalty Guidance (fn2), paragraph 2.20.
\textsuperscript{351} Ciceley’s penalties for Infringement 3 and Infringement 5 after the Settlement Discount, pursuant to Decision 3 and Decision 5, are £221,245 and £212,961 respectively. The sum of the penalties for its involvement in Infringements 2, 3 and 5, after the Settlement Discount, is £659,675.
### Settlement Penalty: £225,468

#### VII.51
The OFT therefore requires Ciceley to pay the Settlement Penalty as set out in the table above. Payment should be made to the OFT by close of banking business on 31 May 2013 or on such other date or dates as may be agreed in writing with the OFT.  

#### VII.52
In the event that the Settlement Agreement with Ciceley is terminated in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the OFT requires Ciceley to pay the Settlement Discount to the OFT no later than 30 days following the date on which the Settlement Agreement is terminated.

#### VII.53
If the Settlement Penalty or (where applicable) the Settlement Discount is not paid by the date on which it becomes due and either an appeal against the imposition or amount of that penalty has not been made within the applicable time period for so doing or such an appeal has been made and determined in the OFT’s favour, the OFT may commence proceedings to recover any amount payable that remains outstanding as a civil debt.

---

Ali Nikpay  
Senior Director, Cartels and Criminal Enforcement Group  
27 March 2013

Office of Fair Trading  
Fleetbank House  
2-6 Salisbury Square  
London  
EC4Y 8JX  
Tel: 020 7211 8000

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352 Details on how to pay are set out in the letter accompanying this Decision.  
353 Section 37 of the Act.
ANNEX A

Copy of the Settlement Agreement entered into between the OFT and Ciceley on 20 February 2013
By email

Ciceley Commercials Limited
Ciceley Limited
c/o Adam Aldred
Addleshaw Goddard
Sovereign House
Sovereign Street
Leeds
LS1 1HQ

Case ref: CE/9161-09
Date: 13 February 2013
Your ref: 

Direct line: 020 7211 8153
Fax: 020 7211 8992
Email: Stephanie.E.Oneil@oft.gsi.gov.uk

Dear Mr Aldred

Competition Act 1998 – Investigation into the distribution of Mercedes-Benz commercial vehicles

As you are aware, the Office of Fair Trading (‘OFT’) proposes to adopt one or more decisions (a ‘Decision’; together, the ‘Decisions’) that Ciceley Commercials Limited and Ciceley Limited (collectively referred to as ‘Ciceley’) infringed the prohibition in section 2(1) of the Competition Act 1998 (‘the Chapter I prohibition’) through:

- an agreement and/or concerted practice between Northside and Ciceley which had the object of preventing, restricting or distorting competition for the sale of vans between 15 January 2008 and 26 January 2010 (‘Settlement Infringement 2’);[1]

- an agreement and/or concerted practice between Ciceley and Road Range which had the object of preventing, restricting or distorting competition for the sale of vans between 1 February 2008 and 26 January 2010 (‘Settlement Infringement 3’);[2] and

- an agreement and/or concerted practice between Ciceley, Enza, Mercedes and Road Range which had the object of preventing, restricting or distorting competition for the sale of trucks between 8 December 2009 and 26 January

2010 ('Settlement Infringement 5');

(together, the ‘Settlement Infringements’).

The OFT’s proposed decision is set out in the Statement of Objections – Distribution of Mercedes-Benz Commercial Vehicles - dated 28 June 2012 ('the Statement of Objections').

You have indicated Ciceley’s willingness to admit its involvement in the Settlement Infringements. You have also indicated Ciceley’s willingness to agree to the streamlined procedure and to co-operate with the OFT in expediting the conclusion of its investigation as to whether the Chapter I prohibition has been infringed (the ‘Investigation’). This letter (the ‘Agreement’) sets out the terms upon which the OFT would be prepared to resolve its Investigation. In signing and returning a signed copy of this Agreement to the OFT, Ciceley agrees to the terms of this Agreement. Ciceley enters into this Agreement voluntarily and understands fully the implications of doing so. Ciceley understands and accepts that if another party to the Investigation successfully appeals any infringement decision(s) by the OFT following the Investigation (including as to penalty) the Decision(s) will remain binding against Ciceley. Ciceley also understands and accepts that any Decision(s) may refer to this Agreement, including to Ciceley’s admission as per paragraph 1 below, and may be relied on by third parties in accordance with sections 47A, 47B, 58 and 58A of the Competition Act 1998.

Admission of liability

1. Ciceley admits its liability for the Settlement Infringements, and the facts as set out in sections IV, V, VI.83 to VI.124, VI.125 to VI.188, VI.288 to VI.411 and VII of the Statement of Objections insofar as they are relevant to Ciceley’s involvement in the Settlement infringements, subject to the memorandum referred to in paragraph 3 (if any).

Streamlined procedure

2. The OFT hereby gives written notice to Ciceley of a typographical error in paragraph VII.29 of the Statement of Objections in that the duration multiplier for Settlement Infringement 3 should have been two (as opposed to one and a half). Ciceley understands and accepts that the penalty for its involvement in Settlement Infringement 3 has been calculated on the basis of the correct multiplier at Step 2, namely two.

3. With the exception of a concise memorandum (if any) indicating any material factual inaccuracies, which shall be provided to the OFT at the latest at the same time as Ciceley signed a copy of this Agreement, Ciceley agrees not to provide any written

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3 See paragraphs VI.288 to VI.411 of the Statement of Objections.
representations on the Statement of Objections. Ciceley agrees to limit any written representations on any Supplementary Statement of Objections that the OFT may issue in respect of the Settlement Infringements to a concise memorandum indicating any material factual inaccuracies.

4. Ciceley agrees not to request an oral hearing in respect of the Statement of Objections, or of any Supplementary Statement of Objections.

5. Ciceley has already been provided with access to documents on the OFT’s file at the time when the Statement of Objections was issued. Ciceley will not seek any further access to documents on the OFT’s file except for any documents which are directly relied on and referred to in any Supplementary Statement of Objections and which have not already been provided to Ciceley.

6. Ciceley has been provided with a memorandum (attached as Annex I) setting out the calculation of the penalty for the Settlement Infringements. Ciceley accepts that in respect of the Settlement Infringements it will not also receive a Draft Penalty Statement provided for in the OFT’s Procedures Guidance. Without prejudice to the above, should the OFT decide in the exercise of its discretion to issue a Draft Penalty Statement, Ciceley agrees to limit any representations to a concise memorandum indicating any material factual inaccuracies.

7. Ciceley shall adhere to the deadlines set by the OFT for the performance of the obligations set out in this Agreement.

Cooperation

8. Ciceley agrees to cooperate fully, as set out below, throughout the remainder of the OFT’s Investigation in relation to the Settlement Infringements, and until the conclusion of any action involving the OFT arising as a result of the Investigation in relation to the Settlement Infringements (this includes any actions or proceedings involving the OFT, whether before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (‘CAT’) or any other court or tribunal as a result of or otherwise arising from a Decision or from any other action or decision by the OFT as a result of or otherwise arising from the Investigation):

   a. if requested by the OFT, Ciceley will provide the OFT with any information or documents in its possession or under its control which are directly or indirectly relevant to any of the Settlement Infringements;

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4 OFT Guidance 1263rev, A guide to the OFT’s investigation procedures in competition cases (October 2012).
b. if requested by the OFT, Ciceley will use its best endeavours to secure the complete and truthful cooperation of any of its current or former directors, officers, employees or agents identified by the OFT. Cooperation that the OFT may request from these individuals may include but is not limited to:

i. attending such interviews as the OFT may require at such times and places as may be designated by the OFT;

ii. providing a complete and truthful account of all matters within their knowledge which are directly or indirectly relevant to any of the Settlement Infringements, responding completely and truthfully to all questions the OFT may ask and providing the OFT with a witness statement or statements that accurately reflect their account of those matters;

iii. making no attempt either falsely to protect or falsely to implicate any undertaking in any of the Settlement Infringements;

c. if requested by the OFT, in relation to any court or tribunal proceedings arising from a Decision or from any other action or decision made by the OFT as a result of or otherwise arising from the Investigation, Ciceley will use its best endeavours to facilitate, and secure the complete and truthful cooperation, of any of its current or former directors, officers, employees or agents, even if Ciceley is not a party to those proceedings, in:

i. assisting the OFT or its counsel in the OFT’s preparation for the proceedings;

ii. if requested by the OFT or its counsel, attending the proceedings; and

iii. speaking to their witness statements and being cross-examined on such witness statements in the proceedings.

9. Ciceley agrees not to act in a way inconsistent with its admission in paragraph 1, including through making any form of public statement that is inconsistent with that admission.

OFT infringement decision and reduction in penalty

10. Any Decision or Decisions adopted by the OFT will:
a. set out the OFT's findings in substantially the terms of sections IV, V, VI.83 to VI.124, VI.125 to VI.188, VI.288 to VI.411 and VII of the Statement of Objections, subject to any amendments deemed necessary and appropriate by the OFT including as a result of (i) any representations on material factual inaccuracies in the Statement of Objections from any of the recipients of the Statement of Objections, and/or (ii) any other information, as reflected in any Supplementary Statement of Objections that the OFT may issue in respect of any of the Settlement Infringements;

b. note Ciceley's admission of the Settlement Infringements and conclude that Ciceley has committed the Settlement Infringements;

c. impose in combination penalties on Ciceley totalling no more than £776,088 (the 'Total Penalty'). Liability for 85 per cent of the Total Penalty (the 'Settlement Penalty') will arise on the date specified in the Decision(s). In recognition of Ciceley's ongoing adherence to the terms of this Agreement, liability for the remaining 15 per cent (the 'Settlement Discount'), will only arise in the event that this Agreement is terminated in accordance with paragraphs 13 and/or 14; and

d. set out the OFT's approach to calculating the penalty under its 2004 Penalty Guidance\(^6\) (in accordance with the transitional provisions set out in OFT's 2012 Penalty Guidance).\(^6\)

11. The OFT may without notice make adjustments that have the effect of reducing Ciceley's final penalty.

Time to pay

12. Provided that Ciceley continues to comply with the terms of this Agreement, the OFT will offer Ciceley the option of paying the Settlement Penalty in instalments (with interest) over a period of three years, in accordance with the offer memorandum in Annex II.

Termination

13. This Agreement will be automatically terminated should Ciceley appeal or bring any legal challenge in relation to any Decision or any other action or decision by the OFT as a

\(^6\) OFT Guidance 423, OFT's Guidance as to the Appropriate Amount of a Penalty (December 2004).
\(^8\) See OFT Guidance 423, OFT's Guidance as to the Appropriate Amount of a Penalty (September 2012), paragraph 1.11.
result of or otherwise arising from the Investigation to any court, including but not limited to the CAT.

14. The OFT may terminate this Agreement if, at any time before the conclusion of the case, including any proceedings before the CAT or any other court, it determines that any of the conditions in paragraphs 1 to 9 above has not been complied with.

15. Before terminating this Agreement in accordance with paragraph 14 the OFT shall serve written notice to Ciceley of the nature of the non-compliance and that the OFT is considering terminating the Agreement. Ciceley will be given an opportunity to respond to the notice and, where this is possible and appropriate, to remedy any breach within what the OFT considers to be a reasonable period of time from the service of the notice. If Ciceley fails to remedy the breach within that time, the OFT may terminate the Agreement.

Consequences of termination

16. Where this Agreement is terminated, all the terms of this Agreement, including the agreed Total Penalty, the Settlement Penalty and the Settlement Discount, but excluding paragraphs 16 to 19, will cease to have effect.

17. Where this Agreement is terminated before a Decision is adopted, the OFT will pursue its Investigation in accordance with its normal procedures.

18. If, following the adoption of a Decision, Ciceley brings appeal proceedings before the CAT against any Decision (including as to penalty) or any other action or decision by the OFT as a result of or otherwise arising from the Investigation, the OFT reserves the right to make an application to the CAT:

a. to increase the penalty imposed on Ciceley in relation to any or all of the Settlement Infringements; and

b. to require Ciceley to pay the OFT’s full costs of the appeal regardless of the outcome of that appeal.

Information and other investigations

19. All information, documents and other evidence provided by Ciceley to the OFT under this Agreement shall remain the property of the OFT and may be used by the OFT for the purpose of the performance of its functions by or under any enactment. This includes any witness statements or replies to questions provided by any of the Ciceley’s
current or former directors, officers, employees or agents. In particular, where this Agreement is terminated according to paragraphs 13 and/or 14, the OFT will still be able to rely on the admission made by Ciceley in this Agreement and all information, documents and other evidence provided by Ciceley to the OFT under the Agreement.

Entire agreement

20. This Agreement constitutes the entire settlement agreement between Ciceley and the OFT. It supersedes and extinguishes all previous drafts, agreements, arrangements and understandings between Ciceley and the OFT, whether written or oral, relating to its subject matter.

21. Ciceley accepts that in entering into this Agreement it has not placed reliance on any statements by the OFT or any of its officers save as reflected in the terms of this Agreement.

Other matters

22. Nothing in this Agreement affects any OFT action that is beyond the scope of this Investigation, including any of the OFT's separate ongoing or future investigations into possible infringements of the Competition Act 1998 and/or Articles 101 and/or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or any investigations or other OFT action taken under the Enterprise Act 2002 or any other enactment.

23. Ciceley agrees to the OFT making an announcement that it has entered into this Agreement with Ciceley at any time after the Agreement becomes effective in accordance with paragraph 24. Ciceley also agrees to the publication of this Agreement by the OFT. This Agreement is however confidential until any such announcement and/or publication by the OFT and should not be disclosed by Ciceley without the express written consent of the OFT.

24. This Agreement will be executed in counterparts and shall only become effective when both Ciceley and the OFT have signed their respective counterpart. For the avoidance of doubt, this Agreement will not come into force until it is countersigned for and on behalf of the OFT; in particular, the OFT may decide not to enter into this Agreement in the event that one or more of the parties involved in the Settlement Infringements fails to enter into and return its settlement agreement to OFT within the timetable set by the OFT.

If Ciceley agrees to the terms set out in the Agreement, a duly authorised representative of Ciceley should sign the Agreement as indicated below and return by fax or email the signed copy to the OFT in addition to posting the version bearing the original signature.
Yours faithfully

Stephanie O’Neil
Principal Case Officer
Cartels and Criminal Enforcement Group

SIGNED FOR AND ON BEHALF OF CICELEY COMMERCIALS LIMITED

Name: 
Position: 
Date: 13 Feb 2013

SIGNED FOR AND ON BEHALF OF CICELEY LIMITED

Name: 
Position: 
Date: 13 Feb 2013

COUNTERSIGNED FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING

Name: Ali Nikpay
Position: Senior Director – Cartels and Criminal Enforcement
Date: 20 Nov 2013
Annex I – Penalty calculation

Introduction and background

1. The Office of Fair Trading (‘OFT’) proposes to adopt one or more decisions that a number of parties infringed the prohibition in section 2(1) of the Competition Act 1998 in relation to the distribution of Mercedes-Benz commercial vehicles. The OFT’s proposed decision is set out in the Statement of Objections dated 28 June 2012 (the ‘Statement of Objections’).¹

2. The undertakings listed below (the ‘Settling Parties’²) have indicated their wish to settle the case with the OFT:³

   • Ciceley Commercials Limited and its ultimate parent Ciceley Limited (together, ‘Ciceley’);

   • Enza Motors Limited, its parent Enza Holdings Limited and its ultimate parent Enza Group Limited (together, ‘Enza’);

   • Mercedes-Benz UK Limited, its parent Daimler UK Limited and its ultimate parent Daimler AG (together, ‘Mercedes’); and

   • Road Range Limited (‘Road Range’).

3. The proposed settlements encompass the following alleged infringements (the ‘Settlement Infringements’):⁴

   • An agreement and/or concerted practice between Northside and Ciceley which had the object of preventing, restricting or distorting competition for the sale of vans between 15 January 2008 and 26 January 2010 (‘Settlement

¹ For the avoidance of doubt, no final decision to issue such an infringement decision or decisions has been taken by the OFT.
² Note that the Settling Parties do not include Northside Truck & Van Limited and its ultimate parent S.A.H. Limited (together, ‘Northside’) or H & L Garages Limited and its parent Dusted Powder Limited (together, ‘H & L’). Northside is the immunity applicant and H & L Garages Limited is in liquidation.
³ Pending the conclusion of formal written agreements (the ‘Settlement Agreements’) between each of the Settling Parties and the OFT, these indications, together with the settlement discussions, are not binding on the OFT nor on any of the Settling Parties and have been made on a confidential and without prejudice basis. The terms in which the case is settled will be set out in the Settlement Agreements between the OFT and each of the Settling Parties to which this document is an Annex.
⁴ Note that the other Alleged Infringements detailed in the Statement of Objections ( Alleged Infringements 1 and 4) are being pursued under the normal procedure. Settlement discussions with Mercedes refer to Alleged Infringement 5 only.
Infringement 2');\(^5\)

- An agreement and/or concerted practice between Ciceley and Road Range which had the object of preventing, restricting or distorting competition for the sale of vans between 1 February 2008 and 26 January 2010 ('Settlement Infringement 3');\(^6\) and

- An agreement and/or concerted practice between Ciceley, Enza, Mercedes and Road Range which had the object of preventing, restricting or distorting competition for the sale of trucks between 8 December 2009 and 26 January 2010 ('Settlement Infringement 5').\(^7\)

4. This document sets out the key elements in the OFT’s calculation of the penalties which have been agreed in principle with the Settling Parties and which have been prepared having regard to the OFT’s published guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty in force at the time when the Statement of Objections was issued.\(^8\) These include the starting point percentage, the duration multipliers, adjustments for deterrence and proportionality, and adjustments for aggravating and mitigating factors.

5. Pending the conclusion of the Settlement Agreements, the OFT is not bound by this document nor does it represent a final decision of the OFT – it is wholly without prejudice to the contents of any final decision or decisions that the OFT may adopt should a Settlement Agreement not be concluded with any or all of the Settling Parties.

6. This document is provided to the Settling Parties in confidence and in connection with the current settlement proceedings only. The contents of this document should not therefore be made publicly available or be disclosed to any person without the prior written consent of the OFT, save that they may be disclosed to the Settling Parties’ respective professional advisers for use only in connection with the settlement proceedings to which this document relates. Disclosure of any of the contents of this document to any other person or for any other purpose may constitute a criminal offence under Part 9 of the Enterprise Act 2002.

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\(^5\) See paragraphs VI.83 to VI.124 of the Statement of Objections. Note that, in relation to Settlement Infringement 2, the settlement discussions involved Ciceley only. Northside benefits from an immunity agreement (see paragraph 1.8 of the Statement of Objections).

\(^6\) See paragraphs VI.125 to VI.188 of the Statement of Objections.

\(^7\) See paragraphs VI.288 to VI.411 of the Statement of Objections.

\(^8\) OFT 423, *OFT’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty* (December 2004).
Part 1 - Common aspects of the penalties calculations

Step 1 – starting point

7. Consistent with the approach in the Statement of Objections, the OFT has used a starting point of six per cent (at the ‘middle to upper end of the scale’) for the behaviour engaged in by the Settling Parties in all of the Settlement Infringe-ments.

8. This reflects the fact that the Settlement Infringe-ments are restrictions of intra-brand competition and that Mercedes-Benz commercial vehicle dealers are to a certain extent constrained by dealers of other marques.

9. However, the starting point also reflects the fact that the Settlement Infringe-ments are infringements of the Chapter I prohibition ‘by object’ and can be regarded, by their very nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition and are, therefore, serious infringements of competition law.

Step 2 - duration

10. The OFT has ap-plied the Step 2 adjustments for duration as set out in the Statement of Objections.⁹ For the Settlement Infringe-ments, they are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement Infringement</th>
<th>Adjustment at Step 2 for duration</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>x2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>x1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Step 3 – adjustment for other factors

11. When considering whether an adjustment to the penalty at Step 3 is required and, if so, the amount of any such adjustment, account was taken of the factors set out in paragraphs VII.30 to VII.36 of the Statement of Objections.

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⁹ Note however that, as has already been notified to Ciceley and Road Range, there is a typographical error in paragraph VII.29 of the Statement of Objections in that the duration multiplier for Settlement Infringement 3 should have been two (as opposed to one and a half).
12. In particular, a cross-check was carried out by reference to relevant indicators of the company’s size and financial position when considering whether the proposed level of the penalty was necessary and proportionate.\textsuperscript{10}

13. This cross-check was carried out for each Settling Party by considering the same set of financial indicators in the round. The OFT has not applied specific thresholds in relation to the indicators or taken any one indicator in isolation as determinative in setting the appropriate penalty; different indicators may point in different directions and some indicators may be more or less meaningful for a particular party. Instead, the OFT has applied a common set of principles consistently to ensure that each penalty arrived at was proportionate and achieved the objectives of the OFT’s policy on financial penalties.\textsuperscript{11}

14. The proposed penalty was adjusted at Step 3 where this cross-check assessment indicated that the penalty at the end of Step 2 was either disproportionate or not sufficiently deterrent. In making the Step 3 adjustments, account was also taken of evidence that the profits earned by Ciceley, Road Range and Enza represent a relatively small proportion of their turnover.

Step 4 – adjustment for aggravating and mitigating factors

15. Paragraph VII.38 of the Statement of Objections stated the OFT’s intention to increase the penalty at Step 4 for the involvement of certain members of staff. However, following discussions with the dealers about the structure of their companies, we reassessed our definition of senior management in the particular circumstances of this case and, save where the individual in question was also a director of the relevant Settling Party, the proposed penalties for the Settlement Infringements do not include an uplift at Step 4 for the involvement of van and truck sales managers.

16. The proposed penalties include a ten per cent uplift where a director was directly involved in a Settlement Infringement, and a five per cent uplift where the director’s involvement was more limited.

\textsuperscript{10} When assessing the Settling Parties’ financial position, the OFT considered in particular their (i) three-year (2009, 2010 and 2011) average total turnover, average gross profits and average profits after tax, (ii) net assets in 2011 and (iii) net assets in 2011 plus two years of dividends (2010 and 2011). All the financial indicators figures were obtained from the Settling Parties’ publicly available financial statements, except for Ciceley’s and Road Range’s 2011 accounts which were only available in draft form at the time the settlement discussions were undertaken. See also paragraph VII.35 of the Statement of Objections.

\textsuperscript{11} See Kier Group plc and others v OFT [2011] CAT 3, paragraph 177.
17. The OFT considers that cooperation which enables the enforcement process to be concluded more effectively and speedily is a mitigating factor.\textsuperscript{12} In the case of two of the Settling Parties which provided voluntary cooperation above and beyond their legal obligations, the proposed penalties include a discount at Step 4 for procedural cooperation. This is in addition to the settlement discount.

Step 5 – adjustment for statutory cap

18. None of the penalties exceed the statutory cap of ten per cent of the total worldwide turnover of the undertakings, and therefore no adjustments were necessary at Step 5.

Settlement discount

19. The proposed penalties for the Settling Parties include a settlement discount of 15 per cent, applied to the final penalties. The terms on which the OFT is prepared to offer the settlement discount are set out in the Settlement Agreements.

\textsuperscript{12} OFT 423, \textit{OFT's guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty} (December 2004), paragraph 2.16.
Part 2 - Undertaking-specific calculations and considerations

Cicley

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Settlement Infringement 2</th>
<th>Settlement Infringement 3</th>
<th>Settlement Infringement 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 1</td>
<td>- starting point</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2</td>
<td>- duration multiplier</td>
<td>x2.25</td>
<td>x2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3</td>
<td>- proportionality/deterrence</td>
<td>-50%</td>
<td>-75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- overall proportionality</td>
<td></td>
<td>-40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 4</td>
<td>- aggravating factors</td>
<td>+5%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- mitigating factors</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 5</td>
<td>- statutory maximum</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement discount</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total settlement penalty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>£659,675</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Step 3 - adjustment for other factors

20. The OFT has considered the necessity and proportionality of the proposed penalties in all the circumstances of this case. In doing so, the OFT has had regard to a range of factors relating to Cicley’s financial position. The OFT has also had regard to the fact that Cicley was involved in three Settlement Infringements.

21. For each of the three Settlement Infringements in which Cicley is involved (Settlement Infringements 2, 3 and 5), the penalty at the end of Step 2 constituted multiples of Cicley’s average profits after tax\(^{13}\) and a relatively high proportion of other indicators of Cicley’s financial position, such as average gross profits and average total turnover.\(^{14}\)

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\(^{13}\) For Settlement Infringement 3, the penalty at the end of Step 2 amounted to around 420 per cent of Cicley’s average profits after tax. For Settlement Infringements 2 and 5, each of the penalties at the end of Step 2 amounted to around 200 per cent of Cicley’s average profits after tax.

\(^{14}\) For Settlement Infringement 3, the penalty amounted to around 25 per cent of Cicley’s average gross profits and around three per cent of its average total turnover. For Settlement Infringements 2 and 5, the penalties amounted to just above ten per cent of its average gross profits and just below two per cent of its average total turnover.
The OFT therefore considered that a downwards adjustment was required and applied a reduction of 50 per cent for Settlement Infringements 2 and 5 and 75 per cent for Settlement Infringement 3.

22. In addition, and consistent with the approach taken by the CAT in *Kier,* the OFT took a final step back and considered whether the three penalties, in sum, were necessary and proportionate in order to reflect the seriousness of Ciceley’s participation in the Settlement Infringements and to deter Ciceley and other companies from further breaches of the same kind (the ‘totality principle’). The OFT therefore applied a further reduction of 40 per cent. Without further adjustment, the sum of the three penalties would have amounted to over three years of Ciceley’s average profits after tax and to just under 20 per cent of its average gross profits.

23. Following this further discount, whilst the sum of the three penalties constitutes around 185 per cent of Ciceley’s average profits after tax, it represents between 5 and 10 per cent of Ciceley’s net assets and net assets plus dividends in the last two financial years, and just over one per cent of Ciceley’s average total turnover. In view of this, and considering in particular the need to deter future anti-competitive behaviour and to reflect the seriousness of the Settlement Infringements (including two of longer duration which would have had a bigger actual or potential impact), the OFT is satisfied that, in the round, the resulting penalty is necessary and proportionate to achieve the twin policy objectives in all the circumstances of the case.

**Step 4 – aggravating and mitigating factors**

24. As set out in paragraph 15 above, the proposed penalty does not include an uplift at Step 4 for the involvement of [redacted] in the Settlement Infringements. The OFT has applied a five per cent uplift for the limited involvement of one director in Settlement Infringement 2.\(^{17}\)

25. The OFT does not consider that, so far, it has received cooperation from Ciceley above and beyond its legal obligations which has enabled the process in this case to be concluded more efficiently and speedily, and which would warrant a penalty reduction at Step 4.

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\(^{16}\) *Kier* (fn11), paragraph 180.

\(^{17}\) The OFT notes that Ciceley’s net assets are significantly higher than that of the other two settling dealers, and that it has distributed much higher dividends in the past two years.

\(^{17}\) See Statement of Objections, paragraphs VI.87 and VI.133.
### Road Range

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Settlement Infringement 3</th>
<th>Settlement Infringement 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 1 - starting point</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2 - duration multiplier</td>
<td>x2</td>
<td>x1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3 - proportionality/deterrence</td>
<td>-75%</td>
<td>-50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- overall proportionality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 4 - aggravating factors</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- mitigating factors</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 5 - statutory maximum</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement discount</td>
<td></td>
<td>-15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total settlement penalty</td>
<td></td>
<td>£115,774</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Step 3 - adjustment for other factors

26. The OFT has considered the necessity and proportionality of the proposed penalty in all the circumstances of this case. In doing so, the OFT has had regard to a range of factors relating to Road Range’s financial position, including the fact that Road Range is, by far, the smallest of the Settling Parties in terms of net assets, turnover and profits after tax.\(^\text{18}\)

27. At the end of Step 2, Road Range’s penalty for Settlement Infringements 3 and 5 constituted nearly 300 per cent and nearly 120 per cent of its average profits after tax, respectively. They also represented a relatively high proportion of the other indicators of Road Range’s financial position such as net assets and net assets plus dividends.\(^\text{19}\) The OFT applied a downwards adjustment of 75 per cent for Settlement Infringement 3 and 50 per cent for Settlement Infringement 5.

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\(^{18}\) *Kier* (fn11), paragraph 177.

\(^{19}\) For Settlement Infringement 3 the penalty at the end of Step 2 amounted to around 35 per cent of its net assets and net assets plus dividends and, for Settlement Infringement 5, it amounted to around 15 per cent of its net assets and net assets plus dividends.
28. In addition, and consistent with the approach taken by the CAT in *Kier*, the OFT took a final step back and considered whether the two penalties, in sum, were necessary and proportionate in order to reflect the seriousness of Road Range’s participation in the Settlement Infringements and to deter Road Range and other companies from further breaches of the same kind (the ‘totality principle’). The OFT therefore applied a further reduction of 25 per cent. Without further adjustment, the sum of the two penalties would have amounted to one year and a third of Road Range’s average profits after tax, and around 15 per cent of its net assets and net assets plus dividends in the last two financial years.

29. Following this further discount, the sum of the two penalties represents just over one year of Road Range’s average profits after tax, as well as more than ten per cent of its net assets and net assets plus dividends in the last two years. In view of this, and considering in particular the need to deter future anti-competitive behaviour and to reflect the seriousness of the two Settlement Infringements (including one of longer duration which would have had a bigger actual or potential impact), the OFT is satisfied that, in the round, the resulting penalty is necessary and proportionate to achieve the twin policy objectives in all the circumstances of the case.

**Step 4 – aggravating and mitigating factors**

30. As set out in paragraph 15 above, the proposed penalty does not include an uplift at Step 4 for the involvement of the Settlement Infringements 3 and 5.

31. The OFT does not consider that, so far, it has received cooperation from Road Range above and beyond its legal obligations which has enabled the process in this case to be concluded more efficiently and speedily, and which would warrant a penalty reduction at Step 4.

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*20 Kier (fn11), paragraph 180.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Settlement Infringement 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>starting point</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>duration multiplier</td>
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</tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>proportionality/deterrence</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>statutory maximum</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Settlement discount</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Settlement penalty</td>
<td>£347,198</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Step 3 - adjustment for other factors**

32. The OFT has considered the necessity and proportionality of the proposed penalty in all the circumstances of this case. In doing so, the OFT has had regard to a range of factors relating to Enza's financial position.

33. The OFT considered whether a Step 3 adjustment was necessary. However, the OFT concluded that no adjustment was necessary having considered Enza's financial position in the round. Whilst the penalty at the end of Step 2 amounts to around 60 per cent of Enza's average profits after tax in the last three financial years, the penalty represents over 15 per cent of Enza's net assets and just under 15 per cent of its net assets plus dividends in the last two years. It is also almost ten per cent of its average gross profits.

34. The OFT is satisfied that the resulting penalty is necessary and proportionate to achieve the twin policy objectives in all the circumstances of the case and the proposed penalty does not therefore include an adjustment at Step 3.

**Step 4 - aggravating and mitigating factors**
35. The proposed penalty includes an uplift at Step 4 for senior management involvement. The OFT considers that an uplift of ten per cent is appropriate given [redacted] was directly involved in the meeting of 8 December 2009.21

36. The proposed penalty also includes a reduction of five per cent at Step 4 for procedural co-operation as a mitigating factor to reflect the fact that Enza provided voluntary cooperation above and beyond its legal obligations. Specifically, Enza made key staff available for interview and provided witness statements, which enabled the enforcement process to be concluded more effectively.22

21 See Statement of Objections, paragraph VI.326.
22 See, however, the OFT’s conclusions at paragraphs VI.378 to VI.381 of the Statement of Objections in relation to some of that evidence.
### Mercedes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Settlement Infringement 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 1</td>
<td>- starting point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2</td>
<td>- duration multiplier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3</td>
<td>- proportionality/deterrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 4</td>
<td>- aggravating factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- mitigating factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 5</td>
<td>- statutory maximum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement discount</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement penalty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Step 3 - adjustment for other factors

37. The OFT has considered the necessity and proportionality of the proposed penalty in all the circumstances of this case and considered that Mercedes’ penalty at the end of Step 2 was insufficient to achieve deterrence in view of the company’s size and financial position. The proposed penalty was therefore doubled at Step 3.

38. The OFT considered whether a bigger uplift was required for deterrence. However, although Mercedes is a multinational company, the Settlement Infringement was committed at a local level. At just over ten per cent the adjusted penalty represents a material proportion of Mercedes’ turnover in the relevant market, which means that it will have a material impact on the division responsible for the products and dealers involved in Settlement Infringement 5. The OFT considers that the proposed penalty is necessary and proportionate to achieve the twin policy objectives in all the circumstances of the case.

#### Step 4 - aggravating and mitigating factors

39. The proposed penalty includes a reduction of five per cent at Step 4 for procedural cooperation as a mitigating factor to reflect the fact that Mercedes provided voluntary

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23 These calculations refer to Mercedes’ involvement in Settlement Infringement 5 only. Alleged Infringement 1 is outside the scope of the settlement discussions.
cooperation above and beyond its legal obligations. Specifically, Mercedes made key staff available for interview, which enabled the enforcement process to be concluded more effectively.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{24} See, however, paragraph III.10 of the Statement of Objections in relation to Mercedes' rejection of the OFT's request for the interview transcripts to be signed with a declaration of truth.
Annex II – Payment terms

1. Liability for the Settlement Penalty will arise two months after Ciceley is notified of the Decision(s) (the date on which liability for the Settlement Penalty arises is the ‘Specified Date’).

2. However, the OFT will offer Ciceley the option to pay the Settlement Penalty in instalments over a period of three years which shall start from the Specified Date.

3. The instalments should be paid monthly by bank transfer. Should Ciceley accept the terms of this offer, the OFT will provide Ciceley with the details of the relevant bank account and a schedule of payments in due course.

4. The yearly interest rate applicable will be the Bank of England base rate as at the Specified Date plus 2.5 per cent. For the avoidance of doubt, interest is calculated on a simple basis (not compound) and payments received will be allocated between the penalty charge and interest charged on a straight-line basis.

5. Where two or more legal entities together form or formed a single undertaking and accordingly are being held jointly and severally liable for the penalty, the OFT may receive payment of the instalments from two different sources. However, each of the legal entities in question will continue to be jointly and severally liable for the totality of each instalment payment and the entire outstanding sum, unless otherwise specified by the OFT.

6. If any of the payments are not received on time, or any of the payments are not honoured, the entire outstanding debt will become due and payable immediately, and the OFT may commence legal proceedings immediately under section 37 of the Competition Act 1998 for the recovery of the entire financial penalty that remains outstanding, plus interest, without further notice.

7. Should Ciceley decide to settle the outstanding debt early, the OFT will recalculate the interest charge on the basis of the revised end date.

This offer is time-limited. Should Ciceley decide to accept this offer, it should notify the OFT in writing within three weeks from the date in which Ciceley is notified of the Decision(s). It will not be possible to accept this offer after that date. Acceptance of the offer must be made in writing, marked for the attention of the Finance Director, Office of Fair Trading, 2-6 Salisbury Square, London, EC4Y 8JX and received by the above deadline.

1 Unless otherwise defined herein, all capitalised terms shall have the same meaning as ascribed to them in the Agreement to which this document is attached as Annex II.