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Full Hearings

Hearing: 1st December 2008, day 83

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7 ----------------------







14 ----------------------


16 held at:
The Interpoint Centre
17 20-24 York Street
Belfast BT15 1AQ

19 on Monday, 1 December 2008
commencing at 1.00 pm

21 Day 83









1 Monday, 1 December 2008

2 (1.00 pm)

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Currans, the checklist. Is the public

4 area screen fully in place, locked and the key secured?

5 MR CURRANS: Yes, sir.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Are the fire doors on either side of the

7 screen closed?

8 MR CURRANS: Yes, sir.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: Are the technical support screens in place

10 and securely fastened?

11 MR CURRANS: Yes, sir.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Is anyone other than Inquiry personnel and

13 Participants' legal representatives seated in the body

14 of this chamber?

15 MR CURRANS: No, sir.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

17 Mr (name redacted), can you please confirm that the two

18 witness cameras have been switched off and shrouded?

19 MR (NAME REDACTED): Yes, sir, they have.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: All the other cameras have been switched off?

21 MR (NAME REDACTED): Yes, sir, they have.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

23 Please bring the witness in.

24 The cameras on the Panel, the Inquiry personnel and

25 the Full Participants' legal representatives may now be





1 switched back on.

2 Would you please take the oath?

3 B509 (sworn)

4 Questions by MR PHILLIPS

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Please sit down.

6 Yes, Mr Phillips?

7 MR PHILLIPS: I think it is right that you have made

8 a single statement to the Inquiry. Is that correct?

9 A. Yes, that's correct.

10 Q. Can we have it on the screen, please, at RNI-846-438

11 (displayed)? Do we see your ciphered signature at

12 RNI-846-436 (displayed) and the date of 22 August this

13 year?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Now, if we turn back to RNI-846-438, please, you have

16 been given anonymity and a cipher, B509. And I hope

17 that you have also been provide provided with a list of

18 other witnesses and ciphered names. Is that correct?

19 A. Yes, that's correct.

20 Q. I would be grateful if you would consult the list as we

21 go along so that their anonymity can also be preserved.

22 A. Okay.

23 Q. Just starting at the beginning, please, you talk about

24 the training you received on your arrival in

25 Special Branch in November 1995. Can I ask you this





1 question, please: who conducted that training?

2 A. The training would have been conducted by our own

3 Special Branch training team.

4 Q. Exclusively, or were others involved?

5 A. No, initially our own training team.

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. But on refresher courses after that, we would also have

8 travelled across to England as well for Security Service

9 courses.

10 Q. Thank you. Then the next paragraph, in paragraph 2, you

11 make some general remarks about recruiting sources and

12 you tell us, as I think is the case, that there was no

13 one standard way of recruiting. Is that correct?

14 A. Yes, it is.

15 Q. Thank you. And you say there that:

16 "Each recruitment was different and depended on who

17 specifically you wanted to approach."

18 Can I ask you this question, please: At what level

19 would decisions be taken about recruitment?

20 A. Well, a recruitment obviously would have been discussed

21 at local office level with the Detective Sergeant --

22 Q. Yes.

23 A. -- and the detective inspector too. Now, if the

24 approach was in the final stages, the Detective

25 Inspector may have well spoke to the Detective Chief





1 Inspector or Detective Superintendent, just to ensure

2 that what we had planned was okay to go ahead.

3 Q. The detective inspector you refer to, he was responsible

4 both for Lurgan and for Portadown, was he not?

5 A. Yes, for Lurgan, Portadown and Craigavon, yes.

6 Q. Yes. Thank you very much.

7 Now, that deals with, as it were, the source end of

8 the equation. What about deciding on who the target

9 should be? Was that a decision taken at the same sort

10 of level?

11 A. The decision on the persons we planned to approach would

12 have been taken more or less at office level.

13 Q. At your local office?

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. Thank you. That's the office in Lurgan, which we are

16 hearing about in evidence for the first time today?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. With you and some other detective constables under the

19 command of a detective sergeant?

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. Thank you. Now, you talk in the same paragraph about

22 building up a picture -- this is the picture of the

23 potential source. How would you go about that, please?

24 A. Well, basically you would collate information on the

25 person you were looking at. (Redacted)





1 (redacted), you would look at his financial history, you

2 would look to see where he is working, where he is

3 socialising, people who he frequents, and also you would

4 collate as well intelligence that has been submitted in

5 relation to this person.

6 Q. So you would look at existing material?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And you would gather in new material?

9 A. Yes, hm-mm.

10 Q. And were there occasions on which you at your level

11 would make a suggestion to your sergeant or higher up as

12 to a possible recruit?

13 A. Yes. Basically there was no -- there was never one way

14 of making an approach, so it would have been left very

15 much to yourself to decide when the best time would be

16 to make this approach.

17 Q. Now, we have heard evidence already about intelligence

18 requirements and the picture that we have been given in

19 the evidence is that those sort of requirements would

20 come, as it were, from above, if that's a fair way of

21 putting it?

22 A. Yes, hm-mm.

23 Q. Down to the local office. So did it sometimes happen,

24 when a new requirement for a particular type of

25 intelligence was received, that you, in discussing how





1 to go about that, would resolve that you needed to get

2 more coverage in that particular area?

3 A. Yes, that's correct.

4 Q. So that sort of intelligence requirement might lead to

5 exploration of a recruitment possibility?

6 A. Well, as a result of us saving different taskings you

7 may well have to postpone a number of operations you had

8 planned and take on new ones.

9 Q. Yes. In other words, you would have to re-order your

10 existing priorities?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Thank you. Now, in paragraph 3 of your statement on the

13 next page, which is RNI-846-439, if we could enlarge

14 that, please (displayed), you talk about the various

15 different motivations operating on individuals who

16 decide to act as sources, and one of them you mention is

17 getting out of a difficult position, as you put it. Do

18 you see that?

19 A. Yes, I do, yes.

20 Q. You express the view there in the next sentence -- do

21 you see five lines in? -- that you didn't think that was

22 a good way of recruiting because the motivation wasn't

23 really there. Can you just help? What do you mean by

24 that?

25 A. Well, generally speaking, if someone came to us





1 volunteering to work with us, and in return we could

2 help them by -- we could help them by getting a case or

3 something that they had been caught up in sorted out in

4 some way or other. But generally, it would have took

5 a while for that person to prove to us that he was

6 passionate about doing the job that he wanted to do, as

7 opposed to coming to us more or less saying, "Listen, if

8 you get me squared with this case, I will work for you"

9 and then two months down the line he walks away.

10 Q. As you say, the problem was that once you'd delivered,

11 there would be no continuing motivation?

12 A. Yes, that's correct.

13 Q. Presumably you were wary of individuals that were

14 seeking to get themselves out of trouble by doing deals

15 only to discover later that they were actually not

16 useful?

17 A. Yes, that's correct.

18 Q. Or not prepared to be useful?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Now, this question of getting things sorted out, were

21 there guidelines about that?

22 A. Usually, if people approached us who were living in the

23 Lurgan area -- I don't believe there were guidelines.

24 However, it may well have resulted in the Detective

25 Inspector speaking to the Superintendent in charge of





1 that area at the time to have a case brushed aside.

2 Q. So these are considerations, decisions, that would be

3 taken at a level above your level?

4 A. Yes, hm-mm.

5 Q. Yes. But as I understand it then, what you are doing in

6 this paragraph is to contrast those situations where the

7 motivation might simply end and the continuing

8 motivation which existed in other cases?

9 A. Yes, that's right.

10 Q. What were the sort of motivating factors that you came

11 across?

12 A. Well, generally speaking, as I have said in my statement

13 here, the financial awards would be a fairly good

14 motivating factor, coupled with the fact that people we

15 were working along with do take pride in what they are

16 doing and obviously get a sense of achievement by

17 passing intelligence on to us that directly goes to save

18 someone's life.

19 Q. Now, in cases where the motivation was financial,

20 presumably you had to be on your guard for those

21 individuals whose need for money led them to talk big

22 but, in the process, to pass on information that might

23 not be reliable. Is that correct?

24 A. Yes, that is correct, yes.

25 Q. And so therefore in assessing reliability, you





1 presumably would always have that sort of potential

2 danger in mind?

3 A. Well, hopefully the intelligence that this person would

4 pass on, the intelligence would have been corroborated

5 by another source in the area.

6 Q. So that was one way of checking things. Were there

7 other ways of ensuring, as far as you could, that you

8 had a good feel for the reliability of a source's

9 information?

10 A. No, I think it is a case of building up a trust in the

11 person and being cautious until you realise that the

12 person is willing to help you, and obviously to --

13 before you go and hand a person money, that he is -- it

14 is going to bring him under notice if he can't cover the

15 money. You just don't go and hand people thousands of

16 pounds.

17 Q. But whether the motive was financial or not, presumably

18 you were also concerned to make sure that individuals

19 were not simply telling you what they thought you wanted

20 to hear?

21 A. Well, if that was the case, I daresay it wouldn't be too

22 long until we found out that the intelligence they were

23 passing to us was untrue or false.

24 Q. So this was something that came with experience?

25 A. Yes, hm-mm.





1 Q. Now, can we just look at another topic, which you deal

2 with later on this page, please, RNI-846-439

3 (displayed)? It is paragraph 5; if we could enlarge

4 that, please. Because here you talk about the wider

5 political situation, do you see, and you refer to the

6 IRA ceasefire in 1994?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Now, the evidence that the Inquiry has heard so far

9 suggests that from this point on, in other words from

10 the mid 1990s, the time when you joined in fact,

11 intelligence requirements shifted and at the political

12 level more was required from Special Branch; in other

13 words, what witnesses have described as political

14 intelligence became of importance. Does that accord

15 with your own recollection?

16 A. Yes, it certainly would. However, with us working in

17 Lurgan, we would still have been driven more against

18 the -- the fight against terrorism and these

19 organisations carrying out atrocities, as opposed to the

20 political. But yes, certainly we would have had to bear

21 the political side of our intelligence gathering in

22 mind.

23 Q. Just looking at that answer, I think what you are

24 suggesting is that there was still ongoing paramilitary

25 activity throughout the period from then until the date





1 of Rosemary Nelson's murder, for example?

2 A. Very much so, yes.

3 Q. So that remained, as it were, your bread and butter, if

4 I can put it that way?

5 A. Yes, that's right.

6 Q. But are you also accepting that, at the same time during

7 this period, you were required to gather in information

8 which was of a more political kind?

9 A. Yes, we would have been, yes.

10 Q. So as to satisfy the requirements of politicians

11 effectively, for example, in the context of Drumcree and

12 matters that of kind?

13 A. Yes, that's right.

14 Q. Yes. Now, in paragraph 6, which is at the very bottom

15 of the same page -- we have got it on the screen, or the

16 beginning of it -- you deal with the way your office

17 worked in practice and you talk about running sources in

18 teams. You say probably of four people at your level,

19 detective constable, and then you go on to say, if we

20 look over the page to the top of RNI-864-440

21 (displayed), that the Detective Sergeant, your boss, if

22 I can put it that way, would have overseen all the

23 meets.

24 Now, can I just ask you about this? What you say in

25 your statement a bit later on, RNI-846-448 -- if we





1 could just flick that on to the screen, please

2 (displayed), paragraph 33 -- in relation to a particular

3 bit of intelligence:

4 "The intelligence report refers to four handlers.

5 This is not uncommon, although typically only two

6 handlers would meet the source at any one time."

7 That's correct through the period we are concerned

8 with, is it?

9 A. Yes, it is, yes.

10 Q. So although the team might be rather larger than that,

11 there would generally be two officers present at the

12 meetings?

13 A. Yes, there would be two officers there to carry out the

14 meet.

15 Q. Thank you very much. Did it follow that within the

16 group of four people, as you say, within the team,

17 probably of four people, there would be two who were

18 particularly concerned with the source and would go

19 regularly to the meetings?

20 A. No, not always the case. The handling team for each

21 source usually was made up of three or four

22 detective constables and there was no set rule to who

23 was going out upon a source meet. It could well have

24 been just who was available at that time to carry out

25 the meet.





1 Q. But did it occur from time to time that particular

2 relationships were built up between particular sources

3 and particular handlers?

4 A. Well, the longer handlers worked along with sources.

5 Their relationship was going to be much better than me

6 coming in with only two months' experience on that

7 person.

8 Q. Yes, exactly. Looking back to paragraph 6 on the top of

9 following, page, RNI-846-440 (displayed), you say there

10 that the Detective Sergeant would have been fully aware

11 of what was going on. So he, as it were, kept an eye on

12 all of the intelligence you were receiving in the

13 office. Is that right?

14 A. Yes, that's correct, yes.

15 Q. And as you say, on occasions he would go to meetings

16 himself. Presumably if he wasn't doing that, he learned

17 about the information from the discussions you talk

18 about?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And also from the reports to which he had access?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. Yes, thank you.

23 Now, when you say earlier in the sentence about the

24 fact that the Detective Sergeant would have overseen all

25 the meets, would he from time to time give instructions





1 as to specific matters to be covered in the meetings?

2 A. Yes. Well, the Detective Sergeant would usually have

3 called meetings with our office, maybe two a month,

4 where we would have sat down and looked at the

5 intelligence product that was being supplied.

6 Obviously, what you are told in one meet, you will

7 revisit it again on the next meet to see is there

8 anything further that a source can add to it. If there

9 were specific taskings or requirements, the Detective

10 Sergeant would have raised them at those meetings, and

11 that's basically it.

12 You know, without having to sit down and be told

13 what to ask a source every time you met him, you

14 generally knew what questioning -- what line of

15 questioning you were going to take on the meet.

16 Q. Yes. Now, at the end of this paragraph you refer to the

17 system as it is now, and obviously the Inquiry is much

18 more interested in what was going on then?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. But you also refer to the Detective Inspector there.

21 Did the Detective Inspector, whom we referred to

22 earlier, did he on occasion attend meets with sources?

23 A. Probably not as much as the Detective Sergeant, but yes,

24 on occasions the Detective Inspector would have attended

25 meets.





1 Q. Yes. Now, you have touched on this in the answer you

2 have just given, but can I ask you to look at

3 paragraph 10 of your statement, RNI-846-441 (displayed)

4 because I would now like to ask you some questions about

5 what happened after the meets and how the information

6 was disseminated from that point.

7 Now, it is probably best, if you do not mind, to

8 just explain in your own words rather than reading out

9 the statement. Obviously there would be exceptions, but

10 in an average case when you returned from a meeting what

11 would you do?

12 A. When you returned from the meet, you then would have

13 returned to the Special Branch office, where you would

14 have sat and went over the intelligence that was

15 discussed on the meet with the Detective Sergeant, along

16 with the Detective Inspector, if he was present. Also

17 included in that meeting would be the remaining members

18 of the Special Branch office, not only the handling team

19 but the remaining members in the office.

20 Q. Right. Just pause there, if we may. So you would come

21 back. You would report to your sergeant and, as you

22 said, the inspector if he was there, and in the course

23 of that others would also attend and listen?

24 A. Yes, hm-mm.

25 Q. So --





1 A. Well, it was important in the office that everybody knew

2 what was going on in the Lurgan area.

3 Q. Yes.

4 A. So the fact that you weren't on one particular source,

5 there was a chance you could have been put on to that

6 handling team the following week, so was up to yourself

7 to keep abreast of the intelligence that the source

8 would be able to provide and the access that they had

9 as well.

10 Q. So in general, as you say at the end of this paragraph,

11 everybody within the office would be generally aware of

12 the intelligence that was coming in to the office?

13 A. Yes, that's right.

14 Q. Now, that, as it were, is the first stage. Can we now

15 have paragraph 11 on the screen, please, which is the

16 next paragraph on the same page (displayed)? And it goes

17 over to the next page.

18 So you have had your discussion now, which you have

19 helpfully described. What do you do at the next stage

20 in terms of the information?

21 A. At that time then, once we had discussed the

22 intelligence that was provided, the intelligence then

23 would have been prepared on to debriefs.

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. Which I believe at the time they would have been





1 handwritten, and then at some stage the debriefs would

2 have been took across to the original intelligence unit

3 based at Mahon Road.

4 Q. Yes, that's the regional source unit?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Now, we have had a number of people's recollections

7 about the various computer systems and what went on

8 which system, when. Perhaps I can cut through this. Do

9 you have a detailed recollection now of what the systems

10 were between 1997 and 1999?

11 A. In 1997, I think the MACER system -- the MACER computer

12 system was in operation and a debrief which we created

13 would have been put on that system, (redacted)

14 (redacted).

15 Q. Right. You don't think that was the PRISM system?

16 A. No, the PRISM system would have been dealt with by the

17 regional source unit; we wouldn't have access to the

18 PRISM computer.

19 Q. Right. As far as the MACER system there is concerned,

20 that was the system to which you did have access, you

21 think?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And you were, as far as we have understood from the

24 other witnesses, able to access it up to level 19?

25 A. Yes, that's correct.





1 Q. Is that correct?

2 A. Yes, that's correct.

3 Q. Thank you. So whatever the details of the computer

4 system, once the material had been entered on to the

5 system, you say the MACER system, that was available,

6 was it, to all of the officers working at the Lurgan

7 office?

8 A. Oh, yes.

9 Q. Yes. So to take an example, one of your colleagues

10 isn't available to listen in to the discussion, which

11 followed a meeting, the sort of discussion you have talk

12 about. He or she would be able to come in later and,

13 once the material had made its way on to the system,

14 access the information and, as it were, catch up?

15 A. Yes, that's right.

16 Q. Yes. Now, that process that I have just described and

17 you have agreed with works, provided what goes on to the

18 system contains all the detail which has been given in

19 the oral debrief?

20 A. Yes, that's correct.

21 Q. Was the material edited before being put upon the

22 system?

23 A. Depending on the sensitivity of the intelligence, it

24 would have been sanitised to ensure that the

25 intelligence may not have identified the source himself.





1 Q. And that is so even in relation to the material to which

2 your colleagues within the office had access. Is that

3 right?

4 A. Yes. Well, they would be reading it off the debrief,

5 yes.

6 Q. But are you saying they would be reading it off

7 something which had already been sanitised?

8 A. Yes. Well, if you say if they were off for a number of

9 days and came back to work to catch you up, as they were

10 reading through it, they probably would have asked for

11 an explanation or a wee bit more detail.

12 Q. So if they wanted more, they could ask you or colleagues

13 and get more?

14 A. Certainly, yes.

15 Q. Yes. Now, presumably what would sometimes happen on

16 these debriefing meetings is that the sergeant or

17 inspector, if he was present, would say, "Right, well,

18 thank you very much for that, but what we need is more

19 on A, B, C and D". Is that correct?

20 A. Yes, that's right.

21 Q. Now, in terms of what you describe in your statement in

22 paragraph 7 -- if we can look at that, RNI-846-440

23 (displayed) -- as retasking, you would say:

24 "We would retask the source based on information

25 provided at previous meetings."





1 From what you said earlier, you would re-read the

2 material from the last meeting before you went to the

3 new meeting. Is that correct?

4 A. Yes, hm-mm.

5 Q. And that would be the occasion, if appropriate, to take

6 up with the source the particular requests that had been

7 made by the sergeant or the inspector in the course of

8 the debriefing meeting, for example?

9 A. That's right.

10 Q. Yes. Now, in terms of checking back on the information

11 provided at previous meetings, which is what you have

12 referred to in this paragraph, how would you physically

13 do that? What would you look at?

14 A. Well, you were able to go on to the MACER system and put

15 in a search to see what debriefs had been submitted by

16 a particular source. And you could quantify the date of

17 the search, so you could put in the dates of the times

18 that you were looking to check back on.

19 Q. So you could search by reference to the source?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Yes. At the time we are concerned with here, 1997 to

22 1999, would there also be paper files retained at the

23 local office?

24 A. Yes, there would have been.

25 Q. One for each source?





1 A. Yes, hm-mm.

2 Q. So that for those who weren't computer friendly, for

3 example, they could look at the file?

4 A. Yes, that's right.

5 Q. Whereas the more computer literate could go straight to

6 the computer? The two were running in parallel?

7 A. Yes, that's right.

8 Q. Yes. Now, can I just go back to paragraph 10 for

9 a moment on this question of records, RNI-846-041

10 (displayed)?

11 What you say there, about five lines from the end --

12 do you see after the big redacted passage? --

13 A. I do, yes.

14 Q. -- is:

15 "We didn't always take notes ..."

16 This is at the meetings with the sources. And then

17 you go on to talk about the debrief. If you did take

18 notes at a meeting, what would happen to them?

19 A. Well, the notes would have been used -- the notes that

20 we took at meetings were usually bullet points to enable

21 us, when we got back to the office, just to refresh our

22 memory. They also may have included the -- the notes

23 may also have included details that the source was

24 passing on, for example, car registration number or home

25 address or something like that.





1 Q. Yes.

2 A. But generally speaking, the notes were used for us to

3 prepare our intelligence debriefs and then destroyed

4 after that.

5 Q. They would then be destroyed?

6 A. Yes, hm-mm.

7 Q. So they wouldn't be put on the paper file, for example?

8 A. No.

9 Q. They would be completely superseded by the reports?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Yes. Now, earlier in this same paragraph you say in the

12 fourth line that you did work a lot after an event and

13 that's the first reference you make in your statement to

14 working with CID, and the example you give is

15 investigating a murder.

16 A. Okay.

17 Q. Now, that's dealing with matters after something has

18 happened. A number of your colleagues in their evidence

19 to the Inquiry have suggested that they saw their

20 primary role as trying to stop lives being taken. Is

21 that how you would describe your primary role?

22 A. My role in Special Branch would have been to gather

23 intelligence, and in the ideal world you would like your

24 intelligence to be pre-emptive at all times.

25 Unfortunately, it is not.





1 Certainly if an incident would occur, it would be

2 our aim to gather as much intelligence on that as

3 possible.

4 Q. Yes. And it looks from that expression you used there

5 -- "We did, however, work a lot after the event" -- that

6 regrettably there were many occasions on which you found

7 yourself trying to gather intelligence after something

8 had happened?

9 A. The unfortunate thing about Lurgan between the period

10 and between, I suppose, 1995 and 2000, that we could

11 have sat on a Monday and decided the way ahead, who we

12 were going to look at, and on the Tuesday somebody could

13 be murdered and then the plans we had in place would

14 have to be suspended until we were able to gather

15 intelligence on that atrocity.

16 Q. So in that rather grim sense, nothing surprised you

17 about what happened in Lurgan?

18 A. Not at all.

19 Q. Can I ask you some questions about the business of

20 working with the CID in the example you have given,

21 a murder investigation? When you became

22 a Special Branch officer, did you receive any training

23 on that particular topic: how to work alongside

24 non-Special Branch CID officers?

25 A. No, there is no specific training in relation to that.





1 Q. Was there any specific guidance as to the extent to

2 which it was appropriate to cooperate, share

3 information, with them?

4 A. I believe, if I'm right in saying, there was a Walker

5 Report that had been introduced to -- which covered the

6 interchange of intelligence between ourselves and CID.

7 Q. Indeed. Well, the Walker Report specifically referred

8 to difficulties and tensions in the relationship between

9 CID and Special Branch, where CID were, broadly

10 speaking, complaining that they weren't given adequate

11 information. Was that a problem that you yourself

12 encountered as a serving officer?

13 A. No, I certainly encountered no such ill feeling between

14 the two departments. In Lurgan, just the way things

15 were, we were always liaising closely together and the

16 working relationship was very professional.

17 Q. And can I take it from what you are saying here that you

18 yourself had experience with working with CID in murder

19 investigations?

20 A. No, I had no experience whatsoever.

21 Q. No. But did you have experience as a Special Branch

22 officer in liaising with CID officers in the course of

23 murder investigations?

24 A. Not in an official capacity, no.

25 Q. No. Does that mean that where it happened -- and





1 obviously, because you refer to it in your statement,

2 I assume it did happen -- that it was dealt with by more

3 senior officers?

4 A. Well, if the CID were looking at one particular murder,

5 they would have passed taskings on, probably to the

6 detective -- our own detective inspector or detective

7 sergeant --

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. -- who would then have asked us to revisit the questions

10 that had been put to us by CID.

11 Q. And you refer in your statement to the specific case of

12 the Rosemary Nelson murder investigation, don't you?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And the taskings that came down to you in relation to

15 that?

16 A. That's right. But generally speaking, when we had

17 responses or replies to the taskings, we wouldn't have

18 given them directly to CID. I certainly wouldn't have.

19 It would have been a case for my line managers to pass

20 that on.

21 Q. And can I take it, therefore, that the detailed

22 instructions about what you were required to do and what

23 was needed at your level were given to you not direct by

24 CID officers, but by your superiors within

25 Special Branch?





1 A. Yes, that's correct, yes.

2 Q. Now, in this particular context you deal with a specific

3 aspect of this sort of cooperation in paragraph 12 of

4 your statement, RNI-846-442 (displayed) because here you

5 are talking about dissemination of intelligence and you

6 mention the regional source unit. You say:

7 "If, as handlers, we thought that someone else

8 needed to know, for example, the Drug Squad or CID who

9 were investigating a crime, we would remind the regional

10 source unit to pass on the intelligence to them. But

11 this was a task that they actually undertook."

12 So just to be clear, it was the source unit that was

13 the primary point for dissemination?

14 A. Yes, our intelligence went to the source unit. They

15 would then decide on what caveat the intelligence was

16 going to get, which included then who they thought would

17 need to have readership of that intelligence. And also

18 when the intelligence was going to an outside

19 department, such as Drug Squad, they would then actually

20 issue an action sheet or briefing sheet, as it was then,

21 with the details on it. That would be shared with Drug

22 Squad.

23 Q. Yes. Did they on occasion consult people at your level,

24 in other words, the handlers, as to the sensitivities of

25 intelligence in order to make the right decisions about





1 sanitisation, for example?

2 A. Yes, if need be they would have spoke more than likely,

3 again, to the Detective Sergeant and would have ensured

4 that the form of words they were putting out wouldn't

5 cause any difficulty to our source.

6 Q. Yes. Now, looking at the thing the other way, when you

7 say, "We would remind the regional source unit to pass

8 on ..." was that something that you can recall doing on

9 occasion, getting in touch with them to prompt them to

10 do something?

11 A. Usually you were sitting at the desk beside members of

12 the source unit, handing them the debriefs. And for

13 example, if you were bringing in intelligence to do with

14 drug dealing in the area, you may well say to them,

15 "Listen, make sure that this goes to Drug Squad because

16 they have been speaking to us and are looking at

17 intelligence along those lines".

18 Q. So in the senses you have just been describing, there

19 was a two-way flow, if I can put it that way, between

20 you and the source units?

21 A. Yes, hm-mm.

22 Q. Now, so far as getting your information to the regional

23 source unit, can I just take you back to paragraph 11

24 again? And I don't want to get into the computer

25 systems again, but if we can go to the previous page,





1 RNI-864-441 (displayed), you say:

2 "Having shared intelligence ..."

3 That's the discussion you have talked about:

4 "... intelligence would then be completed on to

5 a debrief form ..."

6 Et cetera, et cetera. Then just a little bit

7 further down, you say:

8 "Prior to their introduction ..."

9 That is the systems, the computer systems:

10 "... I remember we used to type our own ... forms

11 after a meeting, and we would arrange for those to be

12 sent to the regional source unit."

13 So I'm absolutely clear about this, as you were

14 typing, either the debrief forms or into the computer

15 yourself and then pressing the button to send it off,

16 were you sanitising your debrief reports?

17 A. Yes, I was.

18 Q. You were? So that by the time they reached the regional

19 source unit, you in your office -- I don't mean you

20 only, but you as a group -- would have sanitised the

21 material?

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. Now, just thinking back to the paper files on sources

24 that you said also existed locally, would the material

25 that you put into the paper files also be sanitised?





1 A. What you were putting into the paper file was the text

2 of the debrief. Going back to that time, if we were

3 handwriting the debriefs, a copy of the debrief would

4 have went across to the regional source unit and

5 probably the actual debrief that you wrote out would

6 have went into the source folder.

7 Q. Thank you. So that if the system was working properly,

8 the paper file and the computer version of it should be

9 the same?

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. Yes. Now, in terms of sanitisation, the process that

12 you have just described as going through, was that

13 something that you received training on or was it

14 something you, as it were, learned on the job?

15 A. Very much so. You would have learned -- you would have

16 learned very quickly to ensure that the intelligence you

17 were supplying was sanitised.

18 Q. Now, can I just ask you a question about the limits to

19 the intelligence to which you and your colleagues had

20 access in Lurgan? And that's something you talk about in

21 paragraph 13 at RNI-846-442 (displayed). Here, you say

22 in the second sentence, do you see:

23 "The only intelligence I ever saw or had access to

24 was the intelligence that Lurgan office submitted or

25 intelligence that someone outside the Lurgan area had





1 reported into the system in relation to someone who was

2 on our patch in Lurgan."

3 So there are two aspects then: the first is your

4 local intelligence, and I think you have said that was

5 all shared so that everybody knew what was going on. Is

6 that correct?

7 A. That's correct, yes.

8 Q. Dealing with the second part, I just want to see what

9 this means in practice. As I understand it, what you

10 are saying is if something was going on within your

11 area, even if the intelligence had been gathered in

12 outside Lurgan, it would be brought to your attention so

13 that you could see it in Lurgan?

14 A. Yes, that's right.

15 Q. Now, would that be flagged up in some way?

16 A. It would be flagged up generally speaking at the line

17 manager's meetings.

18 Q. Yes.

19 A. However, it mightn't well have been at a meeting. It

20 might well have been a simple phone call by a detective

21 inspector from other area to my detective inspector, who

22 would probably pass on maybe a SIR document number for

23 us to read.

24 Q. Yes. "You need to know about this"?

25 A. Yes.





1 Q. That I understand. Now, what about Portadown because

2 that obviously is a separate office, but it is pretty

3 close by and there were a lot of shared interests, if I

4 can put it that way, were there not?

5 A. Yes. Well, between Lurgan and Portadown there was

6 Craigavon, and Craigavon had its own Special Branch

7 office too.

8 Q. Yes. Now, to what extent would you be alerted to

9 intelligence coming in to, let's say, Portadown?

10 A. I would only have access to Portadown intelligence if it

11 referred to the Lurgan area.

12 Q. Right.

13 A. Or referred to someone who resided in Lurgan.

14 Q. Do you know whether your sergeant's position was any

15 different?

16 A. I don't think his position would have been any

17 different, no.

18 Q. No.

19 A. However, the Detective Inspector covering Portadown

20 would obviously be getting the intelligence from our

21 office as well as his own office.

22 Q. Yes. So in a sense he was the obvious point in which

23 all the three offices came together?

24 A. That's right.

25 Q. Yes. And are you aware of whether there was regular





1 contact/discussion about matters at the slightly lower

2 level of the sergeants?

3 A. No, there would be no discussion at a lower level.

4 Q. Not so far as you are aware, at any rate?

5 A. That's right.

6 Q. Now, did the barriers that you have just talked about

7 between Lurgan on the one hand and Portadown on the

8 other, did that cause difficulties from time to time?

9 A. I would say not. Usually we were busy enough in Lurgan

10 to be worrying about Lurgan, as opposed to what another

11 office was reporting.

12 Q. Yes. Now, if, given the system as you have described

13 it, there was an individual about whom you gathered

14 intelligence in Lurgan who was active, let's put it that

15 way, in Portadown, then no doubt Portadown would expect

16 you to draw that to their intention?

17 A. Draw that -- yes, draw that to their attention probably

18 from the Detective Inspector.

19 Q. So the sense I'm getting then is that if something was

20 going to be disseminated outside your local office, then

21 one way of doing it is, as it were, to go up to the

22 Detective Inspector so it can come down again to the

23 other local office?

24 A. Generally speaking, it was the only way of doing it.

25 Q. Yes, thank you. Can we move on to look at the statement





1 in relation to Rosemary Nelson? In the paragraph we

2 have on the screen, you tell us when you first joined

3 the Lurgan office, which is 1995, as you have told us.

4 You think you knew of her as a local solicitor, but you

5 say she had a very low profile. And it looks from the

6 rest of this paragraph as though, so far as you are

7 concerned, her profile began to be raised by her

8 involvement in the GRRC affairs the following year?

9 A. That's right.

10 Q. Yes. And that's an example, isn't it, of the phenomenon

11 we have just been talking about, where somebody, in this

12 case practising as a lawyer in Lurgan, is working in

13 this important way for the GRRC, whose concerns were

14 actually in Portadown?

15 A. Yes, that's correct.

16 Q. Yes. Now, you say there that you became aware she

17 represented Breandan Mac Cionnaith, who was the

18 spokesman for the Residents Coalition, and he, I think

19 you are saying, had a very high profile and that, again,

20 increased her profile.

21 What did you understand her to be doing as a lawyer

22 for Breandan Mac Cionnaith?

23 A. I suppose Mrs Nelson would have been giving

24 Breandan Mac Cionnaith legal advice to what he could ask

25 for and what he couldn't ask for.





1 Q. Can you be a little clearer about that? What he could

2 ask for, what he couldn't ask for. In what sense?

3 A. Probably what he, as a representative, was allowed to do

4 in having controversial parades banned from his area.

5 Q. Yes. So in other words, giving legal advice about his

6 rights in relation to the marching?

7 A. Yes, that's right.

8 Q. Is that right?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Thank you. Now, just turning the page to paragraph 15,

11 you say:

12 "The fact that she had this high profile did not

13 change my attitude towards her or anyone else's in the

14 RUC Special Branch of which I'm aware. She was

15 a solicitor doing a job. I had no feelings in relation

16 to her one way or the other."

17 Now, I think it is right, isn't it, that since you

18 made this statement you have had an opportunity to look

19 again at some of the intelligence documents coming in to

20 Lurgan in these three years?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. And in the light of that material, I just want to look

23 at this comment you make about the way she was regarded.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Now, you knew at the time, I assume, didn't you, that





1 she was representing Colin Duffy when he was charged

2 with the murders of two police officers in Church Walk

3 in Lurgan in June 1997?

4 A. That's right.

5 Q. And that was a very high profile case as well,

6 wasn't it?

7 A. It certainly was because the general feeling we had in

8 Lurgan was that it forced the Provisional IRA to

9 implement their second ceasefire a month later.

10 Q. Yes. So it was not only a terrible event in and of

11 itself, but it was politically significant?

12 A. Yes, indeed.

13 Q. Yes. Now, again, I don't think I need to take you to

14 much of this material, but you have seen intelligence

15 now, haven't you, to the effect, for example, that she

16 was -- and this is in April 1996 -- gathering

17 information on police officers for the Provisional IRA?

18 A. That's right.

19 Q. Now, is that something you think you would have been

20 aware of at the time?

21 A. Yes, working in Lurgan Special Branch office we would

22 have had access to that intelligence, yes.

23 Q. Yes. And I think we probably should have a quick look

24 at that document because it may illustrate one of the

25 things we have just been discussing together.





1 Can we look at RNI-541-013, please (displayed)? I

2 think we can see from the origin here that this comes in

3 fact from Portadown. Is that right? "JG", as opposed

4 to "JL". Is that right?

5 A. Yes, that's right.

6 Q. If you turn over the page, RNI-541-014 (displayed),

7 that's the intelligence that I was talking about.

8 A. Okay.

9 Q. Now, given what you have told us about the way

10 information should come to you and given the heading,

11 which is "PIRA Lurgan", this information would have been

12 brought into your office or you would have had your

13 attention drawn to, wouldn't you?

14 A. Yes, we would have had readership of it, yes.

15 Q. And you have also seen, I know, intelligence which comes

16 much later than this, after April 1996, and we will look

17 at that in a minute. But can I just pause while we have

18 this on the screen to pick up something you deal with in

19 your statement? Because there you see Rosemary Nelson

20 has an SB number.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And I think what you say in your statement is if you

23 have a number, you have a file.

24 A. That's correct, yes.

25 Q. Yes. So we can see, can't we, from that that





1 by April 1996 she had a file?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Now, in your statement in paragraph 16 -- if we can just

4 go to that, please, RNI-846-443 (displayed) -- the first

5 sentence, you say:

6 "Neither did Special Branch have a file on

7 Rosemary Nelson of which I'm aware. We held files on

8 people who were the targets of our intelligence

9 activities."

10 A. Yes, hm-mm.

11 Q. Just dealing with this in turn, it looks in fact as

12 though there was a file on her, doesn't it, from the

13 fact that she had a number?

14 A. Yes, she would have had her own Special Branch number.

15 She would have had her own file at Headquarters, but I

16 think that the file -- that questionnaire I was

17 responding to was a target file. I may have been asked,

18 "Did Mrs Nelson have a target file in Lurgan office?"

19 Q. I see. Well, let us just be clear what sort of files

20 you had in Lurgan office. You told us you had source

21 files?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. You also had target files, did you?

24 A. Yes, that's right.

25 Q. Paper files?





1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And are you saying that there was not a target file for

3 Rosemary Nelson in Lurgan?

4 A. Oh, definitely, yes.

5 Q. Definitely?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Right. So where would the file be? Would it be at the

8 regional source unit?

9 A. No, the file I'm talking about would have been the

10 file -- would have been -- as I explained earlier, if we

11 had decided to approach someone, the information we had

12 collated on that person would be held in the

13 target file.

14 Q. Yes.

15 A. And kept in our own office.

16 Q. Yes. But where you say in your statement if you have

17 a number, you have a file, which is evidence we have had

18 from number of other witnesses, you are saying, are you,

19 that there would be a file, but it wouldn't be one in

20 the Lurgan office?

21 A. No, sorry, I had mistaken your question. A copy of the

22 file kept at Headquarters would also have been kept in

23 our office.

24 Q. So there would have been a file for Rosemary Nelson in

25 the Lurgan office?





1 A. Yes, a personal file --

2 Q. A personal file?

3 A. -- but not a target file.

4 Q. I understand.

5 A. Sorry.

6 Q. No, there is no need to apologise. There is a source

7 file, there is a target file and then there is

8 a personal file?

9 A. Yes, that's right.

10 Q. So three distinct types of file?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And are you saying, therefore, that this was a file

13 that, if you had wished to, you could have consulted in

14 the Lurgan office, her personal file?

15 A. Yes, hm-mm.

16 Q. And you would have also to access, as it were, the

17 computer file on her within the system?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. By using the number and her name, et cetera, et cetera?

20 A. Yes, the file on that person would have commenced once

21 that person was issued with a Special Branch number.

22 Q. Exactly. So we know that at the very latest, there

23 would have been a file by April 1996 because that

24 intelligence we saw has her number on it at that time?

25 A. That's correct.





1 Q. Thank you.

2 DAME VALERIE STRACHAN: I apologise for pursuing this, but I

3 have been very confused about the nature of files held

4 on people.

5 A target file, you were saying, would apply to

6 someone whom you were thinking of approaching?

7 A. Yes, that's right.

8 DAME VALERIE STRACHAN: So what kind of a file would you

9 have had on Colin Duffy? Would it have been a target

10 file or would it have been a personal file?

11 A. It would have been a personal file.

12 DAME VALERIE STRACHAN: So a very similar sort of file to

13 the one that you would have on Rosemary Nelson?

14 A. Yes. Basically what was kept in that file was the

15 documents that had been submitted against a person.


17 A. And prior to the computer, I think the files -- we may

18 not have continued to use the files once the MACER

19 system was up and running and all the intelligence was

20 transferred on to that system.

21 DAME VALERIE STRACHAN: Thank you. I think I'm beginning to

22 understand.

23 MR PHILLIPS: But that question of the transfer of

24 information -- again, we have heard some evidence about

25 that from other Special Branch officers -- the





1 impression certainly that has come out of recent

2 evidence is that that took place after her murder in, I

3 think somebody at Headquarters said, about 2001, as far

4 as he could remember. Does that sound about right?

5 A. I think the current system we are using currently,

6 CHISM, I think that started about 2001. So it may well

7 have been tied in with the same data.

8 Q. I see. So are you able to say whether, at March 1999,

9 there would have been both the paper and the computer

10 files at Lurgan?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Thank you. Now, in relation to what you have described

13 as the target files, would there have been a copy of

14 those anywhere else other than at Lurgan?

15 A. There would only have been one target file and it was

16 kept in Lurgan office.

17 Q. That was a local file, if I can put it that way?

18 A. It was, yes.

19 Q. And in relation to the personal file that you have just

20 described, as I understand it, on that would be put all

21 the intelligence that you had gathered about the

22 particular individual?

23 A. Yes, that's correct.

24 Q. So presumably some of them were, to be frank, enormous?

25 A. They were, yes.





1 Q. Now, we started all of this because we were looking at

2 the pieces of intelligence, to remind you, that you

3 didn't refer to in your statement but that you have

4 since seen?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And you said in relation to that April 1996 one, that

7 you are sure that was something that you had been aware

8 of. And to remind you, the intelligence was to the

9 effect that she was gathering information on police

10 officers for the Provisional IRA. That's the first

11 thing.

12 You have also seen intelligence, I think, suggesting

13 that she was involved in putting pressure on witnesses

14 in the context of criminal cases, involved in creating

15 false alibis in criminal cases. Do you remember that

16 piece of information? Is it better for me to show you?

17 A. No, I remember -- not specifically, but I do remember

18 the general gist of the intelligence you are mentioning,

19 yes.

20 Q. Yes. Intelligence suggesting she was very close to

21 PIRA, intelligence suggesting that she was allowing

22 local PIRA members into her office to read confidential

23 legal files, and you remember that presumably?

24 A. I do, yes. It was intelligence like that that raised

25 its own issue in our own office where there was a threat





1 assessment carried out on us as well as CID in Lurgan at

2 the time.

3 Q. Really?

4 A. Yes, there was.

5 Q. Can we just have a look at that together then, please?

6 That's RNI-542-089 (displayed), and this is the first

7 page. I'm sure you have seen many of these, so you know

8 that the information -- date of March/April 1998 -- is

9 on the second page. If we could have that, please

10 (displayed)? Thank you:

11 "Rosemary Nelson permits member of Lurgan PIRA to

12 read confidential legal case note documents in the

13 secrecy of her office."

14 So you think you would have been aware of this at

15 the time?

16 A. Yes, certainly.

17 Q. And I think you were saying that that led to a threat

18 assessment being done on you and your colleagues. Is

19 that correct?

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. At this time in March --

22 A. I'm not sure if it was -- if it commenced in March, but

23 probably not too far from that date.

24 Q. And what was the concern, please?

25 A. The concern was basically that Mrs Nelson may have had





1 our details, our personal identities and the fact that

2 Lurgan PIRA was sitting in her office having access to

3 these, it would then lead for them to go and do a bit of

4 research and target us at our homes.

5 Q. So what this prompted then was effectively a threat

6 assessment about the issue of whether Rosemary Nelson,

7 by her actions, was posing a threat to you and your

8 colleagues?

9 A. That's right.

10 Q. Yes. Now, just going back, if you can remember, to the

11 document from April 1996, which said that she was

12 gathering information on police officers -- much more

13 general -- was that something that, as you can remember,

14 led to any action of the kind you have just been talking

15 about?

16 A. I can't honestly say if it did or not. I can't remember

17 if it did.

18 Q. No, but just concentrating on this one, what do you

19 think it was about the case notes that might put

20 Special Branch officers in danger? You wouldn't

21 generally appear in any case notes, would you?

22 A. Well, my name may well have been on interview notes that

23 I took part in, maybe at Gough Barracks.

24 Q. Yes, I see. But anyway, that's what you recall, is it?

25 And do you recall what the result of that exercise was?





1 A. Yes, indeed. I had bullet proof windows put into my

2 house.

3 Q. So there were security measures taken?

4 A. Yes, indeed.

5 Q. Did that involve other colleagues as well, as far as you

6 can remember?

7 A. As far as I can remember, it may well have included most

8 of our Lurgan office and the majority of Lurgan CID

9 as well.

10 Q. You think this was all prompted by this intelligence,

11 do you?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. So on any view, if what you have remembered is correct,

14 this was a very significant piece of intelligence?

15 A. It was.

16 Q. And it is quite at odds, isn't it, with the impression

17 you have given in your statement that you thought of her

18 as just a solicitor doing her job?

19 A. Yes, that's right.

20 Q. Can we go back to paragraph 15 at RNI-846-443

21 (displayed)? Because now I have reminded you of all this

22 intelligence, whatever else your view was of her, you

23 didn't think of her, did you, at the time as just

24 a solicitor doing her job?

25 A. Probably prior to receiving this intelligence, that





1 would have been my opinion of Mrs Nelson. Then it

2 obviously became clear after that that she had let

3 herself then be manipulated by leading Republicans in

4 the Lurgan area.

5 Q. Well, some of the intelligence I have mentioned to you

6 came in in 1997, for example, came in before this

7 example we have just looked at in March/April 1998. Are

8 you really suggesting that at that point you and your

9 colleagues thought of her as a solicitor doing her job?

10 A. No, I'm saying that -- I'm saying that her dealings with

11 such issues like the Garvaghy Road Coalition, she was

12 doing her job.

13 Q. Yes. But these other matters that you and I have just

14 been discussing, were they characterised as just doing

15 her job?

16 A. Well, as I had access to the intelligence and was

17 updated on her activity, I have no doubt that my

18 personal feelings towards Mrs Nelson would have changed.

19 Q. Right. So as I say, now you have had a chance to remind

20 yourself of this material, it looks as though there was

21 a shift in the way you yourself regarded her?

22 A. Very much so.

23 Q. Did you come to regard her as somebody who had crossed

24 the line?

25 A. I would have said probably, being made aware of the





1 intelligence at that time -- she may well have started

2 to cross the line when these Lurgan PIRA members were

3 sitting in her office and discussing whatever they

4 discussed.

5 Q. What about the intelligence that suggested that she had

6 been constructing false alibis for PIRA members? Didn't

7 that suggest to you that she had crossed the line?

8 A. Probably not as much so as actually when it came down to

9 affecting our personal security as well.

10 Q. You see, the Inquiry has now received evidence from very

11 senior Special Branch officers, two individuals who, at

12 one stage, were the Head of the IMG, and they said

13 respectively, one of them, that he regarded her as

14 having committed criminal offences, being involved in

15 criminal activity, and the other, that he regarded her

16 as a terrorist. Was that your view of her, do you

17 think? At any event, after you were made aware of this

18 intelligence in March/April 1998?

19 A. No, I would never have categorised Mrs Nelson as

20 a terrorist. In my eyes, a terrorist is a person who

21 becomes involved in operational activity to achieve

22 a political end.

23 Q. What about the suggestion that she was gathering

24 information on police officers?

25 A. I still wouldn't be categorising her as a terrorist.





1 A terrorist in my eyes is someone who is engaged in

2 going out and carrying out a bombing or shooting.

3 Q. How would you describe this sort of behaviour then?

4 A. I would say that she is certainly assisting.

5 Q. Yes. So if not actively involved, then you regarded

6 her, did you, as assisting the Provisional IRA in their

7 work?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. So assisting terrorists?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. So it might be on that basis that she was indeed, in

12 your view, committing criminal offences?

13 A. Yes -- well, probably she was committing criminal

14 offences, but I wouldn't have categorised her as

15 a terrorist along with members of Lurgan PIRA I was

16 working against.

17 Q. No. But certainly by this stage, you were not regarding

18 her, were you, as a solicitor just doing her job like

19 any other lawyer?

20 A. No, as the intelligence picture against Mrs Nelson

21 increased, my views against her would have changed.

22 Q. Yes. Now, do you remember at any stage in the Lurgan

23 office, once this sort of information started to come

24 in, there being a discussion as to what could be done

25 about this, about the fact that a prominent local





1 solicitor was, according to all this reporting,

2 assisting the Provisional IRA in their work?

3 A. Yes, I believe on a number of occasions we would have

4 discussed this and probably, as a result, directed our

5 efforts towards the PIRA members.

6 Q. Yes. Well, you say as a result direct your efforts to

7 the PIRA members. Do you mean those with whom she

8 associated?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Wasn't it an obvious step for you to take

11 from March/April 1998 to direct your intelligence

12 efforts towards her?

13 A. No. Again, if you are asking me to prioritise, I would

14 always have directed my efforts towards the PIRA member.

15 Q. Indeed, but it was significant, if true, wasn't it, that

16 they were receiving such active assistance from a local

17 solicitor?

18 A. Yes, they were receiving assistance from her, but they

19 were the ones who would have been going out and carrying

20 out the attacks.

21 Q. Were any other steps considered that you could recall,

22 for example, referring the matter to CID so that they

23 could launch a criminal investigation into what was

24 going on?

25 A. No, I don't believe that was discussed at my level.





1 Q. Did you ever hear that such an action was being

2 considered, albeit at a level above your own?

3 A. No, I never heard that.

4 Q. No. So when you say in paragraph 17 -- if we can go

5 back to that page of your statement, please, and enlarge

6 the paragraph (displayed) -- thank you:

7 "I have no recollection of ever tasking a source to

8 specifically find information out in relation to her."

9 That is the case, is it, on your evidence, even

10 after your personal view of her changed?

11 A. That is the case.

12 Q. Now, we know from the files that there is a good deal of

13 reporting on her in fact, after this period that you and

14 I have just talked about, but also before that. Do you

15 think it is possible that others within the office

16 tasked their sources to find out information in relation

17 to her?

18 A. No.

19 Q. So can I take it from that that what you are suggesting

20 here is that where the Inquiry has seen intelligence

21 reporting about her, in each and every case that

22 reporting has come in, as it were, incidentally --

23 A. Yes, that's right.

24 Q. -- to the real focus of intelligence gathering?

25 A. Obviously I do not have access to all the intelligence,





1 but I would say, generally speaking, that's right.

2 Q. Yes. Now, can I just look at a couple of pieces of

3 intelligence here, please, in this context? The first

4 is one you talk about in paragraph 41 of your statement

5 and it is RNI-548-076, if we could look at that, please

6 (displayed). And the second -- so we can see the

7 date, February 1998. You can see it comes from

8 Lurgan -- do you see?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- originating unit, yes. Your cipher appears there on

11 the right-hand side, do you see, 509?

12 A. Hm-mm.

13 Q. Then turning the page, please, there is something about

14 her background, her father and what he does. And on the

15 next document in the file, please -- if we could have

16 RNI-548-079 (displayed) -- same origin, same date, there

17 are you are again, 509.

18 If we can turn over to RNI-548-080 (displayed), here

19 is something about her husband with a number of rather

20 pithy remarks about him.

21 Now, this sort of intelligence about her relatives,

22 her family, was that not gathered as part of an effort

23 to find out more about her?

24 A. No, it wouldn't have been. It would have been submitted

25 probably because during the meet -- it was background





1 intelligence that was mentioned in relation to her.

2 Q. But it suggests at the very least, doesn't it, that she

3 herself was a subject of discussion at the meeting?

4 A. Yes, that's right.

5 Q. And isn't it likely that some questions were being asked

6 here as to this individual, Rosemary Nelson? What do

7 you know about her, what do you know about her family?

8 And the details were handed over and put into the

9 system?

10 A. I daresay Mrs Nelson's -- obviously for those two

11 intelligence debriefs, Mrs Nelson was one of the

12 subjects on the meet. But at no stage would we have

13 been tasked to gather intelligence on Mrs Nelson.

14 Q. But it was very, very shortly after this, the next

15 month, that the information came in about her allowing

16 local PIRA members to read the confidential case notes.

17 So presumably at that stage you were dealing with

18 somebody who you thought might be putting you and your

19 colleagues at risk?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Wasn't that more than sufficient justification to start

22 gathering intelligence on that individual herself?

23 A. No.

24 Q. No?

25 A. No. There were people we were gathering intelligence





1 on, people we were tasked to gather intelligence on, who

2 were active members of paramilitary organisations.

3 Q. Yes, but presumably the individuals you were tasked to

4 gather intelligence on weren't restricted to members of

5 paramilitary organisations?

6 A. Generally speaking, they were.

7 Q. What about the situation where you wanted to find out

8 about those members' associates or contacts?

9 A. Yes, you could have -- yes, associates could have been

10 subjects at one time or another, yes.

11 Q. Yes. Well, you describe Rosemary Nelson in your

12 statement as being a very close associate of

13 Colin Duffy?

14 A. That's right.

15 Q. That's right, isn't it? And you say in your

16 statement -- well, you give a very clear view of how you

17 regarded him, namely as a prominent local member of the

18 Provisional IRA?

19 A. That's right.

20 Q. So didn't that very close association at the very least

21 make her a person of interest to you?

22 A. Yes, she certainly would have been a person of interest

23 to me, but at no stage can I remember tasking any source

24 to gather intelligence in relation to Mrs Nelson.

25 Q. But if she was a person of interest, at the very least





1 you would like to know whatever information you could

2 gather in about such a person, wouldn't you?

3 A. Yes, possibly.

4 Q. In order to fill out the background, as we were

5 discussing right at the beginning of your evidence, for

6 example?

7 A. That's right, yes.

8 Q. But now, so far as this information and the other report

9 we looked at is concerned, can I take it then that once

10 it had been produced in Lurgan, it would have been added

11 to her file and anybody thereafter who consulted her

12 file would be able to gather this little bit of extra

13 information about her family background from it?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. Yes. So it helped to build up the picture?

16 A. It did.

17 Q. Yes. Now, in relation to Colin Duffy, you say in

18 paragraph 16 of your statement, RNI-846-443 (displayed),

19 that you knew, for example, from reports you were

20 getting that at some stage she was having an affair with

21 him?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Thank you. And what I would like to do is look at

24 a couple of pieces of reporting which you do refer to in

25 your statement on this, please. The first is something





1 you refer to in paragraph 42 and it is at RNI-542-127

2 (displayed).

3 Now, if we could just go back to the full page,

4 please -- thank you -- this, as you see, is recorded as

5 being a PRISM document. Do you see that?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. So not MACER, which was the system you mentioned

8 earlier, and not CHISM, which was the later system?

9 A. That's right.

10 Q. But PRISM. Now, as I understood it, what you were

11 saying is that PRISM was something that existed not at

12 Lurgan, but at Headquarters --

13 A. The source unit.

14 Q. At the source unit. You see that the origin of it is

15 "Lurgan, JL". Do you see?

16 A. Yes, hm-mm.

17 Q. And that you are one of the two officers concerned with

18 this particular piece of intelligence. And, as you say

19 in your statement:

20 "This document is definitely one of mine because I

21 am one of the originating officers."

22 Now, you then go on to say in relation to

23 dissemination -- do you see, the third line,

24 "Dissemination, ND":

25 "The document bears the reference 'ND', which means





1 'no dissemination'. We put that on just about all our

2 documentation and would leave it to the regional source

3 unit to change it if they thought appropriate"?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Just following through your evidence, if this is

6 a document generated at the source unit, it looks,

7 doesn't it, as though they had accepted your view and

8 retained ND, no dissemination?

9 A. It does.

10 Q. Thank you very much. Now, the intelligence itself we

11 can see on the next page, RNI-542-128 (displayed), and

12 it has been in part redacted, as indeed has your

13 statement when you deal with this. So we must tread

14 carefully.

15 A. Okay.

16 Q. But what it says is:

17 "Colin Duffy meet up with Rosemary Nelson on

18 a number of occasions."

19 Then:

20 "On one such occasion Duffy park his car in ..."

21 I don't know how to pronounce it.

22 A. It is spelt wrongly. It is Demesne Avenue.

23 Q. Right:

24 " ... area of Lurgan. Duffy then got in to Nelson's

25 car and the two drove off."





1 Then it says, so far as we can read it on the

2 screen:

3 "They are having an affair."

4 Now, that is what it says and I think it is pretty

5 obvious, isn't it, to the objective reader that when you

6 look at what is said in the first paragraph and then you

7 look at what's said in the second paragraph, it does not

8 automatically follow that you reached the conclusion in

9 the third paragraph, does it?

10 A. Well, it doesn't, but where Demesne Avenue is situated

11 in Lurgan, it is in a Loyalist area of Lurgan, and for

12 Colin Duffy to drive into a Loyalist area of Lurgan, his

13 actions alone would raise suspicion.

14 Q. Well, the suggestion you are making then is that in

15 these circumstances humans take risks?

16 A. It seems to me that he did, yes.

17 Q. Yes. But there might be all sorts of explanations for

18 that, might there not?

19 A. There might have been. However, I would have assessed

20 that if he was looking to speak to Mrs Nelson to do with

21 a legal matter, he may well have met her in her office.

22 Q. So this was, in your view then, as it were, a discreet

23 location?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Not where you would normally expect him to be?





1 A. No.

2 Q. Does the same apply to her: not where you would normally

3 expect her to be?

4 A. Yes, I would say the same would apply to Mrs Nelson,

5 yes.

6 Q. Yes. Now, because of our computer system there are

7 limits to what we can do in terms of putting documents

8 on the screen at the same time. What I would like to

9 try to do is to keep this document on the left-hand

10 side, please, and put paragraph 43 on the right

11 (displayed). Sorry, it is paragraph 43, which is at

12 page RNI-846-451 (displayed). Thank you.

13 Now, I think it would be sensible to enlarge

14 paragraph 43, please. Right. Now, as I said, again

15 this paragraph is heavily redacted and that's obviously

16 something to bear in mind, but it looks, bluntly, as

17 though you were being asked questions about the

18 reliability of this intelligence, weren't you?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And it looks as though your answer is that the

21 intelligence was based on direct observation?

22 A. That's right.

23 Q. If I can put it that way?

24 A. Yes, hm-mm.

25 Q. Now, that applies, looking over to the left, doesn't it,





1 about the observations in the first two paragraphs?

2 A. Yes, it applies, yes.

3 Q. Are you saying that the conclusion in the third

4 paragraph -- "they are having a affair" -- is something,

5 on the basis of this intelligence, which is from direct

6 observation?

7 A. Yes, I would say the third line in the text to the left

8 is direct intelligence coupled with the first two lines.

9 Q. You mean paragraphs?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Yes. So as far as you were concerned then, this was

12 reliable information?

13 A. It was, yes.

14 Q. And reliable not just in the detail of the first two

15 paragraphs, but in the conclusion drawn in the third?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Now, if you look again on the left, it gives a date

18 of May 1998. Do you see that?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. "Dated" and then a blank, but then says "05/98". So

21 this comes, doesn't it, just a short while after the

22 intelligence we looked at together about allowing PIRA

23 members to look at the confidential files.

24 So looking at the build-up of information

25 chronologically, what's being suggested here was





1 something that showed an even closer association between

2 Rosemary Nelson and, in your view, a prominent local

3 PIRA member. Is that a fair way of putting it?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And what you say in conclusion is:

6 "From this information, we would have tasked ..."

7 Then there is another redaction:

8 "... saw anything similar again."

9 So what you are describing there is that, as I

10 understand it, this sort of information was sufficiently

11 interesting for you to want more?

12 A. Yes, hm-mm.

13 Q. So isn't this exactly the sort of tasking of

14 intelligence about Rosemary Nelson that you said did not

15 occur?

16 A. I think taking this one intelligence debrief, the fact

17 that someone is telling you that Mrs Nelson is meeting

18 with a leading PIRA member in the area, you are going to

19 ask the source to -- "If you see these two again meeting

20 up, let us -- make us aware of it".

21 Q. But that shows that she was a person of interest to you

22 at this time, doesn't it?

23 A. She was a person of interest to us at this time.

24 However, Colin Duffy was probably of bigger interest to

25 us than her.





1 MR PHILLIPS: Yes. Sir, would that be a convenient moment?

2 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, we will have a quarter of a hour break,

3 quarter to three.

4 Mr (name redacted), before the witness leaves, would you

5 please confirm that all the cameras have been

6 switched off?

7 MR (NAME REDACTED): Yes, sir, they have.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Please escort the witness out.

9 A quarter of an hour break.

10 (2.31 pm)

11 (Short break)

12 (2.49 pm)

13 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Currans, checklist. Is the public area

14 screen fully in place, locked and the key secured?

15 MR CURRANS: Yes, sir.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Are the fire doors on either side of the

17 screen closed?

18 MR CURRANS: Yes, sir.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: Are the technical support screens in place

20 and securely fastened?

21 MR CURRANS: Yes, sir.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Is anyone other than Inquiry personnel and

23 Participants' legal representatives seated in the body

24 of this chamber?

25 MR CURRANS: No, sir.





1 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr (name redacted), can you please confirm that the

2 two witness cameras have been switched off and shrouded?

3 MR (NAME REDACTED): Yes, sir, they have.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: All the other cameras have been switched off?

5 MR (NAME REDACTED): Yes, sir, they have.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

7 Bring the witness in, please.

8 The cameras on the Panel, Inquiry personnel and the

9 Full Participants' legal representatives may now be

10 switched back on.

11 MR PHILLIPS: Now, we were looking at a piece of reporting

12 which, as you said, was one of yours, if I can put it

13 that way, and the point we were looking at is what it

14 was reporting about the relationship between

15 Rosemary Nelson and Colin Duffy.

16 Now, what I would like to do now with you, please,

17 is to look at an earlier part of your statement, before

18 you start looking at the documents --

19 A. Okay.

20 Q. -- where you make some more comments about this. That's

21 paragraph 16, RNI-846-443 (displayed). Could we enlarge

22 that, please?

23 Here, you say -- and, again, there have been, as we

24 can see, substantial redactions -- in the fifth line:

25 "We knew, for example, from reports that we were





1 getting that at some stage Rosemary Nelson was having an

2 affair with Colin Duffy. I think which heard this from

3 all our intelligence assets, and it was generally

4 accepted by us in Special Branch that a sexual

5 relationship between Colin Duffy and Rosemary Nelson was

6 going on."

7 So taking the various points you make in turn, as I

8 understand it, there was a general view in Lurgan, you

9 and your colleagues, that there was a relationship of

10 this kind between the two individuals. Is that correct?

11 A. Yes, that's correct.

12 Q. So if at the debrief stage, for instance, after the

13 reporting we looked at just before the break, you had

14 come back and reported what had been said, there would

15 have been general agreement and understanding that that

16 was what was happening as between these two individuals?

17 A. That's right.

18 Q. And it follows, does it, from what you are telling us in

19 this paragraph, the parts that we can see, that the

20 reporting that came in had more than one origin?

21 A. Yes, that's correct.

22 Q. (Redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 A. (Redacted).





1 Q. Yes. Can I infer from what you say about the general

2 acceptance, that the general view was that the reporting

3 from these origins was trustworthy?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Now, imagine the situation where somebody had said to

6 you -- perhaps somebody quite senior within

7 Special Branch to whom you needed to give a clear and

8 convincing answer -- "Right, what are the reasons upon

9 which you base your view that the reporting you are

10 receiving on this relationship is credible?" What would

11 the points have been that you would make in answer to

12 that question?

13 A. I think intelligence that we would have had access to in

14 the office would have left us in no doubt that this

15 relationship was taking place.

16 Q. What was it about that intelligence that would have

17 convinced you?

18 A. It may have been discussions that were taking place.

19 Q. Do you mean discussions within the office?

20 A. Discussions that were taking place between Mrs Nelson

21 and members of PIRA.

22 Q. You mean intelligence based on that sort of

23 conversation?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Can you recall whether you received intelligence about





1 this from any other area; in other words, from outside

2 Lurgan?

3 A. No, I don't believe there was any reporting outside

4 Lurgan of this relationship taking place.

5 Q. Now, were you at any stage aware that this was a view of

6 the relationship which was more widely shared; in other

7 words, outside Special Branch?

8 A. No, I don't believe that this would have been of

9 knowledge to anyone apart from Special Branch.

10 Q. You don't think it was known about more generally within

11 the community?

12 A. No.

13 Q. And you don't think it was known about more generally

14 within the police, for example?

15 A. Erm, again I would have to assume that the intelligence

16 in relation to the relationship, the caveat wouldn't

17 have allowed it for general police officers to have

18 readership of it.

19 Q. But imagine in the case that you mentioned before the

20 break, where, as I understood what you were saying, an

21 assessment was to be done in relation to your office,

22 your colleagues in Special Branch, but also, I think you

23 said, CID. Wouldn't some explanation have to be given

24 to the relevant officers as to what it was that had

25 prompted this concern about safety?





1 A. Certainly not at my level. I would have given any

2 explanation to CID, and to be truthful I would have

3 thought that they wouldn't have questioned the

4 intelligence specific to the threat.

5 Q. So that deals with that specific issue, but are you

6 saying then that as far as you were aware, this

7 reporting was not disseminated outside Special Branch in

8 Lurgan?

9 A. Yes, that's right.

10 Q. Now, you say in this same paragraph that Colin Duffy had

11 loads of affairs, et cetera, and just because she was

12 a solicitor having an affair with him did not mean she

13 was considered by Special Branch as someone who had

14 crossed the boundary.

15 That, of course, was in a statement where you were

16 being rather caution, if I can put it that way, about

17 describing the way you viewed her, want it? That was

18 before you saw the pieces of intelligence that you

19 and I --

20 A. Yes, it would have been.

21 Q. Now, in relation to the business of the loads of

22 affairs, are you suggesting that that is something that

23 you also received intelligence about over the year?

24 A. I'm sorry, can you repeat the question again?

25 Q. Sorry, it is my fault. Do you see there the statement





1 you make there about Mr Duffy? Was that view of his

2 past -- of the fact that he had loads of affairs --

3 something based on intelligence reporting?

4 A. It would have been as well.

5 Q. Yes. Now, of course, the difference in this case, as we

6 have just seen together, is that, certainly in the

7 Special Branch view, Rosemary Nelson was in a position

8 as a local solicitor representing him to give active

9 assistance to those charged with offences and, indeed,

10 to the organisation more generally. That's the

11 difference, isn't it?

12 A. It is, yes.

13 Q. And it follows, doesn't it, from that that it is likely

14 at the time, not least because of the example you gave,

15 the vivid example about the threat assessment, that she

16 was in fact considered by your colleagues, you and your

17 colleagues in Lurgan, as somebody who had crossed the

18 boundary?

19 A. Yes, certainly. Again, I wouldn't have put Mrs Nelson

20 in the bracket of being a terrorist, but certainly she

21 was there assisting terrorists in the area.

22 Q. Yes. Can you remember ever having any doubt in relation

23 to the reporting that you received?

24 A. No, I can't remember at any stage doubting the

25 intelligence.





1 Q. Is it possible that your view of it was coloured by the

2 intelligence you had received about his earlier affairs?

3 A. I'm not actually sure if the affairs took place after

4 his relationship with Mrs Nelson ended.

5 Q. So it is possible, is it, do you think, that the

6 reporting that you mentioned earlier came after this

7 time?

8 A. The reporting of Colin Duffy having affairs?

9 Q. Yes.

10 A. Again, I'm not I'm not sure if the affairs that he had

11 took place after his affair with Mrs Nelson ended or if

12 they were whilst he was still married to his first wife

13 prior to meeting Mrs Nelson.

14 Q. But is it possible that in assessing these reports, you

15 and your colleagues, because of what you thought you

16 knew about his character, as it were put two and two

17 together and made five?

18 A. To confirm the relationship?

19 Q. Yes.

20 A. No, I don't think it is ...

21 Q. So in other words, that -- do you remember we looked

22 together at that three-paragraph document?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. That in considering the factual reporting in the first

25 two paragraphs, when added to your view of his





1 character, that led to you accepting what was suggested

2 in the third paragraph?

3 A. Yes, it did.

4 Q. It did?

5 A. It did.

6 Q. I'm not sure you have understood my question. What I

7 was suggesting was that you took those factual reports

8 in the first two paragraphs?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And when you assessed the conclusion in the third

11 paragraph as "reliable", you may have had in your mind

12 a particular view of the sort of character he was?

13 A. Can you explain? What do you mean, the sort of

14 character that he was?

15 Q. Well, you say here the sort of person you thought he

16 was, "he had loads of affairs". Do you see? What I'm

17 asking you is whether you think it is possible, when you

18 got the sort of reports that we looked at before, with

19 what had been observed, that in assessing whether or not

20 it was likely to be true, you were influenced by what

21 you thought you knew about his character?

22 A. Yes, I daresay it would have --

23 Q. That's human nature, isn't it?

24 A. -- confirmed it. It would have confirmed that that's

25 another affair that he is having, yes.





1 Q. Right. So far as the picture that you built up is

2 concerned, I would like to look at another report now.

3 This is at paragraph 45 and it is RNI-548-094

4 (displayed). Again, I am afraid if we look at the

5 document and then at the part of the statement, I think

6 it will help.

7 Again, we see your cipher here. This time it is

8 in June 1998. And if we go over to the next page, the

9 suggestion here was that he was going to move into

10 a house which Rosemary Nelson had recently bought and

11 furnished.

12 Now, that, as I say, comes just slightly after the

13 report we looked at just now. Presumably that rather

14 confirmed in your mind, did it, the suggestion about the

15 nature of the relationship that you had heard about

16 already?

17 A. It would have confirmed that the relationship was -- the

18 relationship was still ongoing.

19 Q. Yes. Now, if we go back to your statement, please, and

20 look first at paragraph 43, and that is RNI-846-451

21 (displayed), do you remember we looked at this together

22 and we tried to tread very carefully round the

23 redactions? But you were explaining that you were

24 asking for further information, effectively, if I can

25 put it that way?





1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And do you think it is likely that the document which

3 comes slightly later, the report about the house, was in

4 the response to that tasking?

5 A. I can't recall if it would have led to that or not.

6 Q. Yes. But it fitted the bill, didn't it, in the sense of

7 providing further information on the same topic?

8 A. Yes, it would have fitted the bill.

9 Q. Yes. And it looks as though at that point you became

10 interested, if we look at the very end of this page, in

11 finding out -- because the report we looked at didn't

12 tell us -- where the house actually was?

13 A. Yes, that's right.

14 Q. And we know from other evidence that there was a house

15 in Deeny Drive in Lurgan where Colin Duffy began to

16 live. That's correct, isn't it?

17 A. That's correct, yes.

18 Q. Now, can I just ask you in relation to that, please:

19 were you aware of an application which originated in the

20 Lurgan office to install a device in that house?

21 A. I can't -- to be honest, I can't remember. I can't

22 remember.

23 Q. No. Well, now, in your statement in paragraph 23 -- if

24 we could have that on the screen, please, at RNI-846-445

25 (displayed) -- you say in the second sentence:





1 "None ..."

2 That is technical operations:

3 "... were ever undertaken in relation to

4 Rosemary Nelson directly of which I am aware."

5 And now that you have looked at the further material

6 you have seen before giving your evidence, does that

7 remain your position: that you weren't aware of any such

8 operations?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. Is the key to that piece of evidence the word

11 "directly"?

12 A. Yes, it could be, it could be, yes.

13 Q. Yes. Now, so far as that is concerned, can I just ask

14 you about the next sentence of this same paragraph,

15 where you are talking about technical operations, and

16 you say:

17 "I have not seen any intelligence reports submitted

18 by me in relation to Rosemary Nelson."

19 Now, that obviously isn't correct in terms of any

20 form of intelligence report. Do you mean specifically

21 in relation to technical operations?

22 A. No, by reading that, it appears to me that I was

23 referring to technical operations.

24 Q. Yes. Now, so far as operations more generally is

25 concerned, I would like you to look with me, please, at





1 a document of about this time in the history; in other

2 words May/June 1998. It is at RNI-548-212 (displayed).

3 Now, this is a TCG tasking request form, as we can

4 see at the top, and it shows us that it originated in

5 Lurgan.

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. And there is a box -- the second box down -- isn't there

8 saying:

9 "SB members with knowledge of request."

10 Then there are two ciphers: your sergeant's and then

11 yours?

12 A. Hm-mm.

13 Q. And the subject or target of the operation was

14 Colin Duffy and I think it is right, isn't it -- or

15 perhaps you do not know the name -- that this is what

16 became known as Operation [blank]. Is that correct?

17 A. I'm not aware of the operation name.

18 Q. Now, we look at the objectives and they are very heavily

19 redacted, but we can read:

20 "To target the location where Duffy ..."

21 Then the words:

22 "... meeting Rosemary Nelson. Intelligence case:

23 Colin Duffy and Rosemary Nelson are having an

24 extramarital affair and regularly travel in their own

25 vehicles to pre-arranged meeting points in the





1 greater --

2 A. Craigavon.

3 Q. "... Craigavon [thank you very much] area."

4 Can I take it that this is not in your handwriting?

5 A. That's right, it is in the handwriting of the Detective

6 Sergeant.

7 Q. Thank you. But it looks as though you were either

8 involved in making the request or in some other way

9 concerned with the tasking. Is that right?

10 A. Yes, I think with this form you are referring to, having

11 sight of it earlier, I did carry out research and filled

12 in parts of this form.

13 Q. So that although some of the -- well, we can look on the

14 next page, for instance, because the writing is rather

15 different at RNI-548-213. Do you think you may have

16 been responsible for these parts of the form?

17 A. Yes, it looks like my writing.

18 Q. Thank you very much. Just sticking with that for

19 a moment, we can see RNI-548-213 is details of

20 Colin Duffy, and RNI-548-214 (displayed), the next page,

21 it looks as though you have filled in details in

22 relation to Rosemary Nelson and where she worked, her

23 car, details of her husband and a detailed physical

24 description?

25 A. Yes, that's right.





1 Q. That, presumably, was based on information about her

2 contained in her personal file?

3 A. I would say -- I would say it would have been generated

4 from that, yes.

5 Q. Yes. Because although, for example, you might be able

6 to get her work address from Yellow Pages, the details

7 of her height, et cetera, those are things which

8 required rather more detailed observation, were

9 they not?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Thank you. And then, looking over to RNI-548-215

12 (displayed), if I can put it this way, the first

13 paragraph repeats the point about the relationship:

14 "Duffy and Nelson have been having an affair for the

15 past year. Duffy uses her to glean information on local

16 issues, including police procedures, interviewing

17 techniques and general legal matters to keep him abreast

18 of current systems. Both he and Nelson would be

19 surveillance aware."

20 Now, can I take it that you were aware of and had

21 all those views, the ones that we have set out there,

22 about what she was doing for Colin Duffy?

23 A. Yes, I would have been aware of what she was doing from

24 intelligence that I had read.

25 Q. Exactly. And, again, that takes us back to the position





1 that we looked at earlier, doesn't it, in May 1998?

2 This is not the way you would describe the activities of

3 the average high street solicitor?

4 A. Yes, that's right.

5 Q. Yes. What about the surveillance awareness? Where did

6 that information come from?

7 A. I have no -- I have no idea where that came from.

8 Q. But it suggests, doesn't it, that it was based on

9 experience on other earlier occasions?

10 A. On this particular application. Again, I'm not sure

11 where this would have originated. It was probably

12 a case that I was asked to complete the research in the

13 middle of it and a detective sergeant completed the rest

14 of the report.

15 Q. Yes. Now, just going back to the first page which we

16 looked at, the first page of this request form,

17 RNI-548-212 (displayed), do you remember I read out the

18 intelligence case or those parts of it which we can read

19 on the screen? Do you see there is a reference to

20 travel in their own vehicles to pre-arranged meeting

21 points in the greater Craigavon area?

22 Now, can I take it that this was also based on

23 various intelligence reports that you would have

24 received by this stage?

25 A. That's right.





1 Q. And do you remember earlier you suggested that the road

2 which we saw together -- Demesne Road, was it?

3 A. Yes, that's right.

4 Q. Was rather out of the way. So can you remember, was the

5 reporting you received suggesting that out of the way

6 locations were being used for this sort of meeting?

7 A. Yes, from what I can recall, areas such as Demesne

8 Avenue would have been used for the purpose of

9 Colin Duffy to drive out of his own area and be picked

10 up by Mrs Nelson.

11 Q. Yes. Now, when you talked about that earlier, you said

12 you thought that was a surprising place because it was,

13 I think you said, in a Loyalist area?

14 A. That's right.

15 Q. Can I take it from that that it would be a place where

16 known Republicans would be unwise to visit?

17 A. They probably would never frequent there.

18 Q. Yes. Now, if we go back to look at RNI-542-127

19 together, please, and the report at RNI-548-128

20 (displayed), do you see this is where the reference to

21 that avenue is made? And you said, I think, in answer

22 to my question that the report was likely to be based on

23 direct observation, if I can put it that way?

24 If I can put it this way, was that something that

25 you took into account when assessing the plausibility or





1 reliability of this particular report?

2 A. Well, the fact that we have included this -- the third

3 paragraph -- in the report, at some stage the source

4 must have indicated to us that maybe a gesture took

5 place that in their own mind confirmed that the

6 relationship was between Duffy and Nelson.

7 Q. Yes. But can I ask you this: The direct observation,

8 assuming for the moment -- and it is an assumption --

9 that it was in the vicinity of Demesne Avenue, must have

10 been an observation undertaken by somebody who was

11 presumably comfortable to be there?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Now, is that the sort of thing that you would take into

14 account when assessing the plausibility and reliability

15 of this reporting, the reporting in the second

16 paragraph?

17 A. Yes, I would be quite comfortable to say that the source

18 was reliable.

19 Q. Given what we have just discussed about a particular

20 area?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Thank you. Now, can we move briefly on to another

23 topic, and it is the topic of threat assessments? We

24 have already talked about threat assessments, but in

25 a way that you hadn't mentioned in your statement,





1 threat assessments, as it were, on you, rather than on

2 individuals undertaken by you.

3 A. Okay.

4 Q. But you deal with that topic in paragraphs 19 and 20 in

5 particular of your statement at RNI-846-444 (displayed).

6 Now, here you talk about your experience of dealing

7 with threat assessments, and in paragraph 20 you explain

8 how they would come in and your boss would ask one of

9 you to deal with the request.

10 A. Yes, that's correct.

11 Q. Thank you. Now, we have heard a great deal, as I am

12 sure you know now, about threat assessments and the way

13 they were handled in other parts of the organisation.

14 So what I would like to ask you about is your particular

15 end of the business.

16 When you say "requests would come in", am I right in

17 thinking that they would normally come in from

18 Special Branch Headquarters?

19 A. Yes, it would be.

20 Q. Because we have heard about a particular part of E3, I

21 think it is called E3C, which was responsible for

22 reporting, and is that the unit that would pass the

23 requests on to your detective sergeant?

24 A. I know it is certainly in E3, but they would be the only

25 people who would forward threat assessments to us. They





1 wouldn't come in from any other --

2 Q. No. As I understand it, the request they were putting

3 forward to you was, "Is there an intelligence record of

4 any specific threat to X"?

5 A. Yes, that's right.

6 Q. So as I understand it, what you are saying here is you

7 go to the relevant sources of information within your

8 office -- so we know that that is the paper file, if

9 there is one?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And the computer system, whichever it was, and you look

12 to see whether there is any specific intelligence held

13 by your office?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. Thank you. Now, just to be clear what the purpose of

16 that was, obviously you would know first hand about

17 information that had come direct to you, but as you have

18 explained, you would also have access to all the other

19 Lurgan information in the files and on the computer?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Now, you say there:

22 "This would be done by checking intelligence data on

23 the system, not going out and speaking to sources."

24 In other words, you wouldn't make a special request

25 or task to get the answer, you would look at what you





1 already had on the books, if I can put it that way?

2 A. Yes, that's correct. You would be dealing with

3 intelligence already on the system. You wouldn't go out

4 and be mentioning names to sources. At some stage they

5 would probably think to themselves, "Why am I being

6 asked about a certain individual?"

7 Q. Yes. And how would you respond to the request?

8 A. By --

9 Q. What would you do?

10 A. By being handed the threat assessment? I would have

11 conducted my research and then wrote or had typed on to

12 a report, and that would be forwarded then through the

13 line manager back to E3.

14 Q. Right. And can I take it then that if there wasn't any

15 intelligence of a specific threat against the

16 individual, you would pass the answer back to E3, "No,

17 no intelligence of a specific threat"?

18 A. That's right.

19 Q. Right. Now, in the course of doing that work, I think

20 what you tell us at the end of this paragraph is that

21 you would have been concerned only with the Lurgan

22 picture, and that if somebody wanted to hear about

23 Portadown, they would have to speak to Portadown

24 themselves?

25 A. Yes, that's right.





1 Q. So you didn't ring up Portadown and say, "We haven't got

2 anything ..."?

3 A. No, for a threat assessment, if it crossed to station

4 areas, this may well have been a second report went to

5 the second station as well.

6 Q. Thank you. You then go on in your next paragraph, 21,

7 to talk about what happened when you'd gathered

8 intelligence that somebody's life was at risk. Do you

9 see that there?

10 A. Yes, hm-mm.

11 Q. This was obviously a reasonably frequent occurrence?

12 A. It would have been very frequent, yes.

13 Q. And in those cases, you would submit the intelligence to

14 the source unit who would then deal with it?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. Because obviously that was something that needed to be

17 acted upon as soon as possible?

18 A. It needed to be dealt with as soon as possible, and for

19 that reason generally speaking the intelligence would

20 have been forwarded to them by a secure form.

21 Q. Yes, exactly. So if you got that sort of intelligence

22 of a specific threat against an individual, you acted in

23 that way?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. And I think what you are saying here is that you don't





1 remember receiving intelligence of that kind about

2 Rosemary Nelson in Lurgan?

3 A. Yes, that's right.

4 Q. Yes. Now, that I understand, but what I would like now

5 to consider with you is the question of the work for the

6 threat assessment that you talked about earlier because,

7 you see, if what you have told us is right, as soon as

8 you get specific intelligence of a threat, you act upon

9 it, pass it up to the source unit and they then get on

10 with it?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. So it means, doesn't it, that when somebody asks you,

13 "Is there any intelligence of a specific threat against

14 X?" somebody in E3, the answer was always going to be

15 either no or, "Yes, and we have already dealt with it"?

16 A. I would have assumed that the report would word it in

17 such a way if there was any intelligence specific to

18 a threat against that person, as opposed to just is

19 there any general intelligence held on this person.

20 Q. I see. So you think if there had been general

21 intelligence about an individual, that wasn't what E3

22 were looking for. They wanted to know specifically

23 whether that individual was at risk?

24 A. Yes, that's right.

25 Q. What I'm trying to get at -- and it may be just because





1 I don't understand the system -- is if it is working

2 properly, then all specific intelligence about somebody

3 being in danger or possibly in danger would have been

4 acted upon?

5 A. Yes, and E3 would have had access to the same

6 intelligence that I had access to.

7 Q. Exactly. So the question arises: what actually did they

8 think they were going to get out of asking the local

9 office? Was it perhaps very up-to-date information that

10 might not have reached them?

11 A. Well, usually speaking, if it had been of an urgent

12 nature, the debrief would have been on the system for

13 them to read as well.

14 Q. Yes.

15 A. But -- it may well have been for that reason, but by the

16 time they sent reports from Belfast out to Lurgan, you

17 know, it could have been two or three days before it

18 reached us.

19 Q. Quite. So it follows, doesn't it, that the likelihood

20 is that in issuing your little report back to

21 Headquarters, you were probably just confirming what

22 they already knew?

23 A. I would have said just confirming it, yes.

24 Q. Yes. In other words, if there wasn't anything with them

25 at E3, it was on the whole unlikely they would find





1 anything by asking the local offices?

2 A. Well, I daresay it was maybe just a case that they were

3 asking for our assessment as well in case they missed

4 anything.

5 Q. Yes. Now, just moving on to look at another aspect of

6 what you say there in the very last sentence at

7 paragraph 21, can I take it from that sentence, what you

8 say there, that you received no intelligence in Lurgan

9 before Rosemary Nelson's murder which gave any warning

10 that the attack was to come?

11 A. That's right.

12 Q. And you tell us slightly later your statement, in

13 paragraph 25, which is at RNI-846-446 (displayed), that

14 you were shocked by her murder?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And I just want you to explain to us why you were

17 shocked by it. What was it about it?

18 A. Well, I suppose the last person I would have expected to

19 have been targeted would have been Mrs Nelson. I was

20 shocked that a device had been planted under her car and

21 I was shocked that we had no previous reporting on this

22 prior to it taking place.

23 Q. Just dealing with those various reasons, you were

24 shocked, were you, that you hadn't picked up some

25 intelligence in advance?





1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And did you draw any conclusion from the fact that you

3 hadn't picked up any intelligence in advance?

4 A. The general conclusion dealing with intelligence is that

5 in the ideal world, you would -- you would be in receipt

6 of 100 per cent coverage.

7 Q. Yes.

8 A. And to believe that you had 100 per cent coverage at all

9 times would be wrong.

10 Q. But it suggested, did it then, that there was a gap?

11 A. Yes, indeed.

12 Q. Now, you also said -- and I can't remember exactly how

13 you put it, but that you didn't expect her to be

14 targeted.

15 Now, is that because you hadn't received, as you

16 have already told me, any specific indication earlier

17 that she was at risk?

18 A. That's right.

19 Q. Were you aware that requests for threat assessments were

20 made in relation to her during 1998?

21 A. I can't recall assessments coming to our office in

22 relation to her.

23 Q. So can I take it you weren't involved, at any rate, if

24 they took place?

25 A. I can't recall if I ever wrote on any.





1 Q. No. Now, given what you have told us in your evidence

2 and in your statement about the sort of reporting you

3 were receiving on her, certainly in 1998, and the fact,

4 as you told us, that you thought she had crossed the

5 line, if all of that was true, didn't that put her in

6 a position of some risk in terms of targeting by

7 Loyalist groups?

8 A. No, I wouldn't have considered Mrs Nelson any more

9 a target than other members of the community.

10 Q. You see, that's precisely where the evidence we have had

11 from other officers would disagree with you.

12 Now, you began in your statement, if you remember,

13 by talking about your perception of her just as

14 a solicitor?

15 A. Yes, that's right, and then I went on to say that she

16 had increased her -- through her media coverage, her

17 profile had risen from that.

18 Q. Yes, and we have also seen together the various

19 reporting which suggested what she was actively engaged

20 in for the local PIRA?

21 A. That's right.

22 Q. Now, that puts her in a different position altogether,

23 doesn't it, to, for instance, an ordinary member of the

24 community or a local lawyer?

25 A. No, I wouldn't have considered Mrs Nelson any higher





1 a target than other individuals in the Lurgan area.

2 Q. Right.

3 A. Other individuals such as local members of Parliament,

4 local politicians.

5 Q. Mr Mac Cionnaith, for example?

6 A. Yes. He lived in Portadown, mind you.

7 Q. Yes.

8 A. But I wouldn't consider her any more a target than

9 security force members living in the area.

10 Q. But surely her close association with Colin Duffy

11 itself, or the way it was perceived, at least by you and

12 your colleagues, put her in a very different category in

13 terms of risk, did it not?

14 A. Yes, although we were aware of Mrs Nelson's

15 relationship. I have no reason to assume that Loyalists

16 were aware of this activity.

17 Q. But if you were wrong about that, if you were wrong that

18 this information had indeed seeped out to the Loyalist

19 paramilitaries, then that would undoubtedly, wouldn't

20 it, have put her in a rather different category because

21 she would have been perceived as a very close associate

22 of somebody you regarded certainly, and no doubt they

23 regarded, as a leading member of the other side?

24 A. No, I would have assessed, had Loyalists been aware of

25 this activity, that they may well have mounted their





1 attack against Colin Duffy.

2 Q. And you do not believe that they would have regarded her

3 in very much the same category as --

4 A. Not in the same category, no.

5 Q. Again, that's the evidence that the witness gave to us

6 very, very recently: that she would have been regarded

7 in the same bracket as him and, indeed,

8 Breandan Mac Cionnaith, and you don't agree with that?

9 A. Well, regarded in the same category by ourselves within

10 the department or --

11 Q. No, regarded by Loyalist paramilitaries in that

12 category.

13 A. I don't know. I can't answer that.

14 Q. No. How sure are you that the information that we have

15 seen in the various intelligence reporting, not just

16 about that relationship but about her activities

17 generally, that that information did not leak out into

18 the community?

19 A. I don't know.

20 Q. It is hard to be confident, isn't it?

21 A. Well, I don't think I could turn round and hold my right

22 hand up and say I'm 100 per cent positive that the

23 intelligence would not have got into the wrong hands.

24 Q. Are you aware of anything that suggested that it might

25 well have done?





1 A. No, I'm not aware of it.

2 Q. Now, can I just look at one or two documents that you

3 have addressed in your statement which concern Loyalist

4 activity? The first is at RNI-541-056 (displayed).

5 Again, the origin is Lurgan. This is a much earlier

6 document in February 1997. Your cipher appears on the

7 right-hand side at the bottom of the page.

8 Can we look on to the next page, please, RNI-541-057

9 (displayed)? Now, again, it is redacted and so we have

10 to do the best we can, but it looks, doesn't it, as

11 though somebody described in inverted commas "a bomb

12 maker from Belfast" has expressed his full support for

13 the LVF:

14 "This person will be making an incendiary device and

15 another form of explosive device for the LVF."

16 Now, can I take it that as a result of your work in

17 Lurgan, you were aware of the LVF as an organisation?

18 A. Yes, indeed, very much so.

19 Q. And you had a body of reporting about the organisation?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Some of which I know you have exhibited to your

22 statement. Based on that knowledge, can I ask you this:

23 do you believe that at this period, which is early 1997,

24 the LVF would have had the capacity themselves to

25 construct devices of this kind?





1 A. Well, I feel I can only give an assessment from a Lurgan

2 LVF perspective.

3 Q. Yes.

4 A. And I would be comfortable enough to say that they

5 wouldn't have that capability.

6 Q. They wouldn't?

7 A. They wouldn't.

8 Q. They wouldn't. No. And so it looks, doesn't it, as

9 though what's going on here is contact between a more

10 local base -- I think that's maybe a Portadown rather

11 than a Lurgan base, although it is a Lurgan report,

12 interestingly -- with somebody with greater expertise

13 "from Belfast"?

14 A. That's right.

15 Q. Yes. And were you, as a result of reporting to you,

16 aware of Loyalist bomb makers who were from Belfast and

17 also who had connections with Mark Fulton?

18 A. No, I would daresay we obviously weren't aware of the

19 identity of the bomb maker on that particular meet.

20 Q. Yes.

21 A. In office meetings after that, we may well have been

22 informed of a number of possibilities of who that was.

23 Q. Yes. Now, so far as your view of the LVF -- and

24 I appreciate you qualified it by restricting it to

25 Lurgan -- was concerned, did your view of their





1 expertise, their ability to construct explosive devices,

2 change between February 1997, the date of this, and the

3 time of the murder, March 1999?

4 A. No, it wouldn't have changed.

5 Q. It didn't change? No.

6 Now, if we move on to a report much closer in time

7 to the murder, and that is something you refer to in

8 paragraph 57. I would like to show you paragraph 57

9 first, please, and that's at the bottom of RNI-846-454

10 (displayed). I think we had better have the main body

11 of the paragraph on the next page, please. Again,

12 substantial redaction and a rather detailed series of

13 comments about the date of the information, et cetera.

14 Can we look together at the report itself? That's

15 RNI-548-023 (displayed). This is another PRISM

16 document, originating in Lurgan, as you see at the

17 bottom of the page, "JL", February 1999. If we turn

18 over, please, to RNI-548-024 (displayed), and again, it

19 is somewhat difficult to make a great deal of sense with

20 it as it appears on the screen, but based on your

21 recollection, did you recall this particular piece of

22 information coming in?

23 A. No, I don't, no.

24 Q. No. And do you see the substance of it is that some

25 form of munitions are to be moved into the Portadown





1 area -- not Lurgan, the Portadown area -- in the near

2 future.

3 Now, is that the sort of intelligence that you would

4 have wanted to draw to the attention of your colleagues

5 in Portadown, for example?

6 A. Because the Portadown area has been mentioned, they

7 would have had readership of that document.

8 Q. I see, yes. Do you remember receiving any further

9 intelligence about this movement of munitions at any

10 point before the murder?

11 A. I don't remember any more intelligence. If we had

12 received any more intelligence with reference to the

13 munitions, it would have been on a debrief.

14 Q. Yes. But it looks again, doesn't it, as though the LVF

15 members whose names have been redacted are in contact

16 with somebody, maybe more than one person, and that

17 contact is taking place in Belfast and it is leading to

18 the provision of the munitions?

19 A. That's right.

20 Q. So it looks as though, two years after the intelligence

21 we looked at earlier, the same point is in play here,

22 namely the local people are using their contacts to get

23 material into their local area. Is that a fair summary?

24 A. Yes, it is. And the word "munitions ", generally

25 speaking that would refer to weapons, magazines and





1 rounds of ammunition, as opposed to improvised explosive

2 devices.

3 Q. Thank you. That's very helpful.

4 Now, on that same topic, can we just look together

5 at paragraph 48 of your statement, RNI-544-060

6 (displayed)? This is the document you refer to in that

7 paragraph and it is of a rather different kind. The

8 title is "Loyalist paramilitaries: general threat", the

9 date, February 1999, and the destination is various --

10 we know that "JD" is Portadown, "JL" is Lurgan?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. "JC", Craigavon, one assumes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. "HD"?

15 A. Possibly Armagh.

16 Q. It is part of H Division, anyway?

17 A. Yes, and K Division being Dungannon/Cookstown area.

18 Q. Thank you. If we just turn over the page, please, it

19 says there:

20 "Loyalist dissidents in the Armagh area are in the

21 process of obtaining improvised grenades for use in

22 imminent attacks on Roman Catholic targets in the

23 Armagh/Mid-Ulster area."

24 So this is a general threat warning, is it, sent to

25 what were thought to be the relevant local offices?





1 A. That's right.

2 Q. And we see you there as the DC for Lurgan?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Now, was this a common type of document, where a general

5 alert would be issued about a particular perceived risk?

6 A. It would be fairly common, yes.

7 Q. Yes. And here it talks about improvised grenades.

8 Would that fall into the category, in the other report

9 we looked at together, of munitions?

10 A. No -- well, as far as I am concerned, I would put that

11 outside the category of munitions.

12 Q. Yes. But this sort of threat warning then was a fairly

13 regular thing to see, was it?

14 A. Yes, it would have been.

15 Q. Yes. And can I ask you, what would happen when

16 a general threat without any particular detail, came in?

17 What would you do about it?

18 A. Okay. Well, my number is on that document --

19 Q. Yes.

20 A. -- because I was the person who would have disseminated

21 that intelligence to the divisional commander the area.

22 Q. I see. So you would have been responsible for going

23 to --

24 A. For taking --

25 Q. -- the uniformed divisional commander?





1 A. Yes, for probably taking a copy of that down to the

2 uniformed commander for his signature.

3 Q. That was, I think, in accordance with the various force

4 orders that we have seen about threats, wasn't it?

5 A. Yes, that's right.

6 Q. Other than that -- in other words, telling the local

7 commander -- how else would it be dealt with?

8 A. Once I had passed that on to uniformed personnel, that

9 was it dealt with.

10 Q. That's it?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Yes. So you wouldn't act upon it in any particular way

13 at a much more local Lurgan level?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Is that because, frankly, there wasn't enough detail in

16 it to allow you to do anything very useful?

17 A. Well, with the sheer volume of the threats coming out,

18 you would have been chasing your tail.

19 Q. Yes, right. Can we look together at another document of

20 a similar kind, which is at RNI-544-054 (displayed)?

21 Because here, at exactly the same time, is a document of

22 a similar kind. "Destination: South Region. Dissident

23 Republicans, general threat." If we the turn over to

24 the substance at RNI-544-055 (displayed), it says:

25 "Dissident Republicans are engaged in some form of





1 terrorist operation. Indications are that an attack is

2 imminent and may take the form of a VBIED."

3 My first question is what does that stand for?

4 A. It stands for "vehicle borne improvised explosive

5 device" or "car bomb".

6 Q. Exactly, yes, in rather simpler terms. Yes, right,

7 thank you very much.

8 So obviously here the weapon which is predicted is

9 a different type. It is not improvised grenades, it is

10 a car bomb and this appears to have been distributed

11 very widely, including to Lurgan. So does this help us

12 to see that when these general threats were coming in,

13 they were coming in from both sides?

14 A. Oh, yes, very much so.

15 Q. Can I take it that this sort of general threat warning

16 would have been dealt with in exactly the same way as

17 you have just described; in other words, taken up to the

18 Divisional Commander?

19 A. Yes. Well, if I had received that, I would have took it

20 down to the Commander. He then would have probably put

21 out a brief for the uniformed personnel in the area that

22 he covered.

23 Q. Right. Again, so far as your location, your local

24 office, was concerned, you don't think there is anything

25 specific that would have been done in response to that?





1 A. No.

2 Q. Can I ask you about dissidents generally? We see these

3 documents are February 1999. Is it right that from the

4 summer, certainly the autumn of 1998, a good deal of

5 intelligence effort was being directed to finding out

6 more about the various dissident groupings?

7 A. Yes, that would be a fair assessment, yes.

8 Q. On both sides?

9 A. As in dissident Loyalists as well?

10 Q. Yes. In other words, extreme Loyalist groups, perhaps

11 not dissidents -- perhaps dissidents is the wrong

12 word -- but extreme Loyalists on the one hand and

13 dissident Republicans on the other?

14 A. Yes, I would say, depending on the area that you

15 covered, Lurgan wouldn't have had too -- wouldn't have

16 had, I don't believe, a renegade Loyalist grouping.

17 However, we do have our fair share of dissident

18 groupings.

19 Q. Yes. Do you mean dissident Republican grouping, yes?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Exactly. At this point, in the summer and autumn of

22 1998, presumably you were being tasked to find out as

23 much as you could about the Continuity IRA, the

24 Real IRA, in other words, the organisations that had

25 broken away and were continuing their campaign while the





1 Provisional IRA was on ceasefire?

2 A. Yes, that's right.

3 Q. Was there some degree -- in Lurgan, I mean -- of local

4 rivalry between the various groupings?

5 A. Between the various Republican groupings?

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. Yes, there would have been.

8 Q. And why was that, please?

9 A. Certainly in a number of Nationalist estates in the

10 town, you would have had these groupings flexing muscle

11 and trying to take control of that estate.

12 Q. So the rather newer organisations were trying to muscle

13 their way into what might earlier have been PIRA

14 territory?

15 A. That's right.

16 Q. Was there infighting between them; in other words,

17 between CIRA, if you can put it that way, and PIRA, and

18 between CIRA and RIRA?

19 A. Yes, there would have been infighting, yes.

20 Q. And those were questions, the development of the groups,

21 the way they were tussling, those were matters of

22 interest to you and your colleagues on which you were

23 receiving reporting?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. And presumably you were concerned to ensure that you had





1 an intelligence handle, if I can put it that way, on the

2 new groupings as they developed and became more

3 significant?

4 A. Yes. Well, obviously our priority would have been to

5 infiltrate these groupings once we realised that they

6 were forming in our area.

7 Q. Yes. Now, can I ask you to look on in your statement,

8 please, to paragraph 61 and that's at RNI-846-456

9 (displayed)? As you can see, the paragraph is rather

10 brief, particularly when you have taken into account the

11 redaction. So can we look together, please, at the

12 report that you are referring to there to see whether

13 that helps? That's at RNI-548-029 (displayed).

14 Here we see your cipher at the bottom, Lurgan is the

15 origin, the date is March 1999, the title "PIRA North

16 Armagh". Can I just ask you, because I haven't done so

17 before, about the action column or entry there, "Share

18 is E3"? This is where somebody decided who should also

19 have a look at this document. Is that right?

20 A. Well, if I'm right in saying, the regional source unit

21 prepared the document on PRISM and that is them saying

22 share this document with personnel at E3.

23 Q. Thank you very much. If we turn over the page, please,

24 to RNI-548-030 (displayed), it looks -- again, doing

25 what we can with the document as it appears -- as though





1 some form of dispute or conflict was breaking out here

2 within the local PIRA. Is that right?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Now, if you could just keep that in your mind, please,

5 and go back to your statement, RNI-846-456 (displayed),

6 you make various comments about this document and you

7 say first of all that you are confident the information

8 provided is accurate.

9 Can I ask you, please, is that a confidence based on

10 your knowledge and experience of its origin?

11 A. Yes, I would say that the source -- the source of the

12 intelligence would have -- his access would have been

13 very good towards that organisation.

14 Q. Right. Was this reporting that you had received from

15 other origins, namely that the dissent within the ranks

16 of the local PIRA?

17 A. No, I would have to say that that particular debrief, I

18 would say generally speaking, we may have had a number

19 of sources reporting this dissent.

20 Q. Yes. Now, you talk in this paragraph -- again, there

21 has been quite a few redactions -- about the dispute.

22 You conclude by saying -- I think what you are saying at

23 the bottom there is that there came a moment when

24 Colin Duffy was sidelined. Do you see that?

25 A. Yes.





1 Q. And then it looks as though the reporting about that

2 occurs at about the time of Rosemary Nelson's murder

3 in March 1999.

4 A. Okay.

5 Q. I would like to ask you just a question about reporting

6 on Rosemary Nelson at this stage. You tell us late in

7 your statement that, as you put it, you can't recall

8 when the Colin Duffy/Rosemary Nelson relationship ended.

9 Are you confident at least in your recollection that

10 you believed it to have ended before the murder?

11 A. I can't recall if it had ended or not.

12 Q. No. Can you recall whether you continued to see

13 reporting on that topic up until the time of

14 Rosemary Nelson's murder?

15 A. Sorry, what topic was that on?

16 Q. The alleged relationship between them.

17 A. No, I'm sorry. Again, I can't recall.

18 Q. No. Now, in paragraph 27 of your statement, at

19 RNI-846-446 (displayed), you say:

20 "It was naturally assumed that this was a Loyalist

21 killing. There was no perception that this could have

22 been a Republican murder."

23 Do you see that?

24 A. Yes, I do.

25 Q. And that represents, does it, as best you can, your





1 recollection of the way the murder was viewed at the

2 time?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. No question arose as to whether or not it was a Loyalist

5 killing?

6 A. No, no question arose that it was anything but

7 a Loyalist killing.

8 Q. Exactly. And you go on to say that you don't recall any

9 tasking of Special Branch officers -- I assume that

10 means you and your colleagues in Lurgan. Is that right?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. In relation to the possibility of the Republican

13 community retaliating as a result of the murder.

14 Now, if, as you obviously believed, it was

15 a Loyalist murder, weren't you concerned that there

16 might be a violent reaction from the other side?

17 A. Yes, I would have been concerned, yes.

18 Q. But you say that you weren't asked to gather

19 intelligence about that possibility?

20 A. No, I don't think -- I can't recall having been asked or

21 not to ask our Loyalist sources or Republican sources if

22 they were going to retaliate, but I daresay it would

23 have been common practice just to ask without having

24 been tasked to ask.

25 Q. Yes, because presumably one of the obvious things that





1 might have happened after such a high profile murder as

2 this is that those in the other community might seek

3 some sort of revenge?

4 A. Yes, that's right.

5 Q. And that had happened, no doubt, many, many, many times

6 in previous years in Northern Ireland?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. But you can't recall any specific tasking into the

9 possibility of retaliation after this murder?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Do you attribute any significance to that?

12 A. No, no, I don't.

13 Q. No. Can you remember whether there was any tasking of

14 Special Branch officers after the murder in relation to

15 the possibility that it had been a Republican murder?

16 A. No, I can't remember ever being tasked with that line of

17 thinking, no.

18 Q. Did you ever become aware of any intelligence to suggest

19 that Republicans were responsible for the murder?

20 A. No.

21 Q. Based on your knowledge and experience, do you believe

22 that any Republican organisation would have sanctioned

23 the murder of Rosemary Nelson?

24 A. No, I don't believe they would have.

25 Q. Now, if she had indeed been murdered by a member of the





1 Provisional IRA without approval, without sanction

2 within the organisation, what would the reaction of the

3 Provisional IRA have been, do you think?

4 A. I'm not sure what the Provisional IRA would have

5 thought. I'm sure the person who had carried out the

6 murder would have been in serious trouble.

7 Q. That's putting it mildly, isn't it?

8 A. I don't know to what extent or what punishment they

9 would have dished out.

10 Q. But based on your knowledge and experience, you think

11 there would have been some form of reprisal. Is that

12 right?

13 A. Some form of reprisal from Republicans towards

14 Loyalists, yes. Or to security forces.

15 Q. The question I was asking you was what about the

16 position of the member of the organisation -- it is all

17 a hypothesis, this -- who had committed such a murder

18 without sanction, without approval? Presumably the

19 reprisal would first have been visited on him?

20 A. Well, if they had information themselves that this

21 person had carried it out, yes, I daresay they would

22 have took some form of action against this person.

23 Q. Yes. And did you receive intelligence to the effect

24 that any reprisal, punishment, however you want to put

25 it, had been meted out by the Provisional IRA on one of





1 their own members in relation to this murder?

2 A. No, I don't believe I have submitted any intelligence

3 along those lines.

4 MR PHILLIPS: No. Sir, would that be a convenient moment

5 for a break?

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly. 20 past four we will resume.

7 Mr (name redacted), before the witness leaves, would you

8 please confirm that all the cameras have been

9 switched off?

10 MR (NAME REDACTED): Yes, sir, they have.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Please escort the witness out.

12 20 past four.

13 (4.05 pm)

14 (Short break)

15 (4.22 pm)

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Currans, checklist. Is the public area

17 screen fully in place, locked and the key secured?

18 MR CURRANS: Yes, sir.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: Are the fire doors on either side of the

20 screen closed?

21 MR CURRANS: Yes, sir.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Are the technical support screens in place

23 and securely fastened?

24 MR CURRANS: Yes, sir.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Is anyone other than Inquiry personnel and





1 Participants' legal representatives seated in the body

2 of this chamber?

3 MR CURRANS: No, sir.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

5 Mr (name redacted), can you please confirm that the two

6 witness cameras have been switched off and shrouded?

7 MR (NAME REDACTED): Yes, sir, they have.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: All the other cameras have been switched off?

9 MR (NAME REDACTED): Yes, sir, they have.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

11 Bring the witness in, please.

12 The cameras on the Panel, Inquiry personnel and the

13 Full Participants' legal representatives may now be

14 switched back on.

15 Yes, Mr Phillips?

16 MR PHILLIPS: Can we look, please, at one further piece of

17 reporting you mentioned before the murder, and it is

18 paragraph 60 of your statement, RNI-846-455 (displayed).

19 Here, you refer to RNI-548-025, and it is some

20 intelligence report in relation to the LVF. You say

21 there, in answer to a question about their ability to

22 obtain explosive devices:

23 "I would suspect that the ..."

24 Then you read on:

25 "... reference to a bomb attack and an explosive





1 device is a reference to a crude pipe bomb."

2 That was their usual form of attack in your view,

3 was it?

4 A. Yes, it usually would have been no more professional

5 than some crude device.

6 Q. Yes. And so you confirm in the next sentence what you

7 have already told us, namely that they didn't have local

8 expertise. And that takes us back, doesn't it, to the

9 reporting we saw earlier about links with others in that

10 case in Belfast?

11 A. Yes, it does.

12 Q. Yes. Now, looking at the report briefly, RNI-548-025

13 (displayed), it is a reference to a bomb attack. Again,

14 it comes from Lurgan and it says:

15 "LVF were responsible for the recent bomb attack on

16 a house in Coalisland."

17 And the question I have for you, please, is: based

18 again on your experience at the time, would you agree

19 that these types of attack show that there was a violent

20 sectarian aspect to the LVF at this time, in March 1999?

21 A. Yes, hm-mm.

22 Q. Now, moving on to your assistance with the murder

23 investigation, you tell us about that in your statement.

24 Can you remember now what steps, in terms of

25 intelligence, you took in the immediate aftermath of the





1 murder?

2 A. I would assume that our line of questioning with

3 Loyalist sources would directly have been in relation to

4 Mrs Nelson's murder.

5 Q. Yes. So you would seek to find out what you could from

6 your Loyalist sources?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. But not, as I understood it from what you said earlier,

9 from your Republican sources?

10 A. That's right.

11 Q. Yes. Can I take it that on this intelligence gathering,

12 as on other intelligence gathering, you would have met

13 together, had your discussions in the office?

14 A. Yes, it would have been no different than any other

15 meeting.

16 Q. Exactly. Now, you say in your statement at the top of

17 RNI-846-460 (displayed) that:

18 "There would have been pressure on all of us to

19 identify who carried out the murder."

20 Now, are you in that case talking about a particular

21 kind of pressure in relation to this murder?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And where did the pressure come from? Why was the

24 pressure in relation to this murder?

25 A. Probably because of the high profile coverage. I'm sure





1 there was worldwide media press coverage that Mrs Nelson

2 had been killed.

3 Q. How did you become aware of the pressure?

4 A. Probably by the amount of taskings we were being given

5 by CID.

6 Q. So CID were passing on taskings. How did the taskings

7 reach you?

8 A. The -- I'm not sure if they prepared them on to actions.

9 They would then have been passed to the Detective

10 Inspector or Detective Sergeant. He then would have

11 asked us to explore the taskings with relevant sources.

12 Q. Were you aware that the Detective Inspector was acting

13 as the liaison officer to the Murder Investigation Team

14 in this case?

15 A. No, I wasn't aware of that.

16 Q. No. So you, as you have explained, then responded to

17 the tasking that came down to you. If you had anything

18 of relevance, what was the process for passing it back?

19 A. Well, if we had any intelligence relevant to the

20 taskings, that intelligence would have been debriefed in

21 the normal manner and then shared with CID or the SIO

22 via an action sheet or a briefing sheet, or whatever it

23 was called then.

24 Q. Can we just look at a couple of examples to see how this

25 works through?





1 A. Yes.

2 Q. First, in paragraph 74 of your statement -- if we could

3 just flick that on to the screen, please, at RNI-846-458

4 (displayed) -- the first thing to say about it, which is

5 important, is that you don't recall submitting it and

6 you don't recall the meet referred to. That's obviously

7 an important introductory comment. But you go on to

8 say:

9 "This report was disseminated to HQ and thereafter

10 to Lurgan and then to CID Lurgan."

11 Now, let's just look at it together, please,

12 RNI-544-144 (displayed). This contains some wording

13 that we haven't seen before in documents of this kind.

14 Your cipher does appear at the bottom left-hand side?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Yet you are sure, are you, that you weren't directly

17 involved in the gathering in of this intelligence?

18 A. No. By looking at this document here, it looks as if I

19 was on that particular meet.

20 Q. Yes. Now, can we just go back to the full screen,

21 please? Full page. Thank you. I would just like to

22 look at it. 3 -- March -- 1999, murder of

23 Rosemary Nelson. Then these words:

24 "Copied: BSU, IMS, CID, JL" et cetera.

25 A. Yes, that's right.





1 Q. "CID JL" is CID Lurgan, yes?

2 A. Yes, that's right.

3 Q. BSU?

4 A. Belfast source unit.

5 Q. Right. IMS?

6 A. I would have a guess: intelligence management -- I don't

7 know.

8 Q. Then:

9 "Briefing form ..."

10 Not briefing sheet, which you have mentioned:

11 "Briefing form JL, Lurgan, 21/99 issued."

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Am I right in thinking that that was the way in the form

14 of briefing forms that this intelligence reached the

15 Rosemary Nelson Murder Investigation Team?

16 A. Yes, it would have been. It would have been took down

17 on a piece of paper and signed off to.

18 Q. Right. Now, if we go on and look at the actual

19 substance, please, just briefly, it is a reference to

20 somebody whose name is redacted being in some way

21 connected with the murder; no further details. Then

22 right at the bottom on the action section, again:

23 "Briefing form issued and IMS, CID JL briefed."

24 In terms of briefing forms, who would be

25 responsible, please, for putting those together; do you





1 know?

2 A. I'm not sure if at that time the briefing form came

3 through to us on computer and then we would have printed

4 it off. It was more than likely that we would have had

5 to write the briefing form wording out ourselves on to

6 just a blank briefing form.

7 Q. Okay. What I would like to do with you is just to see

8 an example of the system by reference to a later

9 document. At paragraph 77 you refer to it, RNI-846-459

10 (displayed). Again, I'm showing you your own statement

11 here by way of introduction because you say in terms:

12 "I was not in attendance at the meet ..."

13 Et cetera. So you are commenting on a document that

14 you, under the system you have described, would have

15 become aware of, but you were not personally involved in

16 gathering in the intelligence?

17 A. Okay.

18 Q. Now, looking at the document at RNI-548-044, please

19 (displayed), it is another one and, again, it refers to

20 the briefing form, doesn't it, JL 28/99?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And again, the origin is Lurgan:

23 "Subject ..."

24 Bit redacted:

25 "... re Nelson murder"?





1 A. Yes.

2 Q. If you look at the intelligence itself on the next page,

3 again not very helpful perhaps, but X and Y:

4 "... played an active role in carrying out the

5 attack on Rosemary Nelson."

6 Again, the reference to the briefing form.

7 Now, could we look together next, please, at

8 RNI-548-168 (displayed)? Am I right in thinking that

9 this is the briefing form number 28 of 99?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. So in other words, remembering the system that you have

12 just explained to us, this is the document prepared by

13 Special Branch, the originating office is Lurgan, the

14 number we have looked at:

15 "For the information of CID, Nelson murder inquiry,

16 Lurgan station."

17 And the information is set out there:

18 "Intelligence indicates that [blank] and [blank]

19 played", I think it says --

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. -- "... an active role in the murder of

22 Rosemary Nelson"?

23 A. Yes, that's right.

24 Q. From what you have told us before, that's not your

25 handwriting, is it?





1 A. It is not.

2 Q. But it is presumably the handwriting of somebody

3 involved in the transmission of the intelligence over to

4 CID?

5 A. Yes, that's correct.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Looking at the handwriting and looking at

7 your cipher list, do you recognise the handwriting from

8 any of those ciphers?

9 A. Yes. The handwriting is B567.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Just give the cipher.

11 A. B567.

12 MR PHILLIPS: So that was the Detective Inspector,

13 wasn't it?

14 A. That's correct.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

16 MR PHILLIPS: Although, as you said, you didn't know it,

17 certainly the evidence we have is that he was the

18 Special Branch liaison officer for the investigation.

19 And just looking at one more of these documents

20 together, please, so we can see how this is working out

21 in practice, if we go to paragraph 79 of your statement,

22 RNI-846-460 (displayed), here you refer to intelligence

23 about the maker of the bomb. Can I ask you this

24 question, please: am I right in thinking that you were

25 not directly involved in this reporting?





1 A. I don't believe so.

2 Q. Well, looking at the document referred to, RNI-548-046,

3 please (displayed), we don't see your ciphers there,

4 do we?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Right. And does that confirm --

7 A. Yes, it confirms that I wasn't on the --

8 Q. Yes, thank you very much. Then turning over to the next

9 page, RNI-846-047 (displayed):

10 "[Blank] made the bomb which killed

11 Rosemary Nelson."

12 And do you see at the bottom:

13 "Briefing sheet JL26"?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. So if the system was working properly, a document of the

16 kind we were looking at would have been --

17 A. Yes, that's right.

18 Q. And can I ask you this: presumably from time to time,

19 after information of this kind had been passed on,

20 requests for more, for further information, for further

21 tasking, would come back through to you and you would

22 seek to gather in more?

23 A. That's right.

24 Q. Yes. Do you have any specific recollection of that

25 happening in this particular case?





1 A. No, not specifically, no.

2 Q. Thank you. Now, in paragraph 4 of your statement at the

3 top of RNI-846-461 (displayed), you say that you were

4 aware that the Red Hand Defenders made claims to the

5 murder, to having killed Rosemary Nelson. Do you see

6 that in the fourth line:

7 "I am aware that ..."?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Can you recall any intelligence ever coming into the

10 Lurgan office which implicated the Red Hand Defenders or

11 any individuals associated with the Red Hand Defenders?

12 A. No, I can't recall any specific intelligence coming in.

13 Q. Now, so far as Lurgan is concerned, what you say

14 there is:

15 "Sooner or later, Special Branch usually finds out

16 who the personalities are who operate under new names or

17 under new labels."

18 Do you have in mind there the Red Hand Defenders as

19 one of the new labels or new names?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. "I don't think anyone in the Lurgan area ..."

22 You go on to say:

23 "... claimed to or did emerge as a member of that

24 outfit."

25 That's your recollection about this particular





1 organisation. Is that correct?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. Now, so far as the beginning of this paragraph is

4 concerned, do you see you refer there to an immediate

5 allegation that the RUC or Special Branch was involved

6 in the murder? Can you remember who made that

7 allegation?

8 A. I can't remember who made the allegation. I would

9 assess it to be Republicans from the Lurgan area.

10 Q. Yes. Do you have any specific recollection of becoming

11 aware that that allegation of what people called

12 collusion was being made?

13 A. I can't recall -- I can't recall when it first was

14 alleged, but -- no.

15 Q. But you are sure that it was; it was something that you

16 were aware of?

17 A. Yes, I'm well aware that it was alleged that we

18 colluded.

19 Q. And did you ever receive any intelligence in your office

20 to back that up?

21 A. No.

22 Q. No. Now, I would like to go back with you to look at

23 a document that we looked at together, please, and it is

24 the document about Rosemary Nelson's family, which you

25 refer to in paragraph 41 of your statement and that's





1 RNI-548-076 (displayed).

2 Now, here your cipher does appear and your

3 statement, to remind you, says:

4 "I don't recall whether I submitted this report or

5 not, but I would have read it."

6 Do you remember we discussed together why this

7 information was being collected and recorded? So if we

8 just look at the next page, please, RNI-548-077

9 (displayed), now, you have told us about the debrief you

10 conducted when you returned from a meeting and you have

11 told us about how that was recorded, whether it was

12 typed or put on computers or whatever.

13 Now, when we look at these sorts of intelligence

14 reports, they are not, are they -- and this is the

15 example we will use, please -- they are not a complete

16 record of all the intelligence passed over in a meeting,

17 are they?

18 A. No, they wouldn't be, no, not on one debrief.

19 Q. No. And so what I wanted to ask you was how it was that

20 this document came to concentrate on Rosemary Nelson's

21 family, in fact on her father? How were the records of

22 the meets broken up into the various topics?

23 A. Usually you would have kept items of intelligence and

24 background intelligence on separate debriefs. You know,

25 on a meet you could have maybe 15 or 20 debriefs





1 originating from that meet.

2 Q. So that, as it were, the total of the information

3 gathered in the meet might be broken down into 15 or 20

4 separate records?

5 A. Debriefs.

6 Q. Debriefs?

7 A. That's right.

8 Q. Who would divide it up in that way? Would it be at your

9 level, the handler level, or would it be at a higher

10 level?

11 A. No, it would be at our level.

12 Q. So in going through the total record of this meeting --

13 again, just using this as an example -- you, or whoever

14 it was involved, would have decided that this bit of

15 intelligence should be treated separately and allocated

16 its own debrief?

17 A. Yes, that's correct.

18 Q. And presumably, again, just based on what you have said

19 to us already, that debrief would have been put on the

20 relevant file, in this case Rosemary Nelson's file?

21 A. That's right.

22 Q. Thank you. Those are the only questions I have for you,

23 but as you have probably gathered, everybody gets

24 a chance to add to their evidence, if they wish to, if

25 there is something we haven't covered. Is there





1 anything you would like to add?

2 A. No, there is not.

3 MR PHILLIPS: Thank you.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Well, thank you very much for coming to help

5 us by giving evidence.

6 A. Thank you.

7 THE CHAIRMAN: That is the conclusion of the evidence today.

8 Mr (name redacted), before the witness leaves, would you,

9 please, confirm that all the cameras have been

10 switched off?

11 MR (NAME REDACTED): Yes, sir, they have.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Please escort the witness out.

13 10.15 in the morning.

14 (4.45 pm)

15 (The Inquiry adjourned until 10.15 am the following day)














1 I N D E X

B509 (sworn) ..................................... 2
Questions by MR PHILLIPS ..................... 2