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JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS

The successful conduct of military operations requires an intellectually rigorous, clearly articulated and empirically-based framework of understanding that gives advantage to a country’s Armed Forces, and its likely partners, in the management of conflict. This common basis of understanding is provided by doctrine.

UK doctrine is, as far as practicable and sensible, consistent with that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The development of national doctrine addresses those areas not covered adequately by NATO; it also influences the evolution of NATO doctrine in accordance with national thinking and experience.

Endorsed national doctrine is promulgated formally in Joint Doctrine Publications (JDPs). From time to time, Interim Joint Doctrine Publications (IJDPs) are published, caveated to indicate the need for their subsequent revision in light of anticipated changes in relevant policy or legislation, or lessons arising out of operations.

Urgent requirements for doctrine are addressed through Joint Doctrine Notes (JDNs). To ensure timeliness, they are not subject to the rigorous staffing processes applied to JDPs, particularly in terms of formal external approval. Raised by the DCDC, they seek to capture and disseminate best practice or articulate doctrinal solutions from which this can be developed for operations and training.

Details of the joint doctrine development process and the associated hierarchy of JDPs are to be found in JDP 0-00 Joint Doctrine Development Handbook.

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¹ Formerly named Joint Warfare Publications (JWP).
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1. **Background.** Fundamental to the delivery of fighting power are people – correctly selected, trained, equipped and motivated. This level of human resource is achieved and maintained during an operational campaign in large part through personnel support. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 1-05 *Personnel Support for Joint Operations* builds on principles identified in the previous Interim Joint Warfare Publication (IJWP) 1-00 *Joint Operational Personnel Administration*. It covers personnel support from a Joint perspective, but recognises that personnel support although coordinated by the Joint Task Force Headquarters, and normally carried out by the Joint Force Logistic Component (JFLogC) or Headquarters National Support Element, is largely delivered by the Front Line Commands. Since publication of IJWP 1-00, there have been significant changes in the delivery of personnel support to operations. IJWP 1-00 was based on the Armed Forces Overarching Personnel Strategy, which has been superseded by the Service Personnel Plan. The 2 major changes have been the introduction of Joint Personnel Administration, which means for the first time all Service personnel are administered by the same system, and the passing of the Armed Forces Act 2006 that has introduced a single disciplinary system for all Service personnel. Developments in the provision of Deployment Welfare Support and experience from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are also reflected in this first edition of JDP 1-05. The policy basis for personnel support is articulated in the Command Paper of July 2008, *The Nation’s Commitment: Cross-Government Support to our Armed Forces, their Families and Veterans*.

2. **Purpose.** JDP 1-05 draws together in a single document, all the elements of national personnel support to operations. The purpose of JDP 1-05 is to help both planners and operators recognise the significance and influence of Joint personnel support within both national and multinational campaigns. Specific personnel support functions such as personnel administration, discipline, welfare support, casualty management and a range of other specific activities have quite different constraints and procedures. The aim of JDP 1-05 is to demonstrate how the delivery of all these activities interacts and contributes to the effective support of a deployed force.

3. **Scope.** JDP 1-05 describes personnel support at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, outlining why a joint personnel support framework is needed and how it can most effectively be employed. It acknowledges the integration of Reserve personnel and the presence of deployed civil servants and contractors as well as the responsibilities of the joint operational staff towards those personnel. It does not deal with component level personnel support or cover in detail specific personnel
support activities, but where appropriate, it provides a link to the relevant specialist Joint Service Publication. The provision of generic templates in the supporting functions and planning chapters provides a logical framework and general headings for further specialist input, rather than detailing every question for consideration. Links to relevant national and multinational doctrine publications, and other relevant publications are contained in the Bibliography.

4. **Target Audience.** JDP 1-05 is primarily designed for joint operational staff, particularly J1/J4, JFLogC staff, component personnel staff, personnel staff in the front line commands and other MOD organisations and medical staff. It has personal relevance to the Joint Task Force Commander. JDP 1-05 is also intended as the primary personnel support doctrine publication for students at the Joint Services Command and Staff College and other training establishments. Detailed instructions for specific administrative tasks are provided in the relevant Service reference documents.

5. **Structure.** The JDP is in 5 parts:

a. **Part 1 – Fundamentals.** Part 1 contains 3 chapters the first of which sets out the principles and definitions that underpin the various personnel support issues covered in the publication. Chapter 2 covers command and control at the strategic, operational and tactical levels and Chapter 3 covers a range of supporting functions that are relevant to personnel support at all stages of an operation and provides some supporting templates.

b. **Part 2 – Prepare.** Part 2 contains 2 chapters. Chapter 4 covers the Force Generation process and the provision of personnel for operations. Chapter 5 covers the planning process and the personnel issues that must be considered at all stages of operational planning. It also provides some generic templates that can be adapted for specific operations.

c. **Part 3 – Project.** Part 3 contains a single chapter, Chapter 6, which covers personnel support issues during operational deployment.

d. **Part 4 – Sustain.** Part 4 contains 2 chapters. Chapter 7 reiterates fundamentals of personnel management during operations. Chapter 8 covers casualty and compassionate management.

e. **Part 5 – Redeployment.** Part 5 contains a single chapter, Chapter 9, that covers the planning and personnel management of redeployment and drawdown issues.
6. **Lexicon.** A comprehensive Lexicon is included at the back of the publication.

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People are fundamental to the delivery of fighting power. Personnel support provides the essential processes and guidance for the delivery and sustainment of this core element of military strength.

101. War and conflict are essentially human activities. They are violent and uncertain clashes of wills played out with a mixture of human life, equipment, technology, geography and thought. At the heart of military capability and effectiveness are people. There needs to be enough properly trained, adequately equipped, sufficiently well-led and motivated personnel to achieve the military objective and ultimately, deliver the desired political effect. To achieve this throughout an operation, recuperate, and move with agility to another operation, requires good leadership and effective personnel support.

102. The components of fighting power are covered in detail in JDP 0-01 British Defence Doctrine (BDD), Chapter 4. People deliver military effect through a combination of the conceptual, physical and moral components; personnel support has a role to play in all of these. Throughout the operational cycle of force generation, sustainment and recuperation, a balance of these components is essential both for the effectiveness of the force and the benefit of the individual. Personnel support provides the processes and infrastructure to assist the commander in achieving this:

   a. The physical component in theatre is delivered through the force generation process. Pre-deployment training is an essential tool in ensuring the full preparedness of the individual. Physical training, adventure training and sport can also help achieve the requisite levels of stamina and fitness required on operations. This is maintained during operations through in-theatre training and deployed facilities. Well-being is achieved by a balance of this and support in the conceptual and moral components.

   b. The conceptual component relies on people being delivered through the force generation process who are suitably trained, educated and innovative. It is the individual’s ability to apply doctrinal principles in a manner appropriate to the situation that makes the conceptual component an effective part of fighting power.
c. The moral component has a clear focus on people’s ability and willingness to fight and therefore can be most immediately affected by personnel support. In addition to developing the physical component, adventure training can help individuals learn to cope with fear and uncertainty. By using the tools available through personnel support the commander can boost significantly the morale of personnel on operations and strengthen his own role as a leader.

103. The strength of the moral component is critical to success. Equipment, technology, training and doctrine may confer significant advantage, but it is the moral component and the morale of the force in particular that will most often prove decisive. Ethos, leadership, teamwork and courage build this. Vietnam, The Falkland’s Conflict and Arab–Israeli Wars provide numerous examples of how it was the moral component, rather than the physical or conceptual that won the war, but it is perhaps Napoleon who summed it up most neatly: ‘Morale makes up three quarters of the game; the relative balance of man-power accounts only for the remaining quarter’;\(^1\) morale is to the physical and conceptual as 3 is to one.

SECTION II – MORAL COMPONENT

The importance of the moral component of fighting power is made clear in BDD.

Military personnel will be called upon to make personal sacrifices, some the ultimate sacrifice, in the service of the nation.

Military personnel must always be able to expect fair treatment, to be valued and respected as individuals, and that they and their families will be sustained and rewarded by commensurate terms and conditions of service.

The Armed Forces ethos is underpinned by moral courage and trust, the foundations of a successful team.

The Armed Forces adhere to a set of core values that has been drawn from experience as vital for success on operations.

104. **Purpose.** The purpose and measure of the Armed Forces are military effectiveness and success in war and on other operations. Members of the Armed Forces are weapon bearers and all must be prepared to make the decision to engage an enemy or to place themselves in danger of injury and death. This is the unique nature of military life. These grave responsibilities mean that military effectiveness cannot be based on functional output alone.

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\(^1\) Napoleon, 27 August 1808, *Correspondance de Napoleon Ier, publiee par ordre de l’Empereur Napoleon III*, XVII, No 14276 1858-1870.
Unless the Armed Forces are focused on higher external principles and ethics, they risk moral bankruptcy. Such a morally bankrupt force, even if functionally effective, would risk alienation from the community it serves.

105. **Requirement.** Military personnel are required to operate across a mosaic of operational themes. These include conflict prevention, high-intensity combat, peacekeeping, disaster relief and a military contribution to security and stabilisation. The intensity of combat varies both by theme and within themes. Contemporary operations are usually Joint, multinational and multi-agency. They are carried out under the scrutiny of government, society, and media both at home and abroad. The country expects its Armed Forces to be able to act immediately in support of government policy, often as an instrument of last resort. In order to meet these broad and increasingly complex challenges, the Armed Forces need people who are able to accept authority and discipline. Commitment, self-sacrifice, forbearance and mutual trust are also key. Together, these qualities enable the teamwork, resilience, will to win and morale of the Armed Forces that underpins success on operations. The nature of conflict is enduring. It is a violent contest, fundamentally human, and at times apparently irrational, a mix of chance, risk and policy. To prevail in such circumstances, the Armed Forces requires not only good training, equipment and people, but a common moral and ethical basis to bind its personnel. This is challenging when set against increasingly diverse ethical and moral codes in society. A clearly articulated Service ethos and policy can help meet this challenge. Servicemen and women should also be reassured that although they work outside societal norms, what they are required to do is legal, achievable and has the broad support of the nation. In return for their risk and sacrifice, they should expect to be properly led, properly equipped and trained, properly cared for, and properly rewarded for what they do. These requirements are the cornerstone of the moral component and form what is commonly known as the Military Covenant.

106. **The Nation’s Commitment.** Strictly speaking, the Military Covenant is only applicable to the British Army, as articulated in ADP *Operations in the Land Environment*, Chapter 10.\(^2\) However, it has become accepted by the press and much of the general public in the UK to be an appropriate description of the relationship the nation should have with the whole of the Armed Forces. This broader commitment to all Service personnel was formalised, in July 2008, through the MOD’s publication of the Service Personnel Command Paper *The Nation’s Commitment: Cross-Government Support to our Armed Forces, their Families and Veterans*.

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\(^2\) Due for promulgation in Summer 2010.
107. **Moral Component.** The moral component consists of the 3 inter-related functions of moral cohesion, motivation and leadership and together exert a decisive psychological influence in warfare. While morals and morale are both key elements of the moral component of fighting power, they fall short of delivering the whole. This is provided through the functions respectively giving rise to the preparedness to fight, the promotion of courage and commitment, and the inspiration to fight.

108. **Ethos.** The ethos of the British Armed Forces is one of service and sacrifice, underpinned by physical and moral courage. The combination of these qualities makes the highest demands on military personnel at all levels. Such ideals are not always so prevalent amongst the modern society from which servicemen and women are drawn. It is essential though, that all military personnel learn to understand this simple ethos and adopt it at a personal level.

109. **Trust.** The Armed Forces ethos is supported by trust, the foundation of a successful team. The Armed Forces, its leaders, and ultimately the nation, depend on the courage, loyalty and commitment of military personnel and expect them to display the highest standards of professionalism, selflessness and self-discipline. In short, they must all be able to trust military personnel, and military personnel should be able to trust them, as well as one another. Such trust can only exist on the basis of shared values, the maintenance of high standards and the personal commitment of everyone to the task, the team, the Armed Forces and the nation.

110. **Core Values.** The core values set out below are key to both the legitimacy and the cohesion of our Armed Forces, and ultimately therefore to our ability to succeed on operations. It is for this reason that it is essential that all members of the Armed Forces accept and embrace these values both on and off duty. Although the separate Services differ in the way these are brought into the heart of military thinking, with particular focus and presentation as appropriate, they are equally valid for all.

   a. **Commitment.** Personal commitment is the foundation of military service and enables the Armed Forces to demonstrate a sense of purpose. Military personnel must be prepared to serve whenever and wherever they are required, and give their utmost at all times. Military personnel will be expected to put the needs of the mission and the team ahead of their own interests. They have a responsibility to become masters of their craft, consistently setting and meeting the highest professional and personal standards.
b. **Courage.** Courage creates the strength on which fighting spirit, that essential element which turns a fighting force into a winning force, depends. Military personnel must have the physical courage to carry on with the task regardless of danger and discomfort, and the moral courage always to do what they know is right.

c. **Discipline.** The Armed Forces must be disciplined if they are to be effective. Military personnel must therefore obey all lawful orders from their superiors and actively find ways to achieve the mission, which is often conveyed via mission command. While this method of controlling forces expresses the *what* but not the *how*, the mission is not in any way optional. Self-discipline is fundamental; it earns military personnel the respect and trust of their colleagues, and equips them to cope with the difficult, individual decisions they will have to make during their service.

d. **Respect.** Servicemen and women come from a broad variety of cultures and backgrounds. On operations they will often have to live and work under extremely difficult conditions and may have to use lethal force, which can bring added pressure and stress. Even so, at all times military personnel must show respect, tolerance, understanding and compassion for others regardless of their personal background. Leadership and teamwork depend on it, and military personnel have the fundamental right to expect to be treated with the same degree of respect and dignity by all in the Armed Forces. Self-respect underpins attitudes to personal behaviour, drugs and alcohol, and forms the basis of respect for others.

e. **Integrity.** Integrity is that quality of an individual’s character that encompasses honesty, sincerity, responsibility, and selflessness. It is an essential requirement of both leadership and comradeship. Unless military personnel maintain their integrity, others will not trust them and teamwork will suffer. Acting with integrity will often require military personnel to show moral courage; to do the right thing may not always be popular. However, doing the right thing earns respect.

f. **Loyalty.** The Nation, the Armed Forces and those with whom military personnel serve rely on commitment, dedication and support. Military personnel must therefore be loyal to the Crown, their leaders and those that they lead.

111. **Morale.** Leaders have the responsibility for the morale of those they lead. This can be delivered through 3 mutually supportive elements:
Understanding how morale can be influenced through these elements and how they interact is an important aspect of identifying how the commander can inspire the will to fight. These can be considered thus:

a. **Belief.** An individual’s belief that what they are doing is right is fundamental, whether that is based on a personal dedication to the Sovereign, knowledge of national support or simply an eagerness to do right by one’s colleagues. This then underpins the credibility of the tasks being set having relevance to the cause and whether or not the support provided is a fair reflection of the sacrifice being asked.

b. **Credibility.** As well as ensuring tasks are relevant to the operation, they must be sufficiently challenging to be worthwhile. Personnel are generally content to be pushed to the limit as long as it is in support of the overall aim; nugatory work or superficial activity will almost inevitably result in a rapid fall in morale. A leader who has achieved credibility can command the respect and willing obedience of subordinates.

c. **Material.** The balance between absolute trust in the leader’s purpose and acceptance that a fair deal is being gained is achieved
through the material return to the individual. This is the primary target of personnel support in the maintenance of morale and covers all aspects of the Deployed Welfare Package and various support functions delivered in theatre.

SECTION III – SERVICE PERSONNEL PLAN

The Service Personnel Plan (SPP) was first published in 2004 and formally superseded the Armed Forces Overarching Personnel Strategy in 2006.

The SPP is the Defence Board’s strategy for delivering and sustaining the people component of Operational Capability.

The people component of Operational Capability requires the Armed Forces to have the right number of people, with the right skills, who are willing and able to use them.

112. **Strategic Context.** The Armed Forces require Service personnel who are adaptable, flexible and capable of meeting rapidly changing demands. Individuals need to be trained to undertake a wide range of tasks. The need for Service personnel to meet the challenge of network-enabled capabilities requires recruits with relevant skills who are rapidly and readily deployable to meet the requirements of modern expeditionary operations. Combat is a highly physically and mentally demanding activity, being the ultimate test of human strength and will. Accordingly, the Services need to attract sufficient recruits of the right calibre, train them to deliver the diverse skill sets required and provide appropriate terms and conditions of service to encourage personal commitment and a sustainable return of service.

113. **Service Personnel Plan.** The SPP\(^3\) is owned by the Defence Board and is the Department’s strategy for ensuring that the Armed Forces have the right number of people, with the right skills, who are willing and able to use them. In short this means sufficient, capable and motivated people. There are critical inter-dependencies between and within each component and all draw upon wider MOD and Government sources of information. This is shown diagrammatically at Figure 1.2 and can be applied equally effectively at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The SPP complements, and must be considered in conjunction with, the single-Service personnel strategies. DCDS(Pers) as the Service Personnel Process Owner is responsible for ensuring the policies and processes are in place to enable its delivery.

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\(^3\) In 2006, the SPP formally superseded the Armed Forces Overarching Personnel Strategy (AFOPS). The current version, SPP09, will be replaced by a new Service Personnel Strategy in 2010.
Figure 1.2 – The People Component of Operational Capability

114. **Sufficient.** The sufficient element focuses on ensuring that the Armed Forces can supply sufficient people to generate the forces required to conduct and sustain operations, by directing measures to identify, meet and sustain the trained requirement. This relies on the ability to identify the manpower requirement, the existence of selection options that exploit all sources of personnel provision and the freedom to optimise the utilisation of Reserves. The successful delivery of sufficient personnel is essential for the effective conduct of operations and it depends on the Armed Forces placing sustainable demands on those personnel in terms of duration, frequency and nature of operational tours. Warfare changes its form, and pressures on some are greater than those on others, so the sustainability of the People Component of Capability should be a significant consideration in committing the UK to concurrent or enduring operations.

115. **Capable.** The capable component focuses on generating individuals that are trained, ready and able to respond to operational requirements. The scope of the SPP is limited to individual, rather than collective, training and education and the delivery of capable personnel rests primarily with Phase 1, 2 and 3 training, whether provided by the single Services or jointly (through the Strategic Training and Education Programme and the Defence Health Strategy). These aim to ensure that personnel:
a. Have the knowledge, skills and attitudes necessary to conduct their roles on operations and in other forms of employment.

b. Are physically and medically fit for task.

116. **Motivated.** The Motivated component focuses on sustaining personnel, both on operations and between operations, in order to deliver a force that is consistently willing to deliver operational effect. This willingness requires personnel to be prepared to undertake repeated operational tours. This requires them and their families to be supported appropriately while they are deployed, to be allowed reasonable intervals between deployments, and for those intervals to provide them with the right quality of life and career development opportunities. Motivation is a complex area with a range of interdependent levers operating at differing levels for varying individual circumstances and a strong moral component requires support not only to Service personnel but to their families and to veterans, particularly those that are injured or bereaved as a result of military training or operations.

**SECTION IV – SCOPE**

Personnel support covers a broad range of responsibilities. Staff must ensure their output enables the Commander’s Intent.

117. **Scope.** Although the staff who carry out personnel support (often referred to as the J1 staff) may carry out additional duties as required by the Commander, personnel support for operations would be expected to cover the following areas:

a. **Administration.** Appraisal reporting, Honours and Awards, Joint Personnel Administration Management, Cashier, Discipline, Service Inquiries, Captured, Interned and Detained Persons tracking.

b. **Welfare.** Compassionate, Management of the Dead, Deployed Welfare Package, Pastoral Care and Chaplaincy.

c. **Health.** Casualty, Exposure to Hazards, Operational Stress Management, Trauma Risk Management, Operational Fitness Equipment, Decompression.

d. **Ceremonial.** Repatriation.

e. **Manning.** Individual Augmentee Posts, Operational Location Tracking (OPLOC), Reserves.
f. **Education.** Pre-Deployment Language and Cultural Training, Theatre Education Centres.

Personnel support has close links with other Combat Service Support functions, especially with respect to personnel movement, medical support, catering provision and accommodation provision, but is a separate discipline requiring different skills to deliver effectively.

**SECTION V – DELIVERY OF PERSONNEL SUPPORT**

Moral Component delivery is dependent on the timely delivery of personnel support to Service personnel.

Personnel support elements should be joint and be collocated where possible.

118. **Method of Delivery.** The combat effectiveness of a fighting force relies on the integration of the moral, physical and conceptual components of fighting power. One of the key elements in the delivery of the moral component is the timely delivery of personnel support to all personnel deployed on an operation. As a result, personnel support should be made available as far forward as is operationally possible, while recognising the merits of minimising the number of personnel support staff in theatre.

119. **Maximising Personnel Support.** Personnel support functions from different units should be combined into a joint organisation wherever possible in order to minimise the number of personnel support staff and to allow cross-fertilisation of ideas and experience. Whenever possible, reachback\(^4\) should be used to Front Line Command specialists through Permanent Joint Headquarters (J1). This is particularly important for disciplinary, allowances and Terms and Conditions of Service issues where rules may vary between the Services, deployed civil servants and contractors. Occasions when a unit is supported by isolated personnel who may not be fully conversant with all personnel support issues should be kept to the absolute minimum.

120. **Personnel Cell.** When not deploying as part of a unit, personnel staff should normally deploy to an operation initially under the Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters (CJTFHQ). If the Joint Force Logistic Commander is deployed then the personnel support function would sit under it as a component of the CJTFHQ.

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\(^4\) Reachback is the term used to describe the ability to communicate directly back to headquarters and other capabilities in the UK. (JDP 3-40 *Stabilisation and Security: The Military Contribution*)
CHAPTER 2 – COMMAND AND CONTROL

SECTION I – STRATEGIC LEVEL COMMAND AND CONTROL

The Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) provides the Government with military advice and is the Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) collective body for the overall management of crises and the higher direction of operations.

Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Personnel) and Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) are both integral parts of the DCMO and play a central role in the decision-making process.

Front Line Commands (FLCs) are responsible for delivering the necessary forces for PJHQ’s requirements, retaining command responsibility for their Service.

201. The UK’s command and control framework supports command decision-making and enables staff to communicate personnel priorities and other instructions to relevant subordinates, and others such as civilian organisations, for execution. In order to provide the necessary level of personnel support to the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC), processes for the routine and reliable exchange of personnel information between deployed units and the strategic base must be established. At the strategic level, this will usually be conducted via the DCMO/PJHQ and PJHQ/FLC interfaces; linkages within combined operations will be achieved through PJHQ liaison to the strategic headquarters for the operation (should one exist).¹

SECTION II – OPERATIONAL LEVEL COMMAND AND CONTROL

Arrangements for command and control of personnel will be adjusted to suit the situation.

Extensive operational commitments will require augmentee manning.

A scalable Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) may be formed.

A single multi-agency headquarters or individual component commanders will be employed as appropriate.

A deployed personnel support element of Joint Force Logistic Component (JFlogC) may be required.

Multinational operations will have a UK National Contingent Component (NCC) and National Support Element (NSE), responsible for UK personnel support.

¹ Details are in JDP 5-00 Campaign Planning, Chapter 2.
202. **Command and Control of Personnel.** PJHQ has responsibility for meeting the strategic objectives and generally will conduct operations via a JTFC. The JTFC will have a designated Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS), or Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS) J1/J4, depending on the rank of the JTFC, to direct personnel planning and to provide personnel advice. That said, there is no single model for the command and control of personnel; instead, there are a range of models that can be employed.\(^2\) At the very small scale of operations of short duration, such as a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), the core Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) J1/J4 staff will retain a high degree of centralised control. The JFHQ will control both operational and tactical level personnel issues. As the complexity or duration of the operation increases, such as a small-scale focused intervention, the JFHQ staff will be augmented by specialist staff and additional general J1 staff in order to provide 24-hour manning and the full spectrum of planning and execution. The JFHQ has an augmentee manning list, but additional staff could be drawn from FLCs or other MOD organisations; this could include deployed MOD civilian specialists recruited via the *Support to Operations* programme. If the size and complexity of the operation increases further, JFHQ staff lack the resources to manage and control personnel issues, particularly those involving the deployment of components. Medium-scale operations require a separation between the JTFHQ operational personnel staff and devolved, tactical level personnel command and control. The divisions above are only guidelines as the span of responsibility is dependent on the anticipated personnel planning and activity requirements, and not necessarily linked to the scale of an operation. A small-scale operation, such as a NEO, may still involve the management of complex and demanding personnel issues that entail a significant commitment by personnel support specialists.

203. **Component Commanders.** For small-scale operations, the JTFC may elect to exercise command directly over assigned forces through the JFHQ Staff and at the larger scale a joint multi-agency headquarters may be more appropriate than using component commands. However, if circumstances demand, individual component commanders may be appointed to discharge this responsibility. These may include Joint Force Maritime, Land, Air and Logistic Component Commanders (JFMCC, JFLCC, JFACC and JFLogC) together with Special Forces (SF). Component Commanders are normally delegated Operational Control (OPCON) of assigned forces, although in certain circumstances the JTFC may only grant Tactical Command (TACOM), subject to the agreement of the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO). The JTFC will establish the command relationships and division of responsibilities between component commanders. There is likely to be a range of additional personnel tasks at theatre level, especially in multinational operations where

\(^2\) Details are at JDP 3-00 *Campaign Execution*, paragraph 112.
responsibility for the various personnel elements must be clearly set out in agreements between formations and between nations.

204. **Requirement for a Personnel Support Element of the Joint Force Logistic Component.** There may not always be a requirement for the JFLogC to provide a specific personnel support element, although it offers an effective method of coordinating personnel support between components. Component staff are focused primarily on immediate personnel support. By contrast, a JFLogC has a dual role, looking forward to provide personnel support to the components and looking back to monitor personnel activities from and in the UK. A JFLogC is likely to be deployed when the scale or complexity of the operation exceeds the capability of the J1 staff of the JTFHQ. The deployment of a JFLogC to undertake the more practical aspects of operational and tactical personnel support allows the JTFHQ J1 staff to concentrate on the critical personnel factors affecting the campaign plan.

205. **UK Logistics in a National Contingent Headquarters.** Where the UK operates as a partner in a coalition force, a NCC or Commander British Forces will be appointed.³ Components will normally remain within the overall UK command system, although the NCC may not have detailed planning authority over contingents embedded within larger coalition components. The NCC headquarters will normally have a J1/4/8 cell to oversee UK personnel arrangements that may differ substantially from those of other nations. Depending on the situation, the J1/4/8 cell is likely to be responsible for:

   a. Briefing the NCC on operational personnel support.
   
   b. Coordinating activity with other staff branches.
   
   c. Providing direction and policy to a UK JFLogC and UK personnel embedded in other contingents.
   
   d. Liaising with coalition partners at the operational level.

206. **National Support Element.** A NSE provides the national personnel support focus for the JTFC within a multinational operation. Given that the majority of operations are conducted in a multinational context, a NSE is likely to be the enduring successor organisation to the JFLogC for the life of an operation. It delivers a coordination and liaison function between the UK, other deployed coalition forces and CJO, although like the JFLogC it will require command of appropriate force elements to deliver its outputs. Depending on the structure of the UK contribution to the multinational force,

³ Where components are highly dispersed and/or operating within different coalition command and control structures, force commanders may act as *de-facto* National Contingent Commanders in their Joint Operation Area.
the NSE, in addition to a range of theatre personnel support responsibilities, is likely to be closely involved with delivery of direct support to components. The structure of the NSE will depend upon the complexity of the operation, the range of activities to be undertaken, the UK contribution and force laydown, the number of nations involved and any requirement for the UK to act as a lead or framework nation. In the event that the UK is acting as the lead nation, responsibility extends to coordinating the delivery of services by subordinate partner NSEs, but the provision of support remains a national responsibility. NSEs normally consist predominantly of individual augmentees and are tailored to PJHQ’s requirements. It is, however, possible to use a formed headquarters as the core of the NSE.

SECTION III – TACTICAL LEVEL COMMAND AND CONTROL

Units remain responsible for personnel support, with assistance from operational commander and reachback to UK.

207. **Unit and sub-unit.** Responsibility for all aspects of the wellbeing of personnel remains with the unit or sub-unit commander, as appropriate. Support for this role is provided by specialists within the unit, reachback to the operational command headquarters and electronically through Joint Personnel Administration (JPA) (when available). Levels of external assistance will depend upon resources available within unit and the extent of personnel support requirements; as circumstances change, the command chain must be kept informed to ensure appropriate resources are made available.

SECTION IV – ROLE OF THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER

Operational Command has personal responsibilities for effective personnel support.

208. The operational commander has a personal responsibility for the effective delivery of personnel support to all those under his command; some aspects of this responsibility extend to legal obligations. These obligations are context specific and advice from J1 Staff and the Legal Adviser (LEGAD) should be sought. As explained in Chapter 1, personnel support has a direct impact on the operational effectiveness of the force, the primary focus of a commander’s considerations towards his personnel. He should therefore ensure that all reasonable measures are taken to maximise the personnel support arrangements within theatre.

209. In practical terms, the commander must get to know what arrangements are in place across the Joint Operations Area (JOA), identifying
shortfalls and ameliorating them where possible. Taking a personal interest in the effective delivery of the various support packages maintains pressure on the system to deliver and provides clear evidence to those in theatre of the commander’s interest in their welfare. This should extend to making use of trend analysis, which can be developed by J1 staff on request, and reports on post-operational welfare issues, which are produced on an occasional basis.

SECTION V – IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS ON PERSONNEL SUPPORT

A balance is needed between shared facilities and single-nationality recreation space.
Understanding one another’s cultures is essential for operational success.

210. Working in a multinational environment affects more than just the national support arrangements through a NSE; there are significant issues associated with operating with other national support structures which will be based on different cultures and norms. While many of these are easily recognised (though not necessarily well understood) within long-standing treaty and coalition arrangements, misunderstanding within ad hoc operational partnerships can lead to significant strains in relations.

211. Different levels of support between nationalities can lead to severe friction if not recognised and dealt with. Shared arrangements assist in alleviating these issues, though care is needed to ensure such actions remain within the policy rules and guidelines. However, there is also a need to provide, as circumstance and rules permit, time and space for individual nationalities to interact without the pressures of multinational scrutiny.

212. Understanding Why it Can be Difficult to Make Yourself Understood in a Multinational Headquarters. Explicit messages are just a small fraction of the overall message communicated. Individuals’ implicit understanding is formed from a culmination of life experiences; the greater the differences in these experiences between individuals, the more pronounced inconsistencies and misunderstandings will exist. The impact of these inconsistencies can be mitigated through extensive socialisation; really getting to know each other and learning what ‘makes each other tick’ is critical in the drive for achieving common understanding within a multinational force.
CHAPTER 3 – SUPPORTING FUNCTIONS

SECTION I – JOINT PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

Joint Personnel Administration (JPA) is the Human Resource administration tool for Service Personnel.

Deployed offline JPA has less functionality than the online version but it is designed to look and operate as closely as possible to the online version.

Operational Location (OPLOC) tracking, the starting and stopping of operational leave types and updating of allowances is achieved using the arrivals form in JPA.

Deployed administration has some procedures that should only be used on operations.

301. **Joint Personnel Administration.** JPA is the tool for the Human Resources administration of service personnel. JPA consists of 18 processes that include pay and allowances, career management, absences, mobilisation and management of establishments.

302. **Administration.** Human Resource administrators will be familiar with using online JPA in the non-operational environment. They will continue to use online JPA on operations, subject to the limitations of communications back to the UK. Deployed online JPA is supplemented by the deployed offline JPA application, which provides functionality and cached data locally to allow users to continue interrogating and updating records. Offline JPA is then synchronised whenever communications allow, ideally every 24 hours, ensuring that the main JPA and the locally-held data are aligned and updated.

303. **Deployed Offline Joint Personnel Administration.** Deployed offline JPA does not have the same number of processes as the online version but those that it does have are designed to look and operate as closely as possible to the online versions in order to make them familiar to users. There is no self service functionality in the offline version, nor does it have any concept of workflows between users. The processes it does cover are:

   a. Appraisals.
   b. Absences.
   c. Move and Track.
   d. Allowances.
304. **Offline Appraisals Functionality.** Offline appraisals functionality is the same as that available online. Non-Standard Appraisal Report (NSAR) templates have been developed for use where personnel are in locations where no JPA Appraisal functionality is available. The use of the NSAR template and processing procedures are conducted in accordance with single-Service guidance.

305. **Arrivals Process.** The starting and stopping of operational leave types and updating of allowances are achieved using the arrivals process on JPA. Use of the process also updates Assignment or Move and Track Records (according to individual’s service routines) when the person joins a new unit, which then places that individual in the correct unit position. Correct and timely use of the arrivals process is essential for the administration of personnel and the support of JPA interfaces, business reports and headquarters personnel reports that themselves support operations. Within limitations on accuracy, this process also enables the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) to track indicative numbers of military personnel in theatre, which can be a politically sensitive product.

306. **Deployed Administration.** Deployed administration also has some procedures that should only be used on operations and not for routine administration in units that are not deployed. Examples are:

   a. Only OPLOC teams in operational theatres should *depart* personnel on JPA from theatre. The departure process is performed via move and track to an *in-transit* location.

   b. The JPA casualty reporting function is to be used to report all casualties where there is access to online JPA. If there is only access to deployed offline JPA then telephone or signal methods are to be used in accordance with theatre Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs).

   c. The use of a deployed database and deployed Human Resource responsibilities to allow administrators to administer personnel outside of their own organisational hierarchy.

307. **Pre-Deployment Considerations.** The latest versions of the JPA, Joint Service Publications (JSPs), Business Process Guides (BPGs) and the
JPA Pocket Guide to Deployed Administration should be consulted prior to deployment. JPA Deployed pre-deployment preparations that need to be considered and practised as part of the Mission Rehearsal Exercises include:

a. Preparation of equipment and installation of the deployed offline JPA application.

b. Building the deployed database profile and applying for additional personnel to manage the database (i.e. deployed Human Resource Administrator, Unit Deployed Database Administrator). All attached and detached personnel within units are included in this database to ensure correct and timely administration of all deployed personnel.

c. Initiating new deployed base organisation details and associated JPA hierarchies and workflows.

d. Checking existing organisations workflow and taking into account Rear Party and locations of key personnel.

e. Checking existing casualty and discipline resource management groups and updating if required.

308. Support. JPA support may be accessed by a combination of contacting the Service Personnel and Veterans Agency (SPVA), JPA Cell or iSupport if telephone contact is difficult.

**SECTION II – OPERATIONAL LOCATION**

The operational requirement for tracking personnel deployed on operations is delivered through the JPA Move and Track function known as OPLOC. Medical tracking systems for casualties are used in addition to OPLOC. Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) J1 is responsible for coordinating JPA OPLOC within Operational Teams and owns the Personnel Report (PERSREP).

The Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) is responsible for a variety of OPLOC functions although they will normally be carried out by Joint Force Support Headquarters or Headquarters National Support Element (NSE).

309. Introduction. The operational requirement for tracking all regular and mobilised reservist Service personnel, Ministry of Defence (MOD) and designated Other Government Department (OGD) civilians, foreign exchange personnel and any Contractor Support to Operations (CSO) employees deployed on operations is delivered through the JPA Move and Track function
known as OPLOC. The Move and Track process on JPA can be considered to maintain 2 areas of information: location, known as the 24-hour Move and Track location, and allowances. These can be input separately by arrivals clerks in different locations if required. The PERSREP is generated manually by Joint Force Support to show the location of personnel by unit and formation, within PJHQ-set restrictions. OPLOC enables joint operational headquarters and Services to track, within system limitations on detail, the location of individuals on operations. It also identifies the individual’s unit and, once deployed, their medical status, exposure to significant environmental hazards and health risks and precautions taken, such as vaccinations, to mitigate such risks. This information is retained in an easily accessible manner for a minimum of 100 years to support operational analysis and requests for information.

310. **Tracking Personnel in Theatre.** JPA tracks Service personnel for pay and allowances purposes once in every 24-hour period. Specific OPLOC requirements for reception, sustainment and redeployment are covered in the relevant chapters in this publication. Commanders can use tracking information held by J1 staff to assist in the control of in-theatre deployment of personnel and identifying the status of individuals (within the constraints of data protection legislation).

311. **Medical Tracking Mechanisms.** Once within a Medical Treatment Facility (MTF) (Role 2E or higher) all casualties will be tracked using JPA OPLOC routines as well as hospital specific casualty tracking capabilities. These will be dependent upon the level of technology and personnel support available to the MTF. If the patient is not within a UK treatment facility then the appropriate local process should be used alongside appropriate communication via embedded liaison officers.

312. **Command and Control.**

a. Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Personnel) formulates overarching OPLOC policy and its strategic aspects.

b. PJHQ J1 is responsible for coordinating JPA OPLOC within Operational Teams and owns the PERSREP.

c. The JFHQ is responsible to PJHQ for the implementation of JPA OPLOC in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) and for the accuracy of the data in the PERSREP. However, this responsibility is normally delegated to Headquarters Joint Force Logistic Component (JFLogC) or Headquarters NSE.
d. The Joint Force Maritime Component Command is responsible for recording OPLOC of all personnel on ships on entering or leaving the JOA, excluding submarines unless they dock within the JOA but including personnel arriving and departing a ship such as deployment and recovery on amphibious operations.

e. SPVA is responsible for the technical efficacy of JPA and the PERSREP and for maintaining JPA business processes guides to fulfil the OPLOC requirement.

313. **Personnel to be Tracked.** The following personnel are tracked by JPA and reported under OPLOC:

   a. All Service personnel (including Regular and Reserve Forces, Gibraltar Regiment and foreign exchange personnel serving with UK forces).

   b. MOD Civil Servants.

   c. Contractors deployed as part of CSO.

   d. Council of Voluntary Welfare Workers (CVWW).

   e. Defence Medical Welfare Service (DMWS).

   f. Expeditionary Forces Institute (EFI) and Naval Canteen Service (NCS).

   g. Military Provost Guard Service (MPGS).

   h. Navy Army and Air Force Institute (NAAFI).

   i. Services Sound and Vision Corporation (SSVC) including British Forces Broadcasting Service (BFBS) and Central Services Entertainment (CSE) personnel/artistes.

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1 Personnel, including civilians, must have their post recognised by JPA (‘recruited onto the system’) to enable the OPLOC process.

2 Locally Employed Civilians and other non-combatants coming under military control will not be recorded under OPLOC. Captured, interned, or detained persons are tracked using a separate Prisoner Administration application.

3 Includes Royal Navy Reserve (RNR), Royal Marine Reserve (RMR), Territorial Army (TA), Royal Auxiliary Air Force (RAuxAF), Full Time Reserve Service (FTRS), Sponsored Reserves, and Regular Reservists.

4 For Move and Track only. The Gibraltar Regiment is not within the scope of JPA for full administration.

5 This can include: Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA), Meteorological Office, Hydrographic Service, Defence Science and Technology Laboratories (DSTL), Ministry of Defence Police (MDP), Defence Fire Service (DFS).

6 Council of Voluntary Welfare Workers (CVWW) includes Church Army, Salvation Army, Young Women’s Christian Agency (YWCA), Mission to Military Garrisons (MMG) and Church of England Soldiers’, Sailors’ and Airmen’s Clubs (CESSAC).
j. Soldiers’ Sailors’ and Airmen’s Families Association (SSAFA).
k. Women’s Royal Voluntary Service (WRVS).
l. Embedded Press.
m. OGDs including civilian police operating alongside military personnel.
n. All military and civilian UK visitors to military-controlled sites.

Responsibilities

314. **Joint Force Headquarters.** The JFHQ is responsible for the following OPLOC functions although, as stated above, they will normally be carried out by Headquarters Joint Force Support or Headquarters NSE:

   a. Maintenance of OPLOC on all personnel detailed in paragraph 313 OPLOC tracking must occur at the following locations:

      (1) All points of entry and exit into and out of the JOA, on recovery, redeployment or departure for temporary duty, including all air, sea and rail Ports of Disembarkation, Deployed and Forward Operating Bases and Forward Mounting Bases.

      (2) All Medical Treatment Facilities above Role 1.

      (3) Her Majesty’s Ships within the JOA.

      (4) Into and out of major staging and concentration areas, divisional and brigade areas of operation and other operational areas.

      (5) At any other point designated by the JFHQ, particularly when the JOA is large, and may cross a number of national borders, and/or where lines of communication are long.

   b. Tracking of casualties from within theatre and until single-Service staff assume responsibility on their return to the UK is of vital importance. It is usually mediated through the Defence Patient Tracking Cell using various bespoke IT systems; areas of potential loss of tracking information need to be addressed directly and intelligently. Casualties (including captured, interned or detained persons) are to be tracked from as early as possible from point of wounding until return to duties. Casualties may be subject to Aeromedical Evacuation from any location in theatre and may be moved via hospitals outside the JOA.
OPLOC is to be updated whenever possible at staging hospitals through JPA. Casualties moved to Role 4 facilities in the UK will be managed through Standing Joint Commander Medical; the Medical Evacuation Cell will be stood up when the level of Reception Arrangements for Military Patients (RAMP) is raised. Those patients discharged at airhead will fall under the control of the appropriate rear party and will need to be tracked through usual rear party methods of JPA OPLOC.

c. Recording environmental health risks. Significant risks are to be identified by J4 Medical Environmental Health Staff and passed to the J1 OPLOC Cell for recording action.

d. Recording OPLOC on no less than a daily basis.

e. Ensuring access to JPA, and the correct roles and responsibilities for personnel with OPLOC responsibilities, including patient tracking.

f. Notifying PJHQ J1 of any updates to the JPA Move and Track 24-hour locations list, for SPVA action.

g. Instructing and training OPLOC teams in theatre and OPLOC and Arrivals process assurance.

h. JFHQ is not responsible for tracking and other information on Captured Persons (CPERS) (all Prisoners of War, Captured, Interned and Detained Persons) during an operation and until hostilities have ceased. CPERS are to be tracked from capture, through collecting points to prisoner holding facilities and are to be reported by J1 staffs to the PJHQ making use of the prisoner administration application. Those CPERS that are prisoners of war have this information forwarded to SPVA, as the UK Prisoner of War Information Bureau (PWIB). The details of facilities for, and constraints on CPERS, will be theatre specific and can be obtained from the Legal Adviser.

315. **Service Personnel and Veterans Agency.** The SPVA is responsible for providing:

a. Satisfactory arrangements for the long-term archiving of all OPLOC information recorded on JPA.

b. JPA technical support to Operational Teams.

c. Amendments to the JPA Move and Track 24-hour operational locations, following notification by PJHQ.
d. Prisoner of War Information Bureau (Innsworth).

316. **Single Services.** The single Services are responsible for ensuring that the personal details of all personnel due to deploy to or visit operations are up to date on JPA, including details of any medical preparations such as inoculations.

317. **Permanent Joint Headquarters.** PJHQ is responsible for ensuring that the sponsors of all categories of civilians detailed at paragraph 313 have created Contingent Worker Records on JPA prior to the individual’s deployment. The creation of this record will enable OPLOC teams in theatre quickly to process individuals on arrival in theatre. Completed manual forms will assist OPLOC teams to verify these records as required, or to create original records should the process fail prior to deployment.

**Application at Key Stages**

318. **Prepare.** Accurate and timely manpower tracking, OPLOC, informs operational commanders of the forces involved in an operation. Experience has also highlighted the need to track personnel carefully in operational theatres to enable the MOD to answer questions relating to environmental or medical issues. Accounting for individual Service personnel is also vital for the efficient operation of the casualty and compassionate reporting system. Planning and implementing OPLOC in the JOA is a JTFHQ J1 responsibility, normally delegated to the JFLogC or NSE. OPLOC planning needs to determine which personnel (civilians, deployed contractors and others) are to be included. The Prisoner Handling Organisation will need a similar manpower accounting system. The daily routine of the PERSREP and the accuracy of OPLOC is the cornerstone for almost all the J1 activities.

319. **Project.** The vast majority of personnel arrive by air into an operational theatre. There is then an imperative to record initial arrival as quickly as possible in order to allow personnel to disperse from the Airport of Disembarkation. The in-theatre OPLOC team, under the control of the JFLogC or UK NSE, is responsible for recording a change to an individual’s 24 hour move and track location within 6 hours of arrival and for identifying and recording eligibility for the Deployed Welfare Package (Overseas) DWP(O) and ineligibility for other allowances. The UK NSE is responsible for ensuring that the details of personnel arriving through any other entry point, such as the SPOD or civilian airports, are forwarded to the OPLOC team for input within 6 hours of arrival. Specific staff responsibilities are outlined in Chapter 6 Section IV.
320. **Sustain.** A key aspect of long-term personnel management is the maintenance of accurate tracking records. This is important both for the benefit of the individual and for enabling effective manpower control within the JOA. While the administration is the responsibility of OPLOC staff, the commander should be aware that detailed information is available on:

a. Arrivals in theatre for an assignment.
b. Visitors in theatre.
c. Personnel movement within theatre.
d. Temporary absence from theatre.

321. **Redeploy.** OPLOC staff are responsible for maintaining up to date records of those in theatre and this includes accurate and timely capture of personnel departing theatre at the end of tour. This is important for individuals, as it prompts key changes to allowances, and for the management of the manpower plot in theatre.

**SECTION III – SERVICE DIFFERENCES**

Although the aim is to achieve equal treatment of all in theatre, there are some important differences between the Service and civilian organisations.

The details of differences in Terms and Conditions of Service (TACOS) are subject to current JSPs and single-Service regulations.

The commander should be aware of the key aspects of Service differences and how they impact on an overall campaign management plan.

**Single-Service Differences**

322. There is a principle of equal treatment in a JOA. However, there are inevitable exceptions between civilian and Service personnel, regular and reservist and the separate Services. Although exceptions with TACOS are routinely addressed through JSPs, some differences exist through operating environment, Service background or employment arrangements that can also impact on the management of personnel on operations. This section highlights some aspects, identified by the particular Service as peculiar to them, that the commander should consider; it is not definitive nor does it attempt to provide a balanced comparison, rather it highlights some of the issues likely to be encountered.
Naval Service Personnel

323. The Naval Service has a complex Human Resource challenge. It is required to generate an affordable and sustainable workforce that is required to deliver a sizeable maritime air force, a unique nuclear reactor capability, a complex land force delivered from specialised shipping, full traumatic medical care as well as strike carrier force and complex air, surface, underwater, land attack and mine war-fighting skills.

324. The nature of the maritime environment is both physically and mentally challenging, with personnel operating complex and technical ships and equipment in demanding conditions. The increasing technical intricacy of naval vessels creates a demanding manning structure that necessitates a significant return of service from its senior ratings in particular. Across the rank structure, personnel are encouraged to be proactive and to express their views, constructively, in order to enhance the capability and efficiency of the Naval Service.

325. Operations in the maritime environment have clear physical limitations to the delivery of many aspects of the personnel support packages. Where possible, arrangements are made to conform to the aims of these personnel support packages or to make suitable alternative arrangements. The combat conditions have particular impact on individuals that are specific to Naval Service and suitable single-Service arrangements are available to address these. In a truly joint environment, most of the single service anomalies are encompassed in the Second Sea Lord’s Personnel Functional Standards (PFS). PFS applies to Naval Service personnel and supports the Second Sea Lord’s intent for Naval Service personnel and is a mechanism that contributes to the delivery of sufficient, capable and motivated personnel. PFS has been developed to ensure that essential TACOS apply to all Naval Service personnel, including Reserve Forces and Royal Fleet Reserves, appropriate to their level of Service commitment, irrespective of where they serve. It is used to set standards which should be provided to all members of the Naval Service. It provides procedures for identifying and reporting deficiencies (‘breaches’) to the chain of command.

326. PFS deals with important TACOS and many of the standards contained in the PFS document are well established, embraced by current practice and, in many cases, incorporated in tri- and single-Service rules and regulations, such as the Defence Strategic Guidance Harmony Guidelines. Where appropriate the regulations are identified within the PFS document and are the authority for individual eligibility. PFS requires to be constantly monitored by Commanding Officers so that management action can be initiated to prevent breaches or rectify them when they occur. In the first instance action should
be taken at unit level, with progressive referral, if necessary, up the Chain of Command. There will be occasions when PFS is intentionally or unavoidably breached but generally these will only be for exceptional operational or resource reasons; such breaches need to be reported so that early management action can be taken and, when necessary, the reasons for non-compliance communicated to those affected.

**British Army Personnel**

327. The complexities and physical demands of the contemporary and future Land operating environment place requirements on Army personnel that differ significantly from the other Services with the exception of the Royal Marines and, to a lesser degree, the Royal Air Force Regiment.

328. **Robust Personnel.** The need to move on foot through and across complex terrain, carrying heavy personal loads, sometimes at speed and in extreme climatic conditions requires robust personnel with a high level of physical fitness. This results in a Service that is generally below the age of 45. Furthermore, when required to kill, Army personnel frequently see their human targets as individuals, either through a weapon sight or at arms length. This places a significant mental demand on soldiers.

329. **Risk.** The majority of Army personnel in the JOA deploy outside base locations. In doing so they operate in and around indigenous populations with blurred distinctions between enemy and non-combatants. This results in ever-present exposure to physical and mental risk as the use of force is balanced appropriately. For this reason physical and moral courage is a necessity as much as a value across the whole Service. In order to minimise the exposure of personnel inexperienced in the risks pertaining to a specific theatre while at the same time managing their physical and mental degradation, Army personnel deploy for 6 months except for a relatively few posts where the operational imperative demands greater continuity.

330. ‘**Soldiers First**’. The exposure to risk across all Arms and Services means that all personnel, including those in Combat Service Support (CSS) roles, must be ‘soldiers first’, able to defend themselves and their comrades in order to carry out their duties in support of the force.

331. **Leadership and Responsibility.** The factors outlined above demand highly developed leadership skills in both commissioned and non-commissioned officers at the outset of their careers. The ability of every single soldier to interact at a personal level with indigenous populations represents both a strategic threat and opportunity to a mission. Effective leadership delivered by the chain of command at all levels ensures that these
opportunities are exploited and threats mitigated. The high levels of leadership skills developed in non-commissioned personnel enables the Army to devolve significant command responsibility to them, including command of capable and expensive modern platforms such as Challenger 2 and Apache helicopters.

**Royal Air Force Personnel**

332. The career structure for RAF officers is broadly aligned to those of the other 2 Services. However, commanders should note the following key attributes of RAF non-commissioned career structures:

   a. The RAF is a volunteer technical Service and trains non-commissioned personnel to an advanced level of technical competence. The cost and time required to train its technicians are substantial. The RAF is therefore structured to obtain a significant return of service from its non-commissioned personnel to ensure an efficient return on investment.

   b. Promotion of non-commissioned personnel is structured to provide a career structure for non-commissioned personnel to age 55. Consequently, RAF senior non-commissioned officers are often much older than their Army counterparts.

   c. RAF non-commissioned personnel are encouraged to think for themselves and to express their views, constructively, to their superiors. Given their age, experience and technical skills they are also generally given a greater degree of responsibility and empowerment than might be the norm for their peers in other Services.

333. The RAF is structured differently to the other 2 Services, with approximately 21% of its personnel permanently engaged in supporting enduring UK Operations. To maintain optimum efficiency, equipment of the same type is largely collocated. However, short of large-scale operations, it is necessary to retain force elements of each type at readiness. It is not therefore possible to deploy a base as a formed unit because each base is required to maintain its readiness profile even when some of its assets are deployed. Moreover, the technical nature of air power means that those elements deployed required continual support from their home units in the UK. UK Stations are therefore continuously committed to supporting their technical assets on operations. Consequently, much of the RAF's deployed support is generated centrally and consists of personnel drawn from posts invariably already committed to supporting either UK or overseas operations and which remain gapped for the duration of the deployment. The RAF therefore has a
policy of keeping to 4-month tour lengths to ensure that the impact on operations of gapping in any one area is reduced to a minimum. However, that does not preclude the deployment of personnel for longer where there is a clear operational imperative, with those in staff appointments and members of the RAF Regiment typically deploying for 6 months.

**Reserves**

334. The Strategic Review of Reserves (April 2009) established that the fundamental purpose of UK reserve forces is as follows:

a. **Maximum effort** – support to each regular force when it is operating at, or beyond, its declared maximum effort.

b. **Augmentation and resilience** - either in significant numbers or in specialist roles.

c. **Connecting with the nation** – reservists are often better placed to connect and integrate with, and influence, the community.

335. The nature and strength of the Reserve Forces varies between the 3 services, and there are several different types of reserve service (all are subject to the Reserve Forces Act 1996 (RFA 96)):

a. **Volunteer Reserve Forces.** These are civilians who accept an annual training commitment and a liability to call-out for mobilised service. This includes the Royal Navy Reserve, Royal Marines Reserve, Territorial Army and the Royal Auxiliary Air Force. The willingness to be mobilised primarily to use their civilian skills requires their agreement, and consultation with their employer. This will not preclude a commander on operations from ordering an already mobilised reservist to carry out a task for which he or she is qualified, provided it is in response to a changing situation, is a short term expediency, and no alternative exists.

b. **Regular Reserve Forces.** These are ex-regular personnel who, on leaving the Regular Forces, retain a liability to call-out. In some limited and specific circumstances, volunteer civilians also serve in these Regular Reserve Forces.

c. **Sponsored Reserves.** Sponsored Reservists are employees whose employers have an agreement with the MOD (usually a contract) for the provision of support services and who have become members of a reserve force in a special sponsored reserve category. Features are:
(1) Sponsored Reserves have special liabilities for reserve service, training and call-out.

(2) The contractor will be responsible for employing sufficient employees to meet the MOD’s requirements.

(3) TACOS are based on those for conventional volunteer reservists, modified to take account of the special liabilities and commercial relationships involved. Army Sponsored Reserves are paid directly by the contracting company, not via JPA; however, they do receive the benefits of the Deployed Welfare Package (DWP).

(4) Although Sponsored Reserves are not called out under the authority of a call-out order, the call-out must be authorised by the Secretary of State or to whomever he has delegated that power (the Defence Council, any particular officers or officers of a specified description).

d. **Full Time Reserve Service.** Full Time Reserve Service (FTRS) is a period of Service (generally between 6 months and 4 years) undertaken by members of a reserve force in a designated appointment on a full-time basis. There are 3 categories of commitment: full, limited and home. Those serving on limited or home commitment would have to be mobilised to deploy on operations.

e. **Additional Duties Commitment.** Reservists may volunteer for formal part-time work for a specified duration, normally at least one day a week.

**Deployed Civil Servants**

336. MOD deploys significant numbers of civilians each year, directly supporting the deployed formations on operations. MOD civil servants work alongside the armed forces in theatre often performing specialist roles (e.g. specialist finance or commercial roles). While deployed, most civilians sit within the military command chain and the commander of any deployed force has overall responsibility for the conduct and safety of all MOD civilians deployed within their formation. The senior civilian manager in theatre, usually the Civil Secretary, reports in the first instance to the deployed commander (though he or she will have a dual reporting chain and will often report on policy matters to PJHQ). The majority of deployed MOD civilians report in theatre to the Civil Secretary and the day-to-day management of the civilian component, including the discharge of typical duty of care responsibilities, is undertaken by the Civil Secretary. On occasions, however, the Civil Secretary
may wish to escalate serious issues to the deployed commander. Additionally, the commander can (and should) intervene on any issue where he believes it is having an adverse effect on operational effectiveness and/or the safety and security of the deployed formation. In the event of an emergency, MOD civilians are to follow the orders and advice of military colleagues.

a. **Support to Operations.** The Support to Operations (S2O) Team in PJHQ coordinates personnel support arrangements for deployed MOD civil servants. Civil servants from OGDs remain the responsibility of their parent department. MOD civilians receive theatre-specific pre-deployment training and are then tracked into theatre by the Team. Once in theatre, MOD civilians are manually tracked by J1 staff and the in-theatre Civil Secretary.

b. **Rest and Recuperation.** MOD civilian entitlement for rest and recuperation is accrued at the rate of 5 days for initial 4 months and a further 5 days for every additional 2 months in theatre.

c. **Use of Military Facilities.** MOD civilians are able to make use of NSE facilities, including British Forces Post Office, and will be treated by the military system in the event of compassionate or casualty requirements.

d. **Welfare Support.** The MOD Occupational Welfare Service (OWS) is the welfare service provided by the People, Pay & Pensions Agency (PPPA); the OWS is the focal point for welfare support to MOD civilians. While on deployment MOD civilians can contact the OWS should they need support as can their families; an out-of-hours hotline has also been set up. The support offered continues after deployment and individuals are reminded of the OWS capacity and role to provide welfare support.

e. **Discipline.** The Armed Forces Act 2006 allows for deployed civil servants to be subject to Service discipline in certain circumstances. These include those Crown servants who are in one of Her Majesty’s aircraft or ships afloat. A key provision is to make Crown Servants subject to Service discipline where their sole or main role is to work in support of UK Forces and when they are in ‘designated areas’ as specified by order of the Secretary of State. Not all Service offences apply to civil servants who are subject to Service discipline. Specialist J1 and legal advice should accordingly be sought in relation to whether or not a civil servant is subject to Service discipline, and, if so, whether a particular offence applies to such a civil servant.
f. **Reporting Chain.** At small scale joint task force or battlegroup level, the deployed commander will typically act as the first reporting officer for the Civil Secretary and the Policy Adviser and be responsible for setting of, and the completion of, their performance reports.

**Contractors on Deployed Operations**

337. Policy for Contractors on Deployed Operations (CONDO) is detailed in JSP 567 *Contractor Support to Operations* (5th Edition 2009). It is sponsored by Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Log Ops), SO1 Force Policy. In addition, Defence Condition (DEFCON) 697 *Contractors on Deployed Operations* details the contractual TACOS. It is sponsored by Director General Defence Commercial and Defence Equipment and Support. Defence Standard (DEFSTAN) 05 – 129 *Contractors on Deployed Operations Processes and Requirements* details the standards, processes and procedures to effect delivery of services to the military commander on the ground. It is sponsored by PJHQ SO1 J4 CONLOG Plans.

338. JSP 567 and DEFCON 697 detail the support that should be provided by either the contractor or the MOD. This includes the use of welfare facilities. Actual entitlement for the use by CONDO personnel for each deployment, as well as specific CONDO personnel TACOS will be defined in each individual contract. Advice should be sought in the first instance from J4 Contract and J8 Commercial Staffs.

339. In benign situations, contractors are responsible for providing their own Real Life Support (RLS) such as transportation, food, water, accommodation, laundry etc. Where the operational situation exists that prevents this, e.g. non-benign situations or afloat, the MOD will provide and coordinate RLS commensurate with that provided to UK Service personnel as per DEFSTAN 05-129 to ensure value for money and prevent duplication. The contract will address who is to meet the cost of these services and the question of liability in respect of the services provided. Locally Recruited Workers (LRWs) will not be provided with this RLS but may be provided with meals while on duty.

340. Subject to the TACOS and the availability in the JOA, CONDO Personnel may be allowed to make use of BFPO facilities, welfare, internet and telephones (on a pre-payment basis). In addition, TV and similar facilities may be made available. However, Service personnel have priority of use and the contractor may need to fund his own facilities. The contract should address who is to meet the cost of such Service facilities (if available to the CONDO personnel), as well as the question of liability in respect of use by contractors’ personnel.
Additional issues with CONDO personnel of which the commander should be aware are:

a. **Deployment Training and Briefing.** The MOD aims to ensure that all CONDO personnel are adequately prepared and briefed for operational deployments. Briefings will include general MOD and theatre specific matters. The purpose is to prepare the individual to work safely and effectively within the JOA. The preparation and training of CONDO personnel is the employer’s responsibility, but contractors will liaise with their contract sponsors to ensure that their personnel are adequately trained and prepared for deployments. The level will be dependent on a number of factors, including the nature and location of the operation, the duration of task and the threat to those CONDO personnel deployed. Preparation may include pre-deployment briefings, briefings on arrival in-theatre, continuation briefings and specific training before or on deployment. The MOD has specified the generic training requirements that should be achieved by the CONDO personnel to prepare them for working within a JOA. Details of these training requirements can be found at Annex C to DEFSTAN 05 – 129.

b. **CONDO Annual Refresher Training.** In line with military requirements, all CONDO personnel are required to undertake CONDO refresher training on an annual basis. This would not normally be provided in-theatre but must be undertaken at the first available opportunity after 12 months.

c. **Provision of Medical and Dental Services.** Unless otherwise specified by the MOD, the MOD will provide to CONDO personnel, free of charge, medical treatment and emergency dental treatment, equivalent to that provided to military personnel while deployed. The contract will detail any questions of liability in respect of the service provided. LRWs will be provided first aid treatment, free of charge, while on duty in support of the contract; all other treatment should normally be carried out under the LRW’s own national health-care arrangements. Where appropriate, trauma counselling may be made available in the JOA. The contract will also define the extent of emergency and non-emergency health care that will be provided by MOD to contractors’ personnel. The general policy, subject to contract, is to provide treatment and care equivalent to that provided to Service personnel on deployment. The contract will also address who is to meet the cost of this health provision and any question of liability in respect of service provided.
d. **Medical Evacuation.** Medical evacuation for CONDO personnel will normally be the responsibility of the contractor. There may be however, circumstances where it is not safe or possible for the contractor or civilian medical organisation to provide such a service. In such instances the MOD may, where reasonably practicable, offer assistance where appropriate, on either a repayment basis or, at MOD’s discretion, free of charge. Such assistance may be limited to evacuation to a third country only. In these cases, the contractor would need to arrange any further evacuation. Trauma counselling may be made available within an operational area. The contract will define what will be provided, who is to meet the cost of this evacuation and any question of liability in respect of the service provided.

e. **Compassionate Evacuation.** The return to the UK or country of residence, on compassionate grounds of CONDO personnel is primarily the responsibility of the contractor. There will be occasions, however, when Service assistance may be requested to affect a rapid return from, say, a JOA, on either a repayment basis or, at MOD’s discretion, free of charge. The contract will detail who is to meet the cost of this evacuation and any question of liability in respect of the service provided.

f. **Repatriation of the Deceased.** Repatriation of deceased CONDO personnel will normally be the responsibility of the contractor, unless otherwise notified by the MOD in relation to a specific operation. However, there may be circumstances where it may not be safe or practicable for the contractor or civilian medical organisations to provide such a service, in which case the MOD shall, where reasonably practicable, offer assistance where appropriate, on either a repayment basis or, at the MOD’s discretion, free of charge. Repatriation at public expense is only from the country in which the individual had been assigned. For CONDO personnel on leave, or otherwise not on duty, travelling to other countries, the contractor is expected to make private arrangements for medical insurance covering repatriation to the country to which they have been deployed or to the UK. Following any such private repatriation to the country of assignment, the standard MOD options in respect of repatriation from the country of assignment apply.

g. **Force Protection.** Force protection measures will vary dependent upon the situation as well as local conditions and activities being undertaken. However, in all cases, the MOD is responsible for providing as safe and secure an environment as possible for CONDO personnel to operate in, and is also responsible for determining the appropriate force protection commensurate with the threat perceived by
the local military commander. The local military commander remains responsible for the assessment of the threat level and the consequent force protection.

h. **Arms.** CONDO will not be armed; doing so may compromise their civilian status under the Geneva Convention. Arming CONDO may also violate the SOFA/MOU (if one exists) with the host nation and may compromise their status or expected treatment under the SOFA.

i. **Discipline.** The Armed Forces Act 2006 (AFA06), Section 370 allows for CONDO personnel to be designated as ‘civilians subject to Service discipline’. All CONDO personnel in all JOAs will be designated. There are provisions under AFA06 for CONDO Personnel in Her Majesty’s aircraft, or ship’s afloat to be designated if required. LRWs cannot be designated unless they are UK nationals. A civilian subject to Service discipline is only subject to Service jurisdiction for a limited range of offences i.e. AFA 06 Section 42 (criminal conduct) offences and certain Service offences. Specialist advice should be sought in relation to whether or not CONDO personnel are subject to Service discipline, and, if so, whether a particular offence applies to such personnel.

j. **CONDO Personnel Status.** It is MOD policy to endeavour to agree with the host nation (through a SOFA or MOU) that CONDO personnel deployed in support of the armed forces be subject to the same jurisdictional arrangements as the Service personnel they are deploying alongside. Although exclusive jurisdiction is preferred, the UK may not be successful in securing these arrangements with a host nation (which means that the country concerned has agreed to surrender its own right to exercise jurisdiction over UK Armed Forces and CONDO personnel) and the agreed arrangements may only grant jurisdiction to UK authorities for certain circumstances (such as on duty).

342. Administrative action against CONDO personnel may be achieved by their own management in liaison with the deployed military staffs. Under all CONDO contracts the local military commander has the right to insist on the removal of CONDO personnel’s Authority to Deploy to the JOA. The local military commander should seek J1 and legal advice on a case-by-case basis before any decision is made on the appropriate action to take against a contractor. JSP 567 provides more information regarding the impact of service discipline acts on CONDO personnel. Under DEFCON 697, CONDO personnel are to make themselves aware of, and comply with, the commander’s orders, instructions, regulations and procedures.
SECTION IV – OPTIONAL PROTOCOL II TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD

Optional Protocol II to the United Nations Conventions on the Rights of the Child has a direct impact on the deployment and employment of juniors in theatre.

343. At the signature of the Optional Protocol the UK entered the following declaration with the UN Secretariat: ‘the United Kingdom will take all feasible measures to ensure that members of its Armed Forces who have not attained the age of 18 years do not take part in hostilities. However, the UK understands that Article 1 of the protocol would not exclude the deployment of members of the Armed Forces under the age of 18 to take a direct part in hostilities where:

a. There is a genuine military need to deploy their unit or ship to an area in which hostilities are taking place; and

b. By reason of the nature and urgency of the situation it is not practicable to withdraw such persons before deployment; or to do so would undermine the operational effectiveness of their ship or unit and thereby put at risk the successful completion of the military mission and/or the safety of other personnel.’

344. Members of the Armed Forces under the age of 18 are not to deploy from the UK on operations. If there is, or it is considered likely that there will be, an escalation in tension/hostile activity and there is a possibility that a unit will take a direct part in or be put at significant risk by hostilities, personnel under the age of 18 are to be returned to the UK or moved to a temporary place of safety. If, by reason of the nature and urgency of the situation, the commander considers that it is not practicable to withdraw such persons, or to do so would undermine the operational effectiveness of the unit and thereby put at risk the successful completion of the military mission and/or the safety of other personnel, he is to seek early direction from PJHQ.

SECTION V – EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

The extent to which the European Convention on Human Rights applies to UK personnel on operations is still being explored.

345. The UK is a High Contracting Party to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The ECHR sets out a number of rights and freedoms including the right to life, the prohibition of torture, the right to liberty and
security, the right to fair trial, no punishment without fair trial, the right to respect for family and private life, and the prohibition of discrimination. As a High Contracting Party, the UK has agreed to secure to everyone within its jurisdiction the rights and freedoms set out in the ECHR. The meaning of ‘within its jurisdiction’ and the extra-territorial reach of the ECHR have been argued over in the courts, especially concerning UK Servicemen on operations abroad. The extent to which the ECHR applies to such personnel is still being explored. The Human Rights Act 1998 giving effect to the ECHR in UK law, makes it unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a ECHR right, and allows proceedings to be brought in UK courts against a public authority which does act in such a way.

346. The UK’s human rights obligations do not alter the authority of commanders to make operational decisions, nor do they leave them open to additional personal, legal challenge under the Act. Any claims under the Human Rights Act would be brought against the MOD, not individual commanders, as legal liability under the Act lies with the public authority. Nevertheless, commanders’ decisions may be subject to subsequent detailed judicial scrutiny.

SECTION VI - DEPLOYMENT WELFARE SUPPORT

The aim of Deployment Welfare Support (DWS) is the maintenance of the morale of Service personnel in order to optimise and sustain operational effectiveness.

The successful application of DWS and achievement of the desired effects requires commanders and their staff to determine the service need that exists at each deployed location.

DWP(O) is provided to Service personnel, and where appropriate civil servants and contractors, deployed on qualifying operations, exercises and other deployments.

347. Policy. The MOD is committed to providing the highest level of welfare support to Service personnel on operations. The aim of DWS is to maintain morale in order to optimise and sustain operational effectiveness. It encompasses the provision of a range of welfare enablers. DWS Policy is the framework by which the MOD provides personnel with the fullest possible support to ensure their emotional and physical well being, set against, and consistent with, the operational environment and the availability of resources.

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7 Although existing personal liability, for example, for negligent acts/omissions and criminal acts, remains.
8 Details are contained in Part 2 Chapter 1 of JSP 770 Tri-Service Operational and Non-operational Welfare Policy.
It is important to recognise that 90% of the activities responsible for ensuring the health of the force are non-medical. DWS is delivered by means of the DWP(O).\textsuperscript{9} DWS policy also covers Military Aid to Civil Authorities operations in the UK for which the discreet DWP (UK)\textsuperscript{10} has been developed.

348. **Effects.** DWS seeks to achieve the following effects:

   a. **Communicate.** To enable deployed Service personnel to retain contact with family and friends.

   b. **Support.** To provide for the physiological needs of deployed Service personnel.

   c. **Connect.** To provide support for families of deployed Service personnel and facilitate the service person’s reintegration into the family unit.

   d. **Entertain.** To provide for the leisure and relaxation needs of deployed Service personnel.

349. **Qualifying Criteria.** JSP 770, *Tri-Service Operational and Non-Operational Welfare Policy* provides detail of qualification and the provision process of DWP(O). The DWP(O) is provided to members of the Armed Services and MOD Civil Servants and where appropriate contractors,\textsuperscript{11} deployed on qualifying operations, exercises and other deployments. These are defined as:

   a. Operations overseas, expected to last for 2 months or more, with a designated name and under the operational command of PJHQ, for which a Chief of the Defence Staff directive has been issued.

   b. Maritime deployments, outside UK home waters, expected to last for 2 months or more.

   c. Other operations, exercises and deployments overseas, but outside North West Europe,\textsuperscript{12} which are expected to last for 2 months or more, by formed and non-formed units under the operational command of either North Atlantic Treaty Organization, PJHQ or the single-Service commands. This definition includes deployments (but

\textsuperscript{9} Formerly the Operational Welfare Package (OWP). Details of entitlement are contained in JSP 770 Part 2, Chapter 1.

\textsuperscript{10} Details of entitlement are contained in JSP 770 Part 2, Chapter 1.

\textsuperscript{11} Policy for Contractor’s access to Deployable Welfare Package (Overseas) DWP(O) is contained in JSP 567 Contractor Support to Operations.

\textsuperscript{12} North West Europe defined as including NATO states plus the non-NATO Scandinavian nations.
not postings) to the Remote Permanent Joint Operating Bases (RPJOBS).\textsuperscript{13}

350. **Exceptions.** The DWP(O) is not provided in the following circumstances:

a. Locations with a developed infrastructure, where most elements of the DWP(O) are already available to Service personnel.

b. Locations where Service personnel are in receipt of Local Overseas Allowance.

351. **Managing Expectation.** As the DWP(O) becomes commonplace in the fabric of operations, exercises and deployments, it is vital that those involved in developing the policy and its implementation, delivery and use keep a firm focus on what the packages are trying to achieve. This involves ‘managing expectation’ which demands full engagement of the chain of command.

352. **Deployment Welfare Package (Overseas) Provision.** Planning to sustain personnel with food, water and accommodation is a J4 responsibility. Planning the DWP(O) is a J1 responsibility. The successful application of DWS and achievement of the desired effects requires commanders and staff to determine the service need that exists at each location. Fundamental to this approach is the understanding that the service need will change according to location and the stage of a deployment or operation.

**SECTION VII – MEDICAL SUPPORT**

Medical Support covers all aspects of health on operations.

353. Casualty care and force health protection are essential elements in maintaining the effectiveness of the force. Personnel must be confident that the deployed medical services have the capacity, resources and training to meet their needs should they become injured or sick; the commander must be confident that arrangements are in place for minimising risks to the health of all deployed personnel. The expected requirements, based on numbers and likely operational tempo, must be a fundamental part of any operational planning activity. The details of how the support is planned, deployed, sustained and re-deployed are given within JDP 4-03 *Medical Support to Joint Operations* (2\textsuperscript{nd} Edition).

\textsuperscript{13}British Forces South Atlantic Islands and British Indian Ocean Territories, each of which has a bespoke DWP(O) package that varies from some of the standard provision.
SECTION VIII – OPERATIONAL STRESS MANAGEMENT

The 6 step approach to Operational Stress Management is applied appropriately across all Services.

354. Operational stress is part of the continuum of occupational stress for which further guidance is contained in JSP 375 MOD Health and Safety Handbook, Volume 2, Leaflet 25. The MOD’s operational stress management policy\textsuperscript{14} provides the framework for the single-Service policies on operational stress management. The means by which the single Services operate and deploy make it appropriate for the prevention and management of operational stress to be a single service activity. Naval Service, Army and Royal Air Force policies, incorporating a common 6-step framework in which Operational Stress Management is delivered, are in place to ensure consistency of application and raise overall awareness of operations-related stress management. These 6 steps are:

a. Pre-service entry beliefs and attitudes (countering negative attitudes towards mental ill-health in the minds of potential recruits and increasing awareness and understanding of both occupational and operational stress).

b. In-service training and promotion courses for career development (stress management education and training).

c. Pre-deployment (preparing individuals to recognise the symptoms of stress in themselves and others, how to confront the issues they will face on operational duty and the support mechanisms available).

d. Operational deployment (support from the chain of command, peers (including Trauma Risk Management trained personnel where available), and medical/mental health professionals).

e. Post-operational recovery (Decompression\textsuperscript{15}, Normalisation\textsuperscript{16} and In-Service Support.\textsuperscript{17})

\textsuperscript{14} The Overarching Review of Stress Management, phase 1 of which reported to the Service Personnel Executive Group Paper 19/04 dated 29 September 2004. Phase 2, the Training and Communication Strategy, was published 26 April 2005.

\textsuperscript{15} The placing of individuals in a formal, structured and monitored environment, away from (for seagoing units, during the passage home from) the area of operations immediately before recovery to the UK, where they can begin winding down and rehabilitating to a normal, routine, peace-time environment.

\textsuperscript{16} The actions to be taken on return to the home base prior to or on completion of post-operational leave.

\textsuperscript{17} Care for the remainder of time in service.
f. Following discharge from the Armed Forces. This final stage begins on completion of regular or reserve service and is primarily delivered by the National Health Service.

355. For many Service personnel, participation in operations does not result in significant after-effects, indeed for many it is a positive experience; however there are those for whom such experiences are detrimental due to exposure to acute traumatic pressure and resultant post-traumatic distress. Operational Stress Management policies reinforce the message that:

a. Stress reactions are a natural consequence of military operations and all individuals, regardless of rank, age or gender, are susceptible; and;

b. Most stress reactions are entirely normal and manageable, particularly with the correct degree of support from superiors and peers.

356. Commanders at all levels must make every effort to limit the potential for those under their command suffering psychological problems as the result of operations. The onus for identifying vulnerable individuals rests with the chain of command whose familiarity with their personnel makes them best placed to identify the early signs of stress.

357. Recording of Operational Stress Management Interventions. The single-Services’ individual stress management policies contain instructions on how operational stress management interventions (essentially briefings and interviews) are to be delivered and recorded. Since December 2008, JPA has provided a means to record the basic facts of these interventions and this Operational Stress Management Intervention Recording on JPA became compulsory for all regular and reserve personnel with an operational deployment date of 1 February 2009 or later. Should JPA be unavailable, an alternative recording process is required until retrospective online recording can be made.

SECTION IX – DISCIPLINE

Disciplinary arrangements are laid down in the Armed Forces Act 2006. PJHQ does not exercise disciplinary powers but CJO must be satisfied that appropriate arrangements are in place.

Where a joint commander deploys to theatre and is appointed Commander British Forces, consideration should be given to his exercising disciplinary powers in relation to forces under his operational command.
358. **Policy.** Disciplinary arrangements are laid down in the Armed Forces Act 2006 supplemented by subordinate legislation, as set out in the Manual of Service Law. The overarching principle is that the system of discipline that will operate under this Act should be swift, fair and support operational effectiveness.

359. **Principles.** The key principles in the application of discipline are:

a. Commanding Officers should be able to exercise their disciplinary powers over all personnel under their command.

b. Commanding Officers of every unit should only deal with one higher authority in relation to the handling of disciplinary cases.

c. All units should be assigned a single-Service Higher Authority.

d. The Service of the assigned Higher Authority of the unit in which the accused is serving at the time of the offence should be the ‘lead Service’ for the subsequent handling of the case.

e. There should be consistency in the performance of disciplinary powers and duties, irrespective of which disciplinary chain deals with a case.

360. **Authority.** PJHQ does not exercise disciplinary powers\(^\text{18}\) but CJO must be satisfied that arrangements are put in place to ensure that discipline is efficiently administered and that operational effectiveness is thereby best supported.

**Deployed Operations**

361. **Joint Commander’s Authority.** The extent to which disciplinary command should sit with a deployed operational commander will depend upon the scale, character and expected duration of the operation. Where a joint commander deploys to theatre and is appointed Commander British Forces, consideration should be given to his exercising disciplinary powers in relation to forces under his operational command. Joint commanders should act as Higher Authority to all units under their command unless in the circumstances it is not feasible for them to do so. Disciplinary arrangements should be agreed where possible prior to deployment according to principles set out in a service level agreement between CJO and the single-Service Chiefs, and in any event should be made clear in every Mission Directive.

\(^\text{18}\) This assumption underpins the proposals that the exercise of disciplinary powers be provided, or supported by, assigned Front Line Commands. There remains a requirement to agree an approach for other elements of Full Command such as redress and service inquiries.
362. **Exercise of Authority.** Joint Commanders should also be able to exercise commanding officers’ powers where their subordinate commanding officers are not sufficiently senior to deal with a minor matter. If they are to act as Higher Authorities within the meaning of Armed Forces Act 2006, Joint commanders should ensure that they have adequate legal and executive support, either on their staffs or by reachback to an assigned FLC. However, the Commander British Forces should be assigned a lead FLC to optimise consistency of specialist legal, administrative and executive support to the disciplinary process. The headquarters of a Joint commander who is also Commander British Forces for major operations should be assigned an FLC to provide legal and executive support. This should be determined by CJO and Commanders-in-Chief of FLCs taking into account both the character of the operation and administrative loading.

363. **Short Operations.** For short operations commanded by formed units such as 16 Air Assault Brigade or 3 Commando Brigade, commanders should use their own FLCs (Land Command and Navy Command respectively) for legal and executive support. For short operations such as Non-combatant Evacuation Operations units would ordinarily be administered by their assigned single-Service Higher Authorities, although in operations commanded by Chief of Joint Force Operations (CJFO) they could be dealt with instead under JFHQ arrangements.

364. **Jurisdiction.** The question of jurisdiction is critical for military forces and their civilian component deployed to a foreign territory. Often, a SOFA or MOU will exist between the sending state and the host nation. Jurisdiction is usually an integral section within a SOFA/MOU, and such arrangements will vary from theatre to theatre and indeed from time to time. The jurisdictional provisions will determine who has the authority to exercise discipline or criminal jurisdiction over an individual who commits an offence while deployed. The rules may differ depending upon whether the accused is a serviceman, civil servant or contractor. The provisions will determine whether, and in what circumstances, the sending state or host nation have exclusive jurisdiction, or, in the event of concurrent jurisdiction, primacy of jurisdiction. The provisions will determine who can arrest, detain, prosecute, and sentence the accused. It is important for the commander to appreciate the specific jurisdictional rules in theatre. Potential problems may arise, for example, in countries that criminalise behaviour that is legal in the UK, such as homosexuality, public displays of affection, or the consumption of alcohol. Specialist, theatre specific J1, and legal advice should also be obtained in relation to jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis.
SECTION X – PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT

Operational effectiveness can be improved through reporting processes, local awards and UK Honours and Awards.

365. Performance assessment goes beyond a JPA process and should be recognised as a valuable management tool. At the primary level, the reporting system can be used to identify individual’s strengths and weaknesses and thus assist in the process of organisational improvement. The mid-period appraisal is the most useful vehicle for this on the formal level outside the external authority process.

366. Recognition of remarkable performance is important for both the delivering individual’s self-esteem and for encouraging the wider community. Such recognition can consist of locally developed award systems through to the formal UK Honours and Awards process, as detailed in JSP 761.

SECTION XI – SPORT AND RECREATION

Rest and relaxation are important factors in maintaining personal well being. Arrangements should be appropriate to theatre and properly regulated.

367. Off-Duty Relaxation. Some degree of off-duty relaxation will be possible in all except the most intense operations. The following should be considered:

a. **Space.** Although not always possible to provide, the requirement for space for individuals to be able to relax is necessary to support their overall well-being. Expeditionary Campaign Infrastructure (ECI) should provide sufficient space for welfare purposes.

b. **Leisure Facilities.** Leisure facilities on major deployed bases should be provided and staffed by the Expeditionary Forces Institute (EFI),\(^{19}\) and should obviate the need for *ad hoc* unit facilities. However, commanders retain the right to authorise units to make their own provision should EFI be unable to provide the service, particularly in the early stages of an operation. Decisions regarding the licensing and control of unit bars also rest ultimately with the appropriate

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\(^{19}\) EFI is the deployable element of Navy, Army Air Force Institute (NAAFI), and should be the preferred provider (i.e. in preference to other commercial organisations) of bar/leisure facilities for units/sub-units on deployed operations.
commanders\textsuperscript{20}. Separate Officers’, Warrant Officers’, Senior Non-commissioned Officers’ and Non-commissioned Officers’ Mess facilities are not routinely provided by EFI; however, should they be established, NAAFI/EFI should be designated as their sole supplier of beverages, both alcoholic and non-alcoholic. Warships and Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels have extant regulations governing the consumption of alcohol whilst aboard. When engaged in joint operations, pragmatism must be applied in the application of any rules and restrictions. This is particularly apposite when land-based forces are embarked for Rest and Recuperation where no facilities are available ashore.

c. **Physical Recreation.** Physical recreation provides diverse benefits: it enables personnel to maintain their physical fitness for role; in group activities, it engenders team spirit which contributes to unit cohesiveness and, in turn, operational effectiveness; and it provides a means for de-stressing. However, various factors, including security considerations and limited off-duty time, may place significant limitations upon the range and availability of activities. To help redress this situation, the deployment of Operational Fitness Equipment as part of the DWP, together with the unit’s own sports equipment (where possible) should be considered. Should security considerations allow, much can be gained through sporting activity with local teams.

**SECTION XII – THROUGH-LIFE LEARNING AND PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT**

Education and Through Life Learning are important for theatre specific training and for continued career development.

368. Operations are supported by Theatre Learning Centres (TLCs), which are set up as soon as is practicably possible in consultation with PJHQ and are staffed by Education Training Services (ETS) officers. The purpose of a TLC is to support formation-size operations in which there are many different service requirements, which will include Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force personnel. Each deploying battlegroup will also have an Operational Unit Education Officer (Op UEO) embedded or attached to them during the deployment; this link should start during the pre-deployment phase to ensure maximum benefit.

\textsuperscript{20} The JTFC should develop an alcohol management policy to establish his guidance on the consumption of alcohol taking account of disciplinary and cultural aspects and the terms of any SOFA/MOU when working in multinational coalitions and in countries where alcohol is not consumed.
369. TLCs and Op UEOs can deliver amongst others, Basic Skills, annual mandatory Individual Training, Career and Leadership Management, Resettlement and professional development learning such as Military Analysis and Military Knowledge. Op UEOs also signpost higher education as an elective learning option. Reachback is gained through the deploying Divisional ETS staff and then to Headquarters Directorate Education and Training Services (Army). The pictorial representation of what could be offered is at Figure 3.1.

**Key**
- Op UEO: Operational Unit Education Officer
- TLC: Theatre Learning Centre
- DELC: Defence Electronic Learning Centre
- CLM: Command and Leadership Management
- JOLP: Junior Officers’ Leadership Package
- MK: Military Knowledge

**Figure 3.1 – Possible Learning Services on Operations**
Operations Directorate directs and manages the Force Generation process. Force Generation within the Operational Planning Cycle covers the activity and resources necessary to maintain Force Elements (FE) at Readiness (R) and generate FE from $R^x$ to $R^0$.\(^1\)

Front Line Commands (FLCs) maintain their forces at varying degrees of readiness in order to meet the requirements of the Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) Departmental Plan and the UK’s commitment to the Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF).

401. **Operational Planning Cycle.** The Operational Planning Cycle (OPC) combines the requirements, activities and resources necessary to generate, sustain and recuperate a force. Personnel are a fundamental part of this process. A generic representation of the OPC is shown at Figure 4.1.

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\(^1\) $R^x$ indicates the readiness level of a particular force element; $R^0$ indicates an element ready to deploy.
402. **Force Generation.** Force generation has 2 related aspects: the activity and resources required to train and maintain force elements at readiness states mandated by the Departmental Plan, through Service plans; and the activity and resources required to generate those force elements from their normal readiness state to the level required for deployment. Force elements at readiness is abbreviated to FE@Rx where Rx indicates the readiness level of a particular force element. The transition of a force element from its normal readiness state to the point at which it is ready to deploy is shown as Rx to R0, where R0 indicates an element ready to deploy. The force generation element of the OPC is shown at Figure 4.2. A key aspect of achieving FE@R is delivered through the Service Personnel Plan (SPP).

![Force Generation Diagram](image)

**Figure 4.2 - Operational Planning Cycle: Force Generation**

403. **Departmental Plan.** The Departmental Plan sets the requirement for force elements to be held at varying degrees of readiness (FE@R). Training and maintenance activity, together with associated logistic support and sustainability requirements, is programmed against this readiness requirement. FLCs deliver force elements as specified in Service Delivery Agreements. These outputs are derived from Statements of Requirement that include individual and collective training, equipment sustainability, interoperability and readiness. Together these outputs produce force elements at the required readiness that can be allocated to mission groups to meet operational requirements.
404. **Force Preparation.** FLCs maintain their forces at varying degrees of readiness in order to meet the requirements of the MOD’s Departmental Plan and the UK’s commitment to the JRRF. FLCs achieve the required levels of readiness in a variety of ways, dependent on the requirement and the particular needs of their particular operating environment. Each FLC has to achieve a balance between holding force elements at high readiness for extended periods, providing forces for enduring deployed commitments, and maintaining acceptable harmony levels. The impact of casualty replacement is particularly acute for enduring operations, especially when replacement issues can extend beyond the cycle from which they arise.

**SECTION II – FRONT LINE COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FLCs are responsible for delivering FE@R for current and contingency operations; Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) is responsible for current operations.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operations Overseas Directorate is responsible for commitments to conflict resolution.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

405. A tension exists between the requirement to generate forces for enduring operations and the need to be prepared to deploy forces to meet a contingency. Operations Directorate is responsible for keeping the augmentation bill to a minimum for enduring operations, while PJHQ is responsible for filling the augmentation requirement. PJHQ is focused on the need to support enduring operations whereas FLCs must also ensure that force elements remain available for contingencies. This difference in perspective may lead to friction between PJHQ and FLCs especially where the generation of augmentees is concerned.

406. **Front Line Command Responsibilities.** In order to achieve the required FE@R, FLCs must:

- **a.** Maintain standing UK military tasks.
- **b.** Bring units to full manning to deploy as part of joint operations.
- **c.** Provide individuals to support joint operations.
- **d.** Sustain enduring operations from the UK.
- **e.** Provide force elements for contingency tasks.
- **f.** Train force elements and augmentees in preparation for enduring and contingency operations.
407. **Permanent Joint Headquarters Responsibilities.** PJHQ is responsible for ensuring that:

a. Manning requirements in theatre are reviewed in detail every 6 months to ensure that manpower is used efficiently.

b. Long-term manpower sustainability is factored into its campaign planning.

408. **Policing Manpower Demand.** Where an augmentation requirement will create a significant impact on a FLC’s ability to deliver that for which it is responsible, the FLC is required to define the impact to the Operations Overseas Directorate. It is the Operations Overseas Directorate that is responsible for deciding relative priority and who will own the consequent risk.

### SECTION III – AUGMENTATION MANAGEMENT

The Defence Augmentation Cell (DAC) manages defence augmentation on a day-to-day basis on behalf of Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Operations) (ACDS (Ops)).

Augmentation is the process by which individuals are selected, trained and deployed to meet additional manpower requirements during operations.

Military augmentation is divided into Above-the-Line (ATL) and Below-the-Line (BTL) augmentation. ATL augmentation, planned or unplanned, should only be used when essential; it should not be used when manning requirements can be met through conventional means or where better alternatives exist.

Reservists are mandatorily mobilised, either *willingly or unwillingly*, for operational augmentation dependent upon the operational imperative.

409. Augmentation is the process by which individuals are selected, trained and deployed to meet manpower requirements over and above peacetime requirements, during operations. The process needs careful control to ensure that the gapping of peacetime posts and subsequent over-stretch are minimised. ACDS (Ops) is the senior officer responsible for defence augmentation. It is managed on a day-to-day basis by the DAC. The DAC’s task is to scrutinise all augmentation requests and coordinate the provision of augmentees. Once the requirement has been endorsed, the DAC manages the allocation of manpower. The DAC provides advice to the Operations Overseas Directorate concerning provision of augmentees in theatre. The DAC and 2 associated steering groups provide higher level management:

a. **Augmentation Scrutiny Committee.** The Augmentation Scrutiny Committee is chaired by ACDS (Ops) and meets, as required,
to address operational requirements for defence augmentation. It establishes defence augmentation requirements, sets priorities and arbitrates in the event of disagreements.

b. **Defence Augmentation Steering Group.** The Defence Augmentation Steering Group (DASG) is chaired by Operations Overseas Director and draws together the stakeholders involved in the long-term delivery of augmentation. It meets twice-yearly or as required to identify and resolve longer-term issues.

410. **Augmentation.** Augmentation is the temporary re-distribution of individuals, regular, reserve or civilian to wherever they are needed to meet directed operational Military Tasks and Events that cannot be achieved within peacetime establishments. It may include the re-distribution of individuals brought together to form an *ad hoc* unit/sub-unit or the forming or reinforcing of regular units with reserves. Augmentation specifically excludes the planned or unplanned deployment or redeployment of a formed unit/sub-unit or the planned formation of a composite unit/sub-unit of individuals for their crisis role. It should be noted that augmentation is not a free good. Each augmentation post carries a cost and creates risk in the parent unit/organisation. The level of risk is a variable and is often not visible to PJHQ or MOD. The relationship between risk taken and incremental augmentation is not expressed as a straight line but as a rising curve. In other words, the risk of each single augmentee taken in isolation is manageable but as the requirement for augmentation rises, the associated risk rises much faster with consequences that will be hard to predict. Consequently, an augmentation requirement that lasts for longer than 6 months should be established as an addition to the manning margin of the relevant Service.²

411. **Types of Augmentation.** Military augmentation is divided into ATL and BTL augmentation. The ‘line’ is the funded manpower line. For augmentation purposes it is assumed that each Service is fully manned; augmentation is in addition to the fully manned strength of units and formations, and any individual Service plans that exist to increase the strength of units for operations as part of the Force generation process:

a. **Above-the-Line Augmentation.** ATL augmentation is the process of filling MOD-authorised or deployed operational individual manpower requirements, both military and civilian, above funded manpower levels when the post(s) cannot be filled from FLC resources. ATL military augmentation is managed by the DAC; UK civilian augmentation or temporary overseas service is managed by Director

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² The Defence Augmentation Policy is at 2008DIN01-056, dated July 2008.
General Civilian Personnel Central Human Resources - (Augmentation) and PJHQ Head of Joint Operations (Human Resources). The Defence Medical Services Directorate manages medical personnel ATL augmentation requirements.

b. **Below-the-Line Augmentation.** BTL augmentation is the process of filling individual manning requirements for specific operations and is conducted without reference to the DAC. It is managed locally and is part of force generation. In the first instance, FLCs must seek to meet any augmentation requirement from within their own manpower resources as part of the BTL process.

412. **Planned and Unplanned Augmentation.** Military and civilian ATL augmentation is also defined as being either planned or unplanned:

   a. **Planned Augmentation.** Planned augmentation is the process by which an organisation or headquarters creates additional crisis-only posts within its establishment which are scrutinised and approved in advance. They are documented and managed using Augmentation Manning Lists (AML) and are filled either by dual appointing individuals into the crisis role, or by identifying posts or augmentee pools to fill the planned augmentee post when activated.

   b. **Unplanned Augmentation.** Unplanned augmentation is the process by which a demanding organisation or headquarters seeks augmentee manpower to meet unforeseen requirements. Unplanned augmentation, also called *ad hoc* augmentation, is subject to scrutiny and approval by the relevant PJHQ Operations Team and the DAC. Unplanned augmentation posts are not on establishments or AMLs.

413. **Augmentee Categories.** Planned augmentee posts are categorised as either primary or secondary augmentees, dependent on the degree of readiness and the pre-selection and training required:

   a. **Primary Augmentee Posts.** Primary augmentee posts are mission essential posts that require activation within 10 days of the declaration of an operation, during emerging operational planning, or where a time delay of greater than 10 days for the provision of a planned augmentee is untenable. A primary augmentee is dual appointed to a crisis role and the individual is held at R3, 10 days notice to deploy, to ensure that they are able to assume the duties of the augmentee post within 10 days of an activation request being received. In extremis, and only after bi-lateral consultation at the appropriate level with the provider, this can be reduced at short notice.
b. **Secondary Augmentee Posts.** Secondary augmentee posts are those for which an individual must be made available within 20 days of an activation request being received. Secondary augmentees will be identified on the AML by name and post or the post will be filled from an augmentee pool. As a minimum, individuals selected to fill secondary augmentee posts should be given 10 days notice of deployment.

**414. Principles.** ATL augmentation, planned or unplanned, should only be used when essential; it should not be used when manning requirements can be met through conventional means or where better alternatives exist. It is not used to fill ‘gaps’ caused by under-manning or to fill a post vacated as a result of augmentation, a process known as substitution or back-filling, or for the replacement of casualties. Planned ATL augmentation is the preferred method. Unplanned augmentation is only accepted where the need for an augmentation post could not reasonably have been predicted or where there is no peacetime establishment against which the crisis-only post can be raised. An augmentee should be used in the post for which the individual has been activated. The only exception is when a post cannot be filled either within the time frame required or from other theatres; in such rare extremes, theatre commanders and their staff may, by exception, utilise the available manpower to best operational effect. This must be done in consultation with the DAC and any changes in employment should be reported, through PJHQ J1 and the DAC, to the FLC that has provided the augmentee. On completion of the specified task, an augmentee is to be released back to their parent unit and not retained for any other task.

**415. Operational Augmentee Posts.** The operational commitment of an individual augmentee is nominally for 6 months. Supplying FLCs may wish to manage specific tour lengths to suit their particular requirements and changes may be progressed through the auspices of the single-Service’s manpower organisations. Where there is an overriding necessity to deploy for longer, it will be managed on a case-by-case basis. On operations, augmentation posts do not normally last longer than 6 months. If an augmentation post is, or is likely to be required beyond 12 months, or if after the initial deployment there is a continuing requirement for the post, it should be entered into the PJHQ Operational Establishment Table, which is endorsed by the Operations Directorate. However, a permanent increase in service manpower liabilities would need to be approved by central Resource and Plans staffs. Where a particular Service is specified to fill an augmentation post, the responsibility for creating a permanent post falls to the providing Service, although the cost remains the responsibility of the MOD Operations Director. Once a post is operationally established, the incumbent will no longer be considered an augmentee.
416. **Use of Reserves for Augmentation.** Reservists may, subject to Ministerial approval, be mobilised for operational augmentation as set out in the Reserve Forces Act 1996 (RFA 96), as amended by the Armed Forces Act 2006, and in accordance with the procedures set out in Defence Crisis Management Organisation’s Standing Operating Procedures and Joint Service Publication (JSP) 753, *Tri-Service Regulations for the Mobilisation of Reserves*. The Defence intent is that only *willing* reservists are mobilised for enduring operations, except where operational imperatives demand otherwise, e.g. where individuals have specialist capabilities in short supply in the regulars. At other times, and particularly at larger scale, or where concurrency norms are exceeded, reservists may be mobilised against their will. Each call-out order is specifically tailored for the generation of the reserve forces necessary for the particular operation. Reservists mobilised for an operation may provide either direct operational output in theatre or may alternatively be deployed elsewhere to backfill regular Service personnel who have deployed to theatre as individual augmentees. Additionally, reservists on Full-Time Reserve Service commitments can provide individual manpower augmentation to fill short-term requirements. Service manpower suppliers are responsible for identifying suitable reserves, within the readiness criteria to meet the requirement. Reservists may also be used on a voluntary basis for non-operational augmentation, i.e. for exercises and training. Where the training value of augmentation will meet an element of the annual training requirement of the reservist, it can be counted, and funded, with the agreement of the reserve unit, as part of the reservist’s obligatory training carried out under the terms of the RFA 96 Section 22. The remaining activity should be conducted under Section 27 (voluntary training and other duties) and funded as appropriate.

417. **Reservist Time Restrictions.** The time a reservist may be mobilised is governed by the terms of the Section of RFA 96 under which the reservist was mobilised, stated in the call-out order. Where operational requirements dictate a need to retain the reservist in theatre, staff will need to ensure that any extension added onto the period of mobilisation does not exceed the individual’s permitted period. This calculation will need to take into account the period of mobilised time already served, the additional time required in theatre, appropriate post-operational leave and the time for formal demobilisation procedures. Exceptionally, the Secretary of State may seek an extension to the formal period of mobilisation where service is under Section 52 and 54 of RFA 96 by seeking Royal authority to invoked Section 53(22) and 55(11) respectively. Advice on specific details on extensions may be sought from the Directorate of Reserve Forces and Cadets (DRFC).
Personnel support includes the provision and sustainment of manpower and the sustainment of the individual.

J1 staff have responsibility for the overall management of prisoner handling, while specialists are responsible for the handling itself.

J1 staff will normally develop a personnel support element to the estimate and a personnel support annex to the campaign plan.

The Front Line Commands (FLCs) have primary responsibility for providing personnel, usually in formed units, to support joint operations.

501.  **Strategic Planning Process.** Within the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO), Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) and Component Commander Headquarters, J1 staffs have the responsibility for ensuring the delivery of personnel support, and the management of prisoner handling arrangements,\(^1\) throughout the conduct of an operation. Personnel support has 2 primary objectives: the provision and sustainment of manpower for the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) and the sustainment of Service personnel. The J1 role, however, is more than that of coordinating the delivery of information, services and facilities by others, it also includes the on-going responsibility for ensuring that reports, information, services and facilities are available and appropriately managed. J1 staffs are responsible for advising their commanders of shortfalls and most importantly, the likely operational impacts of shortfalls.

502.  **Personnel Support Responsibilities.** J1 staff may direct that the pre-deployment briefings, given by the FLCs, are used to ensure that the Service personnel are correctly trained and equipped, and also to ensure that they receive adequate information on the welfare support available to them and their families during the operation. A representation of J1 personnel support responsibilities is shown in Figure 5.1.

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\(^1\) See Joint Defence Publication (JDP) 1-10 *Prisoners of War, Internees and Detainees.*
503. **Prisoner Handling.** Joint Defence Publication (JDP) 1-10 *Prisoners of War, Internees and Detainees* details the responsibilities of the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) and the J1-J9 staff within the JTFHQ concerning appropriate arrangements for prisoner handling. J1 staff have responsibility for the overall management of prisoner handling. Specific roles are:

a. Establish a Prisoner Handling Organisation (PHO), on behalf of the JTFC, to exercise the administrative function throughout the prisoner handling system.

b. Accounting for, and tracking of, the whereabouts of captured, interned or detained persons, to include transfers and release.²

c. The provision of adequate Information Technology (IT) resources to enable accounting and tracking activity must be addressed at an early stage in consultation with J3.

d. Nominating officers and staff to run collecting points and Prisoner Handling Facilities within the Joint Operations Area (JOA).

² Information on the whereabouts of all prisoners of war, internees and detainees must be forwarded to the International Committee of the Red Cross via the MOD Service Personnel Policy Prisoner of War Information Bureau.
e. Determining the status of captured personnel where it is not clear from the outset.³

f. Making arrangements for the transfer, evacuation, release and repatriation of captured, interned or detained persons.

504. **Operational Planning Process.** The Contingency Planning Team (CPT), led by PJHQ J5, produces a Military Strategic Estimate, in consultation with the Current Commitments Team in the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the relevant FLCs, identifying the capabilities required from Directorate Special Forces and FLCs. All PJHQ staff branches, including J1, are represented on the CPT. Personnel input to the estimate is provided via the J1 member(s) of the CPT through the production of a Logistic Estimate conducted by a Logistic Planning Team. The Logistic Planning Team is chaired by Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff (DACOS) J4 and includes representatives from PJHQ J1 staff.

505. **J1 Responsibilities.** During the estimate and planning process, J1 staff will normally develop a personnel support element to the estimate and a personnel support annex to the campaign plan. A checklist of planning considerations is at Annex 5A. Planning sets the foundation for subsequent activities and therefore J1 staff must consider the following issues from the outset:

a. Understanding the strategic and operational objectives early in the planning process and how they are refined as mission requirements change over time.

b. Understanding of the estimate process, the selection process for a Course of Action (CoA) and the development of plans to support the mission objectives in order to:

   (1) Ensure that personnel support requirements are adequately identified and prioritised relative to the J2-J9 staff input.

   (2) Ensure that requirements for manpower, in particular specific skills such as language or specialist training and knowledge are identified.

   (3) Ensure that the welfare enablers are planned and ordered early as some have long lead-in times.

³ The determination of an individual’s status is the process by which UK armed forces will establish the additional protection and privileges to which that individual is entitled. (JDP 1-10).
(4) Ensure that adequate provision exists for a PHO.  

c. The formulation of the operational welfare input to the Personnel and Administration Annex of the mission directive, in line with MOD Policy and specifically JSP 770 *Tri-Service Operational and Non-Operational Welfare Policy*.

d. Rest and Recuperation (R&R) in conjunction with Defence Supply Chain and Operational Movements (DSCOM) and within the parameters laid down in JSP 760 *Regulations for Leave and Other Types of Absence*.

506. **MOD Responsibilities.** MOD responsibilities are:

a. The Secretary of State for Defence and Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) establish policy, assign responsibilities through CDS’ Directives, and prescribe procedures to include manpower readiness, reserves, prisoner handling and general personnel administration, such as Operational Location (OPLOC), casualty management and compassionate and welfare enablers.

b. The Defence Medical Services, under the direction of Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Health)\(^5\) are responsible for the provision of medical policy guidance.

c. Service Personnel Policy (SP Pol) is responsible for setting overarching operational welfare policy, under the direction of Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Personnel) (DCDS (Pers)) and the Principal Personnel Officers of the Service Personnel Board. SP Pol is also responsible for:

   (1) Providing MOD agreement to specific operational welfare policy formulated by the JTFC/Chief of Joint Operations (CJO).

   (2) All policy matters pertaining to broadcasting services and the provision of live entertainment.

   (3) Navy Army and Air Force Institute (NAAFI).

   (4) Rest and Recuperation policy.

   (5) Terms and Conditions of Service, within the constraints outlined in Chapter 3, Section III.

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\(^4\) Covered in detail in JDP 1-10.

d. Head of Expeditionary Logistics and Support Capability is responsible for making provision for welfare facilities within the Statement of Requirement for Expeditionary Campaign Infrastructure, including the provision of facilities specifically for the Expeditionary Forces Institute (EFI).

f. Directorate of Reserve Forces and Cadets is responsible for the staffing of all call-out orders in support of mobilisation. It also provides policy guidance on the use of reservists and associated legislative constraints to Current Commitments Team, Operations Directorate, PJHQ, FLCs and Standing Joint Commander UK (SJC(UK)).

507. **Single-Service Responsibilities.** The FLCs have primary responsibility for providing personnel, usually in formed units, to support joint operations. This includes responsibility for the mobilisation of reserves. Through the principal personnel officers, the Service manning agencies develop single-Service plans, policy and guidance on manpower and personnel administration issues. FLCs are also responsible for the provision and maintenance of non-public funded welfare equipment, to supplement the publicly-funded welfare package, and the provision of advice and support to PJHQ regarding the detailed formulation of deployed welfare support. As such they are responsible for the implementation of policy, and in some cases the delivery of welfare enablers.

508. **Responsibility for Specific Welfare Services.** A number of organisations have responsibility for the implementation and delivery of specific operational welfare services:

a. **MOD Service Personnel Policy/Permanent Joint Headquarters J1.** MOD SP Pol/PJHQ J1 are responsible for welfare telephones, and internet provision for private use.

b. **British Forces Post Office.** The British Forces Post Office (BFPO) is responsible for the enduring families free mail service, forces free aerogrammes (blueys), electronic aerogrammes (e-blueys) and all other mail issues.

c. **Navy, Army and Air Force Institute, Expeditionary Forces Institute and Naval Canteen Service.** NAAFI, EFI and Naval Canteen Service (NCS), are responsible for retail and leisure facilities, supported by Headquarters Land Forces and National Component Headquarters respectively.

d. **Services Sound and Vision Corporation.** The Services Sound and Vision Corporation (SSVC) is responsible for the British Forces
Broadcasting Service (BFBS) radio and TV, Combined Services’ Entertainment (CSE) shows and forces cinema.

e. **Education and Training Service Library Service.** Education and Training Service (ETS) library service are responsible for providing the services library service.

### SECTION II – J1 PLANNING ACTIVITY

At the planning stage, J5 staff will need to ensure that the manpower requirements are fully identified. J1 delivers to that requirement.

Accurate and timely manpower tracking, OPLOC, informs operational commanders of the forces involved in an operation.

A stress management policy and the resources necessary to implement the policy will need to be in place from deployment through to redeployment.

509. **Personnel Support Element of the Estimate.** The personnel support element is a vital part of the commander’s estimate and essential to the development of the optimum CoA for a military response to a situation. Personnel support considerations are based on the directives issued by CDS, CJO and the JTFC, any relevant reconnaissance reports and sources of information such as the media, internet and Foreign and Commonwealth Office reports. J1 staff will need to address the following:

a. **Manpower.** In coordination with J5, and subject matter experts at the relevant FLCs, manpower requirements are to be determined for the joint force and the headquarters, including the requirement for J1 staff. Manpower planning activity is covered in paragraph 511. Manpower, however, will inherently bring constraints that must be acknowledged in the estimate.

b. **Manpower Accounting and Tracking.** Manpower accounting includes provision for all Service personnel, Contractor Support to Operations, other civilians for whom MOD has responsibility, foreign exchange personnel and prisoners of war, internees and detainees. Casualty and compassionate reporting, mortuary management, repatriation of the dead and war graves registration should also be considered. All activities associated with the OPLOC of personnel are

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6. Manpower may include reserves, service exchange personnel and others.
7. JDP 1-10 covers this subject in detail.
8. The relevant publications covering the procedures for these issues are provided in the comprehensive list of reference publications.
9. Covered in Chapter 3, Section II.
J1 staff responsibilities throughout an operation from deployment to redeployment.

c. **Sustainment of Service Personnel.** The sustainment of Service personnel is an important element of the estimate as many of the welfare enablers have significant logistic implications. Moreover the lead times for the provision of some facilities and equipment can have a significant influence on how personnel sustainment is delivered.

510. **Campaign Plan Personnel Support Annex.** The selection of a CoA by the JTFC will follow the estimate process. The selected CoA will be refined into a campaign plan by all the staff divisions led by the J5 staff. The campaign plan will incorporate an annex that will identify command responsibilities and functional arrangements for the provision of personnel support. Personnel support guidance contained in the annex is derived from the estimate process and concurrent planning activity.

511. **Manpower Planning.** There is inevitably a requirement for additional manpower to provide staff for headquarters, prisoner handling or media operations, which can be manpower intensive. Contingency planning is also essential as concurrent operations, or the likelihood of concurrent operations, may impact on manpower requirements, particularly in areas where skills are vital or in short supply. FLCs are responsible for providing the manpower to the operation and the directives issued by CDS, and CJO will identify the units and/or capabilities that may be assigned to a Joint Force. These directives may also specify a manpower ceiling for the operation. This manpower ceiling may become a significant constraint on the JTFC’s chosen CoA. The planning process should identify the full manpower requirement and initiate the sustainment of that manpower through planned roulement or the mobilisation of reserves.

512. **Sources of Manpower.** Assigned units may have manpower and skills shortages that need to be filled before they can be ready for operations. Although FLCs have the primary responsibility for providing personnel, including the mobilisation of reserves, J1 is responsible for planning and coordinating the efforts of the FLCs to optimise manpower for a joint operation. There are a number of sources of skilled manpower, including from other regular units. However, each source of manpower brings with it certain constraints that must be recognised and managed. For example, the mobilisation of reserves takes time, and usually requires Ministerial approval.

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10 Planning is covered in detail in JDP 5-00 Campaign Planning.
11 JDP 1-10 covers this subject in detail.
513. **Individual Sustainment Planning.** Planning for the sustainment of personnel with food, water and accommodation is a J4 responsibility. However, increasing emphasis has been given to sustaining individuals (physically, mentally and spiritually) with a package of welfare enablers known as Deployed Welfare Support (DWS)\(^\text{12}\) together with guidance on managing stress and alcohol consumption. Planning the DWS package and issuing stress and alcohol management policies are J1 responsibilities.

514. **Welfare Coordination.** During the planning phase of an operation, and ideally at regular intervals thereafter, SP Pol should brief the senior welfare coordinator within PJHQ on all aspects of DWS. Where possible the respective FLC staff officers and JTFHQ J1 representative should be in attendance. In order to ensure that welfare coordination is properly and appropriately supported, it is essential that functional links up through PJHQ, and the FLCs if appropriate, to SP Pol are retained once the force is deployed.

515. **Expectation Management.** Many of the demands for welfare support will be generated not by a genuine need but because there is an expectation that certain facilities and services will be available. By synchronising the welfare plans with operational activity and the briefings given to commanders and Service personnel, the level of expectation can, to some extent, be managed. Good leadership at the tactical level and sound judgement by appointed welfare coordinators should be used to highlight the true welfare needs during planning and subsequently during operations. Equally, all personnel in theatre must be made aware of the risks involved in delivering the welfare elements and the requirement for the command to balance those risks with the needs of personnel. Conditions on the frontline are going to be austere and risks incurred in the delivery of welfare support packages are harder to justify than those for essential warfighting supplies.

516. **Deployed Welfare Support Planning.** Welfare planning guidelines are provided in JSP 770. Regulatory and affordability issues have to be considered for each operation and experience has shown that operations differ in their welfare requirement. The DCDS-Pers Service Conditions and Welfare section can generally agree a package of welfare enablers within 24 hours of a request from PJHQ, in time for those departing with advance parties to be briefed. Identifying timelines and realising the provision of many aspects of DWS is normally a NSE/JLogC responsibility; therefore it is useful to apply the logistic planning considerations of Destination, Demand, Distance and Duration (the 4 Ds).\(^\text{13}\) It must be recognised, however, that operational priorities may delay the implementation of the planned DWS. Paradoxically,

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\(^{12}\) Covered in Chapter 3, Section IV.

\(^{13}\) More detail may be found in JDP 4-00 *Logistics for Joint Operations* (3rd Edition).
the more taxing the deployment, when DWS would be of most benefit, the more difficult it is likely to be to ensure delivery.

517. **Welfare Support Phases.** For the purposes of planning welfare support provision an operation is best divided into 6 phases. The phases provide a structure against which welfare facilities should be provided; although the phases are discrete, there should be a seamless transition between them from the welfare perspective. These phases are shown diagrammatically at Figure 5.2 though it must be emphasised that they serve as a planning guide and should not be rigidly imposed.

![Figure 5.2 – Welfare Support Phases](image)

518. **Stress and Alcohol Management Policies.** The J1 plan should contain a stress management policy, identifying the resources required for implementation. Wherever possible a Traumatic Risk Management (TRiM) capability should be embedded at unit level and an alcohol management policy should be established. Working in coalition with forces that do not

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14 Stress Management is covered in detail in Chapter 3, Section VI.
tolerate the consumption of alcohol will heavily influence the latter, but the driving consideration should be operational effectiveness, discipline and morale.
ANNEX 5A – PERSONNEL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

5A1. Considerations Prior to an Operation. Prior to an operation, preparatory work mainly involves the issuing of directives that incorporate the J1 requirement for the operation. J1 should input into all relevant documentation such as:

- a. Chief of Defence Staff’s (CDS’) Directive.
- d. Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs) as required.
- e. Force Instruction Documents (FIDs).
- f. Mounting Order/Instruction.

5A2. In addition, where possible prior to the publication of these directives, J1 should be represented on the reconnaissance. The level of J1 support to each operational deployment will be dependent on the number of personnel deployed and for whom Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) has responsibility. To obtain maximum benefit from a reconnaissance, prior to departure the J1 representative should establish the following:

- a. The likely mission/role of the deploying force.
- b. Formations/units likely to deploy and locations.
- c. Likely Airports of Disembarkation (APOD)/Seaports of Disembarkation (SPOD).
- d. Likely tasks of Joint Force.
- e. Likely in-theatre Air Transport/Military Transport.
- f. Likely numbers to deploy and rate of deployment.
- g. Communications requirements.
- h. Likely coalition nations involved.
- i. Worst case number of casualties.
- j. Worst case number of refugees/internally displaced personnel.
k. Worst case number of Captured Persons (CPERS) (includes all Prisoners of War, Captured, Interned or Detained Persons).

l. Language constraints.

m. Documentation requirements - visas, licenses, passports, travel order.

n. Entitlement to the Deployed Welfare Package (DWP).

5A3. **Infrastructure.** The extent and quality of the local infrastructure will affect the level of host nation support available in-theatre. The J1 reconnaissance representative, in conjunction with the J4 and J6 representatives, should determine the general standard of the local infrastructure with particular attention to whether the theatre is bare, austere or well found. In particular, the following factors should be considered:

a. Standards of roads.

b. Standards of rail.

c. Standards of communications networks.

d. Weather conditions.

e. Host nation customs and sensitivities, including any inhibitors to freedom of movement.

f. Local amenities and facilities such as banking and local contractors.

5A4. **Command and Control.** Dependent on the location, there may already be a J1 headquarters node in the theatre that would provide headquarters J1 support and advice. If there is no J1 presence in the area, then consideration should be given to whether that function should be provided directly from PJHQ. Additionally, disciplinary chains of command should be considered when reviewing command and control.

5A5. **Personnel Issues.** The J1 reconnaissance representative should consider the following:

a. **Manpower Accounting.** Accurate reporting of personnel movements in/out and within Theatre is core J1 business. As many theatres have manpower caps based on political decisions, manning numbers attract high level attention so the ability to track manpower is paramount. The system to be used for the recording and tracking of
personnel movements will be specified in the operational mounting instruction; however the following considerations should be considered:

(1) Access to JPA.
(2) Where is the most effective location for Operational Location (OPLOC) personnel?
(3) Who will carry out OPLOC?

b. Manpower Provision. While the wider issue of manpower will be dealt with by individual divisions and ultimately by J3, J1 reconnaissance personnel should consider the J1 manpower required to support deployment. Consideration should be given to providing the following J1 capabilities:

(1) Cashier.
(2) Disciplinary advice/staffing.
(3) DWP Management.
(4) OPLOC/Move and track.
(5) Rest and Recuperation coordination.
(6) Compassionate/Casualty cell.
(7) Honours and awards coordination.
(8) General J1 duties.
(9) Chaplaincy provision (in consultation with staff chaplain).
(10) Training and education provision (in consultation with J7).
(11) Physical education requirements.
(12) Provost Support.

c. Reception, Staging Onward Movement and Integration. While predominantly a J4 responsibility, J1 may be required to review the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) requirement. The following factors should therefore be considered by J1 reconnaissance personnel:
(1) Possible locations of Theatre Reception and Departure Centres (TRDC), both main and mobile.
(2) Arrival and departure briefing requirements.
(3) Surge facilities.
(4) IT requirements.

Additionally, the RSOI requirements for formed unit personnel are likely to be different from those required by individual augmentees.

d. **Casualty Reporting/Mortuaries.** In-theatre casualty reporting will be coordinated by the compassionate and casualty cell in theatre; in support of this, J1 recce personnel should consider the following:

(1) Possible locations of casualty cells.
(2) Location of, and Point of Contact at, Embassy/High Commission.
(3) Possible location of Role 2E and 3 Medical Treatment Facilities on land and afloat (liaison with J4 Med/J4).
(4) Location of host nation hospitals (liaison with J4 Med).
(5) Local sensitivities.
(6) Facilities at APOD/SPOD for the repatriation of bodies (including temporary mortuaries, other nations’ mortuary facilities and refrigeration units).
(7) Coordination with MOD contractor, as required.
(8) Mortuary provision/mortuary management.

e. **Captured, Interned and Detained Persons.** In any conflict, it is likely that UK Forces may be required to deal with CPERS. J1 reconnaissance personnel, in consultation with the Provost Marshal, should consider the following:

(1) Possible location of prisoner of war/detainee centres.
(2) Extent of host nation support.
(3) Possibilities for division of responsibility amongst coalition partners.
f. **Refugees/Internally Displaced Persons.** Responsibility for refugees/Internally Displaced Personnel (IDP) is not a military issue; in any operational deployment, responsibility rests with Her Majesty’s Government (Department for International Development (DFID)). It is possible that DFID may seek the assistance of PJHQ in managing refugees/IDP and, therefore, J1 recce personnel consider the following:

(1) Possible locations for camps.
(2) Level of host-nation support.
(3) Level of assistance from coalition nations available.
(4) The lead civilian and military agencies.
(5) The estimated number of refugees and their likely condition.
(6) Likely medical facilities.

5A6. **Deployed Welfare Package (Overseas).** PJHQ always aims to provide the full DWP; however, the operational environment will dictate the extent to which this can be achieved. Full details of the DWP are contained within JSP 770 *Tri-Service Operational and Non-Operational Policy*, J1 reconnaissance personnel should consider the following factors to enable quick establishment of the DWP.

a. **Welfare facility.**

(1) Dedicated welfare/recreation facility.
(2) Infrastructure requirements.
(3) Host-nation support.
(4) Coalition support.

b. **Telephone/internet.**

(1) Extent and reliability of host nation support.
(2) Infrastructure requirements for static communications.
(3) Welfare village – centralised location.
(4) Coalition support (i.e. access to telephone lines, internet or WiFi provision etc).
(5) Optimum satellite locations to combine good reception with easy access.

(6) Availability of high readiness equipment.

c. **British Forces Post Office.**

(1) Extent and reliability of host nation support.

(2) Distance from APOD.

(3) Infrastructure requirements.

(4) Number of personnel in deployment (i.e. small number of personnel may not have access to Postal and Courier Services and therefore may not have specific BFPO number allocated – can the Embassy assist?)

(5) Facilities for fax- and e-blueys.

d. **Operational Fitness Equipment.**

(1) Extent of host-nation support.

(2) Sports halls/fitness room – ongoing management.

(3) Possible alternate locations for operational fitness equipment.

(4) Management/maintenance/re-supply of operational fitness equipment.

e. **British Forces Broadcasting Service Radio/Television.**

(1) Extent, language and quality of local facilities.

(2) Extent of satellite coverage.

(3) Frequencies.

(4) Environmental considerations for Receiving/Transmitting.

(5) Local sensitivities.

(6) Dedicated in-location provision required?

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(7) Ongoing engineering support.
(8) Contract amendments.

f. **Books/Videos/Newspapers/Games.** A regular supply of newspapers, magazines, books and DVDs is a major part of the DWP. The availability of air transport and the operational tempo will clearly dictate the extent to which these items can be delivered. J1 recce personnel should determine the extent of host-nation support and coalition assistance. Particular attention should be paid to local sensitivities.

g. **Expeditionary Forces Institute.** Ready access to an Expeditionary Forces Institute (EFI) facility is highly desirable on any operation, irrespective of the availability of other coalition outlets. J1 recce personnel should consider the following factors:

   (1) Possible locations, balancing access to service personnel and ease of re-supply.
   (2) Extent of host-nation support.
   (3) Extent of coalition outlets.
   (4) Distribution and re-supply considerations.
   (5) Ongoing maintenance requirements and arrangements/contracts.

h. **Rest and Recuperation/Operational Stand-Down.** Regulations concerning the entitlement to rest and recuperation are detailed in JSP 760 *Regulations for Leave and Other Types of Travel*; however, specific location related information is available from PJHQ J1. Rest and recuperation opportunities will vary greatly between locations, but J1 staff should consider the availability and access to sites of local interest, bars, nightlife, sporting facilities etc. The prevailing security situation will determine access to these facilities therefore liaison with J2 and J3 force protection is essential.

i. **Combined Service Entertainment Shows.** J1 reconnaissance personnel should identify potential venues for Combined Service Entertainment (CSE) shows but, in doing so, pay particular attention to local sensitivities when considering appropriate entertainment.
5A7. **Chaplaincy Provision.** Dependent on the number of personnel, dedicated chaplaincy provision may be required. In consultation with the Staff Chaplain, J1 reconnaissance personnel should consider:

a. Location of the chaplain.
b. Church/Prayer Room location.
c. Host-nation support.
d. Coalition support

5A8. **Education and Training.** Dependent on the nature of the operation there may be a requirement to establish an education and training facility. J1 recce personnel, in consultation with J7 should consider:

a. Ongoing educational requirements.
b. Coalition support.
c. Longevity of the operation.
d. Location of training facility.
e. Collocation with welfare facility/sports hall/fitness area.
f. IT requirements (intranet/internet facilities).

5A9. **Security.** The requirement for force protection is paramount. All of the above factors should be set against the prevailing security environment. J1 recce personnel should consider the following additional factors:

a. Specific local dangers, including environmental threats (e.g. mines).
b. Local justice.
c. Specific policing issues (e.g. alcohol consumption).
d. Gender and equal opportunity issues.
e. Transport.

5A10. **Post-Reconnaissance Considerations.** Following the reconnaissance, more detailed planning will be undertaken to complete the directives fully; however the level of J1 detail required will vary dependent on the directive:
a. CDS to CJO: minimal content but with priorities highlighted.

b. CJO to JTFC: more in-depth content containing what PJHQ expects to be achieved and the general outcome of actions.

c. JTFC to Force: in-depth J1 requirement, detailing what the force aims to achieve and how. Personnel under command of JTFC may include MOD Civil Servants, Commonwealth Forces, exchange officers and contractors. JTFC directives should consider the following J1 capabilities:

   (1) Discipline.
   (2) Morale.
   (3) Security.
   (4) Theatre visitors.
   (5) Status of deployed civilians.
   (6) CPERS.
   (7) Welfare.
   (8) Casualty and compassionate.
   (9) Management of the dead.
   (10) Personnel reporting.
   (11) Rest and recuperation.
   (12) OPLOC tracking.
   (13) Operational stress management.
ANNEX 5B – ROLE OF THE CHAPLAIN

5B1. The spiritual and moral welfare of all Service personnel, and especially the spiritual comfort of the sick and wounded, are the responsibilities of chaplains who can make an important contribution to high morale. Chaplains remain ministers of their own churches, without whose authority they would not be permitted to conduct their normal array of duties. However within this context, their role can be as wide and varied as they and their commanders choose, provided they are not expected to perform duties contrary to their profession as priests and ministers. They are uniquely placed as a channel of communication at all levels and all circumstances. Chaplains can act as a lightning conductor for the feelings of Service personnel and as a sounding board for commanders.

5B2. The effective chaplain is one who is a spiritual friend to the individual and a source of support and spiritual advice to the commander. The tasks of chaplains include:

- a. Ministry to Service personnel and Service communities.
- b. Maintaining the spiritual and moral capability of all personnel.
- c. Provide for divine services.
- d. Maintaining the highest standards of personal and corporate behaviour.
- e. Providing pastoral care and welfare.
- f. Conducting burial in the field, where this is permitted.

5B3. There are 2 principles that underpin the role of the chaplaincy:

- a. To provide appropriate pastoral care for all personnel and their dependants irrespective of religion, belief or status.
- b. To provide centres and facilities for worship, as appropriate for each Service, to enable personnel to practise their faith within reasonable constraints imposed by the operational circumstances.

5B4. The link between spiritual needs and overall well-being means that there is an inevitable overlap between sustaining individual Service personnel and chaplaincy support. Chaplains are not welfare officers yet they are part of a larger ‘J1 Team’ and play a key role in the spiritual and pastoral support of Service personnel and their dependants. Chaplains are a crucial resource for commanders and Service personnel. Their efforts should be focused on front
JDP 1-05

line requirements and their command and control arrangements should be clearly articulated.

**Pastoral Needs**

5B5. Pastoral needs relate to the ‘whole person’ and represent the summation of an individual’s needs in many different areas. Everyone has pastoral needs, regardless of faith or religious conviction, and there is a significant overlap between the help provided to personnel and their families by welfare agencies, both professional and voluntary, and that by chaplains. During operations the chaplain’s proactive approach in identifying cases and providing a ‘listening ear’ is very valuable. The general availability of chaplains in deployed units and their unique ability to offer absolute confidentiality can be a major help in preventing cases escalating to the point where a person is no longer combat-effective and may have to be repatriated.

**Religious Needs**

5B6. While many people are not active members of any faith or religion, traumatic incidents will often bring out the need for spiritual support. Conversely, there are a significant number of individuals who are active in a faith or belief and would like the regular ministrations of a chaplain, including the provision of worship. Likewise, adherents of other recognised faiths look to the chaplain to ensure that appropriate provision is made for their religious needs. Spiritual needs vary according to an individual’s particular beliefs and the circumstances in which they find themselves. Their needs are most likely to be acute in life-threatening situations or after traumatic incidents. The demands on chaplaincy will vary accordingly; the time of greatest spiritual need is likely to coincide with that of greatest pastoral need.
PART 3 – PROJECT
CHAPTER 6 – DEPLOYMENT
SECTION I – DEPLOYMENT PROCESS

Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) is the controlling headquarters for all deployed Joint operations unless otherwise directed.

PJHQ J4 Joint Mounting Cell forms the core of the PJHQ Deployment Cell for specific operations and provides a focus for all mounting issues, working to J3/J5 direction.

601. **Mounting.** Mounting is the term applied to all preparations made in areas designated for the purpose of assembling force elements in anticipation of an operation. It includes the assembly in the mounting area, preparation and maintenance within the mounting area, movement to loading points and subsequent embarkation to either ships, craft or aircraft if applicable.\(^1\)

602. **UK Context.** In the UK, mounting refers to the practical coordination of tasks as dictated by the Detailed Deployment Plan (DDP).\(^2\) The DDP encompasses all orders and directions that allocate strategic lift assets and detail the embarkation of personnel and cargoes. The DDP is covered in detail in Section II. Mounting includes the identification and preparation of forces, their equipment and stores, pre-deployment training, briefings and transportation to the Point of Embarkation (POE), most commonly via the Joint Air Mounting Centre at South Cerney or the Sea Mounting Centre at Marchwood Military Port.

603. **Force Generation.** Force Generation and mounting are 2 distinct, but interdependent activities. Force Generation is the sum of activities conducted by the Front Line Commands (FLCs) and Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) to provide the appropriate capability and force elements at readiness (FE@R), to satisfy a Joint Statement of Requirement. It is not specifically part of the mounting process but is a precursor to any deployment. Responsibility for the preparation of force elements and the generation of capability (FE@R) lies with the FLC/DE&S chains of command.

604. **Mounting Command and Control.** PJHQ is the controlling headquarters for all deployed joint operations and major joint exercises.\(^3\)

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1. Allied Administrative Publication (AAP) – 6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.
2. This is covered in detail in Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 4-00 Logistics for Joint Operations (3rd Edition).
3. FLCs can be nominated as mounting headquarters, particularly when deploying force elements are drawn primarily from a single Service.
PJHQ is responsible for directing the activities of FLCs and DE&S in the mounting of a joint force and for coordinating the deployment of that force, but it has no responsibility for that element of mounting relating to force generation. Mounting is a J3-led process directed by J3 Operational Teams. Functional responsibility for mounting lies with Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS) J1/J4 and is exercised on his behalf by Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff (Mounting/Movement) (DACOS M&M). DACOS M&M commands\(^4\) the J4 Joint Mounting Cell (J4 JM Cell) and J4 Movements Cell (J4 Mov Cell).

**SECTION II – RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT AND INTEGRATION**

The Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) and Joint Force Logistic Component Commander (JFLogCC) need to be involved with pre-deployment planning as early as possible.

The speed of deployment into theatre is largely dependent on the availability of appropriate strategic lift assets provided through Defence Supply Chain Operations Movements (DSCOM).

The Joint Force Element Table (JFET)/Joint Desired Order of Arrival (JDOA) determines the sequence and loading patterns of force elements on departure. Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) and JFLogC enabling elements require early entry to theatre and representation on reconnaissance activity.

605. **Permanent Joint Headquarters Deployment Cell.** At the start of planning for an emerging operation, a deployment cell may be created with the J4 joint mounting cell at its core. The deployment cell provides a standing Contingency Planning Team/Operational Team (CPT/OT) focus, which directs and coordinates the planning for the initial deployment, sustainment and redeployment activities for that operation. The deployment cell provides the deployment focus for an operation, but it is not established to manage the mounting activities for enduring operations. The J4 Joint Mounting Cell normally provides the focus for deployment cell activity using J4 Movement and DSCOM subject matter expertise as required. The cell works initially to the direction of the J5 CPT then, as the operation matures, the cell will work under the authority of the relevant J3 Operational Team.

606. **Joint Force Element Table.** Once the Military Strategic Estimate is concluded, PJHQ will issue a statement of required capabilities to the FLCs and DE&S known as the Joint Statement of Requirement (JSOR). The JSOR details those tasked to provide force elements to the operation and enables

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\(^4\) DACOS Mounting/Movement also commands the J4 Operations Support Cell, which has no mounting role.
the drafting of single-Service or organisational Force Element Tables (FET). The J4 Joint Mounting Cell acts as the focus for FET submissions from FLCs/JTFHQ/JFLogC and DE&S, and coordinates submissions in an iterative round of staffing for accuracy and completeness. The product is consolidated into a Joint FET (JFET) for submission to J3 for ratification against the JSOR. Once endorsed by J3, the final JFET is issued under J3 authority, and becomes the authoritative document governing the shape and size of the deploying force. The JFET is comprehensive and details force elements in capability groupings, but is not as detailed as FLC staff tables. In addition to informing the JTFC of the capabilities, equipment and availability of initial operating stocks, capability gaps are highlighted in order that they might be addressed under J3 direction.

607. **Joint Desired Order of Arrival.** The order of arrival of force elements into a theatre must match the commander’s intent for the delivery of effect. PJHQ operational team and JTFHQ staff work concurrently to develop a JDOA from the JFET which supports the operational plan. The JDOA determines the sequence and loading patterns of force elements on departure; its production is an iterative process involving JTFHQ, DSCOM, and PJHQ. The JDOA enables early bids for strategic movement assets to be made and allows the joint force to be mounted and deployed in a manner consistent with the operational plan. Critical requirements must be identified early to ensure that arrival in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) meets the commander’s intent. The JDOA is a JFET with force elements prioritised according to required loading, movement and delivery dates.

608. **Detailed Deployment Plan.** Until a DDP is produced, the mounting process is characterised by planning activity and a detailed staffing process. Once the DDP has been produced by PJHQ J3, with J1/J4 input, the dominant factor in the process is the physical movement of personnel and equipment. The production of a DDP denotes the point in the mounting process where there is a change in emphasis from deployment planning to deployment execution. This change in emphasis is important for both internal and external stakeholders because it is reflected by transfers of responsibility in most of the key organisations involved in the mounting process.

609. **Planning Considerations.** The key planning considerations are Destination, Demand, Duration and Distance (4 Ds). Several factors will fall out of each planning consideration specific to the type of operation being planned. The speed of operational deployment is largely dependent on the availability of appropriate strategic lift assets and, to a lesser extent, the ability to receive force elements into the JOA. Strategic lift assets will inevitably be a combination of military and civilian chartered capability, used in accordance with the law and Ministry of Defence (MOD) policy. The relevance of the
JDOA becomes acute when balancing the available strategic resources against the defined flow into theatre (in the JDOA).

610. **Personnel and Equipment.** Personal equipment provision and medical preparation are key components of the deployment process. The Joint Movement Order (JMO) and other deployment instructions, taking account of statutory and political requirements, are used to coordinate the preparation and mounting of personnel and equipment. The administrative preparation of personnel includes the issue of specialist clothing, fitness screening and the dispensing of inoculations and prophylactic drugs. In the latter case time may be needed before the drugs become effective and, therefore, medical issues may potentially delay any deployment.

611. **Training.** Pre-deployment training within the Strategic Base and in-theatre may be mandatory for all personnel deploying to a JOA. Detailed training requirements will be articulated in the Joint Commander’s Operational Directive for each individual operation, but FLCs remain responsible for the programming and direction of individual, collective and specialist training. The timing and content of training serials should not be underestimated and must be considered early in the planning process in order that it may be factored into the JTFC’s overall priorities for mounting a force.

### SECTION III – RECEPTION ACTIVITIES

FLCs are responsible for mounting force elements from strategic bases to the POE.

Changes to the JFET/JDOA/DDP can only be authorised by PJHQ Operational Team through the J4 Joint Mounting Cell.

Reception process provides opportunity for personal acclimatisation.

612. **Responsibilities.** Approval for any reduction in Notice to Move (NTM) for the deployment of force elements is the responsibility of MOD. This approval will normally be released as a signal and, once received, PJHQ will issue additional coordinating instructions in accordance with the DDP. The J4 Joint Mounting Cell on behalf of the Operational Team monitors, and adjusts as required, the deployment of the force through a series of FETs and Load Allocation Tables (LATs) on behalf of J3 Operational Team. The JFET/JDOA is effectively the first set of Call Forward Coordinating Instructions (CFCI) used by the FLCs and other Operational Mounting Process (OMP) stakeholders. DSCOM movement operations creates a LAT from the latest JFET/JDOA. The LAT allocates individual line serials, which may vary from one individual through to an entire capability, to specific strategic lift.
613. **Reception.** Reception is the process of receiving, offloading, marshalling, recording and transporting personnel, equipment and materiel from strategic or operational lift through sea, air, or rail Points of Disembarkation (PODs). Reception enables the administration and briefing of personnel and their subsequent transport away from the POD. It also enables personnel to become acclimatised to theatre conditions. This is an essential physiological aspect of final preparations for personnel conducting operations. Overall responsibility for the delivery of the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) process is held by J4, as detailed in Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 4-00 *Logistics for Joint Operations*. However, the impact of this process must be factored into the personnel plan for deployment.

SECTION IV – OPERATIONAL LOCATION

At the Deployment stage of an operational tour, Operational Location (OPLOC) is important for tracking individuals in theatre and for initiating appropriate allowances and welfare support.

614. **Role of Unit Human Resource Staff.** Unit Human Resource staff are responsible for recording any onward movement from the theatre arrival point. This should be carried out within 48 hours of arrival in theatre and requires individuals to report to their Human Resource staff. Figure 6.1 shows the division of responsibilities in theatre between OPLOC teams and unit administrative staff.
Figure 6.1 – OPLOC Responsibilities in Theatre

Division of Responsibilities. This division of responsibilities ensures that:

a. An individual’s location is updated quickly so the PERSREP will be more accurate.

b. Action taken by OPLOC staff will be identical for each person arriving.

c. Visitors’ arrival is recorded by the OPLOC staff and their own human resources staff can adjust allowances on return.
PART 4 – SUSTAIN

CHAPTER 7 – PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

SECTION I – TRACKING OF PERSONNEL IN THEATRE

Operational Location (OPLOC) provides an extensive range of information on in-theatre personnel movements.

701. **Move and Track in Theatre.** The commander should be aware of the information OPLOC provides, as detailed in Chapter 3, Section II.

SECTION II – ROULEMENT IN PLACE

Roulement in Place (RIP) is a continuous process for extended campaigns.

702. Smooth roulement is key to campaign continuity. The in-coming unit should take the lead, thereby ensuring that the in-theatre focus can be maintained. Maximum use of current experience should be made in identifying personnel requirements and shortfalls and then preparing appropriately. Where possible, key continuity posts should be identified and filled. In-theatre training must make best use of current expertise and therefore needs to be complete before the end of the hand-over period. Once in post, lessons learnt need to be made available for the next roulement unit as soon as they are identified.

SECTION III – REST AND RECUPERATION

Rest and Recuperation (R&R) is an essential, though disruptive, aspect of care of the individual.

703. The aim of R&R is to provide Service personnel, who have been mentally and physically challenged by continuous service, time to rest out of line and 'recharge their batteries' in order to sustain operational effectiveness. R&R can be disruptive, taking up to 20% of manpower at any one time and extending over 2/3 of a standard deployment; this can be exacerbated by airbridge fragility when the timing of personnel movements can be significantly affected. However, it is essential for individual welfare and long-term operational effectiveness and must therefore be factored in to the personnel management plan. In order to ease the impact of R&R on the conduct of the campaign, careful management of in-theatre movement either side of the
individuals’ time away from the threat area is essential. It should be noted that R&R is normally to take place in a suitable low-threat environment close to theatre, with an option for travel home at public expense only to be taken if this proves more cost effective. JSP 760 Regulations for Leave and Other Types of Absence, Chapter 5 contains the details.

704. Stress management for personnel around their R&R period is important, both for ensuring focus on the task before and after the break and for preparing the individual for dealing with a short period of theatre-based relaxation or home life (as applicable). Minimising apprehension over successfully getting away for R&R and then getting swiftly back into routines on return will go some way in dealing with the former; the provision of theatre-exit welfare briefing/counselling will help with the latter.

SECTION IV – LEARNING ORGANISATIONS

Personnel support, along with all other aspects of campaigning, will improve through the application of the principles of a learning organisation.

705. A learning organisation is one where learning is valued, continuous and most effective when shared, and where every experience is a valuable opportunity to learn. The operational commander is responsible for ensuring that the relevant criteria of a learning organisation are applied in theatre. This not only assists in maintaining a structure that is fit for purpose, but also maximises the value of personnel within that structure. An adaptive military machine, crucial to long-term campaign success, can only occur through the personnel working within it and there are some aspects of the theory of ‘learning organisations’ that are particularly relevant to achieving this adaptability. These include:

a. A self-adjusting organisation can only occur through enabling individuals to have real involvement. This is achieved by having empowered personnel throughout the organisation, with clear lines of responsibility, authority and accountability. Paradoxically, there needs to exist a freedom for intuition, informal ways of working and an acceptance of well-intentioned mistakes.

b. Implicit social learning, that is the unconscious absorption of how the individual fits into a group, is critical to the achievement of the necessary understanding of individual jobs and how they sit within the whole. Continuity of a shared vision relies on an effective corporate

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memory, which in the military environment is heavily influenced by handovers at every level.

c. Workplace layout and ensuring space (physical and temporal) exists for informal meetings between personnel, regardless of formal position within the organisation, are critical enablers.

d. Adjustments identified as appropriate in theatre need to be properly supported throughout the command chain, through all Defence Lines of Development (DLODs). Repeatedly ‘learning’ the same lessons is a profound brake on achieving genuinely adaptable organisations.
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CHAPTER 8 – CASUALTY AND COMPASSIONATE MANAGEMENT

801. **Policy.** The Ministry of Defence (MOD) places the utmost importance on the way the Services deal with their casualties. The casualty reporting and notification process is coordinated by the Joint Casualty and Compassionate Centre (JCCC), part of the Joint Personnel Administration Centre (JPAC) within the Service Personnel and Veterans Agency (SPVA). All information must be routed through it. However the role other single Services play in the process is equally important, as each remains responsible for their own people and the care of the casualty and their family. They will be expected to brief Ministers, on some occasions through MOD, on all matters to do with their own casualties and bereaved families. Detailed instructions and arrangements are set out in Joint Service Publication (JSP) 751 *Joint Casualty and Compassionate Policy and Procedures*.

802. **Definition.** With respect to personnel, the definition of a casualty is ‘*any person who is lost to the organisation by reason of having been declared dead, wounded, injured, diseased, detained, captured or missing*’. The point at which an ill or wounded individual is considered to be lost to the organisation is when he or she is admitted to a medical facility. It follows therefore that Servicemen and women who are seen by a unit medical officer or a medical orderly within a regimental or medical aid post and returned to duty shortly thereafter, without the need to be admitted to a hospital, will not normally be classified as casualties. Unit Role 1 medical staffs collect details about those they have treated by injury and numbers treated. This information is used by the medical chain of command to identify trends and to keep commanders informed. While it is true therefore that all casualties, less those missing or killed, are patients, the converse is not always true.

**SECTION I – NOTIFICATION OF CASUALTIES**

Accuracy and timeliness are essential for the Notification of Casualties (NOTICAS).

803. **Notifiable Casualties.** Notifiable casualties are reported to JCCC on a tri-Service basis to ensure that next of kin are informed and speedy compassionate arrangements are made. The notification of casualties, or NOTICAS as it is known, must be undertaken as quickly and sensitively as possible and it takes precedence over all but the most urgent operational and

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1 Casuality can also refer to vehicles.
2 Joint Doctrine Publication 4-03 *Medical Support to Joint Operations* (2nd Edition).
security matters. Clearly, the accuracy of the information reported is also of
the utmost importance. All categories of illness and injury, together with
deaths, detainees, captured and missing are reported as NOTICAS through
the chain of command, with the exception of the most minor ailments; see JSP
751 Chapter 2. At all times, the medical confidentiality of Service casualties
should be respected and the legal requirements adhered to, particularly when
dealing with next of kin.

SECTION II – INJURY

Official reporting data may differ from details released to the media and
therefore requires close attention by J1 staff.

804. **Categorisation.** For personnel reporting purposes 4 main categories
of illness and/or injury are identified. A medical professional at a Role 2E/3
Medical Treatment Facility (MTF) will provide the category for each individual;
these categories are separate from those used in Triage (Category A, B or T1,
T2 etc). Injury/illness categories and their brief description are:

a. **Very Seriously Ill.** A patient is termed Very Seriously Ill (VSI)
when his/her illness or injury is of such severity that life or reason is
imminently endangered.

b. **Seriously Ill.** A patient is Seriously Ill (SI) when his/her illness or
injury is of such severity that there is cause for immediate concern but
there is no imminent danger to life or reason.

c. **Incapacitating Illness or Injury.** The Incapacitating Illness or
Injury (III) category applies to an individual whose illness or injury
requires hospitalisation, whose condition does not warrant classification
as VSI or SI, but whose illness or injury makes the person physically or
mentally unable to communicate with friends or relatives.

d. **Unlisted.** Unlisted (UL) covers the remainder requiring
hospitalisation whose illness or injury does not fall into a higher
category.

805. **Application.** These categories enable broad clinical decisions to be
made and inform JCCC and personnel staffs on the level of compassionate
support – particularly leave and travel at public expense – that they might be
expected to provide. In a mass casualty situation or during the reporting of an
operational incident of public interest (PUBLINTCAS) it may be necessary to
report other personnel who were involved but uninjured or who were treated
for minor injuries but not detained. It is very important for reporting and
statistical purposes to note that these individuals must not be reported as casualties.

SECTION III – MEDICAL EVACUATION

Aeromedical Evacuation is an important asset, use of which must be in accordance with Air Publication (AP) 3394, RAF Aeromedical Evacuation Service.

806. Aeromedical Evacuation. The MOD policy for aeromedical evacuation is contained in AP 3394. Responsible authorities (MTFs, headquarters or individual units) requiring aeromedical evacuation must follow the procedures laid down in that document. Any listed casualty who is moved by air using aeromedical evacuation system will be reported and monitored as a casualty by the JCCC. Most Service casualties will be either discharged at the UK airhead or moved to the Royal Centre for Defence Medicine (RCDM) in Birmingham. However some may be admitted directly to other National Health Service (NHS) or private hospitals especially at times when large numbers are being evacuated. In these cases special arrangements are made which are covered by the Reception Arrangements for Military Patients (RAMP).

SECTION IV – RECEPTION ARRANGEMENTS FOR MILITARY PATIENTS

Treatment in the UK will usually be provided by the NHS. Administrative responsibilities are shared between MOD and the Department of Health.

807. Requirement. The UK health departments accept that the NHS will be responsible for the reception, triage and acute secondary care of military patients evacuated from overseas deployments to UK. There is also a potential requirement to treat Captured Persons (CPERS) (includes all Prisoners of War, Captured, Interned and Detained Persons), some of whom cannot be removed from theatre for treatment, depending on their legal status. The MOD and the Department of Health have agreed a requirement for an integrated plan to cover the reporting of patients, their medical reception, movement, tracking, care and administration within the NHS.

808. Arrangements. The RAMP plan is modular in concept and based upon 3 levels of escalation beyond Level 1, which is the day-to-day aeromedical evacuation through RCDM. The plan can be escalated through all levels or activated initially at any level, but a planned major campaign is
likely to require a full Level 4 response with national Department of Health coordination from the outset. The Level 4 arrangement is the most likely to deal with captured personnel patients. The plan assumes that beyond Level 1 the majority of patients will arrive in the UK by air and that any substantial level of aeromedical evacuation will involve the use of civil air assets and 24 pre-determined reception airports. The 4 levels in the operational management of patient reception are summarised in Table 8.1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 1</td>
<td>Day-to-day aeromedical evacuation through RCDM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2</td>
<td>Arrangements to manage a surge in aeromedical evacuation activity beyond the capabilities of RCDM and University Hospital Birmingham within the Birmingham and Black Country capacity management systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3</td>
<td>Arrangements for the dispersal of patients to the NHS outside the Birmingham and Black Country capacity management area in circumstances to meet a short-term surge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 4</td>
<td>Full implementation of the RAMP to disperse patients across the UK NHS.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 8.1 – Operational Management of RAMP**

**SECTION V – COMPASSIONATE**

Compassionate leave arrangements continue to apply during operations.

809. Compassionate leave is an authorised period of absence granted to enable personnel to attend a domestic crisis. It does not count against an individual’s annual leave entitlement. The chain of command authorises compassionate leave. Instructions regarding the granting of compassionate leave are detailed in JSP 751 Chapter 20, Section 2.
Deceased Service personnel will be repatriated as soon as practicable. Promptness of action must be tempered by respect and appropriate ceremony.

810. MOD policy is to repatriate the bodies of deceased Service personnel to the UK as soon as practicable. Foreign and Commonwealth personnel may be repatriated to their country of origin, via the UK. JSP 751 Chapter 9 details repatriation arrangements. Guidance on mortuary affairs is provided at Annex 8A.

811. Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Fatalities. If fatalities are suspected to have been caused by Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) material, then repatriation will only proceed once the presence of a CBRN agent has been confirmed or ruled out, and then on the basis of a risk assessment by the commanding headquarters.

812. Movement. The instructions covering all aspects of the movement of a body are in JSP 751. When repatriation is required from a country or theatre with a UK Service movement’s organisation arrangements are to be made by the overseas unit/ headquarters, keeping JCCC informed. In consultation with the Front Line Command, preparation of the body for repatriation from these countries, including embalming where appropriate, is to be made through the agents of the MOD repatriation contractor, who will be tasked by Head JCCC.

813. Ceremonies. Operation PABBAY is the standard reception used for all Service personnel and entitled civilians repatriated from operational theatres, in accordance with the guiding principles in JSP 751. The repatriation of the body is conducted with due dignity and the families of the deceased are invited to attend the ceremony. The funeral is considered to be a private occasion for the bereaved family. In addition, Royal Colonels-in-Chief are informed of a death but are not invited to the repatriation. Military attendance is restricted to those who have a clear representative or supportive role. Where larger numbers of individuals are repatriated together or deaths occur in a related incident or action, then Operation KIER may be invoked. Members of the Royal Family, Ministers and very senior officers would be invited to attend.

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3 Foreign and Commonwealth personnel are individuals who were born and brought up in a foreign country but who subsequently travelled to the UK, at their own expense, to enlist in the British Armed Forces. The same entitlements will also apply to Gurkha Service personnel and their families.
4 Currently Germany, Cyprus, Gibraltar, USA (Dulles Air Force Base, Washington DC and Travis Air Base), Canada, Kenya, Falklands Islands, Afghanistan, Iraq and Bosnia.
5 JSP 751, Volume 2, Part 1, Chapter 1, Annex E, Appendix 1.
SECTION VII – OPERATIONAL MEMORIALS

Memorials in theatre to commemorate the dead are generally funded privately and therefore long-term arrangements must be included in considering such a structure.

814. Unless the next of kin request other arrangements, Service personnel who die are officially commemorated by the MOD through the provision of a Service pattern headstone and their grave is maintained in perpetuity. Those men and women of the UK Armed Forces (Regular and Reserve) killed on duty or as a result of terrorist action since the Second World War are also commemorated by name on the Armed Forces Memorial at the National Memorial Arboretum in Staffordshire. In addition, to supplement the AFM, there will be Rolls of Honour in the Church of St Martins-in-the Fields for the Royal Navy and the Chapel of the Royal Hospital Chelsea for the Army, which will be similar to the existing Rolls of Honour for the Royal Air Force kept in the Church of St Clement Danes in the Strand.

815. The desire to further commemorate fallen comrades by erecting memorials locally in theatre, often driven as much by the requirement to bring closure to those left behind as by the need to mark formally the loss of the individuals, is well understood. However, there are certain practicalities that must be addressed prior to authority being granted for the erection and dedication of any memorial within theatre, for which single-Service advice should be sought.6

SECTION VIII – MASS CASUALTIES

In cases where Operation KIER is inadequate, either through capacity or demonstration of respect, Operation GARMENT may be approved by the Secretary of State.

816. The arrangements for dealing with mass casualties are covered under Operation GARMENT, rather than Operation KIER/PABBAY, and are detailed in JSP 751 Chapter 9.

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6 Queen’s Regulations (RN) J9526; (Army) J8.134; (RAF) J174A.(3).
SECTION IX – CASUALTY AVERSION

The impact of casualty aversion must be considered in all aspects of campaign planning.

817. It is the nature of military operations that casualties will be sustained, through direct engagement with the enemy, accidents or ill health. The extent of these casualties can be mitigated by an effective health and medical plan and through the due diligence of commanders and their staff. The public, politicians and media will have little appetite for the wasteful loss of life or a steady toll of casualties for which they can see no apparent reason or benefit. In the modern age with a free media it is likely that military operations will be conducted in the midst of a debate about their validity. The debate will be heightened when casualties are regularly sustained. Commanders and their staff will be cognisant of the debate and the potential opportunities it provides to the enemy who may be in a position to exploit weaknesses.
ANNEX 8A – MORTUARY AFFAIRS

Definitions

8A1. Mortuary affairs is every aspect of the capability and process of returning a fatality from point of death to final resting place or release to the family. This includes all constituent and contributory parts from across the Ministry of Defence (MOD), Services, civil service and contracted support, and every aspect according to the Defence Lines of Development framework. The mortuary affairs chain is the physical process of moving a fatality from point of death to final resting place or release to family. Mortuary affairs provides an effective and efficient system of fatality recovery, identification, investigation, preparation and repatriation of UK Forces personnel. This is underpinned by the need to ensure that, at all stages, the handling of remains is conducted in accordance with the expectations of fellow Service members, next of kin, the UK general public, government policy, interest groups (such as the International Committee of the Red Cross), religious denominations and international treaties. Every unit in which a fatality occurs is duty bound to understand its mortuary affairs chain responsibility.

Principles

Respect and Dignity       Security
Timeliness               Communication
Accuracy                 Exposure
Compassion               Preservation
Sanitation

Roles and Responsibilities

8A2. Ministry of Defence. The MOD, as the Defence policy conduit for the government, is responsible for overarching mortuary affairs policy providing guidance on the treatment of prisoner of war dead, non-combatant dead, enemy dead, and the whole process and governance of the mortuary affairs chain. It also provides policy for fatality handling in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear contamination incidents which may require interment until decontamination is achievable or appropriate repatriation equipment is available. The point of contact for mortuary affairs within the MOD is Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Personnel) who will approve the appropriate level of ceremony for repatriation as recommended by Front Line Commands (FLCs).
8A3. **Permanent Joint Headquarters.** Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) is responsible for planning mortuary affairs in support of an operation. It will liaise with FLCs to assign the required mortuary affairs capabilities to the deploying force elements and dictate in-theatre mortuary affairs policy. It also maintains strong links with the Joint Casualty and Compassionate Centre (JCCC) to direct repatriation of UK Forces personnel. It is responsible for informing the Press Office when, for UK Forces personnel, next of kin have been informed.

8A4. **Joint Casualty and Compassionate Centre.** The lead organisation, the JCCC is informed of a death at the earliest opportunity and is responsible for organising and coordinating all aspects of the mortuary affairs process in the UK during an operation and abroad during peace time. It provides compassionate advice, coordinates repatriation, organises informing the next of kin, contracts civilian morticians and more. The JCCC is also the appointed Service registrar for initial registration of all deaths occurring on operations and in certain other circumstances. The full range of responsibilities and processes is found in JSP 751 *Joint Casualty and Compassionate Procedures*.

8A5. **Navy Command, Land Command, Air Command.** The command headquarters of the 3 Services are responsible for the planning and assignment of force elements to an operation; this includes understanding and supporting mortuary affairs capability. Although the mortuary affairs chain is mainly implemented in a land environment it is essential that it is understood by all commands to ensure their personnel are cared for correctly in the event of a death. Navy Command have their own mortuary affairs chain for deployed vessels as detailed in the Ship's Captain’s Medical Guide Chapter 12, but may require use of the land environment chain when appropriate. Land and air force elements use the same operational mortuary affairs chain based around a deployed hospital which includes stand-alone air forward operating bases and deployed operating bases. Depending on their deployed base locations land and air force elements may also use civilian hospitals.

8A6. **Service Chaplains’ Departments.** Service Chaplains’ departments provide appropriate pastoral care, professional confidentiality, spiritual and moral guidance for all personnel and their dependants irrespective of religion, belief or status. Where a fatality has occurred they are able to give support and comfort to personnel and family whatever the rank or unit and execute the appropriate ceremony according to the individuals' belief or family wishes. Chaplains are appointed for the wellbeing of all personnel and their dependants and are expected to undertake an inclusive model of chaplaincy seeking to support personnel of all faith communities and none.
8A7. **Royal Logistic Corps Pioneers.** Royal Logistic Corps pioneers provide some of the trained mortuary affairs capability on standby for surge and for operations. Their responsibilities range across the whole spectrum of the mortuary affairs chain and include battlegroup liaison and advice, search and recovery, temporary interment, central collection, initial tentative identification, fatality preparation (if required), temporary storage and administration. The full operational pioneer mortuary affairs tasks will be decided during operation planning and a basic framework can be seen in Figure 8A.1. The basic management of fatalities system is shown on the less resource intensive chain that may be used in steady-state, but is also used during warfighting or surge.

**Framework for Current Operations**

8A8. A fatality should be transported with sensitivity and haste as the tactical situation permits. In the likely event that the Army War Graves Service (AWGS) is not deployed to theatre, recovery and transport of human remains is the responsibility of units and formations in line with direction given by the national logistic component headquarters. In certain circumstances the medical chain may be utilised, if spare capacity exists, but this is not guaranteed as the priority for medical assets is with the living. A qualified Ammunition Technical Officer (ATO) must certify any remains free from Ordnance, such as ammunition or unexploded ordnance, prior to release into the repatriation chain. Human remains should be transported to either:

a. A Temporary Mortuary Facility (TMF), if one is established, where a medical officer, or other competent practitioner, can certify death or;

b. An empty treatment room in a medical facility. One or more Royal Logistic Corps (RLC) Pioneer Fatality Recovery Sections, dependent on the tactical situation, detach to each brigade, and act as liaison and communications back to the mortuary affairs Force Identification and Preparation Centre (FIPC).

Following certification of death, human remains are to be stored in a suitable refrigerated container within the TMF. Units are to deliver all personal effects and provide a competent person who knew the deceased in order to identify the body.

8A9. The morticians from the JCCC contract arrive with the strategic air transport, and will prepare and escort the body to the home base coroner, including participating in the ceremony according the status of the death.
8A10. In most cases, and always when an investigation is ongoing, a Royal Military Police representative accompanies the body and presents all evidence to the home base coroner to certify continuity of evidence for identification purposes. The coroner officially identifies the body, with the help of a forensic expert if required, conducts a post mortem examination and releases the body into the care of the family according to their and the deceased’s wishes.

8A11. The more resource intensive warfighting or surge process shown in Figure 8A.1 is the mortuary affairs chain provided by the RLC pioneer mortuary affairs elements that can be adapted to each different theatre. Note that this capability may be withdrawn soonest after the cessation of hostilities. In outline, the Concept of Operations for this example is:

a. One or more RLC Pioneer Fatality Recovery Sections, dependent on the tactical situation, detach to each brigade, and act as liaison and communications back to the mortuary affairs FIPC. Brigade headquarters informs the Fatality Recovery Sections of fatalities, friend, foe or non-combatant, whether by accident or enemy contact. The Fatality Recovery Section travels to the site, searches, initially identifies, gathers and recovers the fatality and personal effects by arranging a battlefield ambulance, helicopter or evacuation by chilled vehicle sent forward from the FIPC or Central Collection Point (CCP). In the event of heavy losses or mass casualties, the CCP is used to collocate the fatalities from different Fatality Recovery Sections. It can also be used over long distances and can act as a command and control node for the pioneers.

b. The fatality is transferred to the FIPC to receive initial positive, or provisional, identification, have the death certificate signed, be prepared for repatriation and be subject to RMP SIB investigation if required. The FIPC is ideally collocated with the hospital to reduce attendance delay and be near the temporary morgue facility.

c. A fatality can also travel down the medical chain and be transferred to the FIPC at any point. The medical officer declares the individual deceased, and the FIPC staff prepare the fatality for repatriation to the UK. Preparation can also be completed by the JCCC contracted morticians who fly to theatre for each fatality, when ordered. The fatality is stored in appropriate refrigeration until transport is available.
Notes
1. RLC pioneer Fatality Recovery Sections liaise with the FLCs, search and recover the fatality whether enemy or friendly forces, non-combatants or prisoner of war.
2. Central Collection Point is generally only necessary with long distances or significant volume of fatalities. It also acts as a command and control node for the pioneers.
3. Helicopter is the preferred method of body intra-theatre evacuation although battlefield ambulances and chilled transporters are used.
4. Force Identification Preparation Centre is generally collocated with a temporary morgue facility. This is where pioneers prepare a body for repatriation and make an initial tentative identification.
5. Medical Officer officially signs the death certificate. In steady-state the morgue facility may be run by medical personnel. Contracted morticians from JCCC join the fatality in theatre and accompany the casket back to the home base coroner.
6. The home base coroner officially completes identification of the body.
7. JCCC coordinates the repatriation of the body and informing of the family.
8. Royal Military Police Special Investigations Branch, where tactically possible, investigates, acts as deployed coroner’s officer, and may accompany the body back to home base.

Figure 8A.1 – Mortuary Affairs
8A12. **Defence Medical Services.** Although priority of medical staff is always with dealing with live casualties, the land environment medical chain may be utilised for mortuary affairs. In this respect the mortuary affairs responsibilities of the deployed Defence Medical Services (DMS) are integral to the operational casualty chain. The exact casualty chain will be decided in the planning of an operation, but flexibility and adaptability are essential for each tactical situation. Note that only a Medical Officer or other competent medical practitioner can certify the death of a fatality. An example of the mortuary affairs chain use of the casualty chain is at Figure 8A.1.

8A13. **Adjutant General’s Corps.** The Adjutant General’s Corps (AGC) has responsibility through 2 remit functions:

   a. **Staff and Personnel Support.** The Staff and Personnel Support (SPS) clerks provide the backbone of the fatality reporting system. They support units and headquarters with the appropriate paperwork and reporting procedures taken from policy, the JCCC and JSP 751.

   b. **Royal Military Police Special Investigations Branch.** On operations the RMP SIB acts as the coroner’s officer and is responsible for the investigation of all deaths of UK Service personnel deployed on operations and also those sponsored visitors and contractors subject to the Service Discipline Acts. SIB will ensure the coroner’s authority is exercised and that appropriate provision is made to secure evidence to allow the coroner to hold a formal inquest in the UK in line with current legislation.

8A14. **Front Line Commands.** It is the responsibility of FLCs to understand, implement and execute their part of the mortuary affairs chain and process. Educating their personnel about the mortuary affairs chain and their role is also essential for the piece of mind of them, their families and friends: the moral component. It is the FLCs who control a fatality incident and initiate the mortuary affairs chain. Unless RLC pioneer support is assigned, they will recover the fatality and personal effects, inform the JCCC (normally via a Central Compassionate/Casualty Cell), provide a positive or tentative initial identification and liaise with all other personnel involved in the mortuary affairs chain as required. The FLC must remain flexible and adaptable, reacting to the tactical situation while correctly administering their fatalities. The formal identification of the body may be done in Theatre by a competent person who knew the deceased or may require formal forensic identification by the appropriate UK Coroner.

8A15. **Temporary Interment.** Although MOD policy ‘is to repatriate to the UK the bodies of deceased Service personnel, including foreign and
commonwealth personnel wherever possible and as soon as practicable’, temporary interment may be required in any number of extreme circumstances but can only be authorised by the theatre controlling headquarters or PJHQ. The correct procedures must be followed, in cognisance that the fatalities will be disinterred and repatriated when the situation allows.

**Command and Control**

8A16. Overall in-theatre command and control resides with the UK force headquarters commanding the operation. This can also be a National Contingent Commander/Multinational Commander when the UK is contributing to multinational operations. Although in steady-state the processes and procedures are a J1/J4 function, during Large-scale/Direct Intervention operations the search and recovery role provided by RLC pioneers may be commanded from the J3 desk. This is partly due to the support the pioneers may require to fulfil their mission. It is the responsibility of the parent unit of the fatality to inform higher formation of their fatality and fatality evacuation requirements, including pioneer support. However it should be noted that during these operations pioneer detachments may provide advice and intimate support to units.

8A17. There is no bespoke Competent Army Authority and Inspectorate designated for mortuary affairs but Provost Marshall (Army) acts as its lead proponent with Director RLC, Director General Army Medical Services and Directorate Army Legal Services in close support.
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PART 5 – OPERATIONAL RECOVERY

CHAPTER 9 – OPERATIONAL RECOVERY

SECTION I – PLANNING

Recovery planning must include all activities up to the start of the next force generation cycle.
Campaign run down or completion has additional planning considerations.

901. Operational recovery from an on-going campaign will be integral to the roulement process. Planning must cover both the smooth handover of the operation to the relief in place and the return of personnel from theatre. This latter process must consider the completion of the entire planning cycle, back to the start of force generation phase, and does not end at departure from theatre. Units that have suffered from casualties in particular will require recuperation both in terms of replacement personnel and in returning all unit personnel back to full fitness.

902. Units involved in running down or completing campaigns will have additional responsibilities for closing down support infrastructure and arrangements and ensuring all aspects of personnel and welfare are considered. When reducing UK commitments in theatre, particular attention to aspects of welfare support provided for those remaining in theatre is required; some units or individuals may be reliant on the arrangements in place for the larger presence and must still be catered for. Care must also be taken to ensure wider liaison with the contractor force (British Forces Broadcasting Service, Paradigm, Expeditionary Forces Institute etc) to ensure timely and effective drawdown of all supporting welfare assets, concurrent with the campaign run down plan.

SECTION II – OPERATIONAL LOCATION

End of tour Operational Location (OPLOC) is important both for accurate tracking and for updating individuals' allowances.

903. The OPLOC process, as detailed in Chapter 3 Section II, must be applied for the benefit of the individual and to assist in the manpower drawdown management.
SECTION III – DECOMPRESSION

Decompression is an important stage of supporting personnel in their adjustment back to normality. It must be well structured and monitored.

904. At the end of an operational tour, units may find that they require a period of decompression before returning to home. This period of time is usually 24-36 hours and detailed guidance and instructions will be provided by Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) J1. Decompression involves placing groups into a structured and monitored environment in which to begin winding down and rehabilitating to a routine, peacetime environment. It allows time to begin rationalising thoughts about the normal Service and family life. Decompression, as a component of overall operational stress management, is a process by which ‘personnel who deploy together, unwind together.’ It fulfils 3 functions:

a. Greatly improves the quality of homecoming having given units the opportunity to:
   (1) Rationalise and talk through operational experiences.
   (2) Receive mandatory briefings.
   (3) Unwind together.

b. Provides an early degree of mental health readjustment for those who need it.

c. Enables adjustment to a non-operational routine.

905. Decompression involves placing personnel into a structured and, critically, monitored environment in which to begin winding down and rehabilitating to a normal routine peacetime environment. Commanders should select mature and robust leaders to supervise this activity. It allows time to begin rationalising thoughts about what has been left behind in the operational setting and to think about normal Service and family life. It will normally form the first part of the overall Post Operational Stress Management (POSM) process, subject to current policy and PJHQ guidance.
SECTION IV – POST OPERATIONAL STRESS MANAGEMENT

Early identification of stress is key to minimising long term impact. This is primarily an executive rather than medical responsibility. Families and post operation employers are an essential part of the support network.

906. The key to successful POSM lies in awareness; the individual, families, colleagues and the chain of command all need to be alert to the signs of stress so that early intervention can lessen the risk of subsequent problems (which can include clinical disorders, disciplinary and social problems and poor work performance). POSM procedures are generic for all theatres however the command must have the flexibility to adapt them for the needs of any particular operation. Wherever possible the aim is to deliver the same level of support to all personnel whilst recognising their differing circumstances and allowing for certain elements to be discretionary depending on the level and intensity of operational activity and resultant exposure to stressors. Providing commanding officers and all those in positions of authority over Service personnel are given a framework of action to be taken and the necessary support, adherence should deliver effective personal support to all individuals returning from operational deployments. For commanders, an integral part of POSM is the debriefing process on return to the UK, including media interviews where appropriate and as organised by Director General Media and Communications. It is therefore important for those individuals to have their various Post Operational Interviews and Operational Experience interviews as soon as practicable on return from theatre.

907. Strong and effective leadership, good communication and training are also fundamental to the prevention and management of operational stress and this is why operational stress management is primarily an executive and not a medical responsibility. When implementing stress management policy it is vital that an expectation of symptoms of stress or disability or a culture of disability is not instilled in individuals. The briefing of individuals prior to deployment and upon their return, either individually or as part of a group, is of fundamental importance as is open discussion on issues arising from operational experiences and dealing with any issues arising in a timely and professional manner. Commanding officers are to refer to, or liaise with, medical authorities at an early stage if there is any concern about an individual’s wellbeing. Medical intervention is always required when
symptoms are prolonged or severe doubt exists over the mental health of an individual.

908. Families, and where applicable civilian employers, must be fully engaged throughout the POSM process. The Ministry of Defence’s (MOD’s) responsibility for the psychological welfare of its people in the lead up to, during, and after any operational deployment is easier to discharge and monitor in the close confines of a 24-hour operational environment but once an individual returns from operations close contact will inevitably diminish and it will often be family members who will be the first to notice changes. This can be particularly relevant when an individual returns from operations and is reassigned to another unit.

SECTION V – POST OPERATIONAL LEAVE

Post operational leave is provided as an addition to annual leave allowance. Post operational leave is to be taken before starting a new assignment.

909. Policy. The MOD introduced post operational leave in recognition of the stresses and strains that operational deployments bring to Service personnel, their families and friends. It is awarded solely as a result of time spent on qualifying operations or deployments and does not apply to exercises and maritime deployments. Post operational leave is granted to Service personnel following periods away on qualifying operations or deployments and who are not entitled to Seagoers’ Leave.

910. Post Operational Leave Allowance. The allowance is in addition to annual leave and service personnel are entitled to one working day of post operational leave for every 9 calendar days deployed. There is no qualifying period before post operational leave can be received and entitlement commences on the day that Service personnel leave their permanent duty station.

911. Authority. Post Operational Leave (POL) should commence as soon as possible and ideally within one month, after a Service person’s return from qualifying operations or deployments. POL is to be taken while on the strength of the unit with which the Service person is deployed. Where an individual is due to be assigned on return, or shortly after return, to the duty station, post operational leave is to be taken before taking up the new assignment. Postponements for Service reasons must be exceptional. POL may however need to be postponed at times for operational reasons, there can be no negotiation and operational commitments must take primacy. The overriding
principle to be applied, however, should be one of fairness and post operational leave is not to be sacrificed for management reasons.

912. **Reserve Forces.** Post operational leave is granted to reserve forces personnel under the same terms as the regular forces.

**SECTION VI – WELFARE DRAWDOWN**

J1 has primary responsibility for redistribution or disposal of welfare equipment.
Care must be taken over balancing cost of recovery with presentational issues over local disposal.

913. Drawdown of J1 welfare equipment is subject to planned redistribution or disposal, dependent on the required speed of that drawdown. Where possible J1 equipment should be returned to the in-theatre J1 team for assessment and grading prior to disposal decisions being made. In the event of a ‘rapid’ drawdown not all aspirations with regard to the onward movement of equipment may be achieved. This is relevant to both MOD-owned J1 equipment and contractor/Integrated Project Team (IPT) equipment. The decision for the disposal of infrastructure will not be made by J1. In accordance with the gifting regulations it is unlikely that any J1 equipment will be suitable for gifting. If it is proposed that equipment is to be gifted this is to be undertaken in consultation with J1, Civil Secretary and J8. Any decision to dispose of equipment needs to be weighed against whether it could be utilised by someone else either in the Joint Operations Area, in another operational area or back at a unit’s location. Moreover, the presentational aspect of UK forces ‘dumping’ equipment must also be considered. Equipment belonging to contractors and IPTs is to be relocated in accordance with their requirements. The assessment of J1 equipment is subjective therefore a full audit trail as to the decision process relating to the disposal of equipment is essential and is to be retained at every stage.

**SECTION VII – PERSONNEL DRAWDOWN**

Reduction in manning is controlled in accordance with the Theatre Capability Review.

914. The J1 element of any drawdown plan is always dictated by the J3/5 estimate. Drawdown planning is completed by J3/5 and the new force laydown proposed. This is then followed by a Theatre Capability Review,
which refines the manning requirement strand by strand. The Theatre Capability Review is then endorsed through ministerial approval before being returned to PJHQ for execution. In terms of changes to the operational establishment table this is only ever completed by J3 as the capability owners. Once all the changes are made, an operational establishment table scrub is held with all manning agencies agreeing alterations to the Individual Augmenteer posts.

**SECTION VIII – OPERATIONAL MEMORABILIA**

Captured Material is HMG property and therefore must be properly accounted for and controlled.

Allowable Memorabilia is approved through the MOD Authority for Operational Memorabilia.

915. The retention of captured enemy equipment is to be controlled in accordance with NATO policy.\(^1\) There is often a desire to retain items for museums, units or individuals, which is policed through Operation PLUNDER. As a general rule, it is important to recognise that all captured materiel becomes HMG property; items identified as suitable as memorabilia must be put forward to the MOD Authority for Operational Memorabilia (MAOM) for approval.\(^2\)

**SECTION IX – RECUPERATION**

Recuperation is designed to restore force elements to their normal readiness level (R\(^X\)).

Defence Strategic Guidance sets out recuperation targets mandating the readiness requirements of force elements, following Contingent Operations Overseas.

The process of recuperation primarily takes place in the strategic base.

916. **Definition.** Recuperation is the replacement of resources, including personnel, equipment and materiel, following operational activity in preparation for further operations. It includes the training necessary to restore force elements to their normal readiness level (R\(^X\)). Recuperation normally takes place in the strategic base as part of the operational planning cycle.

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\(^1\) AJP-2.5(A) Captured Persons, Materiel and Documents.

\(^2\) DCI JS 126/04 Policy for the Retention of Captured Enemy Equipment as Operational Memorabilia.
917. **Planning.** Planning for, and reporting on, recuperation should encompass all aspects of force generation and sustainability, specifically manpower, equipment, training and sustainability:

   a. **Manpower.** The replacement of operational losses and achievement of harmony guidelines.

   b. **Equipment.** The replacement, repair and servicing of equipment.

   c. **Training.** The rebuilding of collective and individual performance.

   d. **Sustainability.** The replacement of logistic resources.

918. **Readiness.** Readiness is the time in which a force is to be made ready to carry out the tasks for which it is organised, equipped and trained, measured by its manpower strength, equipment state and collective performance training level. Recuperation is a precursor to achieving the required readiness criteria. Defence Strategic Guidance sets out recuperation targets mandating the readiness requirements of force elements, following Contingent Operations Overseas, within which they must be capable of carrying out the full range of operations demanded by concurrency assumptions. These generic targets are only valid if force elements are operating at, or within, routine concurrency levels.

919. **Process.** The process of recuperation primarily takes place in the strategic base and, as defined, is designed to bring force elements and materiel back to their pre-operational readiness level ($R^2$) or in accordance with revised target levels. Action must be taken to ensure that where personnel or resources are *double-earmarked* other contingencies remain sustainable or are discounted from consideration as concurrent operations.
LEXICON

This Lexicon contains acronyms/abbreviations and terms/definitions used in this publication. Many of the terms and their definitions detailed in Part 2 are either new or modified following a recent review of this and other doctrine. The source of each term is shown in parenthesis. For fuller reference on all other UK and NATO agreed terminology, see the current edition of JDP 0-01.1 The UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions.

### PART 1 - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>PWIB</td>
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PART 2 – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Administration
1. The management and execution of all military matters not including tactics and strategy.
2. The internal management of units. (AAP-6)

Command
The authority vested in an individual to influence events and to order subordinates to implement decisions. (BDD (3rd Edition))

Note:
It comprises 3 closely inter-related elements: leadership, decision-making (including risk assessment) and control.

Command
1. The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces.
2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action.
3. A unit, group of units, organisation or area under the authority of a single individual.
4. To dominate an area of situation.
5. To exercise command.
(AAP-6)

Conduct of Operations
The art of directing, coordinating, controlling and adjusting the actions of forces to achieve specific objectives. (AAP-6)

Control
That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated. (AAP-6)

Joint Operations Area
An area of land, sea and airspace defined by higher authority, in which a designated joint task force commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A joint operations area including its defining parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission specific. (JDP 0-01.1)
Military Aid to the Civil Authorities
The collective term given to the three types of operations which may take place in a civilian environment, i.e. MACC, MACM and MACP. (JDP 0-01.1)

Mortuary Affairs
Every aspect of the capability and process of returning a fatality from point of death to final resting place or release to the family. (JDP 1-05)

Note: This includes all constituent and contributory parts from across the Ministry of Defence (MOD), Services, Civil Service and contracted support, and every aspect according to the Defence Lines of Development framework.

Mounting
All preparations made in areas designated for the purpose, in anticipation of an operation. It includes the assembly in the mounting area, preparation, and maintenance within the mounting area, movement to loading points, and subsequent embarkation into ships, craft, or aircraft if applicable. (AAP-6)

Redeployment
The complete operation involving preparation and relocation of units and stocks to anew destination. This may be to a new deployment area or to peacetime locations such that units can be available for subsequent deployment as quickly as possible. (JDP 0-01.1)

Tactical Command
The authority delegated to a commander to assign forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. (AAP-6)
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JPA Online Portal
JSP 752 Tri-Service Regulations for Allowances
JSP 754 Regulations for Pay and Charges
JSP 755 Tri-Service Positions and Assignments – Instructions
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