

between myself and the spectrum of other stakeholders was very much one of “grace and favour”. With rare exceptions, I was not expected to have any direct involvement in any cases and the Members had no reporting or accountability responsibilities toward me in respect of the discharge of their duties: the Chief Executive was the Accounting Officer and manager of the Commission’s staff. Early on, the Chief Executive and I formed a powerful working alliance based on mutual respect and shared aspirations for the future of the police complaints’ system in Northern Ireland. We managed to introduce small but significant changes: among these were, opening of Commission monthly meetings to the public and more business-like conduct of these meetings, training programmes and a greater role for staff in the supervision and direction of complaints’ investigations, acquisition of IT equipment and the application of this in creating a more efficient caseload management system. Some of these changes were more welcome than others.

5. In terms of its statutory mandate and powers, the ICPC was a more powerful organisation than its counterpart in England and Wales, but, in the main, the Members of the Commission failed to exercise their powers to maximum effect.
6. Complaints in respect of police conduct had to be made to the police. The Commission had no authority to accept complaints from members of the public or their representatives. Once the police had accepted a complaint into the complaints’ system, it was passed to the Commission to decide if the investigation of alleged misconduct was to be supervised or returned to the RUC for unsupervised investigation by their officers. Partly because of resource limitations and partly because of Members’ mindsets, only a small minority of complaints were actually supervised by the Commission and even then, it was