Opening remarks

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

Just two things I want to say before we start the evidence. First is that it may not have escaped the notice of the more alert of you that the Inquiry has not been able to get email in the last few days. I'm told that there's a problem in the Holborn area. BT are doing their best to resolve it. At the moment they have not resolved it and it's not certain when they will.

However, at around about lunchtime today, I hope that you will be notified of an alternative method of getting emails to the Inquiry through what I'm told is termed a "solicitor's box" by another method. So I hope that will assist. As to when BT manage to get us back on our own email, I have no idea and I don't think, sadly, they have.

The next matter I want to mention is this: today we have a witness, part of his evidence we shall go into camera for. I understand from Mr Elias that it's intended that so far as Counsel to the Inquiry are concerned, that part of his evidence in which we go into camera will be at the very end of Mr Elias' examination of him. I think it would be more convenient and less
disruptive if core participants who have questions for
him on that part of his evidence did so immediately
following that evidence in camera, but I don't want to
make any strict rule about that. If you find it
difficult, we may have to alter that procedure. It may
be that some of you have no questions at all on that
part of his evidence.

Perhaps when we have our morning break you could let
Mr Elias know and, through him, me about what you would
prefer to do about that. As I say, my preference at the
moment is to have the in camera part of his evidence all
in one part, so it would follow on immediately from
Mr Elias' examination of him.

MR ELIAS: Thank you, Sir.

THE CHAIRMAN: Very well.

MR ELIAS: Then I will call, if I may, Nicholas Justin
Mercer, please. Colonel Mercer, please.

THE CHAIRMAN: Colonel, would you be kind enough to stand
up, please, whilst I ask that you take the oath?

NICHOLAS JUSTIN MERCER (sworn)

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Colonel, if you could be kind enough to
speak into the microphone, then we will all be able to
hear you.

A. Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
MR ELIAS: Would you give the Inquiry your full name, please?
A. Nicholas Justin Mercer.
Q. Your current rank is lieutenant colonel.
A. Correct.
Q. Colonel Mercer, would you be kind enough, please, to look at a folder, which I hope is to your right, and to find in that two statements which I think are copies of statements you have made to this Inquiry. If you go to the last page of the first, please, do you find your signature above the date of 9 September 2009?
A. That's correct.
Q. In relation to the second, is that a statement dated in February of this year?
A. That's correct.
Q. And have you signed that?
A. That's correct.
Q. And in signing those statements, Colonel Mercer, were you attesting to the Inquiry that the contents of the statements were true to the best of your knowledge and belief?
A. That's correct.
Q. Thank you.
the documents to which they refer, and I don't propose
by any means to ask you about every aspect that those
statements cover, but to take you to certain stepping
stones perhaps.

A. Yes.

Q. I shall endeavour to take matters chronologically when
dealing with them. But I want to begin, please, by
briefly asking you about your role in Iraq in 2003.

A. Well, I was a command legal adviser for the 1st Armoured
Division.

Q. Command legal adviser -- your voice is a little soft.

A. Sorry, I will get closer to the microphone. I was
a command legal adviser for the 1st Armoured Division,
which meant I gave legal advice to the chain of command
within the division on all matters pertaining to
military operations.

Q. That would include, would it, as you say in your
statement, matters pertaining to the laws of war?

A. Correct.

Q. When dealing with the laws of war, did you liaise with
permanent joint HQ?

A. Yes, I did, but also the national component command,
which was an intervening headquarters, so that was my
direct superior.

Q. So your direct line was to national component command.
I think you say in your statement that would have been directly to Neil Brown, would it?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Commander Neil Brown.

A. That's correct.

Q. And with whom did you liaise at PJHQ?

A. Well, I would normally liaise with Neil Brown at the national component command until that was collapsed some time in May -- I can't remember the date when it was collapsed -- and then, of course, with that interposed headquarters being taken away, then it would go straight to PJHQ at that point.

Q. You say in your statement that at PJHQ you dealt with Rachel Quick and Nick Clapham.

A. That's correct.

Q. You are a solicitor, having been admitted to the role, you tell us, in 1990.

A. That's correct.

Q. You joined the army immediately following that, did you?

A. That's correct.

Q. In 1991?


Q. Have you been in Army Legal Service since that time?

A. I have. It seems a long time now.

Q. You are still in the Army Legal Service working at the
HQ directorate in Wiltshire; is that right?
A. That's correct, yes.
Q. I want to ask you just a little, please, about training, both training that you may have received in relevant areas for this area and also training that you may have given. You have undertaken training in the law of armed conflict yourself, have you?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. That involved learning about the appropriate treatment of prisoners of war, amongst other things?
A. Yes, I mean, we started our law of armed conflict training at Liverpool University, where we got sent for a month. So we were taken through the full panoply of the laws of war, which would include prisoners of war.
Q. If there was a single message that emerged from that training in relation to the handling of prisoners of war, what was it?
A. Well I use the phrase "humanity and dignity".
Q. Did you receive any training at that time about the use of what are sometimes called "the techniques", hoarding, stress positions and so on?
A. No, none whatsoever.
Q. So you weren't given training, for example, or instruction, that these techniques were off limits?
A. No.
Q. You simply received no training at all about that?
A. That's right.

Q. Now prior to Op Telic, did you, yourself, give training
to soldiers who were --

A. Could I come back to your previous question?
Q. Please.

A. We went -- just to build on that, we go to
Liverpool University for a month to do law of armed
conflict training. We then go to San Remo for
a two-week course, which builds the laws of armed
conflict into the staff planning process. Then I did
the advanced laws of war course at San Remo, which
included some elements of human rights law as well. So
it's an accumulative process.

Q. I understand. But does that alter the answer you gave
me as to whether you received any instructions in the
use of the techniques --
A. No, that's correct. It doesn't change.

Q. May I come, then, please, to training that you may have
given in relation to Op Telic 1. You say in the
statement to this Inquiry -- I don't think it need be
put up, but it's your paragraph 17 -- that all soldiers
regardless of rank are supposed to receive annual
training in LOAC, the law of armed conflict.
A. That's correct.
Q. That, as the Inquiry already knows, would have included specific provision with regard to the treatment of prisoners of war. Soldiers' cards, which you refer to in your statement, would have been provided, you say, to all combat troops in theatre.

A. That's correct.

Q. Do you know whether they were in fact?

A. Well, they were -- we briefed 14,000 of the 25,000 soldiers in theatre and we had boxes of soldiers' cards which would go out with the trainers. So I use the words "combat troops" deliberately because it's simply impossible to get round 25,000 soldiers. So it was the key combat arms who we trained first and foremost.

Q. I follow. We will come back quite a little later on to cards again. But the cards, so far as prisoners of war were concerned, gave an indication that civilians were to be treated humanely and respected at all times; is that right?

A. That's correct.

Q. In-theatre training -- what in-theatre training did you give?

A. Well it would tend -- it would be the law of armed conflict -- those law of armed conflict briefs to the combat troops prior to the war commencing in March 2003.

Q. That was training which you and your department, if
I can call it that, gave?

A. That's right. I wrote the script for that. I sent it up to the NCC for clearance. I handed that -- it was not for them to read out like a homily, but it was there to give them a guidance on the subject to be covered, and I delivered some of them myself.

Q. And the subjects to be covered would have included, as I think you say in your statement, the need to treat civilian prisoners with humanity and dignity, as you put it.

A. That's right. Those words were included.

Q. Was any training given by you or your subordinates in this context, in theatre, in relation to the use of hooding, stress positions, matters of that kind?

A. No, none whatsoever. We gave training in relation to prisoner-handling, not prisoner interrogation.

Q. So you gave no instruction again either way -- if I can put it that way -- as to whether it was appropriate or not to use hoods, for example?

A. No. That's correct.

Q. So we are clear about it, you gave no instruction as to deprivation of sight, whether by hoods, blindfolds or anything else?

A. No, that's correct.

Q. Did you not regard, for example, deprivation of sight as
being something that might be necessary in handling prisoners outside the interrogation area?

A. I can't recall whether we gave such instruction, but my understanding was that we just used the generic phrase "humanity and dignity" as a sort of catch-all phrase, "treat them with decency". Blindfolding was on -- JSP 383, which I have seen subsequently, refers to blindfolding as being part of the interrogation process and I have no recollection at all of giving any instruction on blindfolding. Only plasticuffs were covered.

Q. What was said about plasticuffs?

A. Well, they could be used in extremis. If there was a violent prisoner, then they could be cuffed using plasticuffs.

Q. And do you recall -- please don't guess if you can't remember -- whether any instruction was given as to whether plasticuffs were to be applied in front or behind the body?

A. I don't recall that, no.

Q. Can we have on the screen, please, paragraph 20 of your statement -- we find it at BMI04063 -- in which you say this:

"... given the training provided, I had no concerns about prisoner-handling prior to deployment as
I believed it was well understood by all members of the
division."

By that the Inquiry should understand that you were
saying you believed it was well understood that
prisoners should be treated with humanity and dignity.

A. Yes, I mean, this message is reiterated the whole time.
The LOAC video that soldiers watch each year, which is
a sort of old cold war relic or it was then, makes it
absolutely clear: do not mistreat prisoners. This
message is repeated and repeated and repeated.

I had read the Op Granby post-operational tour
report and there was no mention of any problems on
Op Granby and I was pretty confident that we could take
them from the battlefield to the prisoner of war camp
and this part at least was well understood. Indeed
I said that to General Robin Brims in a memo. I said
that I'm confident that, you know, from capture to the
prisoner of war camp will be conducted successfully and
without incident. Indeed, I think it was.

Q. Please don't take this question as implying any
criticism of you, but just so that we understand the
position, you didn't give any -- and by "you" I mean
your subordinates also --

A. Yes.

Q. -- gave no training or instruction as to the use of
hooding, for example, or deprivation of sight. Was that because you considered it and decided that it was not necessary --

A. To be honest it wasn't even on my radar.

Q. So that leads me conveniently, then, to ask you a little more about hooding. At the time of your deployment to Iraq, what was your understanding about the rights and wrongs of the use of hoods on prisoners?

A. It is hard to cast your mind back. As I say, I didn't even give it any thought because I just didn't envisage it. As I said, it hadn't happened on Op Granby, so why would I have it in contemplation? I mean, I had done some human rights training, I was aware of the Ireland case, but it just didn't emerge -- you know, it wasn't an issue.

Q. So you were aware that hooding had been, can I put it this way in shorthand, ruled as being inhumane?


Q. Thank you. You were aware of that. Were you aware, prior to deployment to Iraq, that hooding was being used for any purpose?

A. No, none whatsoever.

Q. Did you become aware that hooding was used for what has sometimes, in shorthand, been described as "security
A. No, as I said in my statement, the first time I came across hooding was when I saw it being used in the JFIT.

Q. We will come to that in due course.

A. Yes.

Q. Again, so that the Inquiry understands, that, are you saying, was the first time, as it were, that you had to address the issue?

A. That's correct.

Q. How long had you been in Iraq by that stage?

A. I think my memo was dated 27/28 March, thereabouts, so I had been in Iraq since January 11.

Q. And had you seen no prisoners hooded in that time?

A. Well, the war broke out on -- I think it was 17 March. We were sitting in Abdaly Farms on the Iraqi border, so you are pretty secluded in your little headquarters in the middle of nowhere. So the war started and I think the first time I got out of the divisional headquarters was seven or eight days later to fly down to the prisoner of war camp. Other than that, we just watched the battle unfold from divisional headquarters.

Q. Forgive me, Colonel, what's the answer to my question? Had you seen any prisoners hooded?

A. No, I hadn't, no.

Q. Before deployment to Iraq, you presumably had heard the
term "conditioning", had you?

A. Possibly, but it was -- you know, I can't recall for certain.

Q. You would have known what it meant?

A. In the context of the Ireland case, yes. But, as I say, you know, you go to a lecture on human rights, you are aware broadly of the case law, but you don't dwell on it unless it becomes relevant to you at a particular point in time.

Q. So should the Inquiry understand that, at the time of your deployment, you would have been aware that stress positions were not to be used under any circumstances?

A. Well, it's quite -- you put me in quite a difficult position because I mean one's aware broadly of the case law. I am dealing largely with the Geneva Conventions. I had raised the Convention on Human Rights with PJHQ, and my -- in the minutes of the meeting of 20 January or thereabouts you can see the question raised endlessly "Will it apply?", and no answer is given on that until later, so one just carries on with Geneva.

Q. I understand that. We are going to look at that in a little more detail in a moment or two.

A. Yes.

Q. Can you help us? Would your view of the use of stress positions have been, at the time of your deployment to
Iraq, if you had been asked, "They are off the menu entirely and not to be used under any circumstances"?

A. Of course, both under Geneva and under ECHR.

Q. Now you refer in your statement -- and I'm trying to take matters, as I have indicated to you, chronologically so far as we can work through these matters -- to what you describe as "pre-deployment concerns". At paragraph 21 -- can we just have that on the screen, please, top of the page -- you say:

"Although I had no concerns about prisoner-handling pre-deployment I did have concerns about the provisions for prisoners generally."

A. That's correct.

Q. I don't necessarily want to go into a lot of detail about this, Colonel Mercer, but are you there indicating that your concerns were about resources being applied to the issue?

A. Yes, it wasn't just resources, it was the emphasis being given to prisoners generally because, as I say in my statement, the battalion assigned to prisoner of war duties was struck off the ORBAT almost immediately prior -- flying out to Kuwait.

So I had looked at the Op Granby report. They used roughly one battalion to evacuate from the battlefield -- to corral on the battlefield, one
battalion to transport and one battalion to deal with the prisoner of war camp. We assigned just one battalion and even that was struck off the ORBAT. So, you know, I was concerned that this was going to fall short of what was required.

Q. But in the broad sense, these were resource issues?
A. These were resource issues, yes.

Q. I am not underplaying them for that reason, but that's really what you are getting at in your statement; is that right?
A. There were not enough troops to task, yes.

Q. You do say at paragraph 23:

"Although the UK maintained that it took its responsibilities under the Geneva Convention in relation to prisoners very seriously, this was not my experience. In my view, the issue of prisoners had very low priority and was treated more as an inconvenience than an obligation under international law."

A. Yes, I think that's correct.

Q. If I may comment, that's quite a serious allegation to be making.
A. It is. If I can just expand on that a bit.

Q. Please.
A. I mean, first of all, prisoners are a huge issue and a very major part of the Geneva Conventions. Of course
it takes up the whole of the Third Geneva Convention. There are very detailed guidelines as to what you need for prisoner of war camps, how they should be built and constructed, how prisoners should be fed and so on and on forth. It is well understood and there are plenty of manuals on that subject. But that came back to the resource issue and did we have enough troops to task.

We then had the sort of -- our obligations were then passed, if you like, to the Americans, who were going to rely on seven American MP battalions to deal with our prisoners. So it was sort of ceded across to the United States and prisoner of war camps were planned just south of the Euphrates. But again we were getting another nation to do what we probably should be doing ourselves.

Q. You seem to indicate from your statement, if I have understood it correctly, that in one sense at least you were rather relieved that that responsibility was being taken over by the Americans, although there were other problems.

A. Yes, but I did warn General Robin Brims that -- for about seven weeks I pushed the resources issue up on the UPREPs to the NCC, saying, "Look, this is flashing amber. I don't think we have done enough". I was also very concerned about the capitulation formula that had been devised.
Q. Those are issues that I don't want to go into detail on --

A. But broadly speaking I was very concerned about it and I found it -- if I just come back to that point about not taking it seriously enough, I felt I was banging my head against a brick wall on that because I would send it up night after night after night on the UPREPs.

Q. What I really wanted to ask you, Colonel, if I may, in relation to paragraph 23 on the screen, is whether, when you say that the issue of prisoners had low priority and was treated more as an inconvenience than an obligation under international law, you mean that resources -- perhaps for reasons that we don't need to go into here -- were not being applied as you would have hoped they might be?

A. That's correct.

Q. You don't mean any more than that?

A. No, I mean on the resource side.

Q. You don't mean that there was a conscious decision, as it were, by some body or some organisation to treat prisoners as low priority?

A. No, it's to do with resources. But if you don't resource it properly, it is a low priority.

Q. I understand, but it's in that context --

A. It's in that context, yes.
Q. I follow. Can we have a look, please, at a minute in relation to a meeting in January of 2003? We find it at MOD053714. You see it's dated 21 January. It's described as a "loose minute". Your name appears second in the list. It's the minutes of PJHQ legal advisers' meeting on prisoner of war issues on 20 January.

If we go through, please, to paragraph 16, under the heading "Divisional works":

"1 (UK) Armoured Division see their role as handling prisoners of war from capture to the cage. Lieutenant Colonel Mercer stated that they were not equipped for anything further than this and were planning accordingly.

"17. Lieutenant Colonel Mercer made it very clear that in order for planning to take place we need to have assurance from the US that they will be accepting the responsibility of the running of prisoner of war camps and that they will be accepting UK captured prisoners of war into those camps. This matter needs to be clarified urgently."

That was really, was it, expressing some of the concerns that you have outlined to us today in a little more detail?

A. Yes, that's correct, yes.

Q. There's an issue at 18 of tracking enemy prisoners of
war. I don't think we need to trouble with that.

"There will need to be a prisoner of war handling organisation ... established. The role of this organisation needs to be defined and its location within the command chain needs to be agreed. Only then can it be staffed/resourced properly."

There's a reference at paragraph 21 to prisoner of war status tribunals. Of course that's a matter that you develop in your statements to this Inquiry and I am not going to go into those aspects because I don't think the Inquiry is directly concerned about that.

Paragraph 34 in the document, because this may be of some significance:

"Lieutenant Colonel Mercer requested definitions and policy guidance on the following points.

"(a) Who is entitled to prisoner of war status;

"(b) Child combatants;

"(c) Levee en masse ...", mass conscription.

"(d) Where are prisoners of war to be held until prisoner of war camps are established."

Then at 36:

"Will the ECHR apply in the conflict or can we derogate in some way?"

Is that a matter you were raising? It's not clear from the quote.
A. No, I raised it.
Q. You raised that issue, did you?
A. Yes.
Q. So you were asking for guidance --
A. Yes, on what law applied.
Q. In relation to those matters.
    Did you ever receive guidance?
A. Well it came -- it did come later. I think it's on one
    of the emails.
Q. But quite a bit later in the --
A. I raised it again because the question hadn't been
    answered -- and put my own thoughts down, expanded a bit
    on it, and then a reply was received from PJHQ.
Q. Could we have a look, please, at paragraph 21 of your
    second statement? We find that at BMI06901A,
    paragraph 21. If we just go down three or four lines in
    the paragraph, you say this:
    "However hooding was not banned by PJHQ until after
    Baha Mousa's death and emails in May 2004 show that
    there was an information gap within the MoD about the
    practice of hooding. It is now clear from
    correspondence in 1999 ... that Army Legal Service 2,
    Lieutenant Colonel Ridge, had given advice to JSIO about
    the practice of hoods amongst other treatment of
    prisoners of war and others in interrogation situations
other than general war in her advice dated 25th November 1999. Despite my requesting guidance from PJHQ on the subject of prisoners of war from as early as 20 January ..."

That note we just looked at.

A. Yes.

Q. "... none was forthcoming", you say.

A. That's correct?

Q. Can we just look at the documents to which you refer in paragraph 21 of your second statement? MOD28352, please. You are referring to a document -- obviously not yours -- of 28 October 1999; correct? If we go through, please, to MOD028354, to a loose minute that's dated 25 November of the same year:

"Legal status of interrogation in situations other than general war."

Then there's the heading, "Armed conflict". Over the page under "Other operations", halfway down the page, after the reference to Article 3 in paragraph 9:

"'Torture' involves suffering of a particular intensity and cruelty. However even though certain action may not amount to torture it can amount to inhumane treatment or degrading treatment. 'Inhumane treatment' includes as a minimum deliberate treatment which causes severe mental and physical suffering as in
the case of Ireland ... where detainees suffered
substantial bruising, cuts to the head and a broken
cheekbone. 'Degrading treatment' consists of treatment
which grossly humiliates a person before other or drives
him to act against his will. Again in Ireland ... the
use of five interrogation techniques, ie keeping
detainees' heads covered by a hood, continuous and
monotonous noise, sleep deprivation, deprivation of food
and water and making the detainees stand [essentially in
stress positions] ... amounted to inhuman and degrading
treatment."

Your reference to those documents in 1999 was
a reference, was it, to the fact that there appears from
that correspondence to be an indication that, for
example, hooding was not to be employed?
A. That's correct. I mean I obviously didn't see these
documents until shown to me by my counsel, but it's
clear that advice was sought in 1999 and the army made
it very clear that these were prohibited. Then we bump
into the issue again in 2003.
Q. But what you're saying, so that the Chairman is clear
about it, is that you did not see this --
A. No.
Q. -- correspondence at the time --
A. No.
Q. -- and were not aware of it, you say, until preparing your evidence for this Inquiry.

A. That's correct.

Q. It's suggested by the witness with the cipher "S002" -- and I think you know to whom I refer -- that there were discussions prior to your observing what you saw in the JFIT about the use of hooding for security purposes and that those discussions, I think you probably will be aware, it is suggested, included you.

A. Yes, I have no recollection of that. Indeed I went back with my counsel over the meetings and we pulled out a meeting and I wasn't even on the list of the attendees. I have no recollection of any such occasion.

Q. What is suggested is that when the discussions took place, as I think you will know, that you raised no objection to the use of hoods for what has been described as "security purposes".

A. I would have objected.

Q. So your position is that you would have objected, would you, if there had been discussion of that kind?

A. As soon as I saw hooding in the JFIT, I wrote immediately to General Robin Brims --

Q. We are going to come to that. It's a bit of a different issue.

A. The point is, sir, that when I saw it for the first
time, I put in an immediate complaint.

Q. It may be a bit of a different issue, if you will forgive me saying so, Colonel. If you had been asked the question, if you had been party to the discussions it is suggested you were party to, would you have sought to distinguish between the use of hoods for conditioning a prisoner prior to questioning or the use for what has been described to this Inquiry, if you will forgive the shorthand, as "security reasons"?

A. I don't like hooding at all. I'm against it. I think it violates the Conventions.

Q. So if I may ask you to be rather more specific to my question, would you have distinguished between the use of hoods for those two purposes --

A. No, I wouldn't. I think it's illegal in both situations.

Q. That, you tell the Inquiry, would have been your position if you had participated in any discussion at the time?

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. So S002 is wrong in his recollection of you, as it were, acquiescing, is he?

A. I have no recollection of that. The first I saw it was about a week ago.

Q. Moving on then in time, please, can we have a look at
a document dated 6 March. We find it at MOD019764. If we go over the page, we can see that it's from you. If we go back to the previous page, you see the date at the top. It's a memo from you, isn't it, to the GOC --

A. That's correct.

Q. --to General Brims. I just want to go through this in a little detail if we may, please. You say this, at paragraph 1:

"The information received on Wednesday regarding the reduction in US MPs battalion from 7 to 1 now puts even greater pressure on the UK with regard to the issue of prisoners of war, particularly with regard to manning and resources."

I don't think I need to go into the detail of that change, but we can see what it was.

"The issue of prisoners of war has been on the divisional 'at risk' register for some time ..."

What did you mean by that?

A. Well, I touched on it earlier, but every night we would UPREP up to the NCC, which the division could raise its concerns to the next superior headquarters, and continually I put the issue of prisoners of war on the UPREPs.

Q. And again this was essentially the resources issue --

A. The resources issue, yes.
Q. Thank you.

"... various requests for manning (minimum of two battalions) have been made continually by this division over the past seven weeks. If the news received on Wednesday is added to the failure to find the additional two battalions then manning shortfall is potentially very serious and getting worse by the day."

This is something you had been repeating, you tell us.

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. At 3:

"I appreciate that the manning and resources estimate for prisoners of war is difficult to evaluate but, as your legal adviser, I am professionally obliged to point out any legal risks that you or the division may run in any area of military operations and, in my opinion, the failure to find additional manning and resources with regard to prisoners of war now brings a real risk of potentially violating international law."

Did you have, Colonel Mercer, in mind any specific violations of international law?

A. Yes, I think I covered them further down in my memo.

One was evacuating prisoners of war from the battlefield. They have to be taken out of danger's way --
Q. Which you deal with at paragraph 4, don't you?
A. That's correct, yes.

Can I just scroll down the document just to refresh my memory?
Q. Please, please.
A. Yes, I deal with the safety during evacuation.
Q. Then we move on to paragraph 6, essentially.
A. That's right, yes.
Q. Can I deal with that in a little more detail perhaps?
"Secondly, in addition to the evacuation from the battlefield there is also the passage of time spent by prisoners of war in so-called collection points and holding areas."
A. Yes.
Q. Pausing there for a moment because I think it's a matter you come back to in a number of documents over the period that we are going to look at, the passage of time spent by prisoners of war in collection points, did you regard that, however, if you like, distasteful it may have been to contemplate it, as itself being a risk to prisoners?
A. I did.
Q. And did you have in mind, then, that, if you like, the longer prisoners were held at collecting points, the greater the opportunity for mistreatment or
ill-treatment of them?

A. No, I make -- I think I make it clear in the memo that I'm confident that prisoners will be captured and taken to the prisoner of war camp successfully. However, if they stay in a transit camp, you can't give them the rights and obligations under the Third Geneva Convention, which is why that provision is there, that it should be as brief as possible, because they recognise that in the evacuation process you can't have a transit camp that's going to be the right -- the same standard as that required under GC III.

Q. So it was essentially the facility and the protection --
A. And also the closeness to combat, which is an added risk.

Q. You go on to say in paragraph 6:

"The Third Geneva Convention anticipates the need for transit camps and requires that any stay in such a camp shall be 'as brief as possible'. I have no problem with the transit camps. However, although it is accepted that such transit facilities will be a temporary measure, there is still a requirement under the Third Geneva Convention for 'proper rations, water and quartering with every guarantee of hygiene and healthfulness'."

Over the page at paragraph 7, where you refer to
"Thirdly and most seriously ..." and you refer to Article 13 of the 1949 Geneva Convention:

"Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated."

You say this in the succeeding paragraph:

"Although I am optimistic that UK forces will not commit unlawful acts clearly the current circumstances mean that an omission leading to death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war remains a very real possibility."

What did you mean by "an omission"?

A. Well, that's failing to give them proper food, water, evacuation from the battlefield and so on and on forth. I think I deal with it -- it says "... prisoners of war, public health, inadequate food and water are just some of the circumstances in which UK forces might cause the death or seriously endanger the health of prisoners of war". So I expand on it.

Q. Thank you. Then in the last paragraph of the document, paragraph 10, you underline for Major General Brims:

"... the situation has now deteriorated further and, in my opinion, to avoid a potential violation of international law remedial action will be required as soon as possible."

You say:
"I have spoken to the NCC about this matter this morning. They will be speaking to CENTCOM today."

Do you know what the GOC's reaction to that report was?

A. I did go and discuss it with the GOC and the chief of staff and I'm not sure what came of it. Can you just remind me on the date again?

Q. 6 March.

A. Yes, by this stage we're about a month into living in the desert. I think we were anticipating the war to begin in three days' or four days' time because the start point kept changing. So there was very little we could do, I think, at this point, to be honest.

Q. I think that's what you say in your statement.

A. Yes.

Q. If we look at it at paragraph 33, BMI04066, please.

Paragraph 33, towards the end of it, having sent the memo, you say:

"I discussed my concerns personally with the GOC and the chief of staff but, in my view, we were too close to hostilities breaking out to make any discernible difference at this late stage."

That encapsulates --

A. Yes, that's what I said.

Q. -- what you have said.
I now want to ask you, moving on a little in time to later in March, please, about visits that you made to the TIF. You kept a diary. Was that a diary intended for your own use, your own consumption, if you like, alone?

A. Yes, my grandfather had kept one in 1939, so I rather wanted to repeat what he had done, my forefathers had done, so it was just personal.

THE CHAIRMAN: You have always kept a diary, have you?

A. No, I've never kept a diary. I don't like them.

THE CHAIRMAN: Never.

A. But I thought these were historic times, so I would keep a record of what happened.

THE CHAIRMAN: So this is a new departure for you?

A. A new departure, yes.

MR ELIAS: What I really wanted to know, Colonel, was whether you were keeping a diary with a view to it being published to a wider audience.

A. No, it was a private record and my wife very kindly typed it up at the end for me.

Q. It was never intended to be anything more than that, was it?

A. No. Quite frankly some of it is embarrassing.

Q. When you say "typed up", out of pure curiosity, does that mean that what we see as your diary in that rather
neat writing is a font?

A. It's a font, yes. I kept it in various notebooks.

THE CHAIRMAN: I was for a moment lost with envy of anyone who is able to write as carefully as that, but ...

A. An electronic diary in Iraq would have been lost to some power failure.

MR ELIAS: So what we are looking at in the bundle that we have is in fact a typed script?

A. It is, yes.

Q. I follow.

How many visits did you make to the TIF?

A. In time I made -- I think I made quite a number of visits to the TIF, but I think my first one was on the day that I saw what was going on in the JFIT.

Q. Can you remember -- and, please, I haven't said this to you publicly, Colonel Mercer, but when you are naming names, be careful as some names are ciphered, as I think you know. If you have a doubt, please pause and we will provide you with a list.

On your first visit when you describe what you saw there, which I think caused you some concern, if that isn't too neutral a word --

A. Yes.

Q. -- can you remember who was present on that first occasion?
A. Well, the reason that I went down to the prisoner of war camp with the general, General Robin Brims, was because the Article 5 tribunals were underway and my S02 had objected to the way they were being conducted and was told that unless he came into line, he would be asked to leave the prisoner of war camp. So obviously I had a bit of an incident to sort out. So I flew down with General Robin in a helicopter to the prisoner of war camp and this was my first visit since the war had begun.

Q. If we look at your diary, please, can we look at 28 March at MOD019884. You refer to this, don't you, in the last half a dozen lines of this entry?

"I went by helicopter with the GOC to Um Qasr to see the prisoner of war collation area."

Is that the occasion that you are now referring to?

A. That would be correct, yes.

Q. Can we assume, therefore, that the diary is reflecting the date at the top, 28 March, as to when this happened?

A. I think that -- yes, that's probably correct.

Q. You say again:

"... a unique experience where I saw over 3,000 prisoners of war all in different compounds separated by large strands of barbed wire. Very few were in uniform, but all had been captured in various battles other the
last seven days. Some looked terrified, others
defiant."

Over the page, please, to Saturday 29 March, where
your entry begins:

"Another exceptional day. I flew to the PWHO
organisation in Um Qasr and intervened, yet again, in
the prisoner of war process ... massive row with the CO
QDG about Article 5 tribunals."

As I have indicated, I am not going to trouble you
with that:

"You need a very thick skin for this job. Anyhow,
my view prevailed and I spent the rest of the day at the
PWHO."

Does it follow from those entries, Colonel Mercer,
that you made two visits, one on the 28th and one on the
29th?

A. It could do. I do not have a recollection of two
visits. I only have a recollection of one visit. It
seems to be that I went on two separate occasions.

Q. It would seem from the diary as if those two occasions
were successive days.

A. It does seem like that. My recollection is that I just
went on one occasion, but, you know, the passage of time
...

Q. On the first occasion, at all events, as you have
recorded on 28 March, was the GOC with you?

A. Yes -- no -- he is mentioned there.

Q. Forgive me --

A. The GOC was with me. My diary says that he was there on that occasion.

Q. Is there any doubt about it?

A. There isn't. Obviously I am coming back to this after some time, but the day that this happened was, I think, the Saturday because I went with the specific intent of sorting out the Article 5 tribunals. I did have a bit of a run-in with the commandant and then doubled back during the day to investigate what I had seen at the JFIT. So I believe it all happened on the Saturday.

Q. So you think it all happened on the Saturday, which would be 29 March then. You think it was on the Saturday then, do you, that the GOC would have been with you?

A. Yes, he was with me, yes.

Q. At that time?

A. Yes.

Q. On that visit?

A. I think so, yes. In fact I know so because we flew down in the helicopter together.

Q. As you describe in your diary.

A. Yes.
THE CHAIRMAN: It's my fault. I have got it confused. Your diary of Friday the 28th says that you did fly down with the GOC.

"I went by helicopter with the GOC to Um Qasr."

A. It does look as if I have gone down on two separate days. I must admit that I have no recollection of two separate days, but clearly the diary says otherwise.

THE CHAIRMAN: What I want to know is if the diary is accurate, then it was the first day that the GOC went with you.

A. It looks like that, yes. But I am pretty sure he was there for the second day as well.

THE CHAIRMAN: That's possible. It's not mentioned in the diary.

A. Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, I see.

MR ELIAS: What, so you think the GOC was present on the day on which the Article 5 tribunals was the issue?

A. We did, because I tagged on to the visit to sort out the Article 5 tribunals.

Q. All right. Well it may or may not matter. On the visit, the first day of the visit, did you see anything which caused you concern?

A. Well, I -- again I'm obviously -- as you can see, I don't know -- it appears that I made two visits.
I did see something of concern on the day that I saw the JFIT because I was coming into the camp -- I remember it quite clearly. The GOC was picked up by the -- was met by the commandant --

Q. You are just dropping your voice a little.
A. Sorry, the GOC was met. I was then -- someone welcomed me and I went into the prisoner of war camp with the -- a captain from the Queen's Dragoon Guards, who was assigned to look after me for that particular visit.

Q. So can we understand that what you are about to describe occurred on the same day as you had what you describe as the run-in with the commandant?
A. I think so.

Q. Just before we go on, then, on that occasion who else, apart from yourself and the GOC, was present at the JFIT?
A. We weren't going to see the JFIT.

Q. No.
A. We were going to visit the prisoner of war camp.

Q. I understand.
A. So the JFIT was situated at the entrance to the prisoner of war camp; in other words, as you walked into the prisoner of war camp, the JFIT, from memory, was to your right and there was a guard on the JFIT gate, who was there obviously guarding, and then there was some sort
of passage, from memory, into the JFIT. So the general
was met by a huge posse of people and I sort of tagged
along at the back.

Q. And on this occasion what, if anything, did you see that
caus[ed] you have concern?
A. Well, this was the first time that I'd seen what was
going on in the JFIT. As I walked past, I saw two lines
of prisoners and I think some prisoners -- from memory,
there were two lines of prisoners, all kneeling in the
sand, hands cuffed behind their backs, all with hoods on
their heads, and from memory there were two lines of
prisoners and another group, I think, squatting
somewhere in the corner.

Q. And the two lines of prisoners comprised roughly how
many?
A. Well, there was quite a large number of prisoners in
there. I think it was -- I mean, two columns of
prisoners and some in the corner, either 30 or 40,
I would think.

Q. All of them hooded?
A. From memory, yes.

Q. With what?
A. Well, I saw sandbags on their heads and I'm pretty sure
there were other bags as well, which would be -- I think
they were blue bags from memory.
Q. You think they were blue bags?
A. There were some blue bags, yes.

Q. Were the blue bags woven hessian like the sandbags?
A. Well, I clearly was not close enough -- the JFIT is to my right. I mean, it's a bit like seeing a picture of Guantanamo Bay for the first time. It is quite a shock.

Q. Would you describe the position in which the prisoners were being held -- apart from the hoods on their heads -- would you describe the positions as being stress positions?
A. Yes, I mean I wrote -- you have got my memo to the GOC.

Q. We are going to come to that.
A. But that's my -- the way I described it to him when I wrote my concerns down in that memo.

Q. Can you remember who, if anyone else, was in your company to see what you've described to us?
A. I just had one sort of bag handler with me, who very kindly sort of came to meet and greet and escort me into the prisoner of war camp itself. If I just go back to the stress positions, the prisoners were cuffed behind their backs, up like this (indicates), so it looked extremely uncomfortable.

Q. Did you speak to anyone at the JFIT as to what was going on?
A. I did, but first of all I went to deal with the
Article 5 tribunals, and so dealt with that. Then, at an appropriate point, when I had dealt with that issue and everything that went with it -- and it was not a particularly pleasant day -- I then doubled back to the JFIT and went to speak to someone in the interrogation tent.

Q. Do you know to whom you spoke?
A. No, I don't. I think there were two people in there from memory.

Q. Do you remember the rank of the person to whom you spoke?
A. No, but he certainly -- he wasn't -- he was probably a major or a captain.

Q. What, in essence, did you say to him?
A. Well, I expressed my concern as to what was happening and my view that it was illegal, and his words were -- again I am going back to my memo that I wrote to the GOC -- he said it was part of UK doctrine.

Q. Did he tell you or did you ask where the doctrine was to be found?
A. No, I didn't get into that.

Q. Did you tell him, the major or the captain that you spoke to, that you regarded what you had seen as being unlawful?
A. I believe I did.
Q. You wrote a memo to the GOC about this, as you have told us.
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. Could that be because, in fact, the GOC wasn't present on this occasion?
A. I don't think the GOC -- I mean the GOC went, from memory -- and it's difficult and I appreciate my diary doesn't help matters here -- from memory he went ahead of me and was surrounded by -- I mean I was sort of left in his wake as he was surrounded by a whole group of people and I followed on behind him.
Q. Again, I don't want you to guess about this: you don't know, do you, whether the GOC saw what you saw or not?
A. Well, he never mentioned it later. I mean I obviously gave him the memo and he didn't say "I saw it too" or anything of that nature.
Q. It might be suggested, you see, that since you wrote a memo to him, perhaps an inference to be drawn from that is that he wasn't present, otherwise you would have spoken with him there and then about it.
A. He went back by separate means.
Q. I follow. So you weren't with him at the time you saw it and you don't know whether he saw it; is that right?
A. That's correct.
Q. And subsequently you sent him a memo.
A. That's right.

Q. Can we have a look, please, at that memo? We find it at MOD011447. Can we enlarge that somewhat? Thank you very much. It is to the GOC, from you. We see it's dated 29 March. That's Saturday. It does seem, doesn't it, from the first line of that document, that indeed you had made two visits because you're saying here "I attended the PWHO again today ..."

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. So you sent this memo. It's under the heading "Article 5 tribunals and questioning of prisoner of war".

"I attended the PWHO again today to speak to my S02 and to review the process that had been put in place to review the prisoners of war who claim to be civilians."

You then refer to sitting on a tribunal. As I have indicated to you, I am not going to take you through that aspect of matters because it's not directly in point for us.

Can I come to paragraph 6, please, where you say this:

"Finally I visited the JFIT and witnessed a number of prisoners of war who were hooded and in various is stress positions. I am informed that this is in accordance with British Army doctrine on tactical
questioning."

Was that a reference to what the major or captain had told you?

A. I think so.

Q. "Whereas if may be in accordance with British Army doctrine [you went on to say], in my opinion, it violates international law. Prisoners of war must at all times be protected against acts of violence or intimidation and must have respect for their persons and their honour [you refer to Articles 13 and 14 of Geneva Convention III]. I accept that tactical questioning may be permitted but this behaviour clearly violates the Convention."

When you say, as you do there, "I accept that tactical questioning may be permitted", were you giving any indication of any view that, for example, hooding or stress positions -- those matters about which you were complaining -- may have some part to play in the tactical questioning?

A. No, not at all.

Q. -- operation?

A. No.

Q. So why did you refer to tactical questioning in this memo?

A. Well, I mean, I've headed it "Questioning of PW's".
I mean, when I arrived at the JFIT -- I mean I -- we were aware that tactical questioning took part because it's mentioned. What we had no idea about was the methodology that was being employed. When I first saw the JFIT, my immediate impression was that these prisoners were being intimidated to make interrogation easier.

Q. I need to ask you about that.

A. Yes. And therefore I was aware that tactical questioning took place -- everyone is -- but not the methodology employed.

Q. So when you saw what you saw and you assumed that this was part of the process of tactical questioning, if I can put in shorthand what I think you said, was that merely an assumption on your part or were you told anything to that effect?

A. Well, clearly, they were interrogating prisoners. I mean, the whole thing was set up with the prisoners in these position and hooded in front of an interrogation tent with generators running. I mean this was all designed for the interrogation process. So clearly -- yes, of course, you can ask tactical questions, but of course not using these methods.

Q. Did you have any discussion with the captain or major about generators and the reason for them running?
A. I don't -- I can't recall if I did at the time, but my
view was that the picture being painted for the
prisoners was that the generators were being used to
muffle sound. I mean you try to get into the military
mindset, but I think if I was a prisoner there and
I could hear the noise, I would wonder what they were
trying to muffle, and that was the picture in my view
that was being painted.

Q. If you had been told that the purpose or one of them of
the generator noise was so that what was going on in one
tent by way of tactical questioning may not be heard in
another, would you then have accepted that as being
appropriate for tactical questioning?

A. No, I mean, my impression was, when I saw it, that this
is being used to roll over prisoners; in other words
they were being intimidated by these various means so
when it came to interrogation, they would roll over in
the interrogation.

Q. Did you take that up, Colonel Mercer, in those terms, if
you like, with the major or captain to whom you spoke?

A. Well, I went to investigate what was happening. I went
into the interrogation tent. I didn't know what I'd
find and I was relieved I didn't find anything
unpleasant in the interrogation tent because that was
the picture, in my view, that was being painted to the
prisoners. I obviously had a discussion about the legality and then was told it was part of UK doctrine.

Q. But did you put -- can I put it quite bluntly to you -- to the individual that you spoke to that what you believed you were observing was no more nor less than a softening-up process prior to questioning?

A. I mean, obviously I made my concerns known to him. I mean, the conversation took place seven years ago.

Q. Were those the concerns that you did raise or --

A. I think it was generic. We didn't break it down into constituent parts. I mean, basically, "What on earth's going on here?"

Q. I asked those questions because -- if we can have a look, please, at paragraph 39 of your statement to this Inquiry at BMI04067 -- after your return to your headquarters, you say you spoke to intelligence officers in G2, including S002, "... where I was advised that the treatment I had witnessed was in accordance with British Army doctrine on tactical questioning".

A. Yes.

Q. Was that something that was said to you by the major or captain also?

A. I don't think I was referred to any document. All I can say is my memo is the closest thing I've got to a contemporaneous note.
Q. If we look at paragraph 43 of your statement, please, where you say this:

"My complaint to the GOC ... (about hooding and stress positions) caused considerable disquiet among the G2 branch."

How were you made aware of that?

A. It was just obvious. It was not popular.

Q. Say that again.

A. It was just obvious. It was not very popular.

Q. You say:

"My legal advice was not accepted by the G2 branch and the issue was staffed to the NCC."

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. By whom was the issue staffed to the NCC, do you know?

A. I can't -- I can't recall how it went up, up the chain, but I had numerous phone calls and there was quite a lot of email traffic about it. I mean it went backwards and forwards for days with the NCC.

Q. So again, trying to take it relatively shortly anyway, should the Inquiry understand that you had made your position quite clear that hooding and stress positions and the use thereof was unlawful and should not be employed under any circumstances --

A. That was correct.

Q. -- and, if you like, the advice that was coming back was
that, what, hooding could be employed for certain purposes?

A. Yes, it was, yes.

Q. Were you told for what purposes?

A. Well, I can't recall -- the correspondence came back and I remember the SO2 G2 coming up to me and saying, "Look we've just got this letter from the NCC. You've got the law wrong". I said, "Well ..." -- you know, obviously that put me in a difficult position because I had objected, a counter-view had been obtained from a higher headquarters, but then the issue, of course, took on a different complexion because it wasn't just me who had seen it and raised their concerns, but, of course, the P info officer -- I think I can refer to his name.

Q. Yes.

A. -- Chris Vernon had spotted it.

Q. Yes.

A. I understand subsequently that the commandant of the prisoner of war camp had also seen it and raised his concerns and, of course, whilst I was being told I was wrong, at this point the Red Cross picked up on it and it was now -- obviously once the Red Cross had got on it, it was a turbo-charged issue.

Q. It was more in the forefront?

A. Yes. So that, you know, my position was in a sense
vindicated by those other concerns being raised from other quarters. I mean, anyone who would see it would just say "What is happening here?" and that came from all sorts of angles.

Q. I am going to come to those other concerns and the Red Cross in a moment or two, if I may.

A. Yes.

Q. But the position, as we understand it then, was that you had said "This isn't on". You had been told that you were wrong about that. What I do want to ask you, Colonel Mercer, is whether you can remember whether there were, as it were, any conditions imposed on how hooding may be used when you were told that it was going to continue -- for any particular purpose.

A. No. As I understand it, the hooding was banned on -- I think it was 3 April --

Q. We are going to come to that.

A. Yes.

Q. But before that --

A. I think the issue was still at large at that point.

Q. I follow.

I don't think it need be put up, but at the end of paragraph 43 of your statement to this Inquiry, after what you describe as the to-ing and fro-ing and emails and so on, you say:
"I was not persuaded by the contrary view of the law and did not change my own advice."

A. That's correct?

Q. Moving on in time, please -- and again going back to your diary to try to ascertain a date, could we have a look, please, at MOD019890, Thursday 3 April, where you record the temperature above 100 degrees in the tent. I want to go down nine or ten lines. Do you see the line that begins "I do not think the war will last much longer ..." and then you say this:

"At the same time, I gained a minor victory as I managed to prevent prisoners of war being hooded by interrogators. I referred the matter to the general on Saturday ..."

That would be to Major General Brims, would it?

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. "... and said it was a breach of the law of international armed conflict. G2 tried to argue that it was approved by the Government but when I checked there was no mention of hooding. Hopefully law brings some humanity to the battlefield."

What was that a reference to, Colonel Mercer, the "minor victory"?

A. Well, the victory was getting hooding banned in theatre.

Q. What did you know about the ban on hooding? Who had
issued that?

A. Well, as I understand it, the decision had been made by
the NCC that -- there was legal debate about the issue,
but as we were theatre troops, we could make our own
policy on it and that the GOC had then banned hooding
and that had been disseminated orally over the
radio net.

Q. Forgive me being pedantic about it, and if you don't
know the answer, please say so, but did you understand
the GOC's order to be a ban on hooding or a ban on sight
deprivation or what?

A. A ban on hooding.

Q. You understood that it was an order that was issued
orally?

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. Did you know -- and again please don't guess about it --
who had in fact issued the order?

A. Yes, it was Colonel Marriott.

THE CHAIRMAN: He is the chief of staff, is that right?

A. Yes, he was chief of staff and chief G3.

MR ELIAS: Did you visit the TIF on subsequent occasions?

A. I think I -- yes, on quite a lot of occasions.

Q. And on any subsequent occasions after that order had
been issued, as you understood it, did you see hoods
used?
A. No, I never saw hoods used again.

Q. Did you see any other form of sight deprivation used on any of your visits?

A. I don't recall that I did.

Q. And on any of those visits, did you see stress positions or anything equating to them used?

A. No, I had addressed it with the chief G2 and a compromise had been reached that if prisoners did need restraining, then they were to be cuffed to the front and not up behind their backs. I had also instructed my legal officers down there to be on the lookout, to give me eyes and ears over the prisoner of war camp for any hint of any mistreatment.

Q. And none was reported to you?

A. None was reported to me.

Q. Thank you.

Now you have alluded to the fact that the Red Cross -- the ICRC -- became involved through their visits. Indeed the Inquiry has already heard of certain of the concerns that were raised by the ICRC. Did you attend meetings at which representatives of the ICRC attended?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Were those meetings at the JFIT?

A. Not at the JFIT, but in the prisoner of war camp.
Q. Thank you. You say in your statement that concerns were expressed by the Red Cross representatives about the treatment of prisoners of war, including, for example, hooding, which it was said violated the Geneva Conventions, and that was a matter with which you would have agreed; is that correct?

A. That’s correct.

Q. At those meetings where the ICRC were raising concerns about hooding, was there any attempt to justify the use of hooding for any purpose by any of the British representatives?

A. Yes. I am free to talk on it at this moment, am I?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes, there were attempts to justify it.

Q. What was the basis, if you can give it to us in a nutshell, upon which it was being suggested hooding could be justified?

A. From memory, I think it was security of the prisoner and security of the interrogators.

Q. Bearing in mind the caution that I have given you about names, can you remember --

A. Yes.

Q. -- from the meeting those who were advancing that proposition that hooding could be justified on security grounds?
A. I think S002 was one of those people.

Q. Any others that you can remember?

A. I am struggling to remember the delegates at the meeting itself. I can't even remember if S02 G2 was there either. I think other people supported that position.

Q. Can I just invite you -- and if you need to correct it, please do so -- but would you look at paragraph 49 on the screen of your statement, BMI04070. Under the long redaction in that paragraph, you say:

"Some of the participants at the meeting [and you include S002] tried to justify the UK approach to hooding on the grounds of security."

But you name two others there.

A. Yes, that's correct, S02s.

Q. Were they also supportive of that proposition?

A. And I think that was -- yes, to a degree.

Q. So David Frend and Gavin Davies you say also were justifying the UK approach to hooding on the grounds of security.

A. That's correct.

Q. What was your attitude to that when it was raised, that security was a reason for hooding?

A. Well, I was -- I didn't accept it for a minute.

I thought there was no requirement at all and I thought it was not the way that hooding was actually being used
when I'd seen it.

Q. So it would be fair, would it, to say that you didn't believe that is why it was being used --

A. I was hard-over on hooding. I just find the whole thing repulsive.

Q. I understand that.

A. So I was -- in my view it amounts to violence and intimidation and it degrades the individual. So I don't like it at all under any circumstances.

Q. Again, so that the Inquiry understands your position, at the meetings we are here describing and you were describing at paragraph 49, are you telling the Inquiry that you believed that the ground of security that was being put forward was not in fact the truthful ground for which it was being operated?

A. I certainly -- it certainly wasn't being operated on those grounds when I saw it and I don't -- yes, I think it's unnecessary for security as well. I think there are numerous ways you can get round the issue: proper design of the interrogation centre, proper control of prisoners, separate facilities. There are numerous ways you can get round it by design and sensible handling of prisoners.

Q. Would you accept, Colonel Mercer, that perhaps in the early days, when resources had not caught up with the
situations -- if you follow the question -- that there
may have been some need, for some purposes, to deprive
sight of prisoners for security reasons?
A. I don't accept that.
Q. Not under any circumstances?
A. No.
Q. I use the term "deprive sight" not necessarily to
include hooding --
A. I got that. I'm against hooding. If someone had come
up to me and said, "We needed to blindfold one prisoner
for that, then so be it", but hooding, absolutely not.
Q. I am just a little confused then. Are you saying that
blindfolding might have been acceptable as a means of
ensuring security if, for example, we didn't have enough
tentage, we didn't have enough buildings, they couldn't
be separated from each other --
A. I can rarely see -- it's so -- I can rarely see the
point. I mean, I had this discussion with one of the
handlers at the prisoner of war camp, who came from the
Military Corrective Training Centre so he had been used
to handling prisoners, and there were things being told
that they would see the rear echelons when they were
being transported or they might see X, Y and Z. And
I said, "There were other ways to stop this happening.
Put screens around an enclosure, for instance. You
don't have to put hoods on their heads. Put up hessian
screens. Black out the windows of a bus". You know,
there were no rear echelons to see that every man and
his dog could see anyway because you just take a coach
down the road. So I must admit I was fairly cynical
about this.

Q. And you made that clear at the meeting, did you?
A. I was instructed not to speak at the meeting.
Q. I want to ask you about that, of course. You were
instructed not to speak about what?
A. About anything.
Q. And by whom were you so instructed?
A. I think it's probably on the list of ciphers.
Q. Would you like --
A. Is there a list?
Q. Would you like to have a list?
A. S034.
Q. S034 instructed you what?
A. Not to say anything at the meeting.
Q. Was that simply because it was known that your view
would be contrary, if you like, to the line that was
being put forward?
A. Quite possibly.
Q. Did you walk out of any meeting at which the ICRC were
present?
A. I did walk out at one point of the meeting, yes.
Q. Why did you walk out of the meeting?
A. Because I was very cross with some of the excuses that were being put forward, what I saw as excuses.
Q. What, excuses for hooding?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you just answer this "yes" or "no" please? Do you recall whether the use of stress positions was discussed at the meetings at which the Red Cross attended?
A. No, I don't believe it was.
Q. We are now at 25 past 11.
MR ELIAS: That would be a convenient moment, Sir.
THE CHAIRMAN: All right. We break off now for ten minutes so you can have a bit of a rest. I don't need to tell you not to speak to anybody about your evidence, of course.
Right, 25 to please.
(11.25 am)
(A short break)
(11.35 am)
THE CHAIRMAN: Once again, I don't need to remind you, but you are still under oath.
A. Thank you very much.
THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.
MR ELIAS: Colonel Mercer, in the course of what I am going
to categorise as general discussions about this issue of
hooding and whether it was justified in any way, was the
shock of capture referred to by anyone as any sort of
justification to your recollection?
A. What, at this meeting?
Q. At this or indeed any other meeting where these matters
were discussed.
A. I mean, I'm aware of the concept of the shock of
capture, but I didn't understand it in the sense that
you put a head over someone's head -- I mean, the shock
is there because you have been captured.
Q. So you don't recall it featuring in any of the
discussions about whether hooding was justified or not?
A. No.
Q. Could we look, please, at paragraph 52 of your statement
at BMI04070? You say this:
"From my perspective, the issue of hooding was now
in the hands of the NCC. I had no doubt that, given the
seriousness of the situation, it would be staffed to
PJHQ and to ministers as there was going to be an
official complaint to the UK Government by the ICRC [the
Red Cross]."
I just want to ask you this about it: that was your
assumption, was it, that the matter would go, as it
were, all the way up to ministers?
A. I am not sure how much I am allowed to say at this point. Please stop me if I am going somewhere I shouldn't. But, yes, I think if the Red Cross is going to make an official complaint to a government, which is what it does, then there is no way that this thing would have stayed at the level of the NCC. It would have gone all the way up.

Q. That's what you assumed would happen?

A. I did, yes.

Q. I don't want to go into the detail of it, but are you saying, then, that it was because of the Red Cross intervention or because it was an issue of such seriousness that in any event you would have expected it to go up the chain?

A. No, I mean, a one star political adviser was flown in to deal with this. It was obviously getting pretty serious.

Q. So what is the answer to my question? Leave aside the Red Cross, would you still have expected this to have gone up to Government level?

A. What, if they'd --

Q. Without the complaint from the Red Cross, you having raised the issue, you having, as it were, been rebuffed, there being the to-ing and fro-ing that you have described --
A. I am not sure that I would in those circumstances.

I would certainly expect it to go to PJHQ in those circumstances.

Q. I follow.

THE CHAIRMAN: By "one star", do you mean someone --

A. Of the equivalent rank, yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: Of major general?

A. Of brigadier.

THE CHAIRMAN: Brigadier.

A. Yes.

MR ELIAS: Now all of this was happening, as we have seen,
towards the end of March. The order was issued, as you recall from your diary, on or about 3 April. Could I just go back to that for a moment? You told us, I think, that you knew that it was Marriott who had issued the order.

A. Yes.

Q. How did you know that?

A. I have a recollection that he gave it on the radio, but I --

Q. What, and you heard it?

A. I believe so. I mean, I am trying to cast my mind back to that, but clearly I was aware that it had because I recorded it in my diary.

Q. Can we move on, please, to look at FRAGO 79?
THE CHAIRMAN: Just pause there. When you say that you recorded it, do you mean the passage in the diary on 3 April?

A. That's correct, yes.

MR ELIAS: You refer in that obliquely, don't you --

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR ELIAS: If we go back to that, you refer to that obliquely, I think, in your diary entry, as your "minor victory preventing prisoners of war -- if we look at MOD019890, nine or ten lines down.

"I don't think the war will last much longer. At the same time, I gained a minor victory as I managed to prevent prisoners of war being hooded by interrogators."

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. That's a reference to the order, is it?

A. That's a reference to the order, yes. I imagine it would be one and the same day, although I -- yes, it's highly likely that it was the same day.

Q. As you told us, your recollection is that that was a ban on hooding.

A. Correct.

Q. Can we move on then, please, to look at FRAGO 79? Again I am trying to take matters in something like chronological order. We find that at MOD016165, please. Is that dated 3 April 2003? If we go to MOD016169, the
last page of the FRAGO itself, this would appear to have
been issued by you.

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Going back, please, to the first page of it, under 5 we
find, do we, under "Stop/search/temporarily detain":

"The powers to stop, search and temporarily detain
are the principle powers which will be required by the
brigades in the discharge of their responsibilities for
'public order and safety'."

And under 6:

"Under the rules of engagement all soldiers have the
power to stop, search and temporarily detain.

"680 Bravo (1) permits the temporary detention of
persons posing a threat to coalition forces or elements
under UK protection or otherwise interfering with or
threatening the coalition mission."

Over the page of this FRAGO, please, at
paragraph 10:

"Once a person has been temporarily detained, he
should either be released or handed over to the RMP (or
equivalent) as soon as practicable and in any event
within six hours."

What was the reasoning for the handover of prisoners
as soon as practicable and in any event within six
hours?
A. I think it was just a timeframe that seemed to fit in with the geographical distribution around theatre.

Q. So that was a realistic timeframe -- is that what you are saying -- as you believed it?

A. It is very hard to judge, but I think we believed it to be the case. I should just say, at this stage, that the concept for public order and safety -- in other words law and order -- in occupied territory is obviously going to be evolutionary and we are very much finding our way through this problem. I mean, if you can imagine occupying someone's country, you just don't know what you are going to find or how things will develop on the ground.

Q. So -- and again I don't take you to your statement -- but I think, as you say in your statement, these were evolutionary matters and you were feeling your way and setting out a position that you thought was tenable.

A. Yes, I mean, it's impossible to know whether you'll inherit a country that is with its civil powers in place or whether it will disintegrate. No one can possibly gauge precisely what you'll find. So we've written the law and order schematic in a way that would enable us, as the occupying power, to deal with law and order issues as we found them, and obviously, then, we would adapt as the situation on the ground developed.
Q. That was a FRAGO issued on 3 April; indeed, the same day, you believe, as the general had issued his order banning hooding.

If we move on, please, to the document we find at MOD019141, now dated 8 May. This is a document headed "Detention procedures". It is emanating, is it, from the provost marshal?

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. You refer to it, I think, in your statement for the contents of the first paragraph specifically, which says this -- and note the date of 8 May:

"A review of custody and detention procedures has been conducted to ensure compliance with references A and B [Declaration of human rights and ECHR]. It has been determined that current procedures are not consistent with UK legislation and accepted 'best practice' in relation to custody and detention. It may also be argued that current procedures are inconsistent with Article 5 of ... [ECHR]. Remedial action is, therefore, required."

Do you know, Colonel Mercer, in which way or ways current procedures were not consistent with those benchmarks, as it were?

A. I think -- I mean there was a debate about -- I mean, we were, at this point, detaining people in the theatre...
internment facility and, therefore, the conditions were fairly crude, and whereas we had wanted a separate facility for detainees -- those that were potential criminals -- and a separate facility for internees, potentially, and also voluntarily detainees, we kept having to divide the prisoner of war camp into ever-smaller segments to accommodate the different categories of prisoners we had.

Now, these prisoners were sleeping pretty much rough. There was some tentage over their heads; there were lime pits for sanitation. It smelt pretty bad. And also our review procedures of those who were detained were pretty primitive.

Q. As I indicated, I don't want to get into that latter matter --

A. So I think that's how it was understood --

Q. Those were the concerns perhaps referred to in that provost marshal note.

Moving on in time to paragraph 81 of your statement at BMI04077, at the foot of page, where you say this: "Although strict instructions had been given in FRAGO 79 [the one we just looked at a moment or two ago] that detainees were to be handed over to the Royal Military Police as soon as practicable, and in any event within six hours, before being transported to the TIC,
I began to have concerns that this was not being
complied with in theatre and that detainees were being
held by battlegroups."

Can you help as to why you began to have concerns?
What were the source of your --

A. Well, the schematic was fairly straightforward,
I thought; in other words, that people who were detained
under the ROE were handed to the police and the police
then handed them to the -- took them down to the TIC,
the theatre internment centre, or TIF or whatever it's
called, at this particular moment in time.

It's very hard to read a situation from divisional
headquarters. You have 25,000 soldiers over a massive
geographical area and you begin -- you were conscious
that things might happen or might be happening, and one
of my concerns was that people weren't being taken down
to the TIF, but were being held elsewhere.

Q. Where did you learn that?

A. I can't remember where that came up. It may have been
anecdotal. It may have been from -- I can't remember
the source, but to address this issue I put it in
a FRAGO that all units were to report --

Q. We are going to look at that in just a moment, but

I just want to deal with your concerns, if I may, in
this paragraph. You say:
"I began to have concerns that this was not being
complied with ..."

That is the handover within the timescale that had
been set.

A. That's correct.

Q. You can't put your finger on where those concerns
emanated from or what evidence, if you like, there was?

A. I can't specifically. No one came up to me
specifically, but I just -- you sort of detect -- you
suspect things might be happening that shouldn't be
happening, but it is very hard to read from the locus
of the divisional headquarters. You are sitting there
in your staff headquarters and, of course, you have
troops spread all across the ground, so you are blind to
a large degree.

Q. Your statement goes on at paragraph 81, as we can see --
you began to have concerns that it wasn't being complied
with in theatre. You go on to say this:

"Although I had no direct knowledge of this ..."

That is to say that it wasn't being complied with;
is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. "... I believe that I requested the paragraph in
FRAGO 143 dated 14 May ... to try and identify any such
locations."
By which you mean locations in which detainees were being held by battlegroups.

A. Potentially, yes.

Q. Can we look, then, please, at FRAGO 143? This is now dated 14 May. We find it please at MOD030974. You see at the top of the page, FRAGO 143.

A. Yes.

Q. "Daily miscellaneous FRAGO" is its headline. If we go over the page, please, paragraph 3 in the middle of the page, "Treatment of detainees":

"Brigades are reminded that detainees should be treated in accordance with the responsibilities as laid out in 'Geneva Convention 4'."

Then this:

"All details of locations where detainees are held in the div area of responsibility should be confirmed to G3 pro at this HQ by 15 May at 18.30 hours and all are reminded to allow [Red Cross] access to such sites if requested."

Is that the paragraph to which you are referring at paragraph 81 of your statement?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. So what you were asking for here, in paragraph 3, is to know the location -- any location -- where detainees were being held?
A. Yes. I mean the schematic was simple: detain under the ROE, hand to the police, the police take them down to the TIF. But, of course, as we know, that system had become very overloaded and broken.

Q. And so the purpose of having those areas identified was what?

A. Well, I mean, obviously the schematic wasn't working. I wanted people in the TIF and nowhere else.

Q. I understand that. What was the purpose of having these areas where detainees were going to be held or were being held -- what was the purpose in having those, as it were, confirmed to G3 pro --

A. Well, I'm not sure that any were confirmed. I can't recall what results came from this FRAGO.

Q. That's another issue. What was the purpose of requesting it, Colonel?

A. Well to see if there were -- if this was working as it should or if people were holding them against instructions.

Q. But you don't recall what, if any, was the result of that --

A. No, I don't recall. I don't recall any being identified, to be honest.

Q. You don't recall any being identified?

A. No.
Q. Again, I have asked you this in relation to an early matter but, in seeking to get that information, was there anything in your mind that if detainees were located at a particular battlegroup location, there was any higher risk of them being mistreated or ill-treated?

A. Well, not at this point, I don't think. I mean I like to think it was clearly understood that they should be properly treated.

Q. You go on in your statement to say -- moving on now to 20 May -- that you were advised by the SIB that there had been a death in custody of someone held by a battlegroup and that that matter was being investigated.

A. That's correct.

Q. You were also led to believe that there may have been other deaths in British custody.

A. I think from memory the way this worked was when the SIB investigate an incident, you get what's call an "interim report", and that interim report would hit my desk as commander legal in the divisional headquarters. So I do recall the first interim report being issued where there had been a death of an individual held by a battlegroup in theatre. But of course you don't know at that stage whether -- what the possible cause of the death is. So you are concerned, but you don't know for certain what
caused it until it's properly investigated --

Q. It obviously could be natural causes, couldn't it?
A. Absolutely. So the first one I had left. I had registered it and I thought "We will wait and see what happens". But when I got number two and I spoke to a member of the SIB, who said they were investigating a number of others, and that was communicated to me orally, I decided to act immediately on that information.

Q. Again, please don't speculate or guess if you don't remember, but was there any indication given to you in relation to any or either of the deaths about which you specifically became aware, you tell us, that any breathing difficulties may have been involved in those deaths?
A. No, there was none whatsoever.

Q. So having been alerted to the two deaths, as I understand you to say it was, what then did you do about it?
A. Well, it wasn't just two deaths. There were a number of deaths -- I thought the figure was higher -- and of course I issued FRAGO 152.

Q. You say in your statement -- or at least you intimate if you don't say it directly -- that you issued FRAGO 152 very shortly after being given this information about
the death.

A. I think from memory I was given the information -- I mean I have given you a chronology in my statement about what was happening at this stage and, to be honest, we were busting a gut to get the courts up and running so that we could get rid of detainees from the TIF and actually start to cope with all that was going on in Iraq. So the day was spent running around trying to find judges, find magistrates, find lawyers, build the courthouses. I got back in the evening, from memory at 6 or 7 at night, a member of the SIB spoke to me and gave me this information.

Q. If we look at MOD017061, we find there, do we, FRAGO 152? Again if we just look at the end of it at MOD17063, please. Again issued by you?

A. That's correct.

Q. If we go back to the first page if we may, we can see the date at the top, can we, of 20 May 2003 as the date of issue? The time at 22.30. So are you telling the Inquiry -- please don't just accept it from me -- that that was issued on the same evening as you were given the information about the deaths?

A. That's correct.

Q. I follow.

Can we see what you set out here? It is headed the
"Miscellaneous FRAGO". Under "Legal", in paragraph 3:

"... find renewed guidance on the detention of civilians attached at enclosure 1. This is to be passed down to the lowest level."

Over the page, under the heading of "Detention of civilians", you record at paragraph 1:

"There have recently been a number of deaths in custody where Iraqi civilians have died whilst being held by various units in theatre. A number of these cases are currently being investigated by the SIB but all units in theatre are to ensure that all persons detained by UK forces are treated with humanity and dignity at all times."

That is reinforcing the lesson you say had been given --

A. Yes, reiterating the words we had used in our briefings.

Q. -- many times over.

Then at paragraph 4 under the general heading "Minimum force", there's a reiteration, isn't there, of the handing over within six hours of detention.

"Delivery to the RMP should occur as soon as possible. The guidance allowing up to six hours is to take account of those units which might be in remote locations. All other units should attempt to deliver the detained person in under a hour."
That was what was being aimed at, correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. At 5:

"If a unit has to hold a detained person prior to the arrival of the Royal Military Police or to await transport or for any other unavoidable reason, the detained person should be treated with humanity and dignity [I think highlighted in black] at all times. They should not be assaulted. They should be provided with water in all cases and food if they are detained for longer."

Just pausing there, if I may for a moment, "they should not be assaulted", was that put into this FRAGO for any specific reason because you were aware of any allegations that prisoners had been assaulted?

A. I was aware that prisoners had died.

Q. But you knew no more or less than that, did you?

A. Well, I can't remember if it was at this point or others, but there were reports of prisoners -- some prisoners -- being delivered who were quite bruised down to the TIF. Now I cannot recall whether it fell before this or after this. Now that's difficult because was it a result of a lift operation, which it could be, or was it for some other reason? So I put that in. I can't recall at this particular moment in time, but it's
likely to have been because of the mention of the
deaths.

Q. But we should assume, should we -- the Inquiry should
assume -- that you put it in, as it were, specifically,
not because it formed some part of a stream of words
that would have been used in a FRAGO of this kind come
what may?

A. No. It was aimed specifically.

Q. Then reading on:

"... water in all cases and food if they are
detained for longer. If they need to be restrained,
then this should be only be effected where absolutely
necessary and using the minimum force required."

Then this:

"Under no circumstances should their faces be
covered as this might impair breathing. Medical
assistance should be close at hand at all times. The
Royal Military Police are specifically trained in all
these matters and timely delivery to the Military Police
is the best way to ensure that the correct procedures
are adopted at the outset."

"Under no circumstances should their faces be
covered as this might impair breathing."

A. Mm-hm.

Q. Why did you put that into this FRAGO, Colonel?
A. Well, at this point, of course, I've got two interim reports or two reports from the SIB that people -- two people held by battlegroups had died. I, as the lawyer, am trying envisage what might have happened. I don't know. So I am trying to cover as many bases as I can. I covered the assault in the first paragraph. I cover food, water in the second line. I cover -- hooding had been banned and I was thinking, well, soldiers being soldiers, they might try something else because I know what they're like -- if they say "hooding is banned", then they will do something that, you know, cuts out sight or whatever using other means. So I put it in for those reasons. I am really trying to get at what might be going wrong here.

I think, if I may say -- and it's something I picked up in the press -- I did see pictures of prisoners who had black masking tape round their heads and round their noses, so actually my guess from the headquarters I don't think was too wide of the mark.

Q. Do you mean that you saw that at the time?

A. No, it came up during the course of this Inquiry.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

A. So I did see that. And I thought, "Well, actually that's precisely the sort of inventiveness unfortunately that you get".
MR ELIAS: So the "under no circumstances should their faces
be covered as this might impair breathing" was not
specifically aimed at no hooding.

A. No, hooding had been banned. This is why it was couched
in these terms.

Q. Let's examine that. As you said, you knew hooding had
been banned because you heard the oral order.

A. Yes.

Q. You had nothing in writing about it, did you?

A. Well the situation is I am the command legal adviser.

If the general gives an order or instructs his chief of
staff to give an order, then the chief of staff will do
that order in whatever way he sees fit. It's not for
me, as a legal adviser, to do anything in those
circumstances.

Q. Forgive me. You have perhaps answered a question
I haven't not asked you --

A. No.

Q. -- and I didn't intend to ask you. I do want to ask you
this one.

A. Yes.

Q. Given that you knew that hooding had been banned by way
of an oral order from Major General Brims via
Marriott -- but you knew it was not in writing, didn't
you?
A. That's correct.

Q. -- did you think that in this FRAGO, where you were making things -- as you put it in your statement, setting them out in unequivocal terms, did you think that in this FRAGO it might be an opportunity to indicate that of course prisoners may not be hooded?

A. Well, I took that as a given and this addressed the situation where they were trying to get round that instruction.

Q. Taking it as a given, therefore, you didn't consider that you needed to put the ban on hooding unequivocally and in writing in this FRAGO --

A. Well, the order had already been given --

Q. Yes.

A. -- so this supplemented.

Q. Okay. By "faces being covered", what did you have in particular in mind?

A. Well, I just thought someone could have wrapped something round their eyes, covered their noses. I mean, I was trying to guess how this could have happened.

Q. Forgive me for asking it again, but we can be quite clear, can we, that you had not been given any indication by anyone that maybe difficulties with breathing had brought about the death of --
A. No, none whatsoever.

Q. You say in paragraph 83 -- can we have that on the screen, please -- of your statement to this Inquiry, BMI04078, that:

"I used the phrase ... because I was concerned that detainees might possibly be being blindfolded (given the unfinished debate about the legality of hooding) and that the blindfolding ... might also be a potential danger (if it was applied in a way that might impair breathing, over the nose for instance). This was in an abundance of caution and was not a reference to hooding or anything of which I was aware."

You then go on to say:

"Furthermore, the FRAGO made it clear that interrogation was only to take place at the TIC [or TIF] where I was content that I had sufficient supervision and awareness of the prisoner-handling process."

I don't think this FRAGO in fact did go to that issue, did it?

A. No, it didn't. It was later. It was 163, I think.

Q. Yes.

A. Actually -- if I can just come back to that, actually, I think it does because it refers to delivery to the RMP of course, so that would then fit into the schematic.

Q. I understand that.
A. Yes.

Q. Of course you were still maintaining the six-hour maximum period for handover.

A. Yes, we were.

Q. You are aware now, are you, that it does seem in a variety of areas that after Major General Brims' order, hooding continued to be employed? You are aware of that now, are you?

A. I'm not -- at this stage I'm not.

Q. Had you been aware of any uncertainty as to whether that order had been received, you would presumably have included it, would you, in the FRAGO we just looked at?

A. It would have been reiterated.

Q. So FRAGO 152 was 20 May. Can we move on, please, to have a look at a document that isn't precisely dated, but which I suggest may be around end of May?

MOD011514, please. Again if we go to MOD011516, we see it is a document under your name, with a heading "Internees" on the first page. You refer at the top of that page, the first paragraph, to guidance being provided recently. To whom were you providing this guidance?

A. I think -- I can't find -- this will have been attached to a FRAGO. What I tended to do -- the FRAGO would deal with the subject and then there would be an annex which
dealt specifically with the particular issue of the moment. I think -- if I just take you back to the chronology here, on 1 June the courts and prison and police were all brought on-stream. We had restored sufficient capacity to deal -- so the Iraqis could deal with public order and safety or law and order.

Roughly on 1 or 2 June, the entire pool of 300 detainees were transferred from the theatre internment facility to Al Maqu'al prison in Basra; in other words, we -- prisoners of war bar one or two had all been cleared; detainees, of which there were about 300, were all moved to the prison, handed to the Iraqi authorities, paperwork given to an Iraqi judge and therefore the last category remaining in the theatre internment facility was internees. In other words, I then would address this specific issue because that was the only one remaining at this particular moment in time, bar one or two legacies in the prisoner of war camp.

Q. Can I then, please, take you just to parts of the document. Under "Introduction" you say:

"Guidance was provided recently on detainees (being those persons who have committed a serious criminal offence who are subsequently detained by coalition forces). However there is another category of persons
who can be detained called internees."
That is the point you just made, I think, essentially. Was the guidance provided recently a reference to FRAGO 152, do you think?
A. It could have been. I can't recall?
Q. All right:
"These are people who simply pose a threat to force security and under the IV Geneva Convention 1949, such persons may be interned where it is 'absolutely necessary' for force security ... At the present time, however, there appears to be some confusion within the brigades as to the procedure for arresting and holding internees and this document is intended to provide guidance to ensure that internees are not held unlawfully."
Just to go to the foot of page, please, the last paragraph, there is a reiteration, isn't there, here of the six-hour guide to allow those in remote locations to deliver, so still the six hours is, as it were, being adhered to.
A. Yes.
Q. Over the page, the ideal --
A. Within one hour.
Q. -- that they should be delivered within one hour, as you underline in the document.
A. Yes.

Q. "This should hopefully ensure the safe detention of both internees and detainees."

Again, was that notion of safety, the safe detention -- did you have in mind, in writing it, any query as to whether detainees might otherwise be mistreated or ill-treated?

A. I was trying to design out the potential for abuse.

Q. And "designing out the potential for abuse" means, putting it in straightforward language, lessening the opportunity for assault?

A. That's correct.

Q. That was being done by -- may I put it this way -- this constant reiterating of the six-hour maximum and the one-hour ideal?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. You go on to say:

"The procedure is identical in both cases."

Then if we go to the foot of the page, under the heading "Questioning":

"Questioning of internees will not be carried out by the brigades in brigade holding areas and should only be conducted at the theatre internment facility ..."

You go on then to refer to what's going to happen I think some little time in the future.
"From July 2003 ... 3 Div will not have a permanent JFIT presence ...", and so on.

But just to ask you about that, please, the first line, "Questioning of internees will not be carried out by the brigades in brigade holding areas ...", was that suggesting that tactical questioning would not take place there?

A. It covers everything.

Q. So questioning of all kinds?

A. Well, interrogation of all kinds, yes.

Q. Which would include tactical questioning, would it?

A. Of course, yes.

Q. Over the page, as it were --

A. If I can just say on that, the theatre internment facility had a lawyer present at the theatre internment facility; in other words, I had legal supervision at that point and I didn't have it elsewhere.

Q. So what you were seeking to bring in, if you like, through this guidance was -- if it had been going on -- an end to tactical questioning at brigade level?

A. I didn't know it was going on there. The idea was to -- it doesn't say so at all. It says: detain, hand to the police, delivery to the TIF, questioning at the TIF.

Q. But if, insofar as it had been going on, this was designed to prevent tactical questioning or questioning
1 of any kind --
2 A. Of any kind, "questioning" being generic.
3 Q. -- anywhere other than at the TIF?
4 A. At the TIF because I had legal supervision of that.
5 Q. Looking back on it, Colonel Mercer, do you think that it
6 might have been clearer on that issue to indicate that
7 tactical questioning was also not to be conducted?
8 A. No, "questioning" covers everything.
9 Q. So over the page, please, just to underline perhaps the
10 point --
11 A. And I think can I -- sorry, just to go back to that last
12 paragraph, it says "tactical ..." -- it goes on to say
13 "trained tactical questioners who can question the
14 internee at the TIF", so it does deal with tactical
15 questioning. So I hope it's clear.
16 Q. Over the page, then, please, under "Conclusion":
17 "The procedure for both internees and detainees can
18 be summarised follows:
19 "(a) Temporarily detain (as permitted under the
20 Rules of Engagement)
21 "(b) Convey to the Royal Military Police within
22 1 hour (but six hours ...) [if necessary]
23 "(c) Questioning can only take place at the TIF."
24 A. That's correct.
25 Q. Can we then move on, please, to 30 May and to FRAGO 163?
THE CHAIRMAN: One of the rare occasions when I have the document you are struggling to find.

MR ELIAS: I am very grateful. My bundle had been removed and I have it.

Could we find FRAGO 163, please, at MOD017179. Let us try MOD011506? Thank you very much.

Forgive me, Colonel, we can see, can't we, that the date of that is 30 May 2003, isn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you contribute to this FRAGO in terms of its content?

A. I can't recall whether I did or didn't. It could be -- it's highly likely that I had some input into it.

MR ELIAS: Would you forgive me for a moment, Sir? I do want to go back to the document that I was seeking to put up. It is the FRAGO, but it was issued in two versions at later times. But it is certainly the later version adopted at brigade level about which I want to ask this witness.

Can we try MOD016174, please? Let me use that version of it, if I may.

So forgive me, Colonel, you think you may have had some input --

A. Yes, I did have some input.

Q. Thank you. Now 30 May. "Internment and detention
procedures", as we can see. "Scope of the order":

"This FRAGO specifies the procedure to be implemented when detaining or interning civilians."

Then under "General" there is reference to the permission to apprehend and so on those who pose a threat to force security. In the last three lines:

"It is essential that all soldiers must understand the procedures to temporarily detain detainees or internees to prevent violations of international law."

"Execution" at 3, at the foot of the page, please, "Concept of ops", and under A, "Intent":

"To ensure that all ranks are able and have the confidence to initiate internment or detention procedures within a specific process that conforms to legal stipulations."

Over the page at B, "Scheme of manoeuvre", and I want to go to those bold highlighted words, please:

"Those temporarily held by UK forces must be handed to RMP within one to two hours."

So the timeframe, no doubt for the same reasons you have outlined in the earlier FRAGOs, was being maintained; correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. "Any later delivery can only be in exceptional circumstances. The RMP will then be responsible for
initial processing before releasing back to the
arresting battlegroup for onward movement to the TIF.
All internees are to be delivered to the TIF within
6 hours of arrest when practicable."
And that then is further highlighted under
"Coordinating instructions". I don't think I need take
you to the time limits, but they are set out again.
Under (b), "Internment procedures", there is
a reference to the fact that the TIF is closed been
21.00 hours and 8 o'clock in the morning. You were
aware of that, were you?
A. I can't recall being aware of it at this point actually.
Q. All right. Then provision for detainees, as it were, to
be held -- to be returned by the RMP to the battlegroup
RP staff, who will be responsible for the care of the
suspects overnight and in such cases battlegroups are to
deliver the suspects to the TIF before 08.30 the
following morning, half an hour after the opening.
A. Yes.
Q. So it was here envisaged that the RP staff, the provost
staff, would be the guards, if you like.
A. Yes, when it was closed, yes.
Q. Then over the page, the last line of paragraph 5:
"Under no circumstances may a suspect be
interrogated until he has been processed by the TIF."
Again, underlining what we had seen earlier; is that right?

A. That's correct.

Q. Can we have on the screen, please, paragraphs 87 and 88 of your statement to this Inquiry? At paragraph 88:

"At the same time, over the course of the week, specific internment and detention procedures were produced [you say] to 'design out' the possibility of prisoner abuse and on 30th May 2003, FRAGO 163 was issued."

In what ways did these provisions, the guidance that we have seen a moment or two ago and then FRAGO 163 -- how were they designing out the possibility of prisoner abuse?

A. Well, I think it's no questioning except at the TIF and also the time prerogatives for handing over, bringing to the TIF and also the involvement of the Military Police. That's part of the process.

Q. So those were the safeguards essentially?

A. They were, yes.

Q. And they were safeguards, Colonel Mercer, which you were keen to underline, weren't they?

A. Yes, they were.

Q. So that has now been set in place. We are now at 30 May or thereabouts when FRAGO 163 is issued. Can we have
a look together, please, at paragraph 4 of your second 
statement to this Inquiry, in which you say this:

"Despite the measures which were taken with 
FRAGO 152 and including FRAGO 163 (30th May 2003), I was 
still concerned that mistreatment of prisoners by 
battlegroups may be continuing, although any allegations 
could not be substantiated before the SIB had completed 
their investigation."

What gave rise to those concerns?

A. I referred to it earlier and it was the delivery of 
prisoners to the TIF who had suffered bruising. I am 
not quite sure at this stage, but I think at roughly 
this point, because my concerns were -- my antenna were 
picking this up, I then deployed legal officers to the 
brigades to give me a better chance of visibility as to 
what was happening at brigade level because you can 
become very cocooned in a divisional headquarters. So 
I think at roughly the same time, from memory, 
I dispatched some younger officers to the brigades or 
battlegroups to give me some sort of eyes and ears over 
the ground.

Q. Does it come to this, Colonel, that you were -- after 
30th May -- is this what you are saying -- you were made 
aware of the fact that detainees were arriving at the 
TIF -- putting it neutrally -- to some extent and in
some cases the worse for wear physically --

A. That's correct.

Q. -- for reasons that you didn't know?

A. That's correct.

Q. And apart from sending, as you say, legal officers from your department effectively to the battlegroups, to the locations, what, you were keen, were you, to ensure that all those provisions that you had set out -- the one-hour delivery, the involvement of the RMP and so on -- were also maintained and upheld?

A. I was trying to tie it down wherever I could. I had lawyers in the TIF, lawyers in the brigades and had issued FRAGO 152 and so on and so forth, and also the schematic for delivery was in a way a screwing it down as hard as I could.

Q. In that FRAGO 163 that we just looked at, you used the term that no interrogation was to take place before delivery to the TIF.

A. Yes.

Q. Why "interrogation" on this occasion as opposed to "questioning" which we have seen you used earlier?

A. There's no particular reason. I can't see any particular difference between the two.

Q. Would tactical questioning fall under the umbrella of "interrogation"?
A. Yes, very clearly. Interrogation includes tactical questioning and strategic questioning.

Q. Again, with hindsight, do you think that might have been made clearer if that was your intention?

A. If you read it in the light of the previous FRAGO, it makes it absolutely crystal clear that this only takes place at the TIF. This is again a reiteration of that earlier FRAGO.

Q. It is rather what only takes place at the TIF that I am suggesting might have been made a little clearer, to include TQ'ing, if that's what you intended.

A. We looked at that last paragraph in the provisions for internees and it makes it very clear that questioning is only to take place at the TIF, and it includes tactical questioning in that paragraph and then that's reiterated in the later FRAGO.

Q. We then move on to FRAGO 29. You say in your statement that you think you may not have been aware of that until it was disseminated; is that right?

A. No, I hadn't -- I hadn't seen FRAGO 29. It was produced independently of me.

Q. Do you find that surprising?

A. I can see the reasons behind it.

Q. For producing it independently of you?

A. Well, I think -- reading the FRAGO, I don't think --
I can't recall when I saw it. I certainly didn't see it when it was being drafted. I certainly didn't see it for some days later, from memory, and it could have been longer. I can't remember the date of FRAGO 29, but it is certainly late in June, I think. And I think it makes it very clear in the FRAGO that internment is a G2/G3-led operation -- you know, the ground is being seized back.

Q. When you did see FRAGO 29, as you say, the ground now having been seized back -- the bringing in of the BGIRO and the brigade responsibility and matters of that kind -- were you horrified at what you saw?

A. No. I saw the BGIRO -- there clearly has to be a determination in every case as to whether someone goes right to the police or left to the internment facility. That's what I took it to be.

Q. But I'm not focusing upon the BGIRO specifically --

A. Yes -- no, I didn't.

Q. Here you had been striving, as I think we have seen, no doubt with others --

A. Yes.

Q. -- to reduce the amount of time so as to lessen the risk during which prisoners of war might be held at particular points with battlegroups and now, to some extent at least, it might be said, FRAGO 29 was
reversing that process --

A. Yes, I cannot recall when I saw FRAGO 29, but it was some days after it had been issued. It could have been longer. I was not consulted on FRAGO 29 and it makes it is absolutely clear that G2/G3 have taken this back from what they saw was being led by police and lawyers. And of course it makes it clear that interrogation is a G2 function; in other words, we had strayed onto their turf.

I saw it as a way to bring that back into their domain and to marginalise the police and the lawyers.

I should just add on the police bit that the police also were so stretched for resources that they wanted to disengage from the prisoner process altogether. So those are the circumstances in which this arose.

Q. They were the circumstances in which it arose --

A. Sorry, there were two things. One was the 14-hour delivery and I questioned that with the -- someone in the headquarters and was told that the facility was closed from 6 until 6 and that's what I understood the position to be; in other words, we had been giving an order that people simply could not comply with. So one is as it was not a UK facility -- and I think that raises issues because we don't have control where it's run by another nation -- then obviously one had
reluctantly to go along with that.

With regard to the BGIR, I had no other indication that it would be anything more than the determination -- initial determination -- is he a criminal? Go to the Iraqi police. Is he an internee? He goes down to the TIF.

Q. Colonel, let me just ask the question once more.

A. Yes.

Q. Given what you had been striving to do through the FRAGOs we have looked at over the last half an hour or more, when FRAGO 29 came out -- my words -- reversing that process --

A. Yes.

Q. -- in large measure, did you have concerns as to whether prisoners might be mistreated or ill-treated under the new regime?

A. Well, I had hoped by this stage that the provisions of FRAGO 152, setting out very clearly -- you know, it couldn't be more in your face what you shouldn't do to prisoners -- was clear. I was hoping that the interrogation provisions with regard to interrogation at the TIF was clear. And, yes, it wasn't ideal, but at the end of the day I am a legal adviser and it's a G2/G3 product.

Q. I am not sure that answers my question, does it?
A. Well, I am trying to.

Q. Did you have concerns as a result of the regime that FRAGO 29 was now introducing, given your concerns which you've expressed to us over the last hour or so which resulted in FRAGOs 143, 152, 163 and so on?

A. Yes, I think I had ongoing concerns until we left and I think that then -- I mean, this had been taken from our hands, but I didn't think it was -- you know, given that it was a 14-hour, I didn't -- maybe that is regrettable, but I didn't see how we could change that and I had no concerns about the BGİRO, as I understood it.

But I should just say that simultaneously with this, of course, I'd written to General Wall and was now trying another route to screw down on mistreatment, which was by -- this route was going to go directly to commanders to remind them, if they didn't already know, of the doctrine of command responsibility; in other words, I was changing tack to a degree and trying another route to screw down on it.

Q. If you had concerns about the new regime, as I am calling it, produced under FRAGO 29, did you raise those with anyone?

A. Yes, I raised the time limit and checked it and was told that that was a given.
Q. Any other aspects about FRAGO 29 that you raised --
A. I don't recall raising any other.

THE CHAIRMAN: When you say "told that that was a given", you mean there was no way of changing it?
A. Well, I checked that it was closed and --

THE CHAIRMAN: I see, because of --
A. Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: -- the closing of the TIF.
A. Yes.

MR ELIAS: Putting it straightforwardly then, your concerns about the 14 hours arose for the reasons that you gave a little earlier?
A. I mean, ideally I would like the regime I imposed to be in place, but of course sometimes you have to give way to things. I think, if I may say so, if it had been a UK-owned facility and we had done our own -- run our own internment facility, which we should have done, then we would have much more influence over these things. We could have simply issued an order and that would have been it. But here it's an American-run facility, so it makes it very much harder.

Q. But of course that was only one aspect of --
A. It's one aspect, but I think it sets it in context. You know, if it had been a UK-owned facility, simply it would have been a phone call to the commandant and off
it would have happened. Of course with a multinational
operation you have the added difficulty that they are
under a different command chain.

THE CHAIRMAN: You mean you could have issued an order
saying "stay open"?

A. Yes.

MR ELIAS: Did you envisage that even under FRAGO 29 all
questioning would nonetheless take place at the TIF, as
had been previously ordered?

A. Absolutely clear. Questioning only took place at the
TIF.

Q. So how was the BGIRO to operate in his role?

A. Well, it was an immediate determination. What is this
person -- in the same way that the police determined it.
Is he a criminal detainee? Is he an internee?

Q. Without questioning of any kind?

A. Well of course you have to -- obviously there is going
to be some initial contact, but is a crude filtration.

Does he go left? Does he go right? In an internment
situation that would seem, you know, appropriate.

Q. Forgive me, did you envisage that the BGIRO would be
questioning?

A. Well, he would have to ask initial questions to see
which category he fell into.

Q. So there was going to be some questioning before the TIF
under FRAGO 29 --

A. As there always had been, because the police would have
to ask the same question under the previous
schematic, as the battlegroup would.

Q. So if that were to be your understanding of how it would
proceed, should not written guidance have been given
about that?

A. Well, I understood that -- that's how I understood it.

Q. Should not written guidance have been given about that?

On the one hand you were saying in black and white, as
I understood your answer just a few minutes ago,
unequivocally there was to be no questioning before the
TIF. Now you are telling us you would have understood
under the new regime --

A. No, I think you used the word "interrogation" at the TIF
and that includes tactical questioning.

Q. Yes.

A. And I think that was made clear.

Q. What sort of questioning was the BGIRO going to carry
out or questioning carried out on his behalf under
FRAGO 29?

A. Well, you know: what's the circumstances? Is this
simply a criminal who has been apprehended or is this
a threat to force security?

Q. If questioning of that kind was to be permitted, do you
think it should have been set out clearly in black and white?

A. I didn't anticipate a problem at this point.

Q. And the answer to my question?

A. It's very difficult to say. I mean --

Q. It might have been better if it had been?

A. Possibly, but I hoped that the previous FRAGOs had made it clear what our intent was.

Q. Moving on, can I take you, please, to BMI04082, paragraph 99 and on of your statement, under the heading "Conclusion", in which you say:

"The issue of prisoners (of all categories) was a constant battle for the whole of Op Telic 1."

You say:

"... there was a general indifference to prisoners which was reflected, initially, in the lack of manpower and resources provided."

Again the same questions as I asked you at the very outset if I may, Colonel. Do you mean indifference brought about by a lack of resources or indifference demonstrated in other ways?

A. I think by this stage this went wider. I think actually the lack of resources reflected a general lack of consideration for what was going to be a massive issue and indeed it was. And I found that the prisoner issue
overall was a constant battle and that every time we tried to put in proper review procedures and so on and so forth, that we found ourselves fighting some sort of legal war.

Q. Would it be fair to categorise the arguments being put up against you, "It is not pragmatic or practical to adopt what you say we have to adopt"?

A. That was probably the way it was approached. I don't accept that for a minute.

Q. No, I am not asking you to --

A. Yes.

Q. -- but that was the nature of, if you like, the other side of the argument that was being put?

A. I don't think it was put in those -- that it wasn't practicable. I think the word was "use a rod for our own backs"; in other words, if we gave them higher legal rights, shock, horror, we might have to do something about it.

Q. You reflect that, don't you, in paragraph 100, where you say:

"I am still amazed that we had to fight so hard for even basic Geneva Convention rights for prisoners."

A. That's correct.

Q. You say:

"This indifference ... was exacerbated by the total
1 strategic failure to plan for operation and the vacuum
2 it created."
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Then this at paragraph 101:
5 "In my view, if the issue of prisoners had been
6 properly resourced and we had been allowed to implement
7 a proper reviewing and oversight mechanism (and had this
8 been sustained) then the tragedy which unfolded might
9 never have happened."
10 A. Yes, I agree with that.
11 Q. By the "tragedy", are you referring to the particular
12 matter that this Inquiry is investigating?
13 A. Yes, I am here. I mean, you haven't touched on it, but
14 I think if we had had a proper reviewing process in
15 place, I think if we had had a judge in theatre, as we
16 requested, with a detainee/internee management unit, if
17 we had an independent team for prisoners and I think if
18 there wasn't this constant reluctance to accept high
19 legal standards, then I think we could have avoided this
20 tragedy. I think had we had our way -- and it's, you
21 know, perhaps naive of me to say "Why should you get
22 your way?" but I think if we had had our way, we could
23 have put all of this in place.
24 Q. You go on in the final two lines of your statement to
25 this Inquiry -- your first one -- to say:
"Ultimately, however, given the vagaries of all warfare, in my view, it's also about proper education, training and the moral compass."

Q. Proper education, training and the moral compass for whom?

A. This is the wider point. I mean, all staff officers deal with problems within a military operation, but, let's face it, whenever this is going on, then every time a soldier abuses a prisoner, there is generally a junior NCO present who should know what to do. There is generally a senior NCO present who knows what to do. There is generally a platoon commander. There is generally a company commander overseeing that unit. And that's where it -- you cannot stop this sort of thing simply by staff work. It is impossible. It pops up somewhere else. You didn't say this right -- you know, it keeps resurfacing.

Actually it's what happens on the ground and if soldiers are taught to intervene rather than turn a blind eye -- and this is what I refer to as the moral compass, because in so many of these there've been numerous people involved and that's where it should be stopped, because no staff work with the best will in the world can do everything to prevent it. That's the
Q. Looking back on the problem, Colonel -- knowing now what you know did happen in relation to these detainees -- is there anything else that you should have done?

A. If I can just -- I think we struggled with this issue from 20 January to the day we left. We had even prepared cards for the incoming troops.

This was a constant difficulty. You take it as you find it. You win some issues in staff work; you lose some issues. But I think you've got to put it in its wider context which people forget, which is that we arrived in enemy territory having occupied an area of ground that would run from Dover right the way up to Sheffield. That's the sort of territory we were dealing with.

This is a massive undertaking and we had not one document as to how to do that. We did it all ourselves and I think that was a phenomenal achievement. And so, yes, we did do our best; there were things that went wrong, but I think it should be set in that context.

Q. Setting it in that context, looking back on it now and knowing what did go wrong in this particular case, is there anything that you think you should have done that would have ameliorated that position and/or prevented --

A. I did my level best both to anticipate and to deal
with it.

Q. There's nothing else you can think of that you should have done?

A. No.

Q. Then if I may I just want to ask you two or three questions but I think the Inquiry should move into camera, Sir, if we may to deal with them.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. We will do that now. I don't need to rise --

MR ELIAS: I think not.

THE CHAIRMAN: -- so that we now should have only the legal advisers present. Is that right?

MR ELIAS: Core participants and legal advisers --

THE CHAIRMAN: Anybody who is not a core participant or legal adviser, I am afraid I ask you please to go.

(12.47 pm)

PROCEEDINGS IN CAMERA

[Redacted]
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MR ELIAS: Sir, I have completed my questions. Thank you.
THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, very well. Now you are going to be asked questions by other counsel, Colonel.
Yes, Mr Singh.
Questions by MR SINGH

MR SINGH: Yes, thank you, Sir. Thank you, Colonel Mercer. May I start with some evidence you gave early on this morning about your training and you mentioned, I think, a course that you did at San Remo.

A. That's correct.

Q. I think you mentioned that that included an element of human rights law.

A. The advanced course did.

Q. Was human rights law part of the training on other aspects of your legal training before you did the San Remo course?

A. Yes, we did receive instruction in human rights law because that could feed into other operations that fell short of international armed conflict.

Q. Right. When you say "we", can I take it --

A. As an organisation.

Q. As an organisation. The army?

A. Army Legal Services.

Q. Yes, I see. Does the training that you have done for other soldiers who are not lawyers itself include an element of human rights law?

A. It depends on the circumstances, but it could.

Q. Can you tell us briefly in what circumstances it could?

A. Well, I think in an international armed conflict you
would use the lex specialis of the law of armed
conflict, but in conflict falling beneath full
international armed conflict, then, of course, human
rights law could be applicable, so it would depend on
the circumstances.

Q. You also said, I think, this morning, that you had not
done training in relation to interrogation matters.
A. That's correct.

Q. Can I ask you this? Do you know who was supposed to do
training on the legal requirements of interrogation?
A. Looking at the paperwork, ALS -- Army Legal Services --
gave advice to the Chicksands in 1999 on interrogation.
As far as I'm aware, that's the last time we gave advice
until I bumped into the issue in 2003. So Chicksands
will have got their legal advice from -- I don't know --
Ministry of Defence legal advisers -- I am not aware,
but that's all that I can envisage.

Q. Apart from such advice -- some of which you have seen in
the papers, as you know -- in terms of formal training
of the kind that you yourself give sometimes to
soldiers, are you aware of any such training in relation
to interrogation?
A. No, I am not. I am not. We didn't have a legal
adviser --
Q. Yes.
A. After this happened, the army put a legal adviser into Chicksands in 2004.

Q. I see.

A. So they now have a full-time military lawyer at the Chicksands, a head of intelligence.

Q. You have referred to the 1999 advice. Can we briefly go back to a document that you were shown, but a passage that I think you were not shown. Can I please have the reference MOD028354, just to see the beginning of this document, Colonel. That's 25 November 1999.

THE CHAIRMAN: Will you just give me a moment?

MR SINGH: Yes, of course.

THE CHAIRMAN: Do you have a tab number, Mr Elias? You go on. I will find it.

MR SINGH: I am grateful, Sir. It's Lieutenant Colonel Ridge's three-page letter. You may recall that.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, advice, yes.

MR ELIAS: Tab 53 and 54.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

MR SINGH: I am grateful to Mr Elias. That's just to see the first page, Colonel, but I want to take you, if I may, to the final page, which is MOD028356. This is paragraph 12 under "Conclusions". It points out that the reference in the query "... had not outlined your methods of interrogation ... my comments have to be
rather general. As we discussed at reference B much will depend on the operational circumstances. In an international armed conflict you are very limited as to what you can do other than ask questions."

Pausing there, do you agree with that?

A. I am not following which paragraph you are referring to.

Q. Paragraph 12 in the second and third lines.

A. Yes, I've got it.

Q. You have that. I am just asking you, first of all, do you agree with that sentence that in an international armed conflict you are very limited as to what you can do other than ask questions?

A. Yes.

Q. "You intimated to me that the value of interrogation may be such that from a political viewpoint it outweighs the legal considerations. However you should be aware that it is Government policy to comply with its obligations under international law and organisations such as ICRC and Amnesty International will keep a careful watch on proceedings. In a GC III scenario the political fallout from not complying with legal obligations may be considerable. As regards the provision of human rights this is an expanding area with much potential for litigation."

Is it right, Colonel, that you yourself were not
aware of any of the interrogation techniques that were
being used in Iraq at the time you were there?
A. I wasn't aware that this was going on until I saw it.
Q. Saw ...?
A. When I saw the JFIT, which is when I intervened.
Q. Yes, I see. Is that a reference to what you told
Mr Elias earlier today?
A. Yes, that's right, this morning.
Q. Forgive me. I am grateful for that clarification so
I won't go over that again.
You didn't come across, at the time, concepts like
"harshing"?
A. No, I don't know what that means.
Q. All right. Can I move to a different topic, please? At
your meeting that you told us about with the ICRC, when
you gave evidence that S034 told you not to speak at the
meeting -- do you remember that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Can you just remind us what position was held by S034?
A. S034 was the POLAD at the NCC.
Q. What does "POLAD" stand for?
A. Political adviser.
THE CHAIRMAN: One of the very few acronyms I can remember.
MR SINGH: Did you have a view whether this was a political
decision?
A. I thought it was strange.

THE CHAIRMAN: You mean the decision about not speaking?

A. Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

A. I thought it was strange.

MR SINGH: Strange why?

A. Because I was the commander legal. There were other people at the meeting of whom I was on a par with or who were subordinate to me and I was stopped -- prevented from speaking. It's -- I thought it was a highly unusual course of conduct.

Q. I want to move on to a different topic now, please. You gave some evidence and you were asked questions about FRAGO 29. Correct me if I'm wrong, Colonel, but I think the way you described it was that what happened with FRAGO 29 coming in was that the interrogation and prisoner-handling issue was taken back by G2 and G3 from the police and the lawyers. Is that a fair way of putting it?

A. That's how I understand it, yes.

Q. Can you be more specific to help the Inquiry with who it was in G2 and G3 who was seizing it back?

A. Well, I -- I would probably need the list again.

Q. By all means have the list --

THE CHAIRMAN: You had better have the list in front of you.
Do you not have it anymore?

A. No, I haven't.

THE CHAIRMAN: Can we see that the list is handed to him?

MR SINGH: It may be helpful if you can keep it, if that's permissible to the Inquiry.

THE CHAIRMAN: I think in terms of his evidence, that's fine.

MR SINGH: Sir, I am grateful.

So using ciphers where necessary --

A. Yes, I think S002 would certainly be involved.

Q. Anyone else?

A. I can't remember who signed the document at the end.

I do not know if it's possible to bring it up.

Q. You also mentioned that there was some concern -- correct me if I am wrong -- in the RMP about their resources.

A. Well, I mean, the RMP were very, very overstretched --

Q. Yes.

A. -- and I think we both got involved in a process -- if you look at the soldiers' card, it sets out who's responsible for what as far as prisoners are concerned, and this is -- it's very clear, it's a G2/G3 issue, but, of course, lawyers and police have moved on to this patch. Now the police were very overstretched. They wanted to deploy manpower elsewhere.
Q. When you say "they", again use the ciphers if necessary, but who were "they" at the RMP?
A. Colonel Eddie Forster-Knight was one, for instance, and I worked with him on a daily basis.
Q. Yes.
A. And I know he wanted to disengage from the process so he could use his police resources elsewhere. I think the other thing to mention on that -- if you look at the numbers -- you know, we had gone down from 3,000 prisoners of war, who had all, but one or two, been released; we had got rid of 300 criminal detainees, who are now in the Iraqi law and order system, and we were down to 18 internees at this point. So this was a point to disengage as far as the police were concerned.
Q. Okay. I am going to move on to a different topic now. It's to do with the Geneva Conventions, but in particular the protocol that the UK ratified in 1997. The reference, if I can have it please, is MOD022597. You may just want to remind yourself of that text. It's Article 82 of the protocol. It is the requirement to have "... legal advisers, when necessary, to advise military commanders at the appropriate level ..."

Looking back on your time in Iraq, Colonel, do you feel that the UK did comply with that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Did you have any reason to think that not all of your legal colleagues were prepared to stand up to G2 or others that were not lawyers in the army?
A. Well, I think this is a classic dilemma in the army, in that you're within a command structure and there's always pressure to do one thing when legally you may believe something else. But it's an imperative that at all times you do what is correct in law. But that's always a danger.
Q. Do you feel that -- not talking about yourself, but others may sometimes not always have resisted that danger?
A. Yes, I -- perhaps.
Q. I want to move on to a different topic. It's about a colleague of yours called "Commander Brown". Not in terms of rank, but was he, in command structure, superior to you?
A. Yes, he was.
Q. Just remind us -- I know the answer -- where he was based compared to you.
A. He was the commander legal at the NCC.
Q. Thank you. We can go to them if we need to, but the Inquiry has documents before it which consist of some emails concerning Commander Brown in May 2004, after you had left Iraq, in which there is the suggestion, for
example, that the banning of hoods by the Heath
Government related to the UK and Northern Ireland in
particular. Do you want to look at that?

A. Yes, please.

Q. Can we look at that? That's MOD020204. Colonel, it's
the first line that you need to read for the purpose of
my question. Do you see the reference there --

A. Yes, I've got it.

Q. Yes. Was Commander Brown saying things of that sort to
you when you were deployed in Iraq -- I mean in
March/April/May 2003.

A. We didn't get on to the European Convention on Human
Rights. I mean, it automatically impacted on the Geneva
Conventions. We didn't have -- we didn't go any further
down.

Q. Forgive me Colonel, that line there isn't in terms, at
least, talking about the ECHR, is it? It's talking
about the banning of hoods by the Heath Government.

A. I know, but that follows Ireland v UK, as I understand
it, so the human rights case. I considered hooding
purely under the Geneva Conventions, Articles 13, 14
and 17.

Q. And stress positions as well?

A. Yes, because in my view it amounted to violence,
imimidation, degrading treatment and so on and so
forth. It hit all of them.

Q. Can I show you one other document? We won't need to
look at this at length, although it is a long email.
It's MOD020218. This is May 2004. It's a long email
from Commander Brown.

In the middle of that page there's a paragraph which
begins "This resulted ..." I just want to read to you
the salient passage, where it says that:

"... ECHR did not apply (and UK case law in this
area was as I understood it ECHR-related) and GC3 was
the lex specialis."

Again, the question I want to ask you is not about
the content of that email; do you understand, Colonel?
A. Yes.

Q. I am more interested for now in asking you whether, when
you were deployed in Iraq and he was one of your
colleagues, Commander Brown was saying things of similar
effect then.
A. I don't recall the ECHR being discussed at all.
Q. I see.
A. I think the discussion went -- I would say this is
humanitarian law, it's got that generic title, but I
don't recall us going into the ECHR because, as I think
we agreed, in war fighting it was lex specialis and
therefore the ECHR, if it kicked in at all, would be in
Q. I see. Turning to a slightly different topic if I may. Just to introduce it, may I show you, please, paragraph 44 of your first statement to this Inquiry, which is BMI04069. Do you recall saying there?

"This was followed by a long exchange of emails ..."

Just to be fair to you, Colonel, my understanding is that here you are talking about late March/early April 2004.

A. Yes, this is after I raised my email -- it raised my memo with General Robin Brims.

Q. Indeed.

A. So it then gets staffed to the NCC --

THE CHAIRMAN: You raised your email, from recollection, at the very end of March; is that right?

A. Yes, something like 29 March.

THE CHAIRMAN: It is in your diary.

A. Yes. I think if you look at that memo, you will see there's certainly one exhibit that's annotated "We will refer this to the NCC".

MR SINGH: Yes, I may come back to look at the diary in a moment, if I may. Just on paragraph 44 of your statement, can I ask you this? In the exchange of emails over the next few days, you say:

"I recall reminding NCC that we were dealing with
humanitarian law and should not forget the humanitarian
dimension of LOAC."

Are you able to recall how long that exchange of
emails took? Was it one or two days? Was it a week --
A. Probably one or two days or two or three days.

Q. I will be corrected if I am wrong, but I don't think all
of the emails are now available from that period. Can
you give the Inquiry a flavour of what was being said by
those who disagreed?
A. I think the exchange -- basically I was hard over on
hooding and that it breached the Geneva Conventions, and
then there were all sorts of, "Well, it might be lawful
in these circumstances" and so on and so forth. And
I said, "Well, this is humanitarian law. This is about
decency to people on the battlefield".

Q. I want to move in your witness statement to a different
topic which begins at paragraph 67 at page BMI04074.
There and over the next few paragraph, Colonel, you will
recall that you tell the Inquiry about a concept called
"DIMU", which stands, I think, for "detainee and
internee management unit"; is that right?
A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Have I understood your views correctly, Colonel --
if I put it this way: you talked earlier to the Inquiry
about how you had sought to design out the possibility
of abuse; is that fair?

A. That's correct.

Q. Did you see the DIMU idea and, in particular, having an independent reviewing authority as one method of designing out that possibility of abuse?

A. I thought it was the perfect solution, to be honest. It was brought to my attention by one of my subordinates who showed me the -- what had happened in East Timor with the Australian army. At the end of the East Timor operation, the United Nations had described their treatment of prisoners as "exemplary" and of course that's precisely what we wanted. And I -- and the other thing is that it would have had -- it was independent of the chain of command. It would have had a judge heading it up. They would have been able, as a separate team, just to focus on that, rather than everything else that went on, and I am pretty sure that, had we implemented that, we too could have been exemplary.

Q. DIMU was never implemented, was it?

A. No, because we never got to a reviewing authority and --

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Singh, I don't want to interrupt you and I am not going to stop you from asking these questions, but I regard this issue, for the purposes of my terms of reference, on the very edge of the Inquiry.

MR SINGH: Sir, I have nearly reached the end anyway --
THE CHAIRMAN: Then I will not stop you from reaching the end.

MR SINGH: Can I conclude this topic, then, in this way, Colonel? Can we move on in your statement to BMI04076, paragraph 75. We have all read this before, of course, but you may just want to remind yourself of what you said there. You are saying there:

"I believe we would not have encountered the tragedy with prisoners that unfolded (such as the incident which is the subject of this Inquiry), nor breaches of the [ECHR] ... as there would have been suitable independent oversight, accountability and legal clarity."

Do you stand by that?

A. Yes, of course.

MR SINGH: I am very grateful to you, Sir. Sir, that's the end of my questioning.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Mr Garnham?

Questions by MR GARNHAM

MR GARNHAM: Colonel, you said that some army lawyers did not always resist the pressure to comply with the command structure in the army and that they did not always put their legal responsibilities first.

A. I didn't say that. I said there was always pressure to do that.

Q. Did you not say that some gave way to that pressure?
"Yes, I -- perhaps", you said.

A. "Perhaps". I used the word "perhaps".

Q. You would not apply those observations, would you, to either of your subordinates at Um Qasr?

A. Possibly.

Q. Possibly you would. You described Major Frend, in the report that you prepared for him after this tour, as "resourceful, intelligent, with boundless energy", and there is not a word of criticism of this sort or anything else in that report, is there?

A. No, there isn't --

Q. Thank you.

A. -- but the world of reports is a generic overview of a large period of time.

Q. You mean you don't stand by it?

A. Yes, I do stand by it. It's absolutely right. Those words are spot on.

Q. You recommended Major Christie for an award, did you not?

A. Correct.

Q. Such was your view of the contribution, he had made?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it not the case that there was room on the question of hooding, as with so many legal issues, to two points of view?
A. There were different legal opinions, yes.
Q. Legal opinions genuinely and honestly held --
A. I think so.
Q. -- amongst your own team as well as elsewhere in Army
Legal Service?
A. And the Ministry of Defence.
Q. You don't suggest, do you, that those alternative
opinions are other than proper legal opinions that
happen to differ from your own?
A. As a lawyer, I don't.
Q. Your view was that hooding per se was in all
circumstances unlawful?
A. Correct.
Q. Would that apply even if the subject of the hooding
consented to it?
A. Yes.
Q. Would it be the case in an extreme example where, for
example, a person became violent when being transported
in a helicopter?
A. Yes.
Q. And it's also presumably your view that it's unlawful
even if for a short period in temperate conditions for
the safety of British troops?
A. Well, we don't hood anyone in the UK, do we?
Q. That's not my question. In any circumstances, your view
would be that it was unlawful --
A. I am against hooding, full stop.
THE CHAIRMAN: Colonel, if you would be kind enough to wait
for the question.
MR GARNHAM: Your view is that in any circumstances hooding
is unlawful per se?
A. I thought it amounted to violence and intimidation and
affected the dignity of the individual.
Q. In your view, that conclusion is unaffected by, for
example, the length of time for which the hood was
worn --
A. Yes, it's per se.
Q. -- or the temperature in which the hood was worn?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. You told Mr Elias earlier that you had no
recollection of SO2 discussing with you and others
hooding for security purposes --
A. That's correct.
Q. -- in February 2003. You are confident about that?
A. Yes, I am, yes.
Q. You did not at any stage then say to him that you would
have approved that limited use of hooding --
A. I didn't.
Q. -- or that you would have approved of blindfolding in
such circumstances?
A. I don't think we ever had that discussion.

Q. Did you have any similar discussion about hooping or blindfolding for security purposes with the GOC?

A. Not to my recollection.

Q. You never said to him, then, that either hooping or blindfolding might be lawful if they were serving a security purpose?

A. No.

Q. It would be dangerous, would it not, to authorise blindfolding in the field of battle, given your views, because a soldier might resort to hooping if he didn't have a blindfold to hand? Would it be dangerous to authorise blindfolding because of the risk that a soldier so authorised might resort to hooping?

A. As I understand it, blindfolding is only authorised in the situation of interrogation.

Q. You mean during interrogation or delivering a man for interrogation?

A. I think they are -- the two could be part and parcel of the same thing.

Q. Your understanding was that blindfolding would be lawful in -- during interrogation --

A. In --

THE CHAIRMAN: Again, please, it's very --

A. Sorry, I am trying to be as clear as I can.
1 THE CHAIRMAN: It is very easy to jump in before the question is finished, but it doesn't really help because we then have two people asking questions and I don't hear the answer. So I would be grateful if you would pause until the question has been asked. If you would ask it again, Mr Garnham.

7 MR GARNHAM: Your view is that blindfolding during the process of interrogation itself might be lawful?

9 A. I think it says -- I think the words are "justly" -- I can't remember the precise words of JSP 383, but it says where -- in effect -- absolutely necessary.

12 Q. JSP 383, was that published by March 2003? Was that extant?

14 A. It's an ongoing document, as far as I'm aware.

15 Q. And you say that there was an extant version of that document in March 2003?

17 A. In all probability.

18 Q. I wonder if we could have on the screen, please, MOD052196. If we highlight, please, the bottom quarter of that. Thank you. This is part of the document which I think you said you had no part in the preparation of.

22 A. That's correct, yes.

23 Q. Was it instead prepared by Major Christie?

24 A. I don't know who. It might well have been.

25 Q. The text reads:
"An alternative was suggested, namely the use of blacked out sunglasses in order not to restrict the senses of the prisoner any more than was strictly necessary. Direction from GOC, however, was that no form of blindfolding was justified ... If the ICRC view is to be accepted that blindfolding is not acceptable per se then a revision of UK policy and JSP 383 is required."

Does that fit with your recollection?

A. I thought hooding -- the GOC banned hooding and that the solution from the ICRC was blacked-out goggles where it was needed.

Q. Thank you. You say that you regarded what you saw at the JFIT on that occasion in late March 2003 as -- and I paraphrase -- utterly unacceptable.

A. Yes, I was shocked.

Q. And what was unacceptable about it was firstly that people were hooded; yes?

A. Well, it was the overall picture. It was the hooding, the arms cuffed up behind the backs and also the overall intent, in my view, which was to intimidate prisoners awaiting interrogation.

Q. And you regarded that situation as intolerable?

A. I was shocked when I saw it.

Q. Why did you go and attend to your business in relation
to the Article 5 tribunal matter, rather than sorting that out straightaway?

A. Well, I had no option. I had to go -- my appointment that day was for the Article 5 tribunals. I saw the JFIT on my way in, but of course we were in motion, we walked past it. I went to the Article 5 tribunals, went to see what was happening -- because that was my job for the day -- stopped the Article 5 tribunals, which culminated in a massive row with --

Q. S09?

A. -- S09, and then, when I had an opportunity later in the day, came back to JFIT to look at that issue.

Q. So what you saw didn't prompt you immediately to act? You didn't see it and think, "My goodness, that's outrageous, I am going to deal with that now"?

A. The circumstances did not lend themselves to that, but I certainly doubled back when the opportunity arose to go and deal with it.

Q. Why didn't they lend themselves to that? What was to stop you from going and doing that?

A. Because I was going to see the Article 5 tribunal -- that's what I had come for -- and I was in a train behind the general.

Q. When you wrote your memorandum to the GOC that day --

A. Mm-hm.
1 Q. -- your concern about what you'd seen features as paragraph 6 --
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. -- at the end of a memo dealing with Article 5.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Again, it wasn't something that you regarded as so
6 important as to require immediate attention on its own?
7 A. Well, I dealt with both issues together. I mean, it had
8 been quite a bruising day, to be honest.
9 Q. Is it right, Colonel, that you brought this to the
10 attention of the GOC, rather than him seeing a prisoner
11 hooded when he visited?
12 A. I have no recollection of him seeing a prisoner hooded.
13 Q. Were you aware of others reporting the fact that
14 prisoners were being held hooded and kneeling down in
15 the sun?
16 A. Well, obviously Chris Vernon raised his concerns. I saw
17 him do it.
18 Q. Was it that -- I am sorry.
19 A. I understand that S009 also raised his concerns.
20 Q. Was it the fact that they had raised their concerns that
21 prompted you to make your visit?
22 A. No, not at all. I came across it independently.
23 Q. Why was there no mention in the memorandum that you sent
24 the GOC of your belief that generators were being used
to intimidate?

A. Well, I -- that was the impression that I got.

Q. I understand that.

A. When I went there, I raised the two most important
issues which were hooding and which were stress
positions.

Q. Why did you not raise, if it be the case, your concern
that generators were being used to intimidate?

A. Well, I can't -- I can't account for why I left that
off, but I think the point was made that as soon as
I saw what I believed to be a violation of the Geneva
Conventions, I addressed them.

Q. Yes, but you can't offer any explanation as to why you
didn't raise the generator matter?

A. Well --

THE CHAIRMAN: I think we are largely in the area of comment
now, Mr Garnham.

MR GARNHAM: Sir.

You say in your statement that you saw some
40 prisoners kneeling or squatting --

A. Yes.

Q. -- in the sand. Does that mean that some were kneeling
and some were squatting?

A. From memory, yes.

Q. So they weren't all adopting the same position?
A. No, but from memory there were two lines of prisoners, parallel lines, and they were all kneeling in the sand with their arms cuffed behind their backs and hoods on their heads. Then, from memory, I think there was a group -- another group -- of prisoners to the right of that who were squatting.

Q. And you saw them as you passed?

A. I did.

Q. Is it right that the JFIT was surrounded by sand berms -- sand walls?

THE CHAIRMAN: "Berms" I think is the technical term.

A. Yes, I mean I clearly saw it because that caused me to double back and go back in.

MR GARNHAM: I am trying to understand from where you saw them --

A. I saw them as I was walking past. That's all I can say.

Q. Were you aware of the fact that the JFIT was so surrounded?

A. There was a guard on the gate, from memory, but I think there was some sort of tunnel into it or passage into it.

Q. How long did you have these detainees in view?

A. It was very short, but of course I went back in the afternoon.

Q. And they were still in the same position?
A. They were still there.
Q. Still in the same positions?
A. Pretty much.
Q. Some standing? Some squatting?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you tell whether they were being allowed to change from the one position to the other or change within those positions?
A. No.
Q. Did you inquire about that?
A. No.
Q. The discussions that followed with the ICRC related to hooding, didn't they?
A. They did, yes. I think the stress positions I dealt with with S002, and he'd agreed that a less extreme form of cuffing could take place to the front of the body, so that had been dealt with.
Q. Your concern in that regard was the fact that they were cuffed to the rear.
A. I think it's extremely uncomfortable, yes.
Q. But that was the nature of your concern, rather than the position they had adopted?
A. No, clearly plasticuffs were entitled to be used in extremis. I am not sure whether this was all extremis. It's highly unlikely that it was needed in all cases,
but it was the cuffs to the rear.

Q. Can I ask you next about FRAGO 29 and pick up where Mr Elias left off? FRAGO 29 plainly contemplates some questioning --

A. Yes.

Q. -- because that's necessary if you are going to decide whether somebody's --

A. Of course.

Q. -- a threat to the force security.

A. Yes.

Q. How, from your standpoint, was the average commander on the ground to reconcile that with the intent behind FRAGO 152 that there was to be no questioning at brigade level?

A. Well, I think it -- you know, you had to determine the status of the prisoner in all the circumstances. Was he detainee, internee or, in this case, was he an internee or was he now a criminal detainee who would go off to the Iraqi authorities? But, yes, clearly there is going to have to be some sort of questioning in both systems, but not interrogation. It's a determination, not an interrogation.

Q. So the important distinction we should take from that is between questioning for that purpose --

A. Yes.
Q. -- and interrogation?
A. That's correct. It's a determination of status, not an interrogation.
Q. That being so, isn't it likely, from your standpoint, that commanders on the ground would regard themselves as entitled to question but not to interrogate?
A. Determine status, yes.
Q. By means of questioning?
A. And it also says that if you're unsure, then you radio back to the legal branch.
Q. By means of questioning?
A. Of course, yes.
Q. You said in answer, I think, to Mr Singh that the first legal adviser at Chicksands was appointed in 2004.
A. That's correct, yes.
Q. If I were to suggest to you that it was Major Yates(?), appointed in September 2003, could that be possible?
A. Could be. I thought it was 2004, but it certainly was Major Yates.
Q. You described the involvement of S034 -- and do look at who she is -- you describe her involvement in the meeting with the ICRC and you described her instruction to you to keep quiet during the meeting as "unusual". Was it not simply a preference on the part of the officer who was leading that meeting to have the UK's
position presented by one voice?
A. You would have to ask S034 that.
Q. But you were offering opinions a little earlier as to
what might be her motivation and therefore I am asking
you whether that was not the obvious motivation.
A. I can't answer as to her motivation for it. I just
thought it was unusual.
Q. She was the senior person present.
A. That's correct.
Q. She was effectively representing the United Kingdom
Government in a meeting with the ICRC following
a complaint.
A. Yes, correct.
Q. There was nothing unusual, was there, in her --
THE CHAIRMAN: I think we are moving into the realm of
comment, Mr Garnham.
MR GARNHAM: Sir, thank you.
The last question, then. May I have on the screen,
please, MOD011176? Can I just make sure that we have
identified the right document? Would you have a look at
that? Perhaps it could be enlarged. Is that the
document that you had printed 20,000 times and handed
out to troops in Iraq?
A. Could you just go through it a bit further?
Q. Does it have a table on the next --
A. Does it have a table on the next page? Yes, I believe it is.

MR GARNHAM: Thank you very much. Thank you, Sir.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

Yes, Ms Dobbin?

Questions by MS DOBBIN

MS DOBBIN: Colonel, you were referred to the undated document of May 2003. That's the one that refers to questioning only taking place at the TIF.

A. Yes.

Q. In your evidence you seemed to place some emphasis on the importance of a lawyer being present at the TIF.

A. Yes.

Q. I wondered why, in your view, you considered that to be so significant.

A. Well, I think, first of all, it gives me eyes and ears at the TIF, so that when interrogation takes place -- I mean, I had alerted my lawyers to be on the lookout for anything that concerned them at the prisoner of war camp. So having a lawyer down there gave me some comfort that they would be there 24 hours a day, seven days a week and sufficiently around the camp to highlight any concerns. The same applied to the TIF, which is why we pushed so hard for a lawyer at JFLogC, in other words the rear echelon, so that, after I had
left or whilst we were leaving -- and my lawyer by this
stage had gone -- we had another lawyer down there
full-time to oversee that part of the prisoner process.

Q. Thank you. Can I just ask you, then, about the system
that was ushered in by FRAGO 29? I don't seek to
criticise you about its content because you had nothing
to do with its drafting, but can I just ask you about
these matters please? The BGIRO, unlike an RMP officer,
of course, had no sort of investigative training at all.
You accept that?

A. Not in the same way as a policeman, no.

Q. Of course. And he had no training, for example, in
investigative questioning techniques?

A. I don't know how they are trained, so I can't answer
that.

Q. Thank you. Would it have been your understanding or did
you know that in fact there was no training specific to
the BGIRO role at all?

THE CHAIRMAN: I think he said he had no idea what training
they had or hadn't.

MS DOBBIN: I can move on. Thank you, Sir.

Were you aware, for example, that there may have
been a complete absence of secure facilities within
which such detainees would have been kept?

A. What, within a unit?
Q. Yes or a battlegroup.

A. Well, then just create one.

Q. But you weren't aware that there may have been --

A. Well, you can't check every battlegroup.

Q. Had you known that there was such an absence, would that have caused you more concern in respect of FRAGO 29?

A. I think the message had been pounded for so long about decent treatment -- you know, it's not exactly just a one-off. It's all the time. I just don't know what it is that doesn't get through.

Q. Yes, but you had sufficient concerns to want to have a lawyer present --

A. Yes.

Q. -- at the TIF.

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. So you had ongoing concerns and you clearly regarded this as a terribly serious issue --

A. Yes.

Q. -- so I am just trying to understand how you regarded FRAGO 29.

A. As I said before, the BGIRO, in my view, was someone who determined status, as opposed to interrogating per se.

Q. But the issue is that this was a FRAGO which meant that detainees were going to be kept at battlegroup locations for up to 14 hours --
A. Yes.

Q. -- so it wasn't the nature of the questioning process necessarily; it was the fact that they were going to be kept at those locations for so long --

A. Potentially -- well, potentially -- I mean, it was closed overnight. So if someone was captured at 7 o'clock at night, you could not get into the TIF until 6 o'clock the next morning. That was the difficulty -- and it wasn't a UK facility.

Q. I understand that. But what I'm suggesting to you is the fact that detainees were going to be detained for those lengths of time must have been a cause for concern to you, given everything which had preceded this and the efforts that you made to minimise the length of time that detainees were being kept --

A. Well, I wish it had been otherwise, but as I said this morning, we had put out FRAGO 152. We had put out the instructions with regard to internees. We had put out the instructions with regard to interrogation only taking place at the TIF. I was trying to get a lawyer into the TIF to give me cover there. So, you know, the delivery time was not ideal, but it was a US facility. You know, something has to be taken on risk potentially.

MS DOBBIN: Thank you, Sir.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

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Ms Simcock, do you want to ask any questions?

Questions by MS SIMCOCK

MS SIMCOCK: Yes, thank you, Sir.

Prior to your deployment to Iraq, is it right that no training you underwent covered the Heath ruling specifically?

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. And the Heath ruling itself is not mentioned in your statement. Is that because it was never discussed by you with anyone in Iraq --

A. No, it wasn't. We just considered Geneva.

Q. -- or indeed before Iraq?

A. That's correct.

Q. Thank you.

Moving on, do you remember, after his arrival in theatre on 23 June 2003, having a conversation with Major Clifton?

A. I did have a conversation with Major Clifton about courthouses.

Q. Do you remember telling him during the course of that conversation that the hooding of prisoners was banned?

A. I don't recall that, but I did -- I certainly had a conversation with him.

Q. Yes. Do you think, given your views on the subject, that you mentioned or you would have mentioned to him
that hooding was banned?

A. Well, I would have done my handover largely with Colonel Barnett because he was the incoming SO1. But Major Clifton was -- I spent about two or three hours with him going through each and every courthouse, and I know it sounds a bit mundane, but going through what had been done and completed because the judicial reconstruction was such a major part -- indeed Colonel Barnett had given him that task, for which -- you know, I am not surprised he gave it to someone else to deal with because it was, you know, one of those tasks.

Q. Did going over what was in place at the time also include previous orders, FRAGO, that had gone out?

A. I understand all the FRAGOs were read by the incoming team.

Q. Yes. Do you remember mentioning FRAGO 152 to Major Clifton?

A. No, I don't. I just remember talking to him about the courthouses.

Q. And nothing else?

A. Yes.

Q. You didn't, in that conversation, talk to him about the permissibility or legality of stress positions?

A. No.
Q. Is that because it simply would not have been necessary to mention them --

A. That issue was nipped in the bud in March.

MS SIMCOCK: Yes, I am grateful. Thank you, Sir.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Bourne?

Questions by MR BOURNE

MR BOURNE: A point of detail, Colonel. You have mentioned more than once the TIF being closed overnight.

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whether that situation changed at any time?

A. Well, I mean, remember that FRAGO 29 is -- probably comes to my attention about five/six days before I leave theatre, so I don't know if that changed subsequently.

Q. Right. The SO3 from the division that took over from you recalls that in her time the military provost staff -- that's to say the UK military provost staff -- could accept detainees at any hour of the day or night. Do you have any knowledge of that becoming --

A. No, I checked whether it indeed was closed overnight and found that to be true. I was not aware of any variations on that.

Q. During your time?

A. Yes.

MR BOURNE: Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Ms Edington?
Questions by MS EDINGTON

MS EDINGTON: Thank you, Sir.

Colonel Mercer, you were completely aware that your general officer commanding wanted to comply with the Geneva Convention both in spirit and letter?

A. Yes, absolutely.

Q. And in fact he handwrote a little note on a memo that you sent him, didn't he, to that effect on 26 March?

A. Yes, he did.

Q. The memo that you sent him on 29 March, after your visit to the TIF and the JFIT, resulted in a memo back from SO2 to you, didn't it --

A. That's correct.

Q. -- on 30 March; is that right?

A. That's correct.

Q. And he was trying to engage in a discussion with you about --

A. Yes.

Q. -- hooding and stress positions. Basically you nipped that and said you had staffed it to the NCC; is that right?

A. Yes, correct.

Q. In fact that's what he wanted you to do, didn't he?

A. Yes, we agreed to staff it up the chain of command.

Q. And, of course, that was to Commander Brown?
A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. When were you first aware of the publication of the now existing JSP 383?

A. I can't recall. We tended to use JWP 1-10. You will see that at the reference section at the top. So I think we worked off JWP 1-10. When I did see it raised, I went back to the document to double-check it obviously, but that was in the last few weeks, so I can't recall.

Q. Would it be fair to say that the published JSP 383 was actually published in 2004 and that the document before that which was -- I know you've said that JSP 383 was an ongoing document, but the actual published document, if you like the base document, was a 1958 publication?

A. I think it was just one of those documents that was just constantly work in progress. I looked back on the files and there is a published one in 2004, but there seemed to be 1996 -- you know, it's just constantly being updated and amended. So whether it actually -- it crystallised at any point, I don't know.

Q. But was it a document that really came to your front or were you more conscious of GC III and GC IV?

A. GC III and GC IV, yes.

Q. You have been asked about FRAGO 29 and you have said that it came to your attention after it had been
distributed. With FRAGO 29, would it be fair to say that some questioning would actually be the BGIRO of those arresting troops, rather than just of the detainee/internee?

A. Yes, absolutely. I mean it could be the circumstances in which they were -- the person had been detained, it could be any documents found on them, it could be any circumstantial -- that would give them an indication as to whether they were a threat to force security.

Q. So when you say it was a left or right basically for the BGIRO to make that choice --

A. Yes.

Q. -- it could be that the detainee/internee was never actually questioned by anyone at this stage?

A. Yes, quite possible. If they were caught red-handed, it would speak for itself.

MS EDINGTON: Thank you very much, Colonel Mercer. That is all.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Elias.

Further questions by MR ELIAS

MR ELIAS: Just to return briefly to three documents then please, Colonel, in the light of the questions you have been asked. Can we look at JSP 383, the 1984 edition, MOD036434, please.

Can we just go back a page?
THE CHAIRMAN: You did say the date of this. It's when?

MR ELIAS: This is, I believe, in May of 2004.

THE CHAIRMAN: I see.

MR ELIAS: This is one of the editions if you like, Colonel, that you were referring to, an ongoing -- a work in progress, whatever you want to call it.

I just wanted to take you, in the light of the answer that you gave, in particular to Mr Garnham, about this document, as we understood it -- you said -- I hope I quote you accurately -- that you understood that blindfolding may be authorised for the purposes of interrogation --

A. Looking at 383, yes.

Q. -- and you thought that this document may have been some authority for that.

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. If we see the heading there, "Interrogation", against paragraph 8.34, and go over the page, please, to 8.34.2 under that same heading:

"Blindfolding and segregation may be necessary in the interests of security, the physical restraint of prisoners of war or to prevent collaboration prior to interrogation."

And this was the word you were looking for in answer to Mr Garnham, was it?
"These discomforts must be truly justified and be for as short a period as possible."

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. So that we're clear about it and don't lose sight perhaps of the point of all this, were you aware of what might be called that "exception" to the use of blindfolding in 2003 when you were in Iraq?

A. I don't believe I was, no.

Q. Just two other very brief matters. In answer to Mr Singh and in relation to FRAGO 29, when you were being asked, if I can put it this way, about the turf wars and you were asked who in G2, as it were, was advocating the return of this responsibility to G2, I think you said SO2.

A. Yes.

Q. And you said if you could see the document, perhaps you could see the author of FRAGO 29, as I understood it.

A. Yes, sure.

Q. We can see that. Could we look please at MOD016186? Just first of all to note at the top of the page the actual date of it, 26 June. When, in fact, did you leave theatre? Do you know the date?

A. 11 July, I think.

Q. 11 July.
THE CHAIRMAN: You said that you didn't actually see it until a day or two after it had been promulgated.

A. Yes, I didn't see it until the Sunday. I mean, I simply don't recall the date I saw it, but it certainly wasn't when it was promulgated. It came to my attention afterwards.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR ELIAS: If we go to the document, we see the authorship at MOD016189.

A. Yes.

Q. I certainly don't want to lead you into giving us the name of anybody in answer to Mr Singh's question --

A. That makes perfect sense. It would be SO2, G2 and chief G3, which is the chief of staff, as it is a G2/G3 product. I said that it might be S002. I suspect he had some hand in it because it deals with the world in which he was working.

Q. So we understand it, are you saying that the persons named here, Messrs Marriott and Waters, were advocates of the return to G2?

A. Yes, I think there was an attempt to reclaim it. If you go back to the front of the document, it makes this pronouncement:

"This FRAGO announces the intention for the G2 branch to assume overall control of the internment
process."
"Internees are assessed to be a threat to coalition forces and their process is now a G2-led G3 ops responsibility."

So that's what leads me to believe that this was, you know, clawed back, so to speak.

Q. Finally this, please: if we look at what is our tab 20 in the core bundle at MOD011451, you referred -- I think when questioned by Mr Singh -- to an annotated document indicating that a matter had been staffed to NCC.

A. Yes, it's in the top right-hand corner.

Q. Is that the document to which you are referring?

A. Yes, that's right. My annotation is at the top.

Q. "I've referred the matter to the NCC"; is that what it says?

A. Yes, and it's my signature, yes.

Q. Your signature has been blacked out, and then the date, 1 April 2003.

A. That sounds about right.

Q. So, in other words, contemporaneously with raising the issue with the GOC --

A. Yes. It seems to fit sequentially.

MR ELIAS: Sir, I have no further questions. Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, thank you.
THE CHAIRMAN: Can you help me about this, please, Colonel? Suppose that you have a prisoner who wishes to be hooded because he's frightened of being seen where he is or frightened that some of his fellow prisoners will think something that would cause them to do him harm, suppose that's his motivation for hooding --

A. Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: -- would you say hooding then was unlawful?

A. I would, yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: Why?

A. Because I don't think his consent overrides the obligation to treat them with dignity. Secondly, that other ways could be devised to secure the safety of that prisoner. So if someone had come to me with that proposition, I would have said, "Well, devise a system to keep him safe" because we have an obligation to keep people safe generally under the Geneva Conventions.

THE CHAIRMAN: I see. I suppose there is one thing that I have gleaned from your evidence and no doubt a large number of things. You don't think hooding is right in any circumstances; is that so?

A. Well, there are people -- I know people have other views about hooding --

THE CHAIRMAN: I am just asking for your personal --
A. I don't like it at all in any circumstances.

THE CHAIRMAN: It's not only illegal; you think it's a thoroughly bad practice.

A. I do.

THE CHAIRMAN: Do you think in any way, in any sense, that may colour your views about what you saw? Do you understand what I mean?

A. Yes, I understand what you mean and clearly I have to guard against that, but it doesn't colour what I saw. There were not -- it was not just me, it was the Red Cross, it was the --

THE CHAIRMAN: No, I am asking you, please --

A. What I'm trying to say is -- I'm trying to say there were a number of people who expressed concern at what they saw and we were all concerned. It was not just me personally because I have offended by it. There was a whole range of people across -- from all sorts of organisations and positions within the headquarters who said "This is wrong".

THE CHAIRMAN: I see.

A. So it wasn't just me.

THE CHAIRMAN: I follow that you say it's not just you.

A. Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: But do you think in any sense that on the occasions that you saw it, when the others were not
there, your view about hooding has led you to colour the
view of what you actually saw then? I know you say
other people saw it, but they didn't at the same time.
A. But we were almost at the same time. This all
happened -- it was extraordinary because I raised it and
then, within -- I don't know -- a day or so, in comes
chief media ops saying, "What's going on?" I gather
something came in from the commandant at the PW camp at
the same time and then two days later the Red Cross have
also complained, so I think that speaks for itself.

THE CHAIRMAN: All right. Yes.

Thank you very much. Well, I am extremely grateful
to you for coming to the Inquiry to give your evidence.
There are no more questions for you now and you are free
to go. We have other business to transact, so don't
wait for us. Thank you very much indeed.

MR ELIAS: Sir, the next witness will be 20 or 30 minutes,
so far as Counsel to the Inquiry is concerned. I am
just wondering, sir, whether it would be appropriate to
take a break at this stage.

THE CHAIRMAN: Well, the last thing I want to do is do
anybody out of their mid-afternoon break, so we will
have it now in case we go beyond that period.

Ten minutes.

(3.01 pm)
MR HALLIDAY: Sir, the next witness is Mr Medhurst-Cocksworth.

CHRISTOPHER ROBERT MEDHURST-COCKSWORTH (sworn)

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, do sit down. If you would be kind enough to speak into the microphone, which since you are a tall person, that is not quite as easy as it may seem. But please do because then we will all be able to hear you.

Yes, thank you.

Questions by MR HALLIDAY

MR HALLIDAY: Please state your full name.

A.  Christopher Robert Medhurst-Cocksworth.

Q.  Can you see a red folder to your side?

A.  I can.

Q.  Could you open that please? Is your witness statement inside it?

A.  Yes.

Q.  Turn to the last page please. Does your signature appear on the final page?

A.  It does, yes.

Q.  When you signed this statement, were you attesting that it was true to the best of your knowledge and belief?

A.  I was, yes.
Q. You joined the army in 1995; is that correct?
A. That's correct, yes.
Q. And you are still in the army now?
A. I am.
Q. Your rank now is major?
A. Correct.
Q. During Op Telic 2 you were posted to the headquarters of 7 Armoured Brigade; is that correct?
Q. Op Telic 1, I apologise. What was your rank during Op Telic 1?
A. Captain.
Q. What was your role during that tour?
A. I was the SO3 G2 to 7 Armoured Brigade.
Q. Generally speaking, what did that role involve?
A. I would be the adviser to the brigade commander on all intelligence issues.
Q. How would you provide that advice? Where would you get your intelligence from, generally speaking?
A. I was -- I would receive information from the battlegroups with my team. We would decipher that information and try and glean intelligence from it and provide advice to the commander. I would also receive intelligence product from division.
Q. The intelligence you received from battlegroups, was
that ever gathered during tactical questioning?

A. During the war-fighting stage, if something of tactical importance was gleaned after enemy soldiers had been captured, then I would receive that if it was deemed important enough, yes.

Q. Sticking with the war-fighting phase, information then was gathered via tactical questioning, was it?

A. During the war-fighting phase, I am not sure whether tactical questioning took place by the battlegroups at battlegroup level.

Q. But you said you received intelligence from battlegroups.

A. I would receive information.

Q. Information. You must have known something about the source of that information, mustn't you?

A. During the war-fighting phase -- if that's the phase we are still discussing -- then it could be -- I would expect, for example, if a soldier had been captured by a battlegroup and they were receiving information about the tactical situation, then unless it was deemed vitally important for the brigade plan -- if it was, for example, where is the next enemy trench, then I would
not receive that information. If it was of greater significance, then I expect it would come to me, but due to the lack of Arabic speakers I would not expect a huge amount of that to be possible.

Q. When you received information, did you ask where it came from?
A. I can't recall.
Q. Would that not have been a natural question for you to ask?
A. It would.
Q. Can you recall whether you were ever told that information had come from tactical questioning?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Were you aware that 1 Black Watch used to tactically question detainees at its headquarters camp?
A. No.
Q. Definitely not aware of that?
A. I wasn't aware of it, no.
Q. Did you have any role in providing tactical questioners to battlegroups?
A. No, because 7 Brigade wasn't -- didn't have those people attached to it intrinsically. They were a divisional asset that specialised in intelligence corps people.
Q. Are you familiar with a document called "JWP 1-10"?
A. I am not familiar, but if the screen showed it, I might
able to recognise it.

Q. Certainly. Can we have on screen MOD013428, please?

A. No, I am not familiar with that.

Q. There is an aide-memoire inside the document which was
designed to be handed out to troops. That appears at
MOD013466. Were you familiar with this document during
your tour in Iraq?

A. I recognise the style of what it's talking about, yes.

Q. But you're not sure whether you saw this particular
document?

A. I am not sure. I can't remember if I saw this document
itself.

Q. If we go to the second page please, in the
"Responsibilities" section, under "J2/J3", it says:
"Organising tactical questioning and interrogation
of PW ..."

Did that form part of your role --

A. No.

Q. -- during Op Telic 1?

A. No.

Q. Thank you. Was there a particular person at
1 Black Watch with whom you liaised?

A. Through normal course of duties I would expect to liaise
with their intelligence officer.

Q. Can you recall his name?
A. I believe his name was Captain Williamson.

Q. Captain Williamson never mentioned to you, did he, that 1 Black Watch was tactically questioning detainees?

A. I don't think so, no.

Q. Did he ever mention to you that 1 Black Watch was hooding prisoners --

A. No.

Q. -- with sandbags?

A. No.

Q. He didn't tell you that prisoners were hooded both for security reasons and to maintain the shock of capture?

A. I don't recall, no.

Q. Do you recall during the tour ever being informed that there was a ban on the hooding of detainees with sandbags?

A. I can't remember specifically, no.

Q. Were you aware that 1 (UK) Div used to hold conference calls at which oral orders were passed down to brigade?

A. I wouldn't be sat necessarily at all of those, with the brigade commander, but I am aware of the process, yes.

Q. So you attended some of those conference calls, but not all, did you?

A. It was expected that the principal staff officers within the brigade would be listening, on the radio or whichever means it was being passed, with the brigade
commander.

Q. And you fulfilled that expectation sometimes but not other times, is that correct?
A. Unless I was unavoidably detained or elsewhere, then, yes, it would be expected of me to be there to listen in.

Q. Do you recall any discussion during the conference calls that you did attend of hooding of prisoners with sandbags?
A. No, I don't.

Q. Do you recall any discussion of the deprivation of prisoners' sight by any means during those conference calls?
A. I don't recall, no.

Q. Can we have MOD031014 on the screen, please?

We can see from the top left-hand corner that this is brigade FRAGO 63, dated 21 March 2003. It appears that this is the means by which brigade disseminated a divisional order the previous day, named FRAGO 152. Can you see on the right-hand side of the page there's a list of recipients from whom action is required?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. If we go over the page, please, we have a further list of recipients from whom action is required. This is the internal list, internal to brigade -- 7 Armoured
Brigade -- and G2 is listed there, is it not?

A. It is, yes.

Q. Would that have meant you?

A. Yes, it would, and my team, yes.

Q. Can we go back to the first page, please? Paragraph 1 reads as follows:

"Detention of civilians. A number of civilians have died in coalition forces custody and human rights organisations are actively investigating alleged abuses. At annex A is a comprehensive guide to detention of civilians which is to be briefed to all those likely to be in a position of contact with civilians under detention at any stage in the chain. Battlegroups and sub-units are to adhere to this policy."

Can we turn to the annex now, please? Paragraph 1 reads as follows:

"There have recently been a number of deaths in custody where Iraqi civilians have died whilst being held by various units in theatre. At the same time the ICRC have advised that they have received a number of complaints about the handling of detainees by coalition forces."

Then over the page, at paragraph 5, halfway down that paragraph:

"If they [that is detainees] need to be restrained
then this should only be effected where absolutely
necessary and using the minimum force required. Under
no circumstances should their faces be covered as this
might impair breathing."

Do you remember seeing this order whilst you were in
theatre?

A. I don't recall it now, no.

Q. Do you remember being told orally about its contents?

A. As it was a G2 department that was in action, I would
have read it, I expect, but I don't recall it.

Q. Focusing on that phrase I read last, "Under no
circumstances should their faces be covered as this
might impair breathing", what do you understand that to
mean?

A. I presume it means hooding.

Q. Hooding with sandbags?

A. I guess, yes.

Q. You don't recall the order. Presumably you don't recall
whether you took any steps to check that battlegroups
were complying with it.

A. Prisoner-handling was not part of the G2 function of
7 Brigade, therefore I wouldn't have followed up on
this.

Q. Was there no one within 7 Brigade who was responsible
for prisoner-handling?
A. It would have been, I imagine, going through the G3 chain and the RMPs and possibly the G1 train. But 7 Brigade G2 was a very small team. We didn't have that remit.

Q. Can we turn to a different order now, please? It's MOD017101. We can see from the top left corner that this is brigade FRAGO 70, dated 30 May 2003. It appears to be the means by which brigade disseminated a different divisional order of the same date, divisional FRAGO 163.

Can we turn over the page, please? Again, there's a list of action recipients on the right-hand side and amongst the internal recipients we see G2, don't we?

A. G2 is there, yes.

Q. That, again, would be a reference to you, would it?

A. It would be to the G2 department. I, at this stage, had either left or was about to leave and was in the process of handing over to my successor, so I'm not sure whether I actually physically read that document.

Q. Your successor was Major Robinson; is that correct?

A. I believe so, yes.

Q. His recollection, according to his Inquiry witness statement at least, was that that handover took place in early June 2003. Is that different from your recollection?
A. It was towards the end of May/beginning of June.

I can't remember the exact date. I was certainly out of theatre by 1 June -- sorry, the first week of June.

Q. By the first week of June?

A. Definitely.

Q. So you may or may not have been in theatre when this order was actioned?

A. I may have been in theatre, but I don't recall reading that document. We would have been in our handover period if I was in theatre.

Q. Can we turn back to the first page, please?

Paragraph 1, under "General", the final sentence reads as follows:

"It is essential that brigade staff and units understand the procedures to temporarily detain suspects to prevent violations of international law."

Then, over the page, there's a paragraph which begins "International law". The last sentence of that paragraph reads as follows:

"Under no circumstances may a suspect be interrogated until he has been processed by the TIF."

Q. Do you recall receiving that particular instruction whilst you were in Iraq?

A. I don't recall.

Q. You don't know, do you, whether any steps were taken to
check that battlegroups were complying with that
ingstruction?

A. If it was a legal order, then the chain of command would
be expected to follow it. I do not know whether
specific checks to reach the battlegroups took place but
as I said G2 in 7 Brigade weren't responsible for
prisoner-handling.

Q. But this concerns interrogation as opposed to
prisoner-handling generally, does it not?

A. I believe so, yes.

Q. Would that not be a G2 responsibility?

A. 7 Brigade didn't have, as far as I am aware,
interrogators because certainly within my brigade staff
we were only a team of about eight people.
Interrogators will have come from the intelligence
corps, who would have been a divisional asset and
reported to G2X.

Q. Regardless of whether you actually had interrogators,
would it not be the remit of G2 to police whether or not
interrogation was taking place at battlegroup level?

A. I suspect it would be across all branches, G2/G3, the
battlegroup commanding officer, the battlegroup ops
officer. So it is everyone's responsibility, as it
states there.

Q. It might be said that if something is everyone's
responsibility, it ends up being no-one's responsibility. Would G2 not have a particular focus on ensuring that this instruction was complied with?

A. It was not within our remit normally and so, therefore, I did not -- and my team did not -- take particular action on this, no.

Q. There's just one more document I should trouble you with, Major. It's MOD011514. This is a document drafted by the commander legal at 1 (UK) Division, headed "Internees". You have seen this document before?

A. I think I saw this document in a bundle I was given a few weeks ago.

Q. Do you recall whether or not you saw this document whilst you were in theatre?

A. No, I don't and I doubt I would have received a copy.

Q. Why do you doubt that?

A. Because it looks like it's legal advice that would have gone to the brigade legal officer.

Q. If we turn over the page, please, at the bottom of the second page, under the subheading "Questioning", it reads as follows:

"Questioning of internees will not be carried out by the brigades in brigade holding areas and should only be conducted at the theatre internment facility (TIF)."

You don't recall that particular instruction, do
A. I don't recall it, no.

Q. You don't recall receiving any other instructions to the same effect whilst you were in theatre?

A. If that was the guidance given, then I expect that's what would have happened. I can't remember it specifically because I wasn't responsible for moving prisoners from -- or dealing with prisoners in any way.

Q. But again, apart from general prisoner-handling duties, would you not have had some particular responsibility for whether or how prisoners were questioned?

A. No. Questioning, as far as I was aware, was done by divisional assets. I would received the information or the intelligence from G2X in a daily int sum. I wouldn't necessarily know the source of it either.

Q. You have already said that your handover was to Major Robinson, who succeeded you in the post of G2 staff officer at brigade level. Is that correct?

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. What form did your handover to him take?

A. As far as I recall, it was approximately a week and he would shadow me and my team, and I think he had a couple of others from his own team there who would shadow their opposite numbers in their daily duties.

Q. In your handover with Major Robinson, did you say
anything about prisoner-handling or the questioning of prisoners?

A. I don't recall, but it wasn't a major feature or any feature of our normal daily business, so I can't remember.

Q. In his statement to the Inquiry, Major Robinson says that he was told in his handover about brigade's role in providing TQers to battlegroups. Do you not recall saying that to him?

A. I think that's wrong.

Q. You don't think you did say that to him?

A. No, I don't.

Q. Do you think any of your colleagues could have said that to him?

A. I think there's a confusion of where the TQers came from.

Q. According to you, they didn't come from brigade?

A. 7 Brigade did not have TQers or interrogators as part of the brigade set-up. They belonged to divisional assets.

Q. Did you hand over any written orders to Major Robinson?

A. As far as I recall, there was a number of files that would have contained orders that would have been passed around internally. I would imagine that anything that had been passed as an action or even an informant, then it would be in that file.
Q. So you imagined that the two FRAGOs we have looked at in the last half an hour -- FRAGO 63 and FRAGO 70 -- which had G2 on the action list would have been included in that handover file, do you?

A. I would expect them to if they had actually physically been handed to the G2 team.

Q. But you can't recall specifically whether those two orders were included in the file?

A. No, I can't.

Q. Whose responsibility was it at brigade level to hand over matters relating to prisoner-handling?

A. I would imagine the G3 team, RMP, possibly G1 and the legal people.

Q. Whose responsibility in particular would the handover of FRAGO 63 have been, the FRAGO which bans the covering of detainees' faces?

A. I -- as far as I recall, every single FRAGO that we received or we sent out would have been kept either electronically or in a paper copy and that would have been handed over to the next brigade.

Q. Who would have been responsible for that handover of written orders?

A. The ops team, I imagine.

MR HALLIDAY: Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. You are going to be asked probably one
or two questions by other counsel.

Mr Friedman.

Questions by MR FRIEDMAN

MR FRIEDMAN: Thank you, Sir, and thank you, Major.

Can I just start with intelligence generally during Telic 1? Would you accept that near enough brigade and division had to create an intelligence system from scratch, the system of the old regime having been dismantled abruptly?

A. Do you mean after we occupied Basra?

Q. Yes.

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. And you spent your time with your team effectively coordinating and collating information and intelligence that was coming from a range of different sources and agencies?

A. That's correct, and I also received stuff from division as well.

Q. Yes. And was there an urgency and a degree of pressure to the way in which you had to go about your work?

A. If I understand your question, was I pressurised?

Q. Yes.

A. I didn't feel pressurised, no.

Q. But did you, to put it another way, put pressure on yourself and work with urgency because you were with
others at different levels effectively starting from
scratch?

A. We all had a sense of urgency in order to understand the
situation that was before us.

Q. Just two matters about the way in which information was
passed between the different levels. First of all this:
was there a concern expressed at any time that detainees
were being sent up to JFIT, the temporary internal
facility, being questioned, but any information gleaned
from that questioning was not working its way back down
to brigade? Was that concern expressed at any time?

A. I don't recall any concerns that I wasn't getting every
single piece of information, but I wouldn't expect to
get every single piece of information.

Q. No. So you felt from your own experience that there was
a sufficient communication of information down from JFIT
as a result of detainees being questioned at the TIF?

A. I wouldn't necessarily be privy to where the information
that came from division had come from.

Q. I may come on to that in a moment. But just looking at
it the other way, did you ever, at brigade level, have
communication come down to you from JFIT that they
weren't getting sufficient information coming up from
brigade in order to assist them in questioning people
who had been sent up there?
A. I don't recall that, no.

Q. Just some very general questions about the way in which the intelligence and information came to you. Please don't go into detail.

You've touched on it, but can we be clear. If information came from a detainee being questioned, should the fact that it had come from a detainee through questioning have made its way into the written memo of any type that you received?

A. I'm not sure where this -- what you mean by the questioning. Who was questioning the detainee?

Q. A UK agent is questioning someone in UK custody, in Iraq, and, as a result of that questioning, information comes from them, if we call that "detainee reporting" or "detainee answers to questions". But should the fact that had it come from a detainee have made its way into any intelligence summary that you received as a result of that?

A. Not always, no, because quite often sources are kept out of the int sums in order to protect the sources. So if it was coming from G2X, they wouldn't necessarily -- and I wouldn't expect them to necessarily give me a source. I would expect a rating as to how significant that information is -- rated by G2X or division -- they thought it was.
Q. Briefly, within the public domain, rating involves how significant and perhaps how reliable, two points.

A. That's correct.

Q. One can well understand, as it were, different types of informants, but if the person is a prisoner -- never mind whether they are named or not -- the fact that they are in detention being questioned, was that something that should have been kept out, should have been put in or was there no standard practice about that?

A. I don't recall seeing any intelligence coming down that specifically said it came from a detainee. Whether that's significant or not, I couldn't tell you.

Q. Can we understand this to be the case? In your time on that tour, you don't recall any intelligence coming up from battlegroup saying that detainees had answered questions and given the information in the report that you got?

A. No, I don't recall any of that.

Q. Just on that document FRAGO 152 that you don't recall but you would have been on tour when it came down, it refers to the deaths in custody. Were you ever given any information that detainees had died whilst in battlegroup custody?

A. I was aware, I think, of one case.

Q. Just generally about that case, did you know the
circumstances of where they were being held and for what purpose?

A. I do not recall where they were being held. I know he had died of a heart attack, I think, whilst he was being arrested, but I don't recall the detail.

Q. Given the way you have described, in effect, there being no TQ assets available to brigade, was it ever discussed whilst on tour that that was, in effect, hampering brigade and indeed battlegroup capability in terms of gaining intelligence?

A. Yes. When 7 Brigade deployed we had very little time to prepare, so these assets were not given to us or there wasn't enough time for people to be trained. There were few and far between assets at division room level, I remember, so I would imagine, yes, that would have hampered our ability to gain intelligence.

Q. Perhaps more importantly than the hindsight, was that a discussion that you were having amongst your team and with your chain of command at the time, that you were hampered for those reasons?

A. I may have asked for more assets. I can't remember a specific conversation, but I would imagine that everyone asks for more assets anyway. So I may have had that conversation, but I don't recall a specific conversation about it.
Q. Well, then, just into handover with Major Robinson, did anything like that come up in your discussions with him, that, "Effectively there's a lacunae of capability at brigade level to conduct tactical questioning and those are the circumstances we have worked under thus far"?
A. I don't recall talking to him about that specifically. It may have come up. How 19 Brigade were structured may have been very different to 7 Brigade. They may have had more resources. I don't know.

MR FRIEDMAN: Thank you, Sir.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

Ms Edington is not here. Is somebody asking questions on her behalf?

MR HALLIDAY: Sir, Ms Edington did convey a message that she would not be attending.

THE CHAIRMAN: I understand that. I thought that someone was going to raise questions for her.

MR HALLIDAY: The questions she wished to raise were raised by me.

THE CHAIRMAN: Right. Mr Evans.

Questions by MR EVANS

MR EVANS: Major, what was your primary focus when you arrived in Iraq in terms of setting up intelligence?
A. You mean once we were in Basra itself?
Q. Yes. What was your focus of work?
A. We were trying to identify key members of the population who we, 7 Brigade, could interact with and run the city with.

Q. Did that, putting it shortly, occupy a great deal of your time in those early days?

A. That was a significant part of my time.

Q. You tell us in your witness statement that you met prisoners only on one occasion in May 2003. It's paragraph 22, if it can be brought up on the screen. You tell us that you visited Um Qasr and you saw the prisoner of war camp there. Did you see prisoners hooded at that stage?

A. No, I didn't.

Q. Did you see prisoners walking around the facility?

A. I did, yes.

Q. Was that the only time you ever saw prisoners while you were in Iraq?

A. That was the only time, yes.

Q. Was prisoner-handling ever an issue, as far as you were concerned, on your radar, if I can put it that way, during the course of your tour?

A. No.

Q. Can I just take you to FRAGO 63? It's the first page at MOD031014. You were taken to this document. If you look at that, can you see that on the front page of it
it refers to "Detention of civilians" and "Graffiti analysis" and "Passwords" as the three headings.

A. Yes, I can.

Q. From an intelligence perspective, what would have caught your eye on that page as something that might concern you?

A. The requirement to collate analysis on the graffiti.

Q. Finally this: you were a captain when you were in Iraq, is that right?

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. And what age were you then?

A. Nearly 31.

Q. Can you give us some idea, please, of the tempo of work both in the early days in Iraq and by the time it had settled down to routine, if I can call it that?

A. Within my department?

Q. You personally and your department, yes.

A. On average I think for the six months about 18-hour days, seven days a week.

Q. Yes, thank you very much. Thank you, Sir.

MR HALLIDAY: No more questions. Thank you, Sir.

Questions by THE CHAIRMAN

THE CHAIRMAN: When you visited Um Qasr, that is what, as I understand it, was the TIF; is that right?

A. I believe it's called that, yes.
THE CHAIRMAN: Did you see anybody hooded there?
A. None, Sir.
THE CHAIRMAN: None at all?
A. None at all.
THE CHAIRMAN: When was it you went?
A. About May-time, sir.
THE CHAIRMAN: Any advance on "about May-time"?
A. I can't remember. I was going down with someone from
another agency to speak to prisoners.
THE CHAIRMAN: I see. Thank you very much.
Well, that is all the questions you are going to be
asked. I am very grateful to you for coming to the
Inquiry and giving your evidence and you are now free to
go.
A. Thank you, Sir.
THE CHAIRMAN: So that completes business today. Tomorrow
we have --
MR HALLIDAY: Tomorrow we will be calling Messrs Vernon,
Frend and Christie in that order, Sir.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

(3.46 pm)
(The Inquiry adjourned until 10.00 am, Wednesday,
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