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Full Hearings

Hearing: 28th April 2009, day 121

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held at:
The Interpoint Centre
20-24 York Street
Belfast BT15 1AQ

on Tuesday, 28 April 2009
commencing at 10.15 am

Day 121








1 Tuesday, 28 April 2009

2 (10.15 am)

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr Eicke?

4 Closing submissions by MR EICKE

5 MR EICKE: I am grateful. Sir. The Security Service is

6 grateful for this opportunity to respond orally to the

7 voluminous written observations provided by Full

8 Participants, which we received on 17 April, and the

9 issues identified by the Inquiry in its letter of the

10 22nd.

11 At the outset, may I explain by way of an apology

12 that my solicitor unfortunately is not able to be with

13 me today because he has got a clashing engagement at the

14 Billy Wright inquiry. That won't prevent me from making

15 my submissions to you today, but it may put me in

16 a rather more difficult position to answer any questions

17 that you might have for me today. I would, therefore,

18 ask at the outset for permission to answer any question

19 I cannot myself answer in writing as soon as possible

20 after today's proceedings have closed, and I apologise

21 for that.

22 In making these oral submissions, we don't intend to

23 repeat what we set out in our written submissions but to

24 focus on one our two specific issues which, in light of

25 the written submissions we have seen, it seems to the




1 Service to be important to clarify.

2 Before addressing those points of substance, I

3 should perhaps point out that in making these

4 submissions to you today, I will of course only be able

5 to refer to the open evidence before the Inquiry.

6 That's the evidence available to all Full Participants.

7 I should stress immediately that the Service does not

8 seek to make closed submissions, but the importance in

9 this is that of course the Inquiry, when it comes to

10 consider the written and the oral submissions of all

11 Full Participants, will have to consider those

12 submissions in light of both the open and the closed

13 evidence, both oral and written, and in doing so, will

14 have to be aware that by necessity some of the

15 submissions made by the Full Participants were made

16 without ever having had sight of the full evidential

17 picture.

18 However, and without wanting to appear overly

19 defensive, the Security Service wishes to underline the

20 fact that, as the Inquiry is only too aware, the amount

21 of redactions and closed evidence in relation to the

22 material before the Inquiry was kept to the absolute

23 minimum and only involved redactions where that was

24 absolutely necessary so as to protect national security

25 and/or the Article 2 rights of any affected individuals.




1 Can I then perhaps identify the, I think, four main

2 issues I wish to address, the four issues of

3 significance. The first is was Rosemary Nelson of

4 interest to the intelligence services. The second is

5 the operation of the warrantry arrangements in place in

6 Northern Ireland at the time in relation to

7 Rosemary Nelson and in particular the Service's role

8 within it. Operation Indus, and finally the Service's

9 role in the discussions between the Special Branch and

10 the Murder Investigation Team concerning the disclosure

11 of CHIS identities. And in the context of that, I will

12 also have to address, and I will address -- though not

13 as a separate heading -- the significance, if any, of

14 the alleged relationship between Rosemary Nelson and

15 Colin Duffy to the Service and its officers in

16 discharging their functions in Northern Ireland at the

17 relevant time.

18 Can I then start by looking at the first question:

19 was Rosemary Nelson of interest to the intelligence

20 services. And, sir, you will have seen in our written

21 submissions in paragraphs 2.1 and 9.2 that

22 Rosemary Nelson was of no intelligence interest to the

23 Security Service.

24 The written submissions did not, however, address

25 the question: why not. There is a simple answer to this




1 question, perhaps too simple, which may have been why

2 the written submission does not spell it out. The

3 answer, we would submit, lies in the fact that nobody

4 was or is suggesting that there is or was -- and there

5 is and was no credible intelligence which would have

6 given cause to consider that Rosemary Nelson was in any

7 sense involved with or affiliated to any paramilitary

8 organisation, and even less so with the strategic

9 management, if I may be permitted that shorthand, of

10 such an organisation or was a member of the strategic

11 management team of any paramilitary organisation.

12 As a result, her activities were by definition of no

13 intelligence interest to the Service whose accepted role

14 within Northern Ireland at the time was one of gathering

15 and reporting on strategic rather than operational

16 intelligence.

17 This, we would respectfully submit, also answers the

18 question posed by the Inquiry in its letter of 22 April,

19 namely whether they should have been of interest to the

20 intelligence services. In light of the fact, as I have

21 identified, the answer in relation to the Security

22 Service's own intelligence gathering in Northern Ireland

23 at the time, the answer is also plainly no. Insofar as

24 it may be suggested that she should have been of

25 interest to the Service in the context of her featuring




1 in the context of Operation Indus, for reasons I will

2 turn to the answer is also no. In short,

3 Rosemary Nelson was never the target of any operation

4 under warrant, but as far as the Service was and is

5 concerned, merely happened to be the legal owner of and

6 potential sometime visitor to a property which

7 Colin Duffy had rented and made his main residence. It

8 was he who was the target of the operation and he who,

9 for the purposes of warrant application, was and should

10 have been of interest to the Service.

11 As an aside, it's of course clear from the material

12 the Inquiry has seen that Rosemary Nelson -- that there

13 was no intelligence that she had in fact visited the

14 property in question during the relevant period.

15 Turning then to the Service's role within the

16 warrantry arrangements then in place in

17 Northern Ireland, again the Service's written

18 submissions in chapter 3 describe the role of the

19 Service within Northern Ireland at the relevant time.

20 In the context of warrantry process, it is of particular

21 importance always to bear in mind, we would submit, that

22 the role of DCI was as the Secretary of State's

23 principal intelligence adviser and his adviser or her

24 adviser on authorisations of warrants under the

25 Interception of Act, the Intelligence Services Act and




1 latterly the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act.

2 In that capacity, the DCI acted as a gateway to the

3 Secretary of State for those seeking a warrant for

4 technical operations under that legislation. In that

5 role, he would read and consider what the applicant for

6 such a warrant decided was necessary in terms of

7 intelligence case presented in the warrant application

8 for him to know in order to assess whether the necessary

9 national security threshold had been passed.

10 In that context and in that time without the benefit

11 of any investigative facilities directed at operational

12 intelligence at his own disposal through the Security

13 Service, it was inevitable that DCI would have to

14 consider any application for a warrant and their content

15 on the basis of trust. Not unquestioning trust, but

16 still a relationship of trust with the RUC. After all,

17 the relationship of trust between the various security

18 bodies involved was essential for the operation of the

19 security structures as they were at the time.

20 As such, it would have been inappropriate and in

21 fact practically impossible to seek to consider all the

22 raw intelligence and other material underlying any

23 warrant application passed to him for consideration. Of

24 course, it was always open to him to seek further

25 clarification and, if no such clarification was




1 forthcoming, to reject the application. After all, his

2 role was solely to advise the Secretary of State on

3 whether the necessary case had been made out by the

4 applicants in question to justify the Secretary of State

5 signing a warrant and, importantly, to provide advice on

6 legal and operational issues affecting that decision,

7 which may not have been considered by the applicants or

8 which may not have been obvious from the application.

9 Turning then to the specifics of Operation Indus, we

10 would respectfully submit that this is exactly what

11 happened in the case of Operation Indus, and it is

12 respectfully submitted that the evidence shows clearly

13 that the safeguards provided by DCI in this role proved

14 to be effective in that case. After all, it was DCI and

15 his officers who identified the issue of legal

16 professional privilege in the context of this

17 application and raised both with the RUC as well as with

18 the Secretary of State.

19 The issue of legal professional privilege was

20 plainly relevant and important irrespective of the

21 nature of any relationship between Rosemary Nelson and

22 Colin Duffy. There is no question but that she was his

23 solicitor and, as a result, any product recording

24 conversations between them would inevitably raise the

25 question of LPP.




1 The national security assessments relevant to the

2 question whether a property warrant directed at

3 Colin Duffy should be signed were also wholly

4 unconnected with the nature of any relationship between

5 Rosemary Nelson and Colin Duffy. And those assessments

6 do not in fact appear to be disputed by any Full

7 Participant.

8 We can't overemphasise the fact that the warrant

9 application was solely directed at Colin Duffy with the

10 aim of obtaining intelligence on his activities.

11 As a result, we would respectfully submit that there

12 can be no criticism on the basis that DCI cannot

13 consider any underlying material which may have led to

14 the warrant application being made, but which the

15 applicant considered was not necessary for DCI to know.

16 After all, if DCI had decided that the necessary

17 national security case had not been made out, the

18 application for the warrant would not have progressed

19 and the applicant would have had to consider whether to

20 re-apply providing further information.

21 Read in this context, it may be said that the final

22 warrant application provides the clearest

23 contemporaneous confirmation that Rosemary Nelson was

24 not the target of Operation Indus, that the alleged

25 relationship between Rosemary Nelson and Colin Duffy was




1 of no relevant intelligence value to any of the

2 organisations and persons involved in this process and

3 that the only relevance of Rosemary Nelson at all was in

4 the context of fact that she was (a) the owner of the

5 property in relation to which a property warrant was

6 sought and in her role as his solicitor.

7 We would also in this context like to correct what

8 appears to be a misunderstanding in the closing

9 submissions submitted by the families. They describe

10 the operation as having been abandoned a year after its

11 application, before it had ever been put into place.

12 However, we would respectfully submit that to describe

13 what occurred as the authorities having abandoned the

14 operation, in particular in the sense of having done so

15 out of a recognition that it was not justified in the

16 first place, is factually inaccurate.

17 From the evidence it has seen and heard, the Inquiry

18 will be familiar with the considerations that applied to

19 the installation of eavesdropping devices in

20 Northern Ireland at the relevant time. The Inquiry will

21 know the property warrant application was first raised

22 by the RUC in August 1998, was formally made on

23 9 December 1998 and the warrant was signed by the

24 Secretary of State later September that year. However,

25 before the warrant could be acted upon, Rosemary Nelson,




1 the legal owner of the property, the relevant property,

2 was killed. Her death created a situation in which

3 there would have been a great deal of uncertainty

4 whether Colin Duffy, who was the target of the

5 operation, would in fact be allowed to stay at that

6 address. After all, the property formed part of

7 Mrs Nelson's estate, which had yet to be settled and

8 which might well have led to the property being sold by

9 her family. It was as a result of that that it was

10 decided in July 1999 not to proceed with

11 Operation Indus, and this is recorded in document

12 RNI-532-091.

13 It is important to stress, however, that this was

14 a purely business or operational decision and should in

15 no way be taken as an acceptance by the Service that the

16 warrant should not have been sought or signed in the

17 first place.

18 Finally under this heading, it appears to be

19 suggested that the purpose of operation was in fact to

20 articulate and disseminate Special Branch attitudes to

21 Rosemary Nelson "at the highest level". Of course, the

22 Security Service is in no position to know any ulterior

23 purpose that may have been pursued by individuals in

24 making allegations or the application. However, it is

25 clear from the way DCI's gateway function was operated




1 that this process was eminently unsuitable to achieve

2 any dissemination of unnecessary but prejudicial

3 information at the highest level. As the warrant

4 application shows, the final warrant application, the

5 legal professional privilege aspect of the application

6 is directly addressed while the information concerning

7 the alleged relationship did not form part of the

8 submission to the Secretary of State and was not,

9 therefore, disseminated at the highest level through

10 this process. DCI was aware of it, but thought it of no

11 intelligence importance or relevance to the intelligence

12 case and, therefore, would not have had any reason to

13 communicate it up the chain to the Permanent

14 Undersecretary or the Secretary of State.

15 The Assistant Chief Constable for E3 and the

16 Chief Constable were not dependent on DCI for receipt of

17 the information nor allegations in question because they

18 emanated from within their own organisations. As the

19 loose minute from HAG to DCI of 19 March 1999 --

20 document RNI-532-012 -- shows, the Service in the person

21 of HAG was approached by the Permanent Undersecretary

22 about this issue on 17 March 1999, ie after

23 Rosemary Nelson's death, and only then did HAG pass on

24 to PUS the information that was available to him.

25 In fact, as we can ascertain, the evidence from the




1 Permanent Undersecretary himself confirmed that he had

2 received this information not through the warranty

3 process but from Sir Ronnie Flanagan. As a result, we

4 would submit there is no basis for suggesting that the

5 warrantry process and/or DCI's role within it caused

6 damage or even exceptional or substantial damage to

7 Rosemary Nelson through the way the process operated in

8 relation to Operation Indus.

9 Another example of the effectiveness, we would

10 submit, of the warrantry process informed at least in

11 part through DCI's gateway function, is the draft

12 proposal for the application for an intercept warrant in

13 relation to Rosemary Nelson's office. While it is quite

14 clear that the Security Service and DCI had not been

15 aware of this draft proposal until shown the

16 documentation by this Inquiry, it is also clear that the

17 requirements re national security case strong enough to

18 meet the necessary threshold requirements as enforced by

19 DCI, meant that no such proposal ever came to fruition.

20 That leads me to the final of the four headings

21 I identified and that is the issue of discussions about

22 the disclosure of CHIS identities. This is addressed in

23 our written submissions at chapter 8, and as indicated

24 at the outset, I do not intend to repeat those

25 submissions. However, there have been some suggestions




1 that the evidence given by S224 was inaccurate, in

2 particular in his note for file of 5 September 2000 --

3 document RNI-532-157 -- in which he records at

4 paragraph 3 a conversation with the regional head of

5 Special Branch, B629, held on 30 August 2000. The note

6 for file records that the latter said that B62 and the

7 Head of Special Branch would meet Port on 31 August,

8 ie the day after the conversation, that at that meeting

9 the Head of Special Branch intended to delay any

10 decision until consultation with the Chief Constable who

11 was away until 4 September 2000 and -- and this appears

12 to be what is the subject of criticism -- the

13 Chief Constable might need to have a discussion with

14 someone in top management of the Service to encourage

15 him to resist Port's request.

16 Of course, we accept that it is for the Inquiry to

17 assess the evidence and to make a judgment about the

18 reliability and/or accuracy of any particular piece of

19 evidence. However, when doing so, it is important, in

20 our respectful submission, to bear in mind the

21 following.

22 S224 was and is a highly experienced and very senior

23 officer within the Service. Both the written evidence

24 and his oral evidence confirm that he was and is

25 somebody who meticulously or perhaps, as he suggested,




1 too meticulously, if that is possible, recorded anything

2 of relevance as soon as possible after the event.

3 The document in question is the only contemporaneous

4 record of that conversation, whereas any criticism

5 sought to be brought against its accuracy appears to be

6 based solely on the personal recollection, eight or more

7 years after the event, of the individuals concerned.

8 That is of course equally true of the other document

9 created by S224, which appears to be the subject of

10 similar criticism. That's document RNI-532-169. And

11 finally, and in any event, the document records what

12 S224 was told would happen and not what in fact did

13 happen in a subsequent conversation.

14 Sir, subject to the caveat I set out at the outset

15 about being able to provide answers to questions, those

16 are the oral submissions I wish to make on behalf of the

17 Security Service, and unless there is any further

18 assistance I or we can provide, those are our

19 submissions.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

21 DAME VALERIE STRACHAN: Could I raise one or two points?

22 One aspect which I don't think was discussed in your

23 written submissions was the discussion between the

24 Service and Special Branch about Mr Port's request for

25 CHIS identities. I don't think it is covered directly




1 in chapter 8 of the written submission.

2 We were told by the Head of Special Branch South

3 that the Security Service advised him to speak to the

4 Security Service legal adviser. Can you tell me -- you

5 may need to take instructions on this -- whether the

6 Security Service did in fact give legal advice to the

7 RUC Special Branch on the specific issue of what did

8 paragraph 7 of Mr Port's terms of reference mean?

9 MR EICKE: Madam, I will have to defer the answer to that

10 question. I apologise, but that is clearly something

11 where my solicitor would need to, if he were here,

12 search our corporate memory, if I can call it that, and

13 therefore, I will put an answer in writing, if I may.

14 DAME VALERIE STRACHAN: That would be very helpful.

15 And arising from that is more general question about

16 how primacy worked in practice. We heard a fair bit of

17 evidence both from DCI and also from people in

18 Special Branch about how it worked in practice. S629,

19 the Head of Special Branch South, in relation to this

20 particular issue, the disclosure of CHIS identities,

21 said that it was very much a partnership between the two

22 organisations. But when pressed further, he said the

23 Security Service was driving this, and that left me with

24 the question: in practice in this case, which

25 organisation actually did have the primacy?




1 MR EICKE: Madam, again from recollection, of course, this

2 was an issue that was raised with S224 and my client

3 replied in writing to a question you posed to S224 about

4 how it operated and whether there was ever any situation

5 where, if they had put their foot down, they didn't

6 prevail. Beyond what is in that letter -- again,

7 I apologise, but I will have to take more detailed

8 instructions as to how it operated.

9 Without wanting to repeat the evidence you have

10 heard from our witnesses, I will need to take that back.

11 DAME VALERIE STRACHAN: Right, thank you. I have got one or

12 two more questions --

13 THE CHAIRMAN: Perhaps to follow up on the question of

14 primacy, Mr Eicke, inevitably there will be tensions and

15 conflicts of interest between criminal investigators

16 searching for evidence to bring serious criminals before

17 the courts and intelligence-gathering agencies needing

18 a continual flow of information required for national

19 security and the preservation of life. That must be

20 right. Those tensions and conflicts, of course,

21 surfaced in the 18 months or so following

22 Rosemary Nelson's murder. At that time, of course, the

23 tensions were essentially between the Murder

24 Investigation Team run by Mr Port and RUC

25 Special Branch, and they aren't really resolved until




1 round about December 2000.

2 Now, as I understand it, in Northern Ireland the

3 Security Service has primacy over intelligence. If

4 there is a conflict of obligations, a conflict of

5 interest, between the PSNI, as it now is, which has

6 a chain of command which means internal dispute between

7 Special Branch and the CID or not going to recur but the

8 potential of tension and conflict between the PSNI and

9 the Security Service does remain, and the question I had

10 is: is there a protocol now in place to resolve such

11 a potential conflict, that is between the Security

12 Service and the PSNI?

13 MR EICKE: Sir, if you could bear with me. Sir, again,

14 I apologise, I will have to check whether there is now

15 such a protocol in place.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: On the face of it, one would have thought

17 there would be either a written protocol or a written

18 working arrangement if such an occasion arose. That's

19 a matter that certainly I would like an answer to.

20 MR EICKE: Yes, sir, I will ...

21 THE CHAIRMAN: Would you like to carry on?

22 DAME VALERIE STRACHAN: Turning to a quite different

23 subject, which is touched on in paragraph 8.3 of your

24 submission, this is the tricky question about targeting

25 assistance given to the Orange Volunteers by members of




1 the security forces. You discuss that in paragraphs 8.2

2 and following and you draw attention to the so-called

3 lateral logic assuming that all intelligence relating to

4 collusion would be relevant to Mr Port's murder

5 investigation. And you quote the answer given, which

6 was that in this particular case -- which was a piece of

7 intelligence suggesting that the Orange Volunteers were

8 getting assistance from members of the security forces

9 in targeting members of the Catholic community -- the

10 answer was:

11 "If there was potential collusion in the murder of

12 Rosemary Nelson, potentially, therefore, all collusion

13 is the remit of the Port Inquiry. It just doesn't

14 follow."

15 The question that's left in my mind was that on the

16 face of it the particular piece of intelligence was not

17 just a general reference to collusion in relation to

18 anybody, it was a reference to possible collusion with

19 the Orange Volunteers and we have heard a lot about how

20 much the membership of the various dissident Loyalist

21 organisations overlapped with each other. Surely, it

22 seems to me, the combination of who was being targeted,

23 according to this intelligence, and who was doing the

24 targeting would make this particular piece of

25 intelligence highly relevant to the Port investigation.




1 It was on the face of it an indication of like

2 behaviour. Would you like to comment?

3 MR EICKE: Madam, again, I will have to take instruction

4 from my witness whose quote you refer to, S224, in order

5 to be able to answer that in any way satisfactorily or

6 at all, I fear.

7 DAME VALERIE STRACHAN: In doing so, perhaps you could

8 address the worry that I have, which was maybe this

9 wasn't just a question of was it relevant but maybe was

10 it a question of protecting a valuable source,

11 because -- or was there, indeed, the potential for an

12 even deeper and darker motive. Was it a question of

13 protecting real collusion. I think we need to go as far

14 as we can to be satisfied on that point. So perhaps you

15 could cover that too.

16 MR EICKE: I will, Madam.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: If I could follow up on that, what puzzles me

18 is that anyone considering the matter not from the point

19 of view of collusion but solely in relation to relevance

20 and a possible line of enquiry to criminal

21 investigators, could conclude that it wouldn't be of

22 value to the criminal investigators, having regard to

23 the characteristics of the target, the characteristics

24 of the dissident paramilitary organisation and the

25 characteristics of the members of the security forces.




1 So your answer is the same: you would like to take

2 instructions?

3 MR EICKE: Sir, if I may. As I understand your question,

4 sir, it effectively replicates the second half of --

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, but it particularises to the

6 characteristics of the three parts of the intelligence:

7 the target, the dissident organisation and then there is

8 the security forces.

9 MR EICKE: Sir, I will have to take that back because of

10 course there is also a slight difference in perspective

11 from where we are looking at it today and from the way

12 it was looked at at the time.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

14 DAME VALERIE STRACHAN: One other topic which is bothering

15 me: in 9.5 of your submission, you say that:

16 "The Service was aware of the alleged sexual

17 relationship between Rosemary Nelson and Colin Duffy.

18 It has been suggested that such allegations may have

19 been an attempt by members of the RUC to discredit

20 Rosemary Nelson. Service witnesses have been asked

21 whether this information was accepted as fact or whether

22 independent corroboration was obtained."

23 And you go on to refer to the request of the NIO

24 Permanent Secretary as to the evidence in support of the

25 allegations, and say:




1 "The Service had 'pretty definitive' confirmation

2 that the allegations were correct."

3 I just wondered whether you actually did have

4 independent corroboration, or whether in this case you

5 were reliant on what you were being told by the RUC.

6 MR EICKE: Madam, again, this is becoming embarrassing but I

7 will have to take this question back too.

8 DAME VALERIE STRACHAN: Right. And I'm quite sure you are

9 going to have to take my next question back as well --

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Before we go on to the next question, what

11 would assist me on that last question of Dame Valerie's,

12 the Panel are aware of the information -- whether it is

13 valid or invalid is another matter -- but we are aware

14 of the information that was available to the RUC, but

15 I think we would be assisted not only have you

16 independent material but the nature of the independent

17 material, because intelligence and information comes in

18 through various means. I say no more than that.

19 MR EICKE: Sir, again, part of the reason why I will have to

20 revisit that is because, of course, there was a whole

21 raft of documents which were initially supplied to the

22 Inquiry, as we have set out in the written submissions,

23 which should have been, and as far as I understand was,

24 everything we have, from which then was selected what

25 was put into the bundles. So I personally haven't




1 revisited that whole body of intelligence and I will

2 need to take that back to check.

3 DAME VALERIE STRACHAN: The thing that I wanted to draw your

4 attention to and to seek comments on is a piece of

5 evidence which we have had in writing but which hasn't

6 been discussed in oral evidence so far. So I don't

7 expect you to have an instant answer to this, but

8 I would appreciate an answer in due course. This arises

9 from the evidence of S712.

10 I wonder, would it be possible to show on the screen

11 two documents side by side? One is RNI-531-124

12 (displayed) and the other is RNI-844-042 (displayed).

13 On the left-hand side you have got a string of emails

14 which ends with a minute from S712, and perhaps we could

15 highlight that top email. This was in the connection

16 with Operation Indus and whether it was still

17 practicable. I'm not proposing to read out the exact

18 words because they wouldn't come very comfortably from

19 me, but you will see that S712 is expressing some

20 personal views.

21 MR EICKE: Yes.

22 DAME VALERIE STRACHAN: If you look then at the document on

23 the right-hand side, paragraph 22 -- could we highlight

24 the last sentence that of paragraph:

25 "It was based wholly on what I had been told by




1 Special Branch."

2 Now, on the one hand you have got the officer

3 expressing personal views. On the other hand, when

4 giving evidence to Eversheds, the officer explains that

5 these are not independent personal views, this is what

6 the officer got from discussion with Special Branch.

7 That left me concerned personally that what was

8 happening here was, as it were, the retailing of gossip,

9 because the particular things that are said in the email

10 I haven't seen any documentation which backs them up, so

11 I would appreciate comments on that aspect. On the face

12 of it, it looks as though the Security Service is

13 gossiping.

14 Thank you.

15 MR PHILLIPS: Sir, can I just intervene at this point with

16 an eye to the more general procedural situation we are

17 in at the moment. The point of these hearings, as you

18 announced in the solicitor's letter, was so that you

19 could put questions to counsel and, I think everybody

20 must have expected, receive answers to the questions.

21 Now, I quite understand the particular difficulties

22 my learned friend for the Security Service has had in

23 the absence of his solicitor, but clearly this

24 particular question and answer session hasn't taken the

25 matter -- more importantly, taken your understanding --




1 much further. Sir, may I make the following respectful

2 suggestions.

3 First, that the letter with these answers be

4 delivered very promptly, that it be an open letter and

5 that it be shared with the other Full Participants so

6 that they also can know the answer, as they would have

7 been had the answers been given in this session.

8 Secondly, with an eye to the future, that on all

9 subsequent days of these submissions, counsel should

10 attend with those at their respective organisations who

11 are in a position to supply the instructions so that

12 answers can be given to the questions that you pose.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: That seems a submission that should be

14 listened to and heeded by all. Yes, Mr Eicke?

15 MR EICKE: Can I perhaps make clear that it was always our

16 intention to write in the way that my learned friend has

17 suggested, as we have done in relation to the question

18 posed of S224 on primacy, that it would be shared. And

19 I can only reiterate my apologies, but attempts were

20 made to try and coordinate the possibility of my

21 solicitor attending both here and at Billy Wright, but

22 that proved impossible. Otherwise we would have hoped

23 to have been more helpful than, I'm sorry to say, I have

24 been able to do.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much for your help so far and




1 we look forward to it in writing, as suggested by

2 Mr Phillips.

3 MR EICKE: I'm grateful.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: As soon as possible.

5 MR EICKE: Sir, can I just flag up that my solicitor is

6 going to be tied up in Billy Wright for the rest of this

7 week but we will do it as soon as possible. And I have

8 a representative from my client here, so the matter will

9 be taken back and work will started immediately, and we

10 will do it as soon as we can.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Well, we will adjourn until

12 tomorrow.

13 (11.10 am)

14 (The Inquiry adjourned until 10.15 am the following day)














1 I N D E X

Closing submissions by MR EICKE ................. 1