



Philip Williams
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2 November 2010

Déar Mr Williams

Re: Unauthorised access to voicemails

I write in response to your letter received on 28th October 2010 in relation to the above.

As you rightly acknowledge, the mobile network providers worked closely with the MPS at the time of investigation under the guidance and controls of RIPA. However, Orange simply responded to a valid section 22 RIPA notice and does not know the extent to which any of the information that was supplied in relation to that RIPA request relates (or is relevant) to the MPS investigation.

Orange and T-Mobile also introduced a number of preventative measures to ensure that the confidentiality of all our customers' voicemails was protected.

At no point during the investigation, or subsequently, have Orange or T-Mobile been asked by the MPS to contact any potential victims.

To deal with your specific requests for assistance in turn:

1. Orange supplied communications data pursuant to RIPA. The communications data supplied related to searches of our call records to identify incoming calls from particular telephone numbers (supplied to us by the MPS). Of those incoming calls, a portion of those records indicated a connection to the voicemail of 45 Orange subscribers. Our records are not able to identify what activity the callers had undertaken on connection to that voicemail (i.e. our records would indicate how long the call had lasted, but not whether the caller had listened to, created or deleted particular messages).

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Our records are not able to identify whether or not the numbers that we supplied to the MPS were potential victims of voicemail compromise. Orange had no knowledge or visibility of the identity of those calling numbers. At no point were Orange asked by the MPS to make contact with any customer identified as part of the police investigation, nor did we feel it right to take further action in relation to those customers as the disclosure of this information was made during an ongoing police investigation. Also we do not consider it out of the ordinary for mailboxes to be accessed by phones other than the customers' own mobile as this is a feature of the service we provide. As such, no Orange customers were contacted.

2. Orange assisted the investigation by providing a list of mobile numbers that had been called by a set of telephone numbers supplied to us by the MPS. Orange has no knowledge if those Orange mobiles were being called legitimately or with the intention of attempting to access their voicemail without authorisation. This was part of the police investigation and for the MPS to identify.

3. If the MPS can confirm the owner/subscriber of those calling numbers and the reason they believe that those calling numbers potentially unlawfully accessed Orange customers' mailboxes, then I will attempt to make contact with the Orange customers to explain that we have been requested to inform them - by the MPS - that they may have been a victim of voicemail compromise, why the MPS suspect this and provide them with the MPS single point of contact as detailed in your letter.

I would also use the opportunity to reiterate to the customer the importance of taking the appropriate security precautions to protect their voicemail service, such as regularly changing the PINs they use to access their mailboxes. I would also advise that our Customer Services representatives are trained to help callers who seek assistance in protecting the confidentiality of their accounts if they feel that their public profile is such, that additional security measures are appropriate.

I should point out that due to the long period of time since we supplied the call records to you, some of those customers identified may no longer be Orange customers and it will not be possible to make contact with those individuals.

Everything Everywhere is committed to assisting as much as possible in relation to this investigation, within the limitations of what we can usefully provide. If you feel it would be beneficial to discuss this further then please let me know.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Yours sincerely



Jonathan Grayling
Head of Government Liaison & Security
Everything Everywhere

O₂

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12th November 2010

m: [redacted]
e: chris.martin@[redacted]

Dear Mr. Williams

Reference: Interception of Customer Voicemail Messages

Your recent letter to Mr. Gorham has been passed to me to respond.

I am familiar with the enquiry in 2006 concerning interception of voicemails; you may recall I had several meetings with you and DCI Surtees at the time, and provided assistance to the police enquiry team on behalf of O2.

I can confirm that the O2 customers identified in 2006 by us as potential victims of voicemail interception were contacted at the time and given advice. The only exception to this is we did not, at the request of your team, contact the members of the royal household who were being dealt with by the police; however general advice on voicemail security was given to their service provider.

For any future enquiries you may have in relation to this matter I will be your single point of contact at O2.

Yours sincerely

[Redacted signature area]

C Martin
Head of Customer Security
Telefonía O2 UK Limited

A *Telefonía* company



22 November 2010

FAO Philip Williams
Detective Chief Superintendent
SCD11 Surveillance Command
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Your ref: PW/ka
Our Ref: DB/JS 221110

Dear Detective Chief Superintendent Williams

Thank you for your letter of 28th October 2010 sent by email. I am familiar with your enquiry into the activities of Mulcaire and Goodman in 2005/2006. Then, as now, Vodafone is happy to provide support to the police service as required.

I am surprised that you say that you thought at the time of the investigation that "all of the people potentially identified as being victims" had been "contacted" by Service Providers, including Vodafone. Whilst we were able to furnish the police with information and data requested, it is not for Vodafone to determine who is a "potential victim" in a Police led investigation, whether in relation to the Mulcaire and Goodman case or any other. This is something for the police to establish, and it is for the police to take such steps to inform potential victims of crime as they deem appropriate, which I accept could have included asking Vodafone to contact a given list of customers. Indeed in the ordinary course the reverse is in fact the case, in that Vodafone is always at pains to ensure that no confidential details regarding ongoing police investigations are inadvertently made available to the general public. I am sure you agree that this is as it should be, and that it is for the police and other law enforcement agencies to release such details about any investigation as they deem appropriate, so as not to undermine that investigation or jeopardise any subsequent prosecutions.

I have spent some time checking with colleagues who were involved at the time and can confirm that we adhered to the general practice I have described above in the Mulcaire and Goodman case. A search of our files in relation to the matter has not revealed any request from your officers that we do otherwise.

That being the case I note that you now ask that Vodafone contact customers "to suggest that they might have been a victim". I do not regard that as appropriate. First, Vodafone does not have all of the facts concerning this matter, but only copies of its own records and therefore we are unable to determine who might have been a victim connected with this specific investigation. Secondly, if you were to supply me with a list of the individuals and/or entities which you have in mind, it is very likely that a number of these are no longer customers of Vodafone, meaning it is inappropriate for us to approach them in any event.

I trust that this makes Vodafone's position clear, but if you want to discuss this in any detail please let me know.

Yours sincerely

Julie Steele
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Fraud, Risk & Security

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