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Director Communication Planning

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The successful conduct of military operations requires an intellectually rigorous, clearly articulated and empirically-based framework of understanding that gives advantage to a country’s Armed Forces, and its likely partners, in the management of conflict. This common basis of understanding is provided by doctrine.

UK doctrine is, as far as practicable and sensible, consistent with that of NATO. The development of national doctrine addresses those areas not covered adequately by NATO; it also influences the evolution of NATO doctrine in accordance with national thinking and experience.

Endorsed national doctrine is promulgated formally in Joint Doctrine Publications (JDPs). From time to time, Interim Joint Doctrine Publications (IJDPs) are published, caveated to indicate the need for their subsequent revision to reflect anticipated changes in relevant policy or legislation, or future lessons arising out of operations.

Urgent requirements for doctrine are addressed in Joint Doctrine Notes (JDNs). JDNs do not represent an agreed or fully staffed position, but are raised in short order by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) to establish and disseminate current best practice. They also establish the basis for further development and experimentation and provide a doctrinal basis for operations and exercises.

Details of the Joint Doctrine development process and the associated hierarchy of JDPs are to be found in the Joint Doctrine Development Handbook.

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2 Formerly named Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs).
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PREFACE

SCOPE

1. **Purpose.** The content of JDP 3-45.1 ‘Media Operations’ is set at the Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures (JTTPs) level and is aimed at those responsible for Media Operations (Media Ops), specifically the Commander, Media Adviser, the Media Spokesman and the Media Ops staff. This publication is promulgated in advance of ‘Joint Influence’ doctrine, which remains under development, and supersedes JWP 3-45 ‘Media Operations’. It will be useful to MOD media officials, Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) and Front Line Commands (FLCs) Media Ops, and down through the component Media Ops staffs to units although, the document holds relevance for all Service personnel who might encounter the media in the course of their duties on operations. It is the key document in the delivery of Media Ops doctrine in the joint environment and explains the Ends, Ways and Means of Media Ops. JDP 3-45.1 should be in read in conjunction with JWP 3-80 ‘Information Operations’\(^3\) and ‘The MOD Green Book’.\(^4\)

2. **Context.** A key tenet of the Comprehensive Approach is that all Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) Departments must act in a coordinated fashion to achieve the Government’s strategic aim. Critical to this is the maintenance of political and popular support for HMG’s strategic objectives and any military activity in support of it. The MOD, working with other government Departments (OGDs), achieves this through the Information Strategy (Info Strategy), a dynamic and coordinated matrix of themes and messages targeted at specific audiences, using all communications channels. Media Ops are considered a key enabler in the promulgation of the themes and messages that emanate from the Info Strategy. Within the MOD, Media Ops (the ‘Ways’) are delivered at the strategic level through the Director General Media and Communication (DGMC), at the operational level by PJHQ and at theatre level through the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) and the component headquarters. The media is a key body (the ‘Means’) by which opinion is shaped with theatre, national and international audiences and is therefore a consideration during the prosecution of military operations. It supports Joint Action: therefore, Commanders at all levels must seek to engage with the media to convey their key messages and themes and to support the wider Info Strategy.

3. **Structure.** JDP 3-45.1 comprises five chapters:

   a. **Chapter 1.** Chapter 1 explains the need for an Info Strategy and where Media Ops is placed within the wider context of defence. It explains why the

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\(^3\) A review of JWP 3-80 ‘Information Operations’ resulted in a decision by the UK to adopt NATO doctrine developed under the auspices of AJP 3-10 ‘Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations’. Where UK policy diverges from that of NATO, this will be reflected in a national section under the same cover – ‘Green Pages’.

\(^4\) ‘MOD Working Arrangements with the Media for use throughout the full spectrum of Military Operations’.
UK conducts Media Ops and the principles and factors that determine the importance of Media Ops in supporting the Commander’s Intent.

b. **Chapter 2.** Chapter 2 sets out to define the target audiences of Media Ops by breaking them down into 5 categories.

c. **Chapter 3.** Chapter 3 details the characteristics of the media as a profession. It explains the commercial interests and imperatives behind the actions of journalists and provides analysis of the different forms of media that can be used.

d. **Chapter 4.** Chapter 4 discusses the planning and execution of Media Ops at the strategic level. It explains the cross-government Info Strategy and the interaction of Media Ops and Information Operations (Info Ops). The chapter includes the external relationships that the MOD has with other government departments (OGDs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). It details the progression of Information directives from the government through MOD and down to the operational level.

e. **Chapter 5.** Chapter 5 sets out the mechanisms for the planning and execution of Media Ops at the operational level. It concentrates on the delivery of Media Ops and focuses on the part played by PJHQ and the JTFHQ in the delivery of Media Ops at the operational level in the Joint Operations Area (JOA). It explains the interactions of the Media Ops staff and the commanders and the tasks and responsibilities of the various staff appointments.

4. **Assumptions.** For the purpose of this publication, a deployed operational headquarters will be referred to as the JTFHQ although it is accepted that it could, in a combined operation be the National Contingent Commanders Headquarters (NCCHQ). Similarly, the deployed force commander will be referred to as the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) although the Commander may well be the National Contingent Commander (NCC).

5. **Allied Doctrine.** MC 457 is the endorsed NATO policy on Public Information (P Info). However, the UK requires a separate publication because recent experience on multinational operations has highlighted important national points of emphasis.

6. **Joint Doctrine.** JWP 3-00 ‘Joint Operations Execution’ (2nd Edition) describes the integration, coordination and synchronisation of deployed\(^5\) multinational and

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\(^5\) Although many of the principles set out still apply, this publication is primarily concerned with running Media Ops during a military contingent operation and not with routine roulement overseas operations. Furthermore, it is not concerned with routine activity at the UK home base.
national Joint\textsuperscript{6} Operations. JWP 3-00 flows directly from JWP 5-00 ‘Joint Operations Planning’ and together with JDP 01 ‘Joint Operations’, forms the core of the UK’s approach to the conduct of deployed joint operations. All these publications (particularly JWP 3-00) make reference to Media Ops at appropriate places.

7. **Single-Service Doctrine.** There are no single-Service doctrinal publications solely concerned with the delivery of Media Ops.

\textsuperscript{6} Joint operations can be described as the synergistic effect of tactical activities synchronised together in a campaign set at the operational level. Joint operations coordinate and integrate a range of single-Service capabilities, are multi-agency in character and are normally conducted within an alliance or coalition framework.
# MEDIA OPERATIONS

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### Lexicon of Terms and Definitions

### Lexicon of Abbreviations
CHAPTER 1 – CONTEXT

SECTION I – BACKGROUND

101. Modern conflict is becoming increasingly complex. Inter-state conflicts, fought by national forces within a defined and often geographically contiguous area, such as the Gulf War, are largely being replaced by intra-state conflicts, or asymmetric attacks by transnational groups. These usually involve a wide variety of actors and parties, often in loose or ad hoc alliances, frequently operating outside the geographic area in dispute, or even globally. The causes of these conflicts are equally complex; religion, ethnicity, politics, poverty and perceived oppression are among the many factors behind them. Military action alone cannot resolve such situations, but it can set the conditions for resolution by other actors. Therefore there is a need for coherent activity – a cross-government approach – from all instruments of national power, of which the military is but one, and where possible with concerned international organisations (IO).

102. The Impact of the Media. Virtually all crises are conducted under the spotlight of the media. International media reach has increased. This has been brought about by advances in technology in radio and television, such as satellite broadcasting, by the increasingly porous nature of international borders and by the availability of relatively cheap printing or copying equipment that has brought newspapers and other printed material to a much wider audience. Many people now have the ability to access information directly via the Internet and, without necessarily knowing its pedigree and source, place considerable credence on it; this is particularly so in societies without a free press. The Internet can be used to spread or circulate information and opinion, including rumour, with a speed inconceivable a few years ago. All this reinforces the need for a proactive information stance with a global reach. Consequently there is a need to be proactive in ensuring that the presentation of our actions is positive, accurate and credible whilst at the same time, countering the adversary’s or detractor’s attempts to undermine public support.

103. Information Strategy. Consequent to the spread of media access and technology, a vital aspect of the UK’s coherent cross-government response to a crisis will be the proactive presentation of government activity in the form of an Information Strategy (Info Strategy). It is essential that the Government seizes the initiative with respect to information, sends clear strategic messages, maintains public confidence

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1 The Media is defined as the means of mass communication: print, radio, television and Internet.
2 Throughout this publication, the term ‘adversary’ includes potential as well as actual adversary.
3 The Information Strategy was previously known as the Information Campaign. The use of the term Information Strategy is aligned with current NATO practice and recognises that doctrinally there can and should only be one Campaign Plan. The Information Strategy is an integral part of the strategic plan which informs, and is informed by, the Commander’s Campaign Plan. See footnote 11 to D/DCDS(C)/Policy papers/Info Ops Information Operations Policy Update dated 17 Feb 06.
and, vitally, is seen as being in control, if not of events then, at the very least, of the UK’s response to those events. The Info Strategy recognises that all activity has an effect from which deductions are drawn and actions determined by friendly and adversary audiences. It ensures that the message put out by all parts of the UK Government is the intended message: the message most likely to lead to the adoption of the preferred Course(s) of Action (CoA(s)) by the targeted audiences. The Info Strategy incorporates both the management of information in the form of audiences, themes and messages as well as specific actions conducted with the intention of promoting a desired message (Ends, Ways and Means).

SECTION II – DEFINITIONS

104. The Info Strategy is defined as:

*Information activity coordinated across Government that influences decisions, opinions and outcomes in order to support the National Strategic Aim and associated policy objectives.*

105. The aim of the Info Strategy is:

*To secure popular and political support for the UK’s policy objectives.*

Within the Info Strategy, Information Operations (Info Ops) are defined as:

*Coordinated military activity undertaken to affect decision-makers in support of political and military objectives by influencing their will, attacking their decision-making processes and shaping their understanding, while protecting our own.*

106. Joint Action is defined as:

*The Deliberate use and orchestration of the full range of military capabilities and activities to realise effects.*

Its aim as a conceptual framework is to aid the synchronisation of mutually supporting Influence Activities and Fires in order to affect will, understanding and capability of groups and, where necessary, specific individuals, in order to reach a desired outcome in a particular situation.

107. Media Operations (Media Ops) are defined as:

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4 D/DCDS(C)/Policy papers/Info Ops Information Operations Policy Update dated 17 Feb 06.
5 D/DCDS(C)/Policy papers/Info Ops Information Operations Policy Update dated 17 Feb 06.
6 Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 1/07 ‘Joint Action’.
That line of activity developed to ensure timely, accurate and effective provision [through the media] of Public Information (P Info) and implementation of Public Relations (PR) policy within the operational environment whilst maintaining Operations Security.\(^7\)

108. The aim of Media Ops is:

*To provide factual information to a number of audiences via the media to support the aims of the UK Information Strategy.*

109. The main effort of Media Ops in any military operation is to communicate the principal themes and messages to the appropriate audiences in pursuit of the desired effect whilst remaining sensitive to media interests. This is an integral part of any military operation. Media Ops are primarily focused on the need to maintain public and political support and hence freedom of action and manoeuvre. Media Ops will have an influence on adversaries, allies and neutrals and it is therefore essential that Media Ops staff and Info Ops staff work closely together to ensure that the right message is put across to the right audiences. This is particularly important with respect to local and regional media within the Joint Operations Area (JOA) and to other media sources that are influential within the JOA. Media Ops emphasise the benefits of a positive and proactive approach rather than a defensive and reactive one. To avoid giving the impression that the media are being manipulated in any way, a distinction must be maintained between Info Ops and Media Ops; they are distinct, but closely related activities.

**SECTION III – MEDIA OPERATIONS FACTORS**

110. **Public and Political Support.** Military operations undertaken by nations in pursuit of their national and international interest depend on public and political support for their success. Commanders at all levels should contribute to building and sustaining this support through positive engagement and effective media handling for a number of related reasons:

a. Deployed forces must continually demonstrate their accountability to their democratically elected governments.

b. Public support from the UK audience enhances a commander’s freedom of action, making him less vulnerable to external interference and overly restrictive Rules of Engagement (ROE). Support from international and regional audiences tends to enhance freedom of manoeuvre through consent.

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\(^7\) JWP 0-01.1 *‘UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions’* (7th Edition).
Positive media coverage of deployed military operations sustains morale and promotes an image of the Armed Forces as relevant, professional, and valued by the nation.

Public support assists in maintaining cohesion between allies and/or coalition partners.

A positive portrayal of the military, particularly when operational success is achieved, supports the longer-term justification for resources as well as aids recruiting and retention.

To provide rebuttal of inaccurate or untrue stories.

111. **Strategic, Operational and Tactical Levels.** The divisions between strategic, operational and tactical levels are becoming increasingly blurred. Through the media spotlight, minor tactical events can escalate to have strategic effect and generate a need for strategic leaders, such as government ministers, to respond quickly. Clear command and control structures, well-understood areas of delegated responsibility and effective military-media relations are required at all levels. On occasions, in order to get tactical details straight to the strategic level (and vice versa) without delay, it may be necessary to short circuit the primary command and control channels for the flow of information. When this occurs, immediate efforts will be required to bring all those circumvented up to date.

**SECTION IV – MEDIA OPERATIONS PRINCIPLES**

112. **The Military Approach to the Media.** While it is important that the media is encouraged to develop an understanding of the military and military operations, direct control of the media output should not be attempted. The Media should not be overtly exploited and similarly, a wholly protective approach would undoubtedly be considered as defensive. The media comprises many elements, each with different agendas and requirements; some will be generally supportive of the military, others will not. Some may be supportive of the military but wish to expose any flaws in its political leadership. An understanding of the characteristics of the media is important for everyone involved in military operations. It is essential that Media Ops staff treat all media even-handedly.

All communications with the media must be properly authorised. In addition, Media Ops staff and those Service personnel who encounter the media in the normal course of their duties should be aware of the key Media Ops principles:

113. **Force Protection/Operations Security.** As far as possible information released to the media must not provide anything of value to the adversary, particularly where it may put lives at risk, and must comply with MOD
information release policies.\(^8\) When specifically requested by the media, information cleared for release should not be classified or otherwise withheld purely to protect the Force from criticism or embarrassment. Notwithstanding the requirement closely to preserve Operations Security (OPSEC), occasionally it might be advantageous for the benefit of accurate reporting to allow the media to be taken into confidence and for future intentions and operations to be revealed in advance but with a release time limitation.

b. **Focus on the Desired Effect.** As a key element of the wider Info Strategy, Media Ops should derive its objectives from the strategic aim of a campaign or operation. Accordingly, Media Ops are an integral part of the Joint Task Force Commander’s (JTFC) Campaign Plan and support the achievement of campaign success.

c. **Effects-Based Media Operations.** The Media is another dimension of the operating environment and, in common with other aspects of military operations, the planning and conduct of Media Ops must remain focussed upon the overall effect(s) to be achieved. It is Info Strategy outcomes, not specific media outputs such as individual articles or broadcast pieces, that are important. In achieving the overall effect, Media Ops strive to ensure that all media reporting is balanced and accurate, rather than measuring success by comparing the amount of ‘good news’ and ‘bad news’.

d. **Truth.** All communication with the media must be truthful. Deliberately misleading the media must be avoided, no matter how tempting or tactically advantageous it may appear.

e. **Credibility.** Media Ops staff must be credible, both with the military and the media. Those working directly with the media should not be ‘double hatted’, particularly with the Info Ops function.\(^9\) Media Ops staff should think positively and be proactive. They should be candid, avoid jargon and treat the media with respect.

f. **Timeliness.** The globalisation of communications and the accelerating demand for information have turned newsgathering by the media into an unrelenting, 24-hour activity. Commanders and their staff must expect the media to be omnipresent and demanding on operations. Media interest in an operation is likely to be intense at the outset and, thereafter, when there are step changes in the tempo of operations. Accordingly, Media Ops staff should engage with the media at the earliest opportunity. They must be prepared to react swiftly to breaking news and maintain mechanisms to verify, correct and

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\(^8\) See paragraph 411.

\(^9\) Including Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) staffs that plan psychological activities designed to influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and military objectives.
rebut stories as well as to pass newsworthy information to all levels of command as soon as possible.

g. **Preparation.** The conduct of Media Ops involves building relationships with journalists and within staff organisations, consultation with commanders and conducting training exercises so that those involved are fully prepared in advance of any deployment. Strong relationships are required to cope with the inevitable tensions that will occur on operations. The effective conduct of Media Ops, therefore, requires experienced personnel, proper training, involvement in the planning process and trust.

h. **Openness.** A key function of Media Ops is to explain in clear, unambiguous terms the military perspective of an operation; what may seem obvious to the military may appear confusing or even arcane to many members of the public and the media. Positive engagement with the media at all levels is key to setting the context of operations, events and issues. The Media Ops plan, as part of the wider Info Strategy should contain clear objectives and messages, list target audiences and the means by which these audiences should be reached. Every Media Ops plan should take account of the language and culture of the respective target audiences including, particularly, the Host Nation population and any minorities. Experience has shown that an ability to address these audiences in their native tongues as well as being sensitive to cultural aspects is highly beneficial. A proactive approach will mitigate the longer-term effects of adverse news and place events in the wider context.

i. **Countering Disinformation.** During military operations it must be assumed that adversaries will use disinformation to attempt to undermine the will and cohesion of the deployed force, and widen public support for their own cause. Media Ops staff must establish effective, credible and timely rebuttal procedures to counter the effects of inaccurate and unbalanced media stories.
CHAPTER 2 – THE AUDIENCE

201. The aim of Media Ops (Ways) is to provide information to a number of audiences (Ends) via the media (Means) in support of the aims of the UK Info Strategy. Successful Media Ops convey accurate and timely information as well as the right message to the right audiences. It must be appreciated that audiences are not homogenous and their opinions will vary depending on the nature of their location, political preferences, culture, and ethnicity as well as on the operation. What is considered a priority audience may differ between MOD, the operational commander and the tactical commander and the media itself. In effect, audiences can be categorised in 5 distinct groups that each require specific Media Ops actions:

a. **UK Audiences.** Secure and maintain domestic political and public support.

b. **International Audiences.** Secure and maintain wider international support.

c. **Joint Operations Area Regional Audiences.** Secure and maintain regional support.

d. **Joint Operations Area Local Audiences.** Secure and maintain local support.

e. **Internal Audiences.** Maintain force morale.

202. In broad terms, the UK audience comprises:

a. **The Domestic Audience.** At the strategic level, the UK population is usually considered to be the principal target audience for UK Media Ops and comprises a number of overlapping sub-sets across the spectrum of UK society. However, the most influential target audience for Media Ops to address is a fairly limited group of people who hold disproportionate influence on the direction of government and public thinking and policy development. This group comprises: politicians and statesmen, members of ‘think-tanks’ and professional bodies, special political advisers, newspaper columnists, academics, analysts and journalists (who are increasingly voicing opinions on current affairs issues). Nevertheless, the impact of general public opinion on political decision making should never be underestimated.

b. **The Dependant Audience.** A critical sub-set is the dependant audience, which consists of families, partners, Service personnel, civil servants, colleagues and friends. Even though they may not be involved directly in an operation, they are likely to take a more intense interest in (and probably be more affected by) events than the general UK population. Families are a key
audience for Media Ops; they have a direct effect on the morale of the deployed force. While the chain of command will attempt to keep dependants fully informed, the reality is that TV news and the print media are a major source of information for many Service families. It must be borne in mind that the UK dependant audience is relatively small in terms of size and media influence.

203. The international audience comprises:

a. **The Coalition Audience.** The UK is unlikely to conduct medium-scale warfighting operations without a coalition of Allies and Partners. Success may well depend on continuing political support among ‘friendly’ audiences abroad, which will necessarily form a key target audience for the Info Strategy. Indeed, it is usually the case that the strategic centre of gravity for such operations is the cohesion of the alliance/coalition.

b. **The Wider International Audience.** The ubiquity of modern media means that groups within the ‘wider’ audience are likely to have access to many of the same sources of news and information as the home or adversary audiences via satellite and internet. This will also be true of neutral third parties, who may be relevant to an operation. For Peace Support Operations (PSO), or small-scale operations where the UK is the sole participant, support from the wider international community will continue to be important.

204. **Joint Operations Area Regional Audiences.** At the operational level, the regional population is usually considered to be the principal audience for UK Media Ops. The regional audience tends to include the principal tactical level audience.

a. **Operational Regional Audiences.** Depending on the nature of the operation, the audience in countries neighbouring the Joint Operations Area (JOA) could be considered either as the adversary’s allies or part of the coalition audience or the wider international audience. Therefore, careful consideration must be given to the media output that will reach this audience.

b. **Other Audiences.** Within the region there will be countries or sections of a population that are not aligned to any of the factions involved. This group will be watching, listening and reading media product that conveys both sides of the story and whether it is intentional or not, their opinions will be based largely on what the media produces. Therefore, it is important that the Media Ops plan directs effort to placing the themes and messages of the overall Info Strategy before this group.

205. **Joint Operations Area Local Audiences.** At the operational level, the local audience tends to be the principal target for Info Ops but Media Ops also address local
audiences. At the tactical level, this will almost certainly be the key target audience for deployed commanders, for whom effective Media Ops will be key in securing local consent and thus freedom of manoeuvre. Close coordination of Media Ops and Info Ops activity is particularly important at the tactical level, whilst maintaining a distinction between the two.

a. **The Adversary.** Modern media present opportunities directly to address the leadership, armed forces and population of an adversary. Similarly, the effect of the ‘adversary’s media’ should never be underestimated and will need to be countered.

b. **The Adversary’s Allies.** The adversary will seek support from all available sources in an effort to widen ‘legitimacy’ for its actions. This could be in the form of regional support built on established treaties, religious belief, ethnicity, shared values, or other links. Alternatively, there could be allies of convenience i.e. those which might support the adversary due to their traditional opposition to the UK or specific members of any coalition.

206. **The Internal Audience.** On operations, deployed Service personnel become avid news watchers/listeners/readers, tuning in to Satellite TV, BBC World Service and the Internet. Media Ops staff should be sensitive to the effects of media coverage on the Service personnel in the JOA. The importance of internal communications cannot be over-emphasised, whether it be through the chain of command, Defence and single-Service Information Briefs, the publication of theatre newsletters (official or unofficial) or the use of established means such as the British Forces Broadcasting Service (BFBS).
CHAPTER 3 – CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MEDIA

301. **The Media Business.** The majority of the news media are involved in commercial competition for audiences. While individual journalists may have a favourable personal view of events, their loyalty will often be to their editor’s agenda and to their news agency’s or newspaper’s commercial imperatives. Therefore, their primary goal is to produce newsworthy coverage and to produce it fast. They may appear to be sympathetic but their bottom line is the production of information, which is commercially attractive and in line with editorial policy. Therefore the military must not presume that the media is favourable to their cause and must understand the pressures journalists are under in order to assist them properly.

302. **Limited Knowledge.** Many correspondents will have only a limited understanding of military operations and military issues. This means that stories may be set out of context or be over-generalised. This lack of experience of defence means that there can be unrealistic expectations about what can be done, misinterpretations about what is being done and a tendency to jump to conclusions.

303. **The Media’s Perspective.** The media’s perspective in any given situation will be different from that of the military. The media accepts that, in fast flowing situations such as military operations, it is virtually impossible to provide product that can be both fast and wholly accurate. A divide has developed between journalists working for the major news corporations who are required to provide information that is relevant, topical, accurate, comprehensive, and substantial,\(^1\) and those working for the more sensationalist companies where accuracy can be traded for speed and exclusivity – or at the very least with a special angle. If the media is to report breaking stories that are going to sell or attract audiences, they must contain elements that generate human interest. Therefore, the journalistic trend is to ‘generalise from the particular when explaining a complex world’.\(^2\) The media will also require coverage of a story at different levels (e.g. national versus regional); they will want interviews from military personnel at the strategic level downwards to the tactical level.

304. **Media Independence.** There will be correspondents, both national and international, who work independently throughout the Joint Operations Area (JOA), equipped with their own communications facilities and transport. These correspondents will undoubtedly attempt to cross the ‘front line’ and report on the activities of both sides in real time.

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\(^1\) BBC Guidelines reported in ‘The Times’ 23 June 2005.

305. **Embedded Journalists.** There are now very few aspects of military operations that are not covered in some way by the media. One approach is to embed journalists with units to enable reporting direct from the front line. In some circumstances, embedding may be the only way to gain access to the story. Embedding may also be conducive to more accurate and balanced reporting of the situation local to the embed-unit but not necessarily to the wider circumstances of the operation.

306. **Deadlines.** In general, the mainstream media is under pressure to meet tight and fleeting deadlines where their over-riding imperative is to be first with the news. The breaking story is all-important; sometimes this can be at the expense of depth, completeness or accuracy. Staffs must be aware that these drivers can have a tangible effect on staff activity because production of copy for key morning and evening broadcast slots might have to be factored into the daily headquarters staff rhythm. An example of this was the timing of the theatre HQ battle-rhythm (especially press conferences), during operations in Iraq in 2003/2004, to meet timings of the breakfast news channels on the East Coast of the United States. Staffing timeliness for rebuttal will also need to be mindful of these deadlines.

307. **Visual Imagery.** A visual component can help make a story which would otherwise fail. The quality or dramatic impact of the TV footage or photograph can determine whether a story is given airtime or not. Likewise radio stories require background noise to underline the theme of the piece and to add authenticity. In terms of grabbing attention and helping to shape perceptions, a picture can be a defining image and is an area where photography from military sources can help inform the debate.

308. **Initiative.** In order to get the story they want, the media may be prepared to take risks and to stretch any agreements to the limit. On occasions, this may cause friction with deployed military forces. In these cases, the Media Ops staff should endeavour to maintain the initiative by generating a constant flow of positive and accurate newsworthy material to meet the media’s search for stories and images. Information vacuums should be avoided as they can hand the initiative to the media and may lead to the highlighting of negative aspects of the Campaign.

309. **Specific Characteristics.** The different sections of the media have specific characteristics. These characteristics affect their reporting, their interests and how the military should best deal with them.

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3 Journalists attached to the force, under the terms of the ‘*Green Book*’, and sub-attached into a unit or HQ rather than held as a group and attached to a Press Information Centre (PIC).
4 For example, a noticeable decrease in the number of international journalists prepared to operate independently in Iraq from mid 04 to at least early 05.
310. **Nature of Different Nations’ Media.** The UK media tends to be more confrontational, more cynical and less deferential than many others.

“Nowhere in Europe are the debates so heated, the boundaries of taste so stretched or the journalists so irreverent. Two cheers then, for British Democracy.”

It is widely recognised that there are differences in approach between media from different countries. This is of particular note in multinational operations where cohesion of the NATO Alliance or other coalition is often identified as the strategic Centre of Gravity (CoG). It is important to ensure that multinational personnel involved in the operation understand the differences between the approaches used by different national media in order that none are surprised or respond in an inappropriate fashion to questioning.

311. **National Broadcast Media.** For the purposes of this publication, the broadcast media is divided into television and radio:

a. **Television.** In the UK television remains the main platform for news consumption.\(^6\) Digitised technology has radically altered TV newsgathering (known as Electronic News-Gathering (ENG)). An individual journalist can broadcast, via satellite, direct from a JOA, with no dependency on the military communication infrastructure. Beyond this, news documentaries and dramas make a significant impact on the longer term perception of the military and their actions in the minds of the wider public. In order to gain a lead in the eternal competition for ratings, increasingly TV news is as much about comment and entertainment as it is about comprehensive reporting. Satellite TV News channels are gaining increasing importance among the audiences in non-Western countries where the appetite for news in relentless. The acceptance of presented television pictures can give TV journalists news excessive power to influence both public and political opinion.

b. **Radio.** Radio is often a less sensationalist medium but, the influence of the BBC World Service, current affairs and news programmes should not be underestimated. In the developing world, radio is often the primary source of news and information. For Media Ops staff, local radio is an excellent way of developing relationships between deployed service personnel and the local public. In many less developed countries radio may offer the primary source of news for a local population, particularly where literacy rates are low and local/regional newspapers are less established. Consideration should be given to the utility of such media through interpreters.

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312. **Online Media.** Increasingly, the Internet is becoming a major source of news and information. Engagement with online media has become important, particularly as adversaries seek to dominate this medium. The difficulty of identifying the origin of a website is, for many of web-based journalists, the Internet’s greatest advantage. It should always be remembered that the Internet is unregulated and access is open to anyone with a terminal and telephone line.

313. **National Print Media.** Unlike broadcast media in the UK, the print media are not obliged by law to be unbiased. All national print media have agendas, including a political stance. For the purposes of this publication, the print media is divided into national broadsheet and tabloid (red top). Research has shown that in the print media, there is a marked contrast between the readership and writers of the tabloids as opposed to the broadsheets.\(^7\)

> “People will buy a newspaper that will make them feel safe in their own opinions”,\(^8\)

and that the more ‘intellectual’ papers, [the broadsheets], merely

> “inform readers who had already established their own opinion on matters”.

Tabloid journalists often appear to be more subjective in their articles. In broad terms therefore:

a. **Broadsheet Newspapers.** In the UK, the broadsheet press is less widely read than the tabloids but are more likely to influence principal decision-makers and opinion formers. For this reason, their content will include considerable commentary as well as factual news reporting.

b. **Tabloid Newspapers.** The tabloid press is widely read by a significant majority of the UK population. Dramatic headlines and short, pithy pieces are more likely to affect wider perceptions than the longer, considered pieces in the broadsheets.

314. **UK Regional Media.** Regional media is an excellent means of making connections between the wider population and individual Service personnel. The effect on the local population of a ‘home town story’, whether in local print, radio or TV, concerning the single member of a unit deployed on operations whose parents live locally cannot be underestimated. On occasions, these stories can have more impact on a local community than the national coverage of a distant war being fought for complex reasons.

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\(^7\) Public Survey JSCSC 001/2004 dated 23 December 2003.

\(^8\) Smith, Daily Telegraph Defence Correspondent - Interview, 15 December 2003.
315. **International Media.** The international media remain an important element in the successful execution of an Info Strategy, especially when the UK is operating within a coalition or alliance. While they are more likely to serve theatre and worldwide audiences they cannot be ignored.

316. **Media Agencies.** The raw information for much media coverage is provided by international news agencies, such as Reuters, the Press Association, Associated Press and Agence France-Presse and each maintains a sophisticated global operation based on the collection and distribution of their product to a wide range of media networks. Their representatives may not have the profile or reputation of others, but their reporting footage and photographs will still affect operations. Agency reporting, both for print and broadcast tends to focus on hard facts leaving further interpretation and expansion to individual distribution networks.

317. **Adversary Media Coverage.** In regimes where the government or ruling elite exercises direct control of the media, the propensity to engage in propaganda and deception is high. All forms of media are used routinely and recent experience\(^9\) has demonstrated the increasing value of on-line media due to its ability to exceed the geographic range of more traditional forms of information transmission. Objective engagement with the media of an adversary will always be a challenge for Media Ops but one that must be attempted at the earliest opportunity.

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\(^9\) Op TELIC, Phase 4, Hostage taking.
CHAPTER 4 – PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF MEDIA OPERATIONS AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

401. **Information Strategy.** To be effective, the Government must act in a co-ordinated fashion, ensuring that all participants work to the same strategic aim, objectives, messages and themes. In terms of information, this is achieved through an Information Strategy (Info Strategy), illustrated at Figure 4.1. Through the Info Strategy, the Government sets the strategic information objectives, which are then implemented as required through various cross-government groupings. Cross Government Information Strategies are produced by the appropriate Information Strategy Group, which may be MOD chaired and has MOD representation from Director General Operational Policy (DG Op Pol) and Director General Media and Communication (DGMC). Subordinate cross government groups are responsible for planning, coordinating and implementing activity at the strategic, operational and tactical level in accordance with the Info Strategy. The Director Communication Planning (DCP) provides the MOD lead for cross government groups responsible for media and communications activity (e.g. the Iraq Information Group).

![Figure 4.1 - United Kingdom Information Strategy](image)

402. **Structure of the Information Strategy.** Government policy and end-state objectives for the desired outcome of any situation or crisis drive the Info Strategy, which is then translated into Government information and communications activity.

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1 See Chapter 1, Section II.
2 The Iraq Information Strategy Group, for example, is chaired by MOD(DG Op Pol).
Military force is not applied in isolation; it is an integral aspect of the UK’s 3 instruments of national power (Diplomatic, Military and Economic). As well as involving the MOD, the Info Strategy may also include Other Government Departments (OGDs), particularly the Cabinet Office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for International Development (DFID). An Info Strategy should be produced for operations that may require military involvement. It will be iterative and develop as the situation changes and with the intensity and level of the MOD contribution.

403. **The Relationship with Information Operations.** Media Operations (Media Ops) and Information Operations (Info Ops) are distinct but closely related activities, operating in synchronisation within the overall Info Strategy. In order to generate coherent Info Strategy objectives, Media Ops and Info Ops staffs must be cognisant of and support each other’s aims and operations but remain as separate entities.

404. **Key Directives.** The output of the Information Strategy Group is the Info Strategy which will contain key themes, messages and audiences. This informs the development of the cross government strategic media and communications plan. The Media Ops plan will be formulated within the overall campaign planning process, and will ‘dovetail’ into the Info Strategy and the strategic media and communications plan. Media Ops direction is included in the Chief of the Defence Staff’s (CDS) Directive to the Joint Commander (Jt Comd) and the subsequent Jt Comd’s Mission Directive to the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC). The relevant Media Ops direction will be reiterated in directives and orders to component/contingent commanders.

405. **Media Operations Profile.** The key directives formally set out the Media Ops profile to be adopted. The profiles are:

a. **Active Media Operations Profile.** The Active Media Ops Profile is a profile which dictates that attempts will be made to stimulate media/public interest about an issue or activity for the purpose of informing the public. Interest is stimulated, for example, by press advisories, news releases, personal contacts, press conferences or other forms of public presentation.

b. **Semi-Active Media Operations Profile.** The Semi-Active Media Ops Profile is a profile which seeks to inform the media/public without intending to expand or intensify media/public interest. The aim is to prevent uninformed speculation by voluntarily providing factual information about military units or activities which the commander believes are of legitimate interest to the media and public. A semi-active approach usually entails a news release, media advisory statement or interview to provide basic information. Media Ops staffs must then be prepared to respond to possible subsequent queries, but to guard against pursuing an overt or proactive Media Ops approach.
c. **Passive Media Operations Profile.** The Passive Media Operations Profile is a profile which dictates that no attempts will be made to generate media/public interest about an issue or activity. Even when a passive profile is in effect, staff must still be prepared to respond to media queries about the issue or activity and to make brief statements to avoid confusion, speculation, misunderstanding or rumours that may prevail if media queries go unanswered.

The Media Ops profile will be determined by the overall profile HMG wishes to adopt and informed by the level of media interest in the situation and the ‘profile’ HMG wishes to adopt. For example, an operation predominantly involving Special Forces will necessitate a different profile from one involving humanitarian disaster relief activities. PJHQ practice is to use either Active or Passive profiles.

406. **MOD External Communication.** MOD external communication activities are set within the context of the cross-government Info Strategy and MOD’s overall communications priorities. Within the MOD, the focus for handling all crises is the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO), comprising both the Defence Crisis Management Centre (DCMC), under the direction of the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments) (DCDS(C)) and the PJHQ, commanded by the Jt Comd. The head of MOD Media Ops is the DGMC, who is normally represented in the DCMC at meetings of the Current Operations Group (COG) by DCP.

407. **Directorate General Media and Communication.** Within DGMC, the Director News (D News) is responsible for the handling of specific announcements or news events. DCP is responsible for the MOD’s strategic communication planning. The Director Defence Public Relations (D Def PR) is responsible for longer-term engagement with print, broadcast and internet media, including approaches to or from feature writers and documentary makers.

408. **Direct MOD Communication with the Media.** At all stages, careful co-ordination of contact between the media, the MOD and the wider UK Armed Forces community is vital to engender accurate reporting and to build trust. Accordingly, on matters of political or strategic importance, the 2 principal sources of news and information, D News and/or the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) may communicate directly with the media while keeping PJHQ, each other, and the chain of command fully informed about what has been said and why.

409. **Information/Media Release Authority.** Release of information to the media is coordinated by D News through the Defence Press Office³ (DPO) and is supported by the other DGMC Directorates and the Media Ops Branch at PJHQ. D News holds responsibility for the coordination of Information Release. The authority to release information to the media, that is ‘Media Release Authority’ is defined as:

³ The ‘Press Office’.
‘That authority vested in a commander to engage directly with the media without reference to higher authority’.4

During operations, delegated media release authority may be given to appropriate commanders. Limitations and considerations include:

a. Authority for the specific release of weapon systems imagery and protectively marked material remains the responsibility of the Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI), but this might also be delegated to the JTFC as confidence over time is developed.

b. Information that is likely to require comment or response by a Government Minister will require ministerial approval5 before release, e.g. significant collateral damage, multiple UK casualties and incidents of military fratricide.

c. Personal media engagements by senior officers require clearance through D News (1*) or Ministers (2* and above).6

d. Names of casualties will only be released by the DPO.7

Pressure by the media for early release will always need to be tempered by the requirements of Operations Security (OPSEC). Ultimately, decisions on the release of sensitive information may have to be referred to Ministerial level by D News.

410. Media Operations and the Multinational Dimension. Multinational operations occur when there is a political necessity for international consensus and legitimacy for military action.8 The most likely scenario for military action by UK forces at the medium or large-scale of operations will be as part of a coalition.9 In these cases, not only is it important to maintain a common media line at national level, but also, it is equally important to ensure cohesion and present a unified message. Recent campaigns have highlighted the need to coordinate key media themes and messages and to avoid exposing differences and so prevent their exploitation. In the first instance, this will be achieved at the Strategic level by close liaison between governments but Media Ops Staff, at each level, are required to engage with multinational partners, at an equivalent level, in order to discuss and agree upon a set of shared themes and messages. National differences will always remain but liaison must expose these differences and, where the divergence is significant and potentially

4 See new definition in Lexicon of Terms and Definitions.
5 Normally by means of a Ministerial Submission prepared by D News staff.
6 See 2007DIN03-006 Contact with the Media and Communicating in Public, Para 17.
7 The handling of Media Ops aspects of UK Service casualties is covered in JSP 751.
8 Except on the occasions where the UK will choose to act alone at small and medium scales of effort.
9 Probably under UN, EU or NATO mandate/authority.
damaging, these issues should be raised to the highest level necessary to achieve a satisfactory resolution.

411. **DCMC Media Operations Cell.** As the operation develops, when necessary DGMC establishes a Media Ops cell, which maintains a presence inside the DCMC, to support the DCMO. The Media Ops cell is manned 24-hours a day and is responsible for keeping DCMO staff abreast of Media Ops developments and their implications; and ensuring that DGMC is kept aware of operational developments so that appropriator action is taken. D News will conduct the news management of events as they occur during a campaign or operation. Likely issues, tasks and responsibilities will probably include:

   b. Cross-departmental coordination, particularly with No 10, the FCO and DFID.
   c. DGMC representation at Operational Chiefs of Staff (COS) meetings in the DCMC and at the COG.
   d. The development of the Media Ops Annex to CDS’s Directive.
   e. Direction and guidance to the Media Ops chain of command through regular meetings of the D News Media Management Group (MMG).
   f. Requirement for press conferences and other facilities.
   g. Monitoring, verification, rebuttal, prebuttal and analysis.
   h. Requirements for media pooling.
   i. Information release.

412. **Defence Press Office.** Once an operation is under way, the range of activities that are likely to be undertaken by the DPO includes:

   a. First line response to all media enquiries to MOD.
   b. Liaison with OGDs and alliance/coalition Press Offices.
   c. Liaison with Front Line Commands (FLCs).
   d. Strategic and casualty information release.
   e. Liaison with the Department of Health on news release when casualties are treated in NHS hospitals to prevent inadvertent release of sensitive information.
f. Guidance to PJHQ on media lines of enquiry and emerging themes.
g. Requests for information to PJHQ and elsewhere within MOD.
h. Production of lines to take developed by the relevant Secretariat.
i. Assistance with MOD-level media facilities in the UK.
j. When authorised, the release of strategic level information to PJHQ for dissemination through the chain of command.
k. Release of press conference and background briefing summaries to the chain of command.

413. **Rebuttal.**¹⁰ The media are inherently suspicious, particularly of government spokesmen. Bad news stories can develop a life of their own and can swiftly outpace any attempt to control them. Inaccuracy and rumour can gain legitimacy simply through repetition. Depending on the nature of an incident, it may be necessary to consider the need for rebuttal. Rebuttal encompasses defensive actions undertaken to correct factual inaccuracies in media reporting or to refute allegations. Primarily this will be carried out at MOD level but there may be occasions when rebuttal is required in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) where there is direct access to the correspondents whose reporting needs to be rebutted.

414. **Press Conferences.** During operations the MOD may stage press conferences, usually fronted by senior personnel. Officials from OGDs might also be represented as required. Depending on the theme or issue, individual specialists may also be present, and their role is usually confined to providing additional background information in the margins of the press conference.

415. **Background Briefings.** The MOD may provide background briefings in addition to press conferences. Under agreed protocols, these cannot be used as direct references, but they allow correspondents greater insight into certain decisions and events.

416. **Deployment of Media Operations Capability.** At the onset of a military operation, the main UK media interest is almost exclusively managed at the strategic level, principally by DGMC’s staff. Nevertheless, the media ‘band wagon’ will rush to the JOA to report on the unfolding situation, usually in advance of any significant deployment of forces. Consequently, when force deployment commences, media facilities will be a high priority at Forward Mounting Bases (FMB), ports of embarkation, Forward Operating Bases (FOB), Deployment Operating Bases (DOB), airheads and with deploying components. As the military emphasis shifts to the Joint

¹⁰ Included in this term is ‘Prebuttal’ when a media story is pre-empted and its effects mitigated.
Task Force (JTF), so will the media focus. In anticipation of this, and as part of the Strategic Estimate\textsuperscript{11} process, it is important that the Media Ops capability deploys as early as possible to enable rapid engagement with the media in the JOA.

\textsuperscript{11} See JWP 5-00.
CHAPTER 5 – PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF MEDIA OPERATIONS AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

SECTION I – PERMANENT JOINT HEADQUARTERS

501. The Commander. The Joint Commander (Jt Comd)\(^1\) exercises command and control (C2) and Operational Command (OPCOM) UK forces\(^2\) on deployed operations through the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ). The PJHQ Media Operations (Media Ops) Branch, which is part of J9, provides the principal link between the D News and the deployed Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) in the Joint Operations Area (JOA). It is responsible for translating the strategic Media Ops directive into direction to the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) and his Media Ops staff. It also provides the link both up and down on emerging themes, changing areas of media interest and other command initiatives. PJHQ Media Ops staff are also responsible for advising the Jt Comd on any Media Ops aspects that either involve or interest him.

502. Directives. The PJHQ relies on the MOD and Front Line Commands (FLCs) for the provision of deployable Media Ops resources as well as for the guidance and direction required for a forthcoming operation. This will be done in accordance with the force generation process and will include defining the policy on accredited War Correspondents, and other forms of media accompanying the Force.

503. Joint Media Operations Team. At the outset of any major operation, one of the first components of the Joint Media Ops capability to deploy\(^3\) should be a Joint Media Operations Team (JMOT), from the Defence Media Operations Centre (DMOC). This will be supported at the operational and tactical levels by the FLC Media Ops capabilities. The JMOT will be given the primary task of early engagement with the media. The operational situation will dictate whether the JMOT remains in theatre and is augmented or whether it ‘hands over’ to a Joint Media Ops Group (JMOG) and is recovered. The key point about the JMOT capability is its early entry capability, which can pave the way for the establishment of a more enduring capability. The JMOT is non-enduring and for planning purposes has 30 days endurance.

504. PJHQ Media Operations Responsibilities. PJHQ Media Ops mission statement is:

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\(^1\) The default Jt Comd is the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO).

\(^2\) Exceptions are most NATO operations, and some forces that operate within the JOA which might be held at the strategic level, such as submarines and Special Forces.

\(^3\) It is likely that the first component into a theatre will be SO2 Media Ops in the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ), possibly reinforced from FLC Media Ops or from the High-Readiness JMOT.
Plan, deploy and direct Media Ops capability to support operational commanders and the Permanent Joint Operations Bases (PJOBs), in order to support HMG’s strategic Information Strategy(s).

PJHQ Media Ops staff will work with Director General Media and Communication (DGMC) to identify the required Media Ops TASKORG to support the operation. This will be merged into the force generation process and consideration will also be given on how to accommodate accredited War Correspondents and other forms of media accompanying the force. The more detailed responsibilities of the PJHQ Media Ops Branch include:

a. Media Ops input to all Contingency Planning Teams (CPT) and Observation Liaison Reconnaissance Teams (OLRT).

b. Development of the Media Ops input to the Joint Effects Annex to the Jt Comd’s Directive.

c. Advice to and representation at the Information Strategy Coordination Group (ISCG) and DGMC on the JTFC’s concept of operations.

d. Liaison with Info Ops staff through J3 Jt Effects.

e. Liaison between Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) and DGMC.

f. Liaison with FLCs.

g. Engagement with DGMC to determine the requirement for deployed Media Ops support, including deployment of a JMOT, the augmentation of HQ Media Ops Staff and the composition of a deployed Media Ops capability. In defining this, factors that need to be considered include:

(1) The level of media interest in the JOA.

(2) The anticipated time lines for the campaign or operation.

(3) The availability of manpower and equipment.

(4) The state of readiness of these resources.

(5) Size and shape of the Media Ops requirement and the seniority and appointment of the Officer Commanding (OC).

(6) Briefing and training.

h. The deployment, sustainment and recovery of deployed Media Ops staff.
i. Maintenance of communications with deployed Media Ops staff, in particular updating them on the themes and messages agreed at the ISCG and guidance from D News.

j. Staffing responses to Defence Press Office (DPO) enquiries.

k. The release of information as agreed by CJO.

SECTION II – MEDIA OPERATIONS WITHIN THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA

505. The Commander. The Commander is vested with the ultimate responsibility for the success of a nominated multinational or national joint operation. Thus a positive public perception of the JTFC is critical to the success of the Info Strategy. At an early stage, he must decide the broad level of visibility and exposure to the media he personally wishes to have and, as a consequence, how he intends to use his spokesman. He will be advised and supported by both his Media Adviser and Chief Media Ops.

506. Joint Operations Area Media Operations Organisations. At the operational level within the JOA, the Media Ops capability will comprise a number of elements. These are likely to be augmented or replaced as an operation develops and endures:

a. The JTFHQ Media Ops staff.

b. A Press Information Centre (PIC).

c. A Combat Camera Team capability (CCT).

d. Media Production Team (MPT).

e. Military escorts for the media.

f. Administrative and logistic support personnel.

SECTION III – JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS MEDIA OPERATIONS STAFF

507. The default headquarters for deployed UK joint operations is the JTFHQ. When deployed, the JTFHQ Media Ops staff will be augmented as necessary. The Media Ops staff will be located at a central location within the HQ, largely because of

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4 For the purposes of this publication, the Commander is referred to as the JTFC.
5 For an explanation on the role of the commander in its entirety refer to JDP 01 ‘Joint Operations’. The commander’s role within a JFHQ/NCHQ is also explained in JWP 3-00 (2nd Edition) ‘Joint Operations Execution’, Chapter 2.
6 The models for UK operational level headquarters are explained in JWP 3-00 (2nd Edition), Chapter 2.
its J3, J5 and J9 involvement, and the personal support it provides to the JTFC. Usually Media Ops will be an integral part of the JTFHQ J3 Jt Effects Cell but, if augmented to a sufficient degree, can become a semi-autonomous cell reporting directly to the COS.  

The principal role of Media Ops staff is to achieve communications effect through the delivery of messages. Specifically, they are required to conduct a range of tasks, principally to:

a. Keep the JTFC abreast of media activity.
b. Advise the JTFC on the themes and messages being pursued at the strategic level.
c. Assist the JTFC in his direct dealings with the media (including the provision of a spokesman).
d. Plan, coordinate and implement facilities for media assignments.
e. Provide media lines to take in support of key information objectives.
f. Handle the media aspects of serious incidents, including briefing and rebuttal if delegated so to do by DGMC via CJO.
g. Provide direction to the Component Commanders (CCs) and their Media Ops staffs.
h. Ensuring press releases issued within the JOA do not provide information of value to an adversary.
i. Devise a coherent and robust Operations Security (OPSEC) plan up, down, and across all levels of media contact.
j. Conduct appropriate media monitoring and analysis.

508. **Chief Media Operations.** The Chief Media Ops is the JTFC’s principal Media Ops staff officer and is responsible for advising on the implementation in the JOA of ISCG direction, D News and PJHQ guidance and for Media Ops planning and briefing. Although the Chief Media Ops will probably work to an SO1 J3 Jt Effects for all routine aspects of Media Ops within the headquarters, it is essential that he has personal and regular access to the JTFC.

509. **Spokesman.** The spokesman should be a trusted confidante of the JTFC. He might also fill the Chief Media Ops appointment though this will depend on the requirements of the operation. The spokesman will be carefully selected for his credibility and presentational skills (not just his aptitude in front of the camera), as

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7 Particularly if an OF 5 or higher media spokesman is appointed.
well as his ability to understand the wider political and legal dimension of what is going on. This is a key role and it is highly desirable that the Commander should know and have developed trust in his spokesman prior to deployment. Wherever possible, and at least at the theatre level if not others, the Media Ops staff should include a spokesman who can engage with the media using the language(s) of the operational theatre concerned.

510. **Media Adviser.** Wherever possible, a MOD appointed senior civilian Media Adviser will also deploy as part of the Commander’s staff to work alongside the Political Adviser (POLAD) and assist the Media Ops staff. The Media Adviser’s role is to advise the Commander and his Media Ops staff on the wider Info Strategy, particularly regarding the interaction between the media and HMG and to provide detailed assessment of media agendas and the background of individual journalists.

**SECTION IV – JOINT MEDIA OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES**

511. **Press Information Centre.** The PIC is an ‘operational Press Centre’, responsible for day-to-day contact between the JTFHQ and the Media under the direct command of the Chief Media Ops but is run by a PIC Director, who is responsible for its organisation, daily routine and all of the teams that work from it. It provides a facility that gives an acceptable interface with the media and, as such, the atmosphere generated within it has a major impact on the success or otherwise of the media operation. The location of the PIC will be a compromise between military considerations, such as OPSEC, the requirement to minimise disruption in military headquarters, and the needs of the media to readily access such a facility. The PIC Director and his staff represent the military interface with the media within the JOA.

512. **Liaison and Escort Team.** The media liaison and escort team, consisting of Media Liaison Officers (MLOs), are nominally based at the PIC, but are generally detached to escort journalists.

513. **Combat Camera Teams.** Deployed Combat Camera Teams (CCTs) routinely work from the PIC under the direction of the PIC Director. Usually they are placed under Operational Control (OPCON) of the JTFHQ, for the duration of an operation, with full command being retained by their parent FLC. Their primary task is to provide material for subsequent dissemination to the media and Other Government Departments (OGDs) which takes account of our communications priorities. This material is either pre-packaged by the MPT working within the PIC or handed/transmitted directly to the media/OGDs. They also provide archival material as well as material for the MPT. CCTs are available for tasking within theatre for
other Info Strategy activities, the generation of material for training publications and other training activities.\footnote{Such as for operational orientation training under the Operational Training and Advisory Group (OPTAG) and Media Ops specific training under Defence Media Operations Centre (DMOC) Training Wing.}

514. **Media Production Team.** The MPT works within the PIC to process and package imagery, video footage and miscellaneous products for use both by the media and internally. Media Ops staffs must produce some of the raw media product required for use by the media. This typically includes Electronic News Gathering (ENG) footage, still photographs from Mobile News Teams (MNTs) and CCT photography and press releases from Unit Press Officers (UPOs). Media product can either be handed directly to members of the media, electronically transmitted to the media or posted on publicly accessible military websites. Active marketing of such product, both by deployed Media Ops staffs and by the DPO/FLC Media Ops, is essential to give such material a chance of being used by the media.

515. **Monitoring and Analysis Team.** The Monitoring and Analysis (M&A) team analyses data from UK cross-government and contracted commercial sources. It then extracts relevant material for briefing the chain of command. This briefing material is used to contribute to Situational Awareness (SA) by summarising what is being reported, how and why. In addition, the Monitoring and Analysis (M&A) team also contributes to the overall effort by providing M&A of in-theatre, indigenous media. This may entail employment of UK, coalition or indigenous personnel who can speak, read and write the local language(s). The resulting M&A product should also be staffed through appropriate elements of the command chain for transmission back to the UK and to coalition partners.

516. **Administration Team.** The administration team ensures that the PIC and other Media Ops elements run smoothly and efficiently on a 24-hour basis and maintains its J4 support. In particular, the team organises the accreditation and registration of correspondents entering the JOA in accordance with MOD ‘Green Book’ arrangements.
LEXICON OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

The primary reference for the terms and their definitions used in this Lexicon is indicated in parentheses.¹ Those marked (JWP 3-45-1) are new and will be incorporated into the next edition of JDP 0-01.1 ‘The UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions’.

Computer Network Operations
Computer Network Operations (CNO) (Consisting of Computer Network Attack (CNA), Exploitation (CNE) and Protection (CNP)) seek to gain access to computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy their capability, or alternatively to intercept and utilise their capability, whilst protecting the capability of the JTF. Success in this aspect is directly proportional to the adversary’s dependence on such systems. (JWP 0-01.1)

Deception
Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (AAP-6)

End-state
That state of affairs which needs to be achieved at the end of a campaign either to terminate or to resolve the conflict on favourable terms. The end-state should be established prior to execution. (JWP 0-01.1)

Information Strategy
Coordinated information output of all government activity, undertaken to influence approved audiences in support of policy objectives. (JWP 3-45-1)

Joint Action
The Deliberate use and orchestration of the full range of military capabilities and activities to realise effects. (JDN 1/07)

Joint Commander
The Joint Commander (Jt Comd), appointed by CDS, exercises the highest level of operational command (OPCOM) of forces assigned with specific responsibility for deployment, sustainment and recovery. (JWP 0-01.1)

¹ JWP 0-01.1 ‘The United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions’, AAP-6 ‘The NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions’.
Joint Operations Area
An area of land, sea and airspace, defined by higher authority, in which a designated Joint Task Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A Joint Operations Area including its defining parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission-specific. (JWP 0-01.1)

Media Operations
That line of activity developed to ensure timely, accurate and effective provision [through the media] of Public Information (P Info) and implementation of Public Relations (PR) policy within the operational environment whilst maintaining Operations Security (OPSEC). (JWP 0-01.1)

Media Release Authority
That authority vested in a commander to engage directly with the media without reference to higher authority. (JWP 3-45-1)

National Contingent Headquarters
The national HQ deployed alongside a CJTF HQ, or another multinational theatre HQ, for the purposes of executing national command over UK deployed forces. With the exception of the lead nation, each country contributing forces to a multinational operation can be expected to deploy a national contingent commander who will exercise national command and represent national interests at the operational level. (JWP 0-01.1)

Operational Command
The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as the commander deems necessary. Note: it does not include responsibility for administration. (AAP-6)

Operational Control
The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control. (AAP-6)

Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team
A liaison and recce team that is deployed to a crisis by the Permanent Joint Headquarters in order to assess the situation and report back. (JWP 0-01.1)
**Operations Security**  
The process which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security, using passive or active means, to deny the enemy knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities and intentions of friendly forces. (AAP-6)

**Peace Support Operation**  
An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of UN Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peace-keeping, peace-building and/or humanitarian operations. (AAP-6)

**Psychological Operations**  
Planned, culturally sensitive, truthful and attributable activities directed at approved target audiences within the joint operations area in order to achieve political and military objectives by influencing attitudes and behaviour. (JWP 0-01.1)

**Public Relations**  
The planned and sustained effort to establish and maintain goodwill and mutual understanding between an organisation and its public. (JWP 0-01.1)
**LEXICON OF ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APIC</td>
<td>APIC Allied Press Information Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>BFBS</td>
<td>BFBS British Forces Broadcasting Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>C2 Command and Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>CC(s)</td>
<td>CC(s) Component Commander(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCT</td>
<td>CCT Combat Camera Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDI</td>
<td>CDI Chief of Defence Intelligence</td>
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<td>CDS</td>
<td>CDS Chief of Defence Staff</td>
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<td>CJO</td>
<td>CJO Chief of Joint Operations</td>
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<td>CMO</td>
<td>CMO Chief Media Operations</td>
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<td>CNO</td>
<td>CNO Computer Network Operations</td>
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<td>CoA</td>
<td>CoA Course of Action</td>
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<td>COG</td>
<td>COG Current Operations Group</td>
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<td>COS</td>
<td>COS Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>CPT</td>
<td>CPT Contingency Planning Team</td>
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<td>D Def PR</td>
<td>D Def PR Director(ate of) Defence Publicity Relations</td>
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<td>D News</td>
<td>D News Director(ate of) News</td>
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<td>DCDS(C)</td>
<td>DCDS(C) Deputy Chief Defence Staff (Commitments)</td>
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<td>DCMC</td>
<td>DCMC Defence Crisis Management Centre</td>
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<td>DCMO</td>
<td>DCMO Defence Crisis Management Organisation</td>
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<td>DCP</td>
<td>DCP Director(ate of) Communication Planning</td>
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<td>Decep</td>
<td>Decep Deception</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>DFID Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG Op Pol</td>
<td>DG Op Pol Director General Operational Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DGMC</td>
<td>DGMC Director General Media and Communication</td>
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<td>DMOC</td>
<td>DMOC Defence Media Operations Centre</td>
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<td>DOB</td>
<td>DOB Deployment Operating Base</td>
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<td>DPO</td>
<td>DPO Defence Press Office</td>
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<td>DTIO</td>
<td>DTIO Director Targeting and Information Operations</td>
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<td>ENG</td>
<td>ENG Electronic News Gathering</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>FE(s)</td>
<td>FE(s) Force Element(s)</td>
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<td>FLC</td>
<td>FLC Front Line Command</td>
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<td>FMB</td>
<td>FMB Forward Mounting Base</td>
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<td>FOB</td>
<td>FOB Forward Operating Base</td>
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<td>FTU</td>
<td>FTU Forward Transmission Unit</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMG</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Government</td>
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<td>Info Ops</td>
<td>Information Operations</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organisations</td>
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<td>ISCG</td>
<td>Information Strategy Coordination Group</td>
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<td>ISG</td>
<td>Information Strategy Group</td>
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<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
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<td>J3</td>
<td>Joint Operations Staff</td>
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<td>J5</td>
<td>Joint Planning Staff</td>
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<td>J9</td>
<td>Joint Civil Secretariat Staff</td>
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<td>JFHQ</td>
<td>Joint Force Headquarters</td>
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<td>JMOG</td>
<td>Joint Media Ops Group</td>
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<td>JMOT</td>
<td>Joint Media Ops Team</td>
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<td>JOA</td>
<td>Joint Operations Area</td>
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<td>JTFC</td>
<td>Joint Task Force Commander</td>
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<td>JTFHQ</td>
<td>Joint Task Force Headquarters</td>
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<td>LS</td>
<td>Large Scale</td>
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<td>Media Ops</td>
<td>Media Operations</td>
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<td>MLO</td>
<td>Media Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>MMG</td>
<td>Media Management Group</td>
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<td>MNT</td>
<td>Mobile News Team</td>
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<td>MOC</td>
<td>Media Operations Centre</td>
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<td>M&amp;A</td>
<td>Monitoring and Analysis</td>
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<td>MPT</td>
<td>Media Production Team</td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>Medium Scale</td>
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<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Contingent Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCCHQ</td>
<td>National Contingent Commander’s Headquarters</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>OGDs</td>
<td>Other Government Departments</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLRT</td>
<td>Observation Liaison and Reconnaissance Team</td>
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<td>OPCOM</td>
<td>Operational Command</td>
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<td>Operational Control</td>
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<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>Operations Security</td>
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<td>P Info</td>
<td>Public Information</td>
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<td>PIC</td>
<td>Press Information Centre</td>
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<td>PJHQ</td>
<td>Permanent Joint Headquarters</td>
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<td>PJOB</td>
<td>Permanent Joint Operating Base</td>
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<td>POLAD</td>
<td>Political Adviser</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Meaning</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Presence, Posture, Profile</td>
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<td>PR</td>
<td>Public Relations</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSYOPS</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert</td>
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<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Small Scale</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPO</td>
<td>Unit Press Officer</td>
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