Item 1: Update from Permanent Secretaries’ and Ministers’ Meetings

1. ExCo discussed Cabinet Office’s long-term aim to locate all Central London Government Departments in buildings that were either Government-owned or had been commissioned by Government under a PFI contract. ExCo noted that the next lease break for GMH(N) was in 2015 and that it was unlikely that sufficient space in a Government-owned building would be available for all DfT(c) staff by then. Resilience and costing issues were noted.

2. ExCo noted the latest situation on the Intercity Express Programme and agreed the need to continue scoping work on all options, pending a decision by the Secretary of State.

3. DGs agreed to disseminate the need to manage the quantity of information submitted to the Secretary of State, and for project teams to check that he had received and digested the information he required.

   Action: DGs

4. Bronwyn Hill agreed to arrange for the Secretary of State to be briefed on the role of the joint Cabinet Office/HM Treasury-owned Major Projects Authority, which had been set up the previous week. She said that it would be necessary to ascertain the respective roles of the existing Major Projects Review Group and the MPA, and to try to ensure these were not duplicated.

   Action: Bronwyn Hill to consider the timing of an update to the SoS [he was briefed prior to the 9 February launch event]
5. Clare Moriarty agreed to arrange for an invitation to be drafted for Lin Homer to send to David Pitchford, Executive Director of the MPA, to a Senior Management Team meeting and also a DfT Board Meeting.

   **Action:** Clare Moriarty

6. Clare Moriarty drew ExCo’s attention to a Business Plan 3-month forward look, which had been appended to the meeting agenda. ExCo agreed that an updated version of this would be submitted to each ExCo meeting and that DG owners of “at risk” milestones should come prepared to explain the issues and mitigating actions for these at the meeting.

**Item 2: Risk In-depth Review – Weather-Related Transport Disruption**

7. Clare Moriarty introduced the paper, reminding ExCo that this was the second “deep-dive” paper for the DfT Board on a theme it had agreed as not appearing regularly on Board agendas.

8. DfT’s Risk Policy Manager had contacted the directors of the various transport modes and had convened a challenge session during which the Department’s resilience and responses to different forms of potential weather-related transport disruption had been tested in depth. Clare had appended a two-page summary assessment of the principal risk areas and DfT’s approach to managing these risks.

9. Lin Homer asked for ExCo members’ views on the extent to which the paper and summary assessment set out the key issues for the Board to discuss.

10. Views expressed by ExCo included:

   - whether the paper set out clearly enough DfT’s state of resilience to severe weather – as opposed to the UK’s state of resilience;
   - a need for the questions to the Board on DfT’s role to be set out more clearly;
   - whether the volcanic ash risk was set out too starkly, given that the 2010 Icelandic eruption had been followed up satisfactorily;
   - the summary paper’s recommendations needing to reflect the “Details of Residual Risk” and “Impact of Risks” from the main paper;
   - the paper needing to set out DfT’s ability to fund its response to a severe weather incident;
   - the paper needing to set out responsibility for regional resilience, following the abolition of the Government Offices;
   - the paper needing to set out the role of the existing Civil Contingencies secretariat; and
   - the paper needing to set out follow-up work commissioned by the Secretary of State and its progress.

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11. ExCo agreed that there was a need for a lead person to take ownership of the resolution and also follow up – including responding to lessons learned - of weather-related incidents. This would not necessarily fall automatically to a particular director or DG, as the issues concerned would often affect several Groups. The role of the lead would therefore be to act as overall SRO, supported as appropriate from across the Department. As with other forms of incident response – for example during the volcanic ash crisis – resources could be transferred temporarily to support the crisis team, with this being facilitated if necessary via an ExCo meeting.

12. It was confirmed that Graham Pendlebury was the owner of policy on the adaptation of the transport network to long-term climate change. It was also confirmed that three DG Groups were following up the recommendations concerning different modes of transport from the reviews of previous severe weather incidences.

13. Given that Corporate Group was responsible for internal security, there was an argument for it taking on overall responsibility for business continuity and resilience also. Any resilience plan would have to set out explicitly who was in charge of the response to any incident.

14. With regard to the recent winter resilience problems, Steve Gooding and Richard Hatfield had chaired a wash-up meeting at the end of the last bout of severe weather, which had confirmed that follow-up actions, including recommendations from reviews of previous incidences, were in hand. The two DGs would agree how this work should be followed through to provide the Secretary of State with assurance on preparedness for future incidences.

Post-Meeting Note: Richard Hatfield has subsequently agreed to take the lead in co-ordinating this package of work and reporting back to the Secretary of State.

15. ExCo decided that London did not raise any unique resilience issues not covered by a modal analysis, and therefore did not need to be treated separately in the paper’s table and annex.

16. ExCo agreed that:

   i. there was a need to clarify and codify arrangements and responsibilities for response and follow-up to weather-related disruption;
   ii. initial proposals should be ready to put to the DfT Board for discussion at its 4 March meeting;
   iii. the Board should also be clear at its meeting who was in the lead for follow-up work arising from this winter’s resilience issues; and
   iv. finalisation of updated incident response protocols, including responses to non weather-related incidences, would need to wait until the Board had conducted its in-depth reviews of

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business continuity on 1 April and of non weather-related transport disruption on 22 July.

17. The Risk Policy Manager thanked ExCo for its input and agreed to revise her paper, and Clare Moriarty’s summary assessment, in response to ExCo’s views.

Action: DfT Risk Policy Manager

Item 3: Organisational Change Stocktake

18. ExCo noted the milestones that had been achieved during the past week and those towards which work was now under way. It agreed outline content for Lin Homer’s message to staff for the following week.

19. It was agreed that good practice and lessons learned from the DfT (c) Change Programme should be shared with DfT’s Agency Chief Executives. Mervyn Thomas subsequently agreed to undertake this.

Action: Mervyn Thomas

Board Secretariat
16 February 2011

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