Page 1

1 Monday, 27th March 2000.

2 (10.30 am)

3 LORD SAVILLE: Almost two years ago, we made

4 our opening statement in this hall. Since that time

5 this Inquiry has been collecting what now amounts to a

6 very substantial quantity of material relating to

7 Bloody Sunday.

8 Our efforts to do our best, to collect

9 everything of relevance that is still available, will

10 continue but it is appropriate we should now move into

11 the oral and public stage of this Inquiry.

12 As we said in our opening statement, this

13 stage begins with the public presentation by our

14 counsel, Mr Christopher Clarke, Queen's Counsel, of the

15 material we have collected. This is a formidable task

16 given the amount of that material and it will

17 necessarily take some time. However, the presentation

18 will enable the public to see what the Inquiry has been

19 able to do to date and will also set the scene for the

20 hearing of the oral evidence that will follow.

21 We must emphasise that this is a presentation

22 by counsel to the Inquiry. It must not be taken or

23 understood as expressing or implying the view of the

24 Tribunal on any of the many matters of controversy. We

25 have not formed any view on those matters and we will

Page 2

1 not do so until we have heard and considered all the

2 evidence, both written and oral and also considered

3 everything that the interested parties have to say to

4 us.

5 With those opening remarks, I will ask

6 Mr Clarke now to give his presentation.

7 Mr Clarke's presentation.

8 MR CLARKE: On Sunday, 30th January 1972, 13

9 identified people are known to have died and a similar

10 number to have been wounded, probably in the course of

11 no more than 30 minutes on the streets of this city not

12 far from where I now stand. Several of them were

13 teenagers. It seems clear that most, if not all of the

14 casualties, were the result of Army gunfire. The

15 shootings which led to these deaths and injuries took

16 place after an illegal, but peaceful Civil Rights march

17 had been diverted away from the route leading to the

18 Guildhall in which this Inquiry now sits.

19 The march was a protest against internment

20 without trial, a policy which had been in force since

21 the previous August. When the March was stopped

22 rioting by hooligans began and to a greater or lesser

23 extent continued over a period over something like 30

24 minutes at street barriers manned by soldiers.


Page 3

1 A short distance away from the barriers at

2 which the principal stoning and missile throwing was

3 taking place, some five shots were fired by soldiers in

4 circumstances that will form part of the subject matter

5 of this Inquiry, injuring a young boy and a middle-aged

6 man. Not long after this the military operation was

7 launched in the course of which the principal shootings

8 took place.

9 At the time of Bloody Sunday, as that day

10 quickly became known, this was already a troubled city

11 in a divided society. Not only had soldiers and

12 policemen, IRA gunmen and bombers and ordinary

13 civilians lost their lives or been wounded, but the

14 pace and regularity of senseless violence was

15 increasing.

16 The circumstances of the shootings on Bloody

17 Sunday, nevertheless gave rise at once to extreme and

18 unprecedented controversy, a controversy that was not

19 dispelled by the public Inquiry established immediately

20 afterwards under the Chairmanship of Lord Widgery, the

21 then Lord Chief Justice.

22 The report of that Inquiry published on 19th

23 April 1972 was accepted by the Government of the day

24 and seen as, in large measure, a vindication of the

25 Army. To others, including, but by no means limited

Page 4

1 to, the families of the deceased and the wounded the

2 report itself caused further offence and resentment

3 which continue to this day. Anger about what happened

4 on Bloody Sunday is said to have driven many young men

5 in this city to join the IRA with incalculable

6 consequences.

7 Serious then, as were the immediate effects

8 of the shootings, what happened on 30th January 1972

9 has affected the lives of many more people than those

10 who were directly involved. That these events should

11 be fully understood and the facts publicly established

12 is, therefore, even after 28 years, not only a matter

13 of acute, albeit private interest to those most

14 immediately affected, but also a subject with a wider

15 public importance.

16 So it was that on 29th January 1998

17 Parliament decided to establish this Inquiry to

18 examine, in effect to re-examine that which Lord

19 Widgery had examined in 1972, namely, and I quote:

20 "The events on Sunday the 30th January 1972 which led

21 to loss of life in connection with the procession in

22 Londonderry on that day, but taking into account any

23 new information relating to the events of the day."

24 These facts alone are sufficient to

25 demonstrate both the importance and the difficulty of

Page 5

1 the task which has been entrusted to you. What

2 happened on 30th January 1972 was, whatever the truth

3 of the matter, a tragedy, the pain of which has for

4 many endured despite the passage of the years, for a

5 society governed by the rule of law and committed to

6 the maintenance of human rights it was, and it remains,

7 a matter of serious concern for the reason identified

8 by the Prime Minister in his statement announcing the

9 establishment of this Inquiry in the House of Commons

10 when he said this:

11 "Bloody Sunday was different because where

12 the State's own authorities are concerned, we must be

13 as sure as we can of the truth because we pride

14 ourselves in our democracy and respect for the law and

15 on the professionalism and dedication of our security

16 forces."

17 The controversy that has raged since the

18 evening 30th January 1972 can be shortly expressed by

19 considering each side of the divide. On the one hand

20 what has occurred has been described as an engagement

21 in which the Army, intent only upon arresting

22 participants in an illegal riot following an illegal

23 march were fired at by gunmen and bombers in which both

24 the firers or their associates and innocents suffered

25 and in which several people were killed or wounded who

Page 6

1 have never been identified because they were removed or

2 removed themselves from the scene. On the other hand

3 what occurred has been characterised as a massacre of

4 wholly innocent individuals, victims of either

5 deliberate planning or undisciplined excess and

6 condemned as an outrage.

7 The Tribunal's task is to try to discover, so

8 far as is humanly possible in the circumstances and

9 with the means now available, the truth. Not the truth

10 as people see it. Not the truth as people would like

11 it to be, but the truth pure and simple, however

12 complex, painful or unacceptable to whomsoever that

13 truth may be. Those who have campaigned for so long to

14 establish this Inquiry seek no more, Parliament which,

15 by the affirmative resolution of both its houses

16 established this Inquiry, seeks no less, without it the

17 many concerns that led to the unique circumstance of a

18 second Inquiry under the 1921 Act into the same facts

19 cannot be laid to rest.

20 So difficult a task embarked upon after so

21 long an interval is undoubtedly daunting, particularly

22 when in some, but not all instances, the Tribunal is

23 faced with conflicting evidence that appears to fail to

24 meet at any common point that the inquirer almost

25 begins to doubt whether the witnesses were present upon

Page 7

1 the same occasion.

2 There are some who have chosen to regard the

3 task of the Inquiry as impossible. It is not so. What

4 is true, however, is that the ability of the Inquiry to

5 get to the truth is dependent upon two things: firstly,

6 the extent and quality of the evidence available to it

7 and, secondly, the assistance that is provided to it.

8 As to the evidence available, the passage of

9 time has deprived the Tribunal of the immediacy of

10 recollection, of the witnesses who gave or could have

11 given evidence to Lord Widgery. In the interim some

12 witnesses have died and the recollection of others has

13 grown dim, but the events of that day were so traumatic

14 that for some what happened has thereafter, in whole or

15 in part, been etched upon the memory. In other cases

16 memories, which can of course play tricks, are less

17 clear and may have become set in a form whose accuracy

18 cannot be guaranteed, it would be strange if it was

19 otherwise. There are some, no doubt, who have formed a

20 view of the events of that day, seen through the

21 distorting prism of guilt or anger, prejudice or

22 predisposition. But against all that this Inquiry has

23 several advantages, and I propose to identify four of

24 them.

25 Firstly there is a huge amount of evidence

Page 8

1 available, massively more than was available to Lord

2 Widgery. It itself divides into six categories. The

3 first category is the evidence given orally to Lord

4 Widgery by civilians and members of the Army and the

5 RUC. This evidence was given very shortly after the

6 events in question under oath and subject to

7 examination. Whatever were the shortcomings of Lord

8 Widgery's Inquiry, the transcripts of this evidence are

9 an invaluable resource.

10 The second category is the evidence recorded

11 in writing at the time but not given orally before Lord

12 Widgery. This evidence includes statements given under

13 the auspices of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights

14 Association, NICRA, by the citizens of Londonderry and

15 statements given to the Royal Military Police and to

16 the Treasury solicitor by soldiers.

17 This statements constitute a record of the

18 contemporaneous evidence of a large body of the

19 citizens of Derry and of the soldiers as to the events

20 of that day, which is of great value. These statements

21 enable the reader to analyse the extent to which the

22 previous statements of the same witness support, cast

23 doubt upon or discredit his or her subsequent

24 testimony. Equally, they reveal the extent to which

25 statements of others corroborate that testimony.

Page 9

1 The third category is a huge volume of

2 contemporaneous photographs, documents and audio or

3 audio visual material. Although most, but not all of

4 the actuality film footage, that is to say film shots

5 of the events of the day, was before Lord Widgery and

6 some of the documents were, much of this material was

7 not. The material in this category available to this

8 Tribunal is much greater than that which was available

9 to Lord Widgery.

10 The fourth category is a very sizable volume

11 of material subsequent to 1972 including the fruits of

12 a large number of journalistic researches into the

13 events of the day.

14 The fifth category are the statements that

15 have been given to this Inquiry and which have been

16 taken by the Inquiry's solicitors, Messrs Eversheds.

17 Hundreds of witnesses have come forward to

18 give statements and I should like to place on record

19 the Inquiry's thanks to those who have volunteered to

20 give relevant information as to the events of the day.

21 The exercise of taking these statements has illustrated

22 the vital importance to the search for truth of having

23 statements professionally taken. It is no discredit to

24 those who took statements under the auspices of NICRA

25 to observe the plain fact that helpful though many of

Page 10

1 those statements are, some of them lack clarity and

2 completeness and, indeed, are on occasions so obscure

3 or lacking in detail as to be of little value, save the

4 value which is not to be decried of identifying

5 relevant witnesses and the areas to which their

6 evidence relates.

7 These statements were, of course, taken under

8 great pressure of time and by persons who, for the most

9 part, were not professional statement takers. Several

10 of them have been transformed into utility, when

11 professionally drawn by Eversheds, with the assistance

12 of the legal representatives of those who wished to be

13 so represented when their statements were taken.

14 The sixth category is the expert evidence

15 given with the benefit, both of detachment from the

16 events in question and of developments in scientific

17 understanding over the intervening years. The second

18 advantage is that this Inquiry has had considerably

19 greater time than Lord Widgery allowed himself for his

20 task. No one reading or seeing the news material in

21 early 1972 could fail to perceive the urgency with

22 which Lord Widgery was encouraged from several quarters

23 not to allow his Inquiry to drag on and to report as

24 soon as he possibly could.

25 Understandable though that urgency then was,

Page 11

1 it now seems clear that the speed with which the report

2 was compiled contributed to the Widgery Tribunal's

3 inability to establish the complete truth about Bloody

4 Sunday or to secure general public confidence in its

5 conclusions. But if speed is sometimes the enemy of

6 justice, so also is delay. In saying what I have been

7 saying I am, of course, as conscious as everyone else

8 in this room that the time that it has taken since the

9 establishment of this Inquiry to reach the commencement

10 of the oral public hearings is longer than anyone

11 foresaw and that the true scale of the task has turned

12 out to be greater than anyone would have supposed.

13 There are several reasons for that, of which

14 it is appropriate at this stage to mention only one:

15 whatever happened on 30th January 1972 happened at the

16 end of a very public march when the Bogside was entered

17 by several hundred soldiers and when there were many

18 more soldiers deployed on the perimeter or in command

19 or elsewhere. The work of tracing after all these

20 years so great a number of civilian and military

21 witnesses, interviewing them and recording their

22 testimony, has been nothing short of prodigious.

23 Now is not the time for exhaustive detail, it

24 is sufficient to record that Eversheds have interviewed

25 nearly 1400 witnesses, they have received signed

Page 12

1 statements from over 950 and await the return of about

2 450.

3 Moreover, the Inquiry has traced, with much

4 more labour and not without difficulty, many more

5 witnesses to see whether they may have relevant

6 evidence to give, a search which has extended

7 worldwide, not only here and in England, Wales and

8 Scotland, but as far west Africa and as far east as

9 Hong Kong, and on every continent with the exception of

10 Antartica.

11 I explained at the last preliminary hearing

12 the nature of the difficulties in tracing military

13 witnesses in the light of the practice as to

14 record-keeping or the lack of it in 1972. As I speak

15 the Inquiry has traced the whereabouts of about 97% of

16 the total of 1110 check witnesses that it currently

17 seeks to trace. Some 40% of those names provided by

18 the Ministry of Defence as soldiers who may have been

19 present on Bloody Sunday turned out not to have been,

20 and the work involved in tracing them has been useful

21 only in the sense that it eliminates them from the

22 search.

23 We believe, however, that we have traced the

24 whereabouts of the vast majority of those who were

25 present on Bloody Sunday and are still alive,

Page 13

1 including, we believe, all of Support Company, all

2 those who admit to firing live rounds, and all but two

3 of the so-called Widgery soldiers, that is to say those

4 who gave evidence either orally or in writing to Lord

5 Widgery's Tribunal.

6 The third advantage is this: whilst the lapse

7 of years must inevitably dim or distort memories, it

8 may also render more bearable the recitation of

9 unpalatable facts and encourage a frankness, which in

10 earlier times might have been impossible. Indeed, the

11 statements of several of the civilian witnesses reveal

12 they have only recently dug up from the recesses of

13 their memory recollections previously too painful to

14 uncover.

15 Fourthly, and most importantly: the truth has

16 a light of its own, although it may be the first

17 casualty of hostility, it has formidable powers of

18 recovery, even after a long interval.

19 As to assistance, the Inquiry has received

20 and expects to continue to receive, assistance from

21 many different sources. Again I should like to place

22 on record the appreciation of the Inquiry of the

23 contribution that many, literally hundreds, have

24 already made or will make hereafter in volunteering

25 information. The Inquiry has the additional advantage

Page 14

1 that the interested parties are all represented by the

2 lawyers of their choice whom you see before you.

3 I hope I shall be forgiven if in view of the number of

4 those concerned I depart from the custom that applies

5 in London of recording the names of counsel and of

6 those who instruct them and the persons on whose behalf

7 they appear, details of which have already been

8 circulated.

9 In the nature of things the degree of

10 assistance that has been received has ranged from the

11 whole hearted to the grudging. On some few occasions

12 it has been non-existent and it would be naive not to

13 recognise that there are those who, for a number of

14 reasons, would prefer not to assist the Inquiry in the

15 search for the truth.

16 There are those, too, who profess to believe

17 that the Inquiry will not seek to discover the whole

18 truth, or is somehow fated or programmed to produce a

19 particular result, although I suspect that those few

20 who fall into this category are about equally divided

21 as to the mutually inconsistent conclusions that they

22 think the Inquiry is destined to reach.

23 To any who doubt the Inquiry's ability or

24 will to discover the truth, I have a number of things

25 to say: firstly, the Inquiry's commitment to try to

Page 15

1 discover what occurred so far as it can do so by

2 whatever lawful means are open to it, is absolute.

3 Secondly, the Tribunal is both independent

4 and impartial, in the true sense of the latter word,

5 namely, that it takes the side of no one, however

6 powerful or influential, vociferous or insistent they

7 may be.

8 Thirdly, if the truth of what occurred on

9 30th January 1972 is ever to be established, told and

10 acknowledged, now is the time to do it.

11 Fourthly, the Inquiry very much hopes that

12 the witnesses who appear before it will do so

13 voluntarily. But if for some reason that is not

14 possible, the Tribunal will exercise the powers

15 conferred upon it by law to require the attendance of

16 witnesses and the production of documents, compliance

17 with such a requirement (if it has to be made) is not

18 optional, on the contrary non-compliance would

19 constitute an interference with the course of justice

20 and therefore a contempt.

21 Fifthly, no one should fear that by giving

22 evidence to this Inquiry they may incriminate

23 themselves. The Attorney General has given an

24 undertaking, and I quote:

25 "In respect of any person who provides

Page 16

1 evidence to the Inquiry that no evidence he or she may

2 give before the Inquiry, whether orally or by written

3 statement, nor any written statement made preparatory

4 to giving evidence, nor any document produced by that

5 person to the Inquiry will be used to the prejudice of

6 that person in any criminal proceedings against that

7 person, or for the purpose of investigating or deciding

8 whether to bring such proceedings, except proceedings

9 where he or she is charged with having given false

10 evidence in the course of this Inquiry or having

11 conspired with, aided, abetted, counselled, procured,

12 suborned, or incited any other person to do so."

13 In short, anyone who gives evidence before

14 this Inquiry need fear nothing provided he tells the

15 truth.

16 Sixthly, those who attempt deliberately to

17 withhold relevant evidence from the Tribunal may find

18 that inferences adverse to them are drawn from their

19 refusal to state that which they know. A person who

20 has relevant evidence to give, but is not prepared to

21 give his account and answer such questions as may

22 relevantly be put to him about it, in circumstances

23 where his answers will not incriminate himself should

24 not be surprised if in appropriate cases the Tribunal

25 concludes that it cannot rely upon this version or

Page 17

1 account of events that the witness himself is not

2 prepared to support or to support fully by giving

3 evidence of which he claims to be aware.

4 It would be possible to begin this Inquiry

5 with a short statement as to the issues raised by the

6 materials that the Inquiry has received and to proceed

7 forthwith to hear the evidence. I propose to take a

8 radically different course and to review and in part

9 analyse the evidence that the Inquiry has so far

10 received insofar as it has been possible to do so prior

11 to today. I make that caveat because the receipt and

12 distribution of signed statements has, for a number of

13 reasons, taken longer than the Tribunal would have

14 wished.

15 I am taking that course for a number of

16 reasons: firstly, an Inquiry in the year 2000 as to

17 what happened in 1972 must necessarily pay close regard

18 to and have in mind at an early stage what was said by

19 civilians and soldiers in 1972 on dates very close to

20 the day itself. This is not mere background material,

21 nor is it something that can satisfactorily be left to

22 the examination of witnesses when they come to give

23 oral evidence to the Tribunal. It is primary and

24 important evidence.

25 Secondly, the sheer volume of the material

Page 18

1 the Tribunal has received cries out for some fairly

2 detailed analysis at an early stage. Without it it may

3 be difficult to see the wood for the proverbial trees.

4 Thirdly, the Inquiry did not begin today, the

5 Inquiry, its counsel and staff have been engaged in the

6 process of investigation since the time when they were

7 appointed and will not cease until their task is

8 complete.

9 One of the purposes of this opening,

10 therefore, is to express, at least in part, where

11 counsel to the Tribunal have got to in seeing what the

12 evidence amounts to and how, if at all, it

13 interrelates. It will, I hope, establish a provisional

14 frame of reference into which the oral evidence may fit

15 and will serve, hopefully, to narrow or at least to

16 define the issues that require to be resolved.

17 I am of course aware of the limitations and

18 pitfalls of this approach, chief of which is the fact

19 that any analysis is necessarily selective and open to

20 criticism for having ignored whatever it does not

21 include. This is particularly so in the present case

22 where there are few fixed points. So that, for

23 instance, in relation to many of the key issues such as

24 where a victim died or was injured or from what

25 direction he was apparently shot, it is often possible

Page 19

1 to find at least one and sometimes several witnesses

2 whose accounts are mutually contradictory.

3 Nevertheless if the evidence as it evolves is

4 not to become a bewildering kaleidoscope, it is,

5 I believe, necessary to attempt to distinguish some of

6 the basic shapes at an early stage, always recognising

7 that those shapes may alter that as the evidence

8 develops. This should, therefore, be regarded as a

9 working opening.

10 I propose to deal with the matters in broadly

11 the following stages: firstly, a short reference to the

12 historical background. Secondly, a review of the

13 military and political planning that led to the giving

14 of the orders for Operation Forecast, as it was known,

15 and the use of the First Battalion of the Parachute

16 Regiment on 30th January 1972. Thirdly, to consider

17 the position of the IRA. Fourthly, to deal with what

18 happened on the day before the Army entered the

19 Bogside, in particular the march itself and the rioting

20 in barriers 12 and 14. Fifthly, to deal with events in

21 sector one. When I refer to "sectors" I am using, and

22 shall use hereafter, the division of the events of the

23 day for analytical purposes into sectors as described

24 in my first report. Sector 1 deals, in effect,

25 chronologically and geographically with everything that

Page 20

1 occurs before the entry of the soldiers into the

2 Bogside, the principal events occurring in this sector

3 being the wounding of Damien Donaghy and John Johnston,

4 and the evidence as to what may be individual shots

5 from persons other than the Army fired before the Army

6 entered the Bogside. Sixthly, I intend to deal with

7 the issue as to what orders were given to the First

8 Battalion of the Parachute Regiment in relation to

9 entry into the Bogside. Seventhly, I propose to deal

10 with the events in sector 2, that is events involving

11 the mortar Platoon in the car park of the Rossville

12 flats.

13 Next I propose to deal with events in sector

14 3 involving the Anti-tank Platoon and the composite

15 Platoon in Rossville Street. Then in sector 4 dealing

16 with the Anti-tank in Glenfada Park. Next the question

17 of whether or not Joseph Friel made an admission of

18 carrying a firearm and how Gerard Donaghy came to have

19 four nail bombs upon him.

20 Next the events in sector 5, and in

21 particular the deaths of Patrick Doherty and Bernard

22 McGuigan. Next the evidence as to the events of Free

23 Derry Corner and as to firing from the walls.

24 After that I propose a brief examination of

25 what various persons said soon after the event to the

Page 21

1 press or to the public, including statements of or put

2 out by the Army, a group of priests, politicians and

3 the IRA.

4 Next a brief examination of the

5 investigations by The Sunday Times conducted in

6 parallel with the Widgery Inquiry and of what has been

7 discovered by more recent journalistic endeavours.

8 Lastly, at one or more appropriate stages

9 I propose to invite the Tribunal to look or listen to

10 the more significant audio visual or audio material.

11 I must, however, before I begin make certain things

12 entirely plain: in the course of what I am about to say

13 I shall be referring to, summarising, I hope accurately

14 and fairly, and quoting the evidence given by a large

15 number of people and appearing in a large number of

16 documents on highly controversial topics. It will,

17 I believe, be apparent from what I say when that is

18 what I am doing.

19 Different portions of that evidence may well

20 be unpalatable to different people, but it is of course

21 obvious that a tribunal whose function it is to

22 discover the truth cannot hope to fulfil that task if

23 it fails to examine, scrutinise and assess the material

24 evidence from every quarter. The fact that I referred

25 to or summarised the evidence, or at least some of it,

Page 22

1 should be in no way taken to mean or imply that the

2 Tribunal, or for what it matters, I have formed any

3 view as to the accuracy or credibility of that

4 evidence.

5 The fact that I refer to any particular piece

6 of evidence carries with it no form of endorsement.

7 What the truth, so far as it can be discerned may be,

8 it is for the Tribunal alone to decide at the end of

9 the day in the light of all the evidence.

10 Nor, lastly, is any significance to be

11 attributed to the order in which topics, evidence or

12 documents are referred to. I have attempted to employ

13 an order which gives what I am about to say a logical

14 framework. There are no doubt many different ways in

15 which it might be done. I have simply adopted an

16 approach which seemed appropriate when I started on the

17 issue or sector in question.

18 With that introduction, I turn then to say a

19 few words about the historical background to Bloody

20 Sunday. The political, social and economic context in

21 which the events of Bloody Sunday took place have been

22 ably sketched in papers which have been submitted to

23 the Inquiry by two distinguished academics, Professor

24 Paul Arthur of the University of Ulster and Professor

25 Paul Bew of Queens University Belfast. Those papers

Page 23

1 will, of course, speak for themselves. For the moment,

2 at the risk of some statement of the obvious, I propose

3 to highlight a number of facts, matters and events to

4 many of which both professors Arthur and Bew refer to

5 in their reports and which may not be controversial.

6 To some of these events I shall return in the course of

7 this opening.

8 The Derry of the late 1960s and early 1970s

9 was a disunited city, divided, broadly speaking,

10 between Catholic nationalists and protestant unionists,

11 a city of high unemployment. In 1971 unemployment was

12 18% among males and 4.8% amongst women, and an average

13 of 13.2%, with an acute housing shortage and some

14 terrible housing conditions. Discrimination against

15 Catholics in employment and housing were facts of life,

16 as was a local electoral system which had been based

17 upon a redrawing of ward boundaries in 1936. That

18 redrawing, gerrymandering in all but name, had been

19 designed to secure and had secured the maintenance of

20 protestant political control over a majority Catholic

21 population and, to use the language of the 1930s, to

22 prevent Londonderry "passing into the hands of

23 nationalist and Sein Fein parties" for all time.

24 Quite apart from any question of

25 gerrymandering of electoral areas, the local Government

Page 24

1 franchise applied only to occupiers of dwelling of

2 houses and their spouses, and thereby excluded

3 sub-tenants, lodgers and children, so that about a

4 quarter of those entitled to vote at Stormont elections

5 were not entitled to vote in local elections.

6 A similar analysis was made in the report of

7 the Royal Commission chaired by Lord Cameron into the

8 causes and circumstances of the sporadic outbreaks of

9 violence and civil disturbances that had occurred in

10 Northern Ireland since 5th October 1968. That report,

11 the Cameron report, which is not a document that has

12 been circulated but which is a public document, said

13 this, and I quote:

14 "It is plain from what we have heard, read

15 and observed that the train of events and incidents

16 which began in Londonderry on 5th October 1968 has had

17 as its background on the one hand a widespread sense of

18 political and social grievance for long unadmitted and,

19 therefore, unredressed by successive governments of

20 Northern Ireland and, on the other sentiments of fear

21 and apprehension sincerely and tenaciously felt and

22 believed of risks to the integrity and continued

23 existence of the State. These opposing sentiments had

24 by that time built up tensions and pressures within the

25 community of such a kind that incidents comparatively

Page 25

1 small in themselves could readily lead to explosions of

2 violence of a dangerous and serious character. We have

3 also no doubt whatever that the sentiments of grievance

4 expressed in the representations and evidence placed

5 before us were passionately and sincerely held and

6 supported by a formidable catalogue of supporting

7 facts. " I should have said that is paragraph 6 of the

8 Cameron report. Such was the seed bed out of which the

9 Civil Rights movement in Londonderry grew.

10 On 5th October 1968 a Civil Rights march took

11 place in Derry organised by a group centred around the

12 Derry Housing Action Committee. The route of the march

13 was the subject of a partial ban preventing it from any

14 public highway, road, street or public place within and

15 on the walls or in the Waterside ward, the making of

16 which ban, according to the Cameron report, the

17 reference of which is paragraph 165, swelled very

18 considerably the number of persons who ultimately took

19 part.

20 The march soon encountered police

21 resistance. The Cameron report found that the

22 leadership, organisation, and control of the

23 demonstration in Londonderry on that date was

24 "ineffective and insufficient to prevent violent or

25 disorderly conduct amongst certain elements", present

Page 26

1 on that occasion and that the police handling of the

2 demonstration was "in certain material respects ill

3 coordinated and inept with a use of unnecessary and ill

4 controlled force in the dispersal of the demonstrators,

5 only a minority of whom acted in a disorderly and

6 violent manner".

7 Thereafter several large but peaceable

8 marches took place in this city, organised by the Derry

9 Citizens Actions Committee, an organisation formed in

10 October 1968 in which both John Hume and Ivan Cooper

11 were prominent.

12 On 22nd November 1968 the then Prime Minister

13 of Northern Ireland, Captain O'Neill, announced a

14 package of proposed reforms. These included the

15 replacement of the gerrymandered Londonderry Borough

16 Council with an appointed Development Commission. This

17 change took effect within three months and was well

18 received by the Catholic community. Other aspects of

19 the reform programme were less successful or were

20 substantially delayed in their implementation.

21 Between the 1st and the 4th January 1968 a

22 march took place, organised by People's Democracy, an

23 organisation established by student radicals at Queens

24 University Belfast, from Belfast to Derry. Towards the

25 end of the march the marchers were attacked at

Page 27

1 Burntollet Bridge only a few miles away from the city.

2 When the remnant of this march reached Derry rioting

3 against the police began and during the early hours of

4 the following day the police invaded the Bogside.

5 The Cameron report expressed the regretful

6 but unhesitating conclusion that on the night of

7 4th/5th January a number of policemen were guilty of

8 misconduct which involved assault and battery,

9 malicious damage to streets in the predominantly

10 Catholic Bogside area giving reasonable cause for

11 apprehension of personal injury among other

12 inhabitants, and the use of provocative, sectarian and

13 political slogans. These events led to the creation of

14 Free Derry which was painted on the gable wall at Free

15 Derry Corner on 6th April 1969.

16 During 1969 further rioting took place in the

17 city, in particular on the night of the 19th/20th April

18 1969 riots took place in the course of which the police

19 entered the house of Samuel Devanney and administered a

20 beating which was alleged to have been the cause of his

21 death three months later. Immediately after these

22 riots disturbances broke out in Belfast and bombs

23 exploded at the Silent Valley reservoir. These events

24 increased the political pressure on Captain O'Neill,

25 who resigned on 28th April 1969 and was succeeded by

Page 28

1 his cousin, Major James Chichester-Clarke.

2 After the Apprentice Boys march on 12th

3 August 1969 there was very serious rioting in the

4 Bogside which lasted for three days. The police were

5 unable to control the situation. As a result on 14th

6 August of that year British troops were, for the first

7 time during the troubles, deployed on and by many

8 Catholics, welcomed in the streets. The rioting of

9 which I have been speaking led to the appointment of

10 Lord Scarman to head of tribunal of Inquiry. That

11 Inquiry's report which is in comprehensive terms, was

12 published on 6th April 1972, shortly before the report

13 of Lord Widgery.

14 29 months elapsed between the arrival of the

15 British Army on the streets of Northern Ireland in

16 August 1969 and Bloody Sunday at the end of January

17 1972. Initially relations between the Army and the

18 local Catholic population were good. Before long,

19 however, and particularly after the Falls Road curfew

20 of the 3rd to 5th July 1970, the Army came, whether

21 fairly or not, to be seen as an instrument of the

22 Stormont Government and the relationship rapidly

23 deteriorated.

24 The tea cups were withdrawn and in general,

25 but of course with exceptions, community relations, if

Page 29

1 by that is meant the relationship between the Army and

2 the Catholic community, had reached a very low ebb by

3 the middle of 1971. During this period the labour

4 administration of Harold Wilson fell when the

5 Conservative Party won the general election of June

6 1975 and the Premiership of Edward Heath, as he then

7 was, began. James Callaghan was replaced as Home

8 Secretary by Reginald Maudling.

9 In Northern Ireland the first British soldier

10 to be killed in the troubles was shot during

11 disturbances in Belfast on 6th February 1971. Under

12 pressure as his predecessor had been from hardliners

13 within his own party, Major Chichester-Clarke resigned

14 on 19th March 1971. His successor was Brian Faulkner,

15 who was to remain Prime Minister of Northern Ireland

16 until the imposition of direct rule two months after

17 Bloody Sunday.

18 On 8th July 1971, two young Catholic men,

19 Seamus Cusack and Desmond Beatty were shot dead by the

20 Army in Derry. The Army maintained one had been armed

21 with a rifle and the other with the nailbomb.

22 Controversy ensued as to whether this was true. When

23 the Government refused demands for an Inquiry

24 opposition SDLP MPs announced their withdrawal from the

25 Stormont Parliament in protest and the IRA stepped up

Page 30

1 its campaign.

2 By the middle of July 1971 there were renewed

3 calls from right wing unionists and Protestants for the

4 introduction of internment. Many Catholics, for their

5 part wanted to see a ban on marches in place before the

6 Apprentice Boys parade on 12th August. Mr Faulkner

7 secured the agreement of the British Government to

8 internment provided that marches were banned

9 simultaneously. Internment was accordingly introduced

10 on 9th August 1971. Catholics condemned it as an

11 unjust and oppressive policy. On the same day marches

12 were prohibited initially for a period of 6 months,

13 though the ban was extended for a further 12 months,

14 shortly before Bloody Sunday.

15 By the end of August of that year it had

16 become necessary to establish an Inquiry under the

17 Chairmanship of Sir Edmund Compton into allegations

18 that some of the internees had been subjected to

19 physical brutality in the course of interrogation. The

20 report of this Inquiry published on 17th November 1971

21 found that there had been ill-treatment in twelve cases

22 that fell short of brutality, the distinction was not

23 one from which all drew comfort.

24 In response to the introduction of internment

25 a rent and rates strike was called in which 20,000

Page 31

1 Catholics were taking part by the end of the year.

2 Some reforms had been made in the areas of housing and

3 local Government and further proposals for reform were

4 announced in a green paper published in October. But

5 the estrangement of the Catholic population from the

6 existing constitutional arrangements was almost

7 complete and it was widely believed that the Stormont

8 Government would never deliver adequate reforms and

9 that the system itself could not survive.

10 After that necessarily brief summary

11 I propose to consider the events that preceded the 30th

12 January itself, and to begin with the question of

13 military planning and the Army command structure as at

14 January 1972. At that stage the General Officer

15 commanding, or GOC, as the acronym is in Northern

16 Ireland, and the Director of Operations, they are the

17 same person, was the late General Sir Harry Tuzo,

18 T-U-Z-O.

19 From 29th July 1971 onwards Major General

20 Forde was the commander of land forces, CLF,

21 effectively the deputy to the GOC, he having been

22 appointed to that position in succession to General Sir

23 Anthony Farrah-Hockley. Under him there were three

24 brigades: firstly the 39th Infantry Brigade based in

25 Belfast; secondly, the 8th Infantry Brigade based in

Page 32

1 Londonderry and, thirdly, the Fifth Air Portable

2 Brigade based in Lurgan.

3 The Fifth Brigade, the Fifth Air Portable

4 Brigade, had taken over from the 19th Air Portable

5 brigade in about November 1971. The 8th Infantry

6 Brigade, the Londonderry Brigade, was under the command

7 of Brigadier Andrew McClelland who took up his command

8 on 27th October 1971 in succession to the late

9 Brigadier Alan Cowan, its headquarters were at

10 Ebrington Barracks just across the river. Since

11 September 1970, the 39th Brigade had been under the

12 command of Brigadier Frank Kitson.

13 In Northern Ireland at that time security was

14 under the control of a committee known as the Joint

15 Security Committee for Northern Ireland. The members

16 of that committee included the Prime Minister of

17 Northern Ireland as from March 1971, Brian Faulkner.

18 The Minister of State at the Ministry of Home Affairs,

19 John Taylor; the senior Parliamentary secretary at the

20 Ministry of Home Affairs, Commander Albert Anderson;

21 the GOC, i.e. General Tuzo, the Chief Constable of the

22 RUC, then Sir Graham Shillington. The secretary to the

23 Northern Ireland Cabinet, then Sir Harold Black.

24 The Government security advisor, Mr William

25 Stout, and the UK Government representative who was at

Page 33

1 the time Mr Howard Smith, who had previously been

2 Ambassador in Czechoslovakia. Others such as the

3 Command and Land Forces, CLF, attended from time to

4 time. The UK Government representative reported back

5 to the Ministry of Defence in Whitehall, the GOC,

6 General Tuzo, was responsible to the Chief of the

7 General Staff.

8 That committee usually met on Thursdays.

9 Every fortnight it received a security branch

10 assessment relating to the activities of the previous

11 two weeks -- a Special Branch assessment relating to

12 the activities of the previous two weeks. Its role is

13 referred to in a statement of Sir Oliver Wright. Could

14 we have on the screen AW27.6: if you scroll down to

15 paragraph 14, if you look at paragraph 14 at the

16 bottom, Sir Oliver Wright, who I should say had

17 previously been the UK Government representative until

18 March 1975. If you look at paragraph 14, the bottom of

19 his statement says this:

20 "The joint Security Committee's role was

21 largely that of intelligence gathering, particularly

22 about the IRA. The Special Branch of the RUC had quite

23 rudimentary intelligence procedures when we first got

24 there. They needed to be taught how to do the job.

25 The Committee would share information to try to improve

Page 34

1 the gathering of evidence."

2 That is all I think we need from that. The papers

3 before the Tribunal, in particular bundle G, contain a

4 copy of the conclusion of the Joint Security Council

5 committee meetings from 5th August 1971 onwards. Some

6 of them are included because of their particular

7 relevance to the subject matter of the Inquiry, others

8 for the purpose of showing that nothing of materiality

9 is recorded as having been discussed.

10 Another committee with which the Tribunal

11 should be familiar is the so-called Director of

12 Operations Committee. Security operations at that

13 stage were the responsibility of this committee, of

14 which General Tuzo, the General Officer commanding and

15 Director of Operations was the head. General Forde,

16 the Commander of Land Forces was a member of this

17 committee. Other members included the Director of

18 Intelligence; the Chief Constable; the Assistant Chief

19 Constable (operations), named Mr Corbett; the Chief of

20 Staff at Headquarters Northern Ireland; the Government

21 security advisor, the head of the Special Branch and

22 the secretary of the committee. This was not a

23 committee whose meetings were held on any fixed day but

24 only as occasion demanded.

25 The RUC were, of course, a separate force

Page 35

1 under the control of their Chief Constable. Northern

2 Ireland was divided into lettered divisions, division N

3 for "never" included Londonderry. The relationship

4 between the Army and the RUC was imprecise in the sense

5 that it was not always clear who was in charge of each

6 operation.

7 So far as the Army is concerned their

8 position was not an entirely easy one. Their military

9 orders came from the Ministry of Defence in London,

10 although overall responsibility for the security of

11 Northern Ireland was in the hands of the Northern Irish

12 Government, the civil power in support of whom the Army

13 was deployed. The position is set out. May we have

14 V58, in an answer given on 18th February 1972 by the

15 then Secretary of State for Defence. If you look at

16 this excerpt from Hansard, you will see in the

17 left-hand column under the headings "Northern Ireland",

18 the question, Mr Cronin asked the Minister of State for

19 Defence if he will make a statement on the arrangements

20 by which the Government of Northern Ireland indicates

21 to the British Army and Northern Ireland the tactical

22 objectives which they wish it to pursue". I should

23 have said the date of this question is 17th February

24 1972. The reply from the Minister of State is as

25 follows:

Page 36

1 "The tactical objectives of the Army in

2 Northern Ireland are a matter for the General Officer

3 commanding who is responsible to the Ministry of

4 Defence. He works in the closest co-operation with the

5 Northern Ireland Government through the Joint Security

6 Committee."

7 The supplementary questions from Mr Cronin

8 are these: "In spite of that rather vague answer, is

9 not the British Army in Northern Ireland in effect the

10 agent of the Stormont Government? While we feel

11 nothing but admiration for the restraint and discipline

12 of the British Army generally, is it not an intolerable

13 situation, that whatever the provocation, they should

14 be killing, wounding and generally harassing the

15 Catholic population under the direction of the highly

16 partisan protestant Stormont Government? Is it not now

17 urgent that responsibility for security should be

18 transferred to Westminster?" The response from Lord

19 Balniel:

20 "I must repudiate some of the contents of

21 the question. The Army is acting in support of the

22 constitutional civil authority. The Northern Ireland

23 Government are constitutionally responsible for law and

24 order in the province. However, a GOC has overall

25 responsibility for security operations and he exercises

Page 37

1 this responsibility to the Defence Department which is

2 answerable to this House."

3 So overall security in the hands of the

4 Northern Irish Government but the GOC takes his orders

5 from the Ministry of Defence, which is what Lord

6 Balniel meant by the Defence Department in London.

7 After the Army had been deployed in Northern

8 Ireland in August 1969, the GOC had become the supreme

9 security commander for Northern Ireland with

10 operational control over all security forces. It was

11 also agreed at the same time that two senior civil

12 servants from London would be temporarily seconded to

13 the Government of Northern Ireland and Belfast to

14 represent the increased concern of the United Kingdom

15 Government in Northern Irish affairs because of the

16 commitment of its armed forces. These two were the UK

17 representative in Northern Ireland and a civil

18 representative in the Ministry of Home Affairs, though

19 it seems that by 1970 that representative was no longer

20 in post.

21 I then come to the situation as it appeared

22 to the military at the beginning of July 1971. Could

23 we have on the screen bundle G1.1. If you had asked

24 the military at the very beginning of July 1971 for an

25 assessment of the security situation in Londonderry you

Page 38

1 might well have been told that there was a feeling of

2 cautious optimism, but that there were disquietening

3 signs of a resurgence of attacks on the security forces

4 and of pronounced hooligan activity.

5 On 2nd July 1971, as appears from this

6 document, Brigadier Cowan, at the time the Brigadier in

7 command of the 8th Infantry Brigade, signed what is

8 described as -- see the left-hand side of the page --

9 "OP directive number 3 of 1971". We shall see a

10 number of these directives and they take a common form,

11 they are issued, as one sees from the address in the

12 top right-hand corner, from the headquarters of the 8th

13 Infantry Brigade at Ebrington Barracks. They are

14 secret, as appears typed and stamped on the top of the

15 document. They circulate in a number of limited

16 copies. One will see on the right-hand side the words

17 "copy number 22 of 35 copies", one can see a

18 distribution list at the end and they begin usually

19 with a series of references to the maps that are

20 referred to in the order itself, and something called

21 "time zone alpha", which I think simply means that

22 everyone is working on the same time as the rest of the

23 population.

24 If one looks at what is described in -- if

25 one looks at the heading "situation" under "general

Page 39

1 background" what Brigadier Cowan wrote, or somebody

2 wrote on his behalf, was this:

3 "During the last six months the principal

4 threat has swung away from that of street violence to

5 that of an overt campaign of explosive, arson and

6 ambush attacks against the security forces by the

7 Provisional wing of the IRA.

8 "Initially during this period there was a

9 political crisis, stemming from on the one side, the

10 lack of confidence in the Government on the law and

11 order issue, and on the other the alleged lack of

12 perseverance with the reform programme. This crisis

13 culminated in the resignation of the Prime Minister,

14 followed by the predictable appointment of Mr Faulkner

15 as the new leader of the Ulster Unionist Party. During

16 this time of political crisis on the security side, it

17 was one of the most peaceful periods for many months,

18 there was no serious street violence in either Belfast

19 or Londonderry and country areas also remained quiet,

20 the uneasy truce between the two factions of the IRA

21 continued."

22 Can we could to 1.2, please: "(4) the

23 majority of parades during the Easter weekend passed

24 uneventfully. In both Belfast and Londonderry, minor

25 disturbances and stone throwing by hooligans took place

Page 40

1 after the parades were over. In Londonderry vicious

2 rioting by about 50 young hooligans continued for about

3 two hours, but there was no continuation into the

4 evening. An arms amnesty which ended on 8th April led

5 to the surrender of over 1600 weapons and over 99,000

6 rounds of assorted ammunition together with grenades

7 and other explosive accessories.

8 (5): After Easter the Province remained

9 generally free from street disturbance, apart from

10 isolated incidents of stone throwing and petrol

11 bombing. However, explosive attacks on soft targets

12 continued, the majority of which were apparently Brady

13 inspired, Brady means Provisional IRA. As the weeks

14 passed the level of explosive and arson attacks

15 continued, and on 7th May the first remotely controlled

16 ambush took place of a UDR landrover in the border area

17 to the west of Londonderry.

18 (6): Since that first ambush, the number of

19 incidents of ambushes, claymore mining and overt

20 attacks upon members of the security forces has

21 steadily increased, these have included explosive

22 attacks against RUC stations. The level of street

23 violence has also risen with street disturbances in the

24 New Lodge area of Belfast in May and a resurgence of

25 hooligan activity after a long period of comparative

Page 41

1 peace, on the streets of Londonderry towards the end of

2 June."

3 Then under the heading "political" he wrote

4 this:

5 "The Government under Mr Faulkner continues

6 on a stable and successful course with no signs of any

7 loss of confidence, indeed with a measure of support

8 from the opposition, particularly as a result of a

9 decision to ban the Orange Order march in Dungiven.

10 However, critics of the Government continue to call for

11 sterner measures to counter the continuing series of

12 explosive and incendary attacks, this measures include

13 the rearming of the RUC. The reconstruction of the

14 B Specials and enforcement of the law on republican

15 clubs. Proposals to help to reunite the community have

16 been made by the Government, these include measures to

17 improve derelict urban areas, the proposal to introduce

18 majority verdicts, the intention to appoint a Director

19 of Public Prosecutions, the appointment of an Ombudsman

20 of Government contracts, the intention to hold further

21 economic discussions with the Irish Republic and the

22 announcement of the membership of an economic review

23 team.

24 1.3: "Although these proposals and

25 initiatives by the Government have been welcomed and

Page 42

1 supported by the moderate opinion of the Unionist

2 Party, the gap between Mr Faulkner and the right wing

3 seems as wide as ever. There are already signs that

4 the strength of the Prime Minister's support may be

5 diminishing, although given the opportunity to succeed

6 on the law and order issue, Mr Faulkner should be able

7 to survive the threat posed against him from the

8 protestant right."

9 There is then a paragraph in which the order

10 deals with the position of the IRA and distinguishes

11 between the Goulding Group, which means the Officials,

12 and the Brady Group, which means the Provisionals. If

13 you go down the page to 3(c) under the heading "Brady

14 Group", it records -- (a): All reports indicate that

15 the Brady Group intends to maintain and intensify its

16 attacks with explosives and small arms and that these

17 will be primarily directed against the security

18 forces. These attacks will include ambush by mine and

19 bomb of Army patrols in border areas. Explosive

20 attacks will also continue against soft targets such as

21 Government establishments, electricity transformers,

22 telephone exchanges, border RUC stations and Orange

23 Halls.

24 (c): It is reliably reported that the recent

25 street disorders in Londonderry were instigated by the

Page 43

1 Brady Group with the aim of drawing the security forces

2 into the Bogside where they could be attacked with

3 grenades, nail bombs and small arms fire." Perhaps I

4 should have read two, which is the Goulding Group. If

5 one looks at (a) they continue to condemn the Brady

6 Group's policy of violence while at the same time

7 publicising their own non-militant and politically

8 orientated policy. However, there is evidence that the

9 group are being propelled to join in with the violence

10 on the grounds that otherwise they will lose their

11 members to the Brady faction. This is borne out by the

12 report that one of the attacks on an RUC at Belfast was

13 a Goulding operation and that Goulding men have been

14 selected for active service. Should they adopt a more

15 militant posture they can be expected to conduct

16 ambush, assassination and kidnap attacks against

17 members of the security forces.

18 1.4, under the heading "outlook" which is

19 item E, the order read as follows:

20 "The present level of explosive attacks is

21 likely to be continued, especially those directed

22 against the security forces. As the Orange Order

23 marching season gets into full swing, the Brady Group

24 can be expected to defend their Catholic areas and

25 repel incursions and to take advantage of the parades

Page 44

1 to draw the security forces into positions from which

2 they could be attacked."

3 If you go to page 1.5, at paragraph 4, under

4 the heading "task", the task given by the order to the

5 8th Infantry Brigade is expressed as follows:

6 "8th Infantry Brigade is to continue to aid

7 the Civil Authority in the maintenance of peace in RUC

8 divisions L, M, N, O and P." N, you will recall, is

9 that division which includes Londonderry.

10 Under the title "execution" the concept of

11 operations, one can, I think, go to D under the heading

12 "Londonderry City" where the order reads this:

13 "The overall policy of the security forces

14 within the city continues to be embodied in the

15 following, (a): The gradual expansion of the scope of

16 RUC activities with the RUC being well to the fore in

17 any deployment for a specific event. The long-term aim

18 must be that complete control of the city will

19 eventually be handed back to them.

20 (b): The gradual scaling down of direct

21 military involvement, with military forces being less

22 in evidence on the streets. However, reserve forces

23 must be held at short notice at selected positions

24 throughout the city to provide a quick and effective

25 reaction to any incidents of aggression, rioting and

Page 45

1 terrorism without at the same time overreacting to an

2 incident which could be handled by the RUC."

3 1.6 (c): When committed to a riot situation,

4 military forces are to disperse crowds using the

5 minimum of force required and are to effect as many

6 arrests as possible. This latter operation will

7 require imaginative planning and troops will need to

8 act with considerable guile and cunning.

9 (d): The city commander is to pursue the

10 policy of the further isolation of minority extremist

11 and hooligan elements by establishing contact and

12 liaison with the local population, local leaders of

13 industry, civil leaders and other key communicators.

14 No higher level of deployment or activity other than

15 reaction to a riotous situation nor to hot pursuit of

16 gunmen is to take place in the city without the

17 specific authority of the brigade commander. RMP,

18 Royal Military Police patrols, the RMP Patrol Programme

19 is to be integrated with that of the RUC. It is to

20 include mobile patrols of Bogside, Creggan and

21 Waterside by both day and night and foot patrols of the

22 city centre by night. Detailed routes and timings for

23 these patrols will be laid down from time to time by

24 the city commander."

25 If you would go to 1.9, we will see the

Page 46

1 disposition of the Londonderry City Battalion. The

2 general outline: "The City Battalion is responsible

3 for Londonderry city, including the Waterside ward and

4 for RUC Division N, west of the River Foyle. The unit

5 responsible for this city will always be a resident

6 battalion and will conduct a "roulement" between

7 Londonderry city and RUC division N in accordance with

8 the programme at annex J." I think that means it will

9 swap between one and the other:

10 "Grouping, under command, one company of the

11 resident battalion in RUC Division N under operational

12 control, and it is a detachment of the Royal Military

13 Police, elements of the Fifth UDR Battalion. In

14 support, one troop of an air squadron and two sectors

15 of an explosives unit. Tasks, one: Maintain sub-units

16 within the city, currently three companies to provide

17 observation posts, static guards and foot and mobile

18 patrols with an exact deployment as agreed between the

19 brigade commander and commanding officer.

20 2: Maintain One Platoon as a static guard to

21 provide the absolute security of the Craigavon Bridge.

22 This guard is to carry out random vehicles checks on

23 the bridge during the day and night, at the discretion

24 of the commanding officer.

25 (3): Maintain One Platoon as a static guard

Page 47

1 to provide the absolute security of Blease Lane Police

2 Station and for additional support to paragraph four

3 below.

4 (4): Maintain a small mobile force at state

5 1, phase 2, that is no doubt some status of alert, for

6 the immediate support of the RMP and RUC patrols in the

7 Bogside and the Creggan.

8 5: Maintain reserves, currently two

9 companies, at states of readiness as laid down from

10 time to time by this HQ.

11 (6): Provide border patrols to the west of

12 the city by day and night. These patrols are to visit

13 all key posts, customs posts, RUC stations, T and AVR

14 centres", I am not sure what they are,"target

15 installations and all border crossing points within the

16 area at a varying frequency to be determined by the

17 commanding officer in the light of other operational

18 circumstances.

19 (7): Carry out deliberate road block

20 operations at the discretion of the CO."

21 That is all we need look at in this order,

22 save if we just look at 1.15, this is a signature

23 page. If we go to the bottom of the page we will see

24 it is signed by Brigadier Cowan as the Commander of the

25 8th Infantry Brigade and by Major Steel, the Brigade

Page 48

1 Major.

2 If you go to the page 1.16 you will see that

3 the form of these things is that they come with a

4 series of annexes, many of which are not of key

5 importance, but there are two annexes to this order

6 which may be of interest. One is at 1.17, the next

7 page, under the heading -- this is annex A under the

8 heading "security committees". One:

9 "All operations between the military and the

10 RUC will be coordinated at police divisional level by

11 joint consultation within Divisional Security

12 Committees:

13 2: The membership and attendance of these

14 committees is at the discretion of the Chairman, the

15 suggested basic composition is as follows" -- you will

16 see there is a Northern Security Committee, and lower

17 down a "Western Security Committee" and they cover

18 various different areas. The Northern Security

19 Committee had an area which included RUC division N,

20 and a series of military personnel were contemplated as

21 members of this committee, including the commanding

22 officers of the then relevant battalions and somebody

23 whose acronym is MILO North-West and MILO North-East,

24 which being interpreted is Military Intelligence

25 Liaison Officer and various others, together with, for

Page 49

1 the RUC, the divisional commanders of the relevant

2 divisions, and then for the UDR various representatives

3 -- the commanding officers of the various battalions

4 and a civilian representative from LDC, which is

5 presumably the Londonderry Development Commission.

6 I mention this because it looks as if when we

7 come to the planning for Bloody Sunday itself that the

8 Security Committee was not to any significant degree,

9 if at all, involved in anything relating to the

10 planning for the events of the day.

11 If you then turn to the next page, which is

12 1.18, we will see in the top right-hand corner, this is

13 annex L, and there is an annex entitled the use of IS

14 Internal Security weapons, 1:

15 "Commanders must be selective in the use of

16 IS weapons. The most appropriate weapon is to be used

17 to ensure that the force used is the minimum necessary

18 to achieve the objective of keeping the peace.

19 2: Opening fire:

20 "The rules for opening fire with small arms

21 are contained in the Yellow Card which is issued on the

22 scale of one per man. The present card was revised in

23 January 1971 and is marked with a thick black line at

24 the top and bottom of the card, no other card is to be

25 used.

Page 50

1 3: CS, bursting grenades. If the local

2 commander considers that he must open fire with small

3 arms if there is hand incident then he must first use

4 CS bursting grenades. The rules laid down in the

5 Yellow Card must be observed.

6 4: CS gas. CS may only be used if short of

7 opening fire, there is no other way of (a) keeping two

8 hostile crowds apart, (b) stopping a hostile crowd from

9 attacking the position, (c) preventing a crowd from

10 carrying out riotous acts on persons or property, (d)

11 effecting the arrest of ringleaders and those carrying

12 out riotous acts or incitement to riot, (e) preventing

13 a person or persons in an inaccessible position from

14 throwing petrol bombs or similar lethal missiles, (f)

15 protecting property such as military equipment or

16 buildings for which the Army is responsible from being

17 damaged or destroyed, (g) dispersing an illegal meeting

18 or demonstration.

19 5: Water cannon: Water cannon with dye may

20 be used when the local commander considers that its use

21 is necessary in order to achieve control of a crowd or

22 an incident.

23 6: Baton round: (a) baton rounds are to be

24 used in preference to CS gas, (b) the round is best

25 fired in salvoes of not less than six rounds at ranges

Page 51

1 not exceeding 50 metres and from a standing position."

2 1.19: (C) the round should normally be used

3 against the thighs and shins of the crowd by firing the

4 round short of the crowd and bouncing it into the

5 crowd, (d) the baton round may cause severe injury if

6 fired directly at a crowd, but this may be done if the

7 circumstances warrant it, (e) whenever possible the

8 baton round should be fired in conjunction with the

9 deployment of arrest squads in order to pick up those

10 members of the crowd bowled over by the round, (f) if

11 possible baton rounds should be recovered for future

12 use.

13 7: Batons", by batons here means truncheons,

14 there is a baton gun which fires rubber bullets and a

15 baton which is a truncheon. "The baton is a

16 discriminating weapon and in accordance with the

17 doctrine of minimum force, may be used when required.

18 AIS warnings, the use of any AIS weapons must always be

19 preceded by a clear and timely warning to the crowd.

20 Timely warning must also be given to the RUC in order

21 to allow them to take precautions for their own

22 protection.

23 9: Brigade policy. Notwithstanding the

24 rules in this annex and without wishing to inhibit

25 commanders on the spot in moments of crisis, it is

Page 52

1 brigade policy not to use CS gas in Londonderry city

2 unless absolutely necessary."

3 That which we have been looking at is OP

4 directive number 3 of 1971 of the 2nd July.

5 On 4th July, two days after the directive was

6 issued, the situation changed overnight as is reflected

7 in -- and may we have G27.196. On 10th November there

8 was issued OP directive number 4 of 1971 which this

9 is. One sees its date just, 10th November, the 10

10 being in manuscript. The heading is "OP directive

11 number 4/71". What is important for the present

12 purposes is what is set out under the heading

13 "situation. General, background," where this reads

14 as follows:

15 "(1): When the last directive was issued,

16 there was a feeling of cautious optimism about the

17 security situation in Londonderry. At that time no

18 shooting attacks had been mounted against the security

19 forces and the level of overt military activity was

20 low. The hooligan element had been isolated from the

21 vast majority of the community and the IRA were

22 quiescent. There had been significant and perceptible

23 progress towards stability and normality. There were

24 signs that the policy of restraint which the security

25 forces had been following since June 1970, was at last

Page 53

1 beginning to succeed.

2 (2): Within two days of the directive being

3 signed, the situation changed dramatically. On 4th

4 July the IRA mounted a campaign in the city with the

5 short-term aim of so disrupting the life of the city

6 that the Apprentice Boys annual celebrations on August

7 12th would have to be cancelled. The campaign opened

8 with an ever-increasing number of shooting incidents on

9 succeeding days, until the reaction by the security

10 forces to the IRA gunmen led to the return of fire and

11 the death of two of the rioters."

12 (3): The effect of this first ever return of

13 fire in Londonderry instantly turned the Catholic

14 community from benevolent support to complete

15 alienation. The subsequent introduction of interment

16 followed in its turn by the erection and dismantling of

17 barricades throughout the Bogside and Creggan, all

18 combined to lead to a situation in which the security

19 forces were faced by an entirely hostile Catholic

20 community.

21 On 20th August it was decided that the

22 military profile in Londonderry would be lowered in the

23 hope that moderate opinion would win the day. This has

24 proved to be a pious hope. At present," and this

25 document is 10th November 1971, "neither the RUC nor

Page 54

1 the military have control of the Bogside and Creggan

2 areas and law and order is not being effectively

3 maintained. No military routine patrol takes place in

4 these areas and the mob rule of the gun remains."

5 We will come back to this order in due

6 sequence. I refer to it at the moment because of its

7 reference to what occurred on 4th July 1971.

8 The two people killed who are referred to in

9 this order were Seamus Cusack and Desmond Beatty, to

10 whom I have already referred, who were killed on 8th

11 July in Derry following four nights of intensive

12 rioting. It is instructive to see -- may we have E

13 60043. This is a portion of the report of Professor

14 Arthur. If one goes to the very top of the page, it

15 may be instructive to read what he there says in the

16 first sentence on the first line as to the deaths of

17 these two men:

18 "The Army maintained that both men had been

19 armed, a fact vehemently denied by the local

20 community. Three facts are significant in these

21 incidents, one was that one of the victims bled to

22 death, had a simple tourniquet been applied or he been

23 taken to Altnagelvin Hospital, rather than to

24 Letterkenny in the Irish Republic, he may well have

25 survived. The fact that he was not taken to

Page 55

1 Altnagelvin is the pertinent point. It is an

2 indication of the sense of alienation that Bogsiders

3 had for local institutions. To go to Altnagelvin was

4 to invite arrest by the security forces.

5 The second point has been alluded to already

6 by Martin McGuinness when he said that it was these

7 deaths which resurrected the IRA in Derry. This is

8 apparent in the nationalist press. An editorial in the

9 Derry Journal (9 July) entitled 'lamentable' invokes

10 restraint: "Blood calls to blood but it must not be for

11 blood, of which, heaven knows, too much has been shed

12 already, but rather beware of the gulf into which any

13 urge to reprisal can lead'". Despite this lead the

14 paper's columns were filled with condemnation from a

15 wide spectrum of local opinion in the following weeks,

16 and the Army post at the edge of the Bogside and

17 Creggan came under siege and constant attack. By the

18 end of the month the IRA was confident enough to adopt

19 a much higher public profile.

20 "The third point compliments the second:

21 extra parliamentary activity was having a deleterious

22 effect on the political process, no more so than on the

23 SDLP who demanded - and failed to - get an independent

24 Inquiry into the deaths of Beatty and Cusack. They

25 responded by withdrawing from Stormont and set up

Page 56

1 (eventually) their own short-lived assembly in

2 Dungiven. They were conscious of the challenge from

3 the Republican movement, with the result that 'the

4 Party's parliamentary behaviour in 1970 and 1971 was

5 volatile, manifested in the party's consistent tendency

6 to abstain in about one-fifth of all divisions. Their

7 dilemma was best explained by party leader Gerry Fitt

8 in a BBC interview. 'People thought that we were half

9 unionists and that we had forgotten the people who had

10 voted for us', the circumstances surrounding the death

11 of Beatty and Cusack offered them the reason to

12 withdraw from Stormont: 'no influence is more direct

13 upon any leading politician than controversial

14 happenings in his own constituency' and there had been

15 by then a litany of such events in Derry. Hume's

16 decision, though, may well have been strategic rather

17 than tactical, since of all of Northern Ireland's

18 politicians, he been the most inclined to think in

19 grand conceptual terms and in long time scales."

20 A month later, that is correct to say a month

21 after the killing of Seamus Cusack and Desmond Beatty,

22 on 9th August 1971, the day after internment, the

23 Provisionals shot dead their first British soldier in

24 Derry, Paul Gallagher, a soldier in the Royal Horse

25 Artillery -- on 10th August.

Page 57

1 May we then turn, please, to G2.20. This is

2 a note of a meeting between ministers of the Northern

3 Irish Parliament and the General Officer commanding at

4 Stormont Castle on Tuesday 6th July at 10 o'clock, that

5 is to say two days after the beginning of the IRA

6 campaign of 4th July. Those minutes record the

7 presence of the Prime Minister and either all or many

8 of the relevant ministers, the Attorney, the General

9 Officer commanding and the relevant officials, and they

10 record that invited by the Prime Minister to address

11 the meeting the GOC reaffirmed that the Army's role was

12 in support of the civil power and that they would keep

13 in touch and act in consort with the civil power at all

14 times. There were occasions, however, when the local

15 commander on the ground had to act on his own

16 initiative, bearing in mind his ultimate responsibility

17 within the law.

18 Referring to public criticism of the Army,

19 the GOC rejected out of hand allegations of partiality

20 and to criticisms of reluctance to attack law breakers,

21 his answer was that targets could only be fired on

22 where clearly identifiable and where there was no

23 possible danger to innocent bystanders."

24 Reading between the lines it looks as if the

25 GOC was, presumably, sensitive to and facing criticism

Page 58

1 of that order, either at that meeting or before. If

2 you would then jog down to the second half of the

3 page. In the last paragraph, the minutes record that:

4 "In reply to a question about the Army's

5 apparent reluctance to move in and 'mop up' militant

6 elements in the Bogside area of Londonderry, the GOC

7 recalled that, while there had been minor troubles

8 recently, unarmed police patrols had been able to go

9 into the area for the last year and it was debatable

10 whether it was wise to risk a reversal of this

11 acceptable situation through precipitate action."

12 That is the 6th July 1971. From this time

13 onwards, although there was a police post at Blease

14 Lane, the RUC ceased to patrol in the Bogside and the

15 Creggan. Indeed, the so-called police post at Blease

16 Lane was only accessible to the security forces by

17 armoured column escorting a policeman there and back

18 each day. This deteriorating situation in Londonderry

19 was matched elsewhere in Northern Ireland. According

20 to a paper on internment, which we will come to in due

21 course, and whose page reference is G120.795, but we

22 need not have it on the screen, the figures for

23 terrorist incidents rose from 361 in June to 646 in

24 July and reached 1073 in August.

25 I now come to the introduction of

Page 59

1 internment. As from Monday, 9th August 1971, the

2 Minister for Home Affairs of the Northern Ireland

3 Government, acting under Regulation 12 of the schedule

4 to the Civil Authorities Special Powers Act Northern

5 Ireland, 1922, introduced detainment and internment.

6 Simultaneously, acting under Section 2(2) of

7 the Public Order Act 1951, he imposed a six-month ban

8 on public processions on any public highway, road or

9 street. As a result between about 4.30 am and 7.30 am

10 on 9th August 1971 some 342 people suspected of being

11 IRA terrorists or republican activists were arrested in

12 various parts of Northern Ireland. The majority, some

13 70% of them, were thereafter detained or interned

14 without trial. The number of those detained or

15 interned fluctuated from time to time, but at its peak

16 it was at the order of 750, which was the figure as at

17 3rd February 1972.

18 It is not the function of this Inquiry to

19 decide whether or not internment, which was not

20 essential on purely military grounds, was necessary or

21 wise. Nor is it for this Tribunal to decide whether

22 matters would have been worse without internment on the

23 grounds that without it the security forces would have

24 been denied the intelligence derived from those

25 interned and detained and the arms finds made in

Page 60

1 consequence.

2 Secondly, the benefit of taking hundreds of

3 people suspected of involvement in terrorist activity

4 out of circulation. Nor is it the task of the Inquiry

5 to decide whether the policy caught only its lesser

6 targets because the more important ones had flown, or

7 the wrong people altogether because of inaccurate or

8 non-existent intelligence. It is sufficient for

9 present purposes to state the obvious truth that the

10 policy was bitterly opposed, particularly among the

11 Catholic community whom it primarily reflected in

12 practice as an unacceptable inroad into civil liberty

13 and that internment at that date came to be regarded by

14 many as the wrong decision, at least upon the scale on

15 which it was carried out.

16 A judgment such as that was not one reached

17 only with hindsight. If we may look at E6044 we will,

18 I hope, find a portion of Professor Arthur's paper in

19 which he deals with the question of internment where he

20 says this:

21 Hume (John Hume] had been part of a SDLP

22 delegation which had met senior Government officials in

23 London in February 1971. Following that meeting he

24 announced confidently: 'It is our distinct feeling

25 that as a result of our representation on this question

Page 61

1 internment is a much more remote possibility'. He was

2 not alone in his confidence. The Community Relations

3 Commission had had a meeting with the Army GOC in the

4 middle of June 'in words of one syllable he, meaning

5 thereby the GOC, explained the futility of internment

6 as a method of containing conflict, the likelihood that

7 it would not work, the difficulty of getting the right

8 people before they went into hiding or skipped over the

9 border (if they were not already there), the likelihood

10 that internment would be seen to be one-sided and the

11 likelihood that there would be an explosion of violence

12 and his soldiers who had come to keep the peace would

13 become targets. It was a very comprehensive demolition

14 of a policy proposal, and one that seems to have been

15 well rehearsed. Tuzo's analysis was remarkably

16 accurate, as he was to discover after internment had

17 been imposed on 9th August."

18 If we may then turn to bundle T, page 187,

19 bundle T page 407 of a book entitled "Out of Step", the

20 subheading is "Memoirs of a Field Marshall" and they

21 are the published memoirs of Field Marshall Lord

22 Carver. He records there that he and General Tuzo were

23 in agreement that the marches should not be banned and

24 interment should not be recommended. If one takes it

25 up in the first full paragraph:

Page 62

1 "On 11th June [this is 1971] I visited

2 Northern Ireland and discussed with" the word

3 obliterated is Tuzo, "the linked subjects banning

4 marches and internment. Faulkner's line at this time

5 was that one could not be accepted without the other.

6 Tuzo and I agreed marches should not be banned and that

7 internment should not be recommended. On 19th July,

8 with the Belfast marches of 12th July behind us in

9 which the deployment of large numbers of soldiers along

10 the march routes had represented any serious violence,

11 Tuzo and I had a meeting in London with Lord Carrington

12 [who was then the Secretary of State for Defence) to

13 consider what should be done about the 12th August

14 Apprentice Boys March in Londonderry. We stuck to the

15 line that with some changes from its traditional route,

16 it should be allowed to go ahead: that internment

17 should not be introduced, but that 'disruptive

18 operations' should be carried out, with the primary aim

19 of reducing the pressure on Faulkner to take positive

20 action against the IRA.

21 Whilst Faulkner represented the situation as

22 deteriorating, I recommended to ministers on 3rd August

23 that internment should only be introduced as a last

24 resort, and that we should 'ride it out' in the face of

25 threats from both sides. After some discussion, my

Page 63

1 view was accepted. Next day Tuzo reported that

2 Faulkner had said that he had received so many appeals

3 from both Catholics and Protestants to ban the March,

4 because of the likelihood of bloodshed, that he could

5 not morally resist them. He was therefore pressing for

6 the 'double act', that means both banning marches and

7 introducing interment. Tuzo reiterated that we would

8 not recommend it on military grounds but asked that he

9 should immediately initiate the planning for his

10 reinforcement in case the double act was agreed. If it

11 were, he recommended that it should take place on 10th

12 August and recommended that the RUC had reported -- and

13 reported that the RUC had increased their estimate of

14 the number to be interned to 500, 300 to be in the

15 initial pick-up."

16 The introduction of internment was discussed

17 at a meeting between Mr Faulkner, the Northern Ireland

18 Prime Minister and the British Prime Minister, Home

19 Secretary, foreign secretary and Secretary of State

20 held at downing street on 5th August 1971, the minutes

21 of which are at G 550. I should say there were also

22 present for some of the time, as the note of the

23 meeting records the Chief of the General Staff, General

24 Sir Michael Carver, as he then was, Lord Carver as he

25 now is. The GOC in Northern Ireland, General Sir Harry

Page 64

1 Tuzo and the Chief Constable. Those minutes record

2 that "the discussions began in private session with

3 only ministers present. Mr Faulkner stressed the

4 seriousness of the security situation, the decline in

5 public confidence, the increasingly serious

6 implications for commerce and industry and the absence

7 of any new initiative which the security forces could

8 suggest to make an early impact. Accordingly he argued

9 that there should be an early use of internment

10 powers. UK ministers pointed out the difficulty that

11 military advice that internment was necessary had not

12 been given, and that reflects entirely what appears in

13 General Field Marshall Carver's memoirs, and stressed

14 the national and international implications of so

15 serious a stand. It could not be contemplated without

16 'balancing' action against parades, curtailment of gun

17 clubs, and the clearest emphasis that initatives to

18 unite the community would be sustained. Page 51:

19 "Mr Heath made the point that if internment

20 was tried and did not succeed in improving matters the

21 only further option could be direct rule. None of the

22 measures taken so far had really succeeded in uniting

23 the community. Mr Faulkner replied that in his view

24 direct rule would be a calamity and if they could

25 really get a grip on the security position, there was a

Page 65

1 genuine hope of not merely restoring the pre-1968

2 position when people had, for the most part, been

3 living harmoniously together, but of moving forward to

4 something better in conditions where the changes of the

5 past two years could take effect. Moreover, there were

6 other initiatives, notably his committee proposals

7 still 'on the table' to be taken up", that is a

8 reference to certain proposals for broadening the

9 effect of representation at Stormont through the use of

10 committees.

11 "At a second stage of the meeting, the CGS,

12 GOC and Chief Constable were called into consultation.

13 The Chief Constable gave his view that the time for

14 internment had now arrived. The CGS and the GOC took

15 the position that they could not describe it as an

16 essential measure in purely military terms. The IRA

17 could not be defeated by present methods, but whether

18 the likely time scale was acceptable was essentially a

19 political question, and thus not one for determination

20 by them.

21 "3: After the interval, during which

22 ministers discussed the position with their respective

23 advisors, the meeting was resumed between ministers

24 with officials in attendance. Page 52.

25 4: At this stage Mr Heath gave the firm

Page 66

1 decision of the UK Government that if, as the

2 responsible minister, Mr Faulkner informed them it

3 would be his intention to proceed to early internment,

4 they would concur and ensure the necessary Army

5 support. Plans for the operation as such would be

6 coordinated on their side by the Home and Defence

7 secretaries. The Foreign and Commonwealth secretary

8 would handle international repercussions, consultations

9 with other powers, possible action at the UN and

10 derogation from the European Human Rights and

11 Convention. He himself would send a message to the

12 President of the United States and the Prime Minister

13 in Dublin, and would deal with Westminster

14 repercussions. He did not intend that Parliament

15 should be recalled.

16 5: Turning to the repercussions of

17 internment, Mr Heath made it clear that, as a matter of

18 decided cabinet policy, it must be accompanied by a ban

19 on all parades throughout Northern Ireland 'without

20 limit of time' while internment lasted. It would be

21 desirable also to suspend the operation of all rifle

22 clubs until further notice. If there was any evidence

23 of the involvement of Protestants in any form of

24 subversive or terrorist activities, they too should be

25 interned. It would be important to emphasise what had

Page 67

1 already been done by way of reform, and to consider

2 whether any fresh initiatives could be taken. All of

3 these steps would be important, to 'reassure the other

4 side of opinion' in Northern Ireland and in the

5 Republic and to take account of wider international

6 feeling. Over the page.

7 "Mr Faulkner welcomed their attitude on

8 internment and then turned to the other aspects

9 mentioned by Mr Heath. One: Ban on parades. Previous

10 experience of blanket banning was not encouraging. It

11 would certainly be very rash at this stage to use a

12 form of words which could commit the Government so far

13 in advance to ban, say, the next 12th July. The

14 practicality of enforcing such a ban either in this

15 case or in the very possible event of massive Civil

16 Rights protests should not be underestimated. It might

17 be more prudent to limit the ban to Belfast,

18 Londonderry and flashpoint areas. As to time, it would

19 be difficult to justify an unlimited ban by reference

20 to the established criteria; it would therefore be

21 better to proceed, as on previous occasions, by a ban

22 for a specific period which would be extended if

23 circumstances made it desirable. I think we can leave

24 out rifle clubs. Page 54:

25 "Internment of Protestants: whatever their

Page 68

1 involvement in past acts, there is no intelligence

2 indicating an existing or imminent potential protestant

3 threat. It was only on these grounds that internment

4 of Protestants was not envisaged at present. There

5 would be no hesitation to intern such elements in

6 circumstances changed; but the present threat was from

7 the IRA:

8 "Political steps: the Government of Northern

9 Ireland would undeviatingly preserve its declared

10 policies and further initiatives were by no means ruled

11 out, although it was not easy to see what these could

12 be:

13 "In further discussions UK ministers made it

14 clear that the ban on parades must be total, but they

15 accepted the argument that it should initially be for a

16 period of six months." I omit the passage about rifle

17 clubs and go on down:

18 "Mr Heath made it clear that if in the light

19 of these decisions Mr Lynch were to seek a meeting with

20 him earlier than October, this might be difficult to

21 refuse, if Mr Faulkner would consider it helpful to

22 meet him again in advance of any such meeting, he would

23 invite him to Chequers."

24 Over the page at 5.55, the line of a possible

25 statement for Tuesday, 10th August, and it was agreed

Page 69

1 that this should be cleared between the Prime Minister

2 of Northern Ireland and the Home Secretary, it would

3 not be possible to state or imply that the GOC had

4 advised internment, the formula should be in 'in the

5 light of security advice and after consultation with

6 the UK Government'." .

7 One also needs to look in relation to the

8 contemporaneous evidence at G12A 78.1. For the benefit

9 of the transcript G12(a), 78.1 and G12(b) 78.1 are an

10 exchange of letters of 13th and 15th September between

11 General Tuzo and Brian Faulkner in which General Tuzo

12 records, in the second paragraph of the letter that he

13 advised on 5th August that the disadvantages of

14 internment outweighed the advantages. We will have

15 that scanned and put on the screen in due course.

16 We should also look at JS 8.1 in which one

17 finds the statement of Sir Graham Shillington, who was

18 the then Chief Constable. If one turns to paragraph 4,

19 he says this:

20 "The introduction of internment was a

21 turning point in the internal security situation in

22 Northern Ireland. By the middle of 1971 it had become

23 very difficult to convict anyone involved in sectarian

24 violence under the normal criminal justice system.

25 This was because witnesses refused to testify and

Page 70

1 juries were being intimidated. The level of civil

2 unrest was getting out of control and I believe we had

3 reached a point where some form of action had to be

4 taken in order to restore order. I recall discussing

5 the possibility of bringing in internment with my Prime

6 Minister and Harry Tuzo, who was the General Officer

7 commanding at the time. The GOC gave the impression

8 that he was in favour of bringing in internment. Like

9 me, he believed that the time had come to adopt such a

10 measure.

11 On 5th August 1971, the GOC and I attended a

12 meeting with Edward Heath, the British Prime Minister,

13 Brian Faulkner, the Northern Irish Prime Minister and

14 General Carver, the Chief of the General Staff. The

15 meeting had been called in order to discuss internment.

16 I recall being asked by Edward Heath what my views on

17 the subject were. I explained that much as I would

18 prefer to rely on the criminal justice system, it had

19 been too difficult to do so and our laws were being

20 rendered inoperable and ineffective. However, I recall

21 that the GOC appeared to backtrack on the views he had

22 expressed to me. He stated that he did not believe we

23 had reached a stage at which internment could

24 reasonably be brought in. He did not rule it out, but

25 stated that it was his belief that the timing of its

Page 71

1 introduction would not be appropriate. I believed at

2 the time that he was simply being influenced by the

3 presence of General Carver, who was very much against

4 bringing in internment and had made his views on the

5 subject known.

6 The meeting with the Prime Minister started

7 as a political debate. The GOC and I were invited to

8 enter the meeting part way through and we left before

9 it had ended. Following the meeting the Government

10 decided to introduce internment coupled with a

11 universal ban on marches and demonstrations."

12 The minutes of the meeting we have seen are

13 also given flesh in a statement from Sir Edward Heath

14 which is to be found -- may we have KH 4.1. We will

15 have to come back to that in due course. Could we then

16 come to bundle G1.20794. This is a paper headed

17 "Internment" and it was written -- we need not turn it

18 up but it appears from G1.20.801 as having been written

19 on 28th February 1972 and it was attached to the

20 meetings of the Joint Security Committee of the

21 2nd March 1972. Its significance is that it is a paper

22 which was approved by the joint Security Committee as

23 setting out what internment meant and what it was

24 designed to achieve. If we could have the second half

25 of the document, we will see that in the last paragraph

Page 72

1 but one, it records as follows:

2 "Meanwhile a threat of altogether different

3 proportions developed in Northern Ireland. In August

4 1971 the Northern Ireland government found it necessary

5 to introduce internment in order to defeat a campaign

6 of terrorism, the declared aim of which was to

7 overthrow the Northern Ireland institution and to sever

8 Northern Ireland from the rest of the United Kingdom."

9 If we go to page 799, the document sets out

10 the procedure that was supposed to operate. Under the

11 heading "procedures":

12 "The responsibility for making arrests lies

13 with the security forces and persons suspected of IRA

14 activities may be taken into custody for questioning.

15 This is done at a police holding centre where the

16 suspect remains for not more than 48 hours. On arrival

17 at the centre he is medically examined by a doctor

18 appointed by the police authority and he is similarly

19 examined on departure."

20 Then the Compton committee is referred to,

21 which I will deal with in a moment. In the second

22 paragraph:

23 "Members of the armed forces and of the

24 police are required at all times to act within the

25 law. There have been several widely publicised

Page 73

1 allegations of ill treatment of persons arrested, more

2 particularly when the initial arrests were made. All

3 complaints of such treatment are investigated.

4 A person who has been taken into custody may

5 be released within 48 hours or charged with a specific

6 offence or detained for a further period by order of

7 the Minister of Home Affairs. If he is charged with an

8 offence he is immediately allowed the services of a

9 solicitor and is brought before a court. Subject to

10 the normal rules he will qualify for free Legal Aid.

11 It is then for the Court to decide whether he should be

12 discharged or remanded for trial, in the latter case

13 the Court again decides whether he should be remanded

14 on bail or in custody. The Chief Constable may decide

15 to recommend that a person who has not so far been

16 charged be detained beyond the 48 hours. If the

17 minister accepts the recommendation, he will sign a

18 detention order, the purpose of which is to enable the

19 case to be further considered. During the period of

20 detention which is not normally more than 30 days, a

21 charge may be preferred against a person or the

22 Attorney General may order his release. Alternatively

23 the Chief Constable may recommend internment and the

24 Minister may then, if he agrees, make an internment

25 order. It must be emphasised that persons for whom

Page 74

1 internment is considered necessary are identified by

2 the security forces and not by the authority signing

3 the order. The Ministry of Home Affairs as the person

4 who signs the order is not concerned with the

5 preparation of wanted lists and in no case does he take

6 action unless a recommendation is made to him with

7 accompanying reasons." At the top of the next page,

8 800, under the heading "facilities for detainees and

9 internees":

10 "Detainees are held in the Maidstone, a

11 depot ship normally used for troop accommodation in

12 Belfast Harbour. Detainees live in mess decks in the

13 same way as troops. Internees are normally held in

14 centres as Long Kesh, ten miles from Belfast or

15 Magilligan, 20 miles from Londonderry."

16 Then later the same document deals with an

17 advisory committee, under the heading "advisory

18 committee:

19 "When internment was introduced an advisory

20 committee was set up as required by the special powers

21 regulations. The Chairman of the committee is his

22 Honour Judge James Brown, a judge at the Northern

23 Ireland county court. The other members are Mr Phillip

24 Dalton, a former puny judge of Kenya and currently

25 deputy President of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal and

Page 75

1 Mr Reginald Barclay, a leading business figure in

2 Belfast."

3 Then the document goes on to record -- I do

4 not think it is necessary to read -- the procedure by

5 which representations can be made to the Advisory

6 Committee whose function it is to advise the Minister

7 whether or not the person in question should be

8 released. As I have already indicated, complaints were

9 later -- before I go on to that, the camp at Magilligan

10 to which reference is made in that document was in

11 fact, as we shall see, only opened shortly before

12 Bloody Sunday and the first of the internees arrived

13 there on 17th January.

14 As I have already indicated, complaints were,

15 after the introduction of internment, made about the

16 treatment of those interned by the military authorities

17 including allegations of physical brutality. They were

18 the subject of a Home Office Inquiry, as I have said

19 under the Chairmanship of Sir Edmund Compton. He

20 investigated allegations made by some 40 complainants

21 out of those who were arrested on 9th August 1971. His

22 report was presented to Parliament in November 1971.

23 It cleared the Army of any acts of physical brutality

24 or cruelty against the internees, but concluded that

25 there had been in respect of 11 individuals ill

Page 76

1 treatment in the form of being made to stand against

2 the wall for long periods, hooding, noise, deprivation

3 of sleep and a bread and water diet, and it found that

4 there had been in relation to a number of complainants

5 what he described as a measure of ill treatment,

6 sometimes unintended.

7 The task of the Committee was not rendered

8 any easier by the fact that only one of those arrested

9 on 9th August availed himself of the opportunity to

10 substantiate his allegations by appearing before the

11 Committee. Those who did reply to the Committee's

12 letter informing the persons concerned that they might

13 be legally represented refused the offer, most of them

14 adopting the stance taken by NICRA that the inquiry was

15 unacceptable because of its constitution and the fact

16 that its proceedings were in private.

17 The ban on marches which had been introduced

18 in order to avoid occasions of confrontation between

19 the two communities and to leave the security forces

20 free to pursue terrorists, aims which had the support

21 of the Irish Government, precluded equally

22 demonstrations against internment or in support of

23 Civil Rights and marches by the Orange Order. That ban

24 was on both accounts viewed by many as an unacceptable

25 restriction on civil liberty.

Page 77

1 So far as Derry is concerned, following

2 internment barriers were erected in the Bogside and in

3 the Creggan. If we may now have T189 we will see how

4 Lord Carver deals with this in his memoirs. If one

5 goes to the bottom paragraph, in dealing with

6 internment he says this:

7 "Last minute detailed planning took place in

8 a feverish atmosphere when the final list of 520 names

9 was eventually received from the RUC. Of these 326

10 were actually arrested, little or no force being

11 required to persuade them to go along with their

12 captors. They were removed to three assembly centres,

13 the barracks of Girdwood in east Belfast and at

14 Ballykinlar in county Down and the camp at Magilligan

15 at the eastern mouth of Lough Foyle. A special

16 interrogation centre had been set up some time before

17 in the barracks at Ballykelly, a former RAF station

18 North-East of Londonderry. Once the pick-up had been

19 made, it was necessary to redeploy the troops quickly

20 to deal with the threat of rioting and any other

21 reaction. By 12th August Belfast was quiet after some

22 rioting and burning, thanks to the energetic action of

23 Frank Kitson, the Brigade Commander there. The

24 reaction from the Catholic area of Londonderry was

25 severe and got progressively worse over the eight days

Page 78

1 following. Barricades were erected throughout the

2 Bogside the Bogside and Creggan and on 19th August an

3 operation was mounted to clear them. By last light

4 there were still some in the Creggan which had not been

5 removed. During the day, Tuzo and Howard Smith", that

6 is the UK Government representative, "had met with 30

7 prominent local Catholics. They were persuaded to

8 allow the latter to use their influence to get the

9 inhabitants to remove the remaining barricades

10 themselves. They were unsuccessful, and by the

11 beginning of September the barricades were still

12 there. This well meaning attempt to restrict the use

13 of force in Londonderry proved unfortunately to be the

14 thin edge of the wedge that led to the establishment of

15 the no go area, which was to prove so troublesome

16 later."

17 It is in that circumstance that one gets the

18 reference to the committee of 30 or words to that

19 effect:

20 "Opposition to the policy of internment was

21 both vocal and active, either by repeated attempts to

22 defy the ban on marches or by rent strikes or other

23 proposals to comply with civic obligations."

24 If we may now look at document G16, 100, we

25 will find -- this is a portion of a brief for the

Page 79

1 meeting of the United Kingdom Prime Minister and Brian

2 Faulkner on 7th October 1971. The document begins at

3 16.92 but I do not think we need turn that up. G16.100

4 deals with agenda item four headed "Civil disobedience

5 and counter measures". It records that:

6 "On 1st October, the Ministry of

7 Development," that is of Northern Ireland, "estimated

8 that 20% of the population of Northern Ireland (rather

9 over half the Catholic population) were taking part in

10 the civil disobedience campaign. In some areas over

11 90% of the population were involved. When a high

12 proportion of the population is involved, some

13 intimidation is probably occurring. There has been

14 little significant increase in the numbers involved

15 over the past fortnight, but the Government is afraid

16 that unless firm action is taken quickly Protestants

17 will also decline to pay rent and rates leading to a

18 rapid decline in the situation."

19 Internment and an increase in the rate and

20 quantity of violence went hand in hand. If we may look

21 at Professor Arthur's paper, E 6045, we will see in the

22 first full paragraph, the third line down, he says

23 this:

24 "The Northern Ireland Prime Minister, James

25 Chichester-Clarke had resigned in March 1971 after he

Page 80

1 had failed to convince the British Government that

2 there needed to be a stronger security response and

3 more troops on the ground. His successor Brian

4 Faulkner was a more astute and assertive politician who

5 had been Minister of Home Affairs the last time that

6 internment had been introduced in the 50s. It was a

7 well tried security measure that had been relatively

8 successful in 1921-24 and 1938-45 and 1955-62. It

9 begun on 9th August when over 300 men were

10 arrested. 'as a political and security exercise it was

11 a disaster'. It led to terrific resentment, it failed

12 miserably to control the violence. Of the night in

13 1972 who died violently in 1971 (sic), only 28 were

14 killed before internment was introduced. The picture

15 is much more complex than these simple figures suggest:

16 the raw statistics of violence before and after

17 internment have been frequently quoted, but they attest

18 directly to its failure. In the six months preceding

19 August there were 288 explosions; in the succeeding six

20 months, this increased three-fold. In the same two

21 periods shooting incidents multiplied six-fold,

22 security forces deaths four-fold and civilian deaths

23 over eight-fold respectively.

24 More profoundly, the impact of internment and

25 allegations of torture inside the detention camps

Page 81

1 signalled the death knell of the political process.

2 Catholics viewed the course of the post-1968 period as

3 an attempt to attain reform, to achieve justice within

4 the context of the prevailing constitutional and legal

5 system, an assault by the Government on the IRA would

6 be taken as side stepping the real issue and an

7 implicit rejection of their demands for reform. All

8 sections of the Catholic community withdrew their

9 support from the regime and their political

10 representatives in the SDLP began to flounder as they

11 attempted to bridge the gap between parliamentary and

12 extra parliamentary activity. Senior officials began

13 to realise that the time was fast approaching when

14 there was a need to break with the Stormont system.

15 Bloody Sunday was to provide the reasons for making

16 that radical break."

17 I wonder whether that might be a convenient

18 moment?

19 LORD SAVILLE: Yes, Mr Clarke, shall we come

20 back at 2.00?

21 (1.00 pm)

22 (The Luncheon Adjournment)




Page 82

1 (2.00 pm)

2 LORD SAVILLE: Yes, Clarke.

3 MR CLARKE: I hope we can put up on screen

4 now G12A78.1.

5 LORD SAVILLE: There is a hand up behind you,

6 yes.

7 LORD GIFFORD: I was a little disappointed

8 this morning when we were not either given the

9 opportunity for the various legal teams either to

10 introduce themselves or to be introduced. There are

11 certainly a number of new faces that I have not seen,

12 much less the public. Also I think we need to know who

13 is not here. The Ministry of Defence was represented

14 at one point, but I do not see them here. I would

15 respectfully ask that the representations of the

16 various parties be known to us all and to the public

17 before we go very much further.

18 LORD SAVILLE: I think rather than

19 interrupting Mr Clarke this afternoon, if we could come

20 back on that first thing come morning, I will ask

21 Mr Clarke if he could provide us with a list of

22 everybody who is present and whom they represent.

23 Alternatively, if you would prefer, he could

24 go round the room with each legal representative

25 introducing his or herself, as the case may be. I will

Page 83

1 leave it with Mr Clarke and leave it up to you as to

2 the best method of proceeding. I think it would be

3 better to do that tomorrow morning.

4 MR CLARKE: We now have on the screen the

5 letter that it was not possible to find before.

6 I should explain to everybody that there are some

7 documents that have been added to the existing bundles

8 which will be circulated in hard copy in due course,

9 but which I suspect those who have presently received

10 hard copies of bundle G do not have. It rather depends

11 exactly which update they have. This is one of them.

12 There is also an entire bundle, bundle K,

13 which is a bundle of statements by politicians and

14 officials which has not been circulated so far as I am

15 aware at all, certainly not as a bundle, but which is

16 or will become available firstly by being scanned into

17 the system and secondly by being circulated in hard

18 copy, many of the statements in which have only

19 recently been signed, of which the statement of

20 Sir Edward Heath which I am about to come to in

21 a moment is one.

22 There will also appear on the screen from

23 time to time recently signed statements, as recently as

24 this morning which obviously have not been circulated

25 but which will all be circulated in due course.

Page 84

1 I would invite my learned friends to bear with me on

2 the assurance that anything which appears on the screen

3 will also appear on their desks in hard copy in the

4 fullness of time.

5 This letter of 13th September 1971 is from

6 Sir Harry Tuzo to the Prime Minister of Northern

7 Ireland. He says this:

8 "I am taking the liberty of trespassing into

9 a field which is essentially your personal concern but

10 which has a strong military flavour. As you can

11 imagine I am some what concerned by the very strong

12 pressure which appears to come from all sides for the

13 release of detainees. Naturally I concede that a fair

14 number of these people should be let out but I would

15 regard it as quite a serious matter if any man having

16 past or present IRA traces were to reappear on the

17 streets at this stage.

18 As you will remember I advised on 5th August

19 that the disadvantages of internment outweighed the

20 advantages. But once the decision to intern was taken

21 the Army threw its entire weight behind the operation

22 and, in doing so, has brought down on itself not only a

23 physical retaliation, but a fair amount of opprobrium.

24 It would be wholly bad if IRA men, many of whom are

25 known by sight to our soldiers, were to be put back in

Page 85

1 circulation after all we have endured to get them

2 locked up; but what is far more important is the fact

3 that detention is now the main weapon in our campaign

4 against the bomber and the gunman.

5 We are taking in a steady flow of men

6 averaging about two per day and this intake may well

7 increase as the effects of interrogation begin to tell,

8 thus we are neutralizing a large number of the enemy

9 and I feel sure we shall we should not allow any amount

10 of pressure to reduce this effect unless and until the

11 IRA call off their campaign.

12 From a conversation we had recently,

13 I believe that you and I think completely alike on this

14 matter, but I thought I ought to let you know in

15 writing how strongly I feel about it. I must emphasise

16 of course, that I am only concerned with detainees

17 whose release would have a definite military effect.

18 I am taking the liberty of signalling ...

19 This letter seems to make plain, whatever the

20 view of Chief Constable may have been, General Tuzo's

21 view was the advice he had given before internment was

22 introduced to the Government of the day was, as this

23 letter plainly states, that its advantages were

24 outweighed by its disadvantages.

25 We have also, I hope, bundle KH4.1 which is

Page 86

1 the recently signed statement of Sir Edward Heath,

2 which puts some flesh on the minutes of the meeting

3 with the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland. If we go

4 to KH4.4 and go to the bottom of the page. Paragraph

5 15, he says in his statement:

6 "In August 1971 the Prime Minister of

7 Northern Ireland, Mr Brian Faulkner, came to London to

8 seek the agreement of Her Majesty's Government to the

9 introduction of a policy of internment without trial of

10 people who were suspected by the security authorities

11 of complicity in paramilitary violence in Northern

12 Ireland, but in respect of whom there was not

13 sufficient evidence to sustain charges of criminal

14 offences which could be tried in the courts.

15 "16: My colleagues and I discussed this

16 request in every aspect, amongst ourselves, with the

17 military authorities and with Mr Faulkner. We took

18 into consideration the inherent disadvantages of

19 internment, including the problems of where to hold

20 those who were interned, and how and in what

21 circumstances internment could be brought to an end and

22 internees brought to trial in the courts or released.

23 We recognised that the introduction of internment

24 without trial would be highly unwelcome to the

25 nationalist community in Northern Ireland and would not

Page 87

1 be likely to commend itself to the Government of the

2 Republic of Ireland. We recognised that it would be

3 likely to create new problems for the security forces

4 in Northern Ireland, and could well require the

5 commitment of increased military resources, of manpower

6 and equipment.

7 "17: It became clear, however, that

8 Mr Faulkner and his colleagues in the Government of

9 Northern Ireland had come to the view that the

10 introduction of internment was essential in order to

11 contain the threat of republican violence, and attached

12 such importance to it that they would be unlikely to

13 continue in office without it. In that event, direct

14 rule, which was favoured by the Government of the

15 Republic of Ireland, would have become a virtual

16 certainty. The alternative could therefore have been

17 the collapse of Government in Northern Ireland and the

18 introduction at very short notice of direct rule by Her

19 Majesty's Government. We wished to avoid that if

20 possible.

21 "18: As a condition of our agreeing to the

22 introduction of internment. We persuaded Mr Faulkner

23 to agree to a complete ban on marches, so as to ease

24 the strain on the security forces. It did not prove

25 practicable to enforce a complete ban, and it was

Page 88

1 necessary to decide how to deal with such marches as

2 occurred despite the ban.

3 "19: The general policy, agreed with the

4 Northern Ireland Government, was that marches and

5 demonstrations in defiance of the ban should be

6 constrained by the security forces, with a view to

7 avoiding flash points and situations in which marches

8 and demonstrations led to violent clashes between

9 loyalists and nationalists or situations which put

10 innocent members of the civilian population at risk.

11 Within that policy, responsibility for initiating and

12 conducting operations rested with the Chief Constable

13 and the GOC, subject to consultation as seemed to them

14 appropriate with the authorities in Belfast and

15 London. It was well understood that the Army would be

16 required to act in support of the civil power in

17 carrying out these operations; and indeed there would

18 be some operations in which the RUC could not or should

19 not be involved and which would therefore have to be

20 carried out by the Army on its own.

21 "20: It was for officers on the ground to

22 judge in any given situation what force should be used,

23 and how an intended operation should be run, within the

24 context of general policy at the time. This would

25 include what troops should be used and how they should

Page 89

1 be deployed. In general, as has already been stated,

2 the policy was that only the minimum force necessary to

3 achieve the objective should be used. That meant in

4 practice non-lethal instruments, such as water cannons,

5 plastic rounds (I am afraid that I do not now remember

6 when these first became available) and CS riot control

7 agents. The use of firearms was to be an extreme

8 measure the circumstances and the manner in which

9 soldiers were permitted to use firearms were defined in

10 the instructions on the Yellow Card."

11 Now I had reached a stage shortly after the

12 introduction of internment. The position in

13 Londonderry, at least from the viewpoint of the

14 military, is set out in a document at G116.750.

15 G116.750 is a document prepared after Bloody Sunday,

16 entitled: "A summary of events in Londonderry on

17 Sunday, 30th January 1972."

18 It was prepared by Lieutenant-Colonel

19 Overbury and another Lieutenant-Colonel. It is what it

20 describes itself as in the introduction in paragraph 1

21 2B, namely a preliminary report on events in

22 Londonderry on 30th January, including some of the

23 background leading up to these events.

24 It is not, the document says, "the complete

25 story," and is subject to confirmation, but the facts

Page 90

1 have been checked as far as possible in the time

2 available.

3 If we go to page 116.751 we will find,

4 relevant for the present purposes, paragraphs 5 and 6.

5 Paragraph 5 records that:

6 "On 20th August a meeting between the GOC,

7 the UK Rep and the 'Committee of 30' [to which I have

8 already previously referred] took place after it was

9 decided, that in a last attempt to maintain the

10 hitherto successful policy of minimum pressure, the

11 military profile should be lowered in Londonderry in

12 the hope that moderate opinion would win the day.

13 There was, moreover, a tacit understanding that the

14 period allowed for this detente was to be of the order

15 of one month.

16 "6: From August to November an uneasy

17 status quo was maintained and in a conscious effort to

18 avoid provocation, no routine military patrolling was

19 carried out in the Bogside and Creggan and no military

20 initiative was taken, except in response to aggression

21 or for specific search or arrest operations. During

22 this time the IRA were very active, barricades were

23 erected, frequent sniping and bombing attacks were made

24 and the IRA tightened their grip on the population of

25 the Bogside and the Creggan ..."

Page 91

1 The uneasy status quo to which the authors of

2 this document refer on the military level was reflected

3 in an equally uneasy status quo at the level of policy

4 making. Thus, if we look to G49.64 -- try G9.65. Can

5 we look it up in hard copy in volume 1 of bundle G.

6 Bundle G9.65 are the minutes of a meeting of the Joint

7 Security Committee on Thursday, 19th August in Stormont

8 Castle.

9 Under the heading "Situation Report", the

10 minutes record this:

11 "The GOC said that internment had succeeded

12 in disrupting the IRA leadership. Belfast had remained

13 reasonably quiet although there had been a continuation

14 of incidents involving the use of explosives. He

15 anticipated that there would be an increase in activity

16 in border areas in the near future.

17 "The situation in Londonderry had

18 deteriorated but he was not prepared to tolerate

19 republican enclaves in the Bogside and Creggan.

20 "The GOC referred to Wednesday's successful

21 operation when a gunman had been killed and a number of

22 good arrests made. He expressed his confidence in the

23 Army's ability to control the situation but was

24 convinced that this was not enough: some measure must

25 be taken to calm the situation and restore normality.

Page 92

1 "The Chief Constable supported the views of

2 the GOC and said there was evidence of IRA involvement

3 in Londonderry and that some people active in the city

4 had come from the Irish Republic.

5 "The police presence in Blease Lane was being

6 maintained but patrolling was now being carried out in

7 difficult areas, mainly by police in plain clothes."

8 If we could come to G11.73, it is the second

9 page of a document that begins at G11.72, which is the

10 conclusions of the meeting of the same committee, the

11 Joint Security Committee held on Tuesday, 2nd September

12 at Stormont. The situation report that is here set out

13 reflects a tension between two different policies, one

14 of restricting military action in the Bogside and the

15 Creggan in the hope that conditions would improve and

16 the other of refusing to accept that any part of

17 Londonderry should be, or appear to be, a no-go area

18 and taking whatever action is necessary to prevent that

19 from happening.

20 The minutes record this:

21 "The Prime Minister expressed concern about

22 the situation in Londonderry where he said the public

23 had realised that the security situation had changed.

24 The GOC said that he had taken a tactical decision in

25 Londonderry. He had met a number of responsible

Page 93

1 people [that is obviously the Committee of 30] and he

2 believed there was a chance that they might be able to

3 effect some improvement in the situation in Bogside and

4 Creggan if given a chance. The security forces have

5 been engaged in the clearing of barricades and were

6 being attacked. The barricades were being rebuilt and

7 the exercise was fruitless. He was making an effort to

8 break out of the circle of violence which was created

9 by the repeated taking down of barricades (those now

10 remaining were in any case at the present time very

11 small). It was possible that the people to whom he had

12 spoken would be able to encourage a greater sense of

13 responsibility and the formation of the Tenants'

14 Associations which would exercise some degree of

15 leadership. The GOC said that this was an experiment

16 which might fail but he felt it was worth trying.

17 "The Minister of State at the Ministry of

18 Home Affairs said that Londonderry had returned to a

19 'no-go' situation. The GOC said that this was not

20 so.

21 "The Prime Minister said that it seemed to

22 him that a situation had been created similar to that

23 on the Falls Road area where there had been agreement

24 in General Freeland's time that the Army would not go

25 into certain areas. This was why he was asking if any

Page 94

1 progress had been made. The GOC said little progress

2 had been made, but there was no commitment entered into

3 in Londonderry and his troops would go into Bogside or

4 Creggan at any time they felt it necessary.

5 "The Minister of State at the Ministry of

6 Home Affairs said that account would have to be taken

7 of the feelings of people in the country who thought

8 that a'deal' had been done and that a 'no-go' area had

9 been created. There was now an area in Londonderry

10 where the IRA were known to be, where they could now

11 regroup and where arms were known to be and the Army

12 were not going in to get them. He did not feel that he

13 could support such a situation. The Prime Minister

14 said that while one should not be too concerned about

15 what might be termed 'grandstand opinion' [I suppose

16 that means spectators on the sidelines] it was

17 nevertheless necessary to realise that a situation of

18 this sort might have a serious effect elsewhere.

19 "The GOC pointed out that at any time the

20 Army could go back in strength. He knew there were IRA

21 men in the area and he knew where they were. If no

22 progress was made in the new tactical direction then he

23 would be prepared to go in and to take whatever action

24 was necessary. The situation in Londonderry was under

25 constant review."

Page 95

1 The next page, 11.7 -- we should have

2 G11.74. The only two lines on the next page read as

3 follows:

4 "It was agreed that although there might be

5 differences of opinion within the Joint Security

6 Committee, no public indication of this should be

7 given."

8 On 6th September 1971 a riot broke out and

9 Annette McGaffgin was killed by British Army fire in

10 Abbey Street. She is generally regarded as the 100th

11 victim of the troubles, although the recently published

12 book "Lost Lives", which chronicles in a moving way all

13 those who have died in the troubles, places it as

14 number 121.

15 On 9th September 1971 (see G12.76) the Joint

16 Security Committee met again. In paragraph 2, under

17 the "Situation Report":

18 "The Chief of Staff said while they could not

19 feel happy about the situation in Londonderry, Army

20 control there had been vigorous and reasonably

21 effective. Some barricades had come down and they

22 still expected the others would. The GOC did not feel

23 that the time was ripe to force the pace.

24 "The Chief Constable expressed concern about

25 police difficulty in pursuing ordinary criminal

Page 96

1 investigations in parts of Londonderry. The CLF was

2 aware of his concern.

3 "Internment was a continuing exercise and

4 detentions were being effected at an encouraging daily

5 rate."

6 At this time the 8th Brigade was under the

7 command of the late Brigadier Cowan. If we turn to

8 G14A86.001, we will find the manuscript minutes of a

9 meeting that he had on 30th September 1971. If you

10 could maximize the first two lines in capitals, you

11 will see that this is described as:

12 "... a visit of SOFS, PM, Thursday 30th

13 September 1971, 1450 - 1530 hours."

14 I take this to be a visit of the Secretary of

15 State for defence, Lord Carrington and the Prime

16 Minister of Northern Ireland, Brian Faulkner, if only

17 for the reason that in ordinary course -- firstly the

18 English Prime Minister is not known to have visited

19 Northern Ireland on 30th September 1971, and if he did

20 his initials would precede, or his acronym would

21 precede that of the Secretary of State.

22 If we could see a bit more of the document.

23 It is very difficult to decipher but it has various

24 headings. If you could somehow maximize the bottom

25 portion of the document, you will see that the headings

Page 97

1 that were being discussed by Brigadier Cowan were under

2 the heading "Threats" and were these:

3 "1: The IRA.

4 2: Extreme Prods", meaning extreme

5 protestants.

6 "3: Hooligans.

7 4: Political", and that reads, one can with

8 a fine eye distinguish:

9 "Left wing political and industrial acts/

10 subversion/sabotage", and I am afraid I cannot read the

11 words which follow.

12 "(b): Processions, marches and demos.

13 (c): Lurch to the right in the Stormont

14 Government should that occur.

15 (d): Civil disobedience and general

16 withdrawal of Catholics."

17 5: "Of the threats, overall sectarian

18 problems, [something] of hatred, fear, distrust,

19 prejudice, bigotry, et cetera, it seems the antithesis

20 of all the Christian virtues can polarise very

21 quickly,"cry of "burn burn" means exactly what it

22 says."

23 If we could turn to G14A.86.003. I am

24 omitting an intervening page which deals with a lot of

25 history. Could we have the second half of this page?

Page 98

1 Could we have the first half of it and could we try and

2 maximize half of this? He gives a heading, "Outline of

3 events since 4th July":

4 "(a): The shooting incidents on 4th May,

5 4th/5th, 5th/6th and 6th/7th July.

6 "(b): Increased patrolling on night 7th/8th

7 July led directly to further violence and the shooting

8 of Cusack and Beatty.

9 "(c): Major attacks on Blease Lane led to:

10 (i): The strengthening of its defences.

11 (ii): Operation Hailstone on the night 17th

12 July - and its attendant house surveillance.

13 "(d): Other house surveillance,

14 particularly Province-wide programme which began on

15 23rd July.

16 (e): The Westland Street traffic accident.

17 (f): Operation Demetrius on 9th August.

18 [That must be putting into effect of internment] our

19 take being 81.5 per cent (67 out of 86).

20 (g): Violent reaction to it, including

21 obstructions.

22 (h): Clearing operations on 18th and 19th

23 August.

24 (j): GOC's meeting with the Group of 30 on

25 20th August. The accident in Foyle Road. Political

Page 99

1 pause since then, but with continued disorders, mostly

2 in a fairly minor key, and shooting incidents, most of

3 them pretty ineffectual.

4 "We have, of course, continued with an

5 arrest programme since 9th August. 21 known IRA men

6 have been arrested in the brigade area and two killed.

7 No doubt more have been killed or wounded [I cannot

8 read the words above that] we know of five. We have a

9 further four on our immediate arrest list."

10 Then there are details about the number of

11 confirmed shooting incidents and explosions since

12 4th July.

13 Can we try the bottom of the document with

14 the same degree of magnification:

15 "The current situation.

16 (a): As often predicted, there has been a

17 certain tragic inevitability about the way things have

18 gone. Oversimplifying, we handed the IRA on a plate on

19 7th and 8th July what had been denied them for 18

20 months, i.e. we were sucked in, used our weapons for

21 the first time in Derry and turned the population

22 against us and towards the IRA.

23 (b): Internment and its aftermath increase

24 the anger and resentment of the green community.

25 (c): Our operations on 18th and 19th August,

Page 100

1 while successful in themselves, at a price, were doomed

2 to overall failure unless we had sufficient forces to

3 'occupy' the whole area for a substantial period.

4 (d): We have in effect broken rule one in

5 the internal security book; instead of having a

6 friendly population, or at least one which practised

7 benevolent neutrality, we now face an entirely hostile

8 community, in particular..."

9 Could we go on to the next page, 004?

10 "1: A massive civil disobedience campaign

11 organised by Hume and others.

12 "2: Left wing SRG [Socialist Republican

13 Group] organised by McCann and others, this includes

14 Goulding IRA. Three gunman and bombers, mainly Brady

15 IRA, but number of activists are small. Maximum total

16 of 500 of all sorts, more likely 200. 30 Goulding,

17 about 6 active; about 40 Brady, about 6 active; total

18 IRA about 70 plus few from Donegal.

19 "7: The dilemma. (a): At present neither

20 the RUC nor the military have control of the Bogside

21 and Creggan areas. In other words, law and order is

22 not being effectively maintained.

23 "(b): While in some ways this is mainly a

24 political problem and a very deep-seated one at that,

25 it seems unlikely that the Group of 30 and/or John Hume

Page 101

1 and/or anybody else will in fact be successful in

2 overcoming the revolutionary element. Although the

3 maddening thing is that one or two leaders of the

4 Paisley/Devlin type could probably do it quite

5 quickly. Our judgment is that the population is fed up

6 but nobody feels they can do anything about it, they

7 are frightened and in a state of confusion. The

8 likelihood is that military action will be required to

9 re-establish the control and stability which will be

10 necessary in order to permit a political solution to

11 evolve.

12 "In my opinion this can only be achieved

13 properly, quickly, smoothly and with minimum

14 confrontation with the green community by a full-scale

15 coverage of the whole area. I believe this to be the

16 right course militarily and the most promising course

17 politically and I have recommended it. The pros and

18 cons are:

19 "1(a): The force level penalty. For a

20 limited period of time I shall need six battalions;

21 four emergency and the two residential.

22 (b): Policy. It is a complete change of

23 policy in that we abandon the 'slowly, slowly' policy

24 of trying to persuade local Catholics to assume

25 responsibility. In my view this is inevitable as we

Page 102

1 face a brand new and much more dangerous situation."

2 Next page 5, please. This is still part of

3 the cons:

4 "(c): Political. It could be presented as

5 oppressive and punitive. There will be cries of

6 'Falls Road'. It would be up to us to show this was

7 not so."

8 Then he deals with the pros as:

9 "(a): Law and order. I believe it is the

10 only way of re-establishing law and order quickly and

11 relatively painlessly.

12 (b): Gunmen. It will get rid of the gunmen

13 quickly. This will enable us to put back the RMP [the

14 Royal Military Police] and the RUC quickly, unarmed.

15 (c): Community relations. There would

16 inevitably be a hostile reaction in time, but our

17 judgment is that this phase would pass quickly and that

18 the great majority of the population would soon say

19 'thank God you have come'.

20 (d): Political. (i) while the Protestants

21 would be delighted, it would have a major effect in the

22 Province as a whole. (ii) the Catholics would create a

23 situation within which the moderates could operate from

24 a secure base, protection instead of terror.

25 (e): Counter propaganda, e.g., placing the

Page 103

1 bombs by security forces is believed by the population.

2 (f): Timing and execution:

3 (i) a plan exists and could be put into

4 operation as soon as forces were available.

5 (ii) no need for major 'assault'. We could

6 move in on an infiltration basis (but some sort of

7 deflection plan would be needed to account for

8 reinforcements entering Northern Ireland).

9 (iii) while one cannot be sure, my judgment

10 is that: (a) one battalion could be released within

11 three months.

12 (b): A second battalion could be released

13 within a further six to twelve months.

14 (cc): Taking an optimistic view of progress

15 it might even be possible to release a third battalion

16 in about 12 to 15 months from now - and so get us back

17 to the existing force level."

18 Then over the page:

19 "As I see it there are only two other

20 courses of action to the one I have just recommended:

21 (1) to carry on doing what we are now doing.

22 This (a) does not establish law and order; (b) makes it

23 very difficult to deal with gunmen or to make arrests

24 in the hostile areas; (c) virtually encourages the IRA

25 and various other revolutionary groups to increase

Page 104

1 their influence over the local community; (d) puts

2 considerable pressure on the existing three

3 battalions.

4 "Option 2: To increase the force level by,

5 say, one battalion. To permit me to undertake

6 additional but still comparatively limited operations

7 into the hostile areas. I could then carry out raids,

8 arrest operations, clearance operations et cetera, but

9 they would not be sustained. In my view this would

10 serve to aggravate still further the green community

11 without affording the presence and so protection

12 necessary to allow those who are moderate but

13 frightened to come out into the open.

14 "I am convinced that the time has come to

15 admit that the policy in Londonderry has failed for

16 reasons beyond our control and that we shall now take

17 the necessary steps to recreate the situation which

18 existed earlier this year and from which further

19 political progress can be made. If this view is

20 accepted it carries with it an inevitable force level

21 penalty, albeit for a limited period of time."

22 Perhaps if we look at the next page, the

23 second half of the page, under the heading

24 "Relationship with the RUC" -- "Co-operation with the

25 RUC" (a) SB [meaning Special Branch] always good, even

Page 105

1 better since 9th August.

2 (b) uniformed.

3 (1) relationship: very good at all levels,

4 particularly with the commander of N Division [that was

5 at the time Superintendent Lagan]:

6 "2. Clouds on the horizon: (a) $64,000

7 question of riot control in the long-term."

8 By which I understand him to mean who does

9 it, the police or the Army or both.

10 "(b): Numbers game now.

11 (c): Training, initiative, spend et cetera

12 at middle levels of leadership.

13 (d): Morale in face of the gunman.

14 C: Major role played by RMP.

15 12 Winding Up.

16 Hope you will find us all in good shape. We

17 cannot wait to be given the chance to get back to where

18 we were and then onwards."

19 I have taken a little time over that document

20 because it needs some degree of decipherment, but (b),

21 because it represents what is in effect a seven or

22 eight page note of what the Brigadier in charge of the

23 8th Infantry Brigade was saying to the Secretary of

24 State on 30th September 1971, which was in effect, put

25 shortly, to recommend a full-scale coverage of the

Page 106

1 whole area of the Bogside and the Creggan, using six

2 battalions instead of the existing three at his

3 disposal.

4 A week later, on 7th October 1971, the Prime

5 Minister of Northern Ireland was due to meet Edward

6 Heath. In advance of that meeting Mr Heath received a

7 military appreciation from General Carver, which I hope

8 will be found at G14B.86.008. This is the accompanying

9 memorandum. It says:

10 "I forward herewith the military

11 appreciation of the security situation in Northern

12 Ireland required by the Prime Minister before his

13 meeting with Mr Faulkner on October 6th [in fact,

14 I think it was the 7th.]

15 "There are two points which I would

16 emphasise in forwarding it. The first is that the

17 problem is essentially a politico/military one and the

18 factors cannot be disentangled. The history of all

19 previous campaigns against terrorists - and few of them

20 have been wholly successful - proves that a purely

21 military solution is most unlikely to succeed, and that

22 whether it is achieved by military or political means

23 or both, the isolation of the terrorist from the

24 population is a sine qua non of success."

25 Then he says it has been done in a hurry and

Page 107

1 he has not considered the cost. It is signed on 4th

2 October 1971, with the initials "MC", Michael Carver,

3 Chief of the General Staff:

4 "The policy at present governing the

5 operations of the security forces is one of maximum

6 vigour in the elimination and apprehension of

7 identifiable terrorists, tempered by a scrupulous care

8 to avoid actions which are, or may be represented as

9 being, indiscriminate as between the terrorists and the

10 general body of the minority community, or deliberately

11 discriminate between Protestants and Roman Catholics as

12 such. It is so tempered in order not to hamper the

13 development of political initiatives, within the

14 existing constitutional structure of Northern Ireland,

15 designed to bring representatives of the minority

16 community into fuller participation in political life,

17 to persuade the minority community that they are not

18 'second class citizens', and thus to erode the support

19 (or at least benevolent neutrality) which substantial

20 sections of the minority community at present afford to

21 the IRA.

22 "The success of such initiatives would be a

23 major contribution towards ending the terrorist

24 campaign and permitting the resumption of normal

25 political, social and economic life within the

Page 108

1 Province.

2 "2: This appreciation aims first to analyse

3 the present security situation, to consider what

4 additional military measures might be taken within the

5 framework of the existing policy, and to set out their

6 military implications; and secondly to consider what

7 further military options would be available in the

8 event of a political decision to give the ending of the

9 terrorist campaign overriding priority over all other

10 considerations, and so set out their military

11 implications."

12 Go down to the bottom half of the document.

13 Paragraph 3 deals with the statistics in relation to

14 incidents, and I take it up at paragraph 4:

15 "4: Today IRA tactics include a well

16 coordinated bombing campaign; armed attacks on police

17 stations, usually involving automatic fire and

18 occasionally even rockets; indiscriminate shooting at

19 individuals of the security forces, either from snipers

20 or by hit and run raids of cars; and cross border raids

21 and ambushes by Active Service Units (against customs

22 posts and police stations).

23 "In addition, intimidation is rife

24 throughout the Catholic population; no opportunity is

25 lost to stir up inter-sectarian strife; a cunning and

Page 109

1 effective propaganda machine exploits the situation to

2 the full; and kidnappings and assassinations have been

3 planned. In short the IRA has the initiative and is

4 causing disruption out of all proportion to the

5 relatively small numbers engaged. This is not to

6 credit the IRA with any unusual skill; it is the normal

7 pattern of urban guerilla activity."

8 Then he sets out various details about the

9 current deployment of various units and says at 6:

10 "Our ability to conduct successful

11 operations against the terrorists depends fundamentally

12 on intelligence. Indiscriminate operations, which do

13 not distinguish between the terrorists and the

14 population among whom they live are self defeating.

15 Intelligence based operations work slowly, but, as they

16 succeed, develop a snowball effect. The dividend from

17 internment shows signs of entering this phase and will

18 rapidly lead to the need for an increase in the

19 accommodation and interrogation facilities required to

20 deal with internees.

21 "The scope of our operations is also limited

22 by current political policy, though, as the degree of

23 violence has risen, so has the level of minimum force

24 employed to meet it. The problem is compounded by such

25 factors as the local clamour for protection; the

Page 110

1 limitations of the uniformed branch of the RUC; and the

2 operational limitations of the UDR.

3 "Nevertheless, the Army is operating at a

4 very high level of intensity. We are providing basic

5 security throughout the Province. In addition about

6 one-third of our forces are available, as opportunities

7 arise, for offensive operations such as hot pursuit of

8 terrorists, arms searches, border patrols, and road

9 blocks; but this proportion will inevitably be reduced

10 if basic security deteriorates and we have, for

11 example, to deploy substantial forces to deal with

12 inter-sectarian disturbances.

13 "Our dilemma is that, the greater the forces

14 the IRA compel us to devote to providing basic security

15 for the people, the fewer we have available for active

16 operations against them. The specific security

17 measures now in hand to deal with current problems

18 include:

19 "(a) against the bombing campaign - the

20 anti-bomb techniques [I do not think we need go into

21 that in any detail] to meet the local clamour for

22 protection, a limited rearming of the police.

23 "(c): To harness local energies - an

24 expansion of the UDR..."

25 Over the page to 86.11:

Page 111

1 "There remains the problems of the RUC. The

2 general state of service morale is very low and the

3 force is under strength. There is some confusion of

4 aim, a lack of will and leadership - particularly at

5 intermediate levels - and a tendency to rely too much

6 on the Army. Its attitude is passive and its

7 contribution to the security situation minimal. This

8 does not apply at present to the Special Branch, but

9 there are ominous signs of some weakening there an

10 urgent examination of ways and means to improve the

11 effectiveness of the uniformed branch is necessary.

12 Meanwhile, the Army must continue to bear the brunt of

13 the security burden until the RUC can play a more

14 effective part, which may not be for some years.

15 "To summarise, therefore, the IRA, in common

16 with all terrorist organisations, has the initiative

17 and has the resources, partly in the north, but

18 primarily in the south of Ireland, to maintain it;

19 while there are constraints, political, humane and

20 militarily, on the methods and resources the security

21 forces can employ to eradicate it. The aim of the IRA

22 remains unchanged.

23 "There are differences in the long-term aims

24 between the 'Officials' and the 'Provisionals', but

25 both are united in seeking both the end of Stormont and

Page 112

1 subsequently the incorporation of the six counties into

2 a united Ireland. Both, for the present, support a

3 terrorist campaign designed to provoke Protestant

4 anger, to force direct rule and then to influence

5 public opinion in the UK to abandon the struggle,

6 although the Officials claim to be opposed to terrorist

7 action against civilians.

8 "On the basis of a recent JIC assessment

9 [Joint Intelligenc Committee]:

10 "1(a) the present prospect is that IRA

11 activities will continue and possibly increase,

12 especially as they consider that none of their

13 'demands' have been met after the tripartite talks.

14 This continuing violence will only serve to increase

15 polarisation between Catholics and Protestants.

16 "(b) in turn, Protestant feelings will mount

17 against continuing IRA activities, possibly resulting

18 in inter-sectarian trouble, though outright Protestant

19 militant action will probably only emerge if they

20 consider that the integrity of Northern Ireland is in

21 danger."

22 In paragraph 12, under the heading, "Problem

23 Areas", he said this:

24 "The principal problem areas are Belfast,

25 Londonderry and the border. In Belfast, shooting and

Page 113

1 explosions continue, although there has been a

2 diminution of incidents within the last 10 days; but

3 there is a general hardening of attitudes among both

4 Protestants and Catholics, soldiers are liable to be

5 shot at any time and the danger of escalation in

6 methods of violence is ever present. Londonderry is

7 comparatively quiet, but the Bogside and the

8 Creggan have become almost closed areas. Since the

9 Crossmaglen incident operations and patrolling on the

10 border, which is to all intents and purposes completely

11 open, have been intentionally unintrusive. These areas

12 are discussed in more detail below."

13 If we go to the next page, 86.12, he deals at

14 the top of the page with Londonderry:

15 "In Londonderry, the situation in the

16 Creggan and Bogside is such that they are virtually

17 'no-go' areas, with about 200 extremists and 50

18 'hard-core' hooligans operating unchecked. The

19 influence of the 'Committee of 30' has clearly failed

20 to improve matters. One alternative is to let the

21 present situation continue. But it is desirable to

22 reassert the full range of military and police

23 activities throughout the city; and if there is an

24 IRA/Blaney build up in Londonderry with a bomb

25 offensive into the city centre or the Protestant areas

Page 114

1 it may become imperative to go into the Bogside and

2 root out the terrorists and the hooligans. The timing,

3 political implications, and likely reaction to such an

4 operation would have to be carefully judged; and a

5 strong military presence would be required for a long

6 time, possibly as many as five battalions on the ground

7 for several months."

8 Then he deals with the border. Then at

9 paragraph 16 he says this:

10 "To intensify operations simultaneously in

11 all these problems areas [Belfast, Londonderry and the

12 border] and would certainly demand a much higher force

13 level for a period of several months at least and would

14 certainly entail the maintenance thereafter of a higher

15 level than the high level we are at present

16 maintaining. Whether or not the effect of these

17 operations, except in calming Protestant pressures,

18 would be worth the effort involved must be doubtful.

19 They would inevitably harden Catholic and southern

20 Irish attitudes and rally them even more firmly behind

21 the IRA, which itself would be more united.

22 "It would in general run counter to a policy

23 of attempting to isolate the terrorist from the

24 population, the only policy which has been found in the

25 past to be effective against a terrorist organisation.

Page 115

1 This is not to suggest that intensified activity in

2 these areas is not appropriate and should not be

3 undertaken selectively in the near future.

4 "17. If, however, it is decided to abandon

5 the present policy and attempt to improve the situation

6 by a large-scale application of military measures, the

7 following paragraphs consider what those measures might

8 be and the military implications of implementing them.

9 There would, of course, be political implications, both

10 national and international, which are not considered in

11 this paper. The financial implications have not been

12 examined at all."

13 Under the heading, "Tougher Military Measures

14 and their Implications", he says this:

15 "The measures intended to eliminate

16 terrorism primarily by military means must be applied

17 first to the three problem areas already identified in

18 paragraph 12. These measures will inevitably involve

19 both an increase in force levels (paragraph 21) and the

20 application of much more severe tactics. Such tactics

21 include:

22 "(a) less restriction on the use of

23 non-lethal devices (eg SPAD) and firearms, to permit

24 tougher action with a view to deterring riots and

25 hooliganism.

Page 116

1 "(b) more aggressive tactics against gunmen,

2 such as the formation of Q squads in special areas, to

3 mystify, mislead and destroy the terrorists.

4 "(c) restrictions on free movement into, out

5 of, and within the Province. This may involve such

6 measures as the issue of identity cards, greater resort

7 to curfews, and cordons and searches, to allow the

8 security forces to get to grips with terrorists in

9 their 'safe' areas.

10 "(d) over and above the measures discussed in

11 paragraph 15, the declaration of 'closed' border areas,

12 where intruders, once established as such, could be

13 shot at by mobile patrols and where night curfews could

14 be imposed.

15 "In the specific case of Londonderry, there

16 are three courses open:

17 "Course 1. Continuing as we are,

18 controlling the rest of Derry and raiding the area [by

19 which in context he means the Bogside and the Creggan]

20 for gunmen as our intelligence allows us. We would

21 hope, though without great confidence, that progress in

22 the political field would produce a gradual return to

23 normality.

24 "Course 2. Show our ability to go into the

25 area when we want by establishing regular patrol

Page 117

1 patterns. This will achieve little except to please

2 the Protestants.

3 "It is a practical course, but it will not

4 achieve the removal of the obstructions and certainly

5 will not re-establish law and order throughout the

6 areas. But it could be done with our present force

7 levels.

8 "Course 3. To occupy and dominate the

9 areas, take down the barricades and, we hope,

10 eventually persuade the RUC to play their full part.

11 This is a practical military operation, although it

12 will involve some casualties and, most important, stir

13 up Catholic opposition as much as it will satisfy the

14 Protestants. It is difficult to estimate how great the

15 political reaction would be. This must be a political

16 and not a military decision. However, there is one

17 significant military factor. We could only occupy and

18 dominate these areas by an increase in our force levels

19 by three battalions."

20 Pausing there: course three is that course

21 that Brigadier Cowan had been expressing about a week

22 before and this notion of there being three courses

23 available -- which are in effect the containment,

24 incursion and domination of the area -- re-occur though

25 (confusingly) the numbers are sometimes changed

Page 118

1 a fraction, namely course one and a half, also appears

2 as we shall see in due course.

3 "The reaction to these tougher tactics could

4 lead to policy decisions such as the following:

5 "(a) a decision to rearm the RUC. (The

6 conditions and intentions under which the force was

7 disarmed would no longer apply). The only alternative

8 is an injection of armed police from other parts of the

9 UK, a task for which they are not trained.

10 "(b) the imposition of restrictions on the

11 news media.

12 "(c) if the situation so deteriorates that

13 the civil law is inoperable and must be replaced by

14 military tribunals, we might have to impose 'martial

15 law' under the common law powers of the Crown.

16 "(d) a complete closure of the border, with

17 all its implications for our relations with the

18 Republic."

19 Then he goes on to say this:

20 "Militarily, most of the measures outlined

21 in paragraphs 18 and 19 above will affect the force

22 levels required. It is doubtful how effective many of

23 the controls on the population would be, as the

24 machinery to implement them in Northern Ireland does

25 not exist and might be difficult to produce. Their

Page 119

1 effect on co-operation from the public, the economic

2 life of the Province and on the acquisition of

3 intelligence has not been assessed."

4 Then he deals with "Force levels":

5 "In paragraph 5, the current force level of

6 13 battalion and two armoured recce regiments has been

7 described as only sufficient to implement the present

8 policy. If, for instance, a decision was taken to

9 tackle the three problem areas in Belfast, Londonderry

10 and along the border, described in paragraph 12, the

11 force levels to match the tougher measures necessary

12 would be as follows:

13 "(a) In Belfast - a temporary reinforcement

14 of not less than two and a half battalions for the

15 duration of the necessary operations.

16 " (b) In Londonderry - a reinforcement

17 sufficient to allow a strong military presence for a

18 long time, possibly as many as five battalions on the

19 ground for some months. This would involve

20 a reinforcement of not less than three battalions

21 unless the province reserve battalion were permanently

22 committed.

23 "(c) On the border - it has been assessed

24 that the restriction of border movement to authorised

25 frontier crossings only, continuous surveillance along

Page 120

1 the border, and the provision of sufficient military

2 strength to ensure compliance of strict border

3 controls, would require a total of 29 battalions along

4 the actual border, or 18 battalions by cutting some

5 corners.

6 "(d) the force levels to meet the imposition

7 of movement controls such as curfews cannot be assessed

8 accurately."

9 Under the heading "Provision of Units" he

10 attaches a note and says:

11 "A note is at annex b. It shows that the

12 maximum attainable force level is 30 infantry battalion

13 equivalents, that this could be sustained only for

14 a very few months, and that it could be provided only

15 at the risk of very serious embarrassment to our

16 position in NATO and by such radical policy decisions

17 as the withdrawal of all British (as distinct from

18 Gurkha) infantry from Hong Kong.

19 "13 battalions equivalents is the current

20 requirement for the implementation of the present

21 policy. Paragraph 21 lists requirements for a total

22 reinforcement of five and a half battalions to permit

23 more offensive action in Belfast and Londonderry,

24 without taking account of the requirements restrictive

25 border control or for such measures as the imposition

Page 121

1 of curfews. The estimated initial force requirement

2 for direct rule is a minimum of 20 battalions. Thus it

3 can be seen that tackling the bad areas of Belfast and

4 Londonderry simultaneously will involve a force level

5 (18 and a half battalions) nearly equivalent to that

6 assumed for direct rule. Providing continuous

7 surveillance of the whole border appears to be out of

8 the question, although greater restrictions on movement

9 could be imposed with the assistance of the UDR,

10 especially if unapproved roads were cratered, and the

11 number of authorised crossing places were reduced to

12 match the resources available to cover them."

13 We can go to the last page.

14 "The options for future policy in very

15 general terms are three:

16 "(a) Option one. To maintain operations at

17 low intensity in the hope of thus assisting progress in

18 the political field. The danger of this option lies in

19 mounting Protestant pressure which might find practical

20 expression in the formation of a third force and which

21 might make the imposition of direct rule inevitable.

22 "(b) Option two. To abandon all hope of

23 political progress with the minority communities and,

24 adopt a 'tough policy', including most, if not all, of

25 the measures listed in paragraphs 18 and 19 above.

Page 122

1 This option might have short-term benefits, but is

2 unlikely to eliminate terrorism in the long-term.

3 "(c) Option Three. To continue our present

4 policy, but to remove those restraints on the

5 operations GOC Northern Ireland wishes to carry out,

6 which are motivated by a desire not to disturb the

7 current 'political initiatives'. This option would

8 certainly include intensification of border operations,

9 including humping and cratering of roads, and an

10 operation in Londonderry.

11 "The advantages of option one are that it

12 costs less in military terms, and is less likely to

13 provoke either the immediate rising of 'the Catholic

14 people in arms' or the longer term evil of the complete

15 alienation of the minority in the north and the

16 Government in the south. The disadvantage is that it

17 does nothing to appease extreme unionist opinion and

18 thus may fatally weaken Mr Faulkner's position, thereby

19 bringing nearer the unpalatable prospect of direct

20 rule.

21 "The prospective advantage of option two is

22 that some tangible military success may follow and that

23 it will reduce unionist pressure upon both Stormont and

24 Westminster, thereby strengthening Mr Faulkner's

25 position and rendering the contingency of direct rule

Page 123

1 more remote. On the other hand, apart from the certain

2 military penalty of an increased force requirement, the

3 result would be a Pyrrhic victory within Ireland,

4 within Great Britain and internationally.

5 "From this brief analysis of the advantages

6 and disadvantages of options one and two, it would seem

7 therefore that option three represents for the time

8 being the best reconciliation of all the factors which

9 have to be taken into account."

10 If one just pauses for a moment, those

11 options are expressed in the context of Northern

12 Ireland as a whole as opposed to the previous courses

13 contemplated in respect specifically of Londonderry.

14 If one could go back to the top of this page,

15 in option three which is somewhere between option one,

16 of carrying on much the same as before, and option two,

17 of adopting a tough policy, in option three there is

18 a reference to "carrying out an operation in

19 Londonderry", and to the immediate reader of this

20 document it is not entirely clear what was the

21 operation in Londonderry to which the chief of the

22 general staff was referring.

23 One can get what appears to be an answer to

24 that question if we could have up on the screen T193.

25 This is a portion of Field Marshall Carver's memoirs in

Page 124

1 which he discusses the memorandum which we have just

2 been looking at and the various options that I have

3 just been referring to. About 8 lines down from the

4 top of the page he refers to "option three" which we

5 have just been looking at. He says this:

6 "The third was to step up the intensity of

7 operations with the three extra battalions recently

8 sent over; to remove some of the constraints imposed on

9 military action by the desire to help 'political

10 initiatives', including the restriction on 'humping'

11 and closing the roads which cross the border; to

12 intensify border operations and to carry out an

13 operation in Londonderry to eliminate the 'no-go'

14 area."

15 So it appears that the "operation in

16 Londonderry" to which Field Marshall Carver was

17 referring as part of the third option in his brief to

18 the Prime Minister was an option to eliminate the no-go

19 areas. It is not however immediately obvious, if that

20 is the case, how an operation to eliminate the "no-go

21 areas", if that was what was involved in option three,

22 differs from the second option which was that of taking

23 tough measures generally and appears to be consistent

24 with the proposal in Brigadier Cowan's phraseology to

25 take complete control of the Bogside and the Creggan.

Page 125

1 But the distinction can I think be found by looking at

2 another document which is G14C.86.18.

3 This document G14C.86.18, is a portion of

4 minutes or a memorandum, I am not sure what the correct

5 description of it should be, written by an assistant

6 Under Secretary, Mr Hochadey in the Ministry of Defence

7 to the permanent secretary to the Secretary of State.

8 In it he says at paragraph 9, the following:

9 "I understand that the Secretary of State

10 formed the impression (based on a general opinion in HQ

11 Northern Ireland) that in the event of direct rule, the

12 co-operation to be expected from the civil service, the

13 public utility services, et cetera, would be less than

14 has hitherto been assumed in London. This renders the

15 direct rule option even less palatable than we have

16 always supposed. Moreover it is at least possible that

17 a situation in which the Army was either fighting both

18 sides in the middle of a civil war, or (with whatever

19 help was available from GB police, prison service,

20 et cetera) having virtually to run Northern Ireland,

21 would be quite apart from its military implications, be

22 very difficult to sustain in British political terms.

23 From his assessment of the possible implications of

24 direct rule, the Secretary of State is, I understand,

25 even more impressed than before with the importance of

Page 126

1 keeping Mr Faulkner in power as the only apparent

2 alternative to direct rule. It is, however, a matter

3 of reconciling this factor with the lesson of history

4 that a terrorist campaign cannot be overcome without

5 the isolation of the terrorists from the population.

6 It is for this reason that our military appreciation

7 advocates option three (continuation of present policy

8 with the removal of certain constraints, e.g. on the

9 border and in Londonderry - the GOC has now proposed an

10 operation in Londonderry in about two weeks' time for

11 which he would like a reinforcement of three

12 battalions) in preference to either option one

13 (maintenance of status quo) or option two (adoption of

14 a tough policy without regard to its implications for

15 political progress with the minority communities)."

16 In short the operation in Londonderry which

17 was contemplated as part of option three was that

18 option from which the GOC had proposed to take effect

19 in about two weeks' time. In fact, as we shall see

20 hereafter, the operation -- which I think one can

21 assume is the same or the same type of operation as was

22 then proposed -- took place in the first or the first

23 and second week of December, by which time force levels

24 had to some extent increased, and consisted of a series

25 of incursions into the Bogside and the Creggan for the

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1 purpose of making searches and arrests which met with

2 violent resistance but which did not amount to a policy

3 of total elimination of the so-called 'no-go' areas for

4 the domination of the Bogside or the Creggan.

5 LORD SAVILLE: We have come to 3.20. I know

6 we started late this morning, but the general plan was

7 to stop at 3.00 in the afternoon to enable proper

8 preparations to be made for the next day's hearing,

9 especially as we are working ourselves into this new

10 technology and having had today rather less hick-ups

11 than I thought we might have.

12 There is also the added fact that the people

13 here who are listening might want to do their

14 shopping.

15 If it is a convenient moment we might stop

16 now. For the rest of the week I was proposing --

17 I think this has been broadcast generally -- that we

18 should start at 9.30 in the morning round until to

19 12.00, have a break of 45 minutes and then run again

20 from 12.45 to 3.00.

21 If it is a convenient moment, we will adjourn

22 until tomorrow at 9.30.

23 (3.20 pm)

24 Proceedings adjourned until

25 Tuesday, 28th March 2000 at 9.30 am