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Full Hearings

Hearing: 15th October 2008, day 63

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held at:
The Interpoint Centre
20-24 York Street
Belfast BT15 1AQ

on Wednesday, 15 October 2008
commencing at 2.00 pm

Day 63









1 Wednesday, 15 October 2008

2 (2.00 pm)

3 Ruling on closed hearings

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Chapman, before you are sworn, I have an

5 announcement to make.

6 The Panel has reached its decisions on the question

7 of closed hearings.

8 The Inquiry Panel is grateful for the

9 submissions it has received in relation to the issue of

10 closed hearings.

11 We ordered the written submissions to be

12 distributed to the Full Participants in advance of the

13 hearing of oral submissions on 1 October.

14 At that hearing it was notable that further

15 points of consensus emerged with a consequential

16 reduction in the number of points which fall for

17 determination in this ruling.

18 There is a general acceptance that,

19 exceptionally, the Inquiry must hear oral evidence in

20 a closed hearing where necessary to protect national

21 security or to minimise any risk to life.

22 The principal issues for the Panel to determine

23 are therefore: (a) who should attend those hearings; and

24 (b) what steps the Inquiry should take to assist those

25 who are excluded, so that they may continue to





1 participate effectively in the Inquiry.

2 In relation to the first of those issues, we

3 have decided that the following persons will attend in

4 addition to the witness: (a) the witness's solicitor

5 and/or one counsel subject to those persons wishing to

6 be present and holding valid developed vetting, DV,

7 security clearance; and (b) one representative of the

8 relevant organisation whose information will be the

9 subject of questioning, plus one solicitor and counsel,

10 again, subject to their holding valid DV clearance.

11 I should make clear that the purpose of allowing

12 the latter representatives to attend is simply so that

13 they are apprised of the sensitive information that has

14 been provided to the Inquiry Panel and can make any

15 necessary risk assessments which may, in consequence,

16 arise.

17 The Inquiry does not consider it necessary to

18 provide advance copies of unredacted statements to any

19 Full Participants, although numbered copies will be

20 available for reference in the hearing chamber to those

21 who are attending any closed hearing.

22 We do not at this stage consider it necessary to

23 make advance provision for the attendance of any other

24 persons or organisations.

25 However, bearing in mind the submissions we





1 have received, we are mindful of the need for

2 flexibility.

3 Therefore, where the Inquiry intends to hear

4 evidence in a closed hearing, it will endeavour to

5 provide advance indication of this to the

6 representatives of the Full Participants and of any

7 witnesses who may have an interest in such evidence.

8 It will then be open to those representatives

9 to make representations to the Inquiry as to why they

10 should attend.

11 Ordinarily, the Inquiry expects these

12 representations to be made in writing, no later than two

13 working days before the witness is due to give evidence.

14 The second issue for the Inquiry to determine

15 is what steps the Inquiry can take to assist those who are

16 excluded so that they may continue to participate

17 effectively in the Inquiry.

18 Again, we were grateful for the submissions we

19 have received in this regard and we are mindful that we

20 should not be too prescriptive at this stage.

21 As the Inquiry stated in its letter of 18 September

22 2008, only a small number of witnesses will

23 require a closed hearing.

24 In each case the representative of the Full

25 Participants and the interested witnesses will have had





1 the opportunity to consider the witness's statement in

2 redacted form and to submit questions to Inquiry Counsel

3 pursuant to the witness protocol.

4 As the Inquiry also stated in its letter, the

5 examination of the witness will also be commenced in

6 open session and will only revert to a closed hearing, if

7 necessary, prior to the conclusion of the witness's

8 evidence.

9 In order to assist the Full Participants and

10 others, during the open examination of the witnesses,

11 Inquiry Counsel will endeavour to indicate the issues

12 which will require further examination during the closed

13 session as and when they arise.

14 Additionally, once the closed hearing has

15 concluded, the Inquiry will give careful consideration

16 in each case as to whether it will be appropriate for

17 any aspect of the witness's oral evidence to be conveyed

18 to the Full Participants and others in summary form.

19 Where the Inquiry concludes that it would be

20 appropriate to do so, then the Inquiry will consult,

21 through its Counsel and Solicitor, with representatives

22 of the witness and the relevant organisation which

23 attended the closed hearing in order to consider how

24 such a summary can safely be produced and distributed.

25 Those are the procedures that we shall adopt





1 for the closed hearings.

2 As I have said, we shall retain some

3 flexibility and if it appears to the Panel that our

4 procedures need to be altered, then we shall not

5 hesitate to do so.

6 Mr Chapman, would you please take the oath.

7 MR IAN CHAPMAN (sworn)

8 Questions by MR SKELTON

9 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr Skelton?

10 MR SKELTON: Mr Chapman, could you state your full name to

11 the Inquiry, please?

12 A. Ian James Chapman.

13 Q. You have made a written statement dated 7 November last

14 year, and that can be found at RNI-803-211 (displayed).

15 It should come up on your screen. And if we go to the

16 back page of this, which I believe is on RNI-803-233

17 (displayed), is that your signature there?

18 A. That is indeed my signature.

19 Q. Thank you. May I start by asking you a little bit about

20 your background and the RUC. Can you tell us when you

21 joined, please?

22 A. I joined in 1977.

23 Q. Is it right that in about October/November 1997 you were

24 Subdivisional Commander of J Division based in Lurgan?

25 A. That's correct, yes.





1 Q. And were you a superintendent in that post?

2 A. I was, yes.

3 Q. And what had been your position prior to taking that

4 appointment?

5 A. Immediately prior to that I had been the Subdivisional

6 Commander in Omagh for approximately 18 months.

7 Q. Were you doing broadly similar tasks there?

8 A. Yes, a similar role.

9 Q. And you stayed, I think, in Lurgan until 2001, did you?

10 A. That's correct, yes.

11 Q. What did you do after that?

12 A. After that, I transferred to headquarters and was Head

13 of the Security Branch until I retired.

14 Q. When did you retire?

15 A. March 2007.

16 Q. Thank you. The role of subdivisional commander,

17 I believe that's a uniformed officer's role?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. And I think you say in your statement that under your

20 command were about 160 to 180 uniformed officers plus

21 about 30 to 40 civilians?

22 A. Yes, that would be approximately correct.

23 Q. What were your responsibilities?

24 A. Basically I was responsible for the uniformed policing

25 of the Lurgan subdivision, which was one of the three





1 parts of J Division. And basically I was responsible

2 for dealing with traffic offences, lower levels of

3 crime, public order and general relations with the

4 community. I was in actual fact probably the public

5 face of policing in Lurgan at that time.

6 Q. So you would have been quite known personally, would

7 you?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. I think you talk in your statement about what is called

10 the divisional action committees, and for reference this

11 is at paragraph 7 on page RNI-803-213 (displayed).

12 Could you tell us who attended those?

13 A. The divisional action committee was chaired by the

14 Divisional Commander, who was a chief superintendent.

15 The purpose of the divisional action committee was to

16 manage the way in which the division was run and it

17 dealt with all the main policing themes at the time. It

18 dealt with the terrorist threat and then it went on to

19 deal with other issues, like public order and down to

20 what would be the more traditional types of policing,

21 such as ordinary crime and relations with the community

22 and road traffic issues.

23 Q. And you attended as one of the subdivisional commanders.

24 Your counterparts presumably did as well?

25 A. That's correct, yes.





1 Q. Were there representatives of other organisations there?

2 A. The divisional action committee was in two halves. The

3 first half dealt with terrorist-related issues and that

4 would have been attended by a representative from

5 Special Branch and a senior military officer. After

6 that part of the committee had concluded, the

7 Special Branch officer and the military officer would

8 have withdrawn and then we would have dealt with the

9 other issues that I referred to earlier on.

10 Q. Would you have been present during the Special Branch

11 part of the meeting?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. What kind of issues were they raising?

14 A. They provided a general threat brief in relation to what

15 was happening both in Northern Ireland generally and

16 then specifically in J Division.

17 Q. And roughly how much detail was provided to you in those

18 sorts of meetings in relation to individuals or

19 individual groupings?

20 A. There would have been an assessment of the threat from

21 the individual groupings that were active in J Division

22 at that time. It was a generally -- it was a high level

23 assessment of the threat and didn't get down into an

24 awful lot of particular details.

25 Q. What rank would the Special Branch officer have been who





1 attended?

2 A. Generally a chief inspector or an inspector.

3 Q. And I think you say in your statement that the

4 subdivisional action committees broadly dealt with the

5 same issues but on a more local basis. Is that correct?

6 A. That's correct, yes, and had a similar structure as

7 well.

8 Q. Again, could you give us an example of the kind of

9 things that you would have had to deal with, and I think

10 you were the chair of that meeting, were you?

11 A. It was effectively a similar structure. It mirrored

12 what happened at the divisional action committee, in

13 that the first part the meeting dealt with

14 terrorist-related issues and would have been attended by

15 the Special Branch officer who gave a briefing, and

16 someone would have been there to represent the military.

17 At the conclusion of that part of the meeting, the

18 Special Branch officer and the military officer would

19 have withdrawn and then I would have dealt with the

20 other more normal policing issues with my colleagues

21 from Lurgan subdivision.

22 Q. How often did these subdivisional meetings take place?

23 A. Generally every two weeks, although that changed

24 throughout my time in Lurgan to, I think, probably every

25 three or four weeks.





1 Q. Did you have a discretion yourself over the regularity

2 of the meetings?

3 A. In terms of the regularity of the subdivisional action

4 committee, I could have held it more frequently had

5 I felt that appropriate to do so. But generally

6 speaking, it followed on immediately after the

7 divisional action committee, which gave me the

8 opportunity to cascade down to my subdivision any

9 pertinent issues that I felt they should be briefed on.

10 Q. What was the role of the criminal intelligence officer?

11 A. The criminal intelligence officer was a uniformed

12 officer who was attached to my subdivision. He was

13 responsible for briefing uniformed officers in terms of

14 the terrorist threat and in terms of matters relating to

15 non-terrorist crime. And he would have analysed

16 and collated information that he had received and

17 subsequently disseminated down to the uniformed officers

18 in the subdivision.

19 Q. What sort of information would he have available to him?

20 A. He would have had information that he would have

21 received from Special Branch and he would have

22 information that he would have received from

23 non-terrorist sources, in terms of non-terrorist crime.

24 And he would have analysed that and briefed out to the

25 uniformed officers any particular issues that may have





1 been of interest, such as individuals or crime hot spots

2 and matters of that nature.

3 Q. Did he brief you as well?

4 A. He seldom briefed me because I would have received my

5 briefing from Special Branch.

6 Q. And as far as his access to Special Branch went, would

7 he have had access to their computer systems, for

8 example?

9 A. No, not that I am aware, no.

10 Q. So how would he have received the information?

11 A. He would have received -- in terms of the information

12 disseminated by Special Branch, he would have received

13 a similar type of information, a similar level of

14 briefing that I would have got and he would have been

15 a participant at the subdivisional action committee, so

16 he would have been party to that level of information.

17 Q. I think he was at a constable level, was he?

18 A. That's right, yes.

19 Q. Was there one for each subdivision?

20 A. There was, yes.

21 Q. Did that person sort of move on to other roles in

22 Special Branch or did that person generally stay in

23 uniform after that?

24 A. It was a uniformed position. Had he wanted to apply for

25 Special Branch, then he would have been in the same





1 position as everyone else to apply for that in terms of

2 the selection process. So he would not have

3 automatically moved on to Special Branch.

4 Q. Did you work in the same building as Special Branch?

5 A. Yes, I did.

6 Q. But I think it is right that you didn't have any

7 supervisory role of its activities?

8 A. No, I had no supervisory command responsibility for the

9 Special Branch officers. They just happened to be in

10 the same building that I was in.

11 Q. Now, you have discussed that there was a briefing from

12 them at the divisional and subdivisional level through

13 the action committees. Did you have informal access to

14 them as and when you needed to speak to them as well?

15 A. Yes, I could have consulted them if there was any

16 particular issue that I wanted their views on or

17 I needed some guidance in any particular part of

18 policing.

19 Q. As the sort of local superintendent, who would you have

20 spoken to? Who would have been your counterpart?

21 A. There was both a detective inspector and detective

22 sergeant based in Lurgan, so it would have generally

23 have been one of those two officers. However, they may

24 not have been available, so it may simply have been

25 whatever detective constable was available at the time.





1 Q. Did you know who the main terrorists or suspected

2 terrorists were on your patch?

3 A. Yes, I would have been familiar with them, yes.

4 Q. How would that familiarity have come about?

5 A. As part of my induction when I arrived at Lurgan I would

6 have received a briefing from the various parts of the

7 subdivision and that would have included a briefing from

8 Special Branch. And then, as my tenure in Lurgan

9 progressed, then names would have cropped up from time

10 to time in terms of incidents that were happening or

11 things that had occurred.

12 Q. Were there sections of the local community in Lurgan

13 which were not particularly supportive of the police?

14 A. Yes, there were.

15 Q. Which sections were those?

16 A. Well, predominantly there were large parts of Lurgan of

17 strong Nationalist tradition, where policing was

18 difficult, and that was something which was pretty

19 constant throughout the year. There were parts of the

20 strongly Loyalist estates in Lurgan which were also

21 difficult for policing, although that tended to change

22 with whatever was happening on the political/public

23 order front, particularly what was happening in Drumcree

24 and in and around Portadown.

25 Q. When you say difficult to police, what do you mean in





1 practical terms?

2 A. In practical terms what that meant was there were

3 certain parts of Lurgan where it just simply would not

4 have been safe to expect or ask two police officers in

5 a car to patrol it. The risk to them would have been

6 too great, both in terms of terrorist attack and in

7 terms of public order issues.

8 Q. Therefore, when patrolling those areas, presumably you

9 required either MSU support or the military, did you?

10 A. That's correct, yes.

11 Q. When you say there were specific areas, we have heard

12 quite a lot about the Kilwilke Estate, was that one such

13 area?

14 A. Yes, it was.

15 Q. And that's obviously the Nationalist side.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Were there more Nationalist areas than Kilwilke?

18 A. There were, but Kilwilke was by far the most difficult

19 to patrol. Taghnevan, which was another

20 Nationalist/Republican estate, was also difficult to

21 patrol, but not to the same extent as Kilwilke.

22 Q. May I turn then to the issue of personal security of

23 individual civilians. If someone walked into the

24 station and said to the duty officer that they had

25 received a threatening letter, what would then happen?





1 A. Well, the threatening letter in question would have been

2 taken by the police officer and a record of the

3 complaint would have been made by the police officer.

4 If there was any forensic evidence available from the

5 letter, then that would have been dealt with at the

6 time. Specific advice would have been given to the

7 individual. The services of a crime prevention officer

8 may have been offered --

9 Q. Can I just stop you there. Who was the crime prevention

10 officer?

11 A. The crime prevention officer was a uniformed officer who

12 was attached to my subdivision and who was accountable

13 to me and would have given general, low level security

14 advice about crimes generally and the potential to be

15 a victim of crime generally.

16 Q. And would he go out to the person's house to do that

17 kind of thing?

18 A. Yes, that would have been his role, or alternatively he

19 could have met the person in the station or given him

20 a booklet or sent him out a booklet, that type of thing.

21 Q. What sort of advice would be given?

22 A. I'm not specifically aware of the nature of the advice,

23 but it was generally of a pretty low standard. I don't

24 mean low standard, that's probably incorrect, but it was

25 of a pretty low level, the security advice that was





1 given, in terms of the things that a person could do to

2 address any vulnerabilities that they may have in their

3 life with due regard to whatever the particular threat

4 was.

5 Q. Would it include, for example -- and obviously looking

6 at the Rosemary Nelson case -- looking under your car

7 for possible devices, changes to your patterns of

8 movement, that kind of thing?

9 A. Yes, but it would depend on what the nature of the

10 threat was. It would be pretty difficult to give

11 specific security advice unless you knew what the nature

12 of the threat was that the person was subjected to.

13 Q. Did you also have any documentary advice that you could

14 give to people in the form of a leaflet?

15 A. There was a booklet available at the time, which, again,

16 provided pretty low level security advice.

17 Q. Now, we have heard about a thing called "the threat

18 log". What was that?

19 A. The threat log, from my memory, was a register that was

20 kept of individuals who were deemed to be under some

21 kind of threat.

22 Q. And who had control of it?

23 A. Again, from recollection I think that was in the control

24 of the criminal intelligence officer.

25 Q. So would this have been something under lock and key in





1 his possession?

2 A. Yes, but it would have been something he would have been

3 responsible for.

4 Q. Have you seen a threat log?

5 A. Not recently, no.

6 Q. Back when --

7 A. I'm quite sure I have seen one in the past, but I don't

8 recall seeing one.

9 Q. Could you describe what it looks like physically to us?

10 A. My recollection is that it would have been in a standard

11 SO book, which would have been amended or ruled to cater

12 for the various pieces much information that had to be

13 recorded in it.

14 Q. You said "SO"?

15 A. That's stationery office, a Government Stationery Office

16 book.

17 Q. It would be handwritten generally. Would it also have

18 bits Sellotaped into it, which I think is something

19 Mr McMullen told us?

20 A. Yes, it could have. As I recollect there were specific

21 headings, so it may not -- a piece of information that

22 was Sellotaped into it may not have addressed all the

23 various headings that were in the book.

24 Q. What were these headings?

25 A. I can't recall what they are now, but I'm pretty sure





1 they would have asked for details of the individual who

2 was under threat and that type of thing.

3 Q. And the Lurgan threat log, would that have been kept in

4 the office in Lurgan?

5 A. Yes, it would.

6 Q. The KPPS: This is a scheme, I think, administered by

7 the Northern Ireland Office, the NIO?

8 A. That's correct, yes.

9 Q. Is it correct that as far as civilians are concerned, it

10 is for them to initiate an application for the KPPS?

11 A. That's correct, yes.

12 Q. Once an application had been initiated, can you describe

13 the process?

14 A. What I'm about to say would be information that

15 I acquired in my time in Security Branch. I'm quite

16 sure that I wouldn't have been aware of this in detail

17 when I was the Subdivisional Commander in Lurgan.

18 In detail, what happened was the

19 Northern Ireland Office would have considered the

20 application, firstly in terms of whether or not the

21 individual who was applying met the criteria, the

22 occupational criteria, for admission to the scheme. On

23 the basis that it did pass that test, then they would

24 have written to Security Branch, which at that time --

25 and still is -- was part of headquarters.





1 Security Branch then were responsible for carrying

2 out a threat risk analysis, and as part of that

3 exercise, they would have written to a number of parts

4 of the organisation to get as much information as they

5 could about the individual in question. And those parts

6 of the organisation would have been Special Branch and

7 headquarters, the Subdivisional Commander, there was

8 a criminal intelligence section at that time, which

9 dealt with non-terrorist crime, and it would have also

10 written to the firearms branch and any other part of the

11 organisation that they felt might be relevant.

12 They also would have with looked at open source

13 material in terms of what was in the press about the

14 individual, and then in due course when responses from

15 all those bodies came back, that judgment was made about

16 the level of threat that the individual was deemed to be

17 under and that was passed back then to the

18 Northern Ireland Office.

19 Q. So who was the judgment made by, the Security Branch?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Based on all the information they had received?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. So can you remember, as Subdivisional Commander,

24 receiving a request from the Security Branch for such

25 information?





1 A. Yes, I can.

2 Q. And would you have passed that to Special Branch to have

3 a look at?

4 A. Yes. I have no specific recollection, but generally it

5 would have gone, I'm quite sure, to Special Branch for

6 their views. It may also have gone out to someone in --

7 who was performing a neighbourhood policing function,

8 for the local views. Those could have been collated and

9 then a response sent back to Special Branch.

10 Q. And the question I probably should have asked you at the

11 outset: I put the hypothesis of someone walking in and

12 saying they have received a threatening letter. Was the

13 KPPS something that you might advise them to apply for?

14 A. Yes, it may well have been, but I can't say in all

15 circumstances that it would have been something that

16 would have been highlighted to individuals. My

17 recollection is from my time in Security Branch that the

18 Northern Ireland Office weren't keen on that approach

19 being taken because it obviously opened up the number of

20 opportunities that people had then to apply for the

21 scheme.

22 Q. The name of the scheme is the Key Persons Protection

23 Scheme. Do you mean that they wanted to limit it to key

24 persons and not just someone walking in, an ordinary

25 civilian, as it were?





1 A. The occupational criteria that I referred to earlier on

2 effectively dealt with their interpretation of what key

3 persons were. So it almost certainly would have

4 excluded someone who wasn't involved in the

5 administration of justice in its widest sense. It

6 wouldn't have included a person who wasn't involved in

7 that type of work.

8 Q. So would a solicitor -- and you can obviously see why

9 I'm asking this question -- have been the kind of person

10 you would have expected to be included, had he or she

11 applied?

12 A. I'm certainly aware that solicitors are in the scheme.

13 Whether they were eligible to apply at that time or

14 whether it is since the murder of Rosemary Nelson, I

15 can't be sure.

16 Q. Now, the other route to initiating some form of security

17 assessment would be if the police themselves received

18 intelligence about a threat. If Special Branch had

19 received intelligence, would you have been notified

20 of it?

21 A. Yes, they would -- well, I can't say that I was on all

22 occasions when Special Branch received intelligence.

23 What I can say is that Special Branch certainly did

24 notify the Subdivisional Commander on occasions when

25 they had specific intelligence of a threat to an





1 individual.

2 Q. What then would happen?

3 A. In those circumstances then the individual would be

4 approached and informed of the details of the threat.

5 Q. Who would do that?

6 A. That would be a uniformed officer, and generally

7 speaking it would have been an inspector would have

8 done it.

9 Q. So that's not a role for the crime prevention officer

10 then?

11 A. No, not in my experience. Generally it would have been

12 a uniformed inspector.

13 Q. What kind of advice would be given by the inspector?

14 A. Well, again, I can't be specific, but I would imagine

15 that he or she would have told the individual the nature

16 of the threat in terms of the information that they had

17 available and then would have offered the services of

18 the crime prevention officer. And, again, this issue of

19 the two government-funded schemes may well have been

20 raised in terms of the Key Persons Protection Scheme and

21 the SPED scheme.

22 Q. Can you remember -- and I appreciate this was a long

23 time ago -- how many incidences would have occurred like

24 that where an inspector would have gone to see an

25 individual in the community to tell them about a threat?





1 A. I can't remember numbers, but certainly it would have

2 been -- something would have happened reasonably

3 frequently. Certainly I have a recollection of police

4 officers being informed specifically that they were

5 under threat.

6 Q. Just focussing on civilians primarily, was it sometimes

7 the case that those civilians were suspected members of

8 the paramilitary groups?

9 A. Yes, that would be the case.

10 Q. In those instances, would the inspector have gone to see

11 them in their home or on the estate where they lived to

12 give that kind of advice, or would you generally have

13 expected them to be invited to the station?

14 A. I couldn't give a definitive answer one way or the

15 other. I imagine -- that would be my recollection --

16 that the first attempt would be to call out and see the

17 individual at his or her home. At times the individuals

18 may not be available, and in those circumstances it may

19 well be that the individual was asked to come into the

20 police station.

21 Q. Would there have been instances where the individual

22 might have been hostile to the receipt of such advice?

23 A. Yes, I'm quite sure they were, yes.

24 Q. Can you remember that specifically?

25 A. I can't remember any specific examples of that.





1 Q. Turning to the local paramilitary activity in Lurgan, I

2 think you say in your statement at paragraph 3, which we

3 can find on RNI-803-212 (displayed), that Lurgan was

4 a town with a history of a lot of such activity and

5 sectarian violence, and then you say:

6 "To some extent this was at its height in 1997/1998

7 with the parades if Drumcree."

8 Could you explain that a bit further, please?

9 A. The parade at Drumcree in 1997 was a particularly

10 difficult time and there was a lot of disorder that

11 occurred in the immediate aftermath of that parade.

12 That disorder was widespread throughout

13 Northern Ireland, but because of the proximity of Lurgan

14 to Portadown, I think the fallout for Drumcree lasted

15 longer and was much more intense, and people were --

16 almost as soon as the 1997 parade had been completed,

17 people were then considering what is going to happen

18 next year.

19 In addition to that, there were a number of parades

20 in Lurgan, which were particularly contentious, in the

21 centre of the town and all that added to the tension

22 that there was in the community at that time. And that

23 was, I suppose, part of the reason why there was so much

24 tension and it almost seemed to support the sectarian

25 strife that was happening in Lurgan at that time.





1 Q. Did you see Drumcree in particular as the sort of

2 principal focus or influence on paramilitary violence?

3 A. No, I wouldn't have seen it as the principal focus, but

4 it certainly added overall to the tension that there was

5 at that time. Certain Loyalist paramilitary groupings

6 had in previous parades indicated their view on what

7 should or should not take place and certainly there

8 seemed to be some concern as to what was going to happen

9 at the next parade in 1998.

10 Q. Which Loyalist groups in particular made their views

11 known?

12 A. Well, all the Loyalist groups would have had an interest

13 in what happened at Drumcree, but my recollection is

14 particularly the LVF were pretty much to the fore in

15 terms of what was happening.

16 Q. You mentioned the LVF there, we can see, at the bottom

17 of that paragraph and you say there that they were

18 strong in Lurgan?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Did they have a cell, as it were, there or individuals

21 that were living in the community?

22 A. They had quite a unit in Lurgan, yes.

23 Q. And what kind of activity were they involved in?

24 A. Well, they were involved in a number of different types

25 of activity, as far as I was aware. Certainly they





1 would have been involved in attacks on Nationalists.

2 They would have been involved in ordinary criminal

3 issues and they would have been involved in the supply

4 and importation of drugs.

5 Q. Now, were those attacks focused just on Nationalist

6 people randomly or did they particularly, to your

7 recollection, target individuals who might be more

8 prominent?

9 A. They were both random and targeted activity. Certainly

10 my recollection is that there were specific attacks on

11 individuals. I have no recollection of any of them

12 being prominent individuals, but certainly I have

13 a recollection of specific attempted murders on

14 individuals, and there were also random attacks as well.

15 Q. Mr McGoldrick is someone that we have heard about?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Is that an example of that kind of attack?

18 A. I think -- I wasn't in Lurgan at the time, but my

19 recollection is he wasn't specifically targeted. It was

20 a Catholic that was targeted, but I am thinking of

21 another couple of instances; particularly this one

22 instance where there was an attempt to murder a specific

23 target who, again, from recollection, would not have had

24 a particularly high profile.

25 Q. If the LVF had been targeting an individual, would you





1 have expected to have been told about it, assuming there

2 was some intelligence coming in to that effect?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Would you always have gone to speak to the individual or

5 would you have had to have a discussion with

6 Special Branch about whether it was appropriate to

7 do so?

8 A. No, as far as I would have been aware, the threshold

9 would have been passed whenever I would have been

10 informed that an individual was specifically considered

11 to be under threat.

12 Q. Were there any incidences where, to your knowledge,

13 intelligence had been received about the targeting of

14 individuals but you hadn't been informed?

15 A. I don't know. I have no knowledge of that.

16 Q. As far as the Republican groups in your area were

17 concerned, which ones were on your patch?

18 A. Well, traditionally there had been a very significant

19 Provisional IRA presence in Lurgan. Before I went to

20 Lurgan, the Provisional IRA reintroduced their

21 ceasefire, but I think there was still considered to be

22 a considerable amount of Provisional IRA activity.

23 In addition to that, there was a developing

24 dissident threat; dissident in terms of those people who

25 did not agree with the Provisional IRA ceasefire, and





1 that was developing throughout my time in Lurgan.

2 Q. Had those dissidents coalesced into a group at that

3 stage or were they still individuals?

4 A. My recollection is that they were trying to coalesce or

5 trying to form into a group or to join some of the other

6 groups that had sprung up elsewhere.

7 Q. Which groups?

8 A. Well, there was the Real IRA and the Continuity IRA.

9 Q. And you mention the ceasefire. I think that was

10 reinstated in July, so several months before you had

11 arrived?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. You were also presumably aware of the murders of two

14 police officers in June?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. To your knowledge was that considered to have been

17 carried out by Lurgan Provisional IRA?

18 A. That was my understanding, yes.

19 Q. Based on what information?

20 A. It was based on -- I assume it was based on a briefing

21 that I had at that time, and I'm reasonably certain that

22 there was someone in custody whenever I arrived at

23 Lurgan having been charged with the two murders.

24 Q. You are thinking, are you, of Mr Duffy?

25 A. Yes.





1 Q. Was there a view in your station that when he was

2 finally released -- as he was, I think -- and not

3 charged or prosecuted for that offence, that he had

4 escaped justice?

5 A. Well, those wouldn't be words that I would use, but

6 certainly there was disappointment that, having been

7 charged, the charges were withdrawn.

8 Q. An incident took place on 17 November 1997, which

9 involved Mr Duffy. You mention this at paragraph 19 of

10 your statement, which is on page RNI-803-217

11 (displayed). And may we look, please, at the report

12 which you refer to there, which can be found at

13 RNI-101-171.504 (displayed)? Thank you.

14 Now, this is a report, just for those that are

15 listening, to the Divisional Commander of J Division,

16 who was your boss, I think. If we just look briefly at

17 the final page of that -- which is on

18 page RNI-101-171.507 (displayed) -- we can see that's

19 your name there, Mr Chapman. The signature is whose?

20 A. The signature looks like Henry McMullen's.

21 Q. May we go back to the front sheet. Can I ask you about

22 that? Does that mean that he wrote the report or would

23 he have pp'ed it, as it were, on your behalf?

24 A. It looks like he has pp'ed it on my behalf.

25 Q. So you'd have written the body of it, or at least been





1 involved in it, but he would have finally signed it off,

2 would he?

3 A. I don't recollect having written the report and I can't

4 be sure how the report arose. I assume that someone has

5 drafted the report for me and that the report must have

6 been requested by the Divisional Commander J.

7 Q. Now, is that ordinarily the way it works: that a junior

8 officer, one of your chief inspectors or an inspector,

9 would write a report for you like this?

10 A. Yes, that would be a reasonably common occurrence.

11 Q. Would you expect, before you sent it up to the

12 Divisional Commander, to read it and think about it and

13 determine whether or not it was correct and you agreed

14 with it?

15 A. Yes, I would if I was signing it. On this occasion it

16 seems that Henry McMullen has signed it, so I would have

17 assumed that he would then have taken that role on board

18 to ensure he is happy with the draft.

19 Q. So your recollection for the purpose of today 's

20 evidence is that you are not sure you even saw this

21 report?

22 A. I'm not sure that I saw it, no.

23 Q. Are you happy for me to ask you some questions about it

24 in any event?

25 A. Yes.





1 Q. Thank you. The first thing that happens in the report

2 is a summary of the events, which we can see there. And

3 it was an altercation that developed between some local

4 uniformed officers and Mr Duffy and five associates of

5 his who were in a car. Do you remember this incident

6 more generally?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. And I think Mr Duffy was charged, I think, for it,

9 wasn't he?

10 A. He was, yes.

11 Q. And one particular constable, whose name has been

12 redacted, suffered particular injuries and lost his gun

13 during the course of the affray and, as far as we

14 understand it, thought he was going to die?

15 A. That's my understanding of the incident, yes.

16 Q. Can we go overleaf to RNI-101-171.508 and have a look at

17 what's said there (displayed)?

18 Maybe you could take a few moments to look through

19 it, but while you are doing that, I think what it also

20 describes is that after the event -- this is the third

21 paragraph up from the bottom -- on the evening of

22 18 November, which is the next day, rioting, hijacking

23 and a display of weapons took place on the Kilwilke

24 Estate, and on the old Portadown Road, Lurgan, a bus was

25 set on fire.





1 Do you remember these incidents being precipitated

2 by this event?

3 A. Yes, I do.

4 Q. You do? Now, if we go overleaf again to RNI-101-171.509

5 (displayed), there is a particular section in this

6 Special Branch assessment that I would like highlighted,

7 please.

8 First of all, Mr Chapman, why would Special Branch

9 have an involvement in writing a report on this

10 incident?

11 A. Well, I would imagine that the Special Branch assessment

12 was asked for because of the nature of the individuals

13 concerned, specifically Colin Duffy. I would also

14 imagine that the Special Branch assessment was asked

15 because there had been a number of disorders and the

16 assessment must have been that the Provisional IRA were

17 responsible or had orchestrated those particular

18 incidents. So it would strike me that it is a perfectly

19 reasonable thing to ask Special Branch for their

20 assessment.

21 Q. Who would have asked them to provide an input?

22 A. I would imagine the author of the report.

23 Q. And we can see that it focuses initially, in the first

24 paragraph, on the violence the subsequent night, which

25 we have already identified in the body of the report.





1 Then it says this:

2 "The Provisional IRA saw the charging remand of

3 Duffy as an excuse to gain maximum publicity coverage in

4 relation to their ongoing campaign of alleged harassment

5 of Nationalists/Republicans by security forces in

6 general."

7 Focusing on that, were you aware of this, as it

8 were, ongoing campaign of alleged harassment?

9 A. It may not have been something that I would have been

10 familiar with just at the time of this incident, which

11 was only a few weeks after coming into the post, but

12 certainly I think as time went on, during my tenure

13 there, I think there was an issue around alleging

14 police, security force harassment of Nationalist

15 Republicans not only in Lurgan but right across

16 Northern Ireland.

17 Q. Did you see those allegations as being orchestrated by

18 the leadership of the organisation?

19 A. Well, I wouldn't want to pre-judge all allegations that

20 may have been made about police or security force

21 activity, but certainly I would have been of the view,

22 based on a number of years' experience, that there was

23 an attempt to discredit the police and the security

24 forces as often as possible.

25 Q. What was the point of doing that?





1 A. Well, I think the point of doing that needs to be set

2 against what was happening at the time politically and

3 what would have been seen as the political strategy of

4 the Republican movement, and that was to denigrate and

5 discredit the police and the security forces in general

6 as often as possible.

7 Q. Now, the assessment we have from Special Branch here is

8 that that particular activity, the discrediting of the

9 police, appears to have been put into play in relation

10 to Mr Duffy and the context of this incident. Can you

11 remember that, i.e. reporting about this event which tried

12 to portray the police as being the instigators of this

13 incident?

14 A. I don't specifically remember any reports in the local

15 press, but I'm quite sure that there were because

16 Colin Duffy had a reasonably high profile at the time

17 having just recently had charges withdrawn in relation

18 to the murder of two police officers, which was a very

19 high profile incident obviously. So I can only suppose

20 that this incident that had happened with the police,

21 his arrest and subsequent charges, would have attracted

22 some publicity in the local media.

23 Q. And you mentioned the two murders for which he was

24 arrested. Did that also attract such publicity?

25 A. Well, yes, it did. I can certainly speak for the time





1 that he was -- when the charges withdrawn. That would

2 have attracted some publicity. I wasn't in Lurgan when

3 he was charged, but I'm quite sure that attracted some

4 publicity as well.

5 Q. Was an element of that publicity negative towards the

6 police?

7 A. Yes, it would have been in terms of being critical of

8 the criminal justice system in general, by virtue of the

9 fact that the charges were withdrawn.

10 Q. And in relation to this particular issue -- where they

11 are saying that the Provisional IRA saw the charging and

12 remand of Colin Duffy as an excuse to gain maximum

13 publicity -- having received this sort of assessment, is

14 that the sort of thing which you would agree with?

15 A. Yes, that would have been my view at the time.

16 Q. And can we go back to the full page, please, and then

17 highlight the sections "Linkage" and "Relationships"?

18 Now, the first paragraph, which is under the word

19 "linkage", describes briefly the North Armagh battalion

20 of the Provisional IRA and the Lurgan battalion saying

21 that they are one brigade, i.e. North Armagh, and then it

22 goes on to say:

23 "There is a very close liaison on a daily basis with

24 Colin Duffy in charge Lurgan and [blank]."

25 Does that represent your general level of





1 understanding of the local paramilitary group and

2 Colin Duffy's role within it?

3 A. Yes, as far as I would have been aware, my understanding

4 was that Colin Duffy was one of the principal activists

5 in Lurgan at the time.

6 Q. And it goes on, in the other section entitled

7 "Relationships", to describe who was in the car. And

8 I appreciate, Mr Chapman, that a lot of that has been

9 blanked out, so I am afraid we can't see the names, but

10 from the text that you can see, it does appear that each

11 of the people in the car had some association through

12 family or friendship with the Provisional IRA, at least

13 as far as Special Branch are concerned. I think that

14 ties in with what you were saying earlier about why this

15 report was produced by Special Branch; is that correct?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And, again, would you have been aware of the alleged

18 associates and family members of the local suspected

19 paramilitaries?

20 A. From my recollection of the incident, no, the names

21 themselves didn't mean anything in particular to me.

22 Q. May we turn on to the conclusion, which can be found at

23 the bottom there, please? Could you highlight that?

24 Now, first of all, in this first paragraph you just

25 mention the fact that nine officers were injured. How





1 significant was that for you as their commander?

2 A. Well, it was significant in that it followed quite

3 closely on the murder of two police officers in Lurgan

4 earlier on that year. This, by all accounts, was

5 a particularly horrendous incident for the police

6 officers concerned and I was certainly very anxious and

7 concerned about the wellbeing of the police officers who

8 were involved and in terms of the morale generally in

9 the subdivision at the time.

10 Q. Could we turn overleaf, please, to page RNI-101-171.507

11 (displayed) and highlight that final paragraph, please?

12 In the paragraph, the author of the report says:

13 "Despite Rosemary Nelson's PR machine going into

14 overdrive in relation to the ongoing harassment of

15 Colin Duffy, we must not lose sight of the fact that all

16 officers involved carried out sterling work in the face

17 of overwhelming odds."

18 That praise "Rosemary Nelson's PR machine," what do

19 you think that means?

20 A. I can't be sure what that means, but I would surmise

21 that it probably was relating to whatever publicity

22 attached to Duffy's charging for this incident. And I

23 think from memory it did attract some attention from the

24 media in addition to the activities that had occurred in

25 terms of the hijacking and the burning of vehicles in





1 a number of areas across Armagh.

2 Now, whether or not Rosemary Nelson had

3 an involvement in that in terms of the PR that may have

4 been associated with that, I don't know, but I can only

5 imagine that that is what it was referring to.

6 Q. Does the word "machine", which is quite a strong word to

7 use, imply that this was something which had been

8 previously used, was part of your regular repertoire of

9 publicity?

10 A. I can't answer that because I didn't draft it. I don't

11 think it would have been a word that I would have used,

12 but it is for the author, whoever the author was. I

13 can't say.

14 Q. Did you think it was appropriate for a solicitor to be

15 seeking publicity for clients?

16 A. Well, that depends on the nature of what a solicitor

17 sees his or her role as. I really can't answer that. I

18 don't know enough about what the role of a solicitor is

19 in relation to his or her client to be able to offer an

20 opinion on that.

21 Q. May I ask you this: Do you know of any other solicitors

22 that took such steps to publicise their clients' causes

23 in the press?

24 A. I can't think of any, but that doesn't mean to say that

25 there weren't any. I simply can't think of any at the





1 present.

2 Q. Taken in conjunction with the earlier Special Branch

3 assessments which we have seen, which is that this was

4 part of the Provisional IRA's ongoing claims of

5 harassment, doesn't it look from this report as though

6 Rosemary Nelson is being associated directly with the

7 IRA's own, as it were, propaganda?

8 A. That wouldn't have been a conclusion that I would have

9 drawn. It certainly to me would indicate that

10 Rosemary Nelson was involved in representing her client

11 and that there was some PR dimension to that. I'm not

12 so sure it goes as far as you say.

13 Q. The earlier section which we saw talked about the

14 ongoing allegations of harassment by the Provisional IRA

15 in the context of this incident, and in the final

16 paragraph, the author of the report, who we think was

17 Henry McMullen, talks about Rosemary Nelson's PR machine

18 in relation to the same incident. Do you accept that it

19 looks like those two are being connected for the

20 purposes of this report?

21 A. No, I don't see a necessary linkage between the two.

22 Q. Why not?

23 A. Because the earlier section of the report deals with

24 what the Republican movement were trying to do in terms

25 of alleged harassment, while the final paragraph deals





1 specifically with Rosemary Nelson's dealing with the

2 alleged ongoing harassment of Colin Duffy, whom she was

3 representing.

4 Q. Now, when Mr McMullen was asked about this issue, he did

5 comment that he felt that there were newspaper articles

6 in which Rosemary Nelson had commented upon

7 controversies, and that there were insinuations in such

8 articles that the police weren't acting properly or were

9 committing offences or something of that nature, as he

10 put it. Was that your perception?

11 A. Well, at that time I probably wouldn't have been that

12 familiar with Rosemary Nelson's role in that particular

13 aspect of her work, so I can't give you a definitive

14 answer. Certainly I think from this report and from my

15 perception at the time, she certainly represented

16 Colin Duffy's interests quite strongly.

17 Q. Bearing in mind the fact that he had recently been

18 released after being arrested for the murders of the two

19 constables and here he was being picked up again and

20 getting involved with an assault against the officers of

21 the same station, was there a perception that she was

22 perceived negatively as a result of Colin Duffy being

23 released and her publicising it?

24 A. Well, from -- personally speaking, I wouldn't have seen

25 it in those negative terms, but I can understand how





1 police officers in the station at the time may well have

2 seen it in those -- the relationship or her role in

3 those negative terms.

4 Q. You can understand it, but were you also aware of that

5 kind of perception: that there was, as it were, no love

6 lost between Rosemary Nelson and the local police?

7 A. I wouldn't have put it as strong as no love lost.

8 I mean, the role of a solicitor is to represent his or

9 her client, and sometimes there is tension then between

10 police and defence lawyers and defence solicitors

11 because of that. So -- I mean, Rosemary Nelson would

12 not have been seen as a hate figure or anything like

13 that amongst local police. She would have been viewed

14 as someone who was a solicitor who represented

15 Colin Duffy. And, yes, police officers then would have

16 been, I suppose, aware of the -- of the fact that she

17 was a professional lawyer for him, but I wouldn't have

18 seen it in really any stronger terms than that.

19 Q. Mr McMullen in his statement -- for reference this is

20 paragraph 27 -- said that she became very anti-police at

21 some point. That is quite a strong conclusion to have

22 reached, isn't it?

23 A. Well, anti-police is a phrase that I was never

24 comfortable with during my time in the police, and I'm

25 not really sure exactly what it means. Certainly she





1 was a lawyer who represented a number of individuals.

2 To use a generic term like "anti-police" isn't a phrase

3 that I am comfortable with.

4 Q. You had mentioned earlier that there were parts of the

5 locality, parts of Lurgan, the Nationalist areas which

6 were anti-police, which were hostile to officers

7 arriving in the area, and presumably implicitly they had

8 an attitude towards the police which was anti?

9 A. Yes, that's correct.

10 Q. Albeit that she is not, as it were, a suspected PIRA

11 volunteer, did she not herself, as far as you were

12 concerned, have a similar kind of attitude: that there

13 was some hostility there towards the local police?

14 A. I have no recollection of ever meeting the woman or ever

15 having any conversation with her, so I'm not in

16 a position to say whether or not her personal views

17 impacted on her professional duty and responsibilities.

18 I simply couldn't offer a view on that.

19 Q. Sir, I'm about to move on to the topic of the

20 February 1998 threat assessment. It may be worth having

21 an early break for convenience.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Right, we will have a quarter of an hour

23 break now.

24 (3.00 pm)

25 (Short break)





1 (3.15 pm)

2 DAME VALERIE STRACHAN: Before you go on to talk about the

3 threat assessment, I wonder if I could pick up a point

4 that arose earlier on when you were talking to

5 Mr Skelton about what would happen if somebody came in

6 off the street and handed in a threat of some kind. You

7 were asked, you know, what would happen and you said,

8 "Well, it would depend on the nature of the threat."

9 If Rosemary Nelson had come in with the threat that

10 we have now seen quite a lot of in this Inquiry, which

11 was a very, very general threat -- and of course she

12 didn't do that -- but if she had come into Lurgan police

13 station and handed that particular note over to you with

14 its very general terms, what would you have done with

15 the letter and what advice would she have received?

16 A. Well, in terms of trying to preserve any forensic

17 evidence that there might have been, that would have

18 been handed over to the appropriate scenes of crime

19 officer at the time. But the general thrust probably

20 wouldn't have been that much different to what I have

21 earlier described. I can only assume that, as a lawyer

22 or a solicitor, Rosemary Nelson was aware of the two

23 schemes that have been mentioned earlier on: the Key

24 Persons Protection Scheme and the SPED scheme.

25 So I'm not so sure that there would have been that





1 much done other than what I have already outlined.

2 DAME VALERIE STRACHAN: Right. She would have just been

3 advised that there were these two schemes; she wouldn't

4 have been given any direct advice about how to look

5 after her own security?

6 A. I think as I related to you earlier on, a crime

7 prevention officer visit or consultation almost

8 certainly would have been offered. So that would have

9 been made available.

10 The officer on the desk who would have the first

11 interface with her may well have offered her some low

12 level advice, but he would almost certainly have

13 referred her to the crime prevention officer.

14 MR SKELTON: Mr Chapman, just arising from that, you did

15 mention another abbreviation: the SPED scheme. In fact

16 I haven't asked you any questions about that. Could you

17 briefly describe what that is?

18 A. SPED stands for special purchase of evacuated dwellings.

19 I'm pretty sure that is what it means, and that is run

20 by the Housing Executive and that deals with purchasing

21 the homes of individuals who are deemed to be at

22 a particularly high level of threat to allow the

23 individual to move to a different and a new address,

24 which hopefully the terrorists or whoever were targeting

25 the individual weren't aware of.





1 Q. Thank you. May I turn now to the issue of

2 the February 1998 threat assessment, as the Inquiry

3 terms it. It may be helpful if we can have on the

4 screen the slide which shows in summary for the movement

5 of that threat assessment up and down the RUC, from the

6 NIO.

7 You can see from that that it starts within the NIO.

8 It goes down to the Command Secretariat, to the Chief

9 Inspector, P136, who has given evidence already to this

10 Inquiry, through from her to ACC South and Mr Craig,

11 down to Chief Superintendent Charles Robinson, who is

12 not a witness who has cooperated with this Inquiry, and

13 his deputy, Superintendent David (name redacted). Then it

14 continues down through Chief Superintendent Chapman,

15 which is you, and your deputy, Mr McMullen. And at the

16 bottom there we can see the detective sergeant from

17 Lurgan Special Branch who is also involved.

18 What I would like to do, if I may, is take you

19 briskly through the downward chain and then spend more

20 time as we go back up with the assessments that take

21 place. Are you happy that that is the pathway as you

22 recall it?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Thank you. It starts with a letter from Simon Rogers

25 from the NIO to Chief Superintendent P157 at





1 Command Secretariat, and that's dated 23 February 1997

2 and can be found at RNI-101-196 (displayed).

3 Now, the title is "Rosemary Nelson, security". The

4 Inquiry is very familiar with this letter and I think

5 you have seen it already, haven't you, Mr Chapman?

6 A. Yes, I have.

7 Q. We don't need to focus too much on it, but in essence it

8 is asking for whether Mrs Nelson has been given advice

9 about her security and for any further advice you can

10 give back to the NIO about how these issues of threats

11 to her are being dealt with.

12 That progresses downwards towards ACC South, and we

13 can look briefly at RNI-101-202 (displayed), and you can

14 see there, that is the letter from Mr Maxwell to

15 ACC South. Mr Maxwell, I repeat, is from the

16 Command Secretariat and he is asking for views and

17 comments on further action that needs to be taken in

18 relation to this.

19 It goes down to the next document, which we can find

20 at RNI-101-199 (displayed). So we are just following

21 the chain down. This is Superintendent (name redacted), who is

22 effectively annexing the previous memo and saying:

23 "Let me have your comments by 10 March."

24 And his memo is dated the 2nd.

25 At this stage, this is going from





1 Superintendent (name redacted), who is the Deputy Divisional

2 Commander, to you because you are the Subdivisional

3 Commander in Lurgan; is that correct?

4 A. That's correct, yes.

5 Q. Now, it is 2 March 1998. Do you remember personally

6 receiving this memo?

7 A. No, I don't.

8 Q. Would you have personally received it had it been

9 addressed to you or would it have been picked up by

10 somebody else?

11 A. It would have been put in with whatever post came in

12 that day and then, depending on whether Henry McMullen

13 or myself were first into the office, that person would

14 have looked at the post.

15 Q. And how would it have come to your attention?

16 A. Well, there was an admin office in Lurgan that dealt

17 with all incoming and outgoing post. So they would have

18 opened it and sent the post for either Henry McMullen or

19 myself.

20 Q. You do not remember seeing it, but would you have seen

21 it when it came in, or could it only have been seen by

22 Mr McMullen?

23 A. I could have seen it, but I don't recall seeing it. I

24 can't definitively say that I didn't see it, but I have

25 no recollection of seeing it.





1 Q. How usual was it to receive this kind of chain of memos

2 coming from the NIO into the Command Secretariat, down

3 through the ACC, through to the subdivision for

4 a request for further information about an individual?

5 A. The actual nature of the request was, you know -- I have

6 to say was probably unusual, but the correspondence

7 chain wouldn't have been that particularly unusual. It

8 would have come down through the -- from headquarters,

9 down through the region, the division and to,

10 ultimately, the subdivision.

11 Q. So there were instances, were there, where Headquarters

12 were receiving information about a threat to an

13 individual, which they initiated some action in

14 relation to?

15 A. No, not specifically threats to an individual, but it

16 was the principal channel of written communication would

17 have been down from Headquarters and through the region

18 and division and through the various levels of

19 management that there were.

20 Q. How unusual was it to get something initiated by the

21 Northern Ireland Office in relation to an individual?

22 A. That would have been unusual.

23 Q. Have you come across any other instances?

24 A. I have come across other instances. It is whether I was

25 aware of any other instances at that time or not I can't





1 be sure of.

2 Q. Given, as it were, the political side of this request,

3 would you have expected, as the person in charge of the

4 subdivision, to have been notified of its existence?

5 A. I would have expected that if I didn't see the

6 correspondence, if Henry McMullen had dealt with it,

7 that it would have been something that we would have

8 discussed. But, again, I have no recollection of that

9 discussion. But had I been at work over the period when

10 these papers were being prepared, I would have assumed

11 that it would have been something that we would have

12 discussed.

13 Q. We will come on in a moment to any recollection that you

14 may have as to conversations with Mr McMullen, but he

15 appears from the next document, which is on page

16 RNI-101-200 (displayed), to have contacted the Detective

17 Inspector of Special Branch for his views and comments.

18 I think that, as we saw, is the end of the chain.

19 Is that the standard procedure: to go to SB for the low

20 down on the real threat?

21 A. Yes, it would be. In relation to threat, it would be

22 have.

23 Q. You would go to the inspector, would you, the local

24 inspector?

25 A. Why it was addressed to the inspector as opposed to the





1 sergeant, I can't say, but you would get the same

2 response from either.

3 Q. Can we see on page RNI-101-211 (displayed) -- now, this

4 is the memo which is produced by the local

5 Special Branch officer. In fact, it is produced by the

6 sergeant and not the inspector. It is addressed to

7 Subdivisional Commander. That is you.

8 Now, first of all, do you remember receiving this

9 memo or would this have been sent to Mr McMullen?

10 A. I would imagine it would have been sent -- passed on to

11 Henry McMullen as he was the author of the query, but,

12 again, I can't be sure about that.

13 Q. Now, in this memo, this Special Branch officer provides

14 a brief summary of what he perceives to be known about

15 Rosemary Nelson, and the first thing he discusses is

16 there is no record of a threat against Rosemary Nelson

17 held in this office.

18 For your purposes or for your subdivision's

19 purposes, is that the most important piece of

20 information that is given?

21 A. Yes, it would because in these types of issues we would

22 be looking for some intelligence to support the

23 existence of a threat.

24 Q. In fact, having made that bare comment at the start

25 about the absence of a threat against Mrs Nelson held in





1 the office, he goes on to describe more about her

2 perceived background and relationship with her clients,

3 and one of the things that he says -- and you can see

4 that in the third paragraph -- is that:

5 "She remains close to the Republican movement and

6 attends functions and rallies in support of their aims

7 and objectives. As such, she would be regarded in the

8 local Nationalist and Unionist communities as a

9 supporter of the Republican cause."

10 Do you accept that assessment?

11 A. Well, I accept that assessment in terms of that's what

12 the author produced. The basis on which he produced

13 that assessment, I can't say. There may well have been

14 intelligence to support that. I don't know whether

15 there was or not, so I really can't say much more than

16 that on that question.

17 Q. Well, if Special Branch come to a view based on their

18 perception of paramilitaries, which are after all their

19 principal area of interest, would you generally as

20 a uniformed officer have supported or accepted that

21 view?

22 A. Generally I would have accepted the view.

23 Q. Do you recall discussing this aspect of the perceived

24 view of Mrs Nelson with any Special Branch officers?

25 A. No.





1 Q. So you are saying at no time would you have had

2 discussion with, for example, B123, who is the sergeant

3 here, or his superior, B567, who is the inspector, about

4 Mrs Nelson and about this perception?

5 A. What I'm saying is I don't recall having a conversation.

6 It may well be possible that I did have some

7 conversation, but I certainly can't recall it.

8 Q. As far as Mr McMullen goes, he told us in his evidence

9 on Day 48 that he probably did raise it with a superior

10 officer because the issue, i.e. Mrs Nelson's safety and

11 the threats, were discussed at length on many occasions,

12 and he gave examples of the kind of questions. He said

13 things like: what are we doing? What else can we do?

14 Was this done? Was that done?

15 Do you remember having those sorts of discussions on

16 what looks like more than one occasion about

17 Rosemary Nelson?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Can we just continue through to the end of that

20 assessment, please? Sorry, focusing on the final

21 paragraph first of all. He says there -- this is the

22 sergeant:

23 "It is my assessment in the absence of any threat

24 ..."

25 By which I think he means specific threat:





1 "... that she would be known to Loyalist

2 paramilitaries in this area and would be at a degree of

3 risk whilst working and residing in this area."

4 Can we go back to that final paragraph? Would she

5 have been known to local paramilitaries as far as you

6 were concerned?

7 A. Well, I think it is a reasonable assessment to make

8 that, you know, because of the fact that she had

9 represented Colin Duffy that Loyalist paramilitaries

10 would have been aware of her. Yes, I think that's

11 a reasonable assumption to make.

12 Q. Was there anything about Mrs Nelson in particular that

13 would have stood out, since presumably all the

14 paramilitaries who had any involvement with legal

15 proceedings would have had a solicitor? Was there

16 anything about her which made her particularly

17 prominent?

18 A. Only in so much as the prominence that Colin Duffy had.

19 Colin Duffy had a very high level of prominence in

20 Lurgan at that time, and people both in -- of the

21 Nationalist/Republican tradition, indeed even those of

22 the Loyalist/Unionist tradition, you know, knew of

23 Colin Duffy. They may not have known him, but they

24 would have known of him in the Lurgan area. So by

25 association then, she may well have been known to





1 Loyalist paramilitaries.

2 Q. Was there something, for example, about the publicity

3 which she, it would appear, had some involvement in

4 relation to Colin Duffy, which would have made her a bit

5 more prominent?

6 A. That may well have contributed to it. He was involved

7 in these very high profile cases and, I mean, that may

8 well have contributed.

9 There was obviously a very significant local

10 involvement of the murder that he had been released

11 after appeal and then the murders of the two police

12 officers locally. So that would have attracted the

13 attention of both communities in terms of her overall

14 profile.

15 Q. Were you aware in 1998 and 1999 that there were rumours

16 circulating that Mrs Nelson had a relationship, a

17 personal relationship with Mr Duffy?

18 A. Well, it is one of those issues where I'm aware of it.

19 Whether I was aware of it at the time or whether it was

20 something I became aware of after her murder, I can't be

21 sure, but certainly I can say I was aware of it.

22 Q. How did you become aware of it?

23 A. It was just one of those things. Whether I was formally

24 told in a briefing or whether it was one of those things

25 that came out in the aftermath of the murder and the





1 subsequent murder investigation, I can't say. But all I

2 can say is that, yes, it was something that at some

3 point in the past I became aware of it.

4 Q. When you say "the past", do you mean around the time

5 prior to or after her death, the immediate few years

6 around that period?

7 A. I can't say for definite whether it was before her

8 murder or after her murder, but it was at some stage

9 during that time that I became aware of these rumours or

10 allegations, or whatever they were.

11 Q. And you mention you may have heard of it in a briefing.

12 Can you try and recall whether that might have come from

13 Special Branch or from CID or from some other source?

14 A. I mean, if I elaborated any further, I would be in the

15 realms of speculation. I really can't say. I really

16 couldn't give any more information.

17 Q. Just as far as that rumour goes, was it the kind of

18 rumour that was circulating more widely within the

19 police?

20 A. Again, I can't give a definitive answer but I assume

21 that it may well have been.

22 Q. It was on the sort of gossip level, as it were?

23 A. Yes, it may well have been.

24 Q. Again, please only give an answer if you feel that you

25 can: Was that the sort of rumour that was in the local





1 community as well?

2 A. I couldn't answer that, but what I would say is if it

3 was the sort of thing that was -- the uniformed officers

4 in the station were aware of, then it is possible that

5 it is something that other people were aware of as well.

6 Q. Why do you think that?

7 A. Well, simply on the basis that it is the sort of thing

8 that -- police officers do not live in isolation; they

9 live in the community and that could be the sort of

10 thing that would be the topic of conversation.

11 Q. If there was such a rumour circulating at the time, what

12 do you think its origins were?

13 A. I couldn't say.

14 Q. Well, for example, do you think it was something

15 circulated as a sort of vicious calumny against her by

16 the sections of the community that didn't like her, for

17 example, the Loyalists?

18 A. It could have been, but I don't know. I simply don't

19 know where the rumour came from or how it originated.

20 Q. Do you believe -- to give you another example -- that

21 there may have been information that was received in the

22 form of intelligence that supported it?

23 A. I have no recollection of receiving a specific

24 intelligence brief to that effect.

25 Q. Mr McMullen, when he gave evidence, said that the issue





1 of Rosemary Nelson's safety in the context of this

2 threat assessment would, of course, have been raised in

3 the subdivisional action committee meeting. Can you

4 remember it being raised?

5 A. No, I can't remember it being raised and I'm not so sure

6 that it would have been raised in the subdivisional

7 action committee. It may or may not have been raised.

8 I wouldn't go as far as to say or be as strong as to say

9 that it would definitely have been raised.

10 Q. Who would have made the decision whether or not to

11 raise it?

12 A. On the basis of the correspondence that I have seen, it

13 would have been an issue that would have been raised by

14 either the Chairman, which would have been myself, or

15 Henry McMullen, and I have no recollection of raising

16 it. Or it would have been something that would have

17 been possibly raised by the criminal intelligence

18 officer.

19 Q. If it had been raised, what would have been the kind of

20 discussion that would have taken place, and

21 I appreciate, again, you have no specific recollection

22 of it being raised?

23 A. If it had been raised, then the issue would have been in

24 terms of what measures can be taken to deal with the

25 threat.





1 My view that it may not -- my view that I don't

2 think it would have been raised was that the

3 correspondence on the way back up is seeking for

4 information on the threat, so it is not as if there is

5 a concrete threat and something clear that can be done

6 to deal with that threat. The line of correspondence is

7 asking for more information. So there is uncertainty

8 against the veracity of the threat.

9 Q. Let's look at what Chief Inspector McMullen sends back

10 up, and that can be found at RNI-101-204 (displayed).

11 This is his note to the Divisional Commander,

12 Superintendent Robinson, and you can see there it says

13 that the police do not have details of any threat there

14 may be against Rosemary Nelson. And that first section

15 of that sentence, I think, is probably based on the

16 Special Branch report provided to you. Is that correct?

17 A. Yes, that would seem to be the case.

18 Q. "... nor do they know of the nature of or reasons for

19 the deep concerns the US Lawyers Alliance have about her

20 safety."

21 Now, the Lawyers Alliance were mentioned in the

22 original letter from Mr Rogers. Does that chime with

23 your recollection?

24 A. Yes, it does.

25 Q. Can you remember anything about the Lawyers Alliance





1 query or complaint? Can you remember what it was about?

2 A. No, I can't. I can only remember what was written in

3 the letter, which I think talked about her safety.

4 Q. Shall we go back to Mr Rogers' letter, if that would

5 assist you, to see where it was? Can we go back to

6 RNI-101-196 (displayed) and highlight the contents

7 there, please?

8 Now, it simply records that Christine Collins, who

9 is his colleague, met the US Lawyers Alliance yesterday

10 and at the meeting they recorded their deep concerns

11 over the safety of Rosemary Nelson. And they go on to

12 say:

13 "We have also heard these concerns voiced by other

14 organisations and individuals over recent months."

15 Then he goes on to say:

16 "In case these comments were not made to the

17 Chief Constable or you have not picked them up

18 elsewhere, I thought I should write to pass them on. If

19 this has not already happened as a result of her

20 complaints about RUC threats, et cetera, then in

21 a situation where such concerns continue to be expressed

22 by those who apparently met her, it might be prudent to

23 consider whether or not she needs to be approached and

24 given advice on her security."

25 The first point, which I think you have answered, is





1 you were not aware of anything from the Lawyers Alliance

2 group?

3 A. No.

4 Q. So you weren't aware that they had raised a concern that

5 the threats made against Rosemary Nelson were in fact

6 being made by RUC officers?

7 A. Well, I wasn't aware of what the Lawyers Alliance had

8 said. So -- and, again, and in the overall context of,

9 you know, having no recollection of seeing this

10 material, I mean, I can only go by what I'm looking at

11 now and what it says.

12 Q. One thing they do mention, whether or not it emanated

13 from Lawyers Alliance or not, is in the second

14 paragraph, the bit in brackets:

15 "As a result of her complaints about RUC threats

16 ..."

17 Do you remember her bringing complaints about RUC

18 threats, allegedly made to her clients while they were

19 in the holding centre at Gough?

20 A. Yes, I am aware of that and the fact that it was the

21 subject of a couple of investigations, yes.

22 Q. Now, would you have been aware of that back in 1998,

23 when we were looking at the threat assessment?

24 A. I can't say whether I would have been aware of it then

25 or not. I simply don't know.





1 Q. What happens if we go back to Chief Inspector McMullen's

2 memo is that he sends it back up with two appendices.

3 First of all, let's look at the memo again and then I

4 will show you the two appendices that he adds to it.

5 Could you put Appendix B up, which is RNI-101-213

6 (displayed); can we have them both side by side, if that

7 will work? So that's RNI-101-204 and RNI-101-213

8 (displayed). Thank you.

9 He refers in the memo, at the fourth paragraph, to

10 two appendices. One is the Special Branch assessment,

11 which we have seen, Mr Chapman, and the second is what

12 he terms -- I will read it out to you:

13 "As a result of the Northern Ireland Office concerns

14 passed in May 1998 and again in February 1998, police

15 personnel in Lurgan have been briefed as set out in

16 Appendix B."

17 And this document, we think, that you can see on the

18 left of the screen is that Appendix B, which you can see

19 in manuscript at the top right-hand corner. Were you

20 aware of that document, Mr Chapman?

21 A. No, I wasn't -- I'm not sure whether I have seen this

22 document. I can't be sure.

23 Q. Who do you think wrote it?

24 A. I have no idea who wrote it. One assumes that it was

25 written by Henry McMullen or whoever drafted





1 Henry McMullen's report, but I can't say anything more

2 than that as to who may have --

3 Q. I will read out what it says. It says:

4 "American lawyers and pressure groups have raised

5 concerns with the NIO in relation to the personal safety

6 of Rosemary Nelson, solicitor."

7 That, I think, first of all picks up on the

8 Simon Rogers letter:

9 "The gist of these concerns seems to be that they

10 believe her to be under threat from Loyalist

11 paramilitaries due to her high profile involvement in

12 a number of well publicised court cases involving

13 suspected Republican terrorists."

14 I think he is probably referring to the Colin Duffy

15 cases, at least partly. Do you accept that?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. But it is the gist that I am concerned with. He says:

18 "They believe her to be under threat from Loyalist

19 paramilitaries due to her high profile."

20 Now, you have seen in the body of Mr McMullen's

21 letter that in fact he is also referring to issues that

22 had previously come to your attention, which relate to

23 threats from RUC officers. Do you think it is fair to

24 say that a decision was made not to include reference to

25 threats from RUC officers in this appendix?





1 A. Well, I don't know, but I suspect that it wasn't. It is

2 just in terms of the way in which the correspondence has

3 been interpreted, and you know, to some extent this goes

4 back to the point that Henry McMullen was raising: what

5 are the -- what is the information in relation to these

6 threats and seeking more information.

7 Q. I think we will come on in a moment to Superintendent

8 Robinson's memo. He discusses the threats in a bit more

9 detail. Were you aware that there were issues about the

10 validity of these threats and whether or not

11 Rosemary Nelson was cooperating with those who were

12 investigating them?

13 A. The complaints against police?

14 Q. Indeed.

15 A. No, I wouldn't have had specific knowledge of those

16 incidents. I wouldn't have known.

17 Q. Would this not have been something that would have come

18 to your attention if CID officers, these were, from

19 Lurgan were being asked about the complaints against

20 them?

21 A. The CID officers that were in Lurgan weren't directly

22 under my command. The CID officers in Lurgan were the

23 responsibility of a detective superintendent, so there

24 was a different structure for the command and

25 supervision of the CID officers.





1 The only crossover or role that I would have had

2 would have been -- with the CID officers would have been

3 in terms of whatever investigations they were carrying

4 out locally, such as investigations into burglary and

5 that type of thing.

6 Q. Would you have been informed just for reference?

7 A. In terms of complaints that had been made against

8 those --

9 Q. Just so you were aware that there were officers working

10 in Lurgan that had complaints against them, whether or

11 not you had a formal role in the complaints process?

12 A. I think if the complaints had arisen as a result of an

13 incident in Lurgan subdivision, then, yes, I would have

14 been informed. I'm quite certain I would have been

15 informed. But I'm not so certain, and I don't think I

16 would have been informed, if it related to officers who

17 weren't under my command, where the incident alleged of

18 had occurred elsewhere.

19 Q. Mr McMullen told the Inquiry that he thought this was

20 a document which would have been provided to him by

21 Special Branch possibly. Do you think that's correct or

22 is it the type of document which you would have expected

23 Mr McMullen or another one of your uniformed officers to

24 have written?

25 A. I have no recollection of Special Branch preparing that





1 type of document for briefing or further dissemination

2 in that format. So I would have suspected that that

3 would have been something that has been written by

4 either Henry McMullen, whoever drafted the report, or

5 possibly the CIO.

6 Q. And is it the kind of document that one would find in

7 a threat log?

8 A. It strikes me as the sort of document that would have

9 gone into the briefing book rather than a document that

10 would have gone into the threat log.

11 Q. And it would have been cut out and pasted in, would it?

12 Is that the way it works?

13 A. Yes, it would.

14 Q. So you would literally get a pair of scissors, take it

15 out and glue it into --

16 A. That's my recollection of the way the briefing book was

17 maintained.

18 Q. Would you be surprised if this hadn't been pasted into

19 the briefing book?

20 A. Well, I would be surprised on the basis that

21 Henry McMullen has indicated that patrols and personnel

22 have been briefed on it. So I would be surprised if

23 that has been followed through.

24 Q. I should clarify that we understand that the briefing

25 book cannot be located, so I am afraid we cannot assist





1 in that regard any further.

2 Would the contents of this also have been recorded

3 in the threat log?

4 A. It doesn't strike me as a document that would have been

5 included in the threat log. From recollection, the

6 threshold for an entry to go into the threat log would

7 have been where there was specific intelligence of a

8 threat and, I mean, as we have discussed earlier, I

9 think the correspondence that has gone up, back up the

10 correspondence chain, suggests that, you know, there is

11 a request for further information in relation to the

12 threat.

13 Q. Before we turn on to the memos that went back up the

14 chain, can we just focus on the final paragraph there of

15 Appendix B, please? Thank you.

16 It says:

17 "Although no reports have been received from any

18 source threatening Rosemary Nelson and no intelligence

19 exists indicating an actual threat, it is important in

20 view of the concerns raised with the NIO that attention

21 is given to Rosemary Nelson's office in William Street,

22 Lurgan and her home address at 3 Rosemount, Lurgan."

23 Whose responsibility was it to ensure that this

24 briefing took place?

25 A. Well, the responsibility to ensure that the briefing





1 took place -- assuming this document was placed in the

2 briefing book, the responsibility to assume that the

3 briefing took place would be with whoever was briefing

4 the personnel at each relief the duty, which would have

5 been the duty sergeant or the duty inspector.

6 Occasionally the CIO would have gone down and briefed

7 the uniformed personnel as well. So he too may well

8 have had some role in briefing the personnel on this

9 issue.

10 Q. So the CIO may have written this document and then it

11 would have been pasted into the briefing book and then

12 it would have been the duty officer's -- potentially his

13 responsibility to brief the uniformed officers who were

14 being tasked to do this?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. How often would it then occur, once it has been pasted

17 into the brief book?

18 A. How often would the briefing occur?

19 Q. More the actual object of the briefing?

20 A. In terms of what the patrols were being asked to do?

21 Q. Yes.

22 A. It is clear the way this has been written that it is

23 something that the patrols have been asked to do in the

24 course of their duties. So to that extent, it was left

25 quite open-ended.





1 In terms of the frequency with which they could give

2 attention to her office and her home address, the office

3 of course was almost adjacent to the police station,

4 which would have been almost on view from people who

5 were providing security at the front gate. The home

6 address would have been probably not just quite as easy

7 for patrols to get to.

8 Q. Now, we know that this address is incorrect, in terms of

9 the home address at least, and that Mrs Nelson's house

10 was on Ashford Grange, in fact. Were you aware of that

11 error?

12 A. I'm aware of this now. I wasn't aware -- as I say, I

13 can't recollect seeing it, and even if I had seen it, I

14 wouldn't have been aware that Rosemary Nelson lived

15 anywhere.

16 Q. Do you think the uniformed officers would have done or

17 would this have sent them in the wrong direction?

18 A. I would expect that the view, if any, of the uniformed

19 officers would have known where Rosemary Nelson lived.

20 Q. It follows from that that in terms of protecting her

21 house, this wouldn't have worked?

22 A. No, it wouldn't have worked if it was the wrong address.

23 Q. Even if it had been the right address -- which, as we

24 know, as I said, is Ashford Grange, which I think is not

25 too far from the Kilwilke Estate -- is it realistic to





1 assume that uniformed officers would be passing by and

2 keeping an eye on her house given the area it was in?

3 A. My recollection is while it is adjacent to Kilwilke

4 Estate, it was in an area that would not have been the

5 subject of the same frequency or intensity of attacks on

6 police as the Kilwilke Estate itself would have been.

7 So had the address been accurate, yes, it would have

8 been possible for some passing attention to have been

9 paid.

10 Q. And do you think that such actions were in any way

11 likely to deter Loyalist paramilitaries attempting to

12 take her life?

13 A. Well, a physical uniformed police presence was

14 historically one of the main strategies that were used

15 to try and deter attacks, so the answer to your question

16 is yes, it would have helped. But whether or not it

17 would actually have deterred an attack, you know, would

18 have depended on the nature of the attack that was

19 planned. So, yes, it would have been helpful, but it

20 would not be an absolute solution to any vulnerability

21 or threat that may have existed.

22 Q. You mentioned earlier that one of the issues for your

23 subdivision was that you didn't have sufficient

24 information on which to base an assessment, and that you

25 can see Mr McMullen here in the final sentence





1 recommends that the Northern Ireland Office and the

2 US Lawyers Alliance be asked to supply precise details

3 of any information in their possession.

4 Is that a request that you would have agreed with?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. May we look at Superintendent Robinson's memo, which is

7 the one above this one? We can find that at RNI-101-209

8 (displayed).

9 Now, to be fair to you, Mr Chapman, I think today is

10 probably the first time you have seen this memo because

11 it wasn't available, I am afraid, when you were

12 interviewed for the purpose of this Inquiry. Could you

13 take a moment just to read through what it says there?

14 (Pause)

15 The first thing it refers to is the Lawyers Alliance

16 complaint in 1997, alleging comments by detectives

17 making death threats towards Rosemary Nelson, and it

18 comments that these were under investigation by a Chief

19 Inspector, P146, in the Complaints branch, but that

20 Rosemary Nelson hadn't cooperated with the

21 investigation.

22 I think you have already given the answer to this,

23 but I would like to clarify having seen this: were you

24 aware of that investigation and Rosemary Nelson's

25 non-cooperation?





1 A. Well, yes, I was aware of the investigation, but as

2 I said, when I was aware of it, I can't be sure.

3 Q. Would you have spoken to Superintendent Robinson about

4 this?

5 A. No, almost certainly not.

6 Q. Now, it goes on -- and I think the only thing we need to

7 focus on is the business at the end of it, which we will

8 find, I think, overleaf -- and there you can see in the

9 final paragraph, he says:

10 "If the US Lawyers Alliance or the NIO had evidence

11 of a threat or threats, it would be necessary for them

12 to give precise details of any information in their

13 possession so that it can be properly assessed and

14 appropriate security advice given to Mrs Nelson if

15 necessary."

16 It looks like Superintendent Robinson is picking up

17 on Chief Inspector McMullen's request and is passing it

18 up to ACC South, and we know from the chain that we have

19 seen that that gets passed back to the

20 Command Secretariat.

21 To your knowledge, Mr Chapman, was any information

22 forthcoming about the details of the alleged threat

23 against Mrs Nelson?

24 A. No, I have no recollection of any further information

25 coming.





1 Q. May I ask you why you or any of your officers didn't go

2 and see Mrs Nelson and ask her directly what these

3 threats were all about?

4 A. Well, I can only surmise that the reason was that the

5 initial correspondence had come down through quite

6 a laborious chain from the Lawyers Alliance, to the NIO,

7 down through all the various management levels within

8 the organisation, back down to Lurgan subdivision. So

9 I suppose the first answer that I would give is that in

10 those circumstances, I consider it appropriate that the

11 correspondence should have gone back up through that

12 chain of correspondence.

13 And secondly, to be able to go and give someone some

14 security advice or talk to them about security, I think

15 you need to have some understanding as to what the

16 nature of the threat is. And certainly from the papers

17 that I have seen, it is not that clear what the nature

18 of the threat was.

19 So for that reason -- for those two reasons, it

20 seems appropriate to me not to have visited Mrs Nelson

21 and to have sought clarification about the manner in

22 which the information was produced.

23 Q. Doesn't it appear, though, that the origin of the

24 concern is Mrs Nelson herself because it is her clients

25 who are receiving alleged threats and it is her who is





1 raising them in the context of the complaints system.

2 So, in fact, there is nothing really to stop you from

3 going to see her directly and asking her what is this

4 about, without going through what we have seen is at

5 least a six-stage process of memos up and down the RUC

6 chain?

7 A. Well, I still hold the view that it is not appropriate

8 to go and speak to someone about their security when you

9 are not sure exactly what the issue is.

10 Q. Isn't the point of going to see her to find out what the

11 issue is? Isn't that a fair thing to do to someone?

12 A. It is a fair thing to do if someone directly raises the

13 issue of her security with the police, but this seems to

14 have been quite a convoluted way to introduce the issue

15 of a person's security up through a pressure group

16 through the Northern Ireland Office and down through the

17 various chains in the police.

18 Q. Did you get the sense that this was another aspect

19 possibly of the sort of publicity that might have been

20 slightly anti-RUC coming from Mrs Nelson's quarter?

21 A. It certainly strikes me as odd that someone who is

22 concerned about her security wouldn't take a more direct

23 route to raise her concerns and there are a number of

24 different options open to her to do that.

25 Q. Do you think there was a concern within the subdivision





1 that she may be downright hostile or uncooperative if

2 you tried to contact her directly and say what is all

3 this about?

4 A. No, I would not have thought that that would have been

5 a concern because on a number of occasions individuals

6 have been approached who would be very hostile towards

7 the police and passed on specific threat messages. So I

8 wouldn't have seen that as an obstacle to approaching

9 her.

10 Q. One of the things Mr McMullen talked about at some

11 length -- and I will quote from a little bit of his

12 evidence which, if necessary, we can go to and I think

13 you have a hard copy of it in front of you. It is from

14 Day 48, which is the second day of his evidence, and it

15 can be found on page 94. He said:

16 "There was no way I was going to go to a solicitor

17 with a half-baked story that there is a threat against

18 you, for that to appear in the newspaper and get

19 somebody killed as a result."

20 He went on to discuss his reasoning about that in

21 some detail. Do you think there was a sense in which

22 firstly contact with Mrs Nelson would end up in the

23 newspaper, and secondly, that would be dangerous?

24 A. Well, there is always the possibility that the recipient

25 will -- any recipient of this type of conversation would





1 attempt to make some publicity out of it. So to some

2 extent, I agree with him when he talked about not being

3 properly briefed -- I think "half cocked" was the

4 expression he used. I can understand his reasoning

5 behind that. But if the threshold is passed where

6 someone should be told about a specific threat, then the

7 threshold is passed, and irrespective of what that

8 individual may do with the information when they get it

9 is entirely a matter for them. And that is just

10 a reality of telling people about threats that they may

11 be subject to.

12 I think the key point is that there wasn't full

13 possession of all the facts and, therefore, at that

14 stage it wasn't appropriate, and I would certainly agree

15 with him on that.

16 Q. The second part of the question I ask you is to do with

17 the possibility of endangering other people's lives by

18 adverse publicity about this issue. Is that something

19 that you would have thought about when you were

20 considering whether or not to go and see her?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Why not?

23 A. I don't necessarily make the connection between telling

24 someone of a threat and endangering other people's

25 lives. I just -- I don't know what was going through





1 Henry McMullen's mind when he said that, but that

2 certainly would not have been a connection that I would

3 have made or it wouldn't have been an issue that would

4 have been uppermost my mind.

5 Q. Do you think generally that the anti-RUC publicity that

6 may have been prevalent in the late 1990s -- and of

7 course we are talking about the pre-Patten reforms,

8 et cetera -- were in any way dangerous for the force as

9 a whole?

10 A. They were dangerous for the force as a whole on two

11 levels. One would have been at the political/strategic

12 level, where there was an attempt to denigrate policing

13 and what the police were doing at that time. So it was

14 dangerous for the organisation at a strategic level.

15 At a local, sort of micro level, I'm not so sure

16 that it would have added overall to the particular

17 threat that individuals may well have been under.

18 Obviously it depends on the specifics of what the

19 individual threats were. But speaking generically,

20 I just don't make a necessary connection between the two

21 things.

22 Q. I appreciate that this is a retrospective question, but

23 do you consider that in retrospect it was a mistake not

24 to go and see Mrs Nelson and ask her about the threats

25 against her?





1 A. Hindsight is a wonderful thing and we know now what

2 happened. On the basis of the way in which the

3 correspondence came in and the nature of the imprecise

4 information that was provided, I still think that it was

5 right to take the approach that was taken. I mean, I

6 think for me one of the key issues is that had

7 Mrs Nelson been concerned about her own security, there

8 were a number of other avenues that she could have taken

9 to address security concerns without going through an

10 external pressure group.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: What are the other avenues she could have

12 taken?

13 A. She could have written herself to the police. She could

14 have come in herself to the police and raised her

15 concerns. She could have written to the

16 Northern Ireland Office and said, you know, "I feel

17 under threat, I would like to be considered for the Key

18 Persons Protection Scheme or the SPED scheme". Those

19 were all a number of issues or alternatives that

20 certainly I consider would have been available.

21 MR SKELTON: Just picking up on that, the question from the

22 Chairman, do you think it is a possibility that she did

23 raise complaints about threats allegedly made against

24 her by RUC detectives, but they were fed into the

25 complaints system and not in fact dealt with by the





1 security side?

2 A. Yes, almost certainly that's the way they would have

3 been dealt with from a bureaucratic point of view.

4 Q. So in fact the substance of them was investigated as

5 allegations against police officers rather than looked

6 at as genuinely threats that were endangering her life?

7 A. I would suspect that the two are not totally isolated,

8 that had the complaints been substantiated or had the

9 investigation uncovered anything, then it would have fed

10 automatically into almost the intelligence or threat

11 assessment side, if you will. So I'm not so sure that

12 the two issues are in individual silos. I think there

13 was some connection between the two, but I think the key

14 point is that they would have gone into the bureaucratic

15 part of the organisation as a complaint against the

16 police and been investigated as such.

17 Q. The problem with that, of course, is that the

18 bureaucratic side of the complaints system takes a lot

19 of time, and as we know, the complaints weren't in fact

20 fully investigated until after she had died. Can you

21 see why the problem there arises: If the complaints

22 department are taking their time investigating it, that

23 the actual threat itself is not being dealt with, even

24 preventatively, whether or not it is substantiated

25 eventually?





1 A. Well, all I can say is that the -- you know, if any

2 evidence or intelligence, I would imagine, had been

3 uncovered during the investigation of the complaints, it

4 would automatically have fed over into whatever way the

5 threats were dealt with.

6 Q. Did you yourself have any further involvement in

7 addressing issues relating to Rosemary Nelson's safety?

8 A. Not that I can recall.

9 DAME VALERIE STRACHAN: Sorry, can I intervene once more

10 just to pick up on the point about what happens if it

11 goes into the complaints system?

12 As put, you might think that there is a suggestion

13 that the complaints department was taking its time about

14 it. My interpretation was that time was being taken,

15 but not because the police Complaints and Discipline

16 Department were taking their time, it was because of the

17 difficulty of getting cooperation. There was in fact

18 a flow of correspondence. Nevertheless, time was

19 passing by. So I think the fundamental point is still

20 inevitably that process takes time, wasn't it important

21 that the preventative aspect should be looked at?

22 A. Well, I don't know what I can say other than the answers

23 that I have given previously, and that is that in the

24 course of those investigations, then if there was any

25 evidence or whatever disclosed, then they would have





1 been dealt with. But certainly -- I think -- I would

2 accept the point that the complaints against the police

3 were dealt with primarily as complaints against the

4 police and were not dealt with in terms of a threat to

5 the individual.

6 MR SKELTON: Well, we talked at the start of your evidence

7 about someone coming in off the street and saying, "I

8 have had a threat against me" and possibly bringing in

9 a letter saying, "This is the threat".

10 Now, it seemed from your evidence then that action

11 is taken immediately to advise the person to do

12 something to protect themselves in the form of a

13 briefing and a leaflet possibly, or an application to

14 the KPPS, et cetera. What doesn't happen in fact is

15 a full investigation into whether or not the letter was

16 sent necessarily by an individual who was in fact going

17 to take someone's life or, if that investigation does

18 occur, it occurs separately from the advice. Is that

19 a fair assessment?

20 A. Well, I think in the example you have quoted, if I

21 understand your question, the two issues would again go

22 hand in hand, in that the investigation of the alleged

23 receipt of the threatening letter would inform whatever

24 is done in terms of the assessment of the threat. To

25 some extent the assessment of the threat may also inform





1 whether a criminal investigation is carried out in

2 relation to the letter that was received.

3 Q. Do you not give advice straight away, even if you may

4 eventually give slightly different advice while the

5 investigation is going on into the substance of it?

6 A. Yes, it is fair to say that that advice would be

7 offered, yes.

8 Q. You wouldn't wait until the outcome of the investigation

9 into the letter or the phone call, until you gave the

10 advice?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Mr Chapman, I do not have any further questions for you,

13 but the Panel may.

14 Questions by SIR ANTHONY BURDEN

15 SIR ANTHONY BURDEN: Mr Chapman, you took over command at

16 Lurgan at a very difficult time. You explained that to

17 us. And you brought a fresh insight as well to the

18 subdivision. What was the state of morale when you

19 arrived?

20 A. As you can imagine in the aftermath of the murder of the

21 two officers and the continuing public order problems

22 that came from the Drumcree problem, morale at the time

23 was not particularly high and a lot of the officers were

24 very concerned about their personal safety. Having said

25 all that, the Provisional IRA ceasefire had been





1 reintroduced, so to some extent that threat had been

2 taken away. But there was still a lot of fear and

3 apprehension about policing in the Lurgan area.

4 SIR ANTHONY BURDEN: Discipline? Generally?

5 A. I saw no ill effects as far as discipline was concerned.

6 SIR ANTHONY BURDEN: Obviously, as a new commander coming

7 in, you assessed the way in which the community was

8 being policed. Any concerns there about the way in

9 which the two distinct parts of the community were being

10 policed?

11 A. No, I had no specific concerns. The number of options

12 that were available to police the two communities were

13 limited and were governed by the constraints of the

14 terrorist threat and public order issues.

15 SIR ANTHONY BURDEN: And you had reserve police officers

16 working at Lurgan at the time, I suppose?

17 A. Yes.

18 SIR ANTHONY BURDEN: And some of those reserve officers,

19 plus members of the Royal Irish Regiment, would have

20 been living in the same sorts of areas as some Loyalist

21 supporters, I would suppose?

22 A. Certainly as far as police officers were concerned, over

23 the years and especially as a result of Drumcree, there

24 were very few police officers that continued to live in

25 what would be considered to be Loyalist areas. I'm not





1 sure what the position was as far as the Royal Irish was

2 concerned, but I think they would have had a higher

3 level of soldiers living in the more strongly Loyalist

4 areas than the police would.

5 SIR ANTHONY BURDEN: Was it an issue for a subdivisional

6 commander to always be very mindful of intelligence

7 leaks back into the community?

8 A. Yes, it would have been an issue in terms of the

9 briefings that were provided. Having said that, the

10 briefings that were provided were pretty low level as

11 far as uniformed officers and, as far as I was aware,

12 the military were concerned.

13 SIR ANTHONY BURDEN: But you have got this -- I think you

14 agreed -- potential for a rumour machine to be operating

15 outside of official intelligence?

16 A. Yes, that's right.

17 SIR ANTHONY BURDEN: Any concerns on your part in relation

18 to that at Lurgan?

19 A. I had no specific concerns over and above, you know --

20 people have to live in the community and that's just the

21 way things are.

22 SIR ANTHONY BURDEN: Okay, thank you very much.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Chapman, there is nothing else you wish to

24 say to us?

25 A. No.





1 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much for coming to give

2 evidence before us. You may now go and we will adjourn

3 until tomorrow morning at 10.15 am.

4 (4.15 pm)

5 (The Inquiry adjourned until 10.15 am the following day)
























1 I N D E X

Ruling on closed hearings ........................ 1
MR IAN CHAPMAN (sworn) ........................... 5
Questions by MR SKELTON ...................... 5
Questions by SIR ANTHONY BURDEN .............. 81