Non-combatant Evacuation Operations
Joint Warfare Publication 3-51
JOINT WARFARE PUBLICATION 3-51

NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

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As directed by the Chiefs of Staff

Director General Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre

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PREFACE

In the 3 years following the establishment of the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), it planned and deployed troops to 25 operations in 14 countries, spanning 3 continents. Of those 25 operations, 11 were contingency Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), of which 5 were actually conducted in Sierra Leone (2), the Republic of Congo, Eritrea and Albania.

Given the relative high frequency of NEOs and the absence of any endorsed doctrine, PJHQ produced the Joint Planning Guidance (JPG 1) in early 1998 with the aim of providing guidance for the planning and execution of a NEO. JWP 3-51 supersedes JPG 1 and broadens the parameters by including the joint tactics, techniques and procedures involved in the planning and execution of a NEO. Reflecting the primacy that the FCO will have during a NEO, JWP 3-51 was produced as a collaborative MOD/FCO project.

Change 1 represents a revision and update rather than a full review. The publication of merging NATO/EU doctrine on NEO may in future meet our national needs, but this would be subject to decision after its promulgation. Therefore, to ensure doctrinal consistency with NATO and likely NEO partners, the author worked in close coordination with allies, notably Canada and the custodian of AJP-3.4.2 ‘Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations’, in the production of Change 1 (December 03).

The aim of JWP 3-51 is to describe the joint tactics, techniques and procedures for the planning and execution of NEOs.
# NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

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JOINT WARFARE PUBLICATIONS

The successful prosecution of joint operations requires a clearly understood doctrine that is acceptable to all nations and Services concerned. It is UK policy that national doctrine should be consistent with NATO doctrine and, by implication, its terminology and procedures (other than those exceptional circumstances when the UK has elected not to ratify NATO doctrine). Notwithstanding, the requirement exists to develop national doctrine to address those areas not adequately covered, or at all, by NATO doctrine, and to influence the development of NATO doctrine. This is met by the development of a hierarchy of Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs).

As a general rule, JWPs of principal interest to Joint Force Commanders/ National Contingent Commanders and their staffs are situated ‘above the line’ in the hierarchy; while more detailed operational and tactical doctrine including Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (JTTPs) are positioned below.

Interim Joint Doctrine Pamphlets (IJWPs) are published as necessary to meet those occasions when a particular aspect of joint doctrine needs to be agreed, usually in a foreshortened timescale, either in association with a planned exercise or operation, or to enable another aspect of doctrinal work to be developed. This will often occur when a more comprehensive ‘parent’ publication is under development, but normally well in advance of its planned publication.

The Joint Doctrine Development Process, and its associated hierarchy of JWPs, is explained in DCI JS 91/03.
# RECORD OF AMENDMENTS

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CHAPTER 1 – OVERVIEW

101. A Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) is an operation conducted to relocate designated non-combatants threatened in a foreign country to a place of safety. Relocation may be temporary or permanent and the place of safety may be in the same country.¹ Non-combatants will be British nationals, including British military personnel classed as non-combatants, and other nationals, for whom Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) and HM Representative in the country have accepted responsibility. These evacuees are known as UK Entitled Persons (UKEP).² A NEO is classed as a limited intervention operation.³ A NEO is not, for example, an operation to evacuate or relocate refugees, which would normally be conducted under the auspices of the UN. The threat may be from a natural disaster, or conflict, or a complex combination of both. Such complex emergencies generally occur in an unstable State and may be conducted within the context of a wider Peace Support Operation (PSO).

FCO MISSION STATEMENT OBJECTIVE 6

‘To ensure the protection of British citizens abroad’

DEFENCE MISSION A

Peacetime Security

‘To provide forces needed in peacetime to ensure the protection and security of the United Kingdom, to assist as required with the evacuation of British nationals overseas, and to afford Military Aid to the Civil Authorities in the United Kingdom, including Military Aid to the Civil Power, Military Aid to Other Government Departments and Military Aid to the Civil Community.’

102. HMG discharges its responsibilities for the protection of British citizens overseas through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) assisted by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) as required. The FCO’s responsibility for evacuating British citizens falls under its Mission Statement Objective 6. The requirement for MOD to be prepared to support the conduct of a NEO is mandated in Defence Mission A and Military Task 124.2:

¹ JWP 0-01.1 ‘The UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions’
² A UKEP is any UK or other national covered by the Civil Contingency Plan (CCP) for a particular UK Mission/Post.
³ Limited Intervention Operations: Those operations, which have limited objectives such as the rescue of hostages, security of non-combatants or re-establishment of law and order. (JWP 0-01.1)
MILITARY TASK 4.2
Evacuation of British Citizens Overseas

“In cases where civil contingency plans prove insufficient, defence capabilities held for other purposes may be used to evacuate United Kingdom entitled personnel from countries where their lives may be at risk”

SECTION I – OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

103. **Unpredictability.** Each NEO will take place in a unique and unpredictable environment. Frequently NEOs are conducted in rapidly deteriorating conditions, creating an atmosphere of uncertainty and tension. They may be in circumstances where the Host Nation (HN) government or other authorities, overwhelmed by disaster or defeat, have ceased to function effectively, or have been overthrown without replacement. Where there is conflict the level of intensity will vary. State, regional, and localised violence will feature in a complex emergency containing many different factions with conflicting motives and agendas. Thus a low intensity conflict, in which a NEO has been initiated, may experience sporadic, localised and unpredictable periods of higher levels of intensity or deteriorate rapidly and permanently into a high intensity conflict. Therefore the campaign plan must be flexible and easily adaptable, with sequels and branches identified during the Estimate.

104. **Permissiveness.** The degree of permissiveness of the operational environment, defined in terms of the potential opposition to the operation, and the risk both to the evacuees and to the Joint Task Force (JTF) conducting the NEO, will determine its nature and conduct. There are 3 levels of permissiveness:

PERMISSIVE

UNCERTAIN

HOSTILE

105. **Permissive Environment.** A NEO conducted in a permissive environment would most commonly occur following a natural disaster or civil unrest. Under these conditions no resistance to evacuation is expected. In such circumstances there will be HN consent and most likely Host Nation Support (HNS) for the evacuation of those wishing to leave. Therefore scheduled or chartered civil aircraft and shipping would be used if possible (see Paragraph 306). Although military resources are unlikely to be required to provide security, they may be needed for logistic support such as emergency medical treatment and transport. Military staffs will monitor and evaluate
the situation closely and plan for a range of contingencies, including a deteriorating situation and descent into a less permissive environment.

106. **Uncertain Environment.** A NEO conducted in an uncertain environment would most commonly occur following an insurrection, when the HN government does not have effective control of the territory and/or population in an area containing potential UKEP. There are often elements, armed or unarmed, organised or disorganised, that create a climate of insecurity and a threat to potential UKEP. Under these circumstances, the HN government has effective control of the majority of its security forces and is not expected to interfere with the conduct of a NEO. However HNS is less likely to be available or reliable. Planning for NEOs conducted in an uncertain environment must anticipate the possibility of escalation to a hostile environment.

107. **Hostile Environment.** A NEO conducted in a hostile environment would most commonly occur when the HN civil and military authorities have lost control or have ceased to function altogether and there is general breakdown in law and order. Potential UKEP may be directly targeted and their lives increasingly threatened. The HN’s security forces **cannot** be expected to support, and may even obstruct, a NEO. In such an environment, the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) must be prepared for a wide range of contingencies.

**Case Study 1: No Military Involvement**

In May 1998 there was civil disorder in Indonesia which led to the resignation of President Suharto. From the Consulate offices on the 19th floor above the tension, the consular staff watched in horror and disbelief as smoke billowed from fires raging all over Jakarta. Rioting had escalated after 4 students had been killed 2 days before.

In unstable countries, consular offices normally establish a warden organisation to contact and marshal UKEP. Fortunately, the warden system had been kept up-to-date, but with over 4,000 British nationals registered with the Embassy, there was much to do to make sure resident British nationals had the information they needed.

Vital support was given throughout the crisis by locally employed Consulate staff. Drivers delivered passports to British nationals who could not get to the Consulate, and travel advice was updated daily on the Embassy’s web site. Spouses and British Council staff volunteered to answer 24-hour emergency telephones. As well as local support, extra UK-based officers were flown in from Hong Kong and Singapore to provide help. Commercial flights were operating throughout the crisis but, at the Embassy’s request, British Airways put on 3 extra commercial flights.
SECTION II – CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

108. **FCO/MOD Culture and Ethos.** The successful conduct of a NEO requires that the FCO and MOD work as a team. Both Departments have to recognise and interests,\(^4\) will wish to remain diplomatically engaged for as long as possible and accommodate the other’s different culture and ethos. The FCO, whose purpose is to **promote** British avoid both inadvertent political signals and unnecessary commitment. The MOD, whose purpose is to **defend** British interests,\(^5\) will have a preference for timely military planning, early deployment, particularly of reconnaissance and liaison elements, and pre-emptive action. This can create a dynamic tension between diplomatic and military requirements. The military option is invariably seen as the last resort and thus any FCO request to deploy a JTF may not, from a military perspective, be the best timing. Nowhere is this tension more clearly demonstrated than in the responsibilities entrusted to HM Representative. His duty, to represent the interests of HMG to the country to which he is accredited, will demand that he remain at his post for as long as possible. Conversely, his responsibility for the safety of both his staff and UKEP will place pressure on him to call for an evacuation sooner rather than later. Liaison throughout the chain of command will improve the MOD/FCO interface and overcome potential misunderstandings over requirement, capability and timelines.

109. **Multinationality.** Whilst the UK retains the capability to operate unilaterally, NEOs, by definition, are multinational in nature. As well as the foreign country being evacuated inevitably there will be other nations involved to varying degrees. Neighbouring countries will have to be consulted over a range of issues such as overflight rights or staging of UK forces. Other nations will be considering deploying forces to evacuate their own nationals, or requesting others to do so on their behalf. The time at which other nations intend to implement their evacuation plans may influence the precise timing of any UK decision to evacuate. All recent UK NEOs have been de-conflicted or co-ordinated to a greater or lesser extent with other nations operations.

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**Case Study 2: International Co-operation**

In June 1998 an army mutiny in Guinea-Bissau necessitated the evacuation of foreign nationals. Some 30 Britons were amongst those evacuated by a Portuguese cargo ship whilst a French warship evacuated a variety of other foreign nationals.

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\(^4\) ‘The Mission of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office is to promote the national interests of the United Kingdom and to contribute to a strong world community.’ The Government’s Expenditure Plans Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1999-00 to 2001-02 dated March 1999.
110. **Constraints.** UK operations will always be subject to political, legal and practical constraints, the majority of which are strongly influenced by the level of national interest at stake. The scale of HM Forces committed to a NEO and the constraints imposed upon them will be decided by the Secretary of State for Defence in light of advice/requests from the FCO. Political and legal constraints will shape the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and will probably limit the JTFC’s ability to take pre-emptive military action to identify and defend against hostile acts and intentions. The sovereignty of the country to be evacuated normally has to be respected together with its national laws and customs. In a hostile environment the level of force the JTFC may require to overcome any local security force opposition may be so high as to be politically unacceptable, rendering a NEO impossible. Financial considerations are likely to constrain the size, method and duration of the JTF’s deployment.

111. **United Kingdom’s Entitled Persons’ Perceptions.** UKEP will comprise a disparate collection of individuals and groups who may have little or nothing in common save that they are all caught up in the same crisis. Only willing UKEP will be evacuated. The decision to be evacuated will be a personal one taken for a variety of motives. UKEP willingness or reluctance to leave will depend on individual perceptions. UKEP who are non-residents of the country to be evacuated, such as tourists and visiting business people can be expected to leave early and wish to be repatriated. Resident expatriates will be much more reluctant to abandon their homes and livelihoods, will wish to be evacuated no further than is necessary if at all, and will want to return as soon as possible. Aid workers and missionaries inspired by moral and religious ideals may prefer martyrdom to deserting their cause. Recent experience highlights the paradox that deployment of a JTF into an uncertain environment is likely to create a false sense of security amongst some UKEP. They may perceive either that the JTF will ameliorate the threat, thus rendering their departure unnecessary or, should the situation deteriorate, that the JTF will be able to come to their rescue at the last moment, thus allowing them to delay their departure and hang on. This increases the difficulty of conducting a timely and effective evacuation and is illustrated at Figure 1.1.

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5‘The purpose of the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces is to defend the United Kingdom, the Overseas Territories, British people and interests; and to act as a force for good by strengthening international peace and security.’ The Government’s Expenditure Plans Ministry of Defence 1999-00 to 2001-02 dated March 1999.
112. **Media.** The media have the ability to make uncensored live global broadcasts and file instant reports from the Joint Operations Area (JOA). Thus there is the risk that international leaders, politicians, belligerent parties and the general public - at home and abroad - may receive information about military activities at the same time, or even before, the JTFC. Anyone with access to the Internet can comment upon the situation in order to exploit it for their own ends. The most effective way to influence perceptions favourably is to initiate a comprehensive and pro-active Media Operations plan at an early stage in the preparations for the operation and to update it regularly (see Paragraph 320). Points to note are:

a. Advertising the presence of UK forces can sometimes be counter-productive in persuading UKEP to leave (see Paragraph 111).

b. NEOs will invariably be deluged with media seeking a story. An effective and robust crisis management organisation which issues clear, unambiguous and timely ‘lines to take’ as well as experienced media operations personnel on the ground, will be required. Senior and knowledgeable ‘talking heads’ (who have had media techniques training) will also be required in theatre if the NEO continues for any length of time.
SECTION III – COMMAND AND CONTROL

113. **Military in Subordinate Role.** The FCO’s primacy is a key feature of NEOs, thus it is important for the balance of responsibilities between military and diplomatic/civilian staffs to be understood by all when planning and executing an evacuation.

114. **Complexity.** The political sensitivity of the operation will ensure that it will be monitored, and to a degree, may even be controlled at the highest level. It is likely that the FCO and MOD will use their own separate chains of command, which are brought together at ministerial level, where the FCO has precedence. Co-ordination and liaison will probably be complex, frequently involving a number of other different agencies and Non-government Organisations (NGOs). Depending on the HN Government’s degree of control, it may be necessary for the JTFC to establish direct liaison in separate areas of government, including the local security forces, airspace control and port authorities, as well as with commercial agencies and individual NGOs. This will require recognition and a clear articulation of mutual aims, to ensure co-operation wherever possible.

115. **Operational Chain of Command.** The operational chain of command is outlined below.\(^6\)

a. Within the policy determined by Ministers, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) issues military strategic direction and appoints the Joint Commander (Jt Comd) and the JTFC.

b. The Jt Comd, usually the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO), will exercise operational command (OPCOM) from the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ). He is responsible for directing, deploying, sustaining and recovering the JTF.

c. The JTFC will exercise operational control (OPCON) usually from the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) deployed in the JOA. He is responsible for producing the campaign plan and conducting the NEO when ordered. In most NEOs the JTFHQ will be formed from the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) augmented as necessary. The size and location of the JTFHQ will depend on the situation. The rank of the JTFC will be determined by the scale of the operation, may be from any Service, and could be forward deployed, for example in a maritime platform.

116. **HM Representative/Joint Task Force Commander Relationship.** Within the JOA the JTFC will be subordinate to HM Representative, who is not in the military chain of command, but as the senior UK government official on scene is responsible for giving the executive order to evacuate. Whenever possible, either the JTFC or his

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\(^6\) For a fuller explanation of command arrangements refer to JWP 3-00 ‘Joint Operations Execution’ Chapter 2.
Deputy should collocate with HM Representative to ensure detailed co-ordination and development of both the diplomatic and military plans. Once the decision to evacuate by military means has been made, the JTFC assumes responsibility for execution.

117. **Tactical Command.** At the tactical level, Component Commanders (CCs) should be identified early enough to contribute to the JTFC’s operational estimate. They should be intimately involved in the staffing of the campaign plan. The JTFC will designate each CC as a Supported or Supporting Commander for assigned tasks. During Phase 3 Evacuation Operations (see Paragraphs 419) the CC tasked with the JTFC’s Main Effort, the safe evacuation of UKEP, will be the Supported tactical Evacuation Commander responsible for the evacuation. The Evacuation Commander will use his own organic C2 structure, adapted as appropriate, to provide C2 of the evacuation process. In some small scale NEOs the JTFC may elect to exercise direct command over assigned forces and act as the Evacuation Commander using his staff in an appropriately configured JTFHQ.

118. **Advance Force Command and Control.** UK forces already deployed in theatre prior to the Jt Comd being appointed and operating under different command arrangements, such as forward deployed maritime platforms or military close protection, should normally be placed under OPCOM the Jt Comd as soon as he has the means to take command of them. Local command arrangements must be established for UK advance forces operating in theatre prior to the establishment of the JTFHQ.

119. **Multinational Command.** Precedent suggests that national interests mandate separate national operations, which have been deconflicted where possible with other nations plans, rather than a single multinational operation. However, close co-operation leading to more co-ordinated operations has been a defining feature of recent NEOs in Africa. In future it is increasingly likely that UK forces may act in concert with other nations as part of an ad hoc coalition. The ability to obtain unity of effort within a multinational force, potentially in the face of competing national agendas, will be a key factor in a time-sensitive NEO. National interests will always dominate even in multinational operations, requiring a UK National Contingent Commander (NCC) to hold the UK ‘Red Card’ when the UK is not acting as the lead nation.
SECTION IV – OUTLINE CONCEPT

120. **Concept.** The requirement is to receive evacuees, to process and to screen them as early as possible and then move them, possibly through a number of points, to a place of safety. Figure 1.2 illustrates this concept. The emphasis though should be on function rather than geography.

![Diagram of Outline Concept](image)

- **FMB** = Forward Mounting Base
- **EHC** = Evacuation Handling Centre
- **FOB** = Forward Operating Base
- **EvPt** = Evacuation Point
- **RC** = Reception Centre

**Figure 1.2 – Outline Concept**

121. **Initiation.** The responsibility for initiating a NEO rests with HM Representative in consultation with the FCO. Thus prior to any decision to execute a NEO, close co-ordination between the FCO, HM Representative and the JTFC will be essential.

122. **Information Gathering.** The provision of timely information will be key to the success of an operation. The value of early, accurate information cannot be overstated (see Paragraph 403). Low-key planning recces can also be conducted in countries with a potential NEO requirement to inform both FCO and MOD planning.
123. **Deployment and Theatre Entry.** Airlift might deploy the JTF either directly to the country to be evacuated or staged at an intermediate base. The JTF could be embarked in maritime assets, forward deployed, or redeployed given time. Dependent upon the potential UKEP’s proximity to a coastline, an embarked JTF can poise before commitment and provide a seabase and place of safety, thereby reducing both the duration and size of the JTF in country, and minimising the sustainment requirement. Dependant on the environment the NEO may require an amphibious, airborne or air landed insertion.

124. **Components of a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation.** The major components of a NEO are:

   a. **Forward Mounting Base.** A Forward Mounting Base (FMB) is a secure base, port or airfield, from which an operation may be launched. It is normally, but not necessarily, external to the theatre of operations and may be an essential stepping-stone into the theatre. A FMB should have the capacity for an insertion force to form-up within it and subsequently to be able to handle reinforcements, reserves and evacuees. Depending on the scale of an operation, the FMB may also be required to provide Third and/or Fourth Line support.\(^7\)

   b. **Forward Operating Base.** A Forward Operating Base (FOB) is a base established within the operational area, to support tactical operations. It will be resourced to provide minimum services commensurate with sustaining the required level of effort.\(^8\)

   c. **Warden System.** The Warden System is a network of volunteers, usually selected from among well-known members of the British community, known as wardens, who act as a point of contact between HM Representative and the wider British community. They pass information and instructions by a cascade system with each warden usually being responsible for no more than 20 families.

   d. **Civil Contingency Plan.** A Civil Contingency Plan (CCP), produced by the Embassy/High Commission, establishes the Warden System and provides a procedure for an orderly evacuation if required (see Paragraph 302).

   e. **Reception Centre.** Reception Centres (RCs) are pre-designated sites, selected by HM Representative as part of the CCP, where UKEP enter the evacuation chain and are gathered by their local warden (see Paragraph 506).

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\(^7\) JWP 4-00 ‘Logistics for Joint Operations’ Chapter 5 Paragraph 518.
\(^8\) JWP 0-01.1 ‘UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions’.
f. **Evacuation Point.** Evacuation Points (EvPts) are sites where the wardens deliver the UKEP for extraction and where the military assume responsibility. They are selected by HM Representative, often with military advice and are normally designated in the CCP (see Paragraph 509).

g. **Evacuation Handling Centre.** The primary purpose of the EHC is to organise the onward movement of the UKEP to a place of safety. It will also provide a screening facility to ensure that only entitled evacuees are moved and will have the administrative arrangements needed for the provision of adequate medical and logistic support. (see Paragraph 514).

h. **Place of Safety.** A place of safety is where UKEP exit the evacuation chain and are no longer reliant on diplomatic or military assistance. There will be a number of different places of safety dependent on the needs and perceptions of individual UKEP (see Paragraph 525).

125. **Outline Procedure.** The conduct of a NEO is detailed in Chapters 4 and 5. The outline procedure is illustrated in Figure 1.3. The JTF will deploy via a FMB, seabase, or FOB as necessary to secure EvPts and also the EHC if required. When notified by HM Representative through the Warden System, UKEP make their own way to their nearest RC. A designated warden will gather the UKEP at the RC and move them to an EvPt, with JTF assistance where necessary. At the EvPts the JTFC takes responsibility for UKEP and will protect and move them to the EHC. At the EHC, assisted by the JTF as necessary, the FCO resumes responsibility for UKEP and, having established entitlement, will facilitate their repatriation or other onward movement to a place of safety as required. The RC, EvPt, EHC and place of safety should be considered in terms of their functions and not as distinct geographic locations, allowing co-location when appropriate. UKEP may enter and leave the evacuation chain at any point. Screening of potential UKEP to establish their entitlement should take place as far forward in the evacuation chain as possible. However screening must not delay the evacuation process or place potential UKEP, diplomatic staff or military personnel at unnecessary risk.
Figure: 1.3 - Outline Evacuation Process
CHAPTER 2 – THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE’S APPROACH TO NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

201. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Consular Division in UK in general and HM Representative in country in particular have the responsibility for the evacuation of British nationals. In countries where there is a perceived threat from civil unrest/natural disaster, HM Representative is charged with maintaining a Civil Contingency Plan (CCP) which provides a framework for passing information to the British community in time of crisis, and to provide a procedure for conducting an orderly evacuation. Commercial evacuation possibilities should first be explored. As a last resort, a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) may have to be conducted using military resources and military protection, but the responsibility for calling a NEO will remain with HM Representative in consultation with the FCO.

SECTION I – ROLE OF THE FCO

Key Facts

- In 2001 – 2002 there were a record 56.7 million visits abroad by UK residents.
- An estimated 14.2 million British nationals live overseas.
- In 1997 consular offices overseas evacuated some 900 British nationals.
- In 1998, evacuations were organised from Jakarta (May), Eritrea and Guinea-Bissau (June), Lesotho (September), and Sierra Leone (December).

202. Functions. The FCO establishes its Posts to fulfill several functions, including:

a. Carry out foreign policy.

b. Promote understanding overseas of Britain’s foreign and domestic policies.

c. Negotiate, analyse and report on developments abroad.

d. Protect British nationals abroad.

e. Promote British exports abroad and seek inward investment.
203. **Overseas Structure.** The work of Diplomatic Missions overseas is normally broken down into 6 sections:

a. Political (usually called Chancery).

b. Consular/VISA (including entry clearance).

c. Commercial/economic/inward investment.

d. Press and Public Affairs.

e. Defence.

f. Management (internal administration).

All staff in the Sections above report to the Ambassador or High Commissioner (the Head of Mission), through a Deputy Head of Mission. For the purposes of this publication the Head of Mission is generically referred to as HM Representative.

g. **Size and Composition of Posts.** When considering a NEO the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) should note that almost half of Britain’s overseas Posts have 4 or fewer staff from the UK; 24 have only one. In addition to the Posts with UK-based staff, there are 25 Posts staffed entirely by locally engaged staff. There are a further 257 Honorary Posts in 90 countries. In smaller Posts therefore, there may be one officer responsible for political, press and public affairs, commercial and economic reporting; with another responsible for consular, entry clearance and management work. Responsibilities will vary according to the size of the Mission and the number of staff who work in it.

204. **Consular Emergency Unit.** There is a team of 6 consular officers who are on permanent stand-by to operate the FCO’s London-based Emergency Unit in the Consular Division whenever there is a major emergency/disaster overseas that could involve British nationals. A telephone ‘helpline’ is publicised through the media to ensure friends and relatives can remain informed on changing events.

205. **UK Obligations.** UK, and its EU partners, has a formal obligation to assist each other’s nationals in the event of an evacuation. This might mean, for example, that if the UK has no military assets in an area and another EU country does, then they will be requested, by the FCO, to evacuate UK nationals along with their own; and vice versa. UK also has an unwritten but clear understanding with the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand that if any of the 5 countries is arranging to evacuate their

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1 As of April 1999.
nationals from a crisis zone, they will offer to take the nationals of the other countries also. In practice, such evacuations often end up being a combined effort. Other nationalities are included on a space available basis, subject to guarantees of repayment of evacuation costs by their respective governments.

### Case Study 3: A Range of Other Nationals

The list below illustrates the wide range of other nationals for which the UK often takes responsibility and includes as UKEP. On 15 May 1997 during the NEO from Zaire, the UK was responsible for the following numbers of evacuees:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British Citizens, British Overseas Citizens, British Protected Persons</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1463</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additionally, France had responsibility for 800, Belgium had 1400, the US had 200 and Portugal had 500, all of mixed nationalities.
SECTION II – THE FCO’S NEO RESPONSIBILITIES

206. The FCO carries political responsibility for a NEO. MOD operations take place within this overall political responsibility. When considering a NEO, the FCO is responsible for the following specific actions:

a. Initiating a request for MOD assistance and obtaining political approval (drawing on the experience/advice of the Defence Attaché/Advisor (DA) where necessary).

b. In consultation with MOD, assisting in burden-sharing negotiations with other friendly countries involved.

c. Providing political advice on the circumstances for a potential NEO; where appropriate, to MOD on aircraft routing and negotiating requests for diplomatic clearance for over-flight and staging.

d. Assisting in the provision of visas and the Diplomatic Bagging of specialist military equipment.

e. Providing and arranging dispatch of consular processing teams if the FCO or HM Representative feel that reinforcement of staff on the ground is necessary.

f. Establishing and running the Evacuation Handling Centre (EHC) with military assistance as required. Arranging reception and onward movement of UK Entitled Persons (UKEP) from the EHC. Onward movement to the UK is arranged in conjunction with the Home Office, Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DTLR), and other government departments (OGDs).

g. Assisting in the arrangements for the provision of Host Nation Support (HNS) and local resources as required for the support of the Joint Task Force (JTF) at the Forward Mounting Base (FMB).

h. Advising the Home Office of numbers and disembarkation points of evacuees arriving in the UK who do not have leave to remain.

i. Recovering the cost of the evacuation, where appropriate, from each evacuee (i.e. when the FCO charters an aircraft each evacuee is asked to sign an Undertaking to Repay (UTR) to recover the cost. This is not done for an evacuation using military transport, however MOD may seek to recover additional costs from the FCO (in certain circumstances).
207. **In Country.** HM Representative is responsible for:

a. Giving the executive order to evacuate after considering military advice where appropriate.

b. Maintaining the CCP.

c. Maintaining a British Community Register (BCR).\(^2\)

d. Maintaining the Warden System for the dissemination of information.

(1) The warden maintains contact with British nationals in his/her designated area, passes on advice from HM Representative, organises the assembly of evacuees at Reception Centres (RCs) where necessary, and oversees their movement to Evacuation Points (EvPts) when asked to do so.

(2) Apart from using wardens, Posts also use other means to contact British nationals in a crisis. Some set up a staff roster and contact Britons direct; others make use of modern technology where possible by posting advice by E-mail and fax modem, and on the Embassy/High Commission’s website or answerphone. In countries where communications are poor, the FCO equips wardens with radios.

(3) Consular Division in London and the BBC World Service work together to alert British nationals to any emergency. At the Division’s request, the BBC broadcasts announcements to Britons in any country where local conditions have arisen that threaten their safety.

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**Case Study 4: Communications**

In May 1998 there was serious unrest in Indonesia leading to the resignation of President Suharto. In what was a confusing and unpredictable situation, a total of 3 extra commercial flights were laid on to take Britons out of the area. The efforts of Embassy staff helped ensure that most British nationals had the information they needed. But the Embassy was not able to reach all those who needed to be kept informed, and several important lessons were learned from the crisis. The Embassy in Jakarta is now making more use of modern technology to send advice out to the British community by E-mail and fax modem. It has a permanent Internet Homepage and recorded message system in place.

\(^2\) Military readers should not confuse this with Battle Casualty Replacement (BCR).
e. Through the Warden system:
   
   (1) Collating accurate data of the number, location, condition and identity of UKEP to inform the BCR.

   (2) Gathering UKEP at the RCs.

   (3) Transfer of the UKEP from the RCs to the EvPts.

f. Providing the political link with the HN.

g. Liaising with the JTFC when a military operation is required to evacuate UKEP. The timings and procedure must be agreed between the JTFC and HM Representative before the evacuation starts.

h. Liaison and, where necessary, co-ordination of the commencement of the evacuation with other nations’ representatives whose nationals may be involved.

i. Arranging the screening of applicants for evacuation. Local FCO staff, supplemented as necessary from the UK, will be deployed for this task wherever possible.

j. Co-ordinating provision of local resources including transport, accommodation, equipment, fuel, water and medical facilities for the military and/or evacuees where necessary.

208. **Reception of Evacuees in the UK.** Sometimes the destination of evacuees will be the UK (e.g. when they are UK residents or it is the most practical option). If UKEP are evacuated to the UK and do not have leave to enter/remain, the FCO will alert the Home Office and the DTLR of the numbers arriving and their disembarkation points. There may be a requirement for debriefing of both civilian and service personnel. Arrangements will be made as follows:

   a. **Civilians Arriving at Military Airfields.** All the reception arrangements for passengers and baggage will be undertaken by either a resident RAF Air Movements Squadron or a UK Mobile Air Movements Squadron (MAMS) team.

   b. **Civilians Arriving at Civilian Airports.** The Home Office will process evacuees through immigration in the usual way.

   c. **Evacuees Arriving by Sea.** The MOD is responsible for making arrangements with the port authorities for the handling of passengers arriving by sea. The FCO will alert local Social Services to provide help with any temporary accommodation or dispersal of passengers that may be required.
d. **Casualties.** HM Representative is responsible for informing FCO of the number and condition of casualties to be evacuated. Suitable arrangements will then be made to evacuate casualties by either civil or military means.

e. **Repatriation of Dead Evacuees.** If dead UKEP are to be repatriated the coroner covering the port of disembarkation must be informed (see Paragraph 601h).

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3 Full details of the aeromedical evacuation organisation and responsibilities are contained in Air Publication (AP) 3394. Aeromedical evacuation of casualties will be organised through the Aeromedical Tasking Cell at HQ STC. For a military operation these activities will be co-ordinated by JFHQ.
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
CHAPTER 3 – PLANNING

SECTION I – EMBASSY/HIGH COMMISSION PLANNING

301. Normally it is in the final stage of the Civil Contingency Plan (CCP) that a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) is initiated. Once initiated the key to the coordination of CCP and NEO activities is to identify when military action is needed on the ground to support ongoing Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) evacuation and shape the earlier NEO phases to achieve this.

302. **Civil Contingency Planning.** For civil contingency planning purposes diplomatic Posts are designated category A or B. Category A Posts, where it is considered there may be a threat from some sort of civil disorder, must have a CCP and a British Community Register (BCR). The CCP should be updated annually and whenever trouble threatens. Category B Posts are not required to keep a CCP although there may be a requirement for a plan to cover the possibility of a natural disaster. All posts, regardless of category are required to maintain a Consular Emergency Plan (CEP)/Disaster Action Plan. The CEP differs from a CCP in that it provides a framework to help to respond to major events overseas involving UK nationals such as a natural disaster, terrorist incident, aircraft crash. The objectives of a CCP are:

   a. To protect the British community - normally in a deteriorating environment.

   b. To provide the links between HM Representative and the British community for passing information in a time of crisis.

   c. Depending on the level of threat, to provide a procedure for conducting an orderly evacuation of UKEP by commercial means.

303. **NEO Lessons Identified for Civil Contingency Plans.** Experience from recent operations where a CCP has been implemented has identified the minimum requirements for an effective CCP. It must:

   a. Cover the practical details of carrying out an evacuation, including a system for manning an evacuation co-ordination room.

   b. Have an agreed priority for citizens wishing to be evacuated, including other nationals.

   c. Contain a method for producing and updating lists of evacuees.

   d. Include tried and tested radio equipment and associated batteries.
e. Ensure robust communications between at least the lead and rear vehicles of convoys. Hand-held radios are preferable although mobile phones may be used if radios are not available.

f. Ensure staff and wardens are practised in the use of radio equipment, its limitations, and basic voice procedures.

g. Plan regular briefing sessions with wardens, which should include wardens in residence bringing enough food and water with them to last for 24 hours.

h. Ensure CCP routes are checked prior to use. Those in charge of vehicle convoys must have maps and be briefed before the move.

304. **Implementation.** HM Representative is the authority for declaring the stages of the CCP, in consultation with the FCO, as the situation deteriorates. CCPs are normally implemented in 3 stages, usually after UK nationals have been advised to avoid non-essential travel to the country concerned:

a. **Stage I.** The Community is advised to keep their heads down and stay at home.

b. **Stage II.** ‘Go Unless Urgent Need to Stay’. Those who have no urgent need to remain are advised to leave by normal commercial transport.

c. **Stage III.** ‘Go’. Members of the community are advised:

   (1) To leave under their own arrangements, if commercial means still exist, or

   (2) To report to Reception Centres (RCs) for military evacuation under arrangements made by HM Representative – a NEO.

If HM Representative believes that the evacuation can be effected without military support, evacuees will be instructed to report directly to the Evacuation Point (EvPt) (usually a port or airfield) for onward movement by FCO chartered transport. Evacuees may be ferried from RCs in country to the EvPt by FCO chartered buses.

305. **Closure of the Embassy/High Commission.** When calling for a NEO, HM Representative will decide whether to remain at his/her post or to close the Embassy/High Commission and leave as well. Factors affecting this decision include; the level of threat to diplomatic staff and the Embassy/High Commission, the ability of HM Representative to continue to carry out his function and the degree to which UKEP’s willingness to be evacuated is influenced by HM Representative remaining. The measures required to effect an orderly closure of a diplomatic Post will impact on
simultaneously conducting a NEO. Diplomatic staff and resources will be required to prepare the Post for closure and some military assistance may be required.

### Case Study 5: Embassy Closure

In 1998 during the NEO from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), in considering whether to close the Embassy in Kinshasa, HM Ambassador’s first priority was his responsibility for the safety of his staff as diplomatic status ceased to be respected by increasingly ill-disciplined local security forces. He had to weigh up his ability to continue to represent British interests in a rapidly deteriorating environment in which most government ministers had defected from the capital to the interior. He had to evaluate the longer-term impact of closure on British influence both in the DRC and in the wider region. He had to seek the opinions of other Ambassadors. He had to consider the increasing risk the Joint Task Force (JTF) would face as the environment became more hostile. He also had to take into account the safety of those UK Entitled Persons (UKEP) who had declared their intention to remain in the country as long as the embassy remained open. Lastly he had to consider the likely loss of the large financial investment in the Embassy compound infrastructure. Preparations to close the embassy would have limited the number of diplomatic staff available to simultaneously carry out the CCP and would also have affected the Embassy’s ability to communicate.

### Transition to a Military Non-combatant Evacuation Operation

Whilst civilian transport would almost certainly be used to evacuate UKEP from a permissive environment and for onward movement from the EHC, military assets would be required when civilian carriers:

- Become overwhelmed by the demand for spaces.
- Terminate the service for security reasons.
- Cannot react quickly enough to provide the service.

In an uncertain environment, with the likelihood that military assistance may be required, a PJHQ Liaison Officer (LO) or Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) (see Paragraph 404) should be deployed to act as a link between PJHQ, the JTF and HM Representative, in order to facilitate a seamless transition from an evacuation based on commercial means to that which requires military assets. Although highly desirable, it may be impossible to insert the LO or OLRT under uncertain conditions.
307. **Operational Military Advice.** If deployed, the following would be able to provide military advice to assist consular staff in preparing a CCP and HM Representative in making his decision to request a NEO:

a. The Defence Attaché (DA).

b. Routine staff visits from PJHQ/JFHQ.

c. A Military Intelligence Liaison Officer (MILO) (see Paragraph 404 a).

d. A Special Forces or Royal Military Police Close Protection Team (SF CPT/RMP CPT) \(^1\) (see Paragraph 406).

e. An OLRT (see Paragraph 408).

**SECTION II – MILITARY PLANNING**

308. **The Planning Sequence.** In-depth military planning should commence as soon as possible. Where time permits, daily co-ordination meetings are held in the FCO bringing together all involved departments and agencies. The MOD crisis management planning process applies to NEOs as it does to any other operation. The planning process is outlined below. For a fuller explanation refer to UKOPSDOC.

a. The Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) will stand up a Current Commitments Team (CCT) in MOD HQ, which conducts a Grand Strategic Estimate to inform the CDS Planning Directive.

b. MOD HQ issues the CDS Planning Directive to PJHQ and the Support Commands.

c. On receipt of this directive a PJHQ Contingency Planning Team (PJHQ CPT) will form in the PJHQ and, in conjunction with the CCT, will conduct a military strategic estimate to establish a preferred course of action and develop a plan to cover the direction, deployment, sustainment and recovery of allocated forces. To ensure continuity, the JFHQ is also represented on the PJHQ CPT.

d. Once the course of action has been agreed by ministers, a CDS directive will be issued to the Jt Comd authorising deployment of UK forces.

e. The Jt Comd will then issue his Mission Directive for the NEO formally appointing the JTFC, defining the Joint Operations Area (JOA) and constraints for the operation. The Jt Comd is responsible for deploying, sustaining and

\(^1\) Not to be confused with a PJHQ CPT - Contingency Planning Team.
recovering the JTF. Once the operation moves from planning to execution the PJHQ CPT will transition to an Operations Team (OT) – the basic composition of the team stays the same but leadership changes from J5 to J3.

f. The JTFC and his staff will develop a concept of operations and the Campaign plan.

Although hierarchical, much of this sequence occurs concurrently as an iterative process. The Supporting Commands and Director Special Forces (DSF) are an integral part of the planning process throughout. Much of the development of the campaign plan will require direct consultation and liaison with the FCO. Concurrency of FCO (who have primacy) and MOD planning activities during a crisis is shown at Figure 3.1.

309. **Timeliness.** Timescales for planning, Ministerial consideration and the issue of directives can vary from hours to weeks. A NEO may be required to start soon after the political decision to commit forces, and as quickly as militarily practicable. On these occasions the full planning process may have to be abbreviated.

310. **Contingency Plans.** To assist in the planning process PJHQ maintains a series of contingency plans:

a. **Military Contingency Plans.** These are prepared and updated by PJHQ on instructions from MOD HQ. The level of detail contained in the plan will vary with the assessed likelihood of its use. In increasing level of detail, the 3 types of plan are:

   (1) **Joint Planning Guide.** Joint Planning Guides (JPGs) contain general planning data for a particular region or country, which can be used as the basis for more detailed planning during an emerging crisis.

   (2) **Joint Contingency Plan.** Joint Contingency Plan (JCPs) contain more detailed information on force requirements, deployment options and readiness states, but will require further detailed work as a crisis develops.

   (3) **Operational Plan.** An Operational Plan (OPLAN) contains sufficient detail for a specific operation to be conducted. OPLANs require frequent updating to remain current, and as a result are restricted to operations likely to occur at very short notice.

b. **Defence Profiles and Intelligence Briefing Memoranda.** Two intelligence publications, the Defence Profile (DP) and Intelligence Briefing Memoranda (IBM) support the CCP and military contingency plans. The DP includes defence intelligence whilst the IBM covers data such as climate, topography and infrastructure.
Figure 3.1 - FCO and MOD Planning Process Framework
SECTION III – PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

311. NEO Planning Guidance. Annex 3A provides questions that may be used to provide a common framework for the planning and conduct of NEOs. The questions may serve as a detailed guide for the planning and operational dialogue between diplomats and military forces that must precede any successful NEO.

312. Multinational Force Issues. Additional issues to consider in a NEO conducted by a multinational force include:

a. Co-ordination between all the foreign and defence ministries and military headquarters of those nations involved.

b. A mechanism for the in-country diplomatic representatives of those nations involved to co-ordinate and reach agreement on the timing of any evacuation. It should be noted that some nations’ foreign ministries will retain responsibility for ordering a NEO whilst others will delegate this to their Ambassador/Head of Mission.

c. The formation of an effective military command system and infrastructure including a compatible communications plan, an intelligence system which can draw and share data from a number of multinational and national sources, and a logistic system which acknowledges the need for national support, but also caters for multinational needs.

d. The need for compromise will slow response times in multinational operations and may impact on the quality of decision-making.

e. The need to deploy and co-ordinate additional assets such as helicopters and transport, and the shared use of logistic facilities.

f. The selection of high-grade officers for staff and liaison functions to co-ordinate plans with other national contingents, HNs and other civilian agencies.

313. Strategic Communications. The allocation of strategic satellite communications resources is controlled by MOD. Communications planning is conducted by PJHQ based on direction from MOD.

a. Prior to the deployment of the JTFHQ, requests for communications assistance by HM Representative are authorised by MOD on application by the FCO. PJHQ J6 (Communications and Information Systems (CIS)) staff will be required to liaise with the FCO to agree the communications between Diplomatic Posts in-theatre and the deployed force. Similar liaison will be required for the JTFHQ J6 (CIS) staff, when deployed.
b. The JTFHQ will require a range of lightweight, rapidly deployable and secure CIS in order to provide appropriate links to other multinational forces (if applicable) and trunk connectivity to deployed UK components/unit headquarters in theatre.

314. **Search and Rescue.** Although UK currently does not have a specialist Combat Search and Rescue (SAR) capability, recent NEOs have identified the need for SAR in an uncertain or hostile NEO environment. To achieve this, the JTFC may establish a Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre to plan and co-ordinate SAR and Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) missions. Advice may be needed on aircraft defensive aid suites.

315. **Time.** Account must be taken of the Readiness Preparation Time (RPT) required for the JTF. RPT includes the Notice to Move (NTM), deployment time and any training required in the JOA prior to the JTF being ready to conduct operations. Time is usually at a premium for NEOs requiring rapidly deployable or forward deployed forces held at very high readiness.

**Information Operations**

316. Information Operations\(^3\) (Info Ops) are co-ordinated actions undertaken to influence (within the context of NEO) the Host Nation government, the local population and any parties to a conflict in the area, in support of the UK’s political and military objectives. Info Ops are the MOD contribution to the cross-government Information Campaign\(^4\) (Info Campaign), which incorporates both the management of information in the form of themes and messages and specific actions conducted with the intention of promoting a desired message. During initial planning the Directorate of Targeting and Information Operations (DTIO) and PJHQ J3 Ops Sp will prepare Info Ops guidelines for subsequent detailed planning. Once a NEO is ordered, PJHQ and JTFHQ will implement Info Ops at the operational and tactical levels under the overall direction of the MOD, through the DTIO, where the effectiveness of the Info Ops effort will be monitored and co-ordinated with the overall Info Campaign.

317. **Psychological Operations.**\(^5\) PSYOPS can greatly facilitate NEOs in uncertain or hostile environments, especially in the passage of pertinent information to UKEP. Dependent on the in-country infrastructure and situation, Electronic Warfare (EW) or other radio/TV assets may be needed to broadcast information and this should be included in Info Ops planning. PSYOPS could also be used to:

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\(^2\) Further details are contained in JWP 3-80 ‘Information Operations’.

\(^3\) Co-ordinated actions undertaken to influence an adversary or potential adversary in support of political and military objectives by undermining his will, cohesion and decision-making ability, through affecting his information, information based processes and systems while protecting one’s own decision-makers and decision-making processes. (JWP 3-80).

\(^4\) Co-ordinated information output of all government activity undertaken to influence decision-makers in support of policy objectives, while protecting one’s own decision-makers. (JWP 3-80).

\(^5\) Further details are contained in JWP 3-80.1 ‘Information Operations Tools’ Part 3.
a. Explain the purpose of the JTF action to counter disinformation, confusion and rumour.

b. Assist in establishing control of UKEP, neutral local populace and other groups, in order to minimise casualties and to prevent interference with friendly military operations.

c. Prevent or deter interference by hostile forces or other nations.

d. Provide initial and continuing analysis of political and cultural factors to aid planning and maximise the political and psychological effects of the operation.

e. Exploit withdrawal of UK forces while creating positive perceptions of UK intent and goodwill.

318. **Media Operations.** The guidelines for media operations are contained within JWP 3-45. There are a number of media issues which would need to be considered in a NEO including:

a. The Media Plan should be developed in light of guidance from the FCO News Department.

b. Consideration should be given to Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) ‘info-spheres’ such as Reuters’ AlertNet, US State Department’s Global Disaster Info Net and the UN Relief Web. Additionally, FCO, Department for International Development (DFID) and Board of Trade ‘stakeholders’ bring a wealth of knowledge and expertise to bear through interdepartmental influence on the planning process.

c. A NEO is likely to attract considerable media interest.

d. The accredited press may need to be protected.

e. Press with UKEP status will have to be included as potential evacuees.

f. The Media Operations staff’s response must be able to meet the fast tempo of a NEO.

g. Media Operations staff must deploy with robust communications capable of working within the area of operations and back to UK.

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6 The guidelines for media operations are contained within JWP 3-45.
h. Appropriate lines to take on high profile UKEP and delicate UKEP issues will need to be given. Some key planning issues and possible dilemmas are at Annex 3A.

i. Media Operations will be required to assist in the Information Support (Info Sp) plan.

SECTION IV – THE ESTIMATE PROCESS AND MISSION ANALYSIS

319. Prior to the operation and before decisions on force levels are made, a full estimate is conducted. The estimate is based upon intelligence of the area that allows the assessment of a worst-case hostile environment. The force should be task-organised accordingly. An outline NEO Estimate format is included at Annex 3B.

SECTION V – FORCES

320. Force Generation. Forces will generally be drawn from those assigned to the Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF) which incorporates maritime, land, air, SF and logistic forces with a wide range of capabilities and held at NTM ranging from 24 hrs to 30 days.

321. Notice to Move. MOD is the authority for the promulgation of NTM for all military assets. Early ministerial agreement to a reduction of notice, the redeployment of key units, advance sailing of ships and the recovery of RAF air transport aircraft may be essential for the timely implementation of a plan.

322. Capability Requirements. The composition of the JTF will depend on the likely military tasks and the situation in the JOA. In addition to C2 (see Paragraph 115) and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) (see Paragraph 404e) the capabilities required will include some or all of the following and will need to be reflected in the task organisation.

a. Manoeuvre. The strategic estimate will have involved a risk assessment that determined the number of transport assets required for the tactical extraction of the UKEP. At the operational level, maritime and air manoeuvre elements may be required to provide over-the-horizon deterrent activities. Tactical manoeuvre elements may be required to out-flank and/or coerce any potential opposition to guarantee mobility and, when necessary, provide counter-mobility resources. Helicopters are likely to be force multipliers, as will landing craft (including raiding craft and landing craft air cushioned (hovercraft)) in maritime or riverine scenarios.
b. **Protection.** Force elements such as infantry, combat support elements and defensive maritime and air assets may be required to protect HM Representative and other designated VIPs (see Paragraph 406); Consular Staff assisting with the evacuation; the evacuees; and transport assets such as AT. The requirement for force protection is likely to be paramount once the initial insertion of the military force is complete. The need for specialist Security capabilities, such as that provided by RAF Air Transport Security (ATSy), will be considered in the estimate.

c. **Fire Support.** Though NEOs are generally defensive in nature, a strong deterrent posture will often contribute to success. Thus a suitable level of offensive capability may be required. For example fire support may be used for close protection tasks as well as providing extended security to the RCs, EvPts, EHC and evacuation routes. The USMC use of AH-1W Cobra Attack Helicopters in the 1991 US Embassy evacuation in Mogadishu illustrates this requirement. Conversely the mission and ROE may dictate the deployment of non-lethal weapons.

d. **Control of the Electro-magnetic Spectrum.** Control of the Electro-magnetic (EM) Spectrum for offensive and defensive purposes can give the NEO force considerable advantage over any potential adversary. In a complex emergency there may well be a PSO military force and civilian agencies all competing with the HN and warring factions for space on the EM spectrum. Most of these forces and agencies will be outside the control of the NEO force. This will greatly complicate the management and protection of the EM spectrum for the JTF’s use. In a non-permissive environment, resources may be required to disrupt the radios and telephones of any opposition forces (see Paragraph 316).

e. **Sustainability.** A NEO will normally be of short duration thus minimising the sustainability requirements of the force (noting that sustainability became a key issue in the protracted Kinshasa NEO in 1998). However, the requirements of HM Representative’s staff and other evacuees may be considerable and certain evacuees, such as pregnant women and young children, may have specific requirements. Sustainability planning for the evacuees must be conducted for all phases of the operation until the UKEP are in a place of safety and no longer the responsibility of HMG.

f. **Strategic Lift.** Appropriate platforms will be required to deploy personnel, vehicles, equipment and stores to and from the JOA.
SECTION VI – OTHER AGENCIES

323. **The United Nations, International Organisations and Non-governmental Organisations.** In a country in which a NEO is required there will inevitably be a plethora of engaged UN as well as International Organisations (IOs) and NGOs. The UN, IOs and larger NGOs will generally have their own evacuation plans that they increasingly try and co-ordinate together. However, there may also be a large number of small independent NGOs operating unaware of the threat and therefore with no contingency plans. In an uncertain or hostile environment the UN will normally deploy a security officer from UN Security Ordnance (UNSECORD) who will attempt to develop and co-ordinate the various evacuation plans for the humanitarian community at large.

324. **The Commercial Sector.** Major multinational companies operating in-country will frequently have their own security arrangements and evacuation plans. They will have good local contacts and are likely to be well resourced with communications and transport assets.

325. **Liaison.** Deconfliction is essential to avoid these numerous civil agencies competing for resources and evacuation routes and duplicating effort with UK plans. Collaboration is highly desirable to achieve mutual benefit from pooling and sharing resources and plans. Planners must be aware of any political, cultural, professional and commercial sensitivities involved which will need resolution to avoid international or inter-agency friction. To achieve this liaison must be established as soon as possible both in theatre and from the UK. HM Representative will be responsible for overseeing liaison in theatre. The FCO will take the lead assisted by other governmental departments (OGDs) as required in international liaison with agency headquarters.
ANNEX 3A – NEO PLANNING GUIDANCE

This Annex\(^1\) provides questions that may be used to provide a common framework for evacuation planning and operations, as well as facilitating the operational dialogue between diplomats and military forces that must precede any successful NEO.

1. Will this be a permissive, uncertain or hostile NEO?
   a. If the evacuation is permissive, are unarmed hostilities expected?
   b. If the evacuation is uncertain or hostile, will theatre entry be necessary?
   c. What are the risks of security deteriorating and/or of terrorist activity?

2. What is the potential threat?
   a. Strength.
   b. Composition.
   c. Disposition.
   d. Probable tactics.
   e. Weapons available.

3. What is the current situation in the country? In the Embassy/High Commission? Near the UK Entitled Persons (UKEP)?

4. Who are the key personnel of the various Host Nations (HNs) and what are their attitudes toward the NEO?

5. Will the HN government(s) be providing any security for the NEO? What are the security forces:
   a. Locations?
   b. Unit types and identities?
   c. Strengths and capabilities?
   d. Liaison arrangements?

6. What are the HN(s) military forces:

\(^1\) Based on Annex D to US Joint Pub 3-07.5.
a. Location?
b. Availability?
c. Capability, discipline and effectiveness?
d. Loyalty to the HN government(s)?
e. Attitude to the UK?
f. Is factional infighting present?

7. What are the HN(s) police forces:
   a. Location?
   b. Availability?
   c. Capability, discipline and effectiveness?
   d. Loyalty to the HN government(s)?
   e. Attitude to the UK?
   f. Is factional infighting present?

8. What are the HN(s) fire and rescue services:
   a. Location?
   b. Availability?
   c. Capability and effectiveness?

9. What cultural nuances and customs should be known by the JTF to avoid confrontation?

10. Does the Joint Task Force (JTF) have permission to insert Special Forces (SF) and Information Gathering Teams?

11. UK Planning Teams may not be authorised to wear uniform. Methods of identification could include bibs with the Union Jack to identify personnel.

12. Who provides country studies for JTF with information such as concentration of UKEP, airfields, Landing Sites (LS), port facilities, and landing beaches? How will this information be transmitted to the JTF?
13. Are there any members of the JTF, or anyone else reasonably available, who have been in country recently?

14. Is there any information needed immediately from the UKEP?

15. Are map products of the area, including the Embassy/High Commission, available? What are the sources?

16. What are climatological conditions and who will provide meteorological and oceanographic information?

17. What are the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the JTF and what is the legal status of deployed personnel (see 4A1-1). Does the ROE authorise/require non-lethal weapons?

18. What is the chain of command for UK military forces?

19. Who is the senior UK official in charge of the NEO?

20. What is the relationship between the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) and HM Representative?

21. What are the appropriate Command and Control (C2) arrangements if the NEO is conducted as a multinational operation?

22. What other nations’ forces will be operating in the area and what are their plans?
   a. Are multinational forces integrated into the UK plan?
   b. How are national plans being deconflicted if the NEOs are separate? Consider the use of a coordination matrix to deconflict national evacuation planning.
   c. Will other national plans be executed sequentially or simultaneously with the UK NEO?

23. What support is available from other participating nations?

24. What support is required by other participating nations?

25. Who is the primary point of contact within the Embassy/High Commission to work with the JTF on details of the NEO?

26. Is the Embassy/High Commission’s Civil Contingency Plan (CCP) available? Is it up to date?
27. Have the Reception Centres (RCs), Evacuation Points (EvPts), Evacuation Handling Centre (EHC) and routes between them been verified and surveyed?

28. Will there be a requirement for deployment of SF Protective Security Teams (PST) and/or RMP Close Protection Teams (CPT) to provide security and advice for road evacuations and/or for the protection of the High Commission?

29. Will there be a requirement for preparation of contingency plans for the protection and hasty withdrawal of military teams?

30. Have the screening and processing areas of the EHC been verified?

31. Who will screen the UKEP?
   a. Are there consular staff assigned to screen?
   b. Are there any UKEP (e.g. wardens) who will be able to help with processing and screening?
   c. What are the JTF requirements for screening?

32. Will it be necessary to search the baggage and personal property of all evacuees for weapons or explosives?

33. Who will be available to physically search females and children?

34. What steps are being taken by the Embassy/High Commission to get the UKEP ready for evacuation?

35. What is the total number of UKEP to be evacuated?

36. What will be the composition of the UKEP?

37. Are there any changes to the classification of evacuees (see Paragraph 503)?

38. Will HM Representative be able to assign evacuation priorities?

39. What proof of UK citizenship is acceptable?

40. What action should be taken concerning individuals not on the list of evacuees?
   a. Number per priority category.
   b. Identification.

41. What action should be taken if someone asks for political asylum?
42. What discipline problems are expected from the UKEP? Who are the potential troublemakers?

43. What action should be taken if there is an outbreak of violence among evacuees?

44. Are there procedures to handle claims against UK civilians?

45. What are the arrangements for evacuee housing, security and transfer? Will food, water protective clothing or money be required for them?
   a. Type.
   b. Quantity.
   c. Location.

46. Which evacuees have special medical needs or healthcare problems such as pregnancy, infectious disease, disability or paediatric requirements? Should they be given precedence over all other evacuees? What is the physical condition of all evacuees?

47. Will medical support be available from the Embassy/High Commission or HN(s)? What are the Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) procedures? Have they been co-ordinated with the HN(s)? What is the HN(s) health services:
   a. Location?
   b. Availability?
   c. Capability?

48. Will transport be available from the Embassy/High Commission or the HN(s)?
   a. Type.
   b. Location.
   c. Capacity.
   d. Condition.
   e. Operators required.
49. What is the best means of transport to evacuate personnel?
   a. Can commercial airlift provide more timely evacuation than deploying UK military assets?
   b. Have air requirements for units and equipment been quantified?
   c. Are RN assets readily available to stage off the coast?

50. Have all requirements for strategic transport been directed to PJHQ?

51. Are trained Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel available locally?

52. If required, who will provide an emergency resupply of ammunition for the advance party?

53. What support is available from other UK sources?

54. What support is required by other UK agencies?

55. What communications support will be available from the Embassy/High Commission and how will the communication architecture be set up to support the NEO (i.e. networks, frequencies, secure equipment availability, need for relays)?

56. Can portable communications equipment be sent to the Embassy/High Commission to facilitate improved and secure communication?

57. What is the guidance on the use of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS)/Information Support (Info Sp)?

58. What co-ordination has been made with the UK and international media to support the NEO and/or the NEO PSYOPS/Info Sp plan?

59. Will the local media provide support for the NEO and/or the NEO PSYOPS/Info Sp plan?

60. Who will prepare the P Info plan? How often will it be updated? Will media representatives be evacuated?

61. Are there areas from which the media are restricted access? Is there a media support plan?

62. Will interpreter support be available from the Embassy/High Commission or the HN(s)?

63. What is the role of Civil Affairs in NEO?
64. Will the Embassy/High Commission close and all UK staff leave? If not, who will remain? Is there any sensitive equipment or material that will need to be evacuated or destroyed? Will JTF personnel with requisite clearances be required to assist in evacuating or destroying sensitive equipment or material?

65. Who decides that all UKEP have been accounted for prior to terminating the NEO?

66. Will JTF teams be sent to search for missing UKEP?

67. Who will give the JTF permission to terminate the NEO and to withdraw?

68. If UKEP claim to have been evacuated or taken to an unwanted destination against their will and/or demand to be returned, who has responsibility for deciding subsequent action?

**Possible Dilemmas**

69. Because each NEO is unique, situations may arise that require special considerations. JTF personnel should be briefed and prepared to deal with the following:

   a. Questions concerning use of weapon systems in a given situation.
   
   b. Interpretation of the ROE.
   
   c. Hostile detainees who present themselves or are captured by the JTF.
   
   d. Civil disturbance, from passive resistance or civil disobedience to violence and the employment of crowd control techniques including the use of non-lethal weapons.
   
   e. Terrorism.
   
   f. Bomb Threats.
   
   g. Snipers.
   
   h. Disabled evacuees.
   
   i. Language problems.
   
   j. Religious problems.
   
   k. Potential evacuee’s name not on list provided by the Embassy/High Commission but appearing to be a *bona fide* evacuee.
l. Deaths of evacuees and evacuation of remains.

m. Listed evacuees or unlisted potential evacuees with unknown identifications.

n. Evacuees carrying contraband and disposition of the contraband.

o. Overwhelming numbers of civilians coming to EvPts or EHC to request evacuation.

p. Listed evacuee refusing evacuation.

q. Evacuee attempting to give bribes to gain favour.

r. Inaccurate evacuation lists.

s. Large numbers of international journalists converging on the area.
# ANNEX 3B – NEO ESTIMATE FORMAT

## MISSION
The safe evacuation of those UKEP who wish to leave from ***** to a place of safety and the recovery all UK deployed forces.

## MISSION ANALYSIS OUTPUT

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**JTFC issues Initiating Directive**

**EVALUATION OF FACTORS**

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CHAPTER 4 – CONDUCT OF NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

401. At the operational level a NEO will normally be conducted in 4 phases. These phases are usually sequential, but may be concurrent or have significant overlap.

Phase 1 – Preparatory Operations.
Phase 2 – Preliminary Operations.
Phase 3 – Evacuation Operations.
Phase 4 – Withdrawal and Recovery.

PHASE 1 – PREPARATORY OPERATIONS

402. This phase covers the gathering of military information, generation of the Joint Task Force (JTF), training, deployment, logistic build-up, acclimatisation and other administrative preparation.

Military Information Gathering

403. In the early stages of a crisis there will be a great demand for detailed, current information. Initially this will be for strategic information on the overall political and military situation in country. As a NEO becomes more likely and the need for military planning and preparation develops, there will be increased pressure for timely and accurate information on the location, numbers and breakdown of UK Entitled Persons (UKEPs) and advice on the best options for their extraction. It is therefore likely that there will be a requirement to deploy specialist teams and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets in support of HM Representative, to inform the military planning teams. Usually, several factors, including political considerations, may limit the numbers involved.

404. The need to deploy military forces early in the preparatory phase of a NEO has been highlighted in numerous post operational reports. Accurate information gained at the outset of a potential operation saves disproportionate effort in terms of staffing and the forces deployed in subsequent phases. In order to counter sensitivities of a military deployment into another country and to meet political aims it will often be necessary to deploy in civilian clothes and by civilian means. All deployments to theatre must be cleared with MOD Ministers and have the prior agreement of the FCO who have the primary responsibility for co-ordination with HM Representative and for arranging the necessary visas. Teams may consist of:
a. **A Military Intelligence Liaison Officer.** A Military Intelligence Liaison Officer (MILO) can provide an additional information-gathering source in country. As a serving officer, a MILO is trained as a Defence Attaché (DA) and can, in a time of crisis, provide assistance to HM Representative and resident DA. In missions without an accredited DA, a MILO can perform the duties of a DA. MILOs regularly visit countries of potential instability, carrying with them secure data communications. Depending on the situation, MILOs may be granted temporary diplomatic status. MILOs are based in MOD, are available for allocation by the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) and liaise regularly with the FCO.

b. **Special Forces.** In a rapidly deteriorating, or potentially high-threat situation, the timely deployment of Special Forces (SF) is likely to be essential. A small SF team can provide the critical information needed by political and military planners, conduct contingency planning for the evacuation of HM Representative and staff and, if necessary, execute this plan. An SF team can provide close protection and act as an advance force for a NEO. In extremis, SF may conduct elements of, or complete the evacuation. SF will deploy with secure mobile strategic and tactical communications.

c. **Permanent Joint Headquarters Liaison Officer.** When warranted by a deteriorating situation, Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) will often wish to deploy a Liaison Officer (LO), drawn from the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ), with robust secure communications, in order to provide a direct link between HM Representative and the Joint Commander (Jt Comd).

d. **Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team.** In most circumstances there will be a requirement for PJHQ to deploy an Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) drawn from the JFHQ with more substantial secure communications, in order to provide a rapid, guaranteed and continuous link from HM Representative to the Jt Comd, and subsequently the JTFC. The OLRT will gather detailed specialist information to inform the planning process and keep HM Representative abreast of military planning. When authorised the OLRT will also liaise with the HN and other nations’ military representatives in theatre and other agencies.

e. **Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Assets.** Use of assets, whether from maritime, land, air or space platforms, will be required to build the intelligence picture and thus increase situational awareness. In particular, air surveillance will seek to provide systematic observation by electronic, visual or other means to identify and determine movements of friendly and enemy assets/people. Use of Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) will be considered and may require Ministerial
approval. The deployment of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets should be considered with the same priority as SF.

**Advance Force Operations**

405. In addition to the requirements for military information gathering, other tasks, principally in support of HM Representative, may require the conduct of advance force operations.

406. **Close Protection.** Should HM Representative consider there is a threat to himself, his staff and the Embassy/High Commission, he will request close protection through the FCO.

   a. Dependent on the perceived scale of threat a SF Close Protection Team (CPT) or Royal Military Police (RMP) CPT will be assigned to the HM Representative. It will be responsible for his and his staffs’ security and in the event of SF being deployed, will be prepared to execute their evacuation. The team will need to be deployed with robust secure communications.

   b. The SF CPT/RMP CPT is provided by the MOD for the FCO and is therefore FCO funded. On deployment, the SF CPT/RMP CPT will be under Operational Command (OPCOM) of the Deputy Chief of Defence (Commitments) (DCDS(C)). Should planning responsibility and operational command be given to the Jt Comd, consideration will be given to chopping OPCOM of the SF CPT/RMP CPT to him. This will require FCO approval but, from the experience of previous NEOs, is a preferred Command and Control (C2) arrangement.

407. **Communications Support.** Consideration will be given to providing a communications support team to assist HM Representative.

408. **Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team.** In addition to information gathering, the early deployment of an OLRT to the subject country should be considered to carry out the following:

   a. **Brief.** Brief HM Representative on the conduct of a NEO, the likely forces involved and the military considerations.

   b. **Liaise.** Liaise with the DA, his staff and the Embassy/High Commission staff, HN military and other nations military deployed in theatre.

   c. **Review.** Review the Civil Contingency Plan (CCP) and co-ordinate with military plans as necessary.
d. **Plan.** Commence the Operational Planning Process including initiating the Operational Estimate and Campaign Plan on behalf of the JTF and the tactical planning for the Component Commanders (CCs) that will be required in permissive, uncertain and hostile NEOs.

e. **Inform.** Compile local information not otherwise available to update or inform contingency plans.

f. **Communicate.** Test or provide communications equipment at the Embassy/High Commission.

The deployment of an OLRT can take place either well before a crisis develops or as part of the information gathering process in the early stages of the crisis.

409. **Fleet Standby Rifle Troop.** The Fleet Standby Rifle Troop (FSRT) comprises a small group of specially trained Royal Marines at very high readiness with supporting communications and boat teams. Elements (normally 6 man Royal Marine Protection Parties (RMPP) can be deployed by CINCFLFLEET to a forward deployed platform without Ministerial approval. They may therefore be available before other teams, although the same political clearances for insertion ashore will be required. The FSRT have protection and information gathering capabilities that could prove vital in the early stages of a crisis.

410. **Resource Implications.** The extended presence of one or more of these teams may put an additional strain on the limited resources of small diplomatic Missions.

**Preparatory Permanent Joint Headquarter Measures.**

411. Based on the information gathering outlined above, preparatory measures may include:

a. Updating intelligence information.

b. Arranging diplomatic clearance for the deployment and evacuation air routes.

c. Activating the air deployment routes.

d. Chartering civil commercial aircraft, which could take up to 7 days to acquire.

e. Confirming the availability of strategic lift capability to assist in force deployment, if required, from other nations.

f. Initiating the special measures required for augmenting RAF Akrotiri or RAF Ascension if these bases are involved in the deployment or operation.
g. Requesting CINCFLFET to allocate and sail or divert a Naval Task Force or ships.

h. Making arrangements for fuel uplift at en route staging airfields and selected Forward Mounting Base (FMB).

i. Reviewing FMB and in-country mapping requirements.

j. Consideration of legal and Rules of Engagement (ROE) issues (see Annex 4A).

k. Identifying potential Host Nation Support (HNS)/Multinational logistic co-ordination (see Paragraph 601b).

l. Arranging strategic communications.

m. Disseminating a clear Media Policy determined by MOD Director of News (D News) in consultation with the FCO News Department through the medium of the News Release Group (NRG) (see Paragraph 316).

n. Clearing potential FMBs with MOD HQ and the FCO.

o. Ascertaining from the FCO the likely location of the Evacuation Handling Centre (EHC).

p. Confirmation of aircraft routing and timely diplomatic clearance will be crucial to the air component of an operation. The period of notice and time required to obtain diplomatic clearances will vary considerably between individual countries (particularly where there is no HM Representative). In some operations a longer deployment route, the Westabout Reinforcement Route (WRR), which makes use of US and Canadian facilities, may need to be activated. This requires not only notification to, and acceptance by, the respective Governments, but also both a substantial period of time and a significant number of personnel might be required for activation of the WRR. Thus an early decision to use this option is essential.

**Deployment**

412. **Establish a Forward Mounting Base.** A FMB would normally provide a stepping-stone from which a NEO could be launched (see Paragraph 123a). The FMB could be in Gibraltar, Cyprus or Ascension Island to take advantage of established UK facilities or in another country in the region. The selection of the FMB constitutes a key first step in the formulation of the Jt Comd’s concept of operations for the deployment, sustainment and recovery of the force.
413. **Establish a Seabase.** For smaller scale NEOs conducted in the littoral, the establishment of a seabase in international waters free from HN and other constraints may be preferable to establishing a FMB.

414. **Establish Joint Task Force Headquarters.** The early establishment of the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ), and separate CC’s HQs (especially Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and his Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC)), where appropriate, will be required to provide the C2 infrastructure to command the force deployment and build up.

   a. **Location.** The JTFHQ may be located, as appropriate, in country, at the FMB, EHC or afloat.

   b. **Activation.** It is likely that the OLRT will form the activation element of the JTFHQ. If not, an activation team will deploy early. This team should assist in satisfying the Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs).

   c. **Communications.** The early establishment of a communications infrastructure will be necessary with all appropriate links to UK, HNs, allies and coalition partners. In any rapidly changing military operation, the ability to maintain robust communications between all elements and units in the force and other agencies will be vital.

   d. **Intelligence.** The early establishment of the necessary liaison and relationships and the creation of an effective intelligence infrastructure will be critical to satisfy the CCIRs. This will involve intelligence and counter intelligence operations to identify the capabilities, intentions, and possible threats, as well as the demographics and culture of the operational area necessary to support the estimate process. The intelligence aspects of preparing the theatre are explained in JWP 2-00. Deliberate, early investment in this aspect will pay dividends.

   e. **Numbers of United Kingdom Entitled Persons.** Experience indicates that assessments can significantly under-estimate the number of UKEP. Since this figure sets the size of the force protection, logistics lift and UKEP sustainment tasks, the JTFHQ should ensure its CONOPS is flexible enough to manage a much larger evacuation. Military planners should seek to establish a breakdown of UKEPs by age, numbers and sizes of family groups, numbers of young children, elderly and infirm etc. This will enable the appropriate level of medical and other support to be provided.

415. **Deploy lead elements of the Joint Task Force.** The initial arrival of forces in theatre must be balanced to provide an early and viable capability, with the necessary
command functions and logistic support, to meet the commander’s mission requirements. Their arrival is part of the deployment process, controlled by PJHQ, but executed in accordance with the Joint Task Force Commander’s (JTFC’s) Desired Order of Arrival (DOA). Those elements that contribute to the Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integration (RSOI) of the JTF will be high on the DOA.

416. **Deployment of Joint Task Force Main Body.** Deploy the remainder of the JTF to the FMB if required.

417. **Final Preparations.** Once in theatre, forces should ideally have sufficient time to conduct reconnaissance and rehearsals and possibly complete a period of preparation and training prior to the evacuation operation.

a. **Rehearsals.** Rehearsals should, if possible, be held and should cover all contingencies. They will assist with the acclimatisation and familiarisation of teams with new equipment and ROE, allowing the perfection of techniques and procedures. The most important aim will be to practise the evacuation C2 structure. The wider utility of rehearsals for deception, media operations and deterrence can be considerable. Multinational operations will also increase the requirement for exercises to practise multinational C2 and procedures, particularly the generation and deployment of reaction forces in emergencies. Extreme care should be taken not to breach operational security.

b. **Training.** The conduct of training exercises, which may themselves act as a deterrent, must be balanced against the possible escalation in the level of tension that training may cause. Training may also be used as a cover to gain operational information and up-to-date imagery that may better inform the future conduct of the NEO.

**PHASE 2 – PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS**

418. The military objective during the Preliminary Operations phase of a NEO is to identify and secure FOBs and EvPts and assist in the establishment of the EHC as required. These may already be identified in the CCP. SF, the MILO or the OLRT could conduct further reconnaissance of these locations. If the NEO is conducted in a hostile environment this phase may include theatre-entry operations or operations to shape the battlespace. Theatre entry may involve amphibious or air manoeuvre operations. Shaping operations may include gaining environmental dominance, particularly at sea and in the air, using SF or Information Operations (Info Ops) (see Paragraph 317). Tasks may include:

a. **Establish Forward Operating Base.** If a FOB is required to extend the reach of the JTF, a suitable site will be identified and secured as necessary.
FOBs are typically airfields or ports. The selection and use of the FOB is a matter for the JTFC or his CCs, and forms part of their scheme of manoeuvre.

b. Establish Evacuation Points. Identify and, if necessary, secure EvPts close to the threatened community, through which the evacuees can be moved by military transport to the EHC (see Paragraph 508).

c. Establish Evacuation Handling Centre. Provide assistance in establishing, and if required protecting, the EHC (see Paragraph 514).

**PHASE 3 – EVACUATION OPERATIONS**

419. The main effort of this phase of a NEO is the safe and swift evacuation of UKEP enabled by a rapid insertion and withdrawal of the military force. Chapter 5 covers in detail the evacuation process of this phase. In way of summary, tasks may include:

a. Secure Vital Points and Key Terrain. Tactical deployment to the FOBs and EvPts of any additional forces required to conduct the evacuation. This may include forces to dominate approaches to the EvPts and secure the routes from them to the EHC.

b. Support to the Reception Centres. If required and in exceptional circumstances the JTF may deploy force protection assets to the RCs and assist wardens in the movement of UKEP from the RCs to the EvPt by providing escorts and close protection.

c. Evacuation of United Kingdom Entitled Persons. Take responsibility for UKEP at the EvPts. The FCO will screen UKEP as necessary for entitlement for evacuation. Move UKEP by military transport to the EHC, ensuring their safety throughout.

d. Assistance at the Evacuation Handling Centre. Provide assistance to the FCO both in running the EHC and in facilitating onward movement of UKEP to a place of safety.

e. Force Protection. The Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) process will assist in identifying the threats both to own forces and to the UKEP. Flexibility in routes, and the planning of branches and sequels will enable the JTF to retain the initiative in deteriorating security situations.
PHASE 4 – WITHDRAWAL AND RECOVERY

420. The military end-state for a NEO is the safe evacuation of all UKEP to a place of safety and the withdrawal of the JTF, followed by its recovery or redeployment to other tasks as soon as possible. The debriefing and ‘lessons identified’ process should be initiated before the operation is officially ended.
ANNEX 4A – LEGAL ISSUES AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

4A1. The conduct of all military operations including NEOs is circumscribed by the provisions of national and international law. National law includes both the criminal law of the UK, to which UK forces are always subject wherever they may be serving and the law of the particular country to which a force may be deployed, subject to any immunity granted by a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).

4A2. The legal justification for UK forces to enter another state to rescue UK Entitled Persons (UKEP) may arise in different ways.

a. Explicit permission to enter for extraction purposes may be given by the receiving state authorities and in certain circumstances a SOFA may even be concluded.

b. Where there has been a breakdown in law and order and there no longer exists a coherent government, or where such government exists but it is unable or unwilling to protect UK nationals, intervention to protect UK nationals may be justified on grounds of self-defence (Article 51 of the UN Charter).

4A3. Under both of the above, the use of force will be limited to that which is necessary and proportional for mission accomplishment and the defence of UK forces and evacuees and Rules of Engagement (ROE) will be drafted accordingly.

Rules of Engagement Development

4A4. Ministers provide political direction and guidance to commanders through ROE that control the application of force by UK forces. For UK national operations, those ROE will be developed in accordance with JSP 398. They will reflect the legal basis of the operation and HMG’s political and military objectives and will be designed to ensure that any application of force is carefully controlled. ROE are not intended to be used to assign specific tasks or as a means of issuing tactical instructions, and must be cleared by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).

4A5. In a multinational NEO, UK forces will operate under UK national ROE. In these circumstances every effort should be made to ensure that the various national ROE are aligned. Established procedures exist for the provision of ROE within NATO laid down in MC 362.

4A6. The ROE for a particular operation will be developed in accordance with the procedures set out in Paragraphs 12-19 of JSP 398. A diagrammatic summary of that procedure is at Appendix 4A1. These procedures should ensure that the initial profile
is realistic according to the circumstances ruling at the time. Once approved by Ministers, the profile will be attached to the Jt Comd’s Mission Directive. Upon receipt of that Directive, commanders should review that profile in order to evaluate its impact on their conduct of operations. Proposals for change should be submitted to the issuing authority copied to MOD in the form of a ROE Request (ROEREQ) message. A full justification for each requested rule change must be given along with the likely consequences of the requested rule being refused. The approval process will be similar to the original authorisation process.

Self Defence

4A7. In addition to the right of states to exercise individual or collective self defence under international law (Article 51 of the UN Charter), the right of individual service personnel or units to use force in their self defence is inherent and may not be restricted by any rule of engagement. UK law requires that only reasonable force may be used to defend oneself or others from an act carrying an imminent threat of harm. Use of lethal force in self-defence is only justified when the act is believed to be endangering or is likely to endanger life and there is no other way of averting the danger.

Rules of Engagement Implementation

4A8. In implementing ROE commanders should consider the authorised profile as the limit of permissions available and may in their judgement of the situation authorise a more restrictive version of any rule. It is important that ROE are disseminated to the lowest level as quickly as possible and in a form that is readily understood.

4A9. It is also important to note that the conformity of any action with a given set of ROE in force does not guarantee its lawfulness and it remains the commander’s responsibility to use only that degree of force which is necessary, proportionate and lawful in the circumstances.

4A10. Appendix 4A2 provides an ROE profile that is illustrative of what might be expected in the early stages of a NEO.
APPENDIX 4A1 - APPROVAL PROCEDURE FOR ROE

1. PJHQ develop draft profile identifying key issues and broad direction of ROE policy.
2. PJHQ military staff co-ordinate single service inputs.
3. Initial planning meeting convened between PJHQ military, secretariat and legal staff and appropriate Head Office staff to consider draft ROE profile and attribute any further actions required to fully develop ROE Annex to OPLAN.
4. ROE Desk Officer/Head Office Secretariat Staff informally engage FCO regional desk officers and MOD Legal Adviser to identify additional concerns to be addressed during staffing process.
5. MOD Head Office and PJHQ agree draft ROE for OPLAN.
6. MOD Legal Advisers consult FCO Legal Advisers as appropriate.
7. Formal consultations with FCO Regional Department and Legal Advisers and MOD Legal Advisers to establish whether draft ROE are consistent with international law and any relevant international mandates for operation.
8. If required ACDS (Ops) and DG OpPol jointly chair ROE Committee to resolve any points of difficulty.
9. Head Office Secretariat informs DCDS(C) of agreed ROE through DG OpPol, copied to CDS.
10. Head Office Secretariat submits proposed ROE to MOD Ministers together with advice on whether formal approval should be sought from DOP.
APPENDIX 4A2 - TYPICAL ROE PROFILE TO SUPPORT A NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATION

OP HELPMATE

MSGID/PJHQ ROEAUTH HELPMATE 001
REF A JSP 398 (1999)

AREA: TERRITORY, AIRSPACE AND TERRITORIAL WATERS OF ORANGE

PPI/ALFA

AMPLIFICATION

1. UK OBJECTIVE IS THE SAFE EVACUATION OF UK NATIONALS AND OTHER CITIZENS FOR WHOM UK HAS ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY FROM ORANGE TO GREEN.

2. THE INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF DEFENCE IS NOT AFFECTED BY ANY OF THESE RULES.

COMPLETE PROFILE

FIVE HUNDRED CHARLIE

SERVICE PERSONNEL MAY BE DEPLOYED FOR THE CONDUCT OF RIOT CONTROL. THE FOLLOWING MEASURES MAY BE EMPLOYED: STICKS OR TRUNCHEONS, RIOT CONTROL CLOTHING, BATON ROUNDS. USE OF RIOT CONTROL EQUIPMENT IS TO BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH JSP 398 CARD F.

FIVE TEN CHARLIE

COMMANDERS MAY AUTHORIZE SERVICE PERSONNEL TO CARRY PERSONAL WEAPONS AND MAY AUTHORIZE SERVICE PERSONNEL TO CARRY LIVE AMMUNITION AND WEAPONS MAY BE LOADED. THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH PERSONNEL MAY OPEN FIRE ARE CONTAINED IN JSP 398 CARD B.

FIVE TWENTY ALFA

USE OF ARMED FORCE AGAINST ELEMENTS WHICH ARE COMMITTING A HOSTILE ACT AGAINST OWN FORCES IS PROHIBITED, EXCEPT AS A LAST RESORT TO PROTECT LIFE. WHEREVER POSSIBLE EFFORTS SHOULD
FIRST BE MADE TO PASS A WARNING THAT IF ATTACK IS CONTINUED IT WILL BE RETURNED.

FIVE THIRTY ALFA
THE USE OF INFANTRY SUPPORT WEAPONS SYSTEMS IS PROHIBITED.

FIVE FIFTY ALFA
HARRASSMENT IS PROHIBITED.

FIVE SIXTY CHARLIE
ENTRY INTO ORANGE IS ONLY PERMITTED TO CONDUCT OP HELPMATE.

FIVE SEVENTY ALFA (MARITIME AND AIR)
STANDARD APPROACH LIMITATIONS GOVERNING POSITIONING OF OWN MARITIME AND AIR FORCES RELATIVE TO OTHER NATIONAL UNITS AS DETAILED IN JSP 398 APPLY.

FIVE SEVENTY BRAVO (LAND)
THERE ARE NO APPROACH LIMITATIONS BETWEEN HELPMATE LAND FORCES AND ORANGE ELEMENTS WITHIN ORANGE.

FIVE EIGHTY ALFA
USE OF COVERT OPERATIONS IN ORANGE IS PROHIBITED.

SIX TEN ALFA
POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION IS TO BE ESTABLISHED VISUALLY.

SIX THIRTY BRAVO
DIRECTIONAL LIGHT MAY BE USED TO ILLUMINATE TARGETS.

SIX FORTY BRAVO
BUZZING BY HELICOPTERS IN ORANGE TO CONTROL CROWDS OR DOMINATE A SITUATION IS PERMITTED.
SIX SIXTY CHARLIE

WARNING OFF BY DESIGNATED ACTIONS (1) TO (4) OF ORANGE ELEMENTS IS PERMITTED.

SIX SIXTY ECHO

FIRING OF WARNING SHOTS IN THE VICINITY OF ORANGE ELEMENTS IS PERMITTED. NOTES:
1. EVERY EFFORT IS TO BE MADE TO PASS CLEAR VERBAL WARNING.
2. WEAPON USED IS TO BE OF THE SMALLEST CALIBRE APPROPRIATE.
3. IT IS IMPORTANT TO ENSURE THAT EXPENDED ROUNDS FALL INTO A SAFE AREA.

SIX SEVENTY BRAVO

ACTION TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF UK SERVICE PERSONNEL OR ENTITLED PERSONNEL IN THE JOA IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THEIR CAPTURE IS PERMITTED IF THE OPPORTUNITY OCCURS.

SIX EIGHTY ALFA

DETENTION, ARREST OR SEIZURE OF SHIP(S), AIRCRAFT, VEHICLES OR EQUIPMENT IS PROHIBITED.

SIX EIGHTY BRAVO

TEMPORARY DETENTION OF PERSONNEL PREVENTING THE CONDUCT OF THE NEO IS PERMITTED.
NOTE: PERIOD OF DETENTION IS TO BE AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE. WHilst detained orange personnel are to be treated courteously.

SEVEN TWENTY BRAVO

PREPARATION OF NON-EXPLOSIVE OBSTACLES FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONTROLLING ACCESS AND OR CROWD CONTROL DURING EVACUATION IS PERMITTED.
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
CHAPTER 5 – THE EVACUATION PROCESS

501. This chapter describes the evacuation process, which would occur during Phase 3 of the generic Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) model described in Chapter 4.

502. **Principles.** The three guiding principles during the evacuation process are:
   a. **Accuracy.** Everyone must be accounted for.
   b. **Security.** Evacuees and the Joint Task Force (JTF) are safeguarded from all threats.
   c. **Speed.** Processing must be accomplished quickly and efficiently.

SECTION I – CLASSIFICATION OF ENTITLED PERSONS

503. An Embassy’s primary responsibility is for the safety of its own nationals. However, many embassies also have responsibility for other nationalities without diplomatic representation in country. As an example, for contingency planning purposes, the UK has responsibility for the following:
   a. All British nationals including dual nationals (although some categories of British nationals may require immigration clearance to enter and remain in the UK).
   b. The UK may also have responsibility for un-represented EU nationals, un-represented Commonwealth nationals (Australian, New Zealand, Canadian etc and/or American nationals. All other nationalities are included on a ‘space available’ basis and subject to guarantees from their respective governments to repay any evacuation costs.

504. It is UK policy not to split families in an evacuation. This means that the UK would take responsibility for immediate family members (spouse and dependent children) whatever their nationality, assuming local authorities would allow them to leave.

505. **Request for Asylum or Temporary Refuge.** International law and custom have long recognised the humanitarian practice of providing temporary refuge to anyone, regardless of nationality, who may be in imminent physical danger. It is the policy of the UK to grant temporary refuge in a foreign country to nationals of that country solely for humanitarian reasons when extreme or exceptional circumstances put the life or safety of a person in imminent danger, such as pursuit by a mob. The safety of Joint Task Force (JTF) personnel must be taken into consideration along with the following:
a. Temporary refuge can be granted in cases where the requesting individual is in imminent danger, irrespective of whether asylum or temporary refuge is requested.

b. The HM Representative will handle asylum requests through the appropriate channels.

c. Procedures must be established to notify the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) of actions taken in cases of requests for asylum.

**Considerations**

Recent NEO experience has highlighted the following considerations:

- Any changes to the classification of UK Entitled Persons (UKEPs) should be discussed by the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) with HM Representative at an early stage. Clear guidance should be given to all subordinate commanders.

- Depending on the situation, personal baggage will be limited, however UKEPs should not be separated from their baggage.

- Pets should not be evacuated.

- Without a passport, HM Representative might not permit departure of evacuee.

**SECTION II – THE PROCESS**

**Reception Centres**

506. **Characteristics.** Reception Centres (RCs) should be accessible, recognisable, secure and close to UKEP communities. They should be familiar to UKEP and easy for untrained civilians to find at night and under difficult circumstances. The location and significant aspects of each RC are detailed in the Civil Contingency Plan (CCP).

507. **Responsibilities.** HM Representative is responsible for selecting RCs taking into account military advice as necessary. Through the warden system, he is responsible for ensuring each UKEP knows where the nearest RC is and how long it will remain open. HM Representative’s responsibility for administering the RC is normally delegated to a warden.

508. **Activity.** When called forward by HM Representative, UKEP make their own way to their allocated RC where they are gathered by the local warden, assisted by diplomatic staff and military personnel as required. The warden should have a nominal roll of those members of the British community that are expected to report to
his RC and initial screening will take place if possible. At a pre-arranged time, or on call, the warden will close the RC and escort UKEP to the nearest Evacuation Point (EvPt), using UKEP’s own transport and/or transport arranged by HM Representative. Although not a military responsibility, it may be necessary for the military to escort UKEP from RCs to EvPts to ensure safe passage.

Evacuation Points

509. Characteristics. EvPts should be defendable and offer the following facilities - road access, parking, an airstrip/Landing Site (LS) (if aircraft are to be used), a beach/slipway/jetty (if boats are to be used), shelter and security. They should also be sited as close to RCs as possible.

510. Responsibilities. HM Representative is responsible for selecting the EvPts taking into account military advice. The military are formally responsible for running the EvPt and for UKEP from their arrival at the EvPts until their delivery at the Evacuation Handling Centre (EHC), where responsibility for their onward movement reverts to the FCO. Whilst it is likely that a RC is co-located with each EvPt, this does not alter the functional division of responsibilities.

511. Evacuation Point Group. An EvPt will require JTF elements consisting of command, administration, medical and security teams. The EvPt Group Commander should plan on holding the UKEP for the minimum time at the EvPt, must be given clear direction on evacuation priorities, accepted means of identification and the quantities of personal baggage allowed into the evacuation chain. Press presence is likely at EvPts and wardens and military commanders at all levels should have access to the HMG’s press Question and Answer (Q&A) briefing.

512. Tasks. The EvPt Group’s tasks will vary according to the circumstances, however, the following functional elements are normally required:

a. Command Element. Commands the EvPt and reports to the Evacuation Commander. Liaison may be required with the local HN civil and military authorities, other nations and UN or non-governmental organisation (NGO) representatives. This requires the establishment of mutual confidence and trust.

b. Administration Element. The role of the administrative element is to control the smooth flow of evacuees through the EvPt. It may consist of:

(1) Embassy/High Commission consular staff with local knowledge and with some idea of the number of evacuees expected as well as their status. They will screen the UKEP as far forward as is practical in the evacuation chain. The requirements for security checks of UKEPs when entering areas or vehicles or aircraft protected by the UK military will be
the responsibility of UK forces in conjunction with Allied forces and HN security forces and officials. If in doubt, cases can be forwarded to the EHC for detailed screening.

(2) A search team to search UKEP before they are embarked in military transport as a security measure. This may require female searchers.

(3) A medical team who will only be able to administer basic first aid before casualties are forwarded to the Evacuation Handling Centre (EHC). Ideally the team should include female medical or other assistants to assist in dealing with women and children.

(4) Movement control. Airstrips, LS, beach or jetty should be identified, marked, manned and equipped as required when the EvPt is established. Aircraft or boats may be required for Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) as well as for evacuation. A Mobile Air Operations Team (MAOT) or beach master may be required.

c. **Security Element.** A security force is likely to be required for the protection of the EvPt.

   (1) In some situations there will be a requirement for some of the security forces to remain overt. This will act as a reassurance to the evacuees as well as a deterrent against both direct and indirect interference with the EvPt.

   (2) In a benign environment, civil or local military police may carry out this function.

   (3) It is possible that in a hostile environment the EvPt Security element may capture prisoners. The handling of the detainees in the conduct of a NEO will be in accordance with international law.

d. **Burial.** It may not be possible to pass corpses through the evacuation chain. Arrangements need to be made to deal with the burial of casualties as discreetly as possible. A potential site should be identified and marked, and ideally, screened from evacuees in any holding areas or transport loading points. Consular advice should be sought.

513. **Evacuee Movement Group.** Service transport will move the UKEP from the EvPts to the EHC by a combination of road, air and water as required. Dependent on the resources available to service the number of EvPts and UKEP, movement will be sequential or simultaneous, co-ordinated by the Evacuation Commander. The environment (permissive, uncertain or hostile) will dictate the level of escorts, close
protection and/or the picketing of routes required. The transport that inserts the EvPt Groups could be held and used to move the UKEP. UKEP will need appropriate safety briefings prior to embarking in Service transport. In particular, adequate provision of lifejackets for adults and small children should be provided if there is movement on or flight over water.

**Evacuation Handling Centre**

514. **Characteristics.** The primary purpose of the EHC is to organise the onward movement of the UKEP to a place of safety. It will also provide a screening facility to ensure that only entitled evacuees are moved and will have the administrative arrangements needed for the provision of adequate medical and logistic support. It must be of sufficient size to handle the expected number of UKEP, offer shelter and basic sanitation facilities and enable the conduct of the functions describe below.

515. **Location.** The location of the EHC will be dictated by the specific circumstances of the NEO. However, it is most likely to be located at a secure port or airport in an area where the urgency of the evacuation will not be compromised by the screening process. The EHC could be co-located with the FMB or FOB and could be located in the country being evacuated or situated in another country. The advantages and disadvantages of each of these options are:

a. **In another Country.** The 2 main advantages of placing the EHC in another country are that of security and ease of administration especially for the FCO team who may not consist of many personnel. The main disadvantage is the danger of accidental evacuation of non-entitled persons into a country that then subsequently refuses to accept them.

b. **In the Country Being Evacuated.** The main advantages of siting the EHC in the target country are that the accidental evacuation of non-entitled personnel can be avoided and the logistics are potentially simpler. This option will have more attraction in a benign environment, however, the security, administration and time factors will usually discount this option.

c. **Afloat.** Many of the functions of the EHC could be carried out in a seabase, although UKEP would require to be landed before further onward movement under FCO arrangements. Seabasing may be required where there is no suitable land location for an EHC especially in a ‘quick and dirty’ NEO of limited numbers. The benefits of Force Protection are particularly evident when seabased. It also has the advantage of simpler administration for limited numbers.

d. **At the Forward Mounting Base or Forward Operating Base.** The main advantage of co-locating the EHC with the Forward Mounting Base
(FMB) or Forward Operating Base (FOB) is economy of effort. Clear divisions of responsibility and functions must be established. The disadvantage is that whilst a HN government may be willing to support an EHC controlled by civilian officials on humanitarian grounds they may be more reluctant to support a base from which military operations are being launched into neighbouring countries.

516. **Responsibilities.** The FCO is responsible for siting and running the EHC, which may impact on the site of the FMB. The FCO is also responsible for screening potential UKEP and establishing an order of priority. The co-ordination of the use of facilities, customs requirements, security, transportation and billeting is normally a FCO responsibility. The FCO may ask the JTFC to provide security, administrative and logistic support to the EHC. The JTF’s primary duties include control of military transport arriving from the EvPts with UKEP, their disembarkation, maintaining order in the EHC and supporting FCO’s efforts to care for evacuees. The JTFC may allocate responsibility for the military aspects of the EHC to the Evacuation Commander or to another CC. Should the EHC be onboard a RN or RFA ship, responsibility for processing evacuees will rest with the ship’s Commanding Officer.

517. **Factors.** When the FCO establishes an EHC, a number of factors should be considered:

a. The origin and numbers of the FCO staff to man the EHC.

b. The requirement for multinational co-ordination at the EHC.

c. When sited in another country, the willingness of the HN to host the evacuees.

d. Logistic support available, including accommodation and international airline siting.

e. Security.

f. Military advice on the location should there be military involvement.

518. **Procedures During Processing.** Procedures during processing will depend upon the location of the EHC and the FCO’s wishes. Regardless of location, a comprehensive plan for reception and care of evacuees should be implemented. The ethnic and cultural diversity of UKEP presents issues that should not be overlooked. At an air terminal, port or beach, the evacuees’ processing should be located in a building, tent, or other appropriate place to provide shelter and safety to the evacuees. The area should be staffed with security, interpreters, local immigration, embassy, support liaison and medical personnel. The following should be considered:
a. Use of military police when available.
b. Use of easily recognisable markings on UK personnel, vehicles, and equipment.
c. Disarming of evacuees prior to evacuation processing.
d. Establishing a policy concerning JTF responsibility to secure evacuee valuables during processing.
e. Providing interpreters for bilingual information at control sites.
f. Upon initial screen, the use of tags for visual identification.
g. Requirements for searching women, children and disabled and/or injured. This may include providing searchers of the same sex as evacuees.
h. The presence of a chaplain, if available.
i. The organisation of evacuees to ensure the following:
   (1) Establishing of a single point of contact between evacuee group and the JTF.
   (2) Determining the policy for personal weapons and the need for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel (HN or JTF).

519. **Minimum Processing Requirements.** A streamlined system for processing will be used in those cases when there is a concern for the protection and safety of evacuees and the JTF. The procedures used will meet the following guidelines:

a. Processing of persons with life threatening medical problems will be expedited.
b. All evacuees will be screened for verification of identity and documentation as well as prioritisation.
c. Prior to implementation, the HM Representative and the JTFC will agree on procedures for minimum evacuee processing in circumstances of duress and high risk.
SECTION III – EVACUATION HANDLING CENTRE LAYOUT

520. Outline. On arrival the EHC assumes control of the evacuees. The EHC performs the necessary screening, registration, medical and transportation functions to ensure an orderly evacuation. Its purpose is to prepare the evacuees for eventual onward movement to a place of safety. All evacuees should be screened to confirm their identity, to ensure that their documentation is accurate and that all information provided is current. If evacuees arrive without having earlier passed through a RC, processing teams should verify their identity and eligibility for evacuation prior to allowing the evacuees to enter the EHC. There are 3 main areas in the EHC - Reception Area, Registration & Medical Areas, and Holding Area. In addition, there is an EHC control centre. These are discussed below.

521. Evacuation Handling Centre Control Centre. The EHC control centre will plan, organise and supervise the running of the EHC. Under overall FCO leadership, manning by diplomatic and military personnel will reflect the division of responsibility within the EHC. The control centre will also maintain liaison with local authorities and other agencies.

522. Reception Area. This is the point at which evacuees first enter the EHC. It is important that UKEP feel safe and reassured from the outset. In some cases they will be in a state of shock and possibly bereavement. Firm but compassionate handling is essential. This is also the point at which onward destinations are resolved. This can be difficult and cause considerable distress and commotion; it is, therefore, desirable that the reception area is physically separated from the registration and holding areas. The reception area may require:

a. Movement Control. Airstrips, LS, beach or jetty, traffic circuit and vehicle parking area should be identified, marked, manned and equipped as required. A MAOT or beach master may be needed. If the EHC is at an airport or port detailed arrangements for controlling the arrival of military transport from the EvPts will be established with local air traffic control or harbour authorities.

b. A Drop-off Point. The provision of signs and diagrams will help evacuees to understand the procedures and routines they are to follow. The injured and sick will be moved directly to the medical area. The fit will be directed to a screening/search area. In the event of an evacuation following a humanitarian disaster, blankets, food and drink will be required whilst people are awaiting screening. Detainee handling may also be required.

c. A Screening/Search Area. Ideally, screening would take place as early in the evacuation process as tactically possible in order to weed out non-entitled personnel. The longer non-entitled personnel remain within the
system, the more difficult it will be to remove them. Diplomatic staff, supported by military personnel should undertake screening. Male and female searching areas and searchers, who will probably be Service personnel, will be required to carry out personnel/baggage searches. This is the point at which UKEP should be tagged.

**Consideration**

Up-front early-entry screening is a key principle. Thus it should commence as soon as possible, probably in the RCs and continue as a form of entry into the EvPts, at which point the UKEP become a military responsibility. Because UKEP screening is viewed as a function, rather than a place, the requirement is for controlled entry and exit points to the UKEP handling system. For example, controlled entry points (perhaps just one if all UKEP are entering at the same location) should be established before or within the EvPt and an exit point (possibly just one) set-up in the EHC.

d. **Repayment.** In some circumstances, such as when using commercial transport, the FCO or diplomatic staff may require some form of undertaking from the UKEP to repay the costs of evacuation to HMG (see Para 527a). Although it is unlikely that repayment will be necessary, it should be noted that the requirement to make this undertaking is a potential source of resentment, when the individual’s financial position is uncertain following evacuation (especially after a natural disaster). In these circumstances it is highly desirable for the FCO to provide an illustrative guide of the likely costs.

e. **Provision for Special Needs.** The Reception facility must be able to cater for evacuees who have special needs, such as the bereaved. This is manpower intensive, but it is important that some form of reserve manpower is ready to deal with special needs or the unexpected. The provision of welfare support and/or a chaplain is a great help. The bereaved and other victims need particularly sensitive treatment and at this stage. They should be allocated guides to remain with them and escort them through the remainder of the EHC.

523. **Registration and Medical Area.** It is important not to duplicate effort between the reception and registration areas. Nonetheless, there is likely to be a need for considerable clerical and IT support (highlighted in recent post-op reports) to the EHC. In particular, the maintenance of accurate records of evacuees is essential (see Section IV below).

a. **Registration.** At this point UKEP will be grouped depending upon the situation. This might be by nationality, family, or sex. Groups will have separate registration areas. Evacuees’ personal details will be recorded on a
registration sheet and their tag cards completed. For organisational purposes all UKEP should receive a category designator as described in Section I of this Chapter. These categories greatly assist the smooth execution and success of the operation and are used when identifying, moving and locating evacuees.

b. Medical. The medical station provides emergency medical treatment and any immunisations, which may be required before onward movement. Serious medical cases receive top priority for evacuation, with the medical officer ensuring that any seriously ill, injured or wounded persons complete processing. Medical personnel should consider wearing distinctive clothing or markings to aid identification. After a natural disaster, medical advice may be required for all EHC personnel to avoid infection.

524. Holding Area. After registration evacuees will be led, via a field kitchen/feeding station to the holding area, which will be sub-divided into evacuee group holding areas. Sanitation commensurate with the number of expected evacuees will be required. The intention should be to move evacuees from the holding area to the point of embarkation for onward movement as quickly and efficiently as possible.

Onward Movement to a Place of Safety

525. The number and types of places of safety will vary according to the circumstances of each NEO and the UKEP. For UKEP who normally reside in UK, such as tourists, a place of safety will be repatriation to the UK. For UKEP who were residents of the evacuated country, a place of safety may be a hotel close to the EHC. For UKEP who are resident elsewhere, such as EU citizens, a place of safety will be repatriation to their country of origin. Thus UKEP requirements for onward movement will vary greatly. Determination of a place of safety will also have important implications for the location of the EvPt and EHC and for the screening of UKEPs.

526. When practical, the FCO will assist UKEP to make their own arrangements for onward movement from the EHC on to commercial flights, or to local hotels. Where possible, responsibility for non-British nationals will be handed over to diplomatic representatives of their own countries. In these circumstance the UKEP will exit the evacuation process at the EHC. If this were not possible (e.g. commercial flights or local temporary accommodation are not available), the FCO would consider either asking a scheduled airline to lay on extra commercial flights or chartering a civilian flight. The FCO will make reception arrangements in consultation with the Home Office and Department of Transport, Local Government and Regions (DTLR). FCO staff may also be on hand at the port of entry to meet UKEPs arriving on commercial/charter flights. UKEPs would normally leave the evacuation process this point.
SECTION IV – DOCUMENTATION

527. UKEP should complete as much administrative paperwork as possible prior to leaving the country without delaying the evacuation process. EHC documentation will serve as a tally of those evacuated against the British Community Register (BCR). At the EHC, 5 documents could be produced - Form of Undertaking to Repay Registration Form, Evacuee Register, National Summary and Medical Record (if required).

a. **FCO Form of Undertaking to Repay.** In the event of evacuees being required to repay the cost of evacuation, an FCO Form K29 ‘Undertaking to Repay’, or similar document may be used. See the example at Appendix 5A1.

b. **Registration Form.** This is a personal record of the details of each individual evacuee. It should be completed in duplicate. An example is at Appendix 5A2.

c. **Evacuee Register.** The Evacuee Register is a consolidated list of those evacuees who have registered at the EHC. The HQ of the unit operating the EHC will use the registers to manage names on the evacuee list provided by the consular officials. The list is passed on to the FCO representative who will pass it to the immigration authorities. An example of the register is at Appendix 5A3.

d. **National Summary.** The National Summary provides a list of evacuees by nationality and is used to reconcile the various lists of eligible evacuees from foreign nations, against the list of those who have been evacuated. These forms are required by the FCO, and by consular officials of countries whose citizens have been evacuated by UK forces. An example is at Appendix 5A4.

e. **Medical Record.** The Personal Medical Record booklet (B/Med/27) should be used for all UKEP requiring medical treatment. UK medical units carry it.

f. **Tagging System.** Using RAF Baggage Labels (RAF Form 185), printed in numbered series, could assist physical tagging procedures. Every tag splits into 3 sections, each of which carries the identical number. As a UKEP passes through the pipeline, portions of the tag are retained as a useful back-up tracking system.

528. **IT Support.** Use of IT is highly desirable for the efficient monitoring and control of evacuees. Form filling can be bureaucratic, slow and prone to error with UKEP being asked for the same information more than once. Such an inefficient process could erode the UKEP confidence at a time of great stress. A database should
thus be prepared of UKEP as a preparatory step in the NEO. It is intended to produce a simple and robust program that can be used with existing commercial software.

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**Case Study 6: Documentation of UKEP**

As an example, during the NEO from the DRC in 1998, the JTF staff pre-entered information on over 200 UKEP. UKEP were tagged at Brazzaville (Forward EHC). This information was data-transferred to Libreville (FMB/EHC) while the UKEP were in transit between the 2 sites. On arrival at the FMB, much of the information was already confirmed, which improved accuracy and speed.
ANNEX 5A – DOCUMENTATION

Appendix 5A1 - FCO Form of Undertaking to Repay (form K29)

Appendix 5A2 - Registration Form

Appendix 5A3 - Evacuee Register

Appendix 5A4 - National Summary
APPENDIX 5A1 - FCO FORM OF UNDERTAKING TO REPAY (FORM K29)


(For LOIs, ENCAshMENT OF CHEQUES, REPATRIATION, SMALL LOANS, ANY OTHER FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE).

(Please fill the form in block capital letters)

SURNAME: ……………………………………………………………………………………………

FIRST NAMES: ………………………………………………………………………………………..

DATE OF BIRTH: …………………………….. PLACE OF BIRTH: …………………………………………

HOME ADDRESS: ………………………………………………………………………………………

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TELEPHONE NO (incl code):…………………………………………………………………………

I, the above-named, holder of British Passport No: …………….. Issued at ………………………
on …………………………… Acknowledge: (a) receipt of £ …………… sterling, ………………………
(local Currency) from Her Majesty’s Consul/Vice Consul at…………………………………………

OR

(b) payment on my behalf, which cannot yet be determined, but which will be notified to me after I return to the United Kingdom.

I undertake and promise to repay the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the above sum in sterling. I understand that if this sum is not repaid within six months of the request for payment a ten percent surcharge will be added in lieu of interest.

I understand and agree that passport facilities will not normally be available to me until my debt is paid in full, and that failure to repay may result in legal proceedings to recover monies owed.

I consent to the Department of Social Security releasing to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office such information as may be relevant in respect of any non payment of this debt, including details of my current address and any benefits or allowances paid to me.

Signed………………………………………………………………..Date…………………………….
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - this form must be completed in full. If Recoveries Unit is unable to recover the money due to forms wrongly completed, there is a possibility that the sum could be debited to Post’s local budget.

REASON FOR ADVANCE:………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
(ie small loans etc)

BREAKDOWN OF COSTS:

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Exchange Rate: £1 = …………….. (local currency)

(NB: This exchange rate must be that which is entered in the Post’s account for this transaction).

DOCUMENTS ATTACHED TO ORIGINAL UTR AND FORWARDED TO RECOVERIES UNIT CONSULAR DIVISION IMMEDIATELY.

- a traveller’s cheque duly endorsed.
- a personal cheque made payable to ‘Foreign and Commonwealth Office’ (ensure cheque card number and expiry data are on the back of cheque)
- a Letter of Instruction to applicant’s bank
- an explanation of the loan
- a minute explaining repatriation if authorised at Post
- passport (if repatriation)

List any other relevant documentation:
OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS INCLUDED IN THE TOTAL COST OF REPATRIATION

SPOUSE: .................................................................

NAME: .................................................................

DATE OF BIRTH: ......................PLACE OF BIRTH: ......................

NATIONAL STATUS: .................................................................

PASSPORT NO: ..............

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# APPENDIX 5A2 - REGISTRATION FORM

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**APPENDIX 5A3 - EVACUEE REGISTER**

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APPENDIX 5A4 - NATIONAL SUMMARY

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CHAPTER 6 – SERVICE SUPPORT

601. Force levels and sustainability criteria will be determined during the Military Strategic Estimate. In most cases, service support will have to be deployed by air, placing a premium on light scales and Host Nation Support (HNS). Depending on the size of the operation, a separate Logistic Estimate may be required (see JWP 4-00). Effective logistic support for Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs) is reliant on:

a. **Optimal Use of Air Movement Assets.** Payloads must be maximised and ruthlessly prioritised. In a small-scale operation each flight will have strategic significance.

b. **Availability of Host Nation Support.** Regional Joint Planning Guides (JPGs) provide an assessment of what HNS may be available, but confirmation of the level of support will be required during the planning phase of any operation. In addition MOD UK/PJHQ would be able to confirm what HNS arrangements were already in place. Before deployment, or staging of the force into another state, it will be necessary to obtain clearance from the Host Nation (HN) concerned. Once permission has been granted, detailed co-ordination of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which details the general conditions under which the Joint Task Force (JTF) will operate within the particular nation, plus Memoranda of Understanding (MOU), or Implementing Arrangement (IA) under which the principle upon which the HN provides support to the Joint Task Force (JTF), can begin. The provision of mutual logistic support with coalition partners and others will involve bilateral or multinational arrangements at MOD/Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) or PJHQ level. Locally the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) will be granted authority to negotiate HNS, advised by the Embassy/High Commission staff, and his J8/J9 staffs.

c. **Liaison with other Forces and Agencies.** It will be necessary to establish at least procedural deconfliction for the execution phase with other national plans, UN, International Organisations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) (see Paragraphs 312 and 324).

d. **Multinational Logistics.** In multinational operations close liaison with the other nations’ logistic organisations will be essential both to prevent conflicts of interest and to enable the sharing of sources of supply. Agreements between participating nations could offer economies of scale, coverage and alternative sources not otherwise available.

e. **Seabasing.** The NEO can be conducted by land, air or maritime assets. The latter, (in this context all RN and RFA ships have some amphibious
capability; see Case Study 7 below), have the advantage of being self-contained and not reliant on HNS which is likely to be in short supply in the circumstances of the NEO.

**Case Study 7: Seabased Evacuation**

In January 1986, during the civil war in Aden, the Royal Yacht BRITANNIA, later supported by HM Ships NEWCASTLE, JUPITER and RFA BRAMBLELEAF, evacuated 1379 men, women and children of 55 nationalities from the besieged town. The majority were evacuated by the Royal Yacht’s own boats over an open beach.

f. **Environmental Health.** The situation prior to a NEO is frequently compounded by a breakdown in civil infrastructure, which could pose an environmental health risk to evacuees and deployed forces. In particular:

   (1) The provision of potable water, which may be in short supply, should be considered early in the planning process.

   (2) The communicable disease profile of the country may require specific health protection measures to be taken or advised.

g. **Aviation Fuel.** The availability of useable aviation fuel is a critical resource and must be confirmed not assumed. It should be noted that some Support Helicopters (SH) can in extremis use F76 (NATO marine diesel), but this may cause damage to engine and fuel systems.

h. **Disposal of the Dead.** Even in a permissive NEO environment the death of vulnerable UK Entitled Persons (UKEPs) such as the elderly, infirm, or infants may be encountered. The decision to evacuate or locally dispose of the dead is dependent on but not limited to the specifics of the situation, to include the tactical environment, religion, local custom, and the wishes of any relatives, weather and capacity of receiving ships and aircraft. Under no circumstances should remains be transferred before all UKEP have been safely evacuated.

i. **Medical.** Medical plans must provide for care of evacuees (including the vulnerable) as well as the deployed forces. Stress trauma management should be included within the medical plan.

**SECTION I – RESPONSIBILITIES**

602. **Financial Management.** An estimate of the cost of the operation will be required when Ministerial approval is sought. The Jt Comd J8 will issue a letter giving financial authority to the JTFC once a NEO is authorised. D Fin Pol may issue
a financial instruction. Normal peacetime accounting (financial and stores) and financial principles must be observed. A Civil Secretary, who has the authority to raise contracts and facilitate support, will be appointed and may deploy at the start of the operation to assist with in-theatre expenditure. The Civil Secretary will be issued with the necessary financial delegations and will call upon supporting staff with appropriate contractual, land and claims authority as required. The Civil Secretary is under the functional responsibility of the Civil Secretary at PJHQ.

603. **Status of Forces Agreements.** MOD UK will seek to secure appropriate jurisdictional arrangements over UK personnel and deployed civilians in the countries where they are deployed if no SOFA exists. Agreement is normally achieved by means of an exchange of letters with the host government or by accreditation to the British Embassy/High Commission if only a few personnel are involved.

604. **Memoranda of Understanding.** The FCO may approach a potential HN at the time of an operation where there are no MOUs or Technical/Implementing Arrangements covering the provision of HNS. Once the nation has agreed to provide HNS, a PJHQ-led team would provide the UK requirement and negotiate arrangements with policy guidance provided by MOD UK. Alternatively, it may be more appropriate to support UK needs through mutual support arrangements with allied nations operating adjacently. Wherever possible, if HNS arrangements do not already exist MOUs/IAs are completed with the HN before forces deploy. Otherwise, such arrangements with HNs or allied countries are developed through hot planning as required, although in the absence of any HN arrangements at the start, the NEO may well be completed before such a document is signed.

605. **UK Based Movements.** ACDS LOGOPS co-ordinates strategic movements policy. PJHQ J4 (Movements) is the operational movements focus within PJHQ and, working in concert with JTFHQ Movement staff, establishes the movement requirements and priorities. The Defence Transport and Movement Agency (DTMA) is responsible for the allocation of MOD strategic movement assets and the chartering of commercial assts, where appropriate, including the associated contractual issues.

606. **Deployed Movements.** Movement Staff are embedded in the JTFHQ. If the Forward Mounting Base (FMB) is not collocated with the JTFHQ, an officer will deploy to command the FMB with a discrete Joint Movements Command and Control (JMCC) organisation.

607. **Maintenance Requirement.** Where possible, maintenance requirements are to be met by local purchase in the country being evacuated and at the FMB and EHC. Local purchase authority for the operation will be delegated to named individuals by the Defence Contracts Organisation. All other contractual local purchase powers held by individuals at their parent units are not valid in the JOA. Local purchases should
be recorded regardless of whether the costs fall to the MOD or the FCO. If supplies are inadequate, demands are to be forwarded to UK.

608. **Logistic Support.** The Jt Comd's Directive will specify responsibilities for service support. Generally, single services have responsibility down to second line, and for a short operation, that may be all that is required. If sustainability of a JTF is likely to be an issue, the Jt Comd may appoint a Joint Force Logistics Component Commander (JFLogCC) who would be responsible for receiving the force into theatre, co-ordinating its onward movement (Reception, Staging Onward movement and Integration (RSOI)), and thereafter, sustaining it and supporting its recovery. The JTFC controls all aspects of logistic support in his JOA. His J4 staff is responsible for:

a. Monitoring administrative and logistic support of deployed forces.

b. Arranging hire or requisition of transport, fuel and other local resources in a country being evacuated which has no UK diplomatic representation.

c. If required, providing limited medical assistance, food, shelter and transport to evacuees in the country being evacuated.

d. Re-supply of all logistic demands including single Service source items under arrangements made by CINCFLEET, HQ LAND or HQ STC for all British forces, and for UKEP. This would include: ammunition; rations; petrol; oil and lubricants (POL); miscellaneous chemicals and disinfectants; medical supplies; and water.

e. Reporting on the casualty burden, regulating the Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) chain, gathering medical information on an opportunistic basis and leading on medical logistic issues.

609. **Consular Support.** HM Representative in the country being evacuated will endeavour to assist in the provision of local resources for use by the Forces. His staff will also assist in provision of local resources for use by the Force. HM Representatives in the countries where the FMB and Evacuation Handling Centre (EHC) are located will assist in arranging provision of local resources for use at the FMB and EHC except for Cyprus and Ascension Island, where special procedures are in force.
SECTION II – SPECIAL PROCEDURES

610. When Cyprus is designated as the FMB/EHC, the following special responsibilities apply:

a. **Commander British Forces Cyprus.** Commander British Forces Cyprus (CBFC), assisted where necessary by British High Commissioner (BHC) Nicosia, is responsible for reception and if necessary temporary accommodation of refugees in transit through the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs). He may also be required to provide some logistic support to the JTFC. The support required is shown in relevant regional plans. Where RAF Akrotiri is the FMB, reinforcement details are in Joint Contingency Plan 2 (JCP2).

b. **British High Commissioner Nicosia.** BHC Nicosia is responsible for arranging accommodation within the Republic of Cyprus if required for those refugees whose onward movement is delayed and who cannot be accommodated within the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs). BHC Nicosia may request CBFC for the provision of telegraphic communications between his Emergency Section at RAF Akrotiri and FCO London.

611. When Ascension Island is designated as the FMB/EHC for an evacuation and a JTFHQ is not deployed, the Station Commander Ascension Island will be responsible for the reception and if necessary temporary accommodation of evacuees in transit. He may also be required to provide some logistic support for the protection/evacuation force.
GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

The primary reference for the terms and definitions set out in this glossary is denoted in parenthesis. Those marked (JWP 3-51) are new UK approved terms endorsed by Ratification of this publication.

**Area of Operations**
1. At the operational level, the geographical area defined by the operational level commander within his JOA in which a commander designated by him (usually a component commander) is delegated authority to conduct operations. (JWP 0-01.1)
2. At the tactical level, a geographical area defined by lateral and rear boundaries, which is assigned to a commander by a higher commander. Within these boundaries the commander has authority to conduct operations in order to execute his mission. (JWP 0-01.1)

**Civil Contingency Plan**
A Civil Contingency Plan, produced by the Embassy/High Commission, establishes the Warden System and provides a procedure for an orderly evacuation if required. *See Warden System.* (JWP-3-51)

**Decisive Point**
A point from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened. This point may exist in time, space or the information environment. (AAP-6)

**Electronic Countermeasures**
That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum through the use of electromagnetic energy. There are three subdivisions of electronic countermeasures: electronic jamming, electronic deception and electronic neutralisation. (AAP-6)

**Electronic Warfare**
Military action to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum encompassing: the search for, interception and identification of electromagnetic emissions, the employment of electromagnetic energy, including directed energy, to reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum, and actions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces. (AAP-6)

**End-state**
That state of affairs which needs to be achieved at the end of a campaign either to terminate or to resolve the conflict on favourable terms. The end state should be established prior to execution. (JWP 0-01.1)
End-state
The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved. (AAP-6)

Evacuation Handling Centre
The primary purpose of the Evacuation Handling Centre is to organise the onward movement of the UK Entitled Person to a place of safety. It will also provide a screening facility to ensure that only entitled evacuees are moved and will have the administrative arrangements needed for the provision of adequate medical and logistic support. (JWP-3-51)

Evacuation Point
Evacuation Points are sites where the wardens deliver the UK Entitled Person for extraction and where the military assume responsibility. They are selected by HM Representative, often with military advice and are normally designated in the Civil Contingency Plan. (JWP-3-51)

Fire Support
The application of fire, co-ordinated with the manoeuvre of forces, to destroy, neutralise or suppress the enemy. (AAP-6)

Force Protection
A process which aims to conserve the fighting potential of a deployed force by countering the wider threat to its elements from adversaries, natural and human hazards, and fratricide. (JWP 0-01.1)

Forward Mounting Base
A base (also deployed operating base) established within the operational area, to support operations at forward operating bases. It will be resourced to a greater level than a forward operating base, including C2, logistics and administration support elements. (JWP 0-01.1)

Forward Operating Base
A base (also deployed operating base) established within the operational area to support tactical operations. It will be resourced to provide minimum services commensurate with sustaining the required level of air effort. (JWP 0-01.1)

Host-nation
A nation which, by agreement:
a. receives forces and materiel of NATO or other nations operating on/from or transiting through its territory;
b. allows materiel and/or NATO organizations to be located on its territory; and/or
c. provides support for these purposes. See also host-nation support. (AAP-6)
Host-nation Support
Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis or war by a host nation to NATO and/or other forces and NATO organisations which are located on, operating on/from, or in transit through the host nation’s territory. See also host-nation. (AAP-6)

Information Operations
Co-ordinated actions undertaken to influence an adversary or potential adversary in support of political and military objectives by undermining his will, cohesion and decision making ability, including his information, information based processes and systems while protecting one’s own decision-makers and decision making processes. (JWP 0-01.1)

Information Operations
Actions taken to influence decision makers in support of political and military objectives by affecting others’ information and/or information systems. There are two major categories of Info Ops: offensive and defensive, depending on the nature of the actions involved. (AAP-6)

Information Support
The term ‘Information Support’ is to be used by the United Kingdom for national operations other than war. For coalition, alliance and war fighting operations the United Kingdom will continue to use the term ‘Psychological Operations’. See Psychological Operations. (JWP 0-01.1)

Joint
Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at least two services participate. (AAP-6)

Joint Contingency Plan
Deliberate contingency plans prepared for a situation where it is assessed that there is a particular likelihood of an operation being mounted, or the anticipated warning time is reduced. In addition to the planning data contained in Joint Planning Guides, Joint Contingency Plans contain specific information on military capabilities required and deployment options, including readiness states where applicable. (JWP 0-01.1)

Joint Force
A force composed of significant elements of two or more Services operating under a single commander authorised to exercise operational control or command. (JWP 0-01.1)
Joint Operations Area
An area of land, sea and airspace, defined by higher authority, in which a designated Joint Task Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A Joint Operations Area including its defining parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission specific. (JWP 0-01.1)

Joint Planning Guide
Deliberate planning documents which comprise generic planning data for a particular region or for a particular type of operation.

Joint Task Force Commander
The operational commander of a nominated joint force. (JWP 0-01.1)

Joint Task Force Headquarters
A purely national deployable joint headquarters of variable size commanded at the operational level by a Joint Task Force Commander. (JWP 0-01.1)

Joint Theatre Plans
Contingency plans for specific crisis operations in various parts of the world. (JWP 0-01.1)

Multinational
Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations, in which elements of more than one nation participate. (JWP 0-01.1)

Multinational Logistics
The full spectrum of modes used to logistically support operations other than purely national, such as multinational integrated logistic support, role specialisation support and lead nation logistic support. (JWP 0-01.1)

Manoeuvre
1. A movement to place ships or aircraft in a position of advantage over the enemy.
2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the ground, or on a map in imitation of war.
3. The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, to cause it to perform desired movements.
4. Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (AAP-6)
Manoeuvre
To seek to get into a position of advantage in respect of the enemy from which force can be threatened or applied. At the operational level such manoeuvre should be directed towards a decisive point or directly at the centre of gravity. (JWP 0-01.1)

Operation
A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (AAP-6)

Place of Safety
A place of safety is where UK Entitled Persons exit the evacuation chain and are no longer reliant on diplomatic or military assistance. There will be a number of different places of safety dependent on the needs and perceptions of individual UK Entitled Person. (JWP-3-51)

Psychological Operations
Planned psychological activities designed to influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. (AAP-6)

Psychological Operations
Planned, culturally sensitive, truthful and attributable activities directed at approved target audiences within the joint operations area in order to achieve political and military objectives by influencing attitudes and behaviour. (JWP 0-01.1)

Reception Centre
Reception Centres are pre-designated sites, selected by HM Representative as part of the Civil Contingency Plan, where UK Entitled Person enter the evacuation chain and are gathered by their local warden. (JWP-3-51)

Rules of Engagement
Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (AAP-6)

Non-combatant Evacuation Operation
A Non-combatant Evacuation Operation is an operation conducted to relocate designated non-combatants threatened in a foreign country to a place of safety. (JWP 3-51)
**Non-combatant Evacuation Operation**
A Non-combatant Evacuation Operation is an operation conducted to relocate designated non-combatants threatened in a foreign country to a country of safety. (AAP-6)

**Sustainability**
The ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its objectives. (AAP-6)

**Tactical Command**
The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. (AAP-6)

**Tactical Control**
The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (AAP-6)

**Target Audience**
An individual or group selected for influence or attack by means of psychological operations. (AAP-6)

**Task Force**
1. A temporary grouping of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission.
2. Semi-permanent organisation of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a continuing specific task.
3. A component of a fleet organised by the commander of a task fleet or higher authority for the accomplishment of a specific task or tasks. (AAP-6)

**Warden System**
The Warden System is a network of volunteers, usually selected from among well-known members of the British community, known as wardens, who act as a point of contact between HM Representative and the wider British community. They pass information and instructions by a cascade system with each warden usually being responsible for no more than 20 families. (JWP-3-51)
# GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACDS (OPS)</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Defence (Operations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APOD</td>
<td>Airport of Disembarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUS (H&amp;O)</td>
<td>Assistant Under Secretary of State (Home and Overseas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAA</td>
<td>British Airports Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCR</td>
<td>British Community Register</td>
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<tr>
<td>BHC</td>
<td>British High Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2W</td>
<td>Command &amp; Control Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAOC</td>
<td>Combined Air Operations Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASEVAC</td>
<td>Casualty Evacuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBFC</td>
<td>Commander British Forces Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Component Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIR</td>
<td>Commander’s Critical Information Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Civil Contingency Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCT</td>
<td>Current Commitments Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Chief of Defence Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVPOP</td>
<td>Civilian Population</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJO</td>
<td>Chief of Joint Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoA</td>
<td>Course of Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoG</td>
<td>Centre of Gravity</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>Close Protection Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>Contingency Planning Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Defence Attaché/Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCDS(C)</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCMO</td>
<td>Defence Crisis Management Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DETR</td>
<td>Department of the Environment Transport and the Regions</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEWC</td>
<td>Defence Electronic Warfare Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG Op Pol</td>
<td>Director General Operational Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIS</td>
<td>Defence Intelligence Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>D News</td>
<td>Director of News</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOA</td>
<td>Desired Order of Arrival</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOP</td>
<td>Defence and Overseas Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Decisive Point</td>
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<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Defence Profiles</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSF</td>
<td>Director Special Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTLR</td>
<td>Department of Transport, Local Government and Regions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTMA</td>
<td>Defence Transport &amp; Movements Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>EHC</td>
<td>Evacuation Handling Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELINT</td>
<td>Electronic Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>Electro-magnetic</td>
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<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</td>
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<td>EvPt</td>
<td>Evacuation Point</td>
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<tr>
<td>EW</td>
<td>Electronic Warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>EWOS</td>
<td>Electronic Warfare Operational Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign &amp; Commonwealth Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMB</td>
<td>Forward Mounting Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOB</td>
<td>Forward Operating Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOC</td>
<td>Full Operational Capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSRT</td>
<td>Fleet Standby Rifle Troop</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMA</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Ambassador</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMG</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>Host Nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>HNS</td>
<td>Host Nation Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBM</td>
<td>Intelligence Briefing Memoranda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMINT</td>
<td>Imagery Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMS</td>
<td>Integrated Mission Support</td>
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<td>Info Ops</td>
<td>Information Operations</td>
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<td>Info Sp</td>
<td>Information Support</td>
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<td>IA</td>
<td>Implementing Arrangement</td>
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<td>IOC</td>
<td>Initial Operating Capability</td>
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<td>IOs</td>
<td>International Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPB</td>
<td>Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>Joint Contingency Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDCC</td>
<td>Joint Doctrine and Doctrine Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDP</td>
<td>Joint Doctrine Pamphlet</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFACC</td>
<td>Joint Force Air Component Commander</td>
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<td>JFHQ</td>
<td>Joint Force Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFLLogCC</td>
<td>Joint Force Logistics Component Commander</td>
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<td>JMCC</td>
<td>Joint Movements Command &amp; Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>Joint Operations Area</td>
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<td>JPG</td>
<td>Joint Planning Guide</td>
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<td>JRRF</td>
<td>Joint Rapid Reaction Force</td>
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<td>Jt Comd</td>
<td>Joint Commander</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>JTFC</td>
<td>Joint Task Force Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTFHQ</td>
<td>Joint Task Force Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTTPs</td>
<td>Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures</td>
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<td>JWP</td>
<td>Joint Warfare Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>LO</td>
<td>Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>LS</td>
<td>Landing Site</td>
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<td>MAMS</td>
<td>Mobile Air Movements Squadron</td>
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<td>MEDEVAC</td>
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<td>MILO</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memoranda of Understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>Non-combatant Evacuation Operation</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRG</td>
<td>News Release Group</td>
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<td>NTM</td>
<td>Notice to Move</td>
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<tr>
<td>OGD</td>
<td>Other government departments</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLRT</td>
<td>Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team</td>
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<td>OPCOM</td>
<td>Operational Command</td>
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<td>OPCON</td>
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<td>Opposing Forces</td>
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<td>Operations Security</td>
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<td>PIR</td>
<td>Priority Intelligence Requirement</td>
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<td>PJHQ</td>
<td>Permanent Joint Headquarters</td>
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<td>POL</td>
<td>Petrol, Oil and Lubricants</td>
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<td>RMP</td>
<td>Recognised Maritime Picture</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>ROEREQ</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement Request</td>
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<td>ROERO</td>
<td>Roll on Roll off</td>
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<td>RPT</td>
<td>Readiness Preparation Time</td>
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<td>RSOI</td>
<td>Reception, Staging Onward movement and Integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>Search &amp; Rescue</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Sovereign Base Area</td>
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<td>SF</td>
<td>Special Forces</td>
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<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence</td>
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<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
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<td>Seaport of Disembarkation</td>
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<td>UKEP</td>
<td>United Kingdom Entitled Persons</td>
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<td>UKOPSDOC</td>
<td>United Kingdom Doctrine for Joint &amp; Multinational Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSECORD</td>
<td>United Nations Security Ordnance</td>
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<tr>
<td>UTR</td>
<td>Undertaking to Repay</td>
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<tr>
<td>WRR</td>
<td>West-about Reinforcement Route</td>
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