Road Safety Research Report 89

A Review of International Evidence on the Use of Alcohol Ignition Interlocks in Drink-Drive Offences

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report reviews the international experience regarding implementation of alcohol ignition interlock programmes and gathers relevant expert advice related to the current state of knowledge regarding benefits and challenges to implementing such programmes.

Two decades on from the initial development of the interlock, interlock programmes are (or soon will be) available for drink-driving offenders in all but two US states and two Canadian provinces and territories. The level of implementation of the interlock programmes varies widely. In Australia, there is a major programme in Victoria and some smaller ones elsewhere. Progress in Europe has been much slower. Programmes exist in Sweden, Finland and the Haute Savoie region of France. The Netherlands intends to run a trial in 2008/09. Other jurisdictions have, as yet, shown little signs of interest.

The review of international experience was undertaken under five main headings:

- set-up issues;
- operational issues;
- scheme effectiveness;
- costs; and
- future issues.

Although there were problems in the UK study in setting-up the service centres, they were specific to the study and are unlikely to be replicated in any future offender programme. Normally the network of service centres is established by the service provider(s) in accordance with the specification laid down by the jurisdiction. Considerable advice and assistance is available from published documents and individuals with extensive experience of interlock programmes.

To ensure compliance with the programme, it is essential that the various violations and their associated sanctions are made clear and that the effective monitoring of clients is implemented. It should be recognised that most offenders will commit some minor violations as they get used to the equipment. By contrast, the level of attempted circumvention in offender programmes is extremely low – often reported as less than 1%. In addition to any financial penalties, there is now a move towards open-ended programmes in which the offender must show a violation-free record for a period of three to twelve months before being allowed to apply for a full, unrestricted licence. Some jurisdictions impose short jail terms for the most serious violations.
Interlock programmes have been shown to be effective in reducing drink-driving recidivism for both first-time and repeat offenders while the device is installed. However, there is little, if any, residual effect in preventing impaired driving after the device is removed. Interlock devices were designed to provide a physical barrier between the drinker and the operation of the vehicle in which the device was installed. It is unrealistic to expect that the technology would have an effect that persisted beyond the period of use. The main problem lies with low participation rates. Essentially, interlock programmes are not inherently attractive to offenders. Some offenders will prefer to accept and obey a period of disqualification. Others will accept disqualification but continue to drive and drive after drinking. The key to participation is to make the programme more attractive or the ‘least unattractive’ option available. So long as offenders are able to avoid the interlock programme by waiting or simply driving while disqualified, they will do so and participation rates will remain low.

Schemes are costed on the basis of fixed (largely set-up) and variable (mainly participant) costs. Most schemes are based upon the principle of ‘user pays’, with a typical cost of £500 to £800 in North America for a one-year programme. This cost includes the provision and servicing of the interlock, the provision of a restricted licence at the beginning of the programme and a full licence on successful completion of the programme. In two European schemes where attendance at an alcohol education scheme is required or regular assessment of alcohol markers is undertaken, the costs are higher. Some schemes offer discounts to low-income participants (indigents). The subsidy is paid for by an indigent fee imposed on other participants. Some jurisdictions do contribute to the indigent fund.

Advances in technology mean that cameras to identify the individual who provided the breath sample can now be incorporated into the device. Other possibilities for the future include passive alcohol detection. Trends in interlock programmes are towards installing the interlock as soon as possible after the offence, dispensing with any initial period of disqualification, and adopting a criterion-based approach to completing the programme. One final issue relates to the increasing sophistication of the electronic systems of modern cars which threaten the future installation of interlocks.
INTRODUCTION

The results of the recent UK longitudinal study of alcohol interlocks raised further questions related to the practicalities of implementing and operating a successful alcohol interlock programme aimed at drink-drive offenders (Beirness et al., 2008). International evidence from other alcohol ignition interlock programmes could provide valuable answers to these questions, and therefore a review of this evidence was commissioned by the Department for Transport.

1.1 Aims and objectives

The aim of the project is to provide a review of the international experience regarding implementation of alcohol ignition interlock programmes and gather relevant expert advice related to the current state of knowledge regarding benefits and challenges to implementing such programmes. The objective of this project was to inform understanding of the practical and technical issues, problems and solutions in implementing large-scale schemes by reviewing existing international evidence. The answers to a specified list of key questions were sought, and they fall under five main headings:

- set-up issues;
- operational issues;
- costs;
- scheme effectiveness; and
- future issues.

1.2 Methodology

The evidence review aimed to provide both breadth and depth of detail. Much of the required information is qualitative in nature and is not readily available in published documents. It was, therefore, decided that the necessary depth of detail could only be obtained from questioning key players. Even if answers to postal questionnaires could provide the level of detail required, the short timescale for the project precluded their widespread use. Four main techniques were used to obtain the relevant information.

1. Research literature – some questions (e.g. those relating to the effectiveness of individual schemes) can be answered by reference to published literature. Published work includes both reviews by independent researchers, such as Beirness, Rauch and Marques, and evaluations by the scheme organisers themselves (Bjerre in Sweden and Mercier-Guyon in France).
2. **Internet review** – although much research literature is now available on the internet, the term ‘internet review’ is used to refer to legal statutes on drink driving and other information relevant to this review. For example, interlock providers, particularly in the US, advertise their services by this means, thus providing useful information on costs to participants and the network of service centres. Information on population, size of the geographic area and the number of drink-drive offenders can be combined to determine the extent and type of interlock services required.

3. **Key contacts** – despite the value of the above sources, much of the information required for this review can only be obtained by contacting key people in the relevant jurisdictions. Key people fall into several categories, including: the interlock manufacturers and their agents (service providers) who have intimate knowledge of schemes which use their equipment and who also have close contact with legislators in a wide variety of jurisdictions; key government agencies and non-governmental pressure groups (such as the European Transport Safety Council (ETSC)), whose remit includes maintaining a close watch on new drink-drive countermeasures; and the organisers of individual schemes who may be governmental or non-governmental agencies. Face-to-face discussions were held with key staff from the major interlock providers: ACS (Canada), Dräger (Germany) and SmartStart (US). In addition, meetings were held with ETSC (Belgium) and Dr Wolf Nickel (President-elect of the International Council on Alcohol, Drugs and Traffic Safety (ICADTS)).

4. **Case studies** – we selected a sample of eight schemes as case study examples: Florida, New Mexico, Ontario, Quebec, Haute Savoie (France), Sweden, the Netherlands and Victoria. Face-to-face interviews were held with staff from six schemes. It proved impossible to arrange a meeting date with the providers in Florida. Information on the Victoria scheme was obtained by e-mail.
2 SUMMARY OF CURRENT STATUS OF INTERLOCK PROGRAMMES WORLDWIDE

When the first viable alcohol ignition interlock device was introduced more than two decades ago, it was universally hailed as a technology with the potential to have a tremendous impact on the overall magnitude of the alcohol crash problem. However, the technology was greeted with trepidation and interlock programmes failed to flourish. The devices were considered expensive and relatively easy to circumvent. Media reports of isolated failures of some of the early devices served to create a general perception that interlocks did not work.

However, the technology continued to evolve and the shortcomings of the first interlock systems were largely eliminated in the subsequent generation of devices. In addition, evaluation studies began to show promising reductions in repeat offences among offenders in interlock programmes during the period that the interlock was installed.¹ Convinced of their potential, legislators in the US and Canada began introducing legislation permitting the use of alcohol ignition interlocks for persons convicted of a drink-driving offence.

Two decades on from the initial development of the interlock, interlock programmes are (or soon will be) available for drink-driving offenders in all but two US states and two Canadian provinces and territories.² The level of implementation of the interlock programmes varies widely. In Australia, there is a major programme in Victoria and some smaller ones elsewhere.

Progress in Europe has been much slower. Programmes exist in Sweden, Finland and the Haute-Savoie Region of France. The Netherlands intends to run a trial in 2008/09. Other jurisdictions have, as yet, shown little signs of interest.

¹ Recidivism does occur during the period of installation when offenders either drive another vehicle or circumvent the correct operation of the interlock-installed vehicle by, for example, persuading someone else to provide a breath sample.

² The two states with no known current plans to implement interlocks are South Dakota and Vermont. New Brunswick and the Northwest Territories in Canada do not have interlock programmes.
### RESULTS

Answers to each of the questions are summarised here under the five main headings.

#### 3.1 Set-up issues

**3.1.1 How many countries have investigated the possibility of setting up a scheme/started a scheme but then decided not to pursue it/to abandon the scheme? What were the problems/reasons that led to the decision? Are there lessons that can be learnt to prevent these problems arising?**

The answer depends largely on the definition of the term ‘investigated’. If the term means ‘were sufficiently interested in the possibility to talk to one or more interlock manufacturers about it’, then the answer is that none of the major interlock manufacturers are aware of any jurisdictions who subsequently decided not to pursue it/to abandon the scheme. If the term ‘investigated’ refers to internal discussions within jurisdictions without recourse to external advice and expertise, then the answer may be ‘several’, but it is impossible to identify such jurisdictions without contacting each individually and being able to identify someone involved in the decision.

There are European jurisdictions (e.g. Denmark, Belgium and Germany) where currently there appears to be little or no interest among legislators in establishing an interlock programme. There are other jurisdictions (e.g. the Netherlands and Western Australia) where the introduction of the programme is well behind the original schedule. In both cases, the relevant legislation has not yet become law. In Western Australia, the bill has been drafted and approved by Cabinet, but a crowded legislative schedule has delayed its progress through Parliament. The resultant loss of momentum is particularly unfortunate given that the funding arrangements are already in place. In the Netherlands, the bill has yet to be drafted. The experience of these two jurisdictions demonstrates the need for the various parties involved in the development of the interlock programme to work to a common set of objectives and timetable.

In North America, any jurisdiction that has considered an interlock programme has eventually implemented one. There are currently only five states that do not have an interlock programme. Some of these states are actively pursuing legislation; others are very small or primarily rural states (e.g. Vermont, South Dakota and Maine).

Typically, once implemented, interlock programmes grew and became stronger, and often moved from a discretionary beginning towards being mandatory. A move from repeat offenders towards including first-time offenders usually followed. However, one case (Nevada) is known where regressive legislation was passed, changing a
mandatory programme back into a discretionary one. Such moves do not appear to be data-led.

3.1.2 What guidance is available on the practical steps of setting up an interlock programme for offenders, including the identification of suppliers of devices/services?

There are experts and personnel in the jurisdictions with considerably experience and expertise in setting up interlock programmes for offenders. In addition, several research documents on ‘best practices’ exist (Beirness 2001; ICADTS Interlock Working Group 2001). Furthermore, a set of interlock programme standards or guidelines have been drafted for Canada (Beirness and Boase, 2007) and a similar process is underway in the US.

The interlock manufacturers can provide much useful advice. They have considerable experience in all aspects of interlock programmes and can set up a programme to meet the specifications determined by the jurisdiction. It is the prerogative of the jurisdictional authority to establish a clear set of regulations that govern the operation of interlock programmes. Good examples include New Mexico and Ontario.3

One suggestion offered by experts, but as yet unadopted, is to establish a programme implementation team that includes interlock providers. For Britain, the two potential providers at the present time are Dräger and ACS. SmartStart intends to open a European branch in 2008, thus proving a further option. Service providers possess a wealth of experience and expertise that can be useful to the Department for Transport.

The Department for Transport will need to decide whether it will allow any provider to operate in the UK or invite tenders for an exclusive contract. A single provider can be easier – only one device and one reporting system to deal with. However, competition can reduce prices charged to the offenders and the complexities of two (or more) reporting formats can be resolved by the jurisdiction carefully defining its requirements in terms of what data it wants and how it wants it provided, and then leaving it up to the service provider to determine how best to meet those requirements. Expert opinion from jurisdictions with considerable experience in operating offender programmes believes that having two or three providers is quite manageable.

New Mexico has seven different interlock providers operating in the state. Each provider must operate in at least one of the rural regions of the state as well as in one of the two metropolitan areas. They all operate somewhat differently and use

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3 References to both regulations are given in the relevant case studies (see Sections 5 and 6).
different reporting formats. As a result, the monitors must be familiar with a variety of reporting styles. Some providers have requested and received a ‘variance’ from the regulations so that they are able to operate in the state, thus adding a further complication.

The ISO 9000 approach may be of value. The jurisdiction states its requirements and associated criteria. Interested service providers then derive measurable objectives and submit quality plans as to how they will deliver the requirements. This approach enables an independent audit of service provider performance to be undertaken.

### 3.1.3 What needs to be considered in setting up a network of service centres?

Setting-up a network of service centres is normally undertaken by one or more interlock providers in accordance with any requirements specified by the jurisdiction concerned. Networks are normally developed according to population density, the conviction rates of the target population and the availability of required service facilities, including zoning regulations.

Several sorts of service centres may be established. At the busiest sites, an interlock provider may set up a full-time service centre exclusively for interlocks. At less busy sites, the provider may train staff at an auto-electrical service centre to offer interlock installation and servicing as part of a wider range of services. This model was the one in the British research project (Beirness *et al.*, 2008) and is common in North America. Finally, in remote areas, a mobile service may be offered, working from a fixed service centre.

For most routine service visits, mobile units are able to download the data, check the wiring and re-calibrate the unit. It becomes more complicated should there be a technical issue with the device, or if there are numerous violations evident. Although service technicians should be able to deal with most technical issues, it is unlikely that many with be qualified to deal with social and personal issues that often arise during service visits. Mobile service is also more expensive. For these reasons, mobile service, although a viable alternative, is the least desirable option.

In North America, it is generally agreed that, except for people living in remote areas, all other potential participants should be within 100 km of a service centre. In New Mexico, the standard for a service centre is within 100 miles or two hours of a client’s residence, place of business or the sentencing court. In more compact countries in Europe, a figure of 50 km has been suggested.

Requirements to have service facilities within a specified time or distance of all clients puts an undue strain on providers, especially if there is more than one provider. Remote areas could be divided among the providers. The issue is also affected by the presence of fleet schemes in the jurisdiction (see Section 3.1.6).
3.1.4 What start-up time is required to identify and set-up service centres and train staff, including judiciary, before offenders can be accepted on the scheme?

The training of service centres and the provision of equipment can be done quickly. Estimates of one month for this part of the set-up were offered. Given the need to identify the service centres before training can start, a total of 90 days’ start-up time is probably reasonable for service providers to become fully operational.

The greatest amount of time appears to be in establishing the regulations for an interlock programme. Several respondents indicated that getting regulations drafted and approved took much longer than expected.

The training of the judiciary can be undertaken by the interlock provider, although it was suggested that it may be more appropriate for such training to be done by the scheme organiser. Moreover, it is not just the judiciary but court officers, probation officers, prosecutors and defence lawyers that require training. The more people who understand the programme, the more efficient and effective its operation is likely to be. In addition, training is an ongoing issue, not only because of the large number of people involved but because programmes have a tendency to evolve as they mature.

3.1.5 The project found few service centres were willing/able to participate? What were the reasons for this and how can they be overcome?

It is likely that the initial problems of service centre recruitment encountered in the demonstration project were due, at least in part, to the method used for recruitment. The original approach was by letter, with the emphasis upon companies with major networks of service centres. In terms of an immediate business opportunity, the potential returns from installing 100 interlocks and maintaining them for one year are small.

Once the areas in which the demonstration project would operate were defined, a number of potential service centres were identified from a trade directory and a representative from ACS contacted them by phone and made appointments to visit and discuss the requirements in detail. The necessary two centres were signed up within two days, indicating the benefits of a personal approach by someone with expert knowledge of interlock installation and maintenance.

None of the interlock providers contacted during the present review have found any major difficulties in establishing a network of service facilities in any jurisdiction in which they operate. None foresee any difficulties in establishing a network in Britain.
3.1.6 *What are the advantages/disadvantages of offender schemes set up in the context of an existing infrastructure used for non-offender groups (e.g. fleets)?*

The main advantages of setting up an offender scheme in the context of an existing fleet scheme are financial (to the interlock provider) and heightened public awareness of interlocks.

It would normally be expected that the number of fleet interlocks would far exceed the number of offender interlocks in any jurisdiction. In Sweden, there are upwards of 20 times as many fleet interlocks as offender interlocks. The development of a network of service facilities would be influenced by the demands of the fleet users. Normally, this would result in more service facilities although that does not necessarily mean that all would be equipped to deal with the additional demands of an offender programme. However, it would likely help to ensure the availability of a large pool of qualified installation and service technicians.

3.1.7 *What is the typical length of an interlock programme?*

Typically, the lengths of an interlock programme are as follows:

- first offence – 1 year;
- second offence – 2 years; and
- third offence – 3 years.

Several jurisdictions impose a lifetime interlock restriction for a fourth or subsequent offence (e.g. Ontario and New Mexico). There is also a trend towards criterion-based removal of the interlock (see Section 3.2.3).

3.1.8 *Which interlock schemes contain an educational programme, how do such programmes operate and what benefits (if any) have been reported?*

Texas implemented an experimental 12-hour motivational support programme for interlock participants. The programme had assessments before and after interlock programme participation, and involved four individual sessions and four group sessions over a four-month period. The structured group sessions were built on the principles of motivation enhancement and cognitive behavioural therapy. Comparison with a group that did not participate in the support programme revealed that the programme participants had significantly fewer elevated breath tests on the interlock record, which is predictive of a lower likelihood of recidivism after the completion of the interlock programme.
3.1.9 How do interlock programmes interact with other countermeasures against drink drivers, such as rehabilitation schemes, licence disqualification and re-testing of convicted drivers?

The degree of interaction and integration with other countermeasures varies considerably among interlock programmes. Some programmes require that offenders complete all other court-ordered or mandatory requirements for reinstatement prior to being eligible for the interlock programme. Others, most notably New Mexico, allow offenders to enter the interlock programme upon arrest and complete other requirements during the programme.

A period of disqualification prior to entering the interlock programme is still the norm. However, research has repeatedly demonstrated that repeat offence rates are lower among interlock programme participants than among those who serve a comparable period of disqualification. As a result, there is now a definite trend in North America to replace licence disqualification by an interlock programme. There are two main reasons for such a change. One is a policy assessment that the hardship of losing access to personal transport is excessive when an interlock programme offers an alternative which is effective at preventing drink driving. The second is an acknowledgement that it is demanding to ensure that the penal and safety intentions of the disqualification are not lost by convicted drink-drivers continuing to drive and, most likely, driving after drinking. An interlock will at least help to ensure that they do not do the latter.

3.2 Operational issues

This section deals mainly with effective measures to ensure programme compliance. It also considers what effective measures have been taken in other countries to address some of the specific problems identified in the UK research project (e.g., high level of drop-out, complaints about re-testing, issues of identifying and setting up service centres with appropriate facilities and trained staff, device circumvention, and technical problems with devices).

3.2.1 What evidence is there on enforcing compliance with schemes? What is the optimal time interval for service centre visits? How are anomalies/violations in the interlock record dealt with/by whom?

Compliance enforcement is best handled through effective monitoring and consequential actions, such as fines or monetary costs and programme extensions for non-compliant actions. Monitoring is a key element of an effective interlock programme. Participants need to know that their behaviour will be tracked through the interlock recorder and that there are sanctions for violations. There is also a move towards open-ended programmes in which the offender must show a ‘clean
record’ for a period of three to twelve months before being allowed to apply for a full, unrestricted licence.

The optimal time interval for service centre visits depends upon the level to which the offender conforms to the requirements of the programme. In the early months of installation, monthly visits are generally considered to be appropriate. If the offender continues to show a ‘clean record’ then the service interval can be extended to two months (or longer), with consequent financial benefit to the offender.

The devices themselves are capable of handling many thousands of items of data equivalent to many months of normal driving. Current fuel cell alcohol sensors are also relatively stable and do not require monthly calibration to remain accurate. However, the purpose of service centre visits goes beyond equipment issues. These visits also serve as an opportunity to interact with participants to ensure that they are progressing well in the programme. This monitoring function also provides a time to ask questions and check on any problems with the equipment or otherwise.

Anomalies/violations in the interlock record are normally dealt with by an organisation appointed by the jurisdiction. In Sweden and the Netherlands that is typically the body responsible for driver licensing; in Haute-Savoie, it is La Prévention Routière.4 In North America, violations are addressed by the licensing authority or the courts. Licensing authorities are somewhat limited in their ability to impose sanctions, other than extending the interlock period; courts have the ability to put violators in jail.

The larger issue concerns what constitutes a ‘violation of the programme’ which may or may not constitute an offence in the legal sense. In some jurisdictions, a violation consists of tampering, missed re-tests or missed service appointments. In others, violations include any breath-test start fail and failed re-tests. In fact, the courts in some states are using the interlock as a means to monitor judicial orders to abstain from the use of alcohol. This was never intended as a function of interlocks. Participants are often sanctioned for positive breath tests recorded on the interlock. Sanctions can include jail time or being removed from the programme. Many interlock programmes in the US are monitored by the courts either through their existing compliance monitoring programmes or through the probation department. New Mexico is an example of a state that monitors interlock programme compliance through the courts.

Experience with interlock programmes has shown that there is often a learning curve as they get used to the interlock, whereby several failed breath tests are not uncommon during the first month or two. These failed breath tests demonstrate the

4 La Prévention Routière is a non-governmental, non-profit making association created by insurance companies in 1949. Now supported by 160 000 members and donors, it studies and promotes effective initiatives to improve road safety by all suitable means.
safety value of the interlock by preventing the vehicle from being driven by someone who has been drinking. Using the interlock as a means to monitor abstinence and impose further sanctions on offenders will only serve as another disincentive for drink-drive offenders to participate.

3.2.2 What is the level of device circumvention and how can it be reduced?

Device circumvention has tended to decrease as the interlocks themselves have incorporated increased anti-circumvention.

The level of circumvention in the UK research project was probably artificially high because there were essentially no sanctions applied to those committing such acts, other than removal from the research programme. In an offender programme, it is not only necessary to have various measures to thwart or detect attempts at circumvention but also to have a range of suitable sanctions for those who commit – or attempt to commit – such acts.

The level of attempted circumvention in offender programmes is extremely low – often reported informally by service providers as less than 1%. Statistics on the rates of circumvention are not generally collected but might be inferred from rates of programme terminations. These rates vary from under 3% (Washington, Texas) to 17% (Maryland). Unfortunately, these rates often include programme terminations for other actions deemed to be violations in the jurisdiction (e.g. repeated high blood alcohol concentrations (BACs), missed re-tests, failure to report to a service centre). No objective information was available on changes in circumvention rates over time.

3.2.3 How do existing schemes deal with programme violations?

The typical sanction for a programme violation is the extension of the programme. Ontario imposes an extension equivalent to the original interlock period. In programmes that use ‘criterion-based removal’, violations trigger a longer interlock period so as to provide the opportunity to accumulate the required number of months with a clean record. In New Mexico, violations result in a mandatory 48 hours in jail.

In many jurisdictions (e.g. Colorado, California, Arizona, Maryland), attempts to circumvent the device can lead to the offender being removed from the programme. In such cases, programme extension would be seen as inappropriate.

The research literature clearly shows that the number of high BAC start fails is predictive of subsequent recidivism (Marques et al., 2001). Interlock data records should be monitored and those with repeated high BAC start fails should have the

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5 See www.trafficinjuryresearch.com/interlock/interlock_programs.cfm
length of their interlock programme period lengthened and be directed to a rehabilitation/treatment programme. Many jurisdictions extend interlock programme involvement (e.g. Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Quebec, New Mexico, Virginia, Florida). Florida sets the example for integrating rehabilitation into the programme for those with high BAC start fails.

Criterion-based removal is the current trend in interlock programmes. This approach requires participants to have an interlock record free of high BAC start fails for a period of several consecutive months before being released from the programme. Running re-test fails are often treated in the same manner as start fails.

3.2.4 What effective measures exist for reducing the drop-out rate?

In programmes that are discretionary and offender-initiated, there is nothing, other than a desire to drive legally, compelling participants to remain in the programme. They drop out because there are no substantive consequences and no requirement to remain in the programme. For example, in the Ontario mandatory licence restriction programme, approximately 10% of those who have an interlock installed have it removed before they are eligible for a full, unrestricted licence. They either no longer need to drive or simply find it easier to take their chances on driving while suspended. The reasons for voluntary withdrawal from the programme have never been fully explored.

The problem of early withdrawal from interlock programmes is largely overcome by making the programme mandatory. A requirement that offenders must prove that they have participated in an interlock programme for the specified period of time prior to re-granting full unrestricted driving privileges is effective in many jurisdictions in North America that have it. Quebec and New Mexico are good examples. No data are yet available on changes in drop-out rate following a move towards mandatory interlocks.

The high level of drop-out rates in the UK project (Beirness et al., 2008) was probably because the participants could drop out without penalty. Participation was purely voluntary and could be discontinued at any time. There was no benefit in terms of disqualification reduction nor any punishment for non-completion.

3.2.5 Are complaints about running re-tests justified?

Participants tend to overly complain about the difficulties of undertaking running re-tests because they are inconvenient and, more importantly, effective in preventing cheating. They prevent a participant from persuading someone else to provide the initial breath sample to enable the vehicle to be started and then driving with an elevated blood alcohol level.
Given that this feature needs to be active as an anti-circumvention feature, one possible solution to the problem is to adjust the running re-test interval to a minimum of one re-test on every trip. Research into driving patterns in North America indicates that the mean trip duration is about 15 minutes. Therefore, the first re-test should occur within that interval (or a suitable interval for British driving patterns). Otherwise, offenders will soon learn that, if they can get someone to provide the initial start-up breath test, they should be able to reach their destination without providing another test.

An additional feature, not as yet adopted in any jurisdiction, would be that, once a re-test is requested, a breath sample is required even if the vehicle is turned off. Failure to do so would be a programme violation. This feature would at least detect those occasions when a participant manages to get the vehicle started and is able to drive home without providing a running re-test.

3.2.6 What level of technical problem normally occurs?

Technical problems with the devices have diminished with the continued development of alcohol interlock programmes and the increased quality of the products, which must now meet international standards for electronic products within vehicles (see Section 3.5).

Installation problems usually occur in the early stages of a programme as the installers are gaining experience on a variety of vehicles. Easy access to the knowledge held by experienced installers is important, particularly at the start of a new programme. User problems can be minimised by proper initial training of participants and easily understood user guides. A 24/7 help line is usually provided for offender schemes.

Programme authorities do not tend to track the level of installation problems. They hear about very few such problems. Interlock manufacturers are unlikely to divulge any such information for commercial reasons.

3.2.7 How do compulsory schemes deal with situations when the vehicle is also driven by someone other than the offender? Is the consent of the other parties/vehicle’s owner required for the offender to be able to participate?

As far as is known, all interlock programmes make it clear to the participant (offender) that he or she will be held responsible for all breath samples provided to the interlock.

The second issue is of equal importance to the interlock provider as it is to the scheme organisers. Interlock providers insist that written consent is obtained from the legal owner of the vehicle before they will install an interlock.
3.2.8 How do schemes deal with issues such as the use of the emergency override?

There must be a very strict set of rules regarding the use of the emergency override – if, indeed, devices are to be equipped with this feature. The operation of the override differs according to the make and model of the device. Some require the user to call for a code to enable use of the override; others simply require the push of a button or sequence of buttons. In either case, the activation of the override must be recorded, trigger the emergency flashers and an intermittent horn, and put the device into immediate recall mode requiring an unscheduled visit to the service centre. Participants must provide an explanation for every use of the override feature. Unsubstantiated ‘emergencies’ should be treated as violations and lead to sanctions.

In a review of emergency override use in Quebec, there were very few instances where the vehicle was driven more than a few kilometres after the override was activated. In many cases, the vehicle was not driven at all. It is likely that participants did not appreciate the fact that the emergency flashers and intermittent horn would be activated and revised their assessment of the urgency of the situation.

3.3 Scheme effectiveness

3.3.1 What evidence is there on the effectiveness of the intervention for different offender types in terms of scheme participation rates and reconviction/re-offending?

Little research has been conducted on the various types of offender who participate in interlock programmes. Participation rates are generally low and self-selection bias is often raised as an issue to be considered when evaluating the impact of interlock programmes. Those who participate in voluntary programmes are motivated to do so. This could be a consequence of a true desire to change their behaviour or the result of a need to drive. Those who are at the highest risk of recidivism, possibly related to their excessive pattern of drinking, may be the least likely to participate. There are two arguments that can be used to mitigate the potential impact of self-selection bias. First, the randomised controlled trial in Maryland (Beck et al., 1999) clearly showed an impact of interlocks even when offenders were randomly assigned to the interlock and control conditions. Self-selection was not a factor. Second, the repeated observation that recidivism rates among interlock participants return to those comparable to other non-participants after the interlock is removed demonstrates that the two groups are very similar in terms of the most important characteristic, i.e. risk of recidivism, regardless of any self-selection bias that may be operating.

Interlock programmes have also been shown to be effective for both first-time and repeat offenders. The Cochrane review of interlock programmes (Willis et al., 2004) separated the results of published studies according to prior offence status. The
relative risks are presented in Figure 3.1 (taken from their report). It is clear that the effectiveness does not differ substantially between first and repeat offenders.

![Figure 3.1: Relative risks by prior offence status (Willis et al., 2004)](image)

A re-analysis of data from the Alberta study also showed that interlock programmes are effective for offenders who participate voluntarily as well as for those whose participation is mandatory (Beirness et al., 2003). The results are similar during the interlock period and up to four years following removal. Subsequent drink-driving convictions were related more to the number of prior convictions and the number of positive interlock breath tests than to whether the individual participated voluntarily or was ordered to do so.

### 3.3.2 How does the level of take-up/drop-out vary for different scheme types targeted at different offender groups? What reasons are behind the very low take-up rates in programmes?

Research provides little systematic guidance on these issues. We can only infer from the results of studies on various programmes. Comparative research has not been forthcoming on these issues.
Essentially, interlock programmes are not inherently attractive to offenders. The key to participation is to make the programme more attractive or the ‘least unattractive’ option available. So long as offenders are able to avoid the interlock programme by waiting or simply driving while suspended, they will do so and participation rates will remain low.

In Indiana, participation reached 65% of offenders when the alternative was home confinement. In Quebec, participation in the voluntary programme for first-time offenders is about 30%. Offenders can reduce the period of hard suspension by participating in the interlock programme and when driving while under suspension results in immediate vehicle impoundment.

Cost may also be an important factor. The Haute-Savoie and Swedish schemes cost roughly the same per month (about £150) but the Swedish programme lasts four times as long. These two European schemes are more expensive than typical North American schemes, perhaps because of their associated medical psychological monitoring/assessment/treatment, and they offer no reduction to low-wage earners.

3.3.3 Is there any evidence on whether interlock schemes have a lower deterrence impact than licence suspension? Does this outweigh the incapacitation impact of interlocks while in place for convicted offenders?

First, it is important to distinguish between general and specific deterrence. General deterrence refers to the effect of the threat of having to participate in an interlock programme in preventing or otherwise discouraging the general population of drivers from engaging in drink-drive behaviour. The difficult part is to be able to attribute any observed impact to the interlock programme. To date, no study has been conducted to determine whether the threat of interlocks has any general deterrent impact. In this context, it must be recognised that most people know little, if anything, about interlock programmes. Widespread awareness of the programme is an essential precursor of general deterrence. In addition, even with extensive awareness, the expectation that interlock programmes might have a general deterrent impact is at best overstated and most likely misguided. In light of the relatively severe sanctions already in place for drink-drive offences and the extensive public awareness of the dangers of the behaviour, it is unlikely that the addition of an interlock programme will – or can – contribute to general deterrence beyond what already exists.

Specific deterrence refers to the impact that interlock programmes have on those who are directly affected by them. Several studies have evaluated the specific deterrent impact of interlock programmes. Three comprehensive reviews of the evaluation studies agree that interlock programmes have a beneficial impact on recidivism on those who participate (Beirness and Marques 2004; Coben and Larkin 1999; Willis et al., 2004). A fourth review, with similar conclusions, is currently
being prepared by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. On the basis of the only randomised controlled study in this area, drink-drive offenders assigned to an interlock programme had a recidivism rate 64% lower than offenders who served a comparable period of licence suspension. Interestingly, this effect appears to apply to those who are subject to a mandatory interlock licence restriction even if they never actually have the interlock installed.

Table 3.1 (adapted from Beirness and Marques, 2004) summarises the results of the evaluation studies of interlock programmes. The impact of interlock programmes is evident by the large differences in repeat offence rates between interlock programme participants and non-participants. While the device is installed in the vehicle, the repeat offence rate among interlock programme participants is 37% to 90% lower than among a comparison group that does not have the device installed.

Importantly, these studies have examined a wide variety of interlock programmes. Despite the differences among interlock programmes and study designs, the predominant pattern of results indicates that interlocks effectively reduce the incidence of repeat impaired driving offences. The existing studies also indicate that the reduction in recidivism among interlock participants is limited to the period of interlock installation. There is little, if any, residual effect in preventing impaired driving after the device is removed.

The fact that most studies show that re-arrest rates increase following the removal of the interlock does not reflect on the efficacy of interlock programmes, nor should it be used to discount or discredit the beneficial effects of interlock programmes. Firstly, it should be noted that even though the recidivism rate among interlock participants following the removal of the interlock device matches that of drink-drive offenders who did not participate in the programme, the significant effect that is evident during the interlock period is not lost. For example, the three-year cumulative re-offence rate (minimum two years after interlock programme completion) for first-time offenders in the Alberta interlock programme was 15.3 offences per 1,000 drivers, compared with 43.8 for suspended drivers and 131.2 for drivers ineligible for the interlock programme (Voas, 2000). The five-year cumulative re-offence rate for repeat offenders who participated in the interlock programme is about half that of non-participants.

In summary, therefore, interlock programmes appear to be more effective than licence disqualification in preventing offenders from drink driving during the period of the programme. Interlocks are designed to provide a physical barrier between the drinker and the operation of the vehicle in which the device is installed. It is unrealistic to expect that the technology would have an effect that persisted beyond

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6 This review is authored by Elder, Voas, Beirness and others. No publication date has yet been set.
the period of use. In the absence of additional programme features that take into consideration the other factors that contribute to recidivism, there is a good likelihood that many users will continue to drive after drinking once the device is removed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th>Authors/year</th>
<th>Characteristics of population</th>
<th>Findings: recidivism with interlock</th>
<th>Comparison group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>EMT Group (1990)</td>
<td>First and multiple</td>
<td>Interlock 3.9%</td>
<td>Suspended</td>
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<td>Non-interlocks 5.9%</td>
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<td>Morse and Elliot (1992)</td>
<td>First offenders over 0.20% BAC plus multiple offenders</td>
<td>Non-interlocks 2.9%</td>
<td>Suspended</td>
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<td>Multiple offenders</td>
<td>Non-interlocks 8.4%</td>
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<td>Oregon</td>
<td>Jones (1993)</td>
<td>Second offenders</td>
<td>Interlock 5%</td>
<td>Restricted</td>
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<td>Non-interlocks 8%</td>
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<td>Restricted 7.1%</td>
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<td>Suspended 9.8%</td>
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<td>Interlock 10%</td>
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<td>Non-interlocks 25%</td>
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<td>(12 months)</td>
<td>Interlock 0.1%</td>
<td>Suspended and ineligible</td>
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<td>Suspended 2.23%</td>
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<td>Ineligible 4.61%</td>
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<td>(24 months)</td>
<td>Interlock 0.85%</td>
<td>Suspended and ineligible</td>
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<td>Suspended 8.08%</td>
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<td>First (12 months)</td>
<td>Interlock &lt; 0.5%</td>
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<td>Second (24 months)</td>
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<td>Suspended 6%</td>
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<td>Restricted 6.8%</td>
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<td>First and second offenders</td>
<td>Interlock 0%</td>
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<td>Revoked 2.9%</td>
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<td>Interlock 1.6%</td>
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<td>Did not comply 4%</td>
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<td>First and repeat</td>
<td>Interlock 0.85%</td>
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<td>First (12 months)</td>
<td>Interlock &lt; 0.5%</td>
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<td>Second (24 months)</td>
<td>Interlock &lt; 2%</td>
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<td>Interlock 0%</td>
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<td>Interlock 0.85%</td>
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<td>Second (24 months)</td>
<td>Interlock &lt; 2%</td>
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<td>Suspended 6%</td>
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<td>Interlock 1.3%</td>
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<td>Interlock 0%</td>
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<td>Did not apply 6%</td>
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</table>

Table 3.1: Summary of interlock evaluation studies (adapted from Beirness and Marques, 2004)
3.4 Costs

3.4.1 How do device/service providers cost schemes? What are the variable/fixed costs?

Schemes are costed on the basis of fixed and variable costs. The fixed costs include the setting up of service centres, the training of staff and other personnel, the provision of relevant equipment to calibrate the interlocks and upload the data via the internet to the provider’s central secure database, and the provision of a 24/7 help line for participants. The variable costs include the costs of the interlocks themselves and their disposable parts, emergency call-outs, early recall appointments and the rates charged for licensed automotive electrical technicians.

3.4.2 What are the estimated costs of implementing schemes, including the costs of setting up service centres, training service centre staff, setting up a central ‘help line’ facility for service centre staff and ‘out of hours’ calls from participants, training the judiciary, issuing/maintaining interlock devices, monitoring compliance with scheme, etc.?

Interlock providers are commercial organisations and are unwilling, for reasons of commercial confidentiality, to provide precise details of the costs involved in implementing a scheme. It is perhaps more useful to consider the costs charged to the offender for the installation, servicing and removal of the interlock. Examples are given in Table 3.2. As all the schemes listed in the table operate on a self-financing basis, these costs include both the provision and servicing of the interlock and the administrative costs incurred by the jurisdiction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction (provider)</th>
<th>Installation</th>
<th>Monthly charge</th>
<th>Removal</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Estimated current caseload</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victoria (ACS)</td>
<td>AU$120</td>
<td>AU$140</td>
<td>AU$70</td>
<td>AU$1,870</td>
<td>£825</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Mexico (ACS, SmartStart, LifeSafer, Draeger, CST, ADS, Guardian)</td>
<td>US$70</td>
<td>US$70</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>US$1,010</td>
<td>£500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario (ACS)</td>
<td>C$125</td>
<td>C$95</td>
<td>C$25</td>
<td>C$1,290</td>
<td>£645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec (ACS)</td>
<td>C$135</td>
<td>C$95</td>
<td>C$25</td>
<td>C$1,300</td>
<td>£650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haute-Savoie (Dräger/ACS)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>£1260</td>
<td>£880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden (ACS)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>SEK50,000</td>
<td>£3,750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note, all cost are based on a 12-month programme except for Haute-Savoie (six months) and Sweden (two years). New Mexico’s annual costs include US$100 (£50) per year indigent fee. Only total costs are available for Haute-Savoie and Sweden. Ontario imposes an administrative surcharge. Other jurisdictions may impose an application fee, licence reinstatement fee, fees for screening, assessment and rehabilitation, and/or other additional charges.
3.4.3 **What level of throughput is required per location to make set-up costs worthwhile?**

It is impossible to be specific about this answer as the break-even point depends upon the design of the interlock programme. It is perhaps better to design the programme and then invite interlock providers to tender for the work.

3.4.4 **What aspects of the scheme do offenders pay for and what aspects are funded by the government?**

Most jurisdictions aim to ensure that their interlock scheme is self-financing, through the principle of ‘user pays’. There may be three (or more) elements to the programme:

- the installation, servicing and de-installation of the interlock;
- the provision of a restricted licence at the beginning of the programme and a full licence on its successful completion, together with any associated tests or assessments; and
- attendance at an alcohol education scheme or regular assessment of alcohol markers.

The costs associated with the interlock itself are normally paid directly by the offender to the interlock provider/service centre. Where multiple providers exist within a jurisdiction, offenders are free to choose which system to install.

3.4.5 **How have other judiciaries dealt with equity issues when the offenders meet the cost of participating in the scheme? Are contributions variable depending on the ability to pay?**

Many jurisdictions have a scheme by which participants of lower economic means (indigents) pay a reduced amount. These reductions are paid for by an indigent fee imposed on all non-indigent participants in the programme. No subsidy is paid by the jurisdiction itself. In Victoria, for example, holders of a Health Care Card are entitled to a reduction of AU$50 (£20) per month in the cost of the interlock rental. No reduction, however, is given in the cost of any other fees such as call outs or extra servicing.

New Mexico charges interlock participants US$100 (£50) per year towards sustaining the indigent offender fund. The state also contributes US$300,000 (£145,000) per year. This fund helps offset the cost of the interlock programme for offenders who are unable to pay to participate in the programme and would not be able to drive or be re-licensed in the state of New Mexico. The fund pays for the installation and half the monthly lease fee charged to offenders. Offenders are deemed indigent by the convicting court or by their probation or parole officer. There are no uniform criteria to qualify for this programme.
One provider reported that they have never turned someone away or removed them from the programme as a result of an inability to pay. They are always able to work out some type of arrangement. It is recommended that no participant should be given an interlock without paying at least a portion of the fee. Anyone with a violation should be removed from the indigent programme and made to pay the full costs.

The largest financial burden for the offender, which is often overlooked, is the surcharge imposed by insurance companies as a result of a drink-driving conviction which can easily double the cost of vehicle insurance. Cost is often cited as a factor in an offender’s reluctance to participate in an interlock programme but the real cost includes obtaining insurance. It has often been proposed that insurance companies waive or at least reduce the surcharge for the drink-driving offence, provided the person participates in an interlock programme. Such a change would undoubtedly enhance participation.

Currently, many major insurance companies in the UK refuse to quote for a driver with a drink-driving conviction, even if they have a previously unblemished driving record. Smaller specialist companies and brokers will offer quotes, usually with a substantial surcharge that will last for up to five years, albeit on a reducing scale.

### 3.5 Future issues

#### 3.5.1 What changes in interlock technology are forecast and how might they influence policy and practice?

Programme monitors are occasionally faced with a high BAC start fail that the offender claims was provided by a family member or friend. Where offenders must have a continuous period free of positive breath tests prior to being eligible for programme termination, evidence of the identity of the person who provided the sample would solve the situation. New technology, introduced in Texas in January 2008, has the capacity to provide digital photographs of the person taking the breath test. This technology is being offered without additional charge for the first year but after that will cost an extra $15 (£8) per month – approximately 20% more.

Although there is little documented evidence that offenders are circumventing the device by having someone else provide a breath sample on their behalf, this technology will help to eliminate claims by the offender that they were not responsible for the positive breath test. This can be an issue in programmes where positive breath tests are considered a programme violation or a violation of a probation order to abstain from alcohol. At this point, it is not clear whether judges will order an offender to install this new device or offenders will elect this device to avoid accusations and resulting sanctions.
Criterion-based removal is a policy that requires participants to demonstrate that they no longer require the interlock to prevent drink driving before they can be released from the programme. This usually requires offenders to have a consecutive period of several months without an alcohol-positive breath test on the interlock record as well as evidence that the vehicle has been used regularly over that period of time. Supplementary evidence of successful completion of a rehabilitation programme may also be required. Criterion-based removal is a direct result of research evidence, showing that offenders with repeated BAC start fails on their record have a greater likelihood of recidivism.

The term ‘tailored programmes’ refers to the ability to change the programme parameters to meet the specific needs of the offender. For example, where the court deems it necessary to restrict an offender’s driving for specific purposes, interlock technology can be used to restrict the day and time a vehicle can be driven. The device can also be programmed to require an immediate recall if a positive BAC is recorded. Similarly, as an offender progresses through the programme, the device can also be used to provide incentives by systematically reducing the number of re-tests, lengthening the re-test interval, and even the days and time that a breath test is required at start-up. At present, there is little demand for these types of features.

The next generation of interlock devices may very well incorporate a form of passive alcohol sensor. This approach does not require the user to blow directly into the device. Differing technologies have been tried. For example, devices that sample the ambient air around the driver can be used to detect the presence of alcohol but are not sufficiently specific to determine the source of the alcohol. Once alcohol is detected, an active breath test would be required. Transdermal alcohol detectors built into the steering wheel have also been proposed. However, alcohol measurement in sweat lags behind blood alcohol levels and could easily result in an impaired driver being able to start the vehicle long before the technology would measure sufficient alcohol to prevent the individual from driving. Tissue spectroscopy for alcohol detection involves measuring alcohol in the small blood vessels just under the surface of the skin with infrared light. This would be a truly passive system that would provide an accurate measurement of the concentration of alcohol in the blood. The technique is still under development and is, most likely, several years from commercial viability.

One final issue relates to the increasing sophistication of the electronic systems in modern cars which threaten the future installation of interlocks. The European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC) committee is sufficiently concerned about this issue that it has written to the EU canvassing its support to persuade major European and Japanese manufacturers to provide an access point for interlocks in new vehicles.
4 FLORIDA

4.1 Case study

4.1.1 Background

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>18.1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area km(^2) (square miles)</td>
<td>170,305 (65,755)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drink-driving legislation</td>
<td>Attached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interlock legislation</td>
<td>Attached (Section 316.193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual total of drink-drive convictions</td>
<td>2006 = 63,591 arrests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by type of offence</td>
<td>2006 = 34,638 convictions (many pending)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1.2 Set-up

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Programme authority</td>
<td>Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dates of implementation:</td>
<td>1 July 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• pilot</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• phase II</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• full programme</td>
<td>1 February 2005 (operational date)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time required to get the programme up and running (i.e. from the decision to proceed to the first participant enrolled)</td>
<td>Three to six months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems encountered during the set-up phase</td>
<td>State originally contracted with one vendor but court ruled that another competing vendor had to be allowed to operate as well. Result, one vendor operates in the north part of the state, the other in the south</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1.3 Programme details

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eligibility</td>
<td>First DUI (driving under the influence) – if BAC &gt; 0.20% or if passenger is less than 18 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All repeat offenders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary, mandatory, judicial discretionary?</td>
<td>Judicial mandatory – if judge fails to impose interlock, DHSMV requires anyway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of hard suspension prior to eligibility?</td>
<td>1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other conditions prior to eligibility?</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Must the participant own the vehicle?</td>
<td>No. The interlock must be installed in all vehicles owned or jointly owned or leased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What type of licence do offenders hold while on the interlock programme?</td>
<td>Restricted to the operation of a vehicle equipped with an interlock device (work vehicles can be excluded)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current caseload</td>
<td>5,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation rate</td>
<td>(Estimate 15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interlock providers (e.g. ACS, Dräger, Smartstart)</td>
<td>ACS, LifeSafer. Each has half the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devices used (i.e. specific models)</td>
<td>ACS WRII; LifeSafer 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol limit set</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number and type of service providers (fitting and maintenance of devices)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of interlock installation</td>
<td>First DUI – if BAC &gt; 0.20 or if passenger is less than 18 years old, up to six months interlock&lt;br&gt;Second DUI – not less than one year – if BAC over 0.20 or passenger is under 18 years, not less than two years&lt;br&gt;Third DUI – not less than two years&lt;br&gt;Anyone applying for restricted (i.e. work) licence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How is the scheme promoted to potential participants?</td>
<td>The programme is mandatory – ordered by court or imposed by the licensing authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the benefits to the programme participants (e.g. reduction in the length of suspension)?</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 4.1.4 Rehab/education/treatment programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior, during or following the interlock programme?</th>
<th>Violations require the participant to attend counselling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Describe the nature of the programme (i.e. length, type)</td>
<td>First violation requires interview with DUI counsellor to discuss violation and ways to avoid the programme. Second violation requires DUI counsellor to establish case management plan that involves monthly appointments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.1.5 Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost to the offender</th>
<th>$70 (£35) installation $67.50 (£32) monthly $100 (£50) refundable deposit or a $5 (£2.50) monthly insurance charge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appointments with DUI counsellor for violations must be paid for by offenders ($25 (£12) each)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there assistance available for offenders who cannot afford the interlock?</td>
<td>Yes. If the court determines that the person truly cannot afford these costs, then the judge has the authority to order that any standardised fines otherwise associated with the DUI offence be allocated to defray the costs of installation. Essentially, a portion of the fines and court costs that the defendant would normally pay might be used towards the expenses associated with the installation and maintenance of this device (Statute 316.1937(2)(d))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What costs does the jurisdiction bear (e.g. administration of the programme, number of full-time employees, monitoring, dispute resolution)?

| Approximate staff time (equivalent full-time posts) required to administer scheme? | – |

4.1.6 Monitoring

Process and frequency of monitoring (how does data get from the interlock to the person monitoring the offender?)
Initially 30 days, then every 60 days
Violation reports sent via electronic transfer sent to DHSMV

Monitoring reports
Violation – two fails in four hours, tampering, failing to take retest

Who reviews the reports?
Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV)

What are they looking for (e.g. violation, fails)?
Violations (see above)

Are all reports submitted for review or only those that meet certain conditions?
Only violations

What actions can be taken by monitors?
Licence is cancelled if they fail to attend a service appointment
Violations require the participant to make an appointment with the DUI programme. If no appointment is scheduled, the licence is cancelled. The participant must attend the appointment. Further violations require a case monitoring plan to be developed. Monthly visits with a counsellor are required

Drop-out rate
–

Reasons for drop outs
–

4.1.7 Evaluation

How is success on the programme defined?
Reduced recidivism

Are there evaluation reports available (attach copies or references)?
One page sheet of current statistics

How does the interlock scheme interact with other countermeasures to drink driving?
The DUI programme is fully integrated with the interlock programme. Fines can be used to defray interlock costs
### 4.1.8 Future

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Review date</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Future plans | Each violation will extend the interlock programme by one month  
Mandated treatment upon the client’s third violation  
Treatment must be completed before termination of the interlock programme |

### 4.2 Further information

(All websites were accessed on 31 January 2008.)

Florida Statutes – driving under the influence; penalties  
www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=Ch0316/SEC193.HTM&Title=-%3E2007-%3ECh0316-%3ESection%20193#0316.193

Florida Statutes – 316.1937 Ignition interlock devices, requiring unlawful acts  
www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=Ch0316/SEC1937.HTM&Title=-%3E2007-%3ECh0316-%3ESection%201937#0316.1937

Florida Administrative Code (Interlock Devices)  

Background and history to the award of contract to two interlock providers  
www.floridaignitioninterlocks.com/services.htm

Interlock Group of Florida (Lifesaver)  
www.interlockfl.com/
5 NEW MEXICO

5.1 Case study

5.1.1 Background

Population 1.955 million
Area km\(^2\) (square miles) 314,914 (121,355)
Drink-driving legislation See further information (Section 5.3)
Interlock legislation See further information (Section 5.3)
Annual total of drink-drive convictions 12,411 (4,711 were repeat offenders)

5.1.2 Set-up

Programme authority Courts – administered by New Mexico Department of Transportation, Traffic Safety Bureau

Dates of implementation:
- pilot –
- phase II –
- full programme 2003; revised 2006

Time required to get the programme up and running (i.e. from the decision to proceed to the first participant enrolled) Six months to one year

Problems encountered during the set-up phase Developing rules and regulations is a challenge. If they are not specified in law, they must be in the regulations

5.1.3 Programme details

Eligibility All DWI (driving while intoxicated) offenders (except those who have committed vehicular homicide or great bodily injury by vehicle)

Voluntary, mandatory, judicial discretionary? Judicial mandatory Administrative voluntary

Length of hard suspension prior to eligibility? None – New Mexico is unique in this respect in North America

Other conditions prior to eligibility? None
**Must the participant own the vehicle?**
No, but they must have the permission of owner to install the interlock

**What type of licence do offenders hold while on the interlock programme?**
Interlock licence

**Current caseload**
Approximately 5,000

**Participation rate**
36%

**Interlock providers (e.g. ACS, Dräger, Smartstart)**
Seven out of nine: ACS, Dräger, CST, ADS, Lifesafer, Guardian, SmartStart

**Devices used (i.e. specific models)**
Dräger XT 920, SSI 1000, AMS 100, ACS WRII, Lifesafer 1000, ADS Determinator

**Alcohol limit set**
0.025%

**Number and type of service providers (fitting and maintenance of devices)**
52 service facilities plus mobile services

**Duration of interlock installation**
One year for first offence, two years for second, three years for third, life for fourth or more

**How is the scheme promoted to potential participants?**
Public information campaign, prosecutors, defence counsel

**What are the benefits to the programme participants (e.g. reduction in the length of suspension)?**
No mandatory hard suspension – can drive with an interlock as soon as suspension is registered

### 5.1.4 Rehab/education/treatment programme

**Prior, during or following the interlock programme**
Imposed by court – during the interlock period

**Describe the nature of the programme (i.e. length, type)**
Screening for alcohol problems. Treatment can be mandated if required

### 5.1.5 Costs

**Cost to the offender**
US$70 (£35) installation + US$70 (£35) per month + US$100 (£50) indigent fee per year
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is there assistance available for offenders who cannot afford the interlock?</td>
<td>Yes. Offenders declared indigent by the court (or parole officer) only pay half the monthly lease cost. The fund pays for installation, removal, and the other half of the lease. The state contributes $300,000 (£145,000) per year to the fund.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What costs does the jurisdiction bear (e.g. administration of the programme, number of full-time employees, monitoring, dispute resolution)?</td>
<td>The state administers the programme. Several people at the state level spend time on higher level programme functions, for example, regulations, disputes, monitoring providers. Court compliance officers view the reports. Seven new positions have been created to monitor offenders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approximate staff time (equivalent full-time posts) required to administer the scheme?</td>
<td>Seven full-time employees – five monitors plus supervisor and clerk Court compliance officers, probation officers, plus Department of Transportation (DoT) staff.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5.1.6 Monitoring

Process and frequency of monitoring (how does data get from the interlock to the person monitoring the offender?)

First 30 days then every 60 days. Can be once per month if required by the court. Reports sent to the court or probation officer.

Monitoring reports

Have not attained a standard format for reports.

Who reviews the reports?

Probation officer, court compliance officer.

What are they looking for (e.g. violation, fails)?

Failure to appear for service, circumvention, high BAC.

Are all reports submitted for review or only those that meet certain conditions?

All.

What actions can be taken by monitors?

No opportunity to extend the programme. 48 hours in jail appears to be the only available option.

Drop-out rate

5–10%.

Reasons for drop outs

Not known.
5.1.7 Evaluation

How is success on the programme defined? Ultimately, reduction in alcohol-related crashes

Are there evaluation reports available? Not yet. Evaluation is ongoing

How does the interlock scheme interact with other countermeasures to drink driving? Because the interlock programme can begin immediately upon arrest, all other countermeasures (e.g. screening, treatment) occur within the interlock period

5.1.8 Future

Review date New regulations are being introduced

Future plans Compliance-based removal rather than fixed-term installation.

5.2 Brief outline of procedures

There are two parts to the New Mexico interlock programme – administrative and judicial. In Albuquerque, there is a civil part that operates only in municipal courts.

Upon arrest for DWI, offenders are subject to an immediate 90-day administrative licence suspension. (This is routine across the US and throughout Canada.) The offender can have an interlock installed and return to the judge with a copy of the interlock contract and proof of insurance, and, after signing an affidavit stating that he or she will only drive the interlock-equipped vehicle, be granted an interlock licence. From the time of arrest to the time the offender is granted an interlock licence, it takes approximately 30 days. The interlock licence allows the person to drive anywhere at any time, provided that only they operate the vehicle with the interlock installed for a period of one year. This is the administrative part of the programme and is voluntary.

Upon conviction of the offence in court, there is a mandatory period of interlock installation imposed by the judge. Offenders are not eligible for a fully unrestricted licence until they have served the mandatory interlock period. The process for installation (if they have not participated in the administrative portion of the programme) is the same as noted above. Interlock data logger reports are reviewed every 60 days or more frequently if determined by the court. Monitoring is done by probation officers or court compliance officers. Violations consist of circumvention, tampering, missed service appointments and BAC start fails. Violations can result in 24 hours in jail. In Albuquerque, the courts strictly enforce the ‘no fail’ rule on
interlocks. Currently, there is no opportunity for programme extensions in the regulations.

The process for repeat offenders is virtually identical except that the interlock period is longer. The initial interlock contract is for 12 months and must be renewed for each subsequent 12-month period required.

There is an indigent offender fund available to offset the cost of the interlock for those who cannot afford it. The state contributes $300,000 per year to the fund and every (non-indigent) offender contributes $100 per year to the fund. The sentencing court or the parole officer determines who qualifies for the assistance. The criteria vary somewhat. The fund pays for the cost of installation, removal and half the monthly lease fee. The fund is widely used but remains solvent and the state is considering eliminating their annual contribution as it no longer seems to be necessary.

5.3 Further information

Ignition Interlock Licensing Act 2003
http://ipl.unm.edu/traf/Laws/IgnitionInterlock.RTF

New Mexico DWI Law
http://ipl.unm.edu/traf/Laws/NM-DWILaws-06.RTF

Instructions for obtaining an ignition interlock or limited licence
http://ipl.unm.edu/traf/certification/InterlockLic.htm

Ignition interlock devices fees and payments
www.nmecpr.state.nm.us/nmac/parts/title18/18.020.0012.htm

Ignition interlock devices
www.nmecpr.state.nm.us/nmac/parts/title18/18.020.0011.htm

List of approved ignition interlock device service centres in New Mexico
http://transportation.unm.edu/lic/ApprovedProviders.aspx?20

http://ipl.unm.edu/traf/pubs/Interlock/Roth%20MADD%20Panel%20ICADTS’07.ppt
6 ONTARIO

6.1 Case study

6.1.1 Background

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>12.2 million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area km² (square miles)</td>
<td>1,076,395 (415,958)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drink-driving legislation</td>
<td>Criminal Code of Canada, Highway Traffic Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interlock legislation</td>
<td>Ontario Regulation 251/02, Ignition interlock devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual total of drink-drive convictions by type of offence</td>
<td>Approximately 16,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.1.2 Set-up

Programme authority: Ministry of Transportation (MTO), Ontario

Dates of implementation:
- pilot
- phase II
- full programme

- Offenders convicted after 23 December 2001 were subject to the programme.
- Because of the mandatory 12-month suspension, the first interlock was installed after 23 December 2002

Time required to get the programme up and running (i.e. from the decision to proceed to the first participant enrolled)
- Policies, regulations and IT systems required about one year
- The interlock programme took three to four months from awarding the contract

Problems encountered during the set-up phase
- Other criminal code driving offences had to be treated as DWI offences for the purposes of the programme

6.1.3 Programme details

Eligibility
- All DWI offenders except those who have four or more previous DWI offences.
Voluntary, mandatory, judicial discretion ary? Mandatory interlock restriction programme. (Following the full period of suspension offenders must apply for an interlock-restricted licence which is for a period of one or three years or for life, depending on prior offences.) Offenders can choose not to drive during the interlock-restriction period in which case they do not have to have an interlock installed.

Length of hard suspension prior to eligibility? 1st offence – 12 months 2nd offence – 3 years 3rd offence – 10 years 4th+ offence – not eligible for the interlock programme

Other conditions prior to eligibility? Must complete ‘Back on Track’ alcohol education and treatment programme – requires up to 11 months to complete. Participants pay C$475 (£240) plus Goods and Services Tax to cover the cost of the programme. Its three components are:

- assessment – determines the extent of the drinking and driving problem and whether an education or treatment programme is most appropriate;
- education or treatment programme – the driver must successfully complete the appropriate programme aimed at preventing drinking and driving. These programmes focus on how alcohol affects driving performance, the consequences of impaired driving and ways to avoid drinking and driving; and
- follow-up interview – this takes place six months after the completion of the education or treatment programme to revisit the skills obtained and goals set.

Drivers who fail to complete all three components of the ‘Back on Track’ programme before the end of their
suspension period will not get their licence back until they complete the programme and satisfy all other requirements for licence reinstatement

Must the participant own the vehicle?  No, but the owner (or leaseholder) must agree

What type of licence do offenders hold while on the interlock programme?  Restricted to the interlock-equipped vehicle

Current caseload  2,001 (total since 2002 = approximately 7,000)

Participation rate  40% of those who receive the interlock-restricted licence. Only about half of first time offenders reinstate

Interlock providers (e.g. ACS, Draeger, Smartstart)  ACS exclusive contract

Devices used (i.e. specific models)  WR2

Alcohol limit set  0.02

Number and type of service providers (fitting and maintenance of devices)  15 service centres plus two monitoring only centres Contracted to Standard Auto Glass

Duration of interlock installation  1st offence – 12 months 2nd offence – 36 months 3rd offence – lifetime (No minimum period)

How is the scheme promoted to potential participants?  Initial letter sent to convicted drivers explaining the conditions of reinstatement

What are the benefits to the programme participants (e.g. reduction in the length of the suspension)?  Offenders can either have the interlock installed or choose not to drive during the interlock restriction period

6.1.4 Rehab/education/treatment programme

Prior, during or following the interlock programme?  Completion of the ‘Remedial Measures’ programme is required before the interlock programme
Describe the nature of the programme (i.e. length, type) Assessment program that determines whether education or treatment is required. There is a six-month follow-up period that must be completed prior to being eligible for the interlock programme.

6.1.5 Costs

Cost to the offender C$125 (£60) install; C$95 (£45) per month; C$25 (£12) removal

Is there assistance available for offenders who cannot afford the interlock? No

What costs does the jurisdiction bear (e.g. administration of the programme, number of full-time employees, monitoring, dispute resolution)? Programme administration, managing licence restrictions

Approximate staff time (equivalent full-time posts) required to administer scheme? Approximately one full-time employee

Driver control section fields many calls Full-time employee does field audits Other administrative time required to deal with licence restrictions, reinstatements

6.1.6 Monitoring

Process and frequency of monitoring (how does data get from the interlock to the person monitoring the offender)? Initially 30 days, then every 60 days Only violation reports are sent to MTO

Monitoring reports Violations consist of tampering, circumvention and missed service appointment

Who reviews the reports? MTO program manager

What are they looking for (e.g. violation, fails)? Violations – see above

Are all reports submitted for review or only those that meet certain conditions? Only those that contain violations. The provider determines whether the violation meets the criteria
What actions can be taken by monitors?

Extension of the interlock condition by the period equal to the initial interlock condition, i.e. the offender must start the interlock period again

Total of 38 extensions

Total of 79 convictions for driving without device

Drop-out rate

Total 716, or about 10%

Reasons for drop outs

Because they can. The interlock restriction remains in place

6.1.7 Evaluation

How is success on the programme defined?

No answer

Are there evaluation reports available?

No. The evaluation plan has been developed but awaits implementation

How does the interlock scheme interact with other countermeasures to drink driving?

MTO is notified of the successful completion of the ‘Remedial Measures’ programme

6.1.8 Future

Review date

N/A

Future plans

Safer Roads for a Safer Ontario Act 2007 – this creates escalating sanctions for repeat drink drivers with BAC measuring 0.05 to 0.08:

• first instance – driver suspended for three days;
• second instance – driver suspended for seven days and must undergo ‘Remedial Measures’ course; and
• third or subsequent instance – driver suspended for 30 days, must undergo ‘Remedial Measures’ course and have ignition interlock condition on their licence for six months

It allows drivers who are suspended for drinking and driving to get their licences back early if they install an ignition interlock device in their vehicle. It is planned for late 2008
6.2 Brief outline of procedures

Convicted DWI offenders are issued a mandatory prohibition from driving by the court (12 months for a first conviction, 24 months for a second and 36 months for subsequent convictions). MTO imposes a concurrent licence suspension of 12 months for a first conviction, 36 months for a second, and a lifetime suspension for a third offence. Upon conviction, MTO notifies offenders of their period of suspension and the requirement to attend (and pay for) the ‘Remedial Measures’ programme. Offenders are also sent information about the ‘Remedial Measures’ programme, including an application form and the dates and locations of programmes. Three months into the suspension, MTO sends a reminder of the requirement to complete the ‘Remedial Measures’ programmes before being eligible for reinstatement. Completion of the programme can take between nine and eleven months due to the required six-month follow-up. After offenders have completed the ‘Remedial Measures’ programmes and served the full 12- (or 36-) month suspension, offenders can apply to have their licence reinstated with an ‘I’ condition. The ‘I’ condition restricts the driver to a vehicle equipped with an ignition interlock. The ‘I’ condition remains in effect for the same period of time as the original suspension. Third-time offenders can apply for an ‘I’ licence after serving 10 years of their lifetime suspension. Offenders have the option of installing an interlock or not driving. Driving a vehicle without an interlock is equivalent to driving with an invalid licence. Monitoring is done primarily by the provider. Only violations (defined as tampering, circumvention, failing to report for service) are reported to MTO. Violations result in the period of the interlock licence restriction being extended by a period equal to the original length of the restriction.

At this point in time, second-time offenders are only beginning to be eligible for the interlock licence restriction. It is not known how many have or will apply for the interlock restricted licence and enter the interlock programme. It will be many years before any third-time offenders will be eligible.

Once on the interlock programme, offenders are free to leave the programme at any time. There is no penalty for leaving. Drivers must apply to have the interlock restriction removed from their licence.

6.3 Further information

Criminal Code of Canada

Highway Traffic Act 1990
www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_90h08_e.htm

Ignition Interlock information from Ministry of Transportation
www.mto.gov.on.ca/english/safety/impaired/interlock/
Ontario Regulation 251/02 Ignition Interlock Devices
www.canlii.org/on/laws/regu/2002r.251/20030812/whole.html

Ministry of Transportation, *Break The Law, Pay The Price* (penalties for drink driving offences)
www.mto.gov.on.ca/english/safety/impaired/breaklaw/breaklaw.htm

Safer Roads for a Safer Ontario Act 2007
7 QUEBEC

7.1 Case study

7.1.1 Background

Population 7.55 million
Area km² (square miles) 1,542,056 (595,391)
Interlock (antidémarreur) legislation Highway Safety Code, R.S.Q. c. C-24.2
Annual total of drink-drive convictions Approximately 14,000 (10,000 first offenders)

7.1.2 Set-up

Programme authority SAAQ (La Société de l’assurance automobile du Québec) (administrative)
Dates of implementation:
• pilot –
• phase II – 1 December 1997
• full programme –
Time required to get the programme up and running (i.e. from the decision to proceed to the first participant enrolled) Request for Proposal was issued June/July 1997 for start up in December 1997. Specifically requested one provider. The reason: easier to work with one rather than several

Problems encountered during the set-up phase Provider severely underestimated the initial demand and insufficient number of devices available

7.1.3 Programme details

Eligibility All DWI offenders
Voluntary, mandatory, judicial discretionary? Voluntary for the reduction of suspension Mandatory for all repeats Mandatory for first offenders if unsatisfactory assessment
| Length of hard suspension prior to eligibility? | 1<sup>st</sup> offence – 3 months  
2<sup>nd</sup> offence – 6 months  
3<sup>rd+</sup> offence – 12 months |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other conditions prior to eligibility?</td>
<td>No other suspensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Must the participant own the vehicle?</td>
<td>No, but the permission of the owner is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What type of licence do offenders hold while on the interlock programme?</td>
<td>Restricted to interlock-equipped vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current caseload</td>
<td>Approximately 7,000 (total since 1997 – 50,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation rate</td>
<td>Approximately 30% (difficult to determine for repeat offenders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interlock providers</td>
<td>ACS – dba Guardian Interlock Systems (GIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devices used (i.e. specific models)</td>
<td>WR2. Now installing WR3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol limit set</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number and type of service providers (fitting and maintenance of the devices)</td>
<td>23 contract providers throughout province Lebeau Auto Glass</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Duration of interlock installation | 1<sup>st</sup> offence – voluntary nine months (minimum three months)  
1<sup>st</sup> offence – if unsatisfactory assessment, 12 months  
2<sup>nd</sup> offence – two and a half years voluntary plus two years mandatory  
3<sup>rd</sup> offence – four years voluntary plus three years mandatory |
| How is the scheme promoted to potential participants? | Upon conviction, offenders are sent a letter from SAAQ outlining the requirements for reinstatement, including the interlock, as well as a brochure from GIS. GIS is not allowed to contact convicted offenders directly |
| What are the benefits to the programme participants (e.g. reduction in the length of the suspension)? | Voluntary part of programme allows reduction in the length of hard suspension |
7.1.4 Rehab/education/treatment programme

Prior, during or following the interlock programme?

During voluntary programme; prior to mandatory

Describe the nature of the programme (i.e. length, type)

Assessment programme.

Alcofrein\textsuperscript{7} is a driver education programme, formerly under the responsibility of the Ministère de la Sécurité publique, now administered by SAAQ since 1 April 2006. Taking part in Alcofrein is a condition for licence reinstatement following a first conviction for alcohol-impaired driving. Alcofrein is a measure that aims to raise awareness and prevent recurrence by:

• reminding participants of the legal, social and personal consequences of impaired driving;
• explaining the effects of alcohol and other intoxicants on the human body; and
• undercutting the false ideas held by many about alcohol consumption.

An Alcofrein session lasts three hours; the related fee (C$150 (£75))\textsuperscript{8} must be paid by the offender.

7.1.5 Costs

Cost to the offender

C$135 (£70) installation; C$95 (£50) monthly; C$25 (£12) installation

Is there assistance available for offenders who cannot afford the interlock?

No

What costs does the jurisdiction bear (e.g. administration of the programme, number of full-time employees, monitoring, dispute resolution)?

Administration only

\textsuperscript{7} See www.saaq.gouv.qc.ca/en/miscellany/alcofrein/index.html

\textsuperscript{8} See www.educaloi.qc.ca/en/loi/drivers/14/
Approximate staff time (equivalent full-time posts) required to administer scheme? 1 full-time employee for the interlock programme. Approximately one other full-time employee involved in administration, research, etc.

### 7.1.6 Monitoring

**Process and frequency of monitoring** Initially, one month, then every two months. Significant events trigger early recall (how does data get from the interlock to the person monitoring the offender?)

**Monitoring reports** Only significant events are reported. The provider uses a matrix to determine when events have to be reported to SAAQ

**Who reviews the reports?** SAAQ administrator

**What are they looking for** Only significant events are reported: use of the emergency bypass, failure to report for service, failed or missed retest, circumvention, tampering. High BAC events are not reported (e.g. violation, fails)?

**Are all reports submitted for review or only those that meet certain conditions?** The provider uses a matrix to determine if criteria for reporting have been met (SAAQ to provide matrix)

**What actions can be taken by monitors?** Removed from programme. This is rare – 40 to 50 per year

**Drop-out rate** Extremely rare

**Reasons for drop outs** Usually inability to provide sufficient breath volume

### 7.1.7 Evaluation

**How is success of the programme defined?** Reduced recidivism

**Are there evaluation reports available (attach copies or references)?** Yes

**How does the interlock scheme interact with other countermeasures to drink driving?** Relies on results of assessment to determine mandatory programme involvement for first offenders. Assessment must be completed by all repeats
7.1.8 Future

Review date –

Future plans Examine interlock logger data to determine if programme should be extended

Examine time to reinstatement

Find ways to reduce the number of event reports that have to be examined

7.2 Brief outline of procedures

7.2.1 First offenders

Upon conviction, offenders are sent a letter from SAAQ outlining the requirements to become reinstated. The letter also includes information about the optional interlock programme, the mandatory Alcofrein programme and the requirement for assessment.

If the offender decides to participate in the voluntary interlock programme, they must ensure that the court has authorised a reduction in the mandatory period of driving prohibition from twelve months to three months. The individual then applies for a restricted licence and has the interlock installed. They are then able to drive but restricted to an interlock-equipped vehicle for the remainder of the 12 months period of prohibition. (The minimum period of installation is three months.) Prior to the end of the interlock period, the individual must complete the mandatory Alcofrein programme and alcohol assessment. The assessment/evaluation process can take several months. If it is not completed before the 12-month period of suspension is complete, the individual may apply for an interlock-restricted (condition i) licence. If the evaluation reveals that the person is at risk of further alcohol problems, they are required to have an interlock installed for a period of 12 months before being eligible for full reinstatement. About 20% of first offenders have an unfavourable evaluation and, hence, have an interlock imposed for 12 months. The voluntary period of interlock use does not reduce the mandatory 12-month interlock period.

7.2.2 Repeat offenders

Repeat offenders also have the option of participating in the interlock programme in exchange for a reduction in the period of hard suspension. Second offenders can participate after serving six months of a three-year suspension; multiple offenders can do so after serving 12 months of a five-year suspension. Hence, the interlock period is 30 months for a second offender and four years for a multiple offender.
Prior to the end of the period of suspension, whether the individual has participated in the interlock programme or not, the individual must complete an alcohol evaluation. Regardless of the result of the evaluation, the offender is then subject to a mandatory two-year period of interlock use before being eligible for a full, unrestricted licence. The offender cannot simply wait out the period but must show that they have participated in the interlock programme for two years.

Multiple offenders have a four-year voluntary interlock period followed by a three-year mandatory period.

7.2.3 Emergency bypass
An emergency bypass is available on the interlock device. The WR2 simply requires the user to press the appropriate button and start the vehicle. No breath test is required. When the vehicle starts, the flashers and horn sound. The WR3 initiates the flashers and horn upon pressing the button. The user then has 20 seconds to determine whether or not they wish to start the vehicle. If they decide to drive, they must confirm the bypass by pressing the button again and then starting the vehicle. If they do not confirm, the bypass use is not recorded. On all starts following bypass use, the device goes into five-day recall mode and the user must take the vehicle to the service centre. Bypass use is considered a significant event that can cause programme termination. For the current year, there have been a total of 192 instances of the use of the emergency bypass recorded. It is not know whether or not the vehicle was subsequently driven.

7.2.4 Vehicle impoundment
Quebec has a very active vehicle impoundment program that affects all drivers who are found to be driving while suspended or in violation of an interlock restriction.

7.3 Further information
Criminal Code of Canada

Highway Safety Code Quebec
www.canlii.org/qc/laws/sta/c-24.2/20050809/whole.html

Alcofrein driver education program

Reapplying for a driving licence
www.saaq.gouv.qc.ca/en/driver_licence/alcohol/conditions.html
Drinking and Driving – Harsher Penalties to Prevent a Repeat Offence

Criminal Code Offences
www.saaq.gouv.qc.ca/publications/permis/offences_c3954a_p.pdf

Vehicle seizure
www.saaq.gouv.qc.ca/publications/permis/vehicle_seizure.pdf

Costs related to an impaired driving offence
www.saaq.gouv.qc.ca/en/driver_licence/alcohol/too_many.html
8 HAUTE-SAVOIE

8.1 Case study

8.1.1 Background

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annecy – 229,039</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note, the Judicial areas do not coincide precisely with the arrondissements</td>
<td>Thonon-les-Bains – 110,356 (one hour by car from Annecy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thonon-les-Bains – 110,356 (one hour by car from Annecy)</td>
<td>Bonneville – 161,410 (20 minutes by car from Annecy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonneville – 161,410 (20 minutes by car from Annecy)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area km² (square miles)</td>
<td>Annecy – 1,262 (487)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annecy – 1,262 (487)</td>
<td>Thonon-les-Bains – 908 (351)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thonon-les-Bains – 908 (351)</td>
<td>Bonneville – 1,558 (602)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonneville – 1,558 (602)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drink-driving legislation</td>
<td>0.25 mg/L in breath or 0.50 g/L in blood, leading to a fine and a withdrawal of six points of the driving licence providing offence did not involve a crash. Otherwise sent to Justice Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.25 mg/L in breath or 0.50 g/L in blood, leading to a fine and a withdrawal of six points of the driving licence providing offence did not involve a crash. Otherwise sent to Justice Court</td>
<td>0.4 mg/L in breath or 0.80 g/L in blood, leading to a fine, a withdrawal of six points of the driving licence, and a suspension of their licence for a duration from 15 days to three years, depending on the alcohol level and the circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.4 mg/L in breath or 0.80 g/L in blood, leading to a fine, a withdrawal of six points of the driving licence, and a suspension of their licence for a duration from 15 days to three years, depending on the alcohol level and the circumstances</td>
<td>0.4 mg/L in breath or 0.80 g/L in blood, leading to a fine, a withdrawal of six points of the driving licence, and a suspension of their licence for a duration from 15 days to three years, depending on the alcohol level and the circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Around 90% of the offenders on the interlock programme are detected by police roadside checkpoints.</td>
<td>Around 90% of the offenders on the interlock programme are detected by police roadside checkpoints.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interlock legislation (attach copy, URL or statute reference)</td>
<td>This programme is permitted under French law but there is no specific interlock legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This programme is permitted under French law but there is no specific interlock legislation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual total of drink-drive convictions by type of offence</td>
<td>Data not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data not available</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.1.2 Set-up

Programme authority

Largely organised by local Committee of Prévention Routière (PR) on behalf of Préfecture du Annecy. Original idea developed by Dr Charles Mercier-Guyon (CMG) of Annecy
8.1.3 Programme details

Eligibility

Drivers with BrAC within range 0.41–0.99mg/L but some special cases outside these limits are permitted by the Prefect

Probationary (young and new) drivers excluded

Recidivists and alcohol-addicted drivers excluded

Crash-involved drivers excluded if third parties involved

Voluntary, mandatory, judicial discretionary?

Voluntary

Length of hard suspension prior to eligibility?

15 days

Other conditions prior to eligibility?

Participants undergo a medical assessment within two weeks of offence

Must the participant own the vehicle?

No. Interlocks have been fitted to two trucks and several company cars

What type of licence do offenders hold while on the interlock programme?

Drivers are reissued with a full licence endorsed ‘Interlock’ and valid for one year only. Licence is issued by the Prefecture in Annecy
Current caseload: Depends on the level of RBT undertaken. Last week two new ones. Estimated that in two months, caseload will rise to 8–12 per week.

Participation rate: Estimated at 60% of those whose vehicles can be equipped with interlocks. Some companies will not permit interlocks on company vehicles.

Interlock providers (e.g. ACS, Dräger, Smartstart): ACS, Dräger

Devices used (i.e. specific models): Guardian Mk II. Mk III to be introduced in 2008.

Alcohol limit set: 0.15mg/L in breath.

Number and type of service providers (fitting and maintenance of the devices): Three – one in each sub-prefecture.

Duration of interlock installation: Six months.

How is the scheme promoted to potential participants?: After providing positive evidential sample at a police station, eligible offenders are given an explanatory note. This is not always done. CMG has taken out an advertisement about the programme in the local paper to coincide with the latest RBT campaign.

What are the benefits to the programme participants (e.g. reduction in the length of the suspension)?: Prosecutions cancelled if the offender succeeds in the programme. Termed ‘Classé sans suite’.

8.1.4 Rehab/education/treatment programme

Prior, during or following the interlock programme?: Held two to four months into the programme. Needs minimum number to run, so dependent upon throughput.

Describe the nature of the programme (i.e., length, type): Two-day training course. Devised by Chair of Prévention Routière (CMG). Day 1 – usual alcohol training course. Use certified trainers, psychologist and trainer of driving instructors. Topics include risk of accident, alcohol-related problems and...
concrete examples. Day 2 is run by CMG. Based on Quebec (SAAQ) system. Start with the story of the offence, then question the offender on what they did and why, what they could have done differently. Interactive discussion. Normally 12–15 people on the course. Not allowed (by law?) to have more than 15. Certificates of attendance issued at the end of the course but retained by PR. The ‘training course involving the interlock’ is an official alternative to prosecution. At the end of the programme, offenders see CMG for a 20-minute debriefing. He claims 100% approval from offenders for scheme. Post-programme follow-up for more serious offenders. Flexible 6–24 months.

8.1.5 Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost to the offender</th>
<th>€1260 (approximately £880). Every participant must provide a cheque for €800 to PR as a deposit for the programme. Cheque not cashed by PR, merely held by them. Participant pays €280 to PR, €250 for training course and €30 for PR costs. Remainder of costs paid directly to service provider for installation and rental.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is there assistance available for offenders who cannot afford the interlock?</td>
<td>PR do allow payment to be spread over 12 months in case of hardship. Can also negotiate cost of call-outs with service provider.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What costs does the jurisdiction bear (e.g. administration of the programme, number of full-time employees, monitoring, dispute resolution)?</td>
<td>CMG’s time does not appear to be covered. Seems unlikely that the €30 charge made by PR covers their costs either. They did charge €60 but, when the cost of the training course went up, they elected not to increase the total cost to the participant.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Approximate staff time (equivalent full-time posts) required to administer scheme?

30 minutes to one hour to get the offender on to the programme
30-minute debrief at the end of the programme. Both scenarios 1:1
Perhaps six hours per week on average
A realistic charge for these two tasks would be €100+ per participant. The programme is essentially subsidised by PR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8.1.6 Monitoring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Process and frequency of monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service centres send a weekly report to CMG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(how does data get from the interlock to the person monitoring the offender?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excel file showing critical events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who reviews the reports?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMG. It takes him 30 minutes to review it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are they looking for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e.g. violation, fails)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are all reports submitted for review or only those that meet certain conditions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What actions can be taken by monitors?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants can be removed from the programme for a serious traffic violation or gross violation of the equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drop-out rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low, if any</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons for drop outs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not known</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8.1.7 Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How is success on the programme defined?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant fulfils requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there evaluation reports available (attach copies or references)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INRETS (The French National Institute For Transport And Safety Research) are undertaking a comparison study of interlock and control groups over a three-year period. CMG is passing the data to INRETS. Giving questionnaires to participants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
How does the interlock scheme interact with other countermeasures to drink driving? Provides alternative to six-point penalty to drivers within a certain BAC range

8.1.8 Future

Review date None

Future plans An extension to other justice courts in other departments, such as Calvados and Avignon, is beginning, again using the local committees of Prevention Routière

It will also be proposed to the French Parliament that the interlock programme be included as a new legal sanction within the framework of the mandatory sanctions for recidivists; for the ‘guilty plea’ system recently implemented in France; it could stay as a part of the alternative sanctions only for new offenders; probationary system for drivers already sentenced with a cancellation of licence

8.2 Brief outline of procedures

A driver providing a positive breath test is brought to the police station for an evidential test. If it is within the range (0.4–1.0 mg/L in breath), the gendarme gives him a note outlining the interlock as an alternative to fine/suspension/loss of points. If the offender is interested, he or she must tell the police within two days.

Faxes are sent to the Prosecutor and to the Prefect to notify them and also to check their driving record. Assuming no problems, the driver is given a medical assessment by the Chair of Prévention Routière (CMG), which, if passed, allows the Prefect to issue a full licence for one year with an interlock endorsement. The medical assessment is mainly to allow CMG to learn more about the participant. He tries to avoid ‘heavy alcoholics’.

Devising an interlock endorsement for the licence proved to be difficult. French law does not permit a mark on the licence itself. In the end, CMG and the local branch

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9 Under the French points system, a driver starts with 12 points and then loses varying numbers according to the offence committed. Once all points are lost, licence suspension/cancellation is probable.

10 CMG informally preselects those for medical assessment, presumably to weed out ‘undesirables’.
of La Prévention Routière (PR) devised a security sealed see-through plastic envelope to contain the licence with a label (the interlock endorsement) fixed to the inside of the envelope. Checks for tampering are made every time the interlock is serviced.

In France, ex-professionals (e.g. retired judges and army officers) are delegated by the Prosecutor to review judicial cases. In Haute-Savoie, the Director of PR is a retired colonel who has been appointed by the Prosecutor to review drink-driving cases. The Director also manages the interlock programme.

At the start of the programme, each participant gets a ‘passport’ which lists key information, such as the date of the offence, medical assessment, dates of the programme, etc. The participant selects which service provided to use and goes to the garage to get the interlock installed. He or she can drive (with the interlock) two weeks after the date of the offence.

Participants get a three-hour course on the interlock. They are told to keep a bottle of water in the car to rinse the mouth. They bring the vehicle for servicing every month for the first two months. If there are no serious critical events, then the servicing is reduced to every two months. So a participant who behaves would have services at month 1, 2, and 4, with de-installation at month 6. At de-installation, participants have a 20-minute debrief with CMG.
9 SWEDEN

9.1 Case study

9.1.1 Background

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>9.1 million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area km² (square miles)</td>
<td>450,000 (173,700)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drink-driving legislation</td>
<td>To be added</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interlock legislation</td>
<td>Not available in English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual total of drink-drive convictions by type of offence</td>
<td>Around 4,500 (estimated from fact that 11% of potential offenders enrol on interlock scheme)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.1.2 Set-up

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme authority (name and type, e.g. judicial, administrative, etc.)</th>
<th>Administrative. Run by County Administrative Boards (who are also responsible for driver licensing)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dates of implementation:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• pilot</td>
<td>1999 in three counties (Västerbotten, Stockholm and Östergötland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• phase II (extended to cover whole country)</td>
<td>October 2003 to October 2009 (plus two years for last entrants to complete programme)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• full programme</td>
<td>Not yet operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time required to get the programme up and running (i.e. from the decision to proceed to the first participant enrolled)</td>
<td>Nine years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Problems encountered during the set-up phase | A Swedish doctor who had spent some time in the US wrote an article on interlocks in the Swedish Medical Journal in the late 1980s. Hans Laurell wrote a paper for the Swedish Road Safety Office which went to the Government in 1990 to ask for an interlock trial. It took nine years to happen. The lawyers were against it and took the political decision to oppose it before it came before the MPs. The lawyers thought that the punishment |
associated with drink driving would be diluted by interlocks, by allowing people to drive. In fact, the judicial system is unaffected by the interlock programme and still functions as normal. Legislators were confused between administrative and judicial systems. MPs were informed through the Transport Committee, which ran courses for MPs, to explain everything about interlocks. It was a schizophrenic situation – the lawyers said that only non-drinkers could come on the interlock programme! In the end, the professionals managed to get the programme as a treatment programme. They had to get MPs to understand the characteristics of drink drivers – that many were problem drinkers, alcohol dependents, etc. The development of the programme required co-operation between two ministries – Transport and Justice.

No negative reactions from the media although some press did try and run stories on beating the interlock. There were also some comments about a class system – that only the rich can afford to go on the programme.

### 9.1.3 Programme details

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eligibility:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st offenders?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd offenders?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple offenders?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voluntary, mandatory, judicial discretion?</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st offenders?</td>
<td>Voluntary administrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd offenders?</td>
<td>Voluntary administrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple offenders?</td>
<td>Voluntary administrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of hard suspension prior to eligibility?</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; offenders?</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; offenders?</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple offenders?</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other conditions prior to eligibility?</td>
<td>No drug users or drivers with medical licence restrictions permitted on programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Must the participant own the vehicle?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are offenders considered to be on probation?</td>
<td>They receive a conditional licence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On a restricted licence?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current caseload (per week, month, year)</td>
<td>As of August 2007, 2,216 have entered since it started in 1999. A third (32%) have been dismissed from the programme, a third (35%) have completed the full two years and the remaining third (32%) are currently on the programme. Over the past two years, an average of 41 offenders per month have entered the programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation rate (per cent of all drink-drive offenders, per cent of all eligible drink-drive offenders)</td>
<td>Estimated at 11% of the potential offenders (see Bjerre and Thorsson, 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interlock providers</td>
<td>ACS. The Dräger machine is now approved but has not obtained any significant market share yet. The Swedish Roads Administration (SRA) is concerned about the current monopoly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devices used (i.e. specific models)</td>
<td>ACS Interlock Mk II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dräger Interlock XT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol limit set</td>
<td>0.02 g/L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number and type of service providers (fitting and maintenance of devices)</td>
<td>To be checked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of interlock installation:</td>
<td>Two years. In the second year, the participant must be ‘entirely sober’ during the second year otherwise they are removed from the programme – their alcohol indicators cannot be elevated at all</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
How is the scheme promoted to potential participants?

If a driver blows 0.03 g/L or higher, he will lose his licence and be required to pass a new driving test before getting a new licence. The County (Licensing) Board will write to the driver telling him/her this and stating that he or she can appeal or enrol on an interlock programme. Such an option is not offered if the drink-drive offence is aggravated/combined with other offences which would themselves lead to suspension. They must first submit to a medical examination with an SRA-trained doctor who will check for signs of drug use and medical conditions such as epilepsy which would prevent enrolment on the interlock programme. In the original trial, there were six doctors in the three counties. The police who administer the evidential test are also supposed to tell the driver about interlocks. Not sure that this always happens. But, perhaps because of fleet use of interlocks, they are becoming more well-known devices – stories reporting them (court cases) are seen every week in local press.

What are the benefits to the programme participants (e.g. reduction in the length of suspension)?

The participants do not lose use of the vehicle and do not have to take a new test before getting their licence back. The alternative is 12–24 months’ licence revocation after which a new licence can be applied for following at least two medical checks which include sampling of medical indicators. A licence is only reissued after an approved doctor’s assessment which, as a rule, presupposes limited alcohol consumption, including normal values for the alcohol indicators, and passing a new driving test.
9.1.4 **Rehab/education/treatment programme**

Prior, during or following the interlock programme?

Describe the nature of the programme (i.e. length, type)

Have to submit to tests every three months. If elevated in Year 2, dismissed from the programme

9.1.5 **Costs**

Cost to the offender

SEK50,000 (£3,750)

Is there assistance available for offenders who cannot afford the interlock?

No

What costs does the jurisdiction bear (e.g. administration of the programme, number of full-time employees, monitoring, dispute resolution)?

None

Approximate staff time (equivalent full-time posts) required to administer the scheme

Varies according to the size of the county/number of participants. Seems unlikely that extra staff were recruited. Administration costs included in the fees charged to the participant

9.1.6 **Monitoring**

Process and frequency of monitoring (how does data get from the interlock to the person monitoring the offender?)

Uploaded from the interlock to the ACS server in Toronto. Local licensing staff can then access the database. Viewed every three months in line with other monitoring

Monitoring reports:

- Who reviews the reports?
  - Local licensing staff

- What are they looking for (e.g. violation, fails)?
  - Critical events, particularly signs of alcohol use

- Are all reports submitted for review or only those that meet certain conditions?
  - All

- What actions can be taken by monitors?
  - If critical events are spotted in Year 2, the offender is dismissed from the programme
Drop-out rate
About 48%

Reasons for drop outs
45% result from attempts to start the vehicle with a BAC above 0.2 g/L; 38% because they are ‘unable to verify sobriety’ during the second year of the programme; and the remainder drop out voluntarily

9.1.7 Evaluation

How is success on the programme defined?
Showing no evidence of alcohol use in the second year of the programme

Are there evaluation reports available (attach copies or references)?
Bjerre and Thorsson (2007)
Bjerre et al. (2006)
Nordbakke et al. (2007)

How does the interlock scheme interact with other countermeasures to drink driving?
It is an alternative to 12–24 months’ hard suspension plus a reapplication for a licence which involves at least two medical checks for evidence of alcohol misuse

9.1.8 Future

Review date
2011

Future plans
SRA is currently putting forward new proposals to the Swedish Government:
• there should be a certification period of one year that is performance-based. So, in future, people would not be thrown off the programme. They would stay until they had been clean for one year;
• periodic tests for drugs using offenders’ hair; and
• SEK10,000 (£750) rebate on successful completion of the programme

9.2 Alcolock for DWI offenders

A programme involving the trial use of an alcolock was initiated in 1999.11
Originally the device was used only in private passenger cars but this has now been

11 See www.vv.se/templates/page3___20791.aspx
extended to include light lorries, heavy lorries and buses (driving licence categories B, BE, C, CE, D, DE). Those holding a probationary driving licence are not eligible for the alcohol ignition interlock programme. Participation is based on the condition that those electing to take part must do so for two years and pay the full cost themselves.

9.2.1 Penalty not affected

Any fine or prison sentence imposed on the driver remains the same even if he or she takes part in the alcohol ignition interlock programme. In other words, participation has no effect on the penalty.

9.2.2 Medical requirements

Anyone who takes addictive drugs or medicine may not participate in the alcohol ignition interlock programme. Taking tranquilizers or painkillers that are addictive can only be accepted temporarily during the programme period and only if prescribed by a doctor.

Participants should refrain from drinking alcohol during the entire conditional period. During the second year of the programme a sober lifestyle must be regularly verified by blood tests and certified by a doctor. Anyone unable to do so is not permitted to continue in the programme.

9.2.3 Costs

The total cost for the individual participant amounts to about SEK50,000 (£3,750) distributed over the two-year programme period. The cost includes:

- the county administrative board application fee and participation fee;
- a medical certificate, including medical examinations with a blood test every third month;
- rental of the alcolock; and
- issuance of the driving licence.

9.2.4 What is the procedure?

The driver sends his or her application to the County Administrative Board along with:

- a medical certificate issued by a specified doctor;
- a declaration of intention in which the driver agrees to follow the specific terms and conditions in the programme;
• a contract drawn up between the driver and the alcolock supplier; and
• an application fee (SEK1,000).

After the County Administrative Board has formally approved the use of an alcolock, the driver must contact an alcolock supplier to have the device installed. The Swedish Road Administration then issues a driving licence with a special condition code (code 105).

9.2.5 Participation fee

A participation fee of SEK5,300 shall be paid to the County Administrative Board. Half of this is due within two months and the remainder within 14 months of the decision. The Swedish Road Administration will then issue a driving licence with a special condition code. A new medical examination must be conducted no later than four weeks after receipt of this and subsequently every third month during the entire programme period. The alcolock itself must be inspected every other month. The information in the alcolock memory is transferred to the County Administrative Board in connection with this inspection.

9.2.6 False manipulation leads to exclusion

As a rule, false manipulation of the alcolock and trying to start the car after alcohol consumption results in exclusion from the programme. Anyone renting an alcolock is personally responsible for everything that is recorded in its memory. Note, prior to exhaling into the device, the driver must rinse his or her mouth with water to avoid an incorrect reading.

9.2.7 What happens if anyone wants to quit or is excluded from the programme?

In this event the County Administrative Board resumes the process of withdrawing the driving licence and decides on the length of the driving prohibition period. No credit will then be given for the time when the conditional driving licence was valid. Neither will there be any refund of the fee paid.

9.2.8 Medical requirements

Anyone who takes addictive drugs or medicine may not participate in the alcohol ignition interlock programme. Taking tranquillisers or painkillers that are addictive can only be accepted temporarily during the programme period and only if prescribed by a doctor.

Participants should refrain from drinking alcohol during the entire conditional period. During the second year of the programme, a sober lifestyle must be regularly
verified by blood tests and certified by a doctor. Anyone unable to do so is not permitted to continue in the programme.

9.2.9 Swedish Road Administration

The Swedish Road Administration (SRA) is collaborating with County Administrative Boards and medical doctors in a programme involving the trial use of an alcolock. The SRA is responsible for co-ordinating this collaboration as well as evaluating the programme results.
10 THE NETHERLANDS

10.1 Case study

10.1.1 Background

| Population  | 16.4 million |
| Area km² (square miles) | 41,526 (16,033) |
| Drink-driving legislation | It is prohibited to drive a vehicle if the percentage of alcohol in your blood exceeds 0.5%. If you are stopped by the police for an alcohol check, you have an obligation to cooperate. If you refuse to cooperate, your driving licence will be taken in custody. The punishment for drink driving varies from a fine of at least €190 to some years in prison, as well as a driving ban for a maximum of five years (10 years for repeat drink drivers).\(^\text{12}\)

There have also been stricter rules for new drivers since March 2002. New drivers of motor vehicles for which a driving licence is required must not have more than 0.02% of alcohol in their blood for the first five years after passing their driving test. This blood alcohol level also applies to people below the age of 24 who ride mopeds, motorised bicycles and scooters.\(^\text{13}\)

In November 2007, a Bill approved by Cabinet provides that motorists, motorcyclists or moped riders who are convicted of drink driving for the second time in five years (with a BAC of 0.1% or over) will automatically lose their driving licence regardless of their BAC for the first offence. The Bill also looks ahead to the introduction of a future ‘alcohol

\(^\text{12}\) See www.verkeershandhaving.nl/?s=105

\(^\text{13}\) See www.verkeerenwaterstaat.nl/english/topics/road_traffic_safety/alcohol_drugs_and_driving/index.aspx
ignition lock’ programme. In anticipation of an intended revision of the litigation procedure, the purpose of introducing such an obligation will be to notify the Central Office for Motor Vehicle Testing (CBR) of cases of drink driving involving new drivers with a BAC of 0.05% or higher. At present this level is set at 0.08%. The proposal is related to the intended introduction of a ‘light’ educational alcohol measure which is still under development.14

See also drink-driving countermeasures 1974–2006 below (Section 10.2)

Interlock legislation (attach copy, URL, or statute reference) Not yet enacted

Annual total of drink-drive convictions by type of offence Not known. 2.0 million to 2.5 million alcohol checks per annum

10.1.2 Proposed set-up

Programme authority (name and type, e.g. judicial, administrative, etc.) Administrative

Possible dates of implementation:
- pilot 2008
- full programme 2009/10

Time required to get the programme up and running (i.e. from the decision to proceed to the first participant enrolled)? Been discussing interlocks for six years. The current project leader (from the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management) is the third to be appointed and has been in the post since June 2007

Problems encountered during the set-up phase Major problem yet to be resolved concerns interaction with existing judicial sanctions. Unless the law is modified, a driver may apply and start the interlock programme with a restricted licence and then, a few months later, be summoned to

court and have his licence revoked by a judge. Currently, virtually everyone with a BAC above 130 mg/100 ml has their licence revoked.

10.1.3 Programme details

Note, all information provided below is subject to change as the legislation is not yet enacted.

Eligibility
- All drivers with BACs between 130 mg and 210 mg/100 ml
- All novice drivers (less than five years’ experience) and repeat offenders with BACs between 100 mg and 180 mg/100 ml

Voluntary, mandatory, judicial discretionary?
- Mandatory for all drivers listed above

Length of hard suspension prior to eligibility?
- No hard suspension as such

Other conditions prior to eligibility?
- None known

Must the participant own the vehicle?
- No

Are offenders considered to be on probation? On a restricted licence?
- Restricted licence. May cost up to €400

Current caseload (per week, month, year)?
- Not applicable

Participation rate (per cent of all drink-drive offenders, per cent of all eligible drink-drive offenders)?
- Not applicable

Interlock providers (e.g. ACS, Dräger, Smartstart)
- Will be open to anyone with an interlock manufactured to CENELEC 1 standard

Devices used (i.e. specific models)
- Not yet known

Alcohol limit set
- Not yet decided. Likely to be 20 mg/100 ml

Number and type of service providers (fitting and maintenance of the devices)
- Looking to ensure that all offenders will live within 50 km of a service centre

Duration of interlock installation
- Two years for all participants
10.1.4 Rehab/education/treatment programme

Prior, during or following the interlock programme?

Describe the nature of the programme (i.e. length, type)

The Driving Test Organisation (CBR) will implement the programme. It will consist of:
- several group sessions to motivate the client along with information about the physical and mental effects of alcohol;
- screening to determine if the client is alcohol dependent. If he or she is, they will be referred to health care;
- regular evaluation of breath test data; and
- exit session at the close of the programme.

10.1.5 Costs

Cost to the offender

Offender pays for everything. Estimated at €1,600 per annum

Is there assistance available for offenders who cannot afford the interlock?

No final decision yet

What costs does the jurisdiction bear (e.g. administration of the programme, number of full-time employees, monitoring, dispute resolution)?

None. The programme will be administered on self-financing basis by the driving test organisation (CBR)\textsuperscript{15}

Approximate staff time (equivalent full-time posts) required to administer the scheme?

Not yet known

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\textsuperscript{15} CBR (Centraal Bureau Rijvaardigheidsbewijzen) is the Dutch driving licence autonomous administrative authority responsible for the administering of driving tests (www.verkeerenwaterstaat.nl/english/topics/driving%5Flicense/)
10.1.6 Monitoring

Process and frequency of monitoring (how does data get from the interlock to the person monitoring the offender?)
To be undertaken at the service point. The government will own the database containing all the information from the interlock

Monitoring reports:
Who reviews the reports? To be determined
What are they looking for (e.g. violation, fails)? To be determined
Are all reports submitted for review or only those that meet certain conditions? To be determined
What actions can be taken by monitors? To be determined

Drop-out rate Not yet known
Reasons for drop outs Not yet known

10.1.7 Evaluation

How is success on the programme defined? To be determined
Are there evaluation reports available (attach copies or references)? To be determined

How does the interlock scheme interact with other countermeasures to drink driving? It will be used for ‘middle-range’ offenders. Low BAC offenders will be required to take an Educational Measure Alcohol and Traffic course (EMA), whereas high BAC offenders will be required to undertake medical-psychiatric assessment. The EMA consists of a three-day course that is imposed on drivers with relative high BACs and recidivists. Originally the EMA was imposed on a BAC between 1.3 and 2.1 g/l, but since 2000 it is between 1.3 and 1.8 g/l. In 2002 this became between 0.8 and 1.3 g/l for novice drivers who have had their driving licence for less than five years. A study of the effectiveness of EMA showed an increased knowledge about drink driving.
among the participants, but no effect on recidivism\textsuperscript{16}

10.1.8 Future

Review date Not yet known
Future plans Not yet known

10.2 Drink-driving countermeasures 1974–2006\textsuperscript{17}

It was not until the early 1970s that it became clear in the Netherlands just how serious the effects of alcohol were on road safety. This finding was, in the first place, a result of SWOV’s (Stichting Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek Verkeersveiligheid – the Dutch national road safety research institute) many studies of alcohol use among motorists. Since then a large number of measures have been taken to fight drink driving. The most important of these are listed in Table 10.1. They are linked to the developments in drink driving which were observed in different periods.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Developments in drink driving</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Introduction of: • a legal BAC limit of 0.05 g/l; • (chemical) test tubes for the selection of suspects; and • blood analysis for evidential purposes. All this was accompanied by intensive information (‘the November Law’). These measures made the first focused police enforcement of drink-driving possible</td>
<td>1974–83 Drink driving in weekend nights declined from 15% in the early 1970s to 12% in the early 1980s. Shortly after the introduction of the 0.05 g/l limit, only 1% of drivers were drink drivers because they initially estimated the risk of being caught as much higher than it really was</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>The gradual introduction of electronic breath testers to replace the test tubes, reducing the risk of false negatives and lowering the cost per breath test</td>
<td>1984–86 During the 1984–1986 period the risk of being caught increased considerably and drink driving during weekend nights declined further to 8% in 1987. The decrease was highest among young drivers, showing a positive effect of the information campaigns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Gradual change from select to random police checks to increase the general preventative effect of enforcement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>The Dutch Traffic Safety Association and the Ministry of Health started campaigns focused on the young</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)

\textsuperscript{16} See the SWOV (Stichting Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek Verkeersveiligheid) fact sheet, \textit{Driving under the influence of alcohol}, at \url{www.swov.nl/rapport/Factsheets/FS_Driving_under_the_influence.pdf}

\textsuperscript{17} See \url{www.swov.nl/uk/research/kennisbank/inhoud/40_gedrag/05_alcohol/measures_1974_2006.htm}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Developments in drink driving</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Introduction of breath analysis for evidential purposes to increase the efficiency of police enforcement</td>
<td>1987–91 The introduction of breath analysis and tit-for-tat policy led to a further increase of random police enforcement and, with it, an increase in the risk of being caught. The percentage of drink-drivers during weekend nights dropped further to 3.9% in 1991. Alternative transport being available has probably also had a positive effect, but it is unknown to what extent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Introduction of a tit-for-tat policy for the lighter offenders – settlement proposal immediately after breath analysis for evidential purposes – to increase the efficiency of sanctioning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Introduction of special public transport for customers of pubs and discos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Further extension of the tit-for-tat policy – heavier offenders also immediately receive a filled-in summons to appear in court, usually together with a settlement proposal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>More severe penalties for drink driving, including higher fines and faster seizure of the driving licence by the police</td>
<td>1992–94 The more severe penalties have had no demonstrable effect on drink driving, which increased to 4.9% in 1994. This increase followed a temporary large decrease of police enforcement because of large-scale police reorganisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Introduction of ‘Regulation Measures Driving Skills and Fitness to Drive’. This gives the Minister of Transport the possibility to oblige drink drivers to follow a three-day course on alcohol and traffic which they have to pay for themselves, or otherwise undergo a test of their fitness to drive</td>
<td>1995–99 During this period weekend night drink-driving stabilised at about 4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Introduction of regional police teams for traffic enforcement.</td>
<td>2000–04 In the 2000–04 period the number of random alcohol checks doubled. The percentage of drink drivers decreased further to about 3.5%. Furthermore, the relatively large decrease among the young male drivers is striking. The percentage of young male drivers being involved in severe injury crashes after drinking decreased from 25% to 22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Start of the ‘Designated Driver’ campaign which is regularly being repeated. Establishment of the Regional Traffic Enforcement Teams that resulted in the doubling of random enforcement between 2001 and 2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>The legal BAC limit for novice drivers was lowered to 0.2 g/l</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11 STATE OF VICTORIA

11.1 Case study

11.1.1 Background

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population (2006)</th>
<th>4.9 million(^{18}) of which 3.6 million live in Melbourne(^{19})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area km(^2) (square miles)</td>
<td>227,416 (87,806)(^{20})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drink-driving legislation</td>
<td>Road Safety Act 1986 Part 5 Sections 49 and 52.(^{21}) There are five offences relating to drink driving:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• driving while over the prescribed BAC level;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• over 0.05% for full licence folders, over and 0.00% for probationary and learner drivers, and over 0.05% for drivers accompanying learner drivers;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• providing a breath or blood sample which is over the prescribed BAC within three hours of driving; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• refusing to undergo breath or blood tests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interlock legislation</td>
<td>Road Safety (Ignition Interlocks) Act 2002(^{22})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 2006, Victoria Police breath tested 1.37 million drivers and riders from ‘Booze Bus’ operations. Over 5,500 drivers and riders were caught with an illegal BAC (above 0.05%) over this period.

### 11.1.2 Set-up

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme authority (name and type, e.g. judicial, administrative, etc.)</th>
<th>Administered by VivRoads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dates of implementation:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• pilot</td>
<td>No evidence of a pilot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• phase II</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• full programme</td>
<td>May 2003&lt;sup&gt;24&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time required to get the programme up and running (i.e. from the decision to proceed to the first participant enrolled)</td>
<td>Not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems encountered during the set-up phase</td>
<td>An early Victorian trial proposed for interlocks for repeat, high range BAC offenders experienced a variety of difficulties and was never implemented&lt;sup&gt;25&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 11.1.3 Programme details

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eligibility:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; offenders?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; offenders?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple offenders?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary, mandatory, judicial discretion?</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; offenders?</td>
<td>BAC &gt; 0.15%&lt;sup&gt;21&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; offenders?</td>
<td>Two or more previous&lt;sup&gt;21&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young offenders</td>
<td>Less than 26 years or probationary driver and BAC &gt; 0.07%&lt;sup&gt;21&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<sup>24</sup> See Swann (2005).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Length of hard suspension prior to eligibility?</strong></th>
<th><strong>Varies according to BAC</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; offenders?</td>
<td>Nil – 15 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; offenders?</td>
<td>15–48 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple offenders?</td>
<td>15–48 months or more</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Other conditions prior to eligibility?** | None known |
| **Must the participant own the vehicle?** | No |
| **Are offenders considered to be on probation?** | Licence Restoration Order issued by the court allows VicRoads to issue driver licence or permit with an interlock condition. The letter ‘I’ is printed in the Conditions section on the front of the licence or permit.  
| **On a restricted licence?** |  |

| **Current caseload (per week, month, year)** | In the first 18 months, 1,277 drink-driving offenders were relicensed with alcohol interlock conditions. By September 2005, 1,600 were currently installed.  |
| **Participation rate (per cent of all drink-drive offenders, per cent of all eligible drink-drive offenders)** | Approximately 70% of drivers who have been granted ‘interlock licences’ have had an interlock fitted to their vehicle. More than 99% of drivers who have had interlocks fitted have continued with the programme and less than 1% have withdrawn. |

| **Interlock providers (e.g. ACS, Dräger, Smartstart)** | ACS and Dräger |
| **Devices used (i.e. specific models)** |  |
| **Alcohol limit set** | 0.0% |
| **Number and type of service providers (fitting and maintenance of devices)** | Guardian – any Bosch dealer will be able to provide advice on interlock, although not all are qualified to fit them initially. Service centres are established at Wodonga, Portland, Echuca, Shepparton, Geelong, Sunbury, Kingsbury, Clayton North and Horsham. Dräger – information not available |

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27 See www.dpc.vic.gov.au/domino/Web_Notes/newmedia.nsf/955cbeae7df9460dca256c8c00152d2b/f29723b3db45447aca256f53007b3ec0!OpenDocument
Service interval Initially one month. If the interlock is used correctly for the first three months, the interlock supplier may arrange for the service interval to be extended. 24

Duration of interlock installation: 1st offenders? BAC 0.07–0.15%
P-platers: >= six months
Under 26 years: >= six months
All others: discretionary six months
BAC greater than 0.15% >= six months

2nd offenders?
BAC less than 0.15% >= 12 months
BAC greater than or equal to 0.15% >= four years

Multiple offenders?
BAC greater than or equal to 0.15% >= four years irrespective of BAC28

How is the scheme promoted to potential participants? Transport Accident Commission (TAC) website

What are the benefits to the programme participants (e.g. reduction in the length of the suspension)?

11.1.4 Rehab/education/treatment programme

Prior, during or following the interlock programme? Towards the end of the interlock programme

Describe the nature of the programme (i.e. length, type) Before getting a Licence Restoration Order, participants must have an alcohol assessment by an accredited education agency. To obtain an Interlock Condition Removal Order (ICRO), the offender must obtain a Compliance Assessment Report (CAR) from the interlock provider. This is sent to an assessor (normally the driver education agency used for the initial alcohol assessment) who produces a report containing the CAR an evaluation of the use of alcohol during the interlock period and the last licence restoration report. Offenders must arrange a court hearing to get an ICRO. Will be interviewed by VicPolice prior to court hearing26

11.1.5 Costs

Cost to the offender Guardian:
• fitting of the interlock, which includes a vehicle electrical check and user training (about AU$120);
• monthly hire and servicing costs (about AU$140 per month); and
• removal of the interlock and provision of the appropriate court required documentation (about AU$70) 29

Offenders must also pay for their assessments, drink-drive education classes, the court hearing and fees charged by VicRoads for issuing a new licence26

Is there assistance available for offenders who cannot afford the interlock?

Holders of a health card issued by the Australian Government may claim financial assistance when paying interlock costs26
Guardian – if you hold a health care card, you will be eligible for a concession of $50.00 per month off the normal charges, however, you will need to pay the full cost of any other fees, such as call outs or extra servicing29

What costs does the jurisdiction bear (e.g. administration of the programme, number of full-time employees, monitoring, dispute resolution)?

None as far as is known

Approximate staff time (equivalent full-time posts) required to administer the scheme?

Not known

11.1.6 Monitoring

Process and frequency of monitoring (how does data get from the interlock to the person monitoring the offender?)

Not known

Monitoring reports: Not known
  Who reviews the reports?
  What are they looking for
  (e.g. violation, fails)?
  Are all reports submitted for review or
  only those that meet certain conditions?
  What actions can be taken by monitors?

Drop-out rate Not known
Reasons for drop outs Not known

11.1.7 Evaluation

How is success on the programme defined? Not known
Are there evaluation reports available
(attach copies or references)? –
How does the interlock scheme interact with other countermeasures
to drink driving? –

11.1.8 Future

Review date Not known
Future plans A new road safety strategy announced in February 2008 includes a tough new focus
on drink driving with drivers who record a blood alcohol level of 0.10% immediately
taken off the road, rather than waiting until they go to court.30

11.2 Outline procedure

There are 10 steps that drivers must take if they want to drive legally when their
licence banned period has expired:

1. Prepare to obtain a Licence Restoration Order:
   • At least 28 days before their licence banned period ends, they should
     attend a magistrates’ court nearest to where they live to organise a
court hearing for their Licence Restoration Order.

1&navID=63CC12CD7F00000101A5D19311EC6AC2&navLink=null&pageID=1545
• They also have to contact an accredited education agency to arrange an alcohol assessment.
• They should also ensure that the police are aware of their application for the Licence Restoration Order.

2. Investigate options for leasing an alcohol interlock:
• If they are likely to be issued with an interlock condition order, they should contact all approved interlock suppliers and investigate their options.

3. Attend a court hearing to obtain a Licence Restoration Order.
• If the magistrates’ court believes it is appropriate for them to be re-licensed, it will issue them with an order allowing them to apply to VicRoads to obtain a licence or permit. If the court decides that they must drive with an alcohol interlock, their licence will be marked with an ‘I’.

4. Attend VicRoads Customer Service Centre to have their licence re-issued:
• After the court has given them a Licence Restoration Order, VicRoads can issue them with a licence or permit. They must attend a VicRoads Customer Service Centre with proof of identity and present their Licence Restoration Order.

5. Install alcohol interlock:
• Before driving again they must sign an agreement with an approved alcohol interlock supplier and have an interlock fitted. Only approved service agents registered with approved interlock suppliers can install, service and remove interlocks.

6. Legally drive with an alcohol interlock fitted and attend scheduled maintenance services:
• First they must successfully complete at least the minimum period with an alcohol interlock fitted to their car. During this period, which is set by the court, they must attend all the scheduled services and comply with both the interlock order and the manufacturer’s instructions.

7. Prepare for their Interlock Condition Removal Order hearing:
• They have three jobs to do to prepare for their court hearing. These are to visit the court nearest to where they live to organise a date for the court hearing, contact the alcohol interlock supplier for a report and, finally, contact the driver education agency for an assessment report. They have to start on these jobs at least 28 days before their alcohol interlock period ends.
• They should also ensure that the police are aware of their application for the Interlock Condition Removal Order.

8. Attend court for their Interlock Condition Removal Order:
• They have to attend the magistrates’ court on the date set to apply for an Interlock Condition Removal Order.

9. Attend VicRoads Customer Service Centre:
• They must attend a VicRoads Customer Service Centre to have the interlock condition removed from their licence.
10. Remove the alcohol interlock:
   - They must take their car to the alcohol interlock service agent to have
     the interlock removed and to complete their contract with the supplier.

11.3 Further information

Road Safety Act 1986
a12f6f0fbd56800ca256de500201e54/
479EA672FA097CCBCA25738D00086DD4/$FILE/86-127a105.pdf

Road Safety (Alcohol Interlocks) Act 2002
f932b66241ecf1b7ca256e92000e23be/
1EB7EF68D03D3284CA256E5B00213FCC/$FILE/02-001a.pdf

Victoria’s Alcohol Interlock Program

Getting your licence back
Getting_Your_Licence_back.pdf

Drink driving statistics 2006
12&tierID=1&navID=A9348A54&navLink=null&pageID=164

International Interlock Symposium, Annecy.
www.trafficinjuryresearch.com/interlock/documents/
Summary_of_Papers_from_6th_Interlock_Symposium.pdf


Marine, W., Lowenstein, S., Glazner, J., Lesotte, D., Michel, D., & Zhaoxing, P. (2000) Results of Colorado’s Voluntary Alcohol Ignition Interlock Pilot Program (Senate Bill 95-011): Evaluation and Recommendations for Change. The Department of Preventative Medicine & Biometrics and the Division of Emergency Medicine, Department of Surgery, University of Colorado Health Sciences Center


