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Full Hearings
Hearing: 24th June 2008, day 40
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ROSEMARY NELSON
PUBLIC INQUIRY
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held at:
The Interpoint Centre
20-24 York Street
Belfast BT15 1AQ
on Tuesday, 24th June 2008
commencing at 10.15 am
Day 40
1 Tuesday, 24th June 2008
2 (10.15 am)
3 Opening submissions by MR PHILLIPS (Part 2)
4 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr Phillips.
5 MR PHILLIPS: Sir, on the first day of my opening
6 submissions in April, I gave a necessarily brief
7 overview of Part 2 of the Inquiry. The transcript
8 references are Day 1, 73/14 to 82/15.
9 At that stage, for various reasons, the Inquiry was
10 not able to release to the Full Participants the Part 2
11 Bundle. I am happy to say that the main impediment to
12 this has now been removed and, as a result, the majority
13 of the documents which comprise the Part 2 Bundle have
14 now been distributed to the Full Participants.
15 The exceptions are, broadly, a very small quantity
16 of material which has been held back whilst an issue in
17 relation to a potential witness to the Inquiry is
18 resolved, and secondly, some documents which post-dated
19 the murder in relation to which consultation is
20 continuing.
21 However, we have now arrived at the point at which,
22 as foreshadowed in my comments on the first day of these
23 hearings, it is now appropriate for me to provide a more
24 detailed introduction to this part of the Bundle.
25 But before turning to the details, I would like to
2
1 make some general remarks. The first is about witness
2 statements. Although the Part 2 Bundle, or the majority
3 of it, has now been distributed, the Full Participants
4 have still not had the benefit of seeing the Part 2
5 witness statements. In my introduction to this
6 in April, I explained the process which the Part 2
7 documents had undergone, and clearly the same sort of
8 process has been necessary in relation to the witness
9 statements which deal with that material.
10 It is perhaps obvious that the more detailed the
11 statement, the more time consuming the redaction
12 process.
13 The Inquiry team, with assistance from the Security
14 Service, the PSNI and the MoD and from the witnesses and
15 their legal advisers, have been heavily engaged in this
16 process over the last few months. Good progress has
17 been made and we hope to be able to release a batch
18 containing all the Security Service statements and the
19 majority of the Army statements in the near future. The
20 remainder, comprising the rest of the Army statements
21 and a large number of statements from Special Branch
22 officers, will of course follow as soon as possible.
23 Sir, the second point I want to make at the outset
24 is simply to remind you of the main focus of this part
25 of the Bundle and of the evidence which relates to it.
3
1 On the first day of hearings I set out what I think
2 I called headline issues with which the Inquiry is
3 concerned in this area. And I hope you will forgive me
4 if I repeat them now, as it is important to maintain
5 a clear sense of the relevance of this material to the
6 Inquiry's work.
7 They are as follows: the extent to which
8 Rosemary Nelson was of interest to the intelligence
9 agencies; why she was of interest and at what level,
10 which, I should add, brings in the important question of
11 dissemination: how intelligence was passed around within
12 and between the various agencies and to what levels
13 within each. Next, the extent to which any intelligence
14 reporting on Rosemary Nelson may have affected the
15 attitudes of the security forces or other state agencies
16 towards her; the extent to which intelligence reporting
17 on Rosemary Nelson may have been known outside the
18 intelligence agencies or government departments and may
19 thereby have affected her safety; whether there was any
20 intelligence relating to any threats to Rosemary Nelson,
21 either in general or specific terms prior to her death;
22 and finally, whether there was any intelligence after
23 her death, either in general or specific terms, which
24 might have indicated who was responsible for the murder.
25 As I said in April, those issues themselves give
4
1 rise to a host of more detailed questions, many of which
2 I will be highlighting during my submissions today.
3 Sir, may I make some further general points in
4 relation to this material. The first concerns the place
5 of the material, and indeed of the evidence relating to
6 it, in its proper context. What has been collated in
7 the Bundle represents only a part of the intelligence
8 material which the Inquiry has considered and which is
9 relevant to the issues which are you are investigating.
10 As I noted in my opening submissions, an arrangement was
11 reached for members of the Inquiry team to interrogate
12 the PSNI databases, and in relation to that material
13 searches were detailed and thorough.
14 Now, only those documents within all of the
15 documents searched in this way, which are of particular
16 relevance to the Inquiry, have been included in the
17 Bundle. Clearly, the material which has been searched,
18 the smaller amount of material within the Bundle, itself
19 only represents a fraction of the intelligence material
20 generated at the relevant time by any and all of these
21 agencies. And there is a resulting danger here that the
22 issues raised in these pages, the pages of the Part 2
23 Bundle, will be seen to take on an importance in the
24 overall field of intelligence which would not truly or
25 accurately reflect their actual significance or
5
1 perceived importance at the time.
2 The questions with which the Inquiry is concerned
3 were some of no doubt many, many issues which crossed
4 the desks of intelligence officers at the various
5 agencies, and indeed of others to whom the information
6 was passed during the relevant years. And it is
7 important, I would suggest, to bear this particular
8 point in mind at all times when considering this
9 material.
10 Secondly, the documents only take us so far. They
11 raise questions, they raise obvious lines of inquiry,
12 but in many cases those can only be followed up with the
13 witnesses, the witnesses who in due course you will
14 decide to call to give evidence to you. And it follows
15 in this respect also that the picture presented by the
16 documents is itself incomplete.
17 During the course of today, I will be able to touch
18 on only some of the main themes which emerge from that
19 material. Clearly, these issues can only fully and
20 properly be assessed in the light of all of the material
21 and of the witness evidence that relates to it.
22 Thirdly, the documents contain intelligence. That
23 is not the same as fact. The documents are not put
24 forward by the Inquiry as evidence of the truth of the
25 many allegations and assertions set out in them, nor, I
6
1 would suggest, is the Inquiry in general interested to
2 establish whether the allegations therein set out were
3 or were not in fact true. They show what was being
4 said.
5 They may show what was believed by those who wrote
6 and disseminated and read and evaluated and analysed and
7 relied upon them. They reveal, you may think, a great
8 deal about how Rosemary Nelson and others with whom she
9 was associated were regarded by the intelligence
10 agencies. They disclose a good deal, you may decide,
11 about attitudes to her: to her work and to the way she
12 lived her life. They are in these ways of significance
13 to the Inquiry, but I repeat: the Inquiry will not spend
14 time and energy trying to prove or disprove whether
15 allegations made in these pages about Rosemary Nelson or
16 about others with whom she was linked in various ways
17 were in fact correct. That is not, I would suggest, the
18 Inquiry's concern; nor is the Inquiry a trial of these
19 or any other issues about Rosemary Nelson, or anyone
20 else.
21 Finally, I would like to stress this point: although
22 this material is presented in its own discrete part of
23 the Inquiry Bundle, the documents contained in these
24 files relate to or have a connection with many of the
25 issues which we describe as part 1 or Part 3 issues. I
7
1 will flag up particular examples later today, but at
2 this stage I would like to stress that in a sense the
3 Part 2 material should be seen not as separate from the
4 part 1 material, but as sitting behind it.
5 The full context of many of the events about which
6 you have already heard and read can only be seen when
7 the Part 2 material and related evidence on those issues
8 is taken into account. And the same is true, you may
9 think, of Part 3, as I'll endeavour to explain in due
10 course.
11 In short, the questions to be asked of some
12 witnesses who are yet to give evidence will include:
13 whether and to what extent they were aware of the
14 matters which appear in these pages and to what extent
15 were their views of Rosemary Nelson shaped or influenced
16 by that knowledge; to what extent was the way in which
17 they dealt with her or with matters relating to her
18 shaped or influenced by that knowledge; to what extent
19 were conclusions reached or decisions made which were
20 themselves shaped or influenced by that knowledge; and
21 equally, in relation to some issues, the question will
22 be whether witnesses ought to have taken such matters,
23 or some of them, into account and if they did not, why
24 that was and what the effects of any such omission were.
25 To give an obvious example, these questions, or
8
1 questions very like them, arise in the context of the
2 threat assessments which were undertaken in relation to
3 Rosemary Nelson in February and March and then
4 in August 1998. The questions arise for all of those
5 involved in the process of assessment and subsequent
6 reporting, consideration and decision-making, from those
7 concerned, as it were, at the bottom of the chain, on
8 the ground, all the way up the chain to the top of the
9 RUC and to those dealing with such matters at the NIO.
10 To what extent was their view of the nature/kind of
11 the threat to Rosemary Nelson influenced or determined
12 by any, and, if so, what, intelligence about her. If it
13 was not so influenced or determined, should it have
14 been? If they were not aware of such intelligence, why
15 was that? Should they have been so aware? What
16 difference would it have made to their views?
17 Those are just two examples, but the same might also
18 be said of the meetings with the Chief Constable, which
19 we have been hearing about in the evidence to date; for
20 example, with the Special Rapporteur in
21 late October 1997 and with the LAJI delegations
22 in February 1998 and 1999.
23 To what extent were the Chief Constable and any
24 other senior officers present at those meetings aware of
25 that intelligence? To what extent did it shape or
9
1 influence the views which were expressed by them at
2 those meetings? To what extent did it shape or
3 influence their attitudes to the points, the criticisms,
4 the concerns expressed by others at those meetings?
5 So also with the post-murder period. Although, as
6 I have explained, we have to hold back some of this
7 material while consultations continue, the questions
8 which will arise include: to what extent did the Part 2
9 intelligence shape the attitude of the RUC or of
10 Special Branch to the murder of Rosemary Nelson and to
11 the murder investigation? In particular, did that
12 material lead to something less than full cooperation
13 with the murder investigation team? Specifically, was
14 information withheld from the murder investigation team
15 on the basis that to reveal it would potentially expose
16 or prejudice or put at risk sources of intelligence?
17 These are the sorts of questions which arise in
18 relation to the issue set out in the Inquiry's Terms of
19 Reference as to whether there was any actual or
20 attempted obstruction of the investigation.
21 Sir, with those general points and questions,
22 I hope, in mind, may I now explain how I intend to
23 outline the contents of the Bundle today.
24 I am going to first look at the structures, the
25 structures of the intelligence community in
10
1 Northern Ireland at about the time of Rosemary Nelson's
2 death, and focus in particular on the three principal
3 providers of the Part 2 material: namely, the PSNI or
4 RUC, the Security Service and the Army.
5 As part of that, I intend to introduce the
6 documentary and, in general terms, the witness evidence
7 and to highlight the main issues which will be addressed
8 in the coming months. I hope that that will help people
9 to make their way round these bundles but also to put
10 the material in a proper context.
11 Then I propose to look in particular at the material
12 which deals with Rosemary Nelson and with the question
13 of how it was that she came to the attention of the
14 intelligence community. And then finally, I intend to
15 say something about the material in these files, the
16 intelligence material, concerning the main Loyalist
17 paramilitary groups which were active at the time of her
18 murder.
19 So, sir, dealing with the structures first.
20 Historically, the allocation of responsibility for
21 intelligence and counter terrorism by the state has been
22 different in Northern Ireland to the rest of the
23 United Kingdom. From 1976, the RUC and, more
24 specifically, Special Branch have taken the lead
25 responsibility for the direction of intelligence and
11
1 operations against terrorism here in Northern Ireland.
2 That can be contrasted with the position in relation
3 to the rest of the United Kingdom. Originally, that
4 role, the lead role, was undertaken by the
5 Metropolitan Police. However, in October 1992 the
6 Security Service added this responsibility to its
7 pre-existing role in countering threats from Irish
8 terrorism.
9 Now, sir, looking to the present situation, as is
10 well-known, the Patten Commission recommended that
11 responsibility for policing should be devolved to the
12 Northern Ireland Executive, albeit that that has not yet
13 taken place. However, the Patten Commission's view was
14 that national security was "an essential function of
15 national government" and was not suitable to be devolved
16 in that way. Accordingly, responsibility for national
17 security work in Northern Ireland was transferred to the
18 Security Service in October last year.
19 Sir, returning to the time with which we are
20 concerned, you may think it clear that the RUC, in
21 particular Special Branch, had formal primacy with
22 regard to intelligence and counter terrorism matters in
23 Northern Ireland. In a statement which the Inquiry has
24 received and to which I will refer later, this primacy
25 is said to have been "by convention".
12
1 It is, however, more difficult to identify exactly
2 how this operated in practice, and this will be a matter
3 to be explored with witnesses in their evidence.
4 However, it is plainly important to the Inquiry to
5 understand the roles and responsibilities of the
6 different agencies and how they interacted with each
7 other.
8 The Inquiry has already undertaken a good deal of
9 work in this area and I will in a moment outline the
10 relevant structures and relationships in
11 Northern Ireland at the time of Rosemary Nelson's
12 murder.
13 But, sir, I should say immediately that in putting
14 those matters to you today, I, and indeed the Inquiry
15 team as a whole, have been particularly assisted by
16 a statement provided by a former senior security service
17 officer who discharged the duties of director and
18 coordinator of intelligence in Northern Ireland. This
19 statement was provided to the Full Participants at the
20 end of last week, although it is not yet on the Inquiry
21 display system in the chamber.
22 Some readers of the statement may also have noticed
23 that it doesn't conform with the usual run of Inquiry
24 statements and that the witness does not have a cipher
25 of the usual Inquiry kind. So perhaps I can deal with
13
1 that immediately.
2 The statement was originally prepared for the
3 Billy Wright Inquiry, but the Security Service have
4 agreed to its use in this Inquiry for it covers matters
5 of interest to us and deals with the relevant period of
6 time.
7 However, sir, although that statement has provided
8 us with a useful framework, it is, of course, written
9 from the perspective of only one of the intelligence
10 agencies, and in due course the Inquiry will be
11 considering both general and specific evidence about the
12 intelligence structure pertaining in Northern Ireland
13 from all three of the relevant agencies. And at that
14 point, of course, this statement will fall to be
15 assessed and tested in the light of all of that
16 evidence. It is simply convenient for me at this stage,
17 because it has been disclosed, to draw on it in this
18 brief outline.
19 Sir, may I begin with the RUC. Starting at a very
20 general level, you will remember, I think, that the
21 Patten Report described the RUC in their report, which I
22 think was issued in September 1999, as a:
23 "... police force with a complicated and
24 multi-layered command structure, the development of
25 which had been driven more by the response to security
14
1 threats than to the demands of community policing or
2 management efficiency."
3 It was noted in that report that historically police
4 forces were modelled on military lines and that the RUC
5 had retained this type of structure more than most
6 police forces at that time.
7 Now, as we all know, significant changes were
8 introduced and implemented as a result of the Patten
9 Commission's recommendations, but clearly our focus
10 today and throughout the Inquiry must principally be on
11 the structures as they were at the time; namely, in the
12 late 1990s.
13 Sir, can we look now, please, at the slides that I
14 think I took you to briefly in opening in April. I
15 think the one we want in relation to the RUC is slide 2
16 (displayed).
17 Sir, could I just say by way of disclaimer what
18 I said at the outset of our hearings, which is that
19 these charts, these diagrams, have been produced by the
20 Inquiry and they are based on our understanding of what
21 the position was. I invited comment, criticism,
22 amendment on them at the beginning when I first showed
23 you the slide. As far as I am aware, none has been
24 received, so I am going to assume for the moment at
25 least that they are reasonably accurate.
15
1 The structure is, I hope, very clear from this with
2 obviously the Chief Constable at the top. We have
3 looked in detail earlier at his office, the Command
4 Secretariat, and so far as we are concerned today, the
5 next relevant layer is at the Assistant Chief Constable
6 level and in particular, obviously, on the left-hand
7 side of the screen, the Assistant Chief Constable, who
8 is the head of Special Branch or, as it says in the
9 bracket there, "HSB".
10 At the stage with which we are concerned, the
11 late 1990s, the Special Branch consisted of about
12 850 officers, about 10 per cent of the overall strength
13 of the force, so it says in the Patten Report. And
14 indeed, it is in that same report that the Commission
15 observes that the Special Branch had been described to
16 them as "a force within a force".
17 Can we look, please, at side 4 (displayed), and see
18 what happens if we click.
19 There is the head of the organisation, as I have
20 mentioned, and below him his deputy. Can we go on to
21 the next line, please. Thank you. Here you will see
22 the three sections -- I hope that is the right term --
23 into which Special Branch was divided. I would like to
24 focus on those which seem particularly relevant to us,
25 and they are E3, all the way along, reading from left to
16
1 right, to E9.
2 So far as E3 is concerned, it was responsible, as we
3 understand it, for collating, assessing and
4 disseminating intelligence coming into Special Branch
5 headquarters and was itself divided -- and there they
6 are -- into a number of subsections or desks: E3A was
7 the Republican desk, E3B was the Loyalist desk. As far
8 as E3C is concerned, it was responsible, we believe, for
9 processing intelligence for dissemination. It appears
10 also, sir, to have had some role in relation to threat
11 assessments, and we will hear about that in the evidence
12 in due course.
13 Turning to E4, operations, as its name suggests, it
14 was the operational arm of headquarters, HQ, and
15 comprised inter alia, E4A, surveillance, and the
16 headquarters mobile support unit.
17 Now, moving along, E5 to E8 were the regional
18 branches of the Special Branch, and in a sense you can
19 see an echo here of the regional divisions of the RUC as
20 a whole, which we looked at in the opening.
21 E5, as it says, Belfast, E6, the North region, and
22 then E7, South East, and E8, South West, as we
23 understand it. And I will return to look at the regions
24 in a little more detail in a moment.
25 But E9 ran operations, including surveillance
17
1 against strategic level targets, predominantly, as we
2 understand it, on the Republican side.
3 Sir, can I say just a little bit more about E3 on
4 the left-hand side of the screen. At some point during
5 1997, the headquarters structure which I have just
6 outlined was partially modified. Following
7 the recommendations of the Warner Report in the
8 mid 1990s, E3 and parts, we believe, of E9 were
9 amalgamated into a new entity called the Intelligence
10 Management Group, or IMG, to which we will see reference
11 in the material.
12 During the course of the hearings, the Inquiry will
13 be looking more closely at the role of E3 and its
14 successor, the IMG, and we will focus in particular on
15 the following: first, the role of headquarters, HQ, in
16 analysing intelligence, including the following issues:
17 what intelligence did it receive, what intelligence in
18 particular from HQ operations, from the regions and from
19 external sources; who decided what intelligence should
20 go to HQ; how quickly did it receive it; to which
21 databases did it have access; what type of analysis did
22 it produce; who were the customers for its analysis; and
23 what was the purpose of its analysis.
24 We will also consider the role of HQ in
25 disseminating intelligence and the role of HQ in
18
1 directing, or to use the expression which is used in the
2 documents, tasking intelligence, specifically these
3 questions: could E3 task HQ operations; could it task
4 regional operations.
5 We will also, as I indicated earlier, look at the
6 role of E3 with regard to threats and threat
7 assessments, especially those undertaken
8 in February, March and August 1998 in relation to
9 Rosemary Nelson.
10 We will consider the relationship between E3 and the
11 regions and the extent to which officers in E3 liaised
12 with the rest of Special Branch and with the other
13 intelligence agencies. And finally, we will look at the
14 effects of the post-Warner changes, in particular what
15 was the purpose behind the creation of the IMG and to
16 what extent did this change or improve E3's ability to
17 process intelligence.
18 Now, sir, with a view to answering those questions,
19 the Inquiry has taken statements from, amongst others,
20 two heads of the IMG at around the time of
21 Rosemary Nelson's murder and a source handler who
22 subsequently moved to E3A.
23 May I just say a little bit more about E4. A number
24 of E4 operations are relevant to the work of the
25 Inquiry. In order to understand their significance and
19
1 the product which came from them, the Inquiry will need
2 to consider in particular the following questions: what
3 was the relationship between the operational arm of HQ
4 and the operational units at a regional level? Who
5 tasked E4? What sort of operations did they carry out?
6 Where were the E4 units based? And who was responsible
7 for collating, analysing and disseminating intelligence
8 product from their operations?
9 The Part 2 Bundle contains a number of documents
10 which are connected to E4 operations. I would like to
11 start by showing you one of them. Can we look, please,
12 at RNI-542-124 (displayed)? Now, this, as I hope is
13 clear from the heading, is a TCG tasking sheet for an E4
14 operation. You can see on the top right-hand corner
15 "E4A." That is all I wish to say about it at the
16 moment.
17 Can I just show you another E4 document, which is
18 a product document, if I can put it that way,
19 RNI-541-089 (displayed). Again, you will see the title
20 on the top left-hand corner, in this case, E4A South,
21 the name of two operations -- and I will say a little
22 more about them in a moment -- and here the results with
23 the times down the left-hand side of the relevant
24 surveillance. And in particular, you can see that this
25 is a document in which reference is made -- bottom
20
1 right-hand corner -- to Rosemary Nelson herself.
2 Sir, can we return to the slides, please
3 (displayed). I indicated I want to say something about
4 the South Region. Each region within Special Branch was
5 headed by a regional head of Special Branch, who was at
6 chief superintendent rank, assisted by a deputy who was
7 himself a superintendent. At each regional level, the
8 regional Special Branch comprised a tasking and
9 coordinating group -- and we have just seen reference to
10 the one in the South Region in that document -- and
11 a source unit, and you can see the two boxes in light
12 blue on the bottom right-hand corner. TCG could be
13 described as the operational arm of the region.
14 As its name indicates, it was responsible for
15 directing and facilitating intelligence operations at
16 a regional level. Some of them may have been initiated
17 at HQ level, but would be managed by the regional TCG.
18 A source unit, again, as its name suggests, was
19 responsible for collating intelligence from human
20 sources.
21 Now, as you'll see from the slides, each region was
22 also divided into a number of divisions. And, again,
23 these appear to have broadly correlated to the divisions
24 within the uniformed force as a whole. You will see
25 here that the South Region was divided into L, K, J, G
21
1 and H, and J is the division with which we are
2 particularly concerned.
3 As you will see, it breaks down into local offices.
4 As I think I may have said in April, it may be that
5 there was a further office, a Banbridge office, within
6 J Division, but so far as we are concerned, Lurgan,
7 Portadown and Craigavon, the ones at the bottom of the
8 slide, are the relevant local offices.
9 The regional Special Branch officers were, you may
10 think, clearly at the coalface of intelligence gathering
11 and counter terrorist operations in Northern Ireland.
12 And the Inquiry has taken a significant number of
13 statements from Special Branch officers of various ranks
14 of this kind, and it seems likely, if I can put it that
15 way, that you will decide to call some of them at least
16 to give evidence to you in the next session, and they
17 include the heads of Special Branch, the head of South
18 Region Special Branch, the detective superintendent in
19 charge of J Division, a detective inspector from that
20 division, the detective sergeants in charge of Lurgan
21 and Portadown offices and source handlers from both the
22 South Region and the Belfast region, as well as other
23 Special Branch officers.
24 Now, sir, as I have indicated, in addition to this
25 substantial amount of witness evidence, the Inquiry has
22
1 considered a very substantial number of intelligence
2 documents originating from the PSNI. So far as their
3 presentation in the Bundle is concerned, they fall into
4 two main categories. First, there are five files, 541
5 to 545, principally containing intelligence reports and
6 organised chronologically. This intelligence may have
7 come from human sources, a variety of technical devices
8 or surveillance operations. I should repeat at this
9 point that for the reasons I gave earlier, the Full
10 Participants have not yet received every single document
11 within those files, but they do have now the clear
12 majority.
13 Sir, the second category of material within the
14 Part 2 Bundle in relation to PSNI consists of
15 documentation relating to two distinct operations, which
16 I will discuss in due course. But before dealing with
17 those operations, can I return to a topic I mentioned
18 right at the outset of the Inquiry, which is the PSNI
19 databases.
20 Again, at this stage, coming now towards the end
21 of June, unfortunately my outline of the PSNI databases
22 is still slightly tentative, because the position, as
23 I explained it to you at the outset, still remains that
24 we have not received a statement dealing with these
25 matters from the PSNI.
23
1 My understanding is that the statement has been held
2 up while an application for anonymity is being made.
3 I gather that the issue is close to being resolved and
4 I hope that the statement will be received in the very
5 near future, as I am sure you do, sir.
6 In addition, however, the Inquiry has identified
7 a witness of fact who can speak to this issue, and has
8 instructed its solicitors, Eversheds, to take
9 a statement from that witness. And again, I hope that
10 that process will be completed in the near future.
11 Broadly speaking, the material in these bundles
12 comes from two databases, PRISM and MACER, and you may
13 remember in my opening submissions I also referred to
14 a later system called CHISM, which, as I understand it,
15 came into operation after the murder of Rosemary Nelson.
16 However, for today's purposes, and for the Inquiry
17 generally, the main focus will be on the two and not on
18 the three systems.
19 In general the position, as we understand it, is
20 that intelligence was usually entered first on to PRISM,
21 and this appears to have been the principal database
22 used by the desks in HQ. Some, but not all,
23 intelligence would then be transferred to MACER, which
24 was the principal tool for dissemination. Now, when we
25 look at the documents, we will see there are two
24
1 principal types of MACER document: secret intelligence
2 reports or SIRs, and secret intelligence dissemination
3 document or SIDDs.
4 It appears that in a typical case the PRISM, the
5 original version of intelligence, covers a range of
6 issues and they are then broken down into individual
7 pieces of intelligence and entered as separate SIRs.
8 Some of those may then be sanitised, by which I mean
9 that sensitive details are removed, and disseminated as
10 SIDDs to a wider readership.
11 Sir, what I would like to do is to show how that
12 process worked using an example of a document, which we
13 can trace through the various stages.
14 Sir, I see that we haven't yet come to the full
15 hour. I am proposing to carry on with the comparison.
16 I hope that that is all right with the shorthand writer.
17 So far as the example is concerned, I would like to
18 take, please, RNI-544-037 (displayed). This, sir, is
19 the PRISM document, as it appears at the very top.
20 So far as general points to be derived from this go,
21 can I first point out that this document -- and I think
22 all the documents in the Part 2 Bundle -- now bears the
23 marking at the top "RNI declassified". What has
24 happened, obviously, is that as a result of the
25 redaction process, documents that were originally
25
1 protectively marked have been reduced and are,
2 therefore, marked in this way, "declassified".
3 You will see a number of documents of this kind in
4 the Bundle. Can I draw your attention to, first of all,
5 the reference number, the document number, RNI-131-264,
6 (displayed) and the date. Although there has been
7 a redaction of the specific date, we have the
8 month, February 1999. Then you will see the title, the
9 subject matter of the document, which in this case is
10 "RHD", Red Hand Defenders. And can I highlight also the
11 rating: entry source rating, data rating, et cetera. In
12 this and all other PSNI documents these have been
13 redacted on the grounds of sensitivity, and I can't say
14 any more about those entries at this stage.
15 If and to the extent that the reliability of
16 intelligence has to be investigated with witnesses, this
17 may have to be done in closed or private sessions later
18 in the course of your hearings.
19 But, sir, this cover sheet -- for that is what it
20 is -- raises two particular questions to which I don't
21 at the moment have an answer, but which we will
22 obviously pursue with the witnesses in due course.
23 First, at the top right-hand side is recorded "group
24 number 10". That appears, at least to us, to be some
25 form of restriction on access, but that has not yet been
26
1 clarified.
2 Two lines down on the left-hand side, you will see
3 the word "dissemination" and then "ND". And it might
4 reasonably be thought that that indicated there should
5 be no dissemination of this intelligence. However, as
6 we will see, that isn't correct in this case because
7 there was in fact a relevant SIR, and indeed a SIDD. So
8 that expression, those letters, remain something of
9 a mystery.
10 Now, if we turn over to RNI-544-038 (displayed),
11 this is the body of the document and, again, in general
12 terms I should say that with the PRISM documents, you
13 have the cover sheet and then the meat of the report on
14 the next page.
15 You will see that some of the details we have looked
16 at appear at the top of this page, also, for example,
17 the document number and the title, et cetera.
18 We also see a reference at the top right-hand corner
19 "security level: 199". Again, that would appear on the
20 face of it to have something to do with limiting access,
21 but we haven't yet been able to establish exactly what
22 it means nor how it interacts with the group number,
23 which you will have noticed has changed. On this
24 document it is 11, on the previous cover sheet it is 10.
25 I am afraid I can't help you on that point either.
27
1 Turning to the substance of the report, you will see
2 the three lines beginning:
3 "It is the intention ..."
4 Then there are various comments. I should say that
5 under the first heading, "Comment", the extreme
6 left-hand of the first line is "NFD", no further
7 details. That is not a redaction; it is a piece of poor
8 photocopy. The comment comes in that:
9 "Members of the RHD and OV ..."
10 Which is Orange Volunteers:
11 "... are targeting leading Republicans."
12 At the very bottom of the page we will see what
13 appear to be instructions in relation to the onward
14 distribution or dissemination of this material.
15 Now, can we then turn to the next page, RNI-544-039,
16 which is the corresponding SIR (displayed). This, as
17 I hope I have made clear now, is a MACER document. It
18 contains similar details on its own cover sheet to the
19 PRISM document we have seen, albeit arranged in
20 a different format.
21 Sir, can I draw your attention to four particular
22 points about it, the first, at the top right-hand,
23 "DSL 19." That is the dissemination level which, as we
24 understand it, was the method for restricting access to
25 documents on the MACER system. Users would have access
28
1 to different dissemination levels according to their
2 rank, their need to know, et cetera. Again, we are
3 awaiting an authoritative explanation of these
4 dissemination levels, but as far as we are aware, 19 is
5 one of the highest, although there may possibly also
6 have been, we think, a level 23.
7 Now, moving down the page, you will see in the
8 second group of the text an entry "text caveat", then in
9 capital letters "NO DOWNWARD DISSEMINATION". Again,
10 this is also rather puzzling, because we will see in due
11 course that there was in relation to this
12 a corresponding, if I can put it that way, SIDD; and
13 that is clear, as you can see, from an entry just a few
14 lines below. So in fact, this information, or some of
15 it at any rate, was in fact disseminated more widely.
16 Sir, can I also draw your attention to the ciphers
17 which appear in the middle of the page, just above the
18 redaction opposite 3. Those are the ciphers of
19 Special Branch officers who were involved in the
20 creation of this report and who are witnesses to the
21 Inquiry.
22 If we turn over the page, we will see the substance
23 of this SIR, and it is an edited version of the text of
24 the PRISM document, although you can perhaps see that
25 some of the comment has not been repeated. And maybe we
29
1 can see that most clearly by looking at the two
2 together.
3 Can we have RNI-544-038 on the left-hand side,
4 please (displayed). Sir, the PRISM document is in fact
5 on the right and the corresponding SIR on the left, and
6 you will see that all of the comment section on the
7 right-hand side has been removed and what you are left
8 with is an edited and rather generalised version of the
9 opening three lines, which finds its way into the SIR.
10 I should say, sir, just looking at the left-hand
11 document, the SIR, as you go through the Bundle, you
12 will see that some of those SIRs have been redacted in
13 accordance with the Inquiry's normal policy. But as you
14 can see in this particular case, no redactions were
15 deemed necessary.
16 Now, moving down, if I can put it that way, to the
17 relevant SIDD, which is at RNI-544-041 (displayed).
18 Here, the cover sheet is not dissimilar to the SIR cover
19 sheet, but it is a rather abbreviated version, if I can
20 put it that way. Here, though, the dissemination level,
21 top right-hand corner, "DSL", is 7, a lower level,
22 indicating obviously that this is suitable for wider
23 dissemination. As I say, that raises the question of
24 what those initials "ND" were intended to mean in the
25 context of this intelligence.
30
1 If we look over to the substance of this SIDD --
2 that is at RNI-544-042 (displayed) -- and in fact it is
3 identical, as far as we can see, to the text of the SIR,
4 without, however, any comment whatsoever. In some cases
5 you will see that the text between the SIDD on the one
6 hand and the SIR on the other does differ, and this is
7 part of the sanitisation process that I mentioned
8 earlier.
9 But you won't be surprised to hear in going through
10 the Bundle, therefore, that there are relatively few
11 cases in which it has been necessary to redact any part
12 of the substance of a SIDD, because in a sense that has
13 already been done in the sanitisation process.
14 Now, sir, those are some examples of documents which
15 appear again and again and again in the PSNI, Part 2
16 Bundle. It is right to say, however, that of course not
17 all of the material in the PSNI part of the Bundle is in
18 those formats, and we will see in due course -- and
19 indeed have already seen in the context of the E4
20 operations -- documents of a very different kind. We
21 looked, for example, at the surveillance log a little
22 earlier.
23 So far as the question of the formats and the
24 material being produced in three different ways, I
25 should say that in cases where intelligence has appeared
31
1 in more than one format, the Inquiry has generally --
2 generally -- selected the best version, i.e. the version
3 with the most detail.
4 Sir, at this point I wanted to open to you some of
5 the detail of the two particular operations, where the
6 documents are set out in RNI-546 and RNI-547. Would it
7 be convenient to start that after the break?
8 THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly. We will have a break of a quarter
9 of an hour. 10 to 12.
10 (11.32 am)
11 (Short break)
12 (11.50 am)
13 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.
14 MR PHILLIPS: Sir, I mentioned that material in files
15 RNI-546 and RNI-547 is of a different character. They
16 contain tasking sheets and reports arising from two
17 particular operations which were running at around the
18 time of Rosemary Nelson's murder. The first, which is
19 in RNI-546, was a surveillance operation carried out by
20 Special Branch and the military against the LVF in
21 mid-Ulster, and it was known -- and I hope I am going to
22 pronounce this correctly -- as Operation Shubr.
23 May I just say a few words about that operation at
24 this stage. Can we look, first, at the initial tasking
25 sheet, and that is at RNI-546-001 (displayed).
32
1 It is a PRISM document, and you can see from it that
2 this operation began in April of 1998. You can see the
3 origin there, the TCG (South), and the title of the
4 operation. As I say, I am pronouncing it "shoober". So
5 far as the intelligence case for the operation is
6 concerned, that is at RNI-546-003, and paragraph 3
7 (displayed):
8 "Mid Ulster LVF have some form of terrorist activity
9 planned for the near future."
10 Then various details are provided. You will see the
11 aims of the operation:
12 "Surveillance to identify: individuals involved
13 [and] possible targets."
14 It appears from the PRISM material that the Inquiry
15 has seen that this surveillance continued on an
16 intermittent basis until August 2000.
17 Now, the reports from April 1998 through to October
18 of that year indicate that the focus of the surveillance
19 in that period was Mark Fulton who was believed to be
20 the Officer Commanding of the Portadown LVF. However,
21 from about October that year, it appears that the
22 surveillance, or the focus of the surveillance, shifted
23 to other leading members of the Portadown LVF.
24 So far as the Inquiry is concerned, it is important
25 to note that the operation was running at various times,
33
1 it would appear, during March 1999. However, I should
2 tell you that on the face of the material which the
3 Inquiry has seen, it appears that the operation was not
4 running on the weekend of Rosemary Nelson's murder.
5 Plainly, that is at least potentially an important point
6 and one we will be testing with the relevant witnesses.
7 Sir, the significance of that is obviously that it
8 was indeed members of the LVF who were suspected of
9 committing the murder of Rosemary Nelson, and as
10 I indicated in my opening in April, those individuals
11 were, from an early stage, the focus of the murder
12 investigation itself.
13 Sir, the fact that members of the Portadown LVF were
14 the subject of a surveillance operation which was
15 continuing at the time of the murder raises a number of
16 questions which the Inquiry must address. For example,
17 what did the intelligence agencies hope to achieve from
18 the surveillances and did it achieve its objectives?
19 Why did the surveillance teams not go out on the weekend
20 of the murder? Did the operation, either before or
21 after the murder, produce any intelligence to suggest
22 that the LVF were or were not responsible for the
23 murder? Was the fact of this operation made known to
24 the murder investigation team, and if so, when, and if
25 not, why not? Finally, was any intelligence from this
34
1 operation provided to the murder investigation team and
2 if so, when, and if not, why not?
3 Now, clearly there is a substantial overlap here
4 with the Part 3 or due diligence aspect of the Inquiry,
5 and also -- and, again, obviously -- a possible overlap
6 with the issue of obstruction. However, the more
7 general aspects of this operation will be explored with
8 the relevant Part 2 witnesses, including a number of
9 Army witnesses and Special Branch officers.
10 Sir, the second operation, where the documents are
11 contained in file RNI-547, was known as Operation
12 Fagotto, and RNI-547 contains tasking sheets and
13 surveillance reports from this operation which, again,
14 I alluded to in my opening in April. And the reference
15 to the transcript there is Day 10, 109 at 11 to 110 at
16 22.
17 Now, sir, as I explained then, this was
18 a Special Branch operation which took place in the
19 vicinity of Rosemary Nelson's house over the weekend
20 before her murder, and as a result of that operation
21 there were Special Branch officers in the area,
22 including one who passed Rosemary Nelson's house at
23 around midnight on 14th March.
24 In my opening submissions, I mentioned a number of
25 significant issues which arise in relation to this
35
1 operation, including the question of whether there was
2 any connection between this operation, the officers
3 involved in it and the murder. That would, of course,
4 raise the issue of collusion in a particularly stark and
5 direct form.
6 Operation Fagotto is also relevant to the murder
7 investigation. It appears that the murder investigation
8 team were apprised of the operation at a fairly early
9 stage of their work, and Mr Port and his team
10 investigated it in some depth. And this in turn has
11 been considered by Mr Ayling in his report on the
12 question of due diligence. And as a result, a good deal
13 of material relating to it will appear in due course in
14 the Part 3 Bundle.
15 Sir, so far as the Inquiry's investigation of this
16 is concerned, the Inquiry has taken, and is in the
17 process of taking, witness statements from a number of
18 officers who were involved in this operation, both on
19 the ground, if I can put it that way, and at
20 a decision-making level. And those statements will, of
21 course, be disclosed to the Full Participants as soon as
22 possible.
23 In addition, the Inquiry has searched the PSNI
24 databases for documentation relating to it and in
25 particular in the period from the beginning
36
1 of January 1999 to the end of March 1999, and those are
2 the documents which appear in file RNI-547.
3 It is clear from those documents that the operation
4 was a long-term operation. It wasn't, as it were, a
5 one-off operation on the night of the murder. If we
6 look at the intelligence case for this operation, which
7 begins at RNI-547-001 (displayed), we will see the
8 background to it.
9 Again, a PRISM document, the same origin,
10 TCG (South), the title "Operation Fagotto" and the
11 intelligence case, again at RNI-547-003 (displayed),
12 states there that:
13 "An individual ..."
14 Whose name has been redacted:
15 "... was believed currently to be playing a major
16 role in PIRA [Provisional IRA] activity in the South
17 Region."
18 And the objective of the operation is given as:
19 "To conduct surveillance to identify that person's
20 associates."
21 So far as the product is concerned, we can see an
22 example of it at RNI-547-009 (displayed) in the same
23 bundle and this, which is a document of a kind which we
24 see also in RNI-546 in relation to Operation Shubr, sets
25 out, as it says there, a summary of operations; in other
37
1 words, of the surveillance undertaken on that
2 individual.
3 The material continues with product being recorded
4 as the days and weeks pass, until what is, so far as the
5 Inquiry is concerned, the relevant date, 14th March.
6 And we can see that product at RNI-547-061 (displayed).
7 Again, it is another PRISM document and you will see
8 there the destination, TCG (South), and the origin, E4A.
9 If we turn over the page to RNI-547-062 (displayed)
10 this, so far as the Inquiry is concerned, appears to be
11 the report of this form of Special Branch activity near
12 Rosemary Nelson's house on the eve of her murder. As is
13 obvious, the report has been quite heavily redacted and
14 it might fairly be said that it raises as many questions
15 as answers. However, you may think that this shows that
16 Special Branch were carrying out checks in the vicinity
17 of the home address of the surveillance target.
18 Now, in the Bundle there are various other reports
19 after this, which show that the particular operation,
20 Operation Fagotto, continued for some time after the
21 murder. However, on grounds of relevance, in
22 bundle RNI-547, we have the last report as being at the
23 end of March 1999.
24 Sir, clearly there is a good deal more to be
25 explored on this topic, but that will have to wait for
38
1 the witness statements and any evidence that you decide
2 should be called.
3 So, sir, can I try to bring some of the PSNI points
4 together at this stage and suggest some of the further
5 general issues which will need to be considered during
6 this part of the evidence. I would like to do so, as it
7 were, from the top down in terms of PSNI.
8 The first issue which arises in relation to this
9 sort of material is this: how was the Chief Constable,
10 or those in his office at the Command Secretariat,
11 briefed on intelligence matters? How regularly? By
12 whom and on the basis of what material?
13 And I should note here, sir, that as far as I am
14 aware, the Inquiry has seen very little, if any,
15 material evidencing the transfer of intelligence or
16 information about intelligence from Special Branch to
17 the Chief Constable. That will, therefore, be a matter
18 to be investigated in the evidence.
19 Next, and moving down, if I can put it that way, the
20 management and reporting structure between the regional
21 parts of Special Branch and HQ: How much autonomy did
22 the region have in terms of gathering, collating,
23 analysing and disseminating intelligence? What degree
24 of liaison was there between the region and HQ? What
25 role did the head of Special Branch play in monitoring
39
1 and authorising the activities of regional
2 Special Branch offices, and how frequently was HQ
3 informed of regional operations and of the intelligence
4 product of those operations?
5 Next, the management and reporting structure within
6 regional Special Branch: Who reported to whom? What
7 steps were required for operations to be authorised?
8 Who within the region was responsible for technical
9 operations? Who authorised them? Who implemented this?
10 What was the role of the source unit and of the TCG, and
11 what was the relationship between those two entities and
12 the regional offices? Who at regional level, if anyone,
13 was responsible for analysing intelligence? What was
14 the purpose of any such analysis and how was it
15 undertaken? How did it differ, such analysis, from the
16 analysis which was undertaken by E3 or IMG? How did the
17 intelligence analysis tie into operational tasking?
18 Then questions of dissemination: Who was
19 responsible for deciding what intelligence was
20 disseminated both within Special Branch and beyond, and
21 by what means was it so disseminated? Finally, and in
22 general, what was the relationship between regional
23 Special Branch officers and their uniform or CID
24 counterparts?
25 Sir, can I turn now to say something about the Army
40
1 and its material within the Part 2 Bundle. First
2 dealing with the question of structure, and taking it
3 very broadly first, as I think is very well-known,
4 additional troops were first deployed in
5 Northern Ireland in August 1969, initially being
6 deployed to assist the then RUC in restoring law and
7 order when the trouble first flared up.
8 Operation Banner, as it became known, developed into the
9 Army's longest continuous campaign lasting 38 years. I
10 think it was brought formally to a close at the end
11 of July last year.
12 The situation, as we understand it now, is that the
13 Army is no longer "operating in support of the civil
14 power in Northern Ireland", although there is still
15 a garrison of about 5,000 troops here. They have the
16 same status as their counterparts in the rest of the
17 United Kingdom.
18 So far as the period with which we are concerned
19 goes, in the late 1990s there were approximately 9,000
20 troops in Northern Ireland, together with 4,500-odd
21 members of the Royal Irish Regiment.
22 And as the Inquiry understands it, the Army at that time
23 saw its role as acting in support of the RUC. However,
24 the precise form of that support was not always entirely
25 clear, particularly in the most difficult and
41
1 challenging areas, such as south Armagh.
2 In broad terms, however, the Army's operations in
3 Northern Ireland can be divided into two categories for
4 our purposes: first, routine tasks -- vehicle
5 checkpoints, foot and vehicle patrols, providing
6 protection and support to the police in maintaining
7 public order -- and secondly, the provision of
8 specialist support; for example, bomb disposal and the
9 provision of military helicopters.
10 Now, as part of the Army's role in supporting the
11 RUC, it also had a role in intelligence. By the end of
12 the 1970s, it seems that one soldier in eight was
13 directly involved in intelligence. The Army received
14 intelligence from a number of different sources,
15 including observations from patrols, observation posts
16 and vehicle checkpoints, overt and covert surveillance.
17 Sir, so far as the structures in more detail are
18 concerned, I regret that at this point I'm not able to
19 deploy an open and disclosed statement in relation to
20 the Army in the same way that I have been in relation to
21 the Security Service, because, regrettably, we are not
22 yet in a position to be able to disclose one to the Full
23 Participants. So I am afraid that very brief outline is
24 all I can say about structure.
25 So far as Army intelligence documents are concerned,
42
1 there are examples in the relevant part of the Bundle,
2 which is files RNI-511 and RNI-512, of various types of
3 document, and I would just like to mention them briefly
4 at this stage.
5 The first documents, called daily briefs or "int
6 sums", which are intelligence summaries, produced daily
7 and for rapid dissemination of intelligence. We think
8 that int sums were also produced on a weekly and monthly
9 basis, and those reports contain more by way of
10 analysis.
11 Next, "int reps", incident reports, which were
12 produced following terrorist incidents. The Inquiry has
13 been provided with a number of these, for example,
14 including those produced in the aftermath of
15 Rosemary Nelson's murder.
16 Intelligence assessments intended to provide
17 a longer term outlook and based on identified patterns
18 of conduct or behaviour, and then military intelligence
19 source reports, or MISRs, which contain intelligence
20 gathered from sources. Finally, weapons intelligence
21 section reports or WISREPs which, again, were compiled
22 following terrorist incidents with a particular focus on
23 the weapons used. And, again, the Inquiry has seen
24 a WISREP which was produced after the murder.
25 So far as these two files, RNI-511 and RNI-512, are
43
1 concerned, I think it is fair to say that the
2 intelligence contained in them is at a relatively low
3 level. Much of the pre-murder material comprises
4 reports of sightings, presumably from foot patrols or
5 vehicle checkpoints. The reports were often voluminous
6 and it is, therefore, important to explain the approach
7 the Inquiry has taken to this material.
8 The initial searching for Army material of this kind
9 was undertaken by the Tribunal Inquiry's unit at the
10 MoD, and this search identified a large number of
11 documents referring to Rosemary Nelson. Those were then
12 reviewed by the Inquiry's team, who selected those of
13 relevance to your Terms of Reference and List of Issues.
14 There was then, however, a further filter, because
15 a number of the documents, as I have said, were very
16 long and the relevant parts of them were very modest.
17 So in this part of the Bundle, you will see examples
18 of where only part of a document -- that part relating
19 to the Inquiry's work -- has been included. Can I just
20 show you a example so that everybody is aware of this
21 from the outset. If we look at RNI-511-001 (displayed),
22 this is a brief. You remember the types of document
23 I mentioned. It is an extremely early document, and at
24 the top right-hand corner you will see "page 1 of 5".
25 So far as the Inquiry is concerned, the relevant passage
44
1 comes on the next page in the Inquiry Bundle,
2 RNI-511-002 (displayed) at paragraph (g). But you can
3 see already, I hope, from the top right-hand corner of
4 this document, that it is not page 2, but page 3 of 5.
5 So what we have here in the bundle of the five pages
6 of this document is, as it were, the cover sheet, page 1
7 of the bundle, and the relevant paragraph, which is set
8 out on page 2 of the bundle. We have not -- so
9 everybody is clear about this -- copied the other pages,
10 which contain material which is not relevant to the
11 Inquiry.
12 So far as the presentation of the document is
13 concerned, it has been processed in the standard way,
14 hence the various redactions. And when you look in more
15 detail at paragraph (g), this document being generated
16 at the end of May 1995, you will see the sort of
17 information which tends to be set out on documents of
18 this kind.
19 The Inquiry will be considering in due course what
20 the purpose was behind the collation of intelligence of
21 this kind, the basis of the comment made in this and
22 other cases, the extent to which the Army and its
23 intelligence gathering arm was interested in
24 Rosemary Nelson herself and the extent to which
25 observations such as those we see on this page and
45
1 others might have coloured perceptions of or attitudes
2 to Rosemary Nelson.
3 Sir, towards the back of this file there is a small
4 group of documents of a very different kind, and I would
5 like just to show you a couple of them. They begin at
6 RNI-511-169 (displayed), and as you can see from the
7 title, this is a pen picture. They tend to focus on
8 individuals of interest, in this case to the Army, and
9 this one, as you see, is about Mark Fulton. The detail
10 is set out on the next page -- I don't know if we have
11 that on the screen -- yes, we do -- and there is
12 information specifically about this named individual.
13 It goes on to page RNI-511-171, and another example
14 we can see at RNI-511-177 (displayed), and again, the
15 substance of the text is at RNI-511-178 (displayed) and
16 RNI-511-179 (displayed).
17 So far as file RNI-512 is concerned -- that is the
18 second volume of Army material -- this includes a number
19 of what are called "action sheets", alerting the Army to
20 threats from Loyalist, including dissident Loyalist,
21 paramilitaries. And we can see an example at
22 RNI-512-001 (displayed):
23 "Orange Volunteers are intending to continue their
24 attacks against Nationalists and Republicans,
25 particularly in the south Derry area."
46
1 Indeed, the same applies to threats from Republican,
2 including dissident Republican, paramilitaries, and we
3 can see an example of that at RNI-512-005 (displayed):
4 "Dissident Republicans are still very much intent on
5 mounting some form of terrorist attack. It is believed
6 that this may take the form of a VBIED."
7 In this, as you can probably just about make out
8 from the top right-hand corner, the second box down, its
9 origin is January 1999.
10 Taking the matter a little further forward, we can
11 see that at RNI-512-060 (displayed), it suggests, as at
12 12th March that year, very shortly before the murder:
13 "Dissident Republican elements are particularly
14 active at this moment in time. The possibility of some
15 form of terrorist attack cannot be ruled out."
16 And on the next page and the next day, RNI-512-061
17 (displayed):
18 "Republican elements are planning to mount a bomb
19 attack in the near future."
20 Now, as we understand it, those action sheets and
21 information they contain were themselves based on
22 Special Branch intelligence, and these are the sorts of
23 documents which will assist the Inquiry in considering
24 how threat information was disseminated between the
25 various agencies and what action was taken in relation
47
1 to them and whether there were, or should have been, any
2 action sheets warning of a planned attack or threatened
3 attack against Rosemary Nelson herself.
4 A second category of material in this file -- that
5 is RNI-512 -- consists of operational documents and
6 patrol reports relating to Army activity in Lurgan
7 around the weekend of the murder. An example here we
8 can see at RNI-512-023 (displayed).
9 This is a document relating, as you see, to military
10 deployments for the period between 1st and 14th March
11 this year, 1999. Now, sir, I mentioned in my opening
12 submissions that, of course, very shortly after the
13 murder a number of local residents said that there had
14 been an unusually high level of security force activity
15 in the area over the weekend before the murder and that
16 led to allegations, effectively, of collusion.
17 As I have explained already, the Inquiry will only
18 be looking at certain aspects of that in the evidence,
19 but as you know, the Inquiry has taken a number of
20 statements from Army personnel who were involved in
21 those activities over the weekend, and in particular in
22 the surge operation called Operation Improvise, which
23 again I have mentioned. And these documents form part
24 of the material to be considered in that regard. The
25 references in the opening are Day 10, 116/13 to 117/7.
48
1 As I explained then, it was in fact a long-running
2 operation with regular deployments over a period of some
3 months. Indeed, it looks as though it was activated, if
4 I can put it that way, on no less than 43 occasions in
5 the first five and a half months of the year, 1999,
6 which included the weekend before the murder.
7 The final category of MoD material which I would
8 like to mention consists of reports in relation to the
9 murder itself, produced in its immediate aftermath, and
10 they begin at RNI-512-078 (displayed) and were produced,
11 it would appear, for various different purposes, contain
12 different levels of detail. The Inquiry has taken
13 witness statements from a number of officers responsible
14 for these reports with a view to understanding, amongst
15 other things, the information on which they are based
16 and the basis which they had for any comments made in
17 these reports about Rosemary Nelson and, indeed, about
18 the murder itself.
19 Now, sir, can I mention at this point that within
20 these two files there are a number of MACER documents,
21 and I have already mentioned that system in the context
22 of Special Branch. In fact, as we understand it, that
23 database was originally created by the MoD and was used
24 both by the RUC and the Army. And again, as we
25 understand it, some of the dissemination levels I have
49
1 mentioned earlier were used by the Army and some, as it
2 were, belonged to the RUC and in particular to
3 Special Branch.
4 So the fact that material went on the system didn't
5 mean that it was open, as it were, to both
6 organisations; indeed, far from it.
7 If we look at one of the cover sheets of such
8 a document -- and this is the first document we looked
9 at, RNI-511-001 (displayed) -- you will see that it does
10 indeed look very much like the cover sheets of the RUC
11 MACER material we saw earlier. However, please note
12 that the dissemination level, top right, "DSL", is lower
13 still than anything we have seen so far: level 3.
14 Our understanding is that the Army, certain Army
15 personnel at any rate, had access to levels 3, 5, 7 and
16 13, of which 3 was, we believe, the lowest of all
17 security levels and, therefore, one assumes, the level
18 at which material was disseminated most widely.
19 Sir, in this case, you will see -- in this MoD
20 document -- the grade or reliability entry appears in
21 the document, unlike in others I have mentioned already.
22 It is given as A1. In the Army material, that entry has
23 not, generally at any rate, been redacted and appears
24 almost invariably to be A1, because as we understand it,
25 the intelligence was based on eye-witness reports from
50
1 soldiers.
2 Now, sir, so far as intelligence sharing and the
3 MACER database is concerned, can I show you another type
4 of document, which you will see in this bundle, and that
5 is at RNI-512-006 (displayed).
6 You will see it is referred to in the second line,
7 "document type: RIRAC", which we understand to signify
8 "RUC intelligence reports and comments". Now, although
9 these appear in this MoD bundle and they are properly
10 described as MoD documents, they are in fact based on
11 RUC intelligence. And as I have indicated earlier, one
12 of the issues we will be looking at with the witnesses
13 is the extent to which intelligence was shared between
14 these two organisations.
15 Sir, so far as witness evidence is concerned, the
16 Inquiry has taken statements from a number of Army
17 witnesses who were involved in intelligence gathering
18 and processing at all levels. They include two officers
19 with responsibilities for intelligence: the regional
20 military intelligence officer for the 3 Infantry
21 Brigade, covering counties Down, Armagh and East Tyrone,
22 and an assistant intelligence officer with the
23 3rd Battalion of the Royal Irish Regiment based
24 Mahon Road.
25 Through those statements, and no doubt in some cases
51
1 their evidence to you, the Inquiry will look at a number
2 of general questions, including, of course: the purpose
3 for which the Army gathered intelligence; the extent to
4 which it acted independently in that regard and the
5 extent to which it was tasked by the RUC; the way in
6 which Army intelligence was collated and analysed; the
7 extent to which it was disseminated internally; and then
8 finally, the extent to which Army intelligence was
9 disseminated amongst the wider intelligence community in
10 Northern Ireland.
11 Sir, turning then finally, in relation to the three
12 principal providers of material, to the Security
13 Service, as I have already mentioned, the Inquiry has
14 had the benefit of the statement from a former senior
15 Security Service officer, and much of what I am going to
16 outline to you at this stage is derived from that
17 statement.
18 The first point to make is that a distinction has to
19 be drawn between the Security Service's role in
20 Northern Ireland and its role in countering the threat
21 from Irish terrorism in the rest of the United Kingdom.
22 Now, outside Northern Ireland, the service had, as
23 I have explained, lead responsibility for gathering
24 intelligence on threats to national security from
25 Republican and Loyalist terrorists and for directing
52
1 intelligence operations to counter such threats.
2 This work was undertaken by T Branch, headed by
3 Director T, which was based at the services headquarters
4 in London. Within that branch, T2 had responsibility
5 for terrorist activity which threatened Great Britain;
6 T5 had corresponding responsibility for terrorist
7 activity overseas. These sections were organised into
8 desks, each of which focused on particular targets.
9 The service ran a number of sources or agents to
10 meet intelligence requirements set by T2 and T5. The
11 department responsible for recruiting, running and
12 supporting these agents or sources was known as T8 and
13 was principally based at the security services
14 headquarters in London.
15 T2 and T5 received intelligence from a variety of
16 sources, but relied in particular on intelligence
17 received from the RUC. Desk officers would liaise
18 regularly with E3 and with Special Branch officers in
19 the regions.
20 In this sense, the Security Service was both
21 a provider and a customer in relation to intelligence.
22 So far as Northern Ireland is concerned, and the
23 Security Service's role there, in accordance with the
24 concept of RUC primacy, which I have mentioned, the
25 Security Service's role in Northern Ireland appears to
53
1 have been more limited, although the precise parameters
2 of that is, of course, a matter which will be explored
3 in the evidence.
4 As with the preceding comments I have made about the
5 RUC, the following sketch is intended simply to provide
6 a framework for the issues which the Inquiry will be
7 addressing in the coming months.
8 The Security Service's primary responsibility in
9 Northern Ireland was to provide strategic intelligence
10 advice to the relevant government departments. In
11 addition to this, the Security Service provided support
12 to the RUC in a variety of ways. The most senior
13 Security Service officer in Northern Ireland was the
14 director and coordinator of intelligence, or DCI. His
15 role was advisory rather than operational. At a general
16 level, he was responsible for providing the Government
17 with strategic valuation advice; more specifically, he
18 had responsibility for advising the Secretary of State
19 for Northern Ireland in relation to the authorisation of
20 warrants for interception and eavesdropping operations.
21 He had a permanent representative in both the RUC
22 and the Army. The roles of these two representatives,
23 one referred to as DCI Rep Knock and the other DCI Rep
24 HQ NI, were largely concerned with liaison. DCI Rep
25 Knock also had a specific responsibility for processing
54
1 national security warrants on behalf of the RUC.
2 Now, perhaps the most important section of the
3 security services operations in Northern Ireland was the
4 assessments group. This comprised a number of
5 intelligence analysts headed by an assistant director
6 known as the head of the assessments group, or HAG, who
7 reported to the DCI. That group was also
8 non-operational, concentrating solely on reporting,
9 assessing and disseminating product of the intelligence
10 gathering operations.
11 The principal purpose of the assessments group was
12 to provide strategic intelligence reports and
13 assessments for government, and that was done
14 principally in the form of Northern Ireland Intelligence
15 reports, or NIIRs.
16 Sir, a number of NIIRs are included in the Part 2
17 Bundle and they can be found in file RNI-534, and I will
18 return to take you to one or two of those in due course.
19 The Security Service also had an operational role in
20 Northern Ireland. An outpost of T8 ran a number of
21 sources or agents in Northern Ireland. Although these
22 officers worked closely with the RUC and the Army, they
23 reported to a manager in London and their intelligence
24 requirements were set by T2, T5 and the assessments
25 group.
55
1 It seems that the focus of these intelligence
2 requirements was strategic intelligence relating to the
3 leadership of the paramilitary groups and intelligence
4 relating to threats outside Northern Ireland. In
5 addition, a number of officers from A Branch provided
6 specialist support to the RUC, for example, by
7 installing and managing eavesdropping devices. The
8 Security Service says that the RUC decided on targets
9 for technical devices and that any intelligence gathered
10 by such means was the property of the RUC.
11 Now, sir, a number of aspects of the Security
12 Service's activity in Northern Ireland around the time
13 of Rosemary Nelson's murder are of particular relevance
14 to your Terms of Reference. For example, the role of
15 the Security Service in advising government customers of
16 the strategic intelligence picture in Northern Ireland;
17 the content of that strategic intelligence; the role of
18 the Security Service in the warrant applications for
19 a number of technical devices; the question of who was
20 responsible for tasking the A Branch officers in
21 Northern Ireland in relation to technical operations;
22 the extent to which Security Service officers were
23 involved in the TCG; the extent to which the Security
24 Service liaised with the RUC and the Army, including in
25 particular the role of the officers embedded in the IMG
56
1 following the Warner Report; the extent to which other
2 Security Service officers worked alongside
3 Special Branch officers; and the question of liaison
4 between the assessments group and the RUC and the Army.
5 These issues, amongst others, will be considered
6 later in these hearings.
7 As I have already mentioned, the Inquiry has
8 received witness statements from a number of officers
9 who served in the Security Service in Northern Ireland
10 at the relevant time, including the DCI, the DCI Rep
11 Knock, the head of the assessments group, the directors
12 of T Branch and A Branch, several officers involved in
13 agent handling in Northern Ireland, several officers
14 involved in the intelligence assessment in
15 Northern Ireland and several officers involved in
16 technical operations.
17 Sir, so far as the documents are concerned, the
18 Security Service part of the Part 2 Bundle divides into
19 four files. The first two, RNI-531 and RNI-532, contain
20 a variety of material which has been arranged in
21 chronological order, and the division between them
22 occurs at the time of the murder and I am going to
23 return to those volumes in a moment, if I may.
24 So far as RNI-533 goes, that contains minutes of and
25 material prepared for the intelligence review committee,
57
1 and I will be explaining about that in a moment.
2 Then finally, and as I have mentioned, file RNI-534
3 contains a number of NIIRs.
4 Now, so far as RNI-531 and RNI-532 are concerned, I
5 am going to deal with some of the themes within those
6 files later on, but in terms of the type of document
7 which you will find in the two files, they are as
8 follows: first, there are a number of source reports,
9 and these contain intelligence from sources or agents
10 run by the Security Service, and for obvious reasons
11 those documents contain a number of redactions. Many,
12 but not all, of those reports are concerned with
13 Loyalist activity.
14 The second type of document is documentation
15 relating to a particular technical operation,
16 Operation Indus, which was directed against a house
17 owned by Rosemary Nelson and lived in by Colin Duffy.
18 And I will be outlining more detail in relation to that
19 operation later on today.
20 For the purposes of this introduction, however,
21 suffice it to say that the proposal for this operation
22 encountered some difficulties, and there are a number of
23 internal Security Service documents -- emails, loose
24 minutes, notes for file, et cetera -- which deal with
25 this operation.
58
1 A third category of documents belong in
2 file RNI-532, because they all post-date the murder, and
3 they relate to the murder investigation themselves and
4 these are some at least of the documents which are not
5 yet ready for disclosure to the Full Participants, as
6 the consultation process is still going on. And I hope
7 that it will be obvious from looking at file RNI-532 and
8 the missing pages within it where the omissions are.
9 Now, sir, may I just say a final word in terms of
10 providers about the Cabinet Office, because one of the
11 files in the Part 2 Bundle, file RNI-521, contains
12 Cabinet Office material; not a great deal of it, but it
13 is put in that separate file, RNI-521. And in a sense,
14 this material represents the very top of the
15 intelligence pyramid, if I can put it that way, for it
16 relates to the intelligence which was being provided,
17 discussed, analysed and then in turn requested at the
18 very highest level within government.
19 It contains only a small number of documents, as
20 I have said, and they are themselves a selection only of
21 the documents which the Inquiry has examined in
22 cooperation with the Cabinet Office. The documents
23 within this file, RNI-521, have been selected of course
24 because of their particular relevance to your Terms of
25 Reference and List of Issues.
59
1 But, sir, you have in fact already seen a
2 substantial amount of material of this kind, because
3 I opened it to you in the context of Drumcree, if you
4 remember, and in file RNI-308. Again, for everyone's
5 note, the relevant part of that was Day 9, 40/25 to
6 Day 10, 100/23.
7 Sir, the final topic I wanted to touch on in this
8 general part of my submissions is to talk about liaison,
9 and it seems that this is the right moment in which to
10 do it, because the Inquiry is concerned about the extent
11 to which intelligence was or should have been circulated
12 or disseminated within, between and beyond the
13 intelligence agencies.
14 That is something one can readily imagine will be
15 investigated with the witnesses, but we have material
16 within the Bundle which bears upon it as well.
17 That, in particular, relates to the work of various
18 committees which I would like briefly to introduce.
19 They are, in ascending order, the subdivisional or
20 divisional or, indeed, regional action committees, and
21 as we understand it, these committees provided
22 a mechanism for day-to-day coordination, primarily, we
23 think, between the RUC and the Army.
24 Next, the intelligence review committee. I have
25 mentioned it already. This was a weekly forum for
60
1 liaison in relation to intelligence production and
2 assessment. It was chaired by the DCI, it was attended
3 by senior representatives from Special Branch, the Army
4 and the Security Service. It was responsible for
5 setting the monthly priority intelligence requirements,
6 which were drafted by the assessments group and agreed
7 by the committee, the IRC. As I have said, the material
8 prepared for their meetings, and indeed the minutes of
9 those meetings, are in file RNI-533.
10 Next up the ladder, the Province Executive
11 Committee. The purpose of this committee was to provide
12 the policy oversight and coordination of counter
13 terrorist operations in Northern Ireland. Although the
14 main focus was on the RUC, it was also attended by
15 senior representatives of the Army and of the Security
16 Service, each of whom would provide a briefing.
17 Finally, the security policy meeting, held more or
18 less on a monthly basis, chaired by the Secretary of
19 State, attended by her security minister and by senior
20 NIO officials and also by the Secretary of State's chief
21 security advisers, namely the Chief Constable, the
22 General Officer Commanding and the DCI, who attended and
23 provided briefings. And as we understand it, at such
24 meetings, the, as it were, apex of the structure, the
25 DCI, usually provided an assessment based upon
61
1 consultation with the RUC and the Army.
2 So, sir, that is the general introduction that
3 I wanted to give to the Bundle, and it was in a sense an
4 attempt to help people to understand its contents, the
5 way it is structured and the context in which it is
6 properly to be viewed. What I would now like to do is
7 to focus in more detail on specific parts of the Bundle
8 and on the themes which emerge.
9 Sir, I would like to start with the Special Branch
10 material and in particular the Special Branch material
11 relating to Rosemary Nelson. Sir, before we look at any
12 of the documents, I would like, if I may, to remind you
13 of a point I made right at the outset of these hearings,
14 which is that no contemporaneous paper file on
15 Rosemary Nelson has been recovered from or disclosed by
16 the PSNI. And you will remember that the PSNI
17 disclosure statement, made by the relevant
18 Assistant Chief Constable, confirmed that the PSNI did
19 not hold a paper file on Rosemary Nelson prior to her
20 murder.
21 Sir, can we then look at the relevant material, and
22 I propose to do so in a part chronological and part
23 thematic way; in other words, not by any means to focus
24 attention on all of the material in this part of the
25 Part 2 Bundle, not by any means to deal with all of the
62
1 points which arise, but to concentrate instead on what,
2 in my submission, are the principal themes within this
3 material.
4 Now, sir, so far as the disclosure to the Inquiry is
5 concerned, it would appear that Rosemary Nelson first
6 came to the notice of Special Branch in December 1994,
7 and the way in which she came to the attention of
8 Special Branch was that it was reported at that stage
9 that she was attempting to construct a false alibi for
10 Colin Duffy, who was a suspected member of the
11 Provisional Irish Republican Army or PIRA. Mr Duffy had
12 been remanded in custody for the murder of the former
13 part-time UDR soldier, John Lyness.
14 Sir, we can see that first document, the first PRISM
15 document, within the PSNI disclosure, which refers to
16 her, at RNI-541-001. Sir, for all of these
17 documents I am hoping that the representatives of the
18 Full Participants have their hard copy files with them,
19 because I'm not intending to display any of this
20 material on the Inquiry system.
21 THE CHAIRMAN: Dame Valerie's RNI-541-001 is a blank sheet
22 of paper.
23 MR PHILLIPS: That appears to be a redaction more savage
24 even than any of the pages I have seen. Sir, it may be
25 a sensible idea to break now so that we can regroup
63
1 a little and make sure --
2 THE CHAIRMAN: Should we say 10 to two.
3 MR PHILLIPS: Yes.
4 THE CHAIRMAN: Right. We will adjourn until 10 to two.
5 (12.51 pm)
6 (The short adjournment)
7 (1.50 pm)
8 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr Phillips.
9 MR PHILLIPS: Now, sir, before the technical hitch, I was
10 about to start the examination of the Special Branch
11 files and I was telling you, if you remember, that the
12 first document or report that we have seen referring to
13 Rosemary Nelson comes in December 1994. And again,
14 using the hard copy files, we can see the relevant text
15 at RNI-541-002.
16 This is, as I say, the first PRISM document the
17 Inquiry has seen. If there is or was earlier reporting
18 about her, we haven't seen it, and that would presumably
19 include reporting recorded in a different format, i.e. not
20 on the system. And obviously, the ambits of that will
21 have to be tested in due course.
22 But moving forward to April 1996, there are three
23 reports to which I would like to draw your attention, in
24 which Rosemary Nelson was the specific subject. The
25 first we see at RNI-541-009. The report here suggests
64
1 that she was using -- this is at RNI-541-010 -- her
2 position as a solicitor to gather information for PIRA
3 in Lurgan, including details of RUC members who she
4 comes into contact with. And you will see the comment:
5 "Nelson is known to represent a number of Republican
6 activists in the Lurgan area."
7 I should say that about this time it would seem
8 in April this year, 1996 -- and we can see it at
9 RNI-541-014, the same file -- there is a specific number
10 for Rosemary Nelson. We see it at the bottom of the
11 page, SB306132. The actual date on which she was
12 allocated that number and the reason for the allocation
13 to her of that number are both entirely unclear, but
14 looking at the substance of the matter again, you will
15 see a second document here, the substance of it, and it
16 repeats the document we have already looked at.
17 Next we see later in the same file, at RNI-541-016,
18 a document, again at the bottom of the page making
19 further reference to her, saying:
20 "She would take a very keen interest within the
21 Republican movement and especially Sinn Fein whom she
22 legally represents."
23 You will see on the next page, RNI-541-017,
24 a reference to her in a list of other names, which has
25 been redacted, with her number.
65
1 Now, it would appear based on this material, that
2 from this time onwards, from 1996 we have been looking
3 at, April, that Special Branch began to gather
4 intelligence specifically relating to her, and as far as
5 those reports are concerned, they can be conveniently
6 divided into three broad categories: first, intelligence
7 on her suspected or alleged association with Lurgan
8 PIRA, including with its suspected leader, Colin Duffy;
9 second, intelligence in relation to her association with
10 the Garvaghy Road Residents Coalition; and third, a
11 miscellaneous quantity of intelligence on her, including
12 her political associations, her friendships and her
13 family.
14 I propose to look at those categories in turn,
15 although you will note, sir, as we go through, that the
16 boundaries between the three categories are often
17 blurred.
18 But, sir, before starting on that, you can see just
19 on the basis of this very early material that it is
20 possible to reach at least the following provisional
21 suggestions. First, if the intelligence from this early
22 period we have just looked at was accepted as reliable
23 by Special Branch, then in these early years, between
24 1994 and 1996, a perception may already have taken root
25 there and, who knows, possibly more widely, that
66
1 Rosemary Nelson actively supported military or militant
2 Republicanism, specifically by thwarting the prosecution
3 of Colin Duffy and more generally assisting Lurgan PIRA
4 in its targeting of RUC officers.
5 Now, sir, in due course the Inquiry will distribute
6 statements from the officers who produced or received
7 the above reports, the ones I have mentioned, and we
8 will no doubt explore with some of them called to give
9 evidence whether that was in fact the case.
10 But, sir, I would also suggest that the reporting we
11 have looked at briefly will also need to be considered
12 in the context of the anti-RUC publicity, which was
13 generated by Colin Duffy's successful appeal against his
14 conviction for the Lyness murder, which, so it was said,
15 Rosemary Nelson was herself instrumental in organising.
16 Sir, returning to the three categories or themes of
17 the intelligence in this Bundle from this point, I would
18 now like to move to 1997. Sir, the background to this
19 is of course that on 16th June that year the two RUC
20 officers were shot and killed in Lurgan. It is clear
21 from the material that the RUC received information that
22 Mr Duffy was involved in the murders and he was arrested
23 on 23rd June and subsequently remanded in custody.
24 Within weeks of those murders, Special Branch began
25 to report on Rosemary Nelson's involvement in this case,
67
1 and I would just like to show you some of that material.
2 We can begin at RNI-541-147. Sir, you see the cover
3 sheet at RNI-541-147, under the title of "Republican
4 General", leads to the substance of the report at
5 RNI-541-148. And as you will see, the suggestion here
6 was that Rosemary Nelson was making contact via an
7 intermediary with a prosecution witness in the case.
8 The report there is that she was concerned that she
9 might be found out trying to make that contact.
10 Next, at RNI-541-150 is another SIR with the text at
11 RNI-541-151; this of an altogether blander kind, you may
12 think, a report that she and CAJ were formulating an
13 application to the European Court in relation to the
14 detention of Colin Duffy. And at RNI-541-153, SIR, with
15 content at RNI-541-154, a report that she had asked
16 a local priest to stand bail on the basis that if he did
17 so, it would enhance Mr Duffy's chances of being
18 released.
19 Now, the reporting continues into September at
20 RNI-541-164, the same type of document, the same
21 heading. And here, the suggestion is that
22 Rosemary Nelson had -- and I use the word in the second
23 paragraph -- "pressurised" a witness into making
24 a statement discrediting the key prosecution witness in
25 the case. And you will see in the third paragraph the
68
1 reported intention: to fax the statement all over the
2 world to prominent politicians, including the DPP's
3 office, the Secretary of State and the press.
4 Now, this is an example of a moment at which two
5 parts of the case come together, as you will remember,
6 because we have seen in looking at documents earlier and
7 indeed in questioning earlier witnesses, that indeed
8 a statement obtained in the course of this prosecution
9 was indeed distributed, perhaps not as widely as it
10 suggests it would be in this report, but something of
11 that kind did indeed transpire.
12 Sir, moving on in the same month and further in the
13 same file, RNI-541-167, this is again the cover sheet of
14 an SIR, the heading this time "PIRA"; the substance at
15 RNI-541-168. It is about the same case and appears to
16 report a conversation. You will see the comment at the
17 bottom that she is a solicitor who represents most of
18 the PIRA members in the greater Craigavon area and is
19 known to be sympathetic to the Republican cause.
20 Now, sir, as you will remember, in due course, at
21 the beginning of October this year, 1997, the
22 Director of Public Prosecutions decided not to proceed
23 with this prosecution. However, the reporting in this
24 area, which we see recorded in the Bundle, continued
25 throughout the next year, 1998. And again, if I can
69
1 just show you a few examples.
2 The first is at RNI-542-063. This is an SIR, the
3 heading again, title "PIRA", and turning to RNI-541-064,
4 the report here is that:
5 "Rosemary Nelson continues to have a close
6 association with Lurgan PIRA, in particular
7 Colin Duffy."
8 And it also says that:
9 "She regularly briefs Colin Duffy on the CID
10 investigation and actively assists him in creating
11 alibis for PIRA murders."
12 THE CHAIRMAN: Members.
13 MR PHILLIPS: I am so sorry, "PIRA members".
14 In the following month, in March 1998, there is
15 a further report, SIR, under the heading "Republican
16 General" at RNI-542-072, and it says that:
17 "Rosemary Nelson is aware she is known by certain
18 politicians and solicitors and also the security forces
19 to be a close associate of members of the Lurgan PIRA.
20 One wonders how long she can continue to be in this
21 position and not be reprimanded by the Law Society."
22 Then at RNI-542-089, the same month, March 1998 and
23 the substance at RNI-542-090. It is another SIR under
24 the heading "PIRA":
25 "Rosemary Nelson permits member of Lurgan PIRA to
70
1 read confidential legal case note documents in the
2 secrecy of her office."
3 Sir, the final March report or document I want to
4 show you is at RNI-542-087. It is a curious document in
5 a number of ways. First, please note the title "PIRA,
6 north Armagh, Rosemary Nelson". It says:
7 "Copy to IMG, share with E3."
8 And the subject is:
9 "Rosemary Nelson speaks to Chief Constable."
10 However, when you turn the page to see where the
11 substance of the report should be, to RNI-542-088, it
12 appears to be completely blank.
13 Now, the reasons why there is no text on this page
14 are at present unclear. I think I am right in saying
15 that there is no other material the Inquiry is aware of
16 which suggests that there was at any rate a meeting
17 between Rosemary Nelson and the Chief Constable at this
18 time. It remains, therefore, something of a mystery.
19 Now, in the next month, at RNI-542-116, there is a
20 SIDD and you will notice that the dissemination level
21 is 7, so a much lower level document, and which on the
22 following page, RNI-542-117, it is reported that PIRA
23 had briefed Rosemary Nelson to instruct an individual to
24 take responsibility for an illegal weapons find.
25 Can I just try to draw some of the threads together
71
1 from that material. As far as the Inquiry can make out,
2 during 1997 and to this point in 1998, there is
3 a significant increase in the volume of Special Branch
4 reporting on Rosemary Nelson, and that reporting has
5 a focus on the following: first, on her involvement in
6 the case concerning the murder of the two constables.
7 Now, sir, again, this is an aspect at which the
8 Part 2 material has to be seen in the wider context of
9 the issues we have already heard and read about in
10 part 1, because of course this was a murder about which
11 a number of witnesses have given evidence in relation to
12 its impact, the effect that it had on people in
13 Northern Ireland, and of course more particularly on
14 those in the local area, given the stage of the peace
15 process which had been reached at that point and the
16 fact that it appeared to run quite contrary to the
17 approach of the Republican movement at that stage.
18 Secondly, focus on Rosemary Nelson's alleged ongoing
19 role in providing assistance to Lurgan PIRA. This
20 reporting we have looked at appears to consolidate in
21 that sense the intelligence received in the previous
22 years. However, you may think that it is obvious from
23 what we have just seen that Rosemary Nelson by this
24 stage has become a person of interest in her own right;
25 hence the March 1998 reporting, for example, in which
72
1 she is the principal subject.
2 Now, sir, note, please, also that most, if not at
3 all, of these reports say that the intelligence within
4 them was passed on to HQ and specifically to the
5 Special Branch department E3, which was responsible for
6 the analysis of intelligence.
7 A couple of point arise at that stage. The first is
8 this: the Inquiry has not received any reports, notes,
9 memoranda or documents produced by E3 containing
10 analysis of the intelligence on Rosemary Nelson. It is,
11 therefore, unclear what conclusions were drawn by
12 Special Branch, either locally or centrally, as to her
13 suggested involvement with PIRA.
14 Secondly, reference to E3 brings in, as it were, the
15 part 1 issue which was going on at this precise moment,
16 by which I mean March 1998, when of course the first of
17 the threat assessment exercises that I mentioned
18 a little earlier was underway with input in that
19 exercise from Special Branch.
20 The other point to note at this stage is this: it is
21 unclear, at least to the Inquiry at this point, how
22 widely any conclusions or even suspicions about
23 Rosemary Nelson's association with PIRA were known. So
24 the following specific questions arise: Was this
25 intelligence shared, passed outside Special Branch?
73
1 Specifically, was it shared with or passed to the
2 Security Service, the Army or the
3 Northern Ireland Office? If it was, how did it affect
4 attitudes towards her and ultimately, of course, towards
5 issues affecting her safety?
6 Now, within this category, the next sub-issue, if I
7 can put it that way, concerns the material which focuses
8 on the incident involving Colin Duffy in November 1997.
9 You remember that led to him being charged with assault
10 and convicted after the murder, in fact, I think on
11 1st April 1999.
12 There are several reports in this part of the Bundle
13 in November 1997, suggesting that Rosemary Nelson was
14 closely involved in highlighting the alleged harassment
15 of Colin Duffy by the RUC. Now, the first of them is
16 back in file RNI-541 and it is RNI-541-203. This is a
17 SIDD, the heading "PIRA", the dissemination level, 7,
18 and the substance is at RNI-541-204:
19 "It is believed that Rosemary Nelson is making plans
20 for Colin Duffy to take part in a Channel 4 documentary
21 which will investigate police harassment of Republicans
22 in the Lurgan area."
23 Then moving on through this bundle to RNI-541-231,
24 this is an SIR, "Republican General" is the heading,
25 much higher dissemination level, 19. The substance is
74
1 at RNI-541-232, reporting that Mr McGuinness had
2 attended her office in November to be advised on two
3 matters: first, the Hamill case -- the murder had taken
4 place in May, you see; and secondly, the point
5 I mentioned earlier, the alleged harassment of
6 Colin Duffy by the security forces.
7 Then slightly further on in the bundle at
8 RNI-541-234, this is a SIDD, dissemination 7, heading
9 "Republican General", and the suggestion is here that
10 there was to be a meeting or conference at a hotel in
11 Belfast to discuss these matters. And it says:
12 "It is probable that Rosemary Nelson arranged the
13 meeting."
14 The next report is at RNI-541-236. It is an SIR,
15 dissemination level 19, "Republican General", the
16 suggestion here being that Rosemary Nelson and
17 Colin Duffy and another person are to meet with the
18 Foreign Affairs Department of the Irish Government to
19 discuss alleged harassment by the security forces in
20 Northern Ireland.
21 So far as the case more specifically is concerned,
22 you will see a PRISM document at RNI-541-241 and its
23 substance at RNI-541-242. The suggestion here is that
24 Republicans have been telling local residents, local to
25 the incident which had led to his arrest, not to make
75
1 any statements to the police but only to Rosemary Nelson
2 or her staff.
3 Now, so far as the incident is concerned, there are
4 a number of documents in this same file, RNI-541, in
5 which resumes or summaries of the incident, as seen from
6 the RUC perspective, appear. And some of them, I think,
7 are also in the Part 1 Bundle and we have looked at some
8 already, I believe. But can I ask you to look first at
9 the resume which appears on RNI-541-220.
10 This comes, as you can see from the next page,
11 RNI-541-221, from the divisional commander for -- I
12 think it is for J Division. Yes, you can see that on
13 the preceding page.
14 You will see the reference on that same page,
15 RNI-541-220, to Mr Duffy and Rosemary Nelson, described
16 as being a vociferous in this paragraph, and in the
17 passages I think we looked at earlier in the hearing, on
18 the next page, in the fourth paragraph down, you will
19 see reference there to a propaganda war against the
20 security forces.
21 This resume, as it were, makes its way up the chain
22 to the higher levels of the RUC, and I should make clear
23 that with it came a document from a lower level officer,
24 the subdivisional commander -- I will just give the
25 reference, RNI-541-222 to RNI-541-228 -- which contains
76
1 a very detailed account of the events said to have taken
2 place in mid November. That is interesting in this
3 context for the reference at the top of RNI-541-225 to:
4 "... Rosemary Nelson's PR machine going into
5 overdrive in relation to the 'ongoing harassment of
6 Colin Duffy'."
7 Which, as you can see now, fits into the other
8 reporting that we have been looking at just a little
9 while ago.
10 Anyway, all of this material from the divisional
11 commander, including that report, goes up the chain.
12 And we can see the next stage at RNI-541-219, and this
13 is addressed to the Chief Constable and signed by the
14 Assistant Chief Constable of South Region.
15 Now, that, in turn, appears to have informed the
16 drafting of a letter dated 10th December 1997 from the
17 Chief Constable to the Secretary of State, and this is
18 not something we have seen before. Could I ask you to
19 look at it, please, at RNI-541-214. It sets out its
20 purpose at the beginning:
21 "The following information relates to the most
22 recent incidents in which Mr Colin Duffy has been
23 involved."
24 And then sets out reference to the Lurgan police
25 officer murder case, to another incident in October and
77
1 then, finally, and at greatest length, RNI-541-215, to
2 the November incident we have just been looking at, and
3 ends with the paragraphs on RNI-541-216 in which the
4 Chief Constable's view of and attitude towards Mr Duffy
5 is clearly set out.
6 It is not clear at this stage exactly what the
7 purpose of this letter was, nor indeed what happened to
8 the information set out within it so far as the
9 Secretary of State is concerned. But can I remind you
10 of at least a couple of documents in the Part 1 Bundle
11 which may help to put it in context, and the first is at
12 RNI-101-176.501 (displayed).
13 This is a document we have already seen. It is
14 dated 4th December, so just a few days earlier than the
15 letter we were just looking at, and it suggests that
16 there had been a conversation between the civil servant
17 and the superintendent at Command Secretariat. And it
18 looks from this as though there had already been
19 a request for a report from the Chief Constable on the
20 Duffy case, but that that request had "fallen between
21 the cracks".
22 Then in the second paragraph there is a request for
23 detail on the arrest and charging and the various
24 allegations about detention, and a request for further
25 information.
78
1 Beyond that, it is difficult to think of any other
2 prompt for the letter from the Chief Constable that we
3 have seen. However, it is not easy to see, as I have
4 suggested, what use, if any, the Secretary of State made
5 of the information given to her from the contemporaneous
6 correspondence -- this is December 1997, if you
7 remember -- the salient one is at RNI-105-180. That, as
8 we will see, I hope, is a letter of 9th December, the
9 day before the Chief Constable's letter we have just
10 been looking at, although it is on the same subject.
11 And this is the letter, if we go over the page to
12 RNI-105-181, you may remember, addressed to Jane Winter
13 of British Irish Rights Watch about this case in which
14 it was revealed by the Secretary of State that she would
15 be speaking to the Director of Public Prosecutions and
16 the Chief Constable about security concerns, and that
17 she had spoken to the Chief Constable about the case, as
18 had her security minister, Mr Ingram, who had also met
19 Mr McGuinness and others to discuss the situation.
20 So, sir, so far as this incident, the November 1997
21 incident, is concerned, as with the June 1997 incident,
22 the two police officers' murder, the incident garnered
23 a significant level of attention, media attention, but
24 also, as we have seen now, other attention, not least as
25 an example of what was said to be RUC harassment.
79
1 You will remember in relation to this incident
2 correspondence involving NGOs such as Ms Winter, but
3 also the involvement of the Irish Government in this
4 matter. As we had already seen -- and this Part 2
5 material simply confirms it, you may think -- it went to
6 the very highest point, both within the NIO and the RUC.
7 Now, the Special Branch reporting appears to have
8 been focused on monitoring the efforts said to have been
9 made by Rosemary Nelson to publicise, to draw attention
10 to this case. You will remember the reporting in
11 relation to the Channel 4 programme, for example.
12 But again, as with the earlier reporting I showed
13 you, it is not clear from the documents we have seen
14 what effect this reporting had or indeed what
15 conclusions were drawn from the basis of it about
16 Rosemary Nelson herself.
17 The next sub-issue under this heading I would like
18 to turn to is the material in the Part 2 Bundle, which
19 deals more specifically with the relationship between
20 Rosemary Nelson and Colin Duffy. Now, it seems that
21 from late 1997, Special Branch also began to report
22 intelligence suggesting that Rosemary Nelson was having
23 a personal relationship with Colin Duffy.
24 In November 1997, for example, it was reported that they
25 had a very close relationship, which is more than
80
1 a client/brief relationship and that they were trying to
2 keep this relationship secret.
3 In February 1998, it was reported that Colin Duffy
4 and Rosemary Nelson continued to have a "close intimate
5 relationship and were meeting almost daily". There were
6 reports of their travelling together in particular to
7 Dublin in November 1997 and in March 1998.
8 Now, sir, the first document I would like to take
9 you to in this area comes from May 1998 and it is at
10 RNI-542-121. This, sir, as you can see, is a tasking
11 request form submitted by the TCG, and it requests the
12 targeting of the location where it was said that
13 Colin Duffy was meeting Rosemary Nelson. And at the
14 bottom of the page, you will see the intelligence case
15 and what is there stated: that Colin Duffy and
16 Rosemary Nelson are having an extra marital affair and
17 regularly travel in their own vehicles to pre-arranged
18 meeting points in the greater Craigavon area.
19 In other reports, a PRISM form and in a SIR and a
20 SIDD in the same month, there were reports of them
21 meeting up and driving off in Rosemary Nelson's car.
22 And in the same month, it was reported -- and this is at
23 RNI-542-134 -- the substance of this document, which is
24 a SIR under the heading "PIRA", at RNI-542-135 was that
25 Rosemary Nelson was to purchase a house in the Kilwilke
81
1 area where Mr Duffy would reside.
2 Now, this sort of reporting continues through the
3 summer of 1998 and, indeed, it forms part of the
4 application in relation to Operation Indus, which
5 I mentioned earlier, and I will take you to that
6 material in a little while.
7 But it continues later in the year into
8 September 1998 and then October, and I can show you just
9 one example at RNI-543-038. This is a SIR under the
10 title "PIRA" and the substance is at RNI-543-039:
11 "Colin Duffy and Rosemary Nelson continue to have an
12 intimate relationship and meet secretly on a regular
13 basis."
14 Sir, so far as other sources of reporting are
15 concerned, in the previous year, in 1997, at the behest
16 of the TCG, Special Branch were also carrying out two
17 surveillance operations, which indirectly led to further
18 intelligence relating to Rosemary Nelson.
19 The first was called Operation Partoid and was
20 directed at Lurgan PIRA with the explicit aim of
21 thwarting its terrorist activities. And we can see
22 material on that, for example, at RNI-541-075. It is in
23 a familiar form, familiar to us now, with the heading
24 "TCG (South)", the operation name, the agency tasked,
25 the intelligence case, "Lurgan PIRA advanced stages of
82
1 a terrorist operation," and then the aim, which is of
2 course surveillance on Lurgan PIRA:
3 "... to arrest persons involved in terrorist
4 activity."
5 The second operation of the two I mentioned, which
6 had the title Operation Idle, was directed at a single
7 suspected PIRA member, namely Colin Duffy, although it
8 would appear from the documents that the two operations
9 seemed to have been interchangeable at times. And we
10 can see examples of the surveillance material generated
11 for it at RNI-541-078.
12 This is the PRISM cover sheet, the title "Operation
13 Partoid", the date June 1997 and the product, if I can
14 put it that way, of this is RNI-541-079. Now, you will
15 see reference there to Mr Duffy, and then lower in the
16 page, about 10 or 12 lines up from the bottom, you will
17 see a reference to Rosemary Nelson's car and to the fact
18 that there was continuing surveillance effectively of
19 the two of them from that point until the end of this
20 particular part of the operation.
21 And in summary, sir, during the course of these two
22 operations, which lasted for several months,
23 surveillance officers from E4A repeatedly reported the
24 visits or apparent visits of suspected PIRA members to
25 Rosemary Nelson's offices and also reported observations
83
1 such as the one we have just looked at at RNI-541-079,
2 and included, for example, occasions where it was
3 reported that Mr Duffy had been seen driving
4 Rosemary Nelson's car.
5 In 1998, there is further surveillance which
6 includes observation about Rosemary Nelson. For
7 example, in March of that year during another operation
8 called "Cog", it is said that Mr Duffy was observed
9 driving Rosemary Nelson in her car late at night. And
10 later in the year, in June and July, during another
11 operation called "Repugnance", an observation of
12 Mr Duffy and Rosemary Nelson together late at night is
13 made on a number of occasions.
14 So far as this material is concerned, then, sir, the
15 following points arise. On the basis of this
16 intelligence reporting, together with the surveillance
17 reports, some of which we have looked at, Special Branch
18 officers may have concluded that in 1998,
19 Rosemary Nelson was having a sexual relationship with
20 Colin Duffy.
21 As with the more general reporting on what was said
22 to be her association with PIRA, it is quite unclear who
23 knew or suspected that this might be the case. We do
24 not know whether this intelligence and reporting was
25 shared outside Special Branch. It is not clear at what
84
1 point and whether it was passed to the other agencies to
2 the Security Service, the Army or indeed the
3 Northern Ireland Office.
4 An issue also arises as to whether members of the
5 local community -- and including, of course, local
6 paramilitary groups -- had suspicions of this kind, and
7 if so, what was the basis for those suspicions, and
8 indeed, what, if anything, was the information on which
9 such views or suspicions were based.
10 Then finally in this, as in all other areas that we
11 have been looking at, how did those views, those
12 suspicions or conclusions, affect attitudes towards
13 Rosemary Nelson and, of course, ultimately her safety?
14 The next aspect of this category of intelligence
15 that I would like to look at in some detail is that
16 concerning Operation Indus. Now, in August 1998,
17 Special Branch applied for a technical operation,
18 referred to as an attack, on a house in Deeny Drive
19 owned by Rosemary Nelson and occupied by Colin Duffy.
20 The proposal for Operation Indus was made by Lurgan
21 Special Branch and made its way up through the South
22 Region of Special Branch to the Security Service and
23 eventually to the office of the DCI.
24 The original written application was made by the
25 detective sergeant of Lurgan Special Branch, and we can
85
1 see it at RNI-543-013.
2 You will see the heading and the nature of the
3 application and the addressee, the detective inspector,
4 and reference to the fact that Mr Duffy occupied the
5 house, to the role within PIRA that he was alleged to
6 hold, and beneath it the intelligence case which sets
7 out a detailed profile, no doubt based on intelligence,
8 in relation to him and his alleged or suspected
9 activities.
10 That continues over the pages until page
11 RNI-543-016, which I would like to highlight for you,
12 because there is then a reference in the paragraph
13 beginning "this role has, however ..." to his contact
14 with other prominent and leading PIRA members. And
15 there is a list, which we don't have in the bundle,
16 appendix B, of meetings.
17 But if you look just a little bit further on, on
18 page RNI-543-016, there is another section beginning:
19 "Those Republicans closest to Duffy who would be
20 regular callers to his home include ..."
21 Then a series of redacted names, each of which has
22 a relevant appendix, of which the only one we can see
23 here is Rosemary Nelson.
24 Note also, please, on the next page, at RNI-543-017,
25 the concern expressed in the middle of the page that he
86
1 is associating with dissident Republican groupings. And
2 sir, just pausing here, it is obviously important to
3 bear in mind the date of this document, which
4 is August 1998; in other words, so far as the political
5 situation is concerned, some four months or so after the
6 Good Friday Agreement, about a month after the events at
7 Drumcree in July of 1998, which, as you remember,
8 sparked interest on both sides in those events, which
9 were of great concern.
10 Turning over to RNI-543-018, you will see
11 a reference here to false alibis, and this paragraph is
12 of some interest to us clearly but the reference is to
13 a particular case involving an arsenal of weapons. It
14 would appear, looking at the earlier reporting, there
15 may be an error here in the sense that the reporting in
16 relation to Rosemary Nelson about this case did not
17 suggest that a false alibi was to be created in that
18 case. Although, of course, we have already seen --
19 indeed, it was the very first document we saw --
20 a suggestion that she had been involved in creating
21 false alibis in other cases.
22 But secondly, note, please, the reference in the
23 last sentence of the paragraph to "CID were briefed on
24 the direction of their enquiries". This is a rare
25 recorded example of where intelligence is said to have
87
1 been disseminated beyond Special Branch within the RUC.
2 It is not, however, clear to the Inquiry what the result
3 of that reporting was in that case, whether in relation
4 to the case itself or more specifically in relation to
5 Rosemary Nelson.
6 Now, sir, if you turn on the pages of this
7 application, you will see the concluding section at the
8 bottom of RNI-543-019, where the case for authorisation
9 is put forward. And it continues over the page at
10 RNI-543-020, which is a heavily redacted page, but you
11 will see the assertion there about the nature of their
12 relationship which forms part of the summary of the case
13 made by this Special Branch officer.
14 So far as the appendix, which we saw reference to
15 earlier, is concerned, that is at RNI-543-033, the
16 penultimate paragraph suggests how it was that
17 Rosemary Nelson had come to the notice of this office,
18 and the two points are made: the association with
19 leading PIRA members in the north Armagh area, and also
20 the fact that she was the legal adviser to the
21 Garvaghy Road Residents Association. And then the blunt
22 assertion in the last paragraph:
23 "Nelson uses her legal training to assist PIRA in
24 any way she can. It is clear Nelson is a dedicated
25 Republican."
88
1 Now, this application, so far as Special Branch is
2 concerned, gets passed up the chain of command in the
3 way with which we are now familiar.
4 The next document is at RNI-543-012 in the same
5 bundle, and then the next steps up, you can see, at
6 RNI-543-011 and finally at RNI-543-010, which is
7 addressed to the head of Special Branch, the relevant
8 Assistant Chief Constable for E Department. And you can
9 see, I hope, from the handwritten comment lower down on
10 the page that this application is then passed on to the
11 DCI for the warrant application to be made.
12 Sir, we will look at the other side of this, if I
13 can put it that way, the Security Service side, in
14 a moment, but you will note in relation to the PSNI
15 material that no concern is expressed at any point in
16 any of the pages we have looked at about the fact that
17 Rosemary Nelson was Colin Duffy's solicitor, and also
18 that the concept of client confidentiality, the concept
19 of legal privilege is nowhere referred to. As we will
20 see, that first enters the thinking, enters the picture
21 when the application is considered at the DCI level of
22 the Security Service.
23 Now, sir, in relation to this operation, may
24 I suggest that it is significant for at least the
25 following reason: first, it provides the clearest
89
1 possible indication of received Special Branch opinion
2 of Rosemary Nelson, both as a dedicated Republican and
3 as someone with close associations to north Armagh PIRA.
4 At the very least, it also raises her profile both in
5 relation to Security Service, as we will see in
6 a moment, because of their involvement with this matter
7 but also -- and again, as we will see in due course --
8 in relation to the Secretary of State and such senior
9 civil servants at the NIO as may have been concerned
10 with the matter when it reached that point, as in due
11 course it did.
12 But, sir, in a way, perhaps the most important point
13 about this material concerns its timing, because at this
14 point in August 1998, as you will recall, the second of
15 the threat assessments which took place that year was
16 being undertaken, and as we have already seen in
17 considering the part 1 material, views were being taken
18 and expressed and passed up the chain in a very similar
19 way to the way that we have seen the chain operate in
20 the case of this application. And, of course, with
21 involvement of the same part of the same organisation,
22 namely Special Branch.
23 So, here, as I suggested right at the outset this
24 morning, is, you may think, a case where one must see
25 the material across the board. One simply cannot form
90
1 a judgment about these issues without knowing not only
2 about the part 1 material and evidence, but also in
3 considering the Part 2 material and any evidence which
4 is called in relation to that.
5 And the issue clearly arises here as to the extent
6 to which those involved in the threat assessment work,
7 as I said earlier, not only at the bottom of the chain
8 but all the way up the chain to the very, very top, were
9 aware of these matters, aware of the basis for this
10 application and of the intelligence reporting on which
11 it was at least in part based.
12 Now, sir, the next category of intelligence within
13 the PSNI part of the Part 2 Bundle concerns the question
14 of Rosemary Nelson and Drumcree.
15 THE CHAIRMAN: Would that be a convenient moment for the
16 stenographer, if not for you?
17 MR PHILLIPS: It would be for me as well, sir.
18 THE CHAIRMAN: We will break for a quarter of an hour to 20
19 past.
20 (3.02 pm)
21 (Short break)
22 (3.20 pm)
23 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr Phillips.
24 MR PHILLIPS: Sir, so far as Drumcree is concerned, as I
25 think I indicated earlier, the reporting in this part of
91
1 the Bundle begins in 1996, in fact in May, and we can
2 see that early document at RNI-541-021. This is a PRISM
3 cover sheet, May 1996, as I say, and the title is
4 "Republican activity at Portadown" and the subject
5 "Garvaghy Road parade, Portadown". The reference is
6 a brief one towards the bottom of the page of text at
7 RNI-541-022. The penultimate paragraph simply says
8 that:
9 "Rosemary Nelson was present in her capacity as
10 legal adviser."
11 And you will see at the bottom of this page in this
12 early document, as I said earlier, that there is already
13 an allocated number.
14 At various other points in 1996 there is reporting
15 of her in this particular context, but it has to be said
16 very much from the point of view of her legal work for
17 the Garvaghy Road Residents Coalition.
18 When one looks at the 1996 reporting, it is
19 possible, I would suggest, to see it as running in
20 parallel with the other intelligence, which we have
21 already seen from this early time, as to her alleged
22 association with Lurgan PIRA.
23 The way the material is presented and the way the
24 reporting is put forward suggests again that her
25 involvement was to give strategic legal direction to
92
1 a hardline Nationalist or Republican organisation with
2 an anti-RUC agenda.
3 Now, as to the exact purpose and effect of this
4 reporting, again that is a matter unclear at this stage,
5 which will require to be considered with the witnesses.
6 In particular, issues which emerge with greater clarity
7 as the years pass need to be considered right from this
8 early point; namely, first the extent to which the
9 Coalition was perceived to be directly connected to the
10 Sinn Fein, to PIRA, and was effectively thereby an
11 extension of the Republican movement, how her perceived
12 connection with the Coalition may have led to or
13 consolidated conclusions about her political or
14 paramilitary allegiances and, as ever, what it tells us
15 about possible effects on attitudes towards her and, of
16 course, to the question of her safety.
17 Finally, in this, as in other, areas, there is the
18 specific question of the extent to which her association
19 with the Coalition may have led, whether at this time or
20 perhaps more likely later in the history, to her
21 becoming a paramilitary target or being perceived as, in
22 the view of those in that world, a legitimate target.
23 Moving through to 1997, intelligence involving
24 Rosemary Nelson and Drumcree continues in that year and
25 I can show you an example from June 1997 at RNI-541-092.
93
1 This is a SIR under the heading "Republican General",
2 the substance at RNI-541-093, and in a sense the report
3 is rather low-key and simply says that she was present
4 in a legal capacity at a meeting between the Coalition
5 and the Secretary of State. Perhaps of greater interest
6 for us is the comment:
7 "Nelson has firm PIRA sympathies."
8 The reporting continues into the key month
9 of July, July 1997, when we see, for example, at
10 RNI-541-104 in the same bundle, RNI-541, substance at
11 105, reporting on her contact with the Secretary of
12 State's office. And again, sir, you will remember from
13 the part 1 material, I am sure, the uncertainty which
14 persisted to the very last minute in 1997 and her role
15 in seeking to find out from the Secretary of State what
16 the decision as to the march was with a view to the
17 possibility at least of getting an injunction to stop it
18 proceeding.
19 Now, I have just shown you a couple of examples, but
20 as far as one can tell, the reporting in this area,
21 Rosemary Nelson and Drumcree, does increase
22 significantly during 1997. There is another aspect
23 here, which we see in the following year; namely,
24 reporting of Rosemary Nelson taking a lead in drawing
25 international attention to Drumcree through her legal
94
1 connections. And again, it is, as it were, the Part 2
2 side of what we are already very familiar with in
3 relation to the international observers and other
4 visitors in the part 1 material.
5 Moving into 1998, the intelligence reporting
6 continues, and here, sir, of course, the wider political
7 context which I mentioned earlier is important, and in
8 particular the fact, attested to by a number of
9 witnesses, that the Drumcree issue and the violence, the
10 protest, the conflict that it sparked, was seen by some
11 as having the potential to halt or, at the very least,
12 to stall the peace process, because it had become a focus
13 of dissident activity on both sides, leading in turn, as
14 you remember, in the second half of that year to close
15 and high level political involvement by the UK
16 Government, culminating in the involvement of Mr Powell
17 in the proximity talks which continued into the
18 following year, 1999.
19 So in these reports we see a flavour of that. Can
20 we start with one from March 1998, and this is in the
21 next file, RNI-542-078. It is a SIR, under the title
22 "Republican General". And, sir, while we are on
23 RNI-542-078, which is the cover sheet, there is another
24 point which applies to a number of documents in the
25 Part 2 Bundle, the PSNI section of it, which concerns
95
1 dissemination.
2 You will see in the second part of text under "SIR
3 basic details" the text caveat -- again, we have seen
4 it -- is "no downward dissemination". But there is
5 underneath it a caveat qualification box, and this, in
6 this or other forms, indicates so far as the Inquiry is
7 concerned that this material was in fact disseminated,
8 passed to the Security Service. And sometimes we will
9 see, as we look through, there is a specific reference
10 to dissemination to the Security Service; sometimes the
11 expression "box" is used. There is confirmation of that
12 at RNI-542-080. If you look over the page, it says
13 "SIDD partial box only". And again, one sees that in
14 particular in relation to Drumcree-related intelligence
15 on a number of pages within this bundle.
16 But, sir, turning to the substance of this, the
17 reporting is at RNI-542-079 and it refers to a meeting
18 between two residents groups, in fact the Lower Ormeau
19 Road group and the Garvaghy Road one, attended here by
20 Rosemary Nelson and Mr Mac Cionnaith.
21 The next report I would like to show you is at
22 RNI-542-205. It is another SIR, the title this time
23 "PIRA", and here the first document of this kind we have
24 seen. The two strands of reporting that we have been
25 looking at are brought together, because this report
96
1 deals with the alleged role of Mr Duffy in orchestrating
2 the rioting. This is just before the marching season,
3 at the very end of June 1998, and then secondly
4 a reference to Mr Mac Cionnaith and Rosemary Nelson,
5 both of whom were said to have been present.
6 That then leads to a further report, which is at
7 RNI-542-208. The substance at RNI-541-209. Suggestion
8 that Rosemary Nelson was instructing local PIRA members
9 to open an incident room at the community centre to
10 record all complaints about the police so that she could
11 submit it to the Policing Commission -- I think that
12 must be the Patten Commission -- that was in session, if
13 I can put it that way, at this time.
14 Now, there are unsurprisingly a large number of
15 reports from July 1998, as it were, the key moment in
16 relation to Drumcree, and I would just like to look at
17 a couple of them. The first is at RNI-542-247. This is
18 the cover sheet of a SIR, "Republican General", and
19 here, as you see, the dissemination to the Security
20 Service is explicit in the second section of text. The
21 substance of the report is at RNI-542-248, and again, it
22 reports on intended legal action and what are said to be
23 Rosemary Nelson's plans in that regard.
24 Now, at RNI-542-266, we will see slightly later in
25 the story a reference in a SIR, same dissemination,
97
1 RNI-542-267, reference here to the proximity talks,
2 a list of people involved and Rosemary Nelson said to be
3 present as note-taker.
4 So, sir, that is just a small sample of the
5 reporting during July. The next document from July,
6 however, is of a different kind, and you can see it at
7 RNI-542-259.500.
8 This is an application written by the detective
9 sergeant at Lurgan Special Branch and we can see that
10 from RNI-542-259.503. The nature of the application
11 appears from the first page, RNI-542-259.500.
12 Now, unfortunately this is not a document which is
13 particularly easy to read, certainly in the second half
14 of this page, but I think it is clear enough that this
15 is an application for a telephone intercept at
16 Rosemary Nelson's work address. So the application was
17 to tap her phone at her solicitor's office.
18 You will see in the second paragraph the purpose of
19 the application, which is to obtain intelligence in
20 relation to the ongoing Drumcree situation in Portadown.
21 In the third paragraph, it points out that she is
22 a practising solicitor and refers to what was said to be
23 her client base: Republican movement, including PIRA,
24 Sinn Fein and residents groups, in particular the
25 Garvaghy Road Residents Coalition. Then the next
98
1 paragraph, as you see, describes her as being:
2 "A close confidant of Colin Duffy, Lurgan PIRA, with
3 whom she is in regular daily contact. She openly
4 supports their cause, and intelligence states that she
5 has 'flouted the law' by creating alibis and
6 'orchestrating witness evidence' [that appears to be in
7 quotation marks] for PIRA members arrested for terrorist
8 offences, including murder. Nelson's solicitor's
9 business success has been due to her commitment to the
10 Republican cause where she has since achieved status by
11 meeting United Nations representatives, invited to the
12 USA to meet congressmen sympathetic to Irish
13 Nationalists and in regular contact with the Irish
14 Government over the issues of Drumcree, the Hamill
15 murder in Portadown in 1997 and the alleged security
16 force harassment of Colin Duffy."
17 It then says that:
18 "She is undoubtedly a significant personality in the
19 Drumcree situation where she is readily available to
20 offer her expert advice to Breandan McKenna and
21 Colin Duffy, two of her closest associates at this time.
22 She also prepares statements on McKenna's behalf,
23 issuing to the media ... that a telephone intercept
24 against Nelson's office at this time would produce
25 valuable intelligence to greatly assist Special Branch
99
1 in keeping abreast of the Garvaghy Road Residents
2 Coalition's views and plans towards the ongoing
3 developments."
4 There follows, sir, a series of summaries of bits of
5 reporting, some of which we have now looked at with the
6 various SIR numbers to identify them, and at the end, on
7 the next page, RNI-542-259.503, the concluding paragraph
8 asks for urgent consideration to be given to this
9 application:
10 "I firmly belief it will produce valuable
11 intelligence to assist us at this time in relation to
12 the Drumcree situation."
13 Now, sir, the Inquiry has received no further
14 documents about this application, unlike in the other
15 case I have shown you, in Indus, we don't have the
16 documents which pass the application up the chain, and
17 we have been given to understand that there are no
18 documents, no further documents, in relation to this
19 application. On that basis, it would appear, therefore,
20 that the application did not progress beyond this stage,
21 the proposal stage.
22 At this point, sir, I simply make the observation
23 that in this document there is no comment on,
24 appreciation of or even reference to any possible
25 question of client confidentiality. The concept of
100
1 legal privilege is not one that found its way into this
2 application. It is not discussed, it is apparently not
3 seen as an impediment, still less a bar to the proposal.
4 Plainly, that means that all related and further
5 questions about this application will have to be pursued
6 in the course of the evidence.
7 So, sir, drawing some of the 1998 points together,
8 there is more reporting in 1998 on this issue. That
9 increase coincides, you may think, with the increase in
10 the political significance of Drumcree in 1998. There
11 are a number of reports on Rosemary Nelson's legal,
12 strategic and advisory role in relation to the Residents
13 Coalition and also on the alleged connection between the
14 Coalition and north Armagh PIRA, specifically through
15 the three individuals whose names we have seen:
16 Rosemary Nelson, Mr Mac Cionnaith and Colin Duffy.
17 So far as the application for a telephone intercept
18 on Rosemary Nelson's office is concerned, a number of
19 specific questions arise: first, what does it tell you
20 about the perception of Rosemary Nelson at that time;
21 why was it, if this is the case, not pursued; where the
22 idea for it originated; who it was who tasked the local
23 Special Branch with the role of gathering in
24 intelligence of this kind; and whether and to what
25 extent the Security Service were involved at any stage
101
1 of this application, given the political and strategic
2 significance of Drumcree at this time.
3 Sir, the third and final category is a miscellaneous
4 category of intelligence, which I propose to deal with
5 very briefly, because in 1997 and 1998, in particular,
6 there was a good deal of reporting which appears to have
7 focused on Rosemary Nelson herself, rather than on her
8 in relation to her work, as we have seen it with the
9 Drumcree case, or her other relationships and alleged
10 involvement or connection with PIRA.
11 You can break it down into five categories: First,
12 her work on, involvement with the family of
13 Robert Hamill; secondly, her family and home life;
14 thirdly, her social life; fourth, her professional,
15 political and religious associations; and finally, her
16 contact with politicians, with NGOs and with other
17 organisations.
18 Sir, because of the miscellaneous nature of this
19 reporting, I'm not going to take you to more than
20 a couple of documents, but simply to give you some of
21 the substance. In relation to the Hamill family, there
22 is reporting in May 1997, for example, that it was
23 Sinn Fein that had put the family in contact with her.
24 Later in that year, in December, the reporting is that
25 she was planning to launch an appeal for funds to bring
102
1 a private prosecution against those involved in his
2 murder. That is RNI-542-001.
3 In relation to her family, there is reporting at the
4 end of 1997 that she was considering having security
5 devices fitted to her house. And we can see that
6 briefly at RNI-542-013. It comes in the form of a SIR
7 under the heading "Republican General". It is when you
8 turn the page to the substance at RNI-542-014, that is
9 literally all there is.
10 In February 1998, there is a report -- and I am
11 going to show it to you -- RNI-542-053, the substance
12 being -- this is a SIDD, dissemination level 7, the
13 substance being at RNI-542-0534, which is about her
14 background and indeed her father, and contains the
15 information that he drives a mini bus.
16 Later in this same file, at RNI-542-055, there is
17 a similar short report, this time about Mr Nelson and
18 his work, a description of him and of his social habits.
19 There are a number of reports in relation to her
20 social life, trips with friends, holidays abroad, for
21 example, and then in the fourth category, a series of
22 miscellaneous reports about her professional, political
23 and religious associations, the fact that she was the
24 legal adviser to the Drumcree Faith and Justice Group,
25 the fact she was to become a member of the CAJ, again
103
1 reporting in relation to media coverage, the Channel 4
2 documentary. And at RNI-542-050, we see in the form of
3 a SIR, dissemination level 19, on page RNI-542-051 there
4 is a report about Nuala McCann. It just says:
5 "She is an associate of Rosemary Nelson, possibly
6 works for her in her capacity as a solicitor."
7 Now, in some later reporting we see what appear to
8 be slightly more substantial bits of information, and I
9 can show you a couple: RNI-542-075 in the same file,
10 dated from March 1998, the substance at RNI-542-076, and
11 here is a familiar theme from the part 1 material:
12 "Rosemary Nelson is alleging that the
13 Chief Constable recently informed visiting members of
14 the United Nations that a number of practising
15 solicitors actively work for and support PIRA."
16 And further suggestions there. And it is
17 a reminder, sir, that of course at this precise
18 time, March 1998, if I can put it this way, the part 1
19 world, the controversy surrounding the draft report of
20 Mr Cumaraswamy and what had allegedly been said at
21 the meeting at the end of November, had broken. And we
22 have heard already evidence about Rosemary Nelson's
23 personal involvement in that.
24 And we see later in that year, in August, at
25 RNI-543-004, in a SIR, dissemination level 19:
104
1 "No dissemination outside Special Branch level."
2 A report at RNI-543-005, saying that:
3 "Rosemary Nelson had recently lectured at Cambridge
4 University on issues such as alleged security force
5 harassment of Nationalists, Drumcree and the unfair
6 justice system in Northern Ireland."
7 And saying that whilst she was there, she befriended
8 members of Steven Lawrence's family.
9 Throughout the rest of the year her activities at
10 this level are tracked. There is reporting on her going
11 to speak at Congress. We have heard about that, her
12 address to the congressional subcommittee in October.
13 She is reported as meeting the Patten Commission, and
14 in November the topics she is said to have raised with
15 the Commission get their own report at RNI-543-096. You
16 will see at the bottom of the page, RNI-543-097, the
17 various points that she was said to be wanting to raise
18 at her meeting with the Commission, 1 to 4.
19 Sir, my submission is that this sort of rag bag of
20 reporting is best seen in the context of the other
21 intelligence on Rosemary Nelson which we have already
22 looked at. It provides a detailed, although one might
23 also say a somewhat distorted perspective on her
24 personal and political associations, and indeed on the
25 breadth of her national and international connections.
105
1 But the volume and the detail of the reporting gives
2 rise to a series of questions. Why was Special Branch
3 recording information of this kind relating to
4 Rosemary Nelson's private life, including details of her
5 family, friends, people who worked in her solicitor's
6 office? Why was Special Branch gathering information on
7 her political associations? Was her engagement, for
8 example, with the Patten Commission seen as part of
9 a wider Nationalist or Republican strategy? And what
10 happened to this sort of information? Was it
11 disseminated within the RUC? Was it shared? Was it
12 passed outside the RUC? Did the RUC Special Branch or
13 other intelligence agencies consider this reporting
14 alongside the other types of intelligence reporting we
15 have looked at earlier, and if so, what conclusions were
16 drawn and how did that in turn affect the question of
17 her safety?
18 But given the focus of this reporting and the
19 minutiae of her life which is set out in reports which
20 are solely devoted to her, in my submission, the
21 question arises again as it did at the opening of my
22 submissions on this part of the Bundle: how likely is it
23 in the light of this intense focus that there was in
24 fact a file on Rosemary Nelson in existence at the time
25 of her murder?
106
1 Now, so far as intelligence leading up to that point
2 is concerned, which takes us into the early part of
3 1999, there appears, on the basis of the material which
4 has been disclosed to the Inquiry, to be very little
5 Special Branch intelligence reporting either directly or
6 indirectly on her.
7 There are a couple of examples, and I will show you
8 one of them, and that is at RNI-543-136. That is
9 a PRISM document, January 1999, the substance at
10 RNI-543-137, referring to an ex-prisoners' centre in the
11 Lurgan area and how she and another person are liaising
12 closely with Colin Duffy and another person and are
13 making great efforts to help them in any way they can.
14 Then one further report at RNI-544-011 -- again,
15 from January 1999, the substance at RNI-544-012 --
16 refers to a campaign against the RUC, following
17 someone's alleged approach by Special Branch and how
18 Rosemary Nelson had been mentioned as being -- and it is
19 in quotation marks -- "on side" and that she would be
20 keen to do a TV interview.
21 As far as we can see, from this point there is no
22 further reporting, Special Branch reporting, about her
23 until the SIR dated 16th March, which briefly sets out
24 the circumstances of her murder the previous day and
25 refers to the claim of responsibility by the
107
1 Red Hand Defenders. Sir, I'm not going to take you
2 through that document, but for the note, as it were, it
3 is at RNI-544-121.
4 Sir, at this stage, it is not possible to reach even
5 a preliminary conclusion as to whether the apparent
6 tailing off of intelligence on Rosemary Nelson in the
7 early months of 1999 is significant or suspicious in any
8 way. However, what is apparent is that, so far as
9 Special Branch is concerned, on the basis of this
10 material there appears to have been no advanced
11 indication whatsoever that Rosemary Nelson was being
12 targeted by paramilitary organisations or indeed by
13 anyone else, or that she would be murdered. And that is
14 obviously a matter of significance for the Inquiry.
15 So, sir, at a later stage, when you come to consider
16 the evidence on this material, you will no doubt wish to
17 establish whether there was in fact no advance
18 intelligence in relation to the threat or the murder; or
19 alternatively, whether there was intelligence received
20 and recorded but it hasn't emerged in the process of
21 disclosure to the Inquiry; whether such intelligence was
22 received but not recorded or reported by Special Branch;
23 or whether it was indeed reported but subsequently
24 removed or deleted from the relevant databases as to
25 which the evidence which I mentioned earlier, the
108
1 statement in relation to the computer systems, will be
2 of great importance.
3 Sir, that is a run through of the larger of the
4 various parts of the Bundle, which relates to PSNI and
5 Special Branch.
6 I would now like to say something about the Security
7 Service material and in particular about file RNI-531.
8 Now, sir, as I think I have already explained, this
9 file contains Security Service material from 1996 to the
10 time of Rosemary Nelson's murder in March 1999. I would
11 like to deal with the material in three categories. The
12 first is the material that relates to Operation Indus;
13 the second is the intelligence on Loyalist paramilitary
14 activity; and the third, intelligence on Republican
15 paramilitary activity.
16 I have outlined what Operation Indus was and we have
17 looked at the application made by the sergeant at Lurgan
18 Special Branch. As I have said, the Security Service
19 was then involved with the operation and there were two
20 aspects to that: First, assistance was given with the
21 warrantry process required under the Interception of
22 Communications Act 1985; and second, Security
23 Service officers were involved with the technical
24 planning and implementation of the operation.
25 Now, it appears that the Security Service were first
109
1 notified of the proposed operation during a meeting with
2 the TCG (South) on 6th August 1998, and we can see that
3 at RNI-531-022 under the heading "Forthcoming Jobs: new
4 requirement", and the sentence in the second line:
5 "This is Duffy's new permanent address that he has
6 been installed in by Rosemary Nelson."
7 Now, thereafter, senior officers in the Security
8 Service, including the DCI himself, became concerned by
9 the fact that Rosemary Nelson owned this property and
10 was Colin Duffy's solicitor, and there were two
11 particular concerns: first, that if the operation were
12 compromised, it would be presented as a further example
13 of harassment by the RUC, both of Colin Duffy and of
14 Rosemary Nelson herself; and secondly, Rosemary Nelson's
15 connection to the property and to Colin Duffy meant that
16 the interception had the potential to offend principles
17 of legal professional privilege.
18 We can see those concerns outlined in an email,
19 which is at RNI-531-024, and you can see from the first
20 line that we have of it, its date is at the end
21 of August 1998, and in the text under "Message
22 Contents", you will see that at (a) and then (b), are
23 concerns said to have been expressed by the DCI about
24 the sensitivities of this operation.
25 You will also see, as it were, right at the
110
1 beginning, the way in which Rosemary Nelson was regarded
2 by the author of this email:
3 "Nelson is the solicitor and lover of Colin Duffy,
4 the target of the operation."
5 And note also, please, in the third line:
6 "DCI Rep has reported that [the Secretary of State]
7 has taken a particular interest in the case and similar
8 claims of harassment by Duffy himself."
9 Again, you may think that is borne out by the part 1
10 material involving the Secretary of State that we have
11 already seen.
12 You see in the succeeding sentences the concern
13 about a compromise could be presented as further
14 harassment, and the plan. The plan is that DCI should
15 speak to the head of Special Branch and the
16 Chief Constable before the warrant is submitted to the
17 Secretary of State to ensure "that they are fully signed
18 up".
19 Then (b) is the privilege concern. If there is
20 a successful installation, reference to similar issue
21 and the understanding from the DCI Rep Knock is that on
22 this occasion, the DCI is minded to include some
23 reference to the issue -- that is the issue of legal
24 privilege -- in the submission.
25 Now, sir, in summary, these concerns led, it would
111
1 appear, to very considerable debate and discussion at
2 the highest levels, it would certainly appear within the
3 Security Service and the RUC, and in due course to the
4 involvement of the Secretary of State herself. She
5 insisted, as we will see, on being fully briefed about
6 the operation's potential ramifications.
7 Can we just see how this works out. The next
8 document, RNI-531-025, at the bottom of the page; this
9 is one is 1st September, under the heading "Intelligence
10 Case", the last few lines before the final redaction:
11 "There are sensitivities which will need to be borne
12 in mind. The property is owned by his girlfriend,
13 Rosemary Nelson, who is also his solicitor. She
14 recently won a harassment case against the RUC.
15 Compromise of the operation could be presented as
16 further harassment. There could also be questions of
17 legal privilege to consider in the event of a successful
18 installation."
19 And then turning the page to RNI-531-026, we will
20 see here the various discussions going on at high levels
21 within Special Branch. In this case, if you see at
22 paragraph 1 and 2, with the regional head of
23 Special Branch south. And the point is taken in the
24 second paragraph that the original application -- that
25 is the one we have seen -- had not referred to the fact
112
1 that Rosemary Nelson owned the target property, and it
2 is stressed in the fourth line:
3 "It was, therefore, important that the head of
4 Special Branch and the Chief Constable were fully aware
5 of the operation."
6 Then a proposal as to privilege, i.e. that there would
7 have to be specific guidelines for dissemination of the
8 product to cover any legally privileged conversations
9 that might take place.
10 At the end, the author makes the point that the
11 Secretary of State was well aware of Nelson's complaints
12 to the PCA -- that, I assume, must be the ICPC -- and
13 getting the warrant signed could not be taken for
14 granted.
15 Now, at RNI-531-028 is the loose minute written by
16 the DCI. It is addressed to Director A and it sets out
17 what actually happened when he went to discuss the case
18 with the Secretary of State. It appears that that
19 discussion took place on 4th September 1998.
20 Just highlighting some of the content here, in
21 paragraph 3, the various concerns of the Secretary of
22 State are recorded by the DCI. She was anxious about the
23 operation, the extra mileage which could be extracted
24 from any compromise, including allegations of RUC
25 harassment and of interference with lawyer/client
113
1 relations.
2 Then further down the page, the question of
3 privilege is apparently discussed, and then over the
4 page the Secretary of State asks who in the RUC had been
5 consulted and the DCI reports himself as saying that:
6 "In addition to the normal process of consultation,
7 I had spoken personally to the head of Special Branch
8 and intended to mention it to the Chief Constable in
9 recognition of the sensitivities.
10 "On the basis of this discussion, but not without
11 further assertions of anxiety, the Secretary of State
12 signed the warrant."
13 Sir, you can see immediately from the next
14 sentences, her signature was conditional on two points:
15 one, that she wished to see the guidance on legally
16 privileged material as early as possible, and to be
17 informed if the entries under the warrant went ahead
18 before she could see it. And the minute ends with
19 a request to be kept informed of any developments in the
20 case:
21 "... as the Secretary of State is sure to ask at
22 future signings."
23 Indeed, we can see those two caveats recorded in
24 handwriting at RNI-531-027, an earlier page:
25 "Informed of all developments of the op at the
114
1 earliest opportunity and to be given guidance on the
2 aspects of legal privilege before the op deploys."
3 So, sir, you can see in the text of paragraph 4 that
4 this particular application is an application recognised
5 by the Security Service as being out of the ordinary.
6 It involved consultation with the RUC outside the normal
7 process of consultation, including the head of
8 Special Branch and the Chief Constable.
9 His comment that he would be discussing it with the
10 Chief Constable we can see coming to fruition at
11 RNI-531-030, and a meeting on the same day. Again, this
12 is a note by the DCI, and in the course of what appears
13 to have been a wider discussion, we will see in the
14 unredacted part of subparagraph 3 a reference to the
15 latest Duffy warrant and the Nelson connection.
16 It is interesting to see in the penultimate sentence
17 that he, the Chief Constable, didn't appear to have been
18 briefed before this meeting about Duffy and this
19 particular case, but was going after that, that evening,
20 to talk to the regional Special Branch heads.
21 Now, what appears to be the formal application
22 begins at RNI-531-031, and under the intelligence case
23 paragraph 3, there is material about Mr Duffy continuing
24 into paragraph 4. And note, please, the reference to
25 "possible or actual links with dissidents", the
115
1 suggestion "eagerness to return to violence", and
2 finally what I am going to call the Drumcree connection.
3 The points which have been the subject of all the
4 discussions we have been looking at are set out in
5 paragraph 9 at RNI-531-033, the reference there to
6 Rosemary Nelson and the question of privilege and the
7 way it was proposed to be addressed or dealt with.
8 In fact, as we can see from later material in this
9 bundle, the operation did not go into effect at any
10 point before the murder of Rosemary Nelson, and after
11 the murder a decision was taken, I think in July 1999,
12 that the operation should not proceed. So, in fact, as
13 far as one can see from the material in this bundle, it
14 did not progress beyond the planning stage, despite the
15 effort that had obviously had to be made to persuade the
16 Secretary of State to sign the relevant warrant.
17 Sir, looking at this material, which we have done
18 very, very briefly -- and we haven't looked by any means
19 at all of it -- may I make the following submissions.
20 It is, I would suggest, significant for a number of
21 reasons in addition to those that I have put to you on
22 the basis of the Special Branch material. It shows
23 again what was believed to be Rosemary Nelson's close
24 association with PIRA on the one hand and with Mr Duffy
25 in particular on the other, and that knowledge being
116
1 held at the very highest level within the NIO, within
2 the Security Service and within the RUC.
3 And I should say this: an aspect of the application,
4 when it reached the Secretary of State, that we will
5 wish to explore in the evidence is whether at that
6 point, if not before, there was also involvement by
7 senior civil servants within the NIO.
8 The application and the way it was considered and
9 addressed also, in my submission, illustrates
10 Rosemary Nelson's political importance, the concern, as
11 you will remember it, of the adverse publicity that she
12 could bring to bear to the operation if it were
13 compromised. And it also confirms, you may think,
14 a general acceptance of the view, obvious from the
15 Special Branch material, as to Mr Duffy himself: that he
16 was a dangerous and committed Republican paramilitary
17 who had the potential to become a dissident leader at
18 a time when mainstream PIRA leadership seemed more
19 positively to be engaged in the political process.
20 Sir, the other thing about it, of course, as I have
21 said before, is timing, because again, as these events
22 were playing out in early September 1998, the question
23 of Rosemary Nelson's own safety was under active
24 consideration. Remember that the August threat
25 assessment I have mentioned earlier, that episode, if I
117
1 can put it that way, came to a conclusion only with the
2 letter from the NIO, which was dated
3 24th September 1998. And the reference to that is
4 RNI-106-324.
5 Now, sir, that is the first of the categories of
6 material. The second is that concerning Loyalist
7 paramilitary activity, and the obvious caveat to enter
8 here in relation to this file is that plainly what has
9 made its way into this file does not represent the
10 totality of the Security Service's intelligence in
11 relation to Loyalist groups in the relevant period;
12 namely, 1996 to 1999.
13 This is a small selection focusing on Loyalist
14 activity in north Armagh and particularly on the issue
15 of the targeting of Nationalists.
16 Broadly speaking, there are two themes to be
17 discerned in this category of reporting: First,
18 intelligence on the targeting of Mr Duffy by
19 Billy Wright and the UVF in late 1996 and early 1997
20 respectively; and secondly, intelligence on the
21 formation and intentions of what appeared to be new
22 Loyalist groupings from late 1998 onwards, specifically
23 the Red Hand Defenders, RHD, and the Orange Volunteers,
24 OV.
25 Sir, can I just show you one or two of the documents
118
1 in this category. The first is at RNI-531-004, and this
2 is a targeting report. And in essence, I have given you
3 the substance of it because it relates to Mr Duffy, and
4 it is said that he is the planned target of
5 Billy Wright.
6 Now, the next document chronologically relates to
7 the LVF, and this is at RNI-531-011, the same file. And
8 this is, again, intelligence in relation to a planned
9 attack on him in April of 1997. You see the date at the
10 top of the page, 8th April 1997.
11 Just following this document through so we can see
12 the way these reports work, on this page, RNI-531-011,
13 we have a section A. At RNI-531-013, we have other
14 comments and you will see at the top of the page that
15 the intelligence was passed to the RUC. And in what
16 appears to be a later copy of the same document at
17 RNI-531-014, in handwriting the Security Service
18 officer, under this "Comment" heading, says:
19 "Thanks. As discussed, we are unable to do anything
20 with this except watch from the sidelines. It would be
21 sad if the RUC were unable to warn Duffy in time ..."
22 Now, on the question of Loyalist activity more
23 generally and moving through to the end of 1998, there
24 are a series of reports about the emergence of the new
25 groupings I have mentioned earlier; the first at
119
1 RNI-531-084. This is about the Red Hand Defenders. The
2 next at RNI-531-090, the same month, November, and this
3 is about the Orange Volunteers. And there are later
4 reports on these organisations through to March of 1999
5 in this bundle.
6 Can I just show you briefly the March documents:
7 RNI-531-118, 3rd March, about the Orange Volunteers, and
8 then the next report at RNI-531-121 about the
9 Red Hand Defenders saying at (2), the bottom of the
10 page:
11 "The title of the Red Hand Defenders was used as
12 a flag of convenience by Orange Volunteers and other
13 dissident Loyalist groups to claim attacks that
14 ordinarily they would not want to own up to."
15 And you will see again the comment which comes at
16 RNI-531-123 in the handwriting:
17 "This is further corroboration for our view that the
18 RHD is not an actual group, although the Chief Constable
19 takes a different view."
20 I think that says:
21 "The UDA has used the RHD to claim a number of
22 sectarian attacks."
23 Sir, we will look at one or two more documents about
24 Loyalist organisations in a moment, but so far as these
25 documents are concerned, the two categories, you will
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1 see certainly in file RNI-531, there is some reporting
2 but not very much. It appears to be not particularly
3 detailed. As I have said, the key point about timing is
4 their emergence late in 1998, and the reports are still
5 coming in, as you see, right up to the month of
6 Rosemary Nelson's murder.
7 None of the reports, as far as we can see, refer to
8 the targeting of any specific individual and certainly
9 not to Rosemary Nelson. And again, there is nothing in
10 the Security Service disclosure that we have seen to
11 suggest there was any warning or intelligence in advance
12 that any such attack, whether by these organisations or
13 any other organisation, was about to be mounted.
14 However, so far as more general analytical work on
15 these groupings is concerned, we will see that in
16 a minute in the documents in RNI-533 and RNI-534. What
17 we have here are the source reports rather than the
18 broader analysis work.
19 So far as targeting and the earlier documents we saw
20 in relation to Colin Duffy are concerned, they seem to
21 show that the Security Service, when provided with
22 intelligence of that kind, passed it on to the RUC to
23 deal with, as it were, on the ground. And you will no
24 doubt draw whatever conclusions you feel appropriate
25 about the handwritten comment I showed you earlier.
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1 This is early material. We don't see similar
2 material in relation to him in the service files in 1998
3 and 1999. And, again, to stress, there is no reporting
4 in these files referring to any targeting of his
5 associates, including Rosemary Nelson.
6 Sir, I haven't quite finished. Would that be a good
7 moment for a short break?
8 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.
9 (4.30 pm)
10 (Short break)
11 (4.45 pm)
12 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.
13 MR PHILLIPS: Sir, the third and final category of material
14 in this file, RNI-531, relates to Republican
15 paramilitary activity and, of course, as I pointed out
16 with the Loyalist material, what you find in the file
17 does not in any sense represent the totality of the
18 intelligence material on these groups in the relevant
19 period, which is 1997 to 1999. However, there is
20 reporting here on issues with a connection to
21 Rosemary Nelson. For example, intelligence in relation
22 to Colin Duffy, intelligence in relation to Colin Duffy
23 and Rosemary Nelson, and intelligence on PIRA and
24 Drumcree.
25 Sir, in the interests of time, I'm not going to take
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1 you to any of the documents within that category, but
2 simply offer the following observations. I suggest that
3 the following preliminary views may perhaps be drawn
4 from this category of material: first, that it seems at
5 any rate that the Security Service was not actively
6 gathering intelligence on Colin Duffy, but were well
7 aware of his alleged status and activities in PIRA;
8 secondly, the Security Service was not actively
9 gathering intelligence in relation to Rosemary Nelson.
10 And it would seem, reading the documents, that most of
11 what the Security Service had on file and, in that
12 sense, knew about her must have originated from the RUC.
13 Sir, that concludes a very brief survey of that
14 file, RNI-531. I promised to say something more
15 generally about the intelligence in these files relating
16 to Loyalist paramilitaries, and that means having a very
17 brief look at files RNI-533 and RNI-534.
18 There is, throughout the Part 2 Bundle, material
19 which fits into this category and obviously there are
20 various ways in which such material is of interest and
21 indeed of importance to the Inquiry, not least in
22 relation to two of the headline issues, as I put it
23 earlier: first, whether there was any intelligence
24 relating to threats prior to her murder; and secondly,
25 whether there was intelligence after her murder
123
1 indicating who might have been responsible.
2 Now, in the light of the fact that the mainstream
3 Loyalist groups were on ceasefire at this time,
4 particular attention then, as now, has been paid to the
5 emerging dissident groups. And I have mentioned two of
6 them, the prominent ones already: the Orange Volunteers
7 and the Red Hand Defenders. Clearly, there is
8 a particular aspect of importance here; namely, the
9 claim of responsibility in this case, which was made
10 apparently by the Red Hand Defenders.
11 What I would like to do is just draw some of the
12 material together in relation to, first of all, the LVF
13 for the reasons I gave earlier -- they were a focus of
14 attention in the murder investigation -- and secondly,
15 to these two newer groupings: the Orange Volunteers and
16 the Red Hand Defenders.
17 The LVF first. They called a ceasefire in May 1998
18 and unsurprisingly, therefore, a lot of intelligence
19 following that time was directed to the question of
20 whether it was a valid ceasefire and whether it was, as
21 it were, holding, and later to the question of the LVF's
22 intentions in relation to decommissions.
23 Can I just show you first an extract from a document
24 of July 1998. That is RNI-533-007. We can see there,
25 these are the minutes of the IRC meeting on 8th July,
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1 and on the next page, RNI-533-008, under a part redacted
2 heading "Meeting with ..." you will see in the third
3 line:
4 "The Government was not yet satisfied the LVF
5 ceasefire was complete and unequivocal."
6 Now, there are later reports that the LVF was
7 planning violence at the Drumcree time, and again,
8 by September -- sorry, those reports exist in relation
9 to Drumcree, i.e. in relation to July 1998.
10 By September that year, the meeting minutes of the
11 SPM, which we see at RNI-521-007, were recording that
12 the LVF leadership remained determined to maintain its
13 ceasefire; a reference there, as I say, RNI-521-007, at
14 the bottom of the page. It is paragraph 4, the third
15 line.
16 Clearly the political implications of this were, at
17 least potentially, significant, and they came through
18 later that year when, in November, the Secretary of
19 State recommend that the LVF be despecified. And again,
20 the reference to that in this same bundle is at
21 RNI-521-013, which is a letter to the private secretary
22 to the Prime Minister.
23 Now, that was obviously, as it were, the political
24 reward for maintaining the ceasefire. It looks from the
25 material later in the Bundle -- I'm not going to take
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1 you to it -- as though progress on decommissioning was
2 limited. For example, the LVF offers in that regard
3 were linked to the release of Mark Fulton from prison.
4 However, looking just slightly beyond the time of the
5 murder, the picture is much more mixed, and I would like
6 to show you the first of the NIIRs, which I want to look
7 at, in RNI-534.
8 This one is at RNI-534-072, which, at paragraph 10,
9 under the heading "LVF", indicates in the second
10 sentence -- this is May 1999, as I think I have said --
11 that:
12 "Members of the group have been heavily involved in
13 attacks by dissident Loyalists, particularly those
14 operating under the RHD banner."
15 So that, as it were, takes the history through to
16 just after the murder and one year after the original
17 ceasefire was called by the LVF in 1998, May.
18 Now, in relation to the newer groups, they first
19 feature, it seems, in the autumn of 1998. And we can
20 see that in the minutes of a security policy meeting on
21 9th September of that year at RNI-521-007, the page we
22 were looking at a little earlier, but the next paragraph
23 down. It is paragraph 5. The Chief Constable is
24 recorded as saying:
25 "There was growing evidence of another Loyalist
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1 group being formed in Portadown separate from the LVF.
2 Explosive devices used over the past weekend were not of
3 the same design as LVF ones and were extremely crude but
4 effective. An RUC officer was still in hospital
5 critically injured."
6 In the files there then follow a number of reports
7 assessing the provenance and indeed the development of
8 those groupings, and I referred to some of them in the
9 Security Service bundle a little earlier. Now, at this
10 stage, it seems to have been uncertain whether these
11 were actually new and separate groupings or merely, if I
12 can put it this way, flags of convenience.
13 However, it seems that by December in the same year,
14 1998 -- and again, you may or may not choose to turn it
15 up, but it is RNI-534-044, the NIIR reports -- there were
16 some reports to suggest that Orange Volunteers in
17 particular had begun to form more organised units.
18 However, the Security Service view as at that stage is
19 that they were not separate or discrete groups, but
20 rather flags of convenience used by others. And here --
21 this is at RNI-534-045 -- at the top, it says:
22 "Used by members of the Justice for Protestants
23 group and other militant Loyalists and are not discrete
24 structured groups."
25 Now, in later material, moving through
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1 to January 1999, at RNI-533-028, there is a lengthy
2 assessment of both of these new groups or organisations,
3 and this assessment begins at paragraph 12 and continues
4 on the next page to paragraph 16. In summary, so far as
5 we are concerned, it says that -- this is a few lines
6 down:
7 "The RHD have continued to attack soft Catholic
8 targets, whilst the OV have demonstrated an ability to
9 target PIRA members."
10 Then you will see references there to the suggestion
11 that the OV have units across the Province and that
12 Loyalist paramilitaries, including former members of
13 other organisations you will see listed there, are
14 involved.
15 This continues, this reporting continues,
16 throughout February 1999. We have seen some of the
17 material earlier. There is reporting from both
18 Special Branch and the Security Service that Loyalist
19 militants were intending to attack Catholics in the
20 mid-Ulster area. It is general, as I have said before.
21 There is, as far as we can see, no indication of
22 specific targets.
23 However, again, the political level, by that same
24 month, the end of February, this is, 1999, the Secretary
25 of State had taken the view that both these
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1 organisations should be proscribed, and the reference
2 for that is RNI-521-022. This is a letter from the
3 private secretary, in fact, to the Secretary of State
4 for Northern Ireland, dated 25th February, to the Prime
5 Minister setting out the case for the proscription of
6 both of those organisations. And it says in terms in
7 the letter that the recommendation had not been made
8 before because it hadn't been clear whether they existed
9 as separate groups. However, in accordance with what we
10 have just looked at:
11 "... recent intelligence indicated they had begun to
12 coalesce into distinct groups."
13 And you will see that that case was accepted by the
14 Prime Minister on 1st March 1999 at RNI-521-027.
15 So far as the Red Hand Defenders are concerned,
16 looking slightly after the murder, there is a detailed
17 assessment in the NIIR which was produced the next day,
18 on 16th March, and that is at RNI-534-056.
19 Sir, I would like to just highlight a couple of
20 paragraphs of that. The first is on RNI-534-057,
21 paragraph 4. It says:
22 "The RHD's claim of responsibility for this attack
23 is consistent with its stated objective to 'assassinate
24 the enemies of Ulster'. The RHD is likely to have
25 considered Nelson a legitimate target, because of her
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1 involvement in representing prominent Republicans and
2 acting as legal adviser to the GRRC. Her high public
3 profile will have given the RHD the desired impact in
4 terms of damaging the peace process."
5 Then there is a lengthy section under the heading
6 "Who are the RHD?" Can I direct your attention in
7 particular to the passage at the bottom of this page,
8 paragraph 6. A few lines from the bottom, it makes the
9 point:
10 "The RHD has to date had an unsophisticated
11 targeting ability. Moreover, it was not previously
12 known to have developed a sophisticated explosives
13 capability, which would enable it to build and deploy
14 a viable UCBT. To date it has only deployed crude pipe
15 bomb-type devices."
16 Now, so far as the device is concerned, you will see
17 the further assessment here in paragraph 8 on the next
18 page, page RNI-534-058. In the last sentence, it says:
19 "We assess that there is a significant possibility
20 that individual UDA members provided the RHD with the
21 device which was used against Rosemary Nelson."
22 Now, the next section deals interestingly, from our
23 perspective, with the LVF under the heading "Was the LVF
24 involved?" The conclusion reached, for various reasons
25 which are set out there, is no, that it wouldn't have
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1 accorded with the aims of that particular organisation
2 and would have jeopardised, as it is put here,
3 Mark Fulton's case, the case for his release from
4 prison.
5 Now, sir, can I just make these concluding remarks
6 about this. I have already pointed out there is what
7 appears to be a lack of very detailed reporting about
8 any of these new groups or organisations, if that's what
9 they were. Secondly, there was an absence, as I have
10 said already, of intelligence relating to specific
11 targeting, specific targeting of individuals. That is
12 in contrast to material which appears later in the
13 bundles after the murder of Rosemary Nelson. I'm not
14 going to look at the document now, but for example, at
15 RNI-532-137, two individuals appear -- in fact, it is
16 a summary of an intelligence document -- as being
17 targeted specifically by the Orange Volunteers.
18 Indeed, there is nothing in the files to suggest any
19 interest, targeting or otherwise, on the part of these
20 new organisations in Rosemary Nelson herself.
21 The final point is the point I have just drawn out
22 from this NIIR, which is certainly the assessment of the
23 intelligence agencies appeared to have been that these
24 new organisations did not have, themselves, the
25 capacity, the technique, if I can put it that way, to
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1 produce a device of the kind which resulted in the
2 murder of Rosemary Nelson.
3 Sir, that is all I wanted to say about the Part 2
4 Bundle at this stage.
5 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. Well, we will rise now
6 until 10.15 tomorrow.
7 (5.07 pm)
8 (The Inquiry adjourned until 10.15 am the following day)
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