Transcript of the Hearing 9 October 2013

 

           1                                      Wednesday, 9 October 2013

           2   (10.30 am)


                                             1
 

          13                  (In the presence of the jury)

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Could the witness please come in.

          15                         V59 (continued)

          16                   (The witness was anonymised)

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much then, V59.  You

          18       are still under the oath you took yesterday.  Please

          19       have a seat.

          20   A.  Thank you.

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The cameras may now be turned back

          22       on and Mr Mansfield was asking you some questions and

          23       he'll now no doubt continue.

          24              Questions by MR MANSFIELD (continued)

          25   MR MANSFIELD:  Good morning, officer.

 


                                             2
 

 

 


           1   A.  Good morning, sir.

           2   Q.  I would like, if we could, just to go back to where we

           3       left off last night, which was the -- there's a sequence

           4       of events.

           5           Sir, may I make a suggestion -- I am quite happy to

           6       do it for the benefit of the Inquest -- just to draw up

           7       for the jury and yourself something I've done for myself

           8       but it's still not complete, which is a chronological

           9       list of times that fit this film sequence -- I hope we

          10       can get it agreed -- with what can be seen, so the jury

          11       can follow.  Otherwise, it may be very difficult to

          12       remember what comes something else.

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I understand that and I'm sure that

          14       that will be something which we'll do.  But I believe we

          15       might be hearing from the people who took it, so we'll

          16       be able to then have a little bit more clarity as to

          17       whether in fact it's in order and what is the order and

          18       what is also being said.  But I agree that by the end of

          19       the hearing that would be a very useful thing to

          20       provide.

          21   MR MANSFIELD:  Sorry, could we just have it back up on

          22       screen again.

          23           What I was attempting to do last night was to ask

          24       you to identify yourself, if you remember, and what --

          25       the position overnight is that there is some uncertainty


                                             3
 

 

 


           1       about which of the -- there are at least two figures you

           2       could be.  We just need to, please, identify which one

           3       it is.

           4           I'm going to call it a still, there's a frame, at

           5       4.51, so if we just run it on and stop at 4.51, ignore

           6       the white arrow for the moment.

           7             (Video footage was played to the court)

           8           There, that figure coming from the control car area

           9       is one such figure.  We can roll it on to 4.55.

          10                    (The video footage ended)

          11           There's another one.

          12   A.  I believe I'm the second male, sir.

          13   Q.  The second one at -- what's the -- 4.55.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, it is 4.55.

          15   MR MANSFIELD:  So that's where you come into the frame.

          16       I don't know whether they are in the witness box, I do

          17       not need you to see them, but there are stills which

          18       we've provided that the jury have in their bundle.  It's

          19       C13.  C13 in the jury bundle.

          20           The first still is 4.46, so in other words it's

          21       showing a scene before you appear.  4.47 is another one

          22       before you appear, because you're at 4.55 -- I know it's

          23       all seconds between each one -- and then there's a gap

          24       to 4.58 in the stills; do you have it?  I will just go

          25       slowly --


                                             4
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes, sir.

           2   Q.  You may not have seen these before?

           3   A.  No, I haven't.

           4   Q.  4.46 is the first still -- it's taken from this film --

           5       4.46 is the first one and 4.47 is the second one and

           6       4.58 is the third one.

           7           So, the still you've just identified, or the frame,

           8       is indexed at 4.55, so it comes before the one, needless

           9       to say, at 4.58.

          10           I am just going to pause for a moment.  I'm going to

          11       ask for all of it to be shown by the time I've finished,

          12       again once more, because it's difficult to piece it all

          13       together.  Would you take it from me for the moment

          14       that, by 4.55, the white-arrowed, white-shirted Q63, if

          15       that's what he is, has in fact a few seconds before --

          16       it's at 4.47 -- he has ducked down -- that's the way

          17       I put it -- he's disappeared from view behind the

          18       minicab at 4.47 and he's still out of view at 4.58, as

          19       you're walking towards that area; do you follow?

          20   A.  Yes, sir.

          21   Q.  So I make it clear to you the sequence here.  Then he

          22       reappears at 4.59.  So he's been out of view, on the

          23       passenger side of the minicab, for about 11 seconds.

          24       It's during those 11 seconds that you've just identified

          25       yourself walking towards the car; do you follow?


                                             5
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes, sir.

           2   Q.  I know it's a question I asked you yesterday, but now

           3       you've seen that sequence, did you see Q63 ahead of you

           4       on the pavement doing something near the open door of

           5       the minicab?

           6   A.  Not that I recall, sir, no.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Do you recall seeing him at all?

           8   A.  No, sir.

           9   MR MANSFIELD:  I am not going to replay sequences where

          10       you're obviously very close to him, but you don't recall

          11       him at all.  I have to ask you this question: did you at

          12       any time -- leaving aside Q63 which you don't

          13       remember -- do you remember seeing a gun in the hand of

          14       a police officer?

          15   A.  No, definitely not, sir.

          16   Q.  Definitely not.  Well, I am not asking it to be

          17       replayed, it comes from yesterday.  You indicated

          18       yesterday that you didn't tell -- or rather you weren't

          19       told -- sorry, I put it this way round -- you weren't

          20       told by Z51, as you go past him -- he doesn't say to

          21       you, "I've just found a gun".

          22   A.  No, he did not, sir.

          23   Q.  Then I want to put it the other way round now.  If you

          24       found the gun, and if it was after he'd found it,

          25       according to the film sequences, did you tell him,


                                             6
 

 

 


           1       "Look, I've seen the gun, I've found it"?

           2   A.  I did not find the gun sir, R31 did.

           3   Q.  All right.  Did you say to your Tactical Firearms

           4       Commander: "It's all right, we've found the gun"?

           5   A.  No, sir.

           6   Q.  Why not?

           7   A.  I don't know, sir.

           8   Q.  I want to, as it were, shift the whole scene onto Leman

           9       Street later that night.  It must have been the buzz

          10       word, or the talk of the town, whatever you want to call

          11       it, the thing that everybody was talking about, back at

          12       the police station, is how the gun got where it was said

          13       to have been found.

          14   A.  No.  That wasn't discussed, sir.

          15   Q.  Wasn't at all?

          16   A.  No, sir.

          17   Q.  Nobody said, in passing?

          18   A.  No, sir.

          19   Q.  No anxiety, nothing at all?

          20   A.  No.

          21   Q.  That's the end of it.  I want to go right back to the

          22       beginning of this operation, only a day or so before,

          23       but I want to take a different sequence now, leading up

          24       to those events we've just been through last night and

          25       some this morning.


                                             7
 

 

 


           1           It starts with a briefing you have on the 3rd -- you

           2       have, particularly -- at Leman Street before you go to

           3       the main briefing.

           4   A.  Yes, sir.

           5   Q.  I am not going through that, although it's important to

           6       remember that you had had that briefing.  So what it

           7       means is all the CO19 team had been given the standard,

           8       as it were, instructions and advice about the various

           9       options they might have to confront on an operation like

          10       this --

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  -- is that fair?

          13   A.  Yes, sir.

          14   Q.  Right.  So then you go to the briefing.  Now, before you

          15       get to the briefing at Wood Green, on the 3rd, were you

          16       aware of any of the intelligence specific to this

          17       operation?

          18   A.  No, I wasn't.

          19   Q.  No.  Would you turn -- it's C12 in the jury bundle,

          20       please -- C12 -- this is the transcript of the recording

          21       and you were taken to it yesterday.  Just one or two

          22       questions about this.  Obviously you participate in it.

          23           The intelligence, which you didn't know about before

          24       this occasion, comes -- it starts on 275, at the bottom

          25       right-hand corner and goes over to 276.  Would you agree


                                             8
 

 

 


           1       that specific intelligence to an operation, for

           2       an Operational Firearms Commander, is important, isn't

           3       it?

           4   A.  Yes, sir.

           5   Q.  Because you're having to -- I'll come to the -- I'm

           6       going to suggest the two roles you were performing.  You

           7       were performing the role of a Tactical Advisor and you

           8       were providing the role of an Operational Firearms

           9       Commander, weren't you?

          10   A.  No, sir.  I was the Operational Firearms Commander.

          11   Q.  We'll come back to that.  Are you quite sure that's all

          12       you were?

          13   A.  Yes, sir.

          14   Q.  As the Firearms Commander Operational -- I am just

          15       dealing with intelligence for the moment -- the

          16       intelligence that you were receiving was actually quite

          17       specific, wasn't it?  It's on 275 and 276.

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  When you heard it did you make at least a mental note of

          20       what you were listening to --

          21   A.  Yes, I did.

          22   Q.  -- because you might have to deal with this situation --

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  -- one man giving a gun to another man, yes?

          25   A.  Yes.


                                             9
 

 

 


           1   Q.  But it was a little more than that because both the

           2       individuals were identified, weren't they?

           3   A.  Yes, they were.

           4   Q.  More than that, the person giving the gun was identified

           5       essentially as the man who's been holding more than one

           6       firearm for one of the subjects.

           7   A.  Yes, sir.

           8   Q.  Now, where there is a person storing guns somewhere,

           9       plainly probably not at their own address, all right --

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  -- then that is a considerable concern to the police,

          12       isn't it?

          13   A.  Yes, sir.

          14   Q.  Because you need to know -- in order to get rid of the

          15       guns in the first place and not have chases through

          16       London, you need to get the guns off the street, don't

          17       you?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  I won't read it all through because the jury have heard

          20       it more than once now, on 276, the details that relate

          21       to Kevin Hutchinson-Foster.  If you remember, there were

          22       photographs of that man as well --

          23   A.  Yes, there were.

          24   Q.  -- as well as others.  Just before we get to the bit

          25       which concerns you particularly because you spoke, did


                                            10
 

 

 


           1       you, as Operational Firearms Commander, say anything to

           2       anybody about how to use this intelligence, how to apply

           3       this intelligence, to the operation on the 3rd?

           4   A.  No, sir.

           5   Q.  Because you are not precluded from -- I'll put it in

           6       a straightforward way: there's nothing to stop you on

           7       the 3rd saying to Z51, for example, "Well, that's very

           8       interesting, if you've got intelligence that the

           9       firearms are being kept by this man, Hutchinson-Foster,

          10       shouldn't we really be pursuing him at this point"; you

          11       could say that, couldn't you?

          12   A.  I could have that discussion with him, yes.

          13   Q.  The short answer to it is you didn't?

          14   A.  No.

          15   Q.  I want to just, as it were, pause for a moment on the

          16       question of what role you were playing because you said

          17       very clearly that you weren't the Tactical Advisor, yes?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  Could we have your EAB back, please, at CD0012.  Is it

          20       up on screen?

          21   A.  Yes, it is.

          22   Q.  You will see there -- and we went through it yesterday

          23       for another reason, twice -- that you really do have to,

          24       if nothing else is included in this particular note --

          25       because it's about the gun and we went through it


                                            11
 

 

 


           1       yesterday -- the one thing you do have to make clear is

           2       what your role was, don't you?

           3   A.  Yes, sir.

           4   Q.  You would not want to mislead the reader or your senior

           5       officers or anybody who does a review of this whole

           6       business --

           7   A.  Not at all, sir.

           8   Q.  -- to make a mistake.  If you look at it in the written

           9       version, about six lines down:

          10           "I was deployed ..."

          11           Do you have that?

          12   A.  Yes, sir.

          13   Q.  Just read the next section to yourself.

          14   A.  (Pause)

          15           Yes.

          16   Q.  You see, what it says very clearly is that you were not

          17       only the Operational Firearms Commander you were also

          18       the Tactical Advisor.

          19   A.  I disagree, sir.

          20   Q.  It says that.

          21   A.  I was able to give advice to the TFC.

          22   Q.  I'm sorry?

          23   A.  I was available to give advice to the TFC as

          24       a Tactical Advisor in relation to the advice given by

          25       Inspector Bennett.


                                            12
 

 

 


           1   Q.  This is a nonsense, isn't it?

           2   A.  No, sir.

           3   Q.  You do know why this is important, don't you?

           4   A.  Yes, sir.

           5   Q.  Why is that?

           6   A.  Due to the separation of roles.

           7   Q.  Yes.  Why is there a separation of roles?

           8   A.  To ensure there's no confusion.

           9   Q.  So you don't end up advising yourself, put shortly --

          10   A.  Yes, sir.

          11   Q.  -- is that fair?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  Which is precisely what happened on this occasion

          14       because you ended up in the control car advising

          15       yourself, didn't you?

          16   A.  No, sir, I completely disagree.

          17   Q.  I see.  You did end up in the control car?

          18   A.  I did, yes.

          19   Q.  Were you advising yourself?

          20   A.  No, sir.

          21   Q.  I see.  Mr Bennett wasn't advising you, was he?

          22   A.  No, he wasn't, no.

          23   Q.  No.  You see, normally the Operational Commander on

          24       something like this would actually be not in the control

          25       car but with his team in one of those cars, wouldn't he?


                                            13
 

 

 


           1   A.  No.

           2   Q.  No?  All right.  Just to emphasise the point if we may,

           3       we go back to the briefing, I was just getting to your

           4       part of it, 277.  Could we have the briefing back.

           5       Thank you.

           6           The part that relates to you in the sense that you

           7       speak, Z51 hands over to you and you introduce yourself:

           8           "... I'm the V59 the Operational Firearms Commander

           9       and the Tactical Advisor to the TFC for this operation."

          10           So there again you are telling your officers that's

          11       what you are.

          12   A.  Again, I disagree, sir.

          13   Q.  Well, no, sorry, you agree that's what you're telling

          14       them?

          15   A.  I agree that that is what I've said, yes.

          16   Q.  That is just a misnomer, is it?

          17   A.  No, sir.

          18   Q.  What is it then?

          19   A.  As I said last time, I was advising in relation to

          20       tactical advice provided by Inspector Bennett in

          21       relation to environmental and operational factors.

          22   Q.  Really?  Who made up the log in this case, the tactical

          23       firearms log for the advisor?

          24   A.  The one previously submitted or the one during the

          25       operation?


                                            14
 

 

 


           1   Q.  During the operation?

           2   A.  That was me, sir.

           3   Q.  You?

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  Yes.  Well, I would like you to see part of it: CD658,

           6       please.  This is just, as I understand it, the last page

           7       of the log.  It's at the front "CO19 Specialist Firearms

           8       Command Tactical Advisor's Log" and it's booked 36A, so

           9       you will be familiar with this, will you not?

          10   A.  Yes, I am, sir, yes.

          11   Q.  I do not think the jury have seen this one before.  We

          12       can see going back to -- that's the front page -- just

          13       going back to 658, there are all the entries on that

          14       page.

          15           If you look at the left-hand column, two thirds of

          16       the way down in slightly smaller print, the date of the

          17       4th appears; do you see that?

          18   A.  Yes, sir.

          19   Q.  Is this all in your writing?

          20   A.  Yes, it is.

          21   Q.  It is?  Only Mr Bennett, whatever he's doing, he's

          22       certainly not writing this up, is he?

          23   A.  No, he's not, sir.

          24   Q.  If you were not the Tactical Advisor what were you doing

          25       writing this up then?


                                            15
 

 

 


           1   A.  This is the log we use as the Operational Firearms

           2       Commander, we did at that time.

           3   Q.  I see.  Does it finish, according to this, at 5.15?

           4   A.  Yes, it does.

           5   Q.  Why is that?

           6   A.  Because I had no time to complete any more in that book.

           7   Q.  Was there more space in the book if you had wanted to?

           8   A.  Yes, there was.

           9   Q.  Did you have it with you?

          10   A.  Yes, I did.

          11   Q.  When you got to the scene and after things had happened,

          12       you stayed at the scene?

          13   A.  Yes, I did.

          14   Q.  With the book?

          15   A.  Yes, I did.

          16   Q.  Why didn't you enter it up?

          17   A.  Because I was going to write a statement when I returned

          18       to Leman Street.

          19   Q.  Why didn't you enter up the log?

          20   A.  Because I was going to write a statement at Leman

          21       Street.

          22   Q.  You have an obligation, whatever else you're doing --

          23       we've been to the statement where you've given certain

          24       descriptions, we have been through all that -- you are

          25       supposed to keep up the log, aren't you?


                                            16
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes, I am.

           2   Q.  This is an omission, isn't it?

           3   A.  No, it's not.

           4   Q.  I see.  So you didn't do it at the scene, although you

           5       had the book, and would you agree you did have time to

           6       do it at the scene?

           7   A.  I did, yes.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  There aren't any more pages to it,

           9       this is the last page?

          10   A.  There are further pages, sir, but there's no more of my

          11       writing, I don't believe.

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  No more entries under 17.15, thank

          13       you.

          14   MR MANSFIELD:  Can we just go back to the briefing itself.

          15       That's 277, thank you.

          16           I just want to ask you about -- the reason I'm

          17       asking, so it will become clear, I want to ask you about

          18       options; do you follow?

          19   A.  Yes, sir.

          20   Q.  One of the issues -- and I suggest to you you would have

          21       been aware of it -- is the need to ensure the use of

          22       minimal force --

          23   A.  Yes, I agree.

          24   Q.  -- especially lethal force?

          25   A.  Yes, sir.


                                            17
 

 

 


           1   Q.  You cannot obviate it all together, you just have to

           2       reduce the risks, as far as is humanly possible.

           3   A.  That is correct.

           4   Q.  Right.  What you say at this stage, on the 3rd is --

           5       it's about two thirds of the way down:

           6           "The method."

           7           Of course, these officers will have heard this many,

           8       many times, they've heard it presumably in the

           9       individual briefing as well as the -- the one back at

          10       Leman Street.

          11   A.  Words to that effect, sir, yes.

          12   Q.  Anyway:

          13           "... interception by way of foot deployment, armed

          14       vehicle stop or entry to premises."

          15           All the officers will know exactly what you're

          16       talking about, they will have -- first of all; is that

          17       right?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  They will have trained for all those possibilities --

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  -- and of course all those possibilities can be

          22       subdivided many times into different kinds of

          23       situations, can't they?

          24   A.  Yes, they can.

          25   Q.  The whole point of CO19 training is ensuring


                                            18
 

 

 


           1       flexibility --

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  -- yes?  And fast response?

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  I want you just to focus on these options, first of all,

           6       because we know the option that was in the end,

           7       I suggest, forced upon you, but I want to deal with the

           8       options as they stand in the round.

           9           Of the three that you put in general terms there, is

          10       one preferable to another or are they all roughly the

          11       same in terms of how you would prefer to carry out

          12       interception?

          13   A.  It depends on the time of day and environmental factors.

          14   Q.  When you talk about environmental factors, what do you

          15       mean?

          16   A.  Locations, premises -- other buildings in the locality,

          17       the general -- whether you're in central London or in

          18       Shropshire, for example -- in the fields in Shropshire

          19       things will make a big difference.

          20   Q.  It depends on the context of where you're having to

          21       carry it out.  That's what it comes to, I understand

          22       that.  But in principle, is there a preferred -- if you

          23       had a free hand, is there a preferred interception

          24       method?

          25   A.  Yes, generally containment and call out on a building.


                                            19
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Containment and call out.

           2           I'm going to ask you about the next one that's on

           3       that list, not in order.  If you're going to do

           4       an interception on foot, is that the least preferred?

           5   A.  Yes, it is.

           6   Q.  It's the least preferred.  So buildings come at the top,

           7       foot at the bottom?

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  In between we've got vehicle stops.  Now, vehicle stops

          10       can take different forms, can't they?

          11   A.  Yes, they can.

          12   Q.  So you can have a mobile stop --

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  -- plainly -- and you've seen the film, we may come back

          15       to it in a moment -- there's a mobile stop and there is

          16       plainly a static stop.

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  In other words, you box a car in so it doesn't even

          19       move.

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  Do you recognise that the mobile hard stop is a high

          22       risk tactic?

          23   A.  (Pause)

          24           No, not with suitably trained officers.

          25   Q.  I'm going to suggest to you it's high risk, even with


                                            20
 

 

 


           1       trained officers, isn't it?

           2   A.  No.

           3   Q.  Are you aware of observations that have been made about

           4       this tactic by those who have reported upon it in the

           5       past?

           6   A.  No.

           7   Q.  You're not?  Well, then I'm going to ask you to look at

           8       them, we have them amongst our papers.  Are you aware of

           9       the Azelle Rodney Inquiry report?

          10   A.  No, I'm not, sir.

          11   Q.  I'm going to ask you because -- do you never get in

          12       training any indication of what the authorities might be

          13       thinking about the tactics you deploy?

          14   A.  Yes, we do.

          15   Q.  You do?  So before today, no one has drawn your

          16       attention to the report in relation to that Inquiry,

          17       which actually was this year, the report?

          18   A.  No, not as yet.

          19   Q.  Well, I'm going to ask you just to have a look at

          20       page 29795.

          21   MR STERN:  Sir, just before my learned friend does that, he

          22       has not informed me that he might want to look at that

          23       and there is a matter that I would like to discuss in

          24       that regard.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  This is a report which was published


                                            21
 

 

 


           1       only a month or two ago?

           2   MR STERN:  Exactly.

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It certainly was not anywhere near

           4       even begun at the time of August 2011.

           5   MR STERN:  Exactly.

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Do you need to go through this

           7       particular aspect?

           8   MR MANSFIELD:  I can do it on another report that was

           9       certainly before this one.  Sir, I do submit that one of

          10       the issues before yourself and this jury is clearly

          11       safety for the future, and if officers, even now, have

          12       not had this drawn to their attention -- there's

          13       a particular section which came from the IPCC which was

          14       actually before this report -- that officers are still

          15       not being told about the risks.  We say this is of

          16       concern when weighing up the risk because he's just

          17       said, as far as he's concerned at least, he's not

          18       accepting that it's a high risk option.

          19           So I can leave that passage.

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I would have thought so.  Let's

          21       leave that for the moment.

          22   MR MANSFIELD:  I can leave it for the moment but I'm going

          23       to ask you to consider this.  It's a similar passage but

          24       it's at an earlier report.  This is --

          25   MR STERN:  Sorry to interrupt, I really am.


                                            22
 

 

 


           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  What was the report you were going

           2       to refer to?

           3   MR MANSFIELD:  McConville 2003.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Which report was that?

           5   MR MANSFIELD:  It's under section 62 of the Police and

           6       Northern Ireland Act, it's a report on the circumstances

           7       of the death of Mr Neil McConville on 29 April, the

           8       Police Ombudsman report.  It's been proffered in other

           9       hearings and the Rodney one was in fact in 2005, so they

          10       both predate this.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The incident was but the report only

          12       came out two months ago.

          13           Yes, Mr Stern?

          14   MR STERN:  The difficulty is that when you embark on looking

          15       at a report, that I am not as familiar with as

          16       Mr Mansfield, one has to look at the details of it

          17       before drawing it to anybody's attention.

          18           The second thing that is perhaps more relevant is

          19       this, that this officer is obviously acting in

          20       accordance with the training that is set down by his

          21       superiors.  If anybody is to be asked about this, it is

          22       not this officer but his superiors who have set down the

          23       training.

          24           I leave open the question of whether or not it's

          25       relevant or indeed helpful at this stage.


                                            23
 

 

 


           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  All right.  I think Mr Mansfield if

           2       we can just deal with it on the basis of his knowledge

           3       and I'm certainly -- I will certainly allow you to ask

           4       him whether he's aware of any recommendation but if he

           5       just says he is or he isn't, I think really we are bound

           6       by the answers and we just press on.  But I am quite

           7       content for you to ask him a little bit about it.

           8   MR MANSFIELD:  I do not want to take up unnecessary time.

           9       I think if the officer is saying he's unaware of any --

          10       I'll put it again --

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Let's ask him.  You heard that

          12       report mentioned.  Are you aware of that report or

          13       contents or recommendations?

          14   A.  Which report, sir?  The Azelle Rodney one or the one

          15       previously?

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The Azelle Rodney, you have already

          17       said you have not read the report, which was out two

          18       months ago and this report in 2003 from in Northern

          19       Ireland into another death, is that a report which you

          20       are aware --

          21   A.  I am not aware of that report no, sir.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  What background -- in your training

          23       what are you told?  Are you referred to various

          24       recommendations made on earlier occasions by judges,

          25       jurors or anything of that nature?


                                            24
 

 

 


           1   A.  We receive the training directly from our instructors

           2       and we train those tactics hundreds and hundreds of

           3       times on a vehicle option, for example.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  When you have just come to the

           5       conclusion -- and I did note you took a little time to

           6       answer, you were thinking it through -- about whether

           7       you thought it was a high risk tactic or not, a mobile

           8       stop of a car in motion, what did you base that on?

           9   A.  I would suggest it's a higher risk than a containment

          10       and call out on a building -- for obvious reasons, the

          11       vehicle is moving -- however with suitably trained and

          12       practised tactics, I would not say it's a high risk

          13       tactic.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Right.

          15   MR MANSFIELD:  Can I make clear the passage I was going to

          16       take from the Azelle Rodney report is actually a passage

          17       that comes from a much earlier report by the IPCC in

          18       2005.  So they are both historical in relation to this.

          19           Can I just continue with this because what I want to

          20       suggest to you is -- or ask you -- is: are you saying

          21       that during the time you've been an Operational

          22       Commander or trained to do that job, or an Advisor --

          23       officially or unofficially, do you follow --

          24   A.  Yes, sir.

          25   Q.  -- as an advisor -- no one has ever said in any training


                                            25
 

 

 


           1       situation to you that a mobile hard stop is a high risk

           2       tactic which should only be adopted once every other

           3       possibility/option, has been, as it were, thought

           4       through; you've never been told that?

           5   A.  No.

           6   Q.  No.  Now, I just want to come to this situation then --

           7       I'm dealing with it in general terms for the moment

           8       because that's how it's put in the briefing, so they are

           9       being prepared.

          10           The problems with -- you haven't been aware of what

          11       various reports may have said.  It is quite obvious that

          12       there are a lot of risks with a mobile hard stop, aren't

          13       there?

          14   A.  Yes, sir.

          15   Q.  I just want to run through them with you.  Again, it's

          16       common sense, I'm sure you'll appreciate.

          17           First of all, if you're having to chase through

          18       traffic, there is a risk that other traffic will get

          19       caught up in it.

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  I don't just mean other cars, there are motorcycles and

          22       also cycles.

          23   A.  Yes, sir.

          24   Q.  So that's things on the road that you have to be careful

          25       about.  It's not just going in the direction you're


                                            26
 

 

 


           1       going, it's people coming the other way as well --

           2   A.  Yes, sir.

           3   Q.  -- people who are overtaking perhaps when they shouldn't

           4       be.

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  All these things have to be taken seriously.  It's

           7       a much more fluid situation --

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  -- because one of the things you really want, doing

          10       an interception, is you want control of a situation that

          11       is known to you, so you know what you've got to deal

          12       with, rather than an unknown situation; do you follow?

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  You think that's fair?

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  Right.  So besides the question of other road users,

          17       clearly you also have to consider members of the public

          18       who are not in vehicles --

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  -- you know, it's obvious again: pedestrians --

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  -- people at bus stops?

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  As you drove up to Tottenham Hale, did you notice anyone

          25       at the bus stop?


                                            27
 

 

 


           1   A.  No, I didn't.

           2   Q.  Did you even look?

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  Did you?

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  Are you sure?

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  You looked to see if there was anyone at the bus stop?

           9   A.  I ensured there was no one within the firearms stop.

          10   Q.  No, sorry, different point.  As you're approaching that

          11       area, since you are not somebody who's going to

          12       necessarily be involved in using weapons -- you might

          13       have to but you might not -- are you saying there was

          14       no one at the bus stop --

          15   A.  I did not see anyone at the bus stop.

          16   Q.  -- or did you not notice whether there was or not?

          17   A.  I did not see anyone at the bus stop.

          18   Q.  I see.  Any cyclists on the Road?

          19   A.  Yes, there was.

          20   Q.  There were?  So we're building the picture here.  Of

          21       course you knew, did you, that you were approaching

          22       a Tube station --

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  -- where there might be people coming in and out?

          25   A.  Yes.


                                            28
 

 

 


           1   Q.  In this particular instance, of course, the car itself

           2       that you were pursuing had a member of the public in

           3       it -- I do not mean Mr Duggan as such, the target you

           4       were after, but there was a minicab driver.

           5   A.  Yes, there was.

           6   Q.  You did know that?

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  One of the further problems of a mobile hard stop is if

           9       you're coming up behind and the driver doesn't

          10       appreciate what's going on, because he may not

          11       appreciate that you're police officers, as opposed to

          12       anything else when it first happens -- all right?

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  There's the risk of collision, isn't there --

          15   A.  Yes, there is.

          16   Q.  -- which might again involve other cars, unless done

          17       carefully.

          18   A.  Yes, unless done carefully.

          19   Q.  So once again, when you've put all these risk factors

          20       together, they mitigate against, do they -- or militate

          21       against -- having a mobile hard stop, as opposed to

          22       a static or containment situation under your control?

          23   A.  As I said, the containment option is better.  However,

          24       I would still suggest a vehicle option is safer than

          25       a foot option.


                                            29
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Yes, I accept that.  But a static vehicle stop is better

           2       than a mobile, isn't it?

           3   A.  Yes, it is.

           4   Q.  Yes.  I wonder if you could just -- I know you've seen

           5       it several times yesterday, I just want you to have

           6       a look at the training film once again.  Could we just

           7       have it once more, that training film from yesterday?

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes.

           9   MR MANSFIELD:  Would you look at the road in particular

          10       there?

          11        (Video footage was played to the court and ended)

          12           Now, I want to ask you this as a general question.

          13       Is that a good example of a hard stop or not?

          14   A.  No, it's not.

          15   Q.  The reason is?

          16   A.  It was implemented too slowly, I do not believe they

          17       quickly surrounded the vehicle, I don't believe they

          18       dominated the subject from the vehicle properly and

          19       there were a few issues around the positioning of the

          20       Hatton gunners.

          21   Q.  Around the?

          22   A.  The positioning of the Hatton gunners, the officers

          23       deploying Hatton guns.

          24   Q.  I see.  Anything about the road in which it was done?

          25       It's a fairly average road.


                                            30
 

 

 


           1   A.  It is an average road, yes.

           2   Q.  The sort of road you find in Leyton?

           3   A.  Yes, sir.

           4   Q.  Yes.  What I want, with your help, to do is to examine

           5       the options that were open to you if you'd had certain

           6       information; do you follow?  I appreciate you didn't

           7       have all of these but I'm going to suggest they could

           8       have been made available.  I'm dealing with the 4th.

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  May I just unroll it a little bit.  If you had been able

          11       to get to the Vicarage Road area with time to spare,

          12       that's obviously an advantage, isn't it?

          13   A.  (Pause)

          14           It depends who else is there, sir.

          15   Q.  Yes.  Well, I'm assuming you are the only CO19 officers

          16       able to do an interception?

          17   A.  Yes.  I'm referring to the TFC and the intelligence

          18       feeds.

          19   Q.  Yes, yes, I'll come to that.  But I am just dealing with

          20       it slowly.  It's an advantage to get there with time to

          21       spare because you don't quite know what's going to go.

          22       So it's an advantage to be near there.

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  Yes.  So that's the first point.  Second point: if, in

          25       fact, by the time you get there -- I'll come to what


                                            31
 

 

 


           1       actually happened in a moment -- if, by the time you get

           2       there, the house from -- in which or by which or near

           3       which this transaction is going to take place has been

           4       identified, that's an advantage too, isn't it?

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  Because that could trigger the safest approach, which is

           7       containment?

           8   A.  No, sir, I disagree there.

           9   Q.  All right.  So why do you say it couldn't do that?

          10   A.  This is a very fast moving operation and it's not likely

          11       the subject will remain in those premises for very long.

          12   Q.  I have not quite finished the picture then, all right.

          13       You agree it's an advantage to know the premises?

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  I want to deal with a rendezvous for the CO19 officers

          16       if they had been able to get there or be in the

          17       vicinity.  It's common practice, is it not, for

          18       a rendezvous point either to be in a police station yard

          19       or a fire station yard or some other car park area that

          20       the police can have access to?

          21   A.  Yes, it is.

          22   Q.  That's common practice?

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  You would either know the area so you would know where

          25       you could say to your officers we'll all meet up here --


                                            32
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes.

           2   Q.  -- or somebody else who you can get advice from can say

           3       "Well, I can tell you a good place to be and it's X"; is

           4       that fair?

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  That can be ascertained relatively quickly, can't it?

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  I want to step back a moment just to fill in a bit more

           9       of this picture for the 4th.  You didn't consider it

          10       and, as far as we can see, no one else did, but if Kevin

          11       Hutchinson-Foster, the man mentioned in the briefing,

          12       had been the subject on the 4th --

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  -- of directed armed surveillance --

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  -- from an address at which he is, we heard yesterday,

          17       during the day, all right, from an address that could

          18       have been discovered during the day and trailed him to

          19       Burchell Road, that would be an advantage to you,

          20       wouldn't it?

          21   A.  It would, sir, yes.

          22   Q.  So I appreciate this didn't happen but I'm putting to

          23       you, I'm suggesting it could have happened, and if, on

          24       the back of that, an armed surveillance officer was

          25       placed in a van, non-descript, to watch the address


                                            33
 

 

 


           1       where it is known he's gone -- that's

           2       Hutchinson-Foster -- that's also possible, isn't it?

           3   A.  It's possible or it's helpful?

           4   Q.  Well, both.

           5   A.  Any intelligence in relation to armed subjects is

           6       helpful, sir.

           7   Q.  What that would do, or could do, is that the armed

           8       officer inside the van, possibly two of them, can keep

           9       an eye on the comings and goings of Mr Hutchinson-Foster

          10       from this particular address.  So that would be helpful

          11       too, wouldn't it?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  Yes.  Meanwhile, I'm suggesting, you could have been in

          14       Leyton at a relatively close RV place, couldn't you?

          15   A.  Hypothetically, yes.

          16   Q.  Hypothetically, all right.  Are you familiar with the

          17       Leyton area?

          18   A.  No, I'm not.

          19   Q.  No.  I am not clear exactly whether the police station

          20       two minutes away was operational or non-operational but

          21       there is a police station in Leyton that's not very far

          22       away, or was then.

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  Just going on with this.  Hutchinson-Foster stays in the

          25       address all afternoon, so the observation van wouldn't


                                            34
 

 

 


           1       be able to tell you very much more than he hasn't come

           2       out.  But then, coming closer to the 4th, what actually

           3       happens is a very close commentary on the movements of

           4       Duggan.  Now, you will appreciate it was known that he

           5       was in a minicab, it was known that he was going to

           6       Vicarage Road and that that intelligence was being

           7       dispersed to CO19 and everybody else from 5.20 onwards.

           8       You know that much, don't you?

           9   A.  Yes, I do.

          10   Q.  So if at 5.20-ish, or 5.25-ish, it had been known to

          11       you, already at a local police station, that Mark Duggan

          12       was on his way to Vicarage Road, that would have been

          13       an advantage, wouldn't it?

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  I just want to ask you what, if you can say, you would

          16       have done.  I'll make it clear what I have in mind.

          17           If you'd managed to get there, hypothetically, into

          18       the local police station to wait -- await unfolding

          19       events, would you have recced the area in any way at all

          20       or just stayed still?

          21   A.  Depending on the time, sir.  If we only had a hour to

          22       two hours we would have remained at the police station.

          23   Q.  All right, you would have remained at the police

          24       station.  But you have available to you some means of

          25       locating roads, premises and places, I mean maps and --


                                            35
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes, we do.

           2   Q.  -- sat navs and whatever you use.  I don't want to know

           3       exactly what it is that you use.  So 5.20/5.25 the

           4       intelligence comes through that he's on his way to

           5       Vicarage Road.  Now, given this is not is an unusual

           6       situation for you, is it --

           7   A.  No.

           8   Q.  -- would you, at the moment the intelligence comes

           9       through that he's on his way to Vicarage Road to take

          10       possession of a gun, and you relate it back to the

          11       intelligence you had only 24 hours before, that this is

          12       exactly the kind of thing that was expected the day

          13       before --

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  -- right, would you at that point have moved out of the

          16       station yard?

          17   A.  No.

          18   Q.  Right.  At what point would you be waiting to move out

          19       of the station yard, the police station yard, if that's

          20       where you parked up?

          21   A.  It depends on how far away the police station is.

          22       However, I would wait for directions from the TFC.

          23   Q.  From the TFC?

          24   A.  Yes, Z51 on this occasion.

          25   Q.  I'm assuming that he's with you --


                                            36
 

 

 


           1   A.  Right.

           2   Q.  -- for these purposes, for the hypothesis that you've

           3       had time to get there.

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  He's actually with you but he does not have to be with

           6       you, does he?

           7   A.  No.

           8   Q.  He could be back somewhere else, can't he?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  He could actually be back at Wood Green, couldn't he?

          11   A.  Yes, it's not ideal but he could be.

          12   Q.  So you're waiting for him to say -- I want to go through

          13       what could have been done in these circumstances.  You

          14       are saying it would be his decision but his decision

          15       could be that it would be advisable to -- you're

          16       advising, are you not --

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  -- as an advisor?  You would be able to say to him,

          19       "Well, I think we should begin to move into some kind of

          20       position around Vicarage Road, not an obvious one but we

          21       should be even closer".  The police station is about two

          22       to three minutes away, according to an officer who knows

          23       the area.

          24   A.  Not at this stage, no, I would remain at the police

          25       station.


                                            37
 

 

 


           1   Q.  No, fair enough.  But then there comes much more

           2       specific intelligence.  Firstly that the car has arrived

           3       in Vicarage Road.

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  You would expect the Tactical Firearms Commander to be

           6       advised by you, "I think we should move".

           7   A.  No, again, I disagree.

           8   Q.  All right.  Still too early?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  Right.  That's intelligence not coming from somebody on

          11       the ground, right, that's coming from ZZ17 who's getting

          12       intelligence from elsewhere.  That's the first bit.

          13           The second bit is parked up was a Trident officer,

          14       ZZ37, on the left-hand side as you come down Vicarage

          15       Road, he's parked up just before Burchell Road.  Did you

          16       know that at the time?

          17   A.  At the time, no, I didn't.

          18   Q.  You didn't.  Have you ever been to this area since?

          19   A.  No, I've not.

          20   Q.  All right.  I'll take it slowly.  In fact, so you can

          21       follow the questions, you might like to look at the plan

          22       we've all got of this area.  It's page 7, tab 1 in the

          23       jury's bundle.  There are photographs to accompany this.

          24       I just pause for a moment.  (Pause)

          25           Have you seen the plan before?


                                            38
 

 

 


           1   A.  No, I've not.

           2   Q.  I think in fairness to you, I will just show you the

           3       disposition of roads.  You see where the black arrows

           4       going down the page are?

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  That's Vicarage Road.  Burchell Road is, as you come

           7       down the black arrows, it's just near the third black

           8       arrow, do you see, on the right-hand side -- it's on the

           9       left-hand side as you come down Burchell Road.

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  Then there's a junction with Farmer Road and so on.

          12       Then if you turn right out of Vicarage Road you come

          13       back into Church Road and back to Lea Bridge Road and

          14       onto Ferry Lane, all right, eventually?

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  That's the context.  The police station is not marked on

          17       here but the officer who knew it said it was a couple of

          18       minutes away.  So, bearing that in mind, the first bit

          19       of intelligence, the car has entered Vicarage Road.  The

          20       second bit of intelligence, from someone on the ground,

          21       is that they've seen the minicab.

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  The third bit of intelligence, it turns into Burchell

          24       Road; do you see that?

          25   A.  Yes.


                                            39
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Now, it's beginning -- if you had all that sort of

           2       intelligence and you were two minutes away, it's

           3       beginning to look like something might happen.

           4   A.  Potentially, yes.

           5   Q.  Potentially.  Because you have to anticipate, don't you?

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  You have to make sensible anticipations, I am not

           8       talking about, you know, fanciful ones.

           9   A.  Yes, you do.

          10   Q.  This is all based on an intelligence capsule, if you

          11       like, of information that's been coming through over

          12       several days, in fact, beyond the 3rd?

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  Would you have expected the Tactical Firearms Commander,

          15       or the Operational Firearms Commander, that's you, to

          16       have sort of said "I think we'd better make a move

          17       here"?

          18   A.  I would be preparing to move from the police station.

          19   Q.  Because, would this be fair, if something is about to

          20       happen, like the transfer of a gun, and that's why

          21       Mr Duggan has gone there, you might want to nip it in

          22       the bud, mightn't you?

          23   A.  We would aim to take the firearm off the street as soon

          24       as possible.

          25   Q.  Yes, exactly.  I have to tread carefully because there


                                            40
 

 

 


           1       are two versions of what may have happened here.

           2           ZZ37 thinks the car turned into Burchell Road and

           3       you think that might be a moment in which you might

           4       begin to move from the police station nearby.

           5   A.  No, sir I would not move from the police station,

           6       I would be ready to --

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Preparing to move.

           8   A.  Preparing to move.

           9   MR MANSFIELD:  I'm sorry, preparing to move at that point,

          10       fair enough.

          11           It almost amounts to the same thing but I just want

          12       to put it to you.  We are now merging with what actually

          13       happened.  The minicab driver, who we've yet to hear

          14       from, is likely to say that he didn't turn into Burchell

          15       Road but actually stopped in Vicarage Road near the

          16       junction with Burchell Road.  You can see that?

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  All right.  Now, we can see there's a school but it's

          19       accepted that this is August, so the school is unlikely,

          20       at this time of day, in August, to have lots of people

          21       around it; you would appreciate that?

          22   A.  The school would be closed, yes.

          23   Q.  The school would be closed.  So once again, even if it's

          24       information or intelligence that the cab has stopped in

          25       Vicarage Road, as opposed to turning into Burchell Road,


                                            41
 

 

 


           1       you would be beginning to think we may have to move

           2       soon?

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  Obviously, if there's an observation van, if there had

           5       been, nearby to see actually what happens -- I cannot

           6       put to you exactly what happens.  Something happens,

           7       either somebody goes into a house and picks the box up

           8       with a gun in it or somebody takes the box out with the

           9       gun in it and gives it to the car in Burchell Road or

          10       somebody walks down Burchell Road to Vicarage Road and

          11       gives the box over.  It's one of those scenarios but

          12       I don't know which one it is.

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  But what we do know for sure is that the intelligence is

          15       that a gun has been transferred, that Duggan has a gun,

          16       and that's at about 6 o'clock.

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  Because even though you're not there, and neither is Z51

          19       at that stage, state amber is called at that point by

          20       Z51, isn't it?

          21   A.  Yes, it is.

          22   Q.  You're at that point miles away, aren't you?

          23   A.  We are still some distance away, yes.

          24   Q.  Much further than round the corner?

          25   A.  Yes.


                                            42
 

 

 


           1   Q.  What I want to just continue with is this: if you had

           2       been round the corner, with all these factors to take

           3       into account, stopping this car, either as it moved off

           4       or even containing it on a static basis before it moved

           5       off, might have been possible, mightn't it?

           6   A.  It's possible, but not preferable.

           7   Q.  I'll come to what's preferable --

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Can I just ask you a little bit,

           9       just in case there's any confusion here.  When the state

          10       amber is called, we're told it's called when the

          11       information comes through that Mark Duggan has a gun.

          12   A.  Yes, sir.

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Would you expect to be mobilised

          14       before state amber, before that sort of information came

          15       through?

          16   A.  It all depends on the operation and it depends how close

          17       we are.  I believe on this occasion we were already on

          18       our route to the Leyton area when state amber was

          19       called.  If you are close by I would -- my preferred

          20       option would be to wait until the subject vehicle has

          21       left that area and then implement the stop --

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  If we are looking back at the map,

          23       which was on the screens there and you're looking at

          24       now, as I understand it, you come in, not that long

          25       after, on the left of the map, along Lea Bridge Road.


                                            43
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes.

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Then you go left up, following the

           3       car.

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The scenario being put to you is

           6       that, in fact, you might have had a head start if you

           7       had come from the bottom right-hand of the map which is

           8       apparently where this police station is and you would

           9       then have had some advantage because you would have been

          10       able to follow the taxi along Park Road and up there.

          11       That may be all the advantage that you may have got but

          12       it might have been an important advantage.

          13   A.  Yes, but there would be very little advantage, in my

          14       view, and it would be higher risk to stop a vehicle in

          15       Vicarage Road or Burchell Road.  I would be more than

          16       happy to allow the surveillance team to follow it away

          17       and then carry out a stop at a safe location chosen by

          18       us.

          19   MR MANSFIELD:  I'm sorry, I'm going to put to you very

          20       clearly it's not a marginal difference between coming

          21       from Wood Green and ending up in this area because

          22       actually you had quite a way to go to catch up.  What

          23       I'm suggesting is, if you are two minutes round the

          24       corner and you can stop this car in its tracks just as

          25       on that video we have just seen, in an ordinary


                                            44
 

 

 


           1       residential road, safely, without bus stops, without

           2       overtaking traffic; that would be the preferred option,

           3       wouldn't it?

           4   A.  Sir, it's a hypothetical question, I don't know what is

           5       in any of those roads around that location.  There could

           6       be people, bikes, bus stops.  I'm not aware.

           7   Q.  I'm going to suggest to you, as you haven't been to the

           8       area and everyone else has, there are some photographs

           9       that you have in that bundle there.  They come at 9 and

          10       10.  As you haven't seen them before, can I just run

          11       through them.  They are slightly out of order but number

          12       9 -- do you have the jury bundle there?

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  Number 9, that is a view down Vicarage Road.  In other

          15       words Lea Bridge Road is behind the cameraman, if you

          16       want to configure it with the plan -- Burchell Road is

          17       on the left there where that blue van is; do you see?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  So that's that view.  Then the next view, 10, is a view

          20       the other way, up Vicarage Road towards Lea Bridge with

          21       Burchell Road on the right, all right?

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  Then the photographs we've inserted recently, 10A -- if

          24       that's how it's been numbered -- 10A is a view down

          25       Burchell Road from Vicarage Road with the same blue van


                                            45
 

 

 


           1       there, all right?

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Do you have that?

           3   A.  Yes, I do, sorry, yes.

           4   MR MANSFIELD:  Certainly take time to look at it.  So that's

           5       10A looking into Burchell Road.  10B is in Burchell

           6       Road, a bit further down, with a terrace of houses on

           7       the left; do you see that.

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  The house we're dealing with, we are not identifying

          10       which one, but it's one of those on the left in that

          11       terrace --

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  -- where the person Mr Hutchinson-Foster went to see

          14       resided at that time.

          15           Then, if you turn to the next one, you'll see this

          16       is further along, past most of the terrace, past a white

          17       van and you will begin so see that it's a cul-de-sac,

          18       you can see that's on the plan.

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  That's not to say there isn't some access, there is

          21       a little alleyway at the far end for pedestrians to walk

          22       through to the next road but for vehicles it's

          23       a cul-de-sac.  You can turn round at the end there, as

          24       you can see.

          25           Photograph 10D is looking back down the road towards


                                            46
 

 

 


           1       Vicarage Road with the same terrace of houses on the

           2       right this time, in which Mr Hutchinson-Foster was

           3       visiting -- at which he was visiting.  Are you getting

           4       your bearings?

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  10E is the junction with Vicarage Road.  10F -- I'm

           7       going a bit quicker -- is the junction with Vicarage

           8       Road, again looking back into Burchell Road with the

           9       dead end sign there.  10G is a bit further down Vicarage

          10       with Burchell Road on the right, and that's it.

          11           So those are the roads in the immediate vicinity.

          12       I haven't got photographs of all these roads in this

          13       area.

          14           So it's a typically -- I'm going to put to you --

          15       a typically quiet residential area with the occasional

          16       car and the occasional pedestrian and no buses; do you

          17       follow?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  Now that is a preferred location, if you're going to

          20       intercept without providing risks to anyone, including

          21       your own police officers, of a mobile stop, isn't it?

          22   A.  I have to disagree, sir.  Those are pictures which show

          23       the streets clear.  At 6 o'clock or whatever time we

          24       were looking to implement the stop I don't know who was

          25       there, I don't know what vehicles could be parked there,


                                            47
 

 

 


           1       I don't know the traffic flow there.  What we did in

           2       stopping the vehicle in Ferry Lane is we chose the

           3       timing and location of the stop and that's one of the

           4       best locations I've ever been involved in for a stop.

           5   Q.  Oh, is it?

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  Have you all met to decide that, as a matter of response

           8       in this Inquest, you are all going to say that Ferry

           9       Lane is the best possible place you have ever known for

          10       a stop?

          11   A.  No, sir.  However it was one of the best stops I've ever

          12       been involved in.

          13   Q.  Was it?

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  I'm going to suggest to you that to actually do a hard

          16       stop where you did it is possibly one of the worst

          17       situations in which you can do a hard stop, putting

          18       people at risk?

          19   A.  We did not put anyone at risk.

          20   Q.  You certainly did put one of your officers at risk --

          21   A.  No, sir.

          22   Q.  -- as it turned out.

          23   A.  No, sir.

          24   Q.  I see.  The one who got shot?

          25   A.  As I mentioned yesterday, sir, we do our best to


                                            48
 

 

 


           1       minimise the risk.  However, it is one of the risks we

           2       have to take on board.

           3   Q.  There are always risks.  You can't, obviously, as I put

           4       at the beginning, obviate all the risks.

           5   A.  No, you can't.

           6   Q.  What you have to do is minimise them.

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  You agree, first of all, house containment is

           9       a preferred option.

          10   A.  In the right circumstances, yes.

          11   Q.  I cannot say whether the transfer took place in the

          12       house or not so, for the moment, I'm saying it looks as

          13       though it may have -- it's only four minutes --

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  -- between the car arriving and wherever it went and it

          16       leaving, so it's unlikely somebody was in a house for

          17       very long if they were.  So being realistic about it, it

          18       looks as though it's -- something has happened on the

          19       street or near the street; do you follow?

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  So if, in fact, therefore, looking at the plan -- can we

          22       go back to that -- you have been in a position from

          23       round the corner to block off the exit of this car from

          24       this area all together -- in other words, you've been

          25       able to get to one of these junctions with cars behind


                                            49
 

 

 


           1       as well -- in other words, it had been thought through

           2       as an exercise, which you'd done many times, yes?

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  You could have intercepted this car before it got

           5       anywhere near Tottenham, couldn't you?

           6   A.  I wouldn't split my convoy of vehicles unless I had to.

           7   Q.  How would you do a static stop?

           8   A.  Normally, sir, we were coming from behind the vehicle

           9       and do a stop exactly as we did on Ferry Lane.

          10   Q.  No, no, a static stop not a mobile one.  In other words,

          11       the car is parked, and we know it is for four minutes,

          12       either in Vicarage Road or in Burchell Road, yes?

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  So it's static?

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  You certainly have quite a lot of information by then,

          17       by the time it's in there, from the day before and

          18       before that, that the high probability is transfer of

          19       gun because that's why he's gone there.

          20   A.  Yes, sir.

          21   Q.  Yes.  So what you could -- I hope this is common

          22       sense -- somebody in the local police station yard where

          23       you were all parked up, if you had got there early

          24       enough, could have said "Look, it's all going to happen

          25       in this very tiny tight area" -- in other words, between


                                            50
 

 

 


           1       the junction of Vicarage Road if that's where it

           2       happened, or in Burchell Road -- "we can get cars behind

           3       the minicab in Vicarage Road and another one in front at

           4       the junction, we won't let it out of Vicarage Road";

           5       what's wrong with that?

           6   A.  That suggestion would be unsuitable because you are

           7       carrying out a stop directly near a premises where

           8       a firearm has been transferred, and I would not want to

           9       split my convoy for the safer option and by -- keeping

          10       my vehicles together and carrying out a conventional

          11       enforced stop would be a safer option.

          12   Q.  So really stopping it anywhere here just wouldn't have

          13       been contemplated, you would have permitted a chase,

          14       would you?

          15   A.  I would not have permitted a chase, sir, but a chase can

          16       happen anywhere.

          17   Q.  Of course.  The risk once you're mobile, do you agree --

          18       this is a different risk to the ones when you get to

          19       actually stop -- is you might lose the car all together?

          20   A.  Potentially, sir, but I haven't lost one yet.

          21   Q.  Potentially, there's a risk you might lose the car.

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  The previous night on the 3rd what happened?

          24   A.  I think that's a different matter, sir.

          25   Q.  On the 3rd, what happened?


                                            51
 

 

 


           1   A.  The surveillance team lost control of the vehicle.

           2   Q.  Within how many minutes?

           3   A.  I don't know, sir.

           4   Q.  A few minutes, they lost control.

           5   A.  I believe it was a slightly different scenario though.

           6   Q.  You were not in control of this, surveillance were,

           7       weren't they?

           8   A.  Yes, they were.

           9   Q.  Yes, and the risk is that if you let surveillance do

          10       it -- I am not being critical of surveillance, it's just

          11       a human error situation -- if you let surveillance take

          12       control there is a risk, if you have not intercepted the

          13       car early on, you lose control?

          14   A.  It's possible, yes.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You mean lose control and lose

          16       contact?

          17   A.  You lose surveillance eyeball of it.

          18   MR MANSFIELD:  That is why I'm suggesting to you, as

          19       a matter of common sense, don't run that risk, take

          20       control at the start, intercept this car on one of the

          21       many places here, once you've seen the area --

          22       residential road, just like on the video -- and stop it.

          23   A.  Sir, I disagree.  My job is around managing risk and by

          24       stopping the vehicle near to where the transaction has

          25       just taken place would be more -- would be higher risk


                                            52
 

 

 


           1       than allowing the vehicle to leave that location, stop

           2       at a timing and location of our choice, and then ideally

           3       going back to that location and dealing with those

           4       premises.

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Are there risks in residential

           6       areas -- we know here that Mr Duggan got out of the

           7       vehicle.  Obviously the jury are going to be looking at

           8       that carefully as the evidence goes on and you've been

           9       telling us about it.  Is there a risk, if we look at

          10       this residential area, of someone getting out of

          11       a vehicle -- you can only stop three cars round three

          12       sides of the vehicle -- that the person runs off into

          13       a house, hostage situation, or runs through a house, out

          14       the back of a house, we don't know anything about the

          15       front or back of the houses.

          16   A.  That's a risk, sir.  The other risk is the roads aren't

          17       very wide and therefore, as you've seen on the training

          18       video, it's very hard for us to put a conventional stop

          19       in sometimes to overtake, because the roads aren't wide

          20       enough to put the stop in, therefore containing the

          21       vehicle effectively.  So a wider road is normally

          22       easier -- those look like fairly narrow streets,

          23       obviously I've not been there.

          24   MR MANSFIELD:  That's why I asked you carefully about the

          25       video.  I wanted to suggest that actually the road


                                            53
 

 

 


           1       conditions for the training of that particular one are

           2       not very different in terms of width to the roads we've

           3       got round here, in this area of Vicarage Road.

           4   A.  Yes, sir but that's on a training site, where there's to

           5       be no oncoming traffic coming towards them.

           6   Q.  You have to operate in London in all sorts of

           7       situations, don't you?

           8   A.  Yes.  That's why it's better for us to pick the location

           9       and timing of the stop.

          10   Q.  Well, pick the location in the sense that, as you say,

          11       nipping things in the bud is preferable to letting

          12       things run, isn't it?

          13   A.  Obviously, sir, yes.

          14   Q.  In relation to Mr Duggan himself, again, I think the

          15       evidence will be -- and it comes from the minicab

          16       driver, but this depends, obviously, on whether ZZ37,

          17       who says something different, is right.

          18   A.  Right.

          19   Q.  ZZ37 says the car goes into Burchell Road, he doesn't

          20       see anything.  The minicab driver says he stops in

          21       Vicarage Road and Mr Duggan does not get out of the car,

          22       somebody comes to the car and hands the box through.

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  Sometimes you don't have the advantage of the situation

          25       I'm putting to you -- had it been planned this way -- of


                                            54
 

 

 


           1       having time to consider various options.  You often are

           2       having to rush to somebody who's already been taken

           3       hostage --

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  -- or kidnapped --

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  -- or a serial killer on the run?

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  All these situations, that's what you're having to deal

          10       with.

          11   A.  Yes, it is.

          12   Q.  Just dealing with the Vicarage Road taxi stop, if that's

          13       where it happened, then you could have blocked in that

          14       car once you got the -- even around the time of the

          15       amber alert, which was given at about 6 o'clock, you

          16       could have blocked that car in so it couldn't have even

          17       taken off from Vicarage Road, couldn't you?

          18   A.  I would not have done that, sir.

          19   Q.  But you could have?

          20   A.  It's a possibility.

          21   Q.  Yes, thank you.  Now, let's just move forward.  As it's

          22       a possibility, why wouldn't you have done it?

          23   A.  Because at the time of a firearms transfer, the subjects

          24       are very aware of their surroundings.  As I have just

          25       said to you, we would be leaving -- I would much rather


                                            55
 

 

 


           1       leave that area, carry out the stop, not disturb the

           2       environment, ie not to allow awareness of police around

           3       there, and then return to that address where we believe

           4       there's a possibility there may be further firearms.

           5   Q.  The risk is that, if you leave it to run, the person may

           6       notice that you're actually on the trail, as he had done

           7       earlier on, then telephone the premises to tell

           8       Mr Hutchinson-Foster, or whoever was in the premises,

           9       "Get rid of the rest", if there are others there; do you

          10       follow?

          11   A.  It's a possibility, yes.

          12   Q.  You're really going to lose a gun store unless you're

          13       very careful.

          14   A.  There's a possibility of that, yes.  However it's

          15       a safer option to do what we did.

          16   MR MANSFIELD:  I wonder if that's --

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, if that's convenient.

          18   MR MANSFIELD:  I have a little more to ask but not too much.

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  With that encouraging news we'll

          20       have a mid-morning break.  So thank you very much.

          21           If you would like to leave us for ten minutes.

          22       I will ask the cameras to come off, please.

 

 

 

 

                                            56
 

 

 

 

           3   (11.46 am)

           4                         (A short break)

           5   (12.00 pm)


           7                  (In the presence of the jury)

           8           We'll have the witness, please.

           9                (The witness returned into court)

          10           Thank you very much.  V59, you are still under the

          11       affirmation you took yesterday and Mr Mansfield is

          12       asking you questions.

          13   MR MANSFIELD:  I am now moving to focus on the precise

          14       events of the day.

          15           The jury bundle, C5, please.  You may not have seen

          16       this before, but it's a plan of the area of London we've

          17       been dealing with.

          18           At the base of the plan, you'll see there's a box,

          19       17.15, where CO19 depart from Leman Street; do you see

          20       that?

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  These are all agreed times.  Duggan is at an address

          23       which you have in fact in your log, I think it is, and

          24       certainly possibly in your notebook.  The Micawber Court

          25       address was known to you; do you remember?

 

 

 

 

 

                                            57
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes, it was.

           2   Q.  That's where he was at 5.15.  Hutchinson-Foster is over

           3       in Vicarage Road at 5.15 and ZZ17 is up in Wood Green at

           4       Quicksilver patrol base.  You leave the base at about

           5       5.15, do you not?

           6   A.  Yes, we do.

           7   Q.  You've been there since 4 o'clock, you've already had

           8       a briefing like the one you did the day before.  So

           9       they've had two briefings from you in two days, general

          10       briefings, about the normal standard material?

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  So I appreciate you may not now remember the route and

          13       I am not going to -- it does not matter particularly but

          14       you're heading north, obviously, from Leman Street.

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  There's the three cars and a control car in which you

          17       are.

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  So some time after that -- and obviously I can't put it

          20       to the minute -- did you make a note exactly when you

          21       got the intelligence?

          22   A.  No, I didn't.

          23   Q.  No.  You get the intelligence and it seems to be it's

          24       somewhere after 5.20, possibly 5.25, somewhere in that

          25       region.  The intelligence is being passed on to Z51 and


                                            58
 

 

 


           1       yourself.  What is it you were told, a few minutes away

           2       from Leman Street; what were you told?

           3   A.  I was told that there was a subject trying to source

           4       a firearm and I needed to get to Wood Green as soon as

           5       possible -- to Quicksilver, sorry.

           6   Q.  Are you saying you were told to get to Quicksilver as

           7       quick as possible?

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  Who by?

          10   A.  ZZ17.

          11   Q.  Was he in charge?

          12   A.  That was on authority of Z51.

          13   Q.  Was it?

          14   A.  That was my understanding, yes.

          15   Q.  So a Z51 decision that everybody goes to Quicksilver?

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  But Z51 wasn't with you --

          18   A.  No.

          19   Q.  -- he lives somewhere else --

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  -- altogether.  I am not interested in where he lives.

          22       But it's some distance away, possibly to the west or

          23       north of Quicksilver --

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   Q.  -- somewhere over there.  Well, you're acting as


                                            59
 

 

 


           1       Tactical Advisor.  I just want to ask whether you asked

           2       any questions.  First of all, did you yourself consider

           3       "That's a bit tricky, going to Wood Green, as opposed to

           4       Leyton where the subject wants to take possession of

           5       a firearm"; did you think that?

           6   A.  No, sir.

           7   Q.  You didn't?

           8   A.  No.

           9   Q.  So basically no consideration at all about the

          10       possibility of going straight to the Leyton area?

          11   A.  No, sir.  I had an incomplete intelligence picture and

          12       I was directed by Z51.

          13   Q.  But you're having to give advice?

          14   A.  When I saw Z51 I would do, yes.

          15   Q.  I appreciate that but you don't have to wait until you

          16       see him, you've got radio communication.  Did you speak

          17       to Z51 and say "I'm not sure this is a very good idea,

          18       why don't we go straight to Leyton?"

          19   A.  No, sir.

          20   Q.  You see according to this map, do you agree, wherever

          21       you were, north of Leman Street, it would have been

          22       possible, obviously, for your group, that's all of the

          23       team except for Z51, to go to Leyton, wouldn't it?

          24   A.  It was possible, yes.

          25   Q.  Yes.  It would have taken you -- because again we've


                                            60
 

 

 


           1       travelled these streets -- with blues and twos and all

           2       the usual kind of paraphernalia that's used to speed

           3       through London, you might have made it in 15 minutes?

           4   A.  Potentially, yes.

           5   Q.  Potentially, yes.  So if you'd done that, let's assume

           6       it's 5.25, you would have got there around, possibly,

           7       5.40, before the minicab ever arrived --

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  -- instead of which, it appears -- do you agree,

          10       obviously, on what you're saying -- that because Z51,

          11       you think, was saying get to Quicksilver, you all go up

          12       to Quicksilver.

          13   A.  Yes, that's correct.

          14   Q.  Now, let us suppose you had thought "Let's go to Leyton"

          15       and you went to Leyton -- you could have done that,

          16       could you not -- not just in terms of driving, you could

          17       have done it even though Z51 wasn't physically with you,

          18       couldn't you?

          19   A.  Yes, possibly.

          20   Q.  As you've already agreed, Z51, in order to determine

          21       amber, doesn't actually have to be on the spot with you,

          22       does he?

          23   A.  No.

          24   Q.  Often in these fast moving situations, I mean armed

          25       response situations, there might not be a Tactical


                                            61
 

 

 


           1       Firearms Commander actually on the spot with you and you

           2       have to bring one in?

           3   A.  That's correct, yes.

           4   Q.  So this is not an unknown situation either, is it?

           5   A.  No.

           6   Q.  So if Z51 -- I mean, for example, we know in this case

           7       he's buying a sandwich, but never mind that.  Supposing

           8       his car has broken down or something and he cannot get

           9       to Quicksilver, what happens is, is this not right,

          10       there's what's called a transfer of command to someone

          11       else?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  Because you now have, and did have then, what's called

          14       a cadre, a Central group of officers on call 24/7?

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  I don't want to know where they are but they are there

          17       on rota, so you have firearms officers and Tactical

          18       Firearms Commanders available all day, every day, on

          19       rota?

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  So if, in fact, you had got over there, or somebody

          22       decided get to Leyton, this was all possible, wasn't it,

          23       in the timeframe?

          24   A.  It was, yes.

          25   Q.  Yes.  Once you got to Wood Green, I appreciate other


                                            62
 

 

 


           1       things are developing, did you ever question, at Wood

           2       Green, since you were reviewing tactics on -- whether

           3       you call it the CMM model or any other -- did you ever

           4       say, "Look, it's most unfortunate that we didn't go

           5       straight over because Trident officers unarmed are over

           6       there"?

           7   A.  No, I did not.

           8   Q.  No?  Right.

           9           I would like finally for you to look, please -- and

          10       I've asked for this to be done at this stage -- that you

          11       look at the whole of the film.  I said earlier, just

          12       watch the whole of the film again so the jury can see

          13       the whole of it from, I think, 4.30, that's right,

          14       through to a later time.  Thank you.

          15             (Video footage was played to the court)

          16           That's fine.  Thank you.  That's the whole stretch

          17       of film that we have at the moment put together.

          18           A couple of questions, finally, on that, now you've

          19       seen it as a whole.

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  Q63 is quite active, he's all over the place.  Do you

          22       know what he was doing?

          23   A.  I think he was trying to be helpful, sir.

          24   Q.  Yes, I appreciate that, but helpful in what way?

          25   A.  Looking for a role to fulfil.


                                            63
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Looking for a role.  Did you notice -- I can play it

           2       again but I really don't want to play it again and

           3       again -- after he's popped up, having been near or in

           4       the minicab, the 11 seconds where he's out of sight, did

           5       you notice that he's pointing towards the grassed area?

           6   A.  I didn't see it, sir, but I'll take your word for it.

           7   Q.  All right.  Did you ever notice him pointing towards the

           8       grassed area before any gun was found?

           9   A.  No, I don't remember that.

          10   MR MANSFIELD:  Yes, thank you.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, Mr Thomas?

          12                      Questions by MR THOMAS

          13   MR THOMAS:  Good afternoon, V59, I represent the loved ones

          14       of Mark Duggan.

          15   A.  Good afternoon.

          16   Q.  Can I start please with some propositions to see whether

          17       or not you agree with them.

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  Firearms officers, that's you and all the men and women

          20       that work in your team, you're trained, if you see

          21       a threat, if you perceive a threat, to fire, then assess

          22       the threat to see if the threat is continuing; that is

          23       right, isn't it?

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   Q.  I would be right in saying that your officers are not


                                            64
 

 

 


           1       trained to fire blindly; would that be right?

           2   A.  That's correct, yes.

           3   Q.  The shots that are discharged, they need to be

           4       discharged where it's absolutely necessary to do so.

           5   A.  Yes, sir.

           6   Q.  So you agree with this: after each shot, there needs to

           7       be some reassessment to see whether or not another shot

           8       is needed?

           9   A.  Yes, sir.

          10   Q.  It would be quite wrong, wouldn't it, to fire blindly,

          11       for instance if you saw a man exiting the vehicle, say

          12       the minicab -- I want to run with two scenarios if

          13       I may, yes?

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  It will be for the jury to consider what happened on the

          16       day.  Let me just run through two scenarios.

          17           Scenario number 1: on your evidence, you say that

          18       when the minicab came to a stop --

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  -- Mark Duggan made a quick exit from the minicab.

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  Right.  You say that you didn't see all of Mark Duggan;

          23       is that right?

          24   A.  That's correct.

          25   Q.  Just run with this, if you would, just for the moment,


                                            65
 

 

 


           1       bearing in mind you didn't see all of Mark Duggan.

           2           If upon exiting the minicab, Mark Duggan had thrown

           3       the gun --

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  -- over that fence, in other words trying to get rid of

           6       evidence --

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  Do you follow?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  That would not have been justification to shoot him,

          11       would it?

          12   A.  It depends on if the officer perceives an imminent

          13       threat to his own life.

          14   Q.  Well, there were two shots that were fired.

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  We know that.

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  You've just accepted that part of the officers' training

          19       would be to make an assessment after a shot --

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  So, on the scenario that I've just painted to you, for

          22       the two shots to have fired -- you know, if Mark was

          23       throwing the gun -- would have to be at -- he would have

          24       to have been shot before he threw the gun; do you

          25       follow?


                                            66
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes.

           2   Q.  But you accept that there can be no justification for

           3       firing a shot at an unarmed man; would you accept that?

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  Let me move on, if I may.

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  These situations that you and your colleagues deal with

           8       are difficult situations, aren't they?

           9   A.  They are, yes.

          10   Q.  I fully accept that, at times, they can be fast moving

          11       situations, yes?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  Decisions need to be made quickly?

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  Sometimes you don't have the benefit of time on your

          16       side?

          17   A.  That's correct.

          18   Q.  But that's when your training comes in, isn't it?

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   Q.  Because you and your colleagues are trained to deal with

          21       these fast moving situations, where you have to make

          22       decisions in quick time; would that be fair?

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  Can we just give the jury just some idea as to the

          25       training that you and your officers have.


                                            67
 

 

 


           1           You're trained regularly, aren't you?  You do

           2       exercises regularly to keep your skill set up?

           3   A.  Yes, we do, we train for five days every six weeks.

           4   Q.  Yes.  The one thing that we can be sure about is that

           5       you and your colleagues, despite this being a fast time

           6       operation, you do have the benefit of regular training,

           7       and that would include all the officers in your team --

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  -- including V53, the shooter in this case?

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  Part of your training also includes, does it not, in the

          12       unfortunate event whereby somebody is shot, the

          13       post-incident procedures, you're trained in relation to

          14       that?

          15   A.  Yes, we have an input on that.

          16   Q.  Yes.  So again, the one thing that we -- that's the

          17       people in this court room -- can be sure of: when this

          18       incident occurred with Mark Duggan, unfortunately and

          19       tragically being shot dead on 4 August 2011, you and

          20       your colleagues had been trained for the post-incident

          21       procedures.  In other words, what I mean is: you weren't

          22       having to look it all up for the first time; you had

          23       an idea as to what you needed to do?

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   Q.  Would that be fair?


                                            68
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes.

           2   Q.  Part of the post-incident procedures included, did it

           3       not, how you write up your accounts, correct?

           4   A.  Sorry, can you rephrase the question?

           5   Q.  Yes.  How you prepare and write up your accounts.

           6   A.  Yes, we were directed as to what notes to write.

           7   Q.  V59, what I'm suggesting to you, just so you're clear:

           8       I know that you received directions on the night, but

           9       you would have had training, and you would have been

          10       aware of what would happen, even before the 4th.

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  That's what I'm putting to you.

          13   A.  Yes, yes.

          14   Q.  Would you agree with this -- I'm going to put to you

          15       a series of propositions and please tell me if you

          16       disagree, okay?

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  When Mark Duggan was shot, and in fact, even if he

          19       hadn't been killed, just the discharge of a firearm on

          20       the busy streets of London, you knew that it would have

          21       to be accounted for --

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  -- is that fair?

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   Q.  You knew, and your team knew, particularly because


                                            69
 

 

 


           1       Mark Duggan was killed, that that death would have to be

           2       explained and, if necessary, justified.

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  Can I break that down, if I may?  Part of the

           5       justification and explanation that you knew would have

           6       to come would be things like whether the man was armed,

           7       yes?

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  Whether a gun was at the scene.

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  When the gun was found.

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  Where the gun was found.

          14   A.  Yes.

          15   Q.  Whether the man made any sudden movement at the time

          16       just before he was shot.

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  Because you would agree -- the propositions I have just

          19       been putting to you, you would agree with.  All of those

          20       matters -- and I know I've broken them down -- may go to

          21       the justification of why a police firearms officer

          22       discharged his weapon: there was a gun, the gun was on

          23       the person, the person made a sudden movement; do you

          24       follow?

          25   A.  Yes.


                                            70
 

 

 


           1   Q.  I'm not going to go through them all but you understand?

           2   A.  Yes.

           3   Q.  These are all relevant and important matters that you

           4       would need to account for to justify the use of force.

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  All right.  Help me with this: you agree that the

           7       matters that I've just listed are relevant matters for

           8       the use of force and the discharge of a firearm.

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  Those matters: you knew they were relevant matters on

          11       4 August.

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  You told us a moment ago, V59, that you had been trained

          14       in the post-incident procedures.

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  Can you just help me with this: can we call up, please,

          17       CD12, that's your pocket book, your first account.

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  Can we just enlarge it on the screen for the jury?  Can

          20       we go to the very top of that page.  At the top of that

          21       page I want to read -- this has not been put to you

          22       yet -- Mr Mansfield tells me that he's put it, but I'm

          23       going to put it again, in any event.

          24           It says this:

          25           "This statement (consisting of two pages each signed


                                            71
 

 

 


           1       by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief

           2       and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in

           3       evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have

           4       wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false

           5       or do not believe to be true."

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  That's a general statement of truth that you put on your

           8       witness statement and you've done that and you're

           9       familiar with that --

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  -- over the many years of your career.

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  Just remind us how many years have you been a police

          14       officer up until August 2011?

          15   A.  13.

          16   Q.  13.  So this is standard fodder for you, you know this,

          17       yes?

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  All right.  Two things.  You know that your statement

          20       has to contain the truth.

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  You also know that your statement -- I'm talking about

          23       not your detailed statement, I'm talking about your

          24       initial account.  I wonder if we can just call up one

          25       other document.  Can we call up, please -- I'll give you


                                            72
 

 

 


           1       the reference -- CD010958.

           2           This is the ACPO guidance.  Can we have a look at

           3       paragraph 7.92.  Can we just make it a little bit

           4       bigger, just for the jury, please.

           5           Let me read it out.  This is talking about your

           6       initial account, the statement that you made on 4 August

           7       and what it should contain, right?

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  It says this:

          10           "Each officer's initial account should only consist

          11       of their individual recollection of events ..."

          12           Just pause there.  What this is making clear is what

          13       you put in your initial account should be personal to

          14       you, agreed?

          15   A.  Yes.

          16   Q.  "... and should, among other things, address the

          17       question of ..."

          18           Can I just break this down:

          19           "... what they believed to be the facts ..."

          20           Yes?

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  "... and why, if relevant, they considered that the use

          23       of force and discharge of firearms was absolutely

          24       necessary."

          25   A.  Yes.


                                            73
 

 

 


           1   Q.  You remember just a moment ago, V59, I put to you that

           2       list of things about when the gun was used, where,

           3       whether the person made any sudden movements and all

           4       that; this is exactly what this is talking about, isn't

           5       it?

           6   A.  I believe that's covered in the detailed statement on

           7       the 7th.

           8   Q.  No, no, hang on, one step at a time.  This is what this

           9       is referring to, the matters that I mentioned before.

          10       In the initial account:

          11           "... the facts and why, if relevant, they considered

          12       that the use of force and discharge of firearms was

          13       absolutely necessary."

          14           In the initial account.  Now, question: you, having

          15       been trained -- because you just told us that -- in the

          16       post-operational procedures, and this is what we're

          17       referring to, can you explain to the jury why you have

          18       made no mention, in your initial account, which is meant

          19       to be your account, without conferring with anybody

          20       else, of those matters?  Help us.

          21   A.  I didn't use any force, sir.

          22   Q.  Sorry?

          23   A.  I did not use any force.

          24   Q.  Hang on a second.  Have a look at the guidelines again.

          25       It doesn't say, does it, that you have to use force?


                                            74
 

 

 


           1       It's not focusing in -- if you pardon the expression, it

           2       is not focusing in on the shooter.  It is focusing in on

           3       the officers who may have been witnesses to the use of

           4       force; do you agree?

           5   A.  No, I don't actually, sir, no.

           6   Q.  Well, I suggest it is, because it says quite clearly:

           7           "Each officer's initial account should only consist

           8       of their individual recollection of events and should,

           9       among other things, address the question of what they

          10       believed to be the facts and why, if relevant, they

          11       considered that" --

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You might like to stress the "if

          13       relevant", I suppose.

          14   MR THOMAS:  Yes.

          15           "... they considered that the use of force and the

          16       discharge of firearms was absolutely necessary."

          17           That does not say that that is limited to the

          18       shooter.

          19   A.  I think it's not relevant to me, sir, is the point

          20       that -- it's for V53 to justify his use of force.

          21       I covered the initial facts in my initial accounts.

          22   Q.  Forgive me, let's test that, shall we?  Let's test that.

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Let's be careful about that, yes.

          24   MR THOMAS:  Let's look at that.  Imagine this scenario:

          25       you're on the scene and you witness that an officer with


                                            75
 

 

 


           1       a firearm shoots and injuries fatally an unarmed man who

           2       was running with no weapon in his hand.  An extreme

           3       example, but let's just take that, for example.

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  You would agree with this: in your initial account, you

           6       would be under an obligation to say that the man who was

           7       shot was unarmed, if that's what you saw; do you agree?

           8   A.  If I saw that, yes, sir.

           9   Q.  Right.  You would be under an obligation, wouldn't you,

          10       to say that at the time the man was shot he was unarmed?

          11       You would be under an obligation to put that on your

          12       statement, wouldn't you?

          13   A.  If that was a fact, sir, yes.

          14   Q.  But you're not the shooter, are you?

          15   A.  No, sir.

          16   Q.  You are commenting on the use of force, aren't you?

          17   A.  If I witnessed that, sir, yes.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Would that be a comment or would you

          19       just be recounting the facts?

          20   A.  It would be a fact, I would suggest.

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  What would help me, the statement

          22       that was put up dated the 4th/5th, that one there, is

          23       that what you see as the initial account?

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  If we look onto the second page of


                                            76
 

 

 


           1       it, you say there at the bottom of that page, right in

           2       the middle of that:

           3           "As I exited my vehicle I heard a number of shots

           4       being fired."

           5   A.  Yes, that's correct, sir.

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Thomas will now ask you about

           7       that.

           8   MR THOMAS:  Yes.  Where do you say anything about sudden

           9       movements by the man and the man looking as if he's

          10       reaching for anything in this statement?

          11   A.  I don't, sir.

          12   Q.  But if the man looked as if he was reaching for

          13       something and then he shot, that may well be

          14       justification for the use of force; do you follow?

          15   A.  Yes, sir.

          16   Q.  Can I ask us to call up, please, a statement that you

          17       made on 7 August, that's a few days afterwards, which is

          18       to be found at CS95; do you see that?  This is your

          19       statement, correct?

          20   A.  Yes, sir.

          21   Q.  This is a statement that you made when you were in the

          22       company of all the other relevant witnesses who were

          23       there; is that right?

          24   A.  Yes, I did.

          25   Q.  I think we heard yesterday that you were together for


                                            77
 

 

 


           1       some 8 hours and 50 minutes, something like that --

           2   A.  Yes, I believe so.

           3   Q.  -- that you had a flip chart that you went through and

           4       you broke at various points during the eight hours --

           5   A.  Yes, that's correct --

           6   Q.  -- where you were discussing your evidence together.

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  Can I ask us to turn to page 99.  If we go to two thirds

           9       down that page, there's a line that begins:

          10           "As we stopped and as I began to get out of our

          11       vehicle ..."

          12           Do you see that?

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  Let me read on:

          15           "I could see an IC3 male ..."

          16           That's a black male, isn't it?  That's a code for

          17       Afro-Caribbean.

          18   A.  Yes, it is.

          19   Q.  "I could see an IC3 male wearing a tan coloured jacket

          20       getting out of the rear nearside of the bronze people

          21       carrier, he was crouched over and was running back

          22       towards our vehicle on the pavement ..."

          23           Is this Mr Duggan you're referring to?

          24   A.  Yes, it was.

          25   Q.  Let me read on:


                                            78
 

 

 


           1           "He was unable to run in any other direction due to

           2       the Alpha vehicle's positioning and a wall and set of

           3       railings next to the pavement.  I opened the door and

           4       placed my blue high visibility police baseball cap on my

           5       head.  At this point the subject was still crouched ..."

           6           Here is the part I want us to focus on:

           7           "... and his right hand was across his body and he

           8       appeared to be reaching for something."

           9           Yes?

          10   A.  Yes.

          11   Q.  You saw that?

          12   A.  Yes, I did.

          13   Q.  So can we just put this in context.  This is at a point

          14       where the hard stop has been called, red's been

          15       called --

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  -- firearms officers have, as we've seen on the training

          18       video, exited their vehicle, they have surrounded the

          19       minicab.  If they're following their training, they're

          20       shouting and they're trying to subdue the occupants of

          21       the minicab.

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  As per the training, they would be shouting things like:

          24       "Armed police, don't move"; things like that, correct?

          25   A.  Yes.


                                            79
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Your evidence, which you produce three days later, is,

           2       despite all of that, here is a man who, on your

           3       evidence, is not listening to the police, correct?

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  He's making sudden movements, correct?

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  And he looks as if he's making a gesture as if he's

           8       going for something, as if he's reaching for something?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  V59, if you saw all of that on the day, that is

          11       precisely what should have been in your initial account,

          12       because it's relevant to the question -- and I repeat:

          13           "... facts and why, if relevant, they considered

          14       that the use of force and the discharge of firearms was

          15       absolutely necessary."

          16           Help us: why didn't you put it in your initial

          17       account?

          18   A.  I disagree with you, sir.  That should not have been in

          19       my initial account.

          20   Q.  All right.  Let me move on.

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We have had a look at that --

          22   A.  Yes, sir.

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- read that over to you.  Does that

          24       help you as to those details?

          25   A.  In what way, sir.


                                            80
 

 

 


           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Well, much of that, which has just

           2       been read over to you, which you say is right, perhaps

           3       the jury, quite rightly, are hearing it for the first

           4       time.  It wasn't actually said by you in that detail

           5       when you were asked questions by Mr Underwood --

           6   A.  No.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- yesterday; why is that?

           8   A.  I don't know, sir, I was just -- maybe it was just

           9       an area I didn't cover in enough detail.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We didn't hear anything about his

          11       right hand reaching across his body.

          12   A.  No, I can give some more detail now, if you would like.

          13   MR THOMAS:  You were asked yesterday.

          14   MR STERN:  No, he wasn't.  He wasn't asked yesterday.

          15   A.  Would you like me to give some more detail in relation

          16       to that or --

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  There will be other people asking

          18       you questions, so I'll let others do it.  But we will

          19       hear about this in due course.

          20   MR THOMAS:  Let's hear the detail that you want to give, go

          21       on, now is your opportunity, tell us.

          22   A.  As per my statement there, as Mr Duggan exited the

          23       vehicle, and he did so rapidly and made his way back

          24       towards the officers from the Charlie vehicle, he

          25       appeared to be sprinting away from that vehicle in a --


                                            81
 

 

 


           1       rapidly -- as though a sprinter was standing up away

           2       from the blocks.  He then reached across with his right

           3       arm, down towards his waistband, and at that point

           4       I think I've gone down to grab -- to take hold of my MP5

           5       and exit my vehicle.

           6           When I've looked back up again, that's when I've

           7       seen the feathers coming from the rear of his back.  As

           8       I'm exiting my vehicle, I've missed a very short segment

           9       of time, however that was what I saw as he exited the

          10       vehicle.

          11   Q.  Can you just help me with this: even in your statement,

          12       on the 7th -- it may well be me and, if it is

          13       I apologise.  Can you just point out where you say

          14       "waistband"?

          15   A.  (Pause)

          16   Q.  You take your time.

          17   A.  (Pause)

          18   Q.  Do you have your statement there?

          19   A.  I have my statement here, yes.

          20   Q.  All I'm asking you to do is look at your statement --

          21       because there's two statements and the statement I'm

          22       referring to is the one dated 7 August.  This is the one

          23       you made after conferring for eight hours with your

          24       colleagues.  I'm just asking you to point out -- because

          25       I may have missed it -- and if I have I apologise --


                                            82
 

 

 


           1       where it says "waistband".

           2   A.  (Pause)

           3           In my statement there I haven't written that, sir.

           4       However, I say reaching across --

           5   Q.  Let's take it stage by stage.  The answer to my question

           6       is: in my statement that I made after eight hours of

           7       conferring with colleagues there's no mention of

           8       "waistband"?

           9   A.  No, sir.

          10   Q.  Right.  Now, can you just explain -- this is my next

          11       question -- bearing in mind this is meant to be your

          12       detailed account, on the 7th, and would you agree with

          13       this, this is the time -- the reason why you have at

          14       least the 48 hours break between your initial account

          15       and this account is to give you an opportunity to be

          16       refreshed?

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  If there was any trauma arising out of the incident,

          19       it's an opportunity to make sure that your head's

          20       clear --

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  -- and I think you've already agreed that this is the

          23       statement where you put in the detail?

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   Q.  Well, V59, tell us: why is that detail not in your


                                            83
 

 

 


           1       statement?

           2   A.  I think in my statement I have put that he reach -- he

           3       was crouched over and his right hand was across his body

           4       and he appeared to be reaching for something.  I have

           5       just shown the jury exactly how that was.

           6   Q.  My question is, sorry, and it's a very clear question:

           7       why is that detail about the waistband and reaching for

           8       something from his waistband -- why is that not in your

           9       detailed account?  That's the question.  Can you answer

          10       it, please?

          11   A.  I don't know, sir.

          12   Q.  You don't know?  Were you tired?

          13   A.  No, sir.

          14   Q.  You see, we may hear other colleagues of yours come and

          15       mention the waistband, and I am going to have to put

          16       this to you: have you subsequently been conferring with

          17       your other colleagues to get the detail right?

          18   A.  No, sir, that's ridiculous.

          19   Q.  Is it?

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  All right.  Let me move on.

          22           Yesterday -- I think there was some mention that

          23       this wasn't put to you yesterday.  Can I repeat the

          24       question that Mr Underwood put to you yesterday?

          25       Mr Underwood asks you, and I'm looking at the transcript


                                            84
 

 

 


           1       version with a page, as opposed to four pages.  It's 139

           2       at line 14 -- 139, line 14.  In fact, can we call that

           3       up on the screen, please, so everybody can see it?

           4           You have just dealt with the hard stop.

           5       Mr Underwood asked you a very, very open question:

           6           "Question: Then what do you see happen?"

           7           Mr Underwood, the gentleman who sits in front of me,

           8       that's what you asked you.

           9   A.  Yes, sir.

          10   Q.  Do you agree that that was an open invitation for you to

          11       say what you saw happen?

          12   A.  Yes, it was.

          13   Q.  That would include Mr Duggan reaching for his waistband?

          14   A.  Yes, sir.

          15   Q.  Right.  Let's see what you said:

          16           "Answer: This is obviously a very fluid thing and

          17       there was a lot happening in front of me.  I could see

          18       officers getting out of the car and I was attempting to

          19       get out of my -- it was a Range Rover Discovery.

          20           "In front of me, I could see -- I saw Mr Duggan exit

          21       the vehicle and in a -- what I can describe as

          22       an inclined purposely forward -- like a runner coming

          23       out of the sprinter's blocks, run back towards the

          24       Charlie vehicle and myself.

          25           "I lent forward to pick up my MP5 which is slung


                                            85
 

 

 


           1       around my neck but between my legs as we came to

           2       a stop ..."

           3           Just bear with me a second.  I am not conversant

           4       with an Apple Mac.  (Pause)

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Straw obviously is.

           6   MR THOMAS:  Yes:

           7           "... turn to my left, open the car door, as I've

           8       turned to my left I've seen the back of Mr Duggan's

           9       jacket and some feathers coming from the rear of his

          10       jacket -- I didn't see the back of his jacket, I saw

          11       feathers coming out of the rear --

          12           "Question: A cloud or just a few?

          13           "Answer: No, quite a lot come from the rear of his

          14       jacket.  I turned to my left, opened the door, made my

          15       way round the vehicle door and made -- ran towards that

          16       position.

          17           "It was obviously apparent to me that he'd been

          18       shot.  He was caught by W70, who then pushed him

          19       backwards in sort of -- caught him and pushed him over

          20       backwards onto his back and took him to the floor."

          21           Then Mr Underwood asks you to pause there.  I hope

          22       I have read that fairly, yes?

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  I come back to the question I did put to you and I was

          25       corrected and I don't accept the correction: why didn't


                                            86
 

 

 


           1       you tell us about this yesterday?

           2   A.  Sir, my statement is 11 pages long.  I have not covered

           3       everything in my statement in what I said yesterday.

           4   Q.  Forgive me.  You know -- V59, you have just told us,

           5       when I started my questions, that sudden movements, the

           6       fact that there may be a gun, where the gun is found,

           7       when the gun is found, these are all relevant matters to

           8       justify the use of force; you've accepted that?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  So what I'm asking you, and what I would like an answer

          11       to, is: yesterday, when counsel to this Inquest asks you

          12       an open question, which is your opportunity to say what

          13       you saw, what happened, why didn't you tell us about

          14       Mr Duggan reaching for his waistband before he was shot?

          15       Tell us.

          16   A.  It's just an area I missed on giving evidence to counsel

          17       to the Inquest, sir.

          18   Q.  May I suggest, V59, there was no error.  What has

          19       happened is that you are forgetting the detail because

          20       you have conferred with others to get the detail right.

          21   A.  Sir, I said it before: that's ridiculous and it's

          22       getting insulting as well.

          23   Q.  Let me move on.  Help me with this.  You accept that the

          24       gun and finding the gun is obviously a highly relevant

          25       matter.


                                            87
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes.

           2   Q.  I am not going to go over all the questions that others

           3       have asked you about, Z51 finding the gun and you

           4       finding the gun, but I do have to ask you this: in your

           5       initial account, the one that we can see and I've taken

           6       you to at page 12, there's absolutely no mention that

           7       you were told that the gun was found, is there?

           8   A.  No.

           9   Q.  Again, can I put this to you for you to comment on: is

          10       that because, on the 4th, you and your colleagues were

          11       waiting until the 7th to decide how you were going to

          12       get your story straight?

          13   A.  Sir, I've said it before.  I've come here to tell the

          14       truth.  You can make any allegation you like, however

          15       I came to tell the truth.  The truth is there are the

          16       brief facts on the 4th and the full facts on the 7th.

          17   Q.  Okay, let me move on.

          18           Inspector Bennett: you had a briefing at Leman

          19       Street on 3 August, correct?

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  Was Inspector Bennett present?

          22   A.  No.

          23   Q.  You've told us that he was a Tactical Firearms Advisor?

          24   A.  Yes, he was.

          25   Q.  Why wasn't he at the briefing?


                                            88
 

 

 


           1   A.  There's no need for him to be at the briefing, sir.

           2   Q.  Again, can we just call up page 12 and enlarge the

           3       manuscript so we can all read it.  I have already read

           4       out to you the top of that page which says that the

           5       facts in this statement have to be "true to the best of

           6       my knowledge and belief", stuff that you're used to.

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  Just tell me: why have you said quite clearly:

           9           "I was the Operational Firearms Commander and

          10       Tactical Advisor to the Tactical Firearms Commander."

          11           Why have you said that?

          12   A.  As I said earlier, the tactical advice was provided by

          13       Inspector Bennett and I was able to give advice in

          14       relation to that document that he provided.  He was the

          15       Tactical Advisor I was giving advice in relation to that

          16       tactical advice to Z51.

          17   Q.  Sorry, my question is: why have you said, in this

          18       document, that you were the Tactical Firearms Advisor?

          19   A.  I think I have just answered that, sir: I was giving

          20       tactical advice in relation to that already provided by

          21       Inspector Bennett.  Therefore, I was advising in

          22       a tactical capacity.

          23   Q.  Did you call Inspector Bennett when Mark Duggan was

          24       shot?

          25   A.  I called the on-call Tactical Advisor.


                                            89
 

 

 


           1   Q.  My question was: did you call Inspector Bennett?

           2   A.  No, I didn't.

           3   Q.  Why not?

           4   A.  Because he was not the on-call Tactical Advisor.

           5   Q.  Let me move on.

           6           Can I just move on to another matter, if I may.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes.

           8   MR THOMAS:  In terms of doing the hard stop, would you agree

           9       with the following propositions:

          10           1.  That having a bus stop where you conduct the

          11       hard stop is not particularly ideal?

          12   A.  No, it's not ideal.

          13   Q.  So number 1 is agreed.

          14           2.  Having a Tube station near is not particularly

          15       ideal?

          16   A.  It's not ideal, no.

          17   Q.  3.  Doing the hard stop in rush hour is not particularly

          18       ideal?

          19   A.  No.

          20   Q.  So that's agreed, yes?

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  4.  If there are cyclists about, that's not particularly

          23       ideal; do you agree?

          24   A.  I do.

          25   Q.  5.  Doing a hard stop in heavy traffic is not


                                            90
 

 

 


           1       particularly ideal?

           2   A.  No, sir.

           3   Q.  One that's not been mentioned: doing the hard stop where

           4       you're approaching the brow of a hill, which you were on

           5       Ferry Lane, is not particularly ideal, because, as you

           6       approach the brow you are not sure what's coming on the

           7       other side; do you follow?

           8   A.  I disagree with that one, sir.

           9   Q.  You disagree with that one.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I think we all understand it

          11       wouldn't be very ideal to do it after the brow of the

          12       hill, just over the hill, for obvious practical reasons.

          13   A.  No.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The person who actually calls the

          15       stop is not you?

          16   A.  No, it's W42, sir.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  He's the one in the Alpha car in the

          18       front passenger seat?

          19   A.  That's correct, yes.

          20   MR THOMAS:  But you're on hand to give tactical advice,

          21       aren't you?

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   Q.  If a hard stop was being suggested somewhere that you

          24       thought was inappropriate, you could say, couldn't you?

          25   A.  Yes, and I would have.


                                            91
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Can we just have a look at --

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Is that right?  You have gone

           3       through the traffic lights, green, amber, red and then

           4       it's over to W42 to actually say "Attack, attack" or

           5       whatever the words, "Strike, strike" --

           6   A.  Strike.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- "strike" in this case.  Those are

           8       his words he says and then everybody goes in?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  So if he calls "Strike, strike" have

          11       you got time to say "Hang on a moment, we are not quite

          12       right here"?

          13   A.  I don't know, however I could say over the radio --

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  "Wait for it"?

          15   A.  The flexibility of the traffic system is we can return

          16       to green at any point, depending on the information

          17       coming from the TFC and the intel feed.  So I am overall

          18       Operational Firearms Commander, therefore I could put on

          19       the radio "Hold, wait", and we'll let it run and pick

          20       a better location, if I've seen something that I believe

          21       is overriding his call.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  So even if he shouts "Strike,

          23       strike" you can actually override it?

          24   A.  I can do, but it would be very foolish because all

          25       officers by this point are going in for the stop and


                                            92
 

 

 


           1       I am not sure they are going to hear it with all the

           2       sirens, et cetera, going on.  So I would try and call it

           3       earlier, if I could.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You say the sirens go on, the sirens

           5       go on after the words "Strike, strike"?

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  They are not on before then?

           8   A.  If he were to call a strike and I was not happy for

           9       whatever reason, and it would be a fairly large reason,

          10       I would say over the radio "Hold, wait" but it would not

          11       be common practice.  It would cause further problems,

          12       I should think.

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, thank you.

          14   MR THOMAS:  I wonder if we could just show a small piece of

          15       footage.  It's KEL/10, which is the bus footage.  I just

          16       want you to look at this a couple of times, please.

          17             (Video footage was played to the court)

          18           I'm going to indicate where it should be paused,

          19       okay.

          20           Pause it there.

          21                    (The video footage ended)

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Did you see that?

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I think we're meant to be looking at

          25       the hard stop right in the middle.


                                            93
 

 

 


           1   MR THOMAS:  Play on just a little bit more.

           2             (Video footage was played to the court)

           3           Now, stop.

           4                    (The video footage ended)

           5           Can we go just before that stop?

           6           (Video footage was played to the court and ended)

           7           Can you see a pedestrian -- on the side where the

           8       hard stop is called, can you see that pedestrian?

           9   A.  Yes, I can.

          10   Q.  Walking.  Now, I will be right in thinking that that

          11       pedestrian is in between Mark Duggan and W42, who was

          12       the officer who was shot?

          13   A.  He was in between them, sir?

          14   Q.  Hang on, let me make sure I've got this right.  Sorry,

          15       the arc of fire?

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The person on the right carrying

          17       a plastic bag?

          18   MR THOMAS:  He would be in the arc of fire?

          19   A.  Potentially, sir, potentially.

          20   Q.  It's not appropriate, is it, to have members of the

          21       public in the arc fire of police officers' firearms, is

          22       it?

          23   A.  It's something we attempt to minimise as much as

          24       possible.

          25   Q.  Last question, subject to instructions, just help me


                                            94
 

 

 


           1       with this: in your 13 years as a police officer, how

           2       many of those years have you been a firearms officer?

           3   A.  At that stage -- (Pause)

           4           Sorry, I've now 15 years -- would you like to know

           5       then or now?

           6   Q.  No, let's deal with then and then we can deal with now?

           7   A.  I had three and a half years then as a firearms --

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You said four in your statement,

           9       which we've seen.  You said 13 years as a PC, four --

          10       yes.

          11   MR THOMAS:  In that time, you have been on many firearms

          12       operations, correct?

          13   A.  Yes, I have.

          14   Q.  Do you care to give us a figure on how many firearms

          15       operations in a year, roughly?

          16   A.  A year?  Since -- in my current role, it's about 150

          17       a year.

          18   Q.  Right.  In your 150 a year roughly -- I'm not holding

          19       you to that, that's the type -- on how many occasions,

          20       and I'm talking back then, had you known for there to be

          21       a blue on blue incident, in other words a police officer

          22       shooting another police officer?

          23   A.  That had not happened before.

          24   Q.  This was the first time, wasn't it?

          25   A.  Yes, it was.


                                            95
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Since this incident, has it happened?

           2   A.  No, sir.

           3   Q.  No.  Things went very badly wrong, I'm going to suggest;

           4       do you accept that?

           5   A.  No, I don't.

           6   Q.  I said, subject to instructions, I've just been handed

           7       a question which I need to deal with, if I may.

           8           V59, earlier on, you were asked by Mr Mansfield, who

           9       sits to my left, about whether or not you were aware of

          10       the recommendations in relation to Azelle Rodney.

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  You told us you hadn't seen the report yourself.

          13   A.  No, I haven't.

          14   Q.  I want to ask you a specific question.  Despite the fact

          15       that you haven't seen the report, have you been briefed

          16       on what happened in Azelle Rodney -- there's

          17       a difference, do you follow?  I'm not asking you whether

          18       you've actually read the report personally.  The

          19       question is: have you been briefed about what happened

          20       in Azelle Rodney and the recommendations; do you follow?

          21   A.  I've not been briefed, no.

          22   MR THOMAS:  Did you not receive a pre-briefing pack for this

          23       Inquest?

          24   A.  No.  Not containing that, no.

          25   Q.  Sorry, you said no, not containing that.  So you have


                                            96
 

 

 


           1       received a pre-briefing pack for this Inquest but not

           2       containing --

           3   A.  No, no I haven't, sir, no.

           4   MR THOMAS:  Thank you very much.

           5   A.  Thank you.

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you.  Would that be

           7       a convenient moment?

           8           I think, Mr Keith, you are going to be asking

           9       questions next.

          10   MR KEITH:  In fact, I have no questions to ask but I am sure

          11       it is still a convenient moment.

          12   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I'll get you to say that at --

          13   MR UNDERWOOD:  2.20.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Because you've been working so hard,

          15       members of the jury, for various reasons, you're going

          16       to be awarded an extra long lunch break.  Fortunately,

          17       it does not look too bad out there so you are not

          18       required back I don't think until 2.20, all right.  So

          19       thank you very much.  So we have the cameras off,

          20       please.

 

 

 

 

 


                                            97
 

 

 

 

           3   (1.04 pm)

           4                     (The short adjournment)

           5   (2.20 pm)

          15                  (In the presence of the jury)

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We'll ask for V59 to come back,

          17       please.

          18                (The witness returned into court)

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  V59 you are

          20       still under the oath you have taken.  The cameras are

          21       now back on.

          22           I would have asked Mr Keith to confirm he didn't

          23       have any questions but, Ms Le Fevre, are there any

          24       questions?

          25   MS LE FEVRE:  I can confirm there are no questions.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


                                            98
 

 

 


           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Butt?

           2                       Questions by MR BUTT

           3   MR BUTT:  I ask questions on behalf of Z51.  You were asked

           4       today and yesterday if Z51 told you that he'd found

           5       a gun at the scene.  The moment you were being referred

           6       to is on the video at about 7 minutes and 44 seconds,

           7       when you and Z51 cross each other's paths; you recall

           8       seeing that, don't you?

           9   A.  Yes, I do.

          10   Q.  You seem to walk towards each other, you get within

          11       a few metres of each other, then Z51 turns away and

          12       perhaps speaks to someone else; you recall seeing that?

          13   A.  Yes, I do.

          14   Q.  If Z51 was talking on the phone to the SIO at that time

          15       and updating him about what had happened, would you have

          16       been surprised if he didn't break off that conversation

          17       to speak to you?

          18   A.  No, not at all.

          19   Q.  Do you know if he even noticed you at that moment on the

          20       video?

          21   A.  I couldn't say, sir.

          22   Q.  Is it fair to say that senior principal officers are

          23       going to be busy and preoccupied after a shooting such

          24       as this?

          25   A.  Yes, very, sir.


                                            99
 

 

 


           1   Q.  In terms of the advice that you gave to the Tactical

           2       Firearms Commander, it was suggested that you were doing

           3       something odd by giving tactical advice and it was put:

           4           "Were you advising yourself?"

           5           You recall that?

           6   A.  Yes, I do.

           7   Q.  Could we look, please, at document CD0339.  Do you

           8       recognise this document?  This is the end, or towards

           9       the end, of the FA5?

          10   A.  Yes, I do.

          11   Q.  What it says here -- and this is a section which would

          12       have been completed by Inspector Bennett; is that right?

          13   A.  Yes, it would be.

          14   Q.  "I am the nominated firearms Tactical Advisor for this

          15       operation.  If any material changes to the

          16       intelligence/information, or operational objectives are

          17       evident either myself, or the 24-hour on-call SFO

          18       Tactical Advisor should be contacted to review this

          19       document."

          20           So the procedure is, is it, that the nominated

          21       Tactical Advisor will be available on the phone or

          22       someone else in his place, should there be a need to

          23       take formal tactical advice?

          24   A.  Yes, that's correct, sir.

          25   Q.  The procedure is not that Inspector Bennett or someone


                                           100
 

 

 


           1       else at his level would deploy with you and the Tactical

           2       Firearms Commander; is that right?

           3   A.  That's correct, sir.

           4   Q.  In terms of your role, it's outlined further in this

           5       document:

           6           "All CO19 supervisors are trained and accredited

           7       Tactical Advisors.  If additional advice is required

           8       during a deployment, the Operational Firearms Commander

           9       should be consulted.  Any advice given in these

          10       circumstances will be recorded in OFC's log FA6/FA6A."

          11   A.  Yes, that's correct.

          12   Q.  Is that what you were doing when you described yourself

          13       as being Tactical Advisor to the TFC?

          14   A.  Yes, it was.

          15   Q.  Have you seen the FA2A and the FA3A in this case?

          16   A.  Yes, I have.

          17   Q.  Do both of those documents name Inspector Bennett as the

          18       nominated Tactical Advisor?

          19   A.  Yes, they do.

          20   Q.  Does that reflect what your understanding was of the

          21       respective roles in the operation?

          22   A.  Yes, exactly, sir.

          23   Q.  The location of the stop.  If you had the choice,

          24       generally, would you prefer to do a stop like this in

          25       a residential area, like Vicarage Road or Burchell Road,


                                           101
 

 

 


           1       or somewhere like Ferry Lane?

           2   A.  Ferry Lane, sir.

           3   Q.  In the training video, we seem to see a stop being

           4       performed in a mock up of a residential area; is that

           5       right?

           6   A.  Yes, sir.

           7   Q.  That is not, is it though, positive advice from the

           8       police that you should try to a stop whenever you can in

           9       an area a bit like this, is it?

          10   A.  Not at all.  That's one of the training roads from our

          11       training centre.

          12   Q.  Can we look at the suggested alternative, if the was in

          13       Vicarage Road or Burchell Road: you would not be

          14       familiar with that area would you?

          15   A.  No, I'm not.

          16   Q.  The subjects would though, wouldn't they?

          17   A.  Yes, they would.

          18   Q.  Is it safe or advisable to hand an advantage like that

          19       to the subjects when you don't have to?

          20   A.  No, it's definitely not an advantage.

          21   Q.  If you had intercepted immediately after, or very

          22       shortly after, the transfer of the gun, what risks would

          23       have been posed by Mark Duggan and Kevin

          24       Hutchinson-Foster?

          25   A.  There would be further risk because they are more highly


                                           102
 

 

 


           1       aware of what's going on in the surroundings and also

           2       we've got no control over Mr Hutchinson-Foster at that

           3       stage, therefore the further risk to my officers, as

           4       well as to the two subjects.

           5   Q.  There would then be further unknown risks, wouldn't

           6       there, such as who is in the house he's come out of --

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  -- who is in other houses?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  Are there more or fewer unknown risks on Ferry Lane by

          11       contrast?

          12   A.  There are much fewer on Ferry Lane, sir.

          13   Q.  It's been mentioned by Mr Mansfield that there was

          14       a risk that Mark Duggan might escape with the gun and

          15       tip Kevin Hutchinson-Foster off.  That's always a risk

          16       in any operation, isn't it?

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  We know that the surveillance officers lost Mark Duggan

          19       on the night of 3 August, don't we?

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  Is it easier to lose a subject during covert

          22       surveillance than during a hard stop?

          23   A.  A lot easier, yes.

          24   Q.  There really is no comparison, is there, between the

          25       high risk of losing someone during covert surveillance


                                           103
 

 

 


           1       and the very low risk during a hard stop?

           2   A.  They are very different scenarios, sir.

           3   Q.  Putting CO19 officers in a van outside the Kevin

           4       Hutchinson-Foster address, or that associated with him:

           5       is it easy to hide firearms officers in their kit in the

           6       back of a van?

           7   A.  It can be, in fairness, sir.

           8   Q.  Do you run the risk of detection by keeping firearms

           9       officers if the back of a van?

          10   A.  The risk is heightened, yes.

          11   Q.  It was also suggested that, at around about 5.15 or

          12       5.25, there could have been a new Tactical Firearms

          13       Commander appointed and you agreed that in theory that

          14       was possible, didn't you?

          15   A.  That is possible, yes.

          16   Q.  I want to look at whether it was at all practical

          17       because, first of all, the new Tactical Firearms

          18       Commander would have to be from SCD7 or SCD8, wouldn't

          19       he or she?

          20   A.  Yes, they would.

          21   Q.  Mr Mansfield mentioned the firearms cadre but, of

          22       course, in order to conduct an operation like this,

          23       a MASTS operation, you would need someone from the

          24       flying squad or Trident, wouldn't you?

          25   A.  Yes, you would, yes.


                                           104
 

 

 


           1   Q.  The person who was going to replace Z51 would have to be

           2       authorised by the Gold Commander, wouldn't he or she?

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  The Gold Commander is going to be very surprised by this

           5       the suggestion, isn't she?

           6   A.  I would imagine so, yes, sir.

           7   Q.  The new Tactical Firearms Commander will need to take

           8       tactical advice, won't they?

           9   A.  Yes, they would.

          10   Q.  They would need to be familiar with the working

          11       strategy?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  It would obviously result in a much, much more

          14       significant delay to appoint a new TFC than to wait for

          15       the appointed, trained Tactical Firearms Commander who

          16       was en route?

          17   A.  Yes, I agree, sir.

          18   Q.  Mr Thomas, towards the end of his questions, pointed out

          19       potential problems with the Ferry Lane stop location.

          20       He mentioned the bus stop, the Tube station that's

          21       near-ish to the stop and traffic on the road.

          22           Is the truth of the matter that any location between

          23       Leyton and Tottenham is going to have some risks and

          24       some drawbacks?

          25   A.  Yes, sir.  It's a busy -- busy London streets.


                                           105
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Because Mark Duggan was not likely to pull into

           2       a deserted car park, was he?

           3   A.  No, sir.

           4   Q.  The risks that Mr Thomas and Mr Mansfield have

           5       identified though are actually to members of the public,

           6       at the bus stop, coming from the Tube station, other

           7       traffic, et cetera, yes?

           8   A.  Yes.

           9   Q.  If we take it back to the man who really matters here,

          10       Mark Duggan, the risk to him from a vehicle stop

          11       wouldn't have been changed by the location, would it?

          12   A.  No, not at all.

          13   Q.  The risk to the subject, first and foremost, is

          14       determined by whether they comply with the firearms

          15       officers' commands, isn't it?

          16   A.  Yes, sir.

          17   Q.  That is something neither CO19 nor the Firearms

          18       Commander can control?

          19   A.  That's true, sir, yes.

          20   MR BUTT:  Thank you very much.

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Ms Leek, I think is next.

          22   MS LEEK:  No thank you.

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Glasson?

          24   MR GLASSON:  No thank you.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Stern?


                                           106
 

 

 


           1                      Questions by MR STERN

           2   MR STERN:  V59, can I first of all try to draw together some

           3       of the questions about your personal history because

           4       I think it's been a little bit hotchpotch, if I may say

           5       so.

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  Without denting your anonymity, I think it is right to

           8       say that you are between 35 and 40 years of age?

           9   A.  I am, yes.

          10   Q.  Having graduated from university in 1994, did you join

          11       the police force in 1998?

          12   A.  I did, yes.

          13   Q.  You remained in the police force, as a Constable, until

          14       2004, when you were promoted to being a Sergeant?

          15   A.  That's correct, yes.

          16   Q.  In 2008, did you join SC&019 --

          17   A.  Yes, sir.

          18   Q.  -- which is the unit or specialist group you are still

          19       associated with?

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  I think initially, as we've heard the progress of the

          22       specialist unit as such, that you joined the armed

          23       response vehicles first of all?

          24   A.  I did, sir, yes.

          25   Q.  Were you involved in numerous operations and instances


                                           107
 

 

 


           1       during the course of being on an armed response vehicle?

           2   A.  I was, sir, yes.

           3   Q.  Again, approximately how many?  Are we talking tens,

           4       hundreds, thousands --

           5   A.  Hundreds, sir.

           6   Q.  I think you became a supervisor as well as Operational

           7       Firearms Commander and a Tactical Advisor?

           8   A.  That's correct, yes.

           9   Q.  Then in March 2010 were you posted to the Tactical

          10       Support Team --

          11   A.  I was.

          12   Q.  -- which is the team that was involved in this operation

          13       that the jury are concerned with?

          14   A.  Yes, sir.

          15   Q.  You are the team leader and you manage 12 experienced

          16       firearms officers?

          17   A.  I do, sir.

          18   Q.  I have not gone into all the other courses you've done

          19       but I'm sure there are very, very many that you've done.

          20   A.  There are, yes.

          21   Q.  That is continuing, presumably on a very regular basis.

          22   A.  Ongoing re-accreditation, yes.

          23   Q.  Is that the same with the team that you're involved

          24       with?

          25   A.  Yes, it is.


                                           108
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Now, of course, you mentioned something yesterday about

           2       neutralising a threat.

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  I want to just try and get people to understand what you

           5       meant by that.

           6           First of all, obviously people who are not involved

           7       in firearms sometimes think that it's possible to shoot

           8       people in the hand or the leg or wherever.  Bearing in

           9       mind that you are highly trained and you've told us

          10       about the number of shots that have to be passed in

          11       order to continue with that, how different is that from

          12       the real world?

          13   A.  The reality is very different.  We would always aim for

          14       the central body mass, as it's very very difficult to

          15       hit a hand, a leg, an arm, et cetera.

          16   Q.  Obviously we see that on the films but is that something

          17       you are trained to do or taught to do?

          18   A.  No, it's not, no.

          19   Q.  You've talked about the central body mass.  Let's not

          20       quibble about the area we're talking about.  Just

          21       demonstrate so that people understand exactly what it is

          22       the training is where you are taught to hit?

          23   A.  It's between the bottom of your neck and your waist,

          24       this area, your central area, where your organs are and

          25       chest, et cetera.


                                           109
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Obviously, as you say, it's where the main organs are.

           2       Now, the reason why you're taught to fire at that

           3       central body mass is what?

           4   A.  It's the quickest way of neutralising the threat.

           5   Q.  So the reality is that, because the largest organs are

           6       there, that is the quickest way to incapacitate

           7       somebody, which is to remove the imminent threat that

           8       they pose?

           9   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.

          10   Q.  Can I ask you about Tasers?  Everybody may have heard of

          11       them but not know exactly how they work.  Perhaps you

          12       could just help people understand that?

          13   A.  Yes.  A Taser is effectively what you would probably

          14       know as a stun gun.  It has a very high electric charge

          15       but as you pull the trigger, in the same way you would

          16       a gun, it fires two barbs towards the person you're

          17       firing towards and basically sends the electric shock --

          18       assuming they attach to the person -- sends an electric

          19       shock through their body and it's not a pain compliance

          20       tool, it basically will just stop your nerves firing

          21       correctly and therefore incapacitate you, so you cannot

          22       move and you would usually drop to the floor for

          23       a period of five seconds whilst it's running its cycle.

          24   Q.  Right.  You say "usually"; does that always happen?

          25   A.  Depending on the -- if you're inside a building and


                                           110
 

 

 


           1       someone falls onto a table or whatever --

           2   Q.  You've been asked a number of theoretical questions

           3       about Tasers, let me ask you about specific involvement

           4       here.

           5           There was intelligence, as you know, that Mark

           6       Duggan was in possession of a firearm.  Would it ever be

           7       appropriate for you to instruct your team to meet that

           8       threat by only being armed with Tasers?

           9   A.  No, never, sir.

          10   Q.  Right.  Why is that?

          11   A.  Because a conventional firearm is the appropriate weapon

          12       to respond to a firearm.  A Taser is not --

          13   Q.  Can I try to narrow it down a bit -- sorry, to interrupt

          14       you -- because you've already spoke about the

          15       unreliability of the Taser.  You've already said

          16       something about the distance may not work or may work.

          17   A.  Yes.

          18   Q.  Obviously, you don't know when people are going to be

          19       confronted, what distance that's going to be.  You said

          20       something about it not going through clothes?

          21   A.  Yes.

          22   Q.  Right.  Does it also depend on the circumstances of the

          23       threat?

          24   A.  Yes, very much so.

          25   Q.  Again, I think the point you're making is that, with


                                           111
 

 

 


           1       a gun, there always has to be a capability for the

           2       officers to have a gun?

           3   A.  We would only ever deploy a less lethal option such as

           4       Taser alongside a conventional firearm --

           5   Q.  I didn't hear: alongside?

           6   A.  A conventional firearm.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  In this particular stop, the way

           8       that I think that you've painted it is that one of the

           9       cars come to a stop, it's really the front seat

          10       passengers in each car who are really the main people

          11       who do the action.  So you get W42, in the front car,

          12       comes round the top end, you've got V53 round the bottom

          13       and then the B car front driver looks at the taxi

          14       driver.

          15   A.  Initially, sir, yes.

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Those are the three main action

          17       people.

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  None of them have Tasers?

          20   A.  No.

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Why not?

          22   A.  Because we are looking to stop a subject in possession

          23       of a firearm and we need to meet the threat they pose

          24       with a firearm.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  But they all have three or four


                                           112
 

 

 


           1       guns --

           2   A.  Yes, sir.

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- each.

           4   A.  You can only use one firearm at once though, sir.

           5   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  But not one of them having a Taser

           6       is an option?

           7   A.  If the subject were to turn and point towards them with

           8       a conventional firearm, they would not be able to

           9       respond.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  But if the subject is pointing one

          11       way towards one of them with a firearm, the officer

          12       behind him or alongside, no?

          13   A.  It's not really practical, sir, no.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Okay.

          15   MR STERN:  Let's take that up.  We're in the realms of

          16       films, again, I think.  If somebody points away with

          17       a firearm, how realistic is it to know which individual

          18       is going to be pointed at with a firearm and which one

          19       with a --

          20   A.  It's very difficult to say.

          21   Q.  The other thing, of course, in relation to that is this:

          22       if a gun is pointing at you and you have a Taser --

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  -- and the person behind is the officer with a gun --

          25   A.  Yes.


                                           113
 

 

 


           1   Q.  -- what's going to happen then?

           2   A.  The person with the gun will fire their weapon and

           3       you'll fire your Taser.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Tasers look like a gun, don't they?

           5   A.  Yes.  Normally they're yellow, normally, the ones we

           6       have, with a cartridge on the front which fires the

           7       barbs.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I know I've asked that in due course

           9       we see these guns.  Can I also ask that we see a Taser,

          10       as well?

          11   MR STERN:  Did you say it's yellow, did I hear you

          12       correctly?

          13   A.  They're generally yellow but we have some covert ones

          14       which are sort of clear, white plastic.

          15   Q.  Can I come onto another issue but I do not want to spend

          16       a long time because a number of people have asked

          17       questions about it.  Again, can we clear away all the

          18       hypotheticals and just look at the reality of this

          19       situation.

          20           You said that the location that Mark Duggan was

          21       stopped, and that the minicab, obviously, was stopped,

          22       was the best that you'd seen since you'd been a firearms

          23       officer.

          24   A.  Yes, sir.

          25   Q.  Is it possible in London to find anywhere where no one


                                           114
 

 

 


           1       is around at all?

           2   A.  No, very rarely.

           3   Q.  So why do you say it was the best location?  What is it

           4       that makes you say it was the best location in your

           5       experience?

           6   A.  In the implementation of the stop we had the mobility to

           7       carry out the overtake and get the vehicles into

           8       position.  The railings and wall prevented a -- created

           9       a natural barrier so he could not escape towards the

          10       grass area and with the vehicles front and rear that

          11       prevented him running towards the Tube station or back

          12       down Ferry Lane, and with the grass area behind that

          13       gave us some sort of back stop, so if we were to fire

          14       the weapons towards that -- fire one of our weapons

          15       towards that area, the grass would -- as it was lower

          16       than us, would normally have taken the energy out of the

          17       bullet as it's fired.

          18   Q.  So there were not people around on that grass so, if

          19       a shot had overshot or gone through, then it would have

          20       gone down on the grass into an area where the public

          21       were?

          22   A.  Yes.

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Taking up the point you were asked

          24       by Mr Butt, obviously very important, if you can, at

          25       all, to look after the interests of Mr Duggan --


                                           115
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes.

           2   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- himself.  Stopping a few metres

           3       on, the taxi would have been right against some railings

           4       directly, wouldn't it?

           5   A.  Sorry, sir, if it had --

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  A few metres on from where the hard

           7       stop took place, there are railings right along the edge

           8       of the road; is that a better location?

           9   A.  No.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You explain to the jury why not.

          11   A.  That's harder for us because, obviously, our intention,

          12       as you've seen from the training video, is to remove the

          13       subjects from the inside the vehicle and handcuff them.

          14       With the taxi directly next to that railings, we would

          15       not be able to do that and, if I remember correctly, the

          16       taxi only has a rear door on the nearside and not on the

          17       offside.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It has no offside rear door.

          19   A.  So we would not be able to get the subject out of the

          20       car, therefore potentially we had a hostage situation,

          21       within the vehicle, of the taxi driver and the subject.

          22       So we need to get access to the rear so ideally we can

          23       cover -- sorry, we can place firearms cover on the

          24       occupants and then remove them safely from the vehicle.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you.


                                           116
 

 

 


           1   MR STERN:  Your position on 4 August, when the stop

           2       occurred, was in the control vehicle.  So we had the

           3       Alpha vehicle which overtook in front of the minicab,

           4       the Bravo vehicle by the side of it and the Charlie

           5       behind the minicab.

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  Then you I think were behind that?

           8   A.  Yes, sir.

           9   Q.  I think you estimated your distance in your statement at

          10       about 10 to 15 metres from the rear of the people

          11       carrier --

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  -- is that fair?

          14   A.  Yes, sir.

          15   Q.  Now, you were asked some questions by my learned friend

          16       Mr Thomas about your statement.  I wonder if you could

          17       just have a look at that, please, page 99.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  This is your second statement of

          19       7 August.

          20   MR STERN:  I think it's your first statement of 7 August.

          21       I think you told us, according to what Mr Thomas said,

          22       that the 4 August was your initial account.

          23   A.  It was.

          24   MR STERN:  Yes.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That was the first statement.


                                           117
 

 

 


           1       That's the second statement.  We are not going to argue

           2       about that.  There's also some argument about whether

           3       the first statement was the 4th or the 5th; what

           4       happened there?

           5   A.  I believe I started it believing it was the night of the

           6       4th and it was actually the early hours of the 5th, it

           7       was just gone past midnight.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The printed version we have has the

           9       4th on it, when did you alter it to the 5th?

          10   A.  I didn't, I don't believe.  It's altered on my EAB.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It's altered on your original one

          12       but our printed one still has the 4th.  Did you alter it

          13       much later?

          14   A.  No, it would have been on the 5th, sir.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Very well.

          16   MR STERN:  Mine only has the 4th but I don't know where the

          17       5th is.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  On the screen, he's crossed out the

          19       4th, put the 5th, it's got 00.10.  That must have been

          20       done subsequently, probably after the printed version

          21       was created.

          22   MR STERN:  Anyway, page 99, this is the part you were asked

          23       about:

          24           "I opened the door and placed my blue high

          25       visibility police baseball cap on my head."


                                           118
 

 

 


           1           First of all, can I ask you about this.  Did

           2       everyone, as far as you recall, have their blue baseball

           3       caps on?

           4   A.  Yes, they did.

           5   Q.  Right, and you say:

           6           "At this point, the subject was still crouched and

           7       his right hand was across his body and appeared to be

           8       reaching for something."

           9   A.  Yes, sir.

          10   Q.  Now, you went on to expand on that, if we look at

          11       page 109, which was a statement which is dated

          12       31 May 2012, I think, in response to questions from the

          13       IPCC.

          14   A.  Yes, sir.

          15   Q.  It's about halfway down, it says:

          16           "I turned to my left and climbed out of my vehicle

          17       due to the size of the door my view was obstructed as

          18       I moved around the door."

          19           That's from your earlier statement and you go on to

          20       say:

          21           "As I turned to my left I looked momentarily to

          22       reach for the door handle to open the door.  I exited my

          23       vehicle as the male was running and reaching across his

          24       body.  My view was obscured for a moment as I stated,

          25       I cannot qualify exactly how long.  The male was in line


                                           119
 

 

 


           1       with the rear of the people carrier on the pavement, he

           2       was between five and ten metres away from me and within

           3       two metres of the railings.  Due to the obstructions

           4       between V53 and W70 I could not see the male's arms or

           5       hands."

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   Q.  W70 and V53 were in front of you, nearer to the minicab

           8       than you?

           9   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.

          10   Q.  V53 was, as you were looking at the rear of the minicab,

          11       to your left?

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  W70 was slightly behind V53 but to his right?

          14   A.  Yes, he was.

          15   Q.  W42, if you look, please, at page 111 -- just to refresh

          16       your memory, if you need it to be refreshed -- W42 being

          17       in the Alpha car, at line 6, following the shots:

          18           "W42 was lying prone next to the subject ..."

          19           By that you mean Mark Duggan?

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  "He was approximately 3 to 8 metres behind the male next

          22       to the railings on the pavement."

          23   A.  Yes.

          24   Q.  Your view of Mark Duggan was, I think as you describe it

          25       in your statement, various snapshots of the whole event?


                                           120
 

 

 


           1   A.  That's correct, sir, yes.

           2   Q.  You saw him double over after the two shots?

           3   A.  Yes, I did.

           4   Q.  Not in between the two shots but after the two shots?

           5   A.  After them, sir.

           6   Q.  He had covered, as I think you said in your statement,

           7       about two to six metres from the minicab.  Obviously,

           8       difficult to judge exactly?

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  But about two to six metres from the minicab?

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  He was nearer the railings than he was the minicab when

          13       he went down to the ground?

          14   A.  Yes, he was.

          15   Q.  When he went down to the ground he received first aid

          16       immediately.

          17   A.  He did.

          18   Q.  Did you see that, were you watching that?

          19   A.  I did, yes.

          20   Q.  The most highly trained medic of the team was V53?

          21   A.  Yes, he was, sir.

          22   Q.  It was V53 who had shot Mark Duggan?

          23   A.  Yes, it was, sir.

          24   Q.  But he immediately went into first aid of Mark Duggan?

          25   A.  He did, yes.


                                           121
 

 

 


           1   Q.  I think, actually, to be fair, he checked that W42 was

           2       okay, first.

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   Q.  He carried on carrying out CPR on Mark Duggan until the

           5       paramedics came, and indeed beyond the paramedics?

           6   A.  Yes, that's correct, sir.

           7   Q.  There's a film of this, as we know Q63 had a camcorder,

           8       and obviously people can see that if they want to.

           9   A.  Yes, sir.

          10   Q.  Whereas he does not move from the position of carrying

          11       out CPR from the moment that he starts to the time after

          12       the paramedics leave.

          13   A.  That's correct, sir.

          14   Q.  Indeed, he hands over to the paramedics?

          15   A.  He does, yes.

          16   Q.  He played no part in looking for a gun.

          17   A.  No, he did not.

          18   Q.  You said that you heard someone shout, "Where's the

          19       gun?" or something like that.

          20   A.  Yes.

          21   Q.  Mr Mansfield asked you where and I can help because it's

          22       in W70's statement.  Now, you asked R31 to look for the

          23       gun --

          24   A.  Yes, I did.

          25   Q.  -- that's your recollection.


                                           122
 

 

 


           1   A.  Yes.

           2   Q.  At this stage, were there any investigating officers

           3       present?

           4   A.  No, there were not.

           5   Q.  Again, may I ask you a question, and I think the answer

           6       is probably very obvious, but how dangerous is it to

           7       leave a gun that you understand to be in the area not

           8       under the control of police?

           9   A.  Very dangerous, sir.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  What do you do with your own guns?

          11   A.  We holster our Glocks, into a holster on our waistbands

          12       and when we have time we place our MP5s back into our

          13       vehicles and secure our vehicles as soon as possible.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  But initially you just leave them on

          15       the ground.

          16   A.  Admittedly they are on slings around your necks so you

          17       can put them behind you and do things.

          18   MR STERN:  Do you leave them on the ground?

          19   A.  No, not normally.

          20   Q.  Now, I wonder if you could watch this video.  I'm sorry

          21       that we're going to have to watch it again.  Can you

          22       watch it -- I want to start right from the beginning

          23       because we haven't watched all of this and we haven't

          24       watched it from the beginning.

          25           Sir, can I, with some assistance, I hope, give the


                                           123
 

 

 


           1       real time of the 00.00.00, so people can work out when

           2       things happen.

           3           The time, according to the analysis, is 18.13.22.

           4       So 00.00.00 is 18.13.22, so pretty soon after the

           5       shooting.

           6             (Video footage was played to the court)

           7           Can you just pause it there I will ask for it to be

           8       paused a few occasions, sorry.

           9                    (The video footage ended)

          10           That grass area beyond the minicab where the

          11       railings are and the wall is, yes --

          12   A.  Yes.

          13   Q.  -- are there any officers there?

          14   A.  No, there aren't.

          15   Q.  Carry on.

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Can we just stop there for a moment.

          17       We see the front C car in its original stop position, do

          18       we not?

          19   A.  The Alpha car, yes.

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Sorry.

          21   MR STERN:  We're going to come to that because at 1.01 it's

          22       going to move, so we'll see it but thank you for drawing

          23       attention.  It's in the original position, that's

          24       exactly right.

          25             (Video footage was played to the court)


                                           124
 

 

 


           1           There's somebody running down there.  Is that

           2       a police officer, as far as you know?

           3   A.  Yes, I would think so.

           4   Q.  Can you see an officer getting into the Alpha car there?

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  We'll see it's going to move in a moment.

           7           There it is, and it goes up on the pavement.  So we

           8       can see where it was originally and we can see where it

           9       was moved to.

          10           Again, pausing it there if we can.

          11                    (The video footage ended)

          12           Any officers on the grass?

          13   A.  No, sir.

          14   Q.  Okay, carry on.

          15             (Video footage was played to the court)

          16           There's the bus, I think that we've seen the film or

          17       CCTV footage, and it's moving on.

          18           Just pause it there for a moment, if we may.

          19                    (The video footage ended)

          20           Just help if you can.  Obviously this is

          21       a significant event that's just occurred.

          22   A.  Yes, it was.

          23   Q.  Can you say generally what people are doing or

          24       specifically what people are doing?

          25   A.  Generally, they are administering first aid, getting the


                                           125
 

 

 


           1       correct kit out of the vehicles for first aid and then

           2       implementing cordons beyond the stop and behind the stop

           3       so that we have a scene which is then preserved, as I've

           4       mentioned in my briefing the day before.

           5   Q.  Does anybody have to be notified that this has happened?

           6   A.  Yes, we obviously informed the local borough, Tottenham,

           7       of what's happened.  We send -- various messages are

           8       sent around to request further resources to us, making

           9       phonecalls to the SFO, on-call Tactical Advisor and

          10       I think I also contacted the ARV control room to request

          11       ARVs to our position as well.

          12   Q.  What about hospitals or ambulances or HEMS?

          13   A.  Yes, LAS and HEMS were also called.  Obviously, we've

          14       got an injured police officer and a severely injured, at

          15       that stage, subject and I'm trying to get the best care

          16       I can to both those people.

          17   Q.  Not just you but other people.  Are other people sitting

          18       around doing nothing?

          19   A.  No.  Everyone is looking to do something useful, to

          20       either contact the relevant departments or the LAS or

          21       HEMS, secure the scene, get the correct first aid

          22       equipment, assist with the first aid, look after the

          23       welfare of their colleagues, general liaising with the

          24       TFC and ZZ17 to try and ensure that the scene is

          25       preserved and we get the right people to the scene as


                                           126
 

 

 


           1       soon as possible.

           2   Q.  All right.  Thank you.  Perhaps we can carry on.

           3             (Video footage was played to the court)

           4           You're in the vicinity there, are you?

           5   A.  Yes, I believe so.

           6   Q.  There or thereabouts?

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  You have not left the scene?

           9   A.  No, not at all.  I'm there.

          10   Q.  So you're there throughout?

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  Did you see anyone go into the minicab at all?

          13   A.  No, I didn't.

          14   Q.  Did you see the driver being removed from the driver's

          15       seat?

          16   A.  No, I did not.

          17   Q.  Again, are there any officers on the grass beyond those

          18       railings?

          19   A.  No, there's not.

          20   Q.  Are there any members of the public there either?

          21   A.  No.

          22   Q.  The next event I'm going to ask for it to be stopped is

          23       when we get to 6.

          24           The yellow arrow, I think, indicates R31.  I do not

          25       think that it's just appeared, it's just that the arrow


                                           127
 

 

 


           1       has appeared.

           2           Now we can see R31, we can see he's just about to

           3       haul himself up there.  If we just pause it.

           4                    (The video footage ended)

           5           Is he the first officer then to go into that area,

           6       the grass area?

           7   A.  Yes, he is.

           8   Q.  So he's now climbing over the fence, as we can see, or

           9       railings, and if we can play that on, please, until we

          10       get to about 7.15 or 7.25.

          11             (Video footage was played to the court)

          12           We can see, because the arrow helps us, that R31 is

          13       moving along and then looking in the bushes there.

          14       Obviously, I think when we went there they've all been

          15       cut away but at the time there are bushes, as you can

          16       see.

          17           He's moving up and down, as we can see.

          18           Now, we need to look at the blue arrow, which is

          19       Z51.  He's moving away.

          20           I think we will see in a moment he now walks into

          21       the green area, can you see?

          22   A.  Yes, sir.

          23   Q.  Pause it there, please.

          24                    (The video footage ended)

          25           Would you please, whilst that's being paused, if


                                           128
 

 

 


           1       it's possible to put something else up on the screen,

           2       I don't know if it is, but CD664.

           3           Thank you, that's very clever.

           4           On the left, we can see a man behind the white

           5       railings who is a civilian, nothing to do with the

           6       police, I think; is that right?

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   Q.  Let's make that clear.  But you can see what we

           9       understand is Z51, by the wall, or near the wall there,

          10       and pointing down with his finger; can you see that?

          11   A.  Yes, sir.

          12   Q.  He told us that that's where he found the gun.  R31, of

          13       course, has not quite got there yet.  Now, if we get rid

          14       of the photograph and we carry on and watch Z51.

          15             (Video footage was played to the court)

          16           He told us he was on the phone and he's come

          17       straight out again, so forget about him.  R31 is now

          18       moving across and has got to the point where the gun is.

          19           All right.  Pausing it there if we may.

          20                    (The video footage ended)

          21           Now, you've already told us Z51 did not tell you

          22       that he had found a gun.

          23   A.  No, he didn't.

          24   Q.  We know he's on the phone but he didn't tell you that.

          25   A.  No.


                                           129
 

 

 


           1   Q.  When you asked R31 to look for the gun, R31 didn't say

           2       to you "By the way, Z51 just told me he's found the

           3       gun"?

           4   A.  No, he didn't.

           5   Q.  Can we take it that R31 didn't know that Z51 had found

           6       the gun?

           7   A.  I didn't believe so, no.

           8   Q.  The two of them, on the face of it, appear to believe

           9       independently that they found the gun.

          10   A.  Yes, it would appear so.

          11   Q.  By a coincidence of time they were there, as you can

          12       see, pretty much at the same time.

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   Q.  In your statement, you were asked about seeing

          15       Mark Duggan's hand or arm as if he was reaching for

          16       something?

          17   A.  Yes, I was.

          18   Q.  I think Mr Thomas suggested to you that you hadn't said

          19       it when you were asked questions, whether it was the

          20       fault of the questioner or you, it may not matter, but

          21       you didn't say it when you were asked questions, but it

          22       was in your statement on 7 August?

          23   A.  That's correct, yes, sir.

          24   Q.  I think he suggested you had conferred with others to

          25       leave it out.


                                           130
 

 

 


           1   MR THOMAS:  No.

           2   MR STERN:  That's as I understood it, anyway.

           3   MR THOMAS:  No, let me be clear as Mr Stern is confused.

           4   MR STERN:  I am.

           5   MR THOMAS:  The suggestion is that the reason why it now

           6       appears to be the officer's evidence is because he has

           7       subsequently conferred.

           8   MR STERN:  Well, I'm afraid that does not make it any

           9       clearer to me because it was in your statement on

          10       7 August, wasn't it?

          11   A.  Yes, it was, sir.

          12   Q.  In any event, you were asked about it; is that accurate?

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  What's accurate?

          14   A.  Sorry, sir?

          15   MR STERN:  Is it accurate you saw him reaching across in the

          16       way that you've described in your statement.

          17   A.  Yes, it is.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  In the statement --

          19   A.  In the statement.

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- what, about this "waistband"

          21       element?

          22   A.  In my statement I have not mentioned the waistband which

          23       is an omission by me, however he was reaching towards

          24       his waistband, that's what I thought I wrote in my

          25       statement.


                                           131
 

 

 


           1   MR STERN:  What you've actually put, that he was reaching

           2       across his body and that he had his right hand across

           3       his body.

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  In relation to his jacket, could you see inside his

           6       jacket or what he was doing?

           7   A.  No, I could not.

           8   Q.  Could you see his actual hand?

           9   A.  No, I could not.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I think it's only fair to say that

          11       when he gave evidence yesterday, you were telling the

          12       jury all you could see of him was -- you did this

          13       (indicates), it was the top left hand part of him.

          14   MR STERN:  Left quarter.

          15   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That's what you told us yesterday.

          16   A.  Yes, sir.  That's as I said, through snapshots, he first

          17       came out and as I saw the feathers coming from the rear

          18       of his back I could just see the top rear quarter of

          19       him.  Prior to that he had come out of the car and I had

          20       seen him reaching out of his body and as the feathers

          21       came from the rear of his jacket I could then see the

          22       top quarter of his body.

          23   MR STERN:  I want to ask you about conferring, please, if

          24       I may?

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  So, I want to be absolutely sure


                                           132
 

 

 


           1       what you're telling us, because I know there's

           2       a transcript going on here.

           3   A.  Yes, sir.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  This is your chance.

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We've been around here a few times.

           7       Let's go through, before we go on to anything about

           8       statements and such like.

           9           You tell us, to the jury, exactly frame by frame

          10       what you can remember, all right?

          11   A.  Okay.  As the vehicle stopped, the side door was open

          12       and I saw Mr Duggan exit, very rapidly, from that side

          13       door.  He was inclined forwards in a sprinting pose, as

          14       I've mentioned, and was moving rapidly towards the

          15       Charlie car.

          16           He's then reaching across his body towards his

          17       waistband area.  I've lent down to collect my MP5,

          18       lifted it up and turned slightly to my left.  At this

          19       stage, as I've turned to my left I can then only see the

          20       top left quarter of his body.

          21           At this point, I've heard two gunshots and then from

          22       the rear of his jacket a load of feathers appear.

          23           I then saw him be caught by W70 and be pushed

          24       backwards onto his back as I exited my vehicle.

          25           So as he's come towards the two officers from the


                                           133
 

 

 


           1       Charlie vehicle, I'm seeing less and less of him as

           2       they're obstructing my view.  Because they are between

           3       me and him.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  What is the time between the two

           5       shots?

           6   A.  They were in fairly quick succession.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  How would they sound?

           8   A.  Bang, bang.

           9   MR STERN:  Just to assist you with your note, page 142 of

          10       the transcript yesterday, Mr Underwood asked:

          11           "Question: Let's again focus on Mr Duggan at the

          12       time the feathers were coming out.  In the first place,

          13       he was in a sort of running stance; is that fair?

          14           "Answer: Yes.

          15           "Question: How did that change when the feathers

          16       flew?

          17           "Answer: By that stage I could only see the top

          18       quarter of him, so I couldn't say how his stance had

          19       changed."

          20           I think that's the point you were asking about.

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, yes, I was open at that page.

          22   MR STERN:  Can we look at CD10958.  I know you've been asked

          23       about this but I just want to ask you about it again, if

          24       I may.

          25   A.  Yes, sir.


                                           134
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Could we look, sorry, at the following page, 59, I beg

           2       your pardon.  Thank you.  7.93 asks about detail:

           3           "Detailed accounts should not normally be made

           4       immediately, but can be left until the officers involved

           5       in the shooting are better able to articulate their

           6       experience in a coherent format, normally after at least

           7       48 hours."

           8           I think the reason for that is set out at 7.97:

           9           "A person involved in a traumatic or life

          10       threatening encounter will often experience a range of

          11       physiological and psychological responses which may

          12       determine their perception of time, distance, auditory

          13       and visual stimuli and the chronology of key events.

          14       This may affect their ability immediately after the

          15       incident to recall what may be important detail.  Where,

          16       over time, officers recall further information, this

          17       should be recorded in a further account."

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  Is that your understanding of the reason why it is that

          20       you were asked to make a statement not on 4 August but

          21       later on?

          22   A.  Yes, sir.

          23   Q.  Is that your decision to make a statement on 7 August or

          24       not?

          25   A.  No, it's not, no.


                                           135
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Right.  We just need to be clear about this.  There is

           2       a post-incident manager; is there not?

           3   A.  There is, sir, yes.

           4   Q.  What's his role?

           5   A.  It's to manage the whole procedure once we return to

           6       Leman Street, manage the scene and manage our welfare

           7       and ensure we comply with the ACPO manual guidance in

           8       relation to completing notes, conferring and gaining the

           9       appropriate support we need.

          10   Q.  If you have been ordered to make your statement on

          11       7 August -- on 4 August -- would you have done that?

          12   A.  No, I would not, no.

          13   Q.  You would not have done that anyway.  But you were told

          14       by whom to make it not on 4 August but at a later date?

          15   A.  Post-incident manager.

          16   Q.  Right.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You did make a statement on

          18       4/5 August, as we know?

          19   A.  Yes, made an initial account, sir.

          20   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Who asked you to do that?

          21   A.  The post-incident manager, again.

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  He/she said, everybody please make

          23       your initial accounts?

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Your training is that you put in


                                           136
 

 

 


           1       some details but obviously not a full detailed account.

           2   A.  Exactly that, sir, yes.

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  When we look at your first account,

           4       you have -- for example you describe the bronze-coloured

           5       people carrier and give its registration number.

           6   A.  Yes.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Is that too much detail?

           8   A.  I don't know, sir.  It's the first initial account I've

           9       written.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Then you write down, as we know:

          11           "As I exited the vehicle I heard a number of shots."

          12           Why not say two?

          13   A.  Because at that stage I was -- I believed it was two but

          14       I was -- I wanted to make sure the whole event was clear

          15       in my mind before I wrote my full detailed account.

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Are you told not to say how many

          17       shots and you just put it as several or a number?

          18   A.  Not that I can recall, no.

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We'll hear from everybody else.

          20       No one says two in their first statements.

          21   A.  Really?  No, I was just -- didn't want to say two if

          22       I thought back later and it could have been more than

          23       two.

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Or it might have been one?

          25   A.  Or less than two, yes.  I knew there was a number of


                                           137
 

 

 


           1       shots fired.  However, I wanted (?) to be clear in my

           2       mind by the time I wrote my statement on the 7th.

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  All right.

           4   MR STERN:  Thank you.  Can we go back to 10958 then, and

           5       look at 7.92 because you were asked a number of

           6       questions about it:

           7           "Each officer's initial account should only consist

           8       of their individual recollection of events and should,

           9       among other things, address the question of what they

          10       believed to be the facts and why, if relevant, they

          11       considered that the use of force and discharge of

          12       firearms was absolutely necessary."

          13           Is the initial account personal to you or do you

          14       have to give a comment on the whole case?

          15   A.  It's personal to me, sir.

          16   Q.  Did you use force, whether it was necessary or

          17       unnecessary on that occasion?

          18   A.  I did not use any force.

          19   Q.  If you look, please, at CD9, is where it actually

          20       starts, it's called an evidence and action book in your

          21       notebook.  It was completed on 4/5 August, yes?

          22   A.  Yes, sir.

          23   Q.  Is this the appropriate book to write that initial

          24       account or not?

          25   A.  I would suggest not, sir, no.


                                           138
 

 

 


           1   Q.  Why is that?

           2   A.  For the very reasons we've been through previously, in

           3       relation to the fact it conflicts with the ACPO manual

           4       guidance.

           5   Q.  Right.  So what should be written on it?

           6   A.  I would suggest a statement may be a better form in the

           7       future.

           8   Q.  Now, you were asked by Mr Mansfield about when you wrote

           9       your notes up.  Did you consider the issues of whether

          10       force was absolutely necessary?

          11   A.  Yes.

          12   Q.  Now, obviously you didn't use any force, as you've

          13       already told us, but he, nevertheless, suggests that you

          14       ought to have included in that note whether you

          15       considered what V53 did was absolutely necessary.

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   Q.  I think that's what the suggestion was.

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   Q.  You were asked that question.  Now, you have not seen

          20       anything in the hand of Mr Duggan?

          21   A.  That's correct.

          22   Q.  What you were relying on when you answered the question

          23       to him, because you said it was absolutely necessary in

          24       your view?

          25   A.  Yes.


                                           139
 

 

 


           1   Q.  That was the answer you gave Mr Mansfield yesterday.  He

           2       asked you how did you discern that, and you said, as

           3       a result of having faith in what the officer obviously

           4       told you about it.

           5   A.  Yes.

           6   Q.  Or was there anything else that caused you to believe

           7       that it was absolutely necessary?

           8   A.  Obviously, I couldn't see where Mr Duggan's hands were.

           9       However, my officers are very highly trained and if they

          10       responded in that way, I've total faith they made

          11       a decision based on an immediate threat to their lives

          12       or someone else's, and with the benefit of hindsight,

          13       obviously, I'm aware of what has happened or what had

          14       happened, and therefore I had considered the use of

          15       force to be absolutely necessary.

          16   Q.  You were asked that by Mr Mansfield and, as a result of

          17       everything that you have now know about the case, that

          18       is your view?

          19   A.  Yes.

          20   MR STERN:  Thank you.

          21               Questions from THE ASSISTANT CORONER

          22   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Right.  Can I just -- you've been

          23       asked about the way you made the initial statement --

          24       sorry to go on about it.

          25   A.  That's all right, sir.


                                           140
 

 

 


           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Then we have the fuller detailed

           2       statement.

           3   A.  Yes.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  In between that we've heard a lot

           5       about how you get together to discuss timings, we've

           6       seen those documents.

           7   A.  Yes.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We've got a picture of you all

           9       sitting around for a number of hours just saying let's

          10       see what we can each contribute to the -- let's call it

          11       like a jigsaw puzzle, I suppose, putting the pieces in

          12       to see how much of the picture you can get.

          13   A.  Yes.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  So, as you talk about that, you can

          15       say "Well, let me just make sure I've got the right

          16       number of the people carrier" and you write that down on

          17       your piece of paper and you put it up there --

          18   A.  Yes.

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- things like this --

          20   A.  Yes, sir.

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- to make sure that's all correct.

          22       What happens when you're talking about this with the

          23       other officers and you disagree?

          24   A.  We didn't disagree, sir, it was a case of facts in

          25       relation to road names and routes and facts of -- who


                                           141
 

 

 


           1       was posted to which vehicle, that sort of thing.  There

           2       was no opinion --

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  During these hours, you didn't say

           4       "I saw this" and someone else said "No, I didn't see

           5       that".

           6   A.  No, because we didn't discuss what someone saw or didn't

           7       see.  It was in relation to vehicle positioning,

           8       sequence of events, the timings and those things are all

           9       fairly -- they are factual, as opposed to opinions and

          10       what an individual person has seen is individual to

          11       them, it's their decision what they write in their

          12       statement.

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  So, for example, a very small

          14       example, is you just read out the fact you said it was

          15       a bronze minicab.

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  On your notes, you've written down

          18       it's a gold minicab, and in your final statement

          19       sometimes you call it gold sometimes you call it bronze.

          20   A.  Yes, I do.

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Now, we are not Olympic athletes, it

          22       does not matter whether it's bronze or gold to us.  Was

          23       there something like that going on and you were saying

          24       "Perhaps I've got the colour wrong?"

          25   A.  No, I think that's my mistake really, I just decided to


                                           142
 

 

 


           1       change the colour from bronze to gold.  I knew I was

           2       referring to the same minicab but it was not something

           3       we discussed: what exact colour or hue the minicab was.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Did you look at each other's

           5       statements at the end to see --

           6   A.  No, not at all.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- whether there were any

           8       discrepancies that you needed to iron out.

           9   A.  I think the thing is, from my point of view, we all saw

          10       different things, I would imagine, because we all came

          11       from different locations.  So for us to discuss things

          12       such as that, would not have been helpful in any way,

          13       because what I saw was individual to me and it was my

          14       account of what I saw happening in front of me.  As

          15       I mentioned previously, I saw snapshots of things occur

          16       in front of me and I didn't see other things.

          17   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Now one little thing, a completely

          18       separate point, I just wanted to clarify.  You told us

          19       all about the armament that you had and the guns and

          20       number of rounds of ammunition, as I understand it.  Did

          21       you have some body armour yourself?

          22   A.  Yes, I had a --

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  What's the body armour that you

          24       wore?

          25   A.  It's a very thin kevlar body armour which goes


                                           143
 

 

 


           1       underneath my t-shirt.  It may be worth having that

           2       brought as well in for people to see.

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Do all the squad wear those?

           4   A.  We all wear them, yes.  It's covert body armour that

           5       sits underneath your t-shirt so in theory it cannot be

           6       seen.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The bit of the body that we were

           8       talking about just now, neck to waist, it covers that,

           9       does it?

          10   A.  Yes.  Very similar to what you see your regular police

          11       officer wear but just a lot thinner and smaller and more

          12       covert.

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I don't know whether the jury or

          14       I see regular police officers wearing -- but anyway.

          15   A.  The black Met vest, which covers that body, the central

          16       body mass again, it's just a thinner and smaller version

          17       of that, which goes underneath our clothing.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You wear that, obviously, to prevent

          19       bullets going through it?

          20   A.  It's part of the risk assessment, yes.

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Dare I ask: successful, do they stop

          22       bullets?

          23   A.  Yes, they do, yes.

          24   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  All right.  Let's see --

          25                Further questions by MR MANSFIELD


                                           144
 

 

 


           1   MR MANSFIELD:  Sir, just one point, it relates to Mr Stern's

           2       questioning of the witness.  I've no objection to any of

           3       the questions he put but the question that I put

           4       yesterday at the end of the sequence was: did you see --

           5       to this officer -- did you see anything that would have

           6       justified the absolute necessity for shooting Mr Duggan.

           7       He said no.  So I think that's the full picture.

           8   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Exactly.  The question, I think, was

           9       put really that the whole conclusion that you have come

          10       to on that is based on your faith in knowing V53 and

          11       what he, and perhaps others, had spoken about after the

          12       event?

          13   A.  Yes, sir.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  That's the way I understood the

          15       answer.

          16           Let's come back to see -- Mr Underwood?

          17                  Further questions by MR STERN

          18   MR STERN:  Just before my learned friend, if he does have

          19       anything.  Can I mention one thing, because you asked

          20       a question about the notes and it may help.  Page

          21       CD0012, I think if you hone in on the date you can see

          22       it was originally written as "4" and I think you crossed

          23       that out, have you --

          24   A.  Yes.

          25   Q.  -- and put 5?  So on the statement it's been typed as


                                           145
 

 

 


           1       the 4th.  You don't type the statement, do you?

           2   A.  No, I do not, no.

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I understand that.  Obviously when

           4       he altered it to the 5th it must have been probably

           5       after it had been submitted for being typed up.

           6   A.  No, I don't believe so.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Not that there was anything

           8       suspicious about it.  Initially, I thought I had

           9       a different statement to that one there but it's not.

          10       It's the same.

          11   A.  I believe I just realised -- at the time it was 00.10,

          12       it's obviously flipped from the 4th to the 5th, so

          13       I altered it when I put the timings.  That's all it was.

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Well, it might be a typist's error

          15       then.

          16           Still no questions?

          17                Further questions by MR UNDERWOOD

          18   MR UNDERWOOD:  Only one matter, something that Mr Stern put

          19       in your mouth.  He said that the reason you thought the

          20       force was justified was that you had faith in what your

          21       officers said.  In fact, what you said yesterday was you

          22       had faith in your officers but that gives rise to the

          23       question: at what point did you realise that V53 had

          24       fired and had sought to justify that firing by the

          25       account that he then gave?


                                           146
 

 

 


           1   A.  (Pause)

           2           Sorry, I don't quite follow, sir?  At what point

           3       did I --

           4   Q.  We now know V53 says that he fired because Mr Duggan was

           5       presenting a gun towards him.  We all know that because

           6       he has made several statements about it, there have been

           7       two trials in which Mr Hutchinson-Foster was prosecuted

           8       and this evidence was led, et cetera.

           9   A.  Yes.

          10   Q.  When did you first know about it?

          11   A.  I can't honestly say.  It was apparent what had happened

          12       very quickly.  However, I can't say exactly when I knew

          13       the facts of him pointing a firearm towards V53.

          14   Q.  Did you know it by the time you finished your statement

          15       on 7 August?

          16   A.  Yes.

          17   MR UNDERWOOD:  Thank you very much.  That's all I want to

          18       ask.  Thank you.

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Thank you very much.  That might

          20       actually be an opportunity for a mid-afternoon

          21       five-minute break.

          22   MR UNDERWOOD:  Certainly.

          23   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  What we'll do, members of the jury,

          24       is firstly turn the cameras off, please.  Then,

          25       secondly, ask the jury to leave us for a short break.


                                           147
 

 

 


           1       Thank you.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                           148
 

 

 

 

           7   (3.29 pm)

           8                         (A short break)

           9   (3.40 pm)

          12                  (In the presence of the jury)

          13   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Mr Underwood, who is it you propose

          14       to call now?

          15   MR UNDERWOOD:  I'm going to call Q63, if I may.

          16   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Q63, please.  Thank you.

          17                          Q63 (affirmed)

          18                   (The witness was anonymised)

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Have a seat, please.  Then I'll

          20       indicate the cameras may now be turned on, then

          21       obviously Mr Underwood will go through the usual

          22       procedures firstly.

          23                    Questions by MR UNDERWOOD

          24   MR UNDERWOOD:  Good afternoon, my name's Underwood, I'm

          25       counsel for the Inquest.  I'll start the questioning.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                           149
 

 

 


           1       I hope you have the laminated piece of paper there with

           2       some initials on and some names.

           3   A.  I do, sir, that's correct.

           4   Q.  Can you run down it and find Q63?

           5   A.  I have that, sir, yes.

           6   Q.  Is that you?

           7   A.  It is, yes.

           8   Q.  Thank you very much.  I think, in August 2011 at least,

           9       you were an officer working with CO19; is that right?

          10   A.  That is correct, I was, yes.

          11   Q.  I want to ask you about the events of 4 August 2011, and

          12       in particular I want to pick it up from about 4 o'clock

          13       that evening.  Is that when you paraded for duty?

          14   A.  That is correct, sir.  It was, yes.

          15   Q.  You were designated the driver of the Bravo car?

          16   A.  Yes, I was.

          17   Q.  What weaponry did you have?

          18   A.  I had immediate access to my Glock 17 self-loading

          19       pistol, which would have been on my right hip in

          20       a holster.  I also had access to a Taser, X26 type

          21       Taser, and my MP5 carbine, which is a longer rifle,

          22       which would have been secured in a slip in the boot of

          23       my vehicle, should I have needed it.

          24   Q.  A slip in the boot, did you say?

          25   A.  Yes.


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           1   Q.  Thank you.  We've heard from a number of officers about

           2       how the trip went from Leman Street to Quicksilver and

           3       how intelligence came en route and how you went from

           4       Quicksilver then to the Leyton area.  I am not going to

           5       trouble you with that.  What I want to do is ask you how

           6       things went from state red being declared; do you

           7       follow?

           8   A.  Okay, sir.

           9   Q.  You were in convoy at that stage, were you?

          10   A.  That is correct, we were, yes.

          11   Q.  Did you personally have sight of the minicab?

          12   A.  I did, yes.  Yes, on a number of occasions.

          13   Q.  There came a point when "Strike" was called; is that so?

          14   A.  That's correct, yes.

          15   Q.  Again, did you have sight of the minicab at that stage?

          16   A.  I did, yes.

          17   Q.  Tell us how the stop went, please.

          18   A.  Okay.  If I take it from the point where we're one -- so

          19       the Alpha vehicle was behind a dark coloured X5 BMW, the

          20       BMW, I think, at the junction of Jarrow Road turned

          21       left, which would have meant our Alpha vehicle was

          22       immediately behind the minicab.

          23           At that stage, the second in command in the Alpha

          24       vehicle called the strike.  The Alpha vehicle pushed

          25       wide and offside of the minicab, drove down the offside


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           1       and cut across the front of it in order to try and

           2       effectively stop the minicab, if you like.

           3           I then drove the Bravo vehicle, the BMW, along the

           4       offside and maintained, as best I could, a parallel with

           5       the offside which gave us a tactical benefit there.

           6           Then the Charlie vehicle effectively brought up the

           7       rear, so we had almost a mobile containment of that

           8       minicab up until the point where we managed to

           9       effectively stop it.

          10   Q.  Anything unusual about the stop, as far as you were

          11       concerned?

          12   A.  No, sir, I think the stop actually went very well.

          13   Q.  Did you use your siren?

          14   A.  I did, that's correct, yes.

          15   Q.  Why?

          16   A.  At the point where I was alongside the minicab somebody

          17       in my vehicle said something along the lines of "I think

          18       he's going to leg it".  At that point, I believed that

          19       the subject inside the car, Mr Duggan, was aware that we

          20       were police officers.  The minicab driver may have been

          21       unaware at this point, so to allow the stop to go in as

          22       safely as possible for everyone involved, I put on the

          23       two tones to alert the minicab driver in the hope that

          24       that would actually allow him to realise who we were and

          25       safely stop the vehicle so we could deploy and attempt


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           1       to detain Mr Duggan.

           2   Q.  Okay.  The original of the minicab that featured in this

           3       stop has unfortunately been turned into a small cube of

           4       rust and we've bought ourselves what we hope is

           5       a replica.  The replica has very dark glass in the back

           6       and we don't know until we get the taxi driver here what

           7       he says about how accurate this replica is.  Can you

           8       recall how easy it was to see inside the minicab?

           9   A.  I can't, no, to be honest, no.

          10   Q.  So, you brought your car to a stop.  We know you've got

          11       a Glock and you have access to a Taser without getting

          12       into the boot.  What did you actually take out of the

          13       car with you?

          14   A.  I had with me my Glock, which remained holstered, and

          15       that was actually all I took with me at the time.

          16   Q.  We've been hearing a fair amount of evidence about how

          17       individual officers in cars are supposed to deploy in

          18       a stop like this and what we gather is that the front

          19       seat passenger is really the first one out to contain

          20       subjects and naturally the driver is pretty much going

          21       to be the last person out of each car; was that the

          22       situation here, as far as you were concerned?

          23   A.  Certainly in our vehicle it was, sir, yes, that's

          24       correct.

          25   Q.  Can you just tell us about your choice of not taking


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           1       your gun out of its holster?

           2   A.  Certainly.  Obviously, every vehicle has an individual

           3       role, if you like, and within that vehicle every officer

           4       has a role.  My role as the driver of the Bravo vehicle

           5       is initially, once a stop is going in, is obviously to

           6       get that vehicle stopped in a way the front seat

           7       operator, if you like, can effectively dominate anybody

           8       inside with firearms, cover and verbal stunning.  They

           9       can then choose to deploy.

          10           I obviously -- obviously -- I remain in the vehicle

          11       for a very short period of time, simply because should

          12       the subject vehicle which we're trying to stop manage to

          13       drive out of the stop in any way by force or bad

          14       judgment by ourselves, it's more than likely that I, as

          15       the driver, will be in the best position to pursue that

          16       vehicle safely without having to try -- and obviously

          17       the Alpha car would be at an angle, so it would make

          18       sense for me to remain.  Once I'm happy the vehicle is

          19       stopped and the subjects are being detained or attempted

          20       to be detained, I get out and I've got an option whereby

          21       I can draw a firearm.

          22           In this instance, it's my choice, my discretion.  As

          23       far as we were concerned, there was one potentially

          24       hostile subject in that vehicle and I was confident with

          25       my team deploying around me that I would not necessarily


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           1       have to deploy straightaway.  I had access to it and

           2       I would have readied it by lifting my t-shirt over and

           3       tucking it inside the holster, which meant, within

           4       a very quick time, a matter of less than a second,

           5       I could draw that and present my firearm to any threat.

           6           As it was, I didn't need to at that time and, as

           7       a Bravo driver, it also gives you that option where it's

           8       likely that you're one of the last people to deploy, if

           9       you like, just by a fraction of a time, but one of the

          10       last to deploy, that you can maintain some kind of

          11       overview to assist and direct people if necessary and

          12       help out the firearms team leader.

          13   Q.  Were the windows down on your car?

          14   A.  They were, that's correct, yes.

          15   Q.  Bearing in mind that you were held in the car for a bit

          16       to see what was going to happen, were you conscious of

          17       shouts while you were in the car or while you were

          18       getting out of the car?

          19   A.  I was, yes.  There were definitely shouts.

          20   Q.  Was it the usual shouting, the dominating shouting that

          21       we've seen on the training videos?

          22   A.  That's correct.  Yes, there was.

          23   Q.  Could you pick out any phrases like "Put the gun down"

          24       or anything like that?

          25   A.  Not necessarily "Put the gun down" but I certainly heard


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           1       shouts of "Armed police", "Show me your hands", "Get on

           2       the floor", for sure.

           3   Q.  Did you hear anybody demanding anyone should stop?

           4   A.  I did, yes.  Yes.

           5   Q.  Can you recall who said that?

           6   A.  I distinctly remember W42 shouting commands.

           7   Q.  What commands?

           8   A.  I believe -- he was saying to stop and identifying

           9       himself as an armed police officer.

          10   Q.  Were you in the car at that stage or out, can you

          11       recall?

          12   A.  He repeated it, so initially -- when I stay in the car,

          13       it's only for a very, very short period of time.  It's

          14       just for me to satisfy myself the vehicle is not going

          15       to go anywhere.  We're talking less than a second, so

          16       for him to repeat something, I probably would have heard

          17       whilst in the car and at the time of deploying.  It was

          18       commands which was repeated and I know he definitely

          19       said it.

          20   Q.  Could you see who he was directing that at?

          21   A.  I couldn't, no.

          22   Q.  So when you got out of your car, which way did you go?

          23   A.  I got out of the car and I effectively turned right,

          24       running down the offside of our vehicle towards the

          25       boot.


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           1   Q.  We've got photographs showing how the cars were left

           2       after the stop.  If we look, for example, in --

           3   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Have a look in that red folder.

           4   MR UNDERWOOD:  -- the bundle there, behind divider 1,

           5       there's a photograph number 14; do you have that

           6       photograph?

           7   A.  I do, sir, that's correct.

           8   Q.  It's taken from an angle, obviously, so it may have --

           9       may give a slightly false impression of how close things

          10       were.  The very dark BMW closest to us there is your

          11       Bravo car, isn't it?

          12   A.  That is correct, it is, yes.

          13   Q.  So you came out of the driver's side and you say you

          14       went round the back?

          15   A.  That is correct, yes.

          16   Q.  Then where?

          17   A.  I ran effectively past the rear boot of our vehicle and

          18       down towards the gap, which is shown there between our

          19       Charlie vehicle, the BMW estate, and the minicab.

          20   Q.  Right.  Did you see the person we now know to be

          21       Mr Duggan?

          22   A.  I did, yes.

          23   Q.  Was he upright at that stage?

          24   A.  He was, that's correct, yes.

          25   Q.  I say "upright" very loosely.  Tell us what position he


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           1       was in, if you could.

           2   A.  He was standing for sure.  He was bent slightly forward,

           3       I suggest, as though he was -- had been or was running.

           4       It was a snapshot I saw but he was lent slightly forward

           5       and was moving towards the officers which were deploying

           6       from our Charlie vehicle.

           7   Q.  Could you see his arms?

           8   A.  I couldn't, no.

           9   Q.  You say it's a snapshot; was it just a glimpse?

          10   A.  Absolutely, yes.

          11   Q.  Did you hear shots?

          12   A.  I did, yes.

          13   Q.  What happened then?

          14   A.  As I got really -- between really our Bravo vehicle and

          15       the Charlie vehicle, the front of that, I hadn't quite

          16       reached the pavement.  I know that for a fact, and

          17       I heard two shots and I saw Mr Duggan, I would describe

          18       it as buckle slightly at the waist, as though he had

          19       been wounded -- sorry, winded not "wounded", as if

          20       somebody had perhaps -- you know, he had been punched in

          21       the stomach.  It had that kind of effect where he bent

          22       forward.

          23   Q.  Did he come back up?

          24   A.  I do not believe he did, no.

          25   Q.  Let's get this clear: he slightly stooped forward as if


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           1       running or had been running, you hear the shots and he

           2       goes forward --

           3   A.  That is correct, yes.

           4   Q.  -- and doesn't ever come back up; is that fair?

           5   A.  In my recollection at the time, he never, ever stood

           6       back upright, no.

           7   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  When you got that glimpse, where

           8       exactly were you in relation to the position of the

           9       vehicles?

          10   A.  From recollection, sir, I would say, if you looked at

          11       the Charlie vehicle, the estate at the rear, I was

          12       probably, in my opinion, in front of the number plate,

          13       if you like, so I was very close --

          14   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  The front number plate?

          15   A.  The front number plate, yes, sir.  So I was in that area

          16       immediately behind the taxi minicab and the front of our

          17       Charlie vehicle.

          18   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  And Mr Duggan was on the pavement?

          19   A.  He was slightly, yes, sir.

          20   MR UNDERWOOD:  You very kindly drew a map in one of the very

          21       many statements you were asked to make by the IPCC.

          22       Perhaps we could look at that, at CE267.  It's not in

          23       there, I'm afraid, it will come up on the screen in

          24       a moment.

          25   A.  Okay.


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           1   Q.  Do you recall this?

           2   A.  I do, yes.

           3   Q.  Looking at the pavement by the minicab, there's a box

           4       with "A" in it; did you draw that?

           5   A.  I did, yes, that's correct.

           6   Q.  What did you mean by that?

           7   A.  That was the area in which I first saw Mr Duggan and in

           8       which he unfortunately ended up when he was laid prone

           9       on the floor immediately following the incident.

          10   Q.  Thank you.  Now, did you see feathers or anything like

          11       feathers?

          12   A.  I did, that's correct, yes.

          13   Q.  Where were they in relation to Mr Duggan?

          14   A.  They were in the air behind him and all around him

          15       really.  It was quite a number of -- quite a large plume

          16       of feathers, if you like.

          17   Q.  Was there much time between the two shots?

          18   A.  There wasn't much time, no.  But, in my opinion, they

          19       were two distinctive shots, although they were very

          20       close together.

          21   Q.  Do you know the phrase "double tap"?

          22   A.  I do sir.

          23   Q.  That's where two shots are fired as quickly as possible.

          24   A.  That's correct, yes.

          25   Q.  Was this a double tap or was there more time between


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           1       them?

           2   A.  It was not a double tap, no.  There was a significant

           3       pause, I believe, in between the two shots.

           4   Q.  You are obviously a trained firearms officer, in your

           5       experience, was that the sort of time between shots that

           6       would represent a reassessment?

           7   A.  In response -- all I would say is it's very -- it's

           8       possible to reassess a situation very, very quickly.  To

           9       fire a shot and then to still see that threat there.  If

          10       you're -- believe there's a real or imminent threat to

          11       yourself or someone else, then it's possible to take two

          12       shots very, very quickly and reassess both shots.

          13   Q.  Again, I'm asking for your opinion on the basis of your

          14       experience here, the time between these two shots was

          15       capable of supporting a reassessment between --

          16   A.  Absolutely, definitely, yes.

          17   Q.  Whether or not that was actually carried out is a matter

          18       for V53, of course --

          19   A.  Certainly, sir, yes.

          20   Q.  -- but I'm just trying to get an impression of time from

          21       you.  Thank you.

          22           Now, what happened to Mr Duggan?  You say he went

          23       forward.  What happened then?

          24   A.  Okay, so there was the two shots, Mr Duggan lent forward

          25       and at some point as he was moving to the floor, falling


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           1       to the floor, an officer almost caught him, if you like,

           2       pretty much and then laid him onto the floor.

           3   Q.  So he was going forward to the floor, was he still --

           4       quite apart from buckling forwards, was he still moving

           5       forwards on his legs; can you recall?

           6   A.  Yes, in my opinion he would have been moving with

           7       purpose at the point of where the shots would have

           8       impacted and I believe that he was moving forward still,

           9       having been trying to run away, if that makes sense --

          10       or make an escape.

          11   Q.  Was it an officer in front of him who caught him or

          12       an officer behind him?

          13   A.  It was an officer in front of him.

          14   Q.  Having caught him and put him down, did he put him

          15       forwards, backwards, sideways or what?

          16   A.  I cannot remember, to be honest, sir.

          17   Q.  The box you marked "A" on the map represents both where

          18       Mr Duggan was when you first saw him and the general

          19       area where he ended up; is that fair?

          20   A.  That is correct, yes.

          21   Q.  Did you, at that stage, look into the minicab?

          22   A.  Shortly after that I did, yes.

          23   Q.  Can you give us some idea of how many seconds might have

          24       gone past?

          25   A.  Two or three maybe.  I cannot be 100 per cent certain


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           1       but it was very soon after the shots.  I mean, it went

           2       down the nearside of the minicab, the sliding door was

           3       open and I looked inside very briefly.

           4   Q.  What for?

           5   A.  Just to clear it of any other people, to see whether

           6       there were any other persons inside that minicab?

           7   Q.  Do you know if the driver had been taken out by that

           8       stage?

           9   A.  I can't be certain.  I believe he had been.  Only

          10       because if he hadn't, then he would have potentially

          11       posed a threat to us and I would have perhaps dealt with

          12       that from where I was, so I think he was taken out.

          13   Q.  All right.  Did you then become aware W42 had been shot?

          14   A.  I did.  It was almost at the same time as I went to look

          15       in the cabin, yes.

          16   Q.  Did you go to him?

          17   A.  I did, that's correct, yes.

          18   Q.  Did you then deal with getting the emergency services

          19       there?

          20   A.  I did, yes, that's correct.

          21   Q.  There came a point when CPR was given to Mr Duggan.

          22       Were you aware of that?

          23   A.  I was, yes.

          24   Q.  There also came a point where R31 reported that he had

          25       found a gun; did you become aware of that?


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           1   A.  I was, yes.

           2   Q.  We know filming was done of the first aid; was that by

           3       you?

           4   A.  Yes.

           5   Q.  Why was that?

           6   A.  It's something that -- certainly I was taught on my

           7       courses, that obviously there's a -- roles, and some of

           8       them are more important than others, and there's always

           9       something you could be doing to help things out.  One of

          10       the suggestions was from people's previous experience,

          11       not mine, from others' previous experience, was it's

          12       beneficial sometimes, if there's nothing else to be

          13       done, to film the first aid to show what efforts were

          14       made in an attempt to save Mr Duggan, and also it may

          15       help the investigation team at a later stage because it

          16       may pick up areas of the scene, et cetera.

          17           So it's just something we were told.  It's not

          18       compulsory but if you get the time, it has been

          19       a benefit in the past and, based on that, I chose to

          20       film it.

          21   Q.  Was there any part of that sort of training and

          22       suggestion that you might usefully film other parts of

          23       the scene?

          24   A.  No, it wasn't, no.

          25   Q.  I know you tell us when you looked in the minicab you


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           1       looked for people.  Did you actually get an impression

           2       of what else was, in fact, in the minicab?

           3   A.  No, I didn't notice anything significant.

           4   Q.  We know there was a box with the lid off it at some

           5       point there sitting on the floor; do you recall seeing

           6       that?

           7   A.  I don't, no.

           8   Q.  We know the helicopter emergency services arrived and

           9       the doctor attended, did surgery and then pronounced

          10       life extinct; were you aware of those things?

          11   A.  I was, yes.

          12   Q.  Did you then go back afterwards and get into the

          13       post-incident procedure?

          14   A.  That's correct, yes.

          15   Q.  We know that you made a statement on 7 August in company

          16       with many other officers in Leman Street and we've heard

          17       that took eight hours or so; can you tell us how that

          18       process went?

          19   A.  Certainly.  I cannot recall the time we met.  We met as

          20       a group and obviously to do our statement around the

          21       events of what happened on 4 August and initially we did

          22       some conferring around specifics, around the timeline,

          23       if you like, and the sequence of events and the

          24       locations of certain instances, road names, et cetera

          25       and I, in fact, prepared some flip chart with those on


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           1       just so people were aware of those details.

           2           At the time I chose to do that because, for example,

           3       it benefited me because, being the driver of the

           4       vehicle, although I'm familiar with the area of London

           5       in which the operation took place, when you're driving

           6       sometimes we cannot use the warning equipment, so you

           7       concentrate so hard on getting to somewhere that you

           8       aren't actually aware of the roads/junctions that you

           9       pass through.  So for me to make a detailed account, it

          10       certainly benefited me that I could have the road

          11       names, et cetera, that we went down.

          12           So once that was prepared, we all agreed that we

          13       would write our statements almost in segments, if you

          14       like, so we would start at a certain point and we would

          15       agree we would write up to the next point.  Once you

          16       finished that, you then left the room and allowed the

          17       next person to finish, and so everyone really worked at

          18       the pace of the slowest person and there was no pressure

          19       on anybody else and once they'd finished we'd have

          20       a natural break or something, then go back and start

          21       again, and we'd write our notes really up until the

          22       point where we deployed, if you like, and from there any

          23       use of force or our individual actions of the scene were

          24       wrote independently of everyone else, although in the

          25       same room, but there was no conferring, and we went


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           1       through our actions and we gave our best detailed

           2       evidence we could of our recollection of events at that

           3       time.

           4   Q.  We keep referring to the officers who were the CO19

           5       officers as a team; were you in fact a team?

           6   A.  We were, yes.

           7   Q.  So you worked together day in, day out?

           8   A.  Yes.  There was some officers who were guesting on our

           9       team, if you like, but we certainly worked very closely

          10       with everyone that was there that day, yes.

          11   Q.  Was there discussion about this incident at any time

          12       between the shooting and the time that you came to make

          13       your statement on 7 August?

          14   A.  I certainly didn't discuss it with anybody else, no.

          15   Q.  What was the purpose of making the statement on

          16       7 August?

          17   A.  Basically, we did an initial account at the time and the

          18       reason we did it on the 7th was it gave us a rest

          19       period, it's recommended maybe up to 48 hours, where

          20       following such a traumatic event, some people

          21       effectively suffer from what's called "perceptual

          22       distortion", whereby sequence of events, timings and

          23       audio and visual aspects, if you like, can be slightly

          24       distorted and may not be in the sequence that it

          25       actually happened.


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           1           So what it does is it allows you that time and your

           2       mind that time to try and get things back in the right

           3       order and allows you then to come in and provide your

           4       best evidence and give a more fuller account to enable

           5       the investigation team to make their investigation.

           6   Q.  Why were you making statements at all?

           7   A.  Sorry, sir?

           8   Q.  Why were you making statements at all?  What was the

           9       purpose of making statements?

          10   A.  Just -- it allowed me to give my version of the event of

          11       what happened on 4 August.

          12   Q.  What did you think was going to happen to that account?

          13   A.  It would be submitted to the investigation team and they

          14       would obviously look at that as part of their

          15       investigation.

          16   Q.  Investigation of what, though?

          17   A.  The fatal shooting of Mr Duggan.

          18   Q.  So, as far as you were concerned, the purpose of these

          19       statements was to explain to those investigating the

          20       shooting what had happened and what had led to the

          21       shooting?

          22   A.  Certainly my statement, sir, yes.

          23   Q.  You're clear, are you, that, at least as far as you were

          24       concerned, there was no discussion between you and other

          25       team members from the moment that shooting happened to


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           1       the moment you finished your statement about just that?

           2   A.  Yes, absolutely, sir, yes.

           3   Q.  Now, officer, we've got some footage we call the BBC

           4       footage.  I dare say you've seen it.

           5   A.  I have, yes.

           6   Q.  We have it in so many different versions it makes the

           7       head spin.  One of the versions which I'm about to show

           8       you has -- it's been called -- it's been subjected to

           9       a process we call "stabilisation", maybe subjected to

          10       even worse, and it's had some arrows put on it.

          11           We do have a version which has none of those which

          12       may be clearer, opinions vary.  We'll show you that

          13       later.  But, first of all, can I show you the one with

          14       arrows on?

          15           I'll let you see the whole length of it, first of

          16       all, but I dare say you've been asked to say whether the

          17       white arrow is you.  But let's play it and perhaps keep

          18       your eye on the white arrow.

          19             (Video footage was played to the court)

          20           Let's just stop it there if we may.

          21                    (The video footage ended)

          22           Until the last few seconds, would this be a fair

          23       description of what you were doing: you were making

          24       yourself useful?

          25   A.  I was, that's correct, yes.


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           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I think we should have it confirmed

           2       who you are.

           3   MR UNDERWOOD:  You are the man with the white arrow, are

           4       you?

           5   A.  That's me, yes.

           6   MR MANSFIELD:  Now, we can't do everything by the second but

           7       the best we can work out is that the minicab stopped

           8       recording its GPS at 6.12.43.  We can see by other

           9       footage that shots were fired by 6.12.53, by the latest

          10       by the look of things.  This video appears to have

          11       started at 6.13.22, so about 30 seconds after the shots

          12       were fired at the most.

          13           So we see you making yourself useful up to the point

          14       where you get behind the minicab.  Can you tell us what

          15       you were doing there?

          16   A.  At what point, sorry, sir?

          17   Q.  There's a point -- in fact it's 6.18.09 -- where you

          18       disappear behind the minicab for 12 seconds and then

          19       come back out again; do you want to see that again?

          20   A.  No, I've seen that plenty of times.

          21   Q.  What were you doing there?

          22   A.  My recollection now is that I was helping initially --

          23       when Mr Duggan was lying on the floor, the two officers,

          24       I believe, at the time were rendering first aid.  One

          25       was giving CPR chest impressions and the other had


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           1       oxygen and putting a squeezy bottle, if you like -- the

           2       best way I can describe it -- giving oxygen in, to try

           3       and keep Mr Duggan alive.

           4           Apologies for this, but there was an awful lot of

           5       blood and stuff and the officers were getting covered in

           6       that and I believe one of the wound dressings was

           7       actually becoming unuseful, if you like.  It was losing

           8       its stick, and there was a second medic pack which

           9       somebody asked me to open.  I opened that.  There's

          10       a plastic seal on them, you have to break the seal and

          11       it's like -- I don't know if you've seen one, it's like

          12       a big rucksack, really, with a zip all the way round.

          13       You fold it open and break it into two halves and then

          14       there's various compartments within that, which hold

          15       various bandages and tourniquets and other useful bits

          16       of kit that would be needed to render first aid.

          17           So I was basically opening that up for the officers

          18       that were giving the first aid and were unfortunately

          19       contaminated with blood.

          20   Q.  Then we see you move away from that area after

          21       12 seconds and it's the bit we just saw before it

          22       stopped, you're walking along to the left on our screen

          23       and your right arm seems to be out and pointing at or

          24       flailing at over the wall; is that fair?

          25   A.  That's correct, sir.


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           1   Q.  What were you doing there?

           2   A.  For a long period of time, one of my main concerns

           3       following the incident was getting the area scened-off,

           4       if you like, and I believe it's -- it may well be --

           5       I don't know the area, apologies -- it may well be

           6       an extension of Jarrow Road which runs parallel with

           7       where the stop took place.

           8           There was a large crowd gathering there and for

           9       a long period of time we were not really able to control

          10       that so I was trying to direct resources as they were

          11       arriving down to that area, just to keep it sterile so

          12       that we could do our job.

          13   Q.  Forgive me for a moment.

          14   A.  Certainly, sir.

          15   Q.  (Pause)

          16           Yes, that's all I want to ask you.  Thank you very

          17       much.

          18   A.  Thank you, sir.

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Yes, Mr Mansfield?

          20   MR MANSFIELD:  I've just been handed something --

          21   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  You take your time with it.

          22   MR MANSFIELD:  -- that applies to this officer.

          23           Sir, it's an original, so I had better be careful

          24       for the moment.  I can do a little tonight but I won't

          25       finish tonight.


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           1   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  I'm in your hands.  If you prefer to

           2       do your questioning in one go --

           3   MR MANSFIELD:  I think I ought to see this first.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- and if you want to see

           5       something --

           6           We were half-promised some second look at something

           7       which may be a little clearer or it's not, of that?

           8   MR MANSFIELD:  Yes.

           9   MR UNDERWOOD:  We have it.  We could show it now.

          10   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Let's do that.  Then that will be

          11       a convenient moment and we won't start any questions.

          12       Let's see what we can put it up.

          13   MR UNDERWOOD:  I say we have it but I hope it's in the same

          14       order.  The trouble is, I think, that the original takes

          15       of this may have amounted to something like seven in

          16       number.  They may have been put together in one order on

          17       one video, they may not be in necessarily the same

          18       order.  Perhaps we could have a look.

          19   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  Let's do the best we can and see

          20       whether there's any better clarity that can be given

          21       to --

          22             (Video footage was played to the court)

          23           I think we have probably passed any useful point in

          24       the film.

          25   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  It goes back over itself a little


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           1       bit.  But generally the picture seems to be slightly

           2       clearer than the centralised one --

           3   MR UNDERWOOD:  I stand corrected.

           4   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  -- whether it provides any better

           5       evidential basis, I don't know.

           6   MR UNDERWOOD:  We'll certainly be hearing from the expert

           7       who's been working on it to stabilise it and so forth

           8       and who put the arrows on it, so all questions about

           9       what can possibly be discerned on it, by experts even

          10       better than us, can be asked of him.

          11   THE ASSISTANT CORONER:  We have now used up the time through

          12       until 4.30 so I think, members of the jury, we'll bring

          13       proceedings to a close now for today.  So I'll ask the

          14       cameras please to be turned off.  Thank you very much,

          15       members of the jury, if you would like to leave us and

          16       be ready for 10.30 tomorrow morning.

 

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           9   (4.29 pm)

          10       (The Inquest adjourned until 10.30 am on Thursday,

          11                         10 October 2013)

          12
               Housekeeping .........................................1
          13
               V59 (continued) ......................................2
          14
                   Questions by MR MANSFIELD (continued) ............2
          15
                   Questions by MR THOMAS ..........................64
          16
                   Questions by MR BUTT ............................99
          17
                   Questions by MR STERN ..........................107
          18
                   Questions from THE ASSISTANT CORONER ...........140
          19
                   Further questions by MR MANSFIELD ..............144
          20
                   Further questions by MR STERN ..................145
          21
                   Further questions by MR UNDERWOOD ..............146
          22
               Q63 (affirmed) .....................................149
          23
                   Questions by MR UNDERWOOD ......................149
          24

          25


          

 


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