Page 1

1 Tuesday, 13th May 2003

2 (9.30 am)

3 LORD SAVILLE: We start, I think, by swearing David, do we

4 not.

5 DAVID, sworn

6 Questioned by MR CLARKE

7 LORD SAVILLE: David, I will introduce myself. I am the

8 Chairman of the Inquiry. My colleagues sit beside me.

9 Questions will come from the barristers and we may ask

10 you to speak up, but at the moment your voice is coming

11 over loud and clear.

12 MR CLARKE: I am Counsel to the Tribunal. I am the first

13 person who is going to ask you some questions.

14 There are a number of preliminaries that I ought to

15 explain before we start. As I am sure you know, we are

16 sitting in the Methodist Central Hall in London where

17 you can be seen by the Tribunal and by the lawyers to

18 the parties, but not by the public, although they can

19 hear what you say.

20 I should tell you that the Tribunal has made some

21 rulings which relate, or may relate to your evidence.

22 The first is that witnesses should not be asked, nor

23 should they answer, any questions the answer to which

24 would or might identify members of the Security Service

25 past and present, including, of course, yourself, or

Page 2

1 questions which would prejudice the operation of the

2 Security Service by revealing its methods of operation

3 or techniques or the like.

4 If you think that an answer to any question that

5 anybody asks you will or might do any of those things,

6 please do not answer it and we will see if we can

7 resolve the issue here. I should tell you that Counsel

8 and solicitors for the security service are in the hall

9 and please take your time if you have any doubt.

10 It is possible that in the course of your evidence

11 somebody will object to your being asked or answering

12 a particular question. That will mean that somebody

13 will stand up in the hall here; you may not be able to

14 see that happening, but you will be able to hear what is

15 said.

16 Please do not answer a question if objection is

17 taken to it before the Tribunal has dealt with the

18 objection.

19 Next, you have, I believe, two hard copy bundles of

20 documents for you to look at. I will have to give

21 instructions for documents to appear on a screen in this

22 hall, but we will be looking at the same document but in

23 different forms.

24 The last matter that I should explain is that

25 everybody here has had the opportunity of reading your

Page 3

1 statement to this Tribunal and I am going to ask you

2 a number of questions that arise out of it.

3 Do you have your statement to this Tribunal? Could

4 we have it on the screen here, KD2.1, which, as appears

5 from the second page, you signed on 17th February 2000?

6 LORD SAVILLE: While we are looking for that, as

7 I understand it, Mr Tate, our solicitor to the Inquiry

8 is present.

9 A. Yes, I have it.

10 Q. Are the contents that statement true to the best of your

11 knowledge and belief?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Could you have a look at paragraphs 1 to 3 and could we

14 have those highlighted on the screen here. You

15 describe, in the first paragraph, how in 1970 you were

16 appointed as Security Liaison Officer for

17 Northern Ireland and you describe how, in paragraph 2,

18 some three months after arriving in Northern Ireland,

19 you were appointed Director of Intelligence for

20 Northern Ireland, based at the Army's headquarters in

21 Lisburn and given an equivalent military rank of major

22 general.

23 You describe in paragraph 3 how your task was to

24 co-ordinate intelligence-gathering efforts of the

25 various elements of the Security Forces and how you

Page 4

1 oversaw a department consisting of Security Service and

2 military officers. Do you recall how big your

3 department was at that stage?

4 A. No, I do not, I am afraid. It is the size -- it was a

5 pretty small Security Service then, but I maintained the

6 SLO's role, as well as being Director of Intelligence.

7 Q. Can you give us any idea of the size; are we talking

8 about four or five people or 20 or 30, or what sort

9 of --

10 A. The Security Service had about four or five.

11 Q. From the military, from the Army itself, do you remember

12 how many approximately?

13 A. There were a fair number of Army, most of them

14 regimental Officers.

15 Q. Would I be right in thinking that you were in regular

16 contact with the GOC and the CLF and other senior

17 officers?

18 A. Oh, yes, every morning.

19 Q. I would now like to have on the screen in London,

20 please, C48.299 and I would like you to look at

21 a document which in our yellow bundle is at flag 1D; it

22 is the memorandum headed, "The situation in Londonderry

23 as at the 7th January 1972"?

24 A. Yes, I have it.

25 Q. This is a memorandum which was written by General Ford

Page 5

1 as Commander of Land Forces for the attention of the

2 GOC, General Tuzo. It is headed, and it describes, "The

3 situation in Londonderry as at the 7th January 1972" and

4 it was probably written on the following Monday, which

5 was 10th January, and it describes, as one can see in

6 the first paragraph, a visit that General Ford had paid

7 to Londonderry on Friday, 7th January with the Assistant

8 Chief Constable (Operations) and discussions that he had

9 had with the Commander of 8 Brigade and others.

10 Do you recall ever having seen this document?

11 A. I cannot recall it.

12 Q. If we turn over the page to paragraph 6, in the document

13 General Ford considers how to deal with the problem of

14 the DYH, as he describes them, the Derry Young Hooligans

15 and if you look in the middle of the paragraph, there is

16 a sentence which begins:

17 "As I understand it, the commander of a body of

18 troops called out to restore law and order has a duty to

19 use minimum force but he also has a duty to restore law

20 and order. We have fulfilled the first duty but are

21 failing in the second. I am coming to the conclusion

22 that the minimum force necessary to achieve

23 a restoration of law and order is to shoot selected

24 ringleaders amongst the DYH, after clear warnings have

25 been issued."

Page 6

1 Do you recall that suggestion or proposal being

2 considered in January 1972?

3 A. Sorry, I have got a frog -- I was not consulted on this

4 document and I dealt more or less exclusively with the

5 GOC rather than with General Ford.

6 Q. Whether or not you consulted on this document, do you

7 have any recollection of this proposal or suggestion

8 being discussed with you or when you were present?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Could we come over the page, please, to paragraph 8. In

11 this paragraph of the document, General Ford deals with

12 the possibility of a march from the Creggan to the

13 Guildhall Square at 1400 hours on Sunday, 16th January.

14 He goes on to say that he has told the Commander of

15 8 Brigade to prepare a plan over the weekend. About

16 halfway down the paragraph he says:

17 "I have issued a warning order to 1 King's Own

18 Border ... and 1 Para."

19 He goes on to say this:

20 "I have asked D Int [which presumably is you] to get

21 the best possible intelligence of the possible strengths

22 of the march and its real intentions. As a result D Int

23 went to Londonderry yesterday and will report today.

24 I understand that the SB [Special Branch] warnings I had

25 about the march may well prove to be unfounded."

Page 7

1 Do you recall going to Londonderry on the second

2 Sunday in January in order to get intelligence about the

3 possible strength of the march and its real intentions?

4 A. No, I do not and I went frequently to various parts of

5 Northern Ireland and I was dealing and making contact

6 with the Security Forces and I had no knowledge whatever

7 of what General Ford was talking about.

8 I said, I think in my first statement --

9 Q. Do you have any recollection of what you reported on at

10 this stage about the march?

11 A. Reported on to whom?

12 Q. To General Ford?

13 A. No, I do not report to General Ford, I report

14 exclusively to the GOC.

15 Q. Do you have any recollection of reporting anything to

16 the GOC about the march as a result of going to

17 Londonderry to find out about it?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Can you, please, have a look at paragraph 8 of your

20 statement --

21 LORD SAVILLE: Before you do that, Lord Gifford is on his

22 feet.

23 LORD GIFFORD: Sir, the fault may be mine, but it would be

24 most helpful to have at least an index to the bundle

25 which David has been supplied with. I had not

Page 8

1 appreciated that the screen would not be visible to him

2 and in case there are documents which we possibly should

3 have given notice of but are not in the bundle, it would

4 be helpful to know which documents are in the bundle

5 and, indeed, when we later come to question him, it may

6 be better to be able to give the appropriate references.

7 LORD SAVILLE: I wonder which is the best way of dealing

8 with it. We can either deal with it that way or are you

9 in a position to supply documents you may wish to deploy

10 to the Inquiry?

11 LORD GIFFORD: Very soon if asked, yes. I know which ones

12 I may want to refer to and certainly during the next

13 half hour I could put it in written form.

14 LORD SAVILLE: I do not know, Mr Clarke, do you have any

15 suggestions as to which is the best way? In a sense

16 I think the quickest way -- is the quickest way to let

17 Lord Gifford have a list of the documents in the bundle

18 Mr Tate has, or for Lord Gifford to give us a list of

19 documents so that we can do the same exercise but the

20 other way round, so to speak.

21 MR CLARKE: I am quite happy for my learned friends to have

22 a list of the documents in the bundle that I have

23 prepared. I do observe that parties were invited, by

24 Wednesday of last week, to produce a list of documents

25 to which they wished to refer, to which Messrs Madden &

Page 9

1 Finucane produced a most helpful list, together with the

2 attachments.

3 What my learned friend is asking for is, if I may

4 respectfully say so, that with which he should have

5 complied.

6 LORD SAVILLE: If you have a copy of that list, Mr Clarke,

7 perhaps you would give it to Lord Gifford and we will

8 see, Lord Gifford, if there are additional documents,

9 whether we can do anything at this stage, but we did

10 make the request some days ago. Do you have a list for

11 Lord Gifford or can someone supply him with one?

12 (Handed)

13 I am sorry, David, for that interruption.

14 Mr Clarke, do continue.

15 MR CLARKE: I was asking you to look at paragraph 8 of your

16 statement, and we have that on the screen at KD2.2.

17 Paragraph 8 of your statement in February 2000 you said,

18 this:

19 "I have been asked if there was any intelligence of

20 which I was aware that specifically predicted that the

21 IRA would attempt to exploit the NICRA march in

22 Londonderry on 30th January 1972 as cover for attacking

23 the Army. I do not remember any intelligence specific

24 to the march in question to that effect but I do

25 remember that it was endemic at the time that the IRA

Page 10

1 would join marches, demonstrations and any civil

2 disturbance to exploit opportunities to cause

3 trouble ..."

4 Since that statement was signed by you in the year

5 2000, further evidence has come to light relating,

6 amongst other things, to an agent in Londonderry who is

7 known to this Inquiry as Observer C and who communicated

8 from time to time with the Security Service through

9 Observer D and I believe that you have seen the bundle

10 of documents that we are working on last night; is that

11 right?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Looking at the document that you have seen, do you have

14 any recollection now of there being a Security Service

15 agent in Londonderry in January 1972?

16 A. The problem is, you see, I did not go to Londonderry to

17 get information about the march and I really cannot now

18 recollect the identity or names of --

19 Q. I do not want you in any way to reveal anything about

20 identity or names of any agents. I was asking whether

21 you had now any recollection of there being an agent in

22 Londonderry, who lived in Londonderry?

23 A. Not, I think -- I was the -- principally with the

24 Special Branch of the RUC for internal security.

25 Q. I would like, in that case, if I may, to go through the

Page 11

1 documents the Inquiry has been provided with to see if

2 they bring back any recollection. Could we, please,

3 have on the screen KJ4.62. This is a document which you

4 will find in tab 1E of the bundle with which we are

5 working. On the first page at tab 1E there is a copy of

6 the original telegram, KJ4.61, but there is a fair typed

7 copy at KJ4.62. Do you have that document?

8 A. Document 62?

9 Q. Yes?

10 A. Yes, I have that in front of me.

11 Q. We can see that this is a telegram sent from D of I

12 Northern Ireland to, or passed for the attention of

13 Julian. It is dated 10th January 1972. It reads as

14 follows:

15 "Following for Julian from Director of Intelligence,

16 Northern Ireland.

17 "We spoke on Saturday about the possibility of march

18 from the Creggan/Bogside to the Guildhall in Londonderry

19 on Sunday, 16th January. I was over there yesterday and

20 was told by Special Branch that there is some doubt

21 whether the march will in fact take place. The

22 organisations primarily concerned are the James Connolly

23 Republican Club, Derry CRA, with which are associated

24 the SRG and kindred souls of the lunatic left. Sam

25 Donnelly had some coverage but anything that you can do

Page 12

1 to let us know whether a march is intended, its

2 forming-up place and route, the intentions of the

3 organisers in the event of Security Forces counteraction

4 et cetera will be very welcome. We are anxious to take

5 no action that might stimulate a march where none is

6 intended but any action that you can take to secure the

7 information we need without this side effect deserves,

8 I think, a high priority."

9 Do you remember asking the Security Service Officer,

10 whom we know as Julian, to take action to secure

11 information about the intended march?

12 A. I have got almost no recollection of documents. I would

13 in fact draw attention to the JIC papers which I have

14 dealt with in my statement which shows the high level of

15 militant activity taking part in the area, with my

16 comments on it, and I suggest it might not be a bad idea

17 to start with that assessment of the troubles occurring

18 in various parts of Northern Ireland.

19 Q. I will come to that in due course. Are you telling us

20 that you now have no recollection of making efforts

21 through the security officer known as Julian --

22 A. I have no recollection of that at all.

23 Q. Can we come, please, to what for you is tab 2 of the

24 bundle. Could we have on the screen G50A.309.1. This

25 is a Joint Intelligence Committee document. It is dated

Page 13

1 11th January 1972. It says:

2 "The attached assessment by the Director of

3 Intelligence Northern Ireland for the week ended

4 10th January 1972 is circulated for consideration by the

5 Ireland Current Intelligence Group at their meeting on

6 12th January 1972."

7 Were you a member of the Joint Intelligence

8 Committee?

9 A. Is this the joint intelligence of Northern Ireland? Um,

10 no, I am sorry, I am still confused with these various

11 documents.

12 Q. Let us turn over the page to G50A.309.2 because the

13 first page that we were looking at is the UK Cabinet

14 Office document and the assessment which is attached, or

15 the document that is attached to it includes the

16 document that we are looking at now, G50A.309.2, which

17 is a meeting of the Director of Operations Intelligence

18 Committee Northern Ireland and am I right in thinking

19 that you certainly were a member of that committee?

20 A. Yes, but I have still no recollection of these documents

21 or of what, um, Julian and James were putting forward.

22 Q. Can you help us on this: if you look at the document

23 that follows the minutes of the meeting of the Director

24 of Operations Intelligence Committee, there is an

25 assessment for the period from 4th to 10th January 1972.

Page 14

1 If you look over the page to 309.3, in fact a number of

2 passages in the assessment have been blanked out. But

3 if we come, for instance, to 309.5, which is two pages

4 on, we can see the sort of thing with which it dealt

5 with. In paragraph 10 there is a reference to marches

6 and in the last sentence of paragraph 10, the assessment

7 reads:

8 "A further march which may be contemplated is in

9 Londonderry on 16th January sponsored by NICRA and the

10 James Connolly Republican Club: but there remains some

11 doubt as to whether the organisers will pursue the

12 idea."

13 Can you help us as to who would be the actual author

14 of these assessments for the Director of Operations

15 Intelligence Committee; would it be you?

16 A. No, what was the question?

17 Q. The question is: do you know who was the actual author

18 of the assessments that were provided to the Director of

19 Operations Intelligence Committee, such as the one that

20 we are looking at now, and in particular would it be you

21 yourself?

22 A. I really cannot remember the documents at this distance

23 of time.

24 Q. You cannot recall who would have written these

25 assessments?

Page 15

1 A. No.

2 Q. Could we go to tab 4A and for us on the screen in London

3 can we have KJ4.66. The document which has the

4 reference KJ4.66 is a fair copy of the document

5 immediately before it, which is KJ4.65, which is a note

6 for the file of the Security Service Officer named

7 Julian, dated 14th January 1972.

8 MR TATE: Christopher, could you hold on a moment, we do not

9 seem to have the document.

10 MR CLARKE: If you look immediately before tab 5.

11 MR TATE: Okay, I have it.

12 MR CLARKE: The file note reads as follows:

13 "Source (1) [he is the source we know as Observer D]

14 telephoned on 12th January to say that source (2) [he is

15 the one we know as Observer C] had visited all the

16 places in Derry where he would be likely to gather

17 information about the proposed march but had gleaned

18 absolutely no information about it at all and nobody

19 seemed to have heard of it.

20 "2. Source (1) rang again on 13th January with the

21 following message. He had spent a couple of hours in

22 Londonderry that morning and there was still no sign of

23 any march on Sunday. He thought, however, that a large

24 meeting of the Officials from Magherafelt and other

25 areas, which took place on 12th January in the evening

Page 16

1 in Magherafelt, might possibly have some bearing on the

2 matter."

3 I leave out paragraphs 3 and 4. Paragraph 5 of the

4 file note reads:

5 "All the above has been passed by telephone by me to

6 David."

7 The file note is signed by Julian.

8 I know that you have no recollection in relation to

9 specific documents, but do you recall, in January 1972,

10 being informed by the Security Service Officer known as

11 Julian, of intelligence about the march that he was

12 gaining or trying to gain from a source in Londonderry?

13 A. No, I do not recollect.

14 Q. Could we please turn to G60B367.4, and that is the

15 second document at tab 5. These are the minutes of the

16 Director of Operations Intelligence Committee for

17 Northern Ireland for the next Monday, 17th January.

18 They have attached to them an assessment for the period

19 from 11th to 17thth January. If we turn, please, to

20 G60B.367.10, which is the last document in tab 5, there

21 is a passage in the assessment marked, "Outlook." If

22 one looks at the last two sentences, they read:

23 "The anti-internment campaign has been given new

24 momentum by the opening of Magilligan internment camp.

25 The planned march in Londonderry on 30th January will

Page 17

1 present a serious security problem."

2 Do you recall what exactly it was that caused the

3 assessment to be made that the planned march on

4 30th January would present a serious security problem?

5 A. No.

6 Q. I want to come on in time, if I may, to events

7 immediately before the march. Could we come, please, to

8 G75.459, which is tab 10 in the folder of documents. Do

9 you have that page; do you have it in front of you?

10 These are the minutes of the Director of Operations'

11 meeting, held on 26th January at HQ Northern Ireland.

12 In the first paragraph, under the heading "Intelligence

13 review," the minutes read:

14 "D Int spoke of intelligence developments noted

15 during the last week."

16 At paragraph 5, under the heading, "NICRA march

17 Londonderry -- 30th January," the minutes record:

18 "Head of Special Branch said that NICRA plans two

19 marches; one from the Creggan to the Guildhall and the

20 other from Shantallow to the Guildhall. The organisers

21 are holding a further meeting on Thursday,

22 27th January ..."

23 The minutes then go on to record that:

24 "Three courses open to the Security Forces for the

25 main march were then considered."

Page 18

1 They are then set out. Then the minute records:

2 "After discussing the implications of each course it

3 was agreed that the second course would be adopted,

4 namely that the marchers would be prevented from leaving

5 the Bogside and Creggan and that barriers would be

6 placed up to 200 yards inside these areas."

7 Do you have any recollection now of discussing the

8 march that was to take place the following Sunday at the

9 meeting of the Director of Operations committee on the

10 Wednesday prior to the march?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Do you have any recollection of discussing either at

13 that meeting or outside that meeting an arrest operation

14 to be conducted in Londonderry on that Sunday?

15 A. No, I do not.

16 Q. Do you have any recollection of any discussion about

17 whether or not the Army or the RUC might be fired upon

18 at the march which was due to take place the following

19 Sunday?

20 A. No.

21 Q. Could we come, please, to tab 16 of the folder that you

22 have. May we have on the screen KJ4.71.

23 MR TATE: Would you repeat the reference?

24 MR CLARKE: KJ4.71, it is at tab 16. 4.71 is a typed-up

25 copy of a note for the file, which is on the two

Page 19

1 immediately preceding pages. The note is made by Julian

2 and it records, this:

3 "I saw Observer C at Observer D's house on

4 26th January. Apart from the intelligence in the note

5 for file at serial [blank] he also gave me the

6 following, which was passed by me verbally to David that

7 evening."

8 Paragraph 2:

9 "Plans for the march were as follows ..." and he

10 gives a series of details about the proposed route and

11 about five lines up from the bottom of paragraph 2,

12 says:

13 "The marchers were expecting to meet Security

14 Forces' road blocks and had made plans for alternative

15 routes if necessary. They were also prepared to cause

16 diversions to draw troops from the main route, using

17 their hooligan element. These diversions were probably

18 taking place in the Brandywell area."

19 If one looks back at the first paragraph, he refers

20 to intelligence in the note for file at a different

21 serial number. If you could go three pages on to

22 KJ4.74, there is a note for the file which is, we think,

23 the one to which he must have been referring. That note

24 records:

25 "On Monday, 31st January at about 9.45 a.m, David

Page 20

1 telephoned and asked me to pass over, within half an

2 hour, the gist of the intelligence we had given to him

3 verbally during the previous week ..."

4 In paragraph 2 he sets out a message which

5 incorporates that gist. That message, is this:

6 "A reliable source reported on 26th January that the

7 organisers of this Londonderry march on 30th January

8 were planning their route to pass the maximum number of

9 flashpoints and had prepared alternative routes as they

10 knew they would be stopped by the Security Forces. It

11 was believed that the marchers would be armed with

12 stones and bottles and that the IRA would use the crowd

13 as cover for sniping attacks on the Security Forces.

14 The organisers were determined to have their revenge for

15 Magilligan, which they regarded as a humiliating defeat.

16 Also that the hooligan element would be used to create

17 diversions and draw the troops away from the main

18 route."

19 According to the two file notes, the information

20 about what Observer C was saying about what was going to

21 happen at the march was passed by Julian to you verbally

22 on the evening of 26th January. Do you have now any

23 recollection of receiving, shortly before the march,

24 intelligence of this nature from Julian which he had

25 received from an agent in Londonderry?

Page 21

1 A. I think we can go on and on about these documents, which

2 I do not remember and, um, in fact I have some

3 difficulty in, until I had met him, of who Julian was.

4 Q. I think the answer to my question is: this brings back

5 no recollection at all?

6 A. No recollection at all. I mean, there is a difference

7 between, you know, operational intelligence which the

8 Army and police need and security intelligence which,

9 um, we need to build up a picture of the, um, capacity

10 of the IRA and its potential for causing trouble.

11 I was concerned with the latter rather than the

12 former. All the times I was in Northern Ireland, as

13 I have repeatedly said, I was trying to build up

14 a security organisation -- a security and an

15 intelligence organisation, I had both -- which would

16 provide reliable source, reliable structure to produce

17 reports which would be of use both to the operational

18 Army, police and me, and my job is to get the Army and

19 police to work together and this is told to me very

20 considerably, as I say, in the report which I signed

21 in March and which has been disclosed.

22 Q. Could we have on the screen, please, G81A.511.1. This

23 is tab 13. This is a letter to Mr David Johnston in the

24 RUC, dated 27th January 1972. It reads:

25 "Dear David:

Page 22

1 "I enclose a copy of a signal I have this morning

2 sent to Commander 8th Infantry Brigade, based on

3 information from London. I have reversed the normal

4 process of passing information first to you on this

5 occasion because the commander is holding a planning

6 meeting this morning.

7 "Yours sincerely, David."

8 Do you recognise the "Dear David" and "yours

9 sincerely, David" handwriting?

10 A. Yes, I do.

11 Q. Is it yours?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. If one goes over the page, which for us is KJ4.45, there

14 is a largely illegible signal, but we can see from the

15 copy on the screen and in front of you that it was sent

16 on 27th January 1972 from HQ Northern Ireland to

17 Commander 8 Brigade.

18 If we go to KJ4.48, there is a typed copy of the

19 signal. The operative words of the signal read as

20 follows:

21 "Following is personal for commander from Director

22 of Intelligence:

23 "One. The source known to you has provided the

24 following information about plans for the march ..."

25 Item two deals with the route that the march is

Page 23

1 expected to take. Item three deals with a possible

2 diversion in the Brandywell area. Item four contains

3 the intelligence:

4 "Source believes that the marchers will be armed

5 with sticks and stones and he expects that the IRA will

6 use the crowd as cover. The organisers are determined

7 to have their revenge to what they regard as

8 a humiliating defeat at Magilligan."

9 Do you have any recollection now of sending a signal

10 to this effect?

11 A. What is in paragraphs one, two, three and four is

12 basically operational intelligence, which is needed by

13 the police and Army. It is not security intelligence

14 with which I am interested with regard to the capacity

15 of the, um, various factions in the IRA, or other

16 terrorists.

17 Q. I understand that distinction. But if we go back to the

18 original document, the signal at KJ4.45?

19 A. Uh-huh.

20 Q. This appears, upon its face, to be a signal sent from HQ

21 Northern Ireland to the commander of 8 Infantry from the

22 Director of Intelligence, which is you. Are you saying

23 that you do not think that you sent any such signal or

24 simply that you have no recollection now of this

25 document, as of many others?

Page 24

1 A. I do recollect that intelligence, but, as I said, there

2 is a difference between security intelligence and

3 operational intelligence, and I was merely a conduit to

4 get the information as rapidly as possible to people who

5 would have to deal with it on the ground.

6 Q. So in one sense you were acting as a post bag, to get

7 the intelligence from those who had gathered it to the

8 people on the ground who had to deal with it

9 operationally?

10 A. Right.

11 Q. Is that your point?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Could we have a look, please, at what for you is tab 11;

14 for us, G76.464, the second page in tab 11. These are

15 the minutes of a meeting of the joint Security Committee

16 held on Thursday, 27th January at Stormont. This is not

17 a meeting at which you are recorded as being present.

18 Did you ever attend the Joint Security Committee

19 meetings in Northern Ireland?

20 A. This is a Northern Ireland --

21 Q. Yes, it is?

22 A. No, I mean a Northern Ireland committee.

23 Q. Yes, it is; did you ever attend it?

24 A. Not that I am aware of.

25 Q. There is only one point I would like to ask you about,

Page 25

1 which is this: could we come over to the next page,

2 G76.465. Under the heading, "Forthcoming events," there

3 is a discussion of the:

4 "Proposed marches on Saturday ... and Sunday (in

5 Londonderry)," and how they posed considerable problems.

6 In the second paragraph, beginning at the second

7 sentence, the minute records:

8 "The Londonderry marches presented more serious

9 difficulties and security action will be primarily an

10 Army operation."

11 Then I omit the next sentence. The sentence after

12 that reads as follows:

13 "The basic plan here will be to block all routes

14 into William Street and stop the march there. The

15 operation might well develop into rioting and even

16 a shooting war."

17 Then it goes on to deal with other things. Do you

18 have any recollection of it being recognised at HQ

19 Northern Ireland that there was a prospect that the

20 Londonderry march might develop into a shooting war?

21 A. I do not recollect that specifically, no. I was not at

22 that meeting.

23 Q. Were you yourself involved in any way with the planning

24 of the operation in Londonderry on 30th January?

25 A. Not in any way whatever.

Page 26

1 Q. May we go back, please, to tab 16; for us KJ4.74. The

2 march, as we know, of course took place on Sunday,

3 30th January. This file note by James of 31st January

4 records, that at about 9.45 on that day, Monday,

5 31st January, David, that is to say you:

6 "... telephoned and asked me to pass over, within

7 half an hour, the gist of the intelligence we had given

8 to him verbally during the previous week when Julian was

9 in Northern Ireland."

10 Do you have any recollection of asking for the gist

11 of the intelligence that you had been given verbally to

12 be passed over in writing and doing so on Monday,

13 31st January?

14 A. No, I do not.

15 Q. I think it follows from that that you do not know why,

16 if you made this request, you did make it?

17 A. I was not concerned with the operational aspects, not at

18 any stage.

19 Q. Assuming that this note is accurate and you telephoned

20 to ask Julian to pass over the gist of the intelligence

21 that had been given to you verbally, do you know what

22 would have prompted you to do that?

23 A. I do not really recollect doing it.

24 Q. Can we turn over the page, for us KJ4.76, which is

25 a fair copy of what appears at KJ4.75, which is

Page 27

1 a telegram, dated 31st January. It reads as follows:

2 "Following for James or Julian from Director of

3 Intelligence, Northern Ireland:

4 "1. We should be grateful if you could arrange to

5 contact your source in Londonderry for any background to

6 yesterday's events that he can provide.

7 "2. Special Branch have a report, which they grade

8 about B3, that [blank] who live in the Rossville Flats

9 saw weapons being distributed behind the flats a short

10 distance beyond the furthest point to which the

11 Parachute Regiment penetrated. Any confirmation of such

12 arming would be extremely valuable."

13 The document speaks for itself, but do you have any

14 recollection now of learning from Special Branch that

15 somebody had reported seeing weapons being distributed

16 behind the flats a short distance beyond the furthest

17 point to which the Parachute Regiment had penetrated?

18 A. Yes, as I said before, operational, not security

19 intelligence and I was, in that sort of case, a conduit

20 for getting it quickly to the people who would have to

21 deal with it, and I was not one of those people.

22 Q. My question was whether you have any recollection now of

23 receiving this intelligence from Special Branch and

24 passing it on?

25 A. No.

Page 28

1 Q. May we look, please, at -- for us G123.819. This you

2 will find at the back of tab 17, it is the last document

3 in tab 17, which is a fair copy of the telegram, which

4 is very difficult to read which, in your bundle, is

5 immediately before this fair copy. It is a telegram of

6 the 1st February 1972 and what it reads is, "Following

7 for [blank]." It is in fact:

8 "Following for James from Director of Intelligence

9 Northern Ireland.

10 "Reference my telegram ..."

11 It says 22 of 21 January, but that is a mistake for

12 the 31st and it is a reference to the telegram we were

13 looking at a moment ago:

14 "I have now learnt that the B3 report of weapons

15 being handed out in Londonderry came from [something has

16 been left out, but in fact it is a reference to the

17 agent or informer whom we know as] Observer B who learnt

18 of it from colleagues in Londonderry. I believe you are

19 meeting him on Wednesday. Could you please debrief him

20 on this."

21 We have understood from other evidence that

22 Observer B was an informant who did not live in

23 Londonderry, but who visited Londonderry from time to

24 time. Do you now have any recollection of an agent or

25 informant who answers to that description?

Page 29

1 A. No.

2 Q. Can we turn, please, to tab 17A, for us G123.815.

3 G123.815 is a fair copy of a telegram, a copy of the

4 original of which appears on the two preceding pages,

5 813 and 814. It reads -- in fact there should be

6 something added to what is there. What it reads is:

7 "Following from Julian I saw [something has been

8 omitted that should be] Observer B yesterday and

9 obtained more precise information about the report he

10 submitted ... on Monday, 31st January."

11 Then it deals with the circumstances in which the

12 information was obtained and has a reference to an

13 "unconscious subsource." In the last full paragraph the

14 telegram, reads:

15 "This subsource said that he had caught one of the

16 buses from the New Lodge Road on the morning of Sunday,

17 30th January, which was taking people to join the

18 march."

19 Then there is a reference to the bus arriving late.

20 Then in the fifth line, it says, this:

21 "He said that he saw cars (numbers not stated)

22 loaded with weapons in the Brandywell area near

23 Free Derry Corner/Lecky Road. One car had a pile of

24 Thompson sub-machine-guns on the back seat, others were

25 loaded with rifles and pistols. These weapons were

Page 30

1 being distributed from the cars at the location stated.

2 This same subsource said that he had talked that same

3 afternoon to a group of Provisionals ... who were very

4 angry with themselves for having left their guns in the

5 pub at Free Derry Corner ..."

6 This appears to be intelligence from an unconscious

7 subsource that cars, loaded with weapons, had appeared

8 at some stage and weapons were distributed from those

9 cars.

10 Do you have any recollection of learning of that

11 sort of intelligence, that information?

12 A. No, I have not and, once again, it is a question of

13 operational intelligence for which I was nothing really

14 more than a conduit.

15 Q. The Observer, Observer B from whom this information was

16 obtained, has now died. But before he died he gave

17 a statement to this Tribunal in which he said that he

18 was in Londonderry two days prior to the march and saw

19 a group of what he took to be IRA auxiliaries drilling

20 in an area called Glenfada Park and later saw them on

21 the landings of Block 2 of the Rossville Flats,

22 apparently planning how to direct sniper fire at the

23 Army.

24 Do you now have any recollection of any intelligence

25 about people being seen drilling or practising sniper

Page 31

1 activity?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Thank you, those are my questions, there will be some

4 others.

5 MR TATE: Lord Saville, could we have a break for two

6 moments, please.

7 LORD SAVILLE: Do you want to ask a question before we have

8 a break, Mr Mansfield?

9 MR MANSFIELD: Could I ask for clarification on one matter;

10 it may be we have misheard, it may be we have not been

11 provided with certain things. On three separate

12 occasions during the evidence this morning, the witness

13 seems to be referring to documents that we do not have.

14 For example, on the first occasion, when talking

15 about the Ford memorandum, the witness said that in his

16 first statement, but he never completed what he was

17 going to say. We only have one statement, it may be he

18 meant that statement.

19 However, on a second occasion, when drawing

20 attention to the Joint Intelligence Committee papers, he

21 said that they were dealt with in his statement. Well,

22 they are not in the statement that we have.

23 Thirdly, when he was dealing with his role of

24 getting the Army and the police to work together, he

25 indicated that he had signed a report in March which had

Page 32

1 been disclosed. Again, if it has -- and it is something

2 that has happened since his statement, we do not appear

3 to have it.

4 May I ask that this opportunity is taken to see

5 whether what I have highlighted is either correct or an

6 error.

7 LORD SAVILLE: I think that is a very good idea,

8 Mr Mansfield. I only have one statement in front of me.

9 The other points you raise also did not ring any bells

10 with me either. Mr Clarke may be able to help, but

11 otherwise we will take this opportunity of a break to

12 see if we can clarify the position.

13 We will take a break for a few minutes now and come

14 back in about 10, 15 minutes time.

15 (10.35 a.m)

16 (A short break)

17 (1.55 pm)

18 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Clarke, I understand we have largely

19 sorted this matter out. The Tribunal has been given

20 a second statement by David and there are various other

21 documents I think to which Mr Mansfield referred, but on

22 which you can now explain the position.

23 MR CLARKE: We have resolved some of the problems. There

24 is, and there has now been circulated, a second

25 statement of David's signed, apparently, on

Page 33

1 11th April 2003. I am afraid I was not personally aware

2 of its existence until after my examination was

3 concluded.

4 What appears to have happened is that although the

5 statement was prepared and signed, it does not, I think,

6 appear to have been delivered to the Inquiry so that

7 I was obviously unaware of it when I examined by

8 reference to what I supposed to be the only statement.

9 That statement refers in it to a number of documents

10 which are documents that have already been disclosed and

11 I can give the references if anybody has failed to find

12 them. It does refer in paragraph 27 to a number of

13 intelligence reports or assessments and it does so in

14 terms that appear to reveal more than is contained in

15 the redacted version of the reports that have been

16 included in the bundles.

17 Mr Mansfield raised that with me when we adjourned.

18 The position appears to be that, at any rate in relation

19 to those documents, what is in the bundles is the most

20 redacted version, in the sense that when the documents

21 were put into the bundles, they were put into a form

22 which contained then suggested redactions, as I think

23 the maximum of what might be redacted. There was then

24 an exercise by all relevant security agencies for the

25 purposes of making a PII claim and it transpires that

Page 34

1 some of that which was originally redacted has become

2 unredacted and it is the unredacted copy that David had

3 obviously seen at the time when his statement, his

4 second statement was drafted.

5 I have handed to my learned friend Mr Mansfield

6 copies of the documents in which he is particularly

7 interested in the ultimate form in which they should be

8 redacted. There are still some redactions, but

9 considerably less and I hope that that will meet

10 a difficulty that might otherwise have arisen.

11 In the light of the fact that I now have the second

12 statement, I would just like to ask David to attest to

13 its accuracy and to deal with a supplementary question

14 that arises out of it.

15 David, do you have your second statement. Could we

16 have on the screen KD2.3, which you signed on 11th April

17 of this year?

18 A. Yes, I have got it.

19 Q. Are the contents of that statement true to the best of

20 your knowledge and belief?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. I must say that I am very sorry that you have been asked

23 by me this morning a number of questions which it would

24 not have been necessary for me to ask had I been aware

25 of the existence of your second statement and which you

Page 35

1 must have been wondering why I was asking, in the light

2 of the fact that you had signed that statement. I am

3 sorry about that.

4 There is one question that I would like to ask you

5 which arises out of your second statement. Could you

6 look at paragraph 3 and could we have on the screen

7 KD2.4. You refer in that paragraph 3 to a document

8 which we have been describing as "the signal document,"

9 dated 27th January 1972 which we looked at this morning.

10 You say in the fourth line:

11 "I believe that it is genuine. I recognise my

12 signature on the covering letter and the format is

13 a standard one that I used. I find it surprising that

14 I did not initial this document before it was sent; that

15 was my normal practice. However, while I do not

16 recollect sending this document, it is unlikely that any

17 of my staff would have issued it in my name, without

18 first clearing it with me."

19 You told us this morning, and you say here that you

20 recognised your signature on the covering letter. When

21 you say you find it surprising that you did not initial

22 this document, is that referring to the signal which was

23 sent or appears to have been sent with the letter?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. There is one further question I would like to ask you

Page 36

1 about this letter and the signal. The Tribunal received

2 some evidence yesterday which suggested that in sending

3 to the RUC your letter with the signal that we are

4 talking about, it might have been necessary for you to

5 follow a procedure that applied to the Ministry of

6 Defence in respect of recording documents and it was

7 suggested that it might have been necessary to complete

8 a form 102 document and to stamp the document that was

9 sent with a stamp showing on what file the original of

10 the document was stored?

11 A. What is a 102 form?

12 Q. I gather it is a form in use by the MoD for recording

13 what has happened to secret documents. Do I understand

14 from your answer that it is not a form you have any

15 recollection of?

16 A. No, it is not.

17 Q. Was it your practice at any stage to stamp documents,

18 such as your letter or the signal attached to the

19 letter, with some form of stamp referring to a file on

20 which an original of the document was stored or could be

21 found?

22 A. I think what I have said on this is that with the amount

23 of stuff that is going through, it was -- and which is

24 reflected in the signals that are quoted in my second

25 statement, um, it is entirely unlikely, we would be more

Page 37

1 or less making up procedures as we went along.

2 MR CLARKE: Thank you, that is the only additional question

3 that I wanted to ask.

4 Questioned by MR MACDONALD

5 MR MACDONALD: David, can you hear me?

6 LORD SAVILLE: Try again, it was not very clear to me

7 either.

8 MR MACDONALD: Can you hear me?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. My name is MacDonald, I represent some of the families,

11 if I could ask you a few questions.

12 Can I ask you first of all, without saying where you

13 are, why you were not prepared to come to London to give

14 evidence to this Inquiry?

15 A. The reason for that is that I now find it extremely

16 difficult to concentrate for any length of time and I am

17 fairly shattered when I have had to do so and it takes

18 time to recover. I am 84 years old now and I do not

19 travel well and so I elected to give evidence on

20 a videolink.

21 Q. Did you consult with members of the Security Service

22 whenever you were preparing your second statement?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And they in fact drafted that statement for you

25 effectively; did they not?

Page 38

1 A. No, I signed, this being my view.

2 Q. To what extent did you draft any of the passages that

3 appear in your second statement?

4 A. Are you referring to the, the telegrams and so on?

5 Q. No, the second statement that was signed, apparently on

6 11th April this year?

7 A. I did the -- I gave the information to security,

8 present-day security staff who put it into the form in

9 which it now is.

10 Q. Can I ask you whether you travelled to London for any

11 purposes related to that, either to speak to the

12 Security Service or to look at documents?

13 A. I have been to London, yes, but, as I said a few minutes

14 ago, the effort of, of concentrating has a long-term

15 effect on my very short-term mental capacity now.

16 Q. Did you travel to London in order to consult with the

17 Security Service for the purpose of drafting and

18 preparing this statement that was signed in April this

19 year?

20 A. No.

21 Q. Sorry, I thought you said you have travelled to London

22 recently; did I misunderstand you?

23 A. I travelled to London and experienced reaction to the

24 prolonged exposure to trying to bring back memories of

25 30-odd years ago, particularly when they were referring

Page 39

1 to individual documents which I just do not recollect.

2 Q. Can I ask you when you last travelled to London?

3 A. When did I last travel to London, um, I know, yes, it

4 was on, on the 11th, when I signed the document.

5 Q. The 11th April. Is that the 11th April this year?

6 A. No, sorry, I signed it here, sorry, I have got it wrong,

7 yes.

8 Q. Sorry, are you saying this on the basis of your own

9 recollection or are you saying this on the basis of

10 prompts that you are receiving in that room? I ask you

11 that because you seem to be looking around a lot.

12 LORD SAVILLE: I think, be assured on that point,

13 Mr MacDonald, we have Mr Tate in the room.

14 MR MACDONALD: It appears that there are other people in the

15 room, maybe I have misunderstood this, but it looks as

16 if there are other people in the room apart from

17 Mr Tate; is that right.

18 MR TATE: Lord Saville, in addition to myself there is

19 David's son, the technician and a gentleman from the

20 Security Service who is helping me hand documents over

21 to David.

22 LORD SAVILLE: I would assume, Mr Tate, that you were

23 ensuring there was no communication between the last of

24 those you mentioned and the witness.

25 MR TATE: Indeed.

Page 40

1 MR MACDONALD: It is just, David, I can see you looking for

2 reassurance, perhaps, from other people in the room and

3 I was going to ask you whether there was a member of the

4 Security Service in the room with you and that appears

5 to be the case; do you understand? Can you hear me?

6 A. Yes, but as has just been explained, there is a member

7 of the Security Service.

8 Q. You said you travelled to London on 11th April this

9 year, as I understood it, to sign your statement --

10 LORD SAVILLE: I do not think that is clear yet,

11 Mr MacDonald, looking at the transcript. Perhaps you

12 could make one further attempt to see if this witness

13 can remember so that he can answer your original

14 question which is, I think: when did you last travel to

15 London.

16 MR MACDONALD: Before I ask that question again, I thought

17 you had said that but then changed your mind when you

18 looked around at someone else in the room; is that not

19 the way it happened?

20 A. Could you repeat that question?

21 Q. I thought you had said originally that you had travelled

22 to London on the 11th to sign your statement, that is

23 11th April of this year. Then you looked around and

24 changed your mind.

25 A. Mmm.

Page 41

1 Q. What is the position; when was the last time you

2 travelled to London?

3 A. The last time I travelled to London, I am afraid

4 I cannot precisely remember.

5 Q. Was it in the last few --

6 A. The documents -- this document here was not signed in

7 London.

8 Q. Did you travel to London within the last few months in

9 order to either read documents for the purpose of this

10 statement or to consult with the Security Service or for

11 any other purpose?

12 A. I think I have already answered that question: yes,

13 I had gone to London and was completely knackered as

14 a result of the experience I had in trying to recall

15 evidence, particularly evidence on little bits of paper

16 which, um, by which I had been surrounded.

17 Q. If you were prepared to travel to London for that

18 purpose or for some other purpose within the last few

19 months, why were you not willing to come to London again

20 to appear in person before this Tribunal?

21 A. But again, can you make me aware what it is you are

22 leading up to?

23 Q. No.

24 A. Well, I told you that the experience of going to London

25 had a lasting effect. I am now 84 years old; I have

Page 42

1 a very dodgy short-term memory and it takes a while for

2 me to recover.

3 Q. Do you know why your statement was not supplied, that is

4 your second statement was not supplied to the Inquiry;

5 I am not suggesting that you have any direct

6 responsibility for this, David, I just want to inquire

7 whether or not you had any knowledge of that?

8 A. No, I had nothing to do with it today, transmitting it.

9 Q. Is it the case that you are reluctant to co-operate with

10 this Inquiry fully?

11 A. I am sorry?

12 Q. Is it the case that you are reluctant to co-operate with

13 this Inquiry fully and you did not want to attend in

14 person?

15 A. No.

16 Q. But you prefer to have --

17 A. I am trying to be as helpful as I can in the statements

18 that I made -- my second statement and um I do not think

19 I can go further than that. I just do not remember --

20 Q. Do you feel more comfortable giving evidence from where

21 you are on a video screen with a Security Service

22 Officer by your side?

23 A. No.

24 Q. You have suggested in your evidence that there was an

25 important distinction between operational intelligence

Page 43

1 and security intelligence?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And that you really were not responsible for operational

4 intelligence?

5 A. That is true.

6 Q. Is it true? Is it not the case that you were equally

7 responsible for operational intelligence?

8 A. It is equally true that I was building up an

9 intelligence organisation which could deal with

10 operational intelligence.

11 Q. But you were actually equally responsible for

12 operational intelligence as of Bloody Sunday?

13 A. I am sorry?

14 Q. You were responsible for operational intelligence just

15 as much as you were responsible for security

16 intelligence as of January 1972?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Could I ask you to look at a document that should have

19 been sent to you some time today at GEN 1.72. Do you

20 see that that is --

21 A. I have not seen this document before.

22 Q. This is a document that was provided by the Cabinet

23 Office in July 2000 for the purpose of assisting the

24 Tribunal in understanding the nature and operation of

25 the intelligence organisation in Northern Ireland

Page 44

1 in January 1972?

2 A. Yes, but I have not seen this before.

3 Q. I am not suggesting you have, but your terms of

4 reference are set out at GEN 1.74, if that could be

5 pointed out to you. You see there is a bullet point

6 about halfway down the page:

7 "Terms of reference for the Director of

8 Intelligence ..."

9 That is you and you were to be responsible to the

10 GOC for the co-ordination of all sources of intelligence

11 deployed in Northern Ireland; to recommend certain

12 things to the GOC:

13 " ... to assess and present to the GOC material from

14 all sources bearing on Northern Ireland; to arrange for

15 the release of all possible material to operational

16 units, as appropriate ..."

17 That was an operational function that you were

18 responsible for?

19 A. Responsible as a conduit for getting the information to

20 the responsible bodies, but I was not responsible

21 for ...

22 Q. Sorry, had you finished, you were not responsible for?

23 A. Sorry, I thought your attention had wandered.

24 Q. What are you saying you were not responsible for?

25 A. I was a conduit for getting a security organisation set

Page 45

1 up in a form which could provide operational

2 intelligence or security intelligence or both of them,

3 but I was concerned, not with the, if you like,

4 consumption of operational intelligence, except as

5 a conduit for getting it to the people who were

6 responsible for it, which is to the Army and police.

7 Q. Could I ask you to look at your second statement,

8 paragraph 5, KD2.4. You see in that paragraph you talk

9 about the distinction between operational

10 intelligence --

11 A. I am with you, yes.

12 Q. And security intelligence. Over the page at KD2.5, you

13 suggest in the third line there:

14 "The type of operational intelligence in the signal

15 document".

16 Do you remember what the signal document was that

17 was referred to this morning? Perhaps if I could remind

18 you --

19 A. What I am saying is, this is perfectly clear:

20 "The type of operational intelligence in the signal

21 document ... I would not have been in a position to

22 judge its significance, but I would have been concerned

23 to pass it on as quickly as possible to those who would

24 be able to assess its value, ie the Army and the RUC."

25 That was time-critical information for them and not for

Page 46

1 me.

2 Q. Was part of your function not to assess intelligence and

3 to advise the recipients of this material on the

4 implications?

5 LORD SAVILLE: I think you could put that question again.

6 MR MACDONALD: Was it not part of your function to assess

7 and evaluate the intelligence material that came your

8 way before you passed it on to its ultimate recipients.

9 A. For the umpteenth time, not operational intelligence.

10 I was responsible, as this document sets out, for

11 assessing the security intelligence quality of the IRA

12 which, for operational purposes, I would not assess. I

13 would pass it quickly, being a conduit, to get the

14 information to the police and the Army.

15 Q. How could the Army assess the value of intelligence

16 material supplied to it by you if the Army had no idea

17 of the reliability of the source? Did you hear the

18 question?

19 A. Yes, but on the source you are talking about, the

20 identity of the source was known to the brigadier

21 concerned.

22 Q. So it was because the identity of that source was known

23 to the brigadier that he could assess this material

24 himself?

25 A. Yes.

Page 47

1 Q. That is why you played no part in assessing the

2 reliability of this source or passing on any evaluation?

3 A. I did not pass an evaluation on that information, no,

4 not at all.

5 Q. I will come back to that shortly. You say at

6 paragraph 3 of your first statement, this is at KD2.1,

7 that your task was to co-ordinate the

8 intelligence-gathering efforts of the various elements

9 of the Security Forces operating in Northern Ireland at

10 the time. I just want to ask you about one of those

11 elements.

12 What can you tell us about the Special

13 Anti-Terrorist Team which was deployed in Derry?

14 A. I was not aware of it.

15 Q. If I could refresh your memory. If you could look at

16 G27.200. This is part of an operational directive,

17 number 4 of 1971, that was issued on 10th November 1971

18 by headquarters 8 Infantry Brigade. At page 5 of the

19 document that appears --

20 MR TATE: Mr MacDonald, could we have a moment, we are

21 trying to find the document.

22 MR MACDONALD: It starts at G27.196.

23 MR CLARKE: It is in Madden & Finucane's bundle at the last

24 tab, I think, the last tab but one, tab 11.

25 MR TATE: What was the date of the document again,

Page 48

1 Mr MacDonald?

2 MR MACDONALD: 10th November 1971. Page 5 of that document,

3 G27.200, there is a reference to a "mission".

4 "8 Infantry Brigade is to restore and maintain law

5 and order throughout the brigade area acting in aid of

6 the civil power in conjunction with the RUC:

7 "Execution:

8 "General outline. In its directive the Commander of

9 Land Forces pointed out that the battle against the IRA

10 must be conducted on three simultaneous and

11 inter-related fronts: the intelligence front, the

12 operational front and the public information front."

13 If you go over the page, there is a reference at the

14 top of the page, sub-paragraph 3, to this:

15 "To increase the flow of intelligence, we must also

16 make use of the Special Anti-Terrorist Team, SATT, which

17 is now deployed operationally within the city, which

18 operates in support of the Special Branch but which

19 remains under command of the city battalion"?

20 A. I have no memory of that.

21 Q. Nobody else has any memory of this and I was wondering

22 if you could help seeing you were the man responsible

23 for the co-ordination of all these different elements.

24 Doing your best, can you offer any kind of assistance to

25 the Tribunal about what this Special Anti-Terrorist Team

Page 49

1 might have done about the time of Bloody Sunday, to

2 increase the flow of intelligence?

3 A. But this is a 38 Brigade document, is it not?

4 Q. Yes.

5 A. I was not involved in the drafting of that.

6 Q. I am not suggesting you were. But you were responsible

7 for co-ordination of all the different elements within

8 the Security Forces dealing with intelligence. Are you

9 saying you have never heard of this expression

10 "anti-terrorist team"?

11 A. No, I have not. I cannot recall it.

12 Q. Nobody else can either. Can you offer an explanation as

13 to why that should be?

14 MR CLARKE: I hesitate to rise but it is not quite correct

15 to say that nobody else is able to offer an explanation.

16 I think, Day 284, page 132, 2241 said that the SATT team

17 consisted of people in the city battalion who were

18 tasked with looking out for low-grade informers.

19 A. Yes, but that is Army intelligence, not security

20 intelligence.

21 MR MACDONALD: You know nothing about that?

22 A. No, at least I cannot recall it.

23 Q. Turning to your first statement, paragraph 8, KD2.2, you

24 say there in the second sentence:

25 "I do not remember ..."

Page 50

1 A. Which one?

2 Q. KD2.2, paragraph 8, the third line:

3 "I do not remember any intelligence specific to the

4 march in question to that effect [that is that the IRA

5 will attempt to exploit the NICRA march in Derry on

6 30th January 1972 as] as cover for attacking the Army."

7 If there had been any intelligence to that effect,

8 that presumably would have featured in the Int Summ 4 of

9 1972 of 27th January 1972; is that right? Do you want

10 to look at that document? G80.488. This is a document

11 that you should be familiar with; is it?

12 A. Well, this is a, a regular publication for the period

13 towards the end of January 1972.

14 Q. Yes, and it went under your name, it was signed "Major

15 for the Director of Intelligence"; you see that on the

16 last page, page 5?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. The point is that if there had been any information

19 received up to 27th January to the effect that the IRA

20 would attempt to exploit the NICRA march in Derry on

21 30th January as cover for attacking the Army, that

22 should have appeared in some way in this document;

23 should it not?

24 Specifically if you look at paragraph 23 at

25 page G80.491, you see the reference there to the march?

Page 51

1 MR TATE: Could you give the reference again, Mr MacDonald.

2 MR MACDONALD: G80.491, paragraph 23. It is mentioned also

3 in paragraph 22, but paragraph 23 is the relevant

4 paragraph. It refers to the march and to the fact that:

5 "The march will present particular problems and

6 a greater than usual opportunity for demonstrating the

7 difficulties of preventing violations of the ban in

8 Republican areas."

9 To complete the picture, paragraph 24 over the page

10 there is a reference to:

11 "IRA activity in the country and border areas ..."

12 Presumably if there had been any intelligence of the

13 kind that I referred to, it would have featured in some

14 way or would have been mentioned in some way in this

15 Int Summ?

16 A. No, I have no recollection of it.

17 Q. I appreciate that, but what I am saying is: if there had

18 been any such intelligence then it would have featured

19 in this Int Summ, perhaps in paragraphs 23 or 24 and the

20 fact that there is no reference to any such intelligence

21 here tends to suggest, does it not, that there was no

22 intelligence indicating that the IRA would be creating

23 any problem at this march; is that fair?

24 A. I do not know who in fact drafted it, it was not I.

25 Q. It is signed by "Major for Director Intelligence", that

Page 52

1 is you?

2 A. No, I am the Director of Intelligence.

3 Q. Yes, I know. Major [blank], I cannot remember the

4 cipher of this major, but it was signed by a major under

5 your command or responsibility on your behalf?

6 A. I have a feeling we are going round in circles on this.

7 Q. If you just answer the question we may not.

8 A. Can you repeat the question?

9 Q. If there had been any intelligence that the IRA -- as of

10 27th January -- that the IRA were going to use this

11 march in Derry on 30th January to attack the Army, that

12 would have appeared in this document, this Int Summ in

13 some shape or form; is that not right?

14 A. When I took -- the first statement of mine was drafted,

15 I did say that it was endemic.

16 Q. I am coming to that. Just answer the question, if you

17 could. I will try again for the last time: the absence

18 in this document of 27th January to any reference to any

19 IRA plans, to engage in hostile activity at Derry on

20 30th January, would tend to suggest, would it not, that

21 there was no intelligence to that effect as of that

22 date?

23 LORD SAVILLE: Well, Mr MacDonald, we will move on because

24 I think it is, to a quite substantial extent, a point of

25 submission.

Page 53

1 MR MACDONALD: Well, except that this is the Director of

2 Intelligence who was responsible for this document --

3 LORD SAVILLE: I agree you have made three attempts and you

4 can draw that to our attention in due course, for what

5 it may be worth. I think we must seek to try and get on

6 as best we may.

7 MR MACDONALD: If I could move on to the next part of that

8 sentence, going back to KD2.2, you say in the fourth

9 line:

10 "I do remember that it was endemic at that time that

11 the IRA would join marches, demonstrations and any civil

12 disturbance to exploit opportunities to cause trouble to

13 the Security Forces."

14 You have dealt with that in more detail in

15 paragraph 27 of your second statement. What you say

16 there, KD2.11, paragraph 27, about six or seven lines

17 down, is that you have asked:

18 " ... current Security Service staff if they could

19 identify any further documents, apart from that

20 telegram, which would illustrate the point that I made

21 in my first statement about it being endemic at that

22 time that the IRA would join marches, demonstrations and

23 any civil disturbance to exploit opportunities to cause

24 trouble to the Security Forces."

25 I think you have already said today that you

Page 54

1 yourself cannot remember any instances of this

2 happening, but the Security Service have on your behalf

3 trawled all the documentation available to them, have

4 they not, in order to see whether they could come up

5 with a single example of the IRA using a civil rights

6 march to engage in hostile activity against the Security

7 Forces; is that right?

8 A. No, I do not think it is.

9 Q. Is that not what you are saying in your statement: that

10 you have asked current Security Service staff if they

11 could identify any further documents which would

12 illustrate your point?

13 A. Illustrate the point that it was endemic?

14 Q. All they have been able to come up with is, in total,

15 three examples, going back to July of the previous year,

16 of simple street disorder where they suggest the IRA

17 became involved; do you accept --

18 A. Might I suggest you re-read my second statement.

19 Q. I am reading it now.

20 A. Uh-huh.

21 Q. Do you accept that neither you nor the Security Service

22 staff acting on your behalf could not come up with any

23 example of a civil rights march where the IRA took

24 advantage of the occasion to attack soldiers?

25 A. They took a lot of opportunity to attack the RUC, we are

Page 55

1 not dealing particularly with soldiers.

2 Q. Or the RUC, there is no example provided by you or the

3 Security Service after a trawl of all the documentation

4 available to them of the IRA using any civil rights

5 march to attack soldiers or police or anyone else; is

6 that right?

7 A. There is a very great deal of evidence of them attacking

8 the -- in particular the RUC, not the Army because the

9 Army was capable of -- was normally represented in

10 force, but in the more remote areas, the RUC were

11 constantly -- it is illustrated in the statements I have

12 prepared on 11th of whatever it was.

13 Q. Not on the occasion of a civil rights march; is that

14 right; do you accept that?

15 A. No.

16 Q. You do not. The point is that if you had been doing

17 your job properly, you would have realised that at the

18 time; would you not?

19 A. Could you repeat the question, I would realise what at

20 the time?

21 Q. You would have realised that there had been no previous

22 occasion when the IRA took advantage of a civil rights

23 march to attack policemen or soldiers?

24 A. I have provided plenty of evidence in the telegram, JLC,

25 whatever it was, that I sent and included in my second

Page 56

1 statement.

2 Q. That is the point: that you sent this telegram to

3 8 Brigade suggesting that this would happen, that the

4 IRA would take advantage of this civil rights march when

5 you must have known that that had never happened before;

6 is that right?

7 A. No, it happened repeatedly with the RUC in particular

8 and that had been listed in my second statement.

9 Q. And you said in the circumstances when you did not offer

10 an assessment of the reliability of this particular

11 source?

12 A. Why? Oh, that is that again. It is because it was

13 clear from the context that Brigadier MacLellan knew the

14 person reporting.

15 Q. Yes, that is right. It would appear to be so and

16 Brigadier MacLellan discounted your intelligence

17 entirely because we have evidence from the Brigade

18 Major, Colonel Steele to the effect that --

19 A. From whom --

20 Q. That at the brigade order group conference that appears

21 to have taken place after this signal was received,

22 there was no talk of any shooting; it was not assessed

23 that there was a prospect of shooting at this march.

24 Now he, that is the brigadier, presumably took that

25 decision and made that assessment himself on the basis

Page 57

1 of a number of different factors, including, first of

2 all, his knowledge of his source; is that possible?

3 That you would have taken into account his knowledge of

4 his source in order to discount it?

5 A. Not necessarily to discount it.

6 Q. Secondly, he could have taken into account intelligence

7 that he received from the police in Derry in order to

8 discount it; is that right?

9 A. No, I do not think he did.

10 Q. You say in your own statement, which should be in front

11 of you, paragraph 8 of your first statement, KD2.2, the

12 last sentence:

13 "In any event, Special Branch Londonderry would more

14 than likely have collected what intelligence there was

15 on the march at a local level at the time and would have

16 given their information directly to the local brigade

17 commander without it ever coming to my attention."

18 A. That was in the context of intelligence coming from

19 London.

20 Q. In whatever context it appears, it seems to be accepted

21 by you that Brigadier MacLellan could have accepted

22 Special Branch intelligence which you received locally;

23 would that be right first of all?

24 A. I hope he would, that was part of my doctrine, that they

25 should get together.

Page 58

1 Q. Such locally-gathered intelligence could have allowed

2 them to discount the signal document; is that right?

3 A. I do not think it would.

4 Q. At paragraph 9 of your statement in the last sentence,

5 you say:

6 "I would have had no input into how to deal with the

7 march itself."

8 That is not entirely correct, is it, in the sense

9 that although you may not have been directly involved or

10 present at the planning meetings, decisions as to how to

11 deal with the march would or could have depended on the

12 intelligence information that you provided; is that

13 right?

14 A. It would be provided on the basis of what intelligence

15 was available, yes.

16 Q. And you therefore had a responsibility to evaluate all

17 the material that you had and offer guidance from an

18 intelligence perspective?

19 A. Not for operational intelligence, no.

20 Q. You did not see that as part of your responsibility at

21 all?

22 A. I was not giving orders to the Army or in Londonderry or

23 anywhere else.

24 Q. But you were providing the brigadier with operational

25 intelligence about the march; were you not?

Page 59

1 A. I was telling him what information I was receiving, but

2 I was not assessing the operational aspects of that

3 intelligence.

4 Q. Was that not irresponsible on your part?

5 Perhaps I will move on. Paragraph 10, when you talk

6 about having no knowledge or recollection of the

7 informer who may have given information about IRA

8 drilling, you see that in paragraph 10.

9 Without taking you to the documents again, can the

10 Tribunal take it from you as the person responsible for

11 the compilation, or at least the oversight of the

12 compilation of the headquarters Int Summs that if any

13 such intelligence had been received, it would have

14 appeared in some shape or form in one of the Int Summs,

15 either before or after Bloody Sunday?

16 A. I think we are going round in circles here. Can you

17 make a more specific question for me to reply to?

18 Q. There is no reference in the Int Summs before or after

19 Bloody Sunday to any kind of IRA drilling or practising

20 of ambushes or anything of that kind. What I am asking

21 you, as the person responsible for the compilation of

22 these Int Summs, is this: does that not mean that there

23 could not have been any such intelligence received to

24 that effect?

25 A. I do not think so, no.

Page 60

1 Q. Why not?

2 A. Because we have been going round in circles on this.

3 Q. If intelligence had been received after the event about

4 civilians firing guns on Bloody Sunday, would that have

5 been Int Summs?

6 A. Have you received my second statement?

7 Q. Yes?

8 A. I deal at some length with, um, the intelligence and the

9 volume of it that was going through at the time. It was

10 a very hectic period and I cannot seriously remember the

11 contents of individual Int Summs.

12 Q. I am not asking you to do that; I am not saying you

13 should have read all the Int Summs or written all the

14 Int Summs. But can we take it that you would have

15 expected these Int Summs to have contained a reference

16 to any intelligence that may have been received after

17 Bloody Sunday, to the effect that civilians were firing

18 guns on Bloody Sunday, if that had been the case?

19 A. Well, that has been answered, I think, in my second

20 statement.

21 Q. What is the answer, is it yes or no? Do you not wish to

22 answer that question?

23 Perhaps I will move on. The UK Government in

24 Northern Ireland was represented by Mr Howard Smith; is

25 that right, at the time?

Page 61

1 A. Yes, I think it was.

2 Q. We know that Mr Smith became head of the

3 Security Service some time after Bloody Sunday. Do you

4 know whether or not he was a member of the Security

5 Services or the Secret Intelligence Services on

6 Bloody Sunday or about that time?

7 A. No, he was Foreign Office.

8 Q. He was Foreign Office. He was assisted by

9 a Mr Frank Steele from MI6; is that right or do you not

10 remember that?

11 A. I had no contact with the MI6 set-up. As I have said,

12 they were operating on a separate brief and I did not

13 control their operation or activities in any way.

14 Q. Did you not have to liaise with the RUC rep and his

15 staff?

16 A. Sorry.

17 Q. Did you not have to liaise with the RUC rep and his

18 staff?

19 A. No.

20 Q. Did you not in fact have contacts with the UK rep and

21 his staff?

22 A. No, I knew them, of course, but I did not organise them

23 in any way.

24 Q. So you had no form of liaison at all?

25 A. I had more than a plateful of my own problems.

Page 62

1 Q. Did the Intelligence Services in Northern Ireland,

2 including yourself, regard the civil rights movement and

3 the IRA as linked?

4 A. There were individuals who needed to be looked at, but

5 the organisation itself, no.

6 Q. Did you not think that they were connected and both

7 subversive?

8 A. Sorry, could you repeat that?

9 Q. Did you not think that the Civil Rights Association and

10 the IRA were linked; did you not form that perception?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Did you see them in the same sort of light?

13 A. I am finding it very hard to hear what you are saying.

14 Q. I am sorry, did you see the civil rights movement and

15 the IRA in the same sort of light?

16 A. Oh no, of course not.

17 Q. Did you know who organised the march in Derry on

18 Bloody Sunday?

19 A. As far as I remember it was NICRA.

20 Q. Did you think it was NICRA or did you think it was the

21 IRA who organised it?

22 A. I just answered the question.

23 Q. You thought it was NICRA?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And did you think they were part of the lunatic left?

Page 63

1 A. No.

2 Q. If we look at KJ4.61, you see that is a telegram sent by

3 you to Julian in January 1972; do you see that?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Do you see that you were suggesting to Julian that this

6 march -- maybe to be complete about it, it says:

7 "We spoke on Saturday about the possibility of a

8 march from the Creggan/Bogside to the Guildhall in

9 Londonderry on Sunday, 16th January. I was over there

10 yesterday and was told by Special Branch that there was

11 some doubt whether the march will in fact take place.

12 The organisations primarily concerned are the

13 James Connolly Republican Club, Derry CRA with which are

14 associated the SRG".

15 Do you remember what that was?

16 A. Not at the moment, no.

17 Q. "and kindred souls of the lunatic left."

18 That was your comment; was it not?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. You did regard the Civil Rights Association in Derry as

21 part of the lunatic left; did you not?

22 A. We are not really on the same wavelength on this. I had

23 no remembrance of what happened in -- over the period of

24 Bloody Sunday. I was reminded of it because it was

25 obviously a time of critical importance for the

Page 64

1 reputation of the services and police and -- although

2 I had reach the point, as I said earlier on, I was, at

3 the time this was happening, I was -- I am now 84 and

4 with a very short span of attention and I find it very

5 difficult to recall people or individual telegrams or

6 individual summaries.

7 Q. Could you look at KJ4.67. Do you have that?

8 A. Not yet.

9 Q. Do you have that now?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. You see there they are talking about the same march,

12 which was supposed to have taken place on 16th January

13 and:

14 " ... would now definitely take place on Sunday,

15 30th January."

16 Julian records that it was being organised by those

17 members of the IRA who had attended the meeting in

18 Magherafelt to which he had previously referred. Was it

19 the Security Services' belief, your belief, that this

20 march was being organised by the IRA or by the

21 Civil Rights Association, or did it just not matter to

22 you because they were really both the same sort of

23 thing?

24 A. I have had to be reminded of this correspondence.

25 I have reached the point where I could not remember who,

Page 65

1 for instance, Julian was, until I met him.

2 Q. Do you agree that it appears to be the case that the

3 Security Service may have formed the view that the IRA

4 were organising this march?

5 A. I do not think that follows.

6 Q. If I could ask you to look finally at G72.451, this is

7 a page in Int Summ 101 which was prepared by 8 Brigade.

8 Do you see paragraph 27 on page G72.451.

9 A. Yes, I am there.

10 Q. Under the heading "Future Events:

11 "A NICRA sponsored march followed by a meeting at

12 the Guildhall Londonderry is planned for 30th January.

13 It is believed that all civil rights groups, whether IRA

14 Goulding or Brady aligned, will combine together in an

15 attempt to cause maximum embarrassment to the

16 Security Forces."

17 This was not a document compiled by you, but does

18 that represent the kind of view that you held at the

19 time, that these civil rights groups were aligned to one

20 faction or other of the IRA?

21 A. I think I have already answered that point: I do not

22 think that they were aligned in that way and I have,

23 until comparatively recently, no recollection of that

24 particular political Int Summ.

25 Q. The question is whether your belief that civil rights

Page 66

1 and the IRA were all mixed up into one big organisation

2 in some general way allowed you to take the view that

3 you could feed the Army with so-called intelligence to

4 the effect that the IRA were going to use this civil

5 rights march to attack soldiers?

6 A. They did use the civil rights march to attack the RUC.

7 Q. Do you take the view that marchers taking part in this

8 march were fair game?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Did you feel any sense of responsibility about advising

11 8 Brigade or General Ford, if you did advise

12 General Ford about your intelligence --

13 A. I did not report to General Ford, I reported to the GOC.

14 Q. Did you advise the GOC that you thought that this was

15 just an IRA march and the IRA would take advantage of

16 it?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Did you speak to General Ford about this --

19 A. No.

20 Q. He says he sent you to Derry --

21 A. I dealt with the GOC, not with General Ford.

22 General Ford was dealing with the, um, if you like,

23 tactical intelligence. But I was completely oblivious

24 to all this until comparatively recently when this

25 Inquiry was started up and I was encouraged to try to

Page 67

1 refresh my memory of what happened at the time, which is

2 what I have tried to do, but with little success.

3 MR MACDONALD: Thank you very much.

4 MR TATE: Lord Saville, David would appreciate a break, if

5 he could have one, please.

6 LORD SAVILLE: We will break for about 10 minutes.

7 (3.00 pm)

8 (A short break)

9 (3.15 pm)

10 Questioned by MR MANSFIELD

11 MR MANSFIELD: David, I represent some of the families,

12 I only have two points I want to make.

13 Sir, the first is really an observation, but I make

14 it in his presence without taking time. Could we have

15 KD2.11, please, this is a statement that we have had

16 disclosed today, KD2.11.

17 MR TATE: Would you give us a paragraph number so we can

18 look at the pages, please.

19 MR MANSFIELD: It is paragraph 27 on that page which refers

20 to three JIC papers as illustrating the endemic point.

21 Sir, we have had those papers produced, they were

22 already amongst our bundles; we have also had, although

23 I do not think they are scanned, the unredacted

24 versions, so the redactions have been removed from the

25 documents we had originally. The point I want to make,

Page 68

1 in relation to each of the three documents specified on

2 that page, that none of those three, when you look at

3 the unredacted versions, relate to hooligan activity

4 being used as cover on a civil rights march. Sir, I do

5 not take more time than that, that is the simple point

6 that comes out of all that material.

7 The question I have for you, David, relates to

8 another topic. If you could have KD2.1, paragraph 7,

9 please. In paragraph 7 you are asked about a document

10 that we know as the Ford memorandum, entitled:

11 "The situation in Londonderry as at the

12 7th January," and you say in that paragraph that you

13 have no recollection that you went to Londonderry on

14 6th January to gather intelligence; do you see that,

15 David?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. I want to follow that through because I want to see if

18 we can go a little further with that. Could we have

19 G48.301. You have seen this before; this is the

20 memorandum, and the paragraph that is relevant. I do

21 not know which tab it is, but it is paragraph 8 in the

22 documents you have. May I read you the sentence to save

23 you having to look at it, but that is where it is.

24 General Ford says that he has asked you to get the

25 best possible intelligence of the possible strengths of

Page 69

1 the march and its real intentions. He goes on to say

2 that as a result you went to Londonderry yesterday.

3 I am going to pause, it looks as though this is

4 a document that he was writing on Monday, 10th January,

5 referring to a visit that he has made, General Ford, on

6 Friday, 7th January; do you follow?

7 A. Yes, that is right.

8 Q. So he is saying, it would appear, that you went to

9 Londonderry on the 9th January and that you would

10 report, it says, the day on which he appears to be

11 writing, namely, 10th January 1972; do you follow?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. You do not recollect this; is that right?

14 A. Sorry?

15 Q. You do not seem to recollect this; is that right: that

16 you went to Londonderry let alone --

17 A. I did not go to Londonderry tasked by General Ford.

18 Q. Did you go to Londonderry tasked by someone else?

19 A. Not on that date, no.

20 Q. In view of that, would you now see, please, KJ4.61,

21 which you saw a few minutes ago. This is a telegram,

22 and would you just look at this one. You will see that

23 the date on this telegram is 10th January 1972; do you

24 see the date on the right-hand corner, up towards the

25 right-hand side "Date of Origin"; do you see the date?

Page 70

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Then if we look at the text for a moment, you are saying

3 to Julian that you spoke on Saturday about the

4 possibility of a march from the Creggan and so forth,

5 and there is some doubt about it taking place:

6 "I was over there yesterday".

7 Do you see those words; would you look at the

8 telegram for a moment.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. It is the third line down in the main paragraph:

11 "I was over there yesterday ..."

12 That would be the 9th January, which is when

13 General Ford said you went. I want to ask you

14 again: you did go to Londonderry on 9th January, did you

15 not?

16 A. That I do not recall. General Ford did not task me.

17 Q. We will do it in stages: you did go to Derry on the 9th,

18 it would appear from this telegram; is that right?

19 A. Yes, that is right.

20 Q. Right. Who asked you to go if it was not General Ford?

21 A. Well, I went on my own steam. I used to go round, as

22 far as possible, meeting Army and Special Branch

23 officers.

24 Q. Had you gone because there was the possibility of a

25 march the following weekend, in other words, the weekend

Page 71

1 after the one you went; is that why you went on the 9th?

2 A. As far as I was concerned, it was a routine visit on the

3 9th, tasked by myself.

4 Q. Did you discuss the march with anyone while you were

5 there on the 9th?

6 A. Well, that I really do not recall. I must have done.

7 Q. You must have done because it appears in the same

8 sentence that you certainly spoke to Special Branch

9 because they were in some doubt as to whether it would

10 in fact take place; do you see, that is all in the

11 telegram?

12 A. Yes, I tasked myself.

13 Q. You tasked yourself. Would you have gone there on your

14 own?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Did you --

17 A. I tasked myself.

18 Q. And you went on your own?

19 A. Well, I cannot remember this particular thing, but that

20 was the normal form, I went round as and when necessary,

21 if possible with the head of Northern Ireland

22 Special Branch but if necessary without him.

23 Q. The next question I have, this is in order to trace

24 documents, that is why I ask this question, if you went

25 on your own on the 9th tasked by yourself and you did

Page 72

1 have conversations about the civil rights march, did you

2 keep any records at the time?

3 A. I -- it is a detail I cannot remember, but if you look

4 at the statement I have made, I was, um, tasking myself;

5 I was not tasked by General Ford.

6 Q. Your statement says you do not remember doing so, that

7 is going to Derry. We are now in the position that you

8 obviously did go to Derry. The question I am currently

9 asking you is whether a record was kept so that we can

10 ask the Security Services now, as you did over other

11 documents, whether there are other documents about your

12 visits, made by you; do you follow?

13 If you went on your own it is likely you would have

14 made notes while you were there and made a report. The

15 question is: where are they?

16 A. Well, it is something I cannot answer because when

17 I left Northern Ireland, um, the -- my successor went to

18 Stormont and some of the documents would have gone

19 there; some would have been returned to London; some may

20 have been transferred to the police. It was a complete

21 reorganisation at that time.

22 Q. Can I ask you this, then: was it your habit to keep

23 a diary or report book?

24 A. No, absolutely not.

25 Q. So how did you make records yourself?

Page 73

1 A. How did I make records myself?

2 Q. Yes, how did you make records yourself of intelligence

3 that you gathered?

4 A. Well, I would leave a note with one of the staff.

5 Q. Which one of the staff would keep a note?

6 A. The position is that, as I said in my report, we were

7 more or less making up what to do as we went along and

8 the volume of traffic was huge, um, but at this stage in

9 time, I have absolutely no idea where those records

10 might be.

11 Q. Sorry, the question was, may I ask you again: which

12 member of staff would keep a record of intelligence

13 gathered by you?

14 A. Well, it would have been the -- you see, I had

15 a military staff; I had Northern Ireland staff and I had

16 a Security Service staff.

17 Q. Yes. The question is: so we can see if there is any

18 possibility of tracing anything else, which of these

19 staff sections would be entrusted with intelligence

20 which you gathered?

21 A. That would almost certainly be the small

22 Security Service staff.

23 Q. Small Security Service staff?

24 A. Staff.

25 Q. Just roughly how many; are we talking about two or

Page 74

1 three?

2 A. Um, I forget exactly, I think maybe four.

3 Q. Do you remember -- and I do not ask for names -- if you

4 remember the names, if you could just say yes or no: do

5 you remember the names of any of them now?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. You do. Would you be in a position -- I do not ask you

8 to say who they were out loud -- would you be in

9 a position to communicate the names by writing them down

10 for us, and so it is clear to you, I am not asking for

11 their real names at any stage, but a way in which

12 matters could be progressed; would you be in a position

13 to write down either the real names or the code names of

14 the four, approximately, who formed your security staff

15 who might have kept a record of your intelligence?

16 A. I would find it difficult because, um, you know, married

17 names differ and, um --

18 Q. Could I ask you, this is the final thing I ask you,

19 could I ask you, with the Tribunal's permission, if you

20 would not mind writing down, at your convenience today,

21 the names, purely for the Tribunal's benefit -- and we

22 may get a redacted version -- of those or any of those

23 four that you can remember; could you do that, please?

24 A. I could go some way towards it, but I do not think

25 I could be accurate at this stage.

Page 75

1 MR MANSFIELD: Sir, I do not have any other questions.

2 LORD SAVILLE: I would have thought, Mr Mansfield, subject

3 to any views you might like to express, that the better

4 idea would be, when we have finished with the videolink,

5 for Mr Tate to see if he can ascertain from this witness

6 any names that this witness remembers.

7 MR MANSFIELD: Yes, thank you.

8 MR TATE: I will do that, Lord Saville.

9 Questioned by LORD GIFFORD

10 LORD GIFFORD: David, I am Anthony Gifford and I represent

11 the family of James Wray. Are you able to see me from

12 where you are sitting?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. I will try not to tax you with documents, but I only

15 want to put one or two things to you for your comment

16 and possible recollection.

17 First of all, in relation to the signal there are

18 two things which you may be able to help on. Could we

19 have the legible version which is at KJ4.48, that is the

20 typed, the re-typed version of the signal with the

21 points going one, two, three, four. We have it on the

22 screen, please will you indicate when you have it in

23 front of you.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Do you see that there is a great deal of detail

Page 76

1 contained in the signal, for instance, do you see in

2 paragraph two that a great number of street names are

3 set out?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. These street names would not have been known to you from

6 your prior knowledge; would they?

7 A. No.

8 Q. You must have been supplied with the details by, one

9 presumes, the officer Julian, who has given evidence

10 about supplying you verbally with information. If one

11 looks to paragraph seven over the page, in addition to

12 more street names there is a map reference; do you see?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Assuming, as I think we must, that it was you who

15 drafted this signal, you must, must you not, have had

16 some document in front of you containing these details?

17 A. But this has been mulled over before, um, it is clear

18 that Commander 8 Brigade knew the source and --

19 Q. I am not asking you about that, I am only asking: if, in

20 order to give him so much detail you must have had a

21 written report in front of you?

22 A. Well, I have not any idea.

23 Q. Thank you. Could we turn now to what happened on the

24 Monday after Bloody Sunday, in particular, the document

25 which we have at KJ4.73. You will see that that is

Page 77

1 a document signed by the person we know as James.

2 A. Yes, I have the document.

3 Q. Do you remember James?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. You will see that the document at the beginning recites:

6 "On Monday, 31st January, at about 9.45 a.m, David

7 telephoned and asked me to pass over, within half an

8 hour, the gist of the intelligence we had given to him

9 verbally during the previous week when Julian was in

10 Northern Ireland and in touch with Observer C."

11 The question which puzzles me and you may be able to

12 help over, is why, when you had so much detail already

13 which you had put in the signal, you are now asking for

14 the gist on the morning after the event?

15 A. At this distance in time, I do not recall.

16 Q. If that document, that signal had been sent on the

17 27th January, you already had and knew not just the gist

18 of the intelligence, but the detail, why ask him for the

19 gist?

20 A. I am really not sure, but you see Brigadier Lewis was

21 nothing to do with, um -- he is somebody in London,

22 Brigadier Lewis, extension 2733 was not available, but

23 his message was passed to his staff officer.

24 I did not deal with Brigadier Lewis, he was in

25 London.

Page 78

1 Q. I appreciate that, but the sequence of events on the

2 Monday starts with your telephone call?

3 A. My telephone call to Brigadier Lewis?

4 Q. Asking James to pass over the gist?

5 A. Mmm.

6 Q. And he passed it over to the Ministry of Defence?

7 A. Yes, that is right, yes.

8 Q. That is all I ask you at the moment about the signal.

9 Just going back in time, it has already been suggested

10 to you that you were relied on by the senior military to

11 be personally responsible for providing intelligence

12 about the march; you have answered some questions about

13 that.

14 It appears from the documents -- and I just ask you

15 if you agree -- that you continued to be relied on up

16 until 30th January for intelligence about possible IRA

17 intentions regarding the march; would that be right?

18 A. The best assessment about the march for people in

19 Londonderry would have been the RUC Special Branch.

20 Q. Do you recall that the intelligence which came from RUC

21 Special Branch was to the effect that no trouble was

22 anticipated on the march?

23 A. I cannot remember that far back.

24 Q. I want to ask you now about the Monday and Tuesday

25 before the Sunday, namely, 24th and 25th. Did you know

Page 79

1 at the time the Chief of the Defence Staff,

2 Admiral Sir Peter Hill-Norton?

3 A. Did I know him?

4 Q. Yes?

5 A. No, I do not know him.

6 Q. You did not know him?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Do you not --

9 A. I know of him.

10 Q. Of him, but you did not know him as a friend?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Do you not recall that he visited Northern Ireland on

13 Monday, 24th January and was briefed by you?

14 A. I cannot remember that far back, no.

15 Q. He was accompanied, we have heard, by a Colonel in the

16 Ministry of Defence, Colonel Dalzell-Payne; you remember

17 Colonel Dalzell-Payne?

18 A. No, as far as I know I never met him; he was in London.

19 Q. He was in London, and the documents show that he came

20 over and took notes of a briefing and he says there were

21 briefings from the GOC, General Tuzo, the CLF,

22 General Ford, and yourself, briefing Sir Peter --

23 A. Yes, I gave a briefing to nearly every conference there

24 was.

25 Q. It sounds like, for the document, and the document is

Page 80

1 not one you drew up and unless you wish to I do not need

2 to show it to you, the document records that you were

3 one of the people who briefed Admiral

4 Sir Peter Hill-Norton?

5 A. Well, it could be, but I have no recollection of it.

6 Q. Do you remember the -- did you know the Vice Chief of

7 the General Staff at the time? I am not sure whether

8 I am at liberty -- I would have thought his name must be

9 in the public domain, but I am never quite sure in this

10 Inquiry of whether we have released it. UNK840, I am

11 told, is the symbol by which we know him. Does Mr Tate

12 have that available?

13 MR TATE: I am afraid we do not have the answer to that

14 particular cipher. May I be allowed to know if I can

15 speak his name, he must be a public figure.

16 LORD SAVILLE: Perhaps you could start by mentioning it to

17 Mr Clarke quietly to see what the position is?

18 LORD GIFFORD: The documents indicate that you briefed also

19 the Vice Chief of the General Staff who visited

20 Northern Ireland on 25th January; do you recall that?

21 A. I was briefing people endlessly on visits, but

22 I normally did an intelligence input to every visitor

23 who came, and at times I used to say that if I had to

24 keep briefing them I would not have time to count out

25 what to (indistinguishable).

Page 81

1 Q. I am going to put to you for your comment that the

2 briefings being given by Generals Tuzo and Ford to these

3 senior figures about the march, the forthcoming march

4 were to the effect that the problem was the defiance of

5 the ban on marches and the problems that would cause in

6 relation to Protestant opinion; do you recall that

7 problem being discussed?

8 A. No, I do not.

9 Q. Did you not appreciate -- do you not recall that the

10 Protestants, from the Prime Minister downwards, were

11 very agitated about the series of marches which NICRA

12 had been holding since the beginning of the month?

13 A. Yes, that appeared in numerous documents.

14 Q. You knew, I suggest, by 27th January that the Army had

15 determined to carry out a robust operation against the

16 marchers?

17 A. I was not privy to that.

18 Q. One that was likely to result in casualties?

19 A. That, I think, was General Ford's briefing.

20 Q. Do you recall being aware of it during the days

21 preceding the march?

22 A. No, I really cannot, I cannot remember that far back.

23 Q. Was your signal, if it was indeed sent on 27th January,

24 intended to create a justification for casualties by

25 creating an account of likely IRA intervention when in

Page 82

1 fact you did not believe there would be any such?

2 A. No.

3 LORD GIFFORD: Sir, those are my questions.

4 LORD SAVILLE: Do we have any other questions for David?

5 David, it is the Chairman speaking. Thank you very

6 much indeed for giving evidence to this Tribunal, thank

7 you very much.

8 We will come back to the matter, Mr Clarke, please,

9 at 9.30 tomorrow morning.

10 MR CLARKE: Sir, there is a slight change of plan from the

11 announced programme. Officer Z will not be giving

12 evidence tomorrow, it will be Officer Y and then

13 Soldier S.

14 LORD SAVILLE: Thank you.

15 (3.50 pm)

16 (Proceedings adjourned until 9.30 am on

17 Wednesday, 14th May 2003)









Page 83



3 DAVID, sworn ................................. 1

4 Questioned by MR CLARKE ...................... 1

5 Questioned by MR MACDONALD ................... 37

6 Questioned by MR MANSFIELD ................... 67

7 Questioned by LORD GIFFORD ................... 75