

1 (2.00 pm)

2 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Good afternoon.

4 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Good afternoon.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Welcome General Cross, our witness this
6 afternoon, and welcome to those who have joined us or
7 rejoined us for the first of the two afternoon sessions.

8 The objectives of this session, following from those
9 last week on the United Kingdom military planning, are
10 to develop our understanding of the planning for the
11 aftermath of possible military action in Iraq and then
12 compare that to the experience in the first few months
13 after the invasion.

14 Today we are hearing from Major General Tim Cross,
15 who, after a spell on the logistics side of planning,
16 was embedded in the US Organisation for Reconstruction
17 and Humanitarian Assistance -- I think we all know it as
18 ORHA -- from early 2003 and then from there deployed to
19 Iraq itself in the theatre.

20 I'm glad to say that we are now back on
21 a chronological approach. We have had to do two or
22 three sessions out of order because of people being
23 posted abroad, but now we are back starting in late
24 2002, through to the invasion and the first few months
25 after the invasion, up to late June 2003 for this

1 afternoon. I think General Cross, you left Iraq at that
2 point?

3 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Yes, at the end of June.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: And subsequent witnesses will be continuing
5 the story right up to the end of the operation in 2009.

6 Those present and others listening may like to know
7 General Cross has kindly provided us with a very full
8 witness statement, which is now going up on the Inquiry
9 website. Thank you for that.

10 I invite all those listening that the Inquiry has
11 access to many thousands of government papers including
12 the most highly classified for the period we are
13 considering. We are developing a picture of the policy
14 debates and the decision-making processes and these
15 evidence sessions are an important element both in
16 informing our thinking and in complementing the
17 documentary evidence.

18 It is important, therefore, that witnesses are open
19 and frank in their evidence while respecting national
20 security, and I remind every witness they will later be
21 asked to sign a transcript of their evidence to the
22 effect that the evidence they have given is truthful,
23 fair and accurate.

24 Before we start, just for the benefit of those
25 following the Inquiry, I think it may be helpful to

1 point out that the post-invasion phase -- and we have
2 even had a witness who took exception to various other
3 descriptions of it -- is frequently referred to as
4 "Phase 4". So if "Phase 4" is referred to, that is what
5 is meant.

6 General Cross, could I ask you just to say a few
7 words about your role throughout this time and then we
8 will get on to the questioning.

9 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Certainly. In my witness
10 statement I gave a bit of a background, but essentially
11 as far as the Inquiry is concerned, in the autumn of
12 2002, having been involved in some of the logistic
13 planning possible for possible operations at the time
14 within the defence logistic organisation, I was then
15 stood up to become what is called the joint force
16 logistic component commander. I know from your previous
17 sessions that you have heard of the various component
18 commanders, and I was asked to become, or told to become
19 the logistic component commander. And that took me to
20 various places over a period of time in the autumn.

21 With the change in direction from north to south,
22 I then stood down from that role because the logistic
23 piece was far easier. That's not to say it was easy,
24 but it was easier. And then after a couple of weeks
25 I was asked to go to Washington to join what was

1 initially called the Office of Post-War Planning, it
2 became ORHA, and eventually became the Coalition
3 Provisional Authority. And I lived in Washington and
4 then moved with that organisation to Kuwait and then
5 into Baghdad, as you said earlier on.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Thanks very much. I hand over to you.

7 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Thank you very much indeed.

8 Major General, thank you very much for your statement
9 which has been extremely helpful, but can we start with
10 your role with the joint forces logistics component.

11 What were you actually doing there? What sort of
12 issues were you involved with?

13 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Yes. The logistic component
14 commander is responsible for pulling together the -- all
15 aspects of the logistics in order to support the
16 operation in the theatre of operations. So the
17 Permanent Joint Headquarters maintains overall control
18 and, indeed, command of the operation. But with the
19 joint task force commander I was then appointed to look
20 after all the logistic aspects.

21 I had under my command at the time two army logistic
22 brigades and a myriad of other logistic assets, and what
23 we had to try and work through was what logistics would
24 be required to support an operation, possible operation,
25 at the time through northern -- through Turkey and then

1 into northern Iraq, and how would we construct the
2 organisation to lead that, how would I command it, who
3 would do all the heavy lifting, moving and so on. And
4 that included getting us into the theatre of operations,
5 moving us down the line of communication and then
6 sustaining operations, should they come about, in
7 northern Iraq.

8 That encompasses every aspect of logistics, by which
9 I mean strategic lift and movement, ammunition, fuel,
10 spare parts, medical -- the link to the medical side of
11 getting casualties out and so on. So all aspects of
12 sustaining this force.

13 Now, as I said in my statement because the baggage
14 that I carried from my previous deployments and so on,
15 I was also conscious that inevitably some of the
16 immediate post-war issues like dealing with refugees,
17 humanitarian-related issues and so forth, would probably
18 come my way. So there was an element of that planning
19 as well but at a relatively low level.

20 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: During this period you also visited
21 CentCom?

22 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Yes.

23 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: That was part of the coalition
24 planning unit. What insights did you gather into the US
25 military planning when you went to see CentCom?

1 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Yes. I went to CentCom -- I don't
2 know a specific number, but probably two or three, three
3 or four occasions, with Brian Burridge and all of the
4 other component commanders to take part in various
5 conferences there, usually for quite short periods of
6 time and working with General Franks and the
7 Central Command Headquarters in Tampa.

8 My sense was this was a very joined-up headquarters,
9 very well commanded and led with some very capable
10 staff. They had been in place together as a team since
11 11th September, just before 11th September, they had
12 planned and executed the initial operations in
13 Afghanistan, they were now planning for possible
14 operations in Iraq and, I think understandably,
15 General Franks and his team, recognising that they would
16 begin to break as a team the following summer -- because
17 inevitably normal postings and so forth would begin to
18 kick in -- that they were pretty keen to get on with
19 this. They had done a lot of hard work, they had been
20 working 18 hours a day for months on these operations.
21 So they were very --

22 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: You said "these operations", they
23 were Afghanistan or are we looking towards Iraq?

24 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Both. They had been working long
25 hours for Afghanistan and then in the post -- initial

1 operation in Afghanistan and at the same time planning
2 for operations in Iraq.

3 They were, I think, tired, if I'm honest, but I'm
4 not surprised. And I sense that there was a strong
5 desire to move quickly in terms of Iraq, and I sense too
6 in a broader sense -- and I got more of this in
7 Washington -- that following on from these military
8 operations, there would be other things linked to what
9 was then called the Global War on Terror.

10 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: But at that stage CentCom, was there
11 any concentration on the post-invasion planning or not?

12 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: I wouldn't say there was
13 concentration on it. The major focus was making sure
14 that should there be operations in Iraq, the military
15 campaign would win, would succeed, and from a personal
16 point of view I had no problem with that. That's the
17 prime purpose of this headquarters: it is to fight and
18 to make sure they win. There are no prizes for coming
19 second on the battlefield.

20 So that was undoubtedly their prime concern. So far
21 as Phase 4, post-war -- whatever words we want to use --
22 operations were concerned, there were some discussions.
23 They had appointed a one-star brigade general to head up
24 a task force, looking at aspects of this, an engineer,
25 an American engineer. But if I'm honest -- and

1 I remember one specific occasion when there was an
2 attempt to introduce him to the assembled large number
3 of very senior military officers. He really was -- he
4 was not really welcomed into the team. This was a war
5 fighting team and as far as they were concerned, this
6 was not their major business.

7 So I had no sense of detailed planning going on
8 within CentCom. I wouldn't want to give the impression
9 there was none. I'm sure there was some and I know this
10 engineer had been thinking through various issues as
11 well, but, again, I think it was more to do with
12 immediate post-military operations rather than long-term
13 reconstruction programme.

14 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Inside the UK, however, did you
15 report this to anybody in the UK?

16 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: In the UK? When we came back from
17 our various trips, all of the component commanders would
18 gather at the permanent joint headquarters at Northwood
19 and we would have various sessions discussing what we
20 had discovered and so forth. And, yes, in the context
21 of it all I made the point that I saw little evidence of
22 Phase 4 planning, and I know I was heard. But I think
23 the Permanent Joint Headquarters at that stage was
24 equally focused on ensuring that whatever UK was asked
25 to do militarily we would be successful and we would

1 make sure that that was the number 1 priority.

2 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: When you say you were heard, what do
3 you mean by that? Do you think the focus was very much
4 on the military action?

5 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Yes.

6 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: And they were just registering your
7 concerns about the fact there was very little --

8 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: I saw no evidence of any
9 particular planning for post-war operations.

10 Now, again, I stress that doesn't mean to say there
11 wasn't any. I just didn't see any. And at the time,
12 rightly, people were looking to me to ensure that we
13 could -- sustain the operations in terms of getting
14 ourselves through Turkey into northern Iraq and so
15 forth. There was the main effort.

16 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: That was the main effort. As you
17 said earlier, in your introduction, you then moved on to
18 Washington and the role there was as liaison officer
19 with ORHA.

20 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Yes.

21 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Who asked you to go to Washington?

22 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: To be honest, I'm not sure whether
23 it was CGS personally, then General Mike Jackson, whom
24 I knew well and had worked for a lot, whether he rang me
25 or the military secretary rang me, which may sound a bit

1 bizarre, but it was just the reality of it. I wouldn't
2 want to lead you astray. It was either MS or CGS rang
3 up. I had been back only a short time at my desk, where
4 I was the Director General of the defence supply chain,
5 a couple of weeks and the phone rang literally out of
6 the blue, and they just said we want you to go. To be
7 honest, I wasn't surprised.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: The southern option by then had emerged --

9 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: I think the northern option looked
10 pretty dead and the southern option was pretty clearly
11 going to be developed. The decision that we would ramp
12 from a two-star logistic component commander to a
13 one-star brigadier general logistic component commander,
14 which actually was one of the brigade commanders -- 102
15 logistic brigade commanders had been taken -- and that's
16 why I then returned to my day job.

17 So going back to my earlier point, I was not
18 surprised in that my experiences from the Balkans meant
19 that I had got a fair knowledge of the non-military
20 players, some aspects of post-war reconstruction and so
21 on.

22 I would hesitate to claim that I was an expert at
23 it, but at this stage CGS -- and if it wasn't
24 General Mike who rang me, MS would have rung me on his
25 behalf -- what CGS wanted was someone who at least had

1 a fair experience of this business to go out and join
2 this fledging team that was being put together, to find
3 out was this the place that post-war planning was going
4 to be put together or was it some sort of sideshow,
5 because at the time we didn't know.

6 So the message I got was basically, "Get on
7 aeroplane, get yourself out there and find out what's
8 going on".

9 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So your role as liaison officer was
10 mainly to find out what was going on and report back as
11 to what you thought was going on?

12 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Yes. And at that stage -- and
13 I don't know what the agreement was that had been
14 reached -- CDS had a liaison officer in Washington, so
15 I'm sure there must have been some debate that went on
16 before I went saying, "We would like to send this guy,
17 are you happy that he joins you?"

18 So I was going to say my appointment wasn't formal
19 at this stage. It was a liaison officer in a loose
20 sense, I think, rather than a formalised sense, and one
21 of the threads we will pick up with is when does that
22 change.

23 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Did you get any sense of what was
24 UK's understanding of the role of ORHA at this point in
25 time?

1 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: No. I think, to be fair, people
2 just didn't know. ORHA -- well, as I said earlier,
3 initially the office of post-war planning had only been
4 established as a result of a presidential directive
5 in January. I think it was presidential directive 21 on
6 20 January of or presidential directive number 20 on
7 21 January. It was something like that.

8 I said in my statement, and I have said when I have
9 been asked previously, that whilst I think this was
10 a good thing to have done, it was very late in the day.
11 And my experiences at CentCom and the pressures that you
12 could see to carry on with this engagement, I was a bit
13 disappointed there wasn't anything in place earlier than
14 that, but this was it.

15 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Were you briefed about UK's
16 objectives?

17 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Not really, no. I had a couple of
18 initial conversations before I left London, but
19 essentially they were -- we don't quite know --

20 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Who did you have conversations with
21 and what was their content?

22 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: The honest answer is I don't
23 remember. I had somebody within the
24 Ministry of Defence, within the commitments area,
25 because I was to report back to DCDS commitments, who

1 you had with you on Friday.

2 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Were you told how long you would be
3 there?

4 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: No.

5 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Who did you report to and how
6 frequently did you report back?

7 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: My main reporting line was back to
8 General Tony Pigott as DCDSC. At the time the message
9 was, I think, get out there for a couple of weeks, find
10 out what's going on and we will take it from there. The
11 Iraq Planning Unit hadn't been formed at this stage. So
12 my main reporting was back to General Pigott.

13 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: How frequently did you report back?

14 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: I recall every day, every night
15 going back to a flat that we had managed to rent in
16 Arlington -- my MA, who did a brilliant job, managed to
17 secure a flat which we sort of collapsed into in the
18 evening. But just about every night we went to there
19 and to the embassy, and the British Embassy were very
20 helpful to me personally, and Chris Moran, who was the
21 CDS LO(?) was very helpful to me personally. And the MA
22 and myself put together a report, I would say, every
23 night or every other night. So there would be a report
24 going back every couple of days.

25 To be honest, when I asked to see these reports in

1 preparation for the Inquiry, it was -- they weren't
2 found easily. I mean, some of them have now been found
3 partly as a result of my own efforts, but --

4 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Can you remember what you were
5 reporting back?

6 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Yes. I think every day -- well,
7 essentially every day I would report back what meetings
8 had gone on, what conversations had gone on, what were
9 the key issues so far as I could understand it, and then
10 in most occasions, not early on but fairly quickly,
11 saying, "Is there some direction you can give me here on
12 an UK perspective of this issue?"

13 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: But at this stage what was the
14 planning? What was this organisation planning to do?
15 What were their priorities?

16 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: At this stage there weren't many.
17 Garner, who I have a lot of time for, and I hope
18 that came through in my statement, was dealt a very poor
19 hand of cards and I think did a good job in playing them
20 as best he could, although I have been critical in one
21 or two areas. But Jay's response to this initially
22 in February was to hold what the Americans call a "rock
23 drill", which you may have heard referred to before.

24 Essentially, again using American parlance, anybody
25 who thought they had a dog in this fight was called to

1 Fort McNair where they were pulled into a big conference
2 room, and Garner and his team produced an outline agenda
3 and essentially what he said to people was, "Tell me
4 what is happening about this event". That included:
5 what will the currency be; what is going to happen to
6 education; what are we going to be doing about health
7 issues and so on. A whole raft of issues. And we
8 listened to a whole series of briefings from individuals
9 who came along. Some of them were very detailed and
10 I think one could question whether the outcomes were
11 good, bad or indifferent, but a lot of work had clearly
12 been done.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry to interject. Would that gathering
14 have included Civil Department representatives from the
15 US Federal Government or was it military?

16 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: No, it did include some. One of
17 the reasons it was held at Fort McNair was because it
18 was very difficult to non-military to get into the
19 Pentagon. I personally had to wait quite a long time to
20 get a pass in and out of the Pentagon, and there were --
21 well, I hesitate to say none, but I would say none, if
22 not a small handful, working with Garner inside the
23 Pentagon at this stage. But by holding the rock drill
24 at Fort McNair, a number of non-DOD people came to that.

25 What was interesting about that, and following on

1 from it, there were several key individuals there who
2 clearly had done a lot of work on this, and we know the
3 State Department had done a fair piece of work and so
4 on, and I have mentioned in my report the well-known Tom
5 Warwick who asked some very telling questions and
6 provided quite a few not bad answers. And Jay was you
7 know a very capable man and, I remember chatting with
8 Jay on the morning of the first day and he is saying,
9 "This guy Warwick we need on our team" and he then
10 arranged for Warwick to be chatted with and to join the
11 team.

12 Subsequently, Jay was told he had to let him go for
13 whatever reason, but there were interagency people
14 there, not in huge numbers, but you could clearly sense
15 that quite a lot of work had been done. And what Jay
16 was simply trying to do was lay out the foundations:
17 what had been done, what agreements were there, were
18 there any solid plans at all.

19 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: If Warwick understood the issues and
20 was asked to leave the team, what did this tell you
21 about what was the function of this particular planning?

22 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Well, as I have said in my
23 statement, I think -- I don't think there is any doubt
24 at all that if you weren't -- whatever expression one
25 wants to use here, if you weren't on message, if you

1 weren't part of the team, then somebody coming in with
2 different perspectives was not particularly welcome to
3 the team.

4 Now, I don't --

5 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: How did you understand what had been
6 Warwick's perspective?

7 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: I think Warwick was somebody who
8 understood that the planning, such as it was, was not
9 coherent yet and a lot more work needed to be done in
10 a number of areas which he was prepared to elucidate,
11 and in saying that, he was challenging a paradigm.

12 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: What was the paradigm?

13 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: The paradigm effectively was the
14 plan is we do not need a plan. The plan is that once we
15 have moved into Iraq, then the Iraqi people, generally
16 speaking, will welcome us and we will move very quickly
17 on to establishing ministries and some form of
18 democracy, question mark, but that pretty quickly, as in
19 six months, we will downsize the military commitment and
20 we will have secured this issue.

21 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: If that was the case, why was ORHA
22 set up?

23 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Well, because notwithstanding
24 that, there were, coming in from a number of different
25 directions, messages that if Saddam used chemical

1 weapons, biological weapons, if the war itself, if the
2 fighting had gone on for a long time, there would be
3 potentially very severe humanitarian consequences. And,
4 indeed, the messages from the UN, from the NGOs and,
5 indeed, from places like USAID and DFID, were that here
6 are some ideas of what possibly could happen as a result
7 of these operations.

8 I don't want to be unfair to those people. They
9 were quite clearly trying to think through worst case
10 scenarios, but they were pretty worst case scenarios.
11 So in terms of what Garner was there to do, initially,
12 humanitarian, immediate humanitarian issues, initial
13 reconstruction issues, as in arranging for bridges to be
14 rebuilt that were on key lines of communication or
15 whatever, and standing up the Iraqi ministries,
16 particularly in Baghdad, to enable some form of
17 government to emerge, some sort of interim Iraq
18 authority.

19 So not withstanding that the longer term view was
20 this will all be okay, there was a recognition that in
21 those first 60 to 90 days, 180 days, there could
22 possibly be quite a lot of work to be done and there
23 needed to be a focus for that work.

24 One of the issues undoubtedly was where does the
25 transfer of that responsibility sit from the land

1 component commander to this thing called ORHA? And this
2 comes back to a debate about who actually is going to be
3 in charge, what were the command and control
4 arrangements and when would that transfer occur, which
5 would be inevitably events-based. There was no clear --
6 we won't just do this on day 7, we will have to see how
7 events unfold.

8 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: You were talking earlier about
9 taking part in this interagency rehearsal of Phase 4.
10 I understand that Dominick Chilcott from the UK was
11 involved in that?

12 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: He was, and that was the first
13 time I met Dominick.

14 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Yes. When you met him, did you get
15 any insights into the state of the UK planning?

16 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: I think Dominick is with you
17 tomorrow, and obviously he will give you the reality of
18 it.

19 My sense was that we in Whitehall had formed the
20 Iraq Planning Unit, the IPU, I say mid to late February.
21 I don't know the exact date, to be honest. Again,
22 I felt this was very late, and one of my issues, as
23 I was trying to get feedback on the various things that
24 were being debated in Washington, was I sensed no
25 coherent organisation, no coherence to how all of this

1 was being pulled together.

2 Dominick's team was small, we had a military
3 colonel, Colonel Nick Carter, who is currently out in
4 Afghanistan, and he had a small team of civil servants
5 working with him. To our credit, this organisation was
6 put into the Foreign Office in King Charles Street which
7 was, in my view, absolutely right. It wasn't buried
8 inside the Ministry of Defence where nobody could get
9 access to it, but it was very small and at that stage
10 I sensed that we had no thoughts of our own post-war.

11 So when Dominick and the team came out to the rock
12 drill in Fort McNair in late February, 21 February, all
13 that happened was that people listened to this debate
14 rather than saying, "This is what we think we should be
15 doing".

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Can I interject, sorry, one question?

17 Was there an underlying assumption shared by CentCom
18 and, indeed, by ORHA that the security mentioned in the
19 immediate aftermath would not be a serious issue? If
20 the Iraq armed forces were defeated, things would be
21 manageable on the security front in order to allow
22 reconstruction to happen even in the immediate phase?

23 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: I think that's true. But, again,
24 I don't want to be dismissive about this, there land
25 component commander, General Franks himself, recognised

1 that there were a number of options that could emerge,
2 or events that could emerge, including what was termed
3 "Fortress Baghdad", for example. There might have been
4 a really nasty fight to secure Baghdad. So there was no
5 clarity on a timeline that by day 30 you will be able to
6 do this, but there was a general underlying assumption
7 that we were going to win this military domain and,
8 fairly quickly afterwards, the post-war focus would
9 shift. Where that lay or would lie was not clear.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: I was going to ask you just that, I think,
11 whether there was any common view of the time horizon
12 beyond which it wasn't necessary to plan?

13 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: No, I don't think so, and I think
14 one of the issues -- which, again, I have said in my
15 statement -- is that Garner, for me, was to be what
16 I call the viceroy of Iraq, and with all that that meant
17 in the sense that we understand it.

18 Within the US sense, I think, Garner was under
19 command CentCom and I felt from day 1 really, that that
20 wasn't the right answer. Now, I'm not saying I'm right,
21 but that was just the way that I saw it, and Garner's
22 lack of authority and ability to give orders, in
23 inverted commas, to a range of people later on became
24 brutally exposed.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: He was a retired soldier?

1 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: He was.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: And was re-engaged in the US civil
3 administration?

4 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: He was.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Without, therefore, a rank and authority.

6 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: No, and I don't say this
7 dismissively, he was a retired three-star officer. He
8 had led the Operation Haven post-1991 in the Kurdish
9 region. He knew that area very well, but inevitably,
10 dealing with serving four stars, there was an element of
11 he saw himself as under command.

12 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Just going back, you said you were
13 sent there to find out what was going on, and you
14 obviously had reservations about what was going on, and
15 were you feeling that regularly and were you being
16 listened to in the UK?

17 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: I think my sense is that --
18 I certainly was feeling it back regularly -- feeding it
19 back regularly, with written reports, some of which
20 I hope you have seen. I have to say I'm sure there are
21 more reports that I have seen, because my sense was that
22 I wrote more than I have been able to see in preparation
23 for the Inquiry.

24 So, yes, they were coming back regularly. Were they
25 being listened to? Yes, in the sense that I know people

1 read them. Now, what then happened to them, where they
2 were passed in the early days, most of them, I think,
3 lay within General Pigott's area. Once Dominick had
4 established the IPU, I know they went back to him. They
5 also went back to the Permanent Joint Headquarters, to
6 CJO and his staff.

7 Now, again, I think one must acknowledge that this
8 is during the February/March time when the military
9 build-up was becoming -- not becoming, was the number 1
10 issue here. So I'm not for one moment suggesting that
11 I was the only act in town. At this stage in the game
12 I was but a relatively -- not relative minor, but
13 a player below the immediate military operations.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: Just to intervene again, on your reports, and
15 we are starting to see a stream of them, but by no means
16 yet the complete set. I'm sure we will get it insofar
17 as it still exists, but it has come rather late from the
18 MoD. But there we are.

19 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Indeed. I think when you read
20 those reports -- and some of them are several pages
21 long, with descriptions of conversations and what
22 I sensed was happening and, in the early days, frankly
23 saying, "There must be more to this than this. I must
24 be missing something. It can be quite what I'm seeing
25 here", but after two or three weeks, a recognition that

1 that's probably not case, and what we were seeing was
2 the entirety of it.

3 I do want to stress I don't say this in any way to
4 disparage Garner or his team. They were working
5 20 hours a day trying to bring some coherence to all of
6 this. But he was given a very small team and they were,
7 as I said earlier, locked inside the Pentagon, which
8 didn't make it easy communicating with the people
9 outside.

10 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: They were working within a given
11 paradigm?

12 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Indeed.

13 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So their planning was more
14 short-term?

15 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Indeed. And Garner, whom I have
16 got to know very well, and he and I would sit and
17 quietly have conversations as appropriate over the time,
18 expressed a lot of frustration with the difficulty that
19 he was finding the pan Beltway, all these expressions
20 that were being used at the time. He found it very
21 difficult to break out this paradigm, not least of
22 which, for example, was the engagement with the
23 United Nations and other international players.

24 At this stage in the early days I was the only
25 non-US person within that headquarters. An Australian

1 general joined us later on, General Ford.

2 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: When did he join you?

3 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: I can't remember the exact date,
4 but it was some time around the middle of March, middle
5 to late March, I would say.

6 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So it was a very narrow focus and
7 just between the UK and the USA?

8 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Yes.

9 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: No engagement with the
10 United Nations?

11 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: I did say to Jay that I felt it
12 was very important that he went to see the UN, and he
13 had Ambassador George Ward leading his humanitarian
14 pillar within his organisation. And Ambassador Ward was
15 very keen to engage with the UN.

16 Again, it would be wrong of me to say that Jay had
17 been told he will not, but it was very difficult to get
18 agreement. But eventually we did go to New York for
19 a day. We flew up very early in the morning, we spent
20 a day with the UN and we saw both Louise Frechette, who
21 was then the deputy, and I would say 20 UN officials who
22 sat in serried ranks opposite. There were only about
23 five of us. And they were very, very strong on saying
24 to Garner -- the main message was, "You need to
25 understand the legality of what an you are into here.

1 And if you end up as the occupying power, be quite clear
2 what that means." And they looked at me on a number of
3 occasions in passing the same message through me back to
4 the UK.

5 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Did you pass that message back to
6 the UK?

7 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Indeed. Jay did offer to find
8 a slot, a liaison place, for a member of the
9 United Nations and he genuinely meant that. But there
10 was no way they could possibly accept that because at
11 the time it would have been paramount to saying, "We
12 acknowledge there is going to be a war" and this is
13 a post-war planning --

14 THE CHAIRMAN: And accepting subordination to the
15 United States military authority.

16 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Indeed. Whilst we were there, we
17 also met in Jeremy Greenstock, whom I know you have also
18 seen, and also the US Ambassador. But I left -- we left
19 at the end of the day -- I mean, it is not an
20 unimportant day, but one felt that it really didn't
21 begin to grapple with the issues, and the relationship
22 between the UN and the US, of course, at the time was
23 not good.

24 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Now, from there you were deployed to
25 Kuwait with Garner?

1 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Yes.

2 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Now, while travelling to Kuwait, you
3 stopped in the UK and who did you brief while you were
4 here and what was their response?

5 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: I had been back to the UK in
6 between time and I had had video conferences with
7 various people as well as the reports I had been sending
8 back.

9 One of the things I had been highlighting was the
10 lack of depth in Garner's team, and in my statement
11 I gave you a sense of that from the telephone directory.
12 And there were big gaps.

13 So I had been asking for whether we, the UK, were
14 prepared to fill some of those gaps, what was our policy
15 on reinforcing Garner. Because he was asking me whether
16 we would put UK people into some of these slots.

17 In the context of those discussions, one of the
18 issues was over the media team, and Alistair Campbell
19 who was then running Number 10 media, asked to see me
20 and I was very happy to see him. And I have to say,
21 subsequently he produced some support for us in the
22 media team.

23 Whilst I was with him, briefing him at Number 10, he
24 went out at one point and the Prime Minister came back
25 with him, and I had about 30 minutes with the

1 Prime Minister giving him an overview of that. I also
2 briefed the chiefs a couple of times. I went to see
3 DFID and I briefed within the Foreign Office, saw
4 a couple of people in the Foreign Office.

5 Collectively, from my point of view, what I sensed
6 was I was passing information here, I was getting no
7 direction back as to what the UK policy was. And I got
8 no senses of a coherent single focus within the UK that
9 was beginning to grapple with some of these issues.

10 Now, you will have seen some of the documentation
11 and the sort of period we are talking about here,
12 clearly I'm well aware of the debate that went on about
13 the legality and a reluctance to be seen at this stage
14 to be endorsing ORHA or formally placing people within
15 ORHA on the basis that we, the UK, would become liable
16 under the umbrella of international law and so forth if
17 we were a part of it.

18 So at that stage, the correspondence that I have
19 seen coming out of DFID, coming out of the FCO, coming
20 out of the MoD, was a recognition that ORHA needed far
21 more than it had, but not yet an agreement that we, the
22 UK, should be prepared to fill any of those slots.

23 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So your assessment is that we did
24 not want to be overtly seen to be backing the war and,
25 therefore, not giving overt support?

1 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Yes.

2 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: You said when you came here you were
3 speaking to Alistair Campbell and then he got the
4 Prime Minister in. What were your concerns about the
5 media and why were you given support to the media?

6 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Again, it was included in my
7 statement: Garner's media team -- and I don't want to be
8 disparaging to the individual concerned, but Garner's
9 media team consisted of a mid western naval reservist
10 newspaperman, and Garner was going to be, in my
11 understanding, however we defined it -- I called it the
12 viceroy. And it was quite clear that we were going to
13 have an ability to communicate externally to the world
14 through the media, and we needed it an ability to
15 communicate to the Iraqi people. So this was just not
16 big enough. We needed much greater horsepower in this
17 media team.

18 Alongside it, I did ask for reinforcements
19 elsewhere. It wasn't the only issue, but I think
20 a recognition that media is pretty important in today's
21 world elicited a response from Alistair Campbell.

22 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: You said you saw Alistair Campbell
23 and briefly the Prime Minister, and you met someone from
24 DFID. Did you see other ministers, and who did you see
25 at DFID?

1 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: I saw the Secretary of State of
2 DFID whom I knew well from Balkan days, and we had
3 various conversations both face-to-face and over the
4 telephone. Within the FCO, Edward Chaplin was the chap
5 I saw face-to-face. I didn't see the Foreign Secretary
6 then. I did see the Foreign Secretary when he came to
7 Kuwait subsequently, and within the MoD I saw military
8 chiefs. In the --

9 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: You didn't see the Secretary of
10 State?

11 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: No, when I briefed the chiefs at
12 the chiefs' meeting, I'm not sure -- I need to be
13 careful -- I'm not sure, the Secretary of State may have
14 been at one of those briefs, but I don't recall.

15 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: What was the gist of your
16 conversation with the Secretary of State from DFID?

17 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Well, my line was that we were the
18 focus for post-war planning, such as it was, that there
19 were strong views that there were going to be
20 significant humanitarian issues that flowed from that,
21 and notwithstanding the fact that I had some experience
22 of this, I would appreciate some support in terms of
23 people in the team who would bring the UK perspective of
24 this.

25 Now, I recognise that there is this issue at this

1 stage is this still war fighting, is it development, is
2 it humanitarian aid. I did not want to get sucked into
3 the niceties; I just wanted a couple of DFID experts who
4 could be with me alongside, I stress, some senior FCO
5 perspective: What were the foreign policy implications
6 of what was going to happen here, and alongside one or
7 two other skill sets as well.

8 If I'm honest -- and I'm here to be honest --
9 I don't sense that a lot of people still believed there
10 would be a war. I got no sense at all that across
11 Whitehall there was any coherence in a single
12 pan-Whitehall perspective of what this was all about.
13 And I know it has become very -- I was going to say
14 popular, but I know it has become very common for people
15 to blame the Americans for all of this. I just do not
16 accept that. I think we, the UK, and we, Whitehall,
17 should have done far more to get our minds round this
18 issue.

19 At this stage, I'm talking now March, beginning
20 of April, and it is very, very late in the day to be
21 deciding whether or not we are going to be engaged in
22 these post-war operations. So I felt very isolated is
23 the truth. That's not to say that people -- I did not
24 have good conversations with people. I did. These were
25 intelligent people and they had lot of pressures on

1 their time and programmes and so forth, but I got no
2 sense that diaries were being cleared as we prepared for
3 these operations in Iraq.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: You're not saying just diaries cleared to
5 enable you to see people, just generally to go on to a
6 war footing?

7 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Correct.

8 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: The sense I get is that you were
9 sent there for a particular purpose, and you were
10 reporting to General Pigott and yet you are here trying
11 to brief everything -- was it at your own initiative?

12 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Actually it was. Generally
13 speaking, I was ringing saying, "I'm back in the UK on
14 my way out to Kuwait, can I come in and talk to
15 somebody?" Dominick, for example, was very helpful. He
16 arranged a couple of meetings for me. Again, I don't
17 want to overplay my importance in this. It is not that
18 I expected people to be ringing me every five minutes,
19 it is just that I'm here prior to going. It took a long
20 time to get agreement that I would deploy to Kuwait, and
21 I asked the questions on several occasions: Garner is
22 going to go, do you want me to go with him? I didn't
23 get an answer for quite a long time.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: Do you know why, General Cross? Was this the
25 legal impediment, do you think?

1 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: I think -- I don't know, is the
2 answer. But I suspect it was the legal impediment.

3 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So who agreed that you should go to
4 Kuwait?

5 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: If I'm honest, I did. My MA dealt
6 with the all the travel arrangements and so on. That
7 may be unfair, because there may be people back in the
8 UK who made a conscious decision that I should go, but
9 I have seen correspondence, having been in Kuwait for
10 quite a while, correspondence still debating whether or
11 not we, the UK, would formally announce a presence in
12 the ORHA.

13 So being brutal about it, if I had decided to go
14 home I'm not sure who would have rung me and said, "What
15 are you up to?" I suspect it would have been
16 General Pigott. I don't want to knock General Pigott in
17 this either, because I had lots of conversation was him
18 and he was very comfortable with the fact that I was
19 going. I did not receive orders to go. Generally
20 speaking, I was the one who initiated the process.

21 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Why did you think it was important
22 to go? If you didn't get any orders, why did you make
23 a decision to go?

24 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Because there was -- it seemed to
25 me there was no other place that, in theatre, post-war

1 planning was going to be conducted. And we, the UK,
2 needed a strong presence in that headquarters.

3 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Can I just ask one question: you
4 mentioned that you saw the Prime Minister. Did you
5 convey your concerns directly to the Prime Minister?

6 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Yes. Again, I can't honestly
7 remember the words that I used. I would say that it
8 was -- I don't mean a pleasant conversation in
9 a pleasant sense, but it was a good conversation. He
10 was engaged. I gave him the background to what I had
11 been doing. We knew each other from the past. I say
12 that -- I'm not sure he would recognise me on the street
13 now, but we had met in Macedonia, I briefed him in
14 Macedonia when my brigade had been involved in building
15 refugee camps. I had been to Number 10 subsequently and
16 there was a recognition, an understanding of who I was
17 in the background. So we had a very sensible
18 conversation, and at the end of it I do remember saying,
19 in so many words, I have no doubt at all we will win
20 this military campaign. I do not believe that we are
21 ready for post-war Iraq.

22 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: What did he say to that?

23 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: He nodded and didn't say anything
24 particularly. But I'm sure he understood what I was
25 saying.

1 Now, if I may, I do want to recognise publicly the
2 Prime Minister has lots of people giving him lots of
3 briefings and giving him lots of perspectives. So I did
4 not expect him to look me in the eye and say, "This is
5 terrible, we are going to call the whole thing off".
6 I was just one of a number of people briefing him.

7 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Just in terms of the advice -- the
8 report you were giving him, was your concern that we
9 have no plan, all sorts of things may result, or more
10 definitely, this could be chaotic, leading to disaster
11 if we don't get this right?

12 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: I hesitate to say that I used the
13 word "disaster", I might well have used the word
14 "chaotic".

15 I'm quite clear that the plan that we do not need
16 a plan was perhaps plan A, although I have reservations.
17 We desperately needed plan B and plan C and
18 a recognition that, in good military parlance, of the
19 three plans we have got on the table, it is the fourth
20 that actually happens.

21 So we needed more robust thinking on this and the
22 chances of chaos were not insignificant.

23 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: This was basically the message you
24 were taking round Whitehall at that time?

25 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Yes, largely in the context that

1 Garner's headquarters was not in a position to bring
2 coherence and order to this problem. It wasn't big
3 enough, they didn't have the right skill sets and we,
4 the UK, recognising our role in this campaign, needed to
5 reinforce this team with a UK perspective of what we
6 think needed to come out of this and putting good people
7 into the various areas of work that was going on, which
8 included short-term staff, but at this stage included
9 quite a lot of long-term thinking too.

10 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Did you get a sense that anybody
11 shared the degree of concern that you were expressing?

12 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: I don't think there is any doubt
13 that people were concerned. And I certainly don't want
14 to suggest that, you know, people weren't interested,
15 they were very interested. I still think that the issue
16 was are we prepared to engage with ORHA, is this going
17 to be where we put all of our silver? And there was
18 still a lot of indecision about that.

19 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Could that have been because of
20 a lack of certainty about whether ORHA was up to it and
21 that perhaps another organisation might be needed, or
22 just --

23 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: It is a very interesting question.
24 I don't think there is any doubt that many of us,
25 including myself, had a concern about whether ORHA was

1 up to it, but there was nowhere else at this stage.

2 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So it was the only show in town?

3 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: I think it was the only show in
4 town. I know it was the only show in town.

5 What I was seeing, and have subsequently seen, some
6 of the reports and the work that was being pulled
7 together was going to what is called an ad hoc
8 ministerial subCommittee. So I just felt -- and I may
9 be being unfair here, there may have been other work
10 going on and there may have been other ways of doing
11 it -- but I just felt that this wasn't being taken
12 sufficiently seriously. There was no minister of
13 Cabinet rank reporting back and driving this day-to-day.
14 I was certainly being given no clarity of direction of
15 what UK policy was and how we were going to engage with
16 some of these issues. I stress that doesn't mean to say
17 it wasn't there, I just never saw it.

18 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: General Cross, before I take you to
19 Kuwait, ORHA, could I ask you about the meeting you had
20 in that very short window between your very short visit
21 to the UN in New York and coming back to England, which
22 you mentioned in your statement, with Donald Rumsfeld.

23 What was the purpose of the meeting and what emerged
24 from it?

25 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: I was invited by Garner to join,

1 I would say around 20 people with the Secretary of State
2 for lunch and for an informal briefing, where he was
3 updated on a number of issues.

4 As you would expect, I sat at one end of the table
5 rather than in the middle of it, but -- and it was an
6 interesting conversation. People were telling him some
7 of the issues that I was aware of, others that I hadn't
8 been aware of. At one stage in the process he turned to
9 me and said, "Do you have a view of what's going on?"
10 And I said, "Mr Secretary, I think -- what I have seen
11 of the military planning and preparing, I think it is
12 very encouraging", some of the comments that I have made
13 earlier to yourselves, but I said that I felt that from
14 my experiences in Northern Ireland, my experiences in
15 the Balkans, that the numbers of troops we had for this
16 operation and of potential possible outcomes of some of
17 the post-war situation and the plans that I knew were in
18 place to reduce the numbers fairly quickly post-war,
19 that I was concerned about that. I also said that
20 I felt that there needed to be engagement with the
21 United Nations and engagement with the international
22 community for post-war Iraq. I recognised that the US
23 alone, to coin a phrase, and unafraid could win the
24 military campaign, but I had seen and had discussed with
25 people the financial implications of rebuilding Iraq.

1 Where was the money going to come from, for example?
2 And within the US itself, there was a recognition that
3 the international community would have to be part of the
4 funding mechanisms and so on for the rebuild.

5 So I just felt we needed to engage in a much greater
6 way at this stage in the proceedings. I was heard, but
7 I don't think it was welcome, particularly, news.
8 I didn't get a sense that a lot of people were pressing
9 him on those sorts of issues.

10 I know the American military had been talking about
11 numbers for quite a long time, but in the context of
12 internationalising, working with the United Nations and
13 the speed of drawdown and, as I said earlier, some other
14 options that had been thought through and were in place
15 should events dictate, I was not -- my views were not
16 particularly warmly received.

17 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: And your views were essentially the UK
18 views, as you could see them and as you yourself
19 contributed to them?

20 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Yes. But I stress these were
21 personal comments, because I had no -- I had been given
22 no direction or authority to speak anything other than
23 my own experiences. So I did make the point, and I do
24 want to stress again Secretary Rumsfeld, you know, had
25 a lot of people telling him lots of things, and at the

1 end of the day a leader has to decide in his own mind
2 what is this campaign going to look like. And
3 eventually you begin to recognise other people's views
4 and perspectives, but then say, "Okay, I hear that, but
5 nonetheless this is how we are going to proceed."

6 It was quite clear to me that he and the system had
7 made up their mind how they were going to fight this
8 campaign, so anybody speaking outside that paradigm was
9 not particularly well received.

10 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: You arrived in Kuwait on the eve of the
11 war, and Jay Garner asked you to become his coalition
12 deputy. What did you understand by that, and in
13 particular how much was your work in that regard limited
14 by the limitations which the United States were putting
15 on his role?

16 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Jay's original plan was to have
17 three deputies. That didn't work out, for various
18 reasons which I don't think we have got time to explore.

19 The bottom line was at this stage I was effectively
20 his deputy, the only one there. He had a
21 chief of staff, Jerry Baser(?), a lieutenant general
22 retired, who was organising all of the support
23 structures and architecture to support this
24 headquarters. And obviously he and Garner -- well, they
25 knew each other very well and so on and so forth. But

1 Garner said he wanted me to be his coalition deputy
2 because he recognised, notwithstanding all of my earlier
3 points -- Garner was, again, I stress, a very capable
4 operator. He recognised the need to internationalise
5 this and he recognised that there were going to have to
6 be an engagement with UN, NGOs, IOs, as well as the
7 international community.

8 So the effective message was, "I can't do this
9 publicly, will you do it for me?" I said to him,
10 "I don't think I should be a coalition deputy. I think
11 I should be your international deputy." That may sound
12 like dancing on pinheads, but I think I actually sent
13 quite an important message, and as a consequence of
14 discussions I then started to meet with just about every
15 ambassador I could lay hands on in Kuwait.

16 So I had a whole series of meetings with the
17 ambassadors in Kuwait. Sometimes on not quite a
18 one-to-one, but mostly trying to bring in US State
19 Department people who were, by now, part of Garner's
20 team and had been coming into Kuwait. And, again,
21 I wrote reports on all of those conference,
22 conversations, and sent them back to the UK.

23 I had no clarity of direction about what UK's policy
24 was about internationalising this headquarters or, you
25 know, don't speak to this country, but do speak to that

1 country, or this is what we are doing with country Y,
2 whatever. And the reports that I sent back, again, I
3 don't want to be unfair or dismissive, but the reality
4 is I received no guidance on this.

5 I know these reports were read and people found them
6 helpful, but nobody said to me, "We notice you have met
7 with this ambassador and we think what we want to be
8 doing now is taking this forward in this way" and so on,
9 and it was really at this time that I began to really
10 sense that I needed a senior FCO man alongside me.

11 I wasn't exactly writing British foreign policy
12 here, but I was trying to get my mind round how were we
13 going to take this forward.

14 So with a number of State Department people who were
15 very helpful to me personally and actually I have to say
16 delighted to engage with this, we held a whole series of
17 meetings.

18 The other issue at this time was that Garner was
19 very keen that he and his team would move into Iraq
20 quickly. Now, there was a tension here and an
21 understandable tension. Lieutenant General McKiernan,
22 who was the land component commander for the US, the
23 view was we will fight the land campaign and essentially
24 I will tell you when the time is right for you to come,
25 when its safe for you to come.

1 Garner being the sort of man that he is wanted to
2 follow the sound of the guns. So he wanted to get foot
3 into Iraq very quickly. And the provisional plan that
4 was emerging was we would put an ORHA team into southern
5 Iraq very quickly and we would create an ORHA south, if
6 you like, or a CPA south as it subsequently became.

7 Garner had gathered around him amongst others two
8 retired US generals, one called Buck Walters, who was to
9 head up the southern team. Buck was going to do
10 a certain job. Jay also wanted to set up a focus for
11 that and essentially said, "I would like you to lead
12 that team".

13 I reported that back to the UK and I never really
14 got clarity over whether the UK wanted me to head up
15 that team or not, but I know, and I understand why,
16 there was concern about being seen to divide Iraq up
17 into sectors too early in the game, harking back to
18 Ottoman Empire days and so on.

19 I also think -- this is a personal view and I have
20 no evidence to support it -- that UK were worried, if
21 not afraid, that if we were seen to head up ORHA in the
22 south we would be begin to pick up the bill for
23 reconstruction in southern Iraq. There was a very
24 strong thread through these weeks that the US, Iraq
25 itself and others would pay for reconstruction and that

1 we, the UK, did not want to end up by picking up the
2 bill for a sector.

3 I have subsequently asked and seen some papers on
4 what resource we were putting aside for this, because
5 I was trying to find out anyway to see what resource we
6 would have available, and I know that General
7 Robin Brims whom you are seeing later this week was also
8 trying to get his mind around what money we would have
9 available. But essentially, the only clear direction
10 I got over this period was we do not want to become
11 responsible for running and being accountable for, in
12 the sense of reconstructing this part of Iraq at this
13 stage.

14 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: So you had put forward this proposal of
15 Garner's --

16 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Yes, it had fed back as part of my
17 daily sit reps that I was putting back. As you read
18 through them, you will see that throughout them a number
19 of times I would say, "I would welcome some advice, what
20 would you like me to do about this?" and so on. So,
21 yes, it had gone back.

22 -- now, Garner's intent was then that having, if you
23 like, had a rehearsal for how his organisation would
24 work in the south, his intent was he would want to get
25 to Baghdad very quickly. He also had a northern team

1 under a retired two-star US that was going to go north
2 into the Kurdish area and be responsible for four
3 northern provinces, and then he had a lady from State
4 called Barbara Bodine, who would look after the central
5 piece, and his headquarters would be based in the
6 central.

7 But in this context in Kuwait at the time, this is
8 "what if" planning, if you like, and this was his
9 preferred solution as it was beginning to emerge.

10 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: When you reached Baghdad, what did you
11 find there and how did it compare to the scenarios for
12 which you had been preparing or urging preparations?

13 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: If I may just go back one to lead
14 into that. Essentially Garner's solution to his problem
15 was that he had a pillar which dealt with what we would
16 in the military call immediate operations, G3
17 operations, and that was divided up into humanitarian
18 provisions, immediate reconstruction issues and civil
19 administration. And those three pillars were headed up
20 by three chaps whom I have mentioned in the paper:
21 George Ward I have mentioned already; Mike Mobbs; and
22 a third chap whose name will come to me in a minute.

23 The immediate humanitarian issues and so forth were
24 one thing. The issue for Baghdad was how are we going
25 to stand up the civil administries in order to form

1 a civil administration. So Garner's plan was that he
2 would have 18 ministry teams, and when we arrived in
3 Baghdad those ministry teams would literally go out onto
4 the streets of Baghdad, find the relevant ministry and
5 conduct a reconnaissance.

6 When I talk about ministry teams, I'm not talking
7 about 20 or 30 people. I'm talking, in some cases,
8 about two or three people. To head open those ministry
9 teams, Garner had been asking for a long period of time
10 for representatives both across Washington and
11 internationally. So the Ministry of Food, for example,
12 the Australians had offered to put somebody in to head
13 up that ministry. The Italians were looking to head up
14 the Ministry of Culture and so on.

15 As I had been talking to all of these ambassadors in
16 Kuwait, knowing this was Jay's plan, trying to bring in
17 international players who would head up these ministry
18 teams and asking UK: did we have some preferences here?
19 We like to head up this ministry or that ministry? What
20 was our view?

21 So Garner had 18 ministry teams. The heads of those
22 teams, I have to say, changed with boring rapidity.
23 There would be a telex or an email or whatever saying
24 this person is nominated and then within 24 hours, no,
25 he is not nominated any more, he or she is now nominated

1 as the various internecine rivalries in Washington
2 applied.

3 But finally, we did get roughly 18 ministry teams,
4 but very small numbers of people. I should stress at
5 this stage too that I had got with me two what I would
6 call mid-ranking officials from the Foreign Office: SO1,
7 lieutenant colonel equivalent. They were extremely
8 capable guys, very useful to me and they joined some of
9 these teams -- two of these teams.

10 When we arrived in Baghdad, originally we flew in,
11 to my regret overnight in a military aircraft, and we --
12 there were lots of delays. I won't bore you with the
13 whole story, but there were lots of delays which was
14 reflective of the fact that Garner was not seen to be
15 the most important man in town. His planes were
16 delayed, we were pushed back on ramp times and so on,
17 and we got in and we ended up by hanging around for
18 a long time in various places. But the first thing we
19 did was to go around Baghdad and have a look at some of
20 the infrastructure. We went to a hospital, we went to
21 a power station, we went to one or two other places.

22 What I -- my personal sense was this place is in
23 a lot worse condition than I had anticipated. I have
24 said publicly that it was held together by chicken wire
25 and chewing gum. The power stations had an incredible

1 variety of different bits and pieces and technologies
2 that had been under the era of sanctions. How the Iraqi
3 people had kept this infrastructure going, I think --
4 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: What was the British component of the
5 "we" that were going round with you?
6 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Me and my MA.
7 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Just the two of you?
8 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Yes. So I was struck by the years
9 of neglect of the infrastructure. I was also struck,
10 I'm pleased to say -- there was no immediate
11 humanitarian crisis, and it is very easy for us to
12 forget this. There was no immediate humanitarian
13 crisis. There was no immediate initial reconstruction
14 crisis. The war had been conducted, in my view -- and
15 I would say this, wouldn't I, probably, with my
16 background -- I think extremely well, and minimal
17 collateral damage and so on. So what we were seeing was
18 very quickly an understanding that to bring Iraq to any
19 sort of reconstruction was going to be very difficult,
20 whether it would be -- what was the intent? Actually
21 going back to my earlier comment, was the intent to
22 bring this back to pre-sanction Iraq or to construct
23 a health service, you know, a la Whitehall here, or
24 something? I had no indication of that, but it was
25 quite clear that this was going to take a lot of time

1 and treasure and talent.

2 We then flew to the north where Garner was welcomed
3 literally as a conquering hero. There were thousands of
4 people on the streets and they -- they loved him and he
5 knew Barzani and Talebani well. He had met with them.
6 He remembered the names of their children and families.
7 He was a wonderful people person as well as a very
8 capable operator.

9 We had a couple of days there. I remember being
10 quite impressed with what I saw in terms of hospitals
11 and schools and infrastructure in that region. They
12 clearly, under the shelter of the northern fly zone, had
13 been able to build a relatively prosperous architecture.

14 We then returned back to Baghdad and began a whole
15 series of meetings with people, and my sense was that
16 there was a lot of fear, a lot of comment that Saddam
17 had not been found at this stage and the southern
18 uprising in 1991, you will remember, or 1992, following
19 on the 1990 campaign, where a lot of people had been
20 killed as a result of that uprising. So there was a lot
21 of fear that this wasn't over. Could they really trust
22 and believe the coalition were here and were going to
23 stay? Very few people prepared really to offer
24 a perspective of anything, they were really just waiting
25 for orders from the coalition.

1 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: At this early stage what was ORHA able
2 to accomplish? We have had some rather critical
3 comments from Sir Peter Ricketts about it being
4 a shambles. What was your view?

5 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: I think again, to be fair -- and
6 I don't think there is a Stockholm syndrome involved
7 here, but nonetheless I liked these people and they were
8 hard-working people.

9 The reality was the living conditions were pretty
10 atrocious, and although somebody like myself who had
11 done a number of operations was relatively comfortable,
12 for a lot of people just surviving was pretty hard work.
13 The ministry teams got out and about and initially began
14 to meet with success in that they met Iraqis who came
15 out of the rubble, in inverted commas, found some key
16 people, essentially -- and I'm paraphrasing and
17 generalising, but essentially the numbers -- number 1
18 and number 2 in the various ministries and
19 infrastructure had either been killed or who had fled,
20 because they were clearly Saddam people, but the numbers
21 3, 4, that sort of level, were often still there. Some
22 of them literally came out with a CD in their hand and
23 said, "These are the people who used to work in this
24 ministry", and Garner's message to these ministry teams
25 had always been, "We are not here to run these

1 ministries. We are here to find people who can stand up
2 and run their own ministries." And I have to say that
3 with the relatively small numbers of people he had, you
4 could argue there was no other plan possible.

5 But it wasn't a bad plan, and in those early days to
6 find good people and say, "We are here to get this
7 ministry up and running, tell us what you want" -- and
8 that might have included tables and chairs and
9 generators and whatever, but, you know, we are here to
10 help.

11 So I would argue that in those first few days
12 relatively we found some success in the ministries.
13 I stress that we found success in that there was no
14 humanitarian crisis and no reconstruction crisis. We
15 found success in that Barzani and Talebani, who
16 naturally were very supportive of Garner, nonetheless
17 made it absolutely clear that they were not interested
18 in a Kurdish state. They wanted to work with other
19 leaders politically and they wanted to get Iraq up and
20 running as quickly as possible. And we had a series of
21 meetings with what I have euphemistically call the
22 London Seven, Hakim and the others, and Garner's message
23 to them was, "I want to hand sovereignty to you by
24 about July and August time". It is not good enough to
25 simply form a government out of the exiles that left,

1 you need now to identify and begin to talk with people
2 who stay and will work with you to form some sort of
3 interim Iraq administration.

4 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: How much to-ing and fro-ing was there
5 between London?

6 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: In that context I think it is
7 important to stress that my communications back to
8 London were now very difficult. Again, I don't want to
9 be simplistically critical. I'm not here to pillory
10 individuals. I'm trying to give a broad perspective.

11 I was able to get from my military contacts
12 vehicles, some protection and some equipment, but I was
13 given no structure within which to operate at this
14 stage.

15 So although I had been sending pretty regular, if
16 not every other day, reports back to both in Washington
17 and Kuwait, I think it is only fair to say that I was
18 not communicating as well as that in these early days in
19 Baghdad.

20 To talk to somebody on a Thuraya phone, you had to
21 go and stand out in the heat and hope that they were on
22 the other end of the telephone -- or internationally
23 back to the UK. Our communications -- the ORHA
24 communications fit at this stage was not good, and the
25 life support in Iraq was not good, but nonetheless, as

1 best I could, passing back to UK, "This is the
2 situation", and through the military links, through
3 First Armoured Division and through others, passing it
4 on too.

5 And General Mike Jackson, the CGS, came out to visit
6 in Baghdad and the minister from the Foreign Office,
7 Mike O'Brien, came out to visit with some others as part
8 of their party. So one was with able to update them
9 verbally as well as by telephone and by sending back
10 written reports.

11 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: In term of ORHA's activities at this
12 time, which have been criticised, what were you able to
13 do to strengthen them, and in particularly with regard
14 to secondees from the United Kingdom, what part did you
15 take in strengthening that aspect?

16 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: The answer is not as much as
17 I would have liked. When the Foreign Secretary came to
18 Kuwait -- and I can't remember, I think it was something
19 like 10 or 14 April -- that was the day that he stood up
20 at a press conference and announced that we, the UK,
21 were engaged with ORHA formally, and I stood next to him
22 and he announced that (inaudible) is our man and so on.

23 I gave to him and his team -- I say "him", his team,
24 although I did verbally discuss it with him -- what
25 I called a "must, should, could" paper. To be honest,

1 I have never seen that paper since. I do not know
2 whether it is still around, but essentially my message
3 was that if we, the UK, are now going to work within the
4 ORHA context for this phase, post-war, then in my view
5 we must have representation in some of these areas.

6 We probably should have representations in some of
7 these areas, and if we are really taking this seriously,
8 we could well have representation in some of these other
9 areas. And, as I say, Garner was very open to the UK
10 filling certain slots and would have welcomed, I think,
11 some clarity of our intent.

12 That must, should, could paper was taken away.
13 I think the reality then is we fall into just the way
14 the system works. It was brought back to Whitehall.
15 There was no capability of deploying fast non-military
16 capability, so I was asked could I have some job
17 descriptions. Frankly, I wasn't in much of a mood to
18 write job descriptions at this stage, but that's what
19 was needed.

20 The post had to be advertised, people had so
21 volunteer to go. They had to be briefed and selected
22 and prepared. And so the harsh reality was we had
23 a very small trickle of people through this period until
24 around the middle of June, larger numbers began to
25 arrive and about the time John Sawers came out and

1 things began to change. But in that initial period that
2 we are talking about here, we are talking about a couple
3 of FCO chaps, myself, my MA and some military people
4 that I had got from First Armoured Division through my
5 own personal contacts, and maybe one or two others which
6 I can't recall, to be honest, but not many more.

7 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Roderic?

8 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Whose responsibility should it have been
9 within the British Government to make sure the proper
10 planning for the aftermath was actually taking place?

11 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Well, I don't think it is for me
12 to say who by name. My own view would be -- and I carry
13 a bit of baggage on the whole issue of the comprehensive
14 approach, as we now call it. I think in the context of
15 Whitehall, we, in terms of our architecture, we don't
16 have a natural focus for these sorts of things. I know
17 the Government have been criticised for not having a war
18 cabinet. My understanding is there was a war cabinet of
19 sorts, but from the early days -- when I say "early
20 days", I mean sort of February time -- not to have had
21 a clear, single voice, ministerial rank, reporting to
22 the Cabinet, to the Prime Minister, on a day-to-day
23 basis, would have been something that I, frankly, had
24 expected to be in place.

25 So one of my problems dealing with Dominick and his

1 team was that one never had a sense of who actually was
2 overall leading us. I'm not sure that, as I said
3 earlier, that pan-Whitehall we had bought into this.
4 And, therefore, unlike Washington, where there was
5 a very clear sense that we are at war here, and leave
6 aside the internecine warfare and other things that were
7 going on, there was a clarity about that, I never had
8 that sense back here, when was briefing back here or
9 coming back here. That's not to say there weren't very
10 good people working hard in all sorts of areas, but
11 I didn't sense that general focus.

12 But from a military point of view -- and I would say
13 this, wouldn't I -- the permanent joint headquarters,
14 I think, was excellent. It was a clarity of working
15 pan-military, producing an operational campaign plan and
16 bringing that aspect very clearly to the fore.

17 We could have a debate about when PJHQ should have
18 had more of a link into the post-war plan; my own view
19 would be not. It was an operational level military
20 campaign headquarters. This was not military stuff.
21 This was broader stuff.

22 So as I have said in my report -- and I have been
23 saying this for quite a while, so I'm very conscious
24 that I'm trailing my own baggage in public here --
25 I just think we in this country need the equivalent of

1 a PJHQ with the authority and the staffing that can lead
2 on these sorts of thing.

3 Now, you know, what sorts of things will there be in
4 the future? I don't know. I don't think Iraq and
5 Afghanistan are blueprints, but they are certainly
6 signposts and when we tackle all sorts of broad national
7 security issues, I think there needs to be a clarity of
8 intent, a clarity of purpose and a unity, which I don't
9 sense we have.

10 SIR RODERIC LYNE: If we go back to the period of the first
11 few months of 2003, you were sending back a lot of
12 reports, almost daily reports, from the United States
13 about what you were seeing and not seeing and what your
14 concerns were.

15 Then you come back, you spend a week between
16 Washington and going to Kuwait, where you go round and
17 you brief very senior people, you brief the chiefs, you
18 have your meeting with the Prime Minister, you talk to
19 the Foreign Office and so on. So you are putting it
20 across that there is a real problem here. And other
21 people have talked to us about efforts that were being
22 made to try to penetrate American planning for the
23 aftermath, officials going to Washington and so on. And
24 yet this didn't happen.

25 Did you see any action flowing from the warnings

1 that you were giving to the Government that there was
2 this big lacuna?

3 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Well, the simple answer is no.

4 Now, I stress that does not mean to say -- I'm sure
5 there were lots of people doing lots of things and
6 working very hard, but I just did not get a sense that
7 that was happening. I think there were serious
8 discussions and concerns about legality. I think,
9 though, personally, as I alluded to earlier -- I think
10 there were issues over money. I'm not sure what the
11 Treasury view of all of this was. I got no sense at all
12 that there was an understanding of the potential
13 financial implications of what we were setting about.
14 I have seen within DFID papers that by turning to the
15 contingency reserve and taking money that was involved
16 or earmarked for Iraq under the DFID plan that was in
17 place in terms of development in the round, that a sum
18 of £60 million or £70 million might be found.

19 But in the scheme of things, there was no --
20 I sensed no laying aside of resources in terms of money
21 for what might follow, and that concern over what this
22 might cost, plus the legality issues, plus the lack of
23 a sort of coherent focus for all of this, meant that
24 I think there was a lack of clarity.

25 SIR RODERIC LYNE: It is hard to see that the legality issue

1 could have been the stumbling block when we had deployed
2 a very sizeable ground, air and naval force to prepare
3 the fight, the war. So there is no logic to saying that
4 we shouldn't then have been prepared to deal with the
5 aftermath on the grounds of legality that I can see.
6 But let's set that on one side.

7 Looking at it overall, was it your sense that the
8 Government simply underestimated it or that we were
9 aware of it at the highest levels but were unable to
10 exercise any influence over the United States to get
11 them to address it in the way that it needed to be
12 addressed?

13 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: I think there is two or three
14 parts that I would offer in response to that.

15 Firstly, as I said in my witness statement, I think
16 that this whole -- I put it under the umbrella of
17 conditional sovereignty debate, you know, the imperative
18 to engage and intervene where necessary to stop ethnic
19 cleansing and genocide and so on. The experiences of
20 Rwanda, the experience of the Balkans, did mean that
21 there was a sense that this was the right thing to be
22 doing.

23 The successes we had had thus far I think made
24 people believe, felt, that we would be okay, that it
25 would all be okay in the end. This was the right thing

1 to do. We had been successful in the past. We would
2 with be okay on this. I don't think there is any doubt
3 that there were a lot of individual people and,
4 I suspect, within the various departments of state
5 collectively a deep unease about some of these aspects
6 of post-war planning, but a sense that, well, the US
7 will get us out of this if it goes bad.

8 Going back to the question earlier on about what did
9 I find in Baghdad, there was a huge sense of expectancy
10 that here was this massive superpower with a strong
11 coalition alongside the UK and they would bring to bear
12 all that was necessary to make this successful. So
13 I think within Whitehall as a whole there was an
14 uncertainty, unease, but a sense too that it will be
15 okay.

16 And I don't want to be condemning about that, other
17 than I would like to think that some people have said,
18 okay, that's plan A, now what happens if -- what happens
19 if these things don't come to fruition? And I can only
20 say that I never saw any such analysis, any such plan.
21 There may have been some.

22 SIR RODERIC LYNE: You have said several times in your
23 witness statement and in your evidence that you did not
24 see a clear definition from the British side at least of
25 the desired end state of this operation, even as late

1 as April, I suppose, of 2003, April/May. In your
2 witness statement you say that:

3 "There was still no idea what our UK strategic
4 intent was. No response to my must, could, should
5 paper."

6 Did you ever hear of the idea that at one stage was
7 floating around Whitehall in the spring of 2003 that the
8 British should aim to do an exemplary job in the
9 southern region of Iraq?

10 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Yes, I did.

11 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Did you see any follow through to that
12 idea? Do you know where it came from?

13 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: I picked it up from -- I would
14 think I picked it up from Robin Brims and First Armoured
15 Division rather than any other way, and I had been
16 seeing quite a lot of First Armoured Division through
17 the process in Kuwait and so on and trying to manage
18 their expectations of what ORHA would be able to bring
19 to our AOR, our area of operations. And I'm pretty sure
20 that it would be through those discussion that I heard
21 that expression.

22 What did that mean in term of delivering -- in terms
23 of resource and so on? I never saw any analysis of
24 that. What I do know -- and I alluded to in the paper,
25 I think I mentioned specifically not withstanding that I

1 did not go into the south, I went to Baghdad with
2 Garner, the decision to set up a CPA south was made and
3 my question back to Whitehall in the round was, "Do we
4 want to command this, do we want to lead it? What
5 resources are we prepared to put into it and how do you
6 want to play it?"

7 I never got any clarity in response to that. The
8 Danes came into this debate and offered to lead it and,
9 indeed, put in, I think, a very capable man who led it.
10 He was a real character actually and he lived in very
11 rough conditions in Basra, heading up CPA south. But
12 I think from First Armoured Division's point of view
13 that brought very little to their fight, if you like,
14 and this idea of an exemplary AOR.

15 So I know there was a desire to do it. I don't
16 think the CPA as a whole, as it was by then being
17 called, added much value to it and, therefore, I assumed
18 that from within Whitehall, Robin was being given the
19 resources both in terms of support, both in terms of
20 time, specifically in terms of money and people, and
21 I know he had people with him from other parts of
22 Whitehall.

23 SIR RODERIC LYNE: So does this mean that somebody at a very
24 senior level had implanted the idea, perhaps as part of
25 our strategic intent, that we should do an exemplary job

1 in this AOR, but this was never really fleshed out, what
2 was meant by --

3 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: I never saw it. That doesn't mean
4 to say it hadn't been fleshed out somewhere else.

5 I think the issue that was around at that time was
6 in addition to this, what other responsibilities should
7 we have in Baghdad for the rest of Iraq? What resources
8 and people should we be putting into the CPA in Baghdad
9 to help influence and, indeed, deliver effect to the
10 rebuilding of the rest of Iraq?

11 And as the security situation got worse in Baghdad,
12 discussions about whether that should include a military
13 capability or not, for example, were certainly
14 discussed, and I saw various pieces of paper and had
15 conversations with people about that aspect of how we
16 should support Baghdad.

17 But the decision was clearly made in the end to
18 reinforce Baghdad, and that included the arrival of
19 John Sawers and that included Jeremy Greenstock, of
20 course, arriving subsequently and so on, and the
21 addition of capability that came with them which
22 undoubtedly, in my view, was welcomed and I think
23 probably should have been delivered earlier. But
24 I would say that, wouldn't I?

25 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Just a couple of very small questions.

1 In General Garner's team roughly do you recall people
2 who spoke Arabic and had Middle Eastern experience?

3 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Initially, not many. After -- one
4 has got to remember that Garner was then replaced by
5 Bremer fairly quickly in this process, and when Bremer
6 arrived he brought in a large number of additional
7 capabilities. And I think, you know, that sort of
8 capability began to arrive at that stage.

9 Garner did have some people who understood and spoke
10 a little bit of Arabic. He also had quite a lot of
11 Iraqi exiles who came to talk with him both in
12 Washington and Kuwait, and the intent was that there
13 would be exiled Iraqis with the ministry teams and with
14 the other teams who would work with us collectively.

15 I think there was always a sense of we are not quite
16 sure -- I certainly had a sense I wasn't quite sure who
17 these people were, to be honest, but there was that
18 capability within the team.

19 But the issue of your question is relatively small
20 numbers.

21 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Finally, in your Washington period, you
22 say that you were reinforced with a little support from
23 the Foreign Office and then you had some contact with
24 the DFID official based in New York.

25 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Yes.

1 SIR RODERIC LYNE: But you then say that the Secretary of
2 State for International Development did not allow that
3 official to work with you on a full-time basis. How was
4 it that officials from one part of the
5 British Government were working with you and an official
6 from another part of it, relevant official, was banned
7 from doing so?

8 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Very good question. I ought to
9 say -- again, I'm very happy to say -- I happen to like
10 Clare Short. I know her well. I think her engagement
11 as DFID Secretary of State -- I know it was
12 controversial, but I do not have a problem. But when it
13 came to this issue -- that's why I say across Whitehall
14 was there -- had everybody signed up to the fact that we
15 were going to do this and the implications that would
16 flow from it. And there is no doubt at all -- I mean,
17 I saw the evidence of it in a number of different ways
18 and spoke to the Secretary of State and others within
19 DFID who came to visit me and so forth -- they were
20 worried about the legality issues, they were worried
21 about their own resourcing issues, which they had
22 allocated to various development work around the world,
23 and they were not signed up to this operation. I don't
24 think there is any doubt about it.

25 I found that personally not helpful, but how and why

1 it was allowed to continue, I don't think I'm the right
2 man to say, although I have a view.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: A couple of things I would like to ask and
4 I know Sir Lawrence would like to get in as well.

5 I suppose the first is to ask, we had had a number
6 of successful engagements in reconstruction activities:
7 your own, not least, in Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo,
8 Sierra Leone. What's the real difference then with
9 Iraq? Because you offer a very developed critique in
10 terms of structure, attitudes, prioritisation, et
11 cetera, in the United Kingdom's system.

12 We didn't seem to need that for those. Is it just
13 a scale difference or is it that there wasn't an major
14 war fighting phase, or is it that there wasn't a hugely
15 domestic ally within the coalition of two and then more?

16 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: I think there is a number of
17 issues. Not having a Security Council Resolution, which
18 I know we didn't have in Kosovo but in other places.
19 Certainly scale is a part of this, I think -- and my
20 example earlier on of Northern Ireland and Kosovo was we
21 had sufficient military capability to secure the space
22 within which other things, the non-military
23 reconstruction and development, et cetera, could then
24 happen. So the secure environment, which is the prime
25 purpose of the military, was not there very quickly in

1 Iraq and when things began to go wrong, there was an
2 inability to secure that space.

3 Now, I should stress that Northern Ireland was not
4 always a pleasant place and Kosovo wasn't easy, but
5 there was sufficient resource to bring about the change
6 that was necessary at the time. So I would say a large
7 part of it was the inability to secure the environment
8 within which.

9 I don't think there is any doubt either in my mind
10 that the decision to de-Ba'athefie, demobilise and slow
11 down the political process, which is often forgotten in
12 that debate, those three key decisions were flawed. And
13 to be honest -- I said it in my personal witness
14 statement -- I just do not understand how we, Whitehall,
15 failed to engage with that decision particularly when
16 I had seen papers about reinforcing ORHA on the basis
17 that there would be transparency and we would have
18 debates about policy matters before they were announced.

19 So I found it quite difficult when, essentially, the
20 impression I had anyway was that this was a US decision
21 and there was nothing we could do about it.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Whenever Northern Ireland was is
23 mentioned I cannot resist saying something. I think if
24 you simply scale up population to security forces on the
25 ground, you would need at least 500,000 in Iraq to get

1 the same degree of intense coverage that we had in
2 Northern Ireland through the most difficult decades.
3 Yes.

4 Bremer's bombshells, it is perhaps almost unfair to
5 ask you, but they were of such tipping significance in
6 the immediate aftermath and all that followed, was it
7 your sense that the United Kingdom Government either
8 knew sufficiently or had set out to find out that this
9 extraordinary change of policy would happen, against
10 which your advice, Garner's advice and everybody's
11 since, to which we were opposed?

12 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: I don't know. I'm of the view
13 that this was not Bremer arriving in Baghdad, having
14 a look round and saying, "I think we will do these three
15 things". I think he came with those decisions in his
16 pocket. Where they came from within Washington, you
17 know, is a matter of debate. Whether we engaged with
18 that decision process through the embassy, I don't know.
19 I made the point in my statement that I think not having
20 an ambassador around in the process wasn't particularly
21 helpful, but I don't know whether we tried to influence
22 that decision. And when you have John Sawers in front
23 of you later on this week, I think it would be fair to
24 ask him how he saw it because I know that he found it
25 difficult, but in a conversation that I had with him,

1 I don't sense that he was aware that this decision was
2 about to be made. I may be wrong. But I did say --

3 THE CHAIRMAN: We must ask him. Okay.

4 I think I will defer -- Lawrence?

5 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Thank you. Very briefly, just going
6 right back to the start of all of this, with your
7 logistics role, we heard from Lord Boyce that in the
8 autumn of 2002 his efforts to get logistics planning in
9 motion were thwarted because the British Government
10 didn't want to be seen to be pre-empting the diplomatic
11 process.

12 Given that you were doing the work then, did you
13 feel inhibited, impaired then in anything you were
14 trying to do at that time?

15 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Yes. I heard Lord Boyce's comment
16 and I think, again, if I may, to give a sort of overview
17 of that, I understand -- I think we all understood --
18 why, rather like the United Nations decision not to give
19 Garner a liaison officer, in this process when you make
20 decisions you send messages. You might want to send
21 those messages by deploying assets and so forth, but
22 they are not easy decisions to make.

23 The problem for us was that over the preceding
24 ten/15 years we had changed the way we operated our
25 logistics system. We had become a defence-wide

1 logistic organisation, we had driven hard on business
2 imperatives, we had reduced our stock levels and so
3 forth. So if you didn't get early decision making, it
4 would be difficult -- and was very difficult -- to
5 produce what was needed.

6 I know -- and, again, I heard what Lord Boyce said
7 about this and I wouldn't in any sense contradict him.

8 I would simply say that the movement of capability, the
9 depth of our logistic capability, its resilience and its
10 sustainability from my perspective was definitely
11 affected by this.

12 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: This was in the context still of
13 preparing to go through Turkey?

14 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Absolutely, absolutely. That's
15 why I said in my statement I think it would have been
16 a very tough call, and I was quite relieved when we
17 didn't go north.

18 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Thank for that. If we can now just
19 go into the latter part of your fascinating evidence.
20 From what I understood, you were saying that it was
21 entirely possible if you hadn't taken the personal
22 initiative, that the transition from war fighting to
23 what was hoped for, stabilisation, would have taken
24 place without a British officer being present in the key
25 American organisation?

1 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Well, let me caveat that. I was
2 sent to Washington originally, as I have had said. So
3 that's very definitely an MoD, Whitehall, decision. My
4 comment was that Garner around, I suppose, early to
5 mid-March, wanted to get out of Washington. And in the
6 reports that I sent back to the UK, I sort of tried to
7 pass this story as it was developing, and initially
8 I was not certain that Garner's headquarters would
9 deploy. In fact, I don't think it was clear when his
10 headquarters were set up that it would actually deploy.
11 But his answer was we need to get away from Washington,
12 we need to deploy a Kuwait. And, therefore, my question
13 was, "Do you want me to go with him?" and "What are the
14 capabilities?" and so forth.

15 I have no recollection of anybody at any stage
16 saying, "Yes, we definitely want you to go". It just
17 became a sine qua non, I think. It just became accepted
18 that I was going to go, and when I arranged to leave
19 Washington, as part that of process my MA arranged for
20 he and I to continue the journey, if you like.

21 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: It is also reasonably clear from
22 what you said that you had no authority to pick the
23 people you wanted to come and join you. You had to ask
24 for job descriptions.

25 One could just imagine the human resources

1 bureaucracy at work on that. And it didn't have a
2 budget of your own either.

3 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: No.

4 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So everything that you had to work
5 with, in effect you would have to beg, steal or borrow?

6 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Yes.

7 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Was it your sense -- and some of the
8 things you said do give us this impression -- that the
9 attitude in London was we are giving our support to the
10 United States in this big enterprise. It is up to them
11 to make it work afterwards, and if it is going to be as
12 difficult as we suspect, possibly we want as little to
13 do with it as possible?

14 MAJOR GENERAL TIM CROSS: Well, again, I hesitate to be, you
15 know, condemnatory or simplistic about it, but
16 I struggle, frankly, to know what some of the thinking
17 was.

18 Either if we were going to do this, engage with it
19 fully and so on. I didn't see that in any sense as
20 clarity. I think there was a genuine concern over the
21 legality issue and I understand that, but by
22 around March/April time I would have liked to have
23 thought that we would have had a view and pressed on.
24 And I still see correspondence in April and May having
25 this discussion.

1 So I'm just left with a view that across Whitehall
2 there was no clarity of what this was all about, and the
3 purpose and the intent, and there was still a lot of
4 people around who I think still quite late on thought
5 maybe we wouldn't have a war, and (b), if we did, then
6 leave it to the Americans to solve the long-term
7 problem, we don't want to get embroiled too deeply in
8 particularly the Baghdad end. We will have our AOR and
9 that's what we will focus on.

10 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Thank you very much.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: General Cross, thank you very much for your
12 candour and the care of your analysis. It's been
13 helpful to the Committee, not least your witness
14 statement is. With that, thank you for your evidence.

15 We will break now for ten minutes and after the
16 break we will resume where the witness will be
17 Desmond Bowen from the Cabinet Office, the Overseas and
18 Defence Secretariat on the cross-Whitehall planning
19 machinery and how that functioned.

20 With that, thank you all.

21 (3.35 pm)

22 (Short break)

23

24

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FINAL