## STRATEGIC CASE

### Problem
The strategic case for public transport provision in the sub-region has been clearly set out. The key underlying challenge in the Greater Bristol sub-region is that the scale of the new employment and housing development planned, and the already increasing demand for travel (above the national average) will lead to ever-worsening congestion. The overall strategic case for this and the other BRT scheme is to provide high quality public transport options to meet as much of the increasing demand for travel as possible.

The strategic case for this particular scheme on this corridor is less clearly stated in the BAFB, although it is clear that a large proportion of the new employment development planned in Greater Bristol is across the North Fringe and this particular scheme aims to provide a public transport link from this area to Bristol City Centre and the more deprived communities of South Bristol. This is demonstrated by the map of the route showing the many adjacent development sites.

### Objectives/Investment aims
The objectives are to support the local economy, tackle congestion and facilitate regeneration but, as above, are expressed in terms of the area.

### Options Appraisal
Plans for a light rail line broadly in the North Fringe to Hengrove corridor were shelved by Bristol City Council in 2004 following concerns over cost and value for money. The genesis of the rapid transit scheme was the Greater Bristol Strategic Transport Study in 2006 which looked at a range of options including smarter travel, demand management measures, highway measures, and public transport measures. Its recommendations covered all these areas and recommended this route amongst others for a rapid transit system, but it was not clear that all the above measures were evaluated on a corridor by corridor basis. The study did not specify the technology but said that "modern, low-floor, articulated buses" were likely to satisfy the requirements of the service.

The promoters also assessed a number of technology options at various points prior to the submission of the original scheme bid in 2010. A Public Transport Corridor Transport Options Study in 2007 identified and prioritised the routes to be taken forward as rapid transit schemes. In August 2007 a technology review looked at a wide range of potential public transport modes. This was for the West of England generally and not route specific.

Subsequently a detailed analysis was undertaken on the potential route options for the North Fringe to Hengrove Corridor and a further technology review in 2010, specifically for the North Fringe to Hengrove route, examined the case for bus rapid transit against ultra light rail and trolleybus and concluded that BRT was likely to be the least expensive and least risky option, highlighting the relative infancy of ULR technology.

### Scope

#### Scope of previously proposed scheme (June 2010)
The proposed BRT route was to run from Hengrove in South Bristol, north through the City Centre, running up the M32 (with existing traffic), then splitting to two main branches in the Northern end of the route to North Fringe and Eastern Fringe). The total length of the route is over 10 miles.

The scheme involved significant lengths of segregated infrastructure along the route, reconfigured junctions to give bus priority, and a bus-only junction on the M32 (unique in the UK as far as we are aware), enhanced bus stops along the
route and a new park and ride site on the M32.

It was intended that a Quality Partnership Scheme be established with the infrastructure open to operators meeting certain quality thresholds. Vehicles were therefore not part of the capital scheme or funding bid.

**Descoping**

Although the route remains the same, there has been substantial descoping, in particular:-
- a significant reduction in the overall length of segregated busway, concentrating on sections of greatest congestion
- the omission of the M32 Park & Ride site (which the LA intends to bring forward at a later date)
- a reduction in the bus stop standards to be applied
- fewer landscaping/public realm measures in the City centre section

**Impact on objectives?**

As stated above the objectives are fairly widely defined and the reduced scheme appears to continue to meet them, albeit with a reduction in the scale of expected benefits.

**Impact on growth and developments**

**GDP benefits**
The scheme is forecast to deliver £1.06 of GDP benefits per £1 spent by the public sector. This includes journey time savings to business users, improved reliability, higher operating surpluses for transport operators and agglomeration.

**Developments**
There are around 20 individual development sites immediately adjacent to the route of the scheme (some employment, some housing, many mixed use). The major employment sites are at the ends of the North Fringe and Eastern Fringe routes. No sites are physically inaccessible without the scheme.

**No of new dwellings claimed facilitated by scheme**
Although not directly facilitated by the scheme, the proposed sites (see above) have provision for over 22,000 new dwellings including 9,000 in City Centre and 8,000 at North Fringe.

**No of Jobs claimed facilitated by scheme**
Over 100ha of employment land in North and Eastern Fringes about half of which has construction ongoing.

**What is the status of the planning/development**
The BAFB is not clear on all counts but it appears that on 5 sites construction is ongoing (build out is nearly complete at Emerald Park, Eastern Fringe) another 2 have planning consent granted, a further 2 are at masterplanning or equivalent stages. The status of the others is not known.

**Stakeholder views**

**LEP views**
The West of England LEP strongly supports all 5 of the West of England partnership schemes. It stresses the importance of them to the local economy but does not address the specific contributions of the individual schemes.

There are over 100 letters of support on the BAFB for the five West of England partnership schemes, of which five highlight this scheme for particular support and there are three solely in support of this scheme. However the Federation of Small Businesses, while supportive of the schemes, is concerned about the introduction of a Workplace Parking Levy as a funding mechanism (see financial case).

**Statutory Bodies**
The promoters met the Statutory Environmental Bodies for the first time on 12 August 2011 and the bid claims they were supportive, although this meeting appears to have been primarily about the South Bristol Link. Evidence submitted in the MSBC for this scheme in March 2010 indicated broad support from the Statutory Environmental Bodies.

**Previous Correspondence to DfT**
No previous correspondence.

**External Campaigns**
No organised campaigns but there is a significant local lobby of various groups, including the Transport for Greater Bristol Alliance which favours rail and light rail solution over BRT but have not proposed an alternative specifically on this
route, (they are not apparently calling for the old light rail scheme to be resurrected) There is no evidence of any public opposition to this scheme as a whole, but there is opposition to the M32 bus link from some allotment owners who would be affected. They have set up a campaigning webpage.

Consultation
There has been public consultation over the winter of 2009/10 on this scheme in its previous form. The promoters have publicised the revised, descoped scheme widely but do not appear to have undertaken formal consultation on it. They say they will continue to engage on design issues with the local residents affected.

Consultation responses Oct 2011
Three responses in support. One supports only the NFH package and not the other 2 Bristol schemes. The other two support all WoE schemes but picks this one out for special mention. Transport for Greater Bristol Alliance oppose this and the other 2 Bristol schemes, favouring rail (inc Portishead reopening) and ultra-light rail solutions instead.

Neighbouring authorities
The four West of England unitary authorities are all mutually supportive of each others’ Development Pool schemes, through their umbrella organisation the West of England Partnership.

Carbon Impact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traded Sector</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>NIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-traded sector</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>-1,709 CO2eq</td>
<td>-4,268 CO2eq</td>
<td>-4,202 CO2eq</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The scheme is forecast to reduce Carbon Dioxide emissions by 140,000 tonnes over the 60 year appraisal period.

STRATEGIC CASE: SUMMARY

The strategic case for improved public transport capacity across Bristol, to meet some of the growing demand for travel, is well made. The issues and problems on this specific corridor are less well documented in the BA FB, although there was an extensive strategic options process by which this scheme emerged as preferred route for rapid transit in 2007. Overall the assessment of options in terms of routes and vehicle technologies has been thorough and extensive, although some critics would argue that there has been an in-built bias towards bus technology. The scheme would provide a Rapid Transit service linking deprived areas in South Bristol to growing employment sites in the northern and eastern fringes, serving the City Centre and a number of housing and employment development sites on the way. There is a significant level of support for all the Bristol and West of England schemes from businesses but these are expressed in terms of overall provision in the city, and not particularly focussed on this route. There is no evidence of widespread opposition to this scheme but there is a body of opinion, articulated by the Transport for Greater Bristol Alliance, that rail rather than Bus Rapid Transit is the answer. It should be noted however that there is no clear heavy rail alternative along this particular route and an alternative ultra light rail proposal has been considered by the promoters and ruled out on several grounds including the relative infancy of ultra light rail technology. There is also some localised opposition to the M32 bus link.
Economic Case

Scheme Name: North Fringe to Hengrove BRT
Date: 22/11/11

Economic Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Core</th>
<th>Adjusted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PV Benefits (£m)</td>
<td>190.7</td>
<td>207.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PV Costs (£m)</td>
<td>101.6</td>
<td>101.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCR</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Value for Money: Medium/High

Assumptions

The estimates of scheme benefits have been forecast using a transport model which covers highway, bus, Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) and heavy rail. Bid assumes that 12 buses per hour would be provided on three routes by the private sector through a quality partnership. The bid also includes the introduction of a new link road and a bus-only slip road on the M32 which would require a reduction in the speed limit (to 60mph).

The benefits and costs reported above have been prepared on the basis that no other schemes in the development pool proceed (e.g. South Bristol Link and Ashton Vale to Temple Meads). An optimism bias allowance of 46% has been applied to capital costs.

Key Risks, Sensitivities, and Uncertainties

The main uncertainty with the appraisal is that the bidder hasn’t provided sensitivity tests showing alternative assumptions about the location of jobs/housing growth in Bristol. As a number of large scale developments are assumed to occur in the area served by the scheme it is likely that the scheme BCR is sensitive to alternative assumptions.

There is a significant level of uncertainty associated with the value of improved bus stops and buses - the bidder has assumed that these are worth the same as a 9 minute reduction in journey time per passenger (around £1.20 per commuting trip in today’s prices). In constructing our central case we have assumed a more modest improvement (4.5 minutes) to reflect the quality of the existing network – Bristol are in the process of delivering a £70m investment in their bus network as part of a previous Local Majors scheme.

The core assessment has been developed on the assumption that the Ashton Vale to Temple Meads and South Bristol Link schemes (both in the development pool) don’t proceed. This is consistent with guidance and our assessment of other schemes. However, if the Ashton Vale scheme were to be approved (included for consideration as part of the Growth Review) the BCR of the North Fringe package would increase by around 0.3-0.4. In this scenario our assessment would be that this scheme would offer high VfM (rather than borderline high/medium) although there would still be a risk of it falling into medium VfM.

There is some uncertainty regarding whether the new BRT services will be delivered by the private sector particularly given the lack of detail provided by the bidder on deliverability. Lower interpeak frequencies could reduce the BCR by 0.3.

Impacts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impacts</th>
<th>Adjusted BCR Monetised Impacts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reliability</td>
<td>Bidder has estimated improvements in highway reliability of £19.4m for journeys within the urban area i.e. excluding the motorway network. It has not been possible for the bidder to estimate improvements in reliability for bus users but this could potentially be significant given the bus priority measures included.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider Impacts</td>
<td>Estimated by the bidder at £10.8m using the WITA software.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landscape</td>
<td>Landscape dis-benefits of £13.7m estimated due to loss in urban fringe land. This is likely to be an overestimate given that no allowance has been made for mitigation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Positive Non-Monetised Impacts: No moderate or large beneficial non-monetised impacts.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impacts</th>
<th>Negative Non-Monetised Impacts</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No moderate or large adverse non-monetised impacts.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Reduction in benefits required for medium vfm | £4.0m | Probability | Very High |
FINANCIAL CASE

Basic Financial Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Cost</th>
<th>DfT contribution</th>
<th>LA contribution</th>
<th>Third Party contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£m</td>
<td>£m</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>£m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous cost (June 2010)</td>
<td>180.7</td>
<td>170.9</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently proposed cost (BAFB)</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
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</table>

%Change (June 10 to BAFB)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+184%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall scheme costs

- Savings from June 10 to BAFB
  - The extensive descoping of the scheme, and in particular the significant reduction in the length of segregated running, has led to a halving of base construction costs with similar reductions to preliminaries, risk etc.

- Pre-Jun 2010 movement in costs
  - No. The June 2010 cost is based on the Major Scheme Business Case submitted to DfT in March 2010

- Base cost of the scheme
  - There has been a review of costs as part of the descoping and a detailed breakdown of scheme costs has been supplied.
  - It is unclear how the cost of the city centre works has been apportioned between this and the Ashton Vale to Temple Meads scheme although it would be a reasonable assumption that some savings should be possible if both schemes were to go ahead.

- Inflation
  - An inflation factor of 2.79% has been applied to the total scheme cost up to 2014/15 and 6% thereafter.

- Risk
  - The cost of risk was generated by a QRA (Monte Carlo analysis) but the P80 rather than the P50 has been used (see below)
  - The adjusted risk figure is 7% of scheme costs (the P80 would have been 11%) which seems reasonable and in line with other schemes.

- Adjustments made by DfT
  - The following ineligible items have been removed from the above figures
    - Evaluation (£0.150m) is not a capital cost
    - Part 1 claims (£3.766m) have been included as a local contribution but they should not appear in the total scheme cost. Pt 1 inflation (£0.8m) has also been removed from the inflation line
    - The risk figure (£11.163m) is based on the P80 level rather than the normal P50 level (£6.419m).
  - Adjusting for the above the total scheme cost is therefore £92.946m rather than £101.606m as stated in the BAFB.
  - The cost of the scheme at June 2010 has also been adjusted to take account of the P50 risk and is therefore £180.700m as opposed to the £188.190m quoted in the BAFB. (that figure was already exclusive of Part 1 claims and evaluation costs).

Sources of funding (and risks)

- Third Party funding
  - The third party funding is intended to come from Section 106 agreements. Of this £2.0 has already been received, £8.0 is committed or agreed but conditional upon build out and a further £5.7m is estimated to be available from sites at earlier stages with no agreements yet in place.

- LA contribution
  - The proposed total LA contribution as stated on the BAFB is £34.7m, higher than the £27.8m in the above table due to the elimination of ineligible costs. If no further section 106 agreements are forthcoming the liability would rise to £37.6m.
  - In the worst case scenario of no further build out on sites for which contributions have been agreed, then the liability would rise to £45.6m. However that is an extreme scenario which would bring into question the case for the scheme going ahead.

  - Bristol City Council intends to raise its contribution of £19.485m (along with the
contribution to the other two Bristol schemes) largely from borrowing against either a Business Rate Supplement (BRS) or a Workplace Parking Levy (WPL). This strategy was agreed by Bristol’s Cabinet on 1 September. The council has clarified that it would forward fund the contribution to these schemes in advance of WPL or BRS monies being available.

The draft Joint Promotion Agreement between the two councils sets out that financial liabilities shall be apportioned 40% to Bristol and 60% to South Gloucestershire. That implies, but it is not stated explicitly, that any cost overruns would be shared in those proportions. Curiously, the specific contributions as set out in the BAFB are not mentioned directly.

Ongoing costs

The services are expected to be commercial and to generate profit over time. However in the early years they may be loss making and, if bus operators do not operate commercial services in the first few years after opening, services would need to be tendered with revenue support from the Local Authorities. This could be offset by section 106 revenue contributions but would add to the LAs already considerable liability for the capital scheme costs.

FINANCIAL CASE: SUMMARY

The reduction in the scope of the scheme and the consequent cost savings of 50% have been significant and is the second biggest reduction in the Development Pool (after Worcester). The increase in the LA and 3rd party contributions means that the DfT contribution has been reduced by 70%, also the second highest reduction (after Bath).

Recommended conditions of approval (if any):

None
## COMMERCIAL CASE

### Infrastructure

| Packaging of procurement of capital elements | The procurement is to be packaged into 13 different elements:- main works, M32 junction, NR bridge, other major structures, signals, RTPI, bus stops etc.  

The promoters are considering allowing HA to procure and manage the M32 junction and similarly for Network Rail to manage the construction of the Stoke Gifford Railway Bridge. The pros and cons of this approach are not discussed, nor is there any discussion of how the LA would retain control.  

The package for the City Centre works would be combined with the Ashton Vale to Temple Meads scheme (if approved). However there is no discussion of what would happen if only one of these schemes went ahead, or one was delayed. There is little discussion of alternative packaging options and the relative merits. There was a scored evaluation of the different procurement options. There does not seem to be any middle way options between the preferred disaggregated approach and combining the whole scheme in one procurement.  

For example, while using separate/existing contracts for RTPI and bus stop infrastructure seems logical, there are no options considered for packaging the major structures as one contract, or for bundling with the main highway works. |

| Type of procurement | Most of the works are intended to be delivered mainly through framework contracts, where rates and prices are already set. In some cases new Framework contract would be established for some of the higher value packages that are outside the scope of existing frameworks. These would be tendered through mini-completions. There is a methodology showing how various procurement options were scored, this also partly involves different packaging options. However this was conducted as a single exercise for all three Bristol schemes. There is no options analysis for the individual schemes. Also what does not come out through the scoring system is the complexity and overhead for the LA client in managing a multiplicity of different contracts on this scheme alone. For the main highway works a target price mechanism will be used on individual task orders (both target price and fixed price are available through the frameworks). For the bus stops, Real Time Passenger Information system (RTPI) fixed prices would be used. |

| Procurement Route | The BAFB says that most if not all of the new procurements will be carried out under the Restricted procedure. |

### Services

| Procurement of bus/tram/rail services | Access to the route is intended to be regulated through a Quality Partnership which will set requirements on vehicle quality, fares, branding and ticketing. On parts of the route there may also be a requirement for tendered services where a commercial services will not initially operate. The precise extent of this will not be known until further detailed discussions are held with operators. The three main operators (Stagecoach, First and Go-Ahead) have all expressed support for the scheme and willingness in principle to use the routes and invest in high quality vehicles, subject to their own assessment of the commercial case. They do not differentiate between this and the other two Bristol schemes. We would need to see a higher level of commitment from the operators before the scheme could progress to Full Approval and construction. |
While the proposed packaging of elements for procurement appears reasonably logical it has not been demonstrated that it is the optimum strategy and it is possible that there are better options. The number of individual contracts will be very resource consuming and complex for the LA to manage. The detail of how the route would be served by commercial operators is not clear. Whilst the main operators have signalled their support for the routes they are not yet committed to using them. The LAs have clearly stated they will tender support services in the early years if they do not attract commercial services but we can not assume that would continue indefinitely.

**Recommended conditions of approval (if any):** Review of procurement strategy with a view to optimising packaging of elements. Clarification of QPS proposals and securing of services to operate along the infrastructure.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MANAGEMENT CASE</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Est Start Date</strong></td>
<td>Dec 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Est Completion Date</strong></td>
<td>Dec 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage of DfT funding in Spending Review period</strong></td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Timetable and milestones (inc opening date etc)</strong></td>
<td>The timetable seems reasonable with a 13 month period from publication of orders to confirmation. Orders would not be published until June 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Track Record on recent major schemes (and any others known e.g. CIF)</strong></td>
<td>South Gloucestershire is the lead authority in the delivery of the Greater Bristol Bus Network. It is on schedule to be delivered on time (March 2012) as envisaged at the time of Full Approval in 2008, but 9% over budget.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governance</strong></td>
<td>The Governance proposals appear confused and give rise to some significant concerns. The SRO is named as Chris Sane, South Gloucs, but there is also a Rapid Transit SRO covering all five West of England schemes, who chairs a ‘Programme Delivery Board’ and also sits on the scheme Project Board. The promoters have clarified that the Project SRO is the ‘ultimate decision taker’ but subsequently we have seen a draft ‘Joint Promotion Agreement’ between the two authorities which appears to be in direct contradiction to that. In the joint agreement, not only does the SRO appear to have powers delegated to him by the project board, it says that the project board will reach decisions by consensus, and if it cannot, then matters can be decided by the ‘lead officers’ of the two local authorities, (confusingly one of which may be the SRO) with the ultimate decisions being made by the Joint Transport Executive Committee, a West of England Partnership body. The members of the Project Board are listed but not their roles. It is unclear what delegations/tolerances are in place. The Project Board does not appear to meet regularly but only at key milestones (whose frequency is not stated). It is not at all clear how the SRO will have effective control over the contracts let by Bristol City Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependencies</strong></td>
<td>A joint procurement package is proposed for the City Centre works required for this and the Ashton Vale to Temple Meads scheme. If either scheme is delayed this could have a knock on effect on the other.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Statutory Permissions</strong></td>
<td>The scheme requires planning consent and land and possibly side roads orders (although this is not stated explicitly). Negotiations with some land owners in early stages. CPO and Public Inquiry allowed for in the timetable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stakeholders/Opposition</strong></td>
<td>The promoters are planning to undertake community engagement with affected parties and residents as the detailed design of the scheme is developed. There is little opposition to the scheme as a whole although there is opposition from allotment owners to the M32 bus only junction which would take their land. The council have said they will relocate the allotments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Risks</strong></td>
<td>The promoter assesses the biggest risks to be delay in permissions, including HA consent for M32 junction works, and Network Rail. The HA do not have an issue in principle with the bus only junction but will require the LA to strictly control access. There is no indication that the statutory permissions are anything other than straightforward and no particular reason why they should be delayed. Experience with other schemes suggests that securing agreement on possessions from Network Rail (required for Stoke Gifford overbridge) can be difficult and can impact on cost and time. Negotiations are ongoing but at early stages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project Assurance</strong></td>
<td>No reference to Gateway Reviews or project assurance in the BAFB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation/Benefits Realisation</strong></td>
<td>The promoters have set aside £150,000 to conduct pre and post opening monitoring reports in 2013, 2017 and 2018 and a full impact evaluation in 2016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MANAGEMENT CASE: SUMMARY**

The overall timetable seems achievable if everything goes according to plan. We have no reason to doubt the promoters’ ability to deliver, but the governance arrangements, as currently documented, are at face value seriously flawed and at best are very confused. This is a significant concern, particularly as there will be significant highway works across two authorities, and given the high number of individual contractors to manage. The lack of any plans for project assurance is also of concern. Nevertheless the scheme does not
appear particularly complex in construction terms, aside from the inherently greater risks around the rail overbridge and the motorway junction.

**Recommended conditions of approval (if any):**
Clarification and assurance of governance arrangements, including project assurance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Goal/Target</th>
<th>Annual Value</th>
<th>Qualitative</th>
<th>Qualitative 1</th>
<th>Qualitative 2</th>
<th>Median Value</th>
<th>Median Value 1</th>
<th>Median Value 2</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Median 1</th>
<th>Median 2</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Site Selection</td>
<td>The site where an organization finds its facility is the key to its success.</td>
<td>Total of gas processing plants</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td>NA</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>Comments</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environmental Impact</td>
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<td>Comments</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Impact</td>
<td>The impact of operations on the community.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Benefit</td>
<td>The impact of operations on the economy.</td>
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<td>Comments</td>
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</tbody>
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**Notes:**
- The table above is a simplified representation of the data. For a comprehensive analysis, please refer to the full document.
- The “Goal/Target” column indicates the target for each property.
- The “Annual Value” column shows the annual value associated with each property.
- The “Qualitative” and “Qualitative 1” columns provide qualitative assessments of the properties.
- The “Median” and “Median 1” columns show median values for each property.
- The “Comments” column provides additional context or commentary on the properties.