Transcript of the Hearing 23 September 2013

           1                                      Monday, 23 September 2013

           2   (2.00 pm)

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Very good to see you again, members

           4       of the jury.  Thank you very much.  I will now call on

           5       Mr Underwood to begin, I think, a short opening then his

           6       first witness.

           7                Opening statement by MR UNDERWOOD

           8   MR UNDERWOOD:  Good afternoon.  You have heard quite a lot

           9       from me already and it's about time we started on some

          10       evidence but before that just a few small matters, if

          11       I may.  The first is you had the chance to see the

          12       replacement taxi that we brought last week in Tottenham

          13       and we thought, as I gather some of you do, it will be

          14       helpful if you had it here, so we are arranging for it

          15       to come to the car park here.  It should arrive,

          16       I think, next Monday and so it will be available at any


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           1       stage if at any point anyone wants to go and look in or

           2       out of it.

           3           Secondly, there's a map, or plan rather, in your

           4       jury bundles and there is a bigger better one with

           5       better colour on it which we will have put into your

           6       bundles for you.

           7           Thirdly, I made a mistake last Tuesday when

           8       I explained something about the evidence to you.  Can

           9       I just read you something I said.  It was about the

          10       bullet hole that went into the bunch of the jacket on

          11       Mr Duggan.  I said:

          12           "So it went in one part of the jacket through the

          13       other part of the bunch of the jacket then into his

          14       chest.  If that's right, then somehow or other with his

          15       right hand he was bringing that jacket up there when he

          16       received that shot."

          17           All of that is right except I should not have said

          18       with his right hand.  I didn't mean to, I'm sorry if

          19       I misled you about that.  We will see how the evidence

          20       goes as to about how that jacket was bunched up and how

          21       that bullet got through there.

          22           Without more ado I am going to call the first

          23       witness Detective Chief Inspector Foote, the senior

          24       investigating officer running this Operation Dibri.  So

          25       DCI Foote, please.  (Pause)


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           1         DETECTIVE CHIEF INSPECTOR MICK FOOTE (affirmed)

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  Do have a seat

           3       if you wish to.  It might be better if you do, then you

           4       will be more comfortable and then you can tell us --

           5   A.  Thank you.

           6                    Questions by MR UNDERWOOD

           7   MR UNDERWOOD:  Good afternoon, Mr Foote, my name is

           8       Underwood and I'm counsel to the Inquest.  I will start

           9       the ball rolling in terms of questions of which I have

          10       quite a few.  Are you Detective Chief Inspector Foote?

          11   A.  I am Detective Chief Inspector, I'm currently temporary

          12       Superintendent.

          13   Q.  I think in 2011 you were a Detective Chief Inspector in

          14       SCD8 Trident; is that right?

          15   A.  That's correct, yes.

          16   Q.  When did you join Trident?

          17   A.  I joined Trident at the end of January 2010.

          18   Q.  Was that a particular part of Trident or is Trident

          19       split up into geographical areas and were you in part of

          20       that?

          21   A.  Yes.  My role when I joined Trident was on promotion as

          22       Detective Chief Inspector and I had the whole of

          23       north-west London.  That included 13 boroughs and, as

          24       part of that, I had a proactive team that dealt with

          25       proactive investigations with covert enquiries.  And


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           1       then I had a reactive team which was based around

           2       investigating shootings that happened, so it's reactive

           3       investigations.

           4   Q.  Before we go any further, would you mind moving the

           5       microphone with the red on it towards you a bit.

           6       I fully understand why you are talking to the jury but

           7       it needs amplification in here.

           8           Can you give us a brief discussion about what

           9       Trident actually is and what in 2011 it was actually

          10       doing?

          11   A.  Well, Trident originally started, it was formed in 1998

          12       and it was in response to the increase in gun crime that

          13       was occurring in London, across London, and -- the case

          14       of Michelle Carby and Avril Johnson were two murders

          15       that had taken place in different parts of London, and

          16       we saw an increase in gun crime.  So as a result of that

          17       Trident was formed in 1998, mainly intelligence based,

          18       and from then on they formed murder investigation teams

          19       and reactive shooting teams and then proactive teams to

          20       tackle gun crime.

          21   Q.  You have mentioned "proactive" and "reactive", can you

          22       just tell the jury what you mean by that in practical

          23       terms?

          24   A.  In practical terms, reactive teams, they responded or

          25       investigated shootings that occurred during the days and


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           1       nights.  They are a 24/7 response to a shooting that

           2       occurred in London and they tend to be non-fatal

           3       shootings.

           4           The proactive team, they dealt with more covert work

           5       and it's more of a preventative team.  So they worked on

           6       intelligence and, based on that intelligence, they would

           7       go out and try and prevent any shootings or recover

           8       firearms from the streets of London.

           9   Q.  Right.  Are you a Tactical Firearms Commander by

          10       training?

          11   A.  I am tactically -- TFC trained, yes.

          12   Q.  Again, can we help the jury about what that actually

          13       involves?

          14   A.  To be a Tactical Firearms Commander requires a week's

          15       training -- two weeks in Trident's terms but it's a week

          16       initially -- and that's based around authorising -- not

          17       so much authorising but actually deploying on firearms

          18       operations, so you're the lead, if you like.  So as

          19       a Tactical Firearms Commander, you will be responsible

          20       for the tactics that have been set by a senior officer

          21       who's authorised that firearms operation.

          22   Q.  Okay.  Tell us please what Operation Dibri was?

          23   A.  Okay.  Operation Dibri -- it was really -- it was

          24       an operation that was tackling an organised criminal

          25       network, organised criminal gang, known as TMD, in more


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           1       layman terms it's Tottenham Man Dem .  They were involved

           2       in the supply of firearms, or use of firearms, and

           3       drugs, the supply of class A drugs.  As well as that,

           4       they would be involved in a number of murders and

           5       attempted murders and conflict with other organised

           6       criminal gangs, which -- from opposing areas, basically.

           7   Q.  In very broad terms, how many people were you

           8       considering?

           9   A.  Okay.  Well, Operation Dibri had been implemented before

          10       I had attended Trident, or deployed to Trident, and

          11       during that time I understand there was around 100

          12       subjects that were part of that, through research.  But

          13       the core, if you like, of that group were around 48

          14       members and they were considered the most violent people

          15       in London and not only in London but outside London

          16       stretching across to Europe, because of the importation

          17       of drugs and involvement in that aspect, and they were

          18       closely linked to Turkish criminal organisations as

          19       well.

          20   Q.  When you say they were considered the most violent,

          21       et cetera, do you mean the 48 that you were focusing on

          22       in particular or the entirety of the gang?

          23   A.  Well, the entirety of the gang but certainly those 48

          24       were the most active.

          25   Q.  When you joined in January 2010, you became the Senior


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           1       Investigating Officer, I think; is that right?

           2   A.  That's right, yes.

           3   Q.  What does that mean?

           4   A.  Well, basically, as the Senior Investigating Officer,

           5       I was responsible for setting the aims and objectives

           6       and having an overarching responsibility for that

           7       long-term operation.

           8           But not only that, I had responsibilities in

           9       relation to the reactive investigations that were

          10       occurring across London.  Obviously, we had our typical

          11       hot spots, Haringey being one, Brent, Enfield; those

          12       sorts of areas where there was more prevalence with gun

          13       crime.  So of course I had those responsibilities as

          14       well, plus additional things as well the DCI.

          15   Q.  So you had the overarching responsibility?

          16   A.  That's right.

          17   Q.  Can I ask you on the small grain level, fine grain level

          18       rather, if a particular proactive operation, say what

          19       happened between the 3 and 6 August as planned in 2011,

          20       if one of those operations was going on, what was your

          21       role within that?

          22   A.  Well, my role was to ensure there were sufficient

          23       resources, there was funding.  I would be in receipt of

          24       some of the intelligence so we're talking a great volume

          25       of intelligence because, albeit Dibri was the focus of


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           1       the proactive team at that time, there was a number of

           2       subjects where the intelligence was coming into, and

           3       really was to ensure that we -- the direction of the

           4       actual operation was really to focus around dismantling

           5       those in Tottenham Man Dem .

           6   Q.  Again, I do not want to deal with the particulars yet,

           7       but take a general notion of a particular proactive

           8       operation that might run for a few days where you're

           9       interested in a few members of the gang and you think

          10       that somebody's going to get hold of a gun.  What's the

          11       aim of one of those small operations then?

          12   A.  Well, the aim primarily is to arrest.  So when I say --

          13       it will be easiest if I describe it from the start in

          14       relation to intelligence.  Intelligence comes in all

          15       forms and we look at that intelligence and grade it and

          16       decide how it should be treated, and, as a team, we

          17       would get the resources together and if that is really

          18       credible intelligence then the team would then go out

          19       and try to respond to that.

          20           The intelligence, for example, could be that one of

          21       a number of people that we are looking at may be

          22       planning to take possession of a firearm.  So we would

          23       have a look at that intelligence and it may be built up

          24       over a period of time, so it could be historical

          25       intelligence, suggesting they had been involved in


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           1       firearms, but what we would do is where there's specific

           2       intelligence to say someone is going to take possession,

           3       then we would respond to that.  Because our aim is

           4       obviously to protect the public.

           5   Q.  Let's just consider that.  Say you've got a scenario

           6       where the intelligence suggests person A is going to

           7       pick up a gun from person B, and you have a rough idea

           8       of where and when, is the primary objective to arrest A

           9       and B or just to get the gun off the street or what?

          10   A.  Well, the intelligence -- it really is dictated to by

          11       the intelligence.  It's not always as simple as we

          12       think.  There would be often cases where the

          13       intelligence is that A is going to supply B with a gun

          14       and yet we go to respond to that and that intelligence

          15       doesn't develop because we've got no location.  If we

          16       haven't got that location, where it's likely to be, then

          17       we have to sort of stick with what we know and what we

          18       would know is that -- if we know it's A who's got the

          19       gun, then we would try and do something about A, but if

          20       the intelligence that we're getting is more about B

          21       wanting to get the gun from A, then we would stick with

          22       B because we know that that person is intent on taking

          23       possession of a firearm.

          24           We won't know where A is holding that firearm

          25       because the intelligence might not be as specific as


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           1       that.

           2   Q.  Let's stick with my example.  Imagine you've got

           3       intelligence that A is likely to supply a gun to B and

           4       by some means you then find out that the gun has been

           5       transferred, B has it, you know where he is, who makes

           6       the decision to move into arrest in that sort of

           7       operation?  Is it you or the Tactical Firearms Commander

           8       on the ground or what?

           9   A.  No, that would be the Tactical Firearms Commander on the

          10       ground.  Say if there had been -- if they've been

          11       subject of an operation and the transfer of the firearm

          12       has already taken place and we know that B is in

          13       possession, and again that's dictated to us by the

          14       intelligence at that time, then obviously -- and we know

          15       we've got control of B, then the idea is then that we

          16       would take the gun off that street and arrest B at the

          17       same time.

          18   Q.  So going back then to January 2010, you understood the

          19       thrust of the purpose behind Operation Dibri, did you --

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  -- by way of a briefing given to you?

          22   A.  That's right, yes.

          23   Q.  Was Mr Duggan one of the subjects at that stage?

          24   A.  He was one of many subjects, but not on the top of the

          25       sort of priority list, if you like.


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           1   Q.  If this is a false distinction tell me: you told us

           2       there were 100 or so people of whom about 48 were of

           3       particular interest?

           4   A.  That's right.

           5   Q.  Where was he within all of that?

           6   A.  Well, he was within the 48, but to try and -- to explain

           7       how this works is that it's based on the intelligence

           8       that you are getting at that time.  So where that

           9       intelligence is coming from, you then build up a picture

          10       and then you then identify those are the people that

          11       appear to be the most active, and if they are in regular

          12       possession of firearms, then obviously your aim is to

          13       try and arrest them with the firearms.

          14           If not arrest them -- if you have a location at

          15       an address then we could get a search warrant and go and

          16       get that gun off the street which disrupts that criminal

          17       activity.

          18   Q.  I am going to ask you in a moment about the intelligence

          19       that you had about Mr Duggan over the course of 2011 in

          20       broad terms.  Before we do that, without telling us

          21       details of what sort of sources of intelligence you had,

          22       can I ask you about the grading of intelligence?

          23           You earlier said that it ranged in reliability and

          24       so on.  Can you tell us first of all how wide the sweep

          25       was from -- did it go from "very reliable" to "very


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           1       unreliable" or what?

           2   A.  Yes.  In a nutshell, it does.  You have very credible,

           3       reliable intelligence to -- on most -- untested, cannot

           4       be -- what is the word I am looking for -- it makes

           5       it -- you cannot quantify that intelligence because you

           6       don't know where it's come from, how it was obtained.

           7           If there's sort of single sourced intelligence,

           8       again it makes it a little bit untested.

           9   Q.  So one extreme, I suppose you could have an anonymous

          10       person calling Crimestoppers to say something they had

          11       overheard in the pub?

          12   A.  Yes, that's quite a good example.  Then another time

          13       they could be malicious.  They could be, you know, a way

          14       of trying to disrupt something because then it might get

          15       to the police and it would be used to frustrate

          16       operations.

          17   Q.  You talked about grading of intelligence.  How is it

          18       graded in terms of reliability and known source, that

          19       sort of thing?

          20   A.  Well, the easiest way to do it is to give it letters and

          21       numbers.  So you'll have -- for example, E would be

          22       untested, unreliable or unknown, and 4 or 5 would be --

          23       it could be malicious, that type of grading, to sort of

          24       A1, 2, like that.  So it's sort of a letter and number

          25       system.  Does that make sense?


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           1   Q.  Thank you, yes.  Again, I do not want to deal with it in

           2       unnecessary detail.  But the intelligence you had about

           3       Mr Duggan over the course of 2011, did that suggest he

           4       was involved in criminality?

           5   A.  Yes, it did.  The intelligence over that period and

           6       historically was clear indication that Mr Duggan was

           7       involved in gun crime, as well as gun crime he was

           8       involved in the supply of class A drugs and possession

           9       of ammunition as well.  All of those are obviously very

          10       serious crimes.

          11   Q.  Can you help us with the grading of that intelligence?

          12   A.  That grading varied depending on where the source came

          13       from but generally they would be very credible sort of A

          14       category grading to E graded intelligence.

          15   Q.  Can you tell us about what intelligence you had in

          16       relation to January 2011?

          17   A.  The intelligence in January 2011 suggesting that

          18       Mark Duggan had shot someone -- someone at a nightclub

          19       at Christmas time, and that was the intelligence that

          20       was coming in.

          21   Q.  Did anything happen in February in terms of

          22       intelligence?

          23   A.  Yes.  There was intelligence in February that

          24       Mark Duggan had fired shots in a car park, again after

          25       a -- at a nightclub.


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           1   Q.  Anything in June?

           2   A.  In June, yes, there was intelligence that he could be

           3       storing drugs at his home address, and also that later

           4       on in that June month, that he had would probably take

           5       possession -- intent on taking possession of a firearm.

           6   Q.  I am going to move on to late July 2011.  But was there

           7       anything else in July 2011, apart from the intelligence

           8       which led to the actual four-day operation?

           9   A.  Well, in July, because of that historic intelligence

          10       around his use and involvement with firearms, he was

          11       obviously subject of an operation, and part of that

          12       operation is what we do -- call "lifestyle operation".

          13       Basically, that is where we get an armed surveillance

          14       team and follow someone around for a day to see who they

          15       meet, and the idea is that we gain more intelligence

          16       about locations they use and the people they associate

          17       with.  That helps us build up a more accurate

          18       intelligence picture about the person.

          19   Q.  I was going to ask you about what you did in relation to

          20       the intelligence, can I start on that with January 2011?

          21       Was directed surveillance put in place?

          22   A.  Sorry, yes, there was, yes.  There was a directed

          23       surveillance -- I don't know if anyone understands what

          24       that means but --

          25   Q.  Assume that we don't.


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           1   A.  Okay.  "Directed surveillance" means that basically, as

           2       a police state, a law enforcement agency, we have powers

           3       to intrude on people's privacy and that's come under

           4       a legislation called RIPA, the Regulatory Investigative

           5       Police Powers Act.

           6           The idea for that power is to allow us to conduct

           7       surveillance on people, people that are involved in

           8       criminality -- they have to obviously meet a certain

           9       criteria -- and in relation to the subjects that we were

          10       looking at, obviously Trident, gun crime, that's our

          11       specialism, there would be a number of subjects that we

          12       would have power to be able to follow and sort of use

          13       them for surveillance and basically that's what we used

          14       surveillance teams -- all sorts of surveillance activity

          15       that we can use in order to follow people about -- and

          16       understand how they live and identify their associates,

          17       safe houses -- safe houses is basically places where

          18       they will lay guns down or lay drugs down for safe

          19       keeping because it's an address that maybe the police

          20       won't know about, so it's to evade any sort of --

          21       attract any sort of attention.

          22   Q.  You were helping us about some particular surveillance

          23       in July which you said was armed surveillance; is that

          24       right?

          25   A.  Yes.


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           1   Q.  Is that an additional layer on top of this directed

           2       surveillance?

           3   A.  Yes.  Because of the type of criminals that we are --

           4       are subject of our operations, they tend to be armed

           5       most of the time and, as a result of that, part of our

           6       risk assessment and strategy, tactics, is to ensure the

           7       safety of the officers, and obviously the public.

           8           In order to do that, we incorporate having an armed

           9       surveillance team in the event that intelligence

          10       develops that that person may come into contact with

          11       someone who's got a firearm and they might take

          12       a transfer and it could come just out of the blue.  That

          13       way gives us that flexibility to deal with it and armed

          14       surveillance are generally armed for their own

          15       protection, so if someone is armed, and they become

          16       compromised, then -- and they are challenged -- then at

          17       least that surveillance officer has that ability to, you

          18       know, defend themselves with a firearm.

          19   Q.  While we are on this sort of general notion of how

          20       surveillance might involve officers being armed, can you

          21       help us with what the MASTS operation is?

          22   A.  Yes, it's a mobile -- it's just gone out of my head --

          23       Mobile Armed Surveillance To -- basically, that is

          24       another addition, so when we go out on an operation, for

          25       example in this context it was planned to have armed


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           1       surveillance team and CO19 officers -- they are the

           2       specialist in firearms, highly trained very professional

           3       officers, and they are the ones that would generally be

           4       used for the purposes of actually making an arrest,

           5       doing the stop, and hopefully with persons with firearms

           6       in their possession.

           7           They are an additional layer so we have, if you

           8       like, one layer which is just armed surveillance teams

           9       who are just doing lifestyle surveillance.  Then you

          10       have a second layer, when we go out and respond to

          11       intelligence that -- it's -- something may be happening

          12       that day or that week and we have them over a period of

          13       days.

          14           The problem with because they are a finite resource,

          15       you know, you need to try and get these teams well in

          16       advance, so you tend to book them if you can, unless

          17       something else is happening.

          18   Q.  Okay.  I am going to move on to much more specific

          19       information and particular days.  Can I ask you this: in

          20       the period in which you were the Senior Investigating

          21       Officer, down to 4 August 2011, did you have any

          22       information upon which you could have arrested

          23       Mr Duggan?

          24   A.  No.  The way we work is that we respond to intelligence.

          25       So if there is intelligence -- specific intelligence


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           1       that there is a gun at Mark Duggan's address, then we

           2       will get a warrant to get that.  We never had specific

           3       intelligence -- certainly during that time -- up until

           4       4 August.

           5   Q.  Just to get this clear: say you've got intelligence that

           6       Mr Duggan has a gun or anybody else has a gun at

           7       a particular premises and you regard that intelligence

           8       as rock solid, A1 intelligence, would that not be enough

           9       intelligence itself to prosecute without more, even if

          10       you don't find the gun there?

          11   A.  No.  We can't prosecute anyone for intending to or

          12       having possession of a firearm which is not there.  We

          13       have to have the gun.  If you have intelligence that

          14       Mark Duggan had a firearm at his address and we went and

          15       got a search warrant and went there, the "had" is quite

          16       important, it's significant, because if there's no gun

          17       there we cannot arrest him for apparently having

          18       a firearm because there isn't anything there.

          19           So the gun needs to be in that person's possession.

          20   Q.  Can I show you a document.  It's CD29532 and --

          21   A.  Do I have it here?

          22   Q.  There are two ways we can do this: you can look at it on

          23       screen or look at a hard copy?

          24   A.  Okay.

          25   Q.  I confess it might be easier to have a hard copy.  We


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           1       have hard copies for the jury as well.  (Pause)

           2   A.  Thank you.

           3   Q.  Thank you, Mr Foote.  This is a document that's seven

           4       pages long.  It's dated 26 May 2011.  It's headed risk

           5       assessment and risk management form.  First of all, are

           6       you familiar with this type of form?

           7   A.  Yes, I am, yes.  This is a risk assessment and risk

           8       management form, that is part -- that comes part and

           9       parcel with the directed surveillance.  So, like I said

          10       to you before, regarding directed surveillance, that

          11       gives us the kind of authority to carry out surveillance

          12       on people, and that has to be obviously authorised by

          13       a senior officer and it is reviewed by the Office of

          14       Surveillance Commissioners as well.

          15   Q.  Are you familiar with this particular form?

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  Were you aware of it when it was in circulation in May

          18       or June, or whatever, 2011?

          19   A.  Yes I was, yes.

          20   Q.  Can I just take you through it please to see what help

          21       you can give us.  Obviously we see on about the fourth

          22       line down, the completing officer is somebody we call

          23       ZZ75 and I can ask him about the detail if necessary,

          24       but you're content that you knew enough about this to

          25       answer some questions, are you?


                                            27
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes, I am, yes.

           2   Q.  Tell us where this sort of form went during the course

           3       of an operation, if somebody was creating it in the

           4       course of a review?

           5   A.  Well, this is an electronic form, in electronic format,

           6       and that went alongside the review or renewal of the

           7       directed surveillance.  So, even though we've given

           8       authority to put people on surveillance, that has to be

           9       monitored, so we have review periods which are monthly,

          10       renewal periods which is like the whole authority

          11       renewed on a three-monthly basis, as well.  So a risk

          12       assessment would be done with each application.

          13   Q.  Right.  So if we go over the page then, please, 29533,

          14       just look at the text -- it's just taking a little while

          15       to come up on the screen, I will slow down so those

          16       watching it on the screen can -- starting from the top

          17       of the text:

          18           "This operation [Dibri] tackles gun crime, drug

          19       trafficking and the escalating gang feud between

          20       criminal gang within the London boroughs of Hackney,

          21       Haringey in Greater London.  This feud has escalated

          22       within the past few weeks and further acts of violence

          23       are anticipated.  The main focus of this operation will

          24       be to disrupt and remove the criminal activity of

          25       U1,  U8,  U17 and  U14,


                                            28
 

 

 


           1       Mark Duggan and their associates, who are known as

           2       Tottenham Man Dem and their close criminal associates."

           3           Do you know the names that we're giving those

           4       ciphers to?

           5   A.  Yes, I do, yes.

           6   Q.  Then we go on.  Some more names blanked out, then it

           7       says:

           8           "... by gathering a sufficient level of evidence of

           9       drug trafficking and firearms offences in order to

          10       support successful criminal prosecutions.  Proceeds of

          11       Crime Act legislation will also be utilised to remove

          12       their criminal assets.  Intelligence indicates that the

          13       subjects and other members of their criminal network

          14       have in their past been directly possible responsible

          15       for firearms-related criminality, shootings and murders.

          16       Intelligence suggests that they have now moved up the

          17       criminal hierarchy to a position where they are believed

          18       to orchestrate this criminality.  It is entirely

          19       appropriate that police tackle this level of armed

          20       criminality in a robust manner.  Failure to do so would

          21       be likely to lead to a loss of public confidence and

          22       even criticism."

          23           Is that a fair analysis of what you believed in

          24       May 2011 about Mr Duggan?

          25   A.  Yes, it is, yes.


                                            29
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Then if we go down, the next box is "Physical risks",

           2       it's very difficult to read on the hard copy, in fact.

           3       But "Physical risks" then:

           4           "Probability of risks occurring: high.  Impact if

           5       risks occur: serious."

           6           Can you help us with what that's about?

           7   A.  Well, it's more about the fact that the physicality --

           8       the subject's propensity to use firearms and the risks

           9       they pose to the public and not only just the public but

          10       the physical risk to police officers that may encounter

          11       with them, armed or unarmed.

          12   Q.  So in short then, that analysis is that there is a high

          13       risk of something serious happening if police or members

          14       of the public encounter these people; is that it?

          15   A.  Yes, that's right.

          16   Q.  Then if we go to the explanation:

          17           "The subject of this application and their criminal

          18       associates pose a high risk to both the public and

          19       police alike from the enforcement aspects of their

          20       criminality and the likelihood of reprisals emanating

          21       from the current gang feuds.  There are numerous

          22       intelligence reports, recent and historic, to suggest

          23       that members of the TMD have access to firearms and are

          24       prepared to use them.  Many previous shooting incidents

          25       involving TMD have been carried out in public places and


                                            30
 

 

 


           1       in the presence of members of the public."

           2           Again, was that accurate as far as you were aware?

           3   A.  That's from the intelligence I had, yes.

           4   Q.  Then if we go over the page, what we see is -- in fact,

           5       even on the bottom of that page, we see what's blanked

           6       out is some names.  Then over the page, other names are

           7       blanked out.  Then we get down about a quarter of the

           8       way down the page to Mark Duggan.  It just says this:

           9           "Mark Duggan has been implicated in a number of

          10       recent firearm incidents and aggressively confronted

          11       police when stopped on the Broadwater Farm estate."

          12           Is that all that's said about Mr Duggan in this

          13       analysis?

          14   A.  That's from my -- obviously, you've got more further

          15       down but, yes.

          16   Q.  Yes, sorry, there's more about him further down, but in

          17       terms of the threat he posed?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  Let's go down, if we may, to that.  The final two

          20       paragraphs on the page:

          21           "The general public will undoubtedly support the

          22       policing efforts to combat the use of firearms in the

          23       community.  Any risk of compromise to this operation

          24       could have a very serious impact on the police and the

          25       community.  Equally if the police did not commit


                                            31
 

 

 


           1       adequate resources to this operation there could be

           2       serious repercussions in terms of death or serious physical

           3       injury."

           4           Did you agree with that?

           5   A.  Yes, I did, yes.

           6   Q.  "Officers will be fully briefed prior to any deployment

           7       and protective equipment carried when necessary.  The

           8       use of Specialist Firearms Officers and Armed

           9       Surveillance Teams will be considered when and if

          10       necessary.  There is the continued likelihood of

          11       physical violence and firearms offences, both by the

          12       subjects of this operation and by others wishing to cause

          13       them harm."

          14           It looks like this is a rather general background,

          15       if you like, to subsidiary operations; is that fair?

          16   A.  That's fair, yes.

          17   Q.  Then the final paragraph here:

          18           "The enquiry suggests that Mark Duggan, [U8] and

          19       [another] do not possess a full driving licence and are

          20       therefore not qualified to drive a motor vehicle on

          21       a road and will not be covered by third party insurance.

          22       However, it's believed they will continue to do so.

          23       This issue will be managed in such a way that if any of

          24       these subjects are seen to drive a motor vehicle and the

          25       opinion is formed that they are driving in a manner that


                                            32
 

 

 


           1       falls below that of a careful and competent driver, ie

           2       dangerous driving, then assistance will be requested

           3       from uniformed colleagues to stop the vehicle and the

           4       surveillance will cease once the vehicle is stopped by

           5       uniformed officers."

           6           That suggests then that if Mark Duggan was seen

           7       driving a car dangerously unarmed officers would be

           8       expected to stop him; is that right?

           9   A.  No.

          10   Q.  What does it mean then?

          11   A.  Basically, what that means is that there's -- it's

          12       almost like a tolerance level, in as much as if he was

          13       driving competently on the road, even though he hasn't

          14       got a licence, it's the proportionality around the

          15       seriousness.  So the fact that he doesn't have a driving

          16       licence we could almost waive that.  If he's -- drives

          17       dangerously on the road to the risk of the public, then

          18       obviously we would use the assets of uniformed officers

          19       to stop him from driving and remove that risk.

          20   Q.  Yes.  What I'm getting at is this: was the risk

          21       evaluated then this way, that if Mark Duggan was seen

          22       driving in such a way that it was right to stop him, he

          23       would be stopped by unarmed officers?

          24   A.  He would be, yes.

          25   Q.  How does that fit with what you told us earlier about


                                            33
 

 

 


           1       the expectation that this was a serious risk or high

           2       risk of serious things happening and these people tended

           3       to be armed?

           4   A.  It's about the intelligence that we would have at that

           5       time.  So if there was no intelligence suggesting that

           6       Mark Duggan was in possession of a firearm, then that's

           7       the sort of tactic that could be used.

           8   Q.  I understand, thank you.  This goes on:

           9           "If, however, they are seen to drive in a standard

          10       that conforms to that of a careful and competent driver

          11       surveillance will continue."

          12           This is really about the way in which surveillance

          13       would come to a stop, is it?

          14   A.  Yes, that's right.

          15   Q.  Then if we go two pages on, please, to 29536.  About

          16       halfway down this page, there's a paragraph which starts

          17       "Experienced officers"; do you have that?

          18   A.  Yes, I do.

          19   Q.  "Experienced officers will continually assess the

          20       operation with the most recent intelligence and

          21       information at their disposal.  Due to the level of risk

          22       posed to the public and police by the subjects and their

          23       criminal associates, all tactical and strategic options

          24       will be discussed on a regular basis and the risk

          25       assessment will be continually reviewed and updated when


                                            34
 

 

 


           1       necessary."

           2           Did that happen?

           3   A.  Sorry?

           4   Q.  Was the risk assessment continually reviewed and updated

           5       when necessary, in relation to these --

           6   A.  As part of a firearms operation it would be reviewed on

           7       a regular basis, yes.

           8   Q.  Then:

           9           "Each activity throughout the operation will be

          10       separately risk assessed and the appropriate resources

          11       deployed.  This may include armed surveillance teams and

          12       specialist firearms officers when necessary, tactical

          13       firearms advisers will be consulted when appropriate and

          14       strategies formulated prior to deployment.  These

          15       strategies will be continually assessed."

          16           Again, did all of that happen?

          17   A.  Yes, it did, yes.

          18   Q.  Thank you.  Then if I go down to the next paragraph:

          19           "The use of highly trained experienced and properly

          20       equipped officers will be employed in the evidence

          21       gathering and prosecution stages of this operation."

          22           Is that the firearms officers from CO19 we were

          23       talking about earlier?

          24   A.  Yes, it would be, yes, and it would encompass the

          25       surveillance trained officers as well.


                                            35
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Thank you.  Then the last but one paragraph:

           2           "The Crown Prosecution Service will be consulted at

           3       the earliest opportunity to ensure that best evidence is

           4       gathered and disclosed in accordance with the CPIA

           5       regulations.  By acting within the legal and ethical

           6       framework of the law and with due regard to the rights

           7       of all persons who may be affected by this operation,

           8       any potential risks will be greatly reduced."

           9           That there is obviously talking about the chances of

          10       getting a successful prosecution?

          11   A.  That's correct.

          12   Q.  How important was that to you in general terms?

          13   A.  In getting a successful prosecution?

          14   Q.  Yes.

          15   A.  It was important but more important was taking guns off

          16       streets.

          17   Q.  Okay.  Then I want to move on to 1 August.  We know that

          18       in due course a sort of subsidiary operation was put

          19       together for four days in August, focusing on six people

          20       who were thought to be members of TMD, including

          21       Mr Duggan.  That was your decision, I think, wasn't it?

          22   A.  That's right, yes.

          23   Q.  Did you first become involved in making that decision on

          24       1 August or was it earlier?

          25   A.  No, it was much earlier.


                                            36
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Tell us how that evolved, if you would?

           2   A.  Well, it would have been about the -- some time in June.

           3       Due to the evolving intelligence and development of

           4       intelligence around Mark Duggan and others, tensions at

           5       nightclubs, conflicting groups, the proposal then was to

           6       try and book a date in the future to have those

           7       resources available all at the same time to conduct

           8       a four-day operation.

           9           Because the intelligence was suggesting that they

          10       were generally being armed on approach to weekends, of

          11       an evening time, certainly at dances or nightclubs.  So

          12       with that in mind, the plan was to ensure that we booked

          13       the relevant resources, such as the surveillance team,

          14       see they are available, my own team are available and

          15       also CO19 officers available.  Because they are -- the

          16       team that we use are the most specialist of them all,

          17       the top -- if you like, top drawer of CO19 officers

          18       because of the level of the people they were dealing

          19       with.

          20           In order to do that, it was discussed that we would

          21       do that in trying to see about availability for some

          22       time in the future, and it was not just those officers

          23       that were available, it's also the intelligence officers

          24       that would be working on it.

          25   Q.  So this was middle of June planning for something early


                                            37
 

 

 


           1       August?

           2   A.  That's right, yes.

           3   Q.  So not based on intelligence that anything was going to

           4       happen in the immediate future then; would that be

           5       right?

           6   A.  No, no, it's based on historical intelligence.  That

           7       intelligence at that time, this is what's frequently

           8       happening, so, you know, let's do something about it.

           9       All right, well, let's say if we can get all the

          10       resources together, that week looks like a good week,

          11       then let's go for that week.  So that's how it went.

          12   Q.  Can I ask you to look at another document, please?  This

          13       is an FA1.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Just before we do that, what do you

          15       want us to do with the one that we now have and the jury

          16       have before them.

          17   MR UNDERWOOD:  I was going to have them collected up at the

          18       end but if members of the jury want to mark theirs with

          19       their jury number on then, as far as I'm concerned, at

          20       least they can certainly go into their jury bundle.

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It would be sensible for them to

          22       have them in their jury bundle, wouldn't it.

          23   MR UNDERWOOD:  Certainly, if nobody else objects but

          24       I wanted to give people a fair chance in due course to

          25       consider, as I hand documents up, whether they should go


                                            38
 

 

 


           1       in the bundle.

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  But as you read most of them out

           3       they will be in the transcript anyway, really.

           4   MR UNDERWOOD:  Yes.

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Well, just put that to one side and

           6       we can argue about whether you should put it into your

           7       bundle or not in due course.

           8           There's another document which you are going to

           9       refer to now, I think.

          10   MR UNDERWOOD:  Please.  One of the things I am concerned

          11       about is that I may go through a few documents over the

          12       course of evidence, and I do not want the jury bundles

          13       to be overwhelming.  But equally we obviously we want to

          14       give the main documents out.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  All right.  Just put that to one

          16       side for the moment.

          17   MR UNDERWOOD:  This form, FA1, which is at page CD268.

          18       I think the jurors have that.  Detective Chief

          19       Inspector, one is coming up.

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I have not got it either but I'm

          21       looking for it too.

          22   A.  Thank you.

          23   MR UNDERWOOD:  We are going to see a number of form FA1, 2A,

          24       3, 5 and so on across the course of evidence.  Can you

          25       just help us with the general structure of how forms


                                            39
 

 

 


           1       like this worked?

           2   A.  Okay.  This is the form FA1 and basically this is the

           3       intelligence -- this is basically the application to say

           4       to a Senior Firearms Commander that "Can I have

           5       authority for a firearms team?" basically.  That's the

           6       application.  It's based on the intelligence that's held

           7       in there.

           8   Q.  Right.  So this is the starting point, is it, for what

           9       I call the subsidiary operation?

          10   A.  That's right, yes.

          11   Q.  Is there a better phrase for it than "subsidiary

          12       operation"?

          13   A.  No, I think that will do for now.  I cannot think of

          14       another one.

          15   Q.  Again, when you were Senior Investigating Officer in

          16       2011 and an FA1 was brought into play like this, would

          17       you have been aware of it?

          18   A.  Yes, I would, yes.

          19   Q.  Are you familiar with this particular one?

          20   A.  Yes, I am, yes.

          21   Q.  This was created by the officer we are seeing at ZZ17.

          22       He was the intelligence officer, was he?

          23   A.  That's right.

          24   Q.  What does that mean in practice, where was he getting

          25       intelligence from?


                                            40
 

 

 


           1   A.  Okay.  An intelligence officer, probably one of the most

           2       important roles in my job, in certainly proactive

           3       operations, and they collate all the intelligence.  You

           4       know, they will have sight of every bit of intelligence

           5       that comes in, or be an awareness around them, and

           6       really it's based on what that officer would tell me is

           7       how we work, go in the direction that the operation is

           8       going and what's required.

           9           So, for example, everything I was telling you about

          10       now about historical intelligence around these issues

          11       would be coming from that officer or another officer

          12       who's also part of the intelligence as well.

          13           So for example here, 17 would have mentioned -- to

          14       say, look, this is the intelligence around the proposed

          15       operation for, you know, a week's time.

          16   Q.  Right.  So this was created in the context of your

          17       booking of resources for the August operation?

          18   A.  That's right, yes.

          19   Q.  Right.  Let's have a look at the second page then, if we

          20       could, CD269?  The first box talks about a Criminal

          21       Procedures and Investigations Act, I am not going to

          22       trouble with that.  Then it goes down to "Criteria for

          23       deployment of AFOs".  What are AFOs?

          24   A.  Right they are Authorised Firearms Officers.

          25   Q.  Does that include those surveillance officers who were


                                            41
 

 

 


           1       armed for their own protection that you were talking

           2       about?

           3   A.  Yes, it does, yes.

           4   Q.  Then it says at that:

           5           "The deployment of AFOs should only be authorised in

           6       the following circumstances: where a person is in

           7       possession of or has immediate access to a firearm or

           8       other potentially lethal weapon or is otherwise so

           9       dangerous that the deployment of armed officers is

          10       considered to be appropriate or, as an operational

          11       contingency, as part of a specific operation based on

          12       a threat assessment or for the destruction of animals."

          13           One or more of those applied, did they, for this

          14       early August operation that was being planned --

          15   A.  That's right, yes.

          16   Q.  -- in your view?

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  Can you help us with how that fitted into these

          19       criteria?

          20   A.  Well, based on the intelligence that we have, there was

          21       a number -- a number of intelligence that was suggesting

          22       that Mark Duggan and others had ready access to firearms

          23       and they kept them at certain places.  So of course that

          24       would meet criteria 1.

          25   Q.  Thank you.  Then just briefly under "Authorised


                                            42
 

 

 


           1       operations" -- The spontaneous incidents or authorised

           2       operations, and it's one or the other, isn't it, if

           3       something is spontaneous it cannot be authorised and the

           4       other way round; is that so?

           5   A.  Yes, more or less, yes.

           6   Q.  Then if we go over the page, there's a second box, "SIO

           7       or IO, operational strategy aims and objectives"; is

           8       that your operational aims and objectives here?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  Those were:

          11           "(1) to minimise risk; (2) to maximise safety; (3)

          12       to recover firearms; (4) to secure evidence; and (5)

          13       public confidence."

          14           Were they printed on this form or inserted for this

          15       specific operation?

          16   A.  No, they were inserted.

          17   Q.  Are those things you thought through for this particular

          18       operation or not?

          19   A.  Yes, it's part and parcel of the decision making, yes.

          20   Q.  Then under "Intelligence case to support application".

          21       There's a box, which says:

          22           "Information, intelligence, location, victim,

          23       subject.  What is known?  How can it be verified?  How

          24       can it be developed?  How can it be tested?

          25       Identification, capability, intent, contain the threat."


                                            43
 

 

 


           1           That's all part of the form, is it?

           2   A.  That's all part of the form, yes.

           3   Q.  Then what's typed in is specific to this operation?

           4   A.  Yes, and that addresses those few boxes you have just

           5       asked about.

           6   Q.  Thank you.  So what it says is:

           7           "The principal focus of this Operation Dibri is to

           8       arrest/disrupt the senior members of criminal network

           9       the TMD, who were concerned in large scale supply and

          10       distribution of class A controlled drugs in the London

          11       area.  In order to maintain their control and status

          12       they have a propensity to use firearms and extreme

          13       violence.  They have a historical feud with organised

          14       gangs from the Hackney area, in particular London Fields

          15       Gang, which has resulted in numerous assaults, shootings

          16       and murders.  They have a history of robbing other drug

          17       dealers, as these crimes are very rarely reported.

          18       Intelligence continues to link TMD members with the

          19       possession and use of firearms."

          20           Again, was all that true in your view as of 25 July?

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  "Recent intelligence suggests an upsurge in gang related

          23       tensions and that TMD members and their associates are

          24       regularly attending nightclubs and parties in the London

          25       area and when doing so have firearms either on their


                                            44
 

 

 


           1       person or nearby with their associates."

           2           Is that the key passage, the key issue, about why it

           3       was that you decided in about June to have this

           4       operation in August?

           5   A.  Yes, it is.  That's probably the most important part of

           6       that, yes.

           7   Q.  Then:

           8           "A number of TMD members, including those listed

           9       below, are flagged to this operation and subjects of

          10       authorised directed surveillance.  This list is not

          11       exhaustive as there are numerous other members of the

          12       TMD and other criminal associates of these subjects."

          13           By "flagged to this operation" do you mean

          14       identified within it?

          15   A.  Well -- yes.  It's a -- basically, if we flag somebody

          16       it means that they are the subject to an operation.

          17   Q.  Right.  Then, the first person, the details of whom are

          18       all blacked out, is U1.  As far as you were concerned,

          19       U1 was a subject of this operation; is that right?

          20   A.  Yes, that's right, yes.

          21   Q.  Do you know about the anonymous letter that was

          22       circulated?

          23   A.  Yes, I do, yes.

          24   Q.  Do you know that alleges that U1 was, in fact,

          25       an informant who, together with a Trident officer,


                                            45
 

 

 


           1       cooked up a scheme to put the gun in Mr Duggan's hand?

           2   A.  Yes, I am aware of that.

           3   Q.  To your knowledge does that have any proof at all?

           4   A.  No, none at all, absolutely ridiculous.

           5   Q.  Then if we go over the page, "Mark Duggan", it gives

           6       a date of birth and a code number for him and then it

           7       gives a family address, and sets out where he's thought

           8       to be staying.  There's an offence summary and it sets

           9       out a number of offences across the course of a period

          10       from 2000 to 2007.  Were they convictions?

          11   A.  No.  They would be -- well, convictions were -- two,

          12       like cautions and other.

          13   Q.  To be fair, he had a very, very light criminal record,

          14       didn't he?

          15   A.  That's correct, yes.

          16   Q.  Nothing at all serious or recent?

          17   A.  No, that's correct.  However, he did have a number of

          18       serious arrests though.

          19   Q.  Yes, but not prosecutions; is that right?

          20   A.  No, no.

          21   Q.  If we jump -- we don't need to do it by way of hard

          22       copy, but if we look on screen at CHF305, I think it

          23       will take its time to come up on the screen because

          24       I have just taken everyone by surprise with this.

          25           If we look at the bottom of this page, there's


                                            46
 

 

 


           1       a caution in 1999 for a public disorder offence; is that

           2       right?

           3   A.  That's right, yes.

           4   Q.  Then going up, there's a drug offence in 2000 and

           5       a theft and kindred offences in 2007?

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  If we look over the page, there's more detail of those

           8       two actual convictions.

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  The top one, 2000, a plea of guilty for possessing

          11       cannabis, for which Mr Duggan was fined £30, and in

          12       January 2007, a handling stolen goods -- that's

          13       receiving -- he was fined £250; is that right?

          14   A.  That's correct, yes.

          15   Q.  I just want to be clear, going back to CD271, about what

          16       was understood in July 2011 when, in this FA1, the

          17       offence summary dealt with more.  Was it understood that

          18       the offence summary was only dealing with -- largely,

          19       rather, dealing with things of which Mr Duggan had been

          20       suspected but not even prosecuted?

          21   A.  No, it was only -- that was really an offence summary of

          22       things that he would have been arrested for.  Some of

          23       that would have been no further action but mainly just

          24       convictions and cautions.

          25   Q.  What I'm asking is this: were the officers who were


                                            47
 

 

 


           1       reading this, including you, understanding that this

           2       offence summary was not in fact an offence summary, it

           3       was in fact a summary of things he was thought to have

           4       done but not convicted of?

           5   A.  No, things that he has been either arrested for, that he

           6       has done, if you like.

           7   Q.  Let's go on then.  It goes to say:

           8           "Duggan is a long standing senior member of the TMD.

           9       There is a wealth of historic and current reliable

          10       intelligence suggesting that Duggan has ready access to

          11       firearms.  He is actively involved in armed criminality

          12       and the supply of controlled drugs."

          13           Again, is that consistent with your understanding of

          14       the intelligence as at July?

          15   A.  Yes, it is, yes.

          16   Q.  Then it gives one instance, I want to ask you to help us

          17       with this:

          18           "19 July 2011, graded E4.1.  Intelligence suggests

          19       that Mark Duggan has possession of a Beretta handgun.

          20       He used to keep this at his girlfriend's address."

          21           Then it gives a Christian name of the girlfriend.

          22       Can I ask you about that grading?  You told us earlier

          23       A1 would be top notch; where does E4.1 sit on this?

          24   A.  E4 sits quite low.  Because it would be something that's

          25       either untested, cannot be judged intelligence.


                                            48
 

 

 


           1   Q.  To take my ham-fisted example of somebody ringing

           2       Crimestoppers anonymously and saying that they have

           3       overheard something in a pub, where would that fit on

           4       the scale?

           5   A.  That would fit probably in that arena.

           6   Q.  So this may be stating the obvious: there was nothing

           7       there to arrest him on; is that fair?

           8   A.  That's correct.

           9   Q.  Then we skip a page because that deals with the five

          10       other people, apart from U1 and Mark Duggan -- sorry

          11       four others apart from those two.  Then at page CD273,

          12       top of the page:

          13           "It's our intention to carry out armed surveillance

          14       with mobile armed support ..."

          15           Is that what "MASTS" stands for --

          16   A.  That's right, yes.

          17   Q.  -- Mobile Armed Support to Surveillance?

          18           "... on the subjects of Operation Dibri and their

          19       criminal associates, in order to gain sufficient

          20       intelligence evidence against them to allow for CO19 to

          21       deploy an intervention.  Authority is required for CO19

          22       MASTS and for SCD11 surveillance officers to be armed

          23       for their own protection due to the historic and current

          24       involvement of the subjects and their associates with

          25       violence and gun related criminality.  Search warrants


                                            49
 

 

 


           1       have been obtained under section 46 Firearms Act 1968

           2       for numerous addresses frequented by or controlled by

           3       the subjects and, should intelligence develop, authority

           4       may be sought for CO19 officers to execute one or more

           5       of these warrants."

           6           Now, what's the distinction between the ability to

           7       get a search warrant and the ability to execute it?

           8   A.  Well, the ability to get a search warrant requires

           9       a police officer to type up any information, which is

          10       basically a report to a judge, and go to a magistrate's

          11       court and actually obtain a warrant.

          12           The next bit is when you actually execute the

          13       warrant, when you actually go round -- in our case,

          14       obviously, you know, go through someone's door in the

          15       early hours of the morning, and you will have seen it in

          16       the television, armed police, everyone bashing through

          17       the door; that's when you go and actually execute

          18       a warrant.

          19   Q.  I want to ask you about the thought processes involved

          20       in this but can I just take you to one as an example.

          21       There's one at CD4002, I am just going to show it on

          22       screen.  It's dated 2 August.

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  It's information in support of an application for

          25       a search warrant under section 15 of an act of


                                            50
 

 

 


           1       Parliament.  It sets out who the informant is and then

           2       it says:

           3           "Information is today laid before me, the

           4       undersigned, for a warrant under section 46 of the

           5       Firearms Act 1968 to enter an address and any garages,

           6       outhouses, persons present and any vehicles controlled

           7       by them ..."

           8           Then it goes on:

           9           "The deponent on oath/affirmation in support of this

          10       application states that, since November 2008, police

          11       have been conducting a confidential covert proactive

          12       operation into the Organised Criminal Network (OCN)

          13       known as Tottenham Man Dem .  Their base of operations is

          14       the London Borough of Haringey, although their sphere of

          15       influence covers the whole of Greater London, the home

          16       counties and beyond.  The operation was instigated due

          17       to the re-ignition of a long-term feud between the TMD

          18       and The London Field Boys in Hackney.  Since the start

          19       of the operation, there has been in excess of 10

          20       shootings and two murders linked to this OCN and police

          21       have recovered numerous firearms, ammunition and large

          22       quantities of controlled drugs belonging to the TMD and

          23       their criminal associates.  Current intelligence

          24       indicates that Mark Duggan is a member of the TMD and

          25       regularly stores firearms at his girlfriend's address


                                            51
 

 

 


           1       [and he gives the address].  Police have recent, credible

           2       and reliable information that Mark Duggan currently has

           3       possession and control of a firearm and ammunition."

           4           Was that one of the search warrants you were telling

           5       us about that was drawn up and obtained in support of

           6       this four-day operation?

           7   A.  That's one of the warrants, yes.

           8   Q.  Sticking with that, if a police officer was able to say

           9       there that "police have recent credible and reliable

          10       information that Mark Duggan currently has possession

          11       and control of a firearm and ammunition", can you help

          12       us -- again, to go back to my question -- about the

          13       distinction between being able to get the search warrant

          14       and being able to execute it?  If you had that

          15       information, why didn't you execute the search

          16       warrant --

          17   A.  I see, okay.  That information is based on the fact that

          18       he has, like, a constructive control, possession, of

          19       firearms, ie we know that the intelligence that he has

          20       access to and has control of firearms, but the location

          21       of those firearms is unknown.

          22           If we knew immediately there that it was at that

          23       address, then we would have executed a warrant there and

          24       then.

          25   Q.  You had warrants like this for different addresses?


                                            52
 

 

 


           1   A.  That's right.  For all the six subjects that were the

           2       subject of that operation.

           3   Q.  Thank you.  I want to ask how this subsidiary operation,

           4       as I keep calling it, developed.  So middle of June, you

           5       thought ahead, booked resources for this period of four

           6       days in early August.  There are continuing threat

           7       assessments, are there, during that period?

           8   A.  That's right.

           9   Q.  And you do the FA1 -- or rather you see the FA1 -- and

          10       the intelligence that is set out in there is a fair

          11       picture, is it, of what you knew in July?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  How did the intelligence develop so far as Mr Duggan was

          14       concerned after that?

          15   A.  From the moment of the warrant?

          16   Q.  From your point of view.

          17   A.  Well -- or, sorry, the FA1?

          18   Q.  Yes.

          19   A.  From my understanding, I was aware that there was

          20       intelligence coming in on the following week, that

          21       certainly he seemed, out of the six, the most likely to

          22       obtain a firearm.

          23   Q.  What was the reaction to that?  What was done in

          24       response to that intelligence change?

          25   A.  It has not changed -- it had not changed the picture


                                            53
 

 

 


           1       because there was nothing specific.  As far as the

           2       intelligence was concerned, it was still the same, that

           3       Mark Duggan and the like were -- have ready access to

           4       firearms.  And it was very much a case of seeing how

           5       that intelligence developed, for something to be

           6       specific that was actionable.

           7   Q.  Right.  Let me just take you to particular days.  The

           8       2 August, which I think was Tuesday, did you meet with

           9       the Strategic Firearms Commander and the Tactical

          10       Firearms Commander?

          11   A.  Yes, I did, yes.

          12   Q.  Z50 and Z51 we are calling them.  What was the purpose

          13       of that meeting?

          14   A.  The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the MASTS

          15       operation that had been planned for that week.

          16   Q.  Can we have a look at CD286, please.

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  We have hard copies of these as well.  Do you have

          19       a hard copy?

          20   A.  Yes, I've got one.

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  What are you looking at now?

          22   MR UNDERWOOD:  CD286.  We see decision number 18 at the top

          23       of this and all sorts of other numbers and writing.

          24       What is this?

          25   A.  Right.  This is part of my decision log.  Basically,


                                            54
 

 

 


           1       it's a sensitive document where I -- this is part of

           2       that overview of the operation that I talked about.  In

           3       this particular entry, this is --

           4   Q.  Sorry can I stop you there before we deal with the

           5       particular entry.  So it's a log?

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  When you make an entry, is it called a decision?

           8   A.  Yes, it's called a decision, yes.

           9   Q.  So this is entry number 18, is it?

          10   A.  That's right, yes.

          11   Q.  You say it's sensitive?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  Are you allowed to write intelligence in this sort of

          14       log?

          15   A.  It depends on where the intelligence comes from, but

          16       generally don't write intelligence of a sensitive nature

          17       in there.

          18   Q.  Do you write sensitive intelligence down anywhere else?

          19   A.  No.  Because we are restricted by legislation from doing

          20       so.

          21   Q.  Just so the jury can get some idea of the surrounding

          22       circumstances of the sensitivity here, how securely was

          23       this log kept?

          24   A.  This log was kept in my office at -- in a secure

          25       building where I worked.


                                            55
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Under lock and key?

           2   A.  Yes, under lock and key.

           3   Q.  So unless you were prevented by law from writing

           4       something in there, you could trust the confidential

           5       nature of what you wrote down, could you?

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  Can you help us reading out the text at the lower half

           8       of this page, please?

           9   A.  "Meeting with ZZ17 held re developing intelligence.

          10       Intelligence suggested that subject 96 ..."

          11   Q.  Is that Mr Duggan?

          12   A.  That's Mr Duggan:

          13           "... becoming more active re drugs supply and

          14       firearms possession and supply.  In light of the

          15       intelligence picture, I have decided on having an

          16       extended MASTS operation for this week into the weekend

          17       to cover firearms possession when attending nightclubs.

          18       Operation to cover late term periods.  As usual, to

          19       allow for fast time response to develop intelligence.

          20       In addition, discussed direction of Operation Dibri and

          21       future subjects.  Discussed issues with ..."

          22   Q.  We have "DSU Mallon", we are using that name.

          23   A.  Yes:

          24       DSU  Mallon  and agreed a meeting with MIB."

          25   Q.  This is dated 1 August, I think, isn't it?


                                            56
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes.

           2   Q.  What you have kindly just read to us sets out the

           3       decision to have the four-day subsidiary operation, does

           4       it?

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  On the basis of the intelligence picture which you had

           7       in June?

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  So this doesn't actually deal with any particular

          10       intelligence coming in on, say, 1 August, does it?

          11   A.  No.

          12   Q.  So on 2 August though you told us you had a meeting?

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  With, amongst others, Detective Inspector Mallon?

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  Did you have a further meeting on 3 August with

          17       Detective Inspector Mallon?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  And ZZ51.  Is CD288 your note of that?

          20   A.  Well, CD288 is the meeting, or review, that is held with

          21       MIB, which is the Met Intelligence Bureau.

          22   Q.  Can you help us by reading out what the text is on

          23       CD288, please?

          24   A.  "Meeting held with MIB and Detective Superintendent

          25       Mallon re direction of operation due to level of


                                            57
 

 

 


           1       investment and longevity of the operation.  [I have a

           2       stamp here but] MIB strongly behind operation.  Should

           3       continue based on following:

           4           "1) TMD members are undoubtedly the most prominent

           5       criminals in London.

           6           "2) As a consequence, this OCN [Organised Criminal

           7       Network] are high on the harm matrix across London MPS,

           8       [Metropolitan Police Service].

           9           "3) Some of the top tier are within reach of being

          10       arrested for substantive offences.

          11           "A list of those were described with possible

          12       triggers for arrest.

          13           "4) MD [ie Mark Duggan] most likely at moment to be

          14       actively involved in firearms possession and therefore

          15       most likely to be arrested.

          16           "5) Agreed with MIB that more frequent use of

          17       extended MASTS operations for late term periods into

          18       weekends would, it is believed, provide more opportunity

          19       for successful operations.

          20           "In conclusion, it was agreed that Operation Dibri

          21       should continue and a review conducted in a month's

          22       time."

          23   Q.  Going back to your number 4:

          24           "MD most likely at moment to be actively involved in

          25       firearms possession and therefore most likely to be


                                            58
 

 

 


           1       arrested."

           2           Did that reflect a change in the intelligence

           3       picture between 1 and 3 August or not?

           4   A.  Yes.  At that time, it was very much the person that was

           5       most likely.  Having had the meeting -- that was on the

           6       3rd, but there was also intelligence coming in on the

           7       2nd, certainly, that said that he was actively looking

           8       to take possession of a firearm.

           9   Q.  Did that change in the intelligence picture cause any

          10       change in the plan?

          11   A.  No.  Because it's still part and parcel of -- the

          12       operation is to try and arrest those that are looking to

          13       take possession, ie if it had possession.  So it hadn't

          14       changed the picture; this is what the operation was

          15       planned for.

          16   Q.  Now, we know what happened on 4 August: an operation

          17       went in and Mr Duggan was shot.

          18           Were you involved at all on 4 August with the

          19       operation?

          20   A.  No.

          21   Q.  So what was the first you heard about those events?

          22   A.  The first -- in relation to the shooting, you mean?

          23   Q.  Yes.

          24   A.  The first I was aware was that ZZ51 had informed me that

          25       there was some fast time intelligence, they were


                                            59
 

 

 


           1       reacting to intelligence that Mark Duggan was probably

           2       taking possession of the firearm now and they were

           3       responding to that.

           4           Then the next contact I had was, as we all know,

           5       what's happened after that.

           6   Q.  So you were kept informed to some degree, were you,

           7       during the day?

           8   A.  Yes, yes.

           9   Q.  After that event, did you attend the post-incident

          10       process?

          11   A.  Yes, I did, yes.

          12   Q.  Did you have anything to do with linking the firearm

          13       that was found in the Ferry Lane area with

          14       Mr Hutchinson-Foster?

          15   A.  Yes, I was, yes.  I was also the SIO in relation to the

          16       reactive investigation into Kevin Hutchinson-Foster, the

          17       person that supplied the gun to Mark Duggan.

          18   Q.  Are you aware whether he was convicted of that?

          19   A.  Yes I was aware, yes.

          20   Q.  Are you also aware that he pleaded guilty to using that

          21       same gun in an assault on 29 July 2011?

          22   A.  Yes.  The same gun -- on 29 July,

          23       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster attended a barber's shop,

          24       a salon in Hackney, in Dalston.  He went into those

          25       premises and assaulted a man using the gun as a --


                                            60
 

 

 


           1       pistol whipping, basically.  And that left some DNA,

           2       forensic DNA, on the firearm.

           3   Q.  In relation to that incident, was Trident involved

           4       before this gun was discovered on 4 August?  Do you

           5       know?

           6   A.  In relation to the barber shop?

           7   Q.  Yes.

           8   A.  No, they were not.

           9   Q.  Was that because Trident didn't get involved in that

          10       sort of use of the gun?

          11   A.  Yes, that's right.  It wasn't part of our terms of

          12       reference.

          13   Q.  I just want to ask you, finally, some more about

          14       Mr Hutchinson-Foster.

          15           Were you aware that there was any suggestion before

          16       4 August that he would be intent on supplying a gun to

          17       Mr Duggan?

          18   A.  Yes, I was.

          19   Q.  Can you tell us when you were first aware that that was

          20       the intelligence picture?

          21   A.  Certainly by -- I think by the close of play on

          22       2 August, I think we had identified that

          23       Kevin Hutchinson-Foster was the person who was going to

          24       supply a firearm to Mark Duggan.

          25   Q.  Did you have an address for him?


                                            61
 

 

 


           1   A.  No.  But not the address where the firearm was most

           2       likely to be --

           3   Q.  Let me take this in careful stages if I may, to find out

           4       how much you knew.  Did you have an address for him as

           5       opposed to the gun?

           6   A.  Not one I personally knew of, no.

           7   Q.  Do you know that anybody in Trident had an address for

           8       him?

           9   A.  That -- I would say that, if they had an address for

          10       him, that it's not one that I was aware of.

          11   Q.  Should I be asking ZZ17?

          12   A.  Yes, I think so.

          13   Q.  What else was known about him that was relevant to how

          14       you might get hold of him?  In early August.

          15   A.  Well, what was known about him was -- certainly we had

          16       a photograph of him and his details, he had been

          17       recently released from prison, there was some

          18       suggestion -- well, the conviction that he had been

          19       inside for was for a drugs matter.  There was also some

          20       intelligence, and I think an arrest, in relation to

          21       firearms.

          22           And in relation to that particular intelligence, on

          23       where the firearm may or may not be, we didn't have, or

          24       was aware of, as it developed -- was that it was with

          25       a third person.


                                            62
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Can I just get that clear.  The intelligence was: he had

           2       the firearm somewhere away from his premises?

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  Did you have any way of finding where he was?

           5   A.  (Pause)  Any way of finding where he was?  It's hard to

           6       say.

           7   Q.  Did you have a phone number for him?

           8   A.  No, I didn't have a phone number for him.  It was

           9       probably possible to find out where he was.  But where

          10       was the firearm?  That's the key.

          11   Q.  If it was possible to find out where he was, was any

          12       thought put to putting directed surveillance on him to

          13       follow him to find the gun?

          14   A.  No, because my view has always been -- and my previous

          15       experience of working in this level of crime -- is that

          16       we had specific intelligence that a person was going to

          17       take possession of that firearm and we did not know --

          18       there was no intelligence to say where that firearm was.

          19       We've got finite resources in relation to following

          20       people and we had an armed team to deal with

          21       Mark Duggan.  In order to then take other resources off

          22       that and follow him would mean losing that -- our

          23       capability and flexibility to stick with the

          24       intelligence where someone we know was going to take

          25       possession of it.


                                            63
 

 

 


           1           That's probably the easiest way to explain it.

           2   Q.  All right.  I may have put the question badly because

           3       what I want to do is distinguish between what was

           4       possible and what was considered.

           5   A.  Right.

           6   Q.  So, as at 2 or 3 August, you knew that the intelligence

           7       situation was that Mr Hutchinson-Foster was proposing to

           8       supply a gun to Mr Duggan?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  As you recorded, the focus of the operation was towards

          11       Mr Duggan because he was the one most likely to pick up

          12       a gun; is that right?

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  You were aware that wherever Mr Hutchinson-Foster lived,

          15       the likelihood was that this gun was somewhere else?

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  You say that you could have put some resources to trying

          18       to find him and follow him; is that fair?

          19   A.  Yes, that is fair.

          20   Q.  Was a conscious decision taken not to do that or was it

          21       not considered?

          22   A.  No, it was considered.  The -- we had credible

          23       intelligence that the firearm was with someone else but

          24       we wouldn't have known where that person was.  Even if

          25       we identified where he lived and followed them, that


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           1       doesn't tell us where the firearm is.  Does that make

           2       sense?

           3   Q.  Would tell you where he was going to be when he

           4       delivered it to Mr Duggan, would it not?

           5   A.  It would tell us what, sorry?

           6   Q.  Where he was going to be when he delivered it to

           7       Mr Duggan though, wouldn't it, if you followed him?

           8   A.  I don't follow.  It would have told us -- certainly that

           9       if we had found him and followed him, it wouldn't have

          10       told us where the gun was going to be.

          11   Q.  It would if you followed him to where the gun was,

          12       wouldn't it?

          13   A.  Yes, but we wouldn't know that.  The intelligence feed

          14       that we had was telling us specifically that Mark Duggan

          15       was going to take possession of a firearm.  Now, that

          16       could have been anywhere.  Even if Kevin

          17       Hutchinson-Foster, we had an address for him, it doesn't

          18       necessarily mean that that's where the gun was going to

          19       be picked up from.

          20   Q.  No, I follow that --

          21   A.  It could be that a third party, which is often the

          22       case -- we call them runners -- are employed to pick up

          23       and ferry a gun to somewhere else.  So it doesn't

          24       necessarily mean that that was going to happen.

          25   Q.  Chief Inspector, it's my fault, I am not making my


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           1       question clear enough.

           2   A.  Right.

           3   Q.  Assume everything I put to you a moment ago, that you

           4       had the intelligence that Mr Duggan and

           5       Mr Hutchinson-Foster might come together for the purpose

           6       of exchanging the gun, you didn't know where that was

           7       going to be but you could possibly put a tail on

           8       Mr Hutchinson-Foster, yes?

           9   A.  Could do, yes.

          10   Q.  What I'm asking you is: did you consider doing that in

          11       order to follow him to the point where he was going to

          12       meet Mr Duggan wherever the gun was?

          13   A.  No.

          14   Q.  Why not?

          15   A.  Because the intelligence was telling us that Mark Duggan

          16       was going to collect or take possession of the firearm.

          17       By following Kevin Hutchinson-Foster does not

          18       necessarily mean that he was going to actually hand over

          19       the firearm.

          20   Q.  So you didn't consider this because of that; is that the

          21       answer?

          22   A.  I didn't consider the surveillance?

          23   Q.  Putting a tail on Mr Hutchinson-Foster?

          24   A.  Yes, based on that, yes.

          25   MR UNDERWOOD:  Detective Inspector thank you very much.  As


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           1       I said, I only open the batting here for the

           2       questioning.  Those are all the questions I have, thank

           3       you, but you will have more.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  Mr Mansfield?

           5   MR MANSFIELD:  I indicated earlier that we have a slight

           6       problem because of material that's only just been served

           7       today, in fact this afternoon, which bears upon the

           8       questions I wish to ask, in fact relating to that last

           9       topic.

          10           So I would ask, in fact, if he could return tomorrow

          11       and I will be hopefully in a position to have read the

          12       few hundred pages that have now been delivered.  I am

          13       sorry about that but we have been asking for it for some

          14       time.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  All right.  Let's see if anyone else

          16       feels ready to ask those questions they might

          17       otherwise -- I believe the next person I have in my

          18       order is Mr Stern?  Mr Stern, are you willing to ask

          19       such questions as you may have?

          20   MR STERN:  I think it would be better if --

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I am not going to push it.  If you

          22       feel actually in the particular circumstances that it

          23       would be better for us to keep to the proper order of

          24       questions, then I'm happy to --

          25   MR STERN:  I think it would for the time being, yes.


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           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  All right.

           2           Members of the jury, let me just address you in

           3       a moment, briefly.

           4           Before anything happens, Mr Underwood, I just want

           5       to ask you what is proposed or shall we discuss this

           6       when the jury have left us, as to those documents?  They

           7       very properly have put them in a pile in front of them

           8       but I would have thought that at some stage we ought to

           9       put them, either available for the jury or incorporate

          10       them into a bundle of some sort.

          11   MR UNDERWOOD:  That would certainly be my suggestion but

          12       I want to give my friends a fair opportunity so we can

          13       see how big this bundle is likely to end up.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I am sure we can all cope.

          15           So, Mr Foote, I'm sorry about that.  You are no

          16       doubt able and ready and willing to come back for 10.30

          17       tomorrow when you will be asked some questions

          18       concerning the evidence that you have already given.  So

          19       thank you very much, Mr Foote, if you would be kind

          20       enough to leave us and be ready to come back tomorrow at

          21       10.30?

          22   A.  Okay, thank you.

          23                      (The witness withdrew)

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Members of the jury, we will finish

          25       a little early this afternoon.  I was hoping we might go


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           1       on another three-quarters of an hour or so.  Not to

           2       worry but at least now we have started dealing with some

           3       evidence.  Tomorrow you will be hearing from Mr Foote

           4       and more witnesses and the picture will begin to emerge

           5       of the planning and the background of the operation and

           6       the other evidence that has come forward.

           7           As I said to you last week when I opened the case to

           8       you, you can see that you have front row seats, you have

           9       the witness there talking to you, questions are coming

          10       over there and I can see that you are concentrating and

          11       noting what's being said.  I say that because I just

          12       want to emphasise perhaps again just for once -- I won't

          13       keep saying this every time we part -- firstly

          14       obviously, how important it is for you to not talk about

          15       the case with anyone else, I'm sure you will continue

          16       with that, but also not to be affected in any way by any

          17       press reports or any publicity, any media, television

          18       coverage.

          19           There is coverage as we all know and you may have

          20       been interested to note it.  You may have also been

          21       interested to note that some of it is very accurate

          22       about what's happened and some of it isn't so accurate

          23       and you will know that you can completely ignore those

          24       areas that are inaccurate.  You are the ones who are

          25       getting it right.  We've got the witnesses there, there


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           1       will be transcripts of the evidence available to you and

           2       you do not need to really bother with the reports in the

           3       press, because they may or may not be accurate.  This is

           4       where the accuracy is.  I want to stress that because

           5       there has been some press coverage which has not

           6       actually been accurate.

           7           But there we are.  What I am going to ask you to do

           8       then is leave us now and be ready to start at 10.30

           9       tomorrow morning, please.  All right, I will remain

          10       here.  If you would like to take those documents with

          11       you.  Then we will sort them out.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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           1   (3.49 pm)

           2              (The Inquest adjourned until 10.30 am

           3                    on Tuesday, 24 September)

           4
               Housekeeping .........................................1
           5
               Opening statement by MR UNDERWOOD ....................9
           6
               DETECTIVE CHIEF INSPECTOR MICK FOOTE ................11
           7             (affirmed)

           8       Questions by MR UNDERWOOD .......................11

           9   Housekeeping ........................................70

          10   Submissions by MR KEITH .............................72

          11

          12

          13

          14

          15

          16

          17

          18

          19

          20

          21

          22

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          25


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