

Review of India: Country of Origin (COI) Report (Home Office UK Border Agency COI Service) 26 August 2011

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1. Introduction

As requested by Richard Lederle, Head of the UK Border Agency Country of Information Service, this review evaluates the *India: Country of Origin (COI) Report (26 August 2011)*² to 'help ensure that this is as accurate, balanced, impartial and up to date as possible',³ by:

- (i) Assessing the extent to which information from source documents has been appropriately and accurately reflected in the COI Report.
- (ii) Identifying additional sources detailing the current human rights situation in the country.
- (iii) Noting and correcting any specific errors or omissions.
- (iv) Making recommendations for general improvements regarding, for example, the structure of the report, its coverage or its overall approach.⁴

Following a subsequent request from Dr Khalid Koser, chair of the UK's Independent Advisory Group on Country Information, this review also considers if the *India: COI Report 2011* picks up on suggestions made in two previous reviews of two earlier

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² Available as a link from the UKBA webpage

<http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/coi/india/>

³ Invitation to tender for evaluation of UK Border Agency Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports: Burma, Gambia, India, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Zimbabwe, accessed on 1 August 2011 at <http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/Invitation-to-tender-Burma-Gambia-India-OPT-Zimbabwe2.pdf>

⁴ *Ibid.*

reports; that is, Chris Smith's *Evaluation of the Country of Origin Information Report on India (Monday, 20 August 2009)*⁵ written in response to *India: COI Report (12 May 2009)*,⁶ and Parikrama Gupta's *Review of the Revised Country of Origin Report for India (22 January 2010)*⁷ authored in response to *India: COI Report (4 January 2010)*.⁸

2. Review: overview

Overall, I find *India: COI Report 2011* to be an excellent report. It utilises an impressive array of suitable international, national and regional resources to provide a comprehensive and relevant coverage of current human rights issues in India in a style that is almost always easy to follow. The relatively few instances of quoted materials that are repeated in various sections are understandable, given that the report is intended to be dipped into as necessary, rather than read in a linear fashion as a whole. At times, I did have some difficulty in following the structure (36 main section headings, many with sub-headings, and even those with subsections!), but this is only a minor complaint. The one measure that certainly would improve readers' understanding of the scale, complexity and/or variation in the location of human rights issues in India would be the insertion of additional maps and graphics into the *India: COI Report 2011* (rather than, as is done in many instances, only referenced by weblinks in the text).

COIS: Agreed. Our inclusion of maps and graphics has been inhibited by copyright concerns; for example, maps published by the Institute of Conflict Management (South Asia Terrorism Portal) and by Maps of India are expressly subject to copyright. However, we will consider what material can be used/adapted.

The comprehensiveness of the *India: COI Report 2011* is not unexpected. In contrast to almost all of the other countries subject to COI reports, and as sources cited in this report acknowledge, there is in India a ready availability of information on all manner of human rights issues from a free and robust media, as well as a thriving

⁵ Available at <http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/review-india-coi-report.pdf>

⁶ Available at <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20101208171359/rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs09/india-120509.doc>

⁷ Available at <http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/review-india2-coi-report.pdf>

⁸ Available at <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20101208171359/rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs10/india-040110.doc>

non-governmental organisation (NGO) community, both of which are present throughout the country, from the major metropolitan areas to smaller population centres. Indeed, with very few and sporadic exceptions (parts of Kashmir and the Northeast, as well as some of the more remote interior areas of central India), the media and NGOs enjoy direct and unfettered access to the subjects of alleged human rights abuses. Happily, the national and state governments are also providing increasingly transparent information on human rights matters that are a useful source of information to international, national and regional media organisations and NGOs. In most cases, media, NGO and governmental sources make their information on human rights in India freely available on the internet.

Indeed, one of the main accomplishments of this particular COI is in its judicious selection and editing of information from the multiplicity of sources on India's human rights issues. On virtually every issue, the appropriate sources are cited and referenced. Any minor shortcomings in sources are pointed out in section 4 below.

Nonetheless, there remain gaps in our understanding of the human rights situation in India. As numerous sources cited in this report state, much of this is due to the under-reporting of instances of issues considered shameful (including, for instance, domestic abuse, sexual preference discrimination, and 'honour' crimes) in what remains a very traditional society, especially outside the major metropolitan areas. There is also the issue of accessibility to the more remote geographic regions of the country as stated above. That said, media, NGO and government sources all acknowledge these shortcomings and most try to extrapolate the 'true' situation when drawing their conclusions about human rights issues in India. Thus, any gaps in our understanding is due to the lack of sufficiently comprehensive firsthand data rather than any shortage of sources willing to collate, analyse and report on them, both within India and internationally.

COIS: Thank you. This expert comment is reassuring and helpful.

3. Review: previous concerns

I can report that *India: COI Report 2011* addresses most of the concerns expressed in Smith's *Evaluation of the Country of Origin Information Report on India (Monday, 20 August 2009)*⁹ about *India: COI Report (12 May 2009)*.¹⁰ The long list of issues (including, but not limited to, the general economic situation, defence expenditure, military desertion, the death penalty, NGOs, dowry, sexual orientation, the persecution of Christians in Orissa, human trafficking) he believes were not sufficiently addressed in *India: COI Report 2009* have been covered adequately in the current report. Smith's concern that the earlier report relied too heavily on a limited number of non-Indian (especially American) sources also has been met in the current report that, as stated above, utilises international, national and regional domestic sources very well (although one source he cites in particular, the People's Union for Civil Liberties,¹¹ is not referenced in *India: COI Report 2011*). Contrary to his experience with *India: COI Report 2009*, grammatical and typographical errors are also almost non-existent in the current report (only one or two such instances are pointed out in section 4 below).

However, there remain a few areas where *India: COI Report 2011* does not fully address suggestions made by Smith. One general issue is his concern that a reader's understanding of the varying impact of particular issues (e.g., insurgency) on a particular community (e.g., religious) and/or area (e.g., particular regions or states) would benefit from their geographical representation. While the text in *India: COI Report 2011* is quite clear when describing what issues affect which areas, it remains my contention that the inclusion of maps and other graphics would greatly enhance a reader's appreciation of the scope, scale and location of the respective human rights issues under discussion. A more specific issue is Smith's concern that paramilitary and/or national police matters need to be dealt with in more detail; a criticism I share about *India: COI Report 2011* (and comment on in some detail in section 4 below).

COIS: Accepted

⁹ Available at <http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/review-india-coi-report.pdf>

¹⁰ Available at <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20101208171359/rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs09/india-120509.doc>

¹¹ See <http://www.pucl.org/>

Assessing whether *India: COI Report 2011* addresses the concerns expressed in Gupta's *Review of the Revised Country of Origin Report for India (22 January 2010)*¹² about *India: COI Report (4 January 2010)*¹³ is more problematic. Certainly, the latter report is much improved over *India: COI Report 2009*, as Gupta limits her criticism mainly to suggesting additional, particularly Indian and/or Asian resources, rather than the wholesale revision of sections. However, while I have not checked to see if each and every one of his suggestions was used in *India: COI Report 2011*, a random check on 20 of Gupta's suggested additional sources shows only six were cited in the current report. The reasons for this discrepancy will vary; the suggested source may have been overtaken by more-up-to-date information, provide unnecessarily detailed information, or simply be unsuitable. (One omitted source, the People's Union for Civil Liberties,¹⁴ is suggested by both Smith and Gupta.) Happily, a number of what I consider to be the most important resources (i.e., the Asian Center for Human Rights,¹⁵ Centre for Civil Society,¹⁶ Human Rights Initiative,¹⁷ and National Crime Records Bureau)¹⁸ suggested by Gupta are used in *India: COI Report 2011*. If this shortfall in the use of suggested sources is of concern, one solution may be to ask the author of each report to provide an 'action response' matrix of suggestions made in the review of the previous report—but this is not a step I am advocating here. In any case, I stand by my own judgement that the current report utilises information from an adequate and, indeed, impressive array of international, national and regional sources. One final note: I agree with Gupta (and disagree with Smith) that Wikipedia remains unsuitable as a primary resource for any information contained in the report.

COIS: We will keep track of new postings on People's Union for Civil Liberties' website. The sources identified by Parikrama Gupta have been very useful, though some are now dated or superseded.

¹² Available at <http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/review-india2-coi-report.pdf>

¹³ Available at <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20101208171359/rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs10/india-040110.doc>

¹⁴ See <http://www.pucl.org/>

¹⁵ See <http://www.achrweb.org/>

¹⁶ See <http://www.ccs.in/>

¹⁷ See <http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/>

¹⁸ See <http://ncrb.nic.in/>

4. Review: detailed concerns

What follows below are some additional suggestions, corrections and other comments on *India: COI Report 2011*, made on a page-by-page basis.

P 11

1.04 Replace 'Bangalore' with 'Bangalore (also known Bengaluru or Bengalooru)'

In 2006, the state government of Karnataka formally requested that the union government recognise the name change of the state's capital from Bangalore to Bengaluru. Although the former name remains more widely used, both names are used on both official and unofficial websites, sometimes even on the same page!

- http://india.gov.in/knowindia/st_karnataka.php
- <http://www.mapsofindia.com/maps/karnataka/bangalore-map.htm>
- http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2006-11-02/bangalore/27801833_1_bengalooru-classical-language-kannada-songs
- http://india.gov.in/knowindia/st_karnataka.php
- http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-02-26/bangalore/28636369_1_bengaluru-bengalooru-spellings

P 14

1.13 It may be somewhat confusing to use a map that uses Indian numerical notation; that is, a *lakh* of 100,000 and a *crore* of 10,000,000, which results in population figures of 1,25,48,926 for Jammu & Kashmir instead of the more recognisable 12,548,926.

As I could not locate a suitable alternative map, perhaps it would be helpful just to insert a small note at the foot of the map regarding India's numerical notation?

P 17

- 3.02 Although a direct quote, the third paragraph here is somewhat misleading: ‘...with the exception of brief periods in the 1970s and 1980s and during a short period in 1996’ should really read ‘...with the exception of brief periods in the [early 1960s,] 1970s and 1980s and during a short period in 1996’.

This is made clear in the paragraph immediately following when the 1964-66 premiership of Lal Bahadur Shastri is specifically mentioned.

P 22

- 3.15 As this is the introductory paragraph, it might be better to make very clear the political ideology of Naxalites; e.g. replace ‘a range of armed groups’ with ‘a range of leftist armed groups’.

P 31

- 8.01 The second paragraph repeats the same sentence twice; that is, ‘Nonetheless, may disputes...realising political goals.’

P 32

- 8.02 Paragraph three gives a link to the South Asia Terrorism Portal map of April 2009. Indeed, this provides a very good graphical representation of the complexity and scale of India’s internal security situation.

As stated above in sections 2 and 3, the readers of the *India: COI Report 2011* would certainly benefit from the insertion of additional maps and graphics into the report, rather than just referenced by links in the text.

9.13 India's paramilitary forces and centralised police organisations under the control of the Ministry of Home Affairs are notable for their numbers, capabilities, expansion and frequent deployment to meet serious national law-and-order challenges (which can lead to allegations of human rights abuses), as well as in more benign aid-to-the civil operations. As there are no comparable organisations in the UK, this opening paragraph could be expanded to give readers a greater understanding of their nature and use.

An example of the size and use of India's central paramilitary forces (CPF) comes in the following passage in my chapter on the 'The NDA and National Security', published in 2005:¹⁹

The Ministry of Home Affairs meets the mounting cost of maintaining India's numerous central paramilitary forces (CPFs): from 1998 to 2001, their personnel increased by 5.2 per cent (from 567,855 to 597,492) while their cost rose by over 33 per cent (from \$1.11 billion to \$1.48 billion).⁹ Internal order costs must also include the funding of local and state police forces paid for at the state level....

The NDA could argue that, while it had increased spending on the CPFs that help maintain internal order, this per cent annual rise never approached the levels seen in previous Janata Dal, INC or United Front administrations. *Reforming the National Security System* recommended increasing funding for the CPFs so that they might replace the Indian Army in internal security duties. Most notably, BJP-led administrations concentrated on significantly increasing the size of the Rashtriya Rifles, a paramilitary force made up of regular army soldiers and officers on rotation under the operational command of the military and funded by the Ministry of Defence (rather than Home Affairs). Up from 36 battalions in 1999 to a projected 66 in 2005 (Gol 2003j: 83), this force has succeeded in freeing many army units from internal security duties in Kashmir. Elsewhere in India, increased spending on CPFs also has been successful, even if only in crude terms of minimising casualties to

¹⁹ A. Kundu, 'The NDA and National Security', in K. Adeney and L. Saez (eds), *Coalition Politics and Hindu Nationalism* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), pp. 225-6.

government forces while increasing terrorist 'kills' (South Asia Terrorism Portal ND).

Unfortunately, sources dealing with India's central paramilitary and police forces are somewhat difficult to find especially since, funded as they are from home office rather than defence sources, they do not appear in conventional surveys of defence organisations. Nonetheless, information more up-to-date information may be gleaned from the following:

- *Government of India Ministry of Home Affairs Annual Report 2010-11*, chapter II Internal Security, pp 5-36 at <http://www.mha.nic.in/pdfs/AR%28E%291011.pdf>
- <http://india.gov.in/govt/armedforces.php>

P 40

9.19 Another paramilitary force under the control of the Ministry of Defence is the Rashtriya Rifles (see above).

P 90

20.19 The information about the Nanavati-Mehta Commission is correct, if somewhat confusing. The third paragraph points to a delay in the Commission's report:

"The Gujarat government appointed the Nanavati-Mehta Commission in 2002 to investigate the violence. The term of the commission was extended for the 14th time with the final report on the 2002 Gujarat communal violence now due on December 31, 2010... [Articles published on the *Times of India's* Nanavati-Mehta Commission webpage up to 11 August 2011 indicated that the Nanavati-Mehta Commission had not yet published its final report .
[13d]

However, the above information appears to contradict the seventh paragraph which describes conclusions reached by the self-same Commission:

“...In September 2008 the Nanavati-Mehta Commission concluded that the Godhra incident was a conspiracy...” **[2b] (Section II)**

I suggest additional text is added, clarifying that the 2006 conclusions of the Nanavati-Mehta Commission were submitted on 18 September 2006 as ‘Part I’ of its report that dealt only with the Godhra train incident while ‘Part II’, which will address itself to the post-incident communal violence, continues to be delayed.

- <http://www.hindu.com/fline/fl2521/stories/20081024252103300.htm>

P 99

20.53 The concluding sentences in paragraph two are unclear, misleading and inaccurate:

In May 1984, the Sikh political party Akali Dal engaged in popular agitation by obstructing the transportation of Punjabi wheat and by withholding taxes from the Indian government. In retaliation, the government sent 100,000 army troops to Punjab, which resulted in violent attacks against the Sikh community in June 1984.” **[97a]**

The grammar of the second sentence above makes it unclear as to whether the ‘violent attacks’ were instigated by the Indian Army or other actors. The ‘in retaliation’ opening of the second sentence is misleading as the insertion of the Indian Army was in response to an increasing number of fatal attacks by Sikh militants/terrorists on civilian and state targets in Punjab rather the obstruction of transportation and the withholding of taxes. Finally, ‘violent attacks’ were not committed by the Army until their use in Operation Blue Star in June 1984. Although many hundreds of civilians were caught up in this Operation, the military itself was

deployed against Sikh militants/terrorists rather than the 'Sikh community' as a whole.

My own understanding of the events leading to Operation Blue Star are captured in the following passage in my book, *Militarism in India: The Army and Civil Society in Consensus*:²⁰

The military action codenamed Operation Blue Star was the central government's belated, if overwrought, response to the increasing militancy of Jarnail Singh, or Sant (Saint), Bhindranwale (henceforth referred to by surname only) and his followers.¹⁰ Bhindranwale himself was plucked from the obscure position of Damdami Temple leader by Sanjay Gandhi and ex-Punjab Chief Minister Zail Singh in the hope that the post-1977 anti-Congress coalition in Punjab could be weakened by promoting a radical new Sikh leader to discredit the moderate Sikh religious party, the Akali Dal.¹¹ In his first public act, Bhindranwale incited an attack on the Amritsar congress of the 'heretical' Sikh sect of Nirankaris, resulting in over a dozen deaths.¹² Yet the Congress publicity machine portrayed him as a hero and, in return, Bhindranwale openly campaigned for the party's candidates in the 1980 general elections, once even sharing a dais with Indira Gandhi.¹³

After Indira Gandhi's return as PM in 1980, Bhindranwale used the government's apparent protection of his increasingly militant activities to great effect. Twice suspected of involvement in the killings of prominent opponents to his increasing militancy, he was twice allowed to walk free after appeals from (now) Minister of Home Affairs Zail Singh.¹⁴ Bhindranwale's second release was a turning point. He was now seen as the one militant Sikh leader capable of openly defying the government. His erstwhile political 'handlers' in New Delhi would no longer be able to influence his actions.

While the professedly non-violent Akali Dal had eventually allied itself with Bhindranwale as a means of pressuring Gandhi during their tortuous negotiations over the 1973 Anandpur Sahib Resolution and other issues,¹⁵ it too became incapable of controlling his behaviour. Bhindranwale had sworn an oath of loyalty and obedience to Harchand Singh Longowal, the most powerful of the Akali Dal's leadership trio, during the party's

²⁰ Apurba Kundu, *Militarism in India: The Army and Civil Society in Consensus* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1998), pp 172-4.

successful *rasta roko* (block roads) campaign of April 1983. Yet it was Longowal himself who, fearful for his own safety, used the Sikh splinter group Babbar Khalsa to push Bhindranwale and his followers out of Amritsar's Golden Temple hostel and into the temple complex itself some six weeks later.

Bhindranwale's strategy of violence was meant to create communal tension sufficient both to drive Hindus from Punjab and to provoke a national backlash which would force the approximately 20 per cent of Sikhs living elsewhere in India to seek the safety of their 'home' state. In 1982, parliament had passed a special resolution expressing 'deep anguish and concern'¹⁶ over the situation in Punjab. By 1983, the identity of many of the militants were known to the local population and police but there was no attempt to bring them to justice as 'Bhindranwale and his men were above the law'.¹⁷ The level of violence escalated. On 23 April 1983, Punjab Police Deputy Inspector-General (DIG) A.S. Atwal was shot dead while on his way out of the Golden Temple complex; on 5 October Sikh militants hijacked a local bus, separated the Hindu and Sikh passengers and shot the former, killing six; on 18 November another bus was hijacked, the passengers again separated by religion, and four Hindus shot dead. Although Gandhi imposed president's (i.e., direct) rule in Punjab on 6 October, the killings spiralled out of control.

Finally, with Bhindranwale openly fortifying the Golden Temple complex and his followers firing on the paramilitary CRPF surrounding them, Gandhi sent the Indian Army into Punjab on 2 June 1984. By the next day it had surrounded 38 gurudwaras (Sikh temples) believed to be harbouring Sikh militants under the command of Bhindranwale, including the Golden Temple and hostel complex where he and a large number of his followers were sheltered.

Operation Blue Star commenced on 5 June. Eschewing a prolonged siege of the Golden Temple and hostel complex for fear of provoking a state-wide uprising, the commander of the army in Punjab, (then Lieut.-General) General K. Sundarji, ordered a night-time attack to flush out Bhindranwale and his followers. In the first move, the army's Para Commandos extricated a number of Sikh moderates from the hostel complex under heavy fire. Leading elements of 10th Guards then stormed the main entrance, only to encounter withering machine gun fire and grenades thrown from concealed positions. The Para Commandos and the paramilitary Special Frontier Force units which were simultaneously attacking the heavily fortified *Akal Takht* (Eternal Throne, the symbol of Sikhism's temporal power) met similar difficulties, as did personnel of 26th Madras when attempting to link up with the former two.

(The militants demonstrated their fire-power by immobilizing an army armoured personnel carrier with an anti-tank weapon.) Nor did the inducement of units of the 9th Garhwali Rifles and 15th Kumaon bring the operation back on schedule. Desperate to complete the action by daybreak, Sundarji sought and received the government's permission to use tank fire to neutralise the *Akal Takht* defences. Although sniper fire would continue throughout the next day, this move effectively ended the militants' defiance.

Operation Blue Star left many scars. The approximately 1000 army personnel involved in the unexpectedly ferocious fighting endured a very high one-third casualty rate of four officers and 79 men killed, 12 officers and 237 men wounded. The subsequent government White Paper also stated that the militants suffered 493 dead, including Bhindranwale, and 86 injured (figures still much disputed). While the Golden Temple itself (the *Hari Mandir*, or Temple of God) sustained little damage as army forces had been under strict orders to avoid damaging it, the *Akal Takht* was almost destroyed and the precious Golden Temple library set on fire. Both sides are reported to have committed atrocities during the battle, especially on the unarmed civilians caught in the middle of the fight for the Golden Temple hostel complex.

P 129

25.03 There is a slight tension between the reported age of consent for legal heterosexual sex versus that for marriage. In this paragraph, the age of consent is stated as '16 [throughout India] except in Manipur, where it is 14. [However] If the partners are married then a lower age of consent applies (13 in Manipur and 15 elsewhere [in India])'. Then, on...

P 131

25.09 It is reported that "The law sets the legal age of marriage for women at 18 years old and men at 21 years old. The law prohibits child marriage in any form...'

In other words, boys and girls cannot engage in legal heterosexual until they are 16 (or 14 in Manipur) unless they are married, in which case consensual sex is legal at

age 15 (or 13 in Manipur), but they cannot be legally married until they are 21 and 18, respectively!

Clarification would be welcome here.

PP 150-151

32.03 The differences between ‘Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI)’, ‘Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs)’ and ‘NRIs’ should be clarified. Indeed, the acronym ‘NRIs’—mentioned in the *India: COI Report 2011* only here in section (iii) here—is never spelled out in full (NRI = non-resident Indian). Also, directly contrary to what is stated in this section of the report, ‘OCI is **not** to be misconstrued as “dual citizenship”’.

- <http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/oci-chart.pdf> (*a particularly useful matrix of differences*)
- <http://moia.gov.in/services.aspx?id1=35&id=m3&idp=35&mainid=23>
- <http://mha.nic.in/foreigDiv/OCI.html>
- <http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/oci-faq.pdf>

P 156

There is a minor matter of consistency here. Why is it that India (1962) ‘...loses [a] brief border war with China...’, but no mention is made of the outcomes of its (1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999) wars with Pakistan? In the spirit of brevity, may I suggest:

- 1948 Brief war with Pakistan over accession of Jammu & Kashmir to India
- 1962 Brief war with China over demarcation of shared borders
- 1965 War with Pakistan over control of Jammu & Kashmir
- 1971 War with Pakistan over independence of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan)
- 1999 Brief war with Pakistan over control of Jammu & Kashmir

P 157

- 4.13 1999 May: Replace 'Indian-held Kashmir' with 'Indian-administered Kashmir' (as used correctly in pp 23, 29, 33, 55, 58, 158, 159, 160, 173).

COIS: We accept all of the points made above and will amend the report accordingly (subject to a consideration of copyright implications for maps and graphics). The additional sources and the clarification on Operation Blue Star are most appreciated.

P162-4

Official website URLs are missing for some of the political parties listed on these pages, including:

- Dravdia Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) <http://www.dmk.in/>
- Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (JKNC) <http://www.jknc.in/>
- Janata Dal (United) <http://www.janatadalunited.org/>
- Janata Dal (Secular) <http://www.janatadalsecular.org.in/>
- Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (*no homepage found*)
- Pattali Makkal Katchi <http://www.pmkparty.org/>
- Revolutionary Socialist Party (*no homepage found*)
- Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) <http://www.shiromaniakalidal.org.in/>
- Shiv Sena (Shiva's Army) <http://www.shivsena.org/> (Maharathi language site)
- Telugu Desam Party (NAIDU) <http://www.telugudesam.org/tdpcms/>

COIS: Thank you.

P 165-8

The list of organisations in Annex C does not exactly tally with the 'LIST OF ORGANISATIONS DECLARED AS TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS UNDER THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) ACT, 1967' by the Government of India Ministry of Home

Affairs webpage last modified on 4 March 2011 at http://mha.nic.in/uniquepage.asp?id_pk=292

COIS: Accepted

In addition, a number of entries for the groups listed in Annex C could be updated to reflect their more recent activities, depending on how important is up-to-date information about these groups in the context of this report.

Certainly, the entry for the 'Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)' needs updating in light of their comprehensive military defeat and destruction by Sri Lanka government forces in Spring 2009. A similarly obvious entry in need of updating is that for the 'Tamil National Retrieval Troops (TNRT)' as it is certainly no longer currently active in 'fighting for an independent homeland for Tamils in India'.

- http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8063409.stm
- http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8066129.stm
- <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12004081>

COIS: Annexes B, C and D will be reviewed and updated.

P 177-207

At the risk of adding even more pages to this report, there may be a need to have an ANNEX H that lists the sources used in alphabetical order in addition to the numerical one provided here. (This would be very useful to the reviewer, if not the readers of the report!)

COIS: We are currently considering new formats for source references, including the use of footnotes, for all country reports. Thank you for the suggestion.