Corruption

1. Corruption is always an issue in conflict environments, and military commanders must both address the issue and be seen to take a leadership role in addressing it. This requires attention, inter alia, to local procurement, to bribes being demanded on the street for safe passage or security, to non-meritocratic awards of jobs. Citizens have a good sense of what is corrupt and what is inevitable: the military commander needs to be aware of this, and to the use of corruption as a propaganda weapon against any official and the government.

Anti-Corruption Initiatives

2. Corruption undermines confidence in the state, impedes the flow of aid, concentrates wealth into the hands of a minority and provides elites with illicit means of protecting their positions and interests. It affords adversarial groups propaganda opportunities and contributes to other forms of crime and instability. Practices deemed acceptable in some societies would be considered corrupt in others. However, practices universally considered corrupt include bribery, embezzlement, fraud and extortion. Whether nepotistic activities, such as patronage, or client-based systems constitute actual corruption is debatable. Local customs and norms should guide the commander in his assessment.

3. It is useful to distinguish between significant and petty corruption. ‘Grand corruption’ refers to practices pervading the highest levels of government, leading to an erosion of confidence in the rule of law. Petty corruption involves the exchange of small amounts of money or the granting of minor favours by those seeking preferential treatment. The critical difference between the 2 is that grand corruption involves the distortion of the central functions of the state whereas petty corruption acts to distort the social fabric at the level where most people interact with agents of the state. While petty corruption may appear to be acceptable within local norms, it can impinge on the security and economic well-being of the population, and thereby the legitimacy of the state. This will be most obvious to the commander in relation to the host nation police forces. Military commanders and their troops need to be alert for instances of petty corruption and, in general, use local government agencies to address culprits.
4. Anti-corruption measures can constitute a threat to elites on whom a political settlement depends. Political settlements may depend on patronage and opportunity for enrichment in order to achieve acceptance from those who have seen this as a normal feature of political activity for generations. However, while such enrichment and patronage may have been normal for previous generations, they do not carry legitimacy and detract from stabilisation efforts. Implementation of anti-corruption measures cannot therefore wait until after a political settlement has been reached; the institutions establishing the settlement should strive for integrity and anti-corruption to the furthest degree possible. Such actions will contribute to a stronger and more legitimate political settlement. Once anti-corruption initiatives are in place, UK forces may be required to support:

   a. Integrated coalition efforts to eradicate grand corruption.
   b. Development and dissemination of codes of conduct and ethical standards for host government security forces and civil servants.
   c. Training in ethics and standards of conduct for security forces.
   d. Ensuring that movements of basic supplies such as food, clothing, and blankets are tracked from point of departure to point of delivery.
   e. Monitoring of security forces on patrol and at checkpoints to prevent opportunistic collection of payments.
   f. Audit, prosecutorial and judicial support.
   g. Accountability arrangements and transparent contract management procedures, especially in the dispersal of reconstruction funds provided by intervention forces and agencies, and in the contracts they agree with local companies.
   h. Establishment of appropriate standards of payment of salaries to security force and bureaucratic personnel, and support for the implantation of these mechanisms.
   i. ‘Whistleblower’ protection schemes.

5. Additionally, the UK forces may be required to contribute to the education of indigenous forces on the roles, norms and standards of behaviour within the new domestic order as well as public awareness programmes and, crucially, broader efforts at the restoration of an independent media capable of exposing corruption and mobilising public opinion. Ultimately, if government corruption threatens campaign progress, then coalition partners will need to make critical components of international support conditional on improved behaviour.
Counter-corruption in Helmand

6. 3 Commando Brigade (3CDO) returned from Operation Herrick 3 in Afghanistan in April 2009. Their experiences of countering corruption were recounted in their force debrief. Whilst specific to Afghanistan, it has resonance for other conflict areas. Their feedback included the following:

   a. Corruption is widely discussed. It is spoken about at every large local meeting and is a central theme in all election manifestos. There is extensive perception of corruption on the streets, causing much resentment of those in positions of power.

   b. The top issues for corruption as seen by 3CDO were payroll, food and fuel.

   c. Most important issue is payroll – without pay, police extract money from people, as a matter of personal necessity (therefore attracting some sympathy). First step is thus to ensure that the police are paid, which in turn requires registration, administrative procedures and correct records on police officers employed.

   d. Sorting out the salaries makes fighting corruption much easier – it is better to attack corruption among police officers who are receiving their salaries than those who are not receiving pay and for whom small bribes are a form of desperation.

   e. Resources regularly went ‘missing’. Tracking delivery of goods and services from order to deliver locally through an intensive supervision process worked well for 3CDO. A good example was the winterisation process. eg 500 blankets to be issued, ask what the plan is for distribution, then call up the intended recipients and tell them to stand-by to receive the blankets, and they would then be able to inform us if they did not arrive. Through that, lost supplies were found again and reissued correctly.

   f. More intrusive supervision is needed, such as being based in the Afghanistan National Party (ANP) offices.

   g. Opinion polling of the population was important to understand corruption perceptions. 3CDO didn’t do their own polling, bodies such as Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) did.

   h. UK forces were liked and trusted, and seen as unimpeachable. This image was important to maintain.
i. On local patrolling, when 3CDO personnel saw a crime being committed they would take the person into custody and hand over to the highest-ranking police officer. On joint patrol, 3CDO will ask the local officer to deal with it.

j. It was important to work with detail of police leave and of training rotations, to break the cycle where they have networks and relationships of corruption developing. For example checkpoints were believed to be corrupt, and so 3CDO mounted a campaign to review the checkpoints, finding out who was manning them, and 3CDO began to establish better accountability lines.

k. A very positive step was establishing a crime-stoppers hotline – this was supervised by UK mentors, with all conversations recorded, with appropriate follow up action.

l. International force commanders, including 3CDO, are much keener to talk about kinetic operations than about local institution building or police reform.

COUNTER-CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY

7. Corruption is an issue in all 3 parts of stabilisation of counter-insurgency, in security, governance and rule of law. Whilst it will have its roots in culture and history of the nation, it is likely to become a central issue during conflict, often being both cause and consequence of the insurgency; perceptions of corruption will be used by both sides to influence public opinion. The military commander needs to approach the topic as a strategic issue.

8. Effective security provision requires legitimacy and accountability of the security forces. The state is charged with the protection of its citizens as the holder of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force; those who use force have an utmost duty not only to be free from corruption, but to be seen to be free from corruption. Citizens cannot confer legitimacy upon the state if they cannot be assured of the integrity of those who hold its offices. Security forces must be seen to be serving the public and not abusing their positions for private enrichment. Legitimacy and accountability are in turn predicated on transparency and civilian oversight of the security sector. Efforts to combat corruption need to become part of the stabilisation process, especially as corruption in fragile states blossoms and develops strong links with organised crime. The perception of corruption as endemic in government will be used by adversaries to undermine the state. Whilst the prime responsibility for state-building lies with the civilian authorities, there is much that the military commander can do support their efforts.
9. The commander should start with developing, in concert with the host nation, the civilian authorities and others, a sound analysis of what the major corruption issues are. Corruption is a simple word, understood intuitively by all, but it is not a simple concept. It has multiple different aspects. Table 1 on the following page shows the 4 major dimensions of corruption risk relevant for the military commander in a stabilization environment, and specific risk areas within each one.

10. Based on an analysis of the corruption risks in collaboration with the host nation, Department for International Development (DFID) and others, the military commander should consider his approach to countering corruption on 5 levels:

   a. International leadership and senior leadership of the host nation government.

   b. Ministries of Interior, Finance, and Defence (or equivalent) in the host nation.

   c. International organisations and donors.

   d. Regional and provincial government.

   e. Field commanders.

**Senior leadership of host nation government**

11. At this level, large-scale corruption issues predominate, such as large-scale theft from central funds, or tolerance given to warlords and others in the political elite with a known history of corruption. The military commander should ensure that there is a common, shared view of the scale and depth of the problem across the leadership community, based on sound analysis and through engaging local communities to understand what the major corruption issues are. If needs be, he should prepare such an analysis himself. He should be active in promoting the actions to be taken.

**Ministries of Interior, Finance and Defence**

12. Within Ministries, corruption opportunities fall between grand corruption and bureaucratic corruption. In working with the Ministries responsible for the armed forces and for the police, the military commander should ensure there is an understanding of the problem in detail, that there is a clear plan for addressing corruption issues, and establish training and capacity-building programmes. Standards of conduct and ethics need to be produced and disseminated among employees of Ministries, as well as enforced. Whistleblower schemes and hotlines can be established to allow misconduct to be reported, investigated, and punished.
International organisations and donors

13. Despite thinking of themselves as being of high integrity, international actors and donors are often viewed as active sources of corruption by local citizens. There are multiple opportunities for this perception: offering higher salaries than locals receive, insisting on overseas contractors, tolerating known corrupt elites, having poor audit and transparency standards and sometimes direct corrupt acts. The military commander, through his deep local contacts with field forces and local forces, may be in one of the best positions to raise this concern and ensure that the international community itself sets out actions to minimise corruption and corruption perception.

Regional and provincial government

14. The military commander is in a position to work actively with the regional government and with the civilian stabilisation teams and to show leadership in addressing regional corruption issues. Similar mechanisms as those developed at the level of Ministries are required to ensure adequate allocation and use of funds, training and rotation of army and police officers. Funds disbursed from central government to the regional level offer many opportunities for money to be lost at either end or en route. Mechanisms to ensure that the correct amount is sent and received, including through physically counting the amounts at either end and ensuring secure passage, can be supported by civilian and military personnel from intervention forces.

Field commanders

15. Field commanders have a huge role to play in showing citizens their concern with corruption and in dealing with it firmly but sensitively. Petty corruption can be as insidious in its effects as grand corruption, taking the form of demands for payments at roadblocks and security checkpoints, or from police officers or military personnel on patrol. For many persons these are the most frequent forms of interaction with agents of the state. How intervention forces react to these issues on the ground can matter hugely to the local population and to the latter’s perception of the state and its ability to provide security, as well as its legitimacy.

16. Tackling corruption is often a commander’s secondary priority to the projection of combat power in order to establish a secure environment. However, corruption reduction is one of the most crucial elements in the restoration of the rule of law and the return of an ordered society; depending on the internal and operational circumstances, this could take a significant amount of time, ranging from many months to many years. Commanders should, therefore, take a long-term view, one which is cohesive across all elements, and insist on continuity from one force deployment to the next. In order to ensure some sense of progress being made, use should be made of surveys and similar metrics to establish a reporting format to track changes and improvements.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOVERNMENT/GOVERNANCE</th>
<th>INTERVENTION &amp; STABILISATION FORCES</th>
<th>INTERNATIONAL</th>
<th>SMALL BRIBES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budget and revenue transparency - inadequate at all levels</td>
<td>Troops/police salary chain payments not made, lack of controls</td>
<td>Donor resources - inappropriately controlled</td>
<td>Small business bribes – hinder economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash controls - inadequate transparency, methodology</td>
<td>Receipt of equipment – often not complete, or bribes demanded</td>
<td>No audit trail of donor funds – lack of clarity / corruption potential</td>
<td>Numerous small bribes for daily living – citizens watch for response by forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Audit – inadequate</td>
<td>Permits/roadblocks – unauthorised cash requests</td>
<td>Donor effort duplication – corruption perception</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior appointments – on, inappropriate basis. Tolerance of corrupt elites</td>
<td>Security outsourcing – lack of control/transparency</td>
<td>Accountability of aid officials – inadequate and corruption potential</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary – inadequate resources, prosecutions</td>
<td>Asset disposal – inadequate control and transparency</td>
<td>High salaries for aid workers – encourages nepotism</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Border controls – historical major corruption area</td>
<td>Private businesses – run by security forces, no oversight</td>
<td>Overseas contractors – corruption perception,</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Organised crime – uncontrolled, not addressed</td>
<td>Conscription – cash request to shield personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Key Policies, incl defence – not debated or transparent</td>
<td>Intelligence material/assets – improperly used</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>National assets (eg timber, licenses, land, oil) – linked to corrupt groups, eg police</td>
<td>Local procurement, supply (by international forces, SSR groups) - lacks anticorruption methodology</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central procurement – Numerous corruption risks: specification, sourcing, evaluation, agents, etc</td>
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</tbody>
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Table 1: Four Major Areas of Corruption Risk in Stabilisation Environment