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Full Hearings

Hearing: 16th December 2008, day 93

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held at:
The Interpoint Centre
20-24 York Street
Belfast BT15 1AQ

on Tuesday, 16 December 2008
commencing at 10.15 am

Day 93








1 Tuesday, 16 December 2008

2 (10.15 am)

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Currans, the checklist. Is the public

4 area screen fully in place, locked and the key secured?

5 MR CURRANS: Yes, sir.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Are the fire doors on either side of the

7 screen closed?

8 MR CURRANS: Yes, sir.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: Are the technical support screens in place

10 and securely fastened?

11 MR CURRANS: Yes, sir.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Is anyone other than Inquiry personnel and

13 Participants' legal representatives seated in the body

14 of this chamber?

15 MR CURRANS: No, sir.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

17 Mr [name redacted], can you please confirm that the two

18 witness cameras have been switched off and shrouded?

19 MR [name redacted]: Yes, sir, they have.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: All the other cameras have been switched off?

21 MR [name redacted]: Yes, sir, they have.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

23 Bring the witness in, please.

24 The cameras on the Panel, Inquiry personnel and the

25 Full Participants' legal representatives may now be




1 switched back on.

2 Yes, Mr Phillips?

3 P157 (continued)

4 Questions by MR PHILLIPS (continued)

5 MR PHILLIPS: The first thing I would like to do, if I may,

6 this morning is to see whether with your help we can

7 clear up or at least shed some light on a point raised

8 by Sir Anthony Burden yesterday afternoon.

9 Now, what I would like to do is to show you first on

10 the screen, please, RNI-110-239 and RNI-110-240, if we

11 could have those on the left and right, please

12 (displayed).

13 Now, these are documents I know you have seen and

14 they are, I hope you will take it from me, John Ware,

15 the journalist, his notes of what he says were in

16 Mr Parra's notes of the famous meeting that we discussed

17 together yesterday afternoon.

18 What I would like to do with you, please, is just to

19 do some comparisons so we can check off, as it were,

20 your notes against his. I would like to start, please,

21 by putting RNI-101-159.505 on the right-hand side of the

22 screen, please (displayed). I have chosen that page

23 because, obviously, that's the key page in your

24 handwriting. If you look down the bottom left in

25 John Ware's notes of Mr Parra's notes, you will see




1 there is also a reference there to Sir Louis:

2 "... has commented upon the corruption of solicitors

3 [and] there are those who are working for a paramilitary

4 agenda and part of that agenda is to make sure that

5 detainees -- stifling any means of communicating

6 information."

7 So you will see that although the words are not

8 exactly the same, this looks, doesn't it, as though

9 these are indeed notes of this part of the conversation

10 in the meeting?

11 A. That's correct, sir.

12 Q. What I would like to do with you is to look in a little

13 more detail at some pages of your notes that we looked

14 at yesterday but we didn't go into in any detail, and

15 compare them with what Mr Ware wrote. So can we have on

16 the left-hand side, please, RNI-110-240 (displayed) and

17 on the right-hand side RNI-101-159.506 (displayed)?

18 Because here, do you see on the left, what Mr Ware

19 recorded, which we didn't see in Mr Parra's notes, the

20 notes you and I looked at yesterday, is a section under

21 the heading "Pat Finucane Murder". What I would like to

22 do with your help, please -- and I don't know whether

23 you have still got the large copies of the notes?

24 A. I do not have them, but it would be very helpful.

25 Q. I think it would be extremely helpful. Oh, thank you




1 very much. (Handed)

2 It is at G. What I would like to do with your help

3 is to just see --

4 A. Could I suggest something, sir?

5 Q. Please do.

6 A. You don't have the original?

7 Q. I do not have the original. We may have the original,

8 as it were, back stage.

9 A. It might be easier to read.

10 Q. Yes, okay. Let's see if we can find the original.

11 A. I'll try this if you wish.

12 Q. Shall we have a go and see how far we get on. There

13 isn't a transcript, as you told us yesterday, but

14 certainly in my copy one can make out in your writing

15 some words. Your writing is, if I may say so, at least

16 consistent.

17 Now, the first thing I would like to do is to look

18 at the first line on the left, which is:

19 "Only prosecute when there is sufficiency of

20 evidence."

21 And the word "sufficiency" appears, doesn't it, at

22 the end of your first line on the right?

23 A. Yes, sufficiency of evidence.

24 Q. Exactly. Do you see your next note is:

25 "Ten times interviewed"?




1 Do you see that?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And it then says on the left:

4 "Interviewed ten people"?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And then Mr Ware writes:

7 "No admissions, no forensic, no identification."

8 Your notes continue:

9 "Ten times interviewed re Finucane murder. No

10 conclusive forensic evidence, no ID evidence."

11 Then you say:

12 "Do not leave ..."

13 Can you read:

14 "... evidential traces" is that?

15 A. I can't see it, but it could be that, sir.

16 Q. Yes. What Mr Parra's note records is:

17 "Nothing incriminating found on suspects."

18 Then you see his next note is:

19 "UVF claimed the murder and ten Loyalists taken in."

20 If you go down to the very bottom of your notes, do

21 you see there is a little arrow at the bottom left?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Underneath, it says "UVF" and then it says, doesn't it:

24 "Ten people claimed by UVF"?

25 A. Yes.




1 Q. Now, if we turn the page on the right-hand side to

2 RNI-101-159.507 (displayed), as far as I can make out,

3 the next similarities occur in the section which begins

4 in your handwriting:

5 "Pat F prominent."

6 Do you see that?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And you record, for example:

9 "Republican family and did not hide it. Brothers,

10 leadership in PIRA."

11 Do you see that?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Do you see what he says:

14 "Seen in company of Provisional IRA members on TV.

15 Brothers were in leadership of IRA"?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Then Mr Parra goes on:

18 "He himself was a Republican."

19 Then this sentence:

20 "Didn't need anyone from security forces to inform

21 Loyalists of this fact."

22 And if you go a few lines down in your text, it

23 says:

24 "Did not need anyone to point finger at F, totally

25 known by the Loyalists."




1 Do you see that?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. "Did not seek to hide himself."

4 Then you see Mr Parra continues:

5 "Have investigated every avenue. Stevens brought in

6 to look at whole issue of collusion."

7 Do you see in your little phrase with an asterisk on

8 either side at the bottom of the page, it says:

9 "Whole issue of collusion."

10 Do you see that, just above --

11 A. This is at the bottom of H?

12 Q. Yes, above the box, the first box?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Do you see?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. "Whole issue of collusion."

17 Exactly the same expression?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Then Mr Parra continues:

20 "Stevens issued summary of his findings."

21 Your box reads:

22 "Summary of Stevens' findings."

23 Doesn't it?

24 A. Hm-mm.

25 Q. And then on the right-hand side you have written the




1 word "action". I assume that's a note to yourself,

2 is it?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Do you think you were going to provide him with

5 a summary of the Stevens Report findings?

6 A. Well, probably Mr White would have been going to do

7 that, but I marked it as an action.

8 Q. Yes, something to be followed up after the meeting?

9 A. Hm-mm.

10 Q. Yes. So it looks, doesn't it, as though Mr Parra is

11 making notes of this part of the conversation; in other

12 words, the part of the conversation that you also record

13 in relation to Pat Finucane?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Can I just ask you, how did the topic of Pat Finucane

16 come up in the meeting, can you recall?

17 A. I can't really. I suspect it was part of the agenda

18 Mr Cumaraswamy was interested in.

19 Q. So you think it may well have been a point he wanted to

20 discuss?

21 A. Yes, and I think Mr White was there briefed up to speak

22 on that. That would be my recollection.

23 Q. And there is obviously a good deal of detail in here,

24 including detail about Mr Finucane's family and, indeed,

25 detail about the murder investigation itself. Can you




1 remember who provided that detail in the meeting?

2 A. Mr White.

3 Q. You think that was Mr White?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And what, as far as you can remember, was the point that

6 Mr White was seeking to get across to Mr Cumaraswamy?

7 A. I don't think there was a point, as such; it was just

8 a relaying of some of the background to the Pat Finucane

9 investigation.

10 Q. And it looks also, though, from the page we have on the

11 screen as though he was seeking to place Mr Finucane in

12 a very particular Republican context, wasn't he?

13 A. I think that's a matter for Mr White to address, sir.

14 Q. If it is Mr White who made these remarks, it looks as

15 though that's what was happening, doesn't it?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Yes. Thank you very much.

18 Now, can I just go back on one point that we did

19 discuss yesterday in relation to this meeting? You have

20 told us about the comments that you say Mr White made

21 and attributed to Sir Louis Blom-Cooper, if you

22 remember?

23 A. Yes, sir.

24 Q. Can I ask you, do you recall whether at any point in the

25 discussion Mr White expressed his own views on the




1 matter?

2 A. Well, I really just have to go by what I have on the

3 note, sir, and --

4 Q. Shall we have a look at RNI-101-159.511 (displayed)? So

5 there are your notes transcribed under F at the bottom.

6 We looked at them in considerable detail yesterday.

7 What I'm getting at is you explain how you think

8 Mr White made these comments and attributed the views to

9 Sir Louis Blom-Cooper. Did he or, indeed, anybody else

10 in the meeting say whether they agreed with those views

11 or not?

12 A. Not to my recollection, sir.

13 Q. They didn't?

14 A. No.

15 Q. They simply reported them as Sir Louis's views?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Look at the bottom of this page, please. Again, you

18 told us yesterday about this. The phrase "not suggest

19 any terrorist involvement" you said was Mr White coming

20 back in when Mr Cumaraswamy had raised a question?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Thank you. Can I ask you this: "not suggest any

23 terrorist involvement", was Mr White at this point

24 saying, "Look, I'm not suggesting that these lawyers are

25 active terrorists, ie people who get involved in murder




1 and bombing, I'm suggesting that they work to

2 a paramilitary agenda; in other words, they work in

3 accordance with the aims and plans of paramilitary

4 organisations"?

5 A. No, I think whatever Mr White said that led

6 Mr Cumaraswamy to say whatever he said, he was trying to

7 redress that. That's what he was trying to do.

8 Q. Yes, that's what I'm asking you. Do you think the

9 distinction he was making was, "Look, I'm not saying

10 they are active bombers, I'm saying they do their work

11 in accordance with the aims and plans of

12 paramilitaries"?

13 A. I couldn't comment.

14 Q. You couldn't. That is a matter for Mr White?

15 A. Absolutely.

16 Q. Can we just go back to the point we had reached

17 yesterday afternoon? We were looking, if you remember,

18 at the process of threat assessment which had begun

19 in February 1998 and where we had seen your involvement

20 at the beginning of April that year. We were looking

21 together at RNI-101-206, which I would like on the

22 screen, please (displayed).

23 Do you remember we looked at the little note at the

24 bottom which referred to your involvement, and you told

25 us what you could remember about the discussion that you




1 had with the Chief Constable?

2 Now, if we move that to the left of the screen,

3 please, what I would like to do is to get up on the

4 right-hand side your paragraph 53, RNI-842-138

5 (displayed). Thank you.

6 Here, you are talking about this very note, do you

7 see, in the middle of the paragraph there, and you say

8 right at the end of the paragraph:

9 "Because of the nature of this matter, we would have

10 wanted to let Sir Ronnie Flanagan know what was going on

11 in relation to it."

12 What did you have in mind, please, when you made

13 that remark?

14 A. That was the fact that he had seen it. You know, he

15 needed -- we needed his imprimatur on it, as it were, as

16 to where we would go from here.

17 Q. Why was that?

18 A. Why was that?

19 Q. Yes.

20 A. Because he had been involved -- it was an issue that

21 would have required his involvement.

22 Q. Why do you say that? What was it about the issue that

23 required his involvement?

24 A. It was just the threat against solicitors, this

25 particular solicitor, related to previous complaints and




1 that sort of thing.

2 Q. It was --

3 A. It was an issue.

4 Q. It was an issue presumably because by this stage all of

5 the points you have just been mentioning there had come

6 up and all the issues you have referred to had come, in

7 one way or another, to the attention of the

8 Chief Constable?

9 A. I think that would be correct, sir, yes.

10 Q. And so as I understand it, it was the combination of all

11 of those factors that made you say there that you would

12 have wanted to let him know what was going on?

13 A. No, this was another part of a sequence, if you like,

14 and he was already aware and au fait with the previous

15 parts of the sequence. And, therefore, it is logical

16 that he should be brought in for this.

17 Q. Yes --

18 A. -- additional matter.

19 Q. And you thought he would have wanted to know?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Now, can I just ask you this question. Up to this

22 point, April 1998, can you recall whether there had been

23 another case in which the Chief Constable had got

24 involved in discussing a threat assessment on an

25 individual?




1 A. I can't remember, sir.

2 Q. No. Can you remember one after this time?

3 A. Not to my recollection, as I sit now.

4 Q. No.

5 A. It is not to say that it didn't happen. It could have

6 happened with other people as well, but ...

7 Q. But no other example --

8 A. That I can recall.

9 Q. Thank you very much. What I would like to do next,

10 please, is to put on the right-hand side of the screen

11 RNI-101-207 (displayed) because this is another version

12 of the same document, but this one has a copy of the

13 Post-It which was put on it, and as I understand it,

14 that's your handwriting?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. On the Post-It?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And what does it say, please?

19 A. It says:

20 "Need to offer --

21 Q. "Her", is that?

22 A. "... her a crime prevention order."

23 Q. Right. What does that mean, please?

24 A. What it is meant to read is:

25 "Need to offer her a crime prevention officer."




1 Q. Right. What lay behind your writing that Post-It?

2 A. I think there were a couple of things. I think the

3 original -- if my memory serves me correct, the original

4 communication from the NIO mentioned that point and

5 I certainly had a discussion with, I think, P136 on that

6 point. And I would have -- in the course of that

7 conversation, I would have mentioned that to the Chief

8 as a possible option.

9 Q. So you think this was a suggestion, do you, which was

10 raised by P136?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. And do you think it was in the course of your

13 discussions at this time, the end of March/beginning

14 of April 1998?

15 A. To the best of my recollection, yes.

16 Q. Just looking at the original NIO letter, that may help

17 you. If we have that on the left-hand of the screen,

18 please, RNI-101-196 (displayed). Do you have in mind

19 what it says in the second paragraph there, where Simon

20 Rogers is commenting:

21 "It might be prudent to consider whether or not she

22 needs to be approached and given advice on her

23 security"?

24 A. Probably linked to that, yes.

25 Q. Yes. Now, what P136 said in her evidence to the Inquiry




1 is that she recalls this question of the crime

2 prevention advice being made by her on two occasions, of

3 which this was one, and then there was another in, I

4 think, August when the same issue of Rosemary Nelson's

5 security came up.

6 Do you think she may have raised it with you on two

7 such occasions?

8 A. That's possible, yes.

9 Q. Yes. And was this something that you discussed with the

10 Chief Constable?

11 A. Well, I would have -- with the -- the note there, I'm

12 sure I would have mentioned that to him as an option.

13 Q. Yes.

14 A. As I mentioned previously. It is not that the

15 Chief Constable wouldn't have already had that in his

16 mind or something, but I would have certainly mentioned

17 it, yes.

18 Q. And that was being considered and discussed even though

19 the threat assessment, which you point out in your

20 statement, had said that there was no specific threat to

21 Rosemary Nelson?

22 A. Yes, it was always an option in those circumstances

23 where there wasn't a specific threat.

24 Q. Right. It was, as it were, a lower key way of dealing

25 with the matter?




1 A. Yes, and I might say probably a much lower key way, if I

2 could put it like that.

3 Q. Exactly. Therefore, can I take it that when the

4 decision from the Chief Constable which you told us

5 about yesterday -- "nothing further can be done by

6 police at this time" -- was made, what the

7 Chief Constable was saying was that all the various

8 options, including crime prevention, should not be taken

9 forward?

10 A. What may have influenced that as well, if my memory is

11 correct, was there was some comment from the region or

12 the division or the subdivision in relation to that on

13 the file as well.

14 Q. To what effect, please?

15 A. Well, I thought it said -- there is a line something

16 like -- and I'm sure it is in the documentation -- that

17 there was -- because they weren't aware of the threat,

18 it was difficult to give crime prevention advice or

19 something like that, or the nature of the threat,

20 something like that.

21 Q. So you think this was a view that the Chief Constable

22 reached, was it, after considering the material that you

23 had put before him in the file?

24 A. I would think so, yes, sir.

25 Q. Can you remember any reasons, apart from the one you




1 have just mentioned, that the Chief Constable put

2 forward for the decision that that should not be done in

3 this case?

4 A. No, sir.

5 Q. No. Now, in her evidence to the Inquiry, P136 said that

6 she thought it was felt to be inappropriate to make this

7 sort of offer, to offer crime prevention advice, because

8 that advice would be given by local officers about whose

9 behaviour Rosemary Nelson had complained.

10 Do you think that was something that was weighing in

11 the balance in making this decision?

12 A. Actually, I wouldn't have thought so because if there

13 was someone going to offer advice, it wouldn't be

14 detectives.

15 Q. So you think that the officers who were the subject of

16 the complaints would not themselves have been the crime

17 prevention officers?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. In other words, the crime prevention officers would have

20 been uniformed --

21 A. Separate post.

22 Q. Yes, thank you. Now, so far as the response to the NIO

23 is concerned, we can see that at RNI-101-267 (displayed)

24 and can I ask you, please, whether you had a hand in the

25 drafting of that?




1 A. I think that was Mr Maxwell's drafting, sir.

2 Q. Right. I think the writing is that of P136, is it not,

3 the handwriting?

4 A. Yes, her signature.

5 Q. Yes, indeed. But you don't think, despite your

6 involvement in dealing with this issue with the

7 Chief Constable and talking to P136 about it, you had

8 any input into this draft?

9 A. No, sir.

10 Q. Thank you. Now, Christine Collins told us that after

11 this letter had been received in Police Division at the

12 NIO, she telephoned Command Secretariat to discuss what

13 was said in this letter. Do you have any recollection

14 of discussing that matter with her?

15 A. No.

16 Q. Would it have been unusual for Police Division at the

17 NIO to ring up to question a threat assessment such as

18 this prepared by the police?

19 A. Well, the NIO would often come back with queries on any

20 sort of correspondence that went through them.

21 Q. Yes. But this was a threat assessment, which was

22 obviously the special province of the police and, within

23 that, the Special Branch. Can you remember occasions

24 when they would come back and raise queries about

25 assessments of this kind?




1 A. I can't remember -- as I sit here, I can't remember any.

2 That's not to say that it didn't happen, sir.

3 Q. No. Was it in fact unusual in itself for

4 Command Secretariat to be sending out what amounted to

5 threat assessments to the NIO?

6 A. I suppose it was because of the chain of correspondence

7 it happened like this.

8 Q. Indeed. But it wasn't the usual way these things were

9 done, was it?

10 A. No, that would be correct.

11 Q. They were normally handled by Security Branch and dealt

12 with in a very different way?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Yes.

15 A. Especially if there was a question of the Key Persons

16 Protection Scheme, they were the link in that chain.

17 Q. Indeed, yes. Can I just check this point with you? In

18 your previous career, can I take it that you yourself

19 had no previous experience of conducting threat

20 assessments?

21 A. I had no previous experience of conducting threat

22 assessments, but I was in ops department for a while.

23 Q. Yes. Now, can I move to the next topic, which is the

24 ICPC, and what happened in June 1998 when they announced

25 that they intended to issue a certificate of




1 dissatisfaction, or rather to decline to issue

2 a certificate of satisfaction about the investigation of

3 the Colin Duffy/Rosemary Nelson, et cetera, complaints?

4 So far as your statement is concerned, this is

5 something that you deal with in paragraphs 61 and

6 following at RNI-842-141, if you have got the statement

7 there to help.

8 A. Paragraph again, sir, sorry?

9 Q. Sorry, paragraph 61, RNI-842-141 (displayed).

10 Now, if we have the letter, or the first page, on

11 the left-hand side of the screen, please, RNI-101-276

12 (displayed), it is dated 19 June, addressed to your

13 Chief Constable. Do you remember discussing this letter

14 and what its implications were with the Chief Constable?

15 A. Not really, sir. I think that went direct to the Chief.

16 Q. Yes. So when you say "not really", do you have no

17 recollection of this issue --

18 A. He may have mentioned it.

19 Q. But it had very considerable ramifications, didn't it?

20 A. It did, yes.

21 Q. And he was involved, as we have heard from lots of other

22 evidence, in dealing with NIO officials, indeed with the

23 Secretary of State, with all of the fallout and the

24 setting-up of the Mulvihill investigation?

25 A. That's correct.




1 Q. So presumably you must have had at least some

2 involvement or discussion with him about it?

3 A. I was aware of the issue, yes.

4 Q. Yes. Mr Steele described the Chief Constable's reaction

5 to this letter and what it contained from the ICPC as

6 being one of fury; in other words, he said that he was

7 furious. Is that how you remember his reaction?

8 A. I don't ever remember him being furious at all.

9 Q. Right.

10 A. I think there was an issue that he had thought that "in

11 confidence" meant it had only come to him.

12 Q. And he then discovered, didn't he, that in fact it had

13 also gone to the Secretary of State?

14 A. I think that's correct.

15 Q. And indeed that the ICPC was intending to inform the

16 various complainants of what they were going to do in

17 very short order. Do you remember that?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Yes. Now, the Chairman of the ICPC at the time,

20 Mr Donnelly, has also given evidence to the Inquiry and

21 he said that before this letter was issued, there had

22 been what he described as signalling to both the NIO and

23 the RUC that the problem was about to emerge. Do you

24 recall any sort of signalling from the ICPC?

25 A. No, sir. If there was any signalling that would have




1 been done to Complaints and Discipline Department, I

2 would imagine.

3 Q. So in other words, so far as you were concerned in

4 Command Secretariat, you knew nothing of this before the

5 arrival of the letter?

6 A. That's correct, sir.

7 Q. Thank you very much. Now, I just want to check one

8 other point with you, if I may, by looking at

9 RNI-101-285 (displayed). This is the Chief Constable's

10 response, and if we have RNI-101-286 on the screen as

11 well, you will see the whole of the document

12 (displayed).

13 It is addressed in fact to the Deputy Chairman

14 because I think Mr Donnelly had in fact gone away at

15 about this point and it records a meeting on the

16 left-hand side, do you see there, third paragraph down

17 on the 24th, the same day, with John Steele? Were you

18 present at that meeting, as far as you can recall?

19 A. To the best of my recollection, no, sir.

20 Q. Thank you. Do you recall whether you had any

21 involvement in drafting this letter or assisting the

22 Chief Constable to do so?

23 A. No, that's his work.

24 Q. Yes. How can you tell?

25 A. I just know.




1 Q. Is there something about the tone, something about the

2 way the language is used?

3 A. No -- I'm not saying that he might -- he may have had

4 a word with Complaints and Discipline or something like

5 that, you know, but it is his letter.

6 Q. But if he wanted a word with Complaints and Discipline,

7 if he wanted information, would he contact them himself,

8 as you said yesterday he might?

9 A. There is every chance he might have done.

10 Q. He could have gone through Command Secretariat, but he

11 might easily have gone direct?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Thank you. So far as the next stage of this is

14 concerned, I would like to take you back to your

15 statement, please, and paragraph 61, at RNI-842-141.

16 Here, you refer to a meeting that took place on 1 July

17 between, what you say there, is Sir Ronnie and

18 Geralyn McNally. I think, in fact, Mr Donnelly may have

19 been present. You say a few lines down in the same

20 paragraph:

21 "I'm not sure where this meeting took place. To the

22 best of my recollection, I did not attend the meeting."

23 Now, Geralyn McNally has also given evidence to the

24 Inquiry, as I'm sure you know, and she certainly does

25 recall you being present. Is it possible that you were




1 present at this meeting on 1 July?

2 A. Yes, sir, I think I would have to say, having read what

3 Miss McNally said, I was present at that meeting. Can I

4 just say that that part of the statement was put to me

5 at the time when I come in, and I answered it then from

6 my -- to the best of my recollection at that time.

7 Q. Yes. Thank you very much. But now you think you were

8 present. Is that right?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And would you have made notes if you had been present?

11 A. If I did, they would have been on a file, but I don't

12 recall any notes being made.

13 Q. Right. Have you had an opportunity to see

14 Geralyn McNally's notes of the meeting?

15 A. It may have been in the bundle, sir.

16 Q. Yes. Well, let's have a look at them just to see

17 whether they help your recollection. It is at

18 RNI-202-173.500 (displayed). I think you have been

19 shown these notes, haven't you?

20 A. Hm-mm.

21 Q. And if we have RNI-202-173.501 on the right-hand side,

22 please (displayed). Did they help you to recall what

23 had been discussed at the meeting?

24 A. Do you want me to read the full thing now or --

25 Q. I'm just asking --




1 A. I'm sure it did, yes.

2 Q. In other words, there was nothing that struck you as

3 being wildly inaccurate or out of place in the notes?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Thank you very much. Now, so far as this incident and

6 what happened thereafter was concerned, including the

7 appointment of the Commander from the

8 Metropolitan Police, this was something that involved,

9 as I said earlier, not only the Chief Constable but also

10 on the other side, the Secretary of State, didn't it?

11 A. Well, they were interested, certainly --

12 Q. Indeed.

13 A. -- in the issue.

14 Q. Yes. And if we look at a document from just about

15 a week after this at RNI-106-235 (displayed), we see in

16 this NIO document that the suggestion is being made that

17 the Chief Constable and the Secretary of State would

18 have a discussion about the matter in the margins or in,

19 as it were, the side part of the security policy meeting

20 which was going to take place that day, I think -- this

21 is 10 July.

22 Now, the security policy meeting on 10 July, can

23 I take it that in accordance with what you have told us

24 earlier, you would have been present in that meeting

25 taking notes, as you described?




1 A. The minutes would confirm that, but --

2 Q. Yes. Now, at that meeting on 10 July, do you recall

3 whether in fact there was a conversation in the margins

4 of the meeting between the Secretary of State and the

5 Chief Constable?

6 A. No, sir.

7 Q. No. Now, so far as that meeting is concerned, you have,

8 I have no doubt, been made aware of the evidence of

9 Mr Watkins, who was also a senior civil servant at the

10 NIO, about the meeting. Have you been made aware of

11 that evidence?

12 A. No, sir.

13 Q. What Mr Watkins recalls -- because he was present at

14 that meeting, as you were -- is that during the course

15 of that meeting, the Chief Constable described

16 Rosemary Nelson as an "immoral woman". Do you recall

17 him using those words of Rosemary Nelson?

18 A. No, sir.

19 Q. Do you recall there being any discussion involving the

20 Chief Constable of Rosemary Nelson on that occasion?

21 A. If it was, sir, it would be minuted.

22 Q. Yes. Do you recall any discussion of Rosemary Nelson on

23 that occasion in an SPM or, indeed, on any other

24 occasion in an SPM?

25 A. As I sit here, no. But as I stress, they were minuted




1 meetings and if there was, it should have been minuted.

2 Q. Yes. Now, you told us just a little while ago that you

3 think on reflection you were present at the meeting with

4 Geralyn McNally on 1 July 1998. Were you present at

5 a second meeting with her and the Chief Constable at

6 some point between October that year and the time of

7 Rosemary Nelson's murder?

8 A. No, sir.

9 Q. You were not? Are you sure about that?

10 A. To the best of my recollection, I wasn't.

11 Q. Because it's suggested, you see, that in that second

12 meeting the Chief Constable told Miss McNally that

13 Rosemary Nelson was having an affair with Colin Duffy.

14 But you don't recall being at such a meeting?

15 A. No, sir.

16 Q. Thank you. Were you aware of that allegation or that

17 rumour at any time before Rosemary Nelson was murdered?

18 A. No, sir.

19 Q. You were not?

20 A. Obviously I have heard it since and one tries to

21 recollect when that came, but I suspect it was after the

22 murder.

23 Q. Are you sure?

24 A. I can't be 100 per cent sure with the passage of time.

25 Q. But it follows from what you are saying, does it, that




1 you don't recall any reference to this rumour, to these

2 allegations, being made by the Chief Constable?

3 A. No, sir.

4 Q. Again, are you sure about that?

5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. Now, after the murder of Rosemary Nelson, immediately

7 after the murder, the ICPC released their verdict, if I

8 can put it that way, about first of all the Mulvihill

9 investigation. But also, in the form of an appendix,

10 they registered their concerns about the original

11 complaints and discipline investigation. The Inquiry

12 has heard evidence about press coverage concerning

13 Geralyn McNally which came after that. Were you aware

14 at the time that this sort of press comment about

15 Geralyn McNally was being made?

16 A. No, sir.

17 Q. You were not?

18 A. No.

19 Q. You weren't aware of the suggestion that there was some

20 form of whispering campaign, a campaign of rumours

21 against her?

22 A. No, sir.

23 Q. It wasn't something you remember discussing within

24 Command Secretariat?

25 A. No, sir.




1 Q. There is a suggestion, again by Mr Donnelly, that the

2 Chief Constable was briefing journalists in relation to

3 this matter. Was that something you were aware of?

4 A. No, sir.

5 Q. I would like to move back, if I may, to August 1998 and

6 the second threat assessment. Again, I know you have

7 seen the various documents on this, but to jog your

8 memory further, I would like to show you the NIO letter

9 that begins the process, and that's at RNI-101-327

10 (displayed). It is dated 6 August. It is from

11 Simon Rogers again, addressed not to you but to P136.

12 Now, what I wanted to ask you in terms of your

13 involvement with this matter is concerned: given the

14 history that you have described for us in April, the

15 previous threat assessment, can I take that you would

16 have been involved at some point in this next threat

17 assessment in August/September 1998?

18 A. Yes, but I think it was later in the process, sir.

19 Q. Do you mean at the similar stage to the last one; in

20 other words, when the time came to decide what was to be

21 said back to the NIO?

22 A. I think so, although I do have a memory of seeing the

23 leaflet.

24 Q. Yes, and you refer to that in your statement, don't you,

25 at paragraph 66? If we put that on the right-hand side




1 of the screen, please, RNI-842-142 (displayed), here you

2 talk about -- you mean the "Man Without a Future"

3 pamphlet?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Thank you. And you say towards the bottom:

6 "I would not have been involved in the threat

7 assessment ..."

8 We can see that from the documents:

9 "... but could well have been involved in the chain

10 of correspondence. I became aware of it subsequently,

11 as I have set out in the following paragraphs."

12 Then can we just have RNI-842-143 on the screen,

13 please (displayed)? There you set out essentially the

14 chain of documents which we have in our files, and which

15 we have all seen many, many times in which --

16 A. Which were put into my statement, sir.

17 Q. Exactly, in which the documents worked their way down

18 and the assessments come back, in this case from two

19 parts of the RUC, not only E Department, Special Branch,

20 but also from South Region.

21 Now, so far as Simon Rogers' letter was concerned,

22 on the left-hand side, this was only four months after

23 the last communication where P136 had written back to

24 the NIO. So presumably you and she looked again at the

25 file and what had happened on the previous occasion?




1 A. Well, yes, I'm sure --

2 Q. It seems logical, doesn't it? You would want to check

3 back to see what had been said before?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Now, on this occasion the NIO were directing your

6 attention specifically, weren't they, to the KPPS?

7 That's the third paragraph on the left. Do you see?

8 A. Well, I don't think that's the KPPS they are

9 referring to.

10 Q. Right. What do you think they are referring to?

11 A. Some other scheme.

12 Q. Right. What scheme do you think they are referring to

13 if it is not the KPPS?

14 A. It is described as a limited scheme which she could

15 apply for.

16 Q. I have to say you are in a very small minority in

17 thinking that they are not referring to the KPPS. Was

18 there another scheme which we don't know about operated

19 by the NIO?

20 A. There could have been, yes. I think there was a lesser

21 scheme, but now -- it is a long time since my direct

22 knowledge of it, but I think there is a lesser scheme --

23 there was a lesser scheme.

24 Q. The one that everybody else seems to think -- I think

25 including Mr Rogers -- he was talking about was the




1 KPPS, and that was obviously, if I can put it this

2 way --

3 A. The KPPS may be many things, but it is not limited, sir.

4 It is a comprehensive package, if I can put it like

5 that.

6 Q. It applies, or it applied then, in two parts, didn't it?

7 The first part was automatic for those who held

8 positions of importance, and they qualified

9 automatically. But there was a large discretionary

10 element within the scheme, wasn't there? But you had to

11 meet various qualifying criteria. That's right,

12 isn't it?

13 A. Well, as I say, it's a while since I have been involved

14 directly, but I always thought the key thing was the

15 threat assessment, the specific threat.

16 Q. Indeed, but you have made the suggestion, you see, that

17 you don't think this was the KPPS, and what I'm trying

18 to understand from you is if it wasn't the KPPS, what

19 was it?

20 A. There may have been another scheme.

21 Q. Right.

22 A. Why -- Simon would have referred to the KPPS, I would

23 have thought, but ...

24 Q. Okay. Well, now, if we look at the situation when the

25 matter came back to you, we can see that at RNI-106-314




1 (displayed), and this is the letter that goes out again

2 from P136. Can I take it that on this occasion also you

3 discussed it with P136; in other words, the question of

4 what was going to be said back to Simon Rogers? Is that

5 right?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. And did you then take it in and discuss the matter with

8 the Chief Constable?

9 A. That's correct, sir.

10 Q. And can I take it also that in doing so you would have

11 followed the same procedure that you described earlier,

12 namely you would have taken in the file so the

13 Chief Constable could see the file and take his decision

14 based on what he saw there?

15 A. Yes, sir.

16 Q. And no doubt you would have briefed him to the extent

17 that you thought he needed to be briefed?

18 A. Yes, or he may have read the stuff as well. That was

19 always a possibility.

20 Q. Yes, he may have read the stuff and if he wanted to ask

21 you any questions, no doubt he would have done so?

22 A. In fact, if my memory serves me right, I think there was

23 a considerable delay in that happening in this case and

24 it may be that the file was actually left with him.

25 That's a possibility.




1 Q. It looks as though, from the other evidence -- and I

2 will just show you the documents that confirm this,

3 RNI-101-349 (displayed) -- as though there was a delay

4 of about a week, I think it was, until the 10th. Do you

5 see the letter we looked at before was dated the 3rd,

6 this is the 10th, from you to P136 saying that by this

7 stage it had been approved?

8 A. That's correct, sir.

9 Q. Can you remember now why there was that delay of a week?

10 A. I can't, sir.

11 Q. No. But it seems likely, doesn't it, that the delay was

12 because you felt that it was something that he had to

13 see and approve before it went out?

14 A. That's correct, sir.

15 Q. So we can take it then that the letter we looked at

16 together, 3 September, went out with his approval?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. Thank you. Now, I would like to turn to a specific

19 aspect of this process and one only, please, with you,

20 which is about the threat note. This was the document,

21 if you remember, about which there became a great deal

22 of controversy as to whether it had got to the

23 Command Secretariat and, if it had, how it had got there

24 and what had happened to it in terms of the filing.

25 Now, I'm going to deal with this as briefly as I




1 can. When were you first aware that in addition to the

2 pamphlet, the NIO had at least thought they had supplied

3 the threat note?

4 A. When it was brought in to me by 136.

5 Q. Yes. And when was that?

6 A. That was after the publication of the police authority

7 minute.

8 Q. Yes. And the questions that were raised about them by

9 the CAJ?

10 A. Yes, I think that was the case, yes.

11 Q. Yes. And actually you deal with this in paragraph 86 of

12 your statement, if we could have that on the screen. It

13 is actually RNI-842-150 (displayed), where you get to

14 the nub of it, as it were. So you think this is a few

15 months after Rosemary Nelson's murder. I think it was

16 in about May 1999. Is that right?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. Yes. So at no point before that, as far as you are

19 aware, had the question of whether or not you in

20 Command Secretariat had the threat note, had that

21 arisen?

22 A. No, sir.

23 Q. And you had never heard P136 refer to it or mention it?

24 A. No, sir.

25 Q. No. Can I just ask you something about these files, the




1 files on which the material about the threat assessments

2 was placed? Do you remember what happened to the files

3 immediately after Rosemary Nelson's murder?

4 A. I was away on leave, I think, when the murder took

5 place.

6 Q. Yes. And the answer to my question is?

7 A. Well, I have read somewhere that P136 gathered the files

8 up and held them.

9 Q. Well, what has been said in evidence by P136 is that on

10 the Chief Constable's direction she handed them over to

11 Special Branch, who took them away?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Now, are you saying that that was something you weren't

14 involved in?

15 A. I wasn't directly involved in it, but it was the logical

16 and right thing to happen.

17 Q. Why do you say that, please?

18 A. Sorry, did you say Special Branch?

19 Q. Yes, I did.

20 A. Well, I would have thought it would have been the murder

21 inquiry people would have had it.

22 Q. Indeed.

23 A. Sorry.

24 Q. Are you suggesting that it was the logical and rational

25 and sensible thing to give the files to Special Branch?




1 A. No, they should have gone to the murder inquiry team.

2 Q. Do you know when they came back?

3 A. The files?

4 Q. Yes.

5 A. No.

6 Q. When you discovered they had been given to

7 Special Branch, did you question that decision?

8 A. I have always assumed that they went to the murder

9 inquiry team.

10 Q. So just going back to my question, when you discovered

11 that actually they had gone out to Special Branch, what

12 did you do about it?

13 A. But as I sit here, I still think that they went to the

14 inquiry team. It wasn't within my knowledge.

15 Q. You think they went, as it were, to Special Branch and

16 then, through Special Branch, to the Murder

17 Investigation Team?

18 A. Well, they had to go to the Murder Investigation Team.

19 Q. That seems logical, doesn't it?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Yes. Anyway, you can't assist as to how they may have

22 got there?

23 A. No, sir.

24 Q. No. Now, when you say you first became aware that the

25 note wasn't on the file at the time of the police




1 authority minutes and the letter that followed from the

2 CAJ, did you seek to discover whether the note was on

3 the file and what your colleagues and the staff in

4 Command Secretariat knew about it?

5 A. Yes, sir, I think I did. I think I asked P136 to do

6 that.

7 Q. Yes. And with what result?

8 A. Negative result. We couldn't --

9 Q. There was no trace on it on your files at that point?

10 A. No, sir.

11 Q. Right. Now, can I take it, therefore, that by the time

12 the issue came up, there must have been returned to

13 you -- wherever it came from, Special Branch, Murder

14 Investigation Team -- the files; in other words, the

15 files that had been put aside and you thought handed to

16 the investigators, P136 said handed to Special Branch,

17 must have come back into your office, otherwise there

18 would be nothing to search at that point?

19 A. I would presume -- yes.

20 Q. Are you able to assist as to the circumstances in which

21 they appeared back in your office?

22 A. No, sir.

23 Q. So all of this to do with the files going out and the

24 files coming back is not something you were involved in?

25 A. Correct, sir.




1 Q. We know that P136 was involved in, as it were, moving

2 them out. As far as you were aware, was she involved in

3 the process of getting them back in?

4 A. I couldn't be sure, but it is possible, yes.

5 Q. Now, in your statement you then go on to talk about the

6 investigation by Detective Superintendent Short, and as

7 I understand it, you were interviewed briefly by him and

8 you have exhibited, I think, your questions and answers.

9 What I wanted to ask you is, before the Short

10 investigation you had realised, hadn't you, that this

11 threat note and the fact that it was missing or may not

12 have been received was important?

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. And you tell us that in your statement about seven lines

15 down from the top of this page:

16 "I immediately realised the importance of this and

17 rang Sir Ronnie Flanagan up to tell him about it."

18 What was important about it?

19 A. Well, firstly it could have been germane to the murder

20 inquiry.

21 Q. Yes.

22 A. Which was the first thing.

23 Q. Yes. Just to be clear about that, do you mean germane

24 in the sense that it contained a threat?

25 A. Yes.




1 Q. Yes.

2 A. Which could have been -- as I say, germane to the

3 inquiry. I think I later learned that the inquiry

4 already had the note.

5 Q. Do you remember who told you that?

6 A. No.

7 Q. No.

8 A. No. And the other thing was, of course, we had

9 a document that could have formed -- could have formed

10 part of a threat assessment that hadn't been seen or

11 hadn't been accompanying the papers.

12 Q. Yes. So something that, certainly so far as the NIO is

13 concerned, should have been considered in the threat

14 assessment, had not been because of the problem in

15 getting the threat note?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And that was significant enough for you to contact

18 Sir Ronnie?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Yes. And can you remember what his views or his

21 instructions were when you made contact and when, as you

22 describe it, he came back and you showed him the papers?

23 A. I think -- that was it. I showed him it. He may well

24 then have contacted the murder team himself. In fact, I

25 think he probably did.




1 Q. As I understand it, in addition to that, he set up,

2 through, I think Assistant Chief Constable White, the

3 Short investigation?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And is it fair to say that after his months of

6 investigation and interviewing, Detective

7 Superintendent Short wasn't able to actually to cast any

8 light on how the note had come back into the file?

9 A. That's correct, sir.

10 Q. Yes. Can I take it that you are not able to assist us

11 as to how the threat note came back on to the file?

12 A. No, sir.

13 Q. Did you ever hear any explanation as to how it might

14 have got on to the file, be offered by colleague or

15 colleagues at Command Secretariat?

16 A. I don't think so, sir.

17 Q. No. Now, can I now ask you just some questions, please,

18 about a meeting with the Lawyers Alliance for Justice in

19 Ireland delegation in February 1999? So about a month

20 before Rosemary Nelson's murder. To help you, this is

21 paragraph 73 and following of your statement, which is

22 RNI-842-145 (displayed). Perhaps we could have

23 RNI-842-146 on the page as well (displayed). Thank you.

24 Can I ask you, do you have any recollection of this

25 meeting now?




1 A. Yes, yes.

2 Q. You do?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. You certainly talk about it in your statement. You were

5 present with Sir Ronnie Flanagan, as I understand it?

6 A. That's correct, sir.

7 Q. Was anybody else present from the RUC side that you can

8 recall?

9 A. No, sir, there wasn't, just the two of us.

10 Q. So the two of you from the RUC and a number of delegates

11 from the Lawyers Alliance?

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. Did you make notes of the meeting?

14 A. I may have made a note at the time, but my recollection

15 was that that was more in relation to matters that I was

16 to follow up and send material to the Lawyers Alliance.

17 Q. So what you describe in your other note as action

18 points?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Yes, indeed. Now, Sir Ronnie has given an account of

21 this meeting, which I don't think we have seen before,

22 and I would like to show it to you, please, at

23 RNI-837-241. Could we have that on the right-hand side,

24 please (displayed)? We see a letter that he wrote to

25 Judge Cory in the course of the Cory investigation -- at




1 least I hope we do. There is a rather ominous silence.

2 Is it not possible to show this document?

3 MR [name redacted]: No, sir, it is not.

4 MR PHILLIPS: That's the end of that. It makes it quicker

5 for us all.

6 So far as Sir Ronnie's recollection is concerned,

7 perhaps you can just take it from me, he said he was

8 accompanied by you:

9 Mr Lynch had a wide-ranging agenda he wished to

10 cover, including the ongoing work of the Patten

11 Commission on police reform, the marching issue,

12 security and political developments generally and, of

13 course, their concerns regarding Rosemary Nelson, as

14 articulated by them in their original complaint."

15 Does that sound right as a summary of the points

16 that were discussed?

17 A. Yes, my recollection is that the Lawyers Alliance were

18 frequent visitors and they came and were briefed on

19 many, many issues.

20 Q. Yes. And you say in relation to Rosemary Nelson and

21 specifically about Mr Lynch:

22 "I cannot imagine Mr Lynch being present at the

23 meeting and not mentioning her, although I do not

24 specifically recall this."

25 So presumably that's a view of his interest in the




1 matter that you formed on the basis of your dealings

2 with him over the years?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Yes. Thank you. Now, the delegates in their evidence

5 have made various comments to us about the meeting and

6 I just want to see the extent to which they accord with

7 whatever recollection you now have about it.

8 It has been suggested first that Rosemary Nelson and

9 the question of her safety was the principal item on the

10 agenda for the meeting. Does that sound correct to you?

11 A. As I say, I'm sure it would have been mentioned, but my

12 recollection is of, you know, major matters in relation

13 to possible police reform and that sort of thing.

14 Q. So that Rosemary Nelson would be, as it were, one of,

15 but not the principal, topic?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. What the Chief Constable went on to say is:

18 "They had ..."

19 That's the delegation of course:

20 "... by this time met Commander Mulvihill and our

21 discussion in respect of Mrs Nelson centred on the

22 progress of his investigation."

23 In other words, the Chief Constable's recollection

24 was that it was about the investigation rather than

25 directly about her safety?




1 A. I think that would be right. I must confess I was not

2 aware they had met Mr Mulvihill, I must say.

3 Q. Other members of the delegation suggest that in the

4 meeting the Chief Constable suggested or indicated that

5 he was not aware of Rosemary Nelson's circumstances and

6 that this was the first time he had heard of the alleged

7 threats. Does that sound likely to you?

8 A. That is incorrect, sir, absolutely.

9 Q. Because, not least from what you have been telling us,

10 the Chief Constable was well aware of all of these

11 matters, wasn't he?

12 A. Absolutely, yes.

13 Q. And there has also evidence been given to the effect

14 that the Chief Constable commented that Rosemary Nelson

15 was not entitled to any protection under the law. How

16 do you respond to that suggestion?

17 A. No, that is not something he would have said either.

18 Q. No. Now, so far as Sir Ronnie's evidence in the Inquiry

19 is concerned, he says that at no stage did he make any

20 commitments regarding offering Rosemary Nelson

21 protection. Indeed, he says he doesn't recall

22 discussion in the meeting as to whether it was necessary

23 to offer her protection. Do you have any recollection

24 of that part of the conversation?

25 A. No, sir.




1 Q. No. Right, we have come to the end of all the questions

2 I had for you. If there are, however, matters that you

3 feel we should have covered or other things you would

4 like to say to the Tribunal, this is your opportunity.

5 A. I don't think so, sir.

6 I suppose, I was an operational police officer for

7 many years before I ended up in this particular job and

8 I had wide experience in policing in Northern Ireland in

9 difficult areas. And all I would say is my absolute

10 sympathy to the Nelson family for the way their mother

11 and their wife met her end; dreadful.

12 MR PHILLIPS: Thank you.


14 DAME VALERIE STRACHAN: Could I just ask a sort of general

15 question about your role?

16 I was left with the impression -- and I'm sure it

17 must be wrong -- that you were almost just a postman;

18 that you were putting things in without expressing an

19 opinion and, as it were, making sure that bits of paper

20 got from here to there. I'm sure that must be a wrong

21 impression.

22 Please can you just say a little bit more about when

23 you would offer your own opinions, for example, to the

24 Chief Constable?

25 A. Well, the main role in Command Secretariat was the




1 management of that correspondence, and the knowledge to

2 address the points that arose in correspondence lay

3 outside Command Secretariat. So it was very much a role

4 like that of pulling stuff together and bringing it in.

5 Now, that's not to say that at some stage something

6 could have been asked about something, that you might

7 have put an opinion in on, but that would have just been

8 a matter for the Chief Constable.

9 DAME VALERIE STRACHAN: Yes. But would you ever sort of go

10 in to the Chief Constable with this pile of

11 correspondence and say, "There is this draft here,

12 Chief. You may want to look a bit closely at this

13 because, you know, it doesn't read quite right to me"?

14 A. Yes, there could be issues like that, absolutely. There

15 would have been an element of that, and because -- at

16 times, sometimes replies come in that weren't fit for

17 purpose, you know, and you had to go back and get

18 that -- things like that sorted. There was certainly

19 that role, yes.

20 DAME VALERIE STRACHAN: So sometimes you would ring up the

21 drafter of the piece of correspondence and say, "Look, I

22 don't think the Chief is going to be satisfied with this

23 because you haven't covered all the points"?

24 A. Yes, the idea was that by the time the stuff reached

25 him, it was in its best state for him to decide upon his




1 course of action.



4 SIR ANTHONY BURDEN: Can I just bring you back to your

5 notes, if I may?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 SIR ANTHONY BURDEN: And your comments this morning about

8 pages G onwards and the discussions concerning

9 Pat Finucane.

10 Those comments were very helpful because I think you

11 said in the main that that was Mr White speaking on

12 those elements?

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 SIR ANTHONY BURDEN: And I do appreciate the passage of time

15 on this aspect, but can I just put to you, please,

16 another scenario and just seek your views on it: That

17 is the way that you have included R White, Mr White's

18 name on page F, that that entry could possibly have been

19 made because at that stage and up until that time the

20 Chief Constable had spoken, that the Chief Constable

21 actually introduced Mr White as the speaker for the

22 items that followed which, therefore, gave you

23 an opportunity to put Mr White's name in there, as you

24 have -- not as a side entry but as a main page entry --

25 and that he was the speaker from then on having been




1 introduced by the Chief Constable.

2 I just put that to you as a possibility and would

3 seek your opinion on that, please.

4 A. I'm sure my recollection is that Mr White was the one

5 that introduced the material in relation to

6 Sir Louis Blom-Cooper and he was speaking to that.

7 SIR ANTHONY BURDEN: To the Louis Blom-Cooper comments?

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 SIR ANTHONY BURDEN: Okay, thank you very much indeed.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Well, thank you very much for coming to give

11 evidence before us.

12 Mr [name redacted], before the witness leaves, would

13 you please confirm that all the cameras have been

14 switched off?

15 MR [name redacted]: Yes, sir, they have.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Please escort the witness out.

17 We will adjourn until 2 o'clock.

18 (11.30 am)

19 (The short adjournment)

20 (2.05 pm)


22 Questions by MR PHILLIPS

23 MR PHILLIPS: Mr White, can you give us your full name,

24 please?

25 A. My name is Raymond Carson White.




1 Q. Thank you. Can we look, please, at your statement to

2 the Inquiry at RNI-841-182 (displayed)? Do we see your

3 signature on the last page, RNI-841-194 (displayed)?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. Can I take you back to paragraph 1 and the comments you

6 make about your career in the RUC. You tell us in

7 particular that in 1974 you became a detective inspector

8 and moved to Special Branch and served there, as I

9 understand it, for 15 years ending up as Regional Head,

10 Special Branch in Belfast. Is that correct?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. Thank you very much. I would like to concentrate with

13 you this afternoon, please, on your time as

14 Assistant Chief Constable in the crime department, which

15 you refer to in paragraph 2. I hope to show you your

16 place in one of our charts, hoping also that it is

17 accurate, and this is slide 2, the RUC organisation

18 chart, please (displayed).

19 Do we see you there second on the left of the ACC

20 ranks?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. Yes. Now, in brief terms, what were your

23 responsibilities in that role, please?

24 A. It was in dealing basically with all issues relative to

25 the exchange of correspondence between the




1 Chief Constable's office and the wider, shall we say,

2 legal body, the Director of Public Prosecutions. It was

3 the transmission of investigation files of an indictable

4 nature between the Chief Constable's office and the

5 Director of Public Prosecutions, and dealing with any

6 correspondence that basically came in from the legal

7 fraternity in relation to police investigations.

8 Q. If I can put it this way, it was an outward facing role

9 dealing with various bodies and agencies outside the

10 force?

11 A. As you will appreciate, there would be a vast amount of

12 correspondence from the Northern Ireland Office, the

13 Home Office dealing with new legislation, things like

14 that. We were the interchange point for that.

15 Q. So in the role, you didn't have any operational

16 responsibilities?

17 A. Slight operational responsibilities, in that I had what

18 you would call a number of centrally provided services;

19 the like of fraud investigation fell on to me,

20 computer-related crime fell -- those services that were

21 best and afforded and funded from the centre.

22 Q. Right. But with the exception of those, as it were,

23 specialist units, you weren't in operational command?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. Thank you very much. And can I take it then from those




1 remarks about the nature of your work that you would

2 have been in regular contact with the NIO, with the DPP

3 and with other outside bodies of that kind?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. Thank you. Can I ask you some questions about other

6 bodies? Did you have any regular contact with the ICPC?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Thank you. And what about contact with the Commissioner

9 for the holding centres, Sir Louis Blom-Cooper?

10 A. Yes, periodically we would have spoken to issues that

11 would have been in his annual reports.

12 Q. But that was a periodic contact?

13 A. It was.

14 Q. It wasn't a formal part of your job to be in touch with

15 him?

16 A. No.

17 Q. No. Now, so far as your colleagues at this level, at

18 this rank, within the RUC are concerned, did you attend

19 the meetings of what has been called in evidence to us

20 the Chief officer's group?

21 A. That would be correct, yes.

22 Q. And we have heard that they took place monthly. Is that

23 how you remember it?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. We have also been told about a smaller meeting which met




1 more regularly, that being a meeting of senior officers

2 who were in operational departments. Can I take it from

3 your earlier evidence that you did not attend those

4 meetings?

5 A. I did attend those meetings, sir.

6 Q. Right. And they were on a weekly basis. Is that right?

7 A. That's right.

8 Q. Thank you. So far as your contact with or links with

9 other ACCs, can I ask you how regularly you would have

10 been in contact with the Head of Special Branch?

11 A. I would say meeting him probably at the weekly meeting.

12 There would only have been periodic contact relative to

13 a given issue that may have arisen.

14 Q. Yes. Now, presumably when you were at Special Branch,

15 you would have had regular access to intelligence,

16 intelligence briefings?

17 A. Yes, consistent with my capacity at the time.

18 Q. Indeed. And you describe your rank as being from

19 Detective Inspector up to the Regional Head. Would that

20 be in the rank of detective chief superintendent?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. Thank you. Now, we have heard evidence to the effect

23 that the Chief Constable was provided with a daily

24 intelligence report from Special Branch. Was that

25 something you were aware of?




1 A. I was aware, yes, from the fact that I had been present

2 at the meeting when issues in it would have been

3 referred to.

4 Q. And by that meeting, do you mean the operational

5 meeting?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Yes. So matters which had emerged from the intelligence

8 report might be discussed in that weekly meeting?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. Now, we know that Sir Ronnie Flanagan himself spent time

11 in Special Branch, didn't he?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And we have heard witnesses telling us that he was

14 regarded as a very hands-on Chief Constable. Would you

15 agree with that?

16 A. I think that's a fair comment, yes.

17 Q. Is it fair to say that he was generally regarded as well

18 briefed in intelligence matters?

19 A. I think he made himself aware of what was happening,

20 yes.

21 Q. Yes. The evidence we have heard suggests that he was

22 somebody who would go out and find out what was going

23 on, rather than simply wait to be told. Is that a fair

24 summary?

25 A. That's a fair comment, yes.




1 Q. Thank you very much. Now, I would like to ask you next

2 some questions about your perception of Rosemary Nelson,

3 and bear in mind, please, that the issues and time

4 period with which the Inquiry is concerned take us from,

5 broadly speaking, the beginning of January 1997 to her

6 murder in March 1999.

7 Now, in particular we have heard evidence from two

8 former heads of Special Branch who have expressed their

9 views, as they held them at the time, about her, and as

10 I'm sure you know, one has said that he regarded her as

11 a terrorist and the other that he regarded her as

12 someone who was involved in criminal activity. Now,

13 were those views that you heard expressed about her at

14 any time before her murder?

15 A. I must confess, no, not to me.

16 Q. Did you yourself regard her in that way?

17 A. No, and this is where I have difficulty in separating

18 off obviously what has been said over the past ten years

19 in respect of it, but reflecting back, I knew

20 Rosemary Nelson simply through what you would call a CID

21 perspective, where she was representing clients that

22 were being taken to the holding centres in Armagh or

23 Belfast.

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. Outside that, as regards any involvement she had with




1 paramilitary groupings, I have no knowledge.

2 Q. And that wasn't something you recall coming up, for

3 example, in these weekly meetings where intelligence was

4 discussed?

5 A. No, I can't recall her being discussed in that respect

6 at all.

7 Q. Were you surprised to hear that those views were held at

8 the time?

9 A. Surprised when, though?

10 Q. Were you surprised to hear the views which have been

11 expressed to the Inquiry by these former senior officers

12 about her?

13 A. I can't deal with the issue of surprise. If they say

14 it, they must say it from within their own knowledge.

15 But it wasn't a knowledge that had been shared with

16 myself.

17 Q. And it wasn't a view that you heard expressed during

18 your time as ACC before her murder?

19 A. No, I can't (inaudible).

20 Q. So I know that you have been shown before giving your

21 evidence to us various items of intelligence reporting

22 from this period, from 1996, 1997, 1998. Can I take it

23 from your answers that you did not see that reporting

24 and were not aware of what is alleged in it?

25 A. To which documents now are you referring?




1 Q. I was hoping we could do without showing them all.

2 Shall I give you a sample?

3 A. If you would, please.

4 Q. Yes. Let's have a look at RNI-541-164 (displayed). If

5 we look at the substance of it, which is on the next

6 page, do you see the allegation here is that she was

7 pressurising witnesses and acting, in broad terms,

8 improperly in the conduct of the defence of Colin Duffy

9 in 1997.

10 The next document is at RNI-542-064 (displayed).

11 The suggestion here is that she was actively assisting

12 Colin Duffy in creating alibis for PIRA members, and the

13 last one was at RNI-542-121 (displayed), and the

14 allegation there at the bottom of the page, which is

15 a rather different allegation, as you see:

16 "Colin Duffy and Rosemary Nelson are having an

17 extramarital affair."

18 Just dealing with the allegations set out in the

19 first two documents, can I take it from your earlier

20 answers that you did not see those reports and were not

21 aware of what's alleged?

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. Thank you. What about the allegation set out on the

24 document on the screen here about the alleged affair?

25 Was that something you had heard comment about before




1 the murder of Rosemary Nelson?

2 A. It is hard to distinguish, you know, some ten years on

3 whether or not that was something that had been spoken

4 about. I would be reluctant to confirm that as

5 something that I had heard at that stage.

6 Q. Is it possible that you may have done?

7 A. It is possible.

8 Q. Thank you. Is it possible for you to assist us in this

9 further respect, what the likely source of that

10 information was?

11 A. No, there is nothing I could have put forward that would

12 assist in that respect.

13 Q. Thank you very much. Now, can I move on to a completely

14 different topic, which you touch on in your statement at

15 paragraph 6, and if it assists you to look at that, it

16 is RNI-841-184 (displayed)?

17 Here, you deal with the question of threats and,

18 again, by way of background, the Inquiry has heard

19 evidence about threat assessments carried out on

20 Rosemary Nelson in February and August 1998. Were you

21 aware that those threat assessments were being carried

22 out at the time?

23 A. No.

24 Q. Thank you. Can I just pick up a couple of points in

25 your statement. If we go to the bottom of this page,




1 paragraph 9, and the second sentence where you are

2 talking about undertaking threat assessments, you say:

3 "Investigators could only do so much and their

4 investigation depended on the cooperation of the

5 recipient, who may be dismissive of it."

6 Can you explain that in a little more detail for me,

7 please?

8 A. It was a general comment, where quite often people

9 received through the mail perhaps a threat letter which

10 had been put together from cut-outs from newspapers and

11 things, and whenever those officers would be

12 investigating the background to the possible threat, on

13 many occasions people would say to them, "Look, I don't

14 put much weight on that. It is somebody trying to get

15 at me because of my business" and so on.

16 It is in that context that if you weren't getting,

17 as it were, the people to see the perspective that there

18 may be a danger there, quite often they were dismissive

19 of it. And really from the point of view of people

20 offering advice thereafter, it in a sense was falling on

21 deaf ears.

22 Q. Because they simply weren't taking it seriously?

23 A. They were taking it in the context, well, it is

24 happening to other people and nothing is followed up on

25 it. It is being used not so much that the message




1 itself is intended to be carried through. It is simply

2 given to me to cause frustration and fear within my own

3 family, and that appears to be the end objective that

4 the person issuing the threat is seeking to achieve.

5 Q. Yes, thank you. As I understand it, the next comments

6 you make are really intended to illustrate the limits of

7 what was possible. You simply wouldn't lock people up

8 for their own protection?

9 A. Even if there was, shall we say, a belief on the part of

10 the policing service that perhaps there was something

11 more to this, if the individual chose to go on with

12 their own given lifestyle, you couldn't basically place

13 them under any sort of obligation to do other than they

14 chose to.

15 You could work with them and give them the best

16 possible advice as regards how they protected their home

17 or travelled to their work or the precautions they could

18 take, but how long they lasted or how long they paid

19 attention to those matters was entirely up to the

20 individuals themselves.

21 Q. Because in the end it was a matter of individual choice,

22 is, I think, what you are saying?

23 A. Exactly.

24 Q. Can we turn to the next paragraph, please, on the next

25 page, RNI-841-185 (displayed). Here, you tell us about




1 the procedures which were in place, and as I understand

2 it, what you are telling us at the start is in your role

3 of ACC Crime, you weren't dealing on the ground with

4 assessments but you were responsible for those

5 procedures. Is that correct?

6 A. It was an answer of a general nature. Simply because of

7 the structure and style of my department, a lot of what

8 you would call the instructions under which the force

9 operated were either derived from new legislation or

10 procedures that needed to accommodate legislation. And

11 in that respect, my department had the task, as it were,

12 of writing the instructions, as it were, for how the

13 force should respond to legislation. And obviously,

14 from time to time, all that force instruction came

15 cyclically round for review.

16 Q. Just while we are on that, before we come back to the

17 threat procedures, can I take it from what you are

18 saying that you were the senior officer at the RUC

19 responsible for dealing with relevant changes of

20 legislation and how they impacted on the force?

21 A. Not in its entirety; relative to what you would call

22 crime and criminal matters. There would obviously be

23 a body of activity that was without Crime Branch and

24 that would have been dealt with by the relevant

25 department, with that operations department or




1 administration.

2 Q. But, for example, if changes were proposed in relation

3 to the emergency legislation, would you have been in the

4 lead on those issues?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Thank you. Just coming back to threats and those

7 procedures, please, you talk in the next sentence about

8 periodical reviews, and then you say:

9 "As issues arose which resulted in procedures being

10 found wanting, re-examination would be triggered."

11 We know in relation to the threat procedures that

12 there was a change which took place in March 1998. Now,

13 I'm not suggesting you can probably recall that precise

14 date now, but can you remember what triggered that

15 change?

16 A. I can't, no. It is nothing that comes to mind.

17 Q. And can I take it, therefore, that you can't assist as

18 to whether it might have been triggered by the

19 Rosemary Nelson case?

20 A. I would be guessing in respect of it now. I can't take

21 a view any further down that road.

22 Q. Thank you. Now, so far as threats are concerned, you

23 have referred in your answers already to the view that

24 some people had, which was that a number of other people

25 were under threat and, therefore, they weren't inclined




1 to take matters seriously. And in your statement at

2 paragraph 8, you say:

3 "Most people in Northern Ireland were aware that

4 threats were almost two-a-penny."

5 Now, so far as the sort of threat that we are

6 concerned with in this Inquiry, in other words threats

7 against lawyers, were they also common in your

8 experience?

9 A. No, not -- more or less when I referred to that comment,

10 it was the general public I was referring to, those in

11 business and elsewhere.

12 Q. Yes, but the question specifically of threats against a

13 lawyer, would it be fair to say, to suggest that they

14 were a much smaller number?

15 A. Very much.

16 Q. Were there any other prominent cases -- please don't

17 give any names -- that you can think of at this time in

18 addition to Rosemary Nelson?

19 A. No, there is nothing that comes back to memory that

20 would sort of -- I could add to what you have said.

21 Q. Thank you. Now, so far as complaints are concerned, you

22 touch on this topic, complaints against the police, in

23 your statement and in particular you talk about the

24 complaints system in paragraph 38 of your statement. I

25 would like you to look at that with me, please, at




1 RNI-841-192 (displayed).

2 In relation to this paragraph, you will remember

3 that what you were doing in your statement at this stage

4 was to comment on various parts of your memorandum on

5 the draft report of the Special Rapporteur. That's why

6 you introduce it in that way, and we will look at that

7 in due course. But just on the question of complaints,

8 what, as I understand it, you are saying here is that

9 there were often cases where complaints investigations

10 didn't get beyond first base?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And as I understand it, you attribute reasons to that in

13 the previous sentence, namely:

14 "(i) the complaint has no substance if there is no

15 identification of the complainant and no details are

16 provided."

17 Now, do you mean in that sentence, no identification

18 of the complainant or did you mean no identification of

19 the officer or officers complained against?

20 A. In actual fact, it would be inclusive of both. Quite

21 often without an identification of the complainant, it

22 was impossible to pin down exactly who he or she was

23 referring to in relation to the complaint that had been

24 made.

25 Q. Are you suggesting then that some of the complaints




1 were, as it were, anonymous?

2 A. No, anonymous in the sense that they were submitted by

3 the legal representative with an embargo that their

4 client wished to have no further contact with the

5 police. So depending on what was contained within the

6 statement, it was quite often all that the investigating

7 officer had to go forward on.

8 Q. So in other words, these are cases, are they, where, the

9 complaint having been lodged, there was effectively no

10 further cooperation whatsoever?

11 A. That's right.

12 Q. And, as you say, in those cases they didn't get beyond

13 first base?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. Sorry, before you leave that, just so that I'm clear,

16 are you saying that the complainant's name would be

17 known but the complainant had made it clear to his legal

18 representative that they didn't wish to have further

19 contact with the police?

20 A. That would be correct. He may be named or else there

21 may just be a generalised complaint.

22 DAME VALERIE STRACHAN: It could be either?

23 A. Without the name being added. Simply that, "Whilst one

24 of my clients was in custody, the following comments

25 were made" or "the following things occurred". On most




1 cases, it may name the individual but refuse you

2 thereafter the cooperation of that individual.


4 MR PHILLIPS: Now, this paragraph begins with a comment

5 about the Rapporteur's view as expressed in the draft,

6 which was that solicitors were failing to make use of

7 the system and that was, indeed, contributing to a lack

8 of confidence in the system?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. As I understand it, in broad terms you were agreeing

11 with him on that?

12 A. I was, and it was something that had been commented on,

13 I think, since 1990 and 1991 by -- Lord Colville had

14 been in the review of the emergency legislation, had

15 been pressing solicitors to make their comments more

16 fulsome and so follow through with them. So it was just

17 a reiteration of that.

18 Q. Yes. Just so we are clear about that, your department

19 at this stage, the crime department, you didn't have any

20 direct responsibility for the investigation of

21 complaints, did you?

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. Am I right in thinking that at no part in your career

24 had you been involved directly in the investigation of

25 complaints?




1 A. No, that would be wrong.

2 Q. That would be wrong?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. You were involved --

5 A. Complaints from time to time would be assigned to

6 individual officers for the purposes of assisting

7 G Department in investigating complaints. So in my time

8 as a superintendent, or even chief superintendent, I

9 would have received complaints from G Department for the

10 purposes of investigation.

11 Q. Thank you. That's very helpful.

12 At this stage -- in 1997/1998 it is, when you are

13 compiling your memorandum -- what responsibility did you

14 have in relation to the complaints system?

15 A. I would have been a recipient of the analysis from

16 G Department as to the body of complaints that had been

17 made and the nature and type of those complaints as they

18 were relevant to CID officers.

19 Q. And were you responsible for dealing from the RUC point

20 of view with the proposed changes in legislation which

21 led to the creation of the Ombudsman's office?

22 A. No.

23 Q. You were not?

24 A. No.

25 Q. No. Thank you.




1 Now, can I ask you about a related topic, which you

2 touch on in paragraph 14, RNI-841-186 (displayed)? You

3 say:

4 "As I have said, the investigation of specific

5 complaints, including complaints relating to the

6 intimidation and harassment of lawyers, were outside of

7 my team's remit. However, I was aware that intimidation

8 and harassment were ongoing issues."

9 Now, just looking at that for a moment, you make

10 this comment as part of your evidence about the meeting

11 with the Special Rapporteur, don't you?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. So I can take it then, can I, that in October 1997 you

14 were aware that intimidation and harassment were ongoing

15 issues?

16 A. They were, yes.

17 Q. Because it is right, isn't it, that by that stage, late

18 1997, there had been a number of reports and documents

19 produced by NGOs and others setting out what they said

20 was a history of alleged intimidation and harassment of

21 lawyers?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now, so far as that issue is concerned, you go on -- and

24 I would like the whole of this page on the screen,

25 please, RNI-841-186 (displayed) -- to, as you put it,




1 put that awareness in context, and you touch on the

2 question, there in the next paragraph, 15, of

3 anti-interrogation techniques. And it was plainly your

4 view, I take it, that these techniques were being used

5 by paramilitary detainees at this time?

6 A. I'm referring there to the contents of what was known as

7 the "Green Book", which was a document used by the

8 Provisional IRA to make its people aware or to prepare

9 them, as it were, for the interrogation process. And it

10 sets out in considerable detail what those people can

11 expect when an arrest takes place.

12 Q. Yes. But it was your view, presumably, that such

13 techniques were in fact being deployed by interviews in

14 the holding centres?

15 A. No, I think you are reading too much into that aspect of

16 it. I'm simple saying that the paramilitaries were

17 trained to resist, as it were, in that respect and, as

18 I say, had an expectation that techniques of that nature

19 would be used and that they should prepare themselves

20 for it.

21 Q. Now, so far as detainees and complaints are concerned,

22 was it your view at this point that some detainees

23 abused the system by deliberately making complaints

24 which were without foundation?

25 A. I think that's the case, yes.




1 Q. Yes. And that presumably is the point you are making in

2 the next paragraph?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Did you think also that sometimes complaints were made

5 in order to get some form of procedural advantage in

6 pending criminal proceedings?

7 A. Certainly in the respect that it was well-known that if

8 a complaint was made, the Director of Public

9 Prosecutions, prior to ruling on whether or not

10 a prosecution would occur, would ask to see the full

11 investigation report so he could take that into

12 consideration to satisfy himself that there was no undue

13 pressure brought to bear as regards any of the

14 interviews.

15 Q. Yes.

16 A. So in that sense that was commonly aware, and quite

17 often we finished up in the Diplock courts with voir

18 dires taking place where issues where complaints had

19 been made were argued out before the actual trial took

20 place.

21 Q. So presumably it is with those sorts of considerations

22 in mind that you say this became part and parcel of the

23 defence process itself?

24 A. Yes, in terms of the laying of a complaint in that

25 respect.




1 Q. Yes. Now, did you see all of that as forming part of

2 a more general campaign to discredit or undermine the

3 police?

4 A. No, I don't see it as a campaign. I saw it as an

5 opportunity that the paramilitaries saw for frustrating

6 the system in part. I don't think it was intended to

7 undermine the entire policing service, but it was

8 a weakness in terms of our systems, and the inability to

9 sort of definitively prove on some occasions that what

10 was alleged didn't occur.

11 Q. Indeed. Now, so far as the complaints of the kind we

12 have just been discussing are concerned, it is right,

13 isn't it, that often they were put forward by lawyers,

14 by solicitors?

15 A. Complaints quite often were made on behalf of their

16 clients, yes.

17 Q. Now, did you see the lawyers in those cases as being

18 complicit in these fabricated complaints or complaints

19 which were made tactically for defence purposes?

20 A. No, not in any way.

21 Q. Not in any way?

22 A. No.

23 Q. But were you aware of at least a public perception that

24 some solicitors who represented paramilitaries

25 themselves worked for the paramilitaries?




1 A. Sorry, could you say that again?

2 Q. Were you at least aware of a public perception that some

3 solicitors who represented paramilitaries were

4 themselves working for paramilitaries?

5 A. I believe that perception was there amongst some

6 elements of the community.

7 Q. Yes. In paragraph 30 of your statement at RNI-841-190

8 you make that point. Could we just see that at the top

9 of the page, please (displayed)? You go on to suggest

10 that some RUC officers may also have been under the same

11 misconception.

12 A. That was a belief I had, yes.

13 Q. By that, I assume you mean where they didn't

14 distinguish, as it were, the lawyer doing the job from

15 the client for whom he was acting?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And what was it that made you think that this

18 misconception may well have been held by some RUC

19 officers, please?

20 A. Just in general, as it were, conversations with some

21 officers, you were left -- most likely officers that had

22 absolutely nothing to do with what you would call the

23 interview process, that comments would be made in

24 relation to their belief that some solicitors had

25 a close association with the paramilitary structure.




1 Q. And those views, you believed, did you, were not soundly

2 based?

3 A. Not from my particular knowledge, I didn't believe that

4 they were soundly based. But, I mean, RUC officers and

5 part-time officers are drawn from the community and they

6 gather their views, I suspect, from their interactions

7 with the community.

8 Q. And so these views may have been the same sort of views

9 as those held by the members of the public that you

10 mention in your first sentence?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Now, you then go on to say, having said this:

13 "At the time I was aware of one or two instances

14 where concerns had been raised regarding the role of

15 solicitors."

16 And you then give a particular example with some

17 detail in paragraph 31. Now, just standing back from

18 that example for a moment, that rather suggests, doesn't

19 it, that example, that you did in fact think there was

20 some merit to the suggestion that some solicitors were

21 working for paramilitaries?

22 A. I give it as an example. It illustrates the previous

23 sentence; in other words, that perceptions by some RUC

24 officers can be drawn from an example such as this. In

25 other words, that that gets itself repeated. Then, as




1 I say, that reinforces the belief. I'm not saying it as

2 a definitive belief on my own behalf.

3 Q. Right. So, as it were, you present it as a set of

4 facts. From these facts, some people may draw the

5 conclusions that you indicate at paragraph 30?

6 A. Exactly.

7 Q. You, however, draw a different conclusion, which is the

8 one you have explained to me. Is that right?

9 A. That's right.

10 Q. So in a sense, it is an illustration of the sort of

11 circumstances that gave rise to the misconception,

12 rather than of the truth of the statement that they were

13 working for paramilitaries. Is that right?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Thank you. Now, you then go on to cite in the next two

16 paragraphs various provisions of the Emergency

17 Provisions Act Northern Ireland 1991. This is

18 paragraphs 32 and 33. Having made various references to

19 various reports, in paragraph 33 you specifically

20 highlight various sections, and then at the bottom of

21 the page you give a reason for their introduction into

22 the legislation as follows:

23 "The reason for these provisions being required in

24 legislation was because it was recognised by the

25 Government that the relationship between a suspect and




1 his solicitor was open to abuse, particularly at the

2 early stage prior to the interview. The point is that

3 this was not merely a suspicion or opinion held by RUC

4 officers; it was reality to the extent that it required

5 recognition by Government and legislation."

6 Now, surely what you are suggesting here is that

7 there were some solicitors who did indeed abuse their

8 position, that that's why the legislation was introduced

9 in the way that it was and this was recognised not just

10 by the RUC but also by Government?

11 A. No, I'm suggesting there that the legislation was

12 introduced to prevent such an occurrence taking place.

13 Q. But presumably the reason you have brought it up in this

14 context is because what you are seeking to suggest is

15 that there was at least recognised a real prospect that

16 such abuse would occur?

17 A. That it could occur, yes.

18 Q. Which involves, doesn't it, some particular view of the

19 way in which some solicitors behaved?

20 A. No, I don't think that was the intention at the time,

21 and I spoke of that. It was more or less asking the

22 question, well, you know, why would the Government

23 introduce legislation if it wasn't seeking to prevent

24 a situation arising? But most of the exclusions, I

25 think, within section 45(5) to (8), deal with a delay




1 for the purposes of permitting or, shall we say,

2 excluding contact between a detained person and his

3 solicitor.

4 Q. What sort of abuse were you referring to there?

5 A. I think the abuses referred to there in actual fact were

6 dealt with by the Court of Appeal in Harper v McKenna,

7 where the deferral took place because the Detective

8 Superintendent believed that information could pass due

9 to pressure being brought to bear on the detainee's

10 representative. And I think the court in its own

11 comments -- I think you have in front of you. If I

12 could refer to it.

13 Q. Can I just ask you, to help the rest of us, is this

14 exhibited to your statement?

15 A. Yes, it was. It was in Sir Louis Blom-Cooper's first

16 report on the holding centres.

17 Q. Right.

18 A. It deals with his examination or his reference to the

19 whole issue of deferment of interrogation at page 71.

20 Q. Right.

21 A. "The Northern Ireland Court of Appeal in Harper accepted

22 that a solicitor may be used as a conduit for a message

23 to terrorist confederates. The same point was made in

24 McKenna, on 10 February 1992."

25 And at the bottom of page 72, it says:




1 "The court held that the police had satisfied the

2 burden of proof, that there were reasonable grounds for

3 the Superintendent's belief ..."

4 And in inverted commas:

5 "... 'because the Provisional IRA is a completely

6 ruthless and unscrupulous terrorist organisation which

7 would be fully prepared, by force or threat against him

8 or his family [that is a solicitor] to compel the

9 solicitor against his will, in breach of his undertaking

10 to disclose to it what the applicant had told him in the

11 course of consultations.'"

12 Q. Just to be clear, because actually I haven't found this

13 page reference and I don't think anybody else has either

14 so far, I am afraid, are you quoting there from

15 Sir Louis's report?

16 A. Yes, indeed.

17 Q. Thank you very much. Now, as we can see from the

18 beginning of paragraph 32, which we have on the screen,

19 again in this paragraph what you are in fact referring

20 to is the commentary or the memorandum you prepared in

21 relation to the draft Cumaraswamy Report.

22 What I would like to do now, please, is to introduce

23 that and take you to RNI-101-216 (displayed). Can I

24 just ask you first of all: we know that this is dated

25 13 March, this document, 1998. Can you remember how you




1 came to prepare it?

2 A. I received a copy of it sent to me from

3 Command Secretariat.

4 Q. Do you mean you received a copy of the draft report?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. So can I take it from that that you decided yourself to

7 prepare it?

8 A. I was asked for my comments on it, yes.

9 Q. So that's the answer to my question. You prepared it in

10 response to a request to you from the Chief Constable,

11 presumably?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. For your comments on the draft?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Thank you very much. Now, what I would like to do with

16 you, please, is to look at the next point you take up

17 here in your statement.

18 If we could have RNI-101-218 on the left-hand side

19 of the screen, please (displayed), and paragraph 36 of

20 your statement at RNI-841-191 on the right-hand side

21 (displayed), just by way of further introduction, as I

22 understand it, you went through the draft and where you

23 had comments on a relevant paragraph, you put the

24 paragraph number, as it were, on the left and made your

25 comments on the right. Is that correct?




1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Now, so far as paragraph 26 is concerned, here, in

3 commenting on that in your statement, you say:

4 "Separately, in relation to the neutrality of the

5 Law Society at paragraph 26 of the report,

6 Mr Cumaraswamy commented on the complaints system and

7 stated that the Law Society's position was attributed to

8 a view that it should remain neutral in political cases

9 to avoid a divide within its own membership."

10 Do you see? That's the section that you also have

11 on the left-hand side of the screen there in your

12 comment. Do you see that?

13 A. I'm sorry --

14 Q. Paragraph 26, the second paragraph on the left, is where

15 you make that point.

16 A. Yes, indeed, yes.

17 Q. And then you go on to say:

18 "This is an acknowledgment of the fact that

19 solicitors are not [underlined] apolitical and gives

20 tacit recognition to assertions by some that some

21 solicitors are at the least sympathetic to the

22 paramilitaries!"

23 Exclamation mark. Now, in commenting, as you did

24 there, were you in fact at this point expressing your

25 own view, namely that some solicitors were at the least




1 sympathetic to paramilitaries?

2 A. No, I was simply, I think, being somewhat perverse and

3 simply saying that that is a twisted interpretation that

4 could be put on it.

5 Q. Right. This is your side swipe, as you put it?

6 A. It was a side swipe.

7 Q. Yes. You then say:

8 "I was voicing my frustration at the report."

9 We can see that, to be absolutely frank, at various

10 points in your note, can't we?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. You weren't a happy reader of the report?

13 A. I certainly was not a happy reader of the report.

14 Q. No. Then you say to us in your statement:

15 "By way of clarification, I was not actually saying

16 that solicitors were in fact sympathetic to the ..."

17 If we could turn over, please, RNI-841-192

18 (displayed):

19 "... paramilitaries, but questioning if the

20 Law Society was saying that even if there was a divide

21 within its members, it should turn its back on the issue

22 in order to remain apolitical itself."

23 So if you weren't actually saying that solicitors

24 were in fact sympathetic to the paramilitaries, what

25 were you saying?




1 A. I think my comment in the original response to the draft

2 was simply saying, well -- I suppose I was to some

3 degree inferring that in order to keep the peace within

4 its own house, the Law Society must have been giving

5 some recognition to the fact that, you know, solicitors,

6 like everybody else, have political opinions.

7 Q. Yes, that there were solicitors with political views?

8 A. Yes, and to keep that, in essence they were shying away

9 from the issue to some degree as regards investigating

10 issues of complaints or taking matters forward.

11 Q. But, again, presumably you would say that if others drew

12 the conclusion from that that some solicitors were at

13 the least sympathetic to the paramilitaries, you were

14 not amongst them?

15 A. What I was expressing there was an extreme view in that

16 respect, but it was open to that interpretation,

17 that's all.

18 Q. And it takes us back to what you describe as the

19 misconception held by some members of the public and

20 possibly, as you put it, by some members of the RUC?

21 A. Certainly I couldn't and didn't know what the political

22 aspirations and views were of the legal profession, but

23 I give them credit for separating off their political

24 views from their legal responsibilities.

25 Q. Indeed. Now, so far as the views that you have told us




1 you think were likely to have been held by some members

2 of the public, may possibly have been held by some

3 members of the RUC, do you think that, as far as you

4 were aware, the Chief Constable would also have been

5 aware that such views were held?

6 A. I think the Chief Constable certainly would have been

7 well aware that there was a wide political opinion

8 within the police service, given the numbers that had

9 passed through the organisation over the three decades

10 of the Troubles.

11 Q. Yes. Did you have conversations with the

12 Chief Constable about this issue of the alleged

13 harassment and intimidation of defence lawyers?

14 A. I think from time to time, yes, it certainly came up.

15 Q. And can you remember for us now what his views were on

16 that topic?

17 A. Certainly his views always were consistent, in that if

18 there was any substance to them, we certainly should

19 investigate them. And even if there wasn't what you

20 would call hard and fast information, that we should

21 take all steps possible to ensure that professional

22 conduct existed in the interview process.

23 Q. And did you play any part in taking steps to ensure that

24 such professional conduct was followed in the interview

25 process?




1 A. Very much so. As I said to you before, on receipt from

2 G Department of a breakdown of the complaints, at my

3 sort of quarterly meetings with my regional heads of

4 CID, this certainly would have been a topic for

5 discussion. And in Training Branch, they employed the

6 services of a member of the legal profession to give

7 a flavour to the training of new CID officers as to what

8 the role of a defence solicitor was in PACE-type

9 scenarios. So, you know, at each stage where we could

10 emphasise it with officers. And thirdly, that senior

11 officers who supervised at holding centres were then

12 very much alert to the fact that complaints of that

13 nature were easily made and, as I say, would have been

14 sitting in from time to time on interviews simply to

15 supervise.

16 Q. What do you mean by the expression "complaints of that

17 nature were easily made"?

18 A. They know the susceptibility, the very fact that we had

19 not audio recording and that complaints had been made in

20 the past. Therefore, this was an area from time to time

21 that would require, as it were, supervision in that

22 respect.

23 Q. I mean, the point about the audio and video recording

24 was of course that there was nothing objective to rely

25 on as to what had happened in the interview?




1 A. Exactly, and these issues were aired from time to time

2 in court cases and things, so officers attending knew

3 full well that good cases could be lost if there was, as

4 it were, any credibility to the complaints.

5 Q. Yes.

6 A. Because the case could be dismissed.

7 Q. That's very helpful, thank you.

8 But those comments you have been making, as I

9 understand it, are about the general question of

10 complaints and getting the message across to officers

11 about that. What about this specific issue of the

12 harassment and intimidation of defence lawyers as

13 alleged? Now, was that something that you took any part

14 in seeking to deal with?

15 A. No, it would have been dealt in the general body of

16 making sure that the professionalism of those

17 conducting, as it were, the interviews embraced every

18 possible issue that could be embraced. There was

19 nothing there that you could point to to determine what

20 exactly was harassment.

21 This is one of the issues I had some debate with

22 Mr Cumaraswamy, what exactly he meant by the term

23 because it was a phrase used but lacking any clarity of

24 definition as to what types of incident were being

25 referred to, because what some might see as harassment,




1 I took issue with them in terms of I didn't see it as

2 harassment or, as I say, I didn't see it as

3 discreditable conduct in respect of, as it were,

4 solicitors. So there was a divergence of opinion in

5 that respect.

6 Q. So that takes us very neatly to the main topic of your

7 statement, which is indeed the meeting with

8 Mr Cumaraswamy.

9 Now, we know it took place at the end

10 of October 1997. How did you come to attend the

11 meeting? Can you remember?

12 A. On the basis simply of recollection, I got a call, I

13 think, from the Chief Superintendent in

14 Command Secretariat inviting me to attend the meeting

15 with the UN Rapporteur and his people. And I asked,

16 what was the agenda, and I was -- I think, from

17 recollection, I was told that there was no agenda. It

18 was, as he thought at the time, perhaps just a courtesy

19 visit.

20 Q. Yes. When you say "he", do you mean the Chief

21 Superintendent?

22 A. The Chief Superintendent.

23 Q. Yes. Were you not aware by this stage that the

24 Rapporteur was due to pay a visit to Northern Ireland?

25 A. Yes, I think it had been in the news and there had been




1 some articles in respect of it.

2 Q. And you were aware, weren't you, that one of his

3 concerns was precisely this topic we have been

4 discussing?

5 A. Yes, indeed, yes.

6 Q. The alleged intimidation and harassment of lawyers?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Now, can I ask you this: were you also aware that NGOs

9 and in particular the British Irish Rights Watch had

10 been supplying him with information?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. From which he had appeared to draw certain conclusions?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. Now, what did you do to prepare yourself for the

15 meeting?

16 A. Well, in the absence of what you would say a fixed

17 agenda, because this was -- this meeting was taking

18 place, as I was aware, at the beginning of his visit.

19 Q. Yes.

20 A. So, therefore, issues that might be raised with him,

21 that he might wish to raise with the Chief Constable,

22 hadn't been brought to his attention. But with the

23 general knowledge and background that you have referred

24 to, I asked one of my staff to research some of the

25 possible issues that might arise and that would need to




1 be addressed at the meeting.

2 Q. Did he then prepare a briefing note for you?

3 A. He did, yes.

4 Q. I hope everybody now has a copy of it. The reference on

5 the system, which I hope is going to work, is

6 RNI-838-078 (displayed). It does. Excellent, thank you

7 very much indeed.

8 Now, I just want to ask you some questions about

9 this. It is a document, isn't it, three pages long?

10 A. Yes, indeed, yes.

11 Q. And you brought it along with you today?

12 A. I did, yes.

13 Q. Can I take it that you have had a copy of it since the

14 time of the meeting?

15 A. I have had a copy, but I wasn't aware that I had a copy

16 of it.

17 Q. Just casting your mind back to this, if I can put it

18 that way, the filing system that would have operated in

19 your office at the time, where would this briefing paper

20 have ended up after the meeting?

21 A. It probably would never have been filed. It was just,

22 as it were, a note for myself in relation to the issues

23 that might arise. So it wouldn't have arisen or been

24 filed away in anything, and hence I think that's

25 probably the reason why you weren't provided with




1 a copy.

2 Q. So you think you kept it with your papers?

3 A. It was in amongst other papers that I had.

4 Q. I'm just trying to put together the story with you. You

5 took it away with you when you retired?

6 A. I had some personal papers that I took and this was one

7 of the documents that must have been amongst them.

8 Q. We know that you were interviewed and signed your

9 statement to the Inquiry on 7 August last year?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And you were interviewed at length, weren't you, about

12 this meeting?

13 A. Yes, indeed.

14 Q. Were you asked at the beginning of the meeting whether

15 you had any further documents or information to give to

16 the Inquiry?

17 A. No, I can't recall.

18 Q. Did you think to check whether you had anything relevant

19 before giving your evidence to the Inquiry's solicitors?

20 A. No, I hadn't checked anything at that time. I had

21 relied entirely on the documentation that was presented

22 to me.

23 Q. Can I ask you when you first became aware of the

24 existence of the document?

25 A. At the weekend.




1 Q. Right. Now, let's look at it together, please. I would

2 like the second page on the screen, RNI-838-079

3 (displayed). It appears that the principal focus of the

4 document is in fact a report, the 1996 report, of the

5 British Irish Rights Watch. Is that correct?

6 A. Sorry, you say it is?

7 Q. It appears that the principal focus of the document is

8 on the British Irish Rights Watch report

9 of December 1996?

10 A. It makes a reference to it, yes.

11 Q. There are many references to it, aren't there?

12 A. Sorry ...

13 Q. There are many references in this document to the

14 contents of the 1996 BIRW report?

15 A. It just refers to it at one paragraph, I see.

16 Q. Right. If you look at the heading "BIRW Report of

17 December 1996" --

18 A. Yes, for the reference there, yes.

19 Q. -- you say that it is flawed for a number of reasons,

20 giving two of them, and then you give details of the

21 author and of the circumstances in which she came to

22 give evidence in a case in the United States of America.

23 Is that right?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. So had you asked your staff officer to do some research




1 about Jane Winter?

2 A. Yes, to look at the whole issue of British Irish Rights

3 Watch and what possibly it was providing for, as it

4 were, the information of Mr Cumaraswamy.

5 Q. Indeed. And he had found for you, had he, some adverse

6 comments about her made by some American judge?

7 A. He did, yes.

8 Q. Yes. And I assume that you went to the meeting with

9 this paper?

10 A. I did.

11 Q. Is that right?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. And also that you drew on it from time to time in making

14 your contributions to the meeting as it proceeded?

15 A. That's most likely, yes.

16 Q. Yes. Now, I would like, please, to look at two parts in

17 particular of the second page with you, but first to ask

18 you this: proposed reforms, as per paragraph 2.10, that,

19 I assume, is a paragraph of the 1996 report. Is that

20 right?

21 A. I presume that's the case, yes.

22 Q. When you say you presume, is that because you didn't

23 yourself check the material, but relied on your staff --

24 A. I relied on the notes, yes.

25 Q. Yes. We can see, if we put on the left-hand of the




1 screen RNI-115-091 (displayed), the relevant

2 paragraph of the report. There are the bullet points:

3 "Repeal the emergency laws;

4 "Immediate access of lawyers to their clients;

5 "Solicitors present during police Interrogations of

6 their clients."

7 Do you see?

8 A. Yes, indeed.

9 Q. So obviously what the staff officer has done is to take

10 the various suggestions for reform and give you some

11 bullet points to deal with?

12 A. I think he was anticipating that these might be issues,

13 yes.

14 Q. Is the document we have seen, as far as you can recall,

15 his work or did he produce a draft and you then work on

16 it to produce the document we now have?

17 A. No, that's his work.

18 Q. Thank you. Now, in particular under the heading -- or

19 it may be a subheading -- "Reasons to disallow

20 solicitors' access to interview", it says this:

21 "Intelligence indicates that there exists a body of

22 solicitors who are unduly sympathetic to

23 paramilitaries."

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Now, were you aware of the existence of that




1 intelligence?

2 A. Not that I can personally recall.

3 Q. It seems incredible, doesn't it, that your staff officer

4 was aware of the existence of such intelligence but that

5 you were not?

6 A. Well, when you say "intelligence", are you meaning that

7 I had read a series of intelligence reports?

8 Q. I'm simply asking you whether that reflects your own

9 understanding at the time, namely that:

10 "... intelligence indicates that there exists a body

11 of solicitors who are unduly sympathetic to

12 paramilitaries"?

13 A. I think the general import of that from intelligence

14 certainly was something that I was aware of, yes.

15 Q. Yes. In other words, that there was a body of

16 solicitors, so intelligence had told you, who would

17 cross the line, who were unduly sympathetic to

18 paramilitaries?

19 A. That's what it suggests, yes.

20 Q. Yes. And then moving on to the next bullet point, it

21 says:

22 "Paragraph 5.6 of the BIRW report, 1996 states, 'the

23 Commissioner ICHC (Independent Commissioner for Holding

24 Centres) believes that some solicitors who regularly

25 attend Castlereagh are corrupt.'"




1 Do you see that?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Now, can we have on the left-hand side of the page,

4 please, RNI-115-097 (displayed)? There, you see

5 paragraph 5.6 and do you see the last sentence of the

6 paragraph? It reads:

7 "The overall impression left by this section of the

8 report ..."

9 That is the report of the Independent Commissioner

10 for the Holding Centres:

11 "... is that the Commissioner believes that some

12 solicitors who regularly attend Castlereagh are

13 corrupt."

14 That's obviously where that quotation comes from,

15 isn't it?

16 A. It would appear to be, yes.

17 Q. Did you read the report for yourself, the BIRW report?

18 A. No.

19 Q. So again, you relied on what your staff officer was

20 telling you?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Now, what the quotation says is:

23 "The overall impression left by this section of the

24 report is that the Commissioner believes ..."

25 Do you see? That's what it says on the left-hand




1 side of the screen.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Now, what you have been given by way of quotation is

4 much shorter and blunter. It simply says:

5 "The Commissioner believes that some solicitors who

6 regularly attend Castlereagh are corrupt."

7 A. That's the last two sentences, last two lines of 5.6.

8 Q. And it is a part quotation, isn't it?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. So that if you didn't check back the 1996 report for

11 yourself, you wouldn't have been aware that this was

12 only a part quotation of what Jane Winter's report had

13 actually said?

14 A. That the overall impression was that, yes.

15 Q. Indeed. That's right, isn't it?

16 A. That's right, yes.

17 Q. But again, that was the material in this note that you

18 took forward with you into the meeting?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Now, so far as that meeting is concerned, who else was

21 present, please?

22 A. My recollection would be, over and above the

23 Chief Constable, Mr Cumaraswamy, that --

24 Mr Cumaraswamy's assistant, myself and I think the

25 Chief Superintendent, who was P157.




1 Q. Yes. We know that Mr Parra and P157 were taking notes.

2 Did you take any notes?

3 A. No.

4 Q. And how detailed is your recollection today of what was

5 said at that meeting?

6 A. It is obviously flawed in that in excess of ten years

7 have now passed and that I'm relying on some of the

8 recollection from the material that you have

9 provided me.

10 Q. Hm-mm. Now, in your statement at paragraph 20,

11 RNI-841-187 (displayed), you say:

12 "My recollection now of what was discussed at the

13 meeting is not detailed. However, I recall that it was

14 a very amicable meeting."

15 That's the first point. That's still your memory,

16 is it?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. It was a perfectly friendly occasion, if I can put it

19 that way?

20 A. There was no harsh words used. People argued

21 a position, and in that sense it was amicable. It

22 certainly wasn't ...

23 Q. Exactly. You then go on to say in this same paragraph:

24 "I don't think I had much to contribute."

25 Now, is that still your recollection?




1 A. Well, the meeting, to my recollection, lasted, I think,

2 somewhere between an hour/an hour and a half. I think

3 that in fact Mr Cumaraswamy overran his time and was

4 late for some other appointment. But in the totality of

5 that hour and a half, I think if I contributed over

6 a period of maybe 10/15 minutes, that would have been --

7 Q. Right. What were the topics that you remember

8 contributing to the discussion on?

9 A. Well, if I can put the sort of meeting in context, one

10 of the key areas was to determine before Mr Cumaraswamy

11 what was the sort of general approach to the whole of

12 the emergency legislation, the Diplock courts, the

13 relationships in relation to the holding centres and to

14 determine what were the rubbing issues that existed

15 between the policing service and those solicitors that

16 represented the clients that were at the holding

17 centres.

18 Q. And is that what took you on to talk about the

19 complaints that you refer to there in paragraph 20?

20 A. Yes, yes.

21 Q. And you say there:

22 "I would have talked about the ease with which

23 complaints had been made ..."

24 That's actual an expression which you used in your

25 evidence just now:




1 "... and the issues which resulted. Also why and

2 how paramilitaries would want to use complaints."

3 Presumably, again, that was the sort of point you

4 and I have been discussing?

5 A. It sort of, as you know yourself, came from the fact

6 that the Diplock court system was not recognised by the

7 paramilitaries and that actually permeated right down

8 through the whole of the structure, so that the whole of

9 the holding centre structure was something that

10 paramilitaries didn't participate. And

11 Louis Blom-Cooper himself, in dealing with the clients

12 within the holding centres, had it brought home to him

13 with an individual basically saying that to permit him

14 to sit in on an interview would be an acknowledgment

15 somehow or other of the existence of the centre and the

16 legitimacy of it.

17 So what I was saying is from the macro level to the

18 micro level, I was bringing it home that the system was

19 something that the paramilitary structures objected to,

20 and that the system, because we hadn't got audio

21 recording, as I say, certainty lent itself to complaints

22 possibly being made.

23 Q. To be fair, it also meant that officers who were

24 involved in the interviewing knew there was no

25 objectively verifiable record of what they had said?




1 A. That's absolutely correct.

2 Q. So it worked on both sides, surely?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Can I just ask you in relation to the document that you

5 have disclosed and that we have just been looking at

6 together, did you give a copy of this to the

7 Chief Constable before the meeting?

8 A. I presume I shared it. I can't say with absolute

9 certainty, but I presume I did share it, yes.

10 Q. It would have been odd to get together all this material

11 and then keep it to yourself?

12 A. Exactly.

13 Q. And was there a pre-meeting meeting, if I can put it

14 that way?

15 A. No, my recollection is that I think I was maybe there

16 about 10 or 15 minutes at most before Mr Cumaraswamy was

17 due, but there was no certainty as regards what the

18 agenda was to be. So I don't know -- I can't recall any

19 discussions in essence.

20 Q. And you can't recall now, can you, when this briefing

21 paper may have made its way to the Command Secretariat?

22 A. Probably a short time before, in actual fact, the

23 meeting as such.

24 Q. So maybe a short time before you made it there?

25 A. I wasn't co-located with the Chief Constable, so




1 I probably brought it with me at that point.

2 MR PHILLIPS: Sir, would that be a convenient moment?

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly.

4 Mr White, we will have a quarter of an hour break

5 until half past three. Thank you.

6 (3.14 pm)

7 (Short break)

8 (3.38 pm)

9 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr Phillips?

10 MR PHILLIPS: Now, so far as the nature of the meeting was

11 concerned, did you understand it to be part of his fact

12 finding during his mission to the United Kingdom and in

13 particular to Northern Ireland?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And presumably you were aware that at the end of that,

16 he would produce a report to the United Nations?

17 A. That was expected, yes.

18 Q. Yes. Was there any discussion at any point before or

19 during the meeting to the effect that it was intended to

20 be confidential?

21 A. No, I don't recall anything being said specifically. I

22 think it was to be an open meeting.

23 Q. Yes. Now, can we just cut to the chase, as it were, and

24 look at the controversial parts of the draft report,

25 which arrived, we know from other evidence, in the




1 Command Secretariat in February 1998. What I would like

2 to do first, please, is to show you paragraph 21 of the

3 draft report, which is at RNI-110-048 (displayed).

4 Here, just to remind you, although I'm sure you are

5 perfectly well aware of it, the key sentence is:

6 "However ..."

7 Six lines from the end:

8 "However, the Chief Constable did express the view

9 that some solicitors may in fact be working for the

10 paramilitaries. In this regard, he stated that this is

11 more than a suspicion."

12 Then he goes on:

13 "He explained one agenda of the paramilitary

14 organisations is to ensure that detainees remain silent,

15 and thus one role of a solicitor is to convey this

16 message to the detainee ..."

17 Et cetera. You are aware, I think -- at least, you

18 are now aware -- that P157 made notes during the

19 meeting?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And you have had an opportunity, I know, to consider

22 those notes, haven't you?

23 A. Well -- that's these notes?

24 Q. Yes, it is indeed. What I would like to do, please,

25 is -- if we keep that paragraph on the left-hand side of




1 the screen, please -- to have on the right-hand side of

2 the screen the relevant page of those handwritten notes,

3 which I hope you have in the large format. Is that

4 right?

5 A. I have, yes.

6 Q. Thank you. RNI-101-159.505 (displayed). Now, you may

7 be an expert in his handwriting?

8 A. No, I'm not, unfortunately.

9 Q. No, I thought you might say that. So we do have

10 a transcript and it is at RNI-101-159.511, if we could

11 have that on the right-hand side, please (displayed).

12 And the relevant part of it, which we may, I think, be

13 able to enlarge without losing the left-hand side --

14 I hope so -- is at F (displayed). Thank you very much.

15 Now, what I wanted to do with you is to go through

16 the notes, initially at least, with the paragraph on the

17 left in mind. But can I take it from the answers you

18 gave earlier that you have no detailed recollection of

19 what was said at the meeting?

20 A. Not word for word, you know. I certainly have the

21 general impression in my mind of the issues that were

22 covered, but I certainly couldn't put words into

23 people's mouths and say exactly where within the

24 discussion it took place.

25 Q. Yes. So, for instance, when you look at the words on




1 the right-hand side of the page which P157 recorded as

2 having been said at the meeting, are you able to assist

3 us now, 11 years later, with who said them?

4 A. I think the first line, "Sir Louis Blom-Cooper, some

5 patently corrupt", must be a reference to the BIRW

6 report.

7 Q. Yes. It is likely, isn't it, or perhaps very likely,

8 that this was a comment made by somebody who had access

9 to the briefing paper that you and I looked at?

10 A. It could well have been myself.

11 Q. Yes. Let's look at the left-hand side of the screen.

12 If we have on the left-hand side RNI-838-079

13 (displayed), please, because here in the paragraph,

14 second line, under "Reasons to disallow solicitors'

15 access", we see the quotation which, as you and I saw

16 earlier, is in fact a part quotation from the BIRW

17 report:

18 "The Commissioner believes that some solicitors who

19 regularly attend Castlereagh are corrupt."

20 Now, in terms of what you had available to you at

21 the meeting, can I take it that this briefing paper was

22 what you had with you in order to deal with the meeting?

23 A. Yes, indeed.

24 Q. You didn't have either the BIRW report or any of the

25 reports by Sir Louis Blom-Cooper?




1 A. No, I wasn't familiar with the BIRW report.

2 Q. And you tell us you haven't checked yourself and were

3 reliant, weren't you, upon your staff officer for

4 quoting it correctly?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. Thank you. What he, therefore, is setting out on the

7 left-hand side is what BIRW, Jane Winter, say was the

8 impression that they got from a report made by

9 Sir Louis Blom-Cooper?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. That's correct, isn't it?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. You think, do you, based on what you have just said to

14 me, that you may well have made the remark at the top of

15 the page on the right?

16 A. It could well have been, yes.

17 Q. But equally, based on what you have told me about who

18 got this briefing paper, it could presumably have been

19 the Chief Constable?

20 A. I couldn't gainsay that.

21 Q. Sorry?

22 A. I couldn't say that it wasn't.

23 Q. We can rule out Mr Parra and Mr Cumaraswamy, I expect,

24 can't we?

25 A. Oh, yes.




1 Q. Do you think it might have been P157?

2 A. I don't think so, no. I don't think he participated.

3 Q. No. What is recorded there is the remark:

4 "... some patently corrupt."

5 Which is a rather stronger version, isn't it, of the

6 expression on the left-hand side of the page:

7 "Some solicitors who regularly attend Castlereagh

8 are corrupt"?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And nor does that expression at the top of the

11 right-hand side reflect the fact that this was not in

12 fact something that Sir Louis Blom-Cooper had actually

13 said; it was rather the impression gained by Jane Winter

14 of something set out in a report and part quoted on the

15 left-hand side of our screen?

16 A. It is an extremely short note, isn't it?

17 Q. Yes, indeed, but that's a fair point, isn't it?

18 Now, what I would like to do with the briefing note

19 in mind is put up on the screen, please, the other note

20 we have of this meeting, which is that made by Mr Parra

21 and that is at RNI-110-033, I believe (displayed).

22 Thank you very much.

23 If you see some eight or ten lines from the bottom,

24 there is a dash and it says there:

25 "Sir Louis has commented upon corruption of




1 solicitors."

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Do you see that?

4 A. Yes, indeed.

5 Q. And, again, when you read that line, do you think it may

6 well have been a remark that you made based on what you

7 had been told by your staff officer?

8 A. It could -- certainly was, yes.

9 Q. Just to be absolutely clear about this, you are not

10 suggesting, are you, that Sir Louis Blom-Cooper had told

11 you himself that some solicitors were patently corrupt?

12 A. No, I was -- I think that reference is to the third

13 annual report of Sir Louis Blom-Cooper, where he was

14 making his case to the Law Society that there should be

15 a nucleus of solicitors based --

16 Q. Yes.

17 A. And he drew their attention to the fact that, as it

18 were, on one side he had commentary being made by police

19 officers that there was an element of impropriety by

20 some solicitors, and he had complaints on the other

21 side. And I think he was inviting the Law Society at

22 that time not to close its mind to this issue and to

23 consider setting up some structure to accommodate these.

24 Q. Indeed. Indeed your staff officer had faithfully

25 recorded what he had said in paragraph 5.6 of that




1 report, namely that:

2 "There was criticism of the Law Society for not

3 seriously considering the possibility of impropriety on

4 the part of solicitors or putting in place adequate

5 control mechanisms."

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. But that, of course, is not the same as allegations

8 straight out that solicitors are patently corrupt,

9 is it?

10 A. Exactly.

11 Q. No. But it seems likely, as I say, doesn't it, based on

12 the contents of this briefing note, that a remark of

13 that kind is likely to have been made in this meeting?

14 A. It quite possibly has, but I mean, you know, without the

15 context being put to it, as I say, it creates an

16 impression.

17 Q. Well, we can see something of the earlier record, do you

18 see, from Mr Parra's notes on the left-hand side of the

19 screen? It looks as though the discussion, for

20 instance, up to the next gap is:

21 "There is a political agenda and police are thought

22 to be one part of the divide. Any use of emergency

23 legislation is part of a broader agenda."

24 A. That's back to what I said before --

25 Q. That was your point, and do you think that also records




1 your contribution or one of your contributions --

2 A. No, I don't think it is my contribution; I'm simply

3 saying that the whole structure of the meeting was

4 intended to address, from the Chief Constable's

5 perspective, this widespread approach to the political

6 structure/the judicial structure/the emergency

7 legislation. So it could be a reflection of the

8 Chief Constable's comments.

9 Q. Because as far as you were aware he shared the same view

10 of the matter that you had?

11 A. Well, it was his meeting, as it were, and I was only

12 participating from time to time.

13 Q. So just to be clear then, it could have been you, but it

14 could equally well have been him?

15 A. Exactly.

16 Q. Thank you. What about the next part that is recorded on

17 the right-hand side of the screen:

18 "A nucleus work to a paramilitary agenda -- stop

19 people giving any information -- the must stop

20 information being passed."

21 Are you able to recall who made those comments in

22 the meeting?

23 A. No, I can't, as it were. I know in general terms what

24 the meeting sort of embraced and I think -- I don't know

25 whether that is a condensed record of what we were




1 saying relative to the Harper v McKenna situation, that

2 solicitors could be under the influence of

3 paramilitaries because of their very nature and that it

4 would be made work to an agenda. Now, whether it has

5 been condensed into that, I can't take it beyond that

6 point.

7 Q. Well, look at the left-hand note, Mr Parra's note.

8 After Sir Louis has commented upon corruption of

9 solicitors:

10 "... and there are those who working for

11 a paramilitary agenda and part of that agenda is to make

12 sure that detainees do not speak, stifling any means of

13 communicating info."

14 Do you see there the use of the word "stifling"

15 mirrors the word "stifle" on the right-hand side of the

16 page. Are you saying that you cannot now recall who

17 from your side, if I can put it that way, made those

18 remarks in the meeting?

19 A. I can't put anybody to them, but I mean the conversation

20 was around the -- sort of what the desire of the

21 paramilitaries were and whether this was simply an

22 indication of the issues that they would wishing to be

23 achieved; in other words, to stifle any information

24 flowing from any individual that was under arrest and to

25 make sure that, as it were, they kept silent during




1 their period in custody. So it could be just a general

2 discussion of what the paramilitaries' agenda and

3 structure was.

4 Q. But what about the remark:

5 "A nucleus work to a paramilitary agenda"?

6 A. No, I can't add anything further to that. Whether or

7 not -- who or what said that.

8 Q. It seems likely, doesn't it, given what you have told us

9 about the way the meeting worked, that it was either you

10 or Sir Ronnie Flanagan?

11 A. It probably was, yes.

12 Q. We can rule out Mr Cumaraswamy and Mr Parra, can't we?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And you say that P157 didn't make any contribution to

15 the meeting?

16 A. That the correct.

17 Q. So I think if the total number is five and we takeaway

18 three, we are left with two, aren't we?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Thank you very much. Mr Parra's recollection and that

21 of Mr Cumaraswamy is that these remarks were made by

22 Sir Ronnie Flanagan. What is your response to that

23 suggestion?

24 A. I can't say that it wasn't and I can't say that it was.

25 I have no recollection, as it were, of him saying it.




1 But obviously it has been recorded there as having been

2 said.

3 Q. Indeed.

4 A. It is either he or I that has said it.

5 Q. Now, P157, whose notes we saw earlier and where we have

6 the transcript on the right-hand side, he, on the other

7 hand, has given evidence to the effect that he believes

8 that you made all of these remarks. What is your

9 response to that, please?

10 A. I can't recall, as it were, the detail of what the

11 conversation -- it was a conversation that lasted for an

12 hour to an hour and a half, and obviously we ranged

13 across a number of issues. The notes certainly are not

14 what you would say detailed enough or reflective enough

15 to sort of give me an account as to where in the

16 conversation it was said. They are not by any means

17 a detailed record of what was said.

18 Q. Yes.

19 A. He seemed to just select certain words and phrases and

20 to record them.

21 Q. Do you think it is possible that you made the comment in

22 this meeting that there were some solicitors or there

23 was a nucleus or a body of solicitors who were working

24 to a paramilitary agenda?

25 A. I will accept that certainly, that that is




1 a possibility. And on saying that, I was drawing down

2 on the references by Sir Louis Blom-Cooper that this was

3 an issue that could not be ignored and that these were

4 matters that needed to be examined.

5 So what we were actually trying to do was say to

6 Mr Cumaraswamy that it -- look, you have got to keep

7 a very open mind on the pressure that is maybe on the

8 solicitors and others brought about by the paramilitary

9 structures and the influence they bring, and the fact

10 that there may be, as it were, a nucleus of people that

11 are inclined to sort of do the bidding of the

12 paramilitaries.

13 Q. And you were suggesting, were you, or you or

14 Sir Ronnie Flanagan were suggesting that there may well

15 be a nucleus of solicitors working to a paramilitary

16 agenda?

17 A. It is a suggestion that I would certainly accept had

18 come across during the meeting, but it wasn't said with

19 the authority that you are saying there was. It was

20 a question of, "You must consider that there might be".

21 Q. But you weren't suggesting that in making that remark

22 you or Sir Ronnie were simply purporting to report what

23 Sir Louis Blom-Cooper believed?

24 A. No, I think on top of that obviously was the knowledge

25 that was there and I think I referred to the case of --




1 it has been edited, but it was a Londonderry case where

2 a statement had been tendered as part of a habeas

3 corpus.

4 Q. Can we look at that on the screen on the left, please,

5 RNI-830-079 (displayed)? I'm very sorry that that name

6 has been redacted. It doesn't help, I am afraid. But

7 you think you may well have made reference to that case?

8 A. I think that case was referred to, yes.

9 Q. While we are looking at that, and before we come back to

10 the notes, can I just get you to look, please, on the

11 right-hand side of the screen at RNI-101-218

12 (displayed). Well, can we then have on the right-hand

13 side of the screen, RNI-838-079, please (displayed)?

14 Thank you.

15 This is back to the commentary you made, and in

16 relation to paragraph 22 do you see on the right-hand

17 side of the screen -- can we enlarge that, please? --

18 there it says:

19 "This is contrary to the fact that he was referred

20 to a statement of evidence made by a detainee

21 in August 1992 in which the detainee specifically stated

22 that he no longer wished his solicitor to act on his

23 behalf as the solicitor was in fact acting in the

24 interests of PIRA and not in the detainee's interests."

25 Is that the same case?




1 A. That's the same case.

2 Q. Yes. So do you think you made a reference to it in the

3 meeting?

4 A. I do.

5 Q. So that's another way, isn't it, in which the

6 information which had been gathered in for you in the

7 briefing note was deployed during the course of the

8 meeting?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Do you think it is possible or probable that you made

11 that reference in the meeting?

12 A. It is highly probable.

13 Q. Highly probable, thank you very much. If we go back to

14 the screen, please, on the right-hand side,

15 RNI-101-159.511 (displayed) and can we enlarge that

16 again, please?

17 Now, the final paragraph on the left-hand side of

18 the screen that I would now like to look at again with

19 you is the paragraph which simply states:

20 "Intelligence indicates that there exists a body of

21 solicitors who are unduly sympathetic to

22 paramilitaries."

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. That presumably was the basis, wasn't it, for the

25 comment recorded on the right-hand side:




1 "A nucleus worked to a paramilitary agenda"?

2 A. That could well be, yes.

3 Q. Yes. And it is likely again, isn't it, that whoever it

4 was, you or Sir Ronnie Flanagan, who had access to this

5 briefing paper would have made that point in the

6 meeting?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. And in that, you weren't relying on

9 Sir Louis Blom-Cooper, you were simply telling him,

10 "Look, Mr Cumaraswamy, there is evidence to suggest that

11 a body of solicitors are unduly sympathetic to

12 paramilitaries"?

13 A. I think the word "body" may be expressed as

14 a collective. I think the word that "there are

15 individual solicitors", I think would be a fair comment

16 in that respect.

17 Q. If you look at the left-hand side, please, RNI-110-033

18 (displayed), Mr Parra's notes, what he records there at

19 the bottom of the page is:

20 "There are those working for a paramilitary agenda."

21 And there is a remark that you or

22 Sir Ronnie Flanagan made in the meeting?

23 A. Could have been, yes.

24 Q. And presumably you made it because you believed it to be

25 true?




1 A. I accepted that there was intelligence, yes.

2 Q. Yes.

3 A. That was the situation, yes.

4 Q. And presumably if Sir Ronnie Flanagan made that comment,

5 he must also have believed it to be the case?

6 A. Well, I can't answer for Mr Flanagan.

7 Q. But it follows as night follows days, doesn't it? He

8 wouldn't have deliberately have misled the UN Special

9 Rapporteur, would he?

10 A. I would certainly hope not.

11 Q. No. Now, can I ask you to look, please, at the bottom

12 of the page on the left-hand side, RNI-110-033

13 (displayed), where Mr Parra records these words:

14 "More than a suspicion on the role of lawyers have

15 terms ..."

16 Which, as he explained to us, was a mistake for

17 "reams", and if we could read over to RNI-110-034

18 (displayed):

19 "... of documented evidence from detainees where

20 that has come out."

21 Do you remember remarks of that kind being made; in

22 other words, Mr Cumaraswamy being told that this was not

23 just speculation, but there was documented evidence

24 about the role of lawyers?

25 A. I'm sorry, where on the page is this again?




1 Q. Sorry, it is very difficult with the screen. Can we put

2 that page, RNI-110-034 on the right-hand side, please,

3 and put RNI-110-033 on the left, which will help

4 (displayed). Thank you. If we read from the bottom

5 left-hand page, the bottom of the page:

6 "More than a suspicion on role of lawyers have terms

7 ..."

8 As I said, Mr Parra explained that that should say:

9 "... reams of documented evidence from detainees

10 where that has come out."

11 Do you see that?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. This presumably was a part of the discussion in which

14 you and Sir Ronnie were assuring him that you weren't

15 just holding suspicions about the lawyers; you had reams

16 of documented evidence to support that point?

17 A. I don't know about the word "reams", but I accept that

18 the issue relating to intelligence indicates there

19 exists -- that there obviously was some intelligence

20 reports to that effect.

21 Q. Because isn't it the case that when these remarks about

22 solicitors and the paramilitary agenda were made,

23 certainly what P157 told us is that at some point the

24 Rapporteur made some comment in return?

25 A. Yes.




1 Q. Do you think it may have been at that point that you or

2 the Chief Constable sought to convince him that you

3 weren't just talking about guesses or suspicions, you

4 had real substance for your concerns?

5 A. I can't recall that particular aspect of it. The only

6 aspect I can refer to is the case where the Londonderry

7 case -- I referred him to that. Now, whether there was

8 more said in relation to it, I have no recollection of

9 that aspect of it.

10 Q. Now, can we just have on the right-hand side, please,

11 RNI-101-159.501 (displayed)? And if we enlarge the

12 section under F, please. Now, in the original notes

13 made by P157, your name, R White, appears in a box and

14 it is underlined twice, which you can check from your

15 hard copy, if you would like to.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. The question that arises is whether that was a note made

18 by him, P157, to indicate who was speaking at any

19 particular moment.

20 Now you have had a chance to look at these notes and

21 your name appearing there, are you able to help any

22 further as to who may have made the comments which are

23 set out on the page on the right?

24 A. No, I'm not. You know, does it refer to the bit after

25 the comments or the bit before the comments -- before my




1 name, I should say? Is it the comments that follow my

2 name or the comments before it?

3 Q. I'll show it to you if you want to look at it. It is

4 RNI-110-159.505, if we could have that on the left

5 (displayed). Do you see?

6 A. Yes, I see that.

7 Q. It appears smack in the middle of the page just above

8 the "Cumara on to it".

9 A. Does it refer to the sentence above it? Does it say

10 something about holding centres?

11 Q. That is one of the questions we have all being trying to

12 resolve.

13 A. Legal people and an agenda.

14 Q. Yes.

15 A. I certainly would be speaking in relation to the holding

16 centre regime, the legislation that the -- shall we say

17 the friction issues that were there between solicitors

18 and CID personnel or, shall we say, the holding centre

19 system. But --

20 Q. So is it likely, do you think, that you were responsible

21 for making all the remarks above "R White" on that page?

22 A. No, I don't accept that. You know, I can see myself

23 speaking in relation to the issues as regards legal

24 people and the holding centres as such, but the other

25 parts of it, no.




1 Q. So you are suggesting, are you, that those must have

2 been made by Sir Ronnie himself?

3 A. I'm suggesting -- you are suggesting that they were

4 made. I have no recollection whether it was me -- it

5 could well have been I contributed to that conversation.

6 Q. Are you now suggesting, by the way, that these notes are

7 incorrect and that those comments were not made at all?

8 A. They give a certain flavour of the meeting as such, but

9 they are by no means fulsome and easy to determine.

10 Q. But they are made by the Chief Constable's senior

11 officer within Command Secretariat, aren't they?

12 A. That still doesn't detract from the fact that they are

13 not very fulsome.

14 Q. Yes. But are you saying that he might have inserted

15 comments there that simply weren't made?

16 A. I'm not saying that for one minute, no.

17 Q. No. Can you shed any light on the note he makes

18 underneath "R White", two lines later, where it says:

19 "Not suggest any terrorist involvement"?

20 A. No. I can only infer that that must have meant that

21 there was no terrorist involvement of any solicitor.

22 Q. What do you think was said on that point?

23 A. Well, I think whoever said it was suggesting certainly

24 that we weren't saying that solicitors were going out

25 and participating in any terrorist activity.




1 Q. So a distinction was being drawn, was it, between

2 solicitors acting in accordance with a paramilitary

3 agenda as lawyers on the one hand, and solicitors

4 actually going out and bombing and murdering on the

5 other?

6 A. I think the involvement, as it were, that was being

7 referred to was the suggestion of impropriety that

8 Sir Louis Blom-Cooper had been referring to that needed

9 to be better investigated.

10 But certainly there was -- I think that emphasises

11 it quite clearly: there was no suggestion from anyone

12 that any solicitor was involved in terrorism.

13 Q. But rather that they were working to a paramilitary

14 agenda?

15 A. That there was an element of impropriety in how they

16 were dealing with their clients --

17 Q. Do you think it was said that they were working for the

18 paramilitaries?

19 A. Working for or influenced by. I don't recall the word

20 "working for". I think that's a very strong comment.

21 Q. It appears in both sets of notes, doesn't it, the word

22 "work" and "working"? Do you want to see Mr Parra's

23 notes again?

24 A. If you would, please.

25 Q. RNI-110-033 on the left-hand side, please (displayed).




1 Do you see under "Sir Louis", the next line says:

2 "And there are those who working for a paramilitary

3 agenda."

4 It is remarkably similar, isn't it?

5 A. Yes, I see that. Yes, the phrase could have been used.

6 I'm not saying it certainly wasn't.

7 Q. Presumably you accept that it was also saying that part

8 of the agenda was to stop people giving information; in

9 other words, as it says there:

10 "Stop people giving information."

11 Or as Mr Parra records:

12 "Part of that agenda is to make sure that detainees

13 does not speak."

14 Do you see that?

15 A. Yes, I see that, yes.

16 Q. The suggestion that was being made was this, wasn't it:

17 that solicitors were actively involved in the

18 paramilitary tactic of ensuring that no information, no

19 comment, was made by interviewees when they were

20 detained?

21 A. No, I think the reflection back there was back to,

22 again, what section 47 was in place to prevent.

23 Q. So you think that was another of your points about the

24 emergency legislation?

25 A. Yes, I think that that was possibly a point being made




1 that this was the very purpose and that this had been

2 recognised as a possibility by the Court of Appeal, that

3 the like of this could happen.

4 Q. But if you then look with me at this paragraph, you have

5 told us about your particular focus on the holding

6 centres, you have told us about the emergency

7 legislation and what you now say was the purport of the

8 next lines up:

9 "Stop people giving information."

10 You have explained about the connection between the

11 nucleus and the sentence in your briefing paper and,

12 indeed, the connection between the top sentence and the

13 information in your briefing paper. Doesn't all of that

14 point to the fact that it was likely to have been you

15 who made these remarks in this meeting?

16 A. There is that possibility, yes.

17 Q. Is it more than a possibility?

18 A. The way the conversation to my recollection went, you

19 know, I could have built upon something being said by

20 the Chief Constable, and in turn there may have been

21 some item picked up from what I said and built upon by

22 him, so -- but, I mean, the whole import of the meeting

23 was not to make the recommendation or suggestion that

24 there was a body of solicitors working for

25 paramilitaries, but to reflect back on what had been




1 said in Sir Louis Blom-Cooper's reports and inviting

2 Mr Cumaraswamy to consider these issues that had been

3 referred to relative to section 47 and the Court of

4 Appeal's decisions.

5 Q. But the point in your briefing paper about intelligence

6 indicating that there exists a body of solicitors who

7 are unduly sympathetic to paramilitaries, that had no

8 connection whatsoever to Sir Louis Blom-Cooper?

9 A. No, that's referring to intelligence reports.

10 Q. It was a separate matter?

11 A. Well, intelligence was received, as you will appreciate,

12 from informants that were in the holding centres

13 themselves and had benefited from the visits of

14 solicitors.

15 Q. Yes, and that was what you were aware of when you made

16 the remarks that you did, or that Sir Ronnie was aware

17 of when he made the remarks that he did?

18 A. Yes, I think that's a fair indication, yes.

19 Q. Yes. Now, can I just ask you some questions about the

20 next pages of the notes -- and here I am afraid you will

21 need to look at the big copy because otherwise they are

22 quite illegible -- because P157 explained to us what he

23 could recall about the sections at RNI-101-159.506,

24 which are headed "Pat Finucane"?

25 A. Yes.




1 Q. And what I wanted to ask you about was: were you the

2 principal speaker in the section of the meeting which

3 concerned Pat Finucane?

4 A. No.

5 Q. You were not?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Was that Sir Ronnie himself, as far as you can recall?

8 A. My recollection was it was.

9 Q. So the detail that is set out there, which is very

10 considerable indeed, was not something that you had at

11 your fingertips. That was very much his territory,

12 was it?

13 A. That's my recollection.

14 Q. Right, if we keep that on the right-hand side and flick

15 back to your briefing paper at RNI-388-080 (displayed),

16 we can see, if this is a complete copy of your

17 document -- and I hope it is -- the three pages, at the

18 very bottom of the page there are simply two lines there

19 about the murder, are there not?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. So that was not a topic that you were expecting to deal

22 with in detail at the meeting?

23 A. No.

24 Q. So your recollection, to be clear then, was that this

25 was very much the Chief Constable's area in the meeting?




1 A. That's my recollection.

2 Q. Thank you. Now, I would like to look at one further

3 part of the notes with you, please, and if we can have

4 on the right-hand side RNI-101-159.501 (displayed), do

5 you see right at the bottom of the page, in P157's note,

6 it has the initials "BIRW"? Do you see that?

7 A. Yes, indeed, yes.

8 Q. And if we get the relevant part of the transcript to

9 help us because I certainly can't read that. It is

10 RNI-101-159.509 (displayed). Thank you very much. But

11 can we now have on the right-hand side then RNI-838-080

12 (displayed)? It is a tough afternoon for the IT

13 operators. Thank you.

14 Now, the statistics in relation to the firm of

15 solicitors at the top right-hand corner -- do you see

16 that?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- which have been prepared for you for the meeting show

19 that that firm, which has been redacted on the left but

20 not redacted on the right, submitted 555 complaints. Do

21 you see that?

22 A. Yes, indeed.

23 Q. And that number appears at the bottom left-hand corner,

24 doesn't it, 555?

25 A. Yes, it does, yes.




1 Q. And I'm going to reveal that under the redaction in the

2 bottom left-hand corner are the initials "M and F". So

3 it is a reference to the same firm, isn't it?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. So it looks, doesn't it, that this is another bit of

6 information in your briefing paper that emerged in the

7 meeting in the form that is recorded in the bottom

8 left-hand?

9 A. Yes, indeed.

10 Q. Thank you very much. And do you think it is likely that

11 you or the Chief Constable would have gone through the

12 points under "Alleged intimidation" at the top

13 right-hand corner that we see set out there about the

14 lack of evidence, absence of formal complaints,

15 et cetera?

16 A. Yes. I recall there was a discussion with it, in that

17 the allegations as regards harassment and intimidation

18 and the fact that it was indicated, I think, by

19 Mr Cumaraswamy, that there was a reluctance on behalf of

20 the legal profession to use the complaints system.

21 Q. Yes.

22 A. But, you know, you had that reluctance relative to

23 themselves, and yet on the other side you had something

24 like 3,000 plus complaints being lodged, mostly by

25 solicitors on behalf of clients.




1 So in one half they were using the system okay, but

2 in the other half they were not making any complaints

3 relative to themselves. So it was a means of saying,

4 "Look, if you are prepared to use the system relative to

5 complaints of a wide variety of nature, why are you not

6 using them whenever these alleged issues of intimidation

7 or harassment arise?"

8 Q. In relation to yourselves?

9 A. In relation to ourselves.

10 Q. And that, of course, was one of the reasons why

11 Rosemary Nelson and her case stood out, wasn't it,

12 because she was prepared to say, "These things are being

13 done to me or said about me, and I'm going to make

14 a complaint about it"?

15 A. Well, I'm not familiar with what Rosemary Nelson said or

16 did not say in that respect.

17 Q. But it was unusual at this point for solicitors

18 themselves to record complaints about alleged

19 intimidation and harassment, wasn't it? That's what you

20 are saying?

21 A. What I think was being implied there was that the system

22 existed and the system was being used to make

23 complaints, and these complaints had existed and, as

24 I say, were believed by solicitors that there was

25 harassment and intimidation. One would have expected




1 them to have come into the system exactly like other

2 complaints.

3 Q. And as the Rapporteur pointed out in his report, one of

4 the difficulties was that they weren't prepared to put

5 their own complaints into the system and make use of it?

6 A. This was the conundrum. You had them using it in one

7 respect and, as it were, saying that it wasn't working

8 in another, so ...

9 Q. Yes.

10 A. And it was more put in there to sort of implore them to

11 actually go through with what had been asked of them

12 since 1990 and 1991 when Lord Colville had made the same

13 request.

14 Q. Can we look again at your memorandum, the memorandum you

15 say you were asked to prepare when the draft came into

16 Command Secretariat? It is at RNI-101-216 (displayed)

17 and can we have on the right-hand side, please,

18 RNI-101-217 (displayed)? Now, just beginning at the

19 beginning, you say:

20 "I've read Mr Cumaraswamy's report with interest and

21 dismay as I feared the mindset he displayed prior to his

22 meeting ..."

23 What do you have in mind there, please?

24 A. I can't recall in detail, but I think there was some

25 publicity or -- in relation to what he was coming to




1 sort of investigate. It would be difficult to go back

2 now with clarity on that aspect.

3 Q. Thank you:

4 "Prior to his meeting with the Chief Constable, it

5 was apparent from his clear intention that this meeting

6 was to be little more than a courtesy call. He clearly

7 was not influenced by any representations made by the

8 Chief Constable or myself. The extent of this mindset

9 is further evidenced by his omitting to use the word

10 'alleged' from the parts of paragraph 15 and ..."

11 I think that's 18:

12 "... and when he outlines the accusations levied

13 against the RUC by some solicitors and/or their

14 clients."

15 Then moving on to the next paragraph:

16 "Mr Cumaraswamy compounds matters by including

17 references which are factually incorrect or seriously

18 flawed. The result is a report which flagrantly lacks

19 objectivity, accuracy or cohesiveness. It therefore

20 cannot be given serious accreditation. Unfortunately,

21 if published in this flawed state, it would give instant

22 succour to those who, over many years, have attempted to

23 denigrate the regime under which suspected terrorists

24 are detained in Northern Ireland.

25 "Mr Cumaraswamy fails to recognise that the aims of




1 such persons/groupings may not be solely of a human

2 rights or altruistic nature, but rather may possibly be

3 self serving or contrived by terrorist groupings who

4 have manipulated their thinking."

5 Now, was this latter part of this paragraph

6 a reference to the NGOs?

7 A. I would say that they were inclusive in that comment,

8 yes.

9 Q. Did you have any other bodies or organisations in mind?

10 A. Not that I can recall, no.

11 Q. So the principal focus then, at any rate, is on the

12 NGOs, and did you think that they had aims or purposes

13 which were self-serving or contrived by terrorist

14 groupings who had manipulated their thinking?

15 A. Well, in terms of the -- Sinn Fein and the Republican

16 movement at that moment in time, I certainly was looking

17 and considering that their position vis-a-vis the

18 emergency legislation, the court systems, and in

19 particular the holding centres would have been something

20 that could have been influential in terms of how those,

21 shall we say, views and opinions were arrived at.

22 Q. So you thought that there was that influence by

23 Republican elements, including Sinn Fein?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. On the thinking and presumably the writing and




1 campaigning of the NGOs?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. So when you read an NGO report or read an NGO letter

4 about an issue, did you have at the back of your mind

5 that this might be something which, whether knowingly or

6 not, was part of a Sinn Fein or Republican campaign?

7 A. It certainly would have been an aspect that I would have

8 considered, yes.

9 Q. Yes. And in some way, at whatever level, it must then

10 have affected your thinking about such organisations?

11 A. No, I think I was clear enough in terms of what I was

12 reading to determine whether it was there or not.

13 Q. Yes. Now, just turning over to the next page on the

14 screen, RNI-101-217 (displayed), your comments on the

15 key paragraph we have been looking at, paragraph 21, you

16 say:

17 "Cites the Chief Constable as having expressed the

18 view that some solicitors may in fact be working for the

19 paramilitaries."

20 That was the Rapporteur's draft report?

21 A. Hm-mm.

22 Q. Then you make this comment. And this, to remind you, is

23 a document dated 13 March 1998. So well over ten years

24 ago:

25 "I have no recall of this view being expressed and




1 neither, so I understand, does the Chief Constable."

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. So you are saying, are you, at this point that neither

4 you nor the Chief Constable, as far as you understood

5 it, could recall the remark being made?

6 A. That would appear to be it, yes.

7 Q. Yes. Now, that's despite what you have been telling us

8 in your discussion earlier about the notes relating to

9 the nucleus working to a paramilitary agenda?

10 A. Well, I think the emphasis was there on the blunt term

11 "working for".

12 Q. So you are taking that point, are you, that there is

13 a distinction between the phrase "working for the

14 paramilitaries" and "working for a paramilitary agenda"

15 or "to a paramilitary agenda"?

16 A. And working to a paramilitary agenda was referring to

17 what again?

18 Q. That was in the notes, do you remember, of the meeting

19 that we looked at earlier?

20 A. Yes, indeed.

21 Q. So that was the point you were objecting to, was it?

22 A. It was certainly, as I say -- there was nobody making

23 a blunt statement that solicitors in general were

24 working to paramilitary instructions.

25 Q. Yes. Then you say:




1 "Even if such a view was expressed, which I dispute,

2 it would have been made within the strictures of a

3 discussion held in confidence."

4 Now, again, earlier in your evidence you accepted

5 from me that this was not a confidential meeting?

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. It was an open meeting --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- wasn't it? So why do you think you made that comment

10 on 13 March that it was within the strictures of a

11 discussion held in confidence?

12 A. I was simply speculating there that if the

13 Chief Constable or myself had have been going to make

14 a statement of such a blunt and forthright nature, you

15 would certainly have caveated it by saying --

16 Q. This is in confidence?

17 A. This is in confidence, or it is off the record or here

18 is the evidence for which I would produce to support it.

19 So it simply was expressing the fact that I couldn't

20 accept that the term "working for paramilitaries" was

21 a correct recollection or a reflection of what had been

22 said.

23 Q. As I understand it, what you are getting at, therefore,

24 is the sort of comment which, even if I believed it to

25 be true, I wouldn't have made in an open meeting?




1 A. Exactly.

2 Q. In your statement to the Inquiry at paragraph 27, and at

3 various other paragraphs of your statement, you give

4 your recollection of what happened at the meeting as

5 at August 2007, when you made this statement. And I

6 would like to have the first of these, please, on the

7 screen at RNI-841-189 on the left-hand side (displayed),

8 thank you.

9 You begin the paragraph by saying -- do you see at

10 the top of the page you have quoted the very passage you

11 and I have just been looking at about being in

12 confidence? You say:

13 "My recollection of the discussion of the meeting

14 was that the Chief Constable was not saying that in his

15 view solicitors may be working for the paramilitaries.

16 Rather, the Chief Constable was saying that this could

17 be the public perception and possibly a view held by

18 some RUC officers."

19 Do you see that?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. So it looks as though in your statement to the Inquiry,

22 what you were suggesting is that the words which were,

23 you thought, misinterpreted by Mr Cumaraswamy were

24 indeed uttered by the Chief Constable?

25 A. It you are referring to the word "working for




1 paramilitaries" there?

2 Q. Yes.

3 A. No, I think what I was inferring there was that, as

4 I said, the Chief Constable, as I say, was expressing

5 the view that there may be a public perception out there

6 that solicitors may work for ... but he wasn't himself

7 saying that he believed that they were working for --

8 Q. But he was making a remark of that kind, was he not?

9 Even on your evidence, you have him making a comment

10 that it might be the public perception that some

11 solicitors were working for the paramilitaries?

12 A. I think in the general flow of conversations, it was

13 embracing what were the perceptions of the public at

14 large, what were the perceptions of police officers and

15 things of that nature. But there was at no point -- I

16 was trying to make the point there that at no point did

17 the Chief Constable say that solicitors were working for

18 paramilitaries. But my recollection was that the

19 conversation at the time we were having it was dealing

20 with the whole issue of perceptions, public perceptions

21 and otherwise.

22 Q. Do you accept that in the notes we have looked at -- and

23 I don't want to put them on the screen again in case the

24 computer system explodes, but do you accept in those

25 notes there is no reference whatsoever about public




1 perception, possibly a view held by some RUC officers?

2 It just doesn't appear in the notes?

3 A. It doesn't appear, but, you know, the notes themselves

4 are not by any means detailed enough to be a full record

5 of what was said over the course of an hour/an hour and

6 a half. So they are only selective recordings of issues

7 there, so I can't say whether or not the term "public

8 perception" or otherwise is something that somebody

9 should have noted down or didn't note down.

10 Q. But we know he didn't?

11 A. We know he didn't.

12 Q. Neither of the note takers made any note of it, did

13 they?

14 A. No, because as I say, was it an issue that they

15 considered was important? But that was the general tone

16 in which issues were being discussed as to what was the

17 perception, as it were, both in the public and in the

18 police, as regards the roles of some solicitors.

19 Q. Then you go on in the same paragraph to say:

20 "The Chief Constable would not have been mindless

21 enough to make such a statement in any event. As police

22 officers, one simply does not make assertions unless you

23 have evidence to support them."

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And does this take us back to the point you were making




1 about whether or not the meeting was in confidence; in

2 other words, this is not the sort of remark -- is that

3 what you are saying? -- that you would make without

4 having something to back it up?

5 A. Exactly, yes.

6 Q. But surely the whole point of this was that in the

7 briefing paper which you have provided to us today, you

8 were being informed -- and you say you were aware of

9 this -- that there was indeed intelligence indicating

10 that a body of solicitors were unduly sympathetic to

11 paramilitaries?

12 A. I mean, but the Chief Constable wasn't in a position to

13 put what intelligence he had on the table in front of

14 Mr Cumaraswamy.

15 Q. Indeed.

16 A. So, you know, without the capacity to do that, I'm

17 simply saying that to use the blunt phrase "may be

18 working for paramilitaries", as I say, is not something

19 that I can recall him saying and I don't think he would

20 have said it unless he had this freedom to put the

21 evidence there to back up what he was saying.

22 Q. But as you accepted earlier, what he did say or, as you

23 put it, he or you said, was that they were working for

24 or working to a paramilitary agenda?

25 A. That is something that must be considered. It wasn't




1 saying that they definitively were. I'm simply saying

2 from the use of section 47 again and what the Court of

3 Appeal had said, that it was an accepted position that

4 they may be working for them and that influences could

5 be brought to bear on them.

6 Q. Now, in paragraph 29 of your statement, looking at the

7 bottom of the left-hand side, where you deal with the

8 point in the draft report saying it was more than

9 a suspicion, you say in the third line:

10 "My recollection of the meeting is that the

11 Chief Constable invited Param Cumaraswamy not to be

12 blind to the fact that this was a possibility, the

13 Chief Constable wanted an open mind to be kept."

14 Do you see that?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. So presumably what you and the Chief Constable were

17 concerned to do is to make sure that Mr Cumaraswamy did

18 not dismiss this out of hand. Is that a fair way of

19 putting it?

20 A. I think -- yes, we were asking him to embrace the views

21 and opinions of others who had commented on these issues

22 over and above what we or the Chief Constable and myself

23 were saying.

24 Q. Yes, and indeed, in that context it was presumably at

25 that point that you said, "Look, we are not being




1 fanciful here, we do have evidence, as Mr Parra records

2 it, documents to back this up"?

3 A. I think that's at the point where that Londonderry case

4 was referred to as an example.

5 Q. Yes, and you think you then could have gone on to that

6 case, whose name we mustn't mention, but the one we

7 looked at earlier?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Thank you. Now, can I just look at some of the

10 follow-up to this report with you? Before I do that,

11 can I just stick with the statement for a moment and

12 these paragraphs we have on the screen, 27 to 29?

13 Your statement is 13 pages long. These are the

14 principal paragraphs in which you deal with the question

15 of who may or may not have made the remarks, and we have

16 looked at what you had to say about it in March 1998.

17 Can I just ask you this very simple question about

18 your witness statement to the Inquiry: why is it that in

19 your witness statement you didn't at least admit of the

20 possibility that you yourself had been responsible for

21 making these remarks?

22 A. I don't think at the time that it was in my mind that I

23 had made the remarks. I knew I had contributed, but on

24 the basis of what material had been provided and the

25 questions that were being asked of me, I had nothing




1 else -- and it was with the benefit of finding these

2 notes and the comments made by other people -- this

3 statement was made at the very outset, as you will

4 appreciate.

5 Q. Indeed.

6 A. Subsequently, you served on me a whole host of other

7 documentation. I wasn't reinterviewed in respect of any

8 of the other material served on me. Therefore, I wasn't

9 able to elaborate or to explain, so it was only with

10 this material becoming available that I have been able

11 to put before the Inquiry this briefing note.

12 Q. But of course there was a huge row about this draft

13 report at the time, wasn't there,

14 in February/March 1998, in which you took part? You

15 were the person who prepared the note for the

16 Chief Constable commenting on the draft report?

17 A. In terms of my recollection of it, yes.

18 Q. Yes. So this is not just a meeting that took place

19 in October 1997 and then you were next asked about it

20 in August 2007. There was a very substantial political

21 row about the draft report and these remarks, wasn't

22 there?

23 A. But it was, shall we say, a dispute in which I wasn't

24 involved. I wasn't aware of what the Chief Constable

25 was exchanging with Mr Cumaraswamy. I see that now




1 amongst the documentation. The focus at the time was

2 did he or did he not say that the solicitors were

3 working for paramilitaries. And that was the issue that

4 was addressed.

5 Q. Thank you. What I would like to do now at exactly this

6 point is to deal with this question of what was alleged

7 and what was said after the draft came out and whether

8 you were involved in that process. Can we start with

9 the letter from British Irish Rights Watch of

10 10 March 1998, at RNI-106-132 (displayed).

11 The question I wanted to ask you is whether you saw

12 this letter at the time it was sent?

13 A. No, I have no recollection of that now in particular.

14 Q. Do you see in the third paragraph, she names you as the

15 possible person who made the comment "may in fact be

16 working for the paramilitaries"?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Had this letter been drawn to your attention, presumably

19 you would have been able to assist the

20 Command Secretariat and, indeed, the NIO in setting the

21 record straight as to what had in fact been said in the

22 meeting?

23 A. I think certainly it might have involved, as it were,

24 a more fuller discussion of what actually were the

25 issues. But I think, again, it looks as if the focus




1 simply has been in on was the phrase used or was it not.

2 Q. Yes. Now, are you able to help us as to how Jane Winter

3 seemed to be fairly well informed about who was saying

4 what at this meeting?

5 A. No, I can only assume that she didn't get anything, as

6 it were, from the Chief Constable or myself. So it must

7 have been access to material provided by someone else.

8 Q. But were you not made aware at this sort of time,

9 in March 1998, that there was an issue about the draft

10 report and what had been said by whom?

11 A. I think it was a matter certainly -- it had been carried

12 in the press.

13 Q. Yes. You see, P157 told us in his evidence that he

14 showed you his notes of the meeting, I think he said, on

15 the way to a police authority meeting. But do you

16 remember seeing the notes at the time?

17 A. I don't even recall attending a police authority

18 meeting.

19 Q. Right. So you think he may be mistaken about that?

20 A. I think he may be mistaken because it wasn't within my

21 role at that stage. In fact, the only person who tabled

22 police authority meetings was the Chief Constable or the

23 Deputy Chief Constable.

24 Q. So you don't remember calling for the notes or being

25 shown a copy of the notes at the time?




1 A. No, that's the first I have seen of the notes.

2 Q. Can I just ask you to look at RNI-101-248.502, please

3 (displayed), which is another copy of the British Irish

4 Rights Watch letter on which somebody has made a number

5 of comments in the margin. Do you recognise the

6 handwriting?

7 A. No, it is not mine.

8 Q. It is not yours, thank you. And somebody has, in

9 relation to the comment at the end of the third

10 paragraph, raised the question:

11 "Was he ..."

12 Presumably Mr Cumaraswamy or it may indeed be the

13 Chief Constable:

14 "Was he asleep?"

15 That wasn't you?

16 A. No.

17 Q. What I would like to do now is just to ask you whether

18 you had any discussions at this time, March/April 1998,

19 with the Chief Constable about what had been said in the

20 meeting about the row that had broken out concerning

21 that?

22 A. Not to my recollection. As I say, over and above the,

23 as it were, comment that I submitted to him, I don't

24 recall being involved in any other aspect of it.

25 Q. Right. Is it possible, do you think, that you were




1 asked by him to make that commentary precisely because

2 you had been aware of what was discussed in that meeting

3 because you had been present at it?

4 A. I was given the draft and just to comment on the draft

5 in itself. It wasn't, I think, obviously related to --

6 to the comments in particular. I think it was on the

7 whole of the draft.

8 Q. Now, so far as that was concerned, did you discuss those

9 comments after you had prepared them with the

10 Chief Constable that you can recall?

11 A. Not to my recollection. I submitted them actually to

12 Command Secretariat. It wasn't directly to the

13 Chief Constable, although they would have been probably

14 given to him. But there was no follow-up on it that I

15 can recall.

16 Q. There is one other aspect about the follow-up that I

17 would like to raise with you and it is the Law Society's

18 complaints. We can see their letter, left-hand side,

19 please, at RNI-103-068 (displayed). They wrote in on

20 13 March, the same day as your commentary, to complain

21 about the comments that had apparently been made, namely

22 in the third paragraph, do you see:

23 "Some solicitors may be working for the

24 paramilitaries. This is more than a suspicion."

25 Et cetera. And we can see from RNI-103-070.500.pdf">RNI-103-070.500




1 (displayed) that you were you were given a copy of this

2 letter for you to consider. Do you see at 2 there, the

3 wording of a reply?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. That's on the right-hand side of the screen. And in the

6 meanwhile, you were also given at 1 an interim reply to

7 the Law Society from P157, which we can see on the

8 left-hand side, please, at RNI-103-069 (displayed),

9 which enclosed the Chief Constable's own letter to the

10 Rapporteur on the right-hand side, now, please, at

11 RNI-103-070 (displayed).

12 Can I ask you first, please, did you have any input

13 into the text of the Chief Constable's letter to the

14 Rapporteur?

15 A. Not that I can recall, no.

16 Q. Do you recall giving any proposed draft text to answer

17 the Law Society's letter?

18 A. No, I can't. Do you have a copy of any text?

19 Q. No, we don't. But you can't help us?

20 A. No, I can't help you, I'm sorry.

21 Q. Let's have a look at a letter which did eventually go

22 back to the Chief Constable. It is at RNI-103-091, if

23 we can have that, please, on the left-hand side

24 (displayed). 8 April 1998. Can you remember, is this

25 a letter into which you had any input?




1 A. No, I hadn't seen that letter before, no.

2 Q. Now, you will see what is set out there in the second

3 paragraph by the Chief Constable:

4 "As I reiterated at the meeting, at no stage did

5 I make comments to Mr Cumaraswamy that gave any grounds

6 for a suggestion that I or the RUC associated lawyers

7 with their clients' causes. There can be no

8 misunderstanding of this. I did not say it because

9 I have no grounds for believing it to be the case."

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Now, presumably if you had been shown that as a draft,

12 you would have felt bound to point out to the

13 Chief Constable that the briefing paper you had received

14 before the meeting said that there was indeed

15 intelligence suggesting that there is a body of

16 solicitors who were unduly sympathetic to

17 paramilitaries?

18 A. Well, I think the Chief Constable certainly would have

19 indicated that intelligence was not something that he

20 could refer to in such a letter, and unless he had it in

21 the form of evidence, that he wouldn't be using it.

22 Q. In other words, when he says "I've no grounds", what he

23 really means is, "I have nothing I can tell you in this

24 letter", is that right?

25 A. I think that is the case, yes.




1 Q. Yes. Thank you very much.

2 Now, I would just like to ask you finally one or two

3 questions about the murder investigation, and it may be

4 that you can't recall the detail that I'm going to put

5 to you. At the time of Rosemary Nelson's murder, I

6 think you were still the ACC Crime, were you not?

7 A. That's correct, yes.

8 Q. Do you remember any involvement in an issue concerning

9 the disclosure of the identity of CID's Loyalist sources

10 to Colin Port?

11 A. I had several discussions with Mr Port, most of them in

12 respect of manpower systems and things of that nature.

13 There was a discussion, yes, in relation to the

14 disclosure of CID informants and their details, yes.

15 Q. Yes. And do you remember attending meetings with him,

16 but also with the then Head of Special Branch -- who has

17 a cipher in these proceedings and is known to us at

18 least as B542 -- about that issue in relation to both

19 CID and Special Branch informants?

20 A. No, I don't recall a joint meeting as such. My

21 recollection is that I had spoken to Mr Port on these

22 matters and there was absolutely nothing that I could

23 see from the point of view of CID criminal informants

24 not being disclosed to him as part of the Inquiry. I

25 wouldn't have been privy to the identity of the SB CHISs




1 as such.

2 Q. So as far as CID was concerned, you had no objection or

3 difficulty with what he was asking?

4 A. No, from the manner in which he intended to use the

5 information and what information he was seeking, I had

6 no objection to it being released.

7 Q. Do you recall what the attitude of the Head of

8 Special Branch was to the same request in relation to

9 his informants?

10 A. I don't know in detail. I can only recall in general

11 that, obviously, given the higher level of sensitivity

12 concerning the -- as it were, covert human intelligence

13 sources that he would have been handling and their

14 potential for being linked in and around this

15 investigation, that he obviously would have had, shall

16 we say, more levels to clear in terms of how he passed

17 the information over and how secure it would be held and

18 how it would be used.

19 Q. So is it fair in summary to suggest that his concerns

20 were greater than yours?

21 A. Greater than mine because most of the informants that

22 the CID handled were what you would call ordinary

23 criminal informants and not associated with paramilitary

24 groupings.

25 Q. Did you become aware in the course of those discussions




1 of the Chief Constable's own attitude to these issues?

2 A. No.

3 Q. No. Forgive me for a moment. (Pause).

4 Those are the questions I have for you, Mr White,

5 but, as I'm sure you know, at the end of the questioning

6 I always offer witnesses an opportunity to add to their

7 evidence. If there is anything you would like to say to

8 the Panel, this is your opportunity.

9 A. Thank you indeed. No, the only thing I would like to

10 put on record is that, Mr Chairman, like every

11 right-thinking person in Northern Ireland, I was

12 appalled by the murder of Rosemary Nelson. It was

13 another senseless act of barbarity which simply added to

14 the long litany of innocent victims that had died at the

15 hands of terrorists, who wage the war not against each

16 other, as we all know, but against selected targets from

17 the community to which they were politically or

18 otherwise opposed.

19 Unfortunately, like many of the other terrorist

20 murders which occurred throughout almost four decades of

21 what were euphemistically called "the Troubles", it has,

22 despite the best efforts of crime investigators, not yet

23 been possible to make anyone amenable to the courts for

24 her death, and this no doubt adds to the anguish of her

25 family.




1 I simply would say that it is yet one more example

2 of the harsh reality of the Northern Ireland experience,

3 that has now been learnt in other parts of the world

4 where anti-insurgency campaigns are being fought, and it

5 is simply the fact that in any sustained terrorist

6 campaign, just as not everyone's life can be saved,

7 neither can the forces of law and order or the criminal

8 justice system guarantee that the perpetrators of every

9 atrocity will be held accountable before the courts.

10 If such deaths and the deaths of my 302 colleagues

11 could have been prevented, then I think that that is an

12 issue that we would have all striven very much to sort

13 of lend weight to the detection of those involved. But

14 I think, when you consider the number of police officers

15 killed during the atrocities, that it illustrates the

16 extreme difficulty that there has been all along to

17 secure convictions in an environment where

18 forensically-aware terrorists, a fearful community and

19 the continuously stretched policing service are all

20 contributing factors.

21 And that's really all I wish to say in relation to

22 the Inquiry.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Mr White, for coming

24 before us to give evidence. Thank you.

25 We will adjourn until tomorrow. Thank you. Quarter




1 past ten.

2 (4.49 pm)

3 (The Inquiry adjourned until 10.15 am the following day)

























1 I N D E X

P157 (continued) ................................. 2
Questions by MR PHILLIPS (continued) ......... 2
Questions by DAME VALERIE STRACHAN ........... 47
Questions by SIR ANTHONY BURDEN .............. 49
MR RAYMOND WHITE (sworn) ......................... 50
Questions by MR PHILLIPS ..................... 50