Transcript of the Hearing 24 September 2013

 

            1                                     Tuesday, 24 September 2013

           2   (10.30 am)

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We are ready for the jury?  In which

           4       case I will ask for the jury.

           5                  (In the presence of the jury)

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Perhaps I could just ask you,

           7       Mr Underwood, before we call the witness in, what was

           8       the position about the documents that you produced

           9       yesterday?

          10   MR UNDERWOOD:  They will be provided to the members of the

          11       jury in a new bundle.  We are going to tab them up in

          12       the order in which they arrive so the first one, we have

          13       a tab number 1 and so on, and I hope we will be able to

          14       make sense of all of this with cross referencing by

          15       giving a schedule of that to everybody.

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  All right, thank you very much.

          17       That being done, we will have the witness.

          18         DETECTIVE CHIEF INSPECTOR MICK FOOTE (continued)

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Good morning Mr Foote.  You are

          20       still under the oath and affirmation you took yesterday

          21       so please have a seat and I think I was calling on

          22       Mr Mansfield to ask you questions.  Thank you.

          23           Yes, Mr Mansfield?

          24                    Questions by MR MANSFIELD

          25   MR MANSFIELD:  May I thank you for the time last night to


                                             1
 

 

 


           1       read the extra material.

           2           May I also enquire whether, as is sometimes the

           3       custom, you intend to have a mid-morning break.  If not

           4       I am happy to go on.

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You let us know.  I was not

           6       intending to but if everybody feels desperate or puts

           7       their hands up or anything like that, let me know.  But

           8       we will press on.

           9           Good morning, Officer?

          10   A.  Good morning.

          11   Q.  I represent the family of Mark Duggan and, so you know,

          12       first of all the order in which I am intending to ask

          13       you questions, chronologically I am going to work

          14       backwards, in other words from the time after the

          15       incident back in time until before the incident; do you

          16       follow?

          17   A.  Okay, yes.

          18   Q.  If you don't understand at any time, just say.

          19   A.  Okay.

          20   Q.  So bearing that in mind, I want to ask you, therefore,

          21       about the 4th itself.  My first question is: were you on

          22       duty on the 4th?

          23   A.  Yes, I was on duty, yes.  Yes, sir.

          24   Q.  Again, at no time do I wish to pry into matters which

          25       are obviously sensitive, but were you at the Trident


                                             2
 

 

 


           1       headquarters?

           2   A.  At which point, sir?

           3   Q.  Well, let's take the start of the day, the 4th?

           4   A.  Yes, I was, yes.

           5   Q.  They are in north London?

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  So the jury may follow, that's not the same as the

           8       Quicksilver base, a patrol base which we know is in

           9       Wood Green?

          10   A.  That is correct, yes, sir.

          11   Q.  Does either of those places, that's the Trident

          12       headquarters -- again, so the jury may follow, it may

          13       become important -- the Trident headquarters are in

          14       north-west London?

          15   A.  Yes.  They're -- West Hendon they're based.

          16   Q.  All right, West Hendon.

          17           In either of those two places, do you have a control

          18       room that is set up for particular operations or for

          19       operations as a whole?

          20   A.  No, we don't.

          21   Q.  There's no control room?

          22   A.  When you say "control room", in relation to what --

          23       doing what, sir, please?

          24   Q.  I'll be coming to it in more detail, but since I'm

          25       dealing with the particular at the beginning, this


                                             3
 

 

 


           1       particular operation, what you call a protracted one,

           2       over several days, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, that one --

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  -- was there a control room for that ongoing operation?

           5   A.  Not a control room as such, we just have an office.  We

           6       have a covert suite where we can monitor various things,

           7       but there's no control room as such.

           8   Q.  Now, where is the covert suite where you can monitor

           9       things; is that with you at West Hendon?

          10   A.  That's at West Hendon, yes.

          11   Q.  West Hendon.  All right.  I am going to come back to

          12       that, I just wanted to establish the physical places

          13       first.

          14   A.  Okay.

          15   Q.  Were you in the West Hendon covert suite during the

          16       course of the day of the 4th?

          17   A.  No, I wasn't.

          18   Q.  Where were you when you first learnt about the shooting?

          19   A.  I was at home.

          20   Q.  I just want to be clear, how much of the day had you

          21       been on duty?

          22   A.  I had been on duty the best part of the day.  To try and

          23       make the jury understand how this works, as the SIO,

          24       I don't have any aspect in controlling of any firearms

          25       operations.  So the moment that operation has been


                                             4
 

 

 


           1       authorised it's actually handed over to other officers

           2       to deal with, who you will hear later on, such as the

           3       Strategic Firearms Commander and the Tactical Firearms

           4       Commander.  My role then becomes almost null and void,

           5       but obviously I've still got other ongoing duties

           6       which -- I've got multi functions to deal with.

           7           So at that time, when I became aware of the

           8       shooting, I was -- I was technically off-duty, I was

           9       sort of at home at that time.

          10   Q.  Sorry, I do want to be clear, because obviously roles

          11       are going to become important in this.  Were you at home

          12       all day on the 4th?

          13   A.  No, I wasn't at home all day.

          14   Q.  Where were you for most of the day on the 4th?

          15   A.  I was at work for most of the day.

          16   Q.  Was work West Hendon?

          17   A.  Yes, it was, yes.

          18   Q.  Right.  What time were you at work at West Hendon on the

          19       4th?

          20   A.  Well, my hours normally are 8.00 until 4.00.

          21   Q.  Does that apply therefore to that day?

          22   A.  Yes, it should apply to that day, yes.

          23   Q.  So you hear for the first time when you are at home that

          24       there's been a shooting --

          25   A.  That's right, yes.


                                             5
 

 

 


           1   Q.  -- in relation to an operation for which you were senior

           2       officer are responsible; is that fair?

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  Thank you.

           5   A.  Can I just clarify?

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes.

           7   A.  Albeit that I was at home, my phone is on 24/7.

           8       Operations that are working throughout the day and

           9       evening, I am constantly updated, so albeit I'm at home,

          10       otherwise I would be at work 24/7 all the time.

          11   MR MANSFIELD:  So you have a deputy don't you?

          12   A.  That's right.

          13   Q.  Isn't that right?

          14   A.  That's right.

          15   Q.  Who was the deputy?

          16   A.  For that operation?

          17   Q.  Who was the deputy on duty when you are at home on the

          18       4th?

          19   A.  Well, the deputy is the intelligence officer --

          20   Q.  The deputy is the intelligence officer?

          21   A.  The intelligence officer, and the operation is being

          22       dealt with by a Tactical Firearms Commander and

          23       Strategic Firearms Commander.

          24   Q.  Now, again I'm going slowly because the jury are getting

          25       familiar with the terms, the intelligence officer in


                                             6
 

 

 


           1       this case was ZZ17, wasn't it?

           2   A.  That's right, yes.

           3   Q.  He's not the only intelligence officer?

           4   A.  No.

           5   Q.  He's one of a number?

           6   A.  That's right, yes.

           7   Q.  He's a Detective Sergeant?

           8   A.  That's right, yes.

           9   Q.  You don't have a Detective Sergeant standing in as your

          10       deputy on this, do you?

          11   A.  Well, that Detective Sergeant, I have delegated the

          12       roles in relation to the operation to him in regards all

          13       the intelligence, the day-to-day decision making,

          14       because it's very much a tactical operation where, once

          15       it's been handed over to the TFC and SFC, that's where

          16       their role becomes more crucial in updating them on the

          17       intelligence as they receive it.

          18   Q.  That doesn't accord with the guidelines, does it?

          19   A.  Sorry, what guidelines are you referring to?

          20   Q.  Guidelines that are set down to ensure that you don't

          21       have a duplication of roles or an overlapping of roles

          22       so there's always an investigative officer having the

          23       overview of what the operation is doing.

          24   A.  Yes.  I do have the overview of the operation and we do

          25       stick to -- we adhere to the guidelines.  The guidelines


                                             7
 

 

 


           1       are to ensure the strategy is still met in relation to

           2       investigation, the overall operation, and as the

           3       intelligence comes in, then the intelligence officer,

           4       once it's an authorised firearms operation, they deal

           5       with the -- providing that intel for the Tactical

           6       Firearms Commander to make decisions around how that

           7       operation is going to proceed.

           8   Q.  One thing you don't do is delegate to the intelligence

           9       officer the day-to-day decisions, do you?

          10   A.  Yes, I -- the intelligence officer is an experienced

          11       Detective Sergeant.  You know, this is replicated across

          12       all the teams that we have on Trident.

          13   Q.  When did you do that?  When did you delegate authority

          14       for decision making to the intelligence officer ZZ17?

          15   A.  Well, that was at the time that I took over that

          16       operation.

          17   Q.  When was that?

          18   A.  That was back in January -- January 2010.

          19   Q.  So from January 2010 onwards -- because of course

          20       there's a general Operation Dibri and then a focused

          21       Operation Dibri?

          22   A.  Yes, that's right.

          23   Q.  So from January 2010, the general Operation Dibri, your

          24       deputy was a Detective Sergeant in charge of

          25       intelligence; is that what you are saying?


                                             8
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes I am.  We have -- the structure of our team, we have

           2       two Detective Sergeants, a number of Detective

           3       Constables.  They are surveillance trained, they are

           4       trained in handling intelligence, tactical

           5       (Particularly?  Practical?) intelligence that we are

           6       referring to today, and the volume of intelligence that

           7       comes through is quite frequent and it's not just about

           8       one person, it's about a number of people.  So obviously

           9       there's quick time decisions being made around what to

          10       do next.

          11           I have a number of roles to do: I lead on

          12       surveillance training for Trident, I also lead on

          13       presentations for new recruits of DCs.  So I've got

          14       a number of things that I'm responsible for and at that

          15       time I was also responsible for the lead for Trident in

          16       relation to the Olympics as well, as well as community

          17       meetings.

          18           So my day is packed out, as you can imagine.  So

          19       these are day-to-day tactical decisions that are being

          20       dealt with by the Detective Sergeant.

          21   Q.  I suggest that's why the normal procedure is to have

          22       a DI, a Detective Inspector, who is part of your

          23       organisation, Trident, between you and the intelligence

          24       that is gathered by the intelligence officer and then

          25       Trident -- then the CO19 officers themselves.  Who was


                                             9
 

 

 


           1       the DI over this period, the Detective Inspector?

           2   A.  For the pro-active teams?

           3   Q.  We'll take it in two stages: for Operation Dibri as

           4       a whole.

           5   A.  For Operation Dibri as a whole?

           6   Q.  Yes.

           7   A.  Well, I'm the SIO for that operation.

           8   Q.  I appreciate that.  The question is: who was the DI for

           9       Operation Dibri as a whole from January 2010?

          10   A.  Well, there's the DI who's ZZ -- or Z50, I should say.

          11   Q.  Who was the DI for Operation Dibri?

          12   A.  I can't -- I am not permitted to actually say his name

          13       because that person has anonymity.

          14   Q.  Well, ZZ50, I'm sorry to use the hieroglyphics, we

          15       understand, is a Strategic Firearms Commander, in other

          16       words dealing with firearms; is that right?

          17   MR KEITH:  I think you have confused ZZ50 with Z50.

          18   MR MANSFIELD:  I am so sorry, ZZ50: is that what you mean?

          19   A.  That's what I said, yes.

          20   Q.  ZZ50 was the Detective Inspector for Dibri as a whole?

          21   A.  No, he was the Detective Inspector for the north-west

          22       pro-active team as a whole.

          23   Q.  From January 2010?

          24   A.  No.  Z -- I'll just call him 50 --

          25   Q.  Perhaps you wouldn't because even I made the same


                                            10
 

 

 


           1       mistake.  There are two 50s, one has ZZ and one has

           2       single Z.  So it's a very simple question --

           3   A.  Sorry, sir --

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Foote, please answer.

           5   A.  My understanding is there's only one 50, there's not two

           6       50s.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Can you just help us, there may be

           8       some magical mystery.  Some people have ZZ and a number

           9       and others just have Z; is there any significance in

          10       that?

          11   A.  Yes.  ZZs are the principal officers that are integral

          12       to that firearms operation, and then the ZZs are

          13       officers that have been provided anonymity, who were

          14       also involved in that operation.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Sorry, can you just do that again?

          16       I thought you said the ZZs were the ones who were the

          17       principal officers integral to the firearms.

          18   A.  Yes, Zs and ZZs, yes.

          19   MR KEITH:  Can I assist?  I do not wish to give evidence.

          20       It may be easier if we just refer to Z50, who is the

          21       Strategic Firearms Commander as Fiona Mallon.  That

          22       pseudonym has been dispensed with now for some time and

          23       then none of us will be confused as to who we are

          24       referring to.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It still does not cure my curiosity


                                            11
 

 

 


           1       about who is a Z and who is a ZZ.

           2   MR KEITH:  I think it's more or less a question of

           3       happenchance as to what pseudonym you get, but ZZ50 is

           4       a Trident officer who remains anonymised as ZZ50.

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you.  Are you all right with

           6       that Mr Foote?

           7   A.  Yes, I am.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You agree.

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   MR MANSFIELD:  The question, and I am only dealing with the

          11       Operation Dibri as a whole at the moment -- not the

          12       focus one, I will come to that -- who was the

          13       Detective Inspector beneath you, namely the deputy to

          14       you, from January 2010 onwards?

          15   A.  Well, I had two Detective Inspectors at different

          16       periods.

          17   Q.  I'll concentrate on a relevant period.  Let's take 2011.

          18       Who was the Detective Inspector below you, the line

          19       manager for ZZ17; who was it?

          20   A.  That's an officer that's not here, who left Trident in

          21       about the May or June of 2011.

          22   Q.  He's serving -- he/she is serving elsewhere?

          23   A.  Yes, they are.

          24   Q.  I don't want to reveal names, I don't know who it is, is

          25       it possible to anonymise, if that's necessary, who that


                                            12
 

 

 


           1       person was, the DI in that period at the beginning of

           2       2011?

           3   A.  Are you asking for me to make him anonymised?

           4   Q.  No, I'm not, no, no.

           5           Sir, I wonder if the officer would be kind enough to

           6       write the name down and it it be given to you and we can

           7       decide on how it could be handled.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It would be very useful if you could

           9       just put it on a piece of paper, the name of that

          10       Detective Inspector.

          11    (The witness wrote down the name and it was handed to the

          12                             Coroner)

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Come to me [to the clerk of the

          14       court] and we will see which way it should go back down.

          15           Let me -- firstly down to you, Mr Keith, then along.

          16       I am going to suggest that if we need to refer to this

          17       person -- I do not believe we have a ZZ100.  But I would

          18       suggest that if everyone is happy I will give leave for

          19       us to refer to him as "ZZ100" and we can see if we do

          20       need to refer to that gentleman again.

          21   MR KEITH:  By extraordinary coincidence I was going to

          22       suggest ZZ100.  Sir, can we simply proceed on this

          23       basis, that whilst we make any checks as to whether it's

          24       proper to put the name to the public may we use that

          25       pseudonym temporarily and we will come back to you when


                                            13
 

 

 


           1       those checks are done.  ZZ100.

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We will call this Detective

           3       Inspector, who left in May/June 2011, serving with

           4       Trident, as ZZ100, and we can decide whether that needs

           5       to continue in due course but, for the moment for

           6       present purposes, that's what we will call him.

           7           All right, Mr Mansfield, let's press on from there.

           8   MR MANSFIELD:  Yes, certainly.  Obviously, we would be

           9       grateful if we could be told whether ZZ100 appears

          10       anywhere in the documentation we've been given, which

          11       goes back to the beginning, at least, if not more, of

          12       January 2011.  So it's just a --

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That's a perfectly valid enquiry and

          14       one that I cannot answer myself at the moment.  But that

          15       can be certainly looked into.

          16   MR MANSFIELD:  I would be very grateful.  Thank you.

          17           I am still on the same topic, we are now in June.

          18       Whenever this person leaves in that period,

          19       May/June 2011, who takes over?

          20   A.  ZZ50, I think that's the right one.

          21   Q.  I am going to come back to ZZ50 in roles, but I want to,

          22       dealing as I am with what happened after the shooting,

          23       come back to you at home receiving a phone call, which

          24       is, I assume, what happened; is that right, you get

          25       a phone call at home?


                                            14
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes, that's right.

           2   Q.  Who was it from?

           3   A.  ZZ50.

           4   Q.  ZZ50.

           5   A.  It's the person that we were just referring to, yes.

           6   Q.  You remember that, do you?

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  Did you keep a record of what you were being told?

           9   A.  No.

          10   Q.  Why not?

          11   A.  Because I didn't feel it was necessary.

          12   Q.  I'm so sorry?

          13   A.  I didn't feel it was necessary.

          14   Q.  I wonder if you would be kind enough to keep your voice

          15       up.  I can hear you but I think those behind find it

          16       difficult.

          17   A.  Okay.

          18   Q.  I'm sorry to have to ask you to do that.  You didn't

          19       think it was necessary, because I am going to ask you

          20       what you were told by ZZ50, your Detective Inspector.

          21   A.  I was told in summary that -- obviously, the operation

          22       had taken place, a stop had taken place, and Mark Duggan

          23       had been shot and that there was -- a gun had been

          24       recovered.

          25   Q.  What time was that?  (Pause)


                                            15
 

 

 


           1   A.  Not sure.  I don't think make a note of the time.

           2   Q.  Of course.  I'm going to suggest to you -- we're only in

           3       the foothills at the moment -- that it was absolutely

           4       necessary for you to keep some sort of record of

           5       important information that you were about to get, and

           6       even though you may not have known it, certainly after

           7       you got it, to make a record.  You do appreciate that,

           8       don't you?

           9   A.  From my point of view, there was no need for me to make

          10       a record.  This was a firearms operation being dealt

          11       with by a number of officers.  The relevance of me

          12       making a record of the fact that -- you know, at what

          13       time I was told and what I was told beared no relevance

          14       at that time.

          15   Q.  You might be told exactly what had happened.

          16   A.  Sorry, say again, sir?

          17   Q.  As the Senior Investigating Officer, you might be told

          18       on this phone call one of the early versions of exactly

          19       what had happened.

          20   A.  Yes, I might have been told but that's not my --

          21       I wasn't there, I didn't see what happened.  There's

          22       a number of officers that were at the scene.

          23   Q.  You would want to know, wouldn't you, because -- I'll

          24       just explain why you would want to know -- this appeared

          25       to be an operation that had gone rather badly wrong: one


                                            16
 

 

 


           1       man dead, a police officer shot apparently, and members

           2       of the public possibly put at risk -- because this is

           3       Tottenham Hale -- and a minicab driver.  That's

           4       important, isn't it?

           5   A.  It's important to know that, but there's no requirement

           6       for me to make a note of that incident.  I had been

           7       informed, I had been updated that obviously Mark Duggan

           8       had been shot, a gun had been recovered.  What bearing

           9       that has in relation to me making a note is of no use at

          10       all.  That operation -- all of the people that were

          11       involved in that, are making the notes, and obviously

          12       you can imagine that's quite a -- will have

          13       a significant impact.

          14   Q.  Yes.  You see, just on a human level, you would want to

          15       know what had gone wrong, wouldn't you?

          16   A.  Gone wrong?

          17   Q.  Yes, I think that would be a fair description.  Someone

          18       dead, a police officer shot, a member of the public

          19       possibly put at risk; you would want to know what had

          20       gone wrong, wouldn't you?

          21   A.  Well, from my understanding, the -- it depends on how

          22       you see that because the operation was planned as

          23       expected and Mark Duggan came out of a cab --

          24   Q.  Doing what?

          25   A.  As far as I'm aware, he had a gun.


                                            17
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Did he?

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  How do you know that?

           4   A.  Because that's what I was told.

           5   Q.  Who told you that?

           6   A.  Because obviously ZZ50 --

           7   Q.  ZZ50?

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  What rank do you say ZZ50 is?

          10   A.  He's a Detective Inspector.

          11   Q.  Was he then?

          12   A.  Yes, he was.

          13   Q.  You are quite sure of that, are you?

          14   A.  Quite sure of what, sir?

          15   Q.  That he was a Detective Inspector on 4 August 2011.

          16   A.  Yes, I am quite sure, yes.

          17   Q.  I am going to come back to it.

          18           I want you to look -- the jury don't have it but

          19       I don't know whether you do -- at a statement dated

          20       9 January 2012; do you have that there?  It's not in

          21       that bundle, I don't think, I'm sorry.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Whose statement is this?

          23   MR MANSFIELD:  This officer's statement, sorry, ZZ21.

          24       That's how it's -- 9 January, just a passage in that.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Do you have your statement?


                                            18
 

 

 


           1   A.  I've got my own copy, yes.

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It's your own statement of

           3       9 January 2012.  It's our CD page 283 onwards.

           4   MR MANSFIELD:  283.  It's CD283.  I'm sorry the jury don't

           5       have it.  I am not asking for them to have it at the

           6       moment.  It's on the screen.

           7           Now, this was a statement that is dated

           8       9 January 2012.  Was this the first time that you put

           9       anything down in writing?

          10   A.  In relation to this incident?

          11   Q.  Yes, that's right?

          12   A.  To this statement, yes.

          13   Q.  I would like you just to read that page that's there, in

          14       relation to the 4th.  It's the third paragraph down:

          15           "On 4 August ..."

          16           Do you see that?

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  Where is any mention of ZZ50?

          19   A.  Sorry, it's Z51.

          20   Q.  No, I'm sorry, please answer the question.

          21   A.  Sorry.

          22   Q.  Where is there any mention of ZZ50, who rang you with

          23       information?

          24   A.  Okay, yes -- it's Z50 is --

          25   Q.  No, I'm sorry, just look at it carefully.  Is there


                                            19
 

 

 


           1       a mention of ZZ50 ringing you?

           2   A.  No, there isn't, no.

           3   Q.  Right.  Why not?

           4   A.  Because it's Z51 that I should be referring to.

           5   Q.  Oh, should it?  Was ZZ50 a Detective Constable?

           6   A.  I don't know who ZZ50 is.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Do you know who Z50 is?

           8   A.  I know who Z50 is.

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Who is that?

          10   A.  Sorry sir, that's the SFC, Detective Inspector Fiona

          11       Mallon.

          12   MR MANSFIELD:  We know that.  We've been over this very

          13       carefully indeed.  I've asked you who the Detective

          14       Inspector was and you said ZZ50.  Then you went on to

          15       say, in relation to the 4th, who rang you; you said

          16       ZZ50, didn't you?

          17   A.  Yes I did, yes.

          18   Q.  Why is ZZ50 not in your statement?

          19   A.  Because obviously I've made a mistake in relation to the

          20       pseudonym of who the officer is.

          21   Q.  ZZ50 was there, I suggest, as a Detective Constable; did

          22       you know that?

          23   A.  I don't know who ZZ50 is.

          24   Q.  He's the one -- or she -- that's the person you've been

          25       claiming rang you.  That's the person you've been


                                            20
 

 

 


           1       claiming was the Detective Inspector who took over from

           2       the one who left in June.

           3   A.  Right.  Z51 is the person that I am referring to as the

           4       Detective Inspector.

           5   Q.  That's what's in the statement but that's not what your

           6       evidence is here, until I drew your attention to the

           7       statement.

           8   A.  You are quite right, Mr Mansfield, but I have made quite

           9       a mistake there on the pseudonyms, it's quite easily

          10       a mistake.

          11   Q.  Is it?  Right.  Well, whoever it was who rang you, you

          12       don't have any record.  I'm going to suggest to you that

          13       this is why it's so essential and necessary for you to

          14       keep a record of who rings you and what they say, just

          15       in case you're being told a nugget of truth about

          16       something; do you follow?

          17   A.  I do.  But in relation to my statement, if I could refer

          18       to the officer at the time then I would be able to tell

          19       you who that was.

          20   Q.  Just going on with your evidence.  A phonecall from

          21       somebody, you don't know the time, tells you there had

          22       been a stop, that Mark Duggan was shot and that a gun

          23       had been recovered; is that right?

          24   A.  Yes, more or less.

          25   Q.  More or less?  Well, I would like to know if there was


                                            21
 

 

 


           1       more you were told?

           2   A.  I know at the time that an officer had also been shot.

           3   Q.  Right.  Now, whoever the person was imparting that

           4       information, whatever the time was, it's got to have

           5       been after the gun had been recovered, all right --

           6       after the gun had been found, plainly, because you are

           7       being told the gun had been recovered or found?

           8   A.  That's right, yes.

           9   Q.  Which was it, recovered or found?

          10   A.  Found.

          11   Q.  Found.  Anything else, do you remember, on this initial

          12       call to you?

          13   A.  Not that I can recall, no.

          14   Q.  All right.  Then I would like, if possible, for you to

          15       have the timeline that the jury have, page 6, dealing

          16       with what is said to be the various times.

          17   MR KEITH:  Mr Foote has his own documents.  He won't have

          18       a copy of the timeline.

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That was the bundle that was put in

          20       yesterday anyway.  Is there a spare jury bundle for the

          21       witness?  Have this, because I have a spare timeline up

          22       here.  You have this bundle.  (Handed)

          23           He has now the timeline that's in the jury bundle.

          24   MR MANSFIELD:  You may not have seen it before so -- have

          25       you seen this before?


                                            22
 

 

 


           1   A.  No.

           2   Q.  In fairness to you, I should just -- I am only going to

           3       take a few entries.  I am dealing with the period after

           4       the shooting.  At the top of this page --

           5           Sir, I am going to go slowly because they have been

           6       amended at various times and I just want to make sure

           7       the copy I have is what everybody else has.

           8           The top entry, 37, should read:

           9           "The shot was fired ... by 18.12.53."

          10   A.  Sorry, where are you?

          11   MR MANSFIELD:  It's page 6 --

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Page 6 of the timeline.

          13   MR MANSFIELD:  Yes, of the timeline, page 6.

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  Entry 37, at the top.

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  "The shot was fired by 18.12.53."

          18           Do you see that?

          19   A.  Yes I do, yes.

          20   Q.  Then there are some other entries -- I am not going

          21       through them -- about the ambulance and the helicopter

          22       emergency team at HEMS, and then other people being

          23       dispatched.

          24           Then at 18.20, Z51 -- I am going to go slowly again

          25       because people might like to add -- he, or she, is the


                                            23
 

 

 


           1       Tactical Firearms Commander.

           2   A.  Yes, that's right.

           3   Q.  Is that right?

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  Z51, what's his rank?

           6   A.  That's the Detective Inspector.

           7   Q.  He's a DI; was he acting as your deputy on this?

           8   A.  No, he was the Tactical Firearms Commander for this.

           9   Q.  No.  He wouldn't and shouldn't be acting as your deputy,

          10       should he?

          11   A.  Not in these circumstances, no.

          12   Q.  No, thank you.  Just so we follow through, that's at

          13       18.20.52.  According to your statement, which was on the

          14       screen a moment ago, 283, Z51 -- not ZZ50, Z51 -- the

          15       Tactical Firearms Commander, contacted you and said that

          16       Mark Duggan had been shot, and so on, right?

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  That's according to your statement.  I just want to ask

          19       you to bear in mind some more times that are not on this

          20       sheet, both of which relate to you.  They don't come out

          21       of your statement because you didn't keep a record.  The

          22       first one, time, is at 18.24.  It's not on here but I am

          23       going to ask you about it because other people have kept

          24       notes, do you follow --

          25   A.  Yes.


                                            24
 

 

 


           1   Q.  -- of conversations with you?

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  Now, at 18.24, you're on the telephone, I assume, unless

           4       you have moved places -- have you moved places?

           5   A.  No.

           6   Q.  No, you are still at home?

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  Right.  You talk to a senior officer called Cundy; do

           9       you remember him?

          10   A.  I do know Cundy, yes.

          11   Q.  What is he, if I can ask?

          12   A.  At the time he was the Detective Chief Superintendent in

          13       charge of Trident.

          14   Q.  You are telling him, at 18.24, that a gun had been found

          15       and a CO19 officer had been accidentally shot; is that

          16       right, is that what you are telling him?

          17   A.  Yes, obviously I am telling him that, yes.

          18   Q.  You don't know now what you told him, do you?

          19   A.  Well, if that's what he's written down then that's

          20       what's been said.

          21   Q.  Right.  Just pause for a moment.  What that means is

          22       that in the few minutes between 18.20.52 -- nearly

          23       18.21 -- and 18.24 you must have had a conversation

          24       with -- so we're timing it now, it's not in your

          25       statement -- you must have had a conversation with the


                                            25
 

 

 


           1       TFC, Z51, for you to be able to tell Mr Cundy at 18.24

           2       at least that the gun had been found and a CO19 officer

           3       shot.

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  Is that fair?

           6   A.  Yes, that's fair, yes.

           7   Q.  But that's not the only call you made.  It's not on the

           8       list, but I am going to ask that another document be

           9       available in one moment.  You spoke to, a little later,

          10       at 6.30, 18.30, so a few minutes later, Z50, Fiona

          11       Mallon; right?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  Yes.  Do you remember that?

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  You do?

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  What did you tell her?

          18   A.  Just repeated more or less what -- the information I had

          19       got from Z51.

          20   Q.  So all you were doing was recounting information you had

          21       got?

          22   A.  Yes, and at that point a discussion was had around

          23       meeting -- implementing the PIP process, which is the

          24       post incident -- when an incident where we've had

          25       a shooting, there is a process where we rendezvous at


                                            26
 

 

 


           1       a certain place.  I don't generally get involved in

           2       that, I don't need to.  However, I felt that as my team

           3       were involved in it, ie the north-west pro-active team,

           4       obviously I'm concerned about their welfare so

           5       a discussion was had about making my way down to that

           6       point.

           7   Q.  I'm going to suggest to you, here in this period, that's

           8       the few minutes between 18.20 and 18.30, a ten-minute

           9       window, you talking about the Tactical Firearms

          10       Commander at the scene, you must have asked him how all

          11       this came about.

          12   A.  How all this came about?

          13   Q.  Yes.  How it is that a CO19 officer is shot, one of your

          14       number in that sense, as well as Mark Duggan being shot

          15       himself.  You must have asked how that had come about,

          16       a police officer getting shot.

          17   A.  Yes, I would have asked but --

          18   Q.  Right.  What were you told?

          19   A.  That I cannot remember -- all I remember was being told

          20       that Mark Duggan had been shot -- the operation went as

          21       planned.  Mark Duggan had been shot and a CO19 officer

          22       had been shot and a gun had been recovered.

          23   Q.  Wait a second, it was not planned to shoot anybody, was

          24       it?

          25   A.  No.  The operation itself was -- went as it should have


                                            27
 

 

 


           1       done, obviously with tragic circumstances,

           2       unfortunately.

           3   Q.  You would want to know how the tragic circumstances

           4       unfolded on an operation that was not planned to shoot

           5       anybody.

           6   A.  Well, I can't -- this is how I see it.  My officer is at

           7       the scene, he is -- still has roles and responsibilities

           8       whilst he's at that scene.  He's given me an account of

           9       what he is aware of at that time.  I'm not going to push

          10       to find out how that happened because that's not for me

          11       to ask, and obviously I know that in time we will be at

          12       this situation.

          13   Q.  Or was a false story being put out even at 6.30?

          14   A.  Sorry, you will have to explain.

          15   Q.  Yes.  I'll put it globally so you understand.  You will

          16       remember at the time that there was a deal of publicity

          17       about the fact that Duggan was shot dead during

          18       an exchange of fire with the police.  You remember all

          19       of that?

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  Yes, you do.  Did that come as a surprise to you when

          22       you read it?

          23   A.  In relation to the fire -- this shooting incident you're

          24       talking --

          25   Q.  Yes.


                                            28
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes, it did.

           2   Q.  Oh, right.  Why?

           3   A.  Because I wasn't aware of the total facts.  I don't

           4       now -- I didn't know at the time how the officer had got

           5       shot, you know, it was still an unknown quantity at that

           6       time.

           7   Q.  Could we have, please, document CD7203?  The jury don't

           8       have this.  So it's clear to you, this is a note made by

           9       the Strategic Firearms Commander, Fiona Mallon, at 6.30,

          10       in relation to a conversation with you.

          11           I hope the jury can see it, it's a little difficult.

          12       Could it zoom in, yes, just a bit more to enlarge it?

          13       I'm sorry, it's just that --

          14           You'll see your name on the left-hand side and the

          15       time 6.30; do you see that?

          16   A.  Yes, I do, yes.

          17   Q.  Have you ever seen this note before?

          18   A.  No, I haven't, no.

          19   Q.  Have you ever been asked about it?

          20   A.  No.

          21   Q.  Has the IPCC therefore never come to you and said "DID

          22       you say anything like this?"

          23   A.  No, they haven't, no.

          24   Q.  Is this the first time anybody has asked you about this?

          25   A.  Yes, it is, yes.


                                            29
 

 

 


           1   Q.  People may have better sight than I do.  It appears to

           2       read:

           3           "Just found a gun and think it's Duggan's gun.  Shot

           4       ..."

           5           I think, I am not quite sure what the next word is:

           6           "... shot at one of ..."

           7           I think that should be:

           8           "CO19 officers by accident ..."

           9           Sorry:

          10           "... 19 officers by accident by another 19 [short

          11       for CO19] officer."

          12           Then there's this underneath:

          13           "Apparently MD came towards officers firing."

          14           Did you tell her that?

          15   A.  No, I don't recall saying that.

          16   Q.  I would like you to think very carefully about this

          17       because, as you see, it's in her note.

          18   A.  It's in her note but I don't recall saying that.

          19   Q.  Well, if she attributes it to you, how could that have

          20       come about?

          21   A.  I don't know.

          22   Q.  You see, I suggest it's the very natural consequence of

          23       you possibly asking a Tactical Firearms Commander, Z51,

          24       "How did it come about?" and he said to you -- because

          25       the only other person you have spoken to at the scene is


                                            30
 

 

 


           1       the Tactical Firearms Commander, isn't it?

           2   A.  That's correct, yes.

           3   Q.  Because we can get rid of ZZ50 all together, can't we,

           4       you don't speak to him?

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  Did you go to the PIP process, the post incident

           7       process, being carried out anywhere?

           8   A.  Yes, I did, yes.

           9   Q.  Where did you go?

          10   A.  I'm not sure if I'm allowed to say where it is.

          11   Q.  All right.  Was it at a police station?

          12   A.  It was in a police building, yes.

          13   Q.  In the police building, was Z51, that is the Tactical

          14       Firearms Commander, there?

          15   A.  Yes, he was.

          16   Q.  Did you talk to him?

          17   A.  Yes, I did.

          18   Q.  Did you keep a note?

          19   A.  No, I didn't.

          20   Q.  Why not?

          21   A.  Because what I talked to him about was his welfare.

          22   Q.  Did you talk about the incident itself?

          23   A.  No.

          24   Q.  Not at all?

          25   A.  No.


                                            31
 

 

 


           1   Q.  How long did you remain in the building where this

           2       process was going on?

           3   A.  I was there for most of the evening.

           4   Q.  Did you talk to any single officer about what had

           5       happened?

           6   A.  I spoke to the other of my teams and how they were, but

           7       in relation to the principal officers, no.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I don't want to have any mystery

           9       more than we have to have.  I do not believe there's any

          10       problems about us knowing where it was that you were

          11       having this post incident procedure.

          12   A.  Okay, that was at Leman Street.

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Leman Street?

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you.

          16   MR MANSFIELD:  I just want to follow, therefore, as you have

          17       mentioned Leman Street, through by going back in time

          18       now you have got to post-incident, I now want to go to

          19       pre-incident, do you follow, just before the incident,

          20       when your telephone, as you have said, is on all the

          21       time, even if you are at home.

          22           Could you turn back to the page 1 of the timeline.

          23       I am going to ask some questions in relation to this

          24       page but, first of all, now we are getting back to the

          25       actual incident itself on the 4th and planning on the


                                            32
 

 

 


           1       3rd, the 2nd, the 1st, 31 July; so I am going backwards

           2       in time.

           3           Would you just allow me to put to you, so you know

           4       where I'm going with the questions and why I'm asking

           5       them, do you follow, three propositions --

           6   A.  Yes, sure.

           7   Q.  -- which I suggest are relevant to you and your overall

           8       responsibility and role?

           9           The first thing I want to put to you is that what

          10       happened, these tragic events, as you put it, on the

          11       4th, were a direct result of:

          12           Firstly, flawed planning, in which you were

          13       involved;

          14           That in turn, secondly, was based on a failure, by

          15       you and others, to properly assess and implement

          16       accurate intelligence, second point;

          17           The third point, and that in turn was the result of

          18       deficient supervision.

          19           So do you want me to run through them again or you

          20       understand the parameters within which I am asking

          21       you --

          22   A.  I understand the parameters that you are running.

          23   Q.  You understand.  Has any officer in relation to this

          24       operation been moved or suspended?

          25   A.  No.


                                            33
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Just before I get into some of the detail, just looking

           2       back on it yourself, and you have looked back,

           3       presumably, on a number of occasions?

           4   A.  Yes, I've reflected on it, yes.

           5   Q.  You have reflected.  When you have reflected, are there

           6       any lessons, do you think, to be learnt from what

           7       happened on that day?

           8   A.  In my view, the operation was well planned.  This is

           9       something that we do on a regular basis, these types of

          10       operations.  The people, the subjects that we have under

          11       observations, that were the subject of our operations,

          12       are -- live chaotic lifestyles and sometimes they don't

          13       do as they intend to do or what the intelligence

          14       suggests they do.  So we're reacting on a spontaneous

          15       basis.

          16           This operation was planned some time ago with a view

          17       that during that week -- we just picked that week --

          18       that we would cover an operation where we would look at

          19       the six targets, of which Mark Duggan was one of them.

          20       At any point during that period they would have -- they

          21       could have been -- there would be intelligence that we

          22       would develop which suggests that they were looking to

          23       take possession of a firearm.

          24           Now, when you work like that, it is working on the

          25       basis on that intelligence, and if the intelligence is


                                            34
 

 

 


           1       specific we respond to it.  But it could be on any six

           2       of those subjects, or it could have been on anybody else

           3       that we have intelligence about, that we would respond

           4       to.  If that intelligence is specific then we would

           5       respond to it, and in this case, that's exactly what

           6       happened.

           7           It happened to be that, at that time, Mark Duggan

           8       was the person that appeared to be the most active, the

           9       most intent on taking possession of a firearm.  As that

          10       intelligence developed, we responded to that and as

          11       a result of that, unfortunately, he met his death.

          12           Now, we use -- a number of resources are involved in

          13       that and we use CO19 officers, as you have heard, who

          14       are highly trained officers and do this type of work day

          15       in, day out.

          16   Q.  What was the question?

          17   A.  I am referring to your question in relation to whether

          18       or not this was a planned operation -- well-planned

          19       operation.

          20   Q.  Is that the extent of your memory, that I asked you the

          21       extent to which it was a planned operation?

          22   A.  I feel at that point that I was responding to your

          23       question.

          24   Q.  That wasn't the question.

          25   A.  Can you repeat your question, please, sir?


                                            35
 

 

 


           1   MR KEITH:  It was a suggestion, actually.

           2   A.  Suggestion.

           3   MR MANSFIELD:  It was a suggestion couched in a question,

           4       not the one you have repeated.

           5   MR KEITH:  I do not think that's fair, with respect.

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes.  I am sure, Mr Mansfield -- we

           7       say a lot about witnesses not having a memory test.

           8       I think it never goes as to what the question is, any

           9       memory test, that's going too far.

          10           Anyway, Mr Foote, don't worry.  Mr Mansfield is

          11       going to ask that question as a question again, if it is

          12       again, and then you will be able to answer it as you

          13       feel fit.

          14   A.  Thank you, sir.

          15   MR MANSFIELD:  In fact, it wasn't even a suggestion.  I am

          16       going to put it again.  I am asking you whether any

          17       lessons have been learnt.  (Pause)

          18   A.  I've often thought about that and I can't think of what

          19       lessons have been learnt.  The only lessons probably for

          20       myself, my personal learning, was probably to -- you

          21       know, as you have said, is make a note of the fact that

          22       I had been spoken to by an officer after the incident.

          23       But apart from that, I'm quite satisfied with the way

          24       things went.

          25   Q.  Right.  I'm going to go through and I am going to point


                                            36
 

 

 


           1       out what I suggest is far more serious than not keeping

           2       a note.

           3           This, as we all now know, was an intelligence led

           4       operation, wasn't it?

           5   A.  Yes, it was, yes.

           6   Q.  What that entails is that these, I suggest to you --

           7       I suggest to you -- are fairly simple steps.  The first

           8       thing is you have to know what the intelligence is in

           9       order to take decisions, correct?

          10   A.  Yes, you do.

          11   Q.  In order to know what it is, since you don't get it

          12       yourself directly, somebody has to make an accurate

          13       record of what it is, don't they?

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  Is that ZZ17?

          16   A.  Well, ZZ17 is in receipt of the intelligence, yes.

          17   Q.  I'm sorry, I don't want to have to repeat questions, but

          18       I will.  Is ZZ17 responsible for recording accurately

          19       the intelligence he receives?

          20   A.  Yes, he is.

          21   Q.  Thank you.  That record is available to you, isn't it?

          22   A.  Yes, it is.

          23   Q.  Next stage.  Once you see what the intelligence is, you

          24       have to make assessments, do you not?

          25   A.  On the intelligence, yes.


                                            37
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Yes.  The first and obvious one, I put to you, is

           2       reliability, isn't it?

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  Because you don't want to go off on one if it's, as was

           5       put to you yesterday, a rumour in a pub --

           6   A.  Yes, that's right, yes.

           7   Q.  -- or a malicious piece of information?

           8   A.  That's correct, yes.

           9   Q.  Right.  Having therefore assessed that it's reliable,

          10       there are some more questions.  Is it actionable?  Can

          11       you do something about it?

          12   A.  Yes, that's right.

          13   Q.  That relates to how specific it is --

          14   A.  That's correct, yes.

          15   Q.  -- because clearly, if it's too vague, there's not much

          16       you can do.

          17   A.  No, that's right.

          18   Q.  Now, there's a further question, I suggest, for you or

          19       your deputy on Dibri -- not for the Tactical Firearms

          20       Commander, not for Strategic Firearms Commander, but for

          21       you -- to assess that, even if the intelligence has come

          22       in, is accurate, is specific and is actionable -- do you

          23       follow all those steps --

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   Q.  -- you may still not want the firearms operation to


                                            38
 

 

 


           1       swing into action in case it jeopardises something else.

           2       It's that sort of area.  In other words, you as

           3       a Detective Chief Inspector is having to weigh

           4       up/balance evidence gathering, intelligence, public

           5       safety and the operation at a whole.

           6   A.  Yes, that's correct, yes.

           7   Q.  That's not the job of the Tactical Firearms Commander,

           8       is it?

           9   A.  Well, they have that responsibility once that operation

          10       is -- has been authorised as a firearms operation.

          11   Q.  You said "Go ahead"?

          12   A.  Yes.  Actually I don't say "Go ahead", that decision is

          13       taken by the Strategic Firearms Commander, yes.

          14   Q.  But none of this would be swinging into action as

          15       an operation, a pro-active investigation, unless you

          16       said so, would it?

          17   A.  Not necessarily, because, like I have just explained

          18       earlier, there are times when we are responding

          19       spontaneously.  I will probably have no decision in that

          20       at all.  So, for example, say subject A -- someone that

          21       we -- have directed surveillance for -- as I explained

          22       yesterday, that we have under surveillance, and there

          23       was specific intelligence that came in which required

          24       a spontaneous response, ie ZZ17 would receive that

          25       intelligence, decide "Well, this needs to be dealt with


                                            39
 

 

 


           1       immediately, and I need a firearms capability", then

           2       there are a number of options we could use.

           3           We could have, like, a MASTS team at the top end of

           4       the firearms teams, if they are available.  We could

           5       have a what we call ARV teams, which are the uniform

           6       type of vehicles, that could assist.  So what we would

           7       do is then go out as the pro-active team, as trained

           8       surveillance officers, provide what capability we can,

           9       and also, with the addition of the SCD11, ie the

          10       surveillance teams, provide an immediate response to

          11       that.

          12           So I don't necessarily get involved in that decision

          13       making aspect.

          14   Q.  Not necessarily.  But this was preplanned, wasn't it?

          15   A.  Yes, it was planned in -- in June time.

          16   Q.  I will come back to that because I'm going back in time.

          17       What I want to do is to present you with an option on

          18       the 4th that would have prevented all of what happened;

          19       do you follow?

          20   A.  Okay.

          21   Q.  Could we have, please, a map which has been made

          22       available, which I would ask the jury to have?

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Is this the one?  (Indicates)

          24   MR MANSFIELD:  Yes.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You have that there.


                                            40
 

 

 


           1   MR MANSFIELD:  I wonder if copies could be given to the

           2       jury; do they have it?

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Do you have those or are they

           4       coming?

           5   MR MANSFIELD:  Can I wait until they are provided?

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Jury, when you get these documents,

           7       they are yours, so you can draw or write on them if you

           8       wish to and we will put holes in them and you can keep

           9       them in your individual bundles.  (Pause)

          10           I think the jury now have -- it looks like we are

          11       one short at the back but we will get some more.

          12   MR MANSFIELD:  I would certainly like everyone to have

          13       access to it at least so we can see --

          14           What I want to deal with with you is a detailed

          15       situation where I am going to suggest that there was

          16       a plain and simple other option on the 4th.

          17           In the office at Trident, used, if you like, to

          18       monitor, do you have on the wall some kind of either

          19       actual map or electronic map of the area you cover?

          20   A.  No.

          21   Q.  You don't?

          22   A.  No.

          23   Q.  I'm going to make it clear in relation to this that

          24       that's pretty basic, that what you would need if you are

          25       going to have an overview is to know where everything


                                            41
 

 

 


           1       is, your resources, your targets, if you get the

           2       information, and so on, so you can pinpoint rapidly how

           3       things are moving.  Nobody has thought of that?

           4   A.  You're talking from an operational room perspective.

           5   Q.  Yes.

           6   A.  We haven't got an operational room at West Hendon.

           7   Q.  Right.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Your covert suite?

           9   A.  It's a covert suite, yes.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Does that not have a map of your

          11       area?

          12   A.  It would have a hard copy poster map but the covert

          13       suite is not an operational room for deploying assets

          14       and identifying where they are.

          15   MR MANSFIELD:  Let's go to the operational room that

          16       I suggest is just absolutely essential for this sort of

          17       operation.

          18           How about the patrol base in Wood Green; that would

          19       have a control room?

          20   A.  That I don't know.

          21   Q.  You don't know?

          22   A.  No, I don't know.

          23   Q.  Have you ever been there?

          24   A.  I have not been to the patrol base at Wood Green,

          25       Quicksilver.  I've had no need to go there.


                                            42
 

 

 


           1   Q.  I am going to put to you straight away: if somebody had

           2       had a map that day and worked it out, the whole thing

           3       could have changed; do you follow?

           4   A.  Well, you need to explain --

           5   Q.  Yes, I will do, with this particular map as a starting

           6       place.

           7           You will see on this map various key places that the

           8       jury and certainly the operation were considering on the

           9       4th.  It's time frozen; do you see?

          10           I'll start at the top because we have been dealing

          11       with the Wood Green base; do you see that?

          12   A.  Yes, I do.

          13   Q.  There's a time which is in all the little boxes.  That

          14       is 5.15.  In the box, you can see the Trident officers:

          15       ZZ17 is the intelligence Detective Sergeant, right?

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  I am just going slowly because the jury have not seen

          18       this before.  Then there are three other officers there.

          19       As the jury will hear, those three were deployed out

          20       a little later.

          21           So that's the Wood Green base.  As you come down the

          22       map, you will see there's another box with the same time

          23       and:

          24           "Mark Duggan was here."

          25           Now, that, I can say, there's no particular secret


                                            43
 

 

 


           1           about it, was Micawber Court.

           2           I am going to pause so we can slot this into the

           3       timeline.  Do you have the timeline sheet there?  That's

           4       the first page of the timeline sheet you need to have

           5       alongside.

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  You will see, at number 4 -- do you see that number 4

           8       entry?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  At 5.12, the taxi collecting Mark Duggan was booked to

          11       go from Micawber Court to Vicarage Road; do you see

          12       that?

          13   A.  Yes, I do, yes.

          14   Q.  Then, if your eye drops further down the page, you will

          15       see another box with 5.15 and that's marking

          16       Leman Street, where CO19 were based.  That's where they

          17       were at 5.15; do you follow?

          18   A.  Yes, I do.

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Just to help the jury, we've got at

          20       item 5 "Quicksilver", does that refer to Wood Green?

          21   MR MANSFIELD:  Yes.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I know that we know that.

          23   MR MANSFIELD:  I am much obliged.

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That's the Wood Green code.

          25   MR MANSFIELD:  Item 3 on the timeline actually just


                                            44
 

 

 


           1       indicates at 5 o'clock, so it's earlier than 5.15, the

           2       intelligence Sergeant, ZZ17, and the other three

           3       officers, were at Quicksilver, that's Wood Green.  So

           4       that's entry number 3.

           5           If you go further up the timeline, you will see at

           6       item number 1, that the CO19 team came on duty at

           7       Leman Street at 16.00, so 4 o'clock.  So they had

           8       already been at their base for an hour and a quarter by

           9       5.15.  So hopefully you are still following the thrust

          10       of the pause in the timeframe.

          11           So at 5.15 we can place various key people.

          12   A.  Okay.

          13   Q.  Then over to the right there's another box and this is

          14       where Kevin Hutchinson-Foster was at 5.15.

          15   A.  Okay.

          16   Q.  In fact, he had been there since the early afternoon.

          17       He'd been there most of the afternoon, having arrived in

          18       a car; are you following this?

          19   A.  I am, yes.

          20   Q.  Right.  Now, I'm going to suggest to you, so you see the

          21       point, that intelligence -- leave aside where it's

          22       coming from for the moment, but I'll have to refer to it

          23       in a minute -- item number 7 on the timeline, at 5.20 --

          24       in other words five minutes after all this pause in time

          25       on the map -- at 5.20, ZZ17 receives intelligence; do


                                            45
 

 

 


           1       you see that?

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  The big question is what is it he was told at that time;

           4       do you know?

           5   A.  No, I don't.

           6   Q.  I'm going to, as it were, fill you in so you know, so

           7       you can then see why I'm asking you to deal with this.

           8           The intelligence, and I'm going to read it slowly,

           9       because I suggest to you it's important, came in -- so

          10       we go back up the timeline -- just before 5.12; do you

          11       see that's entry number 4?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  So just during the period that the taxi is booked, this

          14       is what is coming through at 5.20 to your intelligence

          15       officer -- who's in charge, is he, or are you in charge,

          16       at 5.20?

          17   MR KEITH:  I'm so sorry to rise to my feet, the witness

          18       needs no assistance from me but it's important the jury

          19       and the rest of us are not led up a rather curious path.

          20           I don't know whether it's been suggested that

          21       point 4 in the timeline is intelligence that was

          22       available to the officers responsible for the

          23       intelligence.  This is a timeline prepared after the

          24       event as to what people were doing at that particular

          25       time.  If this question is premised on the basis that


                                            46
 

 

 


           1       this is the intelligence that was available at the time,

           2       that is quite wrong.

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  A fair point there, Mr Keith.

           4           This timeline, members of the jury, has been put

           5       together really by my team, Mr Underwood and those

           6       assisting, from all the various information that we've

           7       been able to put together.  But that does not detract

           8       from the point that Mr Mansfield was asking concerning,

           9       really, the item 7 on the timeline.

          10   MR MANSFIELD:  Mr Keith is wrong because I am going to read

          11       out what was said at 5.20.  May I say it once: we

          12       haven't got the original documents.  This is a gist,

          13       it's all we're allowed.

          14           I'm going to read you what we've been told was said,

          15       or given over, at about 5.20:

          16           "Some time between 5.10 and 5.15 on the 4th August,

          17       I ..."

          18           That is somebody with intelligence not the

          19       intelligence officer, another source, I'll come back to

          20       it, this is what ZZ17 is being told:

          21           "... received intelligence that indicated that

          22       Mr Duggan would be imminently travelling by minicab to

          23       Vicarage Road in Leyton to collect the firearm.  This

          24       was not the first occasion [says the gist] on which he

          25       had received intelligence" --


                                            47
 

 

 


           1   MS LEEK:  It says "This was the first".

           2   MR MANSFIELD:  I'm so sorry:

           3           "This was the first occasion on which I received

           4       intelligence which indicated an area where the firearm

           5       might be.  I assessed the intelligence as being credible

           6       and immediately disseminated it to ZZ17."

           7           So, therefore, around item 4, in other words between

           8       5.10 and 5.15, not ZZ17 himself, someone else had very

           9       specific information about Mr Duggan, didn't they?

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  Right.  Now, I am going to deal with the source for

          12       a moment in general terms.  The source for the

          13       intelligence officer, ZZ17, was someone we know -- and

          14       only I know -- as A10.  But you know as a SOCA officer,

          15       Serious Organised Crime Agency officer; yes?

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  They are not based with Trident, are they?

          18   A.  No, they're not.

          19   Q.  But their information is accurate and reliable, is it

          20       not?

          21   A.  Yes, it's critical intelligence, yes.

          22   Q.  Yes.  So at the latest, that's 5.20, your operation knew

          23       perfectly well -- or knew, let's leave out the word

          24       "perfectly" -- that Duggan was on his way, in a minicab,

          25       to Vicarage Road, Leyton, right?


                                            48
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes.

           2   Q.  Now, look at the map.  I am going to ask you this in

           3       relation to, therefore, five minutes after the map is

           4       compiled, as it were, if you can put yourself forward in

           5       time.  What is the most obvious decision that should be

           6       taken by somebody with supervision of all this at 5.21,

           7       fast time reaction?  (Pause)

           8   A.  Well, in those circumstances, I would be looking to

           9       deploy some surveillance officers around that Vicarage

          10       Road area.

          11   Q.  Yes, exactly that.  And?  And?  (Pause)

          12   A.  That would be -- that's what I would be doing.

          13   Q.  Is that all?

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  Are you sure?

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  I'm going to suggest to you that clearly the option that

          18       was available on the 4th, with a CO19 team already

          19       briefed, because they had come on the day before,

          20       the 3rd and been ready before that, sitting in

          21       Leman Street, somebody should have said, who had a map,

          22       who had a grip on the facts, "Get over to Vicarage

          23       Road".

          24   A.  My understanding was that the team were on their way to

          25       being briefed, so it wasn't a case of continuing the


                                            49
 

 

 


           1       briefing from the day before.

           2   Q.  What I'm going to suggest is that it was completely

           3       ludicrous to ask the firearms team to go all the way to

           4       Wood Green for a briefing when they could have had

           5       a fast time briefing, "Get to Vicarage Road".  That

           6       could have happened, couldn't it?  (Pause)

           7   A.  It could have done.  But my understanding was that they

           8       were already on their way to being briefed at

           9       Wood Green.

          10   Q.  You respond to intelligence flexibly and quickly, don't

          11       you?

          12   A.  That's right, yes.

          13   Q.  That's the point you've been making to the jury

          14       yesterday and today, isn't it?

          15   A.  That's right, yes.

          16   Q.  But it needs somebody, I suggest, who has an overview,

          17       who's able to make a judgment, because, at about 5.21,

          18       firearms, for all we know, five minutes left from their

          19       base to go up to Wood Green, could possibly have been

          20       crossing the very route Duggan was taking on this map.

          21   A.  You are making an assumption there.

          22   Q.  Yes, all right.  Of course.  But what I suggest to you

          23       is much simpler, for either ZZ17, the intelligence

          24       officer, if he's in charge, or you, if you're in charge,

          25       or even the Tactical Firearms Commander officer if he's


                                            50
 

 

 


           1       in charge, to just say, "We'll go straight to Vicarage

           2       Road".  Now, that is the obvious decision, isn't it?

           3   A.  No, it's not the obvious decision at all.

           4   Q.  What's the problem with it?

           5   A.  I am not saying there's a problem with it.  What I'm

           6       saying is it's not the most obvious.  There's

           7       an opportunity to deploy surveillance officers quickly

           8       to that area.

           9   Q.  I'm sorry, the intelligence was very specific: "He's in

          10       a minicab going to Vicarage Road to collect a firearm".

          11   A.  That's right, yes.

          12   Q.  Right.  You don't want to muck about, do you?

          13   A.  No, not at all.

          14   Q.  The one thing you want, and all the others on the team

          15       want, is to get guns off the street.

          16   A.  That's right, yes.

          17   Q.  You go for the gun, don't you, to get it away?

          18   A.  That's right.

          19   Q.  Here you have specific, accurate information that that

          20       is exactly what's going to happen, "There's going to be

          21       a gun handed over in Vicarage Road", not a rumour in

          22       a pub, something from a reliable source.

          23   A.  Now, can I just say something there?

          24   Q.  Yes.

          25   A.  Albeit the information, it says, is specific that he's


                                            51
 

 

 


           1       going to Vicarage Road to collect a firearm and it's

           2       going to be handed over there, the plan is that the

           3       surveillance officers would cover that area to see if he

           4       turns up at Vicarage Road.  All the other units would

           5       have to play, as you say, catch up in relation to where

           6       they are in order to ensure that they could make

           7       an arrest, once the transfer has taken place or it's

           8       been given over.

           9   Q.  Let's just follow it through on a practical basis?

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  The jury may not have realised, but I want to just let

          12       you know, we went on a view the other day and the coach

          13       the jury was on actually passed by Leman Street.

          14   A.  Okay.

          15   Q.  Do you know how long it took the coach to get up to

          16       Vicarage Road, even allowing for roadworks and going

          17       round a different route, and so on?  Have you any idea

          18       of distances and times just in an ordinary coach?

          19   A.  No, I don't, no.

          20   Q.  Half an hour.  But of course CO19 wouldn't go in

          21       a coach, would they?

          22   A.  No, they wouldn't, no.

          23   Q.  They would go using what is commonly called "blues and

          24       twos" --

          25   A.  That's correct.


                                            52
 

 

 


           1   Q.  -- so the jury understands, it's pretty obvious, blue

           2       lights going and whatever else -- to get the traffic out

           3       the way, wouldn't they?

           4   A.  Yes they would, yes.

           5   Q.  They are unmarked cars, as the jury have seen in the

           6       photograph, so they don't have police written all over

           7       them, but they can put a light on the top and all the

           8       rest?

           9   A.  Yes, that's correct.

          10   Q.  So in fact, so you may know, firearms managed to get all

          11       the way to Wood Green by about 5.40.  So getting from

          12       Leman Street to Vicarage Road, I suggest, having got the

          13       intelligence at about 5.21, 5.22, would have taken them

          14       15/20 minutes at the most; do you follow?

          15   A.  Yes, I do, yes.

          16   Q.  Have you been to Vicarage Road?

          17   A.  No, I haven't.

          18   Q.  Do you know the area?

          19   A.  Historically, yes.

          20   Q.  Historically.  You see, if they had gone straight there,

          21       they would have found an ideal place for

          22       an interception, wouldn't they?

          23   A.  I don't know.

          24   Q.  We have a couple of photographs, I'll just show you

          25       those for the moment.  If you would look at photographs


                                            53
 

 

 


           1       9 and 10 in the jury bundle.

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It's in the jury bundle you have in

           3       front of you, Mr Foote.

           4   MR MANSFIELD:  It's 9 and 10.  This is a view, looking down

           5       Vicarage Road.  Vicarage Road is the one in the

           6       foreground with the yellow zigzag lines.  Do you have

           7       photographs 9 and 10?  It's above your head if you want

           8       to look round on the screen.

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It should be in the jury bundle that

          10       I handed to you.

          11   A.  This one here?

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes.

          13   MR MANSFIELD:  You can look at the screen if you prefer.

          14   A.  I would rather look at the photograph itself.  Oh, yes.

          15       Yes.

          16   MR MANSFIELD:  Burchell Road, which is where

          17       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster was with a woman friend, is the

          18       road off to the left as you look at the photograph where

          19       the blue van is parked, all right?

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  There is another photograph, looking the other way.

          22       That's number 10; do you see that?

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  So that's Burchell Road.  Now, Burchell Road, as you may

          25       not have been down it, is a cul-de-sac; did you know


                                            54
 

 

 


           1       that?

           2   A.  No.

           3   Q.  Often cul-de-sacs are regarded as rather useful for

           4       interceptions and interventions because there are

           5       a limited number of ways of getting out of a cul-de-sac.

           6   A.  Okay.

           7   Q.  Well, that's fair, isn't it?

           8   A.  Yes, that's fair, yes.

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Sorry, I was about to interrupt you

          10       because the screens had gone down but now they have

          11       revived.  But I have had a note from someone asking for

          12       a short break, so when there's a convenient moment in

          13       the questions that you're asking.

          14   MR MANSFIELD:  We can do it now.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Let's do it now.

          16           So members of the jury, sorry about this, but we

          17       will just have a short -- I say five minutes, it never

          18       is five minutes because it's so difficult all having to

          19       go away and come back again, but what I'll ask firstly

          20       is for me just to say to Mr Foote, in your presence --

          21           Thank you very much, Mr Foote.  If you would like to

          22       leave us in a moment, please be very careful.  As you

          23       know, but I feel it's only right I should say this

          24       publicly, it's very important for you not to discuss

          25       your evidence or anything to do with this case whilst


                                            55
 

 

 


           1       you are giving evidence in this court.  Thank you very

           2       much.  So Mr Foote if you would like to leave us,

           3       firstly.

           4                      (The witness withdrew)

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Right.  Members of the jury, if you

           6       then also, would now like to leave.  Leave all your

           7       papers there.

           8                   (In the absence of the jury)

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  I will just

          10       rise very briefly and we will try to reconstitute the

          11       court as soon as we can.

          12   (12.00 pm)

          13                         (A short break)

          14   (12.13 pm)

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  We will have

          16       the jury in then, please.

          17                  (In the presence of the jury)

          18                      (The witness returned)

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much Mr Foote, you

          20       are still under the oath that you took and we were just

          21       visiting Vicarage Road and the photographs.  I don't

          22       know whether we are still at that point but over to you

          23       then Mr Mansfield to continue your questioning.

          24   MR MANSFIELD:  Thank you very much.  We are still at that

          25       point, only I wanted to look at a little bit more of the


                                            56
 

 

 


           1       area itself, just so you have the picture.

           2           In the jury bundle, that is, I think, the red folder

           3       you have in the witness box there, at page 7 --

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Is this the one you are looking at

           5       with the photograph in it?

           6   MR MANSFIELD:  It will come up on screen.  It's a detailed

           7       plan of the exact area of Vicarage Road and Burchell

           8       Road where the jury have been.  It's on the screen in

           9       front of you but you can have it in plan form, and there

          10       are boxes, again there, with times written in, which

          11       relate to Mr Duggan, the minicab and the movements down

          12       Vicarage Road; do you see that?

          13   A.  Yes, I do, yes.

          14   Q.  Basically, the minicab has arrived by about 5.55, 17.55,

          15       moving down within that time, and stops for just

          16       under -- yes, that's about four minutes -- between 17.56

          17       and then it's moving off again around 6 o'clock; do you

          18       see that?

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  So that's the time span of the actual minicab arriving

          21       there.  Now, going back, I don't ask you to look at the

          22       map again, I think you have it in mind.  Had CO19 been

          23       directed to Vicarage Road, there would have been,

          24       I suggest to you, looking at the photographs you've

          25       already seen and the plan, an ideal situation to prevent


                                            57
 

 

 


           1       a gun either being handed over or, if handed over,

           2       intercepted and removed from the streets.

           3           Now, do you agree that that would have been an ideal

           4       opportunity?

           5   A.  What, in relation to Burchell Road?

           6   Q.  Yes, on the basis -- sorry, just in case you've left one

           7       factor out -- that CO19 had only just left their base,

           8       could have been redirected across, taken 15/20 minutes

           9       at the most, they would have got there ten minutes

          10       before, possibly 15 minutes before.  So what I'm

          11       suggesting to you is this was an ideal place for

          12       an intercept blocking off roads so the minicab with the

          13       gun in it doesn't go anywhere.

          14   A.  Yes, it could have been an ideal place.

          15   Q.  Yes.  The question is, we know it didn't happen, who was

          16       responsible at 5.20 -- when the intelligence was

          17       communicated for the kind I've already suggested -- who

          18       was responsible at that point for taking a decision as

          19       to where your forces, if I can put it that way, CO19 and

          20       others, should go?

          21   A.  Well, that would be a decision taken between the

          22       tactical adviser, the Tactical Firearms Commander and

          23       the intelligence officer.

          24   Q.  I appreciate you may want to consult with them but this

          25       is -- I think you call it "dynamic", don't you?


                                            58
 

 

 


           1   A.  That's right, yes.

           2   Q.  So at the end of the day the buck has to stop somewhere

           3       in the sense that somebody has to say "I've taken

           4       everything into account, CO19 over there"; who is that

           5       person?

           6   A.  Well, that would be the Tactical Firearms Commander, the

           7       person on the ground dealing with the tactics of that

           8       operation.

           9   Q.  But that, if I may say so is precisely why it shouldn't

          10       be him.  Was he then the DI in charge?

          11   A.  Sorry, again, sir?

          12   Q.  Was he the DI operating between yourself, in other words

          13       combining two roles: being a Tactical Firearms Commander

          14       and being the DI on this operation?

          15   A.  Well, the Tactical Firearms Commander has responsibility

          16       for -- regarding the tactics of that operation.  So as

          17       the intelligence develops, they make the assessment --

          18       they are ultimately responsible in relation to that

          19       operation.

          20           So the Tactical Firearms Commander, if they are in

          21       receipt of that sort of intelligence, like that

          22       information, they make a dynamic assessment to say

          23       "Well, yes, let's get to that location as soon as

          24       possible, send forward -- in surveillance officers, you

          25       know, prior to reaching that destination".


                                            59
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Well, he did get the intelligence --

           2   A.  Okay.

           3   Q.  -- and he didn't take that decision.  A decision

           4       somebody made was to go straight up to Wood Green and

           5       have a briefing up there and, what I'm going to suggest,

           6       lose 40 to 45 minutes of messing around before they

           7       finally decide they have to go to Vicarage Road.

           8   A.  Well, I mean, obviously I wasn't there when this

           9       operation took place but my understanding is that the

          10       teams were already -- they were already making their way

          11       towards that briefing point when that information came

          12       in.

          13   Q.  Yes.  Go back to the map if you wish, they had hardly

          14       left Leman Street -- in fact they left at 5.15, the

          15       information was coming through five minutes later, they

          16       were heading north on a route -- it doesn't matter

          17       which -- the intelligence is in.

          18   A.  Well, I think that's definitely a question you need to

          19       be referring to the CO19 officers about where they were

          20       at that time because obviously I can't answer that.

          21           What I can say is that, on the basis of that

          22       intelligence at that time, it's quite reasonable to send

          23       surveillance officers to that area to see if that

          24       vehicle turns up.

          25           If the decision to reroute the CO19 officers was


                                            60
 

 

 


           1       taken, that's certainly one that would have been

           2       considered by the Tactical Firearms Commander.

           3   Q.  Well, we have no indication, from any document, that

           4       either the Tactical Firearms Commander officer or the

           5       intelligence officer, ZZ17, ever considered this option.

           6       It's just not been on the horizon; do you follow?

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   MR BUTT:  I'm sorry to rise.  We are getting to a point

           9       where this witness is being asked to comment on

          10       decisions that others made that he was not privy to with

          11       information he has not seen until this morning or at

          12       all.  These are actually questions for Tactical Firearms

          13       Commander and the CO19 officers.  We are not going to

          14       assist this Inquest by asking this witness who was not

          15       responsible and doesn't know the answer.

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Butt, I understand it to

          17       a degree, in as much as this clearly this witness is

          18       a very experienced officer and he can always answer, as

          19       indeed in many answers he has made, that he's unable to

          20       assist because that's not his decision.  We are not

          21       asking him to necessarily second-guess what other people

          22       have done but at the same time.

          23   MR BUTT:  I think that's where we are going.

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  If we are going there then obviously

          25       that will not assist this jury but I'm sure Mr Mansfield


                                            61
 

 

 


           1       will err on the side of caution.

           2   MR MANSFIELD:  Yes.  I'm trying to be careful about it.

           3           What I am suggesting is in fact it is your

           4       responsibility as Senior Investigating Officer to

           5       ensure, in this operation, that either you -- and I am

           6       going to put it in the vernacular -- either you have

           7       a handle on it to ensure oversights do not happen or

           8       an investigating officer who's your deputy, not on the

           9       ground but back at wherever you call your monitoring

          10       base, so has an overview and can take decisions when

          11       intelligence comes through, as opposed to people who

          12       might be en route elsewhere.  Do I make myself clear?

          13   A.  You make yourself clear but I do not necessarily agree

          14       with what you are saying.

          15   Q.  You don't.  I just want to go a little further.  That

          16       wasn't the only intelligence coming through on that day,

          17       that's the 4th -- we are still on the 4th.  So the first

          18       suggestion is interception over in Burchell Road.  The

          19       second suggestion I want to make that could have

          20       happened on that day was clearly related, I suggest, to

          21       Mark Duggan, or his understood intentions on that day.

          22       Do you follow what I'm putting to you?

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  It's one thing if somebody is on the way to do an armed

          25       robbery, it's quite another one if in fact all that


                                            62
 

 

 


           1       appears to be happening, important and significant

           2       though it may be, is the transfer of a weapon from one

           3       place to another.  That's a different operation, isn't

           4       it?

           5   A.  Yes, it is, yes.

           6   Q.  Were you aware that on that day the intelligence coming

           7       through from the same source, in other words the Serious

           8       Organised Crime Agency, was that of precisely the

           9       latter, that the gun was on its way to storage, possibly

          10       at Broadwater Farm; did you know that?

          11   A.  No, I didn't know at the time, no.

          12   Q.  Well, I'll read it out.  The actual information that

          13       appears to be gisted -- so I don't know what the

          14       original says -- is this:

          15           "Later on the 4th I received ..."

          16           This is A10, this is the Serious Organised Crime

          17       Agency:

          18           "... credible intelligence that Mr Duggan was in

          19       possession of a firearm and intended taking it to the

          20       Broadwater Farm Estate in Tottenham."

          21           That's it.  You didn't know that?

          22   A.  No.

          23   Q.  Another option I'm going to ask you to consider in this

          24       circumstance would be that obviously, if you've missed

          25       the beginning -- because what I'm going to suggest here


                                            63
 

 

 


           1       is CO19 missed the beginning and they were racing to

           2       catch up because they had come from Wood Green and they

           3       were late on the scene, do you follow --

           4   A.  Yes, I do, yes.

           5   Q.  -- which I'm suggesting could have been avoided.  But

           6       allowing for the fact that's happened, they have missed

           7       the beginning, you might want to let it run -- rather

           8       than a stop in a busy high street with a bus route and

           9       bus shelters, shopping centres and so on, you let it run

          10       since the place it's going to is Broadwater Farm.

          11   A.  No, I wouldn't agree with that at all.  I think that if

          12       Mark Duggan had control of that firearm and if the

          13       intelligence was indicating that it was going to be

          14       taken to a location, an area, Broadwater Farm, then,

          15       whilst you've got control, then why allow that control

          16       to disappear by going on to -- on the estate.  It

          17       doesn't make sense.

          18   Q.  No, no, I am not suggesting you go onto Broadwater Farm

          19       and do it there but that you do it in a safer place,

          20       knowing where it's going, you do it in a safer place

          21       than where the stop occurred.

          22   A.  Well, from what you're telling me, the intelligence said

          23       it's going to Broadwater Farm.  Well, where on

          24       Broadwater Farm is it going to?  We have no idea.  You

          25       know that he's making his way to that location.  If you


                                            64
 

 

 


           1       can intercept him and the vehicle with the gun then, for

           2       me, that's perfect.

           3   Q.  Yes.

           4   A.  So why wait to compromise that at any other point and

           5       lose the fact that, you know, there was an opportunity

           6       to take the gun out as soon as possible.  Because

           7       anything could have happened in between the point where

           8       you say "Let it run" and it goes to the Broadwater Farm,

           9       say for example, you know, an opposing side may have

          10       been passing through and a shot could have been -- you

          11       know, it was a loaded gun -- so that gun could have been

          12       used, even en route to Broadwater Farm.  So, for me,

          13       that doesn't make sense.

          14   Q.  Right.  So it reinforces the need to get to where it's

          15       happening in the first place; do you agree?

          16   A.  Yes, I can see where you're coming from, trying to get

          17       there as soon as possible and get control of the

          18       minicab, yes.

          19   Q.  Yes, and of course you get control of a minicab that's

          20       stationary in a road waiting to happen, don't you?

          21   A.  That's on the basis that everyone gets there in time.

          22       I mean, from -- there are surveillance officers, these

          23       are unarmed officers that are attending that location,

          24       with a view of trying to get control of the vehicle.

          25   Q.  But we've been through it.  Armed officers, as you


                                            65
 

 

 


           1       accept, could have got there to take control.

           2   A.  Well, that's a question, again, for other officers.  But

           3       we'll see.

           4   Q.  So you're saying, are you, that the question of where

           5       they should have gone on that day is really final -- the

           6       decision: is it the Tactical Firearms Commander or is it

           7       ZZ17?

           8   A.  In relation to?

           9   Q.  Yes, getting to --

          10   A.  To that location?

          11   Q.  Getting the armed officers to go straight to Vicarage

          12       Road.

          13   A.  Well, that would be a decision made by the Tactical

          14       Firearms Commander.

          15   Q.  I want to move on and in a sense back.  To the previous

          16       day, the 3rd.

          17           Of course, at this stage you're more actively

          18       involved, you say, because there's developing

          19       intelligence, is there not, at this time --

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  -- 3 August?  Now, on 3 August, do you keep a record of

          22       what's going on, in other words in relation to this

          23       operation, Dibri, and the intelligence that's coming in?

          24   A.  The intelligence officer keeps a record.

          25   Q.  Yes.  But do you keep a record of any kind?


                                            66
 

 

 


           1   A.  No.

           2   Q.  No day book?

           3   A.  No.

           4   Q.  Nothing?

           5   A.  No.  I've got my decision log.

           6   Q.  Yes.  Well, we'll come to that.  On the 3rd, in the

           7       morning, 10.20 to 11.20, you have a meeting, don't you?

           8   A.  Yes, that's right, yes.

           9   Q.  What's the meeting about?

          10   A.  It's a meeting with the Met Intelligence Bureau, ie

          11       SOCA.  It's with the managers of SOCA.

          12   Q.  Because the important point then, on the 3rd, which is

          13       going to be the first day/night, as it were, of the

          14       operation -- is that right --

          15   A.  Yes that's correct.

          16   Q.  -- you need to be assessing and weighing up accurately

          17       the information that's coming through, don't you?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  You need to be reacting to it --

          20   A.  Yes, that's right.

          21   Q.  -- and you need flexibility in relation to that, so

          22       that, rather like the CO19 I have just been through,

          23       there's a flexibility of response?

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   Q.  You don't have any record unfortunately.  Do you think


                                            67
 

 

 


           1       now it would have been better if you had kept a record

           2       of some of these meetings?

           3   A.  Which meetings are you referring to?

           4   Q.  Well, the one with the intelligence officers for a start

           5       off --

           6   A.  Yes, I did --

           7   Q.  -- at 10.20 on the 3rd?

           8   A.  I did keep a record of that meeting.

           9   Q.  Did you?

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  Where is it?

          12   A.  It's in my decision log.

          13   Q.  Right, let's look at it.  Could we have, therefore, the

          14       decision log for the 3rd up on the screen.  Perhaps you

          15       have it in front of you.  I think the jury still have

          16       it, CD286 -- I have it at 288 but it doesn't matter --

          17       decision number 19, 3 August -- 288/289, decision 19,

          18       3 August.  Since you mentioned it, I'm going to ask you

          19       about this, I hope the jury still have the copies of

          20       that.

          21           The meeting I've mentioned happened at -- according

          22       to others who have kept a record -- at 10.20 to 11.20;

          23       something of that order.  Also at the meeting, just

          24       before we turn to the decision log, was the Strategic

          25       Firearms Commander, that's Fiona Mallon; she was there.


                                            68
 

 

 


           1   A.  That's right, yes.

           2   Q.  The thing is, this meeting had occurred because she

           3       wanted this, didn't she?

           4   A.  Yes, we were both in agreement to have a meeting.

           5   Q.  She had wanted it actually the day before, hadn't she,

           6       the 2nd?

           7   A.  We arranged it from the day before, yes.

           8   Q.  She wanted it on the 2nd but it couldn't happen.  She

           9       had already authorised this whole operation on the 2nd,

          10       before she had the meeting with the intelligence; that's

          11       right, isn't it?

          12   A.  That's right, yes.

          13   Q.  Yes.  That's really not a very happy way round, is it?

          14   A.  Why is that?

          15   Q.  To authorise an operation before you have had a meeting

          16       about clarifying the intelligence?

          17   A.  No, well, the meeting wasn't about clarifying the

          18       intelligence.  The intelligence -- that operation was

          19       authorised based on the intelligence at that time.

          20   Q.  Well, I'll have to come back to that.

          21           However, the intelligence at the time which was the

          22       basis of the authorisation in fact was intelligence --

          23       I'm going to put it globally -- related to nightclubs

          24       and parties and that sort of thing?

          25   A.  Yes.


                                            69
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Essentially?

           2   A.  Essentially, yes.

           3   Q.  I summarise.  But of course what was coming through from

           4       the Serious Organised Crime Agency was something far

           5       more specific than that, wasn't it?

           6   A.  Yes, it was, yes.

           7   Q.  Perhaps you can deal with it now or if not perhaps over

           8       lunch you could check it.  There was no information or

           9       intelligence coming through from the Serious Organised

          10       Crime Agency to suggest increased gun crime to do with

          11       nightclubs and party, was there?

          12   A.  Yes, there was.  This was going back to the issue --

          13       I mean, I will try and make this quite clear.  Back in

          14       June, when we had intelligence that was developing

          15       around young men armed with guns going into nightclubs,

          16       and the examples were given -- and we have already

          17       discussed yesterday -- was intelligence that Mark Duggan

          18       had let shots off in a car park, shooting of a DJ.

          19           This wasn't just one person.  It was an issue -- it

          20       was a problem, basically, with guns in clubs, and this

          21       is one of the issues that we were looking at to try and

          22       tackle.  So back in June, the focus of the operation was

          23       as if -- we have used this as a tried and tested tactic

          24       before -- we would book surveillance teams and CO19

          25       officers for a week period, and we have to book them in


                                            70
 

 

 


           1       advance because of the problems we have in getting the

           2       resources.

           3           By doing that, we know that, generally, from

           4       an intelligence picture, that these guys were generally

           5       going out, it tended to be of an evening time, and

           6       either arranging to collect firearms or they are

           7       actually going out on the Friday or the Saturday night

           8       in possession of firearms and taking them into the

           9       clubs.

          10           So that was the purpose of that operation.  Now,

          11       based on that intelligence that we had, my decision was

          12       that, okay, let's look into a period in August where we

          13       can get -- make sure that the right resources are

          14       available, and that included the MIB, SOCA intelligence

          15       people, so that we could work in towards the weekend,

          16       and that included my officers from the pro-active team,

          17       the firearms team, the surveillance team so it's a whole

          18       host of people.

          19           What we had to is make sure they are available to

          20       work evenings over that period of time, and what we do,

          21       in order to respond to it, as the intelligence comes in

          22       that week -- because it's happening all the time.  Even

          23       throughout that period, up until then, anything could

          24       have changed and we have to be that flexible because, as

          25       you will find out later, that there was intelligence on


                                            71
 

 

 


           1       22 June which suggested that he was -- Mark Duggan was

           2       looking to take possession of a gun.

           3           So that could have changed, that situation, if he

           4       had actually gone and done what he was going to do then

           5       we would have successfully arrested him, taken that gun

           6       off the street and then we would have still continued

           7       with the -- that operation, looking at the other five

           8       subjects.

           9   Q.  What was the question again?  Sorry, it's not a memory

          10       test.

          11   A.  No, I'm trying to make it clear --

          12   Q.  What was the question, please?

          13   A.  You are going to have to ask me again then, sir.

          14   Q.  Please pay attention to the answer, you can say what you

          15       want.  The question was: there was no intelligence from

          16       the Serious Organised Crime Agency linked to parties and

          17       nightclubs, was there?

          18   A.  No, that's right.

          19   Q.  Right.

          20   A.  But there was historic intelligence that suggested that.

          21   Q.  There was no intelligence from the Serious Organised

          22       Crime Agency about nightclubs and parties, correct?

          23   A.  Are you talking about on the 3rd and 4th or ever?

          24   Q.  I am eventually working back to the mid-June, so if you

          25       hold it on mid-June when this operation was set up.


                                            72
 

 

 


           1   A.  Sorry, sir, you need to be --

           2   Q.  Let's deal with the 3rd, 4th and 5th.  Was there any

           3       recent intelligence -- we are on the 3rd at the

           4       moment -- to suggest, from SOCA, that nightclubs and

           5       parties was the problem?

           6   A.  Not at that -- on the 3rd and 4th, no.

           7   Q.  Let's deal with what the intelligence actually was at

           8       that time.  I need to know from you what you knew and

           9       what decisions were taken because we've got your

          10       decision log.

          11           Now, in the decision log, the reference to

          12       Mark Duggan is on the second page, as we see.  That was

          13       read out yesterday:

          14           "Most likely at the moment to be involved in

          15       possession of firearms ..." and so on.

          16           What time did you write that?

          17   A.  It would have been after the meeting with the MIB

          18       people.

          19   Q.  What time did you write it?

          20   A.  Well, it would have been in the afternoon, I cannot tell

          21       you the time.

          22   Q.  Why was it not entered up?

          23   A.  I should have written the time in there.

          24   Q.  Would you agree you're a bit lax in your record keeping?

          25   A.  No, not at all.


                                            73
 

 

 


           1   Q.  No?  Where is the note of what happened at the meeting

           2       at 10.20?

           3   A.  What note, sir?

           4   Q.  That's the point.  You directed us to this decision log,

           5       where is the note about the intelligence that was coming

           6       in from SOCA, amongst other things, in the morning?

           7   A.  The meeting with SOCA was around the direction of

           8       Operation Dibri as a whole.  It wasn't specifically

           9       around the intelligence that was coming in.

          10           During that meeting -- the meeting was held because

          11       of the fact that obviously a great deal of investment

          12       had been made in that meeting, it had been running

          13       a fair amount of time and, as you'll see in the decision

          14       that I've -- the log that I've kept of that meeting --

          15       the MIB, ie AKA SOCA, strongly believed the operation

          16       should continue.

          17   Q.  Where is there any record of what you were told about

          18       the SOCA intelligence on the 3rd?

          19   A.  There is no record about the intelligence because we're

          20       restricted legally to record anything around the

          21       intelligence.

          22   Q.  You are not restricted in terms of decisions that are

          23       taken in relation to it, are you?

          24   A.  No, not at all.

          25   Q.  No.


                                            74
 

 

 


           1   A.  But it hasn't changed --

           2   Q.  I'm going to put to you -- before you say anything else,

           3       I'm going to put to you the intelligence which we

           4       understand -- we don't know the times because we are not

           5       shown the originals.  On the 3rd -- I am going to read

           6       you another passage from SOCA.  Was SOCA actually at the

           7       meeting?

           8   A.  What, the MIB meeting?

           9   Q.  Yes.

          10   A.  It was MIB managers who are part of the SOCA, as --

          11   Q.  Yes.  So was it at their premises, Serious Organised

          12       Crime Agency, or was it at your premises?

          13   A.  No, it was at their premises.

          14   Q.  It was at their premises?

          15   A.  That's right.

          16   Q.  They are in central London?

          17   A.  That's right.

          18   Q.  So the meeting at their premises, with SOCA

          19       intelligence, is very close to, obviously, being told

          20       directly what they know about Dibri and the operation.

          21   A.  It was, as I said earlier, it was an overview of that

          22       operation and it was with the managers of -- from MIB

          23       that we had the meeting with.

          24   Q.  I'm going to read you what they, that is SOCA, says, was

          25       being communicated to you.  What I want to know is


                                            75
 

 

 


           1       whether you had it from them directly on the 3rd or you

           2       got it by telephone or you don't know.  This is what

           3       they say:

           4           "On the 3 August ..."

           5           The same person at SOCA, Serious Organised Crime

           6       Agency:

           7           "... received further intelligence that Mark Duggan

           8       still wished to collect the firearm from the male whom

           9       we now believe to be Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.  There was

          10       still insufficient intelligence to identify where the

          11       firearm was being stored beyond the premises of the

          12       female associate.  It was probably in the Leyton area.

          13       The intelligence indicated that Kevin Hutchinson-Foster

          14       intended to travel out of London later that evening."

          15           That's the 3rd, and also on the 3rd:

          16           "I subsequently ..."

          17           That's the SOCA person:

          18           "... received intelligence that indicated that

          19       Mark Duggan would not be in a position to collect the

          20       firearm as he was attending a family BBQ."

          21           Did you know all that on the morning of the 3rd?

          22   MR KEITH:  Could my learned friend read the next sentence,

          23       please.  He said in terms "You were told all this

          24       intelligence".

          25           Could you read the next sentence, please?


                                            76
 

 

 


           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes.

           2   MR MANSFIELD:  I'm asking whether you -- I will read the

           3       next sentence -- were you told that?  I am not

           4       suggesting you were.  I don't know what the answer is,

           5       you have kept no record.  Were you told that?

           6   A.  At the meeting -- at the meeting that I had with MIB --

           7   Q.  I'm sorry, I am going to interrupt.  You give very long

           8       answers, we will be here all day.  Is it yes --

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You are being told "We are not being

          10       given a long enough question", in as much as refusing to

          11       read the next little bit, so you read the next little

          12       bit and we will get Mr Foote to answer the question.

          13   MR MANSFIELD:  "I ..."

          14           That's the SOCA officer:

          15           "... disseminated all of this intelligence to ZZ17

          16       by telephone."

          17   A.  Thank you.  That meeting I had with MIB, at the SOCA

          18       premises, was with the managers and it was talking about

          19       the overall direction --

          20   Q.  I'm sorry, we have been through that.  I am going to ask

          21       you please to answer the question: did you get that

          22       intelligence?

          23   A.  I did not get that intelligence from that SOCA --

          24       because that SOCA officer was not in that meeting.

          25   Q.  So it the SOCA officer you're talking about A10, who was


                                            77
 

 

 


           1       not at the meeting?

           2   A.  Yes, A10.

           3   Q.  A10.  You see, we don't have the times.  I'm sorry to go

           4       to you to have to ask for this.  We don't know when it

           5       was disseminated other than on the 3rd.  I don't know

           6       when ZZ17 himself got it by telephone.  What I wanted to

           7       know was whether you got this precise information, and

           8       you say, no, you didn't get it in the meeting.

           9   A.  I didn't get it in the meeting.

          10   Q.  No.  Was the name Kevin Hutchinson-Foster mentioned by

          11       any of the SOCA officials at the meeting?

          12   A.  Not that I recall, no.

          13   Q.  So that meeting goes by -- I want to go obviously later

          14       in the day, if we can finally get a time.  Did you ever

          15       find out, on the 3rd, the information I've just read

          16       out?  I can read it again if you wish.

          17   A.  No, I was aware on the 3rd that the intelligence had

          18       suggested that Mark Duggan was -- arranged to take

          19       a gun -- take possession of a gun from

          20       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.

          21   Q.  Yes.  Did you know that it was not going to happen that

          22       evening, according to the intelligence, because he was

          23       at a BBQ and Kevin Hutchinson-Foster was out of London?

          24   A.  Yes, I was aware of the fact that it wasn't going to

          25       happen that evening.  I didn't know the details around


                                            78
 

 

 


           1       that aspect.

           2   Q.  You were aware it wasn't going to happen.

           3   A.  Mm.

           4   Q.  Now, I want to ask you when you discovered that, the

           5       bulk of that information, on the 3rd?

           6   A.  Well, the -- in relation to the fact that Kevin

           7       Hutchinson-Foster was the person that Mark Duggan was

           8       going to take the -- possession of the firearm from,

           9       I was aware of that on the close of play on the 2nd.

          10   Q.  On the 2nd?  I haven't got back to the 2nd yet, so all

          11       right.  You knew it from the 2nd and on the 3rd.  So at

          12       some point on the 3rd you got, as it were, combined

          13       information pointing to a transfer of ownership between

          14       one person -- Kevin Hutchinson-Foster -- who's got the

          15       gun, and Duggan, who hasn't got the gun?

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  Right.  Of course, none of this appears in the decision

          18       log, does it, whenever it was made up?

          19   A.  No, it wasn't in the decision log, no.

          20   Q.  You don't have a separate record in relation to this

          21       either, do you?

          22   A.  No, the record already kept, no.

          23   Q.  Yes, well, we've asked for that record and we have had

          24       it gisted and I'm afraid it doesn't help much at the

          25       moment.


                                            79
 

 

 


           1           Now, just going forward -- I'm still on the 3rd; do

           2       you appreciate that?

           3   A.  Yes, I do.

           4   Q.  I'm still on the 3rd.  I want to ask you this -- and you

           5       are involved at this stage?

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  Who was tasked to consider the name Kevin

           8       Hutchinson-Foster as the owner of the gun?

           9   A.  Who was tasked to consider it?  What do you mean by

          10       that?

          11   Q.  Who was tasked to consider Kevin Hutchinson-Foster and

          12       everything about him?

          13   A.  I think you need to be a little bit specific around

          14       "consider", I'm not sure what you are saying.  Are you

          15       talking about who's being tasked to do any research on

          16       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster or what?

          17   Q.  Well, you're the Senior Investigating Officer --

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  -- you've known since the 2nd -- and I suggest it goes

          20       back even further, but certainly the 2nd, you've known

          21       for -- well, we don't know when this was written up but

          22       let's say at least 24 hours, you have known about Kevin

          23       Hutchinson-Foster as a person with a gun?

          24   A.  That's right, yes.

          25   Q.  You would want to do something about that, would you


                                            80
 

 

 


           1       not?

           2   A.  Yes, that's right.

           3   Q.  The first thing is to find out what you can about Kevin

           4       Hutchinson-Foster, is it not?

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  Who is doing that?

           7   A.  The -- ZZ17 will be tasking somebody to do that.

           8   Q.  Would he?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  Who tasked him?

          11   A.  Who tasked ZZ17?

          12   Q.  Yes.

          13   A.  Well, the moment he received -- we're not robots, we do

          14       have the ability to think outside the box a little bit.

          15       So as a Detective Sergeant he is a competent,

          16       experienced detective.  He receives the information, the

          17       intelligence, and he would be tasking officers to do

          18       some research around that.  I don't need to task him to

          19       do that.

          20   Q.  I see.  Because, of course, in the decision log and in

          21       the other documents, and in the original statements that

          22       you all make, Kevin Hutchinson-Foster hardly features,

          23       does he?

          24   A.  Well, we've got statements to show that Kevin

          25       Hutchinson-Foster features, yes.


                                            81
 

 

 


           1   Q.  No, features in your investigative role.  First of

           2       all --

           3   MR KEITH:  Sir, I'm so sorry.  My learned friend knows full

           4       well that the original statements were taken at the

           5       request of the IPCC who investigated the death of

           6       Mark Duggan.  There have been numerous statements over

           7       the years since the tragic events of that day and it

           8       cannot be put to a witness in terms that there is

           9       something mysterious or suspicious about the fact that

          10       the statements did not address in detail Kevin

          11       Hutchinson-Foster.

          12           He was not at that time, as my learned friend knows,

          13       a subject of the investigation because the investigation

          14       centred on Mr Duggan's death.

          15   MR MANSFIELD:  I appreciate that and of course that's the

          16       question.

          17           You made a statement -- you have already seen it,

          18       I can deal with it quickly -- your original statement,

          19       dated 9 January 2012, only mentions Kevin

          20       Hutchinson-Foster after the event of the killing.  All

          21       the events before that, no reference to Kevin

          22       Hutchinson-Foster.  You can look at it if you wish.

          23           Of course, later people come along and ask you -- do

          24       you follow?

          25   A.  Yes, I do, yes.


                                            82
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Yes.  What did you discover before the 4th, the day

           2       we've been dealing with -- what did you discover on

           3       the 3rd about Kevin Hutchinson-Foster?

           4   A.  Well, the only -- I didn't discover anything.  It was

           5       a case of the intelligence suggested that Kevin

           6       Hutchinson-Foster was a person that he was looking to

           7       take a firearm -- I shouldn't say "he" -- Mark Duggan

           8       was looking to take the firearm from him.

           9   Q.  Mr Foote, a little bit more than that.  You know that,

          10       I have just read that intelligence out.  As

          11       an investigating officer who isn't a robot, or ZZ17 who

          12       isn't a robot, so you go of and do the investigation;

          13       what did you discover on the 3rd about this man?

          14   A.  Well, the fact -- what I mentioned to you yesterday, was

          15       the fact that this is a person who's not long been out

          16       of prison.

          17   Q.  Right.  Let's just take it in stages.  When had he been

          18       released from prison?

          19   A.  From recollection, about three or four months before the

          20       barber shop incident.

          21   Q.  8 April 2011; do you know that date?

          22   A.  Not specifically, no.

          23   Q.  It's not difficult to discover though, is it?

          24   A.  No.

          25   Q.  I mean, on the 3rd, it doesn't take, again, a robot to


                                            83
 

 

 


           1       do it, there's a criminal record number, isn't there,

           2       for it?

           3   A.  That's right, there is, yes.

           4   Q.  The Criminal Records Office would have it, it's the most

           5       straightforward bit of information you can get.

           6   A.  Yes, that's right. yes.

           7   Q.  So who discovered that?

           8   A.  Well, that would have been whoever has been tasked to do

           9       the research.

          10   Q.  Exactly.  Who was tasked to do it?

          11   A.  I don't know because it was not my responsibility to

          12       task that person.  But you are almost suggesting that

          13       I've -- do the research myself --

          14   Q.  No.

          15   A.  Well, you are.

          16   Q.  I asked you who you tasked.

          17   A.  I had not tasked anyone because that's done by ZZ17.

          18   Q.  I never suggested you would do the research.  My first

          19       and initial question was who was tasked to do the work

          20       on somebody who has a gun who may convey it to Mark

          21       Duggan, who's one of your targets; do you follow?

          22       That's the point.

          23   A.  Oh, right.  I do, yes.

          24   Q.  Having been in prison, therefore there will be a file,

          25       won't there, on Hutchinson-Foster?


                                            84
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes.

           2   Q.  Yes.  Did you see it on the 3rd?

           3   A.  No.

           4   Q.  Why not?

           5   A.  Because that's, again, not for me to know about.

           6       I would just get gists of information.

           7   Q.  I'm sorry, you're the Senior Investigating Officer, you

           8       are not a robot, you would say "Give me the file, I want

           9       to see all about this or, if I have not got time to look

          10       at it, you tell me what's in the file"; it's pretty

          11       straightforward, isn't it?

          12   A.  Yes, I would just get a rough summary of it --

          13   Q.  What was the rough summary?

          14   A.  The summary was the fact he had been in prison, he had

          15       come out, it was for -- I think it might have been

          16       a drug supply offence, he had a history of -- I think at

          17       the time of arrest, involved in firearms.

          18   Q.  Yes?  This is somebody you might be interested in, isn't

          19       it?

          20   A.  He came from the Hackney area.  Yes, that's roughly

          21       what --

          22   Q.  Is that all you knew?

          23   A.  From what I can remember, yes.

          24   Q.  Where have you noted any of this down?

          25   A.  I have not noted any of this down.


                                            85
 

 

 


           1   Q.  No, you have not noted any of it down.  Again, it's the

           2       question I've asked you repeatedly: why did you not note

           3       this down somewhere or do you carry it all around in

           4       your head?

           5   A.  I don't need to write this information down.  What

           6       I write down in my decision log is incidents that are

           7       relevant, that don't detract or go away from the

           8       strategic aims.  There were other pro-active techniques,

           9       covert aspects to that Operation Dibri that are recorded

          10       in detail in my decision log, which don't relate to

          11       Mark Duggan.

          12           What we do is, on a day-to-day basis, is respond

          13       spontaneously to intelligence.  So I wouldn't be

          14       receiving a volume of intelligence like that.

          15   Q.  Have you ever looked at the file?

          16   A.  No, I haven't, no.

          17   Q.  No.  I'm not asking these as idle questions, you do

          18       understand?

          19   A.  I understand, yes.

          20   Q.  Do you understand what the point of them is?

          21   A.  No, I'm sure you're going to tell me, sir.

          22   Q.  You don't even now recognise the significance of Kevin

          23       Hutchinson-Foster, his possession of a gun, 2nd, 3rd,

          24       possibly before that, and the need to find out as much

          25       as you can about this man in order to remove the gun


                                            86
 

 

 


           1       from the street; that's pretty fair, isn't it?

           2   A.  I can understand what you're saying.  What we do is

           3       actually go with what the intelligence is telling us.

           4   Q.  Exactly.

           5   A.  The intelligence is telling us -- and it's been quite

           6       specific.  So, for example -- I think I made this point

           7       yesterday -- that the fact that we've identified who

           8       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster was, and even located where

           9       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster was, there's no specific

          10       intelligence to say where that firearm was --

          11   Q.  Mr Foote --

          12   A.  -- or how we were going to --

          13   Q.  Mr Foote, you had specific intelligence that

          14       Mr Hutchinson-Foster had possession of a gun and was

          15       going to hand it over.

          16   A.  But we didn't know where that gun was.

          17   Q.  Very simple strategies come into place, don't they?

          18   A.  You're going to have to elaborate --

          19   Q.  I'm sorry, please think.  What are the strategies, once

          20       you --

          21   MR KEITH:  I'm so sorry.  Again, my learned friend must be

          22       careful.  He knows perfectly well that the intelligence

          23       was -- and we have A10's statement -- possession or

          24       control.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We are not concerned either with


                                            87
 

 

 


           1       ownership but the position is you have just told the

           2       jury that we did not know where the gun was.

           3   A.  That's right.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Could you have done anything,

           5       looking back on it now, to have found out more than

           6       actually was found out about where that gun --

           7   A.  No, because the -- I can see where you're coming from,

           8       you're thinking why didn't we just do an operation

           9       around Kevin Hutchinson-Foster at that short -- that

          10       sort of late stage in the operation.  But the problem we

          11       have, and this is -- this is why Trident has developed

          12       the way we do work now, on the basis that what we have

          13       is one person who's got control of a firearm.

          14           There is no specific way of finding out where that

          15       firearm is unless the information is going to be really

          16       specific.  It either comes from -- well, I cannot

          17       explain -- it's difficult to explain this.

          18   MR MANSFIELD:  Mr Foote, can I just -- it's not --

          19   A.  It is -- what I'm trying to do is make the jury

          20       understand that it's not as easy as it sounds, by

          21       putting someone under surveillance "Oh right, okay,

          22       well, the gun must be there".  It doesn't work like

          23       that.

          24           How it generally works is that we have guys like

          25       this who will hide guns at other people's addresses, we


                                            88
 

 

 


           1       call them safe houses, I think I mentioned this

           2       yesterday.  What is quite common is that the safe houses

           3       tend to be girls or young people, and we've had 110

           4       young women charged with firearm offences over the last

           5       seven years, and that's what makes it difficult to

           6       identify where they are.

           7           That person will have control over that firearm, but

           8       we will not necessarily see where that firearm is or

           9       actually know which address it is.  If it's not in a

          10       house, then it could be hidden in a garden.  We often do

          11       estate sweeps where estates -- uniformed officers run

          12       through the estates looking in hidey-holes for firearms,

          13       and they have had a relatively successful -- been quite

          14       successful around that.

          15           So it's not as easy as thinking, "Well, what can you

          16       do about Kevin Hutchinson-Foster".  It's

          17       considered: what can we do?  No, we'll stick with the

          18       intelligence.  We know that Mark Duggan is going to

          19       collect a firearm and he's going to take possession of

          20       that firearm.  We don't know where it is.  We know that

          21       someone is going to provide it to him, and that person

          22       will either direct him into a location or pick it up

          23       from a third person or they will hand it over

          24       themselves.

          25           In this case, it happened to be


                                            89
 

 

 


           1       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster actually handing it over.  And,

           2       like I said to you yesterday, sometimes we have

           3       a runner -- or they have a runner -- that will do it for

           4       them.  So it will be another person will pick it up,

           5       take it from whatever location it may be and hand it

           6       over, and it could have been in that case --

           7   Q.  The intelligence was not like that, was it?  It was that

           8       they were going to meet, Duggan and Hutchinson-Foster,

           9       wasn't it?

          10   MS LEEK:  I wonder if might assist at this point.  In

          11       fairness to this witness, on 1 August it was -- SOCA

          12       received intelligence that the male associate was

          13       storing a firearm at the premises of an unidentified

          14       female.  So it wasn't a situation here that it was known

          15       that Kevin Hutchinson-Foster was storing the firearm.

          16           In fairness to the witness, who may not have seen

          17       this specific intelligence, that is the position in

          18       A10's statement and that was the position as

          19       communicated to ZZ17.

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much, Ms Leek.

          21       I think at that moment we have reached a good time for

          22       us, while we are thinking all about that, to have

          23       a break through until 2 o'clock.

          24           Members of the jury, thank you for your

          25       concentration this morning.


                                            90
 

 

 


           1           We'll firstly allow Mr Foote to go first.  The same

           2       warning as before, Mr Foote.  Thank you very much.  Can

           3       you be back at 2, please.  Thank you very much indeed.

           4       If you would like to leave everything there on the

           5       witness box.

           6                      (The witness withdrew)

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Members of the jury, in a moment we

           8       will also let you escape.  Thank you very much.  We will

           9       turn off the feed upstairs.  All right then, members of

          10       the jury, if you would like to go then with the jury

          11       bailiff.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                            91
 

 

 


          12   (1.04 pm)

          13                     (The short adjournment)

          14   (2.00 pm)

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Can we have the jury in now, please?

          16                  (In the presence of the jury)

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much, members of the

          18       jury.  We will have the witness then, please.  Mr Foote.

          19                      (The witness returned)

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much, Mr Foote, you

          21       continue to be under your affirmation as before.

          22       I believe all the documents are still there as before,

          23       and we will continue with the questioning from

          24       Mr Mansfield.

          25   MR MANSFIELD:  Thank you very much.  We were, before lunch,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


                                            92
 

 

 


           1       dealing with the 3rd.  Is there a document you want?

           2   A.  No, it's just that it was my pack that I brought in and

           3       it's not there.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You tucked it under there.  There

           5       was something.  I hope that nothing --

           6   A.  My papers here, I don't know where they are.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- was removed from there.  You had

           8       statements there, didn't you?

           9   A.  Yes, I did, my own statements that I brought in.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I don't know what's happened.  Has

          11       anything been removed from the witness box.  What I've

          12       got back is my jury bundle I gave you.  You have another

          13       one there, but there were some other statements there.

          14   A.  Yes, there were, yes.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Unless you put them in the back of

          16       this, did you?  No?

          17   A.  No.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  There we are.  (Handed)

          19   A.  Lovely, cheers.

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I don't know how that happened, that

          21       shouldn't have happened.  Are you okay now, Mr Foote?

          22   A.  Yes, I am.

          23   MR MANSFIELD:  We were dealing with the 3 August, the day

          24       before the 4th, obviously.

          25   A.  Yes.


                                            93
 

 

 


           1   Q.  What I would like to do at this stage, because I'm

           2       talking about other options, other ways this could have

           3       been planned -- you appreciate that's the context?

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  I read you the information coming through from A10, that

           6       is the hieroglyphic for the Serious Organised Crime

           7       Agency, on the 3rd.  Now, what I'm going to do now,

           8       perhaps to save time rather than go through it seriatim,

           9       I am going to give you the totality of the information

          10       about Kevin Hutchinson-Foster that was coming through

          11       from A10, including what happened on the 3rd.  I have

          12       already read you what was disseminated on the 4th.

          13           So all the information up to, as far as I can tell,

          14       the end of the 3rd, all right?

          15   A.  Okay.

          16   Q.  The first date which we're told information came through

          17       from them to ZZ17 -- that's the intelligence Detective

          18       Sergeant -- was 31 July.  So it's just before the period

          19       you had prebooked, all right?  You had prebooked 3, 4,

          20       5, and 6 August.  On 31 July you get this information,

          21       and it is that Mark Duggan wished to collect a firearm

          22       from a male associate whose name was Kevin, all right?

          23       I'm going slowly.

          24   MS LEEK:  I wonder if we could be a little more accurate.

          25       It actually says:


                                            94
 

 

 


           1           "Mark Duggan wished to collect the firearm from

           2       a male associate.  This intelligence indicated that the

           3       male might be called Kevin.  There was insufficient

           4       intelligence to establish the male's identity, where the

           5       firearm was being stored or when it was going to be

           6       collected."

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much, very useful,

           8       thank you.

           9   MR MANSFIELD:  I repeat: on 31 July, you, your Trident

          10       operation, are aware that Mark Duggan wished to collect

          11       a firearm, all right?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  Right.  From somebody thought to be called Kevin, right?

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  I appreciate nothing else, didn't know where it was and

          16       so forth.  This is simply the beginning.  The very next

          17       day, further intelligence, that:

          18           "... the male associate [thought to be Kevin] was

          19       holding the firearm stored at the premises of

          20       an unidentified female and, due to the female's absence

          21       at work ..."

          22           I am reading what it says, I am not paraphrasing:

          23           "... each day he [Kevin] would not be able to gain

          24       entry to the premises to retrieve the firearm until she

          25       returned from work some time mid-to-late evening."


                                            95
 

 

 


           1           I'm pausing on that one.  Do you remember that

           2       intelligence?

           3   A.  No, the intelligence I recall was the fact that Kevin is

           4       the person who was to supply the firearm but there was

           5       a suggestion it wouldn't be until the evening.  The

           6       details of the fact that someone was going to be out and

           7       couldn't get access to -- obviously I wasn't aware of

           8       that.

           9   Q.  You were not aware of that?

          10   A.  No.

          11   Q.  Well, on the next day, that's 2 August --

          12   A.  Which is the next day?  Next day is the 2nd or --

          13   Q.  Well, the information I have just read out came through

          14       on the 1st.

          15   A.  Right, okay.

          16   Q.  Now, I'll go slowly.  The 31st, Duggan wished to collect

          17       a firearm from somebody thought to be Kevin -- might be

          18       Kevin.

          19   A.  Is that the 31st being a Sunday?

          20   Q.  You're meaning you wouldn't have known it?

          21   A.  Well, certainly I wasn't working on the Sunday.

          22   Q.  No, no, all right.  I'm really building this up because

          23       by the 3rd, which is not a Sunday, the day on which we

          24       are actually dealing with what options you considered on

          25       the 3rd in the light of intelligence; do you understand?


                                            96
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes, I do, yes.

           2   Q.  Right.  So, again, 1 August, I will read it once more:

           3           "... further intelligence that the male associate

           4       [thought to be Kevin] holding this firearm, stored it at

           5       the premises of an unidentified female and, due to the

           6       female's absence at work each day, he would not be able

           7       to gain entry to the premises to retrieve the firearm

           8       until she returned from work some time mid-to-late

           9       evening."

          10           That's information you knew some time before the

          11       3rd?

          12   A.  Yes.  As a team we will have known that, yes.

          13   Q.  Yes, as a team, all right.

          14   A.  Or certainly the intelligence officer would know that,

          15       yes.

          16   Q.  So it's Mark Duggan to collect a gun and Kevin also to

          17       collect the gun stored somewhere else?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  Right.  You've accepted this is all coming from

          20       a reliable source?

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  On 2 August, again reading what A10 says about that, he

          23       or she:

          24           "... received intelligence that Kevin

          25       Hutchinson-Foster would not be in London ..."


                                            97
 

 

 


           1           That's on the 2nd:

           2           "... in the evening, so Mark Duggan would not be

           3       able to meet with him to collect the firearm."

           4           Did you know that?

           5   A.  Yes, I was aware of some of that, yes.

           6   Q.  Yes.  So pause before we get -- I'm just going to read

           7       out again what was just before lunch, what happened on

           8       the 3rd.  This is useful information and intelligence,

           9       isn't it?

          10   A.  Yes, it's useful.  It shows that Mark Duggan's intent

          11       was still to take possession of a firearm, yes, and take

          12       possession of a firearm by a person named Kevin, yes.

          13   Q.  Yes, and, that Kevin Hutchinson-Foster's got the gun

          14       under his control one way or another?

          15   A.  Yes, he's got constructive possession of it, yes.

          16   Q.  Yes, but he's going to get it from the woman who's got

          17       it.  That's how it's being put, isn't it?

          18   A.  Yes, that's right.

          19   Q.  Yes.  Of course, it could be a myriad of other

          20       possibilities but that's the intelligence, isn't it?

          21   A.  That's right, yes.

          22   Q.  So you do take the intelligence into account as it being

          23       an intelligence led operation?

          24   A.  That's right, it is, yes.

          25   Q.  Right.  Now, we get to the 3rd, so you now see the


                                            98
 

 

 


           1       context of the previous:

           2           "On 3 August, I received further intelligence that

           3       Mark Duggan still wished to collect the firearm from the

           4       male, who I now believe to be Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.

           5       There was still insufficient intelligence to identify

           6       where the firearm was being stored, beyond the premises

           7       of the female associate was probably in the Leyton area.

           8       The intelligence indicated that Kevin Hutchinson-Foster

           9       intended to travel out of London later that evening."

          10           That's the 3rd:

          11           "I subsequently ..."

          12           It is impliedly the 3rd:

          13           "I [A10] subsequently received intelligence that

          14       indicated that Mark Duggan would not be in a position to

          15       collect the firearm as he was attending a family BBQ."

          16           I asked you about this before lunch.  You said this

          17       did not come up at the intelligence meeting in the

          18       morning.

          19   A.  That's right.

          20   Q.  A10 said he disseminated all of this to ZZ17 by

          21       telephone.

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  Right.  But you've agreed that you did know this before

          24       you wrote up the decision log that we've already seen.

          25   A.  I agreed I --


                                            99
 

 

 


           1   Q.  You did know all this intelligence?

           2   A.  Yes, I did, yes.

           3   Q.  Although the decision log is not timed, you have

           4       indicated that you would have known this before you

           5       wrote the log up?

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  Right.  Finally, and this is why I said what I did

           8       before lunch:

           9           "The intelligence throughout this period ..."

          10           Just reflect: the period in the statement is 31 July

          11       through to the 3rd in this particular statement; it only

          12       goes up to the 3rd:

          13           "... throughout this period indicated that

          14       Mark Duggan, upon collection of the firearm, would store

          15       it at unidentified premises."

          16           So that's the information/intelligence up to

          17       the 3rd.

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  Right.  Now, is all of that clear or do I need to repeat

          20       any of it?

          21   A.  No, it's quite clear.  The only thing that I needed to

          22       bring to the jury's attention is that intelligence comes

          23       in at different times throughout the day.  So the way

          24       that you were sort of putting it across sounded like it

          25       was all coming in in one big lump.


                                           100
 

 

 


           1   Q.  No, no, I'm not.

           2   A.  So your decision making changes throughout the day or,

           3       you know, you might take different tacks throughout the

           4       day depending on what comes in.  For example, he was

           5       intent on taking it on the 2nd, and on the 3rd, on both

           6       occasions, it didn't develop.  That's the term that

           7       I use in relation -- as I've been describing before.

           8   Q.  I do appreciate that, I have not suggested to you --

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Can you let him answer.

          10   A.  Yes, so in relation to what activity, if you like, would

          11       be taken is if -- as the intelligence developed, if it

          12       became specific then we would act on that, as in there

          13       was something that could be actionable, ie they are

          14       going to do it now or the gun is at this address or this

          15       location.

          16           The fact that, as the intelligence developed

          17       throughout the day, that it was a change of "Well, Kevin

          18       Hutchinson-Foster is now going out of town, out of

          19       London", so that wasn't going to happen.  Then

          20       Mark Duggan was going to go to a BBQ the following

          21       evening, so that wasn't going to happen, so we're back

          22       to where we are.

          23   Q.  Do you know what your squad did on 3 August in the

          24       evening?

          25   A.  Yes, they -- they actually went down to Quicksilver and


                                           101
 

 

 


           1       did the briefing for the operation.

           2   Q.  What did they do in the evening, despite this

           3       intelligence?

           4   A.  Well, this is the point I'm trying to make --

           5   Q.  What did they do in the evening of the 3rd?

           6   A.  Well, they were waiting to respond to developments in

           7       regard --

           8   Q.  Where did they go on the evening of the 3rd?

           9   A.  Well, they went round to the location round Mark

          10       Duggan's.

          11   Q.  Yes.  You see -- and I would be much obliged if I could

          12       have it now, sir -- we would like to know the times when

          13       this information and intelligence -- because of course,

          14       it's vital to know when ZZ17 got this material, for

          15       example, on the 3rd.  When was it passed over?

          16           I don't want to know where it came from, I don't

          17       want to know when SOCA got it.  I want to know, if this

          18       is fair, when it was passed on.  Because obviously

          19       somebody will say, as has just been said, "Well, we

          20       didn't get it in time for that" or the other.  I think

          21       the point is obvious.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  No, no, I understand the point.  The

          23       question is we have Mr Foote in the witness box now.

          24           Can you help us about that or not?

          25   A.  No, I can't, no.


                                           102
 

 

 


           1   MR MANSFIELD:  But there is someone in the room who can.

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Well, maybe.  But we've only got

           3       this witness and you are not making speeches.

           4   MR MANSFIELD:  I do not want to ask him back, that's the

           5       problem, sir.

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I'm sure Mr Foote would be very

           7       pleased to come back and see us again in the future but

           8       I think he's rather hopeful he might be able to escape

           9       at the end of this.

          10   MR MANSFIELD:  So am I.  However, may I just go on then.

          11           I'm going to take the latest possible time on the

          12       3rd, all right?  So some time in the late evening of the

          13       3rd, it's reasonable to suppose that somebody in your

          14       team, like ZZ17, will have the composite picture that

          15       I have just read out, coming through in dribs and drabs.

          16   A.  Yes, that's right.

          17   Q.  He will have the composite picture?

          18   A.  Yes, he would.

          19   Q.  Yes, he would.  In order to respond to the composite

          20       picture, you would have to consider it, wouldn't you?

          21   A.  Yes, you would.

          22   Q.  Right.  Now, I want to ask you whether, late on on the

          23       3rd, you considered targeting Kevin Hutchinson-Foster?

          24   A.  No.

          25   Q.  You didn't even consider it?


                                           103
 

 

 


           1   A.  No.

           2   Q.  Because I'm going to suggest to you in clearest terms

           3       that it was the most obvious route, at that point late

           4       on the 3rd, and I am going to take you through it in

           5       steps.

           6           First of all, you knew, or could have found out, his

           7       address, didn't you?

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  One of the routes to finding out his address is of

          10       course, having been released from prison, prematurely in

          11       the sense that it was before the end of his sentence, he

          12       was effectively on licence, wasn't he?

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  Yes.  On licence, he was staying at a hostel.

          15   A.  Yes, that's right.

          16   Q.  It would not have been difficult -- and I suggest you

          17       knew where the hostel was.

          18   A.  It would not have been difficult, no.

          19   Q.  No.  In addition to that, of course, the general picture

          20       of Mr Hutchinson-Foster would have been available, would

          21       it not, off the file -- I mentioned it had before

          22       lunch --

          23   A.  That's correct, yes.

          24   Q.  -- which would include other addresses associated with

          25       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster, wouldn't it?


                                           104
 

 

 


           1   A.  Not necessarily.

           2   Q.  No, not necessarily, but I suggest in this case there

           3       were at least three other addresses, other than the

           4       hostel, known to police at this stage, on the

           5       3rd August.

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Are you able to help us about that,

           7       Mr Foote?

           8   A.  No, I can't help you on that.

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I am keen for you just to help us on

          10       your own knowledge --

          11   MR MANSFIELD:  All right, you can't help us.

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- and if you cannot help us then

          13       you can't.

          14   MR MANSFIELD:  In addition to the hostel where he was

          15       staying, he had access to a car; that would have been

          16       traceable, wouldn't it?

          17   A.  I understand he had a car, yes.

          18   Q.  Yes.  In addition to all of that, just a slight

          19       divergence for a moment, he had been himself involved,

          20       on 29 July, in an assault with the very gun in this

          21       case.

          22   A.  That's correct, yes.

          23   Q.  It's a gun that actually had been used by someone else

          24       even earlier than that, hadn't it?

          25   A.  Yes, that's right, yes.


                                           105
 

 

 


           1   Q.  The 11 July?

           2   A.  Yes, that's correct.

           3   Q.  We've only just discovered this, but have you more

           4       details about that one?

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  I am not asking you to say because we haven't been told.

           7       But you have more details on the 11 July?

           8   A.  In relation to the use of the gun on 11 July, yes.

           9   Q.  All right.  I'll leave it there for the moment.  So it's

          10       the gun used on the 11 July, Hutchinson-Foster used it

          11       on the 29 July.

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  I'm going to summarise it: this is what's known as the

          14       pistol-whipping incident in a hairdresser's in Hackney?

          15   A.  Yes, that's right.

          16   Q.  So this is, again, two or three days before the first

          17       intelligence is coming through from A10 on

          18       Mr Hutchinson-Foster -- the first intelligence on a man

          19       thought to be called Kevin, and then developed on the

          20       1st and 2nd, just a few days after this incident on the

          21       29th; are you following me?

          22   A.  Yes, I am, yes.  But Trident weren't aware of the

          23       incident at -- on the 29th at that time.

          24   Q.  Well, you've reviewed that incident, haven't you,

          25       yourself?


                                           106
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes, I have, yes.

           2   Q.  So I'm going to deal with it briefly because it's, if

           3       you like, a subtext.  First of all, there were a number

           4       of witnesses, were there not?

           5   A.  To the assault?

           6   Q.  Yes.

           7   A.  Yes.  Yes, there was.

           8   Q.  The victim was not prepared to cooperate?

           9   A.  That's right, yes.

          10   Q.  But there are two features here.  The hairdresser itself

          11       contained a CCTV, didn't it?

          12   A.  That's right, yes.

          13   Q.  When someone at that time, at Borough level, decided to,

          14       as it were, distil the stills, get the stills off the

          15       CCTV, Kevin Hutchinson-Foster could have been

          16       identified, couldn't he?

          17   A.  Possibly.

          18   Q.  Because you had photographs of Kevin Hutchinson-Foster,

          19       didn't you?

          20   A.  Yes, we did, on the -- certainly by the 3rd, yes.

          21   Q.  Certainly by the 3rd, because they were distributed to

          22       the people at the briefing --

          23   A.  That's right, yes.

          24   Q.  -- on the 3rd.

          25   A.  Yes, that's right.


                                           107
 

 

 


           1   Q.  I am not asking you about that, you weren't there, were

           2       you?

           3   A.  No.

           4   Q.  No, all right.  When you're wanting information --

           5       perhaps I should go back a step.  He, Hutchinson-Foster,

           6       wasn't what you would call a nominal on Trident; he

           7       wasn't somebody part of your target list?

           8   A.  No.

           9   Q.  But if somebody pops up like this -- I don't mean on

          10       the 29th but I mean on the 31st onwards -- one of your

          11       avenues of research could have been at Borough level in

          12       the areas you cover.

          13   A.  It could have been, yes.

          14   Q.  Yes.  Each borough has an intelligence facility?

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  These days, access to that, by your intelligence

          17       officers, is relatively straightforward, isn't it?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  Besides that, that is that possibility to find out if

          20       anybody at borough level knows anything about this man,

          21       of course does Trident have a list of paid or unpaid

          22       informants?

          23   A.  Sorry, a list of paid --

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Does Trident have such a list?

          25   A.  Not to my knowledge, no.


                                           108
 

 

 


           1   MR MANSFIELD:  I'm just asking whether it does, I am not

           2       suggesting it does, I am just asking.  You don't --

           3       I don't mean you personally, but the operation doesn't?

           4   A.  Our operation or Trident as a whole?

           5   Q.  Trident, as a whole.  (Pause)

           6   A.  I'm trying to be careful how I answer this.  There is

           7       an informants' unit that comes under the centre, if you

           8       like, of Metropolitan Police Service.  It's not

           9       necessarily owned by Trident.

          10   Q.  But of course that unit also has an intelligence base.

          11   A.  Yes, it has an intelligence function.  That's their core

          12       role.

          13   Q.  Of course, they might also be able to help in relation

          14       to someone who pops up on the radar, as it were?

          15   A.  Yes, they can do, yes.

          16   Q.  In relation to, therefore, Kevin Hutchinson-Foster,

          17       despite all these possible avenues of discovery, you

          18       don't consider any of them?

          19   A.  The intelligence officers working on my team did do

          20       research around Kevin Hutchinson-Foster, that's how they

          21       identified him and, as a manner of the address, again

          22       that was obtained and aware of that he might be in

          23       a hostel.  None of these aspects assisted in identifying

          24       where the address or location of where the firearm was.

          25   Q.  No, I appreciate that.


                                           109
 

 

 


           1   A.  Certainly -- I just want to take it a step back now to

           2       your reference to the incident at the barber.  Now,

           3       obviously there the name "Kevin" had been mentioned, but

           4       we have got a victim that didn't want to assist the

           5       police, and certainly, in trying to find out information

           6       from that would only have come from the actual crime

           7       report, and all it would say it was "Kev".

           8           You are quite right in relation to the

           9       photographs/stills being obtained but, again, it's --

          10       there's only a possibility that they might have been

          11       identified.

          12   Q.  I want to move forward just to one other aspect of this.

          13       Did you consider, on the 3rd, as I put it before, late

          14       at night, this option -- did you consider it --

          15   A.  No, no.

          16   Q.  -- the option being, say 10 o'clock at night, when all

          17       the intelligence over the previous days was in and all

          18       the information that you could have on the this man; did

          19       you consider then mounting a directed armed surveillance

          20       operation on this man on the address or addresses you

          21       knew?

          22   A.  No.

          23   Q.  You didn't?

          24   A.  No.

          25   Q.  I want to ask you what is the obvious corollary to this:


                                           110
 

 

 


           1       why not?

           2   A.  Okay, the reason why we didn't mount an operation on

           3       Mr Kevin Hutchinson-Foster was a number of reasons.

           4       Certainly, the intelligence that we were getting was

           5       very credible intelligence.  I had no specific

           6       intelligence about him.  The credible intelligence was

           7       that Mark Duggan was going to take possession of a gun.

           8       So I've got to focus my resources around that aspect.

           9       So the resources would be in relation to following him

          10       and where he goes, because he could have ended up

          11       anywhere.

          12           If I decided to direct my resources on Kevin

          13       Hutchinson-Foster and addresses there, then I lose that

          14       ability of where that control is.  I do not have control

          15       of the intel, because there's no intelligence to say

          16       that where Kevin Hutchinson-Foster is going to hold or

          17       store this firearm, apart from an area in Leyton.

          18           But I would need to have something pretty credible

          19       to say "Yes" -- or specific to say "Yes, it's in that

          20       address" or "It's in an address".  I could have spent

          21       the whole -- the 2nd and the 3rd following someone

          22       around who probably wouldn't take us to where we wanted

          23       to be.  So that was the consideration.

          24   Q.  I'm going to suggest to you it's utterly flawed, because

          25       what you had was credible intelligence, you've agreed,


                                           111
 

 

 


           1       that Kevin Hutchinson-Foster was the man in control, and

           2       that you knew where he lived and you do nothing.

           3   A.  No, it wasn't a case of nothing.  The main source of

           4       that intelligence was around Mark Duggan taking

           5       possession.  Like I said to you before, we could have

           6       pooled resources into that which are finite resources,

           7       but that didn't tell us where that firearm was or where

           8       it was going to be, and we could have spent days, even

           9       weeks, trying to find out where it was, when in fact

          10       other alternative arrangements could have been made for

          11       Mark Duggan to actually take possession of that firearm,

          12       or a firearm or another firearm.

          13   Q.  Now, I want to ask you this, because I'm going to

          14       suggest you cannot have it both ways.  You said you

          15       didn't consider it.  But if you are now saying well

          16       I did consider it and it wasn't really sensible because

          17       we are concentrating on Mark Duggan, I did consider it

          18       but dismissed it, I'm going to ask you where you've

          19       recorded any of that?

          20   A.  You're asking me why didn't I do that.  I've said to you

          21       that, in relation to that decision making, that's

          22       between myself and the ZZ17, around how we would deal

          23       with that.

          24           Now, he is more than capable of making those

          25       decisions around what he thinks is the best way of


                                           112
 

 

 


           1       dealing with this.  I've always encouraged my officers

           2       to go with the intelligence because the intelligence is

           3       where you are most likely to get the success.  And we

           4       have had some great successes.  You know, we've seen

           5       a 30 per cent drop in firearms incidents in London

           6       year-on-year as a result of some of the work that we do.

           7       So it's a proven tactic, it's been tested and proven.

           8       I'm quite happy that that's the way it was going to go.

           9   Q.  No, I'm sorry, I'm dealing with Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.

          10   A.  Okay.

          11   Q.  We know the way this went, somebody ended up dead; do

          12       you follow?  So I'm asking it in that context.

          13       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster, you did not consider, did you?

          14   A.  No, I didn't, no.

          15   Q.  No.  So whatever reasons may have been in your mind,

          16       they didn't feature at all, did they?

          17   A.  No.

          18   Q.  No.  I'm going to suggest to you that is a serious

          19       omission, isn't it?

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  He is not going to answer that, is

          21       he?  That's a comment anyway.  So let's keep to the

          22       facts.

          23   MR MANSFIELD:  Well, the fact is, sir, I've made it very

          24       clear, since the jury here are examining planning, and

          25       it's very much at the centre of this, as was opened to


                                           113
 

 

 


           1       the jury, it would be a sensible question to ask the

           2       Senior Investigating Officer whether he accepts there

           3       has been a serious omission, because that is our point.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The way it was put -- clearly, and

           5       it might help the jury to know, because I have a little

           6       note from them, that really part of this examination is

           7       going to matters that the jury are going to be having to

           8       consider, which concerns whether the gun could have been

           9       taken from the streets safely in advance of the tragic

          10       incident on the afternoon of the 4 August.  Indeed, one

          11       of those aspects is obviously whether more could have

          12       been done to either locate Kevin Hutchinson-Foster or

          13       locate the gun or deal with it in advance.

          14           But at the same time -- I am just a little bit

          15       concerned that we are getting much too combative really.

          16       You are getting much too aggressive, that's the note

          17       I've got, and I think it would be much better if we have

          18       a very calm investigation of the decisions taken by the

          19       police, who it was, when and why, without perhaps

          20       getting into too much emotive language.

          21   MR MANSFIELD:  Certainly.  Do you accept it was an omission?

          22   A.  No, not at all.

          23   Q.  Because if you had -- I want to go through the

          24       repercussions -- if you had in fact put directed armed

          25       surveillance onto Kevin Hutchinson-Foster on the late


                                           114
 

 

 


           1       evening of the 3rd or throughout the 4th, you might have

           2       got to Vicarage Road when he did, because he would have

           3       been followed; do you understand that possibility?

           4   A.  I understand that possibility, but my intelligence says

           5       that Mark Duggan is going to pick it up, let's follow

           6       Mark Duggan to where he's going to pick it up.  Why

           7       would I want to go and follow Kevin Hutchinson-Foster?

           8   Q.  Because you are wanting the gun off the streets?

           9   A.  I am, I am.  But that wouldn't have told me where the

          10       specific location of that gun is.  I know that if he's

          11       going to take possession of it -- being it's in his

          12       control, he's going to receive it -- the fact that Kevin

          13       Hutchinson-Foster has a constructive control -- like we

          14       all have.  We could have items stored at different

          15       places and "I'll meet you at so and so", "Yeah, I'll

          16       meet you", "Well, you need to go to another address".

          17           That's how these things work.  Either someone else

          18       comes out and gives the person whatever they're after,

          19       and sometimes we end up just taking out the other person

          20       who actually -- we end up arresting just the person who

          21       is actually the runner to pick up and transfer guns.

          22       That's unfortunately the way it works.

          23           My aim, and always been our aim, is to try and take

          24       the guns off the streets.  So whether young people get

          25       caught in this, young women are getting caught in this;


                                           115
 

 

 


           1       it's a sad consequence.

           2           But certainly, in relation to this, Kevin

           3       Hutchinson-Foster, we didn't know where he had that --

           4       possession of that gun, and it is vital that we stuck

           5       with the intelligence that Mark was going to collect

           6       a gun, and if we had known that -- if that intelligence

           7       said "Well, Kevin Hutchinson-Foster has got it at this

           8       specific address", then we would have gone and retrieved

           9       it, and unfortunately whoever would have been there, if

          10       they were there, would have been arrested for it as

          11       well.

          12   Q.  I am not going back over it because you have said

          13       yourself you never considered any of this.  Right?

          14   A.  Okay.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I do not think that was a question

          16       for him to answer.  But what's the next question?

          17   MR MANSFIELD:  The next question is: one of the other

          18       repercussions here is that did anyone consider, on

          19       the 3rd, bringing the briefing forward that was due for

          20       6 o'clock in the evening of the 4th?

          21   A.  No.

          22   Q.  Why not?

          23   A.  Because the operation -- the intel, as far as I'm aware,

          24       was still that he wasn't intending to pick up the

          25       firearm until after a certain period of night.  So the


                                           116
 

 

 


           1       briefing for 6 o'clock in the evening was quite a right

           2       time to continue the operation.

           3   Q.  But as you have accepted, what happens in these

           4       situations is unpredictable --

           5   A.  That's right, yes.

           6   Q.  -- and you have to anticipate?

           7   A.  Yes, that's right.

           8   Q.  The one thing you have from the intelligence is the

           9       strong possibility of a meeting between two people --

          10   A.  That's right, yes.

          11   Q.  -- which could of course happen at any time once you've

          12       got that intelligence.

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  So one of the contingencies that you have to allow for

          15       is that in fact that's what's going to happen, so you

          16       need to have your resources ready to go?

          17   A.  You're quite right.  I mean, you make a good point

          18       there.  However, the intelligence was that we wouldn't

          19       be able to get access to those premises until after

          20       9 o'clock.  The team were still gauged for a 6.00 pm

          21       start.  You're quite right, it's very unpredictable,

          22       things change at the last minute and we have to respond

          23       quite quickly, as in this case.

          24           So you make a good point in relation to, yes, it's

          25       very unpredictable and we have to deal with that.  But


                                           117
 

 

 


           1       we also got to deal with the fact that if it had --

           2       sometimes we have situations where, yes, it's going to

           3       be 9 o'clock and that doesn't happen, and it could

           4       string out throughout the evening into the early hours

           5       of the morning and then what I would have is a team

           6       that's been on for quite a long period of time.

           7   Q.  On the 2nd, that's the day before the 3rd, working back

           8       one day --

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  -- is it right that there's no decision log for that

          11       day?

          12   A.  The 2nd?

          13   Q.  Yes, in relation to this case?

          14   A.  No.

          15   Q.  No.  The jury have seen that it goes from one to

          16       another.  I do want to ask you about something that

          17       appears to have happened on the 2nd.  Could we have

          18       CD4002, please?  There are hard copies for the jury,

          19       which they didn't get yesterday but are available there.

          20       (Handed)

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Sorry, what is this document?

          22   MR MANSFIELD:  It's a search warrant application at Hendon

          23       magistrate's court, CD4002.  I think it was the one that

          24       was shown yesterday but they don't have copies of it.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Right, members of the jury, the same


                                           118
 

 

 


           1       will go for this document, it will be added in, we will

           2       get a number for it and we'll put it in.  I think it may

           3       even be the fifth exhibit that you have but we will make

           4       sure we get the numbers and get it all together.  But

           5       this is the document, as you can see, CD4002, bottom

           6       right-hand corner.

           7   MR MANSFIELD:  We have seen this yesterday, I just want --

           8       there are in fact three of these for three different

           9       addresses but this is the one address which we've

          10       already heard about today, Micawber Court, which is

          11       where the minicab went to pick up Duggan.

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  Was the application made on the 2nd, one assumes so, at

          14       9.55, because that's what it says?

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  I just want to ask you about the assertions that are

          17       made in it:

          18           "Current intelligence" --

          19           Do you see if you just go down?  I want to deal with

          20       Mark Duggan:

          21           "Current intelligence indicates that Mark Duggan is

          22       a member of the TMD and regularly stores firearms at his

          23       girlfriend's address of Micawber Court, Windsor.

          24       Terrace."

          25           Do you see that?


                                           119
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes, I do, yes.

           2   Q.  First of all, was that true?

           3   A.  The intelligence that we had is that he holds or stores

           4       firearms at such addresses, yes.

           5   Q.  Was it that he regularly stores at his girlfriend's

           6       address?

           7   A.  Well, historical intelligence suggested that he does.

           8   Q.  No, "Current intelligence indicates".

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  Is that true?

          11   A.  Well, at the time that this warrant was obtained, I can

          12       only -- I presume they were working off the intelligence

          13       at that time, which was current intelligence that he

          14       regularly stores firearms at this address.

          15   Q.  Or was it quite different?

          16   A.  In relation to what?

          17   Q.  Well, you've been asked about this, haven't you,

          18       before -- I mean in a statement form --

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  -- and you were asked about it yesterday?

          21   A.  Yes, and the reason -- the reasons why the statements

          22       are obtained is that, in the event that the intelligence

          23       develops that a firearm is -- becomes specific and it is

          24       at an address, then we have possession of a warrant in

          25       which to execute to recover that firearm.


                                           120
 

 

 


           1   Q.  I understand that entirely.  Was the court told that?

           2   A.  I don't know.  I didn't lay the information to the

           3       court.

           4   Q.  You see, when you were asked about this by the IPCC, and

           5       you can see it, it is in an undated statement which we

           6       had recently, one of the questions is whether there are

           7       reasonable grounds to believe what Mark Duggan has,

           8       because you can't mislead a court, can you?

           9   A.  No, that's right.

          10   Q.  No.  Do you want the statement in front of you?

          11   A.  Yes, I do.

          12   Q.  It's the undated one, which we received this month,

          13       I think.  Yes, I have a page reference.  It is in fact

          14       CD30564.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I have it myself in copy form.

          16       Would it be better --

          17   MR MANSFIELD:  I don't mind.

          18   A.  I have a copy.  I think I've got a copy.

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It should have at the bottom

          20       right-hand corner, CD030564.  It's undated but signed;

          21       do you have that?

          22   A.  Yes, I have not got it marked but I know the one you are

          23       talking about.

          24   MR MANSFIELD:  Do you have it?

          25   A.  Yes, I do.


                                           121
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Do you have the page I have mentioned, which is in fact

           2       the second page of a number of pages at the bottom.

           3       There was a question 5, so again the jury don't have it

           4       but I will read it to you.  It's on screen right now at

           5       the bottom of that page.  The question you were asked

           6       was:

           7           "... why search warrants relating to Mark Duggan [at

           8       CD4002 and 4] were sought and what steps were taken once

           9       the information was laid?"

          10           Do you see that?

          11   A.  Yes, I do.

          12   Q.  In answer to that, you mentioned in your statement on

          13       9 January, which I have mentioned before:

          14           "Search warrants were obtained based on research

          15       that there was information suggesting that there was

          16       reasonable grounds to believe that Mark Duggan has

          17       occasional control and access to firearms, which he

          18       keeps at addresses he has access to, for short periods."

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  Then you go on in the next sentence:

          21           "Whilst there was reasonable grounds to believe

          22       these addresses were intermittently used for the storage

          23       of firearms, further intelligence would be required to

          24       develop whether -- we are on the next page -- firearms

          25       at these addresses at any specific point in the


                                           122
 

 

 


           1       operation."

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  Was the court told that, in other words, this was only

           4       intermittent and occasional, and so on?

           5   A.  I don't know, I was not the person laying the

           6       information to the court.

           7   Q.  You knew they were being applied for?

           8   A.  Well, I've asked for -- I've asked for the warrants to

           9       be obtained, yes.

          10   Q.  Where is it in the decision log that you decided that?

          11       (Pause)

          12   A.  Let's have a look.  (Pause)

          13           I haven't got that with me.  I don't think I've

          14       recorded that.

          15   Q.  You should have, shouldn't you?

          16   A.  Not necessarily, I could have done that on a -- it's

          17       a tactic, it's one of those things we do on quite

          18       a regular basis.

          19   Q.  You see, if the court had been told that, actually, you

          20       hadn't got information at that point that things were at

          21       various addresses and you were only wanting the warrants

          22       in case such evidence came to light, that's a very

          23       different picture, isn't it?

          24   A.  Yes, certainly.  As far as I'm aware, that the

          25       officer -- there was an officer that took -- laid the


                                           123
 

 

 


           1       information before the court.  I am not aware of what

           2       was said to the court and he may well have been asked

           3       around that information and addressed that issue.

           4   Q.  Whose is the signature on this page?  If you want to

           5       give a hieroglyphic instead of the name, please do.

           6   A.  Well, I don't recognise this signature but it tells you

           7       who the person is at the top of the page.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The informant, yes.

           9   MR MANSFIELD:  Is he a Trident officer?

          10   A.  He is, yes.

          11   Q.  Just going back to your decision log, where you take

          12       a decision in relation to an operation, you are supposed

          13       to put down what the decision is and why you've taken

          14       it, aren't you?

          15   A.  Well, as I said before, this is a regular tactic and

          16       it's one that is used on a regular basis.  It's not one

          17       where I necessarily need to put a decision log entry

          18       around it.

          19   Q.  I want to go back to an even earlier period, and that's

          20       the origins of this whole operation, focused as it was

          21       on these dates; do you follow?

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  The first indication that the dates, 3, 4, 5 August, and

          24       so on, were being identified for a focused operation in

          25       relation to parties/nightclubs, was in the middle of


                                           124
 

 

 


           1       June --

           2   A.  Yes, that's right.

           3   Q.  -- because ZZ17 made a bid at that time, the 15th, for

           4       armed surveillance to be available --

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  -- and he also circulated the armed officers saying that

           7       that was a date he had in mind.

           8   A.  That was a date that was proposed, yes.

           9   Q.  Could I see any decision log entries about that?

          10   A.  I haven't made a decision log entry around that.  That

          11       was a discussion very much around "Let's look to see

          12       what availability we have".  It wasn't set in stone

          13       we're going to say "Right, there's the particular date

          14       we want to go for and let's see what availability we

          15       could have for that period".  If it didn't work out that

          16       we could get that period, then obviously that would

          17       change.

          18   Q.  Where is there any record of the discussions taking

          19       place in the middle of June for a date which happens to

          20       be the very date on which Duggan does take a weapon; do

          21       you follow?  I want to know if there's any record of the

          22       discussions in the middle of June?

          23   A.  No, there's not a record of discussions.  It was done

          24       informally.

          25   Q.  I see.  ZZ17, as an intelligence officer, does need


                                           125
 

 

 


           1       authority from you for the establishment, or even the

           2       concept, of a particular operation, doesn't he?

           3   A.  Yes, he does, yes.

           4   Q.  So can I move from the mid-June period and deal with

           5       a slightly later period.

           6           You saw some of this yesterday.  So it's FA1, which

           7       I think the jury have.  It's CD268 onwards.

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  Do you know when this was drafted?

          10   A.  Can you blow it up a bit?  Yes, it would have been

          11       25/07.

          12   Q.  You should have -- I'm told you should have an actual

          13       hard copy there?

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You should have it, which has the

          15       date of the application, which is 25/07.

          16   MR MANSFIELD:  273 is particularly --

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It's not in the jury bundle.

          18   A.  It might be here.

          19   MR MANSFIELD:  273.

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It's behind divider 2, I think, in

          21       that one, if it's the same as mine.

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you.

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   MR MANSFIELD:  25 July is the date that's entered up; do you


                                           126
 

 

 


           1       see that?

           2   A.  Yes, I do, yes.

           3   Q.  Were you consulted about this?

           4   A.  Yes, I was, yes.

           5   Q.  When were you consulted?

           6   A.  I spoke to ZZ17 on the phone about this.

           7   Q.  When?

           8   A.  When?

           9   Q.  Yes.

          10   A.  On that date.

          11   Q.  On the 25th?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  Is there any record of the phonecall on the 25th that he

          14       spoke to you?

          15   A.  I was off that day, but that's how I recall it because

          16       I said "I will see it on Monday" which was the 1 August.

          17   Q.  Sorry, I want to be clear.  Did you, on the 25th, say

          18       it's all right to draft the application --

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  Had you, on the 25th, authorised those dates?

          21   A.  What, the 3rd, 4th --

          22   Q.  Yes?

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  You had?

          25   A.  Yes.  I proposed that that was the dates.


                                           127
 

 

 


           1   Q.  On the 25th?

           2   A.  Well, it was planned for that from 15 June.

           3   Q.  Yes, but there's no record of this on 15 June, you have

           4       just said.

           5   A.  All right, yes.

           6   Q.  So I move forward.  This is the formal application for

           7       authority, isn't it?

           8   A.  That's right, yes.

           9   Q.  I mean, it's an important document?

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  The question I'm asking is whether, on 25 July, you

          12       authorised this operation for the 3rd, 4th and 5th?

          13   A.  Yes.  I've proposed that the application for the FA1 is

          14       completed --

          15   Q.  When did you --

          16   A.  On the 25th, when I spoke to DS -- sorry, ZZ17.

          17   Q.  The proposal is an important decision, isn't it?

          18   A.  Well, it's a decision, yes.

          19   Q.  Do you have a decision log entry in relation to the

          20       25 July?

          21   A.  No, it's on the 1 August.

          22   Q.  Do you have a decision log entry for 25 July?

          23   A.  No.  Because I was off on the 25 July.

          24   Q.  But you spoke -- off or not, do you mean you're at home

          25       or somewhere else?


                                           128
 

 

 


           1   A.  Like I said to you before, my phone was on constantly.

           2       So I get a phone call from ZZ17 and we discussed that and

           3       I said "I'll see you on Monday and we'll go through it

           4       then".  So I wouldn't have recorded it at home.

           5   Q.  No.  When did you go back to work?

           6   A.  On the Monday, on 1 August.

           7   Q.  So you are away all of that week?

           8   A.  It's a weekend.

           9   Q.  Yes, all right.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  25 July are we talking about?

          11   A.  I'm sorry, 25 July.  Yes, that was a Friday.  I came

          12       back to work on the following week, I think.

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I do not want you to make a big

          14       a mistake as to when it was you came back.  You came

          15       back 25 July you say is a Friday.

          16   A.  I think it's a Friday, is it not?  It's a Monday.  So

          17       the following --

          18   MR MANSFIELD:  Were you away all that week?

          19   A.  I was off that week.

          20   Q.  You were off that week?

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  However, are you in a position, even though you are off,

          23       to authorise the operation which is being applied for --

          24       being drafted on that day -- for the 3rd, 4th and 5th?

          25   A.  Am I in a position to --


                                           129
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Were you authorising it on the 25th?

           2   A.  Yes, I was.  I was as I say going ahead with the FA form

           3       and it would be ready when I get back on the Monday.

           4   Q.  You're saying there's nothing in the decision log about

           5       what happened on the 25th, but I want to ask you about

           6       the meeting on the 1st, which is when you come back.

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  Did you decide during that meeting that there would be

           9       an operation on the 3rd, 4th and 5th, the meeting on the

          10       1st?

          11   A.  The meeting on the 1st was the -- yes, the decision

          12       where I consolidated and said "Right okay, let's do this

          13       for this week".

          14   Q.  Would you look at the statement that you have had and

          15       is, I think, in front of you.  That's the first one

          16       dated 9 January 2012.  The second page, towards the

          17       bottom, there's a paragraph where you deal with what

          18       happened on 1 August; do you see that?

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Can I make sure we are all looking

          20       at the same document, even though we've got it before us

          21       on the screen.

          22   Q.  Yes.  It's his statement of 9 January.

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  9 January or 29th?

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   MR MANSFIELD:  Do you have that?


                                           130
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes.

           2   Q.  I just want to read how it's introduced.  You see this

           3       paragraph at the bottom, I don't know whether the jury

           4       can read it on the screen but I will read it slowly:

           5           "On 1 August during a meeting with ZZ17 and Z51

           6       where, as a result of intelligence that there were

           7       rising gang tensions and that the OCN ..."

           8           That's a criminal network, isn't it?

           9           "... members and associates, including Mark Duggan,

          10       were attending nightclubs and parties with ready access

          11       to firearms.  In light of this information, I proposed

          12       a MASTS operation for a period of four days taking the

          13       operation into the weekend (3 to 6 August)."

          14           Is that correct?

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  But you had been proposing that for a very long time

          17       according to you?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  Did you see the FA1 on that day that had already been

          20       written out by ZZ17?

          21   A.  I saw it on the 1st, yes.

          22   Q.  You did see it on the 1st.  Would I be right in saying

          23       that on 1 August, as I put to you this morning in

          24       a broader context, there was absolutely no intelligence

          25       to suggest currently that any members of this


                                           131
 

 

 


           1       organisation were attending nightclubs and parties?

           2   A.  Well, as I said to you before, and I explained earlier,

           3       this was on the basis that this is the increasing

           4       pattern we were having during the -- certainly March,

           5       April, May period, and June, around that sort of

           6       activity.  So it was planned that we would try and do

           7       something about this in the August period when there

           8       were people available.

           9   Q.  Yes.  But you see it's where, as a result of

          10       intelligence, there was rising gang tensions and then

          11       you go into:

          12           "... attending nightclubs and parties and ready

          13       access to firearms."

          14   A.  That's right.

          15   Q.  There was no intelligence at that time, whether it's

          16       25 July when it was drafted, or 1 August, was there?

          17   A.  This is historical intelligence.  I mean, this is almost

          18       a given, really, that you expect something like -- come

          19       the Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, Saturday nights that

          20       some of these guys will be going out armed with

          21       firearms.

          22   Q.  If you just go back to the application itself, page 273,

          23       where something similar is said, I want to ask you about

          24       something else that is said there.

          25           273, if you have it, it's the page with the date on,


                                           132
 

 

 


           1       25 July.

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  I want to ask you about the paragraph:

           4           "Search warrants have been obtained."

           5           Was that right?  In the light of the warrants we

           6       have just seen?

           7   A.  No, not to my knowledge, no.

           8   Q.  Well, did that not strike you as a bit odd?

           9   A.  Not really, because I said that -- I said that we should

          10       get warrants on the -- when I spoke to ZZ17 on the 1st.

          11       So I wouldn't think that would odd that they were

          12       improving to obtain warrants, not necessarily had

          13       possession of the warrants.

          14   Q.  No, you see, just look at it for a moment.

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  It's rather like the application for the search warrant

          17       itself, if I may say so.  It's important that accuracy

          18       about state of information, intelligence and need are

          19       put precisely, do you agree, not for academic reasons,

          20       because you're authorising the use, possibly, of lethal

          21       weaponry in the longer run?

          22   A.  Yes, I agree, yes.

          23   Q.  What it says there, dated the 25th, is that search

          24       warrants have been obtained --

          25   A.  Not to my knowledge.


                                           133
 

 

 


           1   Q.  -- but, so far as the addresses we have just seen, they

           2       were not obtained until the 2nd.

           3   A.  That's correct.  I wasn't aware that -- I didn't really

           4       notice that it had been said "obtained".  It should have

           5       been "were going to be obtained".

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It's for numerous addresses but you

           7       don't know what addresses are being referred to.

           8   A.  Yes, I have not seen the warrants for the others so --

           9   MR MANSFIELD:  How carefully did you read this application

          10       for authority?

          11   A.  I read it as carefully as I normally do.

          12   Q.  Because, even by this time, there was, admittedly,

          13       a slowly evolving intelligence picture in relation to

          14       Hutchinson-Foster, wasn't there?

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  I just want to see if you will agree this passage.

          17       Could we have Z50's statement, please?  This is the

          18       Strategic Firearms Officer's statement.  It's the

          19       statement dated 11 August 2011 and it's the tenth page,

          20       I don't have a number at the bottom of this one.

          21   A.  Where will I be looking for that?

          22   Q.  It's just going to come on screen I think, it's probably

          23       there now.  I do not think it's in that bundle there.

          24   A.  Okay.

          25   Q.  If it's up on screen now -- yes, I think it is -- I just


                                           134
 

 

 


           1       want to ask you whether you agree this statement of what

           2       should be happening:

           3           "The Strategic Firearms Commander training ..."

           4           That is the first sentence, then:

           5           "... teaches the conflict management model (CMM)."

           6           Do you see that?

           7   A.  Yes, I do.

           8   Q.  If you follow the rest:

           9           "This means that every time a new piece of

          10       intelligence or information is received the CMM will/is

          11       immediately ..."

          12           I think it's either "will be or is":

          13           "... revisited and reworked to review the

          14       identification, capability and intent of the subjects,

          15       identify any change to the threat assessment and

          16       consider any revision of the working strategy, powers

          17       and policy, tactical options and action to be taken.

          18       This CMM process is revisited upon receipt of any

          19       further intelligence of information and is routinely

          20       an ongoing process throughout the life of a firearms

          21       operation."

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  It's a bit long but is it accurate?

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   Q.  So in this case, why didn't it happen?


                                           135
 

 

 


           1   A.  Because the firearms operation didn't commence until it

           2       had been authorised by the Strategic Firearms Commander.

           3   Q.  Yes.  When did she do that?

           4   A.  The 2nd, I believe.

           5   Q.  Yes.  She did it in the afternoon of the 2nd, which

           6       means, from the 2nd through the 3rd into the 4th, this

           7       model should have been working, shouldn't it?

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  It didn't, did it?

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Are you able to make any comment

          11       about that or not?

          12   A.  No, I think you probably need to explain why it didn't

          13       work.

          14   MR MANSFIELD:  Yes.  I've been through, I don't want to

          15       repeat all the examples.  I just wondered if, having

          16       been through the examples on the 4th about the direction

          17       of CO19, on the 3rd about all the actions you didn't

          18       consider in relation to Hutchinson-Foster and so

          19       forth --

          20   MR KEITH:  I'm so sorry.  My learned friend knows well

          21       that the CMM model, which is provided for in the

          22       National and Metropolitan Police Standard Operating

          23       Procedures, is for the Firearms Commanders.  So this

          24       might be an issue better put to the Strategic and

          25       Tactical Firearm Commanders because the CMM model is


                                           136
 

 

 


           1       a matter for them.

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That's perhaps why I was beginning

           3       to interrupt you.  So what I do not want is one officer

           4       to be asking to comment about another officer's

           5       statement or evidence.  That won't get anywhere and is

           6       something which should not happen.  But I'm very keen

           7       for police officers to answer for their own decisions if

           8       they are of any relevance to those issues that the jury

           9       have to decide.

          10   MR MANSFIELD:  Yes.  I'm suggesting that, in fact, the

          11       Senior Investigating Officer does have a responsibility

          12       with regard to the review of material, which is really,

          13       in essence, what this is about.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  All right.  You have made that point

          15       and he's answered questions about it.

          16   MR MANSFIELD:  Yes.  Thank you very much.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, Mr Thomas.

          18                      Questions by MR THOMAS

          19   MR THOMAS:  Two short questions.  Mr Foote, can you just

          20       help me with this.  You were in charge of this

          21       particular operation and you had various other officers

          22       assisting you and working below you.

          23   A.  That's right, yes.

          24   Q.  Yes.  Can I just go through the structure and the

          25       pyramid just to see if you can help me?


                                           137
 

 

 


           1           Firstly, you would have had Detective Constables,

           2       right at the bottom -- I don't mean that disrespectfully

           3       but that's just the way it is, correct?

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  Then you will have had Detective Sergeants, yes?

           6   A.  That's right, yes.

           7   Q.  Then next up the pyramid, as it were, would be the

           8       Detective Inspectors?

           9   A.  That's correct, yes.

          10   Q.  Then you; is that right?

          11   A.  That's right, yes.

          12   Q.  Can you just help me with this: in the team that you

          13       were controlling, in charge of --

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  -- how many DCs were there, roughly?

          16   A.  About 11.

          17   Q.  Okay.  How many Detective Sergeants?

          18   A.  Two.  This is just the pro-active team we are talking

          19       about, yes?  Because I've got two responsibilities, I've

          20       got the pro-active side and the reactive side, which has

          21       a lot more officers on it.

          22   Q.  Let's just look at the pro-active side, just for the

          23       time being.  So you had two Detective Sergeants and how

          24       many Detective Inspectors?

          25   A.  I had one Detective Inspector.


                                           138
 

 

 


           1   Q.  All right, and then you.  The structure that I've set

           2       out in a way is very much like a line management

           3       structure, isn't it?

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  Now, you told us earlier this morning that during the

           6       period between January and May/June 2011, you had

           7       a Detective Inspector who had been working on this

           8       operation but had left.

           9   A.  That's right, yes.

          10   Q.  That Detective Inspector, between the January and the

          11       June, had been working alongside ZZ17, the DS?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  Would I be right in thinking that they were performing

          14       different roles, because they were not both performing

          15       the same tasks?

          16   A.  No.

          17   Q.  Would that be fair?

          18   A.  That would be fair, yes.

          19   Q.  So when May/June 2011 comes and your DI leaves -- goes

          20       off to do a different job, does he, something like that?

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  Okay.  Who replaces his role?

          23   A.  ZZ -- I have to get this right now -- 51.  No, sorry, so

          24       it's 50.

          25   Q.  Are you sure about that?


                                           139
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes.  It's Z50, one Z.

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Z50, because we gather there's

           3       a ZZ50.

           4   MR THOMAS:  Shall we just do that again, just so we are

           5       absolutely crystal clear as to what your evidence is?

           6       So I am going to repeat the question.

           7   MR KEITH:  Sir, I don't think the jury are under any

           8       illusions or confusion.  There are a multitude of people

           9       in this case, some of whom have been given pseudonyms

          10       and they are rather confusing and we've all fallen into

          11       error when trying to recall the names of the pseudonyms.

          12   MR THOMAS:  No, we haven't because I haven't fallen into

          13       error yet.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Apart from Mr Thomas.

          15   MR KEITH:  Apart from Mr Thomas, who's very special indeed.

          16       The fact is Z51 and Z50 are the Firearms Commanders.

          17   MR THOMAS:  Sorry, I want clarity and I'm going to ask my

          18       question again --

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Please ask your question again.

          20   MR THOMAS:  -- despite Mr Keith's helpful intervention.

          21           Let's just go through this again.  So nobody is

          22       under any confusion as to where I'm going.  You have

          23       told us that you had a DI who was performing a very

          24       different task to ZZ17, your DS?

          25   A.  That's right, yes.


                                           140
 

 

 


           1   Q.  That DI leaves in May/June 2011.

           2   A.  That's right, yes.

           3   Q.  I'm going to ask the question again.  When the DI

           4       leaves, who replaces him and takes on his role?  (Pause)

           5           Why are you struggling on this?

           6   A.  Can I just say that it's Z50?

           7   Q.  You can say that if it's the answer to my question.

           8   A.  It is, yes.

           9   Q.  All right.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Right, thank you.

          11   MR THOMAS:  Bearing in mind that you only have a very small

          12       number of DIs working below you and there's a line

          13       management structure, why was there such difficulty in

          14       answering that question in a relatively small team; can

          15       you help us?

          16   A.  Because it's easier to refer to people by their names.

          17   Q.  So it's the pseudonyms, is it?  Sir, I'm going to make

          18       a suggestion, I'm going to make a suggestion so we know

          19       when a witness is struggling genuinely or not genuinely

          20       that there be a list --

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I had hoped that there would be

          22       a list of all those witnesses by name and by -- which

          23       could then be kept by those witnesses.

          24   MR THOMAS:  My suggestion is slightly different.  I am going

          25       to suggest that list should be with the witness -- we


                                           141
 

 

 


           1       won't be able to see it -- so that the witness can

           2       confirm with the list, so there's no confusion as to who

           3       the witness is talking about, so that the jury will know

           4       whether the witness is being genuine in terms of

           5       recollection or if a mistake is made, because we don't

           6       know.  We don't know if the witness is changing his

           7       evidence.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Thomas, we need to be as accurate

           9       as possible and if there are any problems now, Mr Foote,

          10       if you prefer, rather than try to work out the right

          11       number, if you would prefer to write down on one of

          12       those sticky notes that you had earlier, the name of

          13       this person that you are being asked to identify would

          14       you find that easier?

          15   A.  I would do but it depends how many people we are talking

          16       about.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Then give it to me and then also

          18       others and then we can work out what you want.  So there

          19       we are, a complete blank sheet.  If you write down the

          20       answer that you would like to give without using any

          21       letter of the alphabet or number about who it is who

          22       replaces your DI, who you now call Z100 -- sorry, ZZ100

          23       in May/June, who it was that replaced him.

          24                (The witness wrote down the name)

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  There we are.


                                           142
 

 

 


           1   MR THOMAS:  I wonder if that could be given to Mr Keith and

           2       Mr Keith --

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I wonder if it could be given to me,

           4       first.

           5   MR KEITH:  I would rather it didn't because I don't know the

           6       underlying names, I'm not allowed to.  It's a matter,

           7       sir, for you and for the appropriate person.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, give it to me.  (Handed)

           9           Thank you very much.  Right, I have that, thank you.

          10       It's not the person who we've been referring to by that

          11       number.  But we'll be able to work that one out in due

          12       course.

          13   MR THOMAS:  All right.  So, the person you've written down

          14       was effectively the individual who stepped into the

          15       shoes when the DI left in May/June 2011, correct?

          16   A.  That's right, yes.

          17   Q.  That person who you've written down, would I be right in

          18       thinking they were performing the job of DI in early

          19       August 2011?

          20   A.  Yes, they were.

          21   Q.  So, ZZ17, your DS, would have had to -- they would have

          22       accounted to that individual, who in turn would have

          23       accounted to you, correct?

          24   A.  On a line management basis, yes.

          25   Q.  Let me ask you some specific questions, I am nearly


                                           143
 

 

 


           1       there.

           2           Was that individual working on 3 August?

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  Was that individual working on 4 August?

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  During the day?

           7   A.  Well, they would have been working the hours that the

           8       team were coming on for, which was 6.00 pm.

           9   Q.  Right.  Let's just break this down.  I think you told us

          10       that you left before this operation effectively kicked

          11       off late that afternoon, correct?

          12   A.  That's right, on the 3rd, yes.

          13   Q.  No, no, no, I'm on the 4th.  My fault.  Let's focus on

          14       the 4th because that's the day that Mark Duggan is shot.

          15   A.  Okay.

          16   Q.  So on the afternoon of the 4th, you have already told

          17       us, Mr Foote, that at the time Mark Duggan was shot you

          18       were at home.

          19   A.  That's right, yes.

          20   Q.  Just help us.  I think you said that your hours were

          21       between 8.00 and 4.00 and you have no reason to believe

          22       that you wouldn't have been working between 8.00 and

          23       4.00 that afternoon?

          24   A.  That's right, yes.

          25   Q.  So you leave at 4 o'clock.  My question is a simple one:


                                           144
 

 

 


           1       this new DI, who takes over from the previous DI, were

           2       they working between 4.00 and 6.00 on 4 August?

           3   A.  No.

           4   Q.  No?  So --

           5   A.  Well, they were due to come on for 6.00 pm on the

           6       4 August.

           7   Q.  Just again so we are clear on this: that person would

           8       have been effectively your deputy, correct?

           9   A.  In relation to?

          10   Q.  This operation.

          11   A.  In relation to the operation, well, no.  Because the

          12       deputy is the -- ZZ17.

          13   Q.  Forgive me, ZZ17 is the Detective Sergeant, correct?

          14   A.  Yes, he is, yes.

          15   Q.  ZZ17 would have been working in turn under the DI that

          16       we've just been referring to, who in turn would have

          17       been working under you?

          18   A.  Well, for the purposes of the operation, operationally

          19       the TFC, as it would be in that role, is not part of the

          20       decision-making process around the operation.

          21   Q.  Are you saying, Mr Foote, that the system that you had

          22       in place did not effectively have a DI who was

          23       overseeing what the Detective Sergeants and

          24       Detective Constables were doing?

          25   A.  No, I had the TFC to do that.  On a day-to-day basis, in


                                           145
 

 

 


           1       the administration of the role of the team, then

           2       obviously the DI would be in charge of that team.

           3   Q.  Why is it, Mr Foote, it so happens that on this

           4       particular day, the day that Mark Duggan gets shot, you

           5       are off duty and the Detective Inspector, who normally

           6       would be performing the role as your deputy, hasn't even

           7       come onto duty?  Why was that, why did you allow that to

           8       happen?

           9   A.  Because that was -- it was planned as such, because the

          10       TFC, the operation has been handed over to the SFC, the

          11       Strategic Firearms Commander.  Any decisions in relation

          12       to what needs to be done on the intel basis, obviously

          13       that's been passed to the TFC and the SFC.

          14           My role is -- it becomes almost null and void

          15       really.

          16   Q.  You say that but, just to give one example -- can I make

          17       it clear, I am not going to repeat the questions that

          18       Mr Mansfield has already put to you, but just one

          19       example is who was taking a strategic overview of this

          20       operation?  You remember the question about the map, the

          21       different points, who's given this an overview to make

          22       sure that proper strategic decisions are being made and

          23       not missed?

          24   A.  That -- that would --

          25   Q.  Permit me to finish, I will give you an opportunity to


                                           146
 

 

 


           1       answer.  That would normally be the role that you or the

           2       DI would perform.

           3   A.  No, that's the role of the Strategic Firearms Commander.

           4   Q.  Second and final point -- second question.

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Is that the first point?

           6   MR THOMAS:  That was the first.  Second point: you agree

           7       with this, do you not, that this was an intelligence led

           8       operation, correct?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  One of the things that you have to bear in mind when you

          11       look at keeping the streets of London safe, recovering

          12       firearms, you've got to bear in mind article 2 of the

          13       human rights legislation; you accept that, don't you?

          14   A.  I do, yes.

          15   Q.  Just in case the jury may not have heard of article 2,

          16       that involves even criminals, even subjects who you are

          17       monitoring, surveying, they have a --

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Thomas, I don't want to cut you

          19       off but, really, the jury will hear the law from me and

          20       I don't want Mr Foote's answers to the law or your

          21       speech on the law.

          22   MR THOMAS:  I am not going to give a speech on the law --

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I have a feeling you were.

          24   MR THOMAS:  Well, that's clear.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Let's hear your question.


                                           147
 

 

 


           1   MR THOMAS:  You know that each subject has a right to life?

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  Yes, all right.  Now, what was more important to you

           4       when you were making the decisions in relation to the

           5       1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th?  What was more important to you: to

           6       retrieve a gun and get the gun off the street, the

           7       firearm off the street, or to capture criminals and have

           8       a successful prosecution?  What was more important?

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You don't have to answer this

          10       question but I am not going to stop you from answering

          11       if you want to, Mr Foote, or there may be other things

          12       you want to put into your answer.

          13   A.  Well, it's -- for me, it's vitally important we do take

          14       guns off the street.  You know, it's about making it

          15       safe and making sure that they are not circulating,

          16       because, as you can see from this -- the link to this

          17       firearm, it's been used in a previous shooting, it's

          18       been used in the pistol-whipping, so it is important,

          19       vitally important, to take it off the street.

          20           Now, if there was intelligence to say it was in a --

          21       a bin chute or down a drain somewhere, then obviously we

          22       would go to get that gun.  For me, that's vitally

          23       important but, at the same time, we have to do -- at the

          24       other end of the scale, we have to have operations like

          25       these done by firearms officers in order to recover


                                           148
 

 

 


           1       a firearm in someone's possession because we don't know

           2       if it's going to be used.

           3   MR THOMAS:  Mr Foote, can you help me with this, and this is

           4       my very last point.  If retrieving the firearms and

           5       getting them off the street was vitally important to

           6       you --

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  -- when you received very credible, reliable

           9       intelligence that the person with the firearm was Kevin

          10       Hutchinson-Foster, why did it not cross your mind to

          11       survey him and retrieve the firearm before it changed

          12       hands and went to Mr Duggan?

          13   A.  That's a very good point and I think --

          14   Q.  Answer it please.

          15   A.  I think I have laboured this for some time now.  I need

          16       to know where that gun is --

          17   Q.  You knew where it was, you had intelligence.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Let him answer.

          19   A.  No, no, I didn't know where the gun was.  You can't just

          20       survey someone and hope that by chance they will have

          21       possession of the gun.  You need to know that they've

          22       got the gun and where it's likely to be.

          23           So for me, by identifying Kevin Hutchinson-Foster

          24       and -- the intelligence said that he had a firearm, how

          25       would I get that firearm?  What was going to tell me


                                           149
 

 

 


           1       where that firearm was?  Intelligence is going to tell

           2       me where that firearm is and the intelligence I had was

           3       that Mark Duggan was going to take possession of that

           4       firearm.  Once I know that that firearm is out there and

           5       he's got possession of it, I know it existed and

           6       someone's got that firearm.

           7           By going with Kevin Hutchinson-Foster, it was

           8       a situation where you don't know where it's going to be

           9       because it's going to be held at a number of locations.

          10       It's never as straightforward as surveying someone and

          11       saying, well, they've got -- this is not, you know, like

          12       an armed robbery operation where, you know, you're

          13       gathering intelligence -- evidence at the same time.

          14       This is: what's the intelligence saying?  The

          15       intelligence says he's got possession, that's why he was

          16       arrested at that point.

          17   Q.  Mr Foote, from what you've said -- and I am not

          18       cavilling with what you say, but for this: by the 3rd,

          19       you had reliable, credible intelligence --

          20   A.  That's right.

          21   Q.  -- we don't need to look at the source of that

          22       intelligence but you know what the intelligence was --

          23   A.  That's right, yes.

          24   Q.  -- indicating that Kevin Hutchinson-Foster was going to

          25       supply a gun at a meet with Mark Duggan.  My question


                                           150
 

 

 


           1       is, and you haven't answered it: why not focus on the

           2       man with the gun, if that is the intelligence?  You

           3       haven't answered it.

           4   A.  I've -- I have answered it.  Because there is no

           5       intelligence to say where that gun was.

           6           Could I just --

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You must say whatever you want,

           8       Mr Foote.

           9   A.  I've done 29 years in the service, police service, and

          10       this work is quite challenging.  I've worked in the

          11       armed flying squad, I've worked on murder teams,

          12       investigating murders, and now I'm on Trident and, out

          13       of all of those types of specialist roles that I've

          14       done, this is the most challenging type of role, because

          15       you have to work with the intelligence that's there.

          16           So us just looking at surveying someone, he could

          17       have taken us to various locations.  But in order to see

          18       it in his possession, that's going to be the challenge.

          19       If we knew he had it in his possession, he's got it

          20       right now at this address or he's in a cab on the way

          21       back with the gun in his pocket, then, yes, then we

          22       would do that, or if he was driving the car that he's

          23       supposed to drive, we would do that.  But we didn't have

          24       that type of specific intelligence.

          25           The intelligence we had to go with, that was


                                           151
 

 

 


           1       credible, that we could work with, was that someone was

           2       going to pick one up.  Once we know that that person had

           3       possession, because that's where the intelligence was

           4       coming from, that particular person, then we know that

           5       we've got a firearm in existence.

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.

           7   MR THOMAS:  Sir, that's all I ask.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I have Mr Stern as the next one on

           9       the list to ask some questions.

          10   MR STERN:  Thank you, sir.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Stern represents the CO19.  I see

          12       the jury turning quite properly to their list.

          13                      Questions by MR STERN

          14   MR STERN:  I knew they had a little plan at the back and

          15       when you said my name, I am sure they can probably see

          16       from that that I represent the individual firearms

          17       officers who attended on the 4 August.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you.

          19   MR STERN:  There are three areas, Mr Foote, that I want to

          20       deal with with you, if I may.

          21   A.  Yes, sir.

          22   Q.  The first is what you've described as finite resources,

          23       so just to explore that a little if we may?

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   Q.  SC&O19, as I think it's now called --


                                           152
 

 

 


           1   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.

           2   Q.  -- but it may be easier if we call it SCO19 and leave

           3       out the "and", if nobody objects.  What does that stand

           4       for, do you know?

           5   A.  It's Serious Crime Operations.

           6   Q.  It's part of one of the specialised groups within the

           7       Metropolitan Police Service?

           8   A.  That's right, it is, yes.

           9   Q.  As a specialist group, they are, as you've already been,

          10       I think, good enough to indicate, you said that they

          11       were highly trained and very professional?

          12   A.  They are indeed, sir, yes.

          13   Q.  It is not part of their job to investigate crime or to

          14       detect crime or to act as surveillance officers or

          15       anything like that?

          16   A.  No, it's not.

          17   Q.  They have a very specific task, which I think in this

          18       instance was to stop a vehicle in which the

          19       intelligence, as you have already indicated, set out

          20       that an individual had a gun --

          21   A.  That's correct, yes.

          22   Q.  -- and to do so in the safest way for the members of the

          23       public who may be around --

          24   A.  Yes, sir.

          25   Q.  -- for the individual himself --


                                           153
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes.

           2   Q.  -- the person who has or is in possession of this

           3       unlawful weapon --

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  -- and also the officers themselves --

           6   A.  That's right, yes.

           7   Q.  -- not only the officer who may have to fire a shot, but

           8       all the other officers who are present at the scene.

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  Now, of course, all firearms operations, the mere use of

          11       firearms has a risk.

          12   A.  Yes, always is, yes.

          13   Q.  There is always a risk.  As you've made absolutely

          14       clear, that risk has to be balanced against the very

          15       grave risk of allowing an individual to run loose --

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  -- with a weapon on the streets of London --

          18   A.  That's right, yes.

          19   Q.  -- because all of us have seen the terrible consequences

          20       of individuals using weapons in gangs.

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  I think just this year alone there have been a number of

          23       murders.

          24   A.  There has been, yes, unfortunately, and we've also had

          25       unfortunate incidents where kids as young as 13 have


                                           154
 

 

 


           1       been storing guns for some of these criminals.

           2   Q.  Yes.  These guns are stored, usually, not at the

           3       addresses of those who use the guns, but at the

           4       addresses of their loved ones or their children or

           5       whoever?

           6   A.  That's right, yes.

           7   Q.  Now, within SCO19, there are a number of different types

           8       of officers.  But for a start, there are -- you

           9       mentioned before -- ARVs?

          10   A.  That's right.

          11   Q.  I promise not to mention any Zs or anything like that!

          12   A.  Thank you.

          13   Q.  ARVs, and they are armed response vehicles, as you

          14       mentioned.

          15   A.  That's right.

          16   Q.  I don't know if anybody picked that up but you said they

          17       are the officers who are uniformed.

          18   A.  That's right.

          19   Q.  So those officers react to situations on the streets of

          20       London, gun crime on the streets of London, as and when

          21       it happens.

          22   A.  That's right, yes, they do.

          23   Q.  But there's a small group, and by "small" I don't want

          24       to give exact numbers but in the region of 150 or so --

          25       is that your understanding --


                                           155
 

 

 


           1   A.  That's correct, yes.

           2   Q.  -- of officers who attend at preplanned operations --

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  -- and they are the most high risk --

           5   A.  That's right.

           6   Q.  -- and the most dangerous.

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  Terrorists, State procedures and events.

           9   A.  Yes, that's right.

          10   Q.  Those individuals -- we will hear more obviously from

          11       other people about the level of training that they had,

          12       but as you have already said, they are all -- well, all

          13       of them are very highly trained, but these are the most

          14       highly trained?

          15   A.  They are, yes.

          16   Q.  They are a limited resource and in high demand from

          17       other units across London --

          18   A.  That's right, yes.

          19   Q.  -- because of the skills that they have.

          20   A.  That's correct.

          21   Q.  Now, what that means is that one day they may be working

          22       on, in this case, Operation Dibri.

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  The next day they may be working on a completely

          25       different operation.


                                           156
 

 

 


           1   A.  That's right.

           2   Q.  So they may be working for five or six days of any given

           3       week, whether it be morning, noon or evening, or

           4       overnight or over many days --

           5   A.  That's right.

           6   Q.  -- on any particular operation, but they may not be

           7       focused on Operation Dibri over many weeks or many

           8       months?

           9   A.  No, they do a variety of roles and, you know, it is

          10       competing demand because occasionally the flying squad

          11       use them, the kidnap unit use them, the counter

          12       terrorist department use them; so they are used for

          13       a number of operations.

          14   Q.  Understanding the limited resources that they actually

          15       offer, was it the serious level of criminality and the

          16       reliability of the intelligence that led you to seeking

          17       to deploy them in this particular period of time that

          18       we're concerned with in August 2011?

          19   A.  That's correct, yes.

          20   Q.  The second aspect, please, if I may.

          21   A.  Certainly.

          22   Q.  Would you be good enough to look at what I think is

          23       called the jury bundle.  You were shown two photographs

          24       by my learned friend Mr Mansfield, pages 9 and 10.  You

          25       were asked about this location; I think photo 10 shows


                                           157
 

 

 


           1       it best.

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  You said you hadn't been to the area --

           4   A.  No.

           5   Q.  -- but we can see Burchell Road on the right of photo 10

           6       as we look at it?

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  The jury will remember it, I'm sure, because we were

           9       only there very recently.

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  Now, you were asked, and I think it was actually put to

          12       you, that this was a location, I don't know if it was

          13       put as the "best location", but certainly a location

          14       where the stop could have been made.

          15   A.  Yes, that's right.

          16   Q.  I want to ask you about that.  First of all, the

          17       decision as to where a stop would take place would be

          18       a decision for the armed officers --

          19   A.  That's right, it would be, yes.

          20   Q.  -- because they are the specialists in that area?

          21   A.  Exactly.

          22   Q.  Just a moment's thought, I suggest, shows that this is

          23       probably not the best spot.  First of all, this is

          24       highly built up area, as we can see?

          25   A.  Yes, it is.


                                           158
 

 

 


           1   Q.  We will have seen the narrowness of the streets, the

           2       pictures don't necessarily show.  Also, you see those

           3       yellow zigzag lines?

           4   A.  Yes, it's a school.

           5   Q.  It's a school.  Perhaps you will have a look at page 7

           6       in that bundle, and if that could come up on the map

           7       you'll have an even clearer idea of whether or not you

           8       think this is a particularly good area for a stop.  You

           9       will immediately notice that Burchell Road is almost

          10       completely surrounded by schools.

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Can you see that?

          13   A.  Yes, I can.

          14   MR STERN:  Yes, he can see that on the map.

          15           The school directly opposite Burchell Road in fact

          16       when we were there, the children were in the playground,

          17       so we know exactly where the playground is; it's right

          18       onto Vicarage Road.

          19   A.  Okay, yes.

          20   Q.  So let me ask you whether or not you still think that is

          21       a good location.

          22   A.  No, I wouldn't -- no I wouldn't use that as a good

          23       location.

          24   Q.  All right.  Now, one of the things about the 4 August,

          25       and obviously I represent the Metropolitan Police as


                                           159
 

 

 


           1       a whole, but I do want to ask you just this: you had

           2       intelligence which informed you that a minicab was going

           3       to the vicinity of Vicarage Road in Leyton?

           4   A.  That's right, yes.

           5   Q.  I say "you": you were not actually on duty but you've

           6       been asked lots of questions about it, so let me ask

           7       you.  But was there ever any intelligence in relation to

           8       that as to where the minicab was starting its journey

           9       from?

          10   A.  That I couldn't tell you, no.

          11   Q.  Let me ask you this: do you consider it a realistic

          12       prospect to have three vehicles and a control vehicle,

          13       each of those vehicles, of the three CO19 vehicles,

          14       SCO19 vehicles, containing three armed police officers

          15       sitting on Vicarage Road waiting for the possibility of

          16       Mr Hutchinson-Foster, or some other, coming out and

          17       possibly giving a gun to Mr Duggan?

          18   A.  No, unfortunately -- I mean, certainly in a residential

          19       area like that, the best way to describe it is that they

          20       stick out like a sore thumb and that would be

          21       compromised quite quickly.

          22   Q.  The third area, Kevin Hutchinson-Foster, if I may,

          23       please, because, as I understand it, you were involved

          24       in the case against him --

          25   A.  That's right.


                                           160
 

 

 


           1   Q.  -- in relation to transferring the gun to Mr Duggan?

           2   A.  That's right, yes.

           3   Q.  I want to just ask you about one or two factual aspects,

           4       if I may, because we're going to, I think, hear from him

           5       next week and we haven't got any other officer, but I'm

           6       sure you will remember the facts in relation to it.

           7           As I understand it, at 6.12 in the evening of

           8       29 July 2011, Mr Hutchinson-Foster went to 546 Kingsland

           9       Road, E8?

          10   A.  That's right, yes.

          11   Q.  It's called the Lagoon salon and it's a barber shop?

          12   A.  That's right, yes.

          13   Q.  He had an argument with a man called Peter -- I don't

          14       know if we have to be delicate about his name, but

          15       I will call him "Peter O" for the moment.

          16   A.  Mm-hmm.

          17   Q.  At the end of that argument, as I understand it from the

          18       documents we've been given very recently about some of

          19       this, Mr Hutchinson-Foster said something like he'll be

          20       back, and he then left in a hired vehicle that he was

          21       using.

          22   A.  Right.

          23   Q.  Do you remember this?

          24   A.  No.  I'm not aware of that, no.

          25   Q.  Then I think he drove off, going down Kingsland High


                                           161
 

 

 


           1       Street.

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  Then at 19.24, he returned.  Does that --

           4   A.  That rings a bell, yes.

           5   Q.  At that time he was waving a dark coloured gun around

           6       which was wrapped in a sock?

           7   A.  That's right, yes.

           8   Q.  He pointed the gun at Peter O.  Peter O, I think,

           9       punched him --

          10   A.  That's right, yes.

          11   Q.  -- as a result of which, there was then some drawing of

          12       blood from -- Peter O was bleeding as a result of

          13       Mr Hutchinson-Foster bludgeoning him, or

          14       pistol-whipping, whatever way you want to describe it,

          15       over the head with the gun.

          16   A.  With the gun, that's right.

          17   Q.  As a result of that, Mr Hutchinson-Foster was bleeding

          18       from the punch from Peter O --

          19   A.  That's right.

          20   Q.  -- and Peter O was bleeding from being battered over the

          21       head with the gun?

          22   A.  That's right, yes.

          23   Q.  The consequence of that was that blood from both Peter O

          24       and Mr Hutchinson-Foster, got onto that gun and onto

          25       that sock.


                                           162
 

 

 


           1   A.  That's right, yes.

           2   Q.  As he walked away, Mr Hutchinson-Foster put the gun up

           3       under his t-shirt so the blood went on his t-shirt as

           4       well, and I think there was some on his trainers.

           5   A.  That's right.

           6   Q.  Now, you've already told us that Peter O, the victim in

           7       this particular incident, was non-compliant?

           8   A.  That's right.

           9   Q.  For want of a better expression, he was not prepared to

          10       make a statement in this case.

          11   A.  Reluctant witness.

          12   Q.  He would not make a statement at all, did he?

          13   A.  No.

          14   Q.  As a result of which, the evidence against the defendant

          15       in that case, Mr Hutchinson-Foster, came from CCTV

          16       pictures of him --

          17   A.  That's right.

          18   Q.  -- and he was seen with the gun, et cetera, yes?

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  Now, he left that scene, but he did not use his hired

          21       vehicle; do you remember that?

          22   A.  That's right, yes.

          23   Q.  He got in another car, but not the hired vehicle that he

          24       had arrived in.

          25           Now, I want to ask you about this: the scientific


                                           163
 

 

 


           1       information, that is to say concerning the blood on the

           2       gun and the blood on the sock was not known to anyone

           3       outside a small number of investigators until

           4       24 October 2011, which is the day that

           5       Mr Hutchinson-Foster was arrested --

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  -- and there was care taken that few people should have

           8       that information.

           9   A.  That's right, yes.

          10   Q.  So Mr Hutchinson-Foster could not have come by that

          11       information up until 24 October 2011?

          12   A.  That's right, yes.

          13   Q.  Now, the gun recovered from Ferry Lane was later

          14       analysed, as you have already indicated, and it was

          15       discovered that it was connected to a shooting on

          16       11 July 2011 --

          17   A.  That's right, yes.

          18   Q.  -- the very example you just gave of how dangerous it is

          19       for guns to be out in the open.

          20   A.  Mm.

          21   Q.  On that day, I think a man was shot in the back in

          22       an Asda store car park on Old Kent Road.

          23   A.  That's right, yes.

          24   Q.  But the cartridges that were left from that shooting

          25       incident had been forensically analysed and they were


                                           164
 

 

 


           1       found to have been fired from the very gun that was in

           2       possession of Mr Hutchinson-Foster on 29 July --

           3   A.  That's right.

           4   Q.  -- and let me put it entirely neutrally, found at

           5       Ferry Lane on 4 August on the grass?

           6   A.  That's right, exactly.

           7   Q.  Is that an ongoing investigation?

           8   A.  That investigation is now complete -- oh, that one is

           9       complete because the -- someone was arrested for that.

          10       Do you want me to go anymore on that or not?

          11   Q.  Probably -- I don't know if anybody minds.

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We might as well.

          13   MR STERN:  Might as well hear about it, yes.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  What's the position on that,

          15       Mr Foote?

          16   A.  Someone was arrested for that.  The victim provided

          17       a name and a description of the person and the location

          18       where they could be found, and some time later, the --

          19       it would have been Trident South teams -- arrested that

          20       person and he was interviewed and bailed for the

          21       purposes of an ID procedure.  Unfortunately, the victim,

          22       again, decided that they didn't want to proceed any

          23       further and did not attend the ID procedure.

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Is that the present state of play or

          25       has it now come to an end?


                                           165
 

 

 


           1   A.  It's now come to an end, as far as I'm aware, sir.

           2   MR STERN:  In other words, because the complainant or victim

           3       would not give evidence?

           4   A.  That's right, yes.

           5   Q.  Is that something you find happens on a fairly frequent

           6       basis?

           7   A.  It does, yes, quite a lot.

           8   MR STERN:  Those are the three areas, thank you very much.

           9   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much Mr Stern.

          10                       Questions by MR BUTT

          11   MR BUTT:  Mr Foote, I represent -- the plans for where

          12       counsel sit are now wrong, because I have swapped places

          13       with the IPCC in case anyone is confused.  You will

          14       recall that you were asked whether somebody should have

          15       been in overall command of the operation on 3 and

          16       4 August before lunch; you recall those questions, yes?

          17   A.  That's right, yes.

          18   Q.  Just to be clear on some of the respective roles: you

          19       were the Senior Investigating Officer, so part of your

          20       job was gathering evidence and deciding whether you were

          21       at the stage whereby you could arrest subjects with

          22       a view to charging them and prosecuting them, yes?

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  Were you able to do that in relation to Mark Duggan by

          25       3 August or 4 August 2011?


                                           166
 

 

 


           1   A.  No.

           2   Q.  Were you able to do that for Kevin Hutchinson-Foster by

           3       those dates?

           4   A.  No.

           5   Q.  By contrast, the Tactical Firearms Commander --

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Sorry, we are just talking about --

           7       you are being recorded so that people elsewhere -- the

           8       court above.  Are you now on and working?

           9   MR BUTT:  Yes.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Please continue.

          11   MR BUTT:  By contrast, the Tactical Firearms Commander -- in

          12       this case Z51 -- is responsible for developing

          13       coordinating and executing the firearms tactical plan,

          14       yes.

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  He is quite deliberately not involved in the question of

          17       whether there is enough evidence to arrest for

          18       an offence; is that right?

          19   A.  That's correct, yes.

          20   Q.  The Association of Chief Police Officers give guidance

          21       to police forces, and that guidance is quite clear: the

          22       Tactical Firearms Commander must be separate from the

          23       Senior Investigating Officer, yes --

          24   A.  That's correct, yes.

          25   Q.  -- and that he or she must not play a significant role


                                           167
 

 

 


           1       in the investigation?

           2   A.  That's correct.

           3   Q.  So it is a quite deliberate decision and requirement

           4       that you are separate from the firearms command; is that

           5       right?

           6   A.  Exactly that, yes.

           7   Q.  Is it also right that it would be quite wrong for you to

           8       interfere in the Tactical Commander's firearms command

           9       once that operation was ongoing on 3 and 4 August?

          10   A.  That's right exactly right, yes.

          11   Q.  It was put to you on a number of occasions that you

          12       authorised this operation on the 3rd and the 4th; is the

          13       correct position that, in fact, you authorised ZZ17 to

          14       make an application --

          15   A.  An application, that's right.

          16   Q.  -- for the armed operation?

          17   A.  That's correct.

          18   Q.  That application then goes to the Tactical Firearms

          19       Commander, Z51 --

          20   A.  That's right.

          21   Q.  -- who then has to decide if it goes to the --

          22   A.  Strategic Firearms Commander.

          23   Q.  -- strategic Firearms Commander, and ultimately it is

          24       the Strategic Firearms Commander who authorises the

          25       operation --


                                           168
 

 

 


           1   A.  That's correct, yes.

           2   Q.  -- not you at all?

           3   A.  No, not at all.

           4   Q.  You were asked a number of questions about what was said

           5       to be obvious alternatives by Mr Mansfield.  I think you

           6       said yesterday that you are a trained Tactical Firearms

           7       Commander yourself; is that right?

           8   A.  That's right, yes.

           9   Q.  You were asked questions about, in particular, the

          10       cul-de-sac, and it was said at one stage that

          11       cul-de-sacs are potentially good areas to conduct

          12       interceptions; do you recall that?

          13   A.  Yes, I do, yes.

          14   Q.  Have you actually seen the FA5, which is the tactical

          15       advice document in this case?

          16   A.  No, I haven't, no.

          17   Q.  Could we just briefly look at that?  It's at page 332 of

          18       the documents.  Can you see in relation to "Option 1

          19       Stop."

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  This might be what reference was being made to:

          22           "Intelligence suggests that the subject or occupants

          23       of a vehicle may be armed and there are environmental

          24       reasons that make this option safe to undertake (eg

          25       vehicle stops in a deserted cul-de-sac)."


                                           169
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes.

           2   Q.  Would you describe Burchell Road at 5.30 on a Wednesday

           3       afternoon as a "deserted cul-de-sac"?

           4   A.  No, I wouldn't, no.

           5   Q.  You were also asked some questions about the timing of

           6       the deployment.  I think it was being suggested that

           7       5.15 was, in fact, the obvious alternative time to

           8       deploy, and you were referred to a map which

           9       Mr Mansfield gave you a copy of.

          10   A.  That's right, yes.

          11   Q.  If you look at the top right-hand corner of the map,

          12       this is who was at Quicksilver at 5.15.

          13   A.  That's right, yes.

          14   Q.  You notice the Tactical Firearms Commander was not at

          15       Quicksilver at 5.15, not marked on that map?

          16   A.  That's correct.

          17   Q.  Were you aware at 5.15 that the Tactical Firearms

          18       Commander was a little way away from Quicksilver, the

          19       briefing location?

          20   A.  Yes, I am aware, yes.

          21   Q.  Do you think it would have been safe to have deployed

          22       CO19 to an unknown residential area without a briefing

          23       and without a Tactical Firearms Commander present?

          24   A.  I think it would have been unwise.

          25   Q.  You mentioned that you have historical knowledge of


                                           170
 

 

 


           1       Burchell Road.  Did you know that there was an alleyway

           2       running from the bottom of Burchell Road to Skelton Road

           3       (sic)?

           4   A.  No, I didn't, no.

           5   Q.  We might hear more about that later.

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I think he said he didn't have any

           7       knowledge of Burchell Road at all, but anyway.

           8   A.  I knew the area of Vicarage Road but not Burchell, no.

           9   MR BUTT:  The word "control" has been used today and people

          10       have been talking about gaining control of vehicles and

          11       subjects.  When police officers in pro-active operations

          12       talk about "control", the word has a specific meaning,

          13       doesn't it?

          14   A.  Yes, it does.

          15   Q.  If you say "I had control of the vehicle", it doesn't

          16       mean you have stopped it and you have arrested the

          17       subjects, does it?

          18   A.  No, it doesn't.  It means you can see the vehicle -- at

          19       least you've got control visually of that vehicle.

          20   Q.  Can we just take a step back then, looking at the

          21       tactics.  At 5.20, intelligence comes in, first to ZZ17,

          22       then passed on to Z51, the Tactical Firearms Commander,

          23       that Mark Duggan is going to take possession of

          24       a firearm, yes?

          25   A.  Yes.


                                           171
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Now, that could have happened a few weeks earlier --

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  -- when there wasn't in fact the pro-active firearms

           4       operation being run, couldn't it?

           5   A.  That's right, it could have done, yes.

           6   Q.  Trident and CO19 would have had to respond to that as

           7       best they could, yes?

           8   A.  Yes, that's right.

           9   Q.  As it happens, because there was a preplanned pro-active

          10       operation on that date --

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  -- does it in fact follow that surveillance and CO19 and

          13       Trident officers were able to deploy quicker than they

          14       normally would have done?

          15   A.  Yes, that's right, yes.

          16   Q.  In terms of the planning of an operation like this, it

          17       starts with the FA1 being completed, as we heard, by

          18       ZZ17 --

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  -- and that document was then sent to Z51, the Tactical

          21       Firearms Commander, on 1 August.

          22   A.  That's right.

          23   Q.  Are you aware of that?

          24   A.  Yes, I was, yes.

          25   Q.  We have the emails if we need to look at them, and we


                                           172
 

 

 


           1       shouldn't forget that this pro-active operation was

           2       looking at primarily, but not exclusively, six different

           3       subjects, wasn't it?

           4   A.  That's right, yes.

           5   Q.  All of those six were people who, in the opinion of

           6       Trident, were likely to, and had an intention of, taking

           7       possession of a firearm, yes?

           8   A.  That's right, that's exactly right.

           9   Q.  Mark Duggan was but one of those six, yes?

          10   A.  That's right, yes.

          11   Q.  In fact, the pro-active operation was also ready to deal

          12       with people other than the six who were in the FA1 who

          13       might have taken possession of the firearm.

          14   A.  That's right.  Like I said before, the intelligence --

          15       it was a matter of responding to that intelligence and

          16       seeing how it developed and it could have happened with

          17       any one of those six people.  It just happened to be

          18       that Mark Duggan was the most active.

          19   Q.  I think it also happened that someone other than the

          20       six, earlier on on the 4 August, in fact there was

          21       intelligence that that person was going to take

          22       a firearm --

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  -- and there was going to be possible deployment, but in

          25       the event that never happened?


                                           173
 

 

 


           1   A.  That never happened, that's right.

           2   Q.  Just because someone wants to take possession of

           3       a firearm on a particular day and then doesn't, doesn't

           4       at all mean that they will try the next day, does it?

           5   A.  That's right, no.

           6   Q.  For example, we know that on 22 June 2011 --

           7   A.  That's right --

           8   Q.  -- there was very good intelligence that Mark Duggan was

           9       going to take a firearm, yes?

          10   A.  That's right, yes.

          11   Q.  Because there was no pro-active operation that day,

          12       there was a fast time deployment but, in the event, he

          13       didn't take a gun, did he?

          14   A.  No, he didn't, no.

          15   Q.  There was no reliable intelligence that he made a real

          16       attempt to do so until 3 August, some time later, yes?

          17   A.  That's right, yes.

          18   Q.  Running a pro-active operation is expensive, isn't it?

          19   A.  It is, very much so.

          20   Q.  The police have to pick certain subjects, certain dates,

          21       and certain times when they have the heightened

          22       pro-active response, yes?

          23   A.  That's right, yes.

          24   Q.  Can you assist the jury with why it was that this

          25       pro-active operation began at 6 o'clock in the evening


                                           174
 

 

 


           1       rather than, for example, lunchtime or 11 o'clock in the

           2       morning?

           3   A.  Generally, why this operation started so late is because

           4       of the fact that people -- some of the subjects we were

           5       dealing with actually didn't -- use the cover of

           6       darkness, but mainly to go out and conduct business,

           7       either drugs, sell drugs, sort of large scale drugs as

           8       well, and retrieve firearms, and then obviously, during

           9       the course of an evening, if there's a party that they

          10       are going to go to, then obviously they will take those

          11       firearms with them as well.

          12           That allowed us to go -- starting at 6 o'clock in

          13       the evening, with a sort of -- an eight-hour period,

          14       an eight-hour shift until 2.00 am was quite a good

          15       coverage period and, obviously if it extended beyond

          16       that, then we would pay -- they would be incurring

          17       overtime for that.

          18   Q.  If you could have a 24-hour pro-active team ready to be

          19       deployed at a moment's notice you would have that?

          20   A.  Yes, we'd have that.

          21   Q.  But it's simply not possible, is it?

          22   A.  No.

          23   Q.  Can I finally ask you this, and it concerns the

          24       conversation you had with Z51, the Tactical Firearms

          25       Commander, that Mr Mansfield was asking you about at the


                                           175
 

 

 


           1       beginning of your evidence?

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  He provided you with the initial information about what

           4       had happened at the scene?

           5   A.  That's right, yes.

           6   Q.  Do you recall there was a note that we saw from the Gold

           7       Commander, the Strategic Commander which talked about

           8       a gun being found, yes?

           9   A.  That's right, yes.

          10   Q.  Do you recall that, in fact, Z51 told you that he had

          11       found the gun?

          12   A.  Yes, he did, yes.

          13   Q.  He was on the phone to you in fact when he found the

          14       gun, wasn't he?

          15   A.  He was indeed, yes.

          16   MR BUTT:  Thank you very much, that's all I ask.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  I've got you

          18       down?

          19   MS LEEK:  No, thank you, sir.

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That was my call order.  So you have

          21       no questions on behalf of SOCA.  Then, I think that I've

          22       just -- trying to make sure I have got my right order

          23       going here, I believe that those representing the

          24       interested parties of DS Belfield are next on my list.

          25       I am not quite sure how you have sorted your seats out.


                                           176
 

 

 


           1       So we've got Ms Dobbin.

           2           Sorry for the confusion, I was going the wrong way

           3       round on my list.

           4                      Questions by MS DOBBIN

           5   MS DOBBIN:  Officer, I represent DS Faulkner and

           6       DS Belfield, the two officers in Hackney who were

           7       involved in investigating what's been called the

           8       pistol-whipping incident on 29 July.  I just want to ask

           9       you something about that, if I may.

          10           First of all, if we can be clear about this:  When

          11       the gun and the sock were recovered from the scene on

          12       4 August they were sent away for DNA analysis.

          13   A.  That's right.

          14   Q.  In fact, the DNA of the victim of the pistol-whipping

          15       incident was found on the sock --

          16   A.  That's right.

          17   Q.  -- I believe.

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  It was that which enabled you to trace the firearm back

          20       to the incident which had taken place in Hackney on the

          21       29th July --

          22   A.  That's right, yes.

          23   Q.  -- is that right?  It's also correct that you reviewed

          24       some of the records about the investigation --

          25   A.  I did, yes.


                                           177
 

 

 


           1   Q.  -- of the matter which took place --

           2   A.  I did, yes.

           3   Q.  -- on the 29 July and those investigations had taken

           4       place on Hackney Borough (?), had they not?

           5   A.  That's right, yes.

           6   Q.  It's right, is it not, from your review of that record,

           7       that no witnesses at the scene identified

           8       Mr Hutchinson-Foster as the assailant --

           9   A.  That's correct, yes.

          10   Q.  -- on the 29 July, and this has already been alluded to,

          11       but the gentleman who was hit on the head with the gun

          12       on 29 July did not name Mr Hutchinson-Foster?

          13   A.  No, he didn't, no.

          14   Q.  In fact, he didn't want to cooperate with the police at

          15       all --

          16   A.  No, he didn't.

          17   Q.  -- about the assault on him?

          18   A.  That's correct.

          19   Q.  I think it's right that he suggested that the assault

          20       was linked to his ex-girlfriend and someone that she had

          21       been involved with.

          22   A.  That's right.

          23   Q.  She was spoken to that evening but she didn't name

          24       Mr Hutchinson-Foster --

          25   A.  No.


                                           178
 

 

 


           1   Q.  -- either, and in fact I think she gave the name of

           2       "Kevin Brown" instead?

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Say that again, what was the

           4       question?

           5   MS DOBBIN:  Sorry, that the girlfriend was visited on the

           6       night of 29 July.

           7   A.  That's right.

           8   Q.  She didn't identify Mr Hutchinson-Foster and in fact

           9       I think it's right that she gave the name of "Kevin

          10       Brown" as being the man that she had been involved with;

          11       is that right?

          12   A.  That's right, yes.

          13   Q.  So after 29 July, and whilst you were planning your

          14       operation, there was nothing to link Kevin

          15       Hutchinson-Foster's name to the incident which had taken

          16       place --

          17   A.  That's right, yes.

          18   Q.  -- on 29 July.  It's been suggested to you that CCTV

          19       from the scene of the barber shop where the

          20       pistol-whipping took place could have been downloaded

          21       and somehow circulated so that you, or presumably

          22       someone on your team, might have seen it whilst you were

          23       planning the operation.

          24   A.  Right.  It's -- like I said before, it's possible but

          25       that's a really -- it's a big call.  It would have been


                                           179
 

 

 


           1       very difficult to be able to do that, circulate it and

           2       then get someone to identify them in such a short space

           3       of time.

           4   Q.  That's precisely what I want to ask you about.  There is

           5       a process, isn't there, whereby officers can circulate

           6       images of unknown suspects --

           7   A.  That's right.

           8   Q.  -- around the Metropolitan Police Service?

           9   A.  Yes, there is, yes.

          10   Q.  First of all, they can do it on a local basis --

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  -- by submitting the CCTV images to a local digital

          13       evidence unit --

          14   A.  That's right that's the first stage, yes.

          15   Q.  -- and that local unit will distribute the images

          16       locally.

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  But that process itself can take a number of days --

          19   A.  Yes, it can.

          20   Q.  -- before the images are circulated.

          21   A.  Circulated, yes.

          22   Q.  Thereafter, the images can be circulated on a wider MPS

          23       basis --

          24   A.  That's right.

          25   Q.  -- but that process can take even longer.


                                           180
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes.

           2   Q.  In fact, for an offence like this, which was categorised

           3       as an actual bodily harm --

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  -- that could take a good many number of days indeed; is

           6       that right?

           7   A.  Yes, you are quite right, yes.

           8   Q.  So, in fact, the prospect of you or indeed someone from

           9       your team being able to identify Mr Hutchinson-Foster

          10       after 29 July, by seeing those images, must be very

          11       remote indeed?

          12   A.  Very slim.

          13   MS DOBBIN:  Thank you.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much, Ms Dobbin.

          15       I think it's Mr Glasson now.

          16   MR GLASSON:  No questions, sir.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Now it's Mr Keith.

          18                      Questions by MR KEITH

          19   MR KEITH:  Mr Foote, I am Hugo Keith.  I intend to ask you

          20       some questions on behalf of the Metropolitan Police

          21       Service generally.

          22   A.  Okay.

          23   Q.  I want to start, please, if I may, with your experience

          24       and your general overall responsibilities.

          25           You lead an investigative team, do you --


                                           181
 

 

 


           1   A.  That's right.

           2   Q.  -- for an area in London?

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  North-west London, in fact?

           5   A.  The whole of north-west London, yes.

           6   Q.  How many boroughs does that include?

           7   A.  That's 13 boroughs, who -- certainly we've got

           8       Westminster -- very busy -- Haringey, Brent, Enfield;

           9       they are the busier ones, and Ealing.  And then from

          10       there on we've got what was Hammersmith and Fulham,

          11       Hounslow, Harrow, Barnet ... I think that's it that

          12       I can think of.

          13   Q.  In your team, you deal with two broad areas, of which

          14       we've heard something already: reactive and pro-active

          15       investigations?

          16   A.  That's right, yes.

          17   Q.  Reactive: you respond to events, shootings, that are in

          18       the course of taking place, or have already taken place?

          19   A.  Have already taken place, yes.

          20   Q.  And pro-active: where you plan operations to arrest

          21       criminals --

          22   A.  That's right.

          23   Q.  -- seize their firearms.  And those sorts of operations

          24       are planned all the time based on the intelligence that

          25       is available to you and what you are trying to achieve?


                                           182
 

 

 


           1   A.  That's right, yes.

           2   Q.  All of this forms part of Trident.

           3   A.  That's right, yes.

           4   Q.  As we all know, I'm sure, Trident is part of the

           5       Metropolitan Police Service.  It is a command which

           6       deals with the investigation of -- now, although it

           7       wasn't the position originally when it started in

           8       2000 -- all shootings?

           9   A.  That's right, yes.

          10   Q.  You have told us that you have 29 years of experience in

          11       the Metropolitan Police.  Just remind us, please, how

          12       many years' experience you have in Trident?

          13   A.  I've been on Trident ... well, it will be ... three and

          14       a half years now.

          15   Q.  Then of course, in August of 2011, you had approximately

          16       a year and a half's experience?

          17   A.  That's right, yes.

          18   Q.  During that time, had you been involved in other

          19       investigations other than Dibri?

          20   A.  Yes.  In relation to -- being on Trident?  Yes.  There

          21       had been -- Dibri is just one big overall operation with

          22       many tangents coming from that.  And there was another

          23       operation that was running prior to that, again dealing

          24       with people at the same sort of level.

          25   Q.  That was an operation which had started -- we'll see in


                                           183
 

 

 


           1       a moment -- quite a long time before --

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  -- the events of August 2011.  That was an operation

           4       being run by your Trident officers.

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  That's quite different -- again as we've heard in

           7       part -- from the firearms operation, which was

           8       authorised for August 2011, which was the Mobile Armed

           9       Support to Surveillance Operation, the MASTS operation?

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  That's run in tandem, isn't it, between Trident --

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  -- because you provide the general operational plan, the

          14       background, if you like?

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  Part of the Metropolitan Police that deals with

          17       surveillance?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  And a part of the Metropolitan Police that deals with

          20       firearms, and you've heard some questions being put that

          21       you have answered in relation to SCO19?

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  But they are quite different, aren't they?

          24   A.  They are.

          25   Q.  Operation Dibri is not the firearms operation.


                                           184
 

 

 


           1   A.  That's right.

           2   Q.  Turning and looking at Dibri in a little more detail, it

           3       was a pro-active -- so not a reactive, a pro-active --

           4       operation --

           5   A.  That's right.

           6   Q.  -- into the activities of the Tottenham Man Dem --

           7   A.  That's right.

           8   Q.  -- which was the gang or, you call it with your

           9       acronyms, an OCN, an Organised Criminal Network?

          10   A.  That's right, yes.

          11   Q.  You in fact provided, or you prepared, at some time

          12       in August 2011 a presentation on the Tottenham Man Dem.

          13       Could we have, please, page 6085, CD6085, on the screen.

          14           This refers, does it not, to the fact that

          15       Operation Dibri -- if we could zoom in a little bit

          16       more, please -- was the pro-active investigation

          17       targeting that particular gang, the Tottenham Man Dem?

          18   A.  That's right, yes.

          19   Q.  You have set out in the middle of the page the

          20       information about the TMD.

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  Is that the information from which you drew your answer

          23       to counsel to the Inquest, Mr Underwood, in relation to

          24       how violent they are?

          25   A.  Yes.  That's right, yes.


                                           185
 

 

 


           1   Q.  It says:

           2           "The TMD are ranked number 2 on the MPS OCN matrix."

           3           That's Metropolitan Police Service Organised Crime

           4       Network matrix.  What does that mean in essence?

           5   A.  In essence, across London they are probably the second

           6       highest harmful gang.

           7   Q.  Is that why they were the subject of Operation Dibri?

           8   A.  Yes, that's right, yes.

           9   Q.  If you look at 6088, please.

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  You can see that they've been involved in the supply of

          12       illegal drugs, firearms, kidnapping, blackmail and GBH

          13       offences.  That is, to use your words, their line of

          14       business.  And, importantly, and we'll come to this

          15       a little later, as part of TMD's history they became

          16       engaged in a turf war, a gang war, with another gang?

          17   A.  That's right, yes.

          18   Q.  What was that other gang?

          19   A.  They were called the London Field Boys.

          20   Q.  What was the importance of the fact that they appeared

          21       to be involved in a feud with another gang, in terms of

          22       the risks to the public that you are sworn to protect?

          23   A.  Over a period of time, they had been involved in a

          24       number of murders and GBHs, as mentioned before, and

          25       attempted murders, as we call them, where -- non-fatal


                                           186
 

 

 


           1       shootings, on both sides.  And obviously there -- in

           2       particular -- which started -- a catalyst for this was

           3       the shooting of a 16-year old boy in a Hackney nightclub

           4       by a TMD member.  That person stood trial for that

           5       offence, along with another, and were found not guilty.

           6       And from that point onwards, the friction continued.

           7   Q.  6089, the following page: did you present further

           8       details of the feud and the consequences of the feud and

           9       their general activity, which was that the TMD had been

          10       linked to nine firearm related murders, five attempted

          11       murders, three firearms related GBH (that's grievous

          12       bodily harm) matters, one separate grievous bodily harm

          13       and during the same period they themselves were

          14       subjected to three murders and two attempted murders in

          15       reprisal attacks.

          16   A.  That's right, yes.

          17   Q.  So when you plan these overall operations, are you

          18       bearing in mind, are you taking into account, not just

          19       the risks to the public of allowing such gangs to

          20       operate unhindered and unopposed --

          21   A.  That's right.

          22   Q.  -- but also in fact the risks to the members of the

          23       gangs themselves of being shot or killed by another gang

          24       with whom they are in conflict?

          25   A.  That's correct.  I mean, even whilst we go out on some


                                           187
 

 

 


           1       of these operations, we don't even know if they're going

           2       to be subjected to being shot as well.  And we are going

           3       to be doing something pro-active about a certain person,

           4       so it's something we have to have in the back of our

           5       minds as well.

           6   Q.  In fact, if you go, please, to 6091, operation Dibri,

           7       which was authorised the previous -- two years before,

           8       in January 2009 -- was brought about because of the

           9       rising tension which resulted from a stabbing, the

          10       responsibility for which was laid at the door of the

          11       Hackney Boys?

          12   A.  Yes, that's right, yes.

          13   Q.  So Operation Dibri was designed to arrest and disrupt

          14       senior members of the Tottenham Man Dem; is that right?

          15   A.  That's right, yes.

          16   Q.  If you go to the next page, please, 6092, you set out

          17       there the general purposes of Dibri.

          18   A.  That's right.

          19   Q.  It may seem a rather obvious question, Mr Foote, but

          20       please answer it nevertheless: why did Dibri set out to

          21       try to arrest and disrupt members of the gang?  What was

          22       the purpose of it?  Why were the police doing this?

          23   A.  Well, the main purpose was the fact that it was the fact

          24       that they were -- generally the use of firearms out on

          25       the street.  I mean there's -- good examples of these


                                           188
 

 

 


           1       are the young Sri Lankan girl, Thusha, who was shot --

           2       I don't know if you're aware, if you remember -- back in

           3       South London.  Again, she was shot by accident while she

           4       was in a shop which her family owned.

           5           And also, again, there was the shooting of the --

           6       Agnes, who was a young 16-year old girl who was shot in

           7       a chicken shop in Hackney.  In fact, that happened

           8       around this time.  Or around the time just before

           9       Mr Duggan was shot.

          10           They are the sort of incidents that we're trying to

          11       prevent, innocent members of the public being shot by

          12       gangs feuding amongst themselves.

          13           And, you know, we have murder teams, that are

          14       costing quite a lot of money, to investigate these

          15       shootings and it has to be -- it's paramount that the

          16       public safety -- that we put first.  And that's the real

          17       reason why we conduct those operations.

          18   Q.  The following page, 6093, sets out the operational plan.

          19       Is this the overall strategy --

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  -- the aim of Operation Dibri?

          22   A.  It is, yes.

          23   Q.  It says there, splitting its Infinitive:

          24           "To proactively target the subjects gathering

          25       intelligence on their lifestyles to ascertain their


                                           189
 

 

 


           1       level of criminality and associates, safe houses and

           2       other individuals involved in the supply of illegal

           3       drugs and firearms.

           4           "To gather evidence to arrest and prosecute and to

           5       seize and confiscate assets."

           6           Do members of these gangs just walk into police

           7       stations and present themselves for arrest?

           8   A.  No, they don't.

           9   Q.  How do you obtain the material to arrest and seize the

          10       firearms which pose such a risk?

          11   A.  In order to do that, we have to conduct surveillance on

          12       them.  Lifestyle is one, and through that we can

          13       identify connections to people, and with the purpose of

          14       that identify addresses that they may have control over.

          15       And from there we will use that for the purposes of

          16       getting warrants, as we've done in previous operations

          17       that are known to us.  And when the intelligence

          18       develops that there is something at those addresses,

          19       then we will go and execute those warrants.

          20   Q.  Is that why you said earlier that intelligence is what

          21       drives what you do?

          22   A.  It does indeed, yes.

          23   Q.  You cannot do any of this unless you have the

          24       intelligence with which to do it?

          25   A.  That's right, yes, correct.


                                           190
 

 

 


           1   Q.  If you go forward, please, two more pages, which I think

           2       will take you to CD6095, the way that you started was

           3       that you identified an initial list -- I say "you", you,

           4       I think, joined the operation after it had started, you

           5       took over as the Senior Investigating Officer.  The

           6       operation identified a list of people who were nominally

           7       identified as members of the gang.

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  And Mr Duggan was on the list.

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  But the fact that somebody was on a list didn't

          12       necessarily mean that they would always be the direct

          13       subject of the operation.

          14   A.  No, not at all.  Not at all.

          15   Q.  Why was that?

          16   A.  Because some become -- get arrested for other offences,

          17       more serious offences, and are incarcerated or some just

          18       don't -- there's no intelligence that they're actually

          19       involved in any criminality, so that then changes the

          20       perspective.

          21           What we find is that there were people coming in and

          22       out of our investigation that weren't originally there

          23       before, so we will have an initial list of subjects.

          24       But over a period of time, that list changed.

          25   Q.  In terms of the intelligence that led you to make your


                                           191
 

 

 


           1       decisions, it comes from a variety of sources, doesn't

           2       it?

           3   A.  That's right, it does.

           4   Q.  Some are good, some are bad.

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  Some are very good in terms of accuracy and how specific

           7       it is.

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  That's the best sort?

          10   A.  It is indeed, yes.

          11   Q.  You need that intelligence, the really detailed type, to

          12       be able to make proper hard decisions about when to

          13       intervene.

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  Why is that?  What is the advantage of acting directly

          16       by way of an intervention when you have hard

          17       intelligence?

          18   A.  Because at least with that it gives you the opportunity

          19       to put a stop in, it's -- on those operations, they are

          20       intelligence led and they are intelligence led stops, so

          21       the reason of having firearms officers is that, as a way

          22       of actually doing, as we call it, hard stop, is stopping

          23       that vehicle with a view that you hopefully know inside

          24       that vehicle there will be a firearm, because it was

          25       pointless doing it otherwise.


                                           192
 

 

 


           1   Q.  If you have detailed, specific, up to date, reliable

           2       intelligence, does that have any impact upon the risks

           3       to people involved in the operation?

           4   A.  Oh, yes.

           5   Q.  Firearms operation.  By which I mean the police, the

           6       public who might be in the vicinity --

           7   A.  That's right.

           8   Q.  -- or the members of the gang themselves?

           9   A.  Yes, there's always a risk and there's a number of

          10       considerations.  Certainly we have discussed today about

          11       locations of stops and it's about trying to reduce the

          12       risk to the public.  And, from what I can see, the

          13       location of where Mark Duggan was stopped was probably

          14       one of the safest places.  It's a busy road but it was

          15       away from residential premises.

          16   Q.  We will come back to the issue of the stop later.  Were

          17       there two -- in general terms -- types of

          18       intelligence --

          19   A.  Yes, there is.

          20   Q.  -- concerned in this case and in Operation Dibri.  One

          21       in relation to the general background.

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  And two, the specific intelligence which came in, as you

          24       know, in the first few days in August.

          25   A.  That's right.


                                           193
 

 

 


           1   Q.  The general background is relevant though, isn't it,

           2       because it helps you to assess what somebody is likely

           3       to do?  It helps you to assess the risks --

           4   A.  It does.

           5   Q.  -- of how they might respond?

           6   A.  Yes.  I mean, it's about building up an intelligence

           7       picture, so it's all aspects of intelligence and

           8       information from various source that we all use to give

           9       you a more accurate description, knowledge, around that

          10       person.

          11   Q.  But you can't always, and you won't always, have much

          12       more detailed information when you start to plan an

          13       armed intervention operation?

          14   A.  No, not at all.  You have to -- the intelligence

          15       develops as it goes along.

          16   Q.  We'll come back to this later but, plainly, when you

          17       first started to look at the possibility of whether

          18       resources would be available in August, which was an

          19       investigation or a step you took in June, you couldn't

          20       have known in June what you might, and in the event you

          21       did, know as at 4 August?

          22   A.  No, that's quite right, yes.

          23   Q.  But you cannot just put a whole operation, like

          24       a firearms operation, into place at a moment's notice?

          25   A.  No, that's quite right.


                                           194
 

 

 


           1   Q.  So the background intelligence is quite important then

           2       because you might have to rely upon that when you plan

           3       a firearms operation.

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  Because that may be all you have at the time.

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  Why did there have to be a firearms operation at all?

           8       Why couldn't Operation Dibri just continue to rely upon

           9       the intelligence and gather the intelligence that it

          10       could?

          11   A.  Well, it's the risk that is why it has to be a firearms

          12       operation.  It's the risk of -- you can imagine --

          13       I mean, as it might have been suggested, or a scenario

          14       could be suggested, that, you know, having officers in

          15       Burchell Road to try and detain a man who's taken

          16       possession of a firearm.  For me, the risk is too high

          17       and that's one you would not want to do.  It has to be

          18       proportionate and it's about being proportionate that

          19       you have firearms officers to deal with that scenario to

          20       prevent any risk from anyone getting -- someone else,

          21       other members of the public or even that person getting

          22       shot.

          23   Q.  So when you came to plan the operation, by which you

          24       first started to investigate whether the resources might

          25       be available because they are not your resources they


                                           195
 

 

 


           1       are CO19 --

           2   A.  No.

           3   Q.  -- did you have regard to all the intelligence that

           4       related to the gang --

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  -- and Mr Duggan but not exclusively Mr Duggan --

           7   A.  That's right.

           8   Q.  -- and anybody else who might be the subject of the

           9       operation?

          10   A.  That's right, yes.

          11   Q.  You were asked about some of that intelligence, and you

          12       were asked about some of the material available to you

          13       when the firearms operation was first mooted and, in

          14       very round terms, put into place in June.

          15           Can we just look for a moment, please, at the full

          16       picture.  It's important the jury do have the full

          17       picture since they're considering these issues.

          18           Do you have a copy of your statement dated

          19       12 March 2012.  It's our CS657, I do not think's there's

          20       any problem with putting it on the screen.  You say, in

          21       the bottom half of that page:

          22           "I was certainly familiar with the overall

          23       intelligence picture surrounding Mr Duggan and had been

          24       aware of his alleged criminal activities for some time

          25       prior to 4 August 2011.  My overall knowledge of the


                                           196
 

 

 


           1       intelligence with specific pieces of intelligence,

           2       underpinned my decision making throughout my involvement

           3       in this intelligence led operation.  This intelligence

           4       was also available to other decision makers."

           5           You set out why the background remains important

           6       even if, by the time the operation takes place, might

           7       have more specific intelligence.

           8   A.  That's right, yes.

           9   Q.  It's right, and Mr Underwood asked you about this, if

          10       you go over the page to CS658, that he had convictions

          11       for relatively minor matters in 2007 and 2000, as well

          12       as a police caution.  But he had been arrested, hadn't

          13       he, for a variety of extremely serious other matters?

          14   A.  That's right, yes.

          15   Q.  Do you set out there what they were?

          16   A.  Yes, I do, yes.

          17   Q.  In October 2008 --

          18   A.  3.

          19   Q.  -- a man called Gavin Smith?

          20   A.  Sorry, 2003.

          21   Q.  I'm so sorry, 2003.  A man called Gavin Smith was found

          22       in the Lordship Lane Recreation Ground at the rear of

          23       Broadwater Farm, he had been stabbed twice.  Was

          24       Mr Duggan one of the persons arrested and interviewed in

          25       relation to that murder?


                                           197
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes, he was.

           2   Q.  I make plain that this was a list of occasions on which

           3       he was arrested, he was not prosecuted or convicted in

           4       relation to any of them:

           5           "On 5 May 2006, police were called to a car repair

           6       garage from Tottenham where a Turkish male had been

           7       shot."

           8           He wasn't killed but he lost a kidney and suffered

           9       damage to his bladder.  Mr Duggan was arrested on

          10       22 May 2006 but the identification procedure did not

          11       lead to him being identified by witnesses.  There was,

          12       it seems, no forensic evidence, and so the matter did

          13       not proceed against him, but others who were known

          14       associates were convicted in relation to the shooting.

          15   A.  That's right, yes.

          16   Q.  On 21 July, he was arrested when a round of live

          17       ammunition was found in a car in which he was

          18       a passenger; no charges were brought.

          19   A.  That's right.

          20   Q.  On 1 March 2008 -- we are now onto CS659 -- a convoy of

          21       five cars was stopped by armed police officers in

          22       Chiswick.  A loaded firearm was found wrapped in

          23       a sock in the waistband of a man who was an associate of

          24       Mr Duggan's.

          25   A.  That's right, yes.


                                           198
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Mr Duggan was himself the driver of one of the other

           2       vehicles --

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  -- and no doubt some, if not all of those present, were

           5       arrested, but he himself was not prosecuted in

           6       connection with that?

           7   A.  No.  That was another MASTS operation by Trident.

           8   Q.  It was a MASTS operation?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  So a gun was recovered on that occasion but happily

          11       there was no discharge of any firearm.

          12   A.  That's right.

          13   Q.  Just pausing there for a moment, the gun there was found

          14       wrapped in a sock.  What significance did it have that

          15       it was wrapped in a sock, why do you think it was

          16       wrapped in a sock?

          17   A.  It's to prevent fingerprints and DNA being identified on

          18       the firearm.

          19   Q.  Is that a ruse which is known to you as being used by

          20       organised crime networks?

          21   A.  Yes, it is, yes.  Quite frequent.

          22   Q.  Could you look, please, at another document, which is

          23       a document dated 22 August 2011, so after the tragic

          24       events in question, CD4006.  Could it please be zoomed

          25       into -- again, zoomed in a bit more, please.


                                           199
 

 

 


           1           Does this refer to a piece of intelligence received

           2       by Crimestoppers, as I say, after the event on

           3       22 August 2011?

           4   A.  Yes, it does, yes.

           5   Q.  Does this piece of intelligence, although not relevant

           6       to the events in question, refer to the fact, according

           7       to the informant whoever he or she was, that

           8       Mr Hutchinson-Foster -- if you could just scroll down

           9       a bit, please -- was concerned with drugs, with the

          10       selling of drugs and, if I can find the reference, third

          11       line down, that he was to be said to be in possession of

          12       a gun and known to carry it in his sock.

          13   A.  Yes, that's right, yes.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The date of this?

          15   MR KEITH:  22 August 2011.  Going back, please --

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Keith, as I have interrupted you.

          17       I am quite happy --

          18   MR KEITH:  It's a convenient event point, sir.

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  If you are not able to finish within

          20       a reasonable five or ten minutes' time, I think in which

          21       case we will have to complete tomorrow, to be fair to

          22       the witness and to everybody else.

          23   MR KEITH:  So be it.

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I'm sure we won't mind waiting for

          25       the conclusion.  Sorry about that, Mr Foote, but I think


                                           200
 

 

 


           1       if you are going to be a little while you have already

           2       been in that witness box for two and a half hours, so

           3       I think it's only fair to you that you should be given

           4       a break as well.  So what I'll ask you then, Mr Foote,

           5       is the same warning but I will give it publicly again:

           6       please don't discuss this case and your evidence with

           7       anyone else, certainly those involved in it.  So if you

           8       would be kind enough to leave us and be ready for 10.30

           9       tomorrow morning.  If you leave them there, they will

          10       remain there.

          11   A.  These are mine.

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You are quite happy to take them.

          13   A.  I'll take them.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  All right.

          15                      (The witness withdrew)

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you, members of the jury.  Can

          17       I just address one or two remarks directly to you before

          18       we break for the day.  It's always very, very difficult

          19       to know how long witnesses are going to be and how long

          20       evidence is, and that's why sometimes we try to sit

          21       a little later sometimes to complete witnesses for their

          22       convenience, other times obviously it's not able to be

          23       done.

          24           What I would like just to say for the moment now,

          25       because I did have a note written to me just as I came


                                           201
 

 

 


           1       into court, that I'll deal with that with counsel, but

           2       I want you to be reassured that, yes, there will be some

           3       evidence from A10 in due course, and, yes, we are

           4       dealing with the right sort of process, whereby people

           5       are not on trial.  You are absolutely right about that.

           6           You may have understood that what's been going on

           7       here is an investigation into the facts.  Sometimes, it

           8       happens that, as we move on, things will get a little

           9       quicker and more directed, but it is important, as you

          10       will remember from last week's opening, that we are

          11       having to look at some of the areas that deal with the

          12       build up to this, the planning and some earlier

          13       incidents, to answer questions which are in your

          14       province and your province alone, not in any other

          15       organisation, investigative or the IPCC or anyone else.

          16           You, the jury, are having to look at that, obviously

          17       under my direction, and part of my function, which some

          18       of you thought perhaps I might not have been doing

          19       earlier on, is to control the area of questioning, but

          20       I am conscious that at this early stage it's important

          21       for a lot of areas and the background to be ventilated

          22       before you.

          23           There will be other witnesses tomorrow as well,

          24       which will deal with the lead up to the events on the

          25       day.  It's not just the events on the day that we are


                                           202
 

 

 


           1       concentrating on, although that is, of course, vitally

           2       important.  But we are looking at the surrounding

           3       processes as well to a degree, so that is why we are

           4       going through this, at the moment in some depth, but at

           5       the same time it's all part of what we're here to do

           6       really.

           7           All right, so thank you very much for your attention

           8       today.  If you would like to leave us and be ready for

           9       10.30 start tomorrow morning, please.

 

                                            
          10       (The Inquest adjourned until 10.30 am on Wednesday,

          11                        25 September 2013)

          12
               DETECTIVE CHIEF INSPECTOR MICK FOOTE .................1

                                   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


203

 

           1             (continued)

           2       Questions by MR MANSFIELD ........................1

           3   Housekeeping ........................................91

           4       Questions by MR THOMAS .........................137

           5       Questions by MR STERN ..........................152

           6       Questions by MR BUTT ...........................166

           7       Questions by MS DOBBIN .........................177

           8       Questions by MR KEITH ..........................181

           9   Housekeeping .......................................203

          10

          11

          12

          13

          14

          15

          16

          17

          18

          19

          20

          21

          22

          23

          24

          25


                                           204

 

 

 

           1                                     Tuesday, 24 September 2013

           2   (10.30 am)

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We are ready for the jury?  In which

           4       case I will ask for the jury.

           5                  (In the presence of the jury)

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Perhaps I could just ask you,

           7       Mr Underwood, before we call the witness in, what was

           8       the position about the documents that you produced

           9       yesterday?

          10   MR UNDERWOOD:  They will be provided to the members of the

          11       jury in a new bundle.  We are going to tab them up in

          12       the order in which they arrive so the first one, we have

          13       a tab number 1 and so on, and I hope we will be able to

          14       make sense of all of this with cross referencing by

          15       giving a schedule of that to everybody.

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  All right, thank you very much.

          17       That being done, we will have the witness.

          18         DETECTIVE CHIEF INSPECTOR MICK FOOTE (continued)

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Good morning Mr Foote.  You are

          20       still under the oath and affirmation you took yesterday

          21       so please have a seat and I think I was calling on

          22       Mr Mansfield to ask you questions.  Thank you.

          23           Yes, Mr Mansfield?

          24                    Questions by MR MANSFIELD

          25   MR MANSFIELD:  May I thank you for the time last night to


                                             1
 

 

 


           1       read the extra material.

           2           May I also enquire whether, as is sometimes the

           3       custom, you intend to have a mid-morning break.  If not

           4       I am happy to go on.

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You let us know.  I was not

           6       intending to but if everybody feels desperate or puts

           7       their hands up or anything like that, let me know.  But

           8       we will press on.

           9           Good morning, Officer?

          10   A.  Good morning.

          11   Q.  I represent the family of Mark Duggan and, so you know,

          12    &