1. I have been asked to provide this statement for the purpose of assisting the Leveson Inquiry. In preparing this statement I have sought to answer all the questions asked of me in the Notice served pursuant to s.21 (2) of the Inquiries Act 2005.

2. I retired from the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) on 1st February 2005 and therefore am no longer familiar with the processes and procedures of the MPS. Where the questions are outside my personal knowledge I have relied upon the MPS to provide the information. I have started each section of this statement by listing the questions to which I am responding.

**Personal History**

(1) Who you are and a brief summary of your career history.

3. My full name and title is John Arthur Stevens, the Right Honourable the Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, QPM, DL. I was a serving police
officer for 43 years.

4. I joined the MPS in October 1962. I remained at the MPS for the next 23 years, leaving with the rank of Detective Chief Superintendent. I was awarded a scholarship to study law at Leicester University from 1979-1982. I then completed a two-year spell of teaching at the Police Staff College in Bramshill from 1982-1984, mainly lecturing in leadership and legal subjects. This was followed by a six month period as visiting professor at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University, New York.

5. During my first period in the MPS I was commended on 27 occasions by the Commissioner or by judges for outstanding detective ability and/or courage.

6. In 1986 I transferred to the Hampshire Constabulary, where I was appointed Assistant Chief Constable, in charge of personnel and training. In 1989 I was appointed Deputy Chief Constable of Cambridgeshire Police, where I remained until 1991.

7. During that time I was appointed to head a police inquiry in Northern Ireland. I was tasked with investigating collusion between loyalist paramilitaries, the British security forces in Northern Ireland and the Royal Ulster Constabulary. These investigations lasted for over 20 years and involved three major reports (known as Stevens 1, 2 and 3). It was the longest running criminal investigation in UK history. It resulted in 98 convictions and numerous recommendations. It was
commended by those who commissioned it and by the Irish government. I still have some involvement in it today.

8. In September 1991 I became the Chief Constable of Northumbria Police, a post I occupied for 5 years. During my period in Northumbria, I was asked by Albert Pacey, the Director General of the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), to head up an investigation into allegations of corruption and leaks of intercept material. I agreed and, after an inquiry lasting 9 months, I produced a report which called for much tighter procedures in the handling, analysis and dissemination of sensitive intelligence. All the recommendations were accepted by Government and the Intelligence Community.

9. In 1996 I became one of Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Constabulary (HMIC), with responsibility for inspecting the MPS, West Midlands Police, the NCIS and the National Crime Squad, amongst other forces. I was also given national responsibility for crime.

10. I was appointed Deputy Commissioner of the MPS in 1998. As Deputy Commissioner my main responsibility was for the administration of the MPS. I also had specific responsibility for the modernisation of the MPS and for overseeing the fight against corruption within the MPS. A major consideration at that time was the Public Inquiry into the tragic death of Stephen Lawrence and the publication in 1999 of the Macpherson Report (which labelled the MPS both institutionally racist and incompetent). This placed enormous pressure on the MPS as an organisation and on the then Commissioner, Sir Paul Condon (now...
Lord Condon). I remember when the report came out Sir Paul Condon said “I am staying, we’re changing”. I was tasked with ensuring that the Macpherson recommendations were carried out.

11. Bearing in mind the serious criticisms made in the Macpherson Report, the MPS at that time was under severe strain. Morale was very low. In addition, the MPS had 25,470 officers at that time and we were losing 300 a month to outside forces and people leaving. There is no doubt that the MPS was an organisation in severe crisis.

12. We took on the task of trying to revive morale in the MPS and to gain the support of Londoners and, given the national responsibilities of the MPS, the country generally.

13. I succeeded Sir Paul Condon as Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis on 1st February 2000. Within 6 months of becoming Commissioner I dealt with the appointment of the new Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) and the first Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone. It was important that we got their support and worked together in delivering an efficient, open and transparent police service for London.

14. It was decided by the Senior Management Team (SMT), after consultation with every part of the MPS and various external agencies, including a number of captains of industry, that a wholesale change in culture was needed. This change in culture would involve staging consultations with a huge range of partners. I also intended to inform
the public about the important work the MPS carried out, to improve their understanding and by doing so increase confidence in what we were doing.

15. It seemed to me clear that the way to do this was by establishing a close working relationship with the media. I intended to use the media to promote understanding of the key principles of the work of the MPS, thereby encouraging the public to support us and by doing so help to reduce crime. Another advantage of this increased media awareness and a positive media image would be that support for policing priorities would be easier to obtain, from both the private and public sector. All this meant that the MPS would stand to receive increased funding and by doing so allow the organisation to build and develop as it needed to.

16. A message had to be given out that the MPS was an organisation that was changing and was worth working for. The strategy involved me giving a personal message to staff and officers about what we were doing and the need for integrity, fairness and openness in how we were delivering policing for London.

17. It was an exhausting programme. It meant that I, along with other MPS senior officers and members of the MPA, spoke at numerous events, including one held at Westminster Hall. I personally gave the presentations to police officers about the future of the MPS and then took questions from the audience. Some of those sessions, especially at the beginning, were lengthy. They were often angry and heated,
but we needed to allow people to put their points of view across. This was a rolling programme to give the message to every member of the MPS.

18. I retired 5 years later on 1st February 2005 with the MPS in a far stronger position as a result of a huge team effort from the many dedicated and hardworking police officers and staff I was fortunate enough to work with during my tenure as Commissioner. The transformation of the MPS can also be accredited to a closer working relationship with the MPA, Mayor and the Government of the day, which was largely supportive of all the initiatives we implemented. The media were also hugely important in this as they enabled me and my colleagues to promote the work of the MPS.

19. At the time of my departure, crime levels were coming down and public satisfaction was at an all-time high. Complaints had also fallen by 50%. The murder detection rate was at 98 - 99%. The problem of recruitment had been rectified with the number of police officers in the MPS increasing to 33,000. Internal enquiries also showed that morale was high amongst the staff.

20. Further evidence of the MPS progress can be found in the findings of the HMIC Baseline report, which is exhibited as LJS/1. The report highlighted that the MPS had a style of policing that was increasingly meeting community expectations and that this boded well for the future. It is also highlighted the expertise of the MPS’ counter terrorism department, describing it as the envy of the policing world with
particular emphasis on its excellent leadership and training.

21. On my retirement from the MPS, and with the agreement of the MPA and the new Commissioner, Sir Ian Blair, I continued with the Inquiry I was leading into the death of Diana, Princess of Wales. I also continued with my enquiries into further allegations of loyalist collusion and the use of informants in Northern Ireland (Stevens 3).

22. I continue to be active in public life in various ways - in the House of Lords, as Deputy Lieutenant for London and Northumbria, and as Chancellor of Northumbria University. I am patron of a number of charities, Chairman of the Strategic Advisory committee of INTERPOL and Chairman and non-executive director of a number of companies, including Monitor Quest (Quest), a strategic intelligence company. I am also Honorary Air Commodore of the RAF and Honorary Colonel of Northumbria Cadets.
My Approach to Media Relations

(2) What were your impressions, over the years, about the culture of relations between the MPS and the media?

(3) Describe the personal contact which you had with the media whilst serving with the MPS. The Inquiry would like an overall picture of the type, frequency, duration and content of your contact with the media.

(4) Describe what you were seeking to gain for the MPS through your personal contacts with the media.

(5) Describe in general terms and using illustrative examples what you consider the media has been seeking from you in your personal dealing with them.

24. Prior to my becoming Commissioner the relationship with the media was based on mistrust. There was a general reluctance to provide information, unless it was absolutely necessary. The organisation was seen as secretive and unwilling to engage with the media. I realised that this policy must change if the MPS was to evolve and improve as an organisation. This approach to working with the media was agreed by the SMT. This overall strategy was also agreed by the Home Secretary Jack Straw and was outlined in a Special Notice 19-00 (which can be found at tab A of the MPS Master Bundle).

25. This new Media Relations Policy was based on the importance of being open and honest in dealing with everybody, including the media. It emphasised the need to build relationships based on mutual trust
and confidence. Police officers of Inspector rank and above were encouraged to speak to the media within their own areas of expertise, without the prior approval of a senior officer.

26. In the first few months of my Commissionership, and as part of the new strategy, I delivered the John Harris Memorial Lecture to the Police Foundation, jointly with Nick Ross, the presenter of 'Crimewatch'. One of the aims behind giving this lecture was to inform the public that the MPS intended to re-think what we delivered to society and how we delivered it.

27. In this lecture I stressed that the MPS (and all police services) needed to move from an essentially reactive philosophy of policing to a more proactive model. We needed to try to prevent crime from happening in the first place, rather than just focussing on catching criminals and clearing up the mess they have left behind. A fundamental part of this change was to build collaborative partnerships with others, and the media were, and still are, an important partner in this. I believed that people had a pessimistic view of crime and policing. This perception was damaging to both the MPS and to the public.

28. The central message I wanted to deliver was that reducing crime was about community partnerships and taking a far more lateral approach to policing. A copy of the John Harris Memorial Lecture dated 11 July 2000 is exhibited as LJS/2.

29. This approach came from my experience in Northumbria. The culture
of media relations which I sought to promote was one of embracing the media rather than fighting them. My media strategy was part of the overarching plan to raise the morale and restore trust in the MPS. I believe that this was achieved. However, I also appreciated, from my time in Northern Ireland, the need to take care in making statements to the media. My lengthy and difficult experience of investigating collusion between paramilitaries and security forces had taught me that any statement could be politically misconstrued or misused. The consequences of such misuse could be potentially life-threatening and I took this threat very seriously. Above all, it taught me to be absolutely disciplined about what you talk about and what information you disclose to the media.

30. As Commissioner I worked hard to foster good relations with the media. This involved being available to speak with editors or journalists. I had lunches with the editors of all the national newspapers. Dick Fedorcio, the Director of Public Affairs, would almost always attend these meetings; an exception would be on occasions when I met Max Hastings, or his successor Veronica Wadley, the editors of the Evening Standard, and I wanted to obtain feedback from them on the performance of the Directorate of Public Affairs (DPA). I considered the Evening Standard to be London’s local paper and I trusted these two editors to give me an honest appraisal of how the DPA were doing.

31. My diary entries for the period I was Commissioner demonstrate both
the frequency and extent of my contact with the media. It was crucial for the MPS to demonstrate to all sections of the print and broadcast media that the organisation was changing, to demonstrate how we were achieving this and also to seek feedback from the public.

32. During my time as Commissioner I met members of the media through regular meetings with the Crime Reporters Association (CRA). I would usually be present to open the meetings and answer any questions on the overall MPS strategy. I would then leave when it dealt with more specific issues, for example specialist crime, terrorism or neighbourhood policing. I also met journalists from the BBC and ITN and all major national newspapers. The purpose of my meeting them was always an MPS purpose, such as promoting some new MPS policy or correcting inaccurate reporting. Whilst the meetings may have included hospitality, the conversation was at all times professional. Further, as explained above, I would not normally attend such meetings on my own; I would look to take with me both members of the SMT and a representative from DPA.

33. I tried to follow a policy of being open and transparent with the media, to give answers to proper questions without going into confidential areas. It was about promoting what the MPS was doing well and having frank conversations about what we were doing badly. If the media had a specific question about what I was doing, one-to-one briefings were held. I believe that the boundaries were understood by the media and they knew what was appropriate to discuss and what
was not. I usually had specific topics to talk about, but the details were left to the Assistant Commissioners and other senior officers, who had the detailed knowledge and responsibility for the specific areas the media was interested in.

34. Ultimately, however, it was my view that the people who sell the MPS best are the people doing the job out on the street. If they had an important message to give the public then they should be encouraged to speak to the media, provided they were qualified to do so.

35. I had a variety of personal contacts with the media when I was Commissioner both in a professional capacity and through the charitable work I undertook. In particular, I helped organise the "Millennium Convoy" to Romania, a convoy designed to create and support hostels to assist terminally ill children. This venture involved the London Probation Service, Essex Police, the Rotary Club and members of the media. The convoy was supported by Ross Kemp, the actor and then husband of Rebekah Wade. I was awarded the Star of Romania by the President of Romania for this work.

**Media Relations within the MPS**

(11) What mechanisms were in place to monitor and record hospitality as between the Commissioner and the media?

(12) What mechanisms were in place to monitor and record meetings with the media generally?

(16) Set out your understanding of the type of contact which MPS personnel have had with the media covering nature, extent, and (in general terms) topics / content.

(17) Were contacts with the media restricted to certain staff or were all staff able to deal with the media?
(18) What did you expect the MPS to gain from such contacts with the media?

(19) What did the media seek from such contacts with your personnel?

(25) What policies and procedures were in place to record contact between: (a) the Commissioner and the media; (b) senior managers and the media; (c) other personnel and the media? For the avoidance of doubt please answer in relation to both formal and informal communications.

(28) What systems, policies and procedures were in place in the MPS to ensure that all members of the force (including civilian employees) know what was and what was not appropriate contact with the media?

(29) Were you satisfied that the policies and procedures described above were sufficient and worked effectively? Did you consider that they were capable of improvement?

(30) What training was in place in the MPS to ensure that all members of the force (including civilian employees) knew what was and what was not appropriate contact with the media?

(47) What limitations, if any, were there on staff from the MPS leaving to work for the media and vice versa?

(48) Were records kept of those who joined the MPS from the media, or went on to work for the media after leaving the MPS? If so, please describe the system in place.

(49) To the best of your knowledge were there any discernible patterns in the movement of personnel from the media into the MPS and vice versa?

36. As Commissioner, records of all my official meetings were recorded in my diary by my PA, staff officer and chief of staff. This would also include meetings with the media.

37. My general view was that the police officers and support staff doing the job on the streets were the best people to talk about what the MPS is doing. I therefore encouraged 'Met-wide communication'. I wanted everybody to get out and tell the story and face the questions. I saw it as the responsibility of leaders at every level of our organisation, including (and perhaps, especially) the Sergeants, PCs and PCSOs, together with their partners in each Borough, to be involved in problem solving and public reassurance at the most local level. However,
police officers below the rank of inspector were required to seek the approval of a senior officer to do so, in order to maintain proper control of the process.

38. As I have already made clear, in many respects I regard the media as a key partner for the police service, and I have been grateful on several occasions for the objective and informed coverage given to cases and concerns involving the MPS. Through contact with police officers, the media gained an insight into the difficulties that they faced and by doing so were able to inform the public.

39. The main aim of contact with the media is to build public confidence in the police. By the time I left, trust in the police was at its highest level since 1995 (and, in fact, I note that recent information published by the Home Office suggests that Londoners are more likely than almost everyone else to rate their police as doing a good job). I also hoped that through media contact people would see a little more of the human face of policing. As the level of trust between police and the media grows, so does the potential for us to work increasingly effectively together on issues such as public information and witness appeals.

40. There were some issues that were always of particular interest to the media: the Macpherson Report and the fallout from the Lawrence Inquiry; what progress the MPS was making against street crime; and (post-9/11) what the nature of the terrorist threat was and what the media could do to help. In general terms the media wanted information
sufficient to write newsworthy articles and were interested in the broader picture of policing.

41. I found that whatever the tone of questions we were asked, what the media wanted fundamentally was to investigate and report on topical policing issues. In my view, working closely with the media was also extremely valuable in understanding the tone, temperament and mood of the public.

42. The new Media Policy set out a new way for the MPS to approach their dealings with the media. Equally, I felt no policy should be left unimproved; policies should be monitored constantly and changed where necessary. The Media Policy from 2000 clearly identified the risks of a closer and more open relationship with the media, but the overarching benefits to the MPS made these acceptable risks even when things went wrong.

43. As demonstrated by the Media Policy, I encouraged staff to take the media on police operations, where appropriate. I believed this would benefit the police, the media and (most importantly) the public. I acknowledged that there were risks involved in doing so, but this ought not prevent us from becoming more open and flexible with the media, despite the challenges this presented. A formal policy was introduced across the MPS setting out the circumstances where this would be appropriate. A copy of the relevant Police Notice 06-2001 can be found at tab A of the MPS Master Bundle.
44. The new Media Policy was applicable at every level of the MPS. It was
the responsibility of heads of branches and departments to implement
the policy and provide guidance to all staff. I also introduced training
on the policy at every level. The policy set out the importance of
intermediate and higher training to emphasise the advantages of
avoiding unnecessary secrecy and achieving mutual trust between the
MPS and the media.

45. There were no specific limitations, to my knowledge, on MPS staff
leaving and working for media organisations once they had retired
from the MPS. I do not know of any records being kept of staff joining
the MPS from the media or moving to media organisations from the
MPS. I do not know of any patterns in such movements during my
time in the MPS.

46. Shortly after retiring from the MPS, I decided to write a number of
articles for the News of the World. This was part of a package which
was negotiated around my autobiography, 'Not for the Faint Hearted',
which was serialised in the Times and the News of the World and
which I discuss below. The financial package was negotiated by the
publishers and Jeremy Lee of Jeremy Lee Associates. I was paid
what I was told was the going rate.

47. I was contracted exclusively to do seven articles a year. The articles
went under the title "the Chief". They were edited by Neil Wallis and
based on major policing issues that arose during 2005-2006, such as
the 7/7 bombings and the shooting of PC Sharon Beshenivsky. It did
not seem like an unusual step to take at the time and I was aware that countless politicians had done exactly the same thing. It gave me the opportunity to promote policing and talk about the difficulties MPS police officers and staff had to deal with. Importantly, now that I had retired, I could be an unfettered voice. I terminated the contract with News of The World in October 2007. I have had no further dealings with Neil Wallis or the paper since then.

48. The idea of writing the book came from discussions with Lord Weidenfeld, the Chairman of Orion Publishing, the publishers. Several previous Commissioners had written books after they retired, including Sir Harold Scott, Sir Robert Mark and Sir David McNee. My book would follow the style of Sir Robert Mark’s autobiography in ‘In the Office of Constable’.

49. The book turned out to be a best-seller with more than 31,000 copies sold. The majority of the proceeds went towards scholarships for police staff to attend university (although unfortunately the money was deposited in Northern Rock, and approximately £70,000 was lost). As with the articles, the book followed on from my openness policy and was an attempt to explain the difficulties, problems and frustrations of policing.

(54) What is your current impression of the culture within the MPS in relation to its dealings with the press?

50. I retired as Commissioner from the MPS on 1st February 2005. Since that period I have only returned to New Scotland Yard (NSY) on one
occasions. It is therefore very difficult, if not impossible, for me to provide an accurate answer to questions about the current culture of the MPS in relation to the media. I am not privy to any more information than an ordinary member of the public.

51. Commenting from a distance, however, it seems to me that MPS personnel have become reluctant to speak to the media. The culture has changed significantly and understandably in light of recent events. Since the phone hacking scandal broke, my perception is that the MPS and other police forces are highly sensitive and feel that any contact or relationship with the press is likely to be adversely construed and lead to criticism.

52. Let me make this very clear, in my view this is extremely damaging for British policing. The media need to know what the police are doing; it is absolutely essential to have transparency and openness. The police need to engage with the community; it is a fundamental part of their job. If there is no engagement then the police risk not being part of the community. This will ultimately result in them being distrusted and isolated.

53. It is in precisely these conditions that public order outbreaks occur as community tensions are heightened and there is public concern over the actions of the police. It is in these circumstances that there needs to be clear and unequivocal communication with the public to reassure them and prevent any inaccurate reporting of events. Whatever the police do they need to use the media to explain what they are trying to
achieve and why they took certain actions.

54. The media will also provide invaluable feedback to the police on the areas where things are not going to plan and there is a public feeling of distrust. If there is going to be any further progress on moving to a more preventative model of policing rather than a reactive model (as explained above) there needs to be an effective partnership with the media based on trust.

Gifts & Hospitality

(6) To what extent did you accept hospitality from the media?

(7) Insofar as you accepted hospitality from the media, what was the nature of the hospitality that you accepted?

(8) To what extent did you provide hospitality for the media on behalf of the MPS?

(9) Insofar as you provided hospitality to the media, what was the nature of the hospitality that you provided?

10) In relation to each of the following reputed instances of contact with the media:

a. Lunch/dinner(s) with Rebekah Brooks;

b. Lunch/dinner(s) with Neil Wallis;

c. Lunch/dinner(s) with Les Hinton;

d. Lunch/dinner(s) with Andy Coulson;

e. Lunch/dinner(s) with Stuart Kuttner;

f. Lunch/dinner(s) with Alan Rusbridger;

g. Lunch/dinner(s) with Paul Dacre;

h. Lunch/dinner(s) with Piers Morgan; and

i. Lunch/dinner(s) with other media executives.

(i) Please confirm whether or not they took place and if so, please give approximate dates and the nature of the hospitality.

(ii) Who provided the hospitality?

(iii) What were you seeking to gain for the MPS from providing/accepting this hospitality?

(iv) What do you think the executives/editors/journalists were seeking to gain from you from providing/accepting this hospitality?

(v) Did you make a formal record of these instances of hospitality?

(20) What hospitality were MPS personnel permitted to accept from the media? Inter alia, were they entitled to accept a meal or a drink from a journalist?

(21) What hospitality were personnel permitted to afford to the media?

(22) What mechanisms were in place to record hospitality as between the media and
MPS personnel?

(23) How (if at all) was hospitality between the MPS (including yourself) and the media controlled and/or regulated?

(24) Were the hospitality rules governing contact between MPS personnel (including yourself) and the media different from those covering contact with other third parties? If so, what were the differences?

(26) Were records of hospitality and other contact with the media audited and/or policed and, if so, how and by whom?

(27) In your opinion did the policies and procedures described above; (a) work effectively; (b) were they sufficient; and (c) were they capable of improvement?

55. I received hospitality from the media on a number of occasions. This took the form of working lunches and dinners. I am informed by the MPS that no individual hospitality records were kept during my time as Commissioner, so instead I have relied upon my official diaries for the detail of any meetings.

56. I recollect meetings over lunch or dinner with the editors of many, if not most newspapers, including News International publications. All newspapers were treated equally in this regard. Usually, but not always, the newspapers would meet the bill for the meal. Occasionally, for instance if the meeting was connected with my charity work, I paid personally.

57. A working lunch or dinner provided a forum for discussion and the opportunity to provide detailed explanations to the media to ensure that the right message was given to the public. Such meetings are a much more informative method of communication than a short or constrained formal interview or statement. In my experience, the media never pushed the ethical boundaries; rather they would push
me on what the MPS was doing or my views on important policing topics. Importantly, on the vast majority of occasions, other than when I was looking for feedback on my staff, I was accompanied by a member of DPA to provide professional advice.

58. I saw my relationship with the media as one founded on business in the sense that the aim was to promote the MPS through the national media. Achieving this required the building of relationships of trust and confidence with a whole range of journalists. These relationships did not prevent there being criticism of the MPS or myself. The media play an important role in holding the police to account. That is so even though their attacks were quite personalised and painful at times. The role of Commissioner is a very difficult one, and you have to believe in what you are doing and promote the important key message of the MPS. I would take any criticism levelled at me on the chin. Frankly, it was preferable to other officers being distracted from their work by any negative media headlines about them. There were occasions when the reporting in the media was wholly inaccurate and I would not hesitate to contact the newspaper directly to correct them. (It was not uncommon for them to apologise to me then and then).

59. There were also occasions when the allegations contained in press reports were so misleading that I was forced to seek a legal remedy. On two separate occasions during the Stevens inquiries in Northern Ireland, a national newspaper published articles which were not only factually incorrect, but could have had potentially devastating effects.
on the Inquiry and to a certain extent the safety of my officers. On both occasion I obtained a satisfactory outcome from the Courts and a retraction of the articles. I also complained to the Press Complaints Commission on two occasions about articles which were factually incorrect. On both these occasions I obtained apologies from the newspaper concerned.

60. Further, I was, and still am, extremely conscious that negative news sells (as I explained in the John Harris Memorial Lecture). It is because of this that the traditional culture of suspicion and mistrust of the media needed to be confronted and why a different culture of openness had to be pursued so vigorously.

61. In addition to lunches and dinners with members of the media, I offered visits to the MPS Crime Museum at NSY to the CRA and other members of the media. During my time as Commissioner all editors from the national newspapers were invited and attended the MPS Crime Museum.

62. As I have explained I held dinners and lunches for a broad spectrum of people whilst I was Commissioner. These included a whole range of senior public figures such as politicians, senior public servants, academics, directors of multinational companies and members of the media. I was determined to draw together as much expertise and experience as I could from all quarters of society. I wanted the MPS to listen and learn from their experiences and create an atmosphere of collaboration. This could only benefit the MPS and demonstrate that
we were an organisation that constantly wanted to improve.

63. As part of this process of improvement through collaborations with various respected senior public figures, I opened up the Leadership Training Programme to officers of Chief Inspector rank or above. This training programme also dealt with integrity and anti-corruption with the aim of providing excellence training to the future leaders of the MPS.

64. My meetings with the media were open and were recorded in my diary (either personal or official). They were all part of the overarching Media Policy introduced in 2000 to inform the public via the media of our business. Some editors, quite rightly, had their own campaigns and agendas e.g. Paul Dacre from the Daily Mail ('the tragic death of Stephen Lawrence') and Rebekah Wade from The Sun ('Sarah's Law'). Both Rebekah Wade and Paul Dacre continually pressed on these issues.

65. I do not think that these professional relationships could have been fostered without some form of hospitality, given the relations between the media and police when I was appointed Commissioner. Equally, I could not always dictate where these meetings were held; that would depend on my other official commitments.

66. Nor was it realistic to expect as Commissioner to be able to have a long meeting in the office and for it to ring-fenced against any interruptions when serious incidents came to light. This was a
fundamental difference between working for the MPS and working in Northumbria. In the MPS, unlike in Northumbria, events or issues which required urgent attention arose every day.

67. My style as Commissioner was, as much as possible, to meet and communicate with as many of the staff within the organisation as I could. This involved going out on the beat at least once a month, visiting murder squads and community policing units. This was to witness what the MPS were doing and to speak with those officers who were the face of the MPS on the streets. For example, at the time of the May Day riots I was out with officers at 5am; I had to be seen to be there and to be supporting them.

68. My view was always that when things went wrong, the Commissioner is paid to take the flak and protect officers (unless they are corrupt). Part of the job was then also to relay what I saw and heard to the media so that the public could be kept informed.

69. MPS officers and staff more generally were entitled to accept hospitality providing it was capable of justification and in the interests of the organisation. This strategy required officers to exercise judgement in accordance with their rank. If there was any doubt as to the validity of the offer, then it should ordinarily be declined. During my Commissionership, a policy was introduced which required Assistant Commissioners and heads of business to ensure that a hospitality register was maintained. Guidance for all MPS staff could be found in the various Gifts and Hospitality Policies that were in existence during
my time as Commissioner (these can be found at tab B of the MPS Master Bundle). These were monitored and audited, as evidenced in 2003 by the new policing order to the MPS emphasising the need for hospitality, gifts etc to be correctly recorded and proper judgement to be exercised.

70. As far as I can recall these policies were effective. However, every policy needs to be kept under constant review and improved regularly. Policies are there not to prevent you from doing things but to protect and provide guidance. The MPS is a large organisation and it is not possible to hold everyone’s hand. You have to rely upon the discretion and good sense of individual officers to act with integrity and honesty. People will overstep the mark but overly prescriptive policies leads to negligent policing and a culture of inertia. Wherever possible policies were therefore written to enable and not to constrain.

Leaks

(31) To what extent were leaks from the MPS to the media a problem during your service with the MPS?

(32) What systems and procedures were in place to identify, respond to and detect the source of leaks?

(33) Whilst you were the Commissioner, how many investigations were conducted into actual or suspected leaks from the MPS and how many led to the successful identification of the source of the leak. What was the outcome of the other investigations?

(34) Was disciplinary action taken against any member of staff (whether civilian or police officer) for leaking information to the media whilst you were the Commissioner? If so, please identify the number of cases and their outcome. There is no need to identify the person or persons the subject of the disciplinary process.

71. I have had considerable experience with the problem of leaks of confidential information to the media from my experiences in Northern...
Jreland and the NCIS Inquiry. On at least one occasion, we had to deal with the issue of leaks immediately prior to making significant arrests. On the plane returning to Belfast we were informed by journalists that they were covering the arrests for the following day. As a result, I was forced to delay the operation by 24 hours. Such leaks in a hostile environment like Northern Ireland could potentially have life threatening consequences and therefore I was always mindful of them. Inadvertent or deliberate leaking could also severely prejudice the investigations. On this occasion it was known that elements in the Security forces were responsible for these leaks.

72. To the best of my recollection, during my time as Commissioner I was not aware of any specific cases of leaks to the media by individual officers. Whilst I was Deputy Commissioner the Macpherson Report was leaked on the eve of the publication to the Sunday Telegraph. That was not only objectionable in itself, it also had the effect of depriving the MPS of the ability to control the timing of its response to the recommendations in the report.

73. Ordinarily, any cases involving leaks to the media would be referred to the Directorate of Professional Standards (DPS), in my time under the command of Deputy Commissioner Blair. The general stance was that officers who leaked information should be dealt with by the existing disciplinary process and where appropriate arrested and prosecuted. In an organisation as large as the MPS there are always some that will leak information and use it for their advantage for financial gain. These
officers and staff should be ruthlessly weeded out.

74. During my time as Commissioner, however, there was no leak that could not be dealt with through the normal chain of command (referral to DPS) and there was no need to instigate any formal enquiries.

75. It is important to distinguish between a leak and a conversation with the press. A leak is any information passed that would impair or would cause prejudice to an investigation or the functioning of the police. It could be any issue at all to do with any policing policy or investigation. A leak can also be classed as providing information which is confidential and puts either MPS personnel directly at risk or jeopardises public safety. I was particularly concerned about the leakage of such confidential information due to my 20 years investigating collusion in Northern Ireland. I believe it is generally a good test to ask ‘would I say this in front of everyone; would it be appropriate?’ If the answer was no then invariably it would not be appropriate to be discussing it with that person.

**Politicians**

(13) Did you ever discuss the media, or media coverage, with politicians? If so, how important is such communication and why?

(14) Did you ever know, or sense, that a politician has put pressure on you to take a particular course of action as a result of lobbying or influence exerted on that politician by the media? If so, please explain (although you need not identify the politician at this stage if you do not wish to do so).

(15) Did the prominence which politicians have given to subjects ever give rise to pressure to alter policing priorities so as to allocate more priority to the subject being given prominence by the politicians? If so, please explain.
76. The only politician I remember discussing media coverage with was the then Home Secretary, David Blunkett. At times, there was considerable tension between us and this was often caused by newspapers' reporting.

77. What most concerned me (aside from the personal integrity issues) was the knock on effect that such negative and destabilising reporting could have on the public's confidence in the MPS and the work my officers were doing on the ground. These instances also demonstrated to me the importance the politicians placed on their own individual contact with the press. However, after these initial problems David Blunkett and I achieved a good working relationship.

78. No politician ever tried to influence me during my time as Commissioner. I found the majority of politicians willing to listen to me and take on board my suggestions but at no time did they seek to persuade me take a particular course of action. I emphasised the importance of police operational independence in all my dealings with politicians. Once the police are politicised that is the end of effective operational policing in my view. However, I generally had very productive and effective relationships with the Home Secretaries I worked with during my time as Commissioner.

79. After the disorder and riots on May Day in 2000, I worked closely with Jack Straw in the course of planning the police response to May Day 2001. He was very conscious of the operational independence of the police. I can recall him saying that 'policing is down to you and yours,'
but if we get it wrong we will both be out of a job'. Despite the warning, he gave me total political support throughout this difficult period. It was a close relationship of trust; we were aware that we were in it together and that the difficulties with public order had to be tackled together. I had the same relationship with Prime Minister Tony Blair, Charles Clarke, Gordon Brown, David Blunkett and other ministers. They did not attempt inappropriately to influence my decision-making.

80. I had a policy of keeping people informed and had monthly meetings with Jack Straw and David Blunkett to raise any relevant issues in advance of any unfavourable media reporting. I considered that it is important for the MPS not to wrong-foot politicians and to maintain a close working relationship.

81. I did have dinners and lunches with government officials on occasions to discuss crime figures and associated policing matters. During my time as Commissioner we invited all the Home Secretaries and their wives, along with the Prime Minister, to the NSY mess to thank them for what they did and explain to them what we were doing.

82. I also had weekly meetings with the Chairman of the MPA. I tried to appear in front of the media with him, and with the Mayor, as much as possible. I had a general ethos of openness with politicians (as with the media). I made a point of seeing the Shadow Home Secretary and other Opposition politicians so as not to exclude any political view. I took questions from the House of Lords committees and all political parties. I also initiated regular meetings with an advisory group of
twelve people. This group involved a mix of business and community leaders, and non-political figures. The purpose was to listen, learn and ensure the MPS could accept criticism and improve where appropriate.

**Financial Transactions Between MPS Personnel and the Media**

(35) What payments (if any) were considered to be legitimate financial transactions between MPS personnel and the media?

(36) What policies and/or guidance were in place in relation to financial transactions between MPS personnel and the media?

83. I made it very clear in the new Media Policy 19-00 that that the MPS would not tolerate any officer who disclosed information to the media for financial gain or favour. If any officer did so they would be dealt with using all the disciplinary and criminal processes available. I also implemented a new policy for reporting wrongdoing within the MPS in 2004 (Special Notice 1/04, a copy of which can be found in tab C of the MPS Master Bundle).

**Bribery by the Media**

(37) To what extent do you believe bribery of personnel by the media was a problem for the MPS (if at all)?

(38) What steps were taken: (a) to educate your personnel about bribery; (b) otherwise to prevent the bribery of your personnel; (c) pro-actively to detect bribery; (d) retrospectively to investigate bribery; and (e) to discipline personnel (if any) who are found to have accepted bribes from the media?

84. When I was Commissioner there were concerns about bribery of personnel by the media. It was a continual battle to fight this form of corruption. Corruption was always a significant issue during my career, regardless of whether I was the Commissioner or fulfilling any
other operational police role.

When I was an HMI I inspected the MPS and reported that there was a real problem with corruption and links to organised crime. I led the fight against corruption of all kinds when I was Deputy Commissioner under Sir Paul Condon. Sir Paul had rightly taken the decision to tackle the issue of corruption head on.

We developed a comprehensive Corruption and Dishonesty Prevention Strategy and policies (which can be found at tab C in the MPS Master Bundle). I believe this strategy did achieve a great deal. There was a change in culture, through making sure there was a process by which corruption could be reported and ensuring that any personnel involved were arrested and prosecuted.

We used the media a great deal in our anti-corruption drive. Corrupt personnel read the newspapers, watched TV and listened to the radio so we relied on the media to get our anti-corruption message across. By publishing our anti-corruption campaign widely we also made it easier and more acceptable for the public to make complaints or inform us of corruption. It also made it publicly unacceptable for police officers to behave in this way. This made a key difference compared with publicising the anti-corruption drive only within the MPS. We had to make police corruption unacceptable not just to police officers but to the wider public.
**Directorate of Public Affairs**

(39) What role did the MPS Directorate of Public Affairs (especially the Press Bureau) fulfil? What, in practice, did it do?

(40) How, in practice, did the media get access to you? Did the Head of Public Affairs act as a gatekeeper?

(41) To what extent did the Press Bureau exist to manage the MPS' corporate image in the media?

(42) Why was it necessary for the MPS to have a Press Office, and what was your view of its utility and role?

(43) What was the media's attitude towards the MPS Press Office? In particular, were they satisfied by the provision of information and the routing of communications through your press office or did they prefer direct contact with individual personnel within the MPS?

88. The DPA and its Press Bureau were crucial to the work of the MPS. Its main role was, as media relations professionals, to advise senior officers on any contact with the media. The DPA maintained a database of media responses to a huge variety of current policing issues. They were also responsible for establishing and maintaining the corporate image of the MPS with the media through their established lines of communication.

89. Fundamentally the DPA provided internal and external communications about MPS policies, high profile cases and relayed comment from senior officers (external communications being the responsibility of the Press Bureau). This was a facilitating role, their job being to get the right information to the right people who wanted it.

90. I tried to encourage the flow of information to the DPA to be expedited given the ever increasing pace of media communications. I wanted the Press Bureau to be informed quickly both where officers had...
spoken to the media about an issue or event and where they had chosen not to. This was to ensure that the MPS was consistent in any future comments to the press or subsequent press release.

91. Joy Bentley, and to a lesser extent Dick Fedorcio, generally acted as my personal media liaison from within the DPA. They were the experts and I relied upon their expertise and advice to govern the relationship I had with the press. They would advise on issues of the day, the likely media approaches, and the best stance for me to take. Every media contact also had to come through my staff officer, which meant accurate records were kept.

92. There were occasions when I saw members of the media without a member of DPA present. There could have been a number of reasons why this was the case and given the passage of time, I cannot now independently recall every occasion. As I explain above, however, I do remember such occasions being very useful in monitoring how DPA staff was seen by their fellow professionals.

93. The main criticism from the media during my time as Commissioner, to the best of my knowledge, was that the Press Bureau was not quick enough on the uptake in responding to some enquiries from the media. Given the level of enquiries that they fielded on a daily basis, this was not surprising.

The Metropolitan Police Authority

(44) What role did the Metropolitan Police Authority play in relation to oversight of the MPS relations and communications with the media? Did you consider that it would be
in the public interest to make any changes to this role? If so, what changes?

(45) What level of contact and oversight was there from the MPA in relation to the MPS' relations and communications with the media?

(46) What level of contact and oversight was there from the MPA in relation to the MPS' policing of offences committed, or suspected as having been committed, by the media?

94. The MPA came into existence 6 months after I became Commissioner, and I aimed to work as closely with them as I could. I had regular meetings more than once a month with Sir John Quinton. He was Chair of the Metropolitan Police Committee, which advised the Home Office, and the Home Secretary's representative on the MPA. Latterly this position was filled by Lord Harris (now Lord Harris of Haringey). I also had regular meetings with Catherine Crawford, the Chief Executive of the MPA, and would attend all the public meetings of the full MPA.

95. To begin with the meetings with the MPA were about every aspect of policing and were held in public with the media present. This was a continual process and I considered the relationship with the MPA to be of primary importance to a successfully functioning MPS. As a consequence, I worked hard to establish good relations with the MPA and its members and we went public with our discussions as much as possible, with cameras present all the time. This was all part of the drive for the MPS to be held accountable.

96. I saw one of my tasks as being to open up the MPS to the police authority as I had done in Northumbria. It was my view that an open
door policy with the authority could only improve the relationship and create a more transparent working relationship, and in turn this would be reported in the media and add to public confidence.

Media Crime

(50) What levels of awareness and experience were there in the MPS of "media crime" and in particular: (a) unlawful interception of communications (including the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000); (b) bribery of officials by the media; (c) blackmail; (d) harassment by paparazzi and journalists; (e) traffic and/or public order offences committed by photographers and journalists pursuing stories; (f) inciting officials to communicate confidential information held by the MPS or conspiring with them to obtain such information; and (g) crime within media organisations other than the foregoing (e.g. dishonest expense claims)?

(51) What sort of priority was given to, and what level of resources are available to deal with, the above?

(52) Was any policy and/or guidelines in place relating to the investigation of such offences?

I would refer to my answers provided above concerning the Anti-Corruption Strategy and Reporting Wrongdoing Policy that was introduced whilst I was Deputy Commissioner and then Commissioner. During this period, the first anti-corruption squad was created to tackle all these issues, but beyond this I do not have any specific details.

The IPCC, the Surveillance Commissioner and the Information Commissioner

(53) Whilst you were the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis did contact with the Police Complaints Authority/IPCC and/or the Surveillance Commissioner and/or the Information Commissioner ever give rise to questions about the leakage of information to the media and/or private detectives? If so, please explain?

The IPCC has statutory responsibility for handling complaints and conduct matters, as defined in the Police Reform Act. The IPCC would make an independent assessment and decide on whether any
conduct amounted to recordable conduct. I personally campaigned for the creation of the IPCC.

99. There have been a number of investigations and enquiries undertaken in respect of leaks, or suspected leaks, from MPS personnel to media/private detectives. These were undertaken by the Deputy Commissioner's Office and the relevant discipline authority and I would have no personal knowledge of them.

The HMIC Report

(55) What is your response to the recommendations contained in the HMIC's recent report "Without Fear or Favour"?

(56) Do you consider that there are further steps which could and/or should be taken to ensure that relationships between the police and the media are and remain appropriate?

(57) From your own experience of HMIC, is the HWiiC sufficiently equipped to provide sufficient oversight of relations between the police and the media? What improvements might realistically be made to the system in this regard?

100. Provided that HMIC is given the right resources, it can and should carry out audits of police relations with the media. In 1996 when I was appointed HM I led inspections into the MPS and seven other police forces I was responsible for. Such inspections are crucial - they are a way of ensuring messages are given both publicly and privately as to whether a police force is fulfilling its roles.

101. From my experience as an HMI, the role was very challenging as you are not attached to any police force and therefore seen as outsider and threat to them. This level of independence and impartiality was crucial to the correct functioning of the role. At the same time, I also had national responsibility for crime which meant I advised the chief
HMI and the Home Secretary.

Northumbria

(68) Describe the personal contact which you had with the media whilst Chief Constable of Northumbria Police. The Inquiry would like an overall picture of the type, frequency, duration and content of your contact with the media during your tenure as Chief Constable of Northumbria Police.

(59) Describe what you were seeking to gain for Northumbria Police through your personal contacts with the media.

(60) Describe in general terms and using illustrative examples what you consider the media has been seeking from you in your personal dealing with them during your time as Chief Constable of Northumbria Police.

(61) To what extent did you accept hospitality from the media whilst Chief Constable of Northumbria Police?

(62) Insofar as you accepted hospitality from the media, what was the nature of the hospitality that you accepted?

(63) What did you consider that the media was seeking to gain from affording you hospitality?

(64) To what extent did you provide hospitality for the media on behalf of Northumbria Police whilst you were the Chief Constable of that force?

(65) Insofar as you provided hospitality to the media, what was the nature of the hospitality that you provided?

(66) What were you seeking to gain by affording hospitality for the media?

(67) What mechanisms were in place to monitor and record hospitality as between the Chief Constable of Northumbria Police and the media?

(68) What mechanisms were in place to monitor and record meetings with the media generally?

(72) Set out your understanding of the type of contact which Northumbria Police personnel had whilst you served with the force with the media covering nature, extent, frequency and (in general terms) topics / content.

(73) Were contacts with the media restricted to certain staff or were all staff able to deal with the media?

(74) What did you expect Northumbria Police to gain from such contacts with the media?

(75) What did the media seek from such contacts with your personnel?

(76) What hospitality were your personnel permitted to accept from the media? Inter alia, were they entitled to accept a meal or a drink from a journalist?

(77) What hospitality were your personnel permitted to afford to the media?
(69) Did you ever discuss the media, or media coverage, with politicians whilst Chief Constable of Northumbria Police? If so, how important is such communication and why?

(70) Whilst you were the Chief Constable of Northumbria Police did you ever know or sense that a politician was putting pressure on you to take a particular course of action as a result of lobbying or influence exerted on that politician by the media? If so, please explain (although you need not identify the politician at this stage if you do not wish to do so).

(71) Did the prominence which politicians gave to subjects ever give rise to pressure to alter policing priorities so as to allocate more priority to the subject being given prominence by the politicians? If so, please explain.

(72) What mechanisms were in place to record hospitality as between the media and your personnel?

(73) How (if at all) was hospitality between Northumbria Police (including yourself) and the media policed?

(74) Were the hospitality rules governing contact between Northumbria Police personnel (including yourself) and the media different from those covering contact with other third parties? If so, what were the differences?

(75) What policies and procedures were in place to record contact between: (a) yourself and the media; (b) senior managers and the media; (c) other personnel and the media? For the avoidance of doubt, the reply to this request should cover both on the record and off the record contacts?

(76) Were records of hospitality and/or contact with the media audited and/or policed and, if so, how and by whom?

(77) In your opinion did the policies and procedures described above: (a) work effectively; (b) were they sufficient; and (c) were they capable of improvement?

(78) What systems, policies and procedures were in place in Northumbria Police to ensure that all members of the force (including civilian employees) knew what was and what was not appropriate contact with the media?

(79) Are you satisfied that the policies and procedures described above were sufficient and working effectively?

(80) What training was in place in Northumbria Police, whilst you were Chief Constable, to ensure that all members of the force (including civilian employees) knew what was and what was not appropriate contact with the media?

(81) To what extent were leaks from Northumbria Police to the media a problem during your tenure as Chief Constable?

(82) What systems and procedures were in place to identify, respond to and detect the source of leaks?

(83) How many investigations were conducted into actual or suspected leaks from Northumbria Police to the media during your tenure as Chief Constable (if you cannot access statistics please state your recollection in subjective terms as best you can) and how many led to the successful identification of the source of the leak. What was the outcome of the other investigations to the best of your recollection?
(90) Was disciplinary action taken against any member of staff (whether civilian or police officer) for leaking information to the media during your tenure as Chief Constable of Northumbria Police? If so, please identify the number of cases and their outcome. There is no need to identify the person or persons the subject of the disciplinary process.

(91) To the best of your recollection what procedures were in place to prevent and/or detect data leaks?

(92) To the best of your recollection what protections (if any) were in place to ensure that databases used by Northumbria Police personnel were not misused?

(93) What payments (if any) were considered to be legitimate financial transactions between Northumbria Police personnel and the media?

(94) To what extent did you believe bribery of personnel by the media to be a current problem for the Northumbria Police (if at all)?

(95) What steps were taken: (a) to educate your personnel about bribery; (b) otherwise to prevent the bribery of your personnel; (c) pro-actively to detect bribery; (d) retrospectively to investigate bribery; and (e) to discipline personnel (if any) who were found to have accepted bribes from the media?

(96) What role did the Northumbria Police Service Press Office fulfill? What, in practice, did it do?

(97) To what extent did the Northumbria Police Press Office exist to manage Northumbria Police's corporate image?

(98) Why was it necessary for Northumbria Police to have a press office and what is your view as to its utility and role?

(99) What was the media's attitude towards the Northumbria Police Press Office? In particular, were they satisfied by the provision of information and the routing of communications through your press office or did they prefer direct contact with individual personnel within Northumbria Police?

(100) What role did Northumbria Police Authority play in relation to oversight of Northumbria Police's relations and communications with the media? Do you consider that it would be in the public interest to make any changes to this role? If so, what changes?

(101) What level of contact and oversight was there from Northumbria Police Authority in relation to Northumbria Police's relations and communications with the media whilst you were the Chief Constable?

(102) What level of contact and oversight was there from Northumbria Police in relation to Northumbria Police's policing of the media whilst you were the Chief Constable?

(103) What limitations, if any, were there on staff from Northumbria Police leaving to work for the media and vice versa?

(104) Were records kept of those who joined Northumbria Police from the media, or who went on to work for the media after leaving Northumbria Police? If so, please describe the systems in place to the best of your recollection?

(105) To the best of your recollection were there any discernible patterns in the movement of personnel from the media into Northumbria Police and vice versa.
(106) What level of awareness and experience were there in Northumbria Police of "media crime" and in particular: (a) unlawful interception of communications (including the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000); (b) bribery of officials by the media; (c) blackmail; (d) harassment by paparazzi and journalists; (e) traffic and/or public order offences committed by photographers and journalists pursuing stories; (f) inducing officials to communicate confidential information held by Northumbria Police / conspiring with them to obtain such information; and (g) crime within media organisations other than the foregoing (e.g. dishonest expense claims)?

(107) What sort of priority was given to, and what level of resources were available to deal with the above?

(108) Was any policy and/or guidelines in place relating to the investigation of such offences?

(109) Whilst you were the Chief Constable of Northumbria Police did contact with the Police Complaints Authority and/or the Surveillance Commissioner and/or the Information Commissioner ever give rise to questions about leakage of information to the media and/or private detectives? If so, please explain.

(110) What was your impression of the culture within Northumbria Police overall in relation to its dealings with the press?

102. I was appointed Chief Constable of Northumbria in 1991 and remained in this post until 1996. Therefore there has been a 15 year period since my time as a serving officer. Any recollections of my time in Northumbria are therefore set against this backdrop. I have also sought assistance from Northumbria Police to obtain documentation to assist me in answering these questions.

103. Unfortunately, it has been confirmed by Northumbria Police’s Information Communication Technologies Department that in the mid 1990s all electronic diaries and email would have been deleted from the computer systems 3 months after a person left the force. Further, the Police Authority and I did keep a "gifts" register, but they no longer have records remaining from the early 1990s. My diaries would have shown every meeting/dinner with outside bodies and members of the media.

104. I am also informed that in respect of the questions regarding the
media, the department head left around the same time as I did and therefore there is no corporate memory from my time as Chief Constable.

105. In light of this lack of contemporaneous documentation, I will provide a brief overview of my time in Northumbria to assist the Inquiry, but can provide nothing further.

106. Prior to beginning my post as Chief Constable of Northumbria, riots broke out on the Meadow Well estate in north Tyneside and in the west end of Newcastle in September 1991. The level of violence was of such ferocity that the police had been forced to pull out of the estate. The media coverage had been extensive given the level of unrest. This had been compounded by the fact that crime levels were at a record level and on the increase, and the force was undermanned and financially stretched. Michael Heseltine MP, the then minister for the environment, visited the area in response to the level of civil unrest and media interest. That resulted in the Government agreeing a grant of almost £4.5 million for crime prevention in the region.

107. Northumbria had significant problems with the highest crime rate in Europe. It was referred to as the ram raiding capital of Europe. There were also individuals nicknamed the 'untouchables' because it was believed that the police could not arrest them. This was soon remedied and I authorised an independent investigation into corruption which reported directly to me. In an effort to tackle the rising level of crime, I reorganised the force, placing the emphasis on front line
policing and transferring resources more generally to local commands.

108. My intention was to change the culture of the force and put more officers on the streets to work with the public, gathering intelligence and tackling serious crime head on. Alongside this I encouraged local businesses to work in partnership with the police and to hold the police to account, as did the Police Authority.

109. My approach with the media during this time was to be as open and transparent as possible. In general terms I had a very good relationship with the media during my time as Chief Constable, although the level of press interest was not comparable to my time at the MPS. The local press in Northumbria simply do not have the resources to cover all the police activity with the frequency and intensity that the national media can do in London. There was less scrutiny of police actions and any issues tended to be local issues. I encouraged every single person in the force to deal with the media as I realised this was a key to the success.

110. Notwithstanding these limited resources, I still looked to promote the police through the local media. I would describe my meetings with the media as regular, but given that I do not have any records I cannot be more specific than this.

111. I did accept hospitality from the media during my time at Northumbria. This consisted of lunches and dinners with senior officials and local businesses and journalists. I personally no longer hold records of
these meetings. I saw this as an opportunity to promote the force and broadcast the success that was being achieved in terms of the falling crime levels and the approval we were getting from central government for the various new policing initiatives. I would also publicise to the media the awards presented to Northumbria, such as HMI Blue Ribbon Award for crime reduction, which was used by John Major's government as an example of best practice as to how to get rid of bureaucracy. These awards followed a 40% reduction in crime, a 30% reduction in complaints against the police and a 25% increase in the primary detection rate. My contact with the media was designed to promote my officers and the force and to instil confidence in the community about the work we were doing.

112. There was also a press office. I worked closely with them and they would have been present at the majority meetings with the media, the Police Authority and other official engagements.

I believe the facts presented are true

Signed

Dated