



Responsibility for the regulation of health and safety on the railways was transferred from the Health and Safety Commission (HSC) and Health and Safety Executive (HSE) to the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) on 1 April 2006.

This document was originally produced by HSC/E but responsibility for the subject/work area in the document has now moved to ORR.

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## **Derailments on London Underground at Camden Town and Hammersmith**

### **Friday 17 October 2003 – Eastbound Piccadilly Line derailment – Hammersmith Station**

On Friday 17 October 2003, the last carriage of an eastbound Piccadilly Line train derailed at approximately 21.20 east of Hammersmith station. All eight wheels of the rear carriage left the rails, with the carriage remaining upright, while travelling at approximately 20 mph. There were 70 passengers on the train, and HSE had no reports of any injuries to them. All the passengers were evacuated quickly via a second train adjacent to the derailed one. The immediate cause of the derailment was a broken rail. HSE has reviewed maintenance records and procedures, and is awaiting the outcome of specialist assessment.

This investigation is complete. It focused on track maintenance standards, and the condition of the track in the area of the derailment. No formal enforcement action was taken, but the issues raised have been taken forward as part of HSE's ongoing work on monitoring track maintenance.

### **Sunday 19 October 2003 – Northbound Northern Line derailment – Camden Town station**

A derailment on the northbound Northern Line approach to Camden Town station occurred at 10:00am on Sunday, 19 October 2003. The rear car of the six-car train derailed and hit the wall at the station that separates the two northbound lines. The rest of the train proceeded into platform 3, although the fifth car was also partially derailed. Seven passengers were injured.

The main outcome of our investigation was to continue monitoring track maintenance regimes on the LU network. Many of the issues were similar to those found at White City, and HSE's work on this issue has been taken forward as part of that investigation.

LUL published its final report in February 2004.

This concluded that the derailment could be explained by a rare combination of points design and other wheel/rail interface issues. HSE has been kept informed of the preventive measures taken by LUL and Tube Lines Ltd, the contractor responsible for the Northern Line track maintenance, and is

monitoring the ongoing work to assess the performance of the redesigned points.

## HSE inspection work on London Underground

HSE carried out inspections of track maintenance on the Underground in 2004, as part of its planned intervention for London Underground to assess compliance with its railway safety case. This involved site visits with track inspection teams from each of the areas covered by the maintenance companies. The programme of visits included reviews of issues raised by employee representatives. One of the key aspects of this inspection programme was to monitor LUL's compliance with the action plan it produced last year in response to an Improvement Notice requiring improved management of compliance with their own standards.

Where LUL or one of its contractors identifies non-compliance with LUL's engineering standards it can implement suitable arrangements to mitigate risk e.g. speed restrictions, or increased inspection frequency. If HSE identifies particular sections of track it believes should be taken out of use it has the power to require this. It was not necessary to use these powers during the planned inspection programme, nor has there been any subsequent need to do so. However, HSE will continue to monitor the track maintenance regime on the LUL network.

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