Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience

Joint Doctrine Publication 02 (2nd Edition)

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UK doctrine is, as far as practicable and sensible, consistent with that of NATO. The development of national doctrine addresses those areas not covered adequately by NATO; it also influences the evolution of NATO doctrine in accordance with national thinking and experience.

Endorsed national doctrine is promulgated formally in Joint Doctrine Publications (JDPs).² From time to time, Interim Joint Doctrine Publications (IJDPs) are published, caveated to indicate the need for their subsequent revision to reflect anticipated changes in relevant policy or legislation, or future lessons arising out of operations.

Urgent requirements for doctrine are addressed in Joint Doctrine Notes (JDNs). JDNs do not represent an agreed or fully staffed position, but are raised in short order by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) to establish and disseminate current best practice. They also establish the basis for further development and experimentation and provide a doctrinal basis for operations and exercises.

Details of the Joint Doctrine development process and the associated hierarchy of JDPs are to be found in the Joint Doctrine Development Handbook.

² Formerly named Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs).
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PREFACE

Background

1. A core responsibility of any Government is the security of its sovereign territory and population. In the United Kingdom (UK), there is a distinction between the defence of the UK against military threats and UK civil protection\(^3\) as established in statute by the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and enabled through the cross-Government Department and Inter-Agency Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) approach.\(^4\)

2. All military operations undertaken within the UK fall under the generic title of United Kingdom Operations (UK Ops). This designation includes the Defence contribution to resilience,\(^5\) which is provided at the specific request of the civil authorities, is subject to civil primacy and requires the authorisation of Defence Ministers.

Scope

3. This publication addresses those UK Ops that rely on close civil/military cooperation. UK Ops activity includes: Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA),\(^6\) Military Operations (MO) in support of the standing strategic and overseas tasks and Military Home Defence (MHD) of UK territory\(^7\) against an external military threat. Although MHD is a dormant UK operation, details have been included to reflect its close association with both MACA and the Standing Home Commitment (SHC) military tasks.

Purpose

4. This publication informs a broad civil and military readership (see paragraph 5) and, therefore, avoids overuse of military language and terminology. Its purpose is to provide:

a. Guidance on the nature, planning, Command and Control (C2) and conduct of MACA and MO.

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\(^3\) Preparedness to deal with a wide range of emergencies from localised flooding to terrorist attack, ‘Emergency Preparedness’ HM Government 2005.

\(^4\) The Integrated approach to emergency management is covered in detail at Chapter 8.

\(^5\) The ability of the community services area or infrastructure to withstand the consequences of an incident. It should be noted that in military terminology resilience is defined as, ‘the degree to which people and capabilities will be able to withstand, or recover quickly from, difficult situations. Wherever possible, capabilities, systems and munitions that have utility across a range of activities, high levels of reliability and robustness should be procured’.

\(^6\) With the exception of Military Aid to the Civil Power in Northern Ireland.

\(^7\) HMG has defence responsibilities for the Isle of Man and Channel Islands, although, as British crown dependencies, they are not technically part of the UK.
b. An overview of Government policy regarding the management of emergencies and the IEM system.

c. An outline of the various civil agencies’ responsibilities, command arrangements and capabilities.

d. Details of the legal and constitutional basis for MACA provision and associated procedures.

5. **Target Readership.** This document is aimed at:

a. **Military.** The staffs of the Directorate of Counter Terrorism and United Kingdom Operations (DCCT & UK Ops) and supporting Directorates within the Ministry of Defence (MOD), Front Line Commands, UK Standing Joint Commander (SJC(UK)), formation and unit commanders and Regional Liaison Officers, at all levels, of all 3 Services (including Reserves), and staffs within Defence Equipment and Support (DE & S), the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) and the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE); all of who hold UK Ops responsibilities.

b. **Civil.** The Cabinet Office’s Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS), Other Government Departments (OGDs), the Devolved Administrations, local and regional authorities, Category 1 and Category 2 responders,\(^8\) and other personnel involved in maintaining and enhancing the resilience of the UK.

**Structure**

6. This 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition of JDP 02 includes extensive revision of Chapters 8 and 9 to incorporate the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, with its regulations and guidance. It provides more detail on the arrangements within Devolved Administrations and English regions. The publication is presented in 2 parts and 10 Chapters:

a. Part 1 covers MACA policy, military capabilities, C2 arrangements, planning processes and training policy. Chapter 1 lays out the strategic context for UK Ops, describes the relevant Military Tasks (MT) and provides linkages to MACA, MO and MHD. Chapter 2 outlines the policy for MACA, MO and MHD, the supporting military C2 hierarchy, the Armed Forces’ preparations to respond to emergencies, and relevant military capabilities. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 cover Military Aid to other Government Departments (MAGD), Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) and Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC) respectively, while Chapter 6 links the preceding information by describing the

\(^8\) See Chapter 8 (Table 8.1).
planning process that identifies whether the Armed Forces are able to contribute to the performance of a particular task, and how that contribution would be made. Chapter 7 deals with integrated exercise planning and operational training.

b. Part 2 focuses on parallel civil organisations, capabilities and procedures, identifying where and how assigned military capabilities can be integrated during an emergency response. Chapter 8 describes the Government’s resilience arrangements and IEM at central, devolved, regional and local levels in some detail. Chapter 9 covers the organisation of the main civil agencies and voluntary organisations involved in IEM, whilst Chapter 10 provides details of Major Incident\(^9\) C2, operating procedures and the care and treatment of people.

7. The main body of the publication is supported by a comprehensive lexicon of terms and definitions for both civil and military readers and an extensive reference annex providing details of key documents and the sources of further information. Whilst every attempt has been made to ensure accuracy, many aspects of resilience policy and procedure change quickly and authoritative references should be checked, especially those relating to Internet addresses.

**LINKAGES**

8. JDP 02 is built on the foundations laid in JDP 0-01 ‘*British Defence Doctrine*’ (BDD), and supplemented by JDP 01 ‘*Joint Operations*’ and JDP 5-00 ‘*Joint Operations Planning*’. Practitioners should read JDP 02 in conjunction with appropriate SJC(UK) Joint Contingency Plans (JCPs), Standing Operational Instructions (SOIs) and associated manuals produced by civil agencies and the emergency services. Relevant documents include: ‘*Emergency Preparedness*’ and ‘*Emergency Response & Recovery*’, the Home Office Manual of Counter Terrorist Contingency Planning Guidance and London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) Major Incident Procedure Manual.


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\(^9\) A major incident is any emergency that requires the implementation of special arrangements by one or more of the emergency services, the National Health Service or a local authority to respond to it.
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Military Organisation, Capabilities and Processes
CHAPTER 1 – THE CONTEXT FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

Strategic Background

101. Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) is committed to, and continually improving the country’s ability to respond to disruptive challenges\(^1\) at the national, regional and local levels. The Civil Contingencies Act\(^2\) (CCA) 2004 provides the core framework for civil protection;\(^3\) it defines how organisations, particularly local responders,\(^4\) prepare for emergencies.\(^5\) The Home Secretary has overall Ministerial responsibility for the safety and security of the population within the United Kingdom (UK)\(^6\) and, therefore, is responsible for emergency preparedness and response. Ministers in Lead Government Departments (LGD)\(^7\) are responsible for contingency planning and response within their specific areas.\(^8\) Although the Devolved Administrations (DAs) are responsible for coordinating many aspects of resilience within their respective jurisdictions, they work closely with the Cabinet Office\(^9\) to ensure a coherent approach.

102. Not all emergencies are foreseeable, but for those that are, the Government aim is to identify and mitigate risk well in advance. Horizon scanning\(^10\) and national risk

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1 A disruptive challenge is a situation or series of events that threatens or causes serious damage to human welfare, the environment or security in the UK. Although similar to the definition of ‘Emergency’, it reflects very serious emergencies, which affect a larger geographical area. Civil Contingencies Act 2004 part 2. See footnote 5.

2 The CCA received Royal Assent on 18 Nov 2004, repealing the Civil Act 1948 and the Civil Defence Act (Northern Ireland) 1950. The Act imposes duties on local bodies in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, with the aim of delivering civil protection in the United Kingdom capable of meeting the disruptive challenges of the twenty first century.

3 Preparedness to deal with a wide range of emergencies from localised flooding to terrorist attack.

4 Under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, Category 1 responders are local bodies legally obligated to respond and category 2 responders are local bodies that are duty bound to cooperate with Category 1 responders. See Table 8.1 for details. The Armed Forces are neither, Category 1 nor Category 2 responders.

5 An event or situation that threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the UK or the environment of a place in the UK, or war or terrorism which threatens serious damage to the security of the UK. To constitute an emergency an event or situation must additionally require the implementation of special arrangements by one or more Category 1 responder.

6 The Channel Islands and Isle of Man are not part of the UK and have no representation in Parliament at Westminster. They are internally self-governing ‘Dependencies’ of the Crown included in the term ‘British Islands’. The Channel Islands and the Isle of Man may request UK MACA support through the Lead Government Department mechanism. Further guidance regarding the provision of support to the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man should be sought from the Directorate of Counter Terrorism and United Kingdom Operations (CT & UK Ops) and/or the Ministry of Justice.

7 The Department that, depending upon the nature of an emergency, leads and coordinates Central Government activity.

8 See Annex 8A for LGDs responsibilities. Defence has LGD status for Defence Nuclear installations and/or material incidents and aspects of Search and Rescue (SAR).

9 The purpose of the Cabinet Office, as a Government Department is to coordinate the activities of Government Departments.

10 Looking ahead at likely challenges over a 12-month period.
assessments seek to identify future disruptive challenges in order to prioritise risks, ensure preparedness and inform capability investment. The Government’s capability programme seeks to ensure that a robust infrastructure and response is in place to contain and deal rapidly, effectively and flexibly with the consequences of disruptive activity. The programme includes all elements required in any response to an emergency, such as planning, equipment, people, training and logistics.

103. The overall objective, at all levels of government, is to enhance resilience through the application of the Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) approach. The Cabinet Office’s Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) provides the central focus for cross-Government Department (including the Ministry of Defence (MOD)) and inter-agency coordination that enables the UK to deal effectively with disruptive challenges and crises.

National Response Overview

104. The first response to most emergencies will usually be provided by the local emergency services and authorities (Category 1 and Category 2 responders), through IEM. Where local services find that the scale, duration, impact or nature of events places the situation beyond their capacity, then recourse is usually to mutual aid arrangements. Whilst Central Government may need to be kept informed of events and could be requested to provide specialist advice or assistance, it will not always be necessary for it to become directly involved. The LGD construct sets out arrangements whereby Central Government will be organised to receive information from local agencies and respond as appropriate. This construct sets out, as far as possible, which Government Department would fulfil the function of LGD in any particular situation. The term LGD does not imply that Central Government will assume responsibility for responding to an incident or emergency; however, in situations that require direct involvement (terrorist attack) or if there is no alternative (local responses are overwhelmed) central responsibility will be assumed. As Defence

11 A structured and auditable process of identifying risks over a 5 year period, assessing their likelihood and impacts, and then combining these to provide an overall risk assessment as the basis of future decisions and actions.
13 See Chapter 8, Table 8.1.
14 See Chapter 8.
15 An agreement between Category 1 and 2 responders and other organisations not covered by the Act, within the same sector or across sectors and across boundaries, to provide assistance with additional resource during an emergency, which may go beyond the resources of an individual organisation.
16 Provision of information or capability that is beyond the local level or dealing with parliamentary, media and public enquiries.
18 LGD details are at Annex 8A.
19 The LGD for responding to terrorism in the UK is the Home Office. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office is the LGD for overseas activities.
is the responsibility of Central Government, the potential or actual involvement of the Armed Forces automatically brings with it the engagement of Central Government.

National Coordination

105. A cross-Government response is enabled by the CCS and the Defence and Overseas Secretariat (OD Sec) within the Cabinet Office. The Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC), or a similar committee, will be convened and meet in the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR). In the first instance, the CCC will normally be chaired by the LGD; for example, the Home Secretary will chair the committee in response to a counter-terrorism incident. In extreme situations, the Prime Minister chair the committee. Membership of the committee will be determined by the nature of the emergency and the response required from Central Government. The DAs have similar arrangements for events that require cross-departmental coordination in their areas of responsibility. If the UK Government’s support is needed when a DA is the lead, this will be facilitated by the CCS.

Command

106. The need for a hierarchy of command is recognised by the civil authorities, but does not necessarily imply a formal chain of command between Central Government and local agencies. A core principle of the Police command chain, for instance, is that the Police are operationally independent of Government (a position diametrically opposite to the position of the Armed Forces for whom an operation must be approved by a Defence Minister). There are in practice, however, well-exercised procedures for the control of incidents at both local and regional level, described later in this publication and in more detail in ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’. These procedures will vary between agencies and therefore a multi-agency response to an emergency will require the integration of discrete command structures with different characteristics.

Military Strategic

107. The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) ‘New Chapter’ (NC)(2002) introduced several home defence and security measures aimed at developing the machinery whereby the civil authorities could request appropriate support from the Armed Forces. SDR NC placed particular emphasis on improving Command and Control (C2), liaison, communications and the role of the Reserves. Consequently, the Directorate of Counter-Terrorism and United Kingdom Operations (D CT & UK

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20 See paragraph 208.
21 Despite COBR being a location, the committee operating from COBR is commonly (but erroneously) referred to as ‘COBR’. Separate, but similar, arrangements apply in Northern Ireland.
22 Chapters 8 and 9.
23 Chapter 4.
Ops), Standing Joint Commander United Kingdom (SJC (UK)) and Joint Regional Liaison Officers (JRLOs) were established. Headquarters 2 Signals Brigade was tasked to support of UK Operations (UK Ops) and Reservist Civil Contingency Reaction Forces (CCRFs) were formed in all regions. Additionally, the MOD undertook review and update of policy associated with Military Tasks (MTs), which specify the resourcing of force structures, capability development and Defence activity in the UK.

**Defence Aim**

108. The Defence Aim is ‘To deliver security for the people of the United Kingdom and the Overseas Territories by defending them, including against terrorism, and to act as a force for good by strengthening international peace and security’. Within the UK, the MOD contributes to security through the application of specific Defence capabilities in support of the civil authorities.

**Military Strategic Planning Effects**

109. Strategic Planning Effects (SPEs) are the desired outcomes that UK Defence must be able to deliver, or contribute to delivering alongside Other Government Departments (OGDs), in order to realise the National policy goals, in particular as part of the Defence Aim. Within the domestic context, this relates principally to the relationship that exists between the Government’s long-term resilience and Counter Terrorism (CT) strategies and Defence obligations under the delivery of security for the people of the UK.

**Military Tasks**

110. The MTs provide a policy framework on which the MOD bases its detailed planning for the size, shape and capability development of the Armed Forces. They reflect the full range of operations that Defence expects to undertake and are grouped under the following 4 generic headings: Standing Home Commitments (SHC), Standing Strategic (SS), Standing Overseas Commitments (SOC) and Contingent Operations Overseas (COO). Although UK Ops activity generally falls under the SHC MTs, the strategic and overseas MTs also affect UK Ops, because of the need to conduct or mount their associated activities within or from the UK.

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24 The MOD directorate responsible for providing strategic guidance on operations in the UK and counter-terrorism operations worldwide.
25 CINC Land as SJC (UK) is responsible for the Defence contribution to the planning and execution of Joint and OGD-led civil contingency operations within the UK Joint Operating Area (JOA).
26 JRLOs provide the focus for the integration of UK Ops with the regional/local civil authorities.
27 A reaction force of 500 volunteer Reserves in each region, ready to be mobilised in support of the civil authorities.
Standing Home Commitments

111. These tasks encompass the protection of UK sovereignty and security at home in support of OGDs. SHC tasks directly associated with UK Ops are:

   a. **MT 2.1 Military Aid to the Civil Authorities.**Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) covers the provision of military support to the civil power, OGDs and the community at large. This support is provided on an emergency basis and fielded from irreducible spare capacity. Specialist capabilities are provided when requested by OGDs, including routine Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), partially funded by the Home Office, and a major contribution to the Search and Rescue (SAR) cover for the UK. It also includes support to the maintenance of Government in times of crisis and conflict.

   b. **MT 2.2 Military Aid to the Civil Power in Northern Ireland.** For the time being, the situation in Northern Ireland (NI) continues to warrant a specific MT encompassing support to the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) in maintaining law and order and combating terrorism. Although clearly a military operation within the UK in support of a civil power, this task is specifically excluded from this publication.

   c. **MT 2.3 Integrity of UK Waters.** To ensure the integrity of the UK’s territorial waters and, where necessary, protect national rights and interests in the surrounding seas. This MT includes port and route survey and maritime counter-terrorism.

   d. **MT 2.4 Integrity of UK Airspace.** The provision of a continuous recognised air picture and an air policing capability providing for the interception, identification and engagement of hostile and renegade aircraft to maintain the integrity of the UK’s airspace.

112. Whilst a majority of MACA military operations are conducted under MT 2.1, Defence assets generated under MTs 2.3 and 2.4 are routinely employed in support of MACA. Additionally, a number of special arrangements exist between the MOD and OGDs in which, Defence assets are permanently employed in support of the civil power (MACP), for example: fishery protection, aspects of maritime CT; and aspects of UK airspace policing.

113. MTs 2.3 and 2.4 would form the basis for any Defence-led operations in the UK should an increase in the risk of attack by conventional military forces occur. The MOD maintains the capacity to plan Defence-led operations within the UK, and

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29 MACA is subdivided into Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC), Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) and Military Aid to other Government Departments (MAGD). These are covered in detail at Chapters 3 through to 5.
thereby conduct Military Home Defence (MHD). In reality, the re-emergence of a credible conventional military threat would represent a new task and, consequently, the assets maintained to undertake these tasks at present are minimal.

**Standing Strategic and Overseas Tasks**

114. Defence activities undertaken in the UK to support the strategic and overseas MTs, fall under the heading of Military Operations (MO) within the context of UK Ops. Although these operations do not support the civil authorities, they do require close civil/military liaison and cooperation and, therefore, utilise many of the mechanisms and procedures associated with MT 2.1 and MACA.

**SECTION II – UNITED KINGDOM OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL AUTHORITIES**

**The Defence Perspective**

115. Defence contributes to UK resilience through the provision of a number of guaranteed niche capabilities and a process of augmenting civil authorities and structures when civil capability or capacity is exceeded. When Defence augments civil capability, it will be in response to specific requests for a planned response or to a crisis. Defence augmentation is not guaranteed.

116. A majority of UK Ops are likely to be conducted in support of MACA and military assistance could be requested in response to a wide range of contingencies and emergencies during peace, periods of tension, crisis and war. The contingencies fall into 3 main categories:

a. **Natural Disaster.** The response to natural disasters, such as floods and severe weather, is most likely to draw on Defence resources because of the need for a quick response to protect human life, property and the alleviation of distress.

b. **Network Failure or Disruption.** The consequence of an animal disease epidemic or public service-related industrial dispute may result in network failure or disruption. As such, it could require the allocation of Defence resources because of the potentially widespread impact of such

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30 Examples include: Search and Rescue (SAR), Military Support to the Mounting of Operations (MSMO), Host-nation Support (HNS) to foreign forces based in, or transiting through the UK, Reception Arrangements for Military Patients (RAMP) and the Nuclear Accident Response Organisation (NARO). See Chapter 2 section VII for details.

31 Such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and specialist scientific support.

32 An event or situation that threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the UK, or to the environment of a place in the UK, or war or terrorism which threatens serious damage to the security of the UK. CCA 2004.

33 Within this context, network describes the interconnected national infrastructure enablers, such as transportation links, communications, IT and public services.
disruptions on the safety and security of UK citizens. The extent to which the MOD is engaged would depend upon the nature of the network and the rotational impact of the disruption. However, Defence personnel may be required in greater numbers than for other events, and may require specialist training.

c. **Criminal Activity.** An adequate civil response to criminal activity (including, but not limited to, terrorism) is important to ensure that its impact is managed appropriately. The response to criminal activity is, therefore, least likely to draw on Defence resources in the first instance, but there may be a need to apply military force or specialist expertise in certain circumstances.

117. All requests for MACA should be referred to the MOD (D CT & UK Ops), via usual single-Service chains of command and HQ SJC (UK), before any commitment is made.\(^{34}\) The procedures for dealing with these requests are described in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 and, in most cases,\(^{35}\) require specific Ministerial approval. In extreme situations, military resources may be made available by Central Government without the need for a formal request from local agencies. In any event, military support is only provided as assistance and on the basis that the relevant civil agency retains responsibility for and control over the situation and/or emergency.

118. Responding to emergencies and disasters, in particular, will bring the Armed Forces into close contact with the public. Those members of the public directly affected will have had their lives seriously disrupted and will be distressed. Some members of the public may have been indirectly affected and may fear the spread of a crisis; they will, at the very least, be closely interested in the response to a crisis. The implications of Military involvement are:

a. Very high, and often unrealistic, public expectations of military capability, and potentially serious consequences if things go wrong, which may result in significant pressure being applied on all those engaged in the response.

b. A requirement to ensure that the legal basis of the response is understood and the potentially complex financial arrangements, between Government Departments, are in place.

c. The need to consider community issues and to be sensitive, balanced and fair in the treatment of the public. Guidance on the handling of these issues should always be sought from relevant local responders.

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\(^{34}\) Except for MACC Cat A requests where life is under immediate threat - see Chapter 5.

\(^{35}\) Urgent MACA requests that are subject to ministerial approval may be authorised without full staffing.
d. A voracious appetite for information on the part of the public, the media, and political leaders at all levels, and a consequent need for reliable, consistent, and accurate flow of information across the various elements of the inter-agency command structure.
CHAPTER 2 – UNITED KINGDOM OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

201. Chapter 1 introduced the National and Military strategic context against which Military Operations in the United Kingdom (UK Ops) are conducted. It briefly discussed the cross-Government Department and inter-agency UK resilience objectives, responsibilities and coordination arrangements within which the Defence contribution is provided through Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA). The chapter also outlined Military Operations (MO) in support of the Standing Strategic and Overseas tasks, which demand close civil and military cooperation.

202. This Chapter provides detailed guidance on the planning and execution of MACA and MO. It discusses the Defence contribution to the maintenance of UK maritime and airspace integrity in the context of UK Ops and provides information regarding other areas of Defence-related support provision that falls outside the MACA process.

SECTION I – MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL AUTHORITIES

Introduction

203. Military operations in the UK, under Military Task (MT) 2.1, are placed under the overarching title of MACA. This section examines the principles, procedures and essential features of providing military assistance.

204. MACA is sub-divided into Military Aid to other Government Departments (MAGD), Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) and Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC). These operations are distinct from one another legally and politically, as well as in terms of military implications. More detailed information on MAGD, MACP and MACC is provided in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 respectively.

205. The provision of MACA is guided by 3 criteria:

a. Military aid should always be the last resort. The use of mutual aid, other agencies, and the private sector must be otherwise considered as insufficient or be unsuitable.

b. The Civil Authority lacks the required level of capability to fulfil the task and it is unreasonable or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one.

c. The Civil Authority has a capability, but the need to act is urgent and it lacks readily available resources.
Central Government

206. **Policy.** At the highest level, the National Security International Development Committee (NSID) is the standing Cabinet forum for the policy direction of Integrated Emergency Management (IEM).¹ In a domestic context, NSID directs the work of a standing Ministerial sub-committee, the NSID sub-committee on Protective Security and Resilience (NSID (PSR)). NSID (PSR) reviews the ‘Protect’ and ‘Prepare’ elements of the Government's long-term Counter Terrorism (CT) strategy (CONTEST),² and produces policy:

   a. On protective and other security measures to counter the threat of terrorism in the United Kingdom and to British interests overseas.
   
   b. For managing the consequences of major terrorist or other disruptive incidents in the United Kingdom.

207. **Central Crisis Management.** The Central Government crisis management organisation meets at 3 levels:

   a. **Level 1.** The Lead Government Department (LGD)³ Minister manages the response from their departmental emergency facilities.
   
   b. **Level 2.** The response is coordinated from the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) by the LGD.

      (1) **Terrorism Incident.** Always at Level 2 with the Home Office (HO)⁴ as LGD.

      (2) **Other Incidents.** When the LGD determines a requirement for wider Government resources.
   
   c. **Level 3.** The response is coordinated by COBR/Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC). The Prime Minister or nominated Secretary of State leads in the event of a catastrophic incident requiring the involvement of Central Government to deliver an effective response, or where Emergency Powers are invoked.⁵

¹ Details are at Chapter 8.
² The strategy is divided into 4 parts, Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare. Prevent deals with the radicalisation of individuals, Pursue deals with the disruption of terrorist and their operations, Protect deals with reducing the vulnerability of UK interest to terrorism and Prepare deals with ensuring that the UK is ready to deal with the consequences of a terrorist attack. CM 6888, ‘Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy’, dated July 2006.
³ Details are at Chapter 8.
⁴ Except for incidents in Northern Ireland, run from the Northern Ireland Office Briefing Room.
⁵ Under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.
208. **Civil Contingencies Committee.** The CCC is a crisis management committee, comprising a combination of Ministers and their staff from the relevant Government Departments. The CCC considers non-terrorist domestic emergencies. Terrorist and overseas emergencies are considered by the COBR strategy group. Both are responsible for coordinating the UK Government response to a crisis and has 2 levels, Officials and Ministerial. The Cabinet Office is responsible for the activation of COBR. The Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS)\(^6\) provides support on impact management and recovery issues. The Directorate of Counter Terrorism and UK Operations (D CT & UK Ops), facilitates and supports Ministry of Defence (MOD) is representation at all CCCs, other attendees include all Central Government Departments and other agencies.

**Ministry of Defence**

209. It is a principle of the UK’s democratic system of Government that the Armed Forces remain under the control of Central Government and that civilian Defence Ministers are publicly accountable for the actions of the Armed Forces. The command structure of the Armed Forces is a single chain, stretching from the Secretary of State for Defence (exercising the Royal Prerogative) to the individual unit and Service personnel. All Defence operations, including those conducted in the UK, require authorisation by the Defence Council, and, in particular, by Defence Ministers who lead the Defence Council. However, this single structure is divided into Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels,\(^7\) reflecting specific roles and responsibilities placed upon headquarters staffs.

**Military Strategic**

210. **Policy.** MOD policy and commitments staff, headed by the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Commitments) (DCDS(C)) and the Policy Director, provide strategic guidance to the command structure as a whole and advice to Ministers and Other Government Departments (OGDs) through COBR/CCC during a crisis, or to inter-Departmental groups at other times. In this way, the MOD acts as both a Military HQ and a Department of State. D CT & UK Ops is responsible for all policy on UK Ops on behalf of DCDS(C).

211. **Defence Crisis Management and Command.** The Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) is directed by DCDS(C), under the guise of Director of Operations (D Ops), providing:

   a. Advice on MOD operational policy.

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\(^6\) For greater detail on the role of the CCS see Chapter 8.

\(^7\) Normally associated with the levels of Warfare.
b. Military advice to the Central Government crisis management organisation.

212. Ministers and the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) are the MOD’s chief representatives within the Government-wide crisis management mechanism (outlined at paragraph 207). In their absence, D Ops and his staff provide advice; specifically, D CT & UK Ops (Policy) is responsible for providing policy advice, reflecting at all times the views and decisions of MOD Ministers, and D CT & UK Ops (Mil) provides military advice and direction. D CT & UK Ops is responsible for identifying MOD subject matter experts and for the provision of full-time MOD cover for the Government’s crisis management mechanism, drawing on MOD’s augmentation arrangements as necessary. Subject Matter Experts (SME) can be drawn from any suitably qualified specialist area of the MOD and might include civilian as well as military experts.

Operational

213. For overseas crises and associated military operations, the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) is responsible at the operational level of command for the deployment, direction, sustainment and recovery of a deployed force. For domestic crises, and the support to deployed operations from within the UK, there is no PJHQ equivalent. Instead, CDS has appointed Commander-in-Chief Land (CINCLAND) as the Standing Joint Commander (UK) (SJC(UK)) with the primary responsibility for the MOD contribution to the planning and execution of joint and OGD-led civil contingency operations within the SJC (UK) Joint Operations Area (JOA). In exceptional circumstances, a Joint Commander from another Service may be appointed for specific operations; however, the ‘default setting’ is SJC (UK) who, unless directed otherwise, assumes command of all military operations within the UK.

214. An appropriate subordinate commander, along with assigned forces for an incident, would be detailed by a CDS Directive (drafted by D CT & UK Ops) to SJC (UK) (or another nominated Joint Commander). Single-Service Chiefs will retain Full Command of their personnel. For the majority of UK operations, the command structure will utilise the Army’s regional divisional and brigade hierarchy. However, bespoke arrangements may be necessary for certain contingencies.

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8 Director Special Forces (DSF) may also provide military advice and direction as appropriate.
9 Including UK Special Forces (UKSF).
10 The SJC (UK) JOA is defined as the UK land area and territorial seas. The definition includes Northern Ireland and its territorial sea, but excludes the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands (see Chapter 1, paragraph 101). Territorial seas extend to the 12nm limit (United Nation’s Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Part II Section 2). The JOA also encompasses the 500-metre safety zone established around each UK Offshore Energy Installation (OEI) on the UK continental shelf.
Tactical

215. The Tactical command level will normally report through the Army regional command structure, which has the advantage of being permanently established throughout the UK’s regions. Service personnel, allocated to UK operations, will remain under a military command structure at all times. For formed units, this will be their normal unit command structure. For ad hoc groupings of personnel allocated to an operation, a bespoke command organisation would be formed and specified in the CDS directive.

Information Strategy

216. Information regarding the mechanisms for responding to the media interest that is likely to be generated during emergencies in the UK is contained in Annex 10A. The very high level of demand for detailed information, carefully scrutinised by the media and the public, should be considered at all times. The information requirements of the strategic command level will be high, and the need for consistency and accuracy will be crucial.

217. Operations in the UK are never solely undertaken to enhance the standing of the Armed Forces and can never be justified on that basis. On the one hand, engaging in UK Ops for media advantage is more likely to trivialise the Armed Forces in the eyes of the public and amongst the civil authorities being supported than to enhance that standing or contribution. On the other hand, the media profile of the Armed Forces’ engagement is, itself, part of the support that is being provided. In particular, it must be recognised that support provided to the Police and other law enforcement agencies almost invariably forms part of a wider operation or investigation. It should be assumed that releasing any information on such operations and investigations might be damaging, and possibly the subject of disciplinary or even legal proceedings.

218. Armed Forces support during civil emergencies is likely to attract considerable media attention, precisely because it is unusual and because it is taken to reflect the seriousness of the crisis. Such support should attract a positive public profile, demonstrating a service that Armed Forces personnel provide to the citizens of the UK over and above the already significant service that they provide by undertaking their normal duties. Care should, however, be taken to ensure that the Armed Forces profile does not distort public perceptions of the overall response and situation. The Armed

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11 See Annex 2B.
12 The need for a clear Information Strategy should not be confused with Information Operations. Information Operations are not undertaken in the UK.
13 Particular problems arose during the response to the Foot and Mouth Epidemic of 2001. The deployment of the Armed Forces attracted a great deal of media attention, and was perceived in some quarters as both the leading and the crucial contribution. This reflected the very important contribution made by some Armed Forces personnel. This never, however, exceeded the contribution made by Animal Health and other civil agencies, civil contractors and rural communities, all of which brought their specific contributions in response to a very significant problem. Nor were the
Forces information strategy should therefore be carefully coordinated with the wider strategy, to ensure:

a. That the role of the Armed Forces in the wider response is properly understood.

b. That confidence in the overall response, which is invariably led by the civil authorities, it not undermined.

c. That the engagement of the Armed Forces in the civil response is necessary to reduce the danger and inconvenience to the public.

219. Statements and messages that suggest that the Armed Forces have been deployed to bring a crisis under control or because of the failure of the civil authorities should be avoided. The fact that local responders have the lead responsibility (Under the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA)) should never be obscured.

Planning

220. Contingency planning for UK Ops is conducted by the J5 SJC (UK) branch. When necessary, J5 SJC (UK) can form the nucleus of a planning staff to support an alternative nominated Joint Commander. J5 SJC (UK) develops Standing Operational Instructions (SOIs) and contingency plans on capability, or event-based, scenarios or following agreement by the MOD (using normal MACA procedures) to examine a request for support from the Armed Forces. J5 SJC (UK) also provides a focal point for liaison with the single-Service staffs on the availability of appropriate military capabilities and facilities.

Single-Service Arrangements

221. Each Service has its own arrangements for UK Ops planning, coordinated with those of the other Services. Responsibility for ensuring this takes place rests with the D CT & UK Ops at the strategic level, SJC (UK) at the operational level, and the Army’s regional divisional and brigade structure at the tactical level, as well as with

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14 Details of the planning process are at Chapter 7.
15 For example, support to the DTI in the event of a fuel shortage.
16 For example, support to police security arrangements for large-scale public events.
17 Contingency planning occurs in order to identify the capabilities and resources required to perform a task. The resources and capabilities may not exist, or may not be available, and the very act of undertaking contingency planning may highlight factors that make the task inappropriate to the Armed Forces. Agreement to undertake contingency planning does not, therefore, represent an agreement to perform a task.
18 The civilian reader should note that the terms ‘strategic’, ‘operational’ and ‘tactical’, are used here in the military sense, usage differs in the civilian environment, see Chapter 10 and the Glossary for details.
the single-Services themselves. Joint Regional Liaison Officers\textsuperscript{19} (JRLOs) at the tactical level ensure that this coordination occurs within the regions.\textsuperscript{20} Whilst all UK Ops are deemed to be Joint, single-Service arrangements are important as a means of identifying and generating suitable forces and capabilities for operations under the nominated Joint commander.

a. \textbf{Royal Navy}. The Commander-in-Chief Fleet (CINCFL\textsuperscript{E}E\textsuperscript{T}) is responsible for the maritime contribution to UK Ops policy, planning and execution. Flag Officer Scotland, Northern England and Northern Ireland (FOSNNI) directs the management of the maritime reserves and through the Naval Regional Commanders (NRCs) is responsible for the coherency of naval UK regional matters, which includes UK ops. The NRCs\textsuperscript{21} based at Rosyth, Liverpool, Bristol and London each assisted by a Royal Navy Regional Liaison Officer (RNRLO) represent CINCFL\textsuperscript{E}E\textsuperscript{T} at the Joint Service Coordination Groups (JSCG).\textsuperscript{22} NRCs and RNRLOs provide routine maritime advice to Regional forces and civil agencies. During UK Ops, the Fleet Operations Division at Northwood assumes responsibility for maritime operational planning, Command and Control (C2) of FLEET assets assigned to UK ops and the provision of wider maritime expertise support\textsuperscript{23} to Regional Forces, the Police and/or civil authorities as appropriate.

b. \textbf{Army}. HQ LAND is the lead command for UK Ops in the Army and provides the core Joint staff for the SJC (UK). It maintains geographical command of all Army units throughout the UK:

1. \textbf{Outside London}. Outside London, command is exercised through the Regional Forces’ divisional and brigade structure.\textsuperscript{24} Each regional brigade has a JRLO, a deputy JRLO (Reservist) and a Brigade Reinforcement Team (BRT).\textsuperscript{25} The JRLO provides the UK Ops focus for the brigade and is the primary point of contact for Joint liaison with the civil authorities, emergency services and other civilian agencies on all aspects of IEM. The BRT provides the Brigade HQ with 24-hour staffing, through a pool of watchkeepers and additional liaison officers.

2. \textbf{London}. Within London, HQ London District\textsuperscript{26} (HQ LONDIST) is responsible for the same regional issues as a regional force Division

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\textsuperscript{19} See paragraph 231.
\textsuperscript{20} See Annex 2B.
\textsuperscript{21} Annex 2A.
\textsuperscript{22} See paragraph 234.
\textsuperscript{23} Naval Liaison Officers, Fleet Operations ‘away teams’ or other pre-identified naval officers within the Divisional or Brigade region.
\textsuperscript{24} Annex 2B.
\textsuperscript{25} Provided by nominated Reservists drawn from the RNR, RMR, TA and RAuxAF.
\textsuperscript{26} A 2 star HQ.
and Brigade, and is also responsible for Public Duties and State ceremonial in London and Windsor. The Public Duties (PD) units are commanded and administered by HQ LONDIST. Many units on PD are not regiments. London District boundaries match those of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). As the MPS is responsible for policing Windsor Castle and all Royal security within Windsor, London District has military responsibility for Windsor Castle and the associated barracks.27

c. **Royal Air Force.** Headquarters Air Command (HQAIR) has RAF responsibility for UK Ops. It is supported by a network of 9 RAF Regional Liaison Officers (RAFRLOs)28 parented for administrative purposes by RAF stations throughout the UK. RAFRLOs are the RAF members of each Regional JSCG; their tasks include liaising with external agencies and the provision of support to RAF stations in their respective areas.

![Diagram of MACA Command Hierarchy]

**Figure 2.1 - MACA Command Hierarchy**

27 145 Brigade retains responsibility for the remaining areas of Windsor.
28 Annex 2C.
The Armed Forces’ Response

222. The capability of the Armed Forces to respond to a MACA request is based on 3 pillars:

a. **Pillar 1 - Liaison.** The Army Regional Chain of Command, support staff (for 24-hour operations), JRLOs, RNRLOs and RAFRLOs.

b. **Pillar 2 - Communications.** Communications for the Regional chain of command during UK Ops are provided through the National Communications fixed and deployable Integrated Communications System (ICS) infrastructure by 2 (NC) Signal Brigade.\(^{29}\)

c. **Pillar 3 - Force Elements.** Force elements are provided by Regular and Reserve forces. The exact nature of force elements will be determined by the planning process described in Chapter 6, which will identify tasks to be conducted and the capability required. Whilst contingency plans exist, some situations are unique and require a bespoke plan and atypical command arrangements. Usually, support under MACA procedures would initially be provided by the most appropriate and available Regular UK unit. Under MOD guidance, the single-Service HQs would identify such forces and deploy them to a mounting point where they would be taken under the specified command. There are 3 types of forces that can contribute to the military response:

(1) **Niche Capability.** Specialist Elements, which provide capabilities or advice beyond the capabilities of, or in addition to, the Civil Power; for example, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)\(^{30}\) and Search and Rescue (SAR),\(^{31}\) for which Force Elements are held at readiness.

(2) **Augmentation through Regular Forces.** Forces held at varying degrees of readiness in the UK are not guaranteed for use in the UK JOA. They may have specialist capability or be employed on general duties that may or may not require training. Whilst personnel may not need specific pre-deployment training, all MOD personnel, military or civilian, regular or reserve, likely to be involved in UK Ops are expected to complete the mandatory Level 1 and 2 UK Ops awareness training.\(^{32}\)

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\(^{29}\) See Annex 2F.

\(^{30}\) See Annex 2D.

\(^{31}\) See Annex 2E.

\(^{32}\) CRF/SJC (UK) training Directive.
(3) **Augmentation through the Reserves.** This includes the use of the Civil Contingency Reaction Forces (CCRF).\(^{33}\)

**Military Support Request Considerations**

223. The command and planning structure outlined above (paragraphs 210 to 215 and 221) is responsible for identifying the most appropriate capabilities required in order to achieve the desired effect or outcome. When considering requests for military assistance, civilian authorities and organisations should identify the desired effect or outcome as requests couched in terms of the provision of support by a particular unit and/or task are (at best) incomplete and may actually be unhelpful. Whilst effects based terminology may not be readily appreciated across the civil authorities, the identification of an effect or desired outcome gives a support request substance and, depending on the situation, availability of appropriate military assets and agreement by Defence Ministers, justifies the provision of appropriate Armed Forces support. It is, therefore, essential that JRLOs and/or regional military advisors provide the civil authorities with effects based guidance in the formulation of support requests.\(^{34}\)

**Suitability of Armed Forces Support**

224. When considering military assistance, it is important to bear in mind both the qualitative and the quantitative characteristics of the Armed Forces:

a. The Armed Forces are relatively small when compared to the numbers of personnel in the emergency services, health service and local authorities.

b. The skills, the equipment, and the capabilities of the Armed Forces are designed for military use and focused on expeditionary operations. Both the applicability and the public impact of deploying military capabilities, skills and equipment should be taken into account when undertaking operations in the UK.

c. The Armed Forces themselves draw on civil capabilities wherever necessary. Armed Forces medical support, for example, is closely integrated into the National Health Service (NHS). Civil contractors undertake most logistic, transport, construction and other support tasks. This allows Armed Forces personnel to concentrate on their core business, which is to prepare for, and deploy, on military operations. Using Armed Forces personnel to undertake civil tasks may damage their ability to prepare for the tasks they are regularly asked to perform in the course of their normal duties.

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\(^{33}\) See Annex 2F.

\(^{34}\) *Incorporating and extending the UK military Effect-Based Approach*. Joint Doctrine Note 7/06
d. The Armed Forces are not designed to provide an emergency response service, with certain exceptions.  

e. The Armed Forces do not have a monopoly on equipment suitable for use in emergencies. Some relevant specialist skills and equipment within the Armed Forces often have civil counterparts and equivalents more suited to the civil environment, and usually in greater numbers. All-terrain vehicles, for example, are quite common in both the public and private sectors. Armed Forces engineering capabilities are especially tailored for battlefield use and, even taken as a whole, they do not exceed in size or capability the civilian engineering resources available in a medium-sized town in the UK.

225. Whilst MOD strategy recognises that civil capability may be insufficient at the time of a disruptive challenge, and therefore considers the possibility of augmentation, it neither guarantees nor accepts responsibility for augmenting civil capabilities in any particular sphere.

Legal Considerations

226. General. All operations must be conducted within both civil and military law. Failure to comply with this principle may result in criminal and/or civil law proceedings being brought against individuals or the MOD. Unlike the Police and some other civil agencies, members of the Armed Forces have no powers over and above those of the ordinary citizen. They have the same personal duty as anyone else to abide by the law at all times.

227. Primary Legislation. The use of the Armed Forces is governed by:

   a. Civil Contingencies Act 2004. The Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) has repealed the Emergency Powers Acts 1920 (EPA 1920) and 1964 (EPA 1964) (except for Section 2). In the event of an emergency, in which the supply and distribution of the essentials of life to the community are extensively threatened, the CCA can be used to invoke emergency powers on a local, regional or national basis. The deployment of Service personnel may then be authorised by the Defence Council, and they may be given the power to requisition equipment and other facilities.

   b. The Emergency Powers Act 1964 (Section 2). The Defence Council may, under Section 2 of EPA 1964, authorise the temporary deployment of Service personnel on urgent work of national importance. This Act is the legislation ordinarily used to authorise MAGD deployments. It does not provide powers of requisition.

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35 See Annexes 2D and 2E.
228. **Service Regulations.**\(^{36}\) The legal background to the employment of Service personnel in situations falling short of armed conflict is set out in the Queen’s Regulations for the Royal Navy, the Manual of Military Law and the Manual of Air Force Law.

**Rules of Engagement**

229. The use of ‘armed’ Service Personnel for MACA operations will always be an exception. Where personal weapons or public order control equipment are authorised, commanders will normally be directed to issue appropriate guidance cards.\(^{37}\) The CDS Directive to the Joint Commander will state explicitly whether personal weapons or public order control equipment is authorised and, if so, whether guidance cards and a specific ROE profile are to be applied.

**SECTION II – CIVIL/MILITARY LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS**

**Liaison with Other Government Departments**

230. Within the MOD, D CT & UK Ops is as the Defence focal point for all UK Operations and especially MACA. Likewise, D CT & UK Ops is responsible for liaison with OGDs, mainly the HO and Cabinet Office. D CT & UK Ops also sits on various cross-Government committees/groups and is represented at the Association of Chief Police Officers Terrorism and Allied Matters Committee ACPO (TAM).

**Regional/Local Liaison**

231. **Joint Regional Liaison Officer.**\(^{38}\) The JRLO is the primary focus for the integration of UK Ops with the civil authorities within his/her area of responsibility. Where distance prevents the JRLO from frequent contact with the civil authorities, he is supported by Military Liaison Officers (MLOs), who are usually the Commanding Officers of military establishments or units within that region. Single-Service liaison staff (Royal Navy and Royal Air Force Regional Liaison Officers) supplement the capability of the JRLO and provide specialist single-Service advice. The Armed Forces are also represented by the Regional Brigade Commander or JRLO at Government Office of the Region (GOR), Regional Resilience Forums (RRF) and Local Resilience Forums (LRF) and their equivalents in Scotland and Wales (see Chapter 8).

\(^{36}\) A Tri-Service Discipline Act intended to replace single-Service Acts, received Royal Assent 08 November 2006 and will come into force January 2009.

\(^{37}\) Guidance Cards provide guidance to Armed Forces personnel on the extent and circumstances under which weaponry can be used to perform the task they are being asked to perform. A key principle in the use of force is always that it must be proportionate to the threat being posed either to the individual or to a third party. Rules of Engagement (ROE) and associated Guidance Cards contain a judgement as to the appropriate use of force in the circumstances. They do not authorise the use of force nor do they have any independent legal standing.

\(^{38}\) JRLOs are non-regular permanent staff drawn from all 3 Services.
232. **Joint Regional Liaison Officer’s Principal Objectives.** The JRLO’s principal objectives are to ensure that:

a. Within each region the UK Ops activities of the 3 Services are coordinated to provide the optimum level of support when requested by the civil authorities.

b. Representatives of the civil authorities are made fully aware of MACA principles, procedures, structures, capabilities and limitations of the Armed Forces required to support MACA tasks. This may include acting in a liaison capacity within national, regional or local civil emergency control centres when appropriate.

c. The requirement for effective civil/military liaison is appreciated by all parties conducting emergency planning and that it is both addressed in military and civil contingency plans and regularly practiced.

233. **Joint Regional Liaison Officer’s Other Responsibilities.** The JRLO will also:

a. In coordination with single-Service colleagues and where appropriate, assist the planning and execution of civil multi-agency emergency exercises or other training events in support of the objectives at paragraph 232.39

b. Exercise a coordinating role for liaison, planning and the execution of UK Ops within a Region in partnership with the single-Service regional liaison officers in order to achieve an effective network of local liaison across all 3 Services for routine UK Operations.

c. Ensure that any Defence guidance on UK Ops is promulgated within his functional area of responsibility and that generic issues affecting regional military/civil liaison or UK Ops are reported to SJC (UK).

d. Act as the lead Joint representative for both initial advice to the civil authority on military matters and liaison with the Regional Brigade HQ.

234. **Joint Service Coordination Group.** The Joint Service Coordination Group (JSCG) is a military forum for the discussion of military-led issues. It may be attended by key representatives of the civilian organisations that are likely to have involvement in, or make a contribution to, military activity. JSCGs are required to sit once a year, but may be called more regularly to address specific Military Support to the Mounting of Operations (MSMO) or MACA operations and contingencies. Their

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39 If there is an opportunity for Defence assets to participate in local or regional exercises then a pragmatic balance between community relations and the possible raising of emergency planners expectations, which could result in the development of civil response plans that relay on Defence, must be established.
main tasks are the preparation and coordination of UK Ops within the region, liaison and coordination with regular and reserve units likely to become involved in UK Ops and ensuring that all military planning is consistent with the plans drawn up by the relevant civil authorities.

235. **Joint Service Coordination Group Attendees.** JSCG attendees include (attendance varying depending on the scope of the meeting):

   a. Regional Brigade Commander (Chairman).
   
   b. JRLO (Secretary).
   
   c. Government Office for the Regions (GOR) Resilience Director.
   
   d. ACPO (TAM) representative.
   
   e. Brigade staff officers, including representatives from communications, medical and logistics branches.
   
   f. Commanders of Regional military units, including representatives of US Forces when present within the Region.
   
   g. Single-Service representatives: RN, primarily by the NRC, supported by the RNRLO, RAF by the RAFRLOs.
   
   h. A representative from the Regional Divisional Headquarters.
   
   i. Representatives from Local Authorities, the Emergency Services, Voluntary Aid Societies or other agencies as required, for example, Department of Health/NHS representatives should the Reception Arrangements for Military Patients (RAMP) plan be discussed.
   
   j. SJC (UK).

**Military-Police Liaison**

236. **Counter Terrorism.** The ACPO (TAM) committee, which D CT & UK Ops (Mil) normally attends, provides the direction to the Police for the required liaison arrangements with the Services. Such direction will be dependent on the situation at the time. This policy direction will be coordinated through the HO Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT),\(^{40}\) Regional Assistant Chief Constables Operations and Crime Committees (or equivalent) and through the single-Services to the JSCG. ACPO (TAM) (UK) Police Military Liaison Officer (PMLO) will assist by providing a conduit by which detailed liaison with individual police forces is to take place.

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\(^{40}\) Formerly the Terrorism Protection Unit (TPU).
237. **Association of Chief Police Officers Terrorism and Allied Matters Committee Sub-Committee.** ACPO (TAM) deals with one of the Association of Chief Police Officers’ (ACPO) main business areas. It works on policing policy issues in 5 portfolios: operational, technical, international liaison, legislation and training. In recent years it has:

a. Identified key police objectives to meet the long-term terrorist threat through enhanced preventative measures, pro-active operations and more coordinated post incident investigation.


c. Provided support to forces in order to enable a coordinated police response to the investigation of Irish Republican terrorist attacks.

d. Developed a coordinated approach to countering violent animal rights activity.

e. Provided support to the Counter Terrorism (CT) Liaison Officer within the HO OSCT, who advises forces on certain CT arrangements, the Home Office Manual of Counter Terrorist contingency planning guidance and CT exercises.

f. Provided advice and support to police forces, other ACPO specialist business areas and D CT & UK Ops through the funding and activities of the ACPO (TAM) PMLO.

238. **Police Military Liaison Officer.** ACPO (TAM) funds a police Chief Superintendent who is responsible for police liaison on UK Ops. The PMLO coordinates military/police liaison and is available for advice to D CT & UK Ops and military HQs. In England and Wales, the PMLO is a police Chief Superintendent based in the ACPO London office. Two Superintendents in Scotland (currently based in the Grampian and Strathclyde Forces) perform a similar role, as does a PSNI Superintendent in Northern Ireland.

239. **Association of Chief Police Officers Emergency Procedures Sub Committee.** ACPO Emergency Procedures (ACPO(EP)) Sub Committee is a sub-committee of the ACPO General Policing Committee and is responsible for the provision of guidance and policy on all resilience and consequence management issues for civil emergencies. This is embodied in the ACPO Emergency Procedures Manual, which provides the basis for all police emergency planning. In order to ensure the integration of police crisis and consequence CT policy, Chairman ACPO (EP) represents the sub-committee on ACPO (TAM). SJC (UK) is represented at ACPO (EP) by the J5 staff. ACPO (EP) does not maintain representatives in the ACPO.
regions and all EP policy and guidance for military liaison and planning is communicated through various police force’s operations and planning staffs and to ACPO (TAM) representatives.

240. **Police Military Liaison Officer Responsibilities.** The PMLO coordinates activities between the military and individual police forces. This enables:

a. Police policy development at the strategic level.

b. Routine liaison at the regional and local level.

c. Integration during a multi-agency response.

d. The development and maintenance of understanding, knowledge and trust between the military and police.

241. **Police Military Liaison Officer Main Tasks.** PMLO main tasks include:

a. Primary UK general police liaison to D CT & UK Ops at MOD and to HQ SJC (UK).

b. Developing any support that may be provided by Regional Forces in Home Defence, Security and Strategic Resilience.

c. Supporting the coordination and development of police linkages with the D CT & UK Ops, SJC (UK) and the regional brigades.

d. Providing a single point of contact between the Police and military in respect of national policing issues, including base security, which includes post-incident investigation protocols.

e. On behalf of ACPO (TAM), the development of police/military training and exercise programmes, which contribute towards improved national resilience.

f. Development of policy and procedures for arms control visits and inspections, in support of UK Treaty obligations.

g. Coordination of the Police role in Joint police/military capability building initiatives overseas in support of the UK Government’s long-term counter terrorism strategy.\(^{41}\)

h. National police support to JSCGs, military study days and other similar events.

\(^{41}\) CM 6888 ‘Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy’, dated July 2006.
i. Support to D CT & UK Ops and the Police National Information and Coordination Centre (PNICCC)\textsuperscript{42} during police/military operations, and to the Regional chain of command when dealing with major incidents.

j. The development of Joint police and military procedures to support Defence nuclear road convoys.

**SECTION III – INTEGRITY OF UNITED KINGDOM WATERS**

**Introduction**

242. Within the UK Ops construct, military operations conducted in support of OGDs and agencies within UK waters are enabled through MT 2.1 (MACA) and MT 2.3 (Integrity of UK Waters).\textsuperscript{43} Additionally, a number of special MACA support arrangements exists between the MOD, OGDs and agencies charged with responsibility for maritime security and Search and Rescue (SAR) (see Table 2.2).

**Strategic Context**

243. The maritime domain is a significant element of the UK economy and security. UK waters are rich in fish, natural oil and gas, 95\% of the UK’s trade, by weight, is transported by sea and fifty million people travel to, from and around the UK by ferry each year. The maritime commercial sector employs more than 250,000 people directly (and a further 250,000 indirectly) with an annual turnover of £37 billion.\textsuperscript{44} Conversely, the long sea boundary around the UK presents substantial challenges in ensuring security against terrorism, countering the drugs trade and illegal immigrants and in enforcing UK legislation.

244. **Strategic Environment.** Monitoring, policing and reacting to incidents and illegal activity in the waters around the coasts of the UK provide significant challenges for Government Departments:

   a. **Terrorism.** The potential range of incidents is far reaching and includes:

   (1) Attacks on Offshore Energy Installations (OEI).

   (2) The hijacking of commercial shipping.

\textsuperscript{42} See Chapter 9.

\textsuperscript{43} Integrity of UK Waters. To demonstrate British sovereignty within and ensure the integrity of the UK’s territorial waters and, where necessary, to protect the UK’s rights and interests in the surrounding seas, including port and route survey.

\textsuperscript{44} November 2006 figures from Sea Vision UK, www.seavisionuk.org/.
(3) Attacks on civilian infrastructure or concentrations of populations, through armed attack or suicide bombing. In the future, this type of attack may be launched from the sea.

b. **Counter Narcotics (CN).** In addition to vessels smuggling illegal drugs directly into UK ports, cooevering\(^\text{45}\) from cross-Atlantic sources to supply the UK illegal drugs market also takes place in UK waters.

c. **Pollution.** Illegal or accidental discharge of effluents and/or cargo away from the coast.

d. **Illegal Immigration.** While immigration controls exist, there will be people desperate enough to circumvent them illegally, and unscrupulous persons to exploit them.

e. **Merchant Traffic.** The waters around the UK support a large volume of sea traffic. Whilst positive for the economy, the scale\(^\text{46}\) makes monitoring this movement extremely difficult.

f. **Fishery Conservation.** The British Fishery Limit (BFL) generates 70% of all fish landings from European waters. Fish conservation and enforcement of fisheries legislation within the 270,000 square mile BFL, in which 10,000 fishing vessels are permitted to fish, requires substantial surveillance and policing effort.

g. **Oil and Gas.** There are large natural oil and gas reserves within the UK sector of the North Sea and strong geological evidence of further deposits to the North and West of Scotland. Such valuable strategic resources and their supporting activities need regulation and protection.

h. **Port Security.** As official points of entry into and exit from the UK, ports are an obvious control node in regulating illegal activities. They also represent attractive targets for terrorists, who are increasingly targeting economic infrastructure.

**Legal**

245. UK\(^\text{47}\) law and the jurisdiction of UK civil authorities extend to the limit of territorial seas.\(^\text{48}\) Conduct and jurisdiction in international waters are governed by

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\(^{45}\) Transfer of drugs from a ‘mother’ ship to smaller ‘daughter’ vessels in which the drugs will be landed.
\(^{46}\) The Dover Straits is one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world, with over a quarter of a million shipping movements each year. Over 50 million people travel to, from and around the UK by ferry each year. Every day approximately 15 million containers are in transit at sea world wide and on land and, of these only 2% are screened.
\(^{47}\) There are some differences between Scottish law and the law in the rest of the UK, notably in its application to offshore facilities.
international law, notably the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Military involvement in the policing of UK territorial and international waters is under the following MACP arrangements:

a. **HM Revenue and Customs.** Commissioned Officers in the RN have statutory powers as Customs and Excise Officers\(^49\) to exercise jurisdiction within the UK’s territorial seas and over UK-flagged vessels on the high seas for customs and excise purposes (including the suppression of illicit drug trafficking). However, these powers are rarely used and RN warships will usually have Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) officials embarked when employed in CN interdiction work.\(^50\) RN vessels’ and RAF aircraft powers in territorial waters extend into international waters under the principle of ‘hot pursuit’.\(^51\) Hot pursuit is deemed to exist if there is good reason to suspect that a vessel has contravened UK Law within territorial waters, but has entered international waters.

b. **Maritime Counter Terrorism.** Domestic criminal jurisdiction (exercised by the civil authorities) within the UK, under which MCT operations are conducted, extends to the limits of territorial seas and to the 500-metre safety zones established around OEI on the UK Continental Shelf. In 1998, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) adopted a protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the safety of maritime navigation (SUA).\(^52\) This created a mechanism for extending jurisdiction to the high seas in the event of acts of violence, committed by non-state actors, and introduced legislation to enable the interdiction of vessels believed to be involved in the proliferation of weapons and controlled goods.

c. **Fishery Protection.** Fishery protection is the longest running law enforcement/MACP operation involving military forces. All RN Officers are designated British Sea Fisheries Officers (BSFOs), under the terms of the Sea Fisheries Act 1968, which endows extensive powers of policing. However, in practice, only designated and qualified BSFOs, operating within the RN Fishery Protection Squadron, are authorised to police the BFL.

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\(^{48}\) Several UK authorities have jurisdiction within the 12nm territorial limit. Within the context of UK Ops, the Police Act 1996 is most relevant.

\(^{49}\) Granted under the terms of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979.

\(^{50}\) The Criminal Justice (International Cooperation) Act 1990 extends the powers to stop, board, search and escort to port a suspected vessel in international waters, provided that the state in which they are registered is a party to the 1988 UN Drugs Convention and has given its authority for the action.

\(^{51}\) Hot pursuit allows a warship or military aircraft of a state to pursue a foreign ship, which has violated that State’s law within its internal waters or territorial sea and to arrest in on the high seas. See ‘The Law of the Sea’, 3rd Edition for further details.

\(^{52}\) See [www.imo.org/Conventions](http://www.imo.org/Conventions) for further details.
Central Government Responsibilities

246. The main Government Departments with interests associated with MT 2.3 are summarised Table 2.2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duty/Responsibility</th>
<th>Government Department/Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Environmental Protection (MARPOL)</td>
<td>Department for Transport (DfT) Maritime Coastguard Agency (MCA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvage</td>
<td>DfT(MCA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigation of Maritime Accidents.</td>
<td>DfT (Marine Accident Investigation Board (MAIB)).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigation of Air Accidents.</td>
<td>DfT (Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB)).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety at sea.</td>
<td>DfT (MCA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Search and Rescue.</td>
<td>DfT (MCA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port and shipping security.</td>
<td>DfT Transport Security (TRANSEC).53 MOD.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCT.</td>
<td>HO, MOD, Northern Ireland Office (NIO), Police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK law enforcement.55</td>
<td>Police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration control.</td>
<td>HO.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster relief and humanitarian aid.</td>
<td>Department for International Development (DFID) (note: The Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) has the lead for Humanitarian assistance in the UK).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter Proliferation.</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement of UK customs and fiscal regulations.</td>
<td>HMRC.57,58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

53 Responsible for the security of all major means of transport and the coordination of DfT arrangements for responding to serious disruption.
54 MOD, Naval Base Commander for Naval Dockyards.
55 To 12nm territorial seas limit and the safety zone around OEI.
56 HMRC in the absence of Immigration Officers.
57 HMRC’s departmental responsibility is to the Chief Secretary of the Treasury, an arrangement borne of the primary responsibility of Customs to collect revenue on goods brought into the UK.
58 A sub-department, Maritime A, runs the maritime element of HMRC’s responsibility, including operation of a fleet of 5 cutters (maintained at 30-minute standby throughout the year; 2 generally stationed in the SW, 2 in Scotland and 1 in the SE) and a Dornier and an Islander aircraft.
Table 2.2 – Central Government Department Responsibilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duty/Responsibility</th>
<th>Government Department/Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serious and Organised Crime including CN interdiction.</td>
<td>SOCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishery Protection (FP).</td>
<td>Department for environment, food and rural affairs (Defra), SOCA, Scottish Fisheries Protection Agency (SFPA) and the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (Northern Ireland) (DARD(NI)).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military SAR.</td>
<td>MOD in conjunction with DfT (MCA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence of territorial integrity.</td>
<td>MOD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Aid.</td>
<td>HO/Local Authorities/Police.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

247. **Port and Shipping Security.** Maritime security is an integral part of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) responsibilities. A revised, comprehensive security regime came into force on 1 July 2004. The mandatory security measures, adopted in December 2003, include the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code). The code contains detailed security-related requirements for Government, port authorities and shipping companies in a mandatory section (Part A), together with a series of guidelines about how to meet these requirements in a second, non-mandatory section (Part B). Within the UK, implementation of the ISPS code is the responsibility of the DfT TRANSEC and the MCA.

248. **Maritime Trade Operations.** Maritime domain operations require effective coordination and close cooperation between Government organisations, the military and commercial sectors in order to enable liaison and ensure safety. Cooperation and coordination must be present in peacetime if the benefits are to be realised in an emergency, crisis or conflict. In an emergency, crisis or conflict, whether abroad or at home, the Government’s interests are not just confined to UK and foreign flagged vessels and their cargoes but to crisis response shipping, designated ships and the myriad of maritime related activities, such as international shipping ventures, port operations, security issues, cargo and border (port) controls all of which have a resilience connotation.

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59 Whereas Defra use the RN for surface presence and interdiction, SFPA and DAFNI use their own protection vessels. Airborne surveillance is provided to the SFPA and Defra through a contract with Direct Flight Aviation.

60 All shipping employed in support of military operations, including, military chartered shipping, strategic lift assets, when appropriate, national pre-positioned ships and Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT).

61 Ships nominated by the DfT which may have higher priority over other vessels in Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) activities and, under Naval supervision, will comply with military orders.
249. The UK’s Maritime Trade Operations (MTO) policy, incorporates all matters associated with the worldwide movement and harbour operations of merchant ships and their cargoes in which, the UK Government has an interest. MTO supports the wider shipping industry and contributes to OGD activities in order to facilitate military operations while assisting in the continuance of normal maritime business in peacetime, crisis or conflict. This is achieved through mutually beneficial, pan-Government and industrial liaison, cooperation and guidance at the strategic, operational and tactical levels and by enhancing the protection of merchant ships, ports and anchorages through close cooperation between the military and the shipping industry.

**Military Involvement under Military Aid to the Civil Authorities**

250. Military activity in support of the civil authorities includes:

   a. **Fishery Protection.** Defra is responsible for fishery protection around the coast of England and Wales. The MOD maintains a minimum of 2 Fishery Protection Vessels (FPV) at sea throughout the year.

   b. **Maritime Counter Terrorism.** Contingency plans exist for rapid force deployment to meet a terrorist incident onboard a civilian merchant ship, including the release of hostages, the protection of OEI and to deal with renegade shipping.

   c. **Contraband Interdiction Operations.** The Armed Forces contribute to contraband interdiction both during routine operations around the coast of the UK and by offering military capability at request for a specific operation. Routine surveillance is conducted by RAF and RN assets during their routine operations, but for specific operations, a range of military resources could be allocated under MACP procedures.

   d. **Explosive Ordnance Disposal.** All 3 Services provide EOD expertise as MACP, under the tasking authority of the Joint Service EOD Operations Centre (JSEODOC), Didcot.  

   e. **Search and Rescue.** The Armed Forces, in conjunction with the DfT and police, maintain a UK military/civilian Search and Rescue (SAR) capability to ensure the most effective and timely response is available to assist personnel in hazardous situations.

   f. **Search.** The MOD conducts wide area search activity for sunken vessels/aircraft on request from the MAIB or AAIB. RN ships with high

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62 See Annex 2D for details.
63 See Annex 2E for details.
definition sonar, remote underwater vehicles or clearance divers may be employed for this role.

g. **Survey.** The RN’s surveying squadron is tasked world-wide in support of the Defence Hydrographic Programme, which supports all naval activities including MCM Route Survey, plus the civil marine sector through the supply of hydrographic publications.

h. **Route Survey.** A series of shipping routes around the UK, establishing transit lanes and routes for entry/exit from ports are subject to route survey. Each route is mine-hunted in accordance with MOD priorities in order to provide an accurate database of bottom contacts so that a subsequent minehunting operation can be conducted quickly and with greater confidence.

i. **Diving.** RN/Army diving teams may be used for underwater tasks under MACA arrangements, although MACC rules require that use of this capability for anything other than MACC (Cat A) tasks should only be undertaken in the absence of suitable commercial contractors.

**Command and Control**

251. The C2 of operations in UK waters forms an element of the overall MOD C2 structure outlined at Figure 2.1. Routine maritime activity remains under single-Service command, as does routine activity on land. CINCFLEET is the Joint Commander for fishery protection operations (in support of Defra). MOD SAR aircraft are coordinated by the Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre (ARCC) located at RAF Kinloss.65

**SECTION IV – INTEGRITY OF UNITED KINGDOM AIRSPACE**

252. This section is a brief introduction to those operations associated with MT 2.4 (Integrity of UK Airspace).66 Nearly 2.25 million flights carrying over 230 million passengers pass through UK airspace annually and the baseline predictions suggest that this will rise to over 287 million passengers in 2.6 million flights by 2010/11.68 The UK is responsible under International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and NATO obligations for the safety and security of aircraft flying through UK airspace. Maintaining the integrity of UK airspace entails the maintenance of a continuous

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64 See Chapter 5.
65 See Annex 2E
66 See Chapter 1, paragraph 110.
67 Civil Aviation Authority Corporate Plan 2006 figures.
68 CAA Ibid.
69 Chicago Convention 1944.
recognised air picture\textsuperscript{70} and contingency plans for the interception and possible
destruction of renegade and hostile aircraft.

a. **Hostile Aircraft.** Defence of the UK’s airspace from external attack by
another nation falls under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty and thus underpins the
application of NATO air defence procedures.\textsuperscript{71}

b. **Renegade Aircraft.** A renegade aircraft is an aircraft that has been
stolen or hijacked by terrorists either as a terrorist act in itself, or for use as a
Weapon of Mass Effect (WME). Contingency plans exist for dealing with
such incidents, but they are beyond the classification of this publication.

253. The MOD maintains a continuous ability to detect, deter and if necessary
destroy hostile and renegade aircraft to provide the best achievable defence for UK
citizens. This operation maintains the integrity of UK airspace. It involves close
linkages and cooperation with a variety of civil authorities and forms just one element
of the air security response, illustrated in Figure 2.3.

![Air Counter Terrorism](image)

**Figure 2.3 – Air Counter Terrorism**

**SECTION V – OTHER MILITARY SUPPORT ACTIVITIES**

254. Some requests for support fall outside the MACA process, primarily because
they are not operational activities. The provision of military assistance subject to such
rules includes:

\textsuperscript{70} Achieved by the integration of the civil ATC picture and military resources to form a Recognised Air Picture.

\textsuperscript{71} Allied Joint Publication-3.3 ‘Joint Air and Space Operations Doctrine’.
a. Training and Logistic Assistance to the Civil Power (TLACP).

b. Aircraft Post Crash Management (APCM).

**Training and Logistic Assistance to the Civil Power**\(^{72}\)

255. Training and Logistic Assistance to the Civil Power (TLACP) is part of MACA, but as military involvement is not directly engaged in the Civil Power’s operation it is subject to separate guidance. Defence involvement in the provision of TLACP carries a risk of misinterpretation, leading to the suggestion that the Military are becoming involved in areas properly the province of the Civil Power, and it is therefore sensitive. These difficulties can normally be overcome by distinguishing between direct involvement, in or support to operational activity and involvement in other non-operational training and logistical activity.

256. Any activity that directly engages the Armed Forces in a civil power’s operation is to be regarded as MACP. Any activity, which engages the Armed Forces in logistical support to a civil power’s operation, may be regarded as TLACP Operational Support (TLACP (Op Sp)) and requires authority from D CT & UK Ops. SJC (UK) will be appointed by D CT & UK Ops to exercise operational command for the provision of TLACP (Op Sp). TLACP may also be provided in support of a civil power’s non-operational activity. Normally, this will also require authority from D CT & UK Ops, but in certain circumstances this may be delegated; details are at Annex 2G.

**Non-Operational Support**

257. Support to training of civil authorities should be provided at full cost\(^{73}\) and authorised at brigade, station and unit commander (or equivalent) level. This places a duty on the relevant unit commander to ensure that the provision of this support is properly managed, including the management of any associated presentational implications. Station and unit commanders should consider seeking advice from SJC (UK) and D CT & UK Ops (through the chain of command), and must inform SJC (UK) and D CT & UK Ops of any activity that is likely to lead to or attract media interest. There is, however, no requirement for a unit commander to seek strategic level authorisation on every occasion.

a. **Accommodation.** Accommodation may be provided at the discretion of NBCs, Regional Brigade Commanders or RAF Station Commanders where it is in support of non-operational activity.

\(^{72}\) Historically, training and logistic support has most often been provided to the Police, and this has led to the provision being commonly described as Training and Logistic Assistance to the Police or TLAP. The terminology has changed to reflect the requirement to support other civil powers and authorities.

\(^{73}\) See paragraph 262 and Section VI.
b. **Training Facilities.** Training facilities may be provided at the discretion of NBCs, Regional Brigade/Divisional Commanders or RAF Station Commanders where it is in accordance with the guidance given at Annex 2G.

### Operational Support

258. Operational Support is defined as providing either support to the management and sustainability of civil power operations, or the use of MOD facilities in connection with a civil power’s operation. It brings the Armed Forces into contact with civil power operational activity without actually engaging them in that activity and raises questions about the ability of the civil power to undertake operational activity, which has potentially significant presentational implications, especially misplaced public perceptions of the role of the Armed Forces. All requests for operational support assistance must, therefore, be referred through the chain of command to SJC (UK) and through them to D CT and UK Ops, for advice and if necessary Ministerial authorisation.

259. **Support to Police Public Order Operations.** When the Police deploy in relatively large numbers to deal with such occasions as large-scale demonstrations and public events, the Services may be requested to provide logistic support such as accommodation, stores, transport or catering. All such requests are TLACP (Op Sp) and are to be referred to D CT & UK Ops through the chain of command giving details of the exact purpose of the Police’s request for facilities and the nature and location of the Police operation it would support.

a. **Accommodation.** Accommodation and use of MOD facilities under TLACP (Op Sp) may only be authorised with D CT & UK Ops approval. In all cases:

1. The general public is not to be admitted and accommodation is to be used only for administrative purposes (that is not for temporary police stations or arrest centres).

2. The military establishments involved are not to be in the immediate area of police operations and, consequently, are unlikely to become a target for public disturbances.

3. Arrested persons are not to enter MOD property for any purpose.

b. **Supply of Public Order Control Equipment.** D CT & UK Ops must be notified immediately of all requests for purchase or loan of Service

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74 During the 1984 miners strike the Armed Forces only provided accommodation for the Police. However, media stories circulated that Armed Forces personnel had been deployed, disguised in police uniform, as part of the public order response: media and the public continue to show an interest in the nature of our involvement some 20 years later.

75 The Police are responsible for raising a TLACP request, which should be forwarded to the MOD via the Home Office.
equipment and clothing. Such instances are likely to be extremely rare; police forces are now very well equipped. In an emergency, it may be possible for MOD to authorise release of certain types of equipment; this will only result from a formal request by police forces through the Home Office to the MOD.

260. **Procedure.** Requests for approval submitted to D CT & UK Ops, through the chain of command, should provide:

   a. The exact dates for the use of military resources.
   b. The type of training and/or logistic support requested.
   c. The number of people, vehicles and equipment involved.
   d. Facilities requested and their location.
   e. Whether the same facilities have been used before for a similar purpose, and date, if known.
   f. Details of Service or civilian personnel involved.
   g. Any other relevant details.
   h. Recommendation by each level of the chain of command on whether the request should be approved.

261. Approval submissions should also provide assurance that:

   a. There will be no disruption to normal Service activities, including training.
   b. The activity will be discreet and out of public view.
   c. Logistic support to the Police will be physically separate and unconnected with any potential disturbance and that no arrested persons will be brought on to Service property.
   d. Facilities cannot be provided from non-Service sources.
   e. Appropriate charges will be raised and accepted, and that appropriate indemnity arrangements will be made and in place before any assistance is given.

262. **Recovery of Costs.** Responsibility for setting the level of cost recovery for TLACP, and for ensuring that costs are recovered, is delegated under JSP 368 to the
Top Level Budget (TLB) holders\textsuperscript{76} Senior Finance Officers (SFOs) within the limits of their delegated authority. Use of MOD property, facilities, Service or MOD civilian personnel and equipment by a civil power should normally be charged at the full cost rate. Particular care must be taken to ensure that the cost recovery level takes account of any special requirements where MOD has a commercial partner. The Police, and other civil powers, are responsible for managing, supporting and sustaining their own operational activity. Armed Forces assistance should not be assumed and must be addressed on a case by case basis.

**Aircraft Post Crash Management**

263. Aircraft Post Crash Management (APCM)\textsuperscript{77} of events involving military aircraft is not covered by MACA procedures, but is included in this publication for information. The civil police have primacy at all crash sites in the UK. When dealing with off base incidents, the civilian emergency services will usually be first at the scene, providing an immediate response.

264. The ARCC will normally dispatch 2 Mountain Rescue Teams to provide the immediate guard force and to advise the emergency services. Nominated military units, with areas of responsibility aligned with Police Authority boundaries, are subsequently responsible for the cordonning and guarding of crashed military aircraft in the UK and of civilian aircraft that have crashed on a military airfield. Additionally, when Defence resources are involved in the recovery process, either at the request of the AAIB or under MACC provisions, APCM procedures will be applied. The nominated unit will provide an Incident Officer and guard force to assist and advise the Police as necessary. Recovery of all military crashed aircraft is conducted by the Joint Aircraft Recovery Team (fixed wing), based at St Athan and the Joint Aircraft Recovery Team (rotary wing), based at Gosport. The Police or the AAIB may request assistance from the military for civil aircraft crashes and the recovery of crashed aircraft; such requests would be dealt with under MACA procedures.

**Miscellaneous Defence Related United Kingdom Activities**

265. Other related activities of a non-emergency nature falling outside the scope of this publication are:

a. Ordinary repayment services, for which full costs are normally charged. An example is the loan and hire of Service premises for recreational purposes.\textsuperscript{78}

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\textsuperscript{76} Top Level Budget holders are responsible for the major functions of the Ministry of Defence. Each TLB has delegated powers over resources of cash, personnel and real estate within their respective areas of responsibility. From a UK Ops perspective, CINCFLEET, CINCLAND, CINCAIR and Chief of Defence Materiel (CDM) are TLB holders.

\textsuperscript{77} See JSP 551 ‘Military Flight Safety Regulations – Volume 2 Aircraft Post-Crash Management’ for detail.

\textsuperscript{78} See JSP 368 for detail.
b. Voluntary part-time aid, which individual Service personnel may give in their own free time, and on their own initiative.

SECTION VI – FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL AUTHORITIES

General

266. For the reasons outlined above, MACA activity is, with a few specific exceptions, not funded within the Ministry of Defence (MOD) budget and is, therefore, conducted on a repayment basis. Treasury rules dictate that Government Departments charge for services that do not form part of their funded tasks. No matter how valid a request for assistance may appear, Defence funds are granted for Defence purposes. If the cost is not applicable to Defence, then it represents an improper use of resources and must be recovered.79

267. Financial Principles. There are 4 financial principles governing military assistance:

a. Defence funds are granted for Defence purposes. Where work is done by the Armed Forces for other purposes, the MOD is required by Treasury rules to secure reimbursement for the costs incurred.

b. Defence assistance must be safeguarded against risks through appropriate insurance and indemnity arrangements.

c. Service personnel must not be used as cheap labour or in competition with commercial firms.

d. The basis of any financial charge may vary according to the nature of the assistance to which it relates. Adherence to the charging levels at paragraph 269 generally requires the MOD to recover the full costs of assistance provided to any outside body. Charging full costs avoids subsidising non-defence tasks. It also acts as a useful mechanism to limit the amount of assistance requested to the minimum necessary. However, where there is imminent danger to life (MACC C Cat A), charges are waived.

268. Charging Levels. There are 3 main charging levels that can be used:

a. Full Costs. These cover all costs, both direct and indirect, incurred in providing the assistance, and will include basic pay and allowances of the

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79 Failure to account for these costs may lead to legal or other sanctions on the Department and/or the individuals involved in incurring the costs.
personnel involved. Under Treasury rules, it is normal for Government Departments to recover full costs as a default.

b. **Marginal Costs.** This involves the recovery of costs that would not otherwise have been incurred by the MOD. Marginal costs may be applicable when a task undertaken on behalf of the civil authorities is also considered to be of direct benefit to MOD, or can be combined with a task or activity that the MOD would undertake on its own behalf (for example when a MACA task provides training for the Armed Forces in defence-related tasks).

c. **Waive Costs.** No costs are charged to the Civil Authority in situations where life is at risk or in exceptional other circumstances. The decision to waive costs would normally be taken centrally, often by Ministers.80

269. **Charging Policy.** The charging policy may change from one of the charging levels to another during an operation. For instance, marginal costs may be charged in the early stages of an operation, but the charges may increase to full-costs, where the period of assistance becomes extended and starts to cause detriment to MOD’s primary responsibilities. Full costs are also likely to be recovered where:

a. There are extended or repeated calls for the same MOD support. Support for annual events will, for instance, be charged at full costs. Regular use of the same MOD resources is likely to attract full costs, even if they are being used by different civil authorities.

b. The civil authorities are capable of making alternative arrangements (for instance through mutual aid), but have not done so.

c. The civil authority itself charges for the service they are providing (through the military), or have an additional budget allocation for the overall task.

**Approval and Cost Recovery – Responsibility and Procedures**

270. Provision of MAGD and MACP support requires Ministerial approval. MOD Ministers can decide to reduce or waive costs should they regard it as being in the national interest81 to do so. The decision on the level of cost recovery is made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the factors outlined above.

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80 However, under MACC Cat A rules, unit commanders are empowered to respond immediately to save life and waive costs – See Chapter 5 for details.
81 MOD will not waive costs on grounds of national security. Those aspects of national security for which the MOD has responsibility are funded within the Defence budget. A MACA request might be related to national security, but would by definition fall within the responsibilities, and therefore the budget, of the requesting Department or agency. Whilst the MOD may decide that the provision of Armed Forces’ support can be agreed on grounds of national security, it should not be taken as an indication that costs will be waived in whole or in part. The circumstances under which it is in
271. Where multiple MOD TLBs are involved in an activity that requires costs to be recovered, this will normally be coordinated by Directorate Financial Policy (D Fin Pol). A financial instruction will be issued through Command/Civil Secretaries advising on the procedures to be followed. In all other cases, TLBs are to ensure that processes are in place to ensure that costs are recovered directly by the appropriate staff. In every case, TLB finance staff are to be consulted.

272. Officers dealing with applications for assistance should be aware of the basis of charge for each task and, where applicable, the requirement for appropriate insurance cover and for an indemnity. In all cases, it is important that those requesting assistance should be aware of the financial implications of the request, even though in an emergency there may be no time to complete the paperwork in advance.

273. All expenditure/receipts (estimated or otherwise) should be reported, in accordance with the relevant financial instructions issued for the activity, through the budgetary chain to the relevant Civil Secretary/Budget Manager. Units should keep detailed records of all expenditure for recovery such that these can withstand scrutiny and fully support invoices.

**Preparation of Estimates**

274. It is often impossible to predict with any accuracy the cost of Armed Forces support. A civil agency that bases its request for MAGD or MACP support on the assumption that Armed Forces’ support is cheaper than commercial sources, could be mistaken. As a rule, therefore, the MOD does not guarantee to provide a cost estimate (as opposed to guidance on the charging regime) when it considers provision of the support.

275. An estimate of the full cost of the support forms the basis for the provision of dedicated MOD resources in support of the civil authorities. An estimate of the charge for the task should be prepared accurately, taking account of data in the technical reconnaissance report and including the costs of all reconnaissance work, assessed on the same basis as the task itself (that is, full or marginal costs). When an estimate of the costs is reported to the sponsor, it should be made clear that the estimate is liable to variation and that the final charge will not be determined until completion of the task. If it should prove necessary to revise significantly an estimate that has already been given, the revised estimate must be submitted in writing to the sponsor, who should be invited to confirm agreement that the task should proceed or continue.

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the national interest to waive costs are liable to vary, and the decision rests entirely with MOD Ministers. It is the general rule that the national interest is best served by ensuring that the Defence budget is spent on Defence.

*Advice is to be sought from finance staff before provision of estimates to a sponsor.*
Financial Provisions for Military Aid to the Civil Power

276. Some MACP assistance, for example routine EOD/Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD), is funded by OGDs (in this case the HO and Scottish Executive); therefore costs would not fall to or be met by MOD. The basis for costs is normally decided before an operation is approved. Guidance can be obtained from D CT & UK Ops.

277. The MOD accepts that it may occasionally be appropriate to establish dedicated MOD resources in support of the civil authorities, notably when the MOD has unique skills and capabilities unavailable to them. Provision of dedicated MOD resources should, however, be seen as an exception rather than a rule. The MOD will, in any event, ensure that it is fully reimbursed for the provision of dedicated resources. Civil authorities should always retain the option of developing these skills and capabilities themselves.

278. In a few areas (for instance coordinating the provision of civil air transport), MOD can offer a service that facilitates operational activity by the civil authorities without involving the Armed Forces. This support is generally provided on a cost plus basis (that is the cost of the support plus a handling charge).

Financial Provisions for Military Aid to the Civil Community

279. A local Unit Commander/Head of Establishment has the authority to waive charges if support is provided according to the terms of MACC Cat A outlined in Chapter 5. All expenditure should, however, be reported through the budgetary chain to the relevant Civil Secretary and/or Budget Manager.

280. Responsibility for approving MACC Category B and C tasks rests with:

- **Royal Navy.** CINCFLIGHT, Headquarters, Northwood, Cts.
- **Royal Marines.** The appropriate Royal Marines HQ.
- **Army.** The appropriate District/Divisional HQ.
- **Royal Air Force.** HQ AIR.

As, exceptionally within the MACA rules, responsibility for agreement to provision of MACC Cat B and C usually lies with TLBs, SFOs accordingly have discretion to set the cost recovery level for such support within the limits of their delegated authority under JSP368.

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83 MOD can and has raised charges on civil authorities when the claim that the support was urgent proved false.
84 Details regarding the use of helicopters should be reported to Director Financial Policy (D Fin Pol).
85 JSP 386 ‘The MOD Guide To Repayment’.
281. **Military Aid to the Civil Community Category B – Routine Assistance.**
The levels of charge for MACC Cat B can vary according to the status of the sponsor:

a. For assistance to a local authority or non-commercial concern (such as a charitable or non-profit-making organisation), a charge below full cost may be appropriate if the conditions set out in Chapter 5, Section III are met.

b. Non-operational assistance to the Police should not be considered under the provisions of MACC, but under those for Training and Logistic Assistance to the Civil Power (TLACP).\(^{86}\)

c. One of the prerequisites for the granting of MACC\(^{87}\) Category B assistance is that the task must constitute good military training value. During the reconstruction phase following a major emergency, there may be tasks of a non-emergency nature which, by virtue of the training value which they afford, can be undertaken within the scope of a Category B deployment. If all the relevant conditions set out in Chapter 5, Section III are met, a charge below full cost for a public body or non-commercial concern may be appropriate.

282. **Military Aid to the Civil Community Category C - Attachment of Volunteers.** For MACC Cat C assistance, the organisation requesting the assistance should normally be charged the marginal costs incurred in connection with the attachment of Service personnel (for example travelling expenses and cost of accommodation). MOD would continue to issue pay and normal allowances without recovery.

**Training**

283. When determining the charging basis for military participation in a civil emergency exercise, consideration should be given to the extent of the military role envisaged in the emergency in question:

a. Where the MOD agrees to participate in combined military/civilian exercises in order to test its own procedures (for example, command-post exercises) costs would normally be waived.

b. Where military participation is primarily of benefit to the civil authority requesting it, full costs would normally be raised.

c. Where no military role is envisaged, but MOD facilities are required in order to enable exercise activity such as in the case of TLACP, it may be appropriate to levy full costs.

\(^{86}\) See Section V.

\(^{87}\) See Chapter 5.
SECTION VII – MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE STANDING STRATEGIC AND OVERSEAS TASKS

284. The provision of UK based support to the Standing Strategic and Overseas Military Tasks is enabled via a range of Military Operations (MOs) that involve close cooperation with the Civil Authorities. These operations fall within the UK Ops domain and invariably utilise the command, control and civil/military liaison mechanisms described earlier in this chapter. Operations include:

Military Support to the Mounting of Operations

285. MSMO involves the planning for and the deployment, supporting and recovery of military operations outside the UK. This is chiefly concerned with RAMP, Defence Critical Assets (DCA), UK Line(s) of Communications (LOCs), US/UK LOCs and their associated Joint Contingency Plans (JCP).\textsuperscript{88} A key feature of this planning is extensive liaison with civil authorities, particularly the Police. This is usually conducted on a contingency planning basis through the regional JSCG\textsuperscript{89} or during operations through the JRLO, who will have developed close relations with his police counterparts.

Reception Arrangements for Military Patients

286. It is Government policy that British military casualties sustained overseas, who require secondary surgery or specialised medical treatment, will be repatriated whenever possible. There is also a potential requirement to treat Prisoners of War and local/other civilians under similar arrangements. The NHS is responsible for the reception, triage and acute secondary care of military patients evacuated from overseas to the UK. The NHS determines which NHS hospital receives military casualties, based on bed availability and clinical need.

287. The RAMP CONOPS is modular in concept and based on 4 levels of casualty management:

a. **Level 1.** The day-to-day Aeromedical Evacuation system coordinated through the Royal Centre for Defence Medicine (RCDM).

b. **Level 2.** Arrangements to accommodate a surge in Aeromedical Evacuation, beyond the capabilities of the RCDM and University Hospital Birmingham, within the local area’s capacity management systems.

c. **Level 3.** Arrangements for the dispersal of patients to a wider area in the Midlands and East of England, coordinated through the RCDM.

\textsuperscript{88} Extant Joint Logistic Plans are being rewritten as JCPs.
\textsuperscript{89} See paragraph 234.
d. **Level 4.** Implementation of SJC (UK)’s operational plan to facilitate the dispersal of patients throughout the entire UK NHS and DfT direction.

288. Depending on the situation, the levels may not be activated sequentially. The level required will be driven by the prevailing capacity of the NHS, at the time of notification of inbound casualties.

**UK Lines of Communications**

289. In order to deploy military capability from the UK to support overseas operations, the UK peacetime LOC may need protection and reinforcement by the activation of measures such as movement control and the Main Road Route System (MRRS). SJC (UK) is responsible for the maintenance of plans to provide support to the UK LOC.

a. Movement control requires the activation of various movements’ teams, liaison staff and reinforcements. These personnel are used to enhance security and support outloading plans, thereby easing the flow of men and materiel to and from the operational theatre. Such personnel should be located at key supply depots, deployment ports (including civilian ports) and airfields/airports and railheads.

b. The MRRS is activated where significant road movement is required and includes:

   (1) Enlisting the assistance of civil agencies, such as the Police and the AA, in the Royal Military Police’s traffic control arrangements.

   (2) Establishing and manning Long Halt Areas by Division/Brigade HQs to provide parking, vehicle repair, Petrol, Oil and Lubricants (POL) stocks and rest areas.

   (3) Marking civilian vehicles under military control.

**US/UK Lines of Communications**

290. The US maintains a number of bases in the UK in peace, and their size and number may increase in crisis and in war. The UK has bilateral, Government to Government, arrangements with the US (known as the UK/USLOC Arrangement) to provide Host-nation Support (HNS) for the reception/outload of US forces to/from the UK and the staging of forces through the UK prior to or during a deployment.

291. Support to US forces can range from minor ad hoc requirements, to more extensive HNS, which may or may not require the political process of activating the
UK/US LOC arrangement. ACDS (Log Ops) oversees UK/US LOC policy, and SJC (UK) is the focus for all support activity.

Defence Critical Assets

292. Formerly known as Defence Key Points (DKPs), a DCA\(^{90}\) can be an installation, system or facility which, is of critical and unique importance in supporting any military operation in the UK. The protection and security of a DCA is the responsibility of the parent establishment, which is to maintain contingency plans that enable increased security measures to be established at the DCA during periods of heightened threat. DCA protection planning also includes the provision of increased security measures outside the boundary of the DCA,\(^{91}\) which is enabled through agreement with local civil police forces. SJC (UK) oversee the augmentation of DCA security through the provision of additional manpower should the resources of the parent establishment and its TLB be insufficient.

Additional UK Military Operations

293. **Nuclear Accident Response Organisation.** As the LGD responsible for Defence related nuclear incidents, the MOD maintains a Nuclear Accident Response Organisation (NARO). The aim of the NARO is to ensure, in conjunction with the appropriate civil agencies, an effective response to a defence nuclear incident; the key objective is to protect public health and safety. Defence assets are held at notice to respond to such an incident.

294. **Return of UK Entitled Personnel.** In the event of escalating violence in countries overseas, a military operation may be mounted to remove UK entitled persons from danger. These operations are the responsibility of PJHQ. If, however, there should be a large-scale evacuation of forces personnel and dependants from UK foreign garrisons, then the reception at Airport of Disembarkation (APOD)/Seaport of Disembarkation (SPOD), accommodation, feeding and rehabilitation will be a UK MO.

295. **Military Resilience.** Military resilience is the means by which MOD units and establishments survive and recover from events, which significantly impair their ability to carry out normal functions. It addresses the consequences of extraordinary events and responses beyond the scope of current business continuity planning and makes provision for uninterrupted, sustainable support to overseas operations and core defence functions.

\(^{90}\) Joint Service Publication (JSP) 440 (Defence Manual of Security) supplement 3, defines MOD policy on the security of DCAs and provides guidance regarding Police/Military joint training and operating procedures in relation to DCA protection and security.

\(^{91}\) Private or public land.
The Channel Islands are the responsibility of NRO Wales & West. NRO North East is responsible for the Isle of Man.
ANNEX 2B – REGIONAL FORCES’ BOUNDARIES WITHIN THE UK

The Channel Islands are the responsibility of 43 (Wessex) Brigade. The Isle of Man is the responsibility of 42 (NW) Bde.

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1 The Channel Islands are the responsibility of 43 (Wessex) Brigade. The Isle of Man is the responsibility of 42 (NW) Bde.
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ANNEX 2C – RAF REGIONAL LIAISON OFFICERS’ AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

1 The Channel Islands are the responsibility of RAFRLO South West. The Isle of Man is the responsibility of RAFRLO North.
ANNEX 2D – MILITARY EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL\(^1\) CAPABILITIES

2D1. Defense Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) is that niche element of Defense capability that reduces the hazard posed by Explosive Ordnance (EO)\(^2\) and includes Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance (EOR), Explosive Ordnance Clearance (EOC) where appropriate, Conventional Munitions Disposal (CMD), Biological and Chemical Munitions Disposal (BCMD), Explosive, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (ECBRN) device disposal, Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) and EOD Electronic Counter Measures (ECM).

2D2. Defence provides 24hr EOD support to the civil authorities within the UK under Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) principles. The Metropolitan police and a number of UK commercial companies also maintain a range of EOD capabilities, which might be engaged to support the civil authorities.

2D3. Military MACA EOD operations are commanded by the Standing Joint Commander UK (SJC (UK)). Routine coordination of EOD tasking is conducted by the Joint Service EOD Operations Centre (JSEODOC) at Didcot. The JSEODOC will allocate military teams to an incident by matching the requirement to a particular capability. Deployments are pre-authorised by convention under Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP), when life and property are at risk. The JSEODOC informs SJC (UK) of all EOD deployments via weekly report. Any deployments likely to cause significant public/media interest or disruption are reported immediately.

2D4. **Royal Navy.** The Royal Navy (RN) is the Competent Authority (CA)\(^3\) for all maritime EOD activity, maritime search and the technical lead for British maritime munitions. The RN provides the lead for EOD in tidal waters, on the coastline below the high water mark, in vessels and offshore installations at sea or in port, on or near naval property, all naval ordnance found above and below the surface and High Risk underwater EOD search. The RN MACP EOD capability is embedded in the Fleet Diving Squadron with units at Portsmouth, Plymouth, Clyde and in mine warfare vessels.

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\(^1\) For a more comprehensive description of military EOD, refer to Joint Doctrine Pamphlet (JDP) 2/02 ‘Joint Service Explosive Ordnance Disposal’ and Joint Doctrine Note 5/06 ‘Countering Improvised Explosive Devices’.

\(^2\) All munitions containing explosives, nuclear or fusion materials and biological and chemical agents. This includes bombs and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket and small arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes and depth charges, demolition charges; pyrotechnics; cluster and dispensers; cartridges and propellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and improvised devices; and all similar or related items or components explosive in nature.

\(^3\) A Competent Authority is defined as an individual, supported by a committee or staff, responsible for developing policy for specific activities to ensure the chain of command is informed on how those activities are to be conducted to comply with existing legal and statutory requirements, and for providing advice on emerging legislation.
2D5. **Army.** The Army leads on the provision of MACP EOD and Search\textsuperscript{4} within the UK (out with RN or RAF areas of responsibility), the disposal of WWII German aircraft bombs (other than those on crashed aircraft) and EOD diving in non-tidal waters on munitions not of naval origin. The Army provides the technical lead for British land service ammunition, IEDD and land mines. In his capacity as SJC (UK), CINCLAND is responsible for the delivery of operational scientific advice, technical input for IEDD capabilities and providing the forces associated with the delivery of EOD. These tasks are mainly divided between the Royal Engineers and Royal Logistic Corps with support provided by the Royal Signals and Army Veterinary Corps.

2D6. **Royal Air Force.** The Royal Air Force (RAF) acts as the CA for aviation related EOD activity and as the technical lead for all British air dropped weapons. It provides the lead for EOD on and near RAF installations, including Air Weapons Ranges (AWR), on all crashed aircraft (other than those underwater) and all air dropped weapons (less German WWII aircraft bombs). The RAF MACP EOD capability is embedded in 5131 Bomb Disposal Squadron based at Wittering.

2D7. Military MACP EOD tasks may receive operational support from Ministry of Defence (MOD) scientific expertise as appropriate; including the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) and the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL).

\textsuperscript{4} Search is that element of Defence capability, which provides the management and application of systematic procedures with appropriate detection equipment to locate specific targets. Specified targets may include illegal recourses, conventional, improvised and Chemical, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) munitions, contraband, drugs, documents, other evidence or people.
ANNEX 2E – MILITARY SEARCH AND RESCUE CAPABILITIES

2E1. The MOD provides Search and Rescue (SAR) facilities to cover military operations, exercises and training within the UK Search and Rescue Region (SRR). Although these resources are established for military purposes, it is MOD policy to render assistance whenever possible to other persons, aircraft or vessels in distress. Where the coverage provided by military SAR assets meets the civil SAR requirement, they will be made available for civil aeronautical, maritime and land-based SAR operations. Where MOD coverage does not meet the civil requirement, SAR is provided by the Department for Transport (DfT). The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) and the Police retain primacy for maritime and land incidents respectively.

2E2. MOD-declared SAR resources consist of RAF and RN SAR helicopters, an RAF Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft, and RAF Mountain Rescue Teams (MRT); all these assets are controlled by the Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre (ARCC) at RAF Kinloss. In addition, they can be supplemented by other aircraft and surface vessels. In the event of large-scale disasters, additional military resources can be made available through the Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC) request procedure. At a major incident, each RAF SAR flight may also be able to provide a SAR Liaison Officer (SARFLO) with additional communications equipment.

Declared MOD SAR capabilities are as follows:

a. **Rotary Wing.** The RAF has SAR helicopter flights based at Boulmer, Chivenor, Leconfield, Lossiemouth, Valley and Wattisham and the RN at Culdrose and Prestwick. At each location, one helicopter is available at 15 minutes readiness between 0800 and 2200 with another available at 60 minutes readiness between 0800 and evening civil twilight (ECT). Between 2200 and 0800, one helicopter is at 45 minutes readiness.

b. **Fixed Wing.** The RAF maintains one Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft at RAF Kinloss on 2 hours readiness, 24 hours a day, for national standby duties, including SAR. The Nimrod’s powerful radar, long endurance and comprehensive communications make it the platform of choice for directing activities at the scene of an incident. The aircraft also carries air-droppable stores and multi-seat dinghies.

c. **Mountain Rescue Teams.** The RAF has one MRTs based at each of the following RAF Stations: Kinloss, Leeming, Leuchars, and Valley. Each

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1 MACC Cat A or B, see Chapter 5.
2 The time at which the centre of the setting sun is 6 degrees below the horizon. This is the limit at which twilight is sufficient, under good weather conditions, for terrestrial objects to be clearly distinguished.
MRT comprises up to 36 trained personnel available at 1 hour readiness and possesses a comprehensive communications, including Satellite Communications, HF, VHF, VHF FM and Airwave.

Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre

2E3. MOD SAR assets are coordinated by the ARCC. The ARCC operates 24 hours a day and coordinates the use of military SAR assets within the UK SRR in incidents involving civil or military aircraft in distress, irrespective of nationality. It also controls the military contribution to SAR operations requested by UK SAR authorities or neighbouring Rescue Coordination Centres (RCCs), including operations by military or civil aircraft, whether national or foreign.

2E4. The ARCC has extensive communications links with other SAR authorities and neighbouring RCCs. Other SAR authorities request military SAR helicopter, MRTs or Nimrod assistance for civil maritime or land SAR operations from the ARCC. Exceptionally, if military SAR helicopter assistance is necessary for immediate lifesaving, provision has been made for the MCA and the Police to make direct contact with the nearest helicopter unit and request assistance. In this instance, the requesting authority must inform the ARCC as soon as possible afterwards.

United Kingdom COSPAS-SARSAT Mission Control Centre

2E5. The COSPAS-SARSAT system is an international organisation that uses satellite technology to detect active radio distress beacons anywhere on Earth and to ensure that the distress alert data is passed quickly to the appropriate RCC. The ground segment of the system comprises 2 elements: the Local User Terminal (LUT); and the Mission Control Centre (MCC). The task of the MCC is to receive distress data from the LUT and foreign MCCs before passing this information to the appropriate RCC. The MCA is responsible for the maintenance and operation of the LUT while the MOD is responsible for the maintenance, manning and operation of the United Kingdom MCC which is located within the ARCC.

Distress and Diversion Cells

2E6. Throughout their flights, most aircraft remain in two-way radio contact with the Air Traffic Control Centre (ATCC) appropriate to the area in which they are operating. Usually, an aircraft with an emergency transmits its distress message in the first instance on the frequency (whether VHF, UHF or HF) in use at the time. The transmission will be dealt with by an ATCC, which will in turn alert its Distress and Diversion (D&D) cell (located at West Drayton and Prestwick). The aircraft may also

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3 See MACC Cat A, Chapter 5.
4 121.5, 243.0 and 406.0 MHz.
transmit on one of the dedicated VHF or UHF distress frequencies monitored by the D&D cells. In both cases, the D&D controllers will assume executive control of the incident and alert the ARCC, which will then direct the SAR activity.
ANNEX 2F – SPECIFIC PILLAR 2 AND PILLAR 3 CAPABILITIES

Pillar 2 - 2 (National Communications Signal) Brigade

2F1. 2 (National Communications (NC) Signal) Brigade discharges its responsibilities through Territorial Army (TA) Signal Regiments aligned geographically with the Army’s Regional Brigade structure and a core regular Signal Regiments (10 Signals Regt) based in Corsham, but with squadrons located at the Regional Divisions. The Regiment Commanding Officers are involved directly in Regional Brigade planning, in particular in the communications estimate process.

2F2. Incident Response Team. The Brigade provides communications support to the Regional Brigade initially through 4 Incident Response Teams (IRTs),\(^1\) which offer secure and insecure communications, AIRWA\(^2\) and access to military IT systems and the internet.

2F3. Command Support Team. When the IRTs are activated, consideration will be given to activating Command Support Teams (CSTs) based on the TA Signal Regiments.\(^3\) These units offer similar facilities to the IRTs, but on arrival will enable operations over a protracted period.

2F4. As the scale of the incident becomes clearer, the Brigade has other assets that may be deployed to provide more comprehensive communications at both Brigade and Divisional level. These include VHF communication area systems with rebroadcast facilities and interconnectivity with AIRWA, mobile command post facilities, and SATCOM.

Pillar 3 – Civil Contingency Reaction Force\(^4\)

2F5. Civil Contingency Reaction Forces (CCRFs), of which there are 13 in the UK, are designed to be a military force capable of being mobilised after the Secretary of State for Defence (or a MOD Minister) has made an order authorising the call-out of members of the Reserve Forces. CCRFs are drawn from the Reserve Forces and are capable of providing general duties support, which may be used to supplement the local civil emergency response. However, their mobilisation means drawing upon personnel, who have civilian careers, and requires ministerial approval under the 1996 Reserve Forces Act.

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\(^1\) One at 12 hours notice, the remainder at 24 hours notice.

\(^2\) For details see Chapter 9.

\(^3\) One CST per TA Signal Regt at 12 hrs notice, a second at 24 hrs notice.

\(^4\) See Chapter 2, Paragraph 222.
2F6. The core of a CCRF is formed around a TA Infantry Battalion with its command structure, integral communications, logistic support and sub units. CCRFs are commanded by the Regional Brigade and may include volunteers from all arms of the Royal Naval Reserve, Royal Marines Reserve the TA and the Royal Auxiliary Air Force. Likely CCRF tasking (for which specific training may be required) includes reconnaissance, access control, assistance with mass casualties and displaced people, site search and clearance, transport and communications, provision of water and feeding points and command and control.
ANNEX 2G – TRAINING AND LOGISTIC ASSISTANCE TO THE CIVIL POWER

Training Facilities

2G1. The handling of requests for the use of Service facilities for Civil Power training will vary according to the type of assistance required. Some requests will require prior Ministerial approval, through the Directorate of Counter Terrorism and United Kingdom Operations (D CT & UK Ops); some may be approved by local commanders.

2G2. **Use of Weapons Ranges.** Applications for the use of ranges for firearms training may be approved by a Naval Base Commander (NBC), Army Regional Brigade Commander or a RAF Station Commander providing:

   a. The request is for target shooting/weapon handling practice or instruction on gallery, electric target, 25metre range, Individual Battle Shooting Range or Close Quarter Battle Range.

   b. No military personnel are involved except:

      (1) Service personnel may be used as safety lookouts where police are unable to supply them.

      (2) Service personnel may act as instructors provided their activities are confined solely to instruction of the weapon being fired. They are not to run either firing points or butts.

   c. The Police are responsible for the running of the range.

   d. Range allocation is subject to Service priorities (including Reserve and Cadet Forces).

   e. Conduct of the range is in accordance with current Range Conduct and Safety Rules and local Range Standing Orders, which are to be brought to the attention of the Police.

Requests that fall outside these criteria, or where unusual public interest may be generated, should be passed through the chain of command to D CT & UK Ops for consideration.

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1 See Chapter 2, Paragraphs 255-262.
2 See Chapter 4, Paragraph 403.
2G3. **Use of MOD Property.** Applications for the use of lecture halls and other buildings may be approved by a NBC, Regional Brigade Command or a RAF Station Commander. The use of MOD property for non-military training of a non-controversial nature\(^3\) may also be approved providing:

a. Service personnel are not involved in giving instruction or forming part of the crowd for public order/crowd control training.

b. There is no detriment to Service commitments or training.

c. The Police meet the cost of the facilities provided.

d. The arrangements are made discreetly and the training takes place out of public view.

If there is any doubt as to the sensitivity of a proposed use of MOD facilities, requests should be referred to D CT & UK Ops through the chain of command.

2G4. **Recovery of Costs.** Responsibility for setting the level of charge and recovery of costs for TLACP is detailed in Chapter 2, Section V.

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\(^3\) Such as public-order or crowd control training (when unconnected with specific public order operations or industrial disputes) or physical training.
CHAPTER 3 – MILITARY AID TO OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

301. Military Aid to other Government Departments (MAGD) is assistance provided by the Armed Forces on urgent work of national importance or in maintaining supplies and services essential to the life, health and safety of the community.

302. The provision of MAGD requires the use of emergency powers and can only be undertaken with the explicit authorisation of Ministers and the Defence Council in response to a specific request from the appropriate Lead Government Department (LGD). In the case of MAGD, the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) will often be activated. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has developed contingency plans to support Other Government Departments (OGDs), including the provision of specific types of assistance. These plans are distributed to appropriate military headquarters and guide potential deployments.

Training

303. In some cases, the provision of MAGD support requires special training in skills not normally found within the Armed Forces. The allocation and training of appropriate force elements required to undertake temporary tasking may result in a delay to the deployment. Therefore, MAGD support requests must be made well in advance of the requirement to allow appropriate training to take place.

304. Any special training will be designed to enable Armed Forces personnel to provide a basic capability that temporarily replaces or augments a specific civilian capability. In the case of support provided during industrial disputes, it also ensures that military forces’ support is designed to protect life, rather than contributing to a particular outcome of the dispute.

305. The existence of a contingency plan does not imply any guarantee that resources can be made available, or that training has taken place or will take place. Decisions to undertake training and to deploy armed forces support are taken on a case by case basis.

Legal Authority

306. Section 2 of the Emergency Powers Act 1964 (and related legislation) provides the statutory basis for the deployment of the Armed Forces on non-military tasks. It
has created a Defence Council Order mechanism\(^1\) authorising such deployments on work of 'urgent national importance'. The mechanism also gave rise to the MACC Cat A authorisation process.\(^2\) The key points of the MAGD mechanism are:

a. A submission should be made by the Directorate of Counter Terrorism and United Kingdom Operations (D CT & UK Ops) seeking approval for any deployment. That submission should contain the relevant facts and sufficient information to enable a decision to be made, including the likely impact on defence operations.

b. The Defence Council will consider any request that is of 'urgent national importance' proposed by D CT & UK Ops. Proposals will, however, normally relate to the maintenance of essential supplies and/or services and the alleviation of distress and safeguarding of lives and property in times of disaster.

c. The Defence Council will decide whether to approve the particular employment as being 'urgent work of national importance' or not. In doing so, they will pay particular regard to any representation to that effect made by a civil department requesting the employment.

d. A Defence Council Order, authorising armed forces personnel to undertake specific tasks, should be signed by at least 2 members of the Council, including a Minister, on the same day.

307. The Emergency Powers 1964 Act\(^3\) and the supporting regulations only refer to work of 'urgent national importance'. The ‘civil department requesting the employment’ is, in practice, either the LGD associated with the particular crisis or the Home Office as the overall lead department for civil emergencies and counter-terrorism.

308. Devolved Administrations (DAs) do not have authority to seek MAGD. If they wish to obtain MAGD, they will approach the relevant UK Territorial Department (Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales Offices) to bid on their behalf. The decision as to whether the support will be provided remains with the Defence Council.

309. Ministerial authority is not required for discreet exploratory liaison between the military and local officials, although D CT & UK Ops approval is required prior to any informal discussions with OGDs. Coordinated military/civil authority planning and formal meetings can only take place once Defence Council approval has been given.

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\(^1\) Issued on 10 February 1983.

\(^2\) See Chapter 5.

\(^3\) This Act is the legislation ordinarily used to authorise MAGD deployments.
Principles

310. The principles under which MAGD is authorised are:

a. The Armed Forces do not train for MAGD tasks except in relation to a specific task\(^4\) and after a request for assistance has been authorised by Ministers.

b. Service personnel are used only as a last resort; other options such as the use of managers and supervisors or private contractors should be pursued first.

c. The Armed Forces have to be capable of fulfilling the task required.

d. Penalties to military operations, capability and readiness will be considered prior to agreeing to provide MAGD.

e. MAGD is sensitive and, therefore, all planning is protectively marked and promulgated on a limited distribution.

f. MAGD is coordinated at the national level in response to a request from OGDs.

g. Service personnel deploy unarmed and act under the military chain of command at all times.

h. Civil authorities may only seek the use of MOD property as an emergency mortuary after an incident has occurred.\(^5\)

SECTION II – MILITARY AID TO OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS PROCEDURES

Command

311. D CT & UK Ops is responsible for the coordination of MAGD. The United Kingdom Standing Joint Commander (SJC(UK)) will usually take the lead for MAGD operations exercising Operational Control (OPCON) over assigned RN, Army and RAF assets as appropriate. If the assistance is of a specialist nature, however, the MOD may direct that control be exercised through appropriate Service channels. The structure based on Headquarters Land Command (HQ LAND) and regional Divisional and Brigade HQs will normally coordinate and task Joint resources assigned by MOD for MAGD.

\(^4\) For example, during the fire disputes, Service personnel were given firefighting training in preparation for their duties.

\(^5\) See Annex 3B for further details.
Planning Timelines

312. The formal warning time for MAGD deployments will vary:

a. For animal disease emergencies, there is likely to be a period when the scale of the emergency is being quantified before a request for assistance is made. This period may offer an opportunity for contingency planning or at least for reviewing the lessons from previous emergencies.6

b. Long-range weather forecasts may allow some prediction of requests for severe weather assistance to farmers and others. Such assistance is more likely to be required after extended periods of poor weather.

c. In the case of industrial disputes, warning may be as little as 7 days as a result of political and industrial sensitivities. However, the LGD is likely to be aware of the threat of strike action approximately 6 weeks in advance. Trades Unions are required to provide their employers with 7 days notice of their intention to ballot their members for strike action, thereafter the ballot process will generally last up to 3-4 weeks. Unions are then obliged to give a further 7 days notice prior to strike action commencing. Any subsequent periods of strike action, for example during a series of short strikes, are also required to be notified 7 days in advance. For industrial disputes, the requesting Government department would formally seek MOD assistance during the ballot process. MOD and SJC(UK) would commence preparations as soon as Defence Council authority has been given.

Industrial Disputes

313. The deployment of Service personnel for the maintenance of essential supplies and/or services could easily be perceived as ‘strike breaking’, especially in a long-running dispute. Passions can run high, and it is important that the deployment of service personnel does not exacerbate a situation. The Police are responsible for the protection of persons and property and for the maintenance of law and order. Consequently:

a. If threatened or attacked, Service personnel should seek police assistance.

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6 In the 2001 foot and mouth epidemic Defra (then MAFF) kept the MOD informed from the outset and Ministers formally notified the MOD on 1 March 2001 that they were considering military assistance but did not call for large scale military assistance until the beginning of the week of 12 March 2001, when the scale of the disease had become apparent, and the Department identified a clear role for the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces went on to play a key supportive role, assisting centrally and locally in the organisational and logistical arrangements, particularly for slaughter, transport and disposal of diseased animals.
b. Service personnel on MAGD duties are to be directed to avoid direct contact with pickets.

c. If Service personnel are confronted by pickets, they should act on the advice given by the Police.

d. In the event that no Police are present, Service personnel are to withdraw from situations that would result in injury to themselves or others, or damage to equipment placed in their charge, pending the arrival of police assistance.

e. Service personnel are not authorised to conduct any form of law enforcement activity, including that related to public order duties, as part of MAGD. Where MAGD is conducted in Northern Ireland, service personnel may require to be protected by the Police and by military units operating under the terms of Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP).  

f. If Service personnel are attacked unexpectedly, and police protection proves inadequate, they would be entitled to use minimum reasonable force in self-defence with a view to extricating themselves.

Personnel

314. **Minimum Experience Levels.** Service personnel under the age of 17½ and recruits with less than 8 weeks basic training are not to be deployed on MAGD without the authority of D CT & UK Ops.

315. **Reserve Forces.** Formed Reserve units may be called-out for permanent service under the provisions of the Reserve Forces Act 1996 for deployment on MAGD operations, other than to undertake front-line tasks in industrial disputes. However, individual members of the Reserve Forces permanent staff, Full Time Reserve Service (FTRS) and individuals who volunteer to do so, may be deployed on supporting tasks during industrial disputes.

Presentation

316. MAGD deployments are politically sensitive and potentially controversial. It is for the LGD to deal with the media, however, when assistance is provided at the national level, a media handling strategy will be necessary.

317. Comment on industrial disputes is to be avoided. Publicity should not normally be actively sought and media enquiries should be directed to the MOD Press Office.

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7 MT 2.2.

8 This may differ for specific operations; for example, the minimum age during the 2002/3 fire dispute was set at 18.
Briefing Notes

318. Briefing notes for Service personnel deployed under MAGD are at Annex 3A.
ANNEX 3A – BRIEFING NOTES FOR SERVICE PERSONNEL DEPLOYED IN MILITARY AID TO OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

Introduction

3A1. These notes should be used by commanders when briefing Service personnel involved in providing Military Aid to other Government Departments (MAGD). They should not be issued to individuals as instructions. Additional instructions will be required for service personnel conducting MAGD in Northern Ireland concerning the arrangements for protection by the police and military personnel operating under the terms of Military Aid to the Civil Power.

Background

3A2. Under MAGD, Service personnel can be called upon to carry out urgent work of national importance, for example, helping to maintain essential supplies and services during an emergency.

3A3. Members of the Armed Forces should be fully aware of their responsibilities and rights, specifically the bounds of their legal rights, in such a situation. In helping to maintain essential supplies and services in an emergency, Service personnel are acting under military orders and in the interests of the whole community.

3A4. When deployed during an industrial dispute, Service personnel are not taking the side of one party or another, although inevitably their actions risk being described or misinterpreted as ‘strike breaking’. Service personnel must act within the law and within the bounds of their specific mission. They must, as far as possible, have no direct involvement with strikers. Armed Forces personnel will not be armed under such circumstances.

Legal Authority

3A5. The legal authority for Service personnel to carry out civilian work under MAGD is authorised by the Defence Council under Section 2 of the Emergency Powers Act 1964 or the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. Once the Defence Council has signed an Order, or a State of Emergency has been proclaimed, orders issued to Service personnel to carry out such work are legal orders. The legal obligations and considerations that apply to service personnel deployed under MAGD are:

a. When deployed under MAGD, a member of the Armed Forces has the same basic legal rights and obligations as any citizen.¹

¹ See paragraphs 407 and 412.
b. The Police are responsible for the protection of persons and property and for the maintenance of law and order. Accordingly, if threatened or attacked during the performance of their duties Service personnel should seek police assistance.

c. If police assistance is not available, Service personnel should attempt to withdraw from the situation. However, if this is not possible, a citizen’s right of self-defence applies; it allows the use of only such force as is the minimum necessary and reasonable in the circumstances, for self-protection and the protection of comrades.

d. As citizens, Service personnel are also bound to go to the assistance of the Police, should they specifically ask for help.

e. If it is assessed that the Police have asked for Service personnel assistance, not as citizens, but because they are members of the Armed Forces, they should withdraw from the situation and refer the Police to their Commanding Officer.

Guidance in Relation to Picketing

3A6. Service personnel should, so far as possible, avoid both physical contact and argument with pickets. Although picketing in UK is generally conducted peacefully and within the law, there may be occasions when there will be confrontations between the pickets and those wishing to enter their workplace. In such circumstances, the Police will usually be present and Service personnel should follow their instructions. However, should Service personnel encounter pickets and no police officer is present, they should proceed as follows:

a. If the pickets do not obstruct them and do no more than orally present their case, they should proceed with their duties and avoid entering into a debate.

b. If the pickets obstruct their progress or threaten actual violence, then Service personnel should withdraw and call the Police, whose advice should be followed as regards any further attempt to pass through the pickets.

3A7. Strikers may support their industrial action by ‘sitting-in’ at their place of work. Provided it is conducted peacefully, ‘sitting-in’ does not constitute a criminal offence and, therefore, the Police cannot intervene. The Police may intervene if a criminal offence has occurred or a breach of the peace seems imminent. Service personnel entry to places where there are ‘sitters-in’ might be regarded as provocative and lead to a breach of the peace. Service personnel should not seek to enter such premises.
Media Relations

3A8. If Service personnel are approached by a member of the press or by any other member of the public, they should explain, politely, that they are not permitted to discuss the work that they are doing. They should refer any questions to their Commanding Officer (CO), whose location or headquarters they may divulge. The CO will normally be authorised to make statements of fact about any incident, but should always seek guidance from his superiors before making any statement. Except in a situation where arrest under the Official Secrets Acts would be permissible, it is not possible to prevent photographers or television cameramen from recording, but service personnel should not be drawn into conversation.

3A9. Service personnel should not give their name to any unauthorised person, only to a uniformed policeman or military officer.

Summary

3A10. The 4 main points to remember are that the Armed Forces:

a. Are responsible to the Crown for helping to maintain essential supplies and services during an emergency.

b. Are impartial in industrial disputes and must, as far as possible, avoid direct involvement with strikers.

c. Have the same basic legal rights and obligations, no more and no less, than any other citizen and should take all necessary action to avoid a breach of the peace.

d. Always act within the law.
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ANNEX 3B – EMERGENCY MORTUARIES

Introduction

3B1. Most emergencies in the United Kingdom are planned for and handled by the local emergency services and the relevant local authorities, utilising mutual aid arrangements as required. Recent experience illustrates that multiple incidents, possibly of catastrophic proportion, may need to be handled simultaneously. This includes the handling of mass fatalities.\(^1\)

3B2. A mass fatality incident is ‘any incident where the number of fatalities is greater than normal local arrangements can manage’. The scale and complexity of a mass fatality incident has the potential to overwhelm responders and, therefore it is essential that fatality associated planning forms part of the overall incident/situation response and recovery plan. There is a national, demountable, mortuary capability that may be deployed during crisis involving mass fatalities. Potentially, Defence may be approached to provide hard-standing for this capability.

Background

3B3. HM Coroners are statutorily responsible for finding and equipping emergency mortuaries, and are funded accordingly.

3B4. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) is not funded for providing emergency mortuaries, supporting facilities, infrastructure, or personnel.

3B5. Military installations may offer large storage space out of public view, and provide a means for controlling access. From a Coroners perspective, these characteristics represent ideal emergency mortuary conditions and in the past military installations have been used as both emergency mortuaries and for temporary storage.\(^2\)

3B6. As part of their responsibility for planning for the provision of emergency mortuaries within mass fatality plans, local authorities may identify military sites subject to conditions that include:

a. MOD cannot guarantee the availability of any site during a civil emergency and therefore, military sites cannot be the only options that are included in plans.

b. MOD and Home Office (HO) have no responsibility for the installation, management or decommissioning of emergency mortuaries or any associated services (such as connecting to, or supplying water, electricity and life support)

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\(^2\) For example, following the Severn Tunnel rail disaster (1991), the death of 58 Chinese immigrants near Dover (2000) and the Selby rail crash (2001).
c. MOD will not provide any buildings or permanent structures associated with the installation, management or decommissioning of emergency mortuaries.

d. All the MOD will provide is hard-standing space, grassland will be considered as a fallback option when hard-standing is not available.

e. MOD will arrange for access to its sites for planning and site suitability survey purposes through the Joint Regional Liaison Officers (JRLOs).

Operational Use

3B7. In a mass fatality incident, the Coroner (or local authority acting on behalf of the Coroner) might decide that a MOD site would be the only suitable location for an emergency mortuary. In these circumstances, the Coroner (or local authority acting on behalf of the Coroner) will make a request\(^3\) to the Secretary of State for Defence, to locate the emergency mortuary at a MOD site through a HO minister. The MOD will process such requests in accordance with Military Aid to Civil Authority (MACA) principles.

\(^3\) In England and Wales, emergency mortuary location requests are endorsed by the Mass Fatalities Coordination Group. In Scotland, the Procurator Fiscal or agent is responsible for making decisions regarding the location of emergency mortuaries.
CHAPTER 4 – MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL POWER

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

401. This Chapter covers the policy guidelines for Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP). It covers the conduct of MACP in the United Kingdom (UK).

402. Based under common law, MACP is the provision of military assistance (armed if appropriate) to the Civil Power in its maintenance of law, order and public safety, using specialist capabilities or equipment, in situations beyond the capability of the Civil Power. MACP differs from Military Assistance to other Government Departments (MAGD), where the legal basis for deploying members of the Armed Forces is under statute law.

Civil Power

403. A Civil Power is a civil authority that has constitutional or statutory responsibility for the maintenance of law and order. The Civil Power includes:

   a. Secretaries of State and other Ministers for all Departments of State.
   b. Home Department Police Forces.
   c. Non-Home Department Police Forces\(^1\) (for example, Scottish Forces, Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), British Transport Police and Civil Nuclear Police).\(^2\)
   d. The Security Service (SS), Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).
   e. Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC).
   f. Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA).
   g. Serious and Organised Crimes Agency (SOCA).\(^3\)
   h. Maritime, Rail and Air Accident Investigation Branches.

404. The Armed Forces and the MOD’s scientific agencies have a range of capabilities, developed for both conventional and Counter Terrorism (CT) operations that can assist the Civil Power at home and abroad (including British overseas territories, British embassies and British-flagged merchant vessels) if requested.

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\(^1\) See Chapter 9 for a more complete list.
\(^2\) But not MOD police.
\(^3\) In Scotland, the Scottish Crime and Drugs Enforcement Agency.
MACP is initiated by the Civil Power informing the Ministry of Defence (MOD) via the Lead Government Department (LGD) or Agency of an effect they wish to achieve. At present all requests for military assistance to UK Police Forces are made via the Home Office. The MOD will then determine whether the request should be met and how to achieve the desired effect. In general, assistance may take the form of advice, or the conduct of specific activities, but will always be subject to availability, unless it is a niche capability.  

405. The use of Service personnel in aid of the Civil Power is a particularly sensitive subject and ministers will be intimately involved in the control of such operations.

SECTION II – MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL POWER

PRINCIPLES

406. Generally, MACP is requested to assist the Civil Power in dealing with a varying range of criminal and malicious activities.

Legal Authority

407. Common Law imposes a duty on every citizen, including Service personnel, to go to the aid of the Police/Civil Power, when requested, to assist in the enforcement of law and order, where it is reasonable to do so and where they have the resources and ability to do so. This forms the main (but not the only) basis for the MACP mechanism, since it provides a basis for issuing lawful orders to Service personnel to perform tasks, which are not part of their normal duties. The common law duty is, however, difficult to formulate and cannot be relied upon in all circumstances to provide a legal basis for a response, especially if commanders use it without Defence Council authorisation. The duty of Service personnel to obey lawful orders remains paramount, once it is clear that the requirement for support is reasonable and justified. However, the common law duty of Service personnel is no greater than that placed on any other citizen, and does not, in itself, justify the use of the Armed Forces in support of the Police in preference to support from other citizens.

408. To ensure that the provision of the support is both reasonable and soundly based in law, all MACP support requires the approval of a Defence Minister. As a statutory basis for the provision of support, Section 2 of the 1964 Emergency Powers Act (EPA) and the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) provide a stronger basis for Military Aid to the Civil Authority (MACA) activity than the common law.

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4 See Chapter 2, Paragraph 222c(1).
5 Differs under Scottish Law.
409. Queen’s Regulations\(^6\) place an additional duty on military commanders to act on their own responsibility without a request by the Civil Power where, in very exceptional circumstances, a grave and sudden emergency has arisen, which in the opinion of the Commander demands his immediate intervention to protect life or property. This is in fact the same duty imposed on commanders by Defence Council Order for Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC) Category A.\(^7\)

**Legal Powers of Service Personnel Conducting Military Aid to the Civil Power in the UK**

410. **General Powers.** Service personnel are required to act within the rule of law and will normally have no special legal powers beyond those of the ordinary citizen. Hence, Service personnel may use reasonable force to prevent crime, including in self-defence.

411. **Arrests.** Although Service personnel should not normally attempt to arrest a civilian, in certain circumstances there may be no other option. Any citizen, including a member of the Armed Forces, in England, Wales and Northern Ireland may arrest offenders for a breach of the peace.\(^8\) Furthermore, in England, Wales and Northern Ireland citizens may also arrest a person for any ‘arrestable offence’\(^9\) that has been committed. These will include serious assaults, acts of hostage taking, theft and criminal damage. In Scotland, a citizen may not make an arrest for a breach of the peace, which has already taken place. He/she may, however, intervene to try to stop a breach of the peace and may act to assist a civilian police officer. Furthermore, in Scotland a citizen may make an arrest for serious offences only if he/she sees the crime being committed.

412. In agreeing the provision of MACP support, the MOD agrees that Service personnel can act under the supervision or direction of the Police or other Civil Power to perform a particular task. Service personnel, however, remain under military command at all times. To ensure that both the command relationship and the legal basis of their involvement remain clear, the MOD does not agree to any request that places Armed Forces personnel under the direct command of police officers or other civil-service personnel, or which gives the Armed Forces generic civil powers. The MOD would not, for example, agree to the enlistment of serving Service personnel as

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\(^6\) *The Queen’s Regulations for the Royal Navy* (QRRN) J4801 to 4802 and J4805 to 4806, *The Queen’s Regulations for the Army* J11.001 to 11.010 and *The Queen’s Regulations for the RAF* J852.

\(^7\) Defence Council Order dated 17 January 1983 - see Chapter 5.

\(^8\) In England and Wales a breach of the peace is an occasion where a person causes harm or appears likely to cause harm to persons or property, or acts in a manner the natural consequence of which is to provoke others to violence. In Scotland there is no strict definition; in fact it is normally taken to be somewhat wider than that of England and Wales; if the former definition is used when assessing whether action is appropriate it should meet the requirements of both legal systems.

\(^9\) An offence for which a suspect may be arrested without a warrant. The Serious Organised Crimes and Police Act 2005 defines offences that are arrestable without warrant.
special constables, firefighters or paramedics, or their appointment as Health and Safety Inspectors, Trading Standards Officers or local Government officials.

SECTION III – MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL POWER PROCEDURES

MOD Authorisation

413. Units should not, except in the most exceptional circumstances (see paragraph 414), give assistance to the Civil Power without prior ministerial authorisation, obtained through the Directorate of Counter Terrorism and United Kingdom Operations (D CT & UK Ops). Units that receive requests for assistance should ask the Civil Power to route its request to the relevant Government Department then to the MOD. The Home Office (HO) acts as the LGD for all issues affecting armed forces’ support to the Police. Police forces have been instructed to apply for MACP support via the HO, rather than direct to the MOD. The Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland Offices can also apply to the MOD for MACP support on behalf of the Police or the DAs (which cannot apply direct) within the devolved regions. Other authorities requesting MACP\(^{10}\) should apply directly to D CT & UK Ops.

414. There are only 2 occasions where Service personnel may be deployed to assist a Civil Power, when such a deployment has not received the prior approval of the relevant Government Department and Defence Ministers. These are:

a. Deployment under Military Assistance to the Civil Community (MACC) Category A (see Chapter 5 for details).

b. Routine MACP deployments covered by standing ministerial approval, where the authority to deploy has been delegated to a military commander, such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Search and Rescue (SAR) operations.

Command

415. **MOD.** D CT & UK Ops has responsibility for MOD MACP policy and the conduct of MACP operations worldwide. The SJC(UK) has pre-prepared contingency plans for the use of Service personnel in specific MACP situations.

\(^{10}\) See paragraph 403.
416. **Operational.** The SJC(UK), or delegated Joint Commander (Jt Cmd) in exceptional cases, will exercise operational command and may utilise the Component Commander (CC) system\(^{11}\) to enable the best Joint solution from available resources.

417. **Command Relationships.** Overall responsibility for the resolution of criminal and terrorist incidents lies with the Police, and the direction of operations at the scene will rest with the Police Gold Commander. Service personnel deployed under MACP arrangements will take direction from the senior police officer dealing with the operation, irrespective of rank, to enable the delivery of authorised effect. However, command and tactical control of Service personnel will remain with a military commander.

**Presentation Issues and Aspects**

418. Given that MACP tasks are undertaken in support of police (and other civil power) operations and investigations, public presentation of these operations and investigations will be subject to legal and operational security restrictions. As a result, most MACP support receives no publicity. Exceptions are made only with the agreement of the Police or other Civil Power representatives. The use of pro-active media operations is rare and should not be undertaken without consulting D CT & UK Ops. Under no circumstances should any comment be made about UK Special Forces involvement.

419. Armed Forces personnel may be required to give written or oral evidence in court because of their involvement in police or civil power operations and therefore, commanders should be alert to the need for accurate Operational Record Keeping (ORK) to be undertaken. Under exceptional circumstances, when either the safety of an individual or the security of operational capability might be compromised, the MOD will request the Police or other civil power representatives to take suitable protective measures.

**Sensitivities**

420. Planning for MACP is likely to be highly sensitive and will be protectively marked. It may not take place without D CT & UK Ops approval.

421. **Reserves.** Reserves deployed in support of the Police would be mobilised under the Reserve Forces Act 1996 in support of a Defence Council Order based on either the 1964 Emergency Powers Act or the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. It should be noted that the mobilisation of Reserves is not an instaneous process and that Reserve unit and individual readiness timelines vary depending on the category of Reserve and availability, see Annex 2F.

\(^{11}\) The component structure is a subordinate command structure dividing military operations into environmental (land, air and maritime) or functional (for example logistics) components for more effective coordination.
**Briefing Notes and Guidance**

422. Briefing notes to sub-unit commanders and for Service personnel deployed under MACP are at Annex 4A.

423. Guidance regarding Public Order duties and Guarding is at Annex 4B.
ANNEX 4A – BRIEFING NOTES FOR SERVICE PERSONNEL DEPLOYED IN MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL POWER

General

4A1. These notes are intended for use when briefing Service personnel involved in Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) operations. The overall principles are valid in all MACP circumstances except those operations where specific units are provided with additional legal powers under specific legislation or emergency regulations.

4A2. Whilst it is not practicable to give precise directions, as which are applicable to all circumstances, compliance with the general principles in this guidance should minimise the risk of a military commander acting outside the law. The military commander at the scene is responsible for the conduct of his personnel and any decisions that he makes. Whether such actions are appropriate will be judged on the basis of the law, the circumstances and the available resources.

Legal Authority

4A3. Commanders need to be aware of certain principles:

a. Authority for Intervention:

(1) Common Law imposes a duty on every citizen, including Service personnel, to go to the aid of the Police when requested to assist in the enforcement of law and order where they have the resources and ability to do so. If assisting the Police in such circumstances, Service personnel do so as a citizen, not as a member of the Armed Forces.

(2) All MACP deployments require MOD authorisation. However, if life or property is threatened, local commanders may decide to provide unarmed assistance under the Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC) Cat A delegated authority (see paragraph 409).

b. Use of Force. The principles that apply once Service personnel have become involved are:

(1) Both the military commander and Service personnel under command are individually responsible for acting in accordance with the law.

(2) Force is never lawful unless the immediate object is the prevention of crime (including public order offences), the arrest of offenders, self-defence or the defence of others.
(3) No more force may be used than is both necessary and reasonable in the circumstances and every reasonable precaution should be taken to avoid unnecessary injury to persons and damage to property.

(4) The degree of force can never be reasonable if it is more than that required to achieve the immediate aim.

(5) Force must never be used to punish or to act as a deterrent for the future.

(6) Service personnel should be suitably equipped to deal with the situation. If the potential use of firearms is considered necessary, usually as a last resort in civil disturbances, a force so armed should be kept in reserve and out of sight of those involved in the disturbance.

4A4. Military commanders should consult the Police about the support they are able to provide. Military commanders cannot give orders to the Police but may provide advice where appropriate.

4A5. Representatives of the Civil Power, including police officers, cannot order military commanders or personnel to take a particular course of action. They may, however, advise them when any action taken has achieved its aim and this advice is generally to be accepted and the action terminated.

Further Guidance

4A6. General points of note are:

a. Control. Service personnel should not normally be deployed singly or in small parties when they may become isolated. Military commanders should normally deploy Service personnel in formed bodies. Service personnel should, whenever possible, also be accompanied by police officers.

b. Communications. Communications should be maintained between sub-units and their military headquarters and between that HQ and the civil authorities through either direct contact or the employment of military liaison officers.

c. Rules of Engagement. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the use of Service personnel will be approved by Ministers. ROE will be guided by cards or specific ROE profiles drawn from JSP 398.

d. Guards and Sentries. Service personnel, deployed to prevent the occupation of premises by unarmed demonstrators, should be unarmed. (See Annex 4B for further details and guidance).
Relations with the Media or General Public

4A7. If Service personnel are approached by a member of the press or by any other member of the public, they should explain, politely, that they are not permitted to discuss the work that they are doing. They should refer any questions to their Commanding Officer (CO), whose location or headquarters they may divulge. The CO will normally be authorised to make statements of fact about any incident, but should always seek guidance from his superiors before making any statement. Except in a situation where arrest under the Official Secrets Acts would be permissible, it is not possible to prevent photographers or television cameramen from recording, but Service personnel should not be drawn into conversation.

4A8. Service personnel should not give their name to any unauthorised person, only to a uniformed policeman or military officer.
ANNEX 4B – CORDONS, PUBLIC ORDER DUTIES AND GUARDING

General

4B1. There is a common misconception that the Armed Forces undertake cordonning, public order and guarding duties as a matter of course. As with all other requests for support, it is important to establish what effect is being sought and to ensure that any support provided is appropriate to achieving the desired effect.

Public Order Duties

4B2. Armed Forces personnel require special training (lasting a minimum of 2 weeks) for public order duties. In those circumstances, armed forces personnel are armed with personal weapons and are issued with protective equipment and vehicles. Specialist personnel are armed with gas and baton rounds.

4B3. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) would not deploy untrained or improperly equipped personnel on public order duties. Any such deployment would have to be clearly proportionate to the threat. The need to preserve both the actual and the perceived political neutrality of the Armed Forces would be a primary concern.

4B4. It should, moreover, be assumed that any decline in the UK security environment would lead to changes in policing methods (for example, enhanced police training in public order duties) prior to the use of the armed forces being considered.

Guarding

4B5. Similar difficulties arise when deploying military personnel to undertake armed guarding duties at sensitive civil sites. Guarding can be undertaken with the Police, but only after the personnel involved have received familiarisation training. The balance of risks involved in placing unarmed or armed military personnel in contact with the public (who may be distressed, but not necessarily hostile) should be considered before agreeing to any such request.

Cordons

4B6. An additional activity that Service personnel might be requested to support is the provision of cordons. Although an innocuous sounding word, this activity can involve an expectation on the part of the Police and others that armed forces personnel will undertake guarding and public order duties. It is, therefore, essential that any discussion of cordonning establish what particular tasks are to be performed, what risks may arise, and what training is necessary to perform these tasks.
4B7. It may be that a police request to assist in a cordon is for unarmed personnel whose role is to assist and steward the public. It is, however, important to establish what help and assistance is being offered, ensure that the personnel are unarmed, and assess the risks involved in the particular task.

**Request Procedure**

4B8. MACP request information requirement includes:

a. A brief summary of the request including the nature of the incident/event, where and when it is taking place and the Police name for the operation.

   (1) **Criminal Investigations.** The request should include a brief outline of the investigation and justify military aid. This need not go into detail about the Police case, but should provide enough background information to put the request into context.

   (2) **Major Events.** For large events, or events where more than one military capability is likely to be required, police forces should seek the appointment of a military liaison officer early during the planning process. The appointment of a liaison officer does not preclude the need for a police force to submit a detailed request once an appropriate package of support has been identified.

b. A clear statement is required detailing police objectives. Police forces should not, as a matter of course identify a particular military unit that can achieve their objective, although in some cases it may be self-evident. The MOD will always determine the best means of delivering the desired effect.

c. Confirmation from the Police that the desired effect is cannot be achieved either from within their own resources, or from other sources such as commercial providers, mutual aid another Government Department or Agency. This should include consideration of whether the capability can be obtained from another Government Department or Agency.

d. A detailed and current threat assessment to justify the deployment of military resources. This should be event-specific, and not based on the general threat state. For annual or recurring events, the threat assessment should not merely be a restatement of previous assessments.

e. Proposed timings:
(1) **Routine Operations.** Requests in support of planned operations should be submitted at least 14 days, preferably 28 days, in advance of the requirement.

(2) **Special Operations.** For incidents involving acts of terrorism or where there is an imminent danger to life, the staffing process can be completed in a much-reduced timeframe.
CHAPTER 5 – MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

501. Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC) is the provision of unarmed military assistance that is categorised as:

a. Category A. Emergency assistance to the civil authorities in times of emergency such as natural disasters or major emergencies.

b. Category B. Routine assistance for special projects or events of significant value to the civil community.

c. Category C. Attachment of volunteers to appropriate organisations.

502. The responsibility, both operational and financial, for dealing with civil emergencies and with projects to benefit the civil community, lies with the civil authorities.

Principles

503. The Armed Forces do not maintain standing forces for MACC tasks. Assistance is provided on an availability basis and the Armed Forces cannot make a commitment that guarantees assistance to meet specific emergencies. Neither the production of contingency plans nor the participation in civil exercises guarantees the provision of MACC support.1 Whilst the Civil Contingencies Reaction Forces (CCRFs) are designed to provide support during civil emergencies, their associated mobilisation timeline2 precludes the provision of ‘urgent’ CCRF support.

SECTION II – MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY

CATEGORY A (EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE)

Context

504. When there is a civil emergency because of a natural disaster or malicious threat, responsibility for the immediate response lies with the emergency services (that is, Category 1 Responders3 under the terms of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004). The civil authorities may request military assistance if they assess civil resources to be locally inadequate and/or such resources are not available within a timeline that would assist in the saving of life or the alleviation of distress. The responsibility for recovery

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1 A limited number of standing commitments exist under MACP procedures.
2 24 Hours.
3 See Chapter 8, Table 8.1.
always lies with the local authorities, following the principles of ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’.4

505. Exceptionally, support can be provided by individual units without reference to higher authority, under the Defence Council Order dated 17 January 1983 (derived in turn from Section 2 of the Emergency Powers Act 1964 (EPA 64)). The Defence Council Order approves the employment of Service personnel on tasks:

‘as being urgent work of national importance, such work as is considered by a local commander,5 at the time when the work needs to be performed, to be urgently necessary for the purposes of the alleviation of distress and preservation and safeguarding of lives and property in time of disaster and do hereby authorise the temporary employment in such work of officers and men of Her Majesty’s Naval, Military or Air Forces, and specific tasks to be performed by officers and men of these forces assigned to that employment being such as may be specified by or under orders of the officers commanding the forces.’

506. This authorisation is heavily caveated, notably it applies a limitation to the provision of an urgent response only within a timeframe where the work needs to be performed by a local commander. In making the decision whether such work falls under these provisions and is, therefore, not Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) or Military Aid to other Government Departments (MAGD), it is useful to dissect the Order:

a. ‘Urgent’. This Order invokes EPA 64; the circumstances must be exceptional and MACC Cat A incidents are, therefore, extremely rare.

b. ‘National Importance’.

b. ‘National Importance’. Normally the Defence Council will decide whether an incident is nationally important.6 Within the context of MACC Cat A, the Defence Council delegates this decision to the local commander who in making the decision, determines whether the involvement of the Armed Forces, and therefore Central Government, is appropriate. This emphasises that such incidents will be rare, and probably self-evident.

c. ‘Such Work’. The work must be something that the Armed Forces can undertake within capability and safely at the time, without special equipment or training.

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5 For the purposes of this chapter the term ‘local commander’ should usually be interpreted as a Unit CO [for formed units], Naval Base Commander, Regional Brigade Commander or RAF Station Commander.

d. ‘Local Commander’. In principle, this could be anyone with military command. However, it is far more likely to be a local unit or establishment commanding officer. Local requires that the incident be within the vicinity of the commander. The ‘local commander’ is responsible for the decision to provide support and the safety and welfare of personnel under command. It, therefore, falls to the local commander to inform Ministers through the command chain of the decision to provide MACC Cat A support.

e. ‘At the time when the work needs to be performed’. The situation demands immediate action with no chance for preparation or deliberation. It is analogous to ‘self-defence’ when the need to act is manifest and there can be no delay. The Defence Council’s order does not authorise any commander to plan for such an incident or to mobilise units outside their command. Any operation that requires either of these would fall into either the MAGD or MACP categories.

f. ‘Urgently necessary…alleviation of distress…safeguarding lives and property’. The decision to involve the Armed Forces must be linked to a threat to human life. This can be either direct threat or indirect threat related to loss or damage to property. The imminence of a threat to human life is key. It may be sufficient to ensure the attendance of the emergency services and then withdraw; alternatively, the scale and proximity of the threat to human life may require immediate assistance.

Search and Rescue

507. The MOD has responsibility for providing Search and Rescue (SAR) facilities for military operations, exercises and training within the United Kingdom (UK) and, by agreement, exercises responsibility for civil aeronautical SAR on behalf of the Department for Transport (DfT). Where the coverage provided by military SAR assets meets the civil SAR coverage requirements, they will be made available for civil maritime and land-based SAR operations. The MOD also establishes and maintains an Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre (ARCC) for the operation and coordination of civil and military aeronautical SAR through which, all requests for military SAR assistance should be passed.

508. Major Search and Rescue Incidents. A major SAR incident has the potential to develop into a wider MACC operation. In such cases the ARCC would liaise with the Joint Regional Liaison Officer (JRLO) and the Royal Air Force (RAF) Regional Liaison Officer (RAFRLLO) in whose area assistance is being given. Wherever possible, SAR support would be provided to the incident commander (the Police Gold,

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7 Details in Chapter 2.
Silver or Bronze) by the RAFRLO and a Search and Rescue Force Liaison Officer (SARFLO).

Request Procedures

509. Requests for MACC Cat A assistance should be passed directly to the local military unit and/or the JRLO. The request should provide details of the assistance required, expressed in terms of capability or effect, but not specific military units or equipment. The most appropriate service response will be determined by the local military unit or the MOD.

Summary

510. Abuse of the MACC Cat A mechanism is unacceptable and only serves to undermine its credibility and utility as an effective response. If the initial responder or civil agency has time in an emergency to consider options, or seek authorisation, then the need for a MACC Cat A response is probably inappropriate. The Defence Council Order covers those rare situations when the need to act immediately is readily apparent and the threat to human life is manifest. It is likely that an incident warranting a true MACC Cat A response would exist only for a few hours, before transforming into MACP or MAGD or the need for action subsides.

SECTION III – MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY
CATEGORY B (ROUTINE ASSISTANCE)

511. The Services may in some circumstances be able to provide routine assistance to civil authorities. However, Defence requirements will always take priority. Assistance will only usually be given to public authorities or non-profit making organisations.

Principles

512. Availability. MACC Cat B should be available to all communities across the UK. Care should therefore be taken to ensure that it is not limited to those communities that are familiar with the procedures required for MACC Cat B, or those that have particular links and/or geographic proximity to the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces serve the UK population as a whole.

513. The criteria against which all assistance requests will be assessed are:

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8 In the Police incident command structure, Bronze is the Operational level of command (functionally equates to the military tactical level), Silver the tactical level of command (functionally equates to the military operational level) and Gold the strategic command level. See Chapter 9 for a full description of command levels.
a. **Social Value.** The task must be of social value to the community. This is clearly a matter of judgement, but in principle the broader the benefit to the community, the more likely the proposal will meet with approval. A sponsor’s charitable status is not of itself sufficient reason to allow military aid; there must be other justification within the terms of this sub-paragraph.

b. **Military Training Value.** The task must represent good training value, the equivalent of which is not available, within the same costs, during routine Defence activities. Alternatively, it must provide significant public service value for Defence. Service personnel will not be used as a source of cheap labour and will be required to work as organised bodies under military command.

c. **Sponsor.** The task must be conducted on behalf of a sponsor, who agrees to appropriate financial, liability insurance and health and safety provisions for the task.

d. **Caveats.** Assistance will not be provided when:

   (1) The task limits or hampers training required to maintain a unit’s operational efficiency or if it clashes with any other military task.

   (2) The task is to be performed on behalf of any political organisation.

   (3) It is clear that the task could lead to undesirable publicity for, or criticism of, the Armed Forces.

   (4) Commercial organisations would have a reasonable complaint of loss of business.

514. **Reference to MOD.** Where the task does not meet all of the requirements above, it cannot be undertaken as a MACC Cat B task; however, it may still be an appropriate task to be undertaken on a repayment basis, normally at full cost. Any cases of doubt, particularly concerning tasks involving a commercial organisation or venture or a private individual or body, should be referred through the command chain to the Directorate Counter Terrorism and UK Operations (D CT & UK Ops).

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9 See Chapter 2 Section VI and JSP 368 ‘MOD Finance Guide to Repayment’ for detail.
Request Procedures

515. Requests may be made to service units at any level, and should be passed through the single-Service organisation for authorisation. Factors affecting requests are:

a. **Timing.** Applications should be made as early as possible in order to allow time to assess the military’s ability to assist and enable planning and coordination.

b. **Initial Application.** A preliminary approach should be made to the military to identify whether it is worthwhile making a formal application. Thereafter, where possible, civil authorities should complete an initial application using the format at Annex 5A. This records details of the assistance required and confirms that the requirements set out in paragraph 513 have been met. If it is not possible to use this form, the maximum possible information about the task should be provided. At this stage a reconnaissance may be appropriate.

c. **Provision of Cost Estimate.** The aim of the reconnaissance should be to provide the sponsor with an estimate of the likely costs of the assistance. The estimate should be as accurate as possible, but at the same time it must be made clear that costs are liable to variation and that the charge will not be finally determined until completion of the task. It should also be made clear to the sponsor that a charge may be levied for the reconnaissance itself, regardless of the outcome.

d. **Assessment of Feasibility.** The reconnaissance report and/or initial application should be assessed by the authorising HQ, which should take into account all other relevant factors, including the availability of personnel and equipment for the task. It is essential to avoid the risk of failing to complete a task by taking on more work than can be accomplished within the resources and time available.

e. **Formal Application.** If, after consideration of the initial application (and where necessary a reconnaissance) the authorising HQ decides to provide the assistance, the sponsor will be required to complete a bespoke formal application for which, the generic format at Annex 5B should be used as guidance. Advice should be sought from CT & UK Ops.

f. **Sponsor’s Obligations.** The sponsor must accept that the provision of assistance may have to be interrupted, rescheduled or even cancelled for

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10 Authority is normally held at the appropriate area Naval Base Commander, Army Regional Brigade/Divisional HQ or HQ AIR, unless reference needs to be made to MOD due the nature of the request.
service reasons at any time. The sponsor must provide written confirmation that they have obtained the approval of appropriate organisations affected. These include:

(1) Trade Unions.
(2) Employers’ associations.
(3) The owner and/or occupier if private land is involved.
(4) The local planning authority.
(5) Conservation agencies.
(6) Any other organisations affected.

SECTION IV – MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY CATEGORY C (ATTACHMENT OF VOLUNTEERS)

516. Applications for individual volunteers to serve with appropriate organisations on schemes, which are of social benefit to the civil community, should be forwarded to the appropriate authorising HQ, from where it will then follow the normal procedure for obtaining approval for temporary attachment. Acceptance will be subject to service requirements and the suitability of the volunteer in the view of both the MOD and the organisation concerned.

517. The length of each attachment will be judged on its merits, but the attachment should not exceed a period of one year.

SECTION V – MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Indemnity and Insurance Requirement

518. The MOD may wish to be indemnified against potential claims arising from the assistance requested for which a bespoke indemnity form will be required. A generic form to be used as guidance is at Annex 5C. Any indemnity must be supported by proof of an adequate insurance policy. However, there is no requirement for insurance or indemnity where:

a. As a result of an emergency situation, time precludes prior written indemnity. In this case a manager with financial authority from the organisation seeking assistance will be required to give an immediate oral undertaking to sign an acceptance of liability as soon as possible. Guidance should be sought through CT & UK Ops for indemnity guidance.
b. Assistance is provided to a Government Department.

**Use of Volunteer Reserves for Military Aid to the Civil Community**

519. Members of the Reserve should be asked to carry out MACC Cat A tasks only if they are undertaking training at the time of, or immediately prior to, the task and if they volunteer to do so. \(^{11}\) Authorisation by commands may be given subject to:

a. **Category A.** Naval Base Commanders (NBCs), Army Brigade (Bde) Commanders (Cdrs) and RAF Station (Stn) Cdrs may authorise the employment of volunteer reserves who are willing to volunteer, that is not a formal call-out.

b. **Category B.** Where a task offers opportunities for special-to-arm training not otherwise available, NBCs, Army Bde Cdrs and RAF Stn Cdrs may exceptionally authorise employment of Reservists on Independent units or members of the Royal Navy Reserve (RNR), Royal Marines Reserve (RMR), Territorial Army (TA) and Royal Auxiliary Airforce (RAuxAF). The task should normally be allocated as part of the formal training schedule using man training day allotments, and be consistent with the mandatory training obligations laid down by the regulations governing Reserve Forces. For tasks which do not meet these conditions, NBCs, Army Bde and RAF Commands may exceptionally authorise the use of Reservists on Independent units and members of the RNR, RMR, TA and RAuxAF, who volunteer to participate; careful consideration will need to be given to whether training day payments should be recovered from the sponsor so that training allotments can be made up. Top Level Budget (TLB) finance staffs must be consulted on the level and recovery of costs.

c. **Category C.** It would be inappropriate for Reservists to conduct MACC Cat C requests whilst engaged on Defence duties but individuals are at liberty to engage with volunteer organisations in their own time.

**Use of Ships and Aircraft (Other than in Life-Saving Operations)**

520. Where the use of HM Ships or other craft or aircraft (including helicopters) is proposed, D CT & UK Ops must be consulted.

**Safety and the Environment**

521. The MOD will comply with the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, the Environmental Protection Act 1990 and the Environment Act 1995. At the earliest opportunity following a request for MACC, safety and environmental advice should be

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\(^{11}\) Reserves employed on weekend training and on duty, can be lawfully ordered to provide support as they are subject to service law whilst on duty, provided that the supporting period does not extend beyond their expected training period.
sought from the relevant service Chief Environment and Safety Officer (CESO). The General Agreement between MOD and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) should mean that HSE inspectors will not inspect actual operations. They will, however, monitor standards of health and safety on MACC operations by giving advice, either centrally through joint MOD/HSE consultative arrangements or to the commander carrying out the MACC task, and by investigating serious accidents and incidents. It is likely that a similar approach will be adopted by the Environment Agency (EA).

**Presentation**

522. The possibility that a task may attract positive media coverage is not in itself a reason for undertaking MACC activity. Local publicity arrangements are the responsibility of the relevant civil authority, with MOD providing support if required on only those issues that directly affect the MOD. Enquiries should be handled by the Media Operations staff at the authorising HQ. Where an example of MACC assistance might attract wider media interest, MOD Director News (D News) should be informed and a brief report submitted to D CT & UK Ops. Where tasks concerning conservation are involved, the MOD Conservation Officer in the Defence Estates should also be informed. The importance of coordinating media arrangements with the emergency services cannot be overemphasised.

**Application for MACC Guidance**

523. Annex 5D provides guidance on the completion of the application and indemnity forms at Annexes 5A, B & C.
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## ANNEX 5A – INITIAL APPLICATION FOR MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY

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**Brief Statement of the Task:**

**Task to be completed by (date):**

Have local employers’ associations and Trade Unions agreed to the military undertaking this task?

Has the task been previously put out to tender?
Provide a short assessment of the social benefits to be derived from the task being undertaken.

Are there any other Governmental departments, organisations or individuals who may have an interest in the project? If so, provide details.

Have all other (non-military) options been considered and found to be unavailable?

Provide a short statement of implication if military assistance is not available.
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ANNEX 5B – FORMAL APPLICATION FOR MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY

To: The Secretary of State for Defence (through …………………..[insert HQ as appropriate]).

1. I/We ………………….. of ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… (Hereinafter called ‘the Sponsor’) do hereby apply to you (hereinafter called ‘the Secretary of State’ for assistance (hereinafter called ‘the Service’) in or towards carrying out the works/service described in the schedule hereto.

2. **Indemnity.** In the event of the Secretary of State accepting and agreeing to act on this application the Sponsor undertakes to furnish a completed Indemnity Form as appropriate prior to the completion of the Service other than where a standing indemnity has already been furnished to the Secretary of State and the period covered in the form has not expired.

3. **Insurance.** In the event of the Secretary of State accepting and agreeing to act on this Application, the Sponsor undertakes:
   
   a. To effect with an insurer or insurers a policy or policies of insurance to cover the requirements of the indemnities as follows:
      
      (1) **Ground Risk Insurance.** Minimum of £2,000,000 (two million pounds) any one claim/incident.
      
      (2) **Aviation Risk Insurance.** Minimum of £7,500,000 (seven and a half million pounds).

   b. To duly pay the premium or premiums payable in respect of the said policy or policies and to produce the policy or policies and receipt or receipts whenever so required by or on behalf of the Secretary of State.

4. **Payment.** In the event of the Secretary of State accepting and agreeing to act on this Application, the Sponsor undertakes to:

   a. Pay on demand the charge for the Service determined by the Secretary of State on termination of the Service notwithstanding any prior estimate of charge which may have been given.

   b. Deposit with the Secretary of State the sum of £ ……. and to make such further payments towards the charge as may be required before termination of the Service.
5. **General.**

a. The Sponsor acknowledges the right of the Secretary of State to discontinue the Service without notice.

b. The Sponsor certifies that it has obtained a statement in writing from every trade union, association of employers and other organisation whose members are likely to be affected by the provision of the Service that such trade union, association of employers or organisation does not object to such provision by the Secretary of State.
THE SCHEDULE OF WORKS

Description of the service:

Signature …………………………………………………………………………………………….. being duly authorised to sign on behalf of the Sponsor

Name …………………………………………………………………………………………………

Address……………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

Position …………………………………………………………………………………………… (where applicable)

Dated ………………………………………………………………………………………………

Witnesses* ………………………………………………………………………………………

(Second witness – Scotland only) ……………………………………………………………

Address…………………………………………………………………………………………

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Dated ………………………………………………………………………………………………

* Two witnesses required in Scotland
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ANNEX 5C – FORM OF INDEMNITY FOR MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY TASKS

IN CONSIDERATION of the Secretary of State for Defence (hereinafter called ‘the Secretary of State’) agreeing to provide:* ………………………………………………

(hereinafter called ‘the Organisation’) with ……………………………………………

1. The Organisation HEREBY UNDERTAKES AND AGREES:

   a. That if any servant or agent of the Crown, shall suffer sickness or personal injury (including injury resulting in death) by reason of or arising out of any negligent act or omission connected with the performance of this agreement, the Organisation will fully and effectively indemnify the Crown in respect of:

      (1) All sums payable to that servant or agent or any dependant, relative or representative of his or hers by pay of pension, gratuity or other compensation (other than retired pay, pension or gratuity to which the servant or agent may be entitled by reason of length of time for which he or she has served as a servant or agent of the Crown) or by way of pay and allowances payable to him or her during any period of absence from duty as a result of sickness or injury.

      (2) The costs and expenses of any hospital or medical treatment afforded to him or her on account of such sickness or injury, including any medical care or repatriation costs.

      (3) Any funeral expenses incurred as a result of the death of the servant or agent.

   PROVIDED that if the Secretary of State elects the indemnity under (1) above shall be deemed to be satisfied by the payment of the Organisation to the Secretary of State of a capital sum determined by the Government Actuary and the Insurers.

   b. That if any property of the Crown or of any servant of the Crown or any other property which, at the discretion of the Crown, falls to be replaced at public expense is lost or damaged, and such loss or damage occurs as a result of any negligent act or omission of the Organisation arising out of or in any way connected with the performance of the agreement, the Organisation will repay the Crown, as it may require, either the cost of replacement or repair, whichever is the less.

   c. That the Organisation will fully and effectively indemnify the Crown and any servant or agent of the Crown against all liabilities, claims, actions,
proceedings, demands, costs, charges or expenses which may be incurred by or made against the Crown or any servant or agent of the Crown in respect of sickness or personal injury (including injury resulting in death) or loss of or damage to any property as a result of a negligent act or omissions arising out of or any way connected with the performance of this agreement.

d. That the Organisation will indemnify the Crown against all payments made by the crown of sums paid to its servants or agents for the purpose of indemnifying them against any such liabilities, claims, actions, proceedings, demands, costs, charges and expenses as referred to in sub-paragraph c above.

e. The Organisation will not make against the Crown or any servant or agent of the Crown any claim in respect of loss or damage to property from whatever cause, except negligence on the part of the Crown, sustained by the Organisation (or by any person employed by the Organisation or for whom the Organisation is responsible) by reason of or arising out of or in any way connected with the performance of this agreement.

f. To effect with an Insurance Company or Companies a policy or policies of insurance covering all the matters which are the subject of the indemnities and undertakings herein and contained in the sum of £2,000,000 min (£7,500,000 in the case of Aviation Risks) at least in respect of any one incident and unlimited in total and to ensure that the said policy or policies are endorsed as follows:

   ‘It is hereby declared and agreed that notwithstanding anything contained in this policy or in any memorandum, condition or schedule attached to or forming part of this policy, this policy covers all the sums within the total sum assured which the insured shall become liable to pay under an undertaking to the Crown a copy of which undertaking is set out at the foot hereof,’

PROVIDED ALWAYS that nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as limiting or affecting in any way the Organisation’s liability under any of the said indemnities or undertakings

g. To assign the Crown all sums hereafter to become due under the said policy or policies and to ensure that the interest of the Crown therein is duly noted by the insurer or insurers.

h. To duly pay the premium or premiums payable in respect of the said policy or policies and to produce the policy or policies and receipt or receipts
for the premiums for inspection whenever so required by or on behalf of the Secretary of State.

2. This indemnity will not apply to any of the liabilities referred to in 1a to 1f inclusive or to any other liabilities incurred by criminal acts.

Signed ............................ for and on behalf of ........................................

Position ............................. Dated ..............................................................

Witnessed ............................ Second witness ψ ........................................

(ψ Scotland Only)

Address ...............................

........................................

........................................

*Insert name and authority/organisation
ANNEX 5D – APPLICATION FOR MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY - NOTES

5D1. An application for Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC) assistance should be completed wherever possible before assistance is given.\(^1\) If time does not allow for this to be done, a written acceptance of the sponsor’s liability for any charges raised by Ministry of Defence (MOD) should be obtained wherever practicable before the assistance is given, and in any event as soon as possible afterwards. Local commanders should ensure that those requesting assistance are aware of the costs,\(^2\) which they will be expected to pay for the services provided; bearing in mind that MOD has discretion to waive costs only in the case of urgent attempts to save life.

5D2. For all Category B assistance, an application has to be completed by the sponsor and returned to the authorising Head Quarters (HQ) before any assistance is given. In cases where an exchequer department is the sponsor, a written acceptance of liability for charges incurred, including any third-party claims, may be obtained instead.

5D3. Where the application is required, the sponsor should be made aware that agreement to undertake the task is subject to satisfactory completion of the form and confirmation of valid insurance cover. The authorising HQ should indicate clearly which of the items on the application may be deleted, and satisfy itself that whoever signs the form on behalf of the sponsor is authorised to accept the financial liability involved.

5D4. It is important that the authorising HQ should complete the schedule so as to make clear the extent of the assistance to be provided and the division of responsibility between the Services, the sponsor (including his servants or agents) and any other parties. Questions of legal liability following claims against insurance may sometimes hinge on whether a certain party was or was not responsible for a particular facet of the task.

5D5. If the circumstances make it necessary to impose an obligation not provided for in the application (e.g. when the nature of the task requires insurance that is more comprehensive in order to avoid Defence risk), a suitable alteration may be made to the application form on the advice of MOD.

5D6. The completed application should be regarded as part of the contract, which must be concluded in each case by written acceptance of the application. Any subsequent changes in the schedule must be agreed by the sponsor in writing and relevant correspondence should be attached. If the sponsor cancels the task after the

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\(^1\) See Annex 5A.
\(^2\) See Chapter 2, Section VI.
application has been accepted, all nugatory (including reconnaissance) costs are to be recovered from the sponsor.
CHAPTER 6 – PLANNING PROCESS

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

Planning Resources

601. Operational level planning for United Kingdom Operations (UK Ops) under the command of the Standing Joint Commander UK (SJC (UK)) is normally conducted by the SJC (UK) planning staff. When necessary, this staff would be augmented by additional personnel from the Front Line Commands (FLCs), Chief of Defence Material (CDM) and the Army’s regional forces. Such augmentation would depend on the scale and complexity of the situation, its likely duration and the level of military involvement.

Procedure

602. The generic planning procedure usually comprises of 5 phases, although time pressures might result in the first 3 phases being conducted concurrently. The 5 phases are:

a. The Directorate of Counter Terrorism and United Kingdom Operations (DCT & UK Ops) scrutinise the received support request, submits a recommendation to ministers and if approved issues an executive directive or planning guidance to SJC (UK) or the relevant FLC.

b. The SJC (UK) produces a Joint Contingency Plan (JCP) that meets the requirements of the directive. The JCP could also form the basis of a warning order.

c. Production of an Operation Order (OPORD) to generate, deploy, sustain, and recover the Joint Force.

d. Execution of the plan including changes implemented through the issue of fragmentary orders (FRAGO).

e. Post operational activity including the collection of lessons.

603. In some cases, Category 1 Responders and Government Departments will have notified Defence of their intention to request military assistance in specific situations. In other circumstances, for example as the result of horizon scanning or a perceived gap in civil preparedness, it would be prudent for the Ministry of Defence to...

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1 CINCFLEET, CINCLAND and CINCAIR.
2 See Table 8.1.
3 These requirements will have been identified in local/regional or departmental contingency plans and notification given via the appropriate chain of command.
(MOD) to initiate contingency planning even though it has not received any specific request for assistance. In these cases, MOD would provide detailed direction and guidance to SJC(UK) planning staff. For emerging tasks, particularly during civil emergency or crisis, the MOD would issue direction as appropriate.

Standing Operational Instructions and Joint Contingency Plans

604. Once the MOD has issued detailed planning or guidance, SJC (UK) J5 will produce a JCP. The JCP would be produced in concert with the MOD and the FLCs (including Regional Forces (RFs)). When time permits, the JCP would be produced, but not developed further. In these circumstances, the JCP would be published on the LandWeb.4 The JCP could also serve as a detailed warning order.

Execution of the Plan

605. The completion or existence of a JCP does not guarantee military assistance; execution of the plan is dependent on ministerial approval. Ministerial approval to deploy the Armed Forces will result in the refinement of planning and the issue of an OPORD. As the plan is executed, any adjustments would be made by the issue of FRAGO. As with the development of the JCP, the OPORD and any subsequent FRAGO would be developed in concert with both MOD and the FLCs.

Post Operational Activity

606. On completion of an operation the lessons capture process will be activated and directed by SJC (UK). The output from this will be used to refine UK Ops processes and other JCP.

SECTION II – PLANNING PROCESS

607. Planning Guidance and Direction. MOD will provide planning guidance and direction. Such guidance will provide the military-strategic basis for SJC(UK)-led UK Ops, describing the nature of the situation, the desired military-strategic outcome, and assumptions and constraints on the scale of the military response. It is the clear statement on which any subsequent JCP or FRAGO, will be based and gives detailed direction to SJC(UK) to prepare a JCP.

608. Joint Contingency Plans. Development of a JCP will be initiated by SJC(UK) upon receipt of direction from MOD. The procedure for developing a JCP is:

   a. SJC(UK) receives planning direction and guidance from MOD.

4 http://www.land.army.r.mil.uk/landc/hqland/cts/opscts/opssite/GB/Joint_Contingency_Plans/JCPs.htm (access restricted to military users only).
b. SJC(UK) forms a Contingency Planning Team (CPT) under the leadership of SJC(UK) J5. Representatives would be drawn from the FLCs as required. This team conducts the UK Ops military estimate.  

c. Reconnaissance or liaison with non-military organisations is conducted, as required, to provide information for the military estimate. 

d. The CPT provides a minimum of one Course of Action (COA) to SJC (UK) or the appointed Joint Commander (Jt Comd). 

e. SJC(UK), or the appointed Jt Comd, provides planning guidance for the production of a JCP. 

f. CPT produces a JCP, in concert with the FLCs, and the Army RF chain of command. 

g. The CPT submits the JCP to MOD (D CT & UK Ops) for approval pending the order to implement the plan. 

609. **Operation Order.** Once MOD issues the order to implement the JCP, the CPT will develop the JCP into an OPORD. In most cases, the CPT will produce the OPORD in parallel with producing the JCP. 

610. **Fragmentary Orders.** Once the operation has begun, SJC(UK) would make adjustments to the plan through the issue of FRAGOs, whenever possible. Alternatively, SJC(UK) may make use of video-teleconferencing, email or telephone to issue orders. 

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5 A structured process used by military staffs to analyse an allocated mission, gather information about the situation and factors that are currently affecting it (or which may do so in the future), and then to develop potential options (COAs) to deal with it.
CHAPTER 7 – TRAINING AND EXERCISE POLICY

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

The Government’s Exercise Programme

701. The Government’s Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) exercise programme\(^1\) is designed to test emergency plans and practice procedures across all the levels of response, ranging from Central Government\(^2\) through the Lead Government Departments (LGDs) to regional and local Responders.

702. Regulations under the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) require Category 1 responders to include provision for the conduct of exercises and for the training of staff in emergency plans. The same or similar requirements for exercises and training also apply to business continuity plans.

Central Government Coordination

703. The Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) is responsible for Central Government exercise policy and the coordination of the Government-wide exercise and training programme. The CCS chairs the cross-Government and inter-agency Exercise Working Party (EWP), which coordinates exercise planning and enables cross-departmental and inter-agency liaison. The Directorate of Counter Terrorism and United Kingdom Operations (D CT & UK Ops), represents the Ministry of Defence (MOD) at the EWP. IEM exercises that normally involve Defence include:

a. **National Contingency Planning Exercises.** Armed Forces’ participation will be coordinated by the Standing Joint Commander (UK) (SJC(UK)) in conjunction with the D CT & UK Ops. The Home Office (HO) sponsors 2 or 3 live exercises and 9 regional tabletop exercises each year.

b. **Counter Terrorism.** The HO Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) manage a series of exercises in which the Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) specialist Counter Terrorism (CT) capability is exercised.

c. **Lead Government Department.** The Home Secretary has devolved the requirement to conduct contingency planning and exercises to each LGD. The LGDs are responsible for funding, planning and the conduct IEM exercises for which they have the lead.\(^3\) LGDs regularly request Defence participation in

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1 The programme provides a range of disruptive challenge based, synthetic and live exercises.
2 This includes Defence.
3 See Annex 8A.
their respective exercise programmes. There are 2 non-CT Level 1 exercises conducted per annum.

d. Emergency Services. The emergency services manage a series of local exercises to validate major incident plans, the more comprehensive of which may merit military involvement.

SECTION II – MINISTRY OF DEFENCE UNITED KINGDOM OPERATIONS TRAINING

704. The United Kingdom Operations (UK Ops), Training Management Group (TMG) consists of representatives from D CT & UK Ops, SJC (UK), the Frontline Commands (FLCs), Chief of Defence Material (CDM) and a range of other Defence related departments and organisations that contribute to UK Ops. The TMG is responsible to the 1* UK Ops Steering Group for the coordination of Ministry of Defence (MOD) UK Ops exercises and in ensuring that the training undertaken covers all aspects of UK Ops.

705. SJC (UK) is responsible for the compilation of the Joint UK Ops exercise programme. D CT & UK Ops provides national exercise planning input from the EWP and, in conjunction with SJC (UK), determines the appropriate level of Armed Forces’ involvement in national exercises and training events.

SECTION III – PARTICIPATION IN INTEGRATED EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT TRAINING

Defence Support to Integrated Emergency Management Training and Exercises

706. Defence activity in support of Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) training and exercises, should reflect MOD policy guidance and the principles of Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA). Defence engagement in civil training and exercises should:

a. Be approached on a Joint Service basis. MOD personnel should only participate in IEM training only if there is a positive training benefit for the individual, unit, HQ or MOD as a whole.

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4 Normally at the SO1 level.
5 CINCFL, CINCLAND and CINCAIR.
6 These include, Nuclear Movements and Nuclear Accidents Response (NM&NAR), Defence Science and Technology Laboratories (DSTL).
7 This group is chaired by D CT & UK Ops (Mil) and consists of FLC UK Ops 1 Stars and representatives from Defence Equipment and Support, HQ Land and a number of UK Ops associated MOD Directorates.
b. Take into account the primacy of the civil authorities. In all cases, the civil authorities will have the lead in coordinating and executing IEM training; the MOD only participates in a supporting role.

c. Be realistic, military involvement should only include those tasks or the provision of capabilities that would occur in an actual incident and not encourage the belief that Armed Forces’ support will play a greater role in a given response than would actually be the case.

d. Not result in civil contingency plans relying on the involvement of the military, with the exception of guaranteed niche capability.

e. Reflect the fact that engagement of the Armed Forces draws in a Central Government Department, due to its Command and Control (C2) structure.

f. Make it clear that military assistance engages the MOD C2 structure in the wider Government crisis management organisation, while Armed Forces’ personnel, skills and capabilities are employed in conjunction with, but not part of, that wider structure, remaining under military command throughout.

g. Reflect the fact that Armed Forces’ support will usually be either specialist military, for example, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), CT or general duties military support. The support will always reflect military skills and capabilities, not civil expertise,8 matched to the capability requirement.

707. Regional Brigade planning staff, Joint Regional Liaison Officers (JRLOs), Royal Navy Regional Liaison Officers (RNRLOs) and Royal Air Force Regional Liaison Officers (RAFRLOs) may engage in regional/local IEM tabletop exercises without prior MOD authorisation.

**Command and Control**

708. The C2 arrangements for civil exercises, which do not involve the Central Government command structure, should be fully understood before to MOD participation is agreed. Opportunities to engage the Armed Forces in exercises that involve Central Government should be preferred over those that do not. Similarly, exercises that engage a wide range of civil agencies and structures, especially those that reflect the need to prioritise multiple calls on military support, should be preferred over those that assume a particular role for the Armed Forces.

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8 For example, most Armed Forces’ firefighters are neither qualified nor experienced to the same levels as civilian firefighters.
Exercise and Training Scenario Considerations

709. It may be the case that Defence participation in certain IEM training and exercise scenarios has particular resonance or implications, for example, industrial disputes, terrorist threat, or a distinct type of natural disaster at a time when the likelihood of such a dispute, threat or disaster is particularly high.

710. It is essentially a matter for the civil authorities to ensure that the request for the Armed Forces’ participation is appropriate in these circumstances and that Defence’s participation has been properly authorised by the civil command chain. It is also essential that media, and other communications strategies, are in place to ensure that both the event itself and Armed Forces’ participation are properly managed and do not cause undue alarm. This issue should also be addressed as part of any preparations for engagement in civil training and exercises and guidance is to be sought from DC& UK Ops. It is imperative that any MOD involvement in IEM Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) training is approved through the chain of command by DC& UK Ops.

Exercising on Military Property or Land

711. IEM training with the emergency services may take place on MOD property in order to practise military-civil C2 and liaison procedures that would be used in the event of major incidents and UK CT related operations.

Exercising on Public Highways and Land

712. Military support to IEM training outside MOD establishments, should only be provided in support of National, Government Offices for the Regions (GOR), local authorities or emergency services’ sponsored exercises. The military chain of command is to be kept informed of any civil authorities requesting military involvement. All requests must be made in good time using MACA procedures to DC& UK Ops.

Counter Terrorism Exercises

713. The Association of Chief Police Officer Terrorism and Allied Matters (ACPO (TAM)) has agreed that all police forces taking part in CT exercises will notify the OSCT with details of the proposed exercise. This will ensure that such exercises do not duplicate others, and meet basic requirements of organisations. The OSCT keeps records of each exercise and will issue a unique reference number to police forces, which informs all Other Government Departments (OGDs) that the exercise has been notified to OSCT for post-exercise lessons.
PART 2

Civil Organisations, Capabilities and Processes
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CHAPTER 8 – INTEGRATED EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

801. Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) contingency plans are coordinated with those of the civil authorities, including the command and control (C2) arrangements in order to enable planning coherence, ease implementation and engender civil/military mutual understanding. For the military commander and his staff, this requires an understanding of the part played by central, regional and local Government. This chapter deals with the civil policy of Integrated Emergency Management (IEM)\(^1\) and the coordination arrangements at central, regional and local Government level.

802. While there is no similar standardised, hierarchical system to that of the Armed Forces in central and local Government, defined arrangements do exist to coordinate the actions of disparate civil agencies, private companies and voluntary organisations. Consequently, it is a feature of the United Kingdom’s (UK) system of Government that Whitehall and the Devolved Administrations (DAs) are reluctant to interfere with matters of a local nature. The UK has elected local Government, rather than local administration, which underscores the importance of local autonomy. Local autonomy also brings with it the risk that Armed Forces personnel will become inadvertently engaged in local politics unless the importance of the Armed Forces as a national (UK-wide), institution under Central Government control is fully recognised.

Legal Framework

803. Historically, civil defence legislation dealt with civil protection measures, other than actual combat, for defence against a hostile attack from a foreign power. Emergency Powers legislation dealt with other civil emergencies such as industrial disputes affecting key national services or civil unrest. Following the fuel crisis and severe flooding in the autumn and winter of 2000 respectively, emergency planning arrangements were reviewed and the Government concluded that a major revision to the legal and organisational framework supporting emergency planning was required.

804. The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA) is enabling legislation that sets out local arrangements for civil protection. It imposes on certain local bodies (Category 1 Responders)\(^2\) a legal obligation to prepare plans for addressing risk and dealing with a wide range of civil emergencies. The Act also provides a mechanism to impose duties

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\(^1\) An approach to preventing and managing emergencies which entails 6 key activities: anticipation, assessment, prevention, preparation, response and recovery. IEM is geared to the idea of building greater overall resilience in the face of a broad range of disruptive challenges. It requires a coherent multi-agency effort.

\(^2\) See Table 8.1.
on other local bodies (Category 2 Responders) to cooperate with, and to provide information to, Category 1 Responders in connection with their civil protection duties. Examples in England and Wales are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category 1</th>
<th>Category 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>County Councils</td>
<td>Electricity suppliers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Councils</td>
<td>Gas suppliers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London Borough Councils</td>
<td>Water/sewerage suppliers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Borough Council (Wales)</td>
<td>Telecommunication operators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Officers of Police</td>
<td>Railway operators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire and Rescue Authorities</td>
<td>Airport operators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHS Ambulance Trusts</td>
<td>Harbour Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHS Trusts (A&amp;E providers)</td>
<td>Highway Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Care Trusts</td>
<td>Health and Safety Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment Agency</td>
<td>Strategic Health Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Protection Agency (GB only)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.1- Category 1 and Category 2 Responders

806. Part 1 of the CCA also established a consistent level of civil protection activity across Great Britain. It provides a basic framework defining what tasks should be performed and how cooperation should be conducted, and aims to strengthen and consolidate the arrangements that existed before enactment. The Act is supported by 2 key guidance documents:

a. ‘Emergency Preparedness’. This document provides guidance for CCA Part I and supporting regulations. It defines how, by statute, civil protection should be carried out in England and Wales. The guidance also sets out how civil protection duties should be carried out by certain bodies which, exercise reserved functions on a UK-wide basis in Scotland. Guidance for bodies regulated by Scottish Ministers is set out in ‘Preparing Scotland’. In Northern Ireland, the guidance similarly applies to specific bodies, but neither the Act nor the supporting guidance applies to other bodies in the

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3 CCA Schedule 1 Part 1; Scotland is similar but specified in CCA Schedule 1 Part 2.
4 CCA Schedule 1 Part 3; Scotland Schedule 1 Part 4.
6 Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Amendment of List of Responders) Order 2005
8 Required by law.
9 Maritime and Coastguard Agency. Health and Safety Executive and British Transport Police.
10 Responders that remain subject to Part 1 of the CCA and the regulations and guidance issued by UK Ministers.
11 Police Service of Northern Ireland, Maritime and Coastguard Agency and telecommunications providers.
Province. Nevertheless, similar arrangements to those applicable in the remainder of the UK are established on a non-statutory\(^\text{12}\) basis.

b. **Emergency Response and Recovery**. Emergency Response and Recovery is non-statutory guidance for England and Wales, which describes the arrangements in place at a local level for responding to, and recovering from, emergencies. It also gives local responders context by describing arrangements at the regional, DAs and Central Government levels.

**Terminology**

807. Various terms are commonly used and refer to different types of major emergencies. ‘Disaster,\(^\text{13}\) crisis\(^\text{14}\) and major incident’ are among the most commonly used by professionals and volunteers involved in civil contingency planning. Each label brings particular associations. The term ‘major incident’ is commonly used by emergency services personnel operationally to describe an emergency as defined in the CCA.

808. **Civil Contingencies Act Definition of Emergency**. The CCA defines the term ‘emergency’ as ‘an event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the UK, the environment of a place in the UK, or war or terrorism which threatens serious damage to the security of the UK’\(^\text{15}\). This definition of ‘emergency’ is concerned with consequences rather than with cause or source; an emergency within or outside the UK is covered by the definition provided it has consequences within the UK\(^\text{16}\). Determination of whether an emergency has occurred, or is about to, occur, is addressed as:

a. The CCA guidance provides:

1. A specification of the kinds of event or incident, which may cause ‘damage’ to human welfare,\(^\text{17}\) the environment\(^\text{18}\) or security.

2. Two tests for determining whether an event or situation threatening such damage constitutes an emergency (one of which must be met for the main duties of the Act to apply).

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\(^{12}\) Not required by law.  
\(^{13}\) A sudden accident or a natural catastrophe that causes great damage or loss of life.  
\(^{14}\) A time of intense difficulty or danger.  
\(^{15}\) CCA s.1 and Emergency Preparedness paragraph 1.14.  
\(^{16}\) ‘Within the UK’ is taken to mean within the territorial seas of the UK.  
\(^{17}\) CCA s.1(2), loss of human life; human illness or injury; homelessness; damage to property; disruption of a supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel; disruption of a system of communication; disruption of facilities for transport, or disruption of services relating to health.  
\(^{18}\) CCA s.1(3), contamination of land, water or air with biological, chemical or radio-active matter, or disruption or destruction of plant life or animal life.
b. The Regulations require Category 1 Responders to adopt a standard procedure for making the decision to activate a business continuity or emergency plan.20

809. **Emergency Response Tests.**21 A Category 1 responder must perform its duties under the Act in relation to 2 situations:

a. Where the emergency could seriously obstruct its ability to perform its functions.

b. Where the Category 1 responder considers it necessary or desirable to act to prevent, reduce, control or mitigate the emergency’s effects, or otherwise take action, and would be unable to act without changing the deployment of its resources or acquiring additional resources.

**Emergency Powers**22

810. Part 2 of the CCA updated the Emergency Powers Act 1920 and repealed existing civil defence legislation (the Civil Defence Acts 1939 and 1948 and Civil Defence Acts (Northern Ireland) 1939 and 1950). Section 2 of the Emergency Powers Act 1964, which directly affects MACA, remains extant. Under Part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act, emergency regulations can be made by Her Majesty through order in council (or a Secretary of State if the consequences of any potential delay warrants it) to control, prevent or mitigate the effects of an emergency.

811. Emergency powers23 allow the Government to make special temporary legislation (emergency regulations) as a last resort in the most serious of emergencies where existing legislation is insufficient to respond in the most effective way. As they would be a last resort, emergency planning and response arrangements should not assume that they would be used. Emergency regulations may make provision of any kind that could be made by an Act of Parliament or by exercise of the Royal Prerogative, so long as such action is needed urgently and is both necessary and proportionate in the circumstances. The regulations may extend to the whole of the UK or to any one or more of the English regions and/or the DAs. In English regions, Regional Nominated Coordinators (RNCs) would be appointed to coordinate the handling of the emergency within each region. In devolved areas, they would be known as Emergency Coordinators.

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19 A management process that helps manage the risks to the smooth running of an organisation or delivery of a service, ensuring that it can operate to the extent required in the event of a disruption.
20 A procedure for determining when an emergency has occurred must be written into business continuity and emergency plans. The procedure should identify the person (usually by their post or job title) who will make the judgement, state how they will be advised and whom they must inform.
21 Chapter 1, Emergency Preparedness.
23 CCA Part II, Sections 20 and 21.
812. The CCA states that emergency powers can only be used if an emergency (as defined above) is occurring, has occurred or is about to occur. They can be used preemptively to attempt to prevent or limit an expected emergency, to address an emergency while it is taking place and/or to deal with its aftermath, and to facilitate the return to normality. If the situation or event is so serious that it warrants consideration of use of emergency powers, the deciding factor should be based on whether existing powers, which could be applied, are likely to be insufficient or ineffective. If they are sufficient, then emergency powers cannot be used, no matter how serious the emergency. The decision to use emergency powers is a matter for UK Central Government and would be handled by the relevant Lead Government Department (LGD), subject to collective agreement. Arrangements to ensure effective consultation and coordination with the DAs are detailed in separate concordats with the Welsh and Scottish administrations and in a bilateral agreement with the Northern Ireland administration.

813. Emergency regulations are made by Her Majesty by Order in Council on the advice of her Ministers. If, for whatever reason, this is not possible without serious delay, a senior minister may make the regulations by order. The regulations must then be laid before Parliament as soon as it is reasonably practicable. Parliament must approve them within 7 days of laying or they fall. They may stay in force for up to 30 days, beginning on the day the order comes into force, but can be renewed for a further 30 days if it is deemed necessary.

Civil Protection Duties

814. Civil protection duties specified in the CCA vary across the responders:

   a. Category 1 Responders have to undertake:

      (1) Risk assessment.

      (2) Business Continuity Management (BCM).


      (4) Maintenance of public awareness and arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public.

   b. Local Authorities alone have a duty to provide advice and assistance to the commercial sector and voluntary organisations.

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24 CCA, Part II, Section 22, subsection 2.
26 Chapter 5 Emergency Preparedness, contains detailed emergency planning guidance to Category 1 Responders.
c. All responders have a duty to cooperate and share information.

815. Risk assessment, supported by a collective process, provides the foundation for delivering the substantive elements of the CCA. EP is supported by BCM, and is underpinned by risk assessment. Its purpose is to ensure that Category 1 Responders can perform their functions effectively in an emergency. It supports public awareness work and shapes arrangements for warning and informing the public. Category 1 and 2 Responders must cooperate and share information in fulfilling these duties. Provision of advice and assistance to the local business community and voluntary organisations by a local authority is likely to be linked to emergency plans and to draw on risk assessments. It will also be supported by cooperation and information sharing with partners.

**Integrated Emergency Management**

816. Contingency planning arrangements need to be integrated both within and between organisations in a coherent multi-agency effort to build greater overall resilience to disruptive challenges. They should be an integral part of departmental and organisational planning and should work both individually and in collaboration with each other on certain key activities. Essential integrated approach activities include:

a. **Anticipation.** Category 1 Responders should aim to be aware of emerging hazards and threats, which might affect their locality and be prepared to revise risk assessments accordingly. This activity is often known as horizon scanning and is led in the UK by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat.

b. **Assessment.** The CCA places a risk assessment duty on all Category 1 Responders and demands that they maintain an accurate and shared understanding of the risks that they face, so that plans can be made that are sound and proportionate to risks. The risk assessment enables a rational basis for the prioritisation of objectives, to assess the adequacy of their plans, facilitates comprehensive local planning and informs higher-level risk assessments.

c. **Prevention.** Prevention is the implementation of measures in advance of an emergency to prevent it occurrence and/or to reduce its severity. Certain types of activity carry known risks and are subject to legal requirements such as the Radiation Emergency Preparedness and Public Information Regulations (REPPIR), Control of Major Accident Hazard (COMAH) regulations and

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27 Chapter 4 Emergency Preparedness, provides detailed best practice advice to Responders on risk assessment.
29 ‘Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations’ (COMAH) 1999.
Nuclear safety codes of practice or guidance documents that specify prevention measures. These aspects are not covered within the CCA, as current regulations are considered to meet the requirements of the Act.

d. **Preparation.** Emergency Planning is at the heart of the civil protection duty placed on Category 1 Responders. The CCA requires Category 1 Responders to maintain plans for preventing emergencies or reducing, controlling or mitigating their effects and that risk assessments be considered when developing or reviewing plans. The Regulations also require plans to contain the procedures for determining whether an emergency has occurred, provisions for training key staff and for exercising the plan to ensure it is effective, and measures to ensure that the plan is both reviewed periodically and kept up to date. Particular emphasis is placed on proactive prevention through the dynamic risk assessment\textsuperscript{30} process.

e. **Response.**\textsuperscript{31} Response encompasses the actions taken to deal with the immediate effects of an emergency. Often, this will be relatively short in duration. The rapid implementation of arrangements for collaboration, coordination and communication are, therefore, vital. Response will aim to deal with both the direct (such as fighting fires or rescuing individuals) and indirect effects (such as disruption or media interest) of an emergency.

f. **Recovery Management.**\textsuperscript{32} Recovery management addresses the continuing physical, social, psychological, political and economic consequences of an emergency. Anticipation of those consequences, and appropriate recovery planning, must start at the beginning of any response. Lessons emphasise the need to involve the affected community fully in its own recovery, as well as the private sector, with the legally bound agencies taking on an enabling role.

**Multi-Level Plans**

817. A multi-level plan is a plan covering more than one level of Government, for example, national and regional. National plans have been or are being developed for such emergencies as a foot-and-mouth outbreak, an influenza pandemic, marine and coastal pollution and fuel shortages. There is also a national plan for Wales. Regional plans could relate to flooding, severe weather or a crisis affecting a major utility. Ownership of their part of these plans is the responsibility of each of the relevant Category 1 Responders, but coordination or leadership in the development and execution of these plans is likely to be taken by a national or regional organisation,

\textsuperscript{30} Chapter 4 Emergency Preparedness.
\textsuperscript{31} Emergency Response and Recovery.
\textsuperscript{32} Emergency Response and Recovery.
often relying on one of the local partners to coordinate. The LGDs will publicise these plans to their local partners and ensure that arrangements are properly coordinated.

**Plan Maintenance**

818. The CCA regulations provide for the maintenance of plans, including their validation, revision and quality-assurance, as well as for their publication and the training of staff in their implementation.

**SECTION II – UK CENTRAL ARRANGEMENTS**

819. The central arrangements for the development of Counter Terrorism and Resilience policy and crisis management are described in Chapter 2. The Home Secretary has overall ministerial responsibility for safety and security, and hence for emergency preparedness and response. In support, Ministers in any of the LGDs have clear ownership of specific issues.

820. While both Defence & Overseas Secretariat (OD Sec) and the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) are intimately involved in this area, the CCS has a pivotal role in helping to maintain and improve the quality of civil protection. The UK Government’s work to enhance the country's resilience to the full range of emergencies is coordinated by the CCS, which harmonises the work of the LGDs who are responsible for contingency planning and response within their areas. Additionally, the CCS undertakes a range of central functions that include:

a. Develops and produces the annual National Risk Assessment (NRA) and National Resilience Planning Assumptions (NRPA).

b. Leads horizon-scanning and national risk assessment capability in Central Government, which aims to identify potential disruptive challenges to the UK and assist in the development of an integrated response. The Domestic Horizon Scanning Committee issues horizon scans and risk assessments to give Government Departments warning of potential disruptive challenges up to 12 months ahead, as well as a common understanding of the likely nature and extent of their impact.

c. Coordinates the capabilities work stream programme, the core framework by which the Government seeks to build resilience.33 The programme identifies the generic capabilities that underpin the UK’s resilience to disruptive challenges, and ensures that each of these is developed. These capabilities include dealing with mass casualties and fatalities, response to chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear incidents, provision of essential

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33 The Devolved Administrations in Northern Ireland and Scotland have similar programmes, which are accountable to Scottish and Northern Irish Ministers.
services, and warning and informing the public. Some components of the capabilities relate to the activities of Central Government, such as central crisis management facilities and the use of the Armed Forces. Other components are delivered by regional or local responders, but developed within the framework established in the centre through the capabilities programme in order to ensure consistency and high standards.

d. Coordinates a cross-Governmental exercise programme covering a comprehensive range of domestic disruptive challenges, including accidents, natural disasters and acts of terrorism. The programme is designed to test rigorously the concept of operations from the coordinated central response, through the range of LGD responsibilities and the involvement of the DAs, to the regional tier and local responders.

821. **Business Continuity Management.** Business continuity involves managing risks to the smooth running of an organisation or delivery of a service, ensuring continuity of critical functions in the event of a disruption, and an effective subsequent recovery. Government Departments have plans in place to ensure their continued function in the event of an emergency, based on the same principles and best practice that the Government promotes for all other organisations.

822. **Role of Central Government.** Central Government may be asked to provide specialist advice or assistance, notably where it has information or capabilities not available at the local level. On other occasions, the Central Government role may be limited to dealing with parliamentary, media and public enquiries. In either case, a specific Government Department would be nominated to take the lead.

**The Lead Department Concept**

823. The nomination of a LGD does not affect the underlying principle that, wherever possible local procedures and arrangements should be used for dealing with major incidents. Local organisations aim to use normal links with Government Departments rather than channelling all dealings through the lead department, although, exceptionally, special arrangements may need to be implemented. The LGD construct identifies departments that will take the lead for a range of potentially disruptive challenges. The LGDs are provided with guidance that describes the key processes and disciplines necessary in planning for and responding to crises for which they are either the nominated lead or have key responsibilities to act. Where a LGD is not immediately identifiable, the CCS will lead until a LGD is appointed. The list of

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34 Facilities within the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) complex.
35 A 5 stage process that involves the following: identification of critical deliverables and assessment of those risks that could lead to delivery disruption, identification of alternative strategies in order to mitigate loss, developing responses to business continuity challenges, organisation awareness and ensuring that plans remain current and fit for purpose.
36 See Chapter 1.
pre-nominated LGDs appears on the CCS website.\textsuperscript{38} Where an emergency is a devolved matter, the LGD may become involved where there are cross-border implications or the potential for requiring national assistance or there is an International dimension. A LGD summary, as at January 2007, is at Annex 8A

824. **Change of Lead Government Department.** Circumstances may change as an incident develops or as the recovery phase is entered and it may become appropriate for the department originally nominated to lead to hand over the task to another department.\textsuperscript{39} The CCS would ensure that any such change was agreed interdepartmentally before being implemented and notified to everyone concerned.

825. **Lead Government Department Tasks.** The LDG is expected to be prepared to undertake a broad range of tasks that include:

   a. Coordinate the activities of Central Government Departments in the response to a disaster, providing a framework within which individual departments can discharge their specific responsibilities. An important part of this work will be to ensure that the necessary links are established with the local response.

   b. Coordination of the collection of information on the incident and its effects for the purpose of:

      (1) Briefing Ministers.

      (2) Informing Parliament.

      (3) Providing information to the public and the media at a national level.

   c. If required the provision of a Government Liaison Team (GLT), either centrally or through the Regional Government Office.

826. The way in which a Government Department performs its LGD role will depend on the circumstances of the event. In straightforward cases, no special arrangements may be necessary; lead department officials will work from their normal offices or, out of normal working hours, from home. However, where circumstances demand, the LGD would activate special procedures, such as opening an emergency room, and may need to arrange regular meetings of the relevant departments, either directly or through the CCS.

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\textsuperscript{38} www.ukresilience.info

\textsuperscript{39} This occurred in the aftermath of the storms in October 1987 when the Home Office took the initial lead but handed over to the, then, Department of the Environment at a later stage.
827. However these activities are organised, it is incumbent on the LGD to ensure that there is no unjustified duplication in requests for information directed at responders at the incident site. The LGD should act as the central point of information capture, coordination and dissemination amongst the other departments, agencies and authorities.

SECTION III – REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS\textsuperscript{40} IN ENGLAND

Introduction

828. The Government has established a regional civil protection tier, which draws together activity already previously organised on a regional basis, as a mechanism for improving coordination and communication between Central Government and local arrangements. The operation of the regional civil protection tier is not, for the most part, addressed within the CCA. Activity at the regional level takes place on an unregulated basis. The CCA Regulations and Guidance describe the arrangements that the Government has put in place, but does not oblige Category 1 and 2 Responders to carry out activity in the manner described. The CCA does, however, provide for the role of Regional Nominated Coordinators and allows for special legislative measures to be used on a regional basis.

829. Since April 2003, Regional Resilience Teams (RRTs) have been operational in each of the Government Offices in the 9 English regions.\textsuperscript{41} These teams, led by a senior official, with support from 3 or 4 staff drawing heavily on external civil protection experience, facilitate much of the new regional activity. They take the lead in managing key relationships with Category 1 and 2 Responders, communicating between regional partners, as well as between the regions and central departments. They also provide improved information gathering and reporting to Central Government. In particular, the teams provide secretariat support for the Regional Resilience Forums (RRF) and for Regional Civil Contingencies Committees (RCCCs) in the event that the regional response arrangements are activated. The teams also work with the DA to ensure strong cross-border arrangements are in place.

The Regional Resilience Forum

830. The RRF is the principal mechanism for multi-agency cooperation at the regional level. The forum provides the means by which the organisations, with an interest in regional civil protection issues, cooperate with each other. It is not a statutory body as such, neither does it have powers to direct its members or Local Resilience Forums. The purpose of the RRF process is to ensure effective delivery of

\textsuperscript{40} Chapter 17 Emergency Preparedness.

\textsuperscript{41} See Annex 8B.
those elements of regional civil protection that need to be developed in a multi-agency environment. In particular, the RRF should:

a. Produce a regional risk map.

b. Consider policy initiatives in the area of civil protection that emanate from local and Central Government and all other relevant sources.

c. Facilitate information sharing and cooperation between its members, including, for example, reports on recent incidents and exercises.

d. Share relevant lessons from emergencies and exercises in other parts of the UK and overseas.

e. Support preparation of multi-agency plans and other documents, including Regional Capability Coordination Plans.

f. Coordinate multi-agency exercises and other training events.

831. **Subgroups.** The time constraints on the main RRF, and the high level nature of their discussions, are likely to require the formation of subgroups. Such subgroups will operate at the middle-management level, with organisations represented by experts in the field of civil protection. They may take forward action points from the main RRF, discuss specialist civil protection topics and forward papers for consideration by the RRF. Subgroups fall into 2 types:

a. Those that operate under every RRF, for example are:

(1) **Media Emergency Forum.** The Media Emergency Forum (MEF) exists to provide regional media with a means to engage in civil protection issues. This forum brings together key media representatives with the secretariat provided by the Government News Network.

(2) **Mass Fatalities.** Each RRF has a subgroup to develop regional plans to deal with mass fatalities and emergency mortuaries.

b. Subgroups that may be established by an individual RRF include:

(1) **Regional Working Group.** The Regional Working Group would replicate the broad membership of the RRF and discuss in advance, and in more detail, proposals to be taken to the RRF for their decision or endorsement. It would provide a process at the ‘working level’ through which multi-agency planning could be delivered. For example, this group could work on regional training and exercise programmes.
(2) **Risk Group.** The Risk Group would lead on the work to develop the multi-agency regional risk assessment, based on the national risk assessment.

(3) **Capabilities Groups.** Capabilities groups would lead on work to develop generic capabilities within the overall generic-planning framework. For example, groups might be created to deal with site clearance, or mass decontamination.

(4) **Local Responder Groups by Sector.** These groups would bring together all the organisations of a particular type within an RRF area. Examples might include a local authorities group, a National Health Service (NHS) group, a utilities or transport group or a voluntary sector group.

(5) **Specialist Groups.** Specialist groups would bring together organisations with an interest in a particular aspect of civil protection. Examples might include exercises, events, welfare support for victims, media relations or Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN).

(6) **Project Groups.** Project groups would be formed on a temporary basis to bring together Category 1 and 2 Responders and other organisations, not covered by the Act, to develop a multi-agency approach to a particular short-term priority. Examples might include a particular multi-agency exercise, a large public event, or an urgent and unforeseen planning requirement.

832. **Membership.** A wide range of organisations has an interest in civil protection at the regional level. These organisations have different roles and structures, though there is considerable commonality of purpose and approach when it comes to dealing with emergencies. Membership of the RRF will vary by regions, but will usually include:

a. **Local Public Bodies.**

(1) **Local Authorities.** A single representative (or a small number of representatives) will represent all local authorities within the region. Representation is likely to be at chief executive level.

(2) **Police Forces.** A single representative will represent all police forces within the region. The selection of the representative, usually a Chief Constable, will be overseen by the Association of Chief Police Officers. In most RRFs, the nominated local force lead will also represent the British Transport Police and other specialist police forces.
(3) **Fire and Rescue Authorities.** A single representative will represent all fire and rescue authorities within the region. The selection of the representative, usually a Chief Fire Officer, will be overseen by the Chief Fire Officers’ Association.

(4) **Health Organisations.** Health representation will vary depending on the regional context and the views of the health community in the region. RRFs will draw on Regional Directors of Public Health authorities, the Health Protection Agency (HPA) and Strategic Health Authorities (SHA) to represent health interests. Ambulance services will have their own representative at the forum, with their nomination overseen by the Ambulance Service Association.

b. **National Public Bodies.**

(1) **Environment Agency.** The Environment Agency will be represented by the Regional Director and will provide advice and information on all aspects of the environment for which the Agency has a statutory responsibility.

(2) **Maritime and Coastguard Agency.** The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) engages in the RRF process only in those regions where it operates. The MCA is represented by the relevant Regional Operations Manager.

(3) **Armed Forces.** As with the local level, the Armed Forces do not play a permanent role in regional civil protection. Nevertheless, they will be represented at the RRF to ensure that military aid arrangements and planning are synchronised with civil planning, particularly in relation to larger-scale incidents. The Armed Forces will be represented by an appointed representative of the Regional Brigade Commander.

(4) **Government News Network.** The Government News Network will be represented by the relevant Regional Director.

c. **Voluntary Sector.** The voluntary sector within any region will be large and diverse and most cooperation will be at the local level with Category 1 and 2 Responders. However, there are a number of prominent voluntary sector bodies that have an interest in regional-level planning, particularly for larger-scale emergencies. These voluntary sector bodies are all members of the Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Forum (VSCPF). The working party of this forum will assist regional forums to identify a lead voluntary sector representative for the RRF.
d. **Additional Representatives.** In addition, a representative of the Regional Assembly will also form part of the core membership. Over and above the core membership, RRFs may also include additional members to reflect particular regional circumstances. These additional members may take part as full members or as observers. A (non-exhaustive) list of potential members includes:

1. Representatives of other RRTs, in order to foster effective inter-regional links.
2. Representatives of high-risk sectors with particular prominence in the region, such as the nuclear or chemical industries.
3. Representatives of Central Government departments, including the Civil Contingencies Secretariat.
4. Representatives of the Highways Agency or the Health and Safety Executive.
5. Representatives of utility companies or transport companies.

833. **Cooperation outside the Regional Resilience Forum.** The regional tier may facilitate cooperation on issues that cross Local Resilience Forum (LRF) boundaries. For example, they could bring together coastal LRF to discuss coastal flooding or pollution. The work would be led by the RRT, in response to requests by LRFs or the RRF, or as a result of a need identified by the RRT itself. Where appropriate, the RRTs will also facilitate cooperation across regional borders and with the DAs.

**Emergency Planning**

834. Planning at the regional level is different in many ways from planning by Category 1 and 2 Responders at the local level. All plans are required to be validated (by a combination of shared ownership in the RRF and dissemination to those involved) and exercised to develop staff competencies and to test procedures and systems. The objectives of emergency planning are to:

a. Improve coordination across a region and between regions.
b. Improve coordination between the Central Government and a region.
c. Improve coordination between a region and a local response capability.

835. There are 3 types of regional plan:

a. **Generic Regional Response Plan.** Each region will have a generic plan, owned by the RRF and maintained by the RRT, to ensure that regional
crises management machinery such as RCCCs can be activated effectively. As at the local level, the generic plan will enable the delivery of:

1. A developed and maintained Regional Risk Assessment.
2. A recognised corporate basis of response for a region to any type of emergency.
3. Key supporting elements (capabilities and procedures) which can be selected from and combined as necessary, depending on the nature of the emergency.
4. A recognised framework for:
   a. Raising awareness throughout a region.
   b. Developing training and exercises.
   c. Strengthening the ‘ownership’ of regional civil protection.
5. A recognised corporate framework for participating with Category 1 and 2 Responders in any combined response.

b. **Government Office Business Continuity Plan.** The second element of regional planning is the Government Office Business Continuity Plan (GOBCP). The purpose of this plan is to make sure that the Government Office can continue to operate during an emergency, particularly on those activities that might be necessary for the response to that emergency. The GOBCP is developed on the same basis as Category 1 responder business continuity plans, thereby ensuring that Government Offices meet the same standards and follow the same procedures.

c. **Regional Capability Coordination Plans.** The regional tier has an important role to play in ensuring that there is a consistency of approach at the local level. The purpose of a Regional Capability Coordination Plan (RCCP), owned by the RRT and approved by the RRF, is to support local planning by ensuring that local plans can be scaled-up in response to wider impact events. The decision to develop one or more RCCPs will be taken either by the RRF, or by the relevant LGD, as part of its national planning work. RCCPs address:

1. **Capability Development.** RCCPs are intended to develop capabilities or detail mutual support arrangements on a regional basis to deal with emergencies, which could overwhelm local resources. For example, a large-scale incident with a high number of fatalities could exceed emergency mortuary capacity in a local area and a Regional
Fatalities Coordination Plan could facilitate mortuary facilities across the region to support the affected local area.

(2) **Regional Capabilities.** Although much of the existing capability to respond sits at the local level, some capability lies at the regional level. Essentially, this capability belongs to Central Government bodies that are located regionally. For example, the Armed Forces have a long history of providing capabilities to support a local response. Other Government bodies, such as the Department for Work and Pensions, have staff who could, in the event of a serious emergency, be deployed to assist with certain tasks (as they were during the 2001 foot-and-mouth disease outbreak).

**Regional Civil Contingencies Committee**

836. Most emergencies are dealt with by local responders at a local level. However, exceptional circumstances may arise when response to an emergency benefits from coordination at the regional level. Such circumstances include those where the local response, including locally agreed mutual aid arrangements, is overwhelmed, and where an emergency affects the majority of localities within a region. They are most likely to arise during emergencies without a definable scene.\(^\text{43}\) Although rare, there are clear benefits for having regional response structures in place that can be deployed as and when needed. RCCCs are key to the delivery of such a regional level response in England.\(^\text{44}\)

837. A RCCC is a multi-agency group that includes regional representatives of the emergency services, local authorities, the relevant Government Office (GO), and Central Government departments and agencies with a regional presence (such as the MOD, the Department of Health (DH), HPA and MCA). Other agencies such as voluntary organisations, utilities and transport operators could also be invited, depending on the extent and location of the incident. A RCCC is charged with improving the coordination of a response to an emergency across a given region with a particular, but not exclusive, focus on consequence management and the recovery from an incident. Although they may have a similar membership, RCCCs are distinct from RRFs, which have no role in responding to emergencies, being focused on the development and coordination of emergency planning.

838. In the first instance, the RCCC would be chaired by the Regional Director of the GO. However, the Committee can agree another Chair, if the circumstances merit it, such as a Regional Director of Public Health, a senior police officer or a local authority Chief Executive.

\(^{42}\) Chapter 8 Emergency Response and Recovery.

\(^{43}\) Such as, wide spread flooding or animal disease.

\(^{44}\) See Section V for details of how arrangements differ in the Devolved Administrations.
839. **Role.** The precise role of an RCCC is likely to vary depending on the nature of a given emergency. However, generic aspects of the role are likely to include:

a. Collating and maintaining a strategic picture of the evolving situation within the region, with a particular (but not exclusive) focus on consequence management and recovery issues.

b. Assessing whether there are any issues that cannot be resolved at a local level.

c. Facilitating mutual aid arrangements within the region and, where necessary, between regions.

d. Ensuring an effective flow of communication between local, regional and national levels, including the coordination of reports to the national level on the response and recovery effort.

e. Raising, to a national level, any issues that cannot be resolved at a local or regional level.

f. Ensuring that the national input to response and recovery is coordinated with the local and regional efforts.

g. Guiding the deployment of scarce resources across the region by identifying regional priorities.

h. Providing a regional spokesperson.

840. RCCCs will observe the principle of subsidiarity, in that local decisions should be taken at the local level. Therefore, the RCCC would not interfere in local C2 arrangements unless specifically empowered to do so by emergency regulations (see paragraph 809). When empowered, the RCCC should provide a mechanism for ensuring that local responder decision-making can be fully informed, all responders are fully involved in the development of the response and complement existing arrangements for the coordination of mutual aid and inform the deployment of national resources. In particular, the RCCC should be able to highlight the wider, less obvious, impacts of an emergency, for example the broader, non-health, affects of an infectious disease outbreak within a region (such as the impact on key workers) and present this to the national level.

841. **London.** Unlike other regions in England, many local responder agencies in London have boundaries that align with those of the region. In London there is, therefore, little distinction between an RCCC and the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG). In an emergency, the London Resilience Team (LRT) would provide the GO representatives to either the SCG or the RCCC. In practice, particularly for
immediate-impact emergencies, the group is likely to be referred to as a SCG and will be chaired by the Police. A formal RCCC is more likely to be convened for ‘rising tide’, non police-led events such as infectious disease outbreak and in the recovery phase. In London, the RCCC (SCG), for a large-scale emergency, would include representatives of the utilities, transport providers and the wider health community to enable greater efficiency at strategic level.

842. **Regional Civil Contingency Committee Convening and Levels of Response.** An RCCC would only be convened where it would aid the response and recovery effort; it is unlikely that an RCCC would be convened for a single-site emergency when the impact is contained within a single locality. In these circumstances, there would be a direct line of communication between local and national level. In London, the multi-agency SCG is the RCCC so there will in effect be an RCCC for single-site incidents. An RCCC is more likely to be required where a number of local SCGs are established within a region and there is a need for coordination. An RCCC can be convened at the request of the LGD, or with its agreement, following a request from a member of a local SCG or a request from a member of the RRF (level one only). RCCC meet at 3 levels:

a. **Level 1.** Level one meetings are convened in the phase before an emergency, where prior warning is available. The meeting would be held to review the situation, update local stakeholders, and establish the state of preparedness across the region. Examples of situations that would require a level one meeting could include potentially significant human or animal disease outbreaks, or following receipt of an extreme weather forecast.

b. **Level 2.** Level 2 meetings coordinate the response to an emergency across a region. They are likely to prove particularly useful in the consequence management effort and the recovery phase of an emergency. A level 2 RCCC could, for example, be convened in the event of a wide-area disruptive challenge affecting a large portion of a region. It might also be convened if a national response, or national coordination, of an event was required, such as an outbreak of human or animal disease.

c. **Level 3.** Level 3 meetings are only called following the declaring of emergency regulations under Part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. Level three meetings are chaired by the Regional Nominated Coordinator (RNC) or nominated deputy (see paragraph 840). The role of the RCCC is similar to level 2, but with an additional focus on the implementation of any special legislative measures necessary to respond to the emergency in question.
Regional Nominated Coordinator

843. An RNC must be appointed to all English regions to which the emergency regulations apply. The post-holder is appointed to facilitate coordination of activities under the emergency regulations in line with the response strategy and objectives set by Central Government, as well as to provide a wider coordinating role. The role of the Coordinator is not designed to impinge on the independence of organisations at the local or regional level; the principle of subsidiarity would apply to all decisions concerning its functions. The RNC works alongside the established chains of command. The roles of the RNC include:

a. Communicating the objectives and priorities of Central Government to local, regional and devolved actors, and reporting to Central Government.

b. Providing a strategic overview at the regional/devolved level.

c. Facilitating communication and coordination between local, regional and devolved actors, including the chairing of the RCCC.

d. Acting as a focal point for the communication of Government messages to the media.

e. Liaising with neighbouring coordinators and facilitating cross-regional cooperation and coordination.

RNCs will be appointed by a senior Minister from the LGD. The level of discretion permitted to RNCs will vary according to the strategy adopted by the LGD. RNCs will be directly accountable to the Minister, who retains ultimate decision-making authority and, in England, will be supported by RRTs. The appointment of the RNC will come to an end when the regulations cease to have effect, even though he or she may continue to play an informal role in recovery efforts, if appropriate.

SECTION IV – DEVOLVED ADMINISTRATIONS

844. Each DA has its own civil protection and lead organisation arrangements, which vary according to the terms of devolution settlements and local administrative arrangements. In Scotland and Northern Ireland this sub-UK tier is described as the ‘national level’, in Wales as ‘pan-Wales’ or ‘all-Wales’. Where the response falls within devolved responsibilities, coordination will either be managed by a DA centrally or by one of its departments. DAs are responsible for:

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45 Emergency Coordinator in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland.
46 See Annex 8A.
a. Incidents that take place and are contained entirely within a devolved part of the UK, and where the response falls within their devolved responsibilities. The DA concerned would normally take full responsibility for planning and all response and consequence management activities within its authority. It would also liaise, as appropriate, with the other DAs, any UK-wide departments or agencies involved in the response and ensure that CCS was briefed as necessary.

b. Incidents affecting more than one DA. Each DA would implement its own response, lead department and decision-making and coordination arrangements. Additionally, the DAs would liaise with regional and/or local lead organisations in other parts of the UK, departments and agencies with a wider geographical remit and the CCS as appropriate.

c. Certain events which relate to non-devolved matters where, regardless of location, the lead UK Government department or organisation would have responsibility for dealing with the cause of the emergency. Managing its consequences, however, falls to the DA. In all such instances, the UK lead would liaise closely with its contacts in the DAs; for example, the MCA leads on marine safety across the UK and has a presence in all four home countries. In addition, given that military assistance is always centrally authorised and controlled, the DAs request military assistance through MACA procedures via the Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland Offices.

845. The remainder of this section discusses the particular arrangements for each DA. It describes: the applicability of the CCA; the responsibilities for, and organisation of, emergency planning and associated civil protection duties at the various levels of the administration; and the arrangements for the coordination of an emergency response, with particular reference to cross-boundary liaison. Where possible, the devolved information is compared to the arrangements in England in order to ease understanding and highlight any significant differences.

Scotland

846. **Civil Contingencies Act.** Responsibility for civil protection is largely a devolved matter in Scotland. The CCA grants powers to Scottish Ministers over the devolved agencies, which replicate the powers of UK Ministers for England. Consequently, the balance of activity and interaction between the Scottish Executive and the UK Government in relation to emergencies affecting Scotland depend on the nature of the incident.

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847. **Lead Directorates.** The Scottish Government has central coordination arrangements to enable it to respond corporately to an emergency. Within the Scottish Executive, the allocation of responsibilities for routine day to day activity is retained in the event of emergencies. The lead Scottish Executive is no longer made up of Departments. Instead there are a number of smaller Directorates. Groups of directorates are clustered under a Director General for administrative purposes. Directorates will be brought together to deal with different situations. During an emergency the Emergency Action Team of Senior Officials from the directorates will form and a decision will be taken on which directorate should lead. Directors General with particular responsibility for certain sectors will also contribute to this decision. In effect the Scottish Executive itself should be considered to be the lead department.

848. **Emergency Planning.** The Scottish Executive Emergency Room (SEER)\(^49\) Cabinet Sub Committee (CSC) is responsible to the Scottish Cabinet, for coordinating the emergency planning work of the Scottish Executive. On a day to day basis, the Fire and Civil Contingencies Division (FCCD) promotes and coordinates civil protection efforts across the Executive in a role similar to that of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat at the UK level.

849. **Strategic Coordination Groups.** Eight multi-agency SCGs\(^50\) based on police force areas and chaired by the Chief Constable or local authority Chief Executive take responsibility for preparedness and response at a local level. Each Group has representatives from each Category 1 responder (emergency services, local authority, NHS boards, Scottish Environment Protection Agency and Coastguard) and Category 2 responder representatives (utilities, Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and infrastructure providers). The Scottish Executive, the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service and Military are also represented as are, in many cases, voluntary organisations. Planning involves risk assessment, making generic and, if necessary, specific emergency plans, engaging with the community, training, testing, exercising and reviewing. At a time of emergency, the groups determine the strategy for local response and recovery.

850. The principles of emergency response in Scotland are the same as for the rest of the United Kingdom in that the majority of emergencies are dealt with at the local level without any involvement by the Scottish Executive or UK Government. The Scottish Executive’s arrangements complement response arrangements at the local level and those made by UK Government.

851. **Scottish Executive Emergency Room.** The FCCD is responsible for the SEER, a facility available for communication, information processing and the coordination of the Central Government emergency response led by the Scottish Executive. The SEER is normally based in Edinburgh, but can be established at other locations.

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\(^{49}\) Normally based in Edinburgh, but can be established at other locations.

\(^{50}\) The Scottish equivalent of the Local Resilience Forum in England and Wales, although the SCGs also encompass the response and recovery phases of an emergency.
Executive. It is staffed by an Emergency Action Team of senior civil servants from Scottish Executive directorates, whose role is to coordinate activity and brief Ministers, and an Emergency Support Team that gathers, processes and disseminates information from a variety of sources.

852. The Scottish Executive’s response to the situation will depend on the nature of the emergency. The decision on whether to activate the SEER would depend upon the nature and extent of any emergency in or affecting Scotland. There would be a flexible response to emergencies based on the circumstances that exist at the time; this would also affect which elements are activated. The SEER may simply play a liaison role and monitor a situation being dealt with by a SCG, or it may be employed to manage the Scottish Executive’s response to a larger incident. The decision to escalate, or scale-back, the Scottish response would be taken jointly by the main agencies concerned and the Scottish Executive. A single point of contact in SEER will be known to SCGs, which would be advised of the activation of SEER. In the event of an emergency requiring coordination across Scottish Government, SEER would:

a. Collate and maintain a strategic picture of the evolving situation in Scotland.

b. Assess whether there are any issues that cannot be resolved at a local level.

c. Facilitate mutual aid arrangements in Scotland and, where necessary, negotiate with UK Government to resolve such issues.

d. Provide strategic direction for a Scottish response to an emergency.

e. Coordinate and support the activity of Scottish Executive directorates in the context of the emergency.

f. Brief Scottish Ministers.

g. Ensure effective communication between local, Scottish and UK levels.

h. Coordinate and disseminate information for the public and the media at the Scottish level.

i. At the UK level, raise any issues that cannot be resolved in Scotland.

j. Inform and advise the development of UK strategies.

k. Ensure that UK input to response and recovery is coordinated with local Scottish efforts.

l. Provide, where appropriate, a spokesperson.
m. Draw on existing legislation and, if necessary, consider the use of additional powers through the UK Government.

853. **Coordination Outside Scotland.** When established, SEER has lead responsibility for liaison and cooperation with agencies and authorities outside Scotland. In the event that UK-level arrangements are initiated, SEER would liaise with the COBR, the Scotland Office and other relevant departments in Whitehall and can act as a facilitating link with UK Government departments for mutual aid and cooperation outside Scotland’s administrative boundaries. At a lower level during an emergency, there may be a requirement for mutual aid and cooperation outside Scotland’s administrative boundaries. While local arrangements may already encompass this, the SEER would coordinate with the English Regions and UK-level organisations. SEER would be supported by the SCGs’ local arrangements; however, additional support could be provided by the Scottish Emergencies Coordinating Committee (SECC) and the Scottish Police Information and Coordination Centre (S-PICC).

854. **Scottish Emergencies Coordinating Committee.** SECC has a role both in preparing for emergencies and in providing advice and support for SEER at a time of emergency. During planning, it brings together senior Scottish Executive staff with representatives, at chief officer level, of all the agencies involved in responding to a major incident. In an emergency, SECC would comprise senior managers of affected Scottish Executive directorates and responding agencies, the exact composition being determined by the particular circumstances. It has no executive authority other than that delegated to departmental and other representatives. The role of the SECC is to:

a. Support the local response and provide a further channel for the exchange of information between Scottish and local responders.

b. Monitor the wider impacts of an emergency.

c. Support the coordination of the response where the emergency affects a number of localities in Scotland.

d. Provide specialist support and advice for the Scottish Cabinet.

855. **Scottish Police Information and Coordination Centre.** The S-PICC provides information and advice to the SEER when an emergency demands significant police involvement. When activated, the S-PICC supports the Association of Chief Police Officers (Scotland) (ACPO(S)) representative in SEER in the coordination of mutual aid between police forces and the collection of information from Scottish police forces on the emergency and its wider impacts.

856. **Scottish Emergency Coordinator.** If emergency regulations are made, under the provisions of the CCA, that apply to Scotland, the UK Government must appoint a
Scottish Emergency Coordinator. The Scottish and UK Government will jointly compile a list of designates for this role. The terms of appointment, conditions of service and functions of the Coordinator would be set out in the letter of appointment, though details of the general role may be included in the emergency regulations themselves.

**Wales**\(^{51}\)

857. **Civil Contingencies Act.** The duties in part 1 of the CCA apply in the same way in Wales as they do in Scotland. Category 1 and 2 Responders in Wales are subject to the regulations and guidance made by a Minister of the Crown after liaison with the National Assembly for Wales (NAW).

858. **Emergency Planning.** In Wales, emergency planning is not a devolved function. However, the Welsh Assembly Government (WAG) has responsibility for the Fire and Rescue Service and the Ambulance Service in Wales as well as other functions directly linked to emergency planning. The Emergencies and Security Branch within the Assembly acts in a similar way to the Regional Resilience Teams in England and coordinates planning for Wales. Two discrete types of planning are undertaken at the pan-Wales level. The first type of planning supports emergency preparedness through capability development; the second supports response arrangements within Wales.

859. **Wales Resilience Programme.** The Wales Resilience Programme is an evolving strategic framework for capability development in Wales. The primary objective of the programme is to identify the relationship between planning for emergencies at the local, DA and UK levels and to coordinate this work. At the core of the programme is a Wales Resilience Partnership Team, established to coordinate civil protection work in Wales. A Wales Resilience Stakeholders Forum operates to reinforce communication and information-sharing networks between Category 1 and 2 Responders. The forum helps to keep Category 1 and 2 Responders in Wales informed of developments, at the UK level, and to enable them to contribute to the work of the Partnership Team.

860. **Wales Resilience Forum.** The Wales Resilience Forum (WRF) promotes good communications and the enhancement of emergency planning across agencies and services in Wales by providing a forum for Chief Officers to discuss strategic issues of emergency preparedness with WAG Ministers.

861. **Local Resilience Forums.** Four LRFs, based on police force areas, have been established in Wales, each being chaired by the respective chief constable. Each LRF has established a Coordination Group to run various sub-groups and multi-agency...
partnership teams which are being established to support the LRF and Coordination Groups. The members of the WAG are represented in all LRFs and Coordination Groups.

862. **Risk Assessment.** A risk assessment at DA level is undertaken by the Wales Risk Assessment Group (WRAG) reporting to the WRF. The WRAG is coordinated by the WAG, drawing upon a wide range of expertise from LRFs and partner agencies in Wales. The WRAG includes members from each of the risk assessment groups conducting similar assessments at a local level for the 4 LRFs.

863. **Emergency Response and Recovery.** Emergencies in or affecting Wales will be largely handled at the local level through multi-agency Strategic Coordinating Groups. For wide-area emergencies or disruptive challenges, the response will be coordinated across the LRF areas through the Pan-Wales Response Plan. The plan includes the setting up of a Wales Civil Contingencies Committee (WCCC), which will act as an advisory body for the handling of the emergency.

864. **Wales Civil Contingencies Committee.** The WCCC would be convened in exceptional circumstances where the scale and geographical extent of an emergency requires the response and recovery effort to be coordinated at DA level. The WCCC would only be established where it would add value to the response and recovery effort. It is most likely to be established to deal with wide-area disruptive challenges to the infrastructure of Wales, such as severe weather, infectious disease outbreak, or fuel shortages.

865. **Wales Civil Contingencies Committee Activation.** The triggers for WCCC activation are broadly similar to those used for a Regional Civil Contingencies Committee (RCCC) in England.\(^5^2\) In relation to transferred matters,\(^5^3\) a WCCC may be established at the request of the WAG, or with the agreement of the WAG following a request from a member of a SCG or a member of the WRF (level one only). The WCCC will only meet to discuss non-transferred matters with the agreement of the UK LGD. The UK LGD can also request the WAG to establish a WCCC. The role of the WCCC would be to:

a. Maintain a strategic picture of the evolving situation within Wales, with a particular (but not exclusive) focus on consequence management and recovery issues.

b. Assess whether there are any issues, which cannot be resolved at a local level, facilitate mutual aid arrangements within Wales and, where necessary, between Wales and the border areas of England to resolve such issues.

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\(^{52}\) See paragraph 835.

\(^{53}\) Health, education, economic development, culture, environment and transport.
c. Raise to a UK level any issues that cannot be resolved at a local or DA level.

d. Guide the deployment of scarce resources across the DA area.

e. Provide, where appropriate, a spokesperson.

f. Draw on existing legislation and, in some cases; consider requesting the use of additional powers through the UK Government.

866. **Wales Emergency Coordinator.** If under the provisions of the CCA emergency regulations are implemented that apply to Wales, the UK Government must appoint a Wales Emergency Coordinator. The Welsh DA and UK Government will compile a joint list of designates for this role for particular emergencies. The terms of appointment, conditions of service and functions of the Coordinator would be set out in the letter of appointment, though some details may be included in the emergency regulations themselves.

**Northern Ireland**

867. **Civil Contingencies Act.** Civil protection in Northern Ireland is largely a devolved matter, with the majority of functions exercised by the relevant Northern Ireland departments. Duties under the CCA only apply to those organisations that are not transferred. Because the non-transferred organisations do not represent the full spectrum of response agencies in Northern Ireland, the regulations treat these organisations in a slightly different way to their UK equivalents. The following principles apply to those category 1 and 2 Responders which operate in Northern Ireland:

   a. The regulations that relate to the way Category 1 and 2 Responders should perform their duties apply in the usual way, but with some adjustments for the Northern Ireland security situation.

   b. The provisions, which rely on bilateral cooperation between Category 1 and 2 Responders, apply to Northern Ireland.

   c. The provisions in the regulations relating to the LRF and its activities do not apply to Northern Ireland.

   d. Category 1 Responders in Northern Ireland should have regard to the activities of other bodies in Northern Ireland that are engaged in civil protection.

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54 See Chapter 12 - Emergency Preparedness and Chapter 11 - Emergency Response and Recovery.

55 The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA), and telecommunications operators. In carrying out their statutory duties under the CCA, they should have regard to the overall public service arrangements in Northern Ireland, and it is anticipated that they will undertake their duties in a manner which is compatible with the Northern Ireland Capabilities Framework.
protection (including Northern Ireland departments, the Northern Ireland Ambulance Service and relevant utilities) and, where appropriate, may rely on or adopt those activities.

e. Category 1 Responders in Northern Ireland may delegate their functions to, or exercise their functions jointly with, other bodies in Northern Ireland, which are engaged in civil protection.

868. **Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework.** The Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework, sets out the principles of policy and practice which, will be adhered to by Northern Ireland public service organisations in their civil contingencies activities and in particular requires cooperation between those organisations that have duties under part 1 of the CCA. Framework principles are derived from existing Northern Ireland arrangements and structures, the CCA and other UK policies. The framework is supported by a number of guidance documents.

869. **Geographic Organisation.** Because of the relatively small size of Northern Ireland and the centralised organisation of the delivery of public services, the UK model in the CCA is not ideal. For example, the CCA defines a Local Resilience Area (LRA) as the area covered by a single police service. As Northern Ireland is covered by a single police service, the ‘local’ definition is inappropriate and therefore, the Framework uses the area definitions:

a. **Northern Ireland Regional.** Civil contingency activities at Northern Ireland level are generally comparable to Regional arrangements in UK. This includes the Northern Ireland inter-agency coordination and crisis management arrangements and the generic arrangements of NI departments, agencies and emergency services. Northern Ireland regional arrangements are linked to the UK National arrangements through the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) and the CCS, and through participation of Northern Ireland officials and Ministers in national-level committees. Regional arrangements are also closely linked to the Northern Ireland sub-regional and local level arrangements through, for example, departmental structures and links with agencies, Health Boards and Trusts, District Councils and other public bodies.

b. **Sub-Regional.** The sub-regional level reflects the geographical/structural level of Health and Social Services Boards, Education and Library Boards and District Council Environmental Health Groups. Existing sub-regional arrangements in Northern Ireland include these organisations, the

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56 Examples include; District councils, Housing executive, Fire Authority, Health and Social Services, Foods Standards Agency.
58 A guide to emergency planning arrangements in Northern Ireland and a guide to risk assessment in Northern Ireland.
arrangements of the sub-offices of departments, agencies and the activities of District Councils, which are undertaken at Group level.

c. **Local.** The local level is the level of District Councils and PSNI District Command Units. Existing local arrangements are those which are undertaken by individual PSNI Districts and District Councils and the local arrangements of organisations which operate at that level, for example the Social Security Agency, the Housing Executive and the Post Office.

870. All of these levels make an important contribution to resilience within Northern Ireland. Some organisations, such as District Councils, focus on one level of response, while others, such as the emergency services and some of the NI departments, operate at 2 or 3 of the levels. Contingency planning in Northern Ireland has the additional dimension of an international border with the Republic of Ireland. The Framework document gives guidance on cooperation outside Northern Ireland, with UK-regional and UK-national organisations and with their equivalents in the Republic.

871. **Responsibilities.** In Northern Ireland, the Central Emergency Planning Unit (CEPU) of the Office of the First Minister and Deputy Minister (OFMDFM) performs the same functions as the SECC in Scotland. The Northern Ireland Assembly would normally have oversight of civil contingency arrangements for transferred functions. During any period of suspension of the devolved Assembly, Northern Ireland departments discharge their functions subject to the direction and control of the Secretary of State. Some civil protection functions, most significantly policing, are not devolved and are delivered in Northern Ireland by bodies that fall within the remit of the UK Government. The NIO, which is responsible for policing, criminal justice and security in Northern Ireland, maintains a close relationship with the OFMDFM and relevant Northern Ireland departments to ensure activities are coordinated. It is anticipated that the process of ‘normalisation’ will result in resilience arrangements in Northern Ireland changing to match those in the remainder of the UK.

872. **Liaison with the UK Central Government Response.** In the most challenging emergencies, especially where they affect the UK as a whole, the Northern Ireland Crisis Management Group (CMG) would link into the Northern Ireland Office’s crisis management arrangements and the strategic management arrangements of the UK Government. The NIO is the UK LGD for terrorist incidents affecting Northern Ireland. The NIO’s crisis management response would be coordinated through the activation of the Northern Ireland Office Briefing Rooms (NIOBR).

873. **Lead Government Department.** The LGD principle applies to Northern Ireland departments.59 All Northern Ireland departments and divisions with routine

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59 See Annex 8A.
responsibilities for the provision of a service remain responsible in times of emergency. In Northern Ireland, many functions, which are delivered elsewhere in the UK by local authorities, are delivered directly by Northern Ireland departments, their agencies or non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs). This means that some activities, which in the UK are covered by duties under the CCA, are carried out under LGD arrangements.

874. **Central Emergency Planning Unit.** The CEPU promotes the development of civil protection within the Northern Ireland public sector. It:

a. Encourages Northern Ireland departments, agencies, and other public bodies to prepare, maintain and test their contingency plans.

b. Assists Northern Ireland departments, agencies, and other public bodies in the preparation and exercise of these plans.

c. Advises Northern Ireland departments, agencies, and other public bodies of appropriate training opportunities.

d. Encourages good practice in the field of emergency planning.

e. Facilitates inter-agency coordination at the Northern Ireland level.

875. The CEPU provides information and expertise to planners within organisations and facilitates coordination of planning between organisations through formal and informal structures and dialogue. The CEPU’s customers are primarily Government departments and agencies, but the emergency services and other public service bodies are also engaged. The CEPU also represents Northern Ireland’s interests in policy discussions at UK and international levels.

876. **Central Emergency Management Group.** The Central Emergency Management Group (CEMG) is a pan-Northern Ireland multi-agency forum, broadly analogous to the RRFs in England and Wales, for the development, discussion and agreement of civil protection policy for the Northern Ireland public services. In addition to its policy role, the CEMG supports the strategic coordination of emergencies, where in conjunction with the CMG, the CEMG would supplement existing lead department arrangements. The CEMG may establish subgroups or working groups to deal with development of policy and good practice guidance. The specific functions of the CEMG are to:

a. Review civil contingency policy in Government departments and public bodies in Northern Ireland, as appropriate, and gain agreement on policy principles and standards.

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60 The CMG has the power to direct the emergency response in Northern Ireland. See paragraph 881.
b. Maintain liaison between Government departments, emergency services and other key public service bodies and district councils.

c. Disseminate information to and within member organisations on civil contingency policy, current issues and risks, and the response required to particular emergency situations.

d. Collect and collate information necessary to inform policy development, or the response to emergencies and the provision of briefing on particular issues or emergencies.

e. Establish standing or ad hoc subgroups or working groups to develop policy for, or report on, particular issues or functions.

f. Discuss and coordinate non-emergency service responses to emergencies, which require a multi-agency strategic approach.

877. A meeting of CEMG would be convened if the lead department and CEPU agree that the serious\(^{61}\) or catastrophic\(^{62}\) emergency situation is likely to affect the Northern Ireland infrastructure, including the delivery of public services. CEMG comprises senior representatives of the Northern Ireland departments, emergency services, District Council Chief Executives, and other key agencies. Membership of the group would be tailored to the particular needs of the situation, and additional organisations would be invited, where necessary.

878. **Crisis Management Group.** The CMG has the power to direct the emergency response in Northern Ireland. CMG membership is at Permanent Secretary/Chief Executive level and chaired by the Head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service, although on request, a lead department could chair the meeting. In extreme cases, the CMG may be chaired and/or attended by Ministers. The CMG deals with strategic policy issues and prioritise the management of any issues arising from the emergency. The roles of the lead department, CEPU and attending organisations in the CMG would be similar to those in the CEMG, but the CMG would:


b. Take strategic decisions and monitor implementation.

c. Discuss long-term and high-level policy issues and set objectives for the response and the recovery.

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\(^{61}\) A serious emergency (Level 2) is one which has, or threatens, a wide and prolonged impact requiring sustained Central Government coordination and support from many departments and agencies, including the regional tier in England and, where appropriate, the devolved administrations.

\(^{62}\) A catastrophic emergency (Level 3) is one which, has a high and potentially widespread impact and requires immediate Central Government direction and support.
879. It follows that representatives on the CMG should be empowered and prepared to take strategic decisions and commit their organisations to implement them. A meeting of the CMG would be convened if the lead department and CEPU agree that the emergency was, or was expected to become, so serious that severe disruption to the community had occurred, or was anticipated.

880. **Northern Ireland Administration Arrangements.** When the requirement for a multi-agency response becomes apparent, the lead department (or responder such as PSNI) may request the formation of an interdepartmental group to facilitate coordination of the response by contacting OFMDFM. OFMDFM CEPU will advise on the level and membership of the group and convene as appropriate. The group may be the CEMG or the CMG depending on the circumstances at the time of the emergency. Both groups could be set up simultaneously or sequentially as the emergency response and the recovery progress.

881. **Responsibilities in an Emergency.** Where an emergency is caused by actual or suspected criminal or terrorist activity or the direct response is led by the emergency services, strategic coordination falls to the PSNI and the NIO. The Northern Ireland Administration is responsible for strategic coordination of the response to those types of emergency not primarily requiring an emergency services response, and for coordination of the impact management and recovery response to any emergency.

882. **Northern Ireland Regional/Strategic Response.** The principles of strategic coordination of emergency response in Northern Ireland are the same as those elsewhere in the UK. However, the particular structures used for strategic coordination reflect the particular organisation of public services in Northern Ireland. The strategic response to emergencies, which cannot be managed effectively at local or sub-regional level, would be provided by the emergency services on land (Northern Ireland has one Police Service, one Fire and Rescue Service and one Ambulance Service) or by the MCA where the emergency affects coastal areas. The Northern Ireland departments would respond in accordance with the lead department arrangements, which mirror those governing Whitehall departments.

883. **Sub-Regional Emergency Response.** Some public services in Northern Ireland are organised at sub-regional level and where appropriate, these Sub-regional organisations also respond and provide coordination to emergencies in their areas. For example, the Health and Social Services Boards would coordinate the public health response to disease outbreaks in their geographical areas. Response and coordination at local or sub-regional level would normally be at operational and tactical level. If an emergency was sufficiently serious or widespread to require strategic-level response and coordination, this would bring into play arrangements across Northern Ireland.
Local Emergency Response. The response to emergencies in a particular area is normally managed by the emergency services, which use standard C2 procedures. For emergencies taking place on land, the Police would normally have responsibility for inter-agency coordination at local level, and would involve the other emergency services, other responding organisations and the District Council, as appropriate. Where the nature of the emergency is such that the emergency services do not lead the response, leadership of the multi-agency response and recovery effort will fall to the lead organisation locally, such as the District Council Chief Executive. The District Council Chief Executive would also undertake inter-agency coordination of recovery activities after the immediate response by emergency services has been stood down.

Crown Dependencies

Although counterterrorism is a reserved matter, Crown Dependencies, such as the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man are responsible for the management of any civil crisis response and recovery. Whilst not part of the UK, they may request assistance for MACA through the central LGD construct.

SECTION V – LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS

Introduction

This section deals with the organisation and activities dealing with emergency preparedness at the local level. Generic in tone, it provides a summary of detailed regulations and advice available elsewhere, albeit noting that local variances reflect local conditions. The local resilience model used in England is used as a baseline from which differences in the DAs are identified in the text or by reference to Section III. For military readers, the best source of detailed local arrangements is the appropriate Joint Regional Liaison Officer (JRLO) located within the Regional Brigade structure, RN Regional Liaison Officer and RAF Regional Liaison Officer.

Local Government

Local authorities play a critical role in civil protection. They provide a wide range of functions that are likely to be called upon in an emergency, such as social services and housing. Crucially, they exercise a community leadership role. Local authorities maintain a small group of Emergency Planning Officers, who coordinate and facilitate emergency planning and response work across the authority. As the emphasis moves from response to recovery, a local authority would take the lead in facilitating the rehabilitation of the community and the restoration of the environment. In close collaboration with a wide range of bodies, which are not routinely involved in emergency response, such as Regional Development Agencies, building proprietors and landowners, local authorities enable:
a. The longer-term welfare needs of survivors, such as social services support and financial assistance from appeal funds. They also provide support to a community, for example, provision of memorials, help lines and drop-in centres.

b. The remediation and reoccupation of sites or areas affected by an emergency.

888. Local Government Powers. Local authorities are created by Acts of Parliament. They may be abolished by Parliament and their powers are determined by Parliament. The powers of a councillor are very different from those of an individual citizen. Citizens are free to do anything that is not illegal. Councillors, and their authority, can only do what they are specifically permitted to do by law. Acts of Parliament, which lay down specific duties that must be carried out, are referred to as permissive and adoptive acts.63

889. Local Government Decision-Making. Councils are run by an executive. Those councillors, who do not sit on the executive, are responsible for scrutinising the actions of the executive, usually through one or more committees. All councillors are also responsible for representing their communities. The executive generally takes one of 3 forms:

a. A Directly Elected Mayor with a Cabinet. A mayor is elected by the whole electorate. Once elected, the mayor selects a Cabinet from among the councillors. The mayor is the political leader for the community, proposing policy for approval by a council and steering implementation by the Cabinet through council officers.

b. A Directly Elected Mayor and Council Manager. A mayor is elected by the whole electorate; once elected he or she gives a political lead to an officer or ‘manager’ to whom both strategic policy and day to day decision making are delegated. A mayor’s role is primarily one of influence, guidance and leadership rather than direct decision taking.

c. Leader and Cabinet. A leader is selected by a council and a Cabinet is made up of councillors, either appointed by the leader or elected by the council. The model is very similar to the mayor and cabinet system except that the leader relies on the support of members of a council, rather than an electorate, for his or her authority and can be replaced by that council. Most local authorities have adopted this model.

63 Introduced under the Local Government Act 2000. The Act places local authorities under a duty to develop strategies to improve the well being of their area and its inhabitants, establish ethical framework for local Government and consult the broader community regarding constitutional issues.
890. **Local Government Structure.** There are 2 distinct structures of local Government in the UK: unitary, a single-tier structure in which an all-purpose authority is responsible for providing most of the services; and county and district, comprising at least 2 levels of local Government and found in some of the counties of England. The UK construct is:

a. **English Unitary Authorities.** There are 46 unitary authorities in non-metropolitan areas of England. In some cases, they have emerged from extant shire counties; for example, Peterborough used to be part of Cambridgeshire. Others were formed following the abolition of the counties of Avon, Berkshire, Cleveland and Humberside between 1996 and 1998. Each unitary authority sends representatives to a joint board, which oversees police, fire and civil defence arrangements across the whole area. These boards are authorities in their own right and set precepts or raise council taxes, but they are not directly elected. There are also joint arrangements in most areas for waste disposal. Some unitary authorities have parish councils in their area.

b. **English Metropolitan Areas and Districts.** There are 6 metropolitan areas: West Midlands, Greater Manchester, Merseyside, Tyne and Wear, West Yorkshire and South Yorkshire. Each is divided into metropolitan districts with most of the services provided by elected metropolitan district councils. These are also unitary authorities, responsible for all the services within their boundaries and are often termed borough or city councils. In each metropolitan area, there are 2 joint boards that oversee police, fire and civil defence arrangements. There may also be joint authorities for waste disposal and for transport. The responsibilities of metropolitan district councils are the same as those of unitary authorities. There are very few parish councils in metropolitan areas.

c. **London.** In London, there are 32 London boroughs, with a status similar to metropolitan districts, and the City of London, which is a corporation and has additional roles. The Mayor of London and the Greater London Assembly are responsible for developing strategies to improve transport, economy and environment, as well as running the police and fire services. The Assembly holds the Mayor to account and makes sure services are run effectively. Neither the Mayor nor Assembly take responsibilities from the London boroughs.

d. **English Counties and Districts.** There are 32 counties in England where there are 2, and often 3, levels of local Government. First, each county has an elected county council providing services such as social services, roads and education. Second, the county is divided into several districts, each with its own elected district council providing further local services such as the collection of council taxes and non-domestic rates, housing benefits, health and
housing. Local authorities sometimes provide services on a joint basis with other authorities, through bodies known as joint boards. Joint-boards are not directly elected, but are made up of councillors appointed from the authorities that are covered by the service. Some of these councils are called borough or city councils; these titles are ceremonial and indicate that the authority has a royal charter and a mayor. Finally, many district councils are further divided into elected parish or town councils. A town council is a parish council with a mayor. Most parish or town councils are found in rural areas.

e. Scotland. Since 1996, Scotland has been divided into 32 units known as council areas, whose councils are unitary administrations with responsibility for all areas of local Government. Council areas are built from electoral wards and are divided into ‘communities’. Community Councils (CCs) are not statutory and only exist if volunteers are willing to run them. The principle role of CCs is to act as a channel for the views of local communities.

f. Wales. Since 1996, local Government in Wales has been conducted by 22 unitary authorities. Communities, which fit into and change with unitary authorities, are the Welsh equivalent of parishes. Their councils have similar powers to English parish councils and may also choose to call themselves town councils. Unlike parishes in England, communities represent the whole of Wales.

g. Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland is subdivided into 26 district council areas, although within Northern Ireland they are also known as local Government districts. The district councils are unitary administrations responsible for all areas of local Government, but their remit is more limited than that of local authorities in the rest of the UK.

Local Resilience Forum

891. The principal mechanism for local multi-agency cooperation under the Act is the LRF, which is usually based on a police area. The LRF provides the means by which the organisations with bestowed CCA responsibilities cooperate. The LRF has neither a separate legal identity nor the powers to direct its members; its purpose is to ensure effective delivery of those duties under the CCA, which need to be developed in a multi-agency environment. In particular, the LRF should deliver:

a. The compilation of agreed risk profiles for the area, through a Community Risk Register.

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64 See paragraph 847 for details.
65 See paragraph 859 for details.
66 See paragraph 869 for details.
b. A systematic, planned and coordinated approach to encourage Category 1 Responders to address all aspects of policy in relation to:

(1) Risk.
(2) Emergency planning.
(3) Planning for business continuity management.
(4) Publishing information about risk assessments and plans.
(5) Arrangements to warn and inform the public.
(6) Other aspects of the civil protection duty, including the promotion of business continuity management by local authorities.

c. Support for the preparation of multi-agency plans and protocols and the coordination of multi-agency exercises and other training events.

892. **Representation.** The CCA regulations specify participation in the process of cooperation. In particular, they address the way in which individual Category 1 and 2 Responders are represented:

a. **Category 1 Responders.** A key requirement of the Regulations is that Category 1 Responders attend meetings of the LRF or are ‘effectively represented’. ‘Effective representation’ has a number of elements:

(1) Not every organisation needs to be represented directly at every meeting.
(2) Organisations do need to be represented at meetings of the main LRF when their involvement in local civil protection work will be discussed.
(3) Category 1 Responders need to be represented by individuals who have the authority and appropriate experience to make decisions.

b. **Category 2 Responders.** The CCA has broadened the range of organisations that will be regularly and consistently involved in civil protection at the local level. This is particularly true for Category 2 Responders, some of which were not included, or did not engage in a consistent way, before the Act. However, Category 2 Responders should only be engaged when they can add value. They must respond to reasonable requests, and they must adhere to the principles of effective representation. Category 2 Responders will not be obliged to attend all LRF meetings. Instead, attendance will be determined on
the basis of 2 complementary principles: the right to attend; and the right to invite.

(1) **The Right to Attend.** Some Category 2 Responders will be keen to be part of the main forum, moreover, some also have statutory responsibilities which may require support and, therefore, close liaison with Category 1 Responders, as well as expertise that can aid their cooperation with, and provision of information to, Category 1 Responders.

(2) **The Right to Invite.** A Category 2 responder should be invited, or be effectively represented, should the LRF be dealing with issues relating the responder’s expertise.

893. **Lead Responder Principle.** Given that the main duties of the Act fall equally amongst a number of Category 1 Responders, there is a risk that responders may duplicate each other’s work when, for example, carrying out their duty of risk assessment or providing warnings when an emergency occurs. Within the LRF, difficulty occurs when several Category 1 Responders are obligated to assess the same risk or where more than one Category 1 responder believes it necessary to develop plans for the same contingency. Regulations address these problems by permitting all Category 1 Responders whose functions are exercised in relation to a particular duty (other than the duties to communicate with the public), to identify one of their number as a ‘lead responder’. The nominated lead responder has responsibility for performing a given duty in relation to a given emergency, or an emergency of a particular kind, in that LRA. Once a lead is nominated the other Category 1 Responders are referred to as ‘non-lead’ category 1 Responders.

894. As a strategic multi-agency coordinating group, the LRF’s emergency anticipation, prevention and planning activity matches that of the Gold group established by the Police during the response and recovery phases of an emergency. The LRF also reflects the key principle of UK civil protection arrangements that the initial response to most emergencies is delivered at the local level. Reflecting its nature and importance, attendance will usually be senior representatives at chief executive or deputy chief executive level, and police representatives should be chief constables or their deputies.

895. **Subgroups.** As with RRFs, the high level nature of LRF discussions, is likely to necessitate the formation of subgroups. These groups also operate at the middle management level, with Category 1 and 2 Responders represented by individuals usually employed solely or in part to work in the field of civil protection. They often

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67 CCA Part 6 and Chapter 7 Emergency Preparedness.
68 See Chapter 10.
take forward action points from the main LRF and discuss specialist civil protection topics in the necessary detail, before forwarding matters for information, decision or endorsement by the LRF. The number and composition of subgroups should be established locally. There are numerous types of subgroups which include:

a. **General Working Group.** The general working group would replicate the broad membership of the LRF and discuss in advance, and in more detail, proposals to be taken to the LRF for their decision or endorsement. It would provide a process at the ‘working level’ through which multi-agency planning could be delivered. For example, this group would work on multi-agency emergency plans, training and exercising programmes.

b. **Risk Group.** The risk group would lead the work to develop and maintain the multi-agency Community Risk Register.

c. **Capabilities Groups.** Capabilities groups would lead the work to develop generic capabilities within the overall generic planning framework. For example, groups might be created to deal with fatalities or site decontamination.

d. **Area Groups.** Area groups would be established on the basis of administrative areas within LRF boundaries. For example, a large police area might be made up of a number of counties. Each county could have its own area group. Membership would be determined locally, but would probably be local authority-led and cover the generality of civil protection issues.

e. **Responder Groups by Sector.** Responder groups would bring together all the organisations of a particular type within an LRF area. Examples include a local authorities group, NHS group, maritime group, utilities group, transport group, business group or a voluntary sector group.

f. **Specialist Groups.** Specialist groups would bring together organisations with an interest in a particular aspect of civil protection. Examples include exercises, events, welfare support for victims, media relations or chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) hazards.

g. **Standing Groups.** In many areas, standing groups already exist to deliver certain aspects of civil protection, for example local search and rescue (SAR) committees, flooding and environment groups (part of the National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution). Category 1 Responders may agree that the most appropriate way for these groups to operate will be as formal subgroups within the LRF structure.

h. **Project Groups.** A project group could be formed on an *ad hoc* basis to bring together Category 1 and 2 Responders to develop a multi-agency
approach to a particular short-term priority. Examples include a particular multi-agency exercise, a specific large public event, or an urgent new planning requirement.

896. **Membership of the Local Resilience Forum.** The following description of potential attendance at the LRF is a guide and will be tailored to reflect local circumstances. Category 1 Responders have been included for completeness, as under the Act these responders (or their ‘effective representatives) are required to attend the LRF (see paragraph 848).

a. **Category 1 Responders.**

(1) **Local Authorities.** Local authorities play a critical role in civil protection. They have a wide range of functions, which are likely to be called upon in support of the emergency services during an emergency, including key statutory responsibilities. During the recovery phase, the local authority is likely to take the lead coordination role as part of its wider community leadership responsibility. Each local authority retains the right to attend the LRF, but it may not be practical for every local authority in any given LRF area to be a member of the full LRF. Local authorities may nominate one or more of their number to act on their behalf.

(2) **Police Forces.** Police forces coordinate the response to most emergencies on land. Their key role in coordinating response is based not only on the need to protect the scene for emergency workers and vehicles but to preserve evidence of a potential crime. The Police are also expected to coordinate public information relating to the emergency, including dealings with the media. In coordinating a response, the Police are often called upon to coordinate multi-agency policy work at the LRF level. As the LRFs have been based on police areas, there will be a single local police force member for each LRF. Each police force should have a single representative, although it may have a second if it has taken on the role as chair.

(3) **British Transport Police.** The British Transport Police (BTP) takes responsibility for the management of incidents on the rail network and at train stations. In most LRFs, the local police force will represent the BTP. The exceptions to this are likely to be those meetings where particular consideration is given to rail transport issues, including risk assessments and plans.

(4) **Fire and Rescue Authorities.** Fire and rescue authorities have a pivotal role in the risk assessment process and response to a wide range
of emergencies, both fire and non-fire related. Their expertise and equipment for dealing with chemical emergencies, including decontamination, and their SAR capabilities, give them a key role in multi-agency planning.

(5) **Ambulance Service.** Although a part of the NHS, ambulance services have a distinct place within the multi-agency civil protection effort. If a number of ambulance trusts operate within the same LRF area, they will usually agree on a lead trust (reflecting both the geographical coverage within the LRF area and commitments with other LRFs). In Wales, there is a single ambulance trust covering all four police areas.

(6) **National Health Service.** The NHS is subject to duties under the CCA. The NHS is usually represented by a single representative in the LRF process (in addition to the ambulance service), with this responsibility probably falling to a SHA (although SHAs are Category 2 Responders under the CCA), lead Primary Care Trust (PCT) or local health board.

(7) **Health Protection Agency.** Notwithstanding its close links with the NHS, the HPA is usually represented separately.

(8) **Port Health Authorities.** Port health authorities are concerned with the possibility of human, animal and crop diseases being imported into the UK at seaports and airports. Port health authorities are unlikely to be directly represented on the LRF, but will be represented by the local authority or the HPA. Similar to the BTP, they would be expected to attend the LRF meetings when issues relating to their functions are discussed.

(9) **Environment Agency.** The Environment Agency has responsibilities for environmental protection in England and Wales and plays an important supporting role in emergency planning and response.

(10) **Maritime and Coastguard Agency.** The MCA responsibilities for the initiation and coordination of civil maritime SAR make it an emergency service. Additionally, the MCA leads the response to maritime pollution incidents at sea or on the coast. The MCA is only required to take part in the LRF process in those areas where it operates. As its regional and area boundaries do not coincide with coastal police areas, the MCA will usually be represented at each relevant LRF by a nominated operations manager from the area concerned.
b. **Category 2 Responders.** In general, it is crucial that Category 2 responder planning arrangements be understood by the Category 1 Responders, and vice versa, and that there is a free flow of information between them. They include:

1. **Electricity Utilities.** Electricity distributors and transmitters are covered by the CCA. During an emergency affecting electricity supplies, electricity companies retain control of their operations and seek to meet their obligations as prescribed by their regulator. Electricity companies, operating within a given LRF area, may be represented by one of their number who attends the main LRF group on a ‘right to attend, right to invite’ basis.

2. **Gas Utilities.** Gas distributors are covered by the CCA. During an emergency affecting gas supplies, companies retain control of their operation and have to meet their obligations as prescribed by their regulator. Planning in relation to oil and gas pipelines is covered by the Pipelines Safety Regulations. These regulations, including the conduct of exercises, are likely to be reported to the LRF. The main gas distribution company of any region may attend the main LRF group on the basis of ‘right to attend, right to invite’, and may act as a representative for other gas distributors.

3. **Water and Sewerage Utilities.** During an emergency affecting water or sewerage, water and sewage companies retain control of their operations and also meet their legal obligations. A water utility company operating within an LRF area, will attend the main LRF group on the basis of ‘right to attend, right to invite’. Where there is more than one company, they may be represented by one of their number.

4. **Telephone Service Providers.** During an emergency affecting fixed or mobile telephone supplies, telephone service providers retain control of their operations and have to meet their obligations as prescribed by their regulator. Telephone service providers within a given LRF area, are usually represented by one of their number and may attend the main LRF group on the basis of ‘right to attend, right to invite’.

5. **Railway Operators.** Responsibility for the railway track rests currently with Network Rail. There are a number of train operating companies, organised on a national and regional basis, dealing with passengers and freight. During an emergency affecting the railways,
companies retain control of their operations and have to meet their obligations as prescribed by the regulator. Network Rail, and some train operating companies, are also responsible for operating mainline stations. Freight train operators will in most cases be represented by Network Rail. In some instances, it may be appropriate for passenger train operating companies to be represented at the LRF by Network Rail.

(6) **Airport Operators.** Not every LRF area will have an airport within it, and not every airport will be subject to the CCA. Only ‘relevant airport operators’\(^{70}\) are covered by the CCA. During an emergency affecting an airport, the airport staff retain control of operations and meet obligations as prescribed by the regulator. Each airport is likely to represent itself directly in the LRF process, either at the main group or at a relevant subgroup.

(7) **Ports.** Not every LRF area will have a port within it, and not every port will be subject to the obligations. Only the ‘relevant harbour authorities’\(^{71}\) are covered by the CCA. During an emergency affecting a port, the harbour authority retains control of its operations and has to meet its obligations as prescribed by the Secretary of State of the Department for Transport. If more than one ‘relevant harbour authority’ operates within an LRF area then a lead operator will attend either the main LRF group or a relevant subgroup. This role may be assumed by a representative from the British Ports Association.

(8) **Highways Agency.** The Highways Agency is responsible for managing the major roads network in England,\(^{72}\) including both maintenance and management of traffic. In any local area, the Highways Agency is likely to be responsible for motorways and some of the A-roads. The Agency will have a particular interest in partnership with the police, responding to certain incidents and dealing with any recovery issues where appropriate on their roads. The Highways Agency may attend the main LRF group on the basis of ‘right to attend, right to invite’.

(9) **Health and Safety Executive.** The HSE has a significant input to the risk assessment process and the development of the Community Risk Register. The HSE also has a role in relation to offshore oil and gas installations. The HSE may attend the main LRF group on the basis of ‘right to attend, right to invite’.

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70 Defined as those with an annual throughput of at least 50,000 passengers or 10,000 tonnes of freight.
71 Defined as those with an annual throughput of at least 200,000 passengers or 1.5 million tonnes of freight.
72 The devolved equivalents are Transport Scotland, Transport Wales, Northern Ireland Roads Service and Transport for London.
(10) **Strategic Health Authorities.** In England, the SHAs have an important coordination role in relation to contingency planning. As the local headquarters of the NHS, they are able to mobilise and commit resources across the authority area and are responsible for coordination of health services in the event of an emergency. All NHS organisations, including PCTs and Acute Trusts, are part of a single structure and are accountable through the SHAs. As part of their role, they are responsible for leading local strategic planning, and ensuring that local plans are consistent with NHS guidance and other relevant legislation and guidance. SHAs also act as a liaison point with other partner organisations outside the NHS and represent NHS bodies (except for Ambulance Trusts) on the LRF. SHA boundaries are not coterminous with LRF boundaries. Where there is more than one SHA in a given LRF area, neighbouring SHAs may enter into agreements for one of them to represent the others.

c. **Other Cooperating Bodies.**

(1) **Regional Resilience Teams and the National Assembly for Wales.** RRTs and the NAW are responsible for ensuring that there is two-way communication between Category 1 Responders and Central Government, that planning is coordinated where necessary and Category 1 Responders have the necessary support. RRTs and NAW need a full understanding of the work of LRFs, not least because of the requirement to develop plans for emergencies beyond the local level. RRTs and NAW can be expected to be standing members of the LRFs in their area. They will generally attend as observers, though they will be able to add value in a number of ways, including offering advice on the national and regional pictures, and encouraging cross-boundary working and the sharing of ‘best practice’.

(2) **Armed Forces.** The Armed Forces do not play a permanent role in local civil protection. They can, however, under exceptional circumstances, provide support to Category 1 Responders when responding to a disaster or emergency. They also play an important part in specific scenarios, such as SAR (including mountain rescue) and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). The establishment of close links between Category 1 Responders and the Armed Forces, in their respective areas, is achieved through LRFs and RRF, which should enable Category 1 Responders to develop a greater understanding of how the Armed Forces might support a response to an emergency. It is

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73 Devolved equivalents: NHS Scotland, NHS Wales, Northern Ireland Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety.
important that a Regional Brigade is represented at the appropriate level on LRFs.

(3) **Voluntary Sector.** The voluntary sector is organised nationally and locally. It has a key supporting role to the emergency services and, in certain circumstances such as rescue at sea, an operational role. Further detail on the voluntary sector’s work is detailed in Chapter 8.

897. **London.** As described earlier, London is a special case. The London Regional Resilience Forum (LRRF) is responsible for the development of pan-London multi-agency emergency planning strategy and policy. The LRRF is supported by the LRT, which coordinates the detailed work of the sub-committees and working groups of the LRRF. There are 6 LRFs within London, arranged on a geographical basis around the boroughs and supported by the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA). Additionally, each of the 33 boroughs has its own multi-agency resilience forum and employs an Emergency Planning Officer who is responsible for planning and coordinating the authority’s response to a major incident. The London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) coordinates the policy for the response of the emergency services to a major incident in London and produces the LESLP Major Incident Procedure Manual.

**Local Emergency Planning**

898. The main requirement of the CCA, in regard to emergency planning, is to maintain plans to ensure that, if an emergency occurs or is likely to occur, each Category 1 responder body can deliver its functions so as to reduce, control or mitigate the effects of the emergency. Local emergency plans are based on 3 factors:

a. **Maintaining Plans for Preventing the Emergency.** The first part of the duty to maintain plans deals with the short period before an emergency occurs, when it might be avoided by prompt or decisive action. Plans should be maintained to ensure that if an emergency is likely to occur, the organisation can predict when it might take place and take the necessary steps to prevent its occurrence. Preventative actions may be identified from ‘dynamic risk assessments’ such as public health organisations directing immunisation against the spread of influenza. The CCA does not impose a duty on Category 1 responders to prevent all emergencies, neither does it require Category 1 Responders to undertake remedial works, which might prevent a possible emergency at some future date. Although, such actions may be desirable, and they may be a logical outcome of the risk assessment process, they are not mandated by the CCA.

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74 See Chapter 5 Emergency Preparedness.
b. **Maintain Plans for Reducing, Controlling or Mitigating the Effects of an Emergency.** The central part of any planning duty, under the Act, is to ensure that the organisation can perform its functions so as to reduce, control or mitigate the effects of an emergency. Such plans begin by addressing the disruption, which is the impact of the event. The plan aims to bring order to the response operation by providing a framework for management, coordination and control within which teams of local specialists can operate. Plans should identify:

1. The roles and responsibilities of teams (Gold, Silver and Bronze)\(^{75}\) from within the organisation and from partner organisations.
2. How their activities are coordinated.
3. The communications plan and contact details.
4. The alerting and mobilising procedures.
5. The facilities and equipment available, and their locations.
6. How additional resources may be obtained, if required.
7. How to support and protect staff.
8. A crisis management strategy from response through to recovery.
9. Plans for direct intervention that, for example, protect or remove people from the full impact of the emergency, such as rescuing people from the scene, or evacuating them and treating their injuries, providing them with shelter and comfort and arranging for an orderly return to the scene when it is safe.
10. Linkage with recovery plans, which also mitigate the effects of an emergency and are conducted simultaneously with any response plans.

c. **Maintaining Plans for Taking Other Action in Connection with the Emergency.** The CCA establishes a third duty to plan for any secondary impact of an emergency not captured by the other 2 duties. Not all actions to be taken in preparing for an emergency are directly concerned with controlling, reducing or mitigating its effects, for example, managing public interest in the Category 1 responder operations. The procedures required under this provision of the CCA in support of plans may also include subordinate or

\(^{75}\) Bronze, Silver and Gold correspond to the Operational, Tactical and Strategic level of police operational C2. It should be noted that this structure differs to the military definition in which the tactical level is subordinate to the operational level. Further details are provided at Chapter 10.
incidental arrangements necessary to the development of effective response plans. For example, procedures may be needed to:

1. Develop emergency control centres.
2. Develop reliable internal communications or information management systems for effective response.
3. Bind private contractors into the emergency plans.
4. Ensure the welfare of staff engaged in response.
5. Ensure that sufficient resources (for example, human, material, financial) are available when needed.

**Emergency Preparedness**

Emergency Preparedness describes broad types of plans: generic, specific; and single-agency, multi-agency and multi-level. For multi-agency plans, normally created because a number of responders have a duty in relation to the same emergency, a lead responder will usually coordinate plan development. Most Category 1 Responders have a mixture of generic and specific plans. The 2 work together, with specific plans being supported by the generic plan. Emergency preparedness includes:

a. **Generic Plan.** A generic plan is the core plan for mobilising staff and resources in response to an emergency. Most Category 1 Responders will carry out their main emergency planning responsibility under the CCA by preparing a generic plan. Generic plans are, in the first instance, single-agency plans and are seen as the most important plans for that organisation. However, each organisation’s generic plan should fit with and reference the generic plans of its partner agencies. In some local areas, multi-agency generic plans are developed as part of core planning for a combined response. Therefore, Category 1 Responders should ensure that their response plans, not only meet their own requirements, but also complement the multi-agency plans within each LRA.

b. **Generic Capability or Procedure.** Generic capability or procedures cover a wide range of capabilities, procedures and teams which may need to be developed in support of the core generic plan. For example, in an emergency, it may be necessary to evacuate a single block of flats or to evacuate a whole neighbourhood. Generic capabilities may be required to be able to deal with both types of activity. Capability covers the people mobilised by a plan, their

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76 Emergency Preparedness Chapter 5 and Annexes 5A and 5B.
77 Each LRA (with the exception of London) is based on a police area.
equipment and training, and also the planning, doctrinal and control frameworks for their actions.

c. Specific Hazard or Contingency Plan. Plans are required for particular types of event or situation, identified through the risk assessment process. Specific plans enable a Category 1 responder to move from the general to the particular, by assessing whether a risk requires a specific plan or can be incorporated into the generic plan. Many specific plans, such as for flooding, oil pollution or a stadium incident, are likely to be multi-agency plans. It is, therefore important that specific plans are synchronised with those of partner agencies. Examples of situations requiring specific plans are:

1. An influenza pandemic, which not only requires major specialist interventions within the health service but also, draws on a range of Category 1 Responders and others. Consequently, local multi-agency contingency plans have been produced by the DH.

2. Chemical hazards on the roads, including spillages, may require specialist fire service and chemical industry expertise and equipment, or treatment by private specialist waste firms.

3. Wide-area emergencies, such as major storms, generalised flooding or widespread contamination, build on the standard, generic approach, but can benefit from specific contingency planning.

4. Slow-building wide-area emergencies, such as severe and prolonged cold weather, drought, or an animal disease pandemic.

d. Specific Site or Location. A second category of specific plan can be appropriate for specific sites or locations, where the consequences and impact at the known location are more easily predictable. It is possible to develop detailed plans, that can be tested and improved. There are 2 basic types of specific plan:

1. Pre-Civil Contingencies Act Statutory Requirement. There are pre-CCA statutory planning requirements for major industrial hazard sites, nuclear power stations (including MOD nuclear installations subject to Defence Major Accident Control Regulations) and oil and gas pipeline installations. The CCA places no requirement on Category 1 Responders to prepare plans for these events, because the essential relevant organisations already have this statutory responsibility under

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78 Emergency Preparedness Chapter 5 and Annex 5C.
80 Joint Service Publication 498 - Major Accident Control Regulations.
the existing legislation. In practice, Category 1 Responders will probably wish to integrate planning arrangements under the different statutory regimes at the LRF.

(2) **Requirement identified by Risk Assessment under the Civil Contingencies Act.** The risk assessment process will identify other types of specific site, permanent or temporary, where emergency plans may be needed. These include airports, sports grounds, hospitals, public events or areas where flooding is likely. Specific locations may also need their own plans, such as town or city centres, or coastal areas most vulnerable to pollution.
## ANNEX 8A – LEAD GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Lead Government Department</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>England</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Scotland</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Wales</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Northern Ireland</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Default</td>
<td>Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) immediate lead and then ensure that one department is confirmed as LGD.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terrorism Conventional/ Siege/Hostage.</td>
<td>Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT).</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scottish Executive Civil Contingencies Unit (CCU) initiate the Scottish Executive Emergency Action Team (SEEAT). SE Ministers and Perm Sec to confirm.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>HR (Facilities &amp; Emergencies) Division of the Welsh Assembly Government (WAG) will take immediate lead for any matters which are devolved and in which lead role needs to be confirmed.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Central Emergency Planning Unit of the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister provide advice on lead allocation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN).</td>
<td>OSCT (during Counter Terrorism phase).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Defra (consequence management).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Scottish Executive Emergency Action Team (SEEAT).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>WAG (consequence management for devolved functions).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Defence</td>
<td>Cabinet Office Secretariat (CCS) working closely with the Overseas Defence Secretariat.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flooding (coastal and riverine).</td>
<td>Defra.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scottish Executive Emergency Action Team (SEEAT).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>WAG Department for Environment, Planning and Countryside (DEPC).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Northern Ireland Executive Department of Agriculture and Rural</td>
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1 As at June 2007 definitive list is at http://www.ukresilience.info/response/ukgovernment/handling/responsibilities.shtm.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Lead Government Department</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pollution to groundwaters and surface waters, marine and coastal waters</strong> (oil, chemical or gas) and marine salvage: From vessels and offshore installations. Groundwater and surface waters, including marine water (to 3 miles) arising from land-based sources.</td>
<td>Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) Counter Pollution Branch. MCA Counter Pollution Branch with SEEAT. MCA Counter Pollution Branch.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Marine Salvage</strong></td>
<td>Department for Transport (DfT) MCA: Secretary of State’s Representative for Salvage and Intervention.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Radiation Hazard</strong></td>
<td>Defra Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network (RIMNET) supports all radiological emergencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiated or threatened by terrorism. Civil Nuclear installations.</td>
<td>OSCT (during CT phase). SEEAT. DBERR with WAG DEPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence nuclear installations and defence nuclear material in transit.</td>
<td>MOD (SEEAT to coordinate consequence management, for materials in transit).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accidental release of Department for Transport</td>
<td>MOD (WAG HR Facilities and, Management (HR, F&amp;M) division to coordinate consequence management).</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>MOD (Northern Ireland Executive DOE to lead consequence management).</td>
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2 Formerly the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI).
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<tr>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Lead Government Department</th>
<th>England</th>
<th>Scotland</th>
<th>Wales</th>
<th>Northern Ireland</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>radiation from civil nuclear material in transit.</td>
<td>(DfT).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>coord. conse. man.</td>
<td>Executive DOE.</td>
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<td>CBRN (non terrorist)</td>
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<td>Radiation Hazards (arising outside the UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Result of terrorist action overseas.</td>
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<td>Result of accident overseas.</td>
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<td>Satellite re-entry hazard</td>
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<td>Emergencies on offshore installations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overseas Disasters (UK assistance sought)</td>
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<td>Mass influx of people from abroad (e.g. in event of humanitarian crisis or disaster)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
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<tr>
<td>DfT MCA (HM Coastguard).</td>
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**Defra** to coordinate consequence management for devolved functions.

**SEEAT** to coordinate consequence management for devolved functions.

**WAG HR(F&M)** coordinator consequence management.

**Appropriate NI lead department** for consequence management.

**OSCT** to lead in considering potential threat to UK.

Defra with **WAG DEPC** and Environment Agency.

**Northern Ireland Executive DOE.**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Lead Government Department</th>
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| Military shipping and aircraft, civil aircraft at sea/on land where the location is unknown. | MOD  
(where location is known the emergency is treated as a transport accident, see below). |
| **Severe storms and weather** | CCS to ensure which LGD takes lead in good time to support the response. |
| Primary impact on transport infrastructure. | England: DfT (UK air, GB rail, English roads & ports).  
Scotland: SEEAT.  
Wales: WAG Department for Enterprise, Innovations and Networks (DEIN) (Welsh roads & ports).  
Northern Ireland: Northern Ireland Executive Department for Regional Development (DRD) (roads ports and rail). |
| Primary impact on power system. | England: DBERR.  
Scotland: DBERR and SEETLD.  
Wales: DBERR.  
Northern Ireland: Northern Ireland Executive Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment. |
| Primary effect is flooding. | England: Defra.  
Scotland: SEEAT.  
Wales: WAG DEPC.  
Northern Ireland: Northern Ireland Executive DARD or DRD depending on the source of flooding. |
| Primary effect is on built environment. | England: Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG).³  
Scotland: SEEAT for devolved functions.  
Wales: WAG DEPC.  
Northern Ireland: Appropriate lead NI department. |
| **Transport Accidents** | DfT MCA Marine Accident Investigation Branch or Air Accident Investigation Branch. |
| Shipping and air transport. | England: DfT and the Health and  
Scotland: SEEAT.  
Wales: WAG DEIN.  
Northern Ireland: |  
Land transport. | England: DfT and the Health and  
Scotland: SEEAT.  
Wales: WAG DEIN.  
Northern Ireland: |

³ Formerly Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>England</th>
<th>Scotland</th>
<th>Wales</th>
<th>Northern Ireland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disasters in Sports Grounds.</td>
<td>Safety Executive (HSE) (until DfT rail accident investigation branch fully established).</td>
<td></td>
<td>WAG Local Government and Culture Department.</td>
<td>Executive DRD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dam Failures</td>
<td>Department of Culture, Media and Sport.</td>
<td>SEEAT.</td>
<td>WAG DEPC.</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Executive Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earthquake</td>
<td>Defra.</td>
<td>SEEAT.</td>
<td>WAG DEPC.</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Executive DRD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major structural failure in building (other than those caused by external impact, gas explosion, fire or industrial process).</td>
<td>DCLG. If focus on wider commercial/economic impacts – DBERR, where failure causes major transport disruption-DfT.</td>
<td>DCLG</td>
<td>WAG (department depending on outcome of the event).</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Executive Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment (DETI).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious Industrial Accident</td>
<td>CCS to confirm LGD.</td>
<td>SEEAT.</td>
<td>WAG HR(F &amp; E) Division will determine lead if main focus of attention is a devolved matter.</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Executive (department depending on nature and outcome of the event).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main focus the responsibilities of the HSE.</td>
<td>Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) (with HSE).</td>
<td></td>
<td>DWP with HSE.</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Executive DETI (with HSE).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incident</td>
<td>Lead Government Department</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main focus wider economic and commercial impact.</strong></td>
<td>England: DBERR. Scotland: SEEAT. Wales: DBERR. Northern Ireland: DETI.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pollution arising.</strong></td>
<td>England: Defra. Scotland: SEEAT. Wales: WAG DEPC. Northern Ireland: DOE.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unexploded Wartime Ordnance Disposal.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Police (with MOD support).</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information on whereabouts.</strong></td>
<td><strong>DCLG.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major software failures (analogous to Y2K).</strong></td>
<td><strong>UK: CCS with e-govt unit</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>England: CCS with e-govt unit Scotland: SE Offices of the Permanent Secretary (Communications and Information Services Division) (SE-OPS CISD). Wales: WAG HR (F&amp;E). Northern Ireland: Executive Department of Finance and Personnel.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disruption of Supply Chains</strong></td>
<td>England: CCS in consultation with DfT and Devolved Administrations confirm lead depending upon the nature, territorial spread of the disruption and supplies affected (e.g. DoH-Medical; Defra (with EA) - food, water waste; DBERR - fuel, energy, electronic communication networks, postal services and manufacturing industry; DfT - transport; HM Treasury - finance). Scotland: SEEAT. Wales: NHS(Wales)-health; DEPC - food, water and waste. Northern Ireland: Executive (department depending on outcome of the event).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incident</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal disease and welfare</td>
<td>Defra/State Veterinary Service (with DoH/Food Standards Agency if threat to human life).</td>
<td>SEEAT with Defra/State Veterinary Service.</td>
<td>WAG DEPC with Defra/State Veterinary Services.</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Executive DARD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Contamination</td>
<td>Food Standards Agency (FSA).</td>
<td>FSA in Scotland.</td>
<td>FSA in Wales.</td>
<td>FSA in NI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drinking Water Contamination</td>
<td>Defra.</td>
<td>SEEAT.</td>
<td>WAG DEPC.</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Executive DRD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant Diseases</td>
<td>Defra with Forestry Commission.</td>
<td>SEEAT with Forestry Commission.</td>
<td>DEPC of the WAG with Forestry Commission.</td>
<td>DARD working with Forestry Commission.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX 8B – GOVERNMENT OFFICES OF THE REGIONS

1 North West  Cumbrria, Lancashire, Cheshire
2 North East  Northumberland
3 Yorkshire & the Humber  East Riding of Yorkshire, North Yorkshire, North East Lincolnshire, North Lincolnshire
4 East Midlands  East Riding of Yorkshire, Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire, Lincolnshire, Leicestershire, Northamptonshire
5 East of England  Cambridgeshire, Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, Hertfordshire, Bedfordshire
6 West Midlands  Staffordshire, Warwickshire, Worcestershire, Herefordshire, Shropshire, Telford & Wrekin
7 South East  Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire, Surrey, Oxfordshire, Hampshire, West Sussex, East Sussex, Kent, Medway Towns, Isle of Wight
8 South West  Gloucestershire, South Gloucestershire, Wiltshire, North Somerset Bath & NE Somerset, Dorset, Somerset, Devon, Cornwall
9 London

Sefton  Wirral  Liverpool  Knowsley  St Helens  Wigan  Bolton  Bury  Rochdale  Oldham  Salford  Trafford  Manchester  Stockport  Tameside  Blackpool  Blackburn  Warrington

Newcastle upon Tyne  Gateshead  North Tyneside  South Tyneside  Sunderland  Hartlepool  Stockton-on-Tees  Middlesbrough  Redcar & Cleveland  Durham  Darlington

Bradford  Leeds  York  Kirklees  Calderdale  Barnsley  Doncaster  Rotherham  Sheffield  Wakefield

Wolverhampton  Dudley  Walsall  Sandwell  Birmingham  Solihull  Coventry

Swindon  Bristol  Torbay  Plymouth  Poole  Bournemouth

Milton Keynes  Newbury  Reading  Wokingham  Bracknell Forest  Windsor & Maidenhead  Slough  Portsmouth  Isle of Wight  Southampton  Brighton & Hove

Barking & Dagenham  Hillingdon  Barnet  Bexley  Brent  Bromley  Camden  City of London  City of Westminster  Croydon  Ealing  Enfield  Greenwich  Hackney  Hammersmith & Fulham  Harrow  Havering

Hounslow  Islington  Kensington & Chelsea  Kingston upon Thames  Lambeth  Lewisham  Merton  Newham  Redbridge  Richmond upon Thames  Southwark  Sutton  Tower Hamlets  Waltham Forest  Wandsworth
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
CHAPTER 9 – CIVILIAN ORGANISATIONS

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

901. This chapter is aimed primarily at providing armed forces personnel with an appreciation of the structures and responsibilities associated with a broad range of civil organisations that are likely to be involved in major incidents within the United Kingdom. It provides information regarding the emergency services and a number of other key responder and voluntary organisations, which may prove useful for briefing purposes prior to participation in coordination groups at the Silver/Gold\(^1\) level.

SECTION II – POLICE

General

902. The Police Act 1996 and 1997, the Police (Scotland) Act 1967, the Police and Magistrates Court Act 1994, the Police Reform Act 2002, and the Police Acts (Northern Ireland) 2000 and 2003 are the statutory basis for police forces in the UK. In addition, chief officers of police are Category 1 Responders under the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) 2004. Chief Constables have broad statutory responsibilities:

a. Protection of life and property.

b. Maintenance of the Queen’s peace.

c. Prevention and detection of crime.

d. Prosecution of offenders.

903. Police officers are not employees of the State or of local Government. They hold their position as independent office holders under the Crown. At the same time, like any other citizen, they are answerable to both criminal and civil law, as well as to police disciplinary procedures.

904. The Home Office has the LGD responsibility for the Police Service in the UK.\(^2\) Policing, with the exception of certain national agencies, is locally based and directed through the tripartite arrangements described in Section III.\(^3\)

905. The 43 police forces (area details are at Annex 9A) of England and Wales, comprise of 142,000 full-time police officers, 92,000 full-time staff in the form of

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\(^1\) Described in detail at Chapter 10.

\(^2\) Except for the Police Service of Northern Ireland, funded by the Northern Ireland Office.

\(^3\) Policing in Scotland is a devolved matter under the Scotland Act 1998, therefore, the lead Government Department is the Scottish Executive Justice Department.
community support officers, traffic wardens and other police staff and 11,000 special constables.\textsuperscript{4}

906. Eight police forces in Scotland (details at Annex 9A) and common police services (such as the Scottish Criminal Record Office and Scottish Police College) comprise the Scottish Police Service, which has a strength of 16,000 uniformed police officers, 1,000 special constables and 6,000 support staff.\textsuperscript{5}

907. The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) replaced the Royal Ulster Constabulary in 2001 in reforms under the 1998 ‘Good Friday’ Agreement. The PSNI has an establishment of 7,500 regular officers complemented by 1,700 reserve officers (reducing to 680 by April 2008).\textsuperscript{6}

**England and Wales**

908. The head of the Metropolitan and City of London police forces are Commissioners, whilst other forces outside London are headed by a Chief Constable; they are all responsible for policing a geographical area, which that usually follows local Government boundaries.

909. **London.** The City of London Police, one of the UK’s smallest forces with an authorised strength of about 900 police officers, is responsible for the one square mile of the original walled city. The surrounding area of both inner and outer London, extending to some 15 miles from Central London and covering 620 square miles, including the Royal Parks,\textsuperscript{7} is the responsibility of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), the largest police force in the UK with an authorised strength of 32,000 police officers. The force is divided into territorial areas based on the London Boroughs, each commanded by a Chief Superintendent or Commander. Thereafter, the organisation follows the general structure of other UK police forces. The MPS provides certain national services for all forces, in particular the National Identification Service. It is also responsible for providing personal protection officers for members of the Royal Family, members of the Government, diplomats and providing coordination in the investigation of terrorist offences.

910. **Provincial Police Forces.** There is considerable variation in the size of police forces in England and Wales, but with the exception of the MPS and the City of London Police, most forces are organised and structured as portrayed in figure 9.1.

\textsuperscript{4} Figures as at 31 March 2005, Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary Annual Report 2004/5.

\textsuperscript{5} Figures as at 31 March 2005, Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary Annual Report for Scotland 2004/5.

\textsuperscript{6} Figures as at 31 March 2005, PSNI Chief Constable’s Annual Report 2004/5.

\textsuperscript{7} The Royal Parks Operational Command Unit (OCU) was formed in April 2004 when the former Royal Parks Constabulary joined the MPS. The OCU provides police services to the 17 Royal Parks, Gardens and other open spaces within the MPS area, an area in excess of 6,000 acres.
Figure 9.1 – Typical Provincial Police Force Structure

Notes on Figure 9.1:

a. **Chief Constable.** The Chief Constable has overall strategic responsibility for his force area.

b. **Assistant Chief Constable.** The number varies from force to force, but is related to size. An Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) will have specific responsibility for functional areas, such as the Basic Command Units (BCUs) and operations.

c. **Director of Finance.** A civilian appointments with overall responsibility for finance, administration, procurement and IT. Some forces have also appointed civilian directors of Human Resources.

d. **HQ Department Functional Heads.** Subordinate to the ACC, usually with the rank of Chief Superintendent or Superintendent, Departmental Heads have responsibility for specific areas such as Operations and Special Branch.

e. **Basic Command Unit.** The BCU is, as its name suggests, the basic territorial entity in a police force, forming the units with which the local population identifies. The name will vary between forces being called various
titles such as districts, areas, operational command units or divisions. Commanded by a Superintendent or Chief Superintendent, BCU size and area of responsibility will vary, but it is usually between several hundred to 1,000 police officers and supporting personnel and its area will be coincident with local authority boundaries. The BCU area is subdivided into policing sectors, which are policed by ‘Sector teams’ that comprise of an Inspector, Sergeants and Constables.

f. **Specialist Units.** In each police force, there may be a range of specialist units such as Special Branch, a mounted branch, river police, police dog handlers, underwater search teams, firearms or air support teams.

**Scotland**

911. Scottish police forces are similar in structure to English provincial forces. However, they can differ due to the wide variations in the policing task across Scotland. In general, they are structured into Divisions or Area Commands (commanded by a Chief Superintendent or Superintendent), which are similar to the BCUs in England and Wales. These are, in turn, divided into sub-divisions, sections or local command units.

**Northern Ireland**

912. The PSNI is structured into 8 District Command Units (DCUs) each commanded by a Chief Superintendent or Superintendent.

**Other (Non-Home Office) Police Forces**

913. There are a number of police forces that do not report directly to the Home Office. Each has its own legal status, but their chief constables (or equivalent) are all represented in the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). Whilst Non-Home Office police forces include a number of smaller forces (for example the port police forces at Dover and Liverpool), the main forces are:

a. **Jersey.** The States of Jersey Police number about 250 officers; its Chief Officer reports to the Minister for Home Affairs of Jersey.

b. **Guernsey.** The Guernsey Police Force has an authorised establishment of 157 officers and is responsible for policing the Channel Islands other than Jersey. The Chief Officer of Police reports to the Committee of Home Affairs of Guernsey.

c. **Isle of Man Constabulary.** The Chief Constable of the Isle of Man Constabulary (245 officers) reports to a police committee consisting of the
Minister of Home Affairs and other members of the Isle of Man Parliament with an equal number of lay members.

d. **Ministry of Defence Police.** The Ministry of Defence Police (MDP) was formed in 1971 from the amalgamation of the existing single service constabularies and derives its authority from the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987. The MDP, of about 3,500, officers is headed by a Chief Constable and answers to the Secretary of State for Defence through the MDP Committee chaired by the 2nd Permanent Under Secretary (2nd PUS), which includes 3 independent members and police advisers. The force is responsible for policing all Ministry of Defence (MOD) property, land and personnel and also polices United States Airforce (USAF) bases, Defence Research Establishments, some Royal Ordnance factories and the Royal Mint. Its officers have full police powers in relation to those duties and, unusually for police officers, all are firearms-trained with, at any one time, 70% armed.

e. **British Transport Police.** Headed by a Chief Constable, the British Transport Police (BTP) of 2,200 officers provides a nationwide service policing the railway network throughout England, Wales and Scotland, the London Underground plus the Docklands Light Railway, Croydon Tramlink and the Midland Metro Tram System. A statutory 13 member police authority oversees the BTP, 4 of whom represent rail service providers, 4 representing rail travellers and single members each representing the interests of rail employees, the Strategic Rail Authority and those of England, Wales and Scotland.

f. **Civil Nuclear Constabulary.** The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority Constabulary (UKAEAC) was set up as part of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) by the Atomic Energy Authority Act 1954; it has a statutory remit to protect nuclear material both on UKAEA sites and in transit. The UKAEAC became an independent police force called the Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC) in April 2005 under the strategic direction of the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (DBERR), when it separated from the UKAEA as directed by the Energy Act 2005. The organisation of over 650 officers and support staff is overseen by a 7 member Civil Nuclear Police Authority appointed by the Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform. Its chairman, an independent member and a police adviser are selected after application and interview, with 4 other members being nominated by the nuclear industry.
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Capabilities

914. Considerable investment has been made in recent years in equipping the 3 main emergency services with Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Capabilities (CBRN) equipment and training them in its use. Police forces have:

(1) CBRN Personal Protection Equipment procured on a national basis with the other emergency services.
(2) CBRN trained command teams.
(3) Protected responders (Police Support Units (PSUs)) trained in the use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and the handling of CBRN incidents.
(4) Forensic Management Teams.
(5) Scenes of Crime Officers.
(6) A limited firearms capability, usually CBRN-trained firearms trainers.
(7) A limited search capability.
(8) Detection/monitoring equipment.

Central Executive and Coordinating Bodies

915. National Identification Service. Run by the Metropolitan Police at New Scotland Yard for all police forces, the National Identification Service maintains criminal records, holding some 5 million records supported by 4 million sets of fingerprints.

916. Serious Organised Crime Agency. The Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) came into being on 1 April 2006, amalgamating the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), the National Crime Squad (NCS) and elements of HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and parts of the Immigration Service. Governed by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, SOCA’s activity is directed at major criminals and organised crime at regional, national and international levels. The

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8 Emergency service CBRN training and doctrine is coordinated at the Police National CBRN Centre.
9 On average 1 or 2 GOLD and 3 or 4 SILVER commanders per force, these are available to other police forces through mutual aid arrangements.
10 The average county force has 2 PSUs.
11 Metropolitan Police SO15 Forensic unit and its regional satellite units.
12 2 CBRN trained per force on average.
13 London only at present (2004).
14 The Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency (SCDEA) performs a similar role in Scotland.
Director General is able to grant SOCA officers the powers of police constable, customs officer and immigration officer as necessary to meet operational requirements.

**Police National Information and Coordination Centre**\(^{15}\)

917. There is a statutory requirement for police forces to support each other, and this can be coordinated through the Police National Information and Coordination Centre (PNICC). PNICC is opened to support police forces in an emergency and when the resources required are beyond the capacity of any one police force. It has 3 related functions:

a. To enable ACPO to manage information regarding an emergency.

b. To coordinate the provision of mutual aid between police forces.

c. To provide a facility to ensure that Central Government is provided with information, and to ensure that information from a national perspective is available to police forces.

918. The PNICC is located at the Police National Support Centre, Victoria Street, London. As well as affording better facilities, the move assisted in communication with Government, through the Cabinet Office’s Civil Contingencies Secretariat. However, PNICC remains a police-directed and managed facility, which is kept in a constant state of readiness by full-time staff. The PNICC consists of a series of groups focusing on such issues as intelligence, planning, operations requirements and information management. It is in constant contact with police forces across the country to monitor and assess the current situation.

919. The President of ACPO takes the decision on whether to open the PNICC, and liaises at ministerial level to ensure the Government is properly briefed from the policing perspective. Another officer, of ACPO rank, and usually an Assistant Chief Constable or Commander from one of the 43 police forces, directs PNICC and provides the link between the ACPO President and the PNICC staff. That officer is assisted by a Chief of Staff, usually a Chief Superintendent, who manages and coordinates force information. Although the PNICC can provide a vital coordinating and support role, individual Chief Officers remain responsible for operations and decisions within their own force areas.

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\(^{15}\) Scotland has an equivalent facility, the Scottish Police Information and Coordination Centre (S-PICC).
National Policing Improvement Agency\textsuperscript{16}

920. The National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) is a police owned and led body, which in partnership with ACPO, the Association of Police Authorities (APA) and the Home Office, aims to improve front-line policing and thereby support the delivery of the Home Secretary’s annual mission critical priorities for the Police service. The NPIA’s primary focus is policing improvement in England and Wales. However, it has a strong relationship with policing bodies in Scotland and Northern Ireland and collaborates with them on some initiatives. The agency also has a role in ensuring that England and Wales are able to draw on international policing practice and research where appropriate.

921. NPIA areas of responsibility include:

a. The maintenance and development of national information systems such as the Police National Computer (PNC),\textsuperscript{17} National DNA database and IDENT1, the national fingerprint and palm print system.

b. The provision of specialist training for high-tech crime, forensics and major investigations.

c. The development and deployment of nationally compatible systems and infrastructure, particularly information and communications technology.\textsuperscript{18}

d. The provision of 24 hour specialist operational policing advice to guide forces through murder investigations, public order events, major incidents and searches.

e. The development and delivery of through career learning and training.\textsuperscript{19}

SECTION III – POLICE MANAGEMENT, DIRECTION AND AUDIT

The Tripartite Arrangements

922. Outside London, each police force is managed and directed by tripartite arrangements:

\textsuperscript{16} In April 2007 the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) replaced previous national policing organisations such as the Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO) and the Central Police Training and Development Authority (Centrex) as well as a number of Home Office policing policy functions.

\textsuperscript{17} The PNC database provides all forces with immediate access to criminal records, details of wanted or missing persons and vehicle registrations details.

\textsuperscript{18} See Chapter 10 for AIRWAVE secure communications details.

\textsuperscript{19} Police officer training is provided through a network of regional and satellite learning and development centres.
a. The Home Secretary, or in Scotland, the Scottish Executive and in Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland Office.

b. A Police Authority (Northern Ireland Policing Board in Northern Ireland) or Joint Policing Board.20

c. A Chief Constable.

**Home Secretary**

923. The Home Secretary (and Scottish/Northern Ireland equivalents outside England and Wales) has responsibility to promote and maintain the efficiency and effectiveness of police forces and has a range of powers, which are to:

a. Set objectives and performance targets for the policing of an area.

b. Issue codes of practice relating to the exercise of Police Authority functions.

c. Assess police forces through an inspector of constabulary.

d. Direct a Police Authority to take remedial action when an Inspector of Constabulary reports that a specific police force is under-achieving.

e. Determine the financial grant for each Police Authority.

f. Control senior appointments, usually ACC and above.

**The Police Authority**

924. The exact responsibilities and working practices of the various forms of police authorities varies across the UK. In general terms, police authorities are responsible for providing an effective and efficient local police force.

925. **England and Wales.** There are 43 police authorities in England and Wales, each of which oversees the work of its local police force. Police authorities are independent bodies made up of local people. Subject to the Home Secretary’s approval, they provide the buildings and equipment needed by a force, decide on police establishments and appoint Chief Constables and ACCs. Responsibility for delivering policing services rests with the Chief Constable. However, one key responsibility of a Police Authority is to monitor, on behalf of the local community, how well policing is being delivered and to hold a Chief Constable to account. In addition they:

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20 A term used in Scotland where force borders often cross local authority boundaries – a Joint Board represents their joint interests.
a. Consult with the local community about the policing.

b. Set the Force budget and determine how much money to raise towards the cost of policing through the local council tax.

c. Publish an annual local policing and performance plan (based on a draft by the Chief Constable) setting out priorities for the year ahead, performance targets and the allocation of resources to meet such priorities.

d. Monitor the performance of the Force in delivering the Policing Plan.

e. Report to the local community on the performance of its local police.

f. Deal with certain disciplinary matters and complaints.

926. Police authorities normally consist of 17 members including 3 magistrates, 9 local councillors and 5 independent members (normally appointed by a local selection panel), although this may vary. For example, the Metropolitan Police Authority has 23 members: 12 drawn from the Greater London Authority (GLA), 4 magistrates and 7 independent members.

927. Police authorities meet regularly to take key decisions affecting local policing and question the Chief Officer, and other senior police staff, about all aspects of a Force and its performance. These meetings are usually held in public. Police authorities also operate through committees, panels, project boards and other working groups set up to focus on particular aspects of an authority’s business. All police authorities have a Clerk and Treasurer and a small number of staff, who provide administrative, personnel, legal and policy support.

928. Association of Police Authorities. The Association of Police Authorities (APA) is the national body representing police authorities in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Set up in 1997, the APA works to develop policies on all police related issues, coordinate responses from member authorities and raise public awareness of its concerns. It provides a national voice for police authorities and supports the operation of police authorities locally.

929. Serious Organised Crime Agency Board. Unlike the National Crime Squad and the National Criminal Intelligence Service that preceded it, there is no Service Authority for the SOCA. As a non-departmental publicly funded body SOCA is governed by a board consisting of members of SOCA and non-executive members appointed by the Home Secretary. The board’s responsibility is to ensure that SOCA discharges its statutory responsibilities and implements the priorities set by the Home Secretary. The board reports to the Home Secretary on SOCA’s progress.
930. **Scotland.** In Scotland, 6 Joint Police Boards and 2 Police Authorities govern the 8 police forces. The Joint Boards were formed following local Government reorganisation in 1996, which resulted in police forces serving areas administered by 2 or more local councils. Local councils select councillors to represent their interests on the Joint Boards and Police Authorities.

931. **Northern Ireland.** In Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland Policing Board acts as the local police authority. It has 19 members, comprising 10 members of the Northern Ireland Assembly and 9 independent members appointed through open competition.

**Chief Constable**

932. The Chief Constable (Commissioner in London) is responsible for the strategic direction and management of a given police force. A Chief Constable must have regard to the local policing plan issued by the Police Authority, but is independent concerning operational matters. A Chief Constable is, however, able to influence a policing plan before a Police Authority finally gives its approval. The Chief Constable is the disciplinary authority for all ranks up to, and including, the superintendent ranks. They are accountable for the performance of their respective force, particularly with regard to the Home Secretary’s principal objectives and the annual policing plan.

**SECTION IV – FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE**

**General**

933. In England and Wales, the fire service consists of both full and part-time (retained) fire fighters. In Scotland, in addition to full-time fire fighters there are 3 categories of part-time firefighters: retained; volunteer and auxiliary. In Northern Ireland, there are full-time, retained and volunteer. Full-time firefighters predominate in urban areas, while mainly part-time crews provide rural fire cover. There are approximately 52,000 firefighters in the UK, 35,000 full-time (including about 4,500 in Scotland and 920 in Northern Ireland) and 17,000 part-time. Approximately 1,500 control room staff support them.21

934. **Legislation.** The Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) is a nominated Category 1 Responder under the CCA. The Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (and equivalent legislation in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) provides the statutory framework for the administration of the fire service. Amongst other things, this Act:

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21 See Annex 9B.
a. Requires the Secretary of State\textsuperscript{22} to prepare and keep current a national framework setting out priorities and objectives for Fire and Rescue Authorities, with the aim of promoting public safety.

b. Establishes the duties and powers of fire and rescue authorities, including the power to respond to incidents other than fires and a duty to establish mutual aid arrangements.

c. Places arrangements for fire safety, education and investigative work on a statutory footing.

d. Establishes duties and powers to ensure an adequate supply of water for firefighting purposes.

e. Establishes powers for fire and rescue authorities to perform their duties at sea, including outside UK territorial waters.

f. Allows the creation of larger fire and rescue authorities on the grounds of public safety, economy, efficiency and effectiveness.

\textbf{Responsibilities}

935. **Central Government.** The Department for Communities and local Government (DCLG)\textsuperscript{23} has LGD responsibility for the FRS. Where necessary, the DCLG mandates, through Regional Management Boards, a regional approach to issues where local fire authorities acting in isolation, do not have the capacity to provide the most efficient, effective and economical response. Consequently, a network of 9 regional control centres is being implemented, in parallel with a new communications system called Firelink,\textsuperscript{24} and regional collaboration is being encouraged in areas such as fire investigation, training and human resources.

936. **Fire and Rescue Authorities.** The fire and rescue services\textsuperscript{25} in the UK are managed and funded by Local Government fire and rescue authorities. Each authority is required to produce an Integrated Risk Management Plan, focusing on prevention rather than response with the overall aim of reducing the risk to the public and the environment from emergency incidents. This risk-based approach lends itself to cooperation with other emergency services and agencies in Local Resilience Forums.\textsuperscript{26}

937. **Fire Service College.** The FRS College at Moreton-in-Marsh near Gloucester, and its Scottish equivalent in Gullane, near Edinburgh, have a role in maintaining and

\textsuperscript{22} Secretary of State of Communities and Local Government.

\textsuperscript{23} Formerly the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM).

\textsuperscript{24} See Annex 10B.

\textsuperscript{25} See Annex 9B.

\textsuperscript{26} See Chapter 8.
improving professional standards throughout the Fire Service by providing management and specialist training courses.

938. **Chief Fire and Rescue Adviser’s Unit.** This unit is headed by a Chief Fire and Rescue Adviser. The primary responsibility of the unit is to provide Ministers and officials with direct access to a source of authoritative independent professional advice on matters of structure, organisation, performance and future development of fire and rescue business. The unit also has a number of other duties including advising Ministers, senior officials, Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) and other Government Departments during a major emergency and providing professional advice on fire and rescue service matters to local authorities, professional bodies and other interested organisations on FRS matters.

**Chief Fire Officers’ Association**

939. The Chief Fire Officers’ Association (CFOA) is the foremost official organisation for principal fire officers in the UK. The CFOA was formed in 1974 following local Government reorganisation to allow Principal fire Officers the ability to meet and discuss fire related or Government influenced matters, with the aim of reaching a combined understanding of what each UK Fire Brigade needed to improve operations and training within their service.

**Command and Control**

940. Fire brigades have the ability to mobilise personnel and equipment quickly to almost any part of the UK mainland and generally receive calls for assistance through the public service communications network. Inter-service wide-area communication is currently achieved using public networks, but there is also a local non-public capability to communicate with the other emergency services using specific systems for incident control. The Firelink programme\(^27\) is intended to improve local incident inter-service command and control.

**Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear and Conventional Terrorism\(^28\)**

941. The FRS (DCLG sponsored) ‘New Dimension’ programme\(^29\) deals specifically with the response to conventional terrorism and CBRN incidents. Fire authorities have been supplied with nationally procured equipment:

a. CBRN Personal Protection Equipment procured on a national basis with the other emergency services.

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\(^{27}\) See Annex 10B.

\(^{28}\) See Chapter 10, Paragraph 1055.

\(^{29}\) Although the Ambulance Service has the responsibility for mass decontamination, it has an arrangement with the F&RS for mass decontamination see paragraph 1056d.
b. Detection, Identification and Monitoring (DIM) equipment, strategically located across England providing a capability to detect and analyze a range of chemicals found in different forms and states.

c. Mass\textsuperscript{30} decontamination equipment, is based around modular fast-assembly kits that can be erected quickly and are strategically located no more than 45-60 minutes away from any point in the UK. The kits are transported on one of 80 Incident Response Vehicles, each of which carries 2 decontamination units. The units are self-contained, carrying water heaters and re-robing kits for decontaminated personnel.\textsuperscript{31} There are arrangements in place with the Environment Agency (and equivalents in Scotland) to dispose of contaminated water.

**Urban Search and Rescue**

942. Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) is the recovery of trapped people from collapsed buildings or wreckage. The New Dimension programme provided a US&R capability, building on the extant volunteer UK Fire Service Search and Rescue Team (UKFSSART), which was intended for deployment abroad in areas of natural disaster. New equipment, issued to Incident Response Units, has been provided to those brigades that already had a UKFSSART as an interim capability until the full equipment and training programme completes in 2007. The full capability will be provided by US&R vehicles located throughout the country in 19 teams, each consisting of 2 vehicles with dismountable pods containing technical (sensors, search tools, air lines etc) and heavy (lifting gears, shoring equipment) rescue equipment. US&R activities are supported by a programme of training at the Fire Service College and the provision of realistic training facilities.

**Firefighting Offshore**

943. The Maritime Incident Response Group (MIRG), established in April 2006, comprises 15 teams strategically located in Fire and Rescue Service Authorities\textsuperscript{32} around the country. Each of these teams, supported by paramedics, has been specially trained for firefighting in the marine environment and is equipped with the lighter, more compact equipment required when travelling by helicopter to the scene of an incident. In addition to fire fighting, they can also deal with chemical hazards and free trapped personnel. Their specialised training is also an additional resource for the emergency services across the rest of the UK.

\textsuperscript{30} Mass: planning assumption is 20,000 people in 8-10 hours.
\textsuperscript{31} Up to 200 per hour.
\textsuperscript{32} See Annex 9B.
SECTION V – NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE AND AMBULANCE SERVICES

Organisational Structures

944. **England.** The UK’s 12 Strategic Health Authorities (SHA) focus on strategic planning, performance and quality measurement to ensure that national priorities are incorporated into local health service plans, while Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) provide local care. The SHAs act as a link between PCTs and the Department of Health (DH). Hospitals in the NHS are managed by NHS Acute or Foundation Trusts with their services commissioned on behalf of patients by the PCTs. Ambulance services are provided by 13 Ambulance Service trusts, while SHAs provide health services to the whole of the UK, such as the National Blood and Transport Authority and NHS Direct. In essence, the NHS delivers 2 types of care:

a. **Primary Care.** Primary care is the first point of contact most people have with the NHS and is delivered by a wide range of professionals, including family GPs, nurses, dentists, pharmacists and opticians. This care focuses on the treatment of routine injuries and illnesses, as well as preventive care. Primary care is delivered by more than 15233 PCTs across England, which control 75% of the total NHS budget and report to their local SHA.

b. **Secondary Care.** Secondary care (also known as acute care) can be either elective or emergency and usually takes place in an NHS hospital. Elective care is planned specialist medical care or surgery, usually following referral from a primary or community health professional such as a GP. Elective care patients may be admitted either as an inpatient or a day case patient, or they may attend an outpatient consultation or clinic. Emergency care results from an accident or trauma and usually requires patients to attend the Accident and Emergency department at a hospital, either by themselves or by ambulance.

945. The Department of Health Emergency Preparedness Division oversees the provision of NHS emergency planning in England, ensures the application of lessons learned from incidents and exercises, liaises with Other Government Departments (OGDs) and assists in the development of policies and guidance. NHS Acute Trusts, Ambulance Service Trusts and PCTs are Category 1 responders under the CCA; SHAs are Category 2 Responders.

946. **Scotland.** In Scotland, health is a devolved responsibility. The Scottish Executive Health Department leads the central management of NHS Scotland, heading a Management Executive that oversees the work of 15 Area Health Boards. The

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33 In October 2006 the existing 303 PCTs in England were reorganised into a 152 PCT structure.
Health boards plan health services within their area and commission services from those who provide them, such as NHS hospital trusts and GP practices. They also conduct emergency planning for major incidents, including acts of terrorism. Special Health Boards provide pan-Scotland services, such as the one Ambulance Service Trust, the Scottish Ambulance Service.

947. **Wales.** In Wales, health is also a devolved responsibility with the Welsh Assembly’s policy direction and fund allocation managed through 21 local health boards and one unified healthcare board, each of which is coterminous with local Government unitary authorities. The Local Health Boards commission services from service providers such as NHS Hospital trusts, GP and dental practices. Like Scotland, there is one Ambulance trust, the Welsh Ambulance Services NHS Trust.

948. **Northern Ireland.** The Northern Ireland Executive’s Department of Health Social Services and Public Safety has devolved responsibility for the direction of health services through 4 Area Health and Social Services Boards, who in turn contract for the provision of services from providers such as NHS acute and community hospital trusts and GP practices. Specific training in major incident response, including CBRN attacks, has been given to members of Emergency Medical Assistance and Rescue Teams, which are multidisciplinary groups drawn from medical, ambulance and fire services. Northern Ireland is served by a single ambulance trust, the Northern Ireland Ambulance Service.

**Ambulance Services**

949. Ambulance services have particular responsibilities for the development and validation of emergency plans and are required to take the leading role in the NHS, particularly in liaison with the other emergency services. Ambulance services are nominated as Category 1 Responders in the CCA. The service is responsible for providing and coordinating the NHS response at the scene of an incident. The United Kingdom Ambulance Service is provided by separate authorities in England, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales and the Channel Islands.\(^{34}\)

950. The core role of the Ambulance Service is that of patient/casualty treatment and transport. In other scenarios, support for other agencies would, in general, be limited to light rescue extrication. The Ambulance Service does not train in technical rescue onshore or offshore and is not equipped to do so. However, some Ambulance Services have developed procedures and skills for more technical involvement and, based upon risk assessment by the Service at the time of the incident, may operate with other agencies in hazardous or irrespirable atmospheres and chemical, public order and maritime incidents.

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\(^{34}\) See Annex 9C.
951. **Command and Control.** Activation of Ambulance Service assets is by radio or data from command and communications centres specific to the Service involved, which determines the nearest available asset to be deployed. Inter-Ambulance Service communication on FM radio is nationally available by use of an Emergency Reserve Channel enabling vehicles from other services to communicate with a local control facility. Like the Fire Service, there is a replacement programme in progress to procure new communications equipment.\(^{35}\)

952. **Air Ambulance.** In addition to normal Ambulance Service assets, the Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS) and, in some areas, fixed wing air ambulance provision, is being developed to complement ambulance-based operations. Most are funded and managed by charitable trusts; however, in Scotland, they are a publicly funded part of the Scottish Ambulance Service. HEMS aircraft are required to land on-scene, or in close proximity to any incident, as they do not have a winching capability.

953. **Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear.** The Ambulance Service is the specialist adviser on decontamination\(^{36}\) during a CBRN incident. Advice should be channeled through the Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC)\(^{37}\) at the Strategic Coordination Group (SCG). Ambulance Service personnel are equipped with PPE designed for use during both HAZMAT\(^{38}\) and CBRN agents and are trained to conduct their normal lifesaving duties where there is a CBRN hazard. The Scottish Ambulance Service has a Special Operations Response Team (SORT) trained in decontamination skills that would take the lead role in decontamination in the event of CBRN type incident.

**Primary Care Trusts**

954. Outside Scotland, Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) manage local health services, which are the normal first contact with the NHS, such as GPs, dentists and opticians. PCTs have major incident plans that mobilise primary care and community services in response to a major incident. Such incident plans will also deal with a potential influx of patients (such as those with minor injuries or affected by a chemical plume) and the administering of preventive measures such as vaccines or drugs to protect the health of affected communities.

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\(^{35}\) See Annex 10B.

\(^{36}\) The main reference in this area is *The Decontamination of People Exposed to Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) Substances or Material, Strategic National Guidance*, Home Office, 2\(^{nd}\) Edition, May 2004.

\(^{37}\) See Chapter 10.

\(^{38}\) These are chemicals which can cause harm to humans, animals or the environment.
SECTION VI – MARITIME AND COASTGUARD AGENCY

Responsibilities

955. The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) is an Executive Agency of the Department for Transport (DfT). It is responsible throughout the UK for implementing the Government’s maritime safety policy. That includes:

a. Coordinating Search and Rescue (SAR) at sea by Her Majesty’s Coastguard.

b. Ensuring that ships meet UK and International safety requirements and standards.

c. Working to prevent accidents and loss of life on the coast and at sea.

d. Protecting UK interests and the maritime environment through counter pollution and pollution prevention activities.

e. The MCA is a Category 1 Responder.

956. The MCA has about 1,165 staff based at more than 30 main locations around the UK coast, supported by over 3,250 volunteer Coastguard Rescue Officers (CROs). MCA HQ is based at Southampton, but most operational work is carried out locally.

HM Coastguard

957. The MCA discharges its operational responsibilities through HM Coastguard, which is the authority responsible for the initiation and coordination of civil maritime search and rescue (SAR) throughout the UK SAR Region. This includes the mobilisation, organisation and tasking of resources to respond to persons either in distress at sea, or to persons at risk of injury or death on the cliffs or shoreline of the United Kingdom\(^{39}\) and to incidents offshore by calling out the MIRG.\(^{40}\)

958. Professional Coastguards are concentrated in 19 Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres (MRCC). The 3250 volunteer CROs make-up the Coastguard Rescue Service (CRS). The CRS is organised into local teams which form mobile SAR units that are trained and equipped to undertake land (shoreline) searches, cliff and mud rescue. These teams can respond to inland flooding to provide communications and coordination support. A limited number of teams, mainly on the East coast of Scotland, are also trained and equipped to enter slow moving flood water and support other agencies in evacuating the affected area. The MRCCs are responsible for the call-out and coordination of the Coastguard Rescue Teams (CRTs).

\(^{39}\) For details of the Defence contribution to SAR see Chapter 2.

\(^{40}\) See paragraph 942.
HM Coastguard is also the MCA’s initial point of contact for marine salvage and the management of marine pollution from shipping and offshore installations through its Counter Pollution and Response Branch. Collocated with the MCA is the Secretary of State’s Representative (SOSREP). SOSREP is empowered under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995, and subsequent legislation, to intervene on behalf of the Secretary of State for Transport in salvage operations given certain conditions. This includes powers to require that a ship be moved to, or be removed from, or is not to be moved from a specified area or locality or from UK waters. There are also powers given to SOSREP to establish a Temporary Exclusion Zone. SOSREP has similar powers, delegated by the Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, regarding pollution from offshore oil and gas installations. These powers may only be exercised if there is a threat of significant pollution to the environment.

To support salvage and counter pollution operations, the MCA has access to various resources:

a. Four Emergency Towing Vessels (ETV).

b. Call-out agreements (Coastguard Agreement for Salvage and Towing) with various salvage and tug organisations.

c. Stockpiles of salvage and counter pollution equipment.

**Command and Control**

The MCA is structured into 3 Search and Rescue Regions (SRR), each consisting of 3 Areas.\(^{41}\) Within each area there are 2 MRCCs. The hierarchy consists of a Regional Operations Manager, 3 Area Operations Managers and 2 Rescue Coordination Centre Managers to each area. Sector Managers, normally 7 in each area, train and manage the CRTs. At each MRCC a Watch Manager has delegated operational authority to act as the SAR mission coordinator during the period of his/her duty. The MCA regions are:

a. **Scotland and Northern Ireland Region.** The region covers Scotland, Northern Ireland and the Scottish Isles. There are 6 MRCCs and 4 Marine Offices within the region. There are also 205 smaller properties, which accommodate Sector Managers and CRTs. Within the region there are 2 Coastguard Emergency Towing Vessels (ETVs), one of which is stationed in the Minches and the other in the Fair Isle Channel. The region’s oil-related responsibilities include SAR for in excess of 90 Mobile Rigs and over 100 Production Platforms; over 15,000 personnel work offshore in its area. In total, the region employs 264 permanent staff and 1,310 CROs.

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\(^{41}\) See Annex 9D.
b. **Wales and Western Region.** The region runs from the Mull of Galloway in Dumfries and Galloway to Lyme Regis on the Devon/Dorset border. It encompasses 6 MRCCs, 5 Marine Offices (some of which are collocated), 2 fishing vessel Marine Offices and some 104 smaller properties, which house auxiliary teams and their 22 Sector Managers. The region also directs a Coastguard ETV that protects the SW approaches. Falmouth MRCC, which coordinates the operation of the ETV, is also the International Liaison Station for the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS). The Registry of Shipping and Seamen is collocated with Cardiff Marine Office and the Regional Headquarters. In total, the region employs 273 permanent staff and 1300 Auxiliary Coastguards.

c. **East of England Region.** The region runs from Lyme Regis to the Scotland/England Border on the east coast of the UK. There are 6 MRCCs, 8 Marine Offices (some of which are collocated), complemented by 175 staff, 22 Sector Managers and almost 900 Auxiliary Coastguards. The region has particular responsibilities for the Channel Navigation Information System that conducts continuous radar surveillance of the Dover Straits and its approaches.

962. **HM Coastguard Search and Rescue Helicopters.** HM Coastguard operates 4 SAR helicopters in Shetland, Stornaway, Portland and Lee-on-Solent, which supplement military SAR assets,\(^\text{42}\) to achieve coverage of the UK SAR Region.

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**SECTION VII – OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES**

**Environment Agency**

963. The Environment Agency (EA) is the leading organisation for protecting and improving the environment in England and Wales.\(^\text{43}\) The agency is a non-departmental public body, funded largely by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), and the Welsh Assembly Government, and is a Category 1 Responder under the CCA. It has 11,000 staff and over 50% of its annual budget is allocated to capital spending on flood defences.

964. Unlike its partners, the EA’s regions (7 English plus Wales) and areas (26 in total) are based on water catchment boundaries rather than county or district boundaries. Although not an emergency service, it has a 24-hour callout system, which will respond to an incident that has caused, or has the potential to cause, harm to the natural environment (air, land and water), human health or the built environment. It also has inspection, regulatory and prosecution responsibilities on matters affecting the environment, for example management of hazardous waste, air

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\(^{42}\) Described in Chapter 2.

\(^{43}\) In Northern Ireland, the Environment and Heritage Service (Northern Ireland).
quality, flood management navigation on certain inland waterways, estuaries and harbours and waste management.

965. Key responsibilities include:

a. Maintaining flood defences on certain rivers and coastlines.

b. The issue of warnings to those likely to be affected by flooding or environmental damage.

c. Provision of specialist environmental advice (usually through the STAC\textsuperscript{44} at the SCG).

d. Monitoring an incident to minimise the impact on the environment.

e. Investigating the cause of an incident (if natural rather than criminal).

**Scottish Environment Protection Agency**

966. The Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) is a non-Departmental public body with responsibility for protecting and improving the environment in Scotland. SEPA is a Category 1 Responder and operates a 24-hour callout system. It will respond to an incident that has caused, or is the potential to cause, harm to the natural environment (air, water and land), human health or the built environment and will support the multi-agency management of incidents. SEPA responsibilities include:

a. Enforcement of powers to monitor, prevent, minimise or reduce pollution of the environment.

b. Regulation of the treatment, storage, movement (non-radioactive waste) and disposal of waste, including hazardous waste.

c. As flood warning authority, the provision of information on flood warnings across Scotland.

d. Administration, jointly with the Health and Safety Executive, of the Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) regulations.

e. Regulation of the accumulation and disposal of radioactive waste and the operation of Scottish interest in the Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network (RIMNET).\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{44} See Chapter 10.

\textsuperscript{45} The rest of the network is operated by Defra.
Health Protection Agency

967. The Health Protection Agency (HPA) is a national organisation for England and Wales\(^{46}\) dedicated to protecting people’s health and reducing the impact and consequences of infectious diseases, chemicals, poisons and radiation hazards. It brings together the expertise of health and scientific professionals working in public health, communicable diseases, emergency planning, infection control, laboratories, poisons, chemicals and radiation hazards.

968. The Health Protection Agency Bill 2004, established the Agency as a UK-wide non-departmental public body, incorporating the National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB) and the pre-existing Special Health Authority of the same name. Its 3000 staff are organised into a regional structure (coterminous with the Government Offices of the Regions) and 39 local Health Protection Units, as well as 3 specialist centres dealing with communicable disease surveillance and specialist microbiology (Colingdale), radiation, chemical and environmental hazards (Chilton) applied microbiological research and emergency response (Porton). Its advice is normally presented to an SCG through the STAC.

Health Protection Scotland

969. Health Protection Scotland (HPS) was established in November 2004 by the Scottish Executive to strengthen and coordinate health protection in Scotland and incorporates the functions of the Scottish Centre for Infection and Environmental Health. It is responsible for the national surveillance of communicable diseases and environmental health hazards and the provision of expert operational support on infection and environmental health to health boards and local authorities in Scotland, as well as commissioning national reference library services.

SECTION VIII – VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS

970. Significant reliance is placed on Voluntary Organisations in responding to major emergencies. It is part of the function of the local authority to coordinate the work of these organisations. The National Council for Voluntary Organisations (www.ncvo-vol.org.uk), in 2004, identified 169,249 Voluntary Organisations in existence. The following is not a definitive list.

Royal National Lifeboat Institution

971. The Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI) is a voluntary organisation supported by charitable contributions from the public. The RNLI is not part of the MCA, but works to it by responding to requests for assistance from HM Coastguard.

\(^{46}\) In Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland Executive’s Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety.
It provides, on call, a 24-hour service to cover SAR requirements up to 100 miles out from the coast of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, and a beach rescue service on 71 beaches in the south west of England and Norfolk. There are 232 lifeboat stations strategically placed around the UK and Republic of Ireland. In 2006, the RNLI launched 8377 missions that rescued 8015 people and RNLI beach lifeguards assisted 10448 people.

972. In addition to its traditional lifesaving services at sea and from beaches, the organisation operates hovercraft at 4 locations to cover inter-tidal areas of mud banks and sand not accessible by traditional lifeboats and inland lifeboat stations at Enniskillen, Lough Derg and the South Broads.

Mountain Rescue in the UK

973. Except for incidents on sea cliffs where HM Coastguard is responsible, the overall responsibility for SAR in the UK rests with the Chief Constable of the Police for the area in which the incident occurs. Assistance may be requested from voluntary rescue teams, National Park Rangers, RAF Mountain Rescue Teams (MRTs), and RAF or Royal Navy SAR helicopters. All of these bodies work together both in the field and in the planning and organisation of rescue. The voluntary rescue teams in England and Wales are all autonomous bodies composed of unpaid volunteers, who are called out by the Police when their services are required. More recently, there has been a considerable increase in the number of requests from the Police to the voluntary rescue teams for assistance in searching and rescuing in a non-mountain environment.

974. The various local teams are grouped into autonomous regional organisations that vary slightly in their organisation and function. They are usually responsible for operations involving two or more teams together with police forces serving their area, the RAF or RN SAR helicopter stations and rescue teams. Nationally, the Mountain Rescue (England and Wales) is a voluntary, charitable, autonomous coordinating body to which all the various regional bodies belong together with the British Cave Rescue Council and the Search and Rescue Dog Association (SARDA). The membership of the Mountain Rescue (England and Wales) extends to cover the ACPO, HM Coastguard, RAF SAR, the Chief Fire Officers Association, the Sports Council and the Ambulance Service Association. In Scotland the individual MRTs are members of the Mountain rescue Committee of Scotland. Organisations include:

a. **Mountain Rescue (England and Wales)**. The Mountain Rescue (England and Wales) acts as the liaison and cooperation between 47 independent MRTs, including 2 MOD MRTs, which are grouped into 8 regional associations.\(^{47}\)

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\(^{47}\) See Annex 9E.
b. **Mountain Rescue Committee of Scotland.** Twenty two civilian, 3 Police and 2 MOD independent MRTs in Scotland are structured under the auspices of the Mountain Rescue Committee of Scotland (MRC of S). 48

c. **Association of Lowland Search and Rescue.** The Association of Lowland Search and Rescue (ALSAR) develops, coordinates and promotes the activities of 14 lowland SAR teams covering areas not served by the MRC or MRC of S. 49

d. **Northern Ireland Mountain, Cave and Cliff Rescue Coordinating Committee.** Three voluntary teams (Mourne, North West MRTs and Police Service of Northern Ireland SAR Team) and the Irish Cave Rescue Organisation provide SAR cover in Northern Ireland, in close coordination with their equivalent in the Republic of Ireland, the Irish Mountain Rescue Association.

975. **Search and Rescue Dog Association.** SARDA is a voluntary organisation dedicated to the use of dogs in searching for missing persons. The members are commonly drawn from MRTs and its regional associations are affiliated to the MRC and MRC of S.

**Cave Rescue**

976. **British Cave Rescue Council.** Cave rescues in the UK are carried out by 15 cave rescue organisations. The British Cave Rescue Council (BCRC) is the representative body for cave rescue teams and is affiliated to the MRC.

**Voluntary Aid Societies**

977. The National Voluntary Aid Society Emergency Committee (NVASEC) is the coordinating body for the 3 Voluntary Aid Societies in the UK: The British Red Cross Society; St John Ambulance; and St Andrew’s Ambulance. The Voluntary Aid Societies (VAS) are used in support of the general work of the emergency services (such as provision of first aid personnel or vehicles) or the general healthcare system by carrying out routine admissions, inter-hospital transfers, outpatient movements and the discharge of routine patients. The VAS will not always be present at major incidents. However, they are factored into emergency planning, either to supplement full-time emergency services committed to an incident to ensure normal services continue or direct involvement, if the situation demands.

978. **British Red Cross.** The Red Cross and Red Crescent movement is the largest humanitarian network in the world. The British Red Cross has over 35,000 volunteers

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48 See Annex 9F.
49 See Annex 9E.
throughout the UK working within virtually all communities. It is an integral part of local authority emergency planning, its volunteers providing first aid, emotional and practical support such as providing information to people evacuated to rest and reception centres or person tracing.

979. **St John Ambulance.** St John Ambulance is a self-funding charitable company dedicated to the provision of first aid and medical services in support of community needs and education, training and personal development to young people. Over 60% of its volunteers are under the age of 25. In England, it has over 23,000 adult volunteers trained in First Aid and 1,300 vehicles, including the largest single ambulance fleet in the country. St John Ambulance Wales, a separate charitable institution, performs a similar role in Wales where 2,000 adult volunteers operate over 80 ambulances. Both organisations have emergency planning officers working in the respective council headquarters.

980. **St Andrew’s Ambulance Association.** St Andrew’s Ambulance Association performs a similar role in Scotland to that of St John Ambulance in England and Wales, training over 20,000 people every year.

**Voluntary Organisations**

981. Many other voluntary organisations may be able to contribute to an effective response to a disaster. Their work will usually be coordinated by the Local Authority. They include:

a. **Women’s Royal Voluntary Service.** A voluntary service of over 70,000 volunteers (including 10,000 men) dedicated to tackling social isolation or deprivation through England Scotland and Wales. Their chief role in emergencies is the provision of assistance to people affected by disasters, such as evacuees, and the supply of refreshments to emergency services. To achieve this task, the Women’s Royal Voluntary Service (WRVS) has 24-hour rapid response teams and is written into local authority emergency plans.

b. ** Salvation Army.** The Salvation Army in the UK and Ireland is part of an international Christian church working in 109 countries worldwide. The Salvation Army keeps stocks of resources appropriate for a major incident and each region or division has a divisional emergency plan that relates to that particular area. This plan is lodged with local emergency services so that they can call on the Salvation Army as required. The Salvation Army has particular strengths in evacuation, mass feeding, food distribution, shelter and clothing distribution, counselling, emergency mortuaries and finding missing persons.

c. **Radio Amateurs’ Emergency Network.** Radio Amateurs’ Emergency Network (RAYNET) is a national voluntary communications service provided
by licensed radio amateurs. It has about 5000 members in 200 local groups. RAYNET can provide additional communications at major incidents by using a volunteer’s own equipment to transmit voice and data communications over both long and short distances.

d. **Missions to Seafarers.** The Mission to Seafarers is a missionary society of the Anglican Church caring for the spiritual and practical welfare of seafarers. Based in port areas, they can provide counselling and other welfare facilities.

e. **Victim Support.** Victim Support is a national charity that helps people cope with crime. However, its counsellors may also be utilised during major emergencies.

f. **The Samaritans.** The Samaritans provide confidential emotional support counselling 24 hours a day. Its counsellors may also be able to assist during an emergency.

g. **First Aid Nursing Yeomanry.** The First Aid Nursing Yeomanry (FANY) (Princess Royal’s Volunteer Corps), a registered charity in the London area, has particular skills in first aid, communications and running a casualty bureau.

h. **Disaster Action.** Disaster Action is a charity set up by the survivors and bereaved in response to a series of disasters, which occurred in the UK in the late 1980s. It offers support and guidance to those directly affected by disaster and provides advice to emergency management organisations to ensure that the immediate needs of those affected by disasters are taken into account.
ANNEX 9A – POLICE FORCE AREAS
# POLICE FORCES

## Scotland
- I Northern Constabulary
- II Grampian Police
- III Tayside Police
- IV Central Scotland Police
- V Fife Constabulary
- VI Strathclyde Police
- VII Lothian and Borders Police
- VIII Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary

## England & Wales
1. Avon and Somerset Constabulary
2. Bedfordshire Police
3. Cambridgeshire Constabulary
4. Cheshire Constabulary
5. City of London Police
6. Cleveland Police
7. Cumbria Constabulary
8. Derbyshire Constabulary
9. Devon and Cornwall Constabulary
10. Dorset Police
11. Durham Constabulary
12. Dyfed-Powys Police
13. Essex Police
14. Gloucestershire Constabulary
15. Greater Manchester Police
16. Gwent Police
17. Hampshire Constabulary
18. Hertfordshire Constabulary
19. Humberside Police
20. Kent Police
21. Lancashire Constabulary
22. Leicestershire Constabulary
23. Lincolnshire Police
24. Merseyside Police
25. Metropolitan Police Service
26. Norfolk Constabulary
27. Northamptonshire Police
28. Northumbria Police
29. North Wales Police
30. North Yorkshire Police
31. Nottinghamshire Police
32. South Wales Police
33. South Yorkshire Police
34. Staffordshire Police
35. Suffolk Constabulary
36. Surrey Police
37. Sussex Police
38. Thames Valley Police
39. Warwickshire Police
40. West Mercia Constabulary
41. West Midlands Police
42. West Yorkshire Police
43. Wiltshire Constabulary

## Northern Ireland
- 44 Police Service of Northern Ireland

## Isle of Man
- A Isle of Man Constabulary
- Guernsey Police Force
- States of Jersey Police

## Not Shown
ANNEX 9B – FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE AREAS
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fire and Rescue Service</th>
<th>Fire and Rescue Service</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Central Scotland Fire Brigade</td>
<td>32 Isle of Man Fire &amp; Rescue Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Dumfries &amp; Galloway Fire Brigade</td>
<td>33 Kent Fire Brigade*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Fife Fire &amp; Rescue Service</td>
<td>34 Lancashire Fire &amp; Rescue Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Grampian Fire Brigade</td>
<td>35 Leicestershire Fire &amp; Rescue Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Highland &amp; Islands Fire Brigade*</td>
<td>36 Lincolnshire Fire &amp; Rescue Service*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Lothian &amp; Borders Fire Brigade*</td>
<td>37 London Fire Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Strathclyde Fire Brigade*</td>
<td>38 Merseyside Fire Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Tayside Fire Brigade</td>
<td>39 Mid &amp; West Wales Fire Brigade*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue Service</td>
<td>40 Norfolk Fire Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Avon Fire Brigade</td>
<td>41 North Wales Fire Service*</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 Bedfordshire &amp; Luton Fire &amp; Rescue Service</td>
<td>42 North Yorkshire Fire &amp; Rescue Service</td>
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<td>12 Buckinghamshire Fire &amp; Rescue Service</td>
<td>43 Northamptonshire Fire &amp; Rescue Service</td>
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<td>15 Cleveland Fire &amp; Rescue Service</td>
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<td>47 Royal Berkshire Fire &amp; Rescue Service</td>
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<td>17 Cumbria County Fire Service</td>
<td>48 Shropshire Fire &amp; Rescue Service</td>
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<td>49 South Wales Fire Service</td>
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<td>19 Devon and Somerset Fire &amp; Rescue Service</td>
<td>50 South Yorkshire Fire &amp; Rescue Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Dorset Fire &amp; Rescue Service</td>
<td>51 Staffordshire Fire &amp; Rescue Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 County Durham &amp; Darlington Fire &amp; Rescue Brigade</td>
<td>52 Suffolk County Fire Service*</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 East Sussex Fire Brigade*</td>
<td>53 Surrey Fire &amp; Rescue Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Essex County Fire &amp; Rescue Service</td>
<td>54 Tyne &amp; Wear Metropolitan Fire Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Gloucestershire Fire &amp; Rescue Service</td>
<td>55 Warwickshire Fire &amp; Rescue Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Greater Manchester County Fire &amp; Rescue Service</td>
<td>56 West Midlands Fire Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Hampshire Fire &amp; Rescue Service*</td>
<td>57 West Sussex Fire Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 Hereford &amp; Worcester Fire Brigade</td>
<td>58 West Yorkshire Fire Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Hertfordshire Fire &amp; Rescue Service</td>
<td>59 Wiltshire Fire Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Humberside Fire Brigade*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Isle of Wight Fire &amp; Rescue Service</td>
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</table>

**Not shown**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fire and Rescue Service</th>
<th>Fire and Rescue Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 Isles of Scilly Fire &amp; Rescue Service</td>
<td>60 States of Guernsey Fire Service*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>61 States of Jersey Fire &amp; Rescue Service*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>62 States of Alderney Fire Service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 * Fire Services that provide Maritime Incident Response Group teams.
ANNEX 9C – AMBULANCE SERVICE AREAS

New trust area (names of the new trusts need to be determined)

1 North East
2 North West
3 Yorkshire and the Humber
4 East Central
5 West Central
6 East of England
7 London
8 South East A
9 South East B
10 South West A
11 South West B
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>Ambulance Trust</th>
<th>Area Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North East Ambulance Service NHS Trust</td>
<td>North East, Part of Tees, East &amp; North Yorkshire.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust</td>
<td>Cumbria, Lancashire, Mersey Region, Greater Manchester.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yorkshire Ambulance Service NHS Trust</td>
<td>Part of Tees, East &amp; North Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, South Yorkshire.¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust</td>
<td>East Midlands, Lincolnshire, Half of Two Shires.²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>West Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust</td>
<td>West Midlands, Hereford &amp; Worcester, Coventry &amp; Warwickshire, Staffordshire.³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffordshire Ambulance Service NHS Trust</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Trust</td>
<td>Kent, Surrey, Sussex.⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>South Central Ambulance Service NHS Trust</td>
<td>Hampshire, Royal Berkshire, Oxfordshire, Half of Two Shires.⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Great Western Ambulance Services NHS Trust</td>
<td>Bristol, North Somerset, Bath &amp; North East Somerset, Wiltshire, Gloucestershire.⁶</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>South West Ambulance Service NHS Trust</td>
<td>Devon, Dorset, Cornwall, Isles of Scilly, Somerset.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Isle of Wight Healthcare Primary Care Trust</td>
<td>Isle of Wight</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ With the exception of North and North East Lincolnshire (see East Midlands).
² With the exception of Glossop and the addition of North and North East Lincolnshire.
³ Staffordshire to remain separate, working in part with the West Midlands with eventual merger.
⁴ This includes the area covered by Rushmoor District Council and part of Hart District Council.
⁵ With the exception of Rushmoor District Council, part of Hart District Council and the electoral ward of Shrivenham.
⁶ Plus the electoral ward of Shriveham (Vale of the White Horse Council).
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
ANNEX 9F – MOUNTAIN RESCUE COMMITTEE OF SCOTLAND

Aberdeen MRT  Arran MRT  Arrochar MRT
Assynt MRT  Borders SAR Unit  Brahma Mra
Cairngorm MRT  Dundonnell MRT  Galloway MRT
Glencoe MRT  Glenelg MRT  Glenmore Lodge MRT
Grampian Police MRT  Killin MRT  RAF Kinloss MRT
Kintail MRT  RAF Leuchars  Lochaber MRT
Lomond MRT  Moffat MRT  Ochils MRT
Skye MRT  Strathclyde Police MRT  Tayside MRT
Tayside Police SARU  Torridon MRT  Tweed Valley MRT

SARDA Scotland  SARDA Southern Scotland
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CHAPTER 10 – MAJOR INCIDENT RESPONSE

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

1001. The preceding chapters have established the context, framework and nature of military operations in the UK (UK Ops) and the equivalent civilian capabilities, organisations and procedures. This chapter covers the generic command framework and structure of the multi-agency response, the various types and scale of contingencies and the care and treatment of people involved in a major incident. This chapter draws heavily on ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’, and its Devolved Administration (DA) equivalents, which are the definitive references for the civilian response.

Objectives

1002. Irrespective of the particular responsibilities of organisations and agencies that may be involved with the emergency response, they will all work to the following common objectives:

a. Saving and protecting life.
b. Relieving suffering.
c. Containing the emergency and limiting its escalation.
d. Providing the public with warnings, advice and information.
e. Protecting the health and safety of personnel.
f. Safeguarding the environment.
g. Protecting property.
h. Maintaining or restoring critical services.
i. Maintaining normal services at an appropriate level.
j. Promoting and facilitating self-help in the community.
k. Facilitating investigations and inquiries.
l. Facilitating the physical, social, economic and psychological recovery of the community.

m. Evaluating the response and recovery effort and identifying lessons.

1003. An incident is usually described in 2 phases, crisis and consequence management. The crisis phase is the early stage of an incident where prime responsibility lies with the first responders and action is focused on saving life, property and containing the incident; on the other hand, consequence management is directed at recovery from an incident and a return to normality. It is important to note that crisis and consequence management is not a sequential process, rather ends of a continuum. Consequence management will begin before a crisis is resolved, for example, efforts to mitigate the effects of a particular threat (terrorist weapon or chemical incident) such as the evacuation of an area or the removal of combustible materials.

SECTION II – COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANISATION

General

1004. In order to achieve a combined and coordinated response to a major emergency, the capabilities of the emergency services should be closely linked with those of the Armed Forces, local authorities and other agencies. To this end, a generic command and control (C2) structure has been agreed nationally, which can be employed for all incidents, but remains sufficiently flexible to be adjusted for a specific scenario. The structure defines relationships between differing levels of management, but allows each agency to tailor its own response plans in order to interface with the plans of others. Unlike conventional military C2 hierarchies, the Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) structure forms-up as needed, grows as necessary and, when no longer required, disperses.

1005. The management of the response to major emergencies will normally be undertaken at 3 levels: the operational, tactical and strategic, depending on the nature and scale of the emergency. It is a characteristic of the C2 chain that for rapid-onset emergencies, in a limited area, the structure tends to be activated from the bottom upwards. For wide-area, slowly evolving emergencies, the converse is often the case.

1006. The terms Bronze, Silver and Gold (for operational, tactical and strategic respectively) are in common use in many organisations as alternatives for levels of command. These command levels are role-orientated and should not be confused with rank structures. The most appropriate and experienced officer will be nominated to

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2 For the military reader it is essential to note that the IEM community’s usage of these familiar military terms is different: IEM ‘operational’ roughly equates to military ‘tactical’, and vice versa. Use of the colour codes Bronze, Silver and Gold as described later will help to avoid confusion.

3 For example: Explosions and transport accidents.

4 For example: Disruption to the fuel supply and spread of infectious disease.

5 Not all police forces use Gold, Silver and Bronze terminology, although it is very common. It is not used in Scotland.
command, and for some incidents, specially trained (for example, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN)) commanders will be required.

**Operational (Bronze) Level ‘Forward Command’**

1007. At the start of an incident, for which there has been no warning, the operational (Bronze) level will be activated first. Usually located at the on-scene Forward Control Point, or close to the incident depending on the assessed danger, the Bronze commander’s role is:

a. Assessment of the extent of the incident.

b. Consideration of the need for the next level of command.

c. Management of specific areas of responsibility.\(^6\)

d. Obtaining further resources as required.

e. To determine specific tasks to be undertaken.

1008. The operational level reflects the normal day-to-day arrangements for responding to smaller scale emergencies. First responders will take appropriate immediate measures to save life and then assess the extent of problem, taking due regard of risk reduction measures and the health and safety of personnel. Details of the assessment will be passed back to the control room, which will effectively become the initial Silver commander and can determine whether the nature of the incident requires a dedicated Silver Commander.

1009. Operational commanders will concentrate their resources on the specific tasks within their areas of responsibility. They will act on delegated responsibility from their parent organisations until other levels of command are established. Individual agencies retain full command of the resources that they apply within a geographical area, or use for a specific purpose, liaising with others to ensure coherency. The Police will normally act as the response coordinator at an identifiable scene.

**Tactical (Silver) Level ‘Incident Command’**

1010. Bronze arrangements will be adequate for the coordination and resolution of most minor emergencies. For serious incidents, which require significantly greater resources, it may be necessary to implement an additional level of C2. A key function of an operational commander or manager will be to consider whether the circumstances warrant a tactical (Silver) level of management.

\(^6\) For example, there could be inner and outer cordon commanders, a commander of RV points and marshalling areas, and a forward ambulance incident officer etc; these would all be at the Bronze level.
1011. Usually located close to the scene for a rapid onset emergency, the Silver Commander’s role is:

a. To determine priorities in allocating resources.

b. To carry out the planning function and coordination of the response.

c. To obtain further resources as required.

d. Assess significant risks and use this to inform tasking of Bronze commanders.

e. Ensure the health and safety of the public and responding personnel.

f. To consider the need for a strategic level of command.

1012. The key feature of Silver command, is that it will consider consequence management early (this may hasten the requirement for a Gold Commander), while the Bronze Commander’s attentions are directed towards rescue, then mitigation and resolution of the incident.

1013. Where there is an identifiable scene, tactical management is usually undertaken from an Incident Control Point\(^7\) established in the vicinity of the incident. While many tactical functions will then be discharged at or close to the scene, tactical managers must concentrate on overall general management. Although they need to be aware of what is happening at the operational level, they should leave the responsibility for dealing with that level to operational managers.\(^8\) For emergencies without a specific scene, a silver headquarters may still be required to coordinate an effective multi-agency response.

1014. Some agencies, for example local authorities, may prefer to operate from their administrative offices but will often send liaison officers to enhance coordination.\(^9\) Inter-agency meetings at appropriate intervals between tactical managers and relevant liaison officers\(^10\) will aim to achieve effective coordination. Planning must also take into account that there may be a number of individual events, or in fact no actual central location to attend, for example during widespread disruption, health emergencies or if the incident is overseas.

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\(^7\) Many agencies have mobile control rooms to perform this function, often collocated to enhance coordination. In London, groupings of Incident Control Points (ICPs) at Silver Control are known as the Joint Emergency Services Control Centre.

\(^8\) Consistent with the military principle of Mission Command.

\(^9\) For specific incidents, such as, flooding, local authorities will have well-exercised call-out routines and nominated officers, who will attend incidents with appropriate information and are empowered to activate local authority resources such as emergency housing and dormant contracts with contractors. This will normally be detailed in the local authority’s major incident plan.

\(^10\) For example: Maritime and Coastguard Agency, the Environment Agency, health organisations, gas, electricity, telephone, water companies, industrial and commercial concerns and environmental specialists.
Strategic (Gold) Level Command

1015. Some incidents, and the early stages of more serious incidents, may only require operational and tactical levels of command. However, if it becomes apparent that the resources or expertise required are beyond the tactical commander, or if there is a need to coordinate more than one incident/scene for which tactical command has been established, a strategic command will be necessary. Major emergencies can place considerable demands on the resources of the responding organisations, with significant challenges for business continuity management and implications for communities, economies and the environment. Such matters require the attention of senior management and possibly the elected members of local authorities. The multi-agency group, which brings together gold\textsuperscript{11} commanders from relevant organisations, is called the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG), although it is also commonly referred to as ‘gold command’ or simply ‘gold’.

1016. The purpose of the SCG is to take overall responsibility for the multi-agency management of the emergency and to establish the policy and strategic framework within which, the Silver level will work. The SCG will:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a.] Determine and promulgate a clear strategic aim and objectives and review them regularly.
  \item[b.] Establish a policy framework for the overall management of the event or situation.
  \item[c.] Prioritise the demands of silver and allocate personnel and resources to meet requirements.
  \item[d.] Formulate and implement media-handling and public communication plans.
  \item[e.] Direct planning and operations beyond the immediate response in order to facilitate the recovery process.
\end{itemize}

1017. The requirement for Gold management may be confined to selected agencies. For example, major flooding would require Gold management from the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) and Environment Agency (EA), but the impact on other agencies might be significantly less. However, emergencies are invariably multi-agency and rarely remain within the scope of a single agency. Even if not directly involved, it may still be appropriate for an agency to send liaison officers to the SCG.

\textsuperscript{11} The ‘Gold’ term is not used in Scotland except in counter-terrorism incidents.
1018. The SCG should be based at an appropriate pre-planned location,\textsuperscript{12} away from the disaster scene. Its members are representatives drawn from all relevant agencies, with authority to make executive decisions appropriate to the circumstances. The SCG itself has no executive authority, but discussion and consensus at the SCG leads to its individual members directing action in their own agencies with greater coherence. Individual agencies may establish their own strategic command centres, working in close liaison with the SCG. The SCG may be assisted by members of the Major Disaster Advisory Team,\textsuperscript{13} a group of police officers with practical experience of dealing with major incidents.

1019. On most occasions, it will be a police responsibility to establish and initially chair the SCG, although the chair may pass between agencies. It is usual to locate the SCG at police headquarters, in the first instance. However, it may move to the local authority during the recovery phase, when the emergency services may have little or no involvement, or to another relevant agency.

1020. In the case of a wide-area emergency, the SCG will need to liaise with similar neighbouring SCGs and, during the recovery phase, with the appropriate Government Office of the Region or DA. When appropriate, it provides the focus for communication to and from the Lead Government Department (LGD).\textsuperscript{14} Government advisors or liaison officers may attend SCG meetings depending on the nature of the incident (for example, nuclear or terrorist incidents).

1021. The SCG should develop a strategy for providing information to the public and for dealing with the media. The SCG will often need to designate a media briefing centre and appoint a suitable manager (normally a police media relations officer). More detail on media management is at Annex 10A.

1022. \textbf{Sub Groups.} The SCG may direct the establishment of a number of sub-groups to address particular issues. These could include:

a. A Government Liaison Team (GLT).

b. A Joint Intelligence Group (JIG).

c. Scientific and Technical Advisory Cell (STAC).\textsuperscript{15}


\textsuperscript{12} For example, many police forces earmark their training facilities, maintaining separation from their control rooms, which of course need to continue with routine business, and local authorities their council meeting rooms.

\textsuperscript{13} Call-out is coordinated through the Incident Management Team at National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA).

\textsuperscript{14} See Chapter 8.

\textsuperscript{15} Formerly the Health Advisory Team (HAT).
Some of these groups, for example the JIG and GLT, may not be established for a non-terrorist incident.

1023. Further issues which may need to be considered, include:

a. Welfare and support for those dealing with or affected by events, including the relatives and friends of those killed, injured or traumatised.

b. Visits by VIPs.

c. Facilitation of inquiries and investigations.

d. The international and diplomatic dimension.

**Government Office Role**

1024. The Government Offices (GOs) in the English regions can provide a useful link to Central Government during a non-terrorist emergency. They will often be the first organisation that Government Departments approach for a situation report on non-terrorist incidents, with the Regional Resilience Teams (RRTs) usually acting as the first point of contact. The GOs are likely to have a role to play in most emergencies that could generate ministerial interest or national/regional press coverage. Government Departments may also use GOs to cascade information and guidance to local responders. The GOs have substantial knowledge and experience of Central Government and provide a valuable immediate source of advice and guidance. In most local emergencies, the GOs role will be limited to gathering information to forward to Central Government. The mechanisms for alerting, mobilising and information sharing between local responders and the GO will be set out in Regional Response Plans. During a non-terrorist emergency incident in England, the role of the GO is to:

a. Act as the main communication point between Government Departments and the multi-agency strategic coordinating groups in the region.

b. Provide representatives, as required, (Government Liaison Officers) to the multi-agency strategic coordinating groups in the region.

c. Provide assessment and situation reports to Central Government and to Other Government Departments (OGDs).

d. Provide support to the operation of the Regional Civil Contingencies Committee (RCCC) when convened, and if appointed, the Regional Nominated Coordinator.

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10-7

**See ER&R Chapter 7 for details.**
e. Provide support to LGDs and local responders as required where the RCCC has not been convened or is no longer sitting (for example, during the recovery phase).

f. Liaison with adjacent regions or the DAs; if necessary one GO (typically that of the region most severely affected) may take the lead role.

**Government Liaison Team**

1025. In counter-terrorist incidents, there are arrangements for a Home Office (HO) led GLT to be activated. The GLT comprises representatives of Central Government and is intended to take pressure off the Gold commander by:

   a. Keeping the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) fully informed of the incident.

   b. Accelerating liaison between the Gold Commander and COBR when Central Government involvement is required in decision-making.

   c. Ensuring that the Police interest is taken fully into account at COBR.

   d. Ensuring smooth communication flow between COBR and the incident.

   e. If the GLT is activated, the GLO from the GO or DA will normally be collocated with that team to advise on consequence management and recovery.

**Joint Intelligence Group**

1026. The JIG is a multi-agency intelligence fusion centre routinely established during terrorist/CBRN incidents and when deemed necessary by the SCG. It is formed from representatives of the Security Service, Police, Defence Intelligence and other agencies to draw and fuse information from their respective collection assets.

1027. The JIG chairman is normally a Detective Chief Inspector, supported by a Detective Inspector. Attendance at the JIG is coordinated by the Police National Information and Coordination Centre (PNICC).

1028. The JIG has its own secure communications and IT equipment and will produce intelligence assessments on any terrorist organisations involved, and the incident, for the SCG and, on a sanitised basis, for Silver/Bronze commanders. It is important to note that the JIG is entirely separate from the evidence gathering process.
Science and Technical Advisory Cell

1029. In emergencies that require access to coordinated science and/or technical advice, a Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) should be formed at the Strategic Command Centre (SCC). The establishment of a STAC is particularly important where there may be significant wider health and environment consequences. The STAC should bring together the scientific and technical experts from those agencies involved in the response in order to provide a central source of information and advice to the Gold Commander. Outside England the STAC may be formed from existing groups within the SCC. For Counter Terrorism (CT) incidents there are agreements in place with the Home Office (HO) regarding working arrangements in response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) incidents.

1030. The main tasks of the STAC are to:

a. Provide the Gold commander with advice regarding public health, public safety, environmental protection and the sampling/monitoring of contaminants.

b. Monitor and corral responding science and technical community information and guidance in order to satisfy Gold’s high-level objectives and immediate priorities.

c. Agree any divergence from agreed arrangements for providing scientific and technical inputs.

d. Pool all available information in order to develop coherent scientific and technical course(s) of action.

e. Provide a common briefing to the technical lead from each agency represented that covers, the extent of the evidence base, all situational developments, consequences and the likely effect of any mitigation strategies.

f. Liaise with national specialist advisors.

g. Ensure consistent advice is presented locally and nationally.

h. Ensure a practical division of effort.

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17 Gold HQ.
18 Although STAC composition will be tailored to match incident specific requirements, it is always likely to include representation from: The Health Protection Agency (HPA), Primary Care Trust and/or Strategic Health Authority Director of public health, Environment Agency (EA) and site/infrastructure owners/operators. Additional representatives may include: Fire Service, Foods Standards Agency, Health and Safety Executive, local Environmental Health (EH) officers, Metrological Office, operational partners of Defra, local utilities and transport operators.
Recovery Working Group

1031. Recovery operations should start as early as possible, ideally in tandem with the response. The SCG decision to move from a phase in which response is the main effort to that in which recovery is the strategic priority would depend on the circumstances, but it is likely to occur when the immediate response efforts to save life, property and recover evidence have concluded. Recovery work taking place during the response phase needs to be coordinated within the strategic framework established by the SCG. To enable this, and subsequent coordination in the recovery phase, a RWG may be formed for incidents where there is likely to be long-term environmental and/or health consequences. If established, it should operate as a subgroup of the SCG rather than as an autonomous and unconnected stream of work. The RWG brings key agencies together to give energy to the recovery process and form the focus for multi-agency integrated recovery planning and execution, while ensuring the coherence of response and recovery work. The RWG is led by a senior officer of the agency most appropriate to the task, often the local authority. The RWG will:

a. Ensure that longer-term recovery priorities are reflected in the planning and execution of the response.

b. Ensure that relevant organisations in the public, private and voluntary sectors are engaged in the recovery effort from the earliest opportunity.

c. Ensure continuity of the management of the emergency once the response phase has been concluded.

Government Decontamination Service

1032. The Government Decontamination Service (GDS) was established to help the UK prepare for a CBRN or significant Hazardous Material (HAZMAT)\(^\text{19}\) incident, and minimise its impact on people, society, the economy and the environment. Given the relatively rare nature of CBRN incidents, it is not cost effective for each authority to permanently maintain a high level of CBRN expertise; therefore, the GDS has been established as a national resource, in order to provide support to the responsible authorities as the need arises. GDS is intended to facilitate the assembly of available expertise in a logical and comprehensive manner, allowing those responsible for decontamination to function more effectively by removing the need for independent procurement, and permit them to benefit from pre-planning. To achieve this GDS performs 3 main functions:

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\(^{19}\) HAZMAT is an accidental release of materials and substances such as: chemicals, biological, radiological and nuclear substances hazardous to health or the environment. HAZMAT should not be confused with CBRN terrorism.
a. Provision of advice and guidance to support those who will be responsible for decontamination before and during incidents. This includes the validation and testing of extant arrangements.

b. Assessment of the ability of specialist companies in the private sector to carry out decontamination operations, and where necessary, ensure that responsible authorities have ready access to those services. This includes assistance with the coordination of decontamination operations following a CBRN or HAZMAT incident.

c. Act as the Central Government’s monitor of the national capability for the decontamination of buildings, infrastructure, mobile transport assets and the open environment, and regularly review the gaps in the UK’s capability to respond to CBRN or HAZMAT incidents.

1033. GDS will not:

a. Assume responsibility for decontamination.

b. Fund decontamination.

c. Deal with humans, animals or their remains.

d. Define how ‘clean’ is ‘safe’.

e. Confirm that decontamination standards are achieved.

f. Accredit specialist supplier capability.

g. Guarantee or indemnify specialist supplier capability.

Communications

1034. An accurate and timely 2-way flow of information is fundamental to the effective management of the response and recovery effort. However, under emergency conditions, this can prove difficult to achieve when information management procedures between agencies vary, situational perspectives differ and communications become overloaded. Emergency communications planning should pay close attention to ensuring inter-agency procedural commonality, in order to achieve an integrated effect. Emergency response and recovery communication media include:

a. Radio.

b. Land line.

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20 Telecommunications networks, in particular, have various methods for managing network loading and emergency capabilities, which are detailed at Annex 10B.
c. CCTV.
d. Mobile phone.
e. Databases.
f. Text messaging.
g. Video conferencing.
h. Pager.
i. Television networks.
j. Fax.
l. E-mail.
m. Internet.

n. ‘Low-tech’ information transfer such as, briefings, liaison meetings, messengers, use of display boards and paper forms.

Debriefing, Inquiries and Lessons

1035. For all incidents, it is essential to keep records. Single-agency and inter-agency debriefing processes should aim to capture information while memories are fresh and draw from records kept of all events, decisions, the reasoning behind key decisions and actions taken. Each organisation should maintain and retain its own records created during the response and have established procedures for retaining records that existed before the emergency occurred. Records are required to:

a. Facilitate operational debriefing.
b. Provide evidence for inquiries, whether they are judicial, public inquests or technical in character.
c. Allow lessons to be made widely available for the benefit of those who might be involved in future emergencies and for post-event action such as revision of plans, procedures and training, strengthening of liaison with other agencies and devising exercises to test alternative approaches.
SECTION III – RESPONSE TO LOCALISED\textsuperscript{21} INCIDENTS

1036. Emergency response and recovery in the United Kingdom (UK) is founded on a bottom-up approach in which operations are managed and decisions made at the lowest appropriate level. In all cases, local responders and agencies form the building blocks of response and recovery operations.

1037. To create situational stability an emergency, it is essential that the emergency services take control of the immediate area and quickly establish arrangements for coordinating the response between the services.

Procedure

1038. The first members of the emergency services to arrive on the scene make a rapid assessment and report to their control room; at this point, they do immediately becoming involved with the incident (although in reality, rapid assessment and initial life saving actions will occur simultaneously). The initial incident report will provide information regarding:

a. The location of the incident.

b. What and who is involved.

c. Which services and resources are present, or will be required.

1039. As soon as possible after the initial report, additional information will be passed regarding hazards (actual and potential), access to the scene, estimates of the number and main types of injuries, possible control and rendezvous points, and any other relevant information.

1040. The control room, which receives the initial message, will alert the other emergency services and local authorities. In accordance with their respective procedures, agencies will, in turn, alert personnel and activate response plans. These response plans may involve alerting other relevant commercial, industrial, voluntary or other organisations.

1041. The underlying principle for a major emergency, with an identifiable scene, is that the Police normally assume the management of overall coordination at all levels of command. This approach ensures that resources are used effectively and coherently, thereby avoiding situations where, for example, resources are called upon simultaneously by different agencies. This is particularly the case for major emergencies, which occur near or across regional boundaries.

\textsuperscript{21} Localised refers to the geographic area within which the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) has responsibility for the effective delivery of multi-agency response effect. See Chapter 8.
1042. The Bronze commanders will:

a. Assess control measures with regard to reducing risk.

b. Decide which functions should be controlled by which agency, after taking due account of:

   (1) The circumstances.

   (2) The professional expertise of the emergency services and other agencies. Utility companies are likely to be required at an early stage of an incident in order to render working areas safe.

   (3) Any statutory obligations.

   (4) The overall priorities at the scene.

c. Set up an Inner Cordon (see Figure 10.1) to secure the immediate scene, exclude non-essential personnel and provide a measure of protection for personnel working within the area. Factors to take into account are:

   (1) The boundary of the Inner Cordon will be determined jointly by the Police, Fire Service and Ambulance Service using all available information.

   (2) All those entering or leaving the Inner Cordon will report to a designated cordon access and egress point, which will be controlled by a designated Bronze commander, who will register entry and exit. This will ensure that, at all times, people within the Inner Cordon can be accounted for in the event of an escalation of the incident.

   (3) Personnel entering the Inner Cordon are also checked to ensure that they have the appropriate level of Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) and have been briefed on the evacuation signal, hazards, control measures and any other extant issues which they need to be aware.

d. Set up Forward Control Points (FCPs) for each agency and establish a routine for inter-agency coordination meetings; where possible, the FCPs should be collocated.
Figure 10.1 - Operational Level Arrangements

e. If practical, establish an Outer Cordon (see Figure 10.2) around the vicinity of the incident to control access to a much wider area around the site. This will allow the emergency services and other agencies to work unhindered and, where appropriate, in privacy. Access through the Outer Cordon for essential non-emergency service personnel will be through a Scene Access Control Point (SACP). The Outer Cordon may then be further supplemented by an external Traffic Cordon (TC), which will be used by the Police to redirect traffic, control traffic flows and clear key routes into the incident.

f. Establish internal traffic routes for emergency and other vehicles.
g. Decide on the location of key functions or facilities. For example:

(1) Casualty clearing station(s) to which the injured can be taken.

(2) An ambulance loading point.

(3) A collection/assembly point for survivors before they are taken to a survivor reception centre.

(4) Possible helicopter landing site(s).

(5) A rendezvous point or points for all responding personnel, which maybe some distance from the scene in the event of a bomb incident or incident involving hazardous materials.

(6) A marshalling area for assembling vehicles and equipment.

(7) A Body Holding Area (BHA), which is an area close to the scene where the dead are temporarily held before transfer to the emergency mortuary or an established mortuary.
(8) A media liaison point.

(9) Consider the possible need for evacuation of the public from the immediate vicinity, this may have to be considered at a very early stage.

1043. Some functions will by their nature be discharged outside cordons and away from the scene, but need to be considered as essential components of an integrated response. Examples include:

   a. Local authority crisis/emergency centre.
   b. Casualty bureau.\(^{22}\)
   c. Rest centres.\(^{23}\)
   d. Emergency mortuary.
   e. Friends and relatives reception centres.
   f. Receiving hospitals.
   g. Survivor reception centres.
   h. Media liaison points.

1044. Liaison officers at the scene should be clearly identifiable. They will be equipped with their own communications so that they can remain in contact with their organisations. Where local authority services might be required at short notice, resources will be assembled nearby so that they are ready for immediate action, if called upon by the emergency services.

1045. If an incident occurs within the perimeter of an industrial or commercial establishment, public venue, airport or harbour, then a Site Incident Officer (SIO) from the affected organisation will usually liaise with responding organisations. Such a representative can ease access to facilities within the establishment and act as a link between the establishment’s senior management and the emergency management structure. Many of the sites will have a major incident plan,\(^{24}\) which will have pre-planned arrangements for both on-site and off-site reactions to incidents.

\(^{22}\) The purpose of the casualty bureau is to provide the initial point of contact for the receiving and assessing of information relating to persons believed to be involved in the emergency. See paragraph 1072.

\(^{23}\) Rest centres are used for temporary accommodation of displaced persons following an incident.

\(^{24}\) For some sites, such as nuclear and chemical facilities, this is a statutory requirement.
SECTION IV – RESPONSE TO NON-LOCALISED INCIDENTS

Maritime Emergencies

1046. The objectives of the combined response, and a tiered management framework, also apply to maritime emergencies. However, the nature of a maritime emergency raises specific management and coordination issues that do not arise in land-based emergencies.

1047. **Roles and Responsibilities.** The offshore response to a maritime emergency will normally be coordinated by the appropriate Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA), Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) or Maritime Rescue Sub-Centre (MRSC). Nevertheless, it is essential that land and maritime authorities liaise at the earliest opportunity in order to address the particular problems caused by such emergencies, which may include a land dimension. The land-based authorities are responsible for dealing with the shore-based consequences such as, reception and care of survivors, wreckage, pollution and berthing arrangements for vessels in distress.

1048. **Fire and Rescue Offshore.** Arrangements for dealing with fires, chemical hazards and rescue from vessels at sea have been formalised between the MCA and certain Fire Brigades.\(^{25}\)

1049. **Coordinating Maritime Incidents.** Search and Rescue (SAR) operations, whether offshore, inshore or on the coast, are controlled, directed and managed from a single coordination centre (either MRCC or MRSC). Ministry of Defence (MOD) assets are coordinated through the Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre (ARCC) at RAF Kinloss.\(^{26}\)

1050. **Initial Reactions.** Initial incident information is usually reported to an MRCC/MRSC, which will initiate SAR operations if lives are at risk. If there is any pollution or threat of pollution, the duty MCA Counter Pollution and Salvage Officer (CPSO) will be alerted. The CPSO will decide on the relevant course of action, initiate the appropriate level of response and alert the appropriate personnel in the MCA Counter Pollution and Response Branch (CPRB). In the event of a major incident, the MCA may activate the Marine Emergency Information Room (MEIR) at Southampton before the deployment of people and equipment to the scene.

1051. **Pollution and Salvage Coordination.** Pollution and salvage incidents will be coordinated from either:

  a. A Marine Response Centre (MRC), which is MCA-led and deals with offshore pollution.

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\(^{25}\) One of the consequences of the Fire and Rescue Services Act, see Chapter 9 Section IV.

\(^{26}\) See Chapter 2.
b. An Operations Control Unit (OCU), which is led by a Secretary of State Representative\textsuperscript{27} (SOSREP) and deals with the offshore gas and oil industry.

c. A Shoreline Response Centre (SRC), which is led by a Local Authority and deals with onshore pollution.

d. A Salvage Control Unit (SCU), which is SOSREP-led and deals with salvage.

These centres and units locate at the nearest MRCC/MRSC or at a Port or Harbour close to the scene, depending on the circumstances of the incident.

**Terrorist Incidents**

1052. The response to a terrorist attack will be similar to that of any major incident and the Police will take overall command. The important difference from ‘natural’ incidents is that the crisis phase requires special handling, particularly if there is a hostage situation. The latter may entail the direct intervention of military forces under Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) procedures, at which point command of the incident will be formally transferred from the Police to the military commander and then handed back once direct military intervention has concluded.

1053. The methodology of some terrorist incidents includes the use of bomb threats, which may themselves be treated as serious incidents. Certain key activities arise with the management of a bomb threat; not all of these activities will necessarily be carried out in every circumstance, nor will they necessarily occur in the same order. Activities include:

a. Police evaluation of the threat with a designated coordinator at the threatened location.

b. Confirmation that a device exists at the threatened location.

c. Consideration of cordons (dependent on the threat and possibly over 500 metres away).

d. Establishing a cordon.

e. Potential evacuation to a safe distance.

f. Rendering any suspect device safe.

g. Gathering of forensic evidence.

\textsuperscript{27} See Chapter 9 for details of the powers of the Secretary of State’s Representative (SOSREP) in relation to salvage and pollution matters.
h. Recovery and re-occupation of the scene.

1054. Military involvement in Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) is coordinated through the Joint Service EOD Operations Centre (JSEODOC) at Didcot. The JSEODOC will allocate military EOD teams to an incident by matching the capability requirement to the particular capabilities of the various teams.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Incidents

1055. From a civil perspective, a CBRN incident differs from HAZMAT in that it always refers to terrorist activity and is therefore both a crime scene and a major incident. HAZMAT, whilst it may include chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials is an accidental release.

1056. CBRN adds extra dimensions to a conventional incident because:

a. It presents additional hazards to both responders and potential victims.

b. It requires detection, identification and monitoring\(^{28}\) of the materials used.

c. Normal tasks must be conducted in PPE.

d. Public reaction will probably be significantly different, which must be considered within the public information plan.

e. Decontamination will be required, potentially of responders and their equipment, plus large numbers of public including the young, disabled and infirm, some of whom may also require medical treatment for ‘conventional’ injuries as well as the effect of the CBRN incident. Eventually, the incident site will need to be decontaminated.

f. Media interest is likely to be heightened.

g. The multi-agency response will require additional support from specialist agencies.

h. Political interest will increase.

i. The emergency services could be the target.

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\(^{28}\) In a HAZMAT incident, the chemical agent is normally known, if not in advance at least soon after arrival.
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Procedure

1057. Although there are similarities with the response to a HAZMAT incident there are crucial differences when responding to a CBRN incident including different procedures within the Inner and Outer Cordons. A CBRN response procedure is:

a. The fire service and police conduct an on-scene assessment to establish whether the material is CBRN or HAZMAT related. To assist in this assessment, both the Police Service and the Fire Service have access to detection equipment.

b. Once the initial assessment is completed an Inner Cordon is established and initial access arrangements determined. The size and shape of the cordon will be determined by a hazard assessment conducted by a number of agencies and taking account of all available information.

c. Where necessary, only personnel wearing appropriate PPE may enter and work within the Inner Cordon.

d. The Ambulance Service determines whether decontamination is required and if mass decontamination is necessary. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Ambulance and Fire Services describes the procedures by which responsibility passes from the former to the latter when mass decontamination is required. The ambulance service retains responsibility for the decontamination of medical casualties.

e. Egress from the Inner Cordon for the general public is through a nominated exit point. This is the start point for decontamination procedures. The requirement for Emergency Service personnel within the Outer Cordon to wear PPE will be determined by local dynamic risk assessment.

f. The first stage of decontamination is a primary triage point where Ambulance Service personnel classify people in one of 3 categories, these are:

(1) The most critically injured.

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29 For details see ‘The Decontamination of People Exposed to Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) Substances or Material, Strategic National Guidance’, Home Office 2nd Edition May 2004 and ‘The release of Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) substances or material, Guidance for Local Authorities’ Home Office August 2003.

30 See diagram at Annex 10C.

31 This applies only to civilian emergency services personnel entering the Inner Cordon. Specific military personnel, if authorised, will conduct their own risk assessments and determine levels of PPE accordingly.

32 This is the process of identifying hazards, assessing risks, taking action to eliminate or reduce risk, monitoring and reviewing, in the rapidly changing circumstances of an operational incident.
Those requiring clinical decontamination due to wounds or because they are unable to decontaminate themselves, such as children or the elderly.

Lightly contaminated people, who can decontaminate themselves.

Ambulance Service personnel decontaminate the first 2 categories, whilst the third proceed through the mass decontamination procedure controlled by the Fire Service.

Mass decontamination follows a set sequence:

1. **Disrobing.** All clothing is removed, thus removing a large proportion of any contaminants. Police at the disrobing point collect and bag all possessions, labelling the bag with the details of its owner for potential evidentiary purposes. Continuity of recording is essential.

2. **Showering.** Each person proceeds through a shower area, for thorough cleansing, under the supervision of the Fire Service.

3. **Dressing.** Once clean, each person dresses in dry clothing provided as part of the mass decontamination equipment. At this point, the Police will take each individual’s details for use at the Casualty Bureau (CB).

All persons within the Inner Cordon, including fatalities, pass through the decontamination process into the Outer Cordon. Once decontamination has been completed:

1. Uninjured persons are passed on to a survivor rest centre loading point for transportation to a designated Rest Centre. On arrival, their details are passed to the CB.

2. Injured persons pass through a secondary triage point where they receive medical treatment before being passed on to the ambulance loading point for transport to designated hospitals. On arrival, their details are passed to the CB.

3. Contaminated fatalities are placed in CBRN body bags. The body bags are then decontaminated before being placed in a body holding area before transportation to a mortuary. Details of casualties are passed to the CB.
j. Emergency service decontamination is conducted in separate smaller decontamination units; their PPE is designed for wet decontamination and there is no need for the disrobing/showering/dressing procedure.

k. The mass and emergency services decontamination units are self-contained and collect the contaminated water created during the decontamination process. The EA\textsuperscript{33} has procedures in place to dispose of the contaminated water.

l. Decontamination of the incident site itself is part of the recovery phase and is the responsibility of the local authority, albeit based on advice provided by relevant experts who may be drawn from the GDS.\textsuperscript{34}

Widespread Natural Disasters

1058. Historically, the UK has been relatively fortunate, suffering less than others, in both frequency and scale, from such widespread natural disasters as storms, flooding or earthquakes. However, since the UK is a generally densely populated country, any widespread disasters are likely to affect large numbers of people. The disaster could overwhelm local resources, disrupt communications and cut off access or egress routes, which may be compounded by people attempting to leave an affected area.

1059. The initial formal response to a widespread disaster would be similar to any other incident. Where inter-agency strategic management is required, SCGs, normally meeting in police headquarters, will be established to ascertain the extent of the emergency and to set out policy priorities for the response. In the event that the consequences span police areas, a number of SCGs may be established and liaison maintained between each group, with one SCG taking the lead in agreement with the others. Each SCG would also provide a focus for liaison with Central Government. There may be a role for the regional tier\textsuperscript{35} in supporting or coordinating the local response, and a LGD may become involved.

1060. Not all emergencies occur suddenly. The emergency management framework set out in this chapter is readily adaptable to slow-onset emergencies, such as animal disease outbreaks or a disruption to the supply of fuel. However, in these circumstances, it becomes more likely that the response will be led from the top-down rather than from the bottom-up, with SCGs convened at the request of, and working within, a strategic framework set by, Government. This is because Central Government may be:

\textsuperscript{33} SEPA in Scotland.
\textsuperscript{34} See paragraph 1032.
\textsuperscript{35} See Chapter 8.
a. Better sighted on an emerging risk (for example, through intelligence reports, international liaison or access to specialist advice).

b. Well positioned to maintain an overview of the situation as it develops (for example, patterns of disruption or infection).

c. Able to help ensure a coherent, integrated and robust response (ensuring that pre-emptive action is taken where necessary).

1061. Effective top-down leadership of an emergency requires robust and timely information to flow upwards and downwards. RRT and the DA will play a crucial role in ensuring that this happens, activating the crisis management machinery described in Chapter 8 where necessary.

1062. Emergencies overseas can also have similar implications for the UK and its citizens, and may impose challenging demands on local responders, for example the 2004 Asian tsunami. However, in such cases the effects are likely to be distributed geographically across the UK and are, therefore, unlikely to overwhelm the resources of a large number of responders. In these circumstances, Central Government, working closely with the Police and other agencies, will lead the response by liaising with their international counterparts to arrange for the identification and repatriation of the dead, injured and survivors, and by communicating with the public.

1063. Resources will be stretched by a widespread disaster. The SCG, whilst avoiding tactical decisions, may have to call on the resources, which industry, the Armed Forces and voluntary agencies can provide. Such responses can be mobilised more quickly, if plans have been made in advance, which address such resource availability. Although there is no single model for dealing with the complex problems which widespread disasters present, the basic principles outlined in this Chapter do not change.

SECTION V – CARE AND TREATMENT OF PEOPLE

1064. The care of those involved in a major emergency, and the way they are treated, lie at the heart of the response and recovery work. In particular, sudden impact major emergencies may cause physical injury and affect the material or emotional welfare of a broad range of people, whether directly or indirectly involved with the emergency. Experience, and study of major emergencies, has identified key groups of affected people, these are:

a. Those who have been injured.

b. Those directly caught up in the emergency occurrence, but who are not physically hurt.
c. Families and friends of the injured, missing or deceased.
d. Rescuers and response workers.
e. Wider sections of the community whose lives are affected or disrupted.
f. Witnesses and spectators.

1065. In addition to medical assistance or material welfare, some of those who are suffering from the effects of an emergency may need immediate access to social and psychological support. Many agencies are involved in the treatment, identification and support of those involved in an emergency and some services may be provided by commercial organisations. In particular, local authorities are responsible for coordinating the provision of welfare services and social care, both in the immediate aftermath and in the medium and longer term. Many local authorities maintain crisis support teams, who are specially trained to respond to the care and welfare needs associated with emergencies.

**Care of Injured Survivors**

1066. For an event where there is no contamination, injured survivors will normally be taken to a casualty clearing station. Medical and paramedical personnel will carry out triage and any appropriate stabilisation measures before ensuring that casualties are evacuated in accordance with clinical priorities for hospital treatment. The casualty clearing station is usually sited in a building or temporary shelter close to the ambulance loading point.

1067. The Ambulance Incident Officer (AIO) is responsible for:

a. The establishment of medical communications on site.
b. The transport of medical teams.
c. The decision whether a Medical Incident Officer (MIO), who is responsible for the management of medical resources at the scene, should be appointed.
d. Liaison with the MIO (if activated) and conveyance of casualties to appropriate receiving hospital(s).
e. Transport of casualties to distant specialist hospitals by helicopter where appropriate.
f. The provision of all ambulance resources necessary for the treatment of casualties.
g. The distribution and replenishment of medical and first aid supplies.

h. Identification of the receiving hospitals.

**Care of Uninjured Survivors**

1068. Those, who have survived a major emergency with no physical injuries (or with only minor injuries), may nevertheless be traumatised and suffering from shock, intense anxiety and grief. They will, therefore, need to be treated with great sensitivity. The local authority will need to coordinate both the professional and voluntary sector welfare response. They will need to work closely with health professionals and with Police Family Liaison Officers (PFLOs) where appropriate.

1069. Survivors are usually anxious for information about their relatives, friends and colleagues, information about the incident, number and location of other survivors, and what will happen to them next and when. Their initial needs are likely to include:

a. Shelter and warmth.

b. Information and assistance with contacting family and friends.

c. Support in their distress.

d. Food and drink.

e. First aid to treat minor injuries.

f. Changing, washing and toilet facilities, and perhaps spare clothing.

1070. Initial needs are usually delivered at a Survivor Reception Centre (SRC), a secure area to which all survivors who are uninjured or have only minor injuries, will be taken. There may also be a need for other welfare support such as transport home, finding temporary accommodation, financial assistance or other advice. The responsibility for organising, staffing and providing logistical support at SRCs, and rest centres, usually rests with the local authority supported by other organisations such as voluntary agencies, medical and police family liaison personnel. The reception centres will also be used by police documentation teams to gather information from survivors, who will often be able to provide crucial information about what happened and may be important witnesses at any subsequent trial or inquiry. Survivors will generally move on from the reception centre to some form of temporary housing or a rest centre, which can provide overnight accommodation if it is not possible for them to return to their homes.
Friends and Relatives

1071. Experience has shown that many people will travel to the scene, or to meeting points such as travel terminals, if they believe their friends or relatives may have been involved in an emergency. If necessary the Police, in consultation with the Local Authority, will establish family and friends reception centres staffed by suitably trained police, local authority personnel and voluntary organisations to help reunite family and friends with survivors. At these centres, the fullest possible information to those seeking news of affected people will be given, taking care to be accurate while preserving the privacy of the individual. In addition, Humanitarian Assistance Centres\(^{36}\) (HACs) may be established at suitable locations, to enable longer-term humanitarian assistance and act as a single resource for survivors, families and all those affected by the incident through which they can access support care and advice.

Casualty and Information Bureau\(^{37}\)

1072. In many emergencies, establishing the identity and whereabouts of people will be a critical issue. The purpose of a Casualty Bureau (CB)\(^{38}\) is to provide a central contact and information point for gathering and distributing information about individuals, who have been, or are believed to have been, involved in an incident. For the purposes of the CB’s operation, a ‘casualty’ may be defined as ‘any person who is directly involved in, or affected by the incident’; this will, therefore, include survivors, evacuees and the deceased. In the case of fatalities, details are passed to the Identification Commission; the bereaved will then be informed (see Dealing with Fatalities below). CB is responsible for:

a. Obtaining relevant information regarding persons involved or potentially involved.

b. Assessing and processing that information.

c. The provision of accurate information to relatives and friends, the investigating and identification officers and HM Coroner.\(^{39}\)

1073. A CB should be established a soon as practicable following the declaration of a major incident. On activation, CB contact details are provided to the media, emergency services, local authorities, hospitals and, if appropriate, foreign embassies, in order to enable the CB to deal with enquiries from concerned friends and relatives that may otherwise be directed at emergency control centres.

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\(^{36}\) See ‘Humanitarian Assistance in Emergencies: Guidance on Establishing Family Assistance Centres’ ACPO/Home Office for details.

\(^{37}\) ‘Casualty Bureau’ is the common term used for what is properly titled a ‘Casualty and Information Bureau’.

\(^{38}\) The Casualty Bureau is usually staffed by police civilian employees such as control room personnel or call centre staff.

\(^{39}\) Procurator Fiscal in Scotland.
1074. As part of the CB activation process, police documentation teams will attend each receiving hospital, mortuary, survivor reception and/or rest centre and homes of relatives. Good coordination of this activity is essential to avoid unnecessary duplication of visits.

1075. In order to fulfil its role, the CB will:

a. Receive enquiries from the public and file missing person reports.

b. Record details regarding the whereabouts of: survivors; evacuees; the injured and deceased, as provided from the Police documentation teams; receiving hospitals; survivor reception centres; rest centres and family and friends reception centres etc.

c. Formulate a comprehensive list of missing persons.

d. Collate data to support identification of persons involved.

e. Liaise with the ante mortem team.40

f. Inform enquirers (by the most appropriate means) of the condition and location of persons.

1076. An important principle of CB operations is that those personnel that receive information and record enquiries from the public (the incident enquiry unit) are not involved in the collation and matching processes. They are, therefore, unable to give information out to enquirers. A separate unit will provide enquirers with casualty information once matches have been established, except in the case of fatalities (see paragraph 1092).

**Air Accidents and the Emergency Procedures Information Centre**

1077. In the event of an air crash involving a British Airways aircraft or an aircraft from one of the contracted airlines, British Airways plc will set up an Emergency Procedures Information Centre (EPIC) at Heathrow. The EPIC collates information about reservations, next of kin and other relevant data, thereby supporting the work of the CB and the coroner. Other carriers have either contracted out this function to Kenyon International or have their own reporting procedures.

1078. If foreign nationals are thought to have been involved, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) will refer any enquiries from foreign consulates, embassies or high commissions to the CB. The Police will inform the consular authorities of the death of any of their nationals.

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40 The team responsible for compiling files in respect of each person missing, or believed to be involved and not identified for comparison with post mortem data and for information of HM Coroner/Procurator Fiscal.
Diverse Needs

1079. Any major emergency occurring in the UK is likely to involve members of differing religious and ethnic backgrounds and may have to deal with the specific needs of children. These needs will be considered when planning or executing major incident plans. Such needs may include:

a. Language facilities (or at least the identification of language resources that may be available).

b. Religious requirements such as medical treatment, hygiene, diet and place for prayer. Depending on the faith of the deceased or bereaved there may also be concern about how the dead are handled, and the timing of funeral arrangements.

c. The specialist staff to deal with children.

Rescuers and Responders

1080. Major emergencies place enormous demands on all those involved in the response, which may need to be sustained over a lengthy period. There is, therefore, a requirement to address the physical and psychological needs of the staff in response organisations. This will include: proper risk assessment and the use of appropriate protective equipment; the provision of refreshments; feeding, washing and changing facilities; appropriate work rosters; and a comprehensive briefing process. There may also be a need for post incident counselling.

Maintenance of Order

1081. A major incident may have a serious impact on law and order. The Police have a duty to keep the peace and protect the public. Any military involvement in this task would be requested by the Police and enabled through ministerial approved Military Assistance to the Civil Power (MACP) procedures.42

SECTION VI – DEALING WITH FATALITIES

1082. It is essential that the handling of issues surrounding fatalities is both efficient and sensitive. In dealing with fatality related information, consideration must given to the potential conflict between trying to satisfy:

a. The full and proper legal requirements for enquiring into what happened.

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41 Various sections of the faith communities have well-established emergency arrangements.
42 See Chapter 4.
b. The emotional needs of the family and/or friends of the deceased.

1083. Hard won experience in recent years has produced details of good practice, which provides an appropriate and sensitive service to relatives, while meeting the requirements for formal identification, and the welfare needs of those who must deal with potentially large numbers of the deceased and human remains.

Procedure

1084. The authority of HM Coroner\textsuperscript{43} is generally required before those who have been pronounced dead can be moved from the scene of the incident. Arrangements are then the responsibility of the Police, who will act on behalf of the Coroner to implement a victim recovery plan.

1085. The Police overall incident commander will appoint a Senior Identification Manager (SIM) to manage and coordinate all aspects concerning the identification of victims.\textsuperscript{44} The SIM will normally appoint a senior officer to be responsible for the recovery of the deceased from the disaster site. This officer will formulate a recovery plan together with other relevant persons and agencies. This will include the Coroner, the Police Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) and, where relevant, other investigative agencies.

1086. Personnel tasked with the recovery of the deceased and human remains should be specifically selected and trained for this purpose. In a large-scale incident, the Armed Forces may be requested to support the Police in this process, through the appropriate channels. Such support may include wide-scale search over open terrain and the provision of logistical support, particularly if victims are to be recovered from a difficult area. Untrained personnel would conduct their activities under the supervision of trained officers.

1087. In summary, the recovery process includes:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a.] Fatalities (or human remains) will not normally be moved until a medical practitioner or paramedic has pronounced life extinct and endorsed the body label accordingly.
  \item[b.] Each victim will be issued with a unique reference number, which will remain constant throughout the identification process.
  \item[c.] The removal will take place in a systematic, structured and documented fashion (including video or photographic evidence if possible), although there are alternative arrangements if quick removal is necessary (for example, to
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{43} Procurator Fiscal in Scotland.
\textsuperscript{44} Disaster Victim Identification (DVI).
prevent loss or further damage to the deceased victim or to rescue or provide medical treatment for trapped survivors).

d. During the process a key requirement is the need to preserve evidence; this particularly affects the procedures for dealing with valuables and other property.

e. Once extracted from the incident site, human remains may be taken first to a location designated as a BHA. This should be under cover and protected from the public view for reasons of security, protection and sensitivity.

1088. For a major incident, existing mortuary capacity will probably be inadequate and its location unsuitable. The usual practice is for victims to be taken to an emergency mortuary for post-mortems to be carried out. It is the responsibility of the Coroner’s office to arrange for the transfer of victims to the mortuary. This is coordinated by the Police acting on behalf of the Coroner’s office using vehicles belonging to undertakers or police. It is essential to establish documented continuity in respect of each aspect of the recovery and transportation process.

1089. Emergency mortuary provision is an inter-agency activity with the local authority taking the lead, taking into account the requirements of the Coroner, pathologists and Health and Safety Regulations. Potential sites are identified when formulating and reviewing the authority’s major incident plan, with the assumption that they would be fully operational within 24 hours from the start of the emergency and any shortfalls in meeting the selection criteria can be corrected within this period.

Identification

1090. HM Coroner has to determine who died and how, and when and where the death occurred for those victims within his district who have met a violent or unnatural death or a sudden death of unknown cause. The powers and duties of Coroners do not vary with the numbers of people killed or the circumstances in which the deaths occur.

1091. The task of identifying the dead is undertaken by an Identification Commission (IC), normally chaired by the Coroner, made up of the supervising pathologist, police SIM, police family liaison coordinator and specialists such as those in odontology, radiology and fingerprints. The functions of the IC include reviewing presented

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45 Military commanders cannot enter into formal or informal arrangements with local authorities on the provision of military sites for emergency mortuaries without approval from D CT & UK Ops, see Annex 3B.
46 Sites may not be buildings – temporary structures such as Portakabins, road trailers, tents or inflatable structures may be used.
47 For further information, including arrangements for dealing with mass fatalities, see the joint Home Office and Cabinet Office publication, ‘Guidance on Dealing with Fatalities in Emergencies’ (May 2004).
48 Procurator Fiscal in Scotland.
identification evidence, making recommendations to the Coroner on identifications and advising the SIM on issues relating to the recovery and identification of victims.

1092. The process is characterised by careful, discreet communications to ensure that there are appropriate links between the coroner, police and the bereaved in order to avoid multiple contact and the misidentification of fatalities. When a positive identification has been made, and the Coroner’s permission has been given, it is generally the Police who will inform the next of kin. Occasionally, the next of kin may be part of the identification process, which is covered by special rules.

SECTION VII – EVACUATION

Introduction

1093. In some circumstances, it may be necessary to advise the public to evacuate a given area or remain and shelter indoors. Such circumstances include risks to life or health from:

   a. Release or threatened release of radioactive materials or other hazardous substances.
   b. Spread of fire.
   c. Threat of explosion.
   d. Damage caused by severe storms.
   e. Threat from serious flooding.
   f. Threat of environmental contamination.
   g. Aftermath of a transportation accident.

1094. A risk assessment will be conducted using information from a number of agencies, including:

   a. Information on the nature of the risk may be obtained from the Fire Service, from chemical data systems and other accredited sources.
   b. There are arrangements for the Meteorological Office to forecast the direction and spread of any chemical plume, using information provided from the scene together with remote telemetry.
   c. The Meteorological Office and/or Regional Weather Centres issue severe weather warnings.
d. The Meteorological Office issues warnings of abnormally high tides that could possibly lead to flooding to the Police and to the EA. The EA is responsible for issuing flood warnings to the public and other organisations on specific rivers and coastline.

**Decision to Evacuate**

1095. The Police normally recommend whether or not to evacuate and define the area to be evacuated. Their recommendation will take account of advice from other agencies:

a. The Fire Service concerning the risks associated with fire, contamination and other hazards.

b. Ambulance and social services on problems associated with moving people, who are frail, disabled or at risk for any other reason.

c. Local authorities on the location of rest centres, which may be pre-designated, and on other possible places of shelter within the area.

1096. The Police can only recommend evacuation and have no power (except within the Inner Cordon in response to a terrorist incident) to require responsible adults to leave their homes. In deciding whether to evacuate or not, it is necessary to assess whether bringing people outdoors may put them at greater risk than leaving them to shelter indoors. This is particularly important in the case of the release of hazardous substances, where terrorist devices may be present, or where flood water levels are likely to rise quickly.

**Procedure**

1097. The physical and organisational difficulties of large-scale evacuation should not be underestimated. There are particular problems in evacuating hospitals, prisons and nursing homes; evacuation is usually a last resort because of the length of time it takes. It is a particularly manpower-intensive operation and is, therefore, a contingency that may require military assistance. The outline procedure is:

a. Evacuation assembly points will be set up near the affected area; if time permits, these will be signposted.

b. People in the affected area will be advised to go to their nearest evacuation assembly point. Various methods can be used for warning and informing the public including: loud-hailers; mobile public address systems; radio or TV announcements; works sirens; display screens; scoreboards and monitors; or various combinations of these methods.
c. People taking prescribed and other medications, or reliant on particular items of equipment (wheelchairs, crutches, nebulizers etc), will be reminded to carry these with them; particular attention needs to be paid to those with sensory impairment.

d. The Police will, as far as is practicable, take steps to ensure the security of property left empty after evacuation. In the event of an extended evacuation, the local authority may have planned for, or have to consider, other security arrangements, including the use of a contractor.

e. Dispersal of evacuees to survivor reception centres or rest centres will be coordinated at the evacuation assembly point.

1098. Reception and rest centres should maintain a comprehensive index of evacuees and their whereabouts, including if they elect to go to another destination (relatives etc). Initially, the Police will need this information for CB purposes and, latterly, if they need to interview witnesses.

1099. Evacuations may also be required from non-residential areas. These could include town centres, shopping complexes, office parks, industrial premises, passenger trains, airports and sports venues, and other such places.
ANNEX 10A – THE MEDIA

Introduction

10A1. The purpose of this Annex is to highlight some of the issues relating to the media and describe extant arrangements. It should be re-emphasised that ‘Armed Forces’ involvement in a major incident is at the request of the civilian authorities that retain primacy on all issues, including dealing with the media. Any exclusively Ministry of Defence (MOD) media issues will be dealt with by specialist MOD personnel in coordination with the other civil agencies. In this context, this Annex is informative only as there will usually be little direct involvement between military personnel undertaking Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) duties and the media unless it is part of the overall media strategy.

SECTION I – LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS

10A2. In the first instance, the task of dealing with the media at the incident scene usually falls to the Police in their response management role, and with regards to their responsibilities for the conduct of criminal investigations. However, there are other incident related issues such as the care and treatment of people, safety and local infrastructure for which local authorities must be prepared to engage with the media from the outset. Depending on the nature of events, attention may also focus on industrial operators and commercial or other organisations. The News Coordination Centre (NCC), which coordinates the Central Government media response and public communications, will also be established.

10A3. The media response is characterised by:

a. **Rapid Arrival.** Media personnel will arrive very quickly and may well reserve all available accommodation in the area. They will often have learnt of a major emergency at the same time as, or even before, the emergency services.

b. **Immediate Demands.** When they arrive, the media will expect to have access to the facilities they require and an instant response to their requests for information and briefing.

c. **Rapid Escalation.** Demands from local and regional media will quickly be augmented by demands from national and, possibly, international media. If these demands are not anticipated, media representatives are likely to add to the confusion.
Initial Actions

10A4. Experience has shown the value of dealing immediately with a number of key issues:

a. **Control of Access to the Emergency Scene.** Restricting access aims to allow rescue services to carry out their work unhindered and to preserve evidence at what may be the scene of a crime.

b. **Establishing a Media Liaison Point.** A Media Liaison Point is a designated point close to an emergency scene, preferably (but not always) outside the Outer Cordon, for the reception of media personnel, checks on their credentials and briefing on arrangements for reporting, filming and photography. It may be little more than a rendezvous point with further facilities provided at a media centre.

c. **Nominating a Media Liaison Officer.** The swift attendance at the scene of a media point of contact (likely to be from the Police) should ease the pressure from the media on responders. Failure to arrange this will prompt media representatives to approach anybody available, which could lend credibility to inaccurate sources. Brief interviews with senior police, fire, and ambulance officers at the site, as well as with specialists from appropriate agencies such as rail or airport officials, will add authority to relayed information.

d. **News Coordination Centre.** Depending on the nature and location of the incident, the NCC may assist in the management, and setting up of, the media operation. This may include establishment of a media centre, in conjunction with the emergency services and local authorities. If the nature of the incident has national and regional implications, the NCC will work with the Government News Network (GNN) to coordinate the public and media.

e. **Assistance from the Government News Network.** Reinforcement may be requested from one of the 8 network offices of the GNN. They will arrive with their own communications facilities and technical support equipment. Assistance can range from helping to staff a media centre to acting as liaison officers with the Lead Government Department (LGD) and handling VIP visits.

f. **Coordination.** The media will use all means of communication and any available member of the response teams to gather information. It is vital that information is properly coordinated and shared so as to avoid the emergence of different or even contradictory information. The nominated media liaison
officer should coordinate the media response from the earliest possible stage. Others should deal only with issues that fall within their own area of responsibility unless prior agreement has been reached.

10A5. During the initial stages of the incident, when definitive information is sparse, useful advice includes:

a. On arrival at the scene, the media will keep open channels on mobile telephones to ensure instant access to their editors. It is possible to anticipate this and protect the cellular telephone system from saturation by invoking the Access Overload Control for Cellular Radio Telephones (ACCOLC)\(^1\) (see Annex 10B).

b. The media may need to be reminded that, in the initial response period, no one can know precisely what has happened. Initial statements should focus on what is happening, the limitations to knowledge at the time and what is being done to arrive at a fuller appreciation of the situation. If such statements are backed by a commitment to provide accurate information as soon as it is available, media personnel are more likely to attend briefings and thus, accept a measure of coordination, particularly if the briefings are scheduled at regular intervals.

c. The media will welcome any factual statements, particularly from eyewitnesses within the emergency services. However, such statements should not include speculation on causal factors, nor premature or uncorroborated estimates of the numbers of casualties.

d. Care should be taken that information regarding casualties is not released until details have been confirmed and next of kin informed. It may be necessary to explain that it can take a long time to identify victims. Only the Coroner or police may authorise the release of information about individuals.

e. Limitations on the release of information, often because of the need to avoid prejudicing what may become a criminal prosecution, should be clearly and candidly explained.

f. It is important to develop the best possible relationship with media personnel from the start of the operation. Pressure of competition between media teams and individuals will make them sensitive to any restrictions, which appear to them to be unfair or if media organisations are being treated differently. It should also allow positive advantage to be taken of the help

\(^1\) Not all media will have access to an ACCOLC-protected telephone. Those, who are using telephones when ACCOLC is invoked, are not cut off. See Annex 10B.
which the media can provide, for example by broadcasting appeals for blood
donors, publicising details of any evacuation arrangements or broadcasting
Casualty Bureau telephone numbers.

g. The management of large numbers of media representatives can be
assisted through ‘pooling’ arrangements. A pool might, for example,
comprise one television crew, one news agency such as the Press Association,
a photographer and a radio reporter. Although a limit can be set on the
number of media personnel to be allowed access to the site, such restrictions
are seldom welcome and it is best to allow the media to decide, who their
representatives should be. Pooling may be particularly helpful if safety or
security considerations restrict access to an emergency scene. The use of
pooling should, however, be regularly reviewed.

10A6. There will be great pressure to obtain interviews with survivors and relatives,
but many will feel too shocked and distressed to give interviews. The first
consideration should always be the well-being of the individual. It does, however,
relieve pressure on all concerned if a willing and able survivor, relative or friend
agrees to speak at a press conference to characterise the events for all. Press officers
of involved organisations should support relatives and survivors, advising them prior
to any media exposure and helping them to prepare a statement.

Subsequent Actions

10A7. In the event of a major emergency, the initial actions just described may be no
more than holding arrangements. As the situation develops, the need for a
comprehensive media response organisation headed by someone, who equates to a
public relations manager, may become apparent. The public relations manager for the
emergency may be drawn from the Police or appropriate local authority, depending on
circumstances and locally agreed plans.

10A8. The public relations manager must be fully involved in the senior
management arrangements for the emergency, for example by attending Strategic
Coordination Group (SCG) meetings, so that he or she is fully briefed and can plan
and oversee all aspects of the media response.

10A9. A major emergency may also justify the establishment of a media centre to
provide working accommodation for media personnel, a news conference and briefing
area, facilities for monitoring television, radio and newspapers and a press office with
communications equipment. The media centre may be set up by the Police or by the
local authority or, in collaboration with the Police, by the principal organisation or
company involved in the emergency. The location of, and responsibility for,
establishing the centre should be agreed in advance as part of the planning process.
10A10. As the emphasis switches to the recovery phase, the media coordination and management role may pass from the Police to another agency, such as the local authority or the Health Service, who would take the lead in dealing with continued media interest and providing any necessary public advice and information. Close and continuing cooperation between the Police and the relieving agency’s media teams from the outset will achieve a smooth handover.

**Ministerial Media Briefings**

10A11. A major emergency inevitably results in requests for ministerial briefing and statements. It is the responsibility of the LGD to coordinate a consistent and properly considered response by Central Government. On media matters, therefore, Chief Constables and local authority Chief Executives should look to the emergency centre of the LGD as their main Central Government contact, which in turn will direct press officers accordingly.

**‘Connecting in a Crisis’**

10A12. ‘Connecting in a Crisis’² is a BBC initiative that seeks to help meet the public demand for information in the event of an emergency. It is about warning and informing in the interests of public safety, concentrating on delivering essential information quickly and is not about the wider issues of news reporting. It aims ahead of any disaster to forge close links between the emergency planning community and BBC local broadcasters on both radio and television, so that in the event of an emergency this framework will provide essential information, warnings, advice and reassurance in the first few hours.

10A13. The BBC has publicised their ‘Public Service Broadcaster’ role. In addition, other media organisations have offered to provide some of their staff in this role. The emergency planners’ access into the BBC’s range of services is via the managing editor of the local BBC radio station. The prime BBC conduit is local radio, supplemented by local and regional Ceefax, websites, regional TV and Radio Data System (RDS). The arrangements are robust, well practised and increasingly incorporated into major incident plans.

**Media Emergency Forum**

10A14. The national Media Emergency Forum (MEF) is an ad hoc group of senior media editors, Government representatives, local authority emergency planners, blue light services and private industry set up to consider media issues arising from civil contingencies and terrorist attacks. Part of their work is to review the lessons learned in major incidents and exercises with a view to improving the way that information is passed to the public.

² [http://www.bbc.co.uk/connectinginacrisis/index.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/connectinginacrisis/index.shtml)
10A15. This work is also mirrored locally. In every Government Office Region (GOR), there is a Regional Media Emergency Forum (RMEF) to provide a regional perspective to the national group’s work and, more importantly, to forge links between Government (local and central), the emergency services and both regional and local media.

10A16. Issues addressed include, automatic recognition of press cards, creation of media centres, pooling procedures, frameworks for briefings and protocols for restricting access to the incident site.

**VIP Visits**

10A17. Visits by VIPs, which will be coordinated by the Police, can lift the morale of those affected as well as those who are involved with the response. A Government Minister may make an early visit to the scene or areas affected, not only to mark public concern but also to be able to report to Parliament on the response. A Government Minister visiting the scene may be accompanied by local Members of Parliament (MPs). This would be arranged by the Minister’s Private Office. It is possible that the scale of a disaster may, in addition, prompt visits by a member of the Royal Family and/or the Prime Minister. Local VIP visitors may include the Lord Lieutenant, the High Sheriff, religious leaders, local MPs, mayors, chairmen and other elected representatives. If foreign nationals have been involved, their country’s Ambassador, High Commissioner or other dignitaries may also want to visit key locations. VIP visits of the Armed Forces, which involve members of parliament, must be approved by the Under Secretary of State in the MOD.

10A18. Visits to the scene of an emergency need to take account of the local situation, and the immediate effects on the local community. It may be inappropriate for VIP visitors to go to a disaster site itself whilst rescue operations are still going on, particularly if casualties are still trapped. VIP visits should not interrupt rescue and lifesaving work and the Police must be consulted over the timing of visits.

10A19. The emergency services are experienced at handling VIP visits in normal circumstances and many of the usual considerations will apply to visits to a disaster site. However, it may be necessary to restrict media coverage of such visits, in which case pooling arrangements may be made. Visiting Ministers and other VIPs will require comprehensive briefing before visiting the site and will require briefing before any meetings with the media.

10A20. VIPs are likely to want to meet those survivors, who are well enough to see them. It will be for the hospitals to decide, on the basis of medical advice and respect for the wishes of individual patients and their relatives, whether it is appropriate for VIPs and/or the media to visit casualties. If the media cannot have access to wards, VIPs can still be interviewed afterwards at the hospital entrance about how patients
and medical staff are coping. Such VIP visits are best managed by an independent team in close consultation with the Police.

Sustainability

10A21. Major emergencies place enormous demands on all involved in the response. Media interest, particularly if it is international, can create pressure throughout a 24-hour period and careful planning of staggered handovers is essential. Chief Constables and local authority Chief Executives will wish to take the sustainability of the level of response to the media into account, and seek mutual aid accordingly. The pooling of resources in a joint media centre should be helpful in this respect. It needs to be remembered that sustainability applies not only to operational personnel, but also to those involved in providing clerical support.

10A22. In the much longer term, experience has shown that media interest is revived on anniversaries of events, and chief officers may wish to give consideration as to how these occasions should be handled.

Media Debriefing

10A23. Where there has been a considerable amount of media attention, there will be inevitable strains between media and emergency service interests. There is much to be gained by inviting senior media representatives to meet with senior members of the emergency services some weeks after a disaster to discuss how both sides saw the way information was managed and to identify any lessons. This may be accomplished through either the Regional Media Emergency Forum s or Local Resilient Forum Communications Groups, and, at a national level, through the National Media Emergency Forum.

SECTION II – CENTRAL ARRANGEMENTS

Public and Media Communications

10A24. Ministers have agreed that, during a crisis or emergency, the NCC will support the LGD and/or Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC)/Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) in providing advice to Ministers on the overall handling of the public information and media communications aspects of the emergency/crisis.

10A25. The level of support for LGDs is flexible depending on the seriousness of the situation. In the event of an incident, it is expected that the NCC will be operational within 2 hours. For example, the NCC could simply coordinate briefing lines, at the other extreme it could organise a full 24-hour operation providing a combination of the activities set out below:
a. Staffing a 24-hour operation - with the support of both the LGD and Other Government Departments (OGDs).

b. Producing coordinated/consolidated briefing for use by Ministers, press officers and stakeholders to ensure consistency in the messages delivered.

c. Coordinating requests for interview with Ministers and leading ‘talking heads’/ third parties.

d. Establish a central press office to work with the LGD and OGDs.

e. Work in conjunction with the Media Monitoring Unit and the GNN to operate an analysis and monitoring team, ensuring that coverage is monitored and assessed and, where necessary, errors corrected.

f. Forward planning capability.

g. Establishing an emergency media centre, in conjunction with the lead responder.

h. Organise media briefings.

i. Working closely with GNN in the regions.

j. Regular updating of UK resilience website and links to related sites as well as monitoring of other external sites.

k. Devising communication strategies, including an exit strategy.

l. Working with LGD to ensure that all relevant audiences, public and stakeholder are targeted quickly and effectively.

m. Liaising closely with Media Emergency Forums (MEFs).

n. Coordinating the production of emergency advertising.

10A26. In a major incident, GNN can provide Press Officers to support the lead responder and partner agencies. The 24-hour call-out number is 0208 938 3560.
ANNEX 10B – TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS

10B1. The communication systems used in responding to an emergency have been updated in line with the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 to mirror how organisations structure themselves in responding to local, regional and national emergencies.

10B2. The Military has no explicit requirement to contribute to the everyday resilience of national communication systems. However, major incident planning includes provision for the various forms of communication between the civilian and military agencies involved in incident response. This Annex describes some of the systems and procedures employed to safeguard networks at periods of high loading, which typically occur during major incidents.

Privileged Access to Telecommunication Systems

10B3. There are currently four privileged communication systems where access is restricted to those with a role in an emergency, these are:

a. Airwave.¹

b. Mobile Telecommunications Privileged Access Scheme (MTPAS).²

c. Fixed Telecommunication Privileged Access Scheme (FTPAS).

d. Access to commercial satellite communications equipment through a Government negotiated catalogue.

Airwave

10B4. Airwave is a secure, resilient digital radio network for the use of emergency and public safety services³ in England, Wales and Scotland. The service is designed to carry both voice and data communications and has guaranteed coverage, on all metalled roads.

10B5. The system employs multi-functional handsets that act as digital radio, mobile phone and data terminal, enabled up to restricted level. To date, Airwave is used by the Police nationally as their primary means of communication; the system also connects to other organisations with which, the emergency services need to communicate.

10B6. Airwave will be used by both the Fire & Rescue Service and by the Ambulance Service which will enable interoperability with other organisations. The

¹ Formerly known as the ‘Public Safety Radio Communications Service’.
² MTPAS formally known as the ACCess OverLoad Class (ACCOLC) scheme
³ Including key MOD UK Ops staffs.
Fire and Ambulance procurement process and national roll out of the airwave system is ongoing.

**Telecommunications Traffic Overload Management through Privileged Access Schemes**

10B7. A major emergency can produce an overload of both the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) and mobile communication networks. This may occur as members of the public seek assurance about the safety of others and/or from damage by an incident to the telephone systems.

10B8. When public telephone networks become overloaded schemes can be invoked on both the fixed and mobile networks to provide privileged access to registered users.

**Mobile Telecommunications Privileged Access Scheme**

10B9. Privileged Access to mobile networks is available for organisations that have a role in responding to, or recovering from, an emergency as defined in The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA). Mobile telephone numbers of essential users can be registered, via a sponsoring process, for the MTPAS, which is supported by all the mobile telephone service providers in the United Kingdom (UK).

10B10. The scheme can only be activated by the Police Gold Commander, by advising all network operators that a major incident has occurred which may cause regional congestion on the network. Subsequent congestion is managed to enable MTPAS registered customers a much higher likelihood of being able to make calls than other customers.

**Privileged Access to Fixed Telecommunications network**

10B11. Currently privileged access to fixed-line telecommunications is managed by British Telecommunication (BT) plc and Cable and Wireless (C&W) plc through the Government Telephone Preference Scheme (GTPS).

10B12. The core telecommunications networks in the UK are about to be completely overhauled and all the existing services converged using the technology that forms the foundations for the Internet. These networks are referred to as Next Generation Networks (NGNs). The whole of the UK is due to be converted by 2011. The new networks will support an enhanced preference scheme that will prevent congestion affecting registered users.
Access to a Government negotiated Catalogue of commercially available Satellite Communications systems

10B13. Commercially available satellite communications assist in enhancing resilience by diversifying the range of communication methods available to responder organisations. From the catalogue, entitled responder organisations are able to purchase at preferential rates satellite communications equipment, specialist training and technical support. The Catalogue contains options for both handheld and fixed equipment, together with specific airtime tariffs tailored to meet the needs of typical responder organisations.

High integrity telecommunications infrastructure

10B14. While it is difficult to justify substantial expenditure installing and maintaining fall-back systems, this needs to be balanced against the risk that key decision makers may be unable to communicate in an emergency. While the risk of national telecommunications failure is low, localised problems can and do occur. In the event of a major emergency key decision makers in multi-agency coordination centres at national, regional and local level across the UK must be able to communicate with each other. The Cabinet Office is looking at a number of ways of achieving the required connectivity and resilience.

Private Telecommunication Providers

10B15. Under the term of their operating licences, BT and C&W have a responsibility to make provision for the availability or restoration of communications services in an emergency or during a network failure. The requirements of the emergency services and local authorities are met by the operators through schemes such as BT National Emergency Linkline, the use of contingency planning, and the provision of technical support to Gold, Silver and Bronze commands. The operators also contribute to the Electronic Communications Resilience and Response Group (ECRRG), which supports cooperation across the industry in response to emergencies affecting telecommunications in the UK.
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
Generic Layout of a CBRN Decontamination Area and the Decontamination Process
LEXICON OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

The primary references for terms and their definitions are indicated in parentheses.¹ Those marked (JDP 02) are new and will be incorporated in JDP 0-01.1 ‘UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions’ following ratification and subsequent promulgation of this publication.

Access Overload Control
The Access Overload Control Scheme gives call preference to registered essential users on the main mobile networks in the UK if the scheme is invoked during a major emergency. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Ambulance Incident Officer
The officer of the ambulance service with overall responsibility for the work of the service at the scene of an emergency. Works in close liaison with the Medical Incident Officer (MIO) to ensure effective use of the medical and ambulance resources at the scene. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Ambulance Loading Point
An area, preferably hard standing, in close proximity to the casualty clearing station, where ambulances can be manoeuvred and patients placed in ambulances for transfer to hospital. Helicopter landing provision may also be needed. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Ante Mortem Team
Officers responsible for liaising with the next of kin on all matters relating to the identification of the deceased. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre
Based at RAF Kinloss in Scotland. An organisation to which the emergency services have direct lines, it provides national coordination of military SAR assets. (JDP 02)

Bellwin Scheme
Discretionary scheme for providing central government financial assistance in exceptional circumstances to affected local authorities in the event of an emergency. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Body Holding Area
An area close to the scene of an emergency where the dead can be held temporarily before transfer to the emergency mortuary or mortuary. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

¹ JDP 0-01.1 ‘United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions’, AAP-6 ‘NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions’.
Bronze
The level at which the management of ‘hands-on’ work is undertaken at the incident site or impacted areas. This is sometimes referred to as the ‘operational level’. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Note: Contrary to traditional military definitions, the Operational (Bronze) level lies below the Tactical (Silver) level, and the Strategic (Gold) level is not at central government; usually it is at County/Unitary Authority level.

Business Continuity Forum
Grouping of organisations to share and coordinate business continuity plans. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Planning’)

Business Continuity Management
A management process that helps manage the risks to the smooth running of an organisation or delivery of a service, ensuring that it can operate to the extent required in the event of a disruption. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Planning’)

Business Continuity Plan
A documented set of procedures and information intended to deliver continuity of critical functions in the event of a disruption. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Planning’)

Casualty
A person killed or physically or mentally injured in war, accident or civil emergency. For Casualty Bureau purposes, the term encompasses any person involved in an incident, including evacuees. In maritime emergencies, it is also used to refer to a vessel or person in distress. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Casualty Bureau
The purpose of the casualty bureau is to provide the initial point of contact for the receiving and assessing of information relating to persons believed to be involved in the emergency. The primary objectives of a casualty bureau are: inform the investigation process relating to the incident; trace and identify people involved in the incident; and reconcile missing persons and collate accurate information in relation to the above for dissemination to appropriate parties. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Casualty Clearing Station
An area set up at the scene of an emergency by the ambulance service in liaison with the Medical Incident Officer to assess, triage and treat casualties and direct their evacuation. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’
Category 1 Responder
A person or body listed in Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Civil Contingencies Act. These bodies are likely to be at the core of the response to most emergencies. As such, they are subject to the full range of civil protection duties in the Act. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Category 2 Responder
A person or body listed in Part 3 of Schedule 1 to the Civil Contingencies Act. These are cooperating responders who are less likely to be involved in the heart of multi-agency planning work, but will be heavily involved in preparing for incidents affecting their sectors. The Act requires them to cooperate and share information with other Category 1 and 2 responders. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Central Emergency Management Group
A pan-Northern Ireland multi-agency forum for the development, discussion and agreement of civil protection policy for the Northern Ireland public services. It is broadly analogous to the Regional Resilience Forums in England. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Planning’)

Civil Contingencies Act

Civil Contingencies Reaction Forces
Drawn from existing reserve forces, CCRFs are military forces capable of being mobilised to assist in dealing with civil emergencies in support of the civil authorities and regular forces. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Civil Contingencies Secretariat
The Cabinet Office secretariat which provides the central focus for the cross-departmental and cross-agency commitment, coordination and cooperation that will enable the UK to deal effectively with disruptive challenges and crises. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Civil Protection
Preparedness to deal with a wide range of emergencies from localised flooding to terrorist attack. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Lexicon-3
2nd Edition
Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations
Regulations applying to the chemical industry and to some storage sites where threshold quantities of dangerous substances, as identified in the Regulations, are kept or used. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Community Risk Register
An assessment of the risks within a local resilience area agreed by the Local Resilience Forum as a basis for supporting the preparation of emergency plans. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Planning’)

Coordination
The harmonious integration of the expertise of all the agencies involved with the object of effectively and efficiently bringing the incident to a successful conclusion. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Cordon – Inner
Surrounds and protects the immediate scene of an incident. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Cordon – Outer
Seals off a controlled area around an incident to which unauthorised persons are not allowed access. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Defence Council (Not a definition)
The formal legal basis for the conduct of defence in the UK rests on a range of powers vested by statute and Letters Patent in the Defence Council, chaired by the Secretary of State for Defence. The Defence Council is responsible for approving the employment of Armed Forces on MACA tasks. This authority is delegated in certain circumstances (generally during emergencies which threaten life) to local unit commanders in order to speed response. The current composition of the Defence Council is:

The Secretary of State for Defence
Minister of State for the Armed Forces
Under Secretary of State for Defence and Minister for Defence Procurement
Under Secretary of State for Defence and Minister for Veterans
Chief of the Defence Staff
Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff
Chief of the Naval Staff and First Sea Lord
Chief of the General Staff
Chief of the Air Staff
Permanent Under Secretary of State
Chief of Defence Procurement
Chief Scientific Adviser
Second Permanent Under Secretary of State

**Devolved Administrations**
Scottish Executive, Welsh Assembly Government and Northern Ireland Executive.
(Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

**Disaster Victim Identification**
The process of collating information about the victim of a disaster to assist in identification. (ACPO Emergency Procedures Manual)

**Emergency**
An event or situation that threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the UK or to the environment of a place in the UK, or war or terrorism which threatens serious damage to the security of the UK. To constitute an emergency this event or situation must require the implementation of special arrangements by one or more Category 1 responder. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

**Emergency Mortuary**
Demountable (temporary) structures or conversion of existing structures whose function is to provide an area where post-mortem and identification examinations of victims can take place and, where necessary, provide body holding capability prior to bodies being released for funeral arrangements to be made. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)
Note: MOD uses the term ‘Resilience mortuary’.

**Evacuation Assembly Point**
Building or area to which evacuees are directed for transfer/transportation to a reception centre or rest centre. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

**Explosive Ordnance Disposal**
The detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe, recovery and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance. It may also include explosives ordnance which has become dangerous by damage or deterioration. (NATO: AAP-6)

**Family and Friends Reception Centre**
Secure area set aside for use and interview of friends and relatives arriving at the scene (or location associated with an incident, such as at an airport or port). (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

**(Police) Family Liaison Officer**
Member of the ante mortem team allocated specific responsibility for one or more families of the deceased. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Lexicon-5
2nd Edition
Forward Control Point
Each service’s command and control facility nearest the scene of the incident – responsible for immediate direction, deployment and security. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Generic Local Assessment
Assessment provided by central government to the local level. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)

Generic plan
A single plan designed to cope with a wide range of emergencies. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)

Gold
Strategic decision-makers at the local level. They establish the framework within which operational and tactical managers work in responding to and recovering from emergencies. Multi-agency cooperation at Gold level is delivered through the Strategic Coordinating Group. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Note: Contrary to traditional military definitions, the Operational (Bronze) level lies below the Tactical (Silver) level, and the Strategic (Gold) level is not at central government; usually it is at County/Unitary Authority level.

Identification Commission
Group representing all aspects of the identification process, which is set up to consider and determine the identity of the deceased to the satisfaction of HM Coroner. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Government Office Business Continuity Plan (GOBCP)
Plan to ensure that the Government Office for the Region can continue to operate its essential functions in an emergency. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)

Hazard
An accidental or naturally occurring event or situation with the potential to cause physical (or psychological) harm to members of the community (including loss of life), damage or losses to property, and/or disruption to the environment or to structures (economic, social, political) upon which a community’s way of life depends. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)

Hazard Assessment
A component of the risk assessment process in which identified hazards are assessed for future action. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)

Note: Contrary to traditional military definitions, the Operational (Bronze) level lies below the Tactical (Silver) level, and the Strategic (Gold) level is not at central government; usually it is at County/Unitary Authority level.
**Hazard Identification**
A process by which potential hazards are identified. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)

**Humanitarian Assistance Centres** (formerly Family Assistance Centres)
A one-stop-shop for survivors, families, friends and all those affected by the emergency, through which they can access support, care and advice. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

**Incident Control Point**
The point from which an emergency service’s tactical manager can control his/her service’s response to a land-based incident. Together, the incident control points of all the services form the focal point for coordinating all activities on site. Also referred to as ‘Silver control’. In London, incident control points are grouped together to form the Joint Emergency Services Control Centre (JESCC). (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

**Integrated Emergency Management**
An approach to preventing and managing emergencies that entails six key activities – anticipation, assessment, prevention, preparation, response and recovery. IEM is geared to the idea of building greater overall resilience in the face of a broad range of disruptive challenges. It requires a coherent multi-agency effort. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

**J Division**
The organisation of a Joint Headquarters is usually divided into divisions. The J3 division is concerned with the execution of operations, J5 with the planning of operations. Single–Service headquarters use a similar structure, replacing prefix J with N(RN), G(Army) or A(raf). (JDP 02)

**Joint Emergency Service Group (JESG)**
A steering group for multi-agency working between the emergency services. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)

**Joint Emergency Services Control Centre**
A grouping of incident control points (see above) – used in London.

**Joint Regional Liaison Officer**
An officer appointed to each Army Regional Brigade who is responsible for leading tri-Service liaison with local authorities, emergency services and other agencies involved in emergency planning. (JDP 0-01.1)
Joint Service Coordination Group
The formal military focus for civil/military and tri-Service liaison within an Army Regional Brigade’s area. (JDP 0-01.1)

Lead Government Department
Government department which, in the event of an emergency, coordinates central government activity. The department which will take the lead varies depending on the nature of the emergency. The Government regularly publishes a full list of LGDs. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness /Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Lead Organisation
Organisation appointed by a group of organisations to speak or act on their behalf or to take the lead in a given situation, with the other organisations’ support. The exact role of the lead organisation depends on the circumstances in which the lead role is being operated. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)

Lead Responder
A Category 1 responder charged with carrying out a duty under the Act on behalf of a number of responder organisations, so as to coordinate its delivery and to avoid unnecessary duplication. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)

Local Resilience Area
The Civil Contingencies Act requires Category 1 and 2 responders to cooperate with other Category 1 and 2 responders in their local resilience area. Each local resilience area (with the exception of London) is based on a police area. The principal mechanism for multi-agency cooperation is the Local Resilience Forum. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness /Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Local Resilience Forum
A process for bringing together all the Category 1 and 2 responders within a local police area for the purpose of facilitating cooperation in fulfilment of their duties under the Civil Contingencies Act. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness /Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Local responder
Organisation which responds to emergencies at the local level. These may include Category 1 and 2 responders under the Civil Contingencies Act and other organisations not covered by the Act. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness /Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Lexicon-8
Local Risk Assessment Guidance
A document provided by central government with information on generic hazards and threats that should assist Category 1 responders in performing their local risk assessment duty under the Civil Contingencies Act. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)

Major Incident
This term is commonly used by emergency services personnel operationally to describe an emergency as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Marine Response Centre
A coordination centre established by the MCA in marine pollution cases requiring a national response. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre
HM Coastguard regional centre responsible for promoting the efficient organisation of maritime search and rescue services and for coordinating the conduct of search and rescue operations within a search and rescue region. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Maritime Rescue Sub Centre
HM Coastguard unit subordinate to a rescue coordination centre and established to complement the latter. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Marshalling Area
Area to which resources and personnel not immediately required at the scene or being held for further use can be directed to standby. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Media Centre
Central location for media enquiries, providing communication, conference monitoring, interview and briefing facilities and access to responding organisation personnel. Staffed by spokespersons from all the principal services/organisations responding. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Media Liaison Officer
Representative who has responsibility for liaising with the media on behalf of his/her organisation. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Media Plan
A key plan for ensuring cooperation between Category 1 and 2 responders and the media in communicating with the public during and after an emergency. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)

Medical Incident Officer
Medical officer responsible for the management of non-ambulance medical resources at the scene of an emergency. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Military Aid to other Government Departments
Assistance provided by the Armed services on urgent work of national importance or in maintaining supplies and services essential to the life, health and safety of the community. (JDP 02)

Military Aid to the Civil Authorities
The collective term given to the three types of operations which may take place in a civilian environment, i.e. MACC, MACP and MAGD - see associated entries. (JDP 0-01.1)

Military Aid to the Civil Community
The provision of unarmed military assistance to the country at large: in time of emergency such as natural disasters and major emergencies; to provide more routine assistance for special projects or events of significant social value to the civil community in the creation and development of local community projects; and of individual assistance by full-time attachment to social service or similar organisations. (JDP 0-01.1)

Military Aid to the Civil Power
The provision of military assistance (armed if appropriate) to the Civil Power in its maintenance of law, order and public safety using specialist capabilities or equipment, in situations beyond the capability of the Civil Power. (JDP 0-01.1)

Military Home Defence
The military activities required to preserve the functions of government and to protect essential national infrastructure in times of crisis and war. (JDP 0-01.1)

Military Support to the Mounting of Operations
The planning for and the deployment, supporting and recovery of military operations outside the UK. (JDP 0-01.1)

Minister (of the Crown)
Government Minister with power to act under the Civil Contingencies Act, usually relating to the issuing of guidance and regulations, but also including urgent powers of direction (for example, in times of catastrophic emergency or to deal with newly arising risks) and monitoring powers. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)

Multi-agency Plan
A plan, usually prepared and maintained by a lead responder, on behalf of a number of organisations who need to coordinate and integrate their preparations for an emergency. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)
Multi-level Plan
A plan, usually initiated and maintained by central government or a regional office, which relies on the participation and cooperation of Category 1 and 2 responders. The plan will cover more than one level of government. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)

Mutual Aid
An agreement between Category 1 and 2 responders and other organisations not covered by the Act, within the same sector or across sectors and across boundaries, to provide assistance with additional resource during an emergency which may go beyond the resources of an individual organisation. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

News Coordination Centre (NCC)
The NCC works with the lead government department to provide coordinating media and public communications support during a crisis, emergency or major event. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996
Legislation on the management of pipeline safety, using an integrated, goal-setting, risk-based approach encompassing both onshore and offshore pipelines; includes the major accident prevention document, the arrangements for emergency plans and the transitional arrangements. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)

Primary Care Trust
Primary Care is the care provided by those professionals the public normally see when they have a health problem (eg doctor, dentist, optician, pharmacist). These services are managed by Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Radiation Emergency Preparedness and Public Information Regulations 2001
Implemented in Great Britain, the articles on intervention in cases of radiation (radiological) emergency in Council Directive 96/29/Euratom, also known as the BS596 Directive. The Directive lays down the safety standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiation. The REPPIR also partly implement the Public Information Directive by subsuming the Public Information for Radiation Emergencies Regulations 1992 (PIRER) on informing the general public about health protection measures to be applied and steps to be taken in the event of an emergency. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Reception Arrangements for Military Patients
The NHS plans for the allocation of military patients to NHS hospitals following their repatriation. (JDP 02)
Receiving Hospital(s)
Any hospital selected by the ambulance service from those designated by health authorities to receive casualties in the event of an emergency. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Recovery
The process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Regional Civil Contingencies Committee
A committee that meets during an emergency when a regional response or other action at regional level is required. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Regional Media Emergency Forum
Group of representatives from the media (editors, journalists), government, emergency services and other organisations involved in dealing with an emergency, meeting to plan and discuss communications challenges and common interests in planning for and responding to emergencies. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)

Regional Nominated Coordinator
Where emergency regulations are used, central government must appoint a Regional Nominated Coordinator (or Emergency Coordinator in the case of the devolved administrations) in each of the English regions to which the emergency regulations apply. The post-holder will be appointed to facilitate coordination of activities under the emergency regulations in line with the response strategy and objectives set by central government. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Regional Resilience Forum
A forum established by a Government Office to discuss civil protection issues from the regional perspective and to create a stronger link between local and central government on resilience issues. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Regional Resilience Team
A small team of civil servants within a Government Office for the Region working on civil protection issues, headed by a Regional Resilience Director. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Regional Risk Map
Map of assessed risks across a region. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)

Lexicon-12
2nd Edition
**Rendezvous point**
Point to which all vehicles and resources arriving at the outer cordon are directed. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

**Resilience**
The ability of the community, services or infrastructure to withstand the consequences of an incident. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

**Risk**
Risk measures the significance of a potential event or situation in terms of likelihood and impact. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

**Risk assessment**
A structured and auditable process of identifying significant events, assessing their likelihood and impacts, and then combining these to provide an overall assessment of risk, as a basis for further decisions and action. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

**Rest Centre**
Premises used for temporary accommodation of displaced persons and following an incident. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

**Safety Advisory Group**
Multi-agency group set up to provide advice on safety matters for a specific event, or events, such as a major sporting event or a concert held in a stadium. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)

**Salvage Control Unit**
A unit established to support the Secretary of State’s Representative in marine salvage incidents. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

**Scene Access Control Point**
Provides access through the outer cordon for essential non-emergency service personnel. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

**Scottish Category 1 Responder**
A person or body listed in Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the Civil Contingencies Act. These responders are subject to Regulations and guidance issued by Scottish Ministers. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)

Lexicon-13
Scottish Category 2 Responder
A person or body listed in Part 4 of Schedule 1 to the Civil Contingencies Act. These responders are subject to Regulations and guidance issued by Scottish Ministers. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)

Scottish Emergencies Coordinating Committee
A multi-agency group in Scotland which ensures that steps are taken to respond to the changing risk environment and determines the national strategy for the development of civil protection. The membership of SECC can be adjusted according to circumstances, but it includes Scottish Executive departments, emergency services, local authorities and the Armed Forces. The SECC may meet at a time of emergency to advise on development of the national strategy. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)

Scottish Executive Emergency Room
A facility within the Scottish Executive for communication, information processing and coordination of the central government emergency response led by the Scottish Executive. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)

Search and Rescue
Operations for locating and retrieving persons in distress, providing for their immediate needs and delivering them to a place of safety. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator
The MCA officer assigned to coordinate the response to an actual or apparent maritime distress situation. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Search and Rescue Region
A specific geographical area within which Search and Rescue operations are conducted and controlled by a Rescue Coordination Centre. (MCA: Search and Rescue Framework Document)

Senior Investigating Officer
The senior detective officer appointed by the senior police officer to assume responsibility for all aspects of the police investigation. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Shoreline Response Centre
A coordination centre established by the local authority most affected by a marine pollution incident. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Lexicon-14 2nd Edition
Silver
Tactical level of management introduced to provide overall management of the response to an emergency. Silver managers determine priorities in allocating resources, obtain further resources as required, and plan and coordinate when tasks will be coordinated. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Note: Contrary to traditional military definitions, the Operational (Bronze) level lies below the Tactical (Silver) level, and the Strategic (Gold) level is not at central government; usually it is at County/Unitary Authority level.

Site Incident Officer
If an incident occurs within the perimeter of an industrial or commercial establishment, public venue, airport or harbour, a representative from the affected organisation will liaise with the emergency management structure. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Specific Plan
A plan designed to cope with a specific type of emergency, where the generic plan is likely to be insufficient. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)

Statutory Services
Those services whose responsibilities are laid down in law: for example, police, fire and ambulance services, HM Coastguard and local authorities. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Strategic Coordinating Group
Multi-agency group which sets the policy and strategic framework for emergency response and recovery work at the local level in England and Wales (see also Gold). (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Subsidiarity
The principle wherein decisions are made at the lowest appropriate level, and higher levels only become involved where necessary. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Survivor Reception Centre
Secure area where survivors not requiring acute hospital treatment can be taken for short-term shelter, first aid, interview and documentation. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Survivors
Those who are directly affected by an emergency, but not killed by it. Including those who have been injured, traumatised or displaced. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)

Lexicon-15

2nd Edition
Triage
Process of assessment and allocation of priorities by the medical or ambulance staff at the site or casualty clearing station prior to evacuation. Triage may be repeated at intervals and on arrival at a receiving hospital. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Utilities
Companies providing essential services e.g. water, energy, telecommunications. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Response and Recovery’)

Voluntary Sector
Bodies, other than public authorities or local authorities, that carry out activities otherwise than for profit. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)

Vulnerability
The susceptibility of a community, services or infrastructure to damage or harm by a realised hazard or threat. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)

Wales Resilience Forum
This Forum is a multi-agency group providing the mechanism for national multi-agency cooperation and strategic advice on civil protection and emergency planning at an all-Wales level. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)

Welsh Borders Resilience Group
A group bringing together the Welsh Assembly Government and Regional Resilience Teams from the Government Offices for the South West, West Midlands and North West to facilitate cooperation and information sharing between Wales and the border areas of England. (Cabinet Office: ‘Emergency Preparedness’)

Lexicon-16
LEXICON OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAIB</td>
<td>Air Accident Investigation Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Assistant Chief Constable</td>
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<td>ACCOLC</td>
<td>Access Overload Control Scheme</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACPO</td>
<td>Association of Chief Police Officers</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACPO(TAM)</td>
<td>Association of Chief Police Officers (Terrorism and Allied Matters)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACPO(S)</td>
<td>Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland</td>
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<td>AIO</td>
<td>Ambulance Incident Officer</td>
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<td>AJP</td>
<td>Allied Joint Publication</td>
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<td>APA</td>
<td>Association of Police Authorities</td>
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<td>APCM</td>
<td>Aircraft Post Crash Management</td>
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<td>ARAD</td>
<td>Agriculture and Rural Affairs Department (Welsh Assembly)</td>
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<td>ARCC</td>
<td>Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre</td>
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<td>ASA</td>
<td>Ambulance Services Association</td>
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<td>ATCC</td>
<td>Air Traffic Control Centre</td>
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<td>AWE</td>
<td>Atomic Weapons Establishment</td>
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<td>Bde</td>
<td>Brigade</td>
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<td>BCRC</td>
<td>British Cave Rescue Council</td>
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<td>BCU</td>
<td>Basic Command Unit</td>
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<td>BFL</td>
<td>British Fishery Limits</td>
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<td>BHA</td>
<td>Body Holding Area</td>
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<td>BNFL</td>
<td>British Nuclear Fuels Ltd</td>
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<td>BRT</td>
<td>Brigade Reinforcement Team</td>
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<td>BSFO</td>
<td>British Sea Fishery Officer</td>
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<td>BTP</td>
<td>British Transport Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear</td>
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<td>CB</td>
<td>Casualty Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>Civil Contingencies Act</td>
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<td>CCC</td>
<td>Civil Contingencies Committee</td>
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<td>CCRF</td>
<td>Civil Contingency Reaction Force</td>
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<td>CCS</td>
<td>Civil Contingencies Secretariat</td>
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<td>CDM</td>
<td>Chief of Defence Materiel</td>
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<td>Cdrs</td>
<td>Commanders</td>
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<td>CDS</td>
<td>Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
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<td>CEMG</td>
<td>Central Emergency Management Group</td>
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<td>CEPU</td>
<td>Central Emergency Planning Unit</td>
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<td>CESO</td>
<td>Chief Environment and Safety Officer</td>
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<td>CFOA</td>
<td>Chief Fire Officers’ Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCAIR</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Air Command</td>
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<td>CINCLAND</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Land Command</td>
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<td>CINC Fleet</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Fleet Command</td>
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<td>CMD</td>
<td>Conventional Munitions Disposal</td>
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<td>CMG</td>
<td>Crisis Management Group</td>
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<td>CNC</td>
<td>Civil Nuclear Constabulary</td>
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<td>COBR</td>
<td>Cabinet Office Briefing Room</td>
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<td>COMAH</td>
<td>Control of Major Accident Hazards</td>
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<td>CPRB</td>
<td>Counter Pollution and Response Branch</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPSO</td>
<td>Counter Pollution and Salvage Officer</td>
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<td>CPT</td>
<td>Contingency Planning Team</td>
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<td>CRF</td>
<td>Commander Regional Forces</td>
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<td>CSIA</td>
<td>Central Sponsor for Information Assurance (Cabinet Office)</td>
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<td>CST</td>
<td>Command Support Team</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism</td>
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<td>C&amp;W</td>
<td>Cable and Wireless</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>Command &amp; Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>D &amp; D</td>
<td>Distress and Diversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Devolved Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAFNI</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture and Fisheries Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DARDNI</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture and Rural Development Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBERR</td>
<td>Department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>Defence Critical Asset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCDS(C)</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Commitments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCLG</td>
<td>Department for Communities and Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCMO</td>
<td>Defence Crisis Management Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCMS</td>
<td>Department of Culture, Media and Sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCT&amp;</td>
<td>Director Counter Terrorism and UK Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defra</td>
<td>Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPC</td>
<td>Department for Environment, Planning and Countryside (WAG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DfES</td>
<td>Department for Education and Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DfT</td>
<td>Department for Transport</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoH</td>
<td>Department of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSTL</td>
<td>Defence Science and technology Laboratory</td>
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<tr>
<td>DWP</td>
<td>Department for Work and Pensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>Environment Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECN</td>
<td>Emergency Communications Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>Emergency Mortuary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abbreviations-3

EP Emergency Planning
EPIC Emergency Procedures Information Centre
ETV Emergency Towing Vessel
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FCP Forward Control Point
FLC Front Line Command
FOSNNI Flag Officer Scotland Northern England and Northern Ireland
FRAGO Fragmentary Order
FSA Food Standards Agency
FTRS Full Time Reserve Service

GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters
GDS Government Decontamination Service
GLA Greater London Authority
GLO Government Liaison Officer
GLT Government Liaison Team
GMDSS Global Maritime Distress and Safety System
GNN Government News Network
GO Government Office
GOBCP Government Office Business Continuity Plan
GOR Government Office for the Regions
GTPS Government Telephone Preference Scheme

HAZMAT Hazardous Material
HAC Humanitarian Assistance Centre
HEMS Helicopter Emergency Medical Service
HMG Her Majesty’s Government
HMIC Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary
HMICS HM Inspectorate of Constabulary for Scotland
HMRC HM Revenue and Customs
HO Home Office
HPA Health Protection Agency
HPS Health Protection Scotland
HQ Headquarters
HQ AIR Headquarters Air Command
HQ LAND Headquarters Land Command
HSE Health and Safety Executive

ICP Incident Control Point
IED Improvised Explosive Device
IEDD Improvised Explosive Device Disposal
IEM Integrated Emergency Management
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMO</td>
<td>International Maritime Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISDN</td>
<td>Integrated Services Digital Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JESCC</td>
<td>Joint Emergency Services Control Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>Joint Contingency Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIG</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JLP</td>
<td>Joint Logistic Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>Joint Operations Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOP</td>
<td>Joint Operational Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPG</td>
<td>Joint Planning Guide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRLO</td>
<td>Joint Regional Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSCG</td>
<td>Joint Service Coordination Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSEODOC</td>
<td>Joint Service EOD Operations Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTAC</td>
<td>Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LESLP</td>
<td>London Emergency Services Liaison Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFEPA</td>
<td>London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGD</td>
<td>Lead Government Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>LO</td>
<td>Liaison Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Local resilience Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRAG</td>
<td>Local Risk Assessment Guidance</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRF</td>
<td>Local Resilience Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>MACA</td>
<td>Military Aid to the Civil Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACC</td>
<td>Military Aid to the Civil Community</td>
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<td>MACP</td>
<td>Military Aid to the Civil Power</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAGD</td>
<td>Military Aid to other Government Departments</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAIB</td>
<td>Marine Accident Investigation Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCA</td>
<td>Maritime and Coastguard Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCT</td>
<td>Maritime Counter Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDAT</td>
<td>Major Disaster Advisory Team</td>
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<td>MDP</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence Police</td>
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<td>MEDEVAC</td>
<td>Medical Evacuation</td>
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<td>MEF</td>
<td>Media Emergency Forum</td>
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<td>MHD</td>
<td>Military Home Defence</td>
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<td>MIO</td>
<td>Medical Incident Officer</td>
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<td>MIRG</td>
<td>Maritime Incident Response Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>Metropolitan Police Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRC</td>
<td>Mountain Rescue Council of England and Wales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRCC</td>
<td>Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRC of S</td>
<td>Mountain Rescue Committee of Scotland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRSC</td>
<td>Maritime Rescue Sub-Centre</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRT</td>
<td>Mountain Rescue Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSMO</td>
<td>Military Support to the Mounting of Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>MT</td>
<td>Military Task</td>
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<tr>
<td>NARO</td>
<td>Nuclear Accident Response Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAW</td>
<td>National Assembly for Wales</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>Naval Base Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCIS</td>
<td>National Criminal Intelligence Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCS</td>
<td>National Crime Squad</td>
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<tr>
<td>NHS</td>
<td>National Health Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIAS</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Ambulance Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIFRS</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIO</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIOBR</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Briefing Room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NISCC</td>
<td>National Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPIA</td>
<td>National Policing Improvement Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>Naval Regional Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRO</td>
<td>Naval regional Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRPB</td>
<td>National Radiological Protection Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSID</td>
<td>National Security International Development</td>
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<td>NSID (PSR)</td>
<td>NSID Sub-committee Protective Security Resilience</td>
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<tr>
<td>NVASEC</td>
<td>National Voluntary Aid Society Emergency Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODSec</td>
<td>Defence &amp; Overseas Secretariat</td>
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<td>OEI</td>
<td>Offshore Energy Installation</td>
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<td>OFMDFM</td>
<td>Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister</td>
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<td>OGD</td>
<td>Other Government Department(s)</td>
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<td>OSCT</td>
<td>Office of Security and Counter Terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCB</td>
<td>Police Casualty Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCT</td>
<td>Primary Care Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>PJHQ</td>
<td>Permanent Joint Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMLO</td>
<td>Police Military Liaison Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNICC</td>
<td>Police National Information and Coordination Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>Petrol, Oil and Lubricants</td>
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<td>PPE</td>
<td>Personal Protective Equipment</td>
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<td>PSNI</td>
<td>Police Service of Northern Ireland</td>
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<td>PSTN</td>
<td>Public Switch Telephone Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSU</td>
<td>Police Support Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAFRLO</td>
<td>RAF Regional Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>RAMP</td>
<td>Reception Arrangements for Military Patients</td>
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<td>RAYNET</td>
<td>Radio Amateurs Emergency Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCC</td>
<td>Rescue Coordination Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCCC</td>
<td>Regional Civil Contingencies Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCDM</td>
<td>Royal Centre for Defence Medicine</td>
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<td>RCU</td>
<td>Regional Coordination Unit</td>
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<td>RDS</td>
<td>Radio Data System</td>
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<td>REPPIR</td>
<td>Radiation Emergency Preparedness and Public Information Regulations</td>
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<td>RMEF</td>
<td>Regional Media Emergency Forum</td>
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<td>RIMNET</td>
<td>Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>RNC</td>
<td>Regional Nominated Coordinator</td>
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<td>RNLI</td>
<td>Royal National Lifeboat Institution</td>
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<td>RNRLRO</td>
<td>Royal Navy Regional Liaison Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>Regional Resilience Forum</td>
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<td>RRT</td>
<td>Regional Resilience Team</td>
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<td>SACP</td>
<td>Scene Access Control Point</td>
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<td>Safety Advisory Group</td>
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<td>Search and Rescue</td>
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<td>SARDA</td>
<td>Search and Rescue Dog Association</td>
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<td>SCG</td>
<td>Strategic-Coordinating Group</td>
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<td>SE</td>
<td>Scottish Executive</td>
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<tr>
<td>SECC</td>
<td>Scottish Emergency Coordinating Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEDD</td>
<td>Scottish Executive Development Department</td>
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<td>SEEAT</td>
<td>Scottish Executive Emergency Action Team</td>
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<td>SEETLLDD</td>
<td>Scottish Executive, Enterprise, Transport and Lifelong Learning Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEER</td>
<td>Scottish Executive Emergency Room</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEERAD</td>
<td>Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEFCSD</td>
<td>Scottish Executive Finance and Central Services Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEJD</td>
<td>Scottish Executive Justice Department</td>
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<td>SEPA</td>
<td>Scottish Environment Protection Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFPA</td>
<td>Scottish Fishery Protection Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHA</td>
<td>Strategic Health Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIO</td>
<td>Senior Investigating Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>SJC(UK)</td>
<td>Standing Joint Commander (UK)</td>
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<td>SME</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert</td>
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<td>SOCA</td>
<td>Serious Organised Crime Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOSREP</td>
<td>Secretary of State’s Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPICC</td>
<td>Scottish Police Information and Coordination Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRR</td>
<td>Search and Rescue Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>STAC</td>
<td>Science Technical Advisory Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUA</td>
<td>Suppression of Unlawful Acts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLACP</td>
<td>Training and Logistics Assistance to the Civil Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>UKAEA</td>
<td>United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority</td>
</tr>
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<td>UKAEAC</td>
<td>United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority Constabulary</td>
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<td>UKFSSART</td>
<td>United Kingdom Fire Service Search and Rescue Team</td>
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<td>US&amp;R</td>
<td>Urban Search and Rescue</td>
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<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<td>VAS</td>
<td>Voluntary Aid Societies</td>
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<td>Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Forum</td>
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<td>WAG</td>
<td>Welsh Assembly Government</td>
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<td>WCCC</td>
<td>Wales Civil Contingencies Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMEF</td>
<td>Welsh Media Emergency Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRAG</td>
<td>Wales Risk Assessment Group</td>
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<td>Wales Resilience Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRVS</td>
<td>Women’s Royal Voluntary Service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Association of Chief Police Officers in 
Scotland. 
Association of Police Authorities. 
British Transport Police.

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National Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre.
National Policing Improvement Agency.
Police (links to regional services).
Police Federation of England and Wales.
Police Federation for Northern Ireland.
Police Information Technology Organisation.
Scottish Police College.
Civil Nuclear Constabulary.
Serious Organised Crime Agency.
Scottish Drug Enforcement Agency.

**Ambulance Service**
Ambulance Services Association.
Scottish Ambulance Service.

**Health Service**
British Association for Immediate Care (BASICS).
NHS Emergency preparedness division.
NHS Scotland Emergency Planning.

**Fire Service**
CFOA.
Firelink.
Fire Service College.
UKFSSART.

**Maritime and Coastguard Agency**
Air Accident Investigation Branch.
Marine Accident Investigation Branch.
MCA website.

**Environment/Public Health Protection**
Chartered Institute Of Environmental Health.
Environment Agency.
Floodline (Environment Agency).
Health Protection Agency.
Health and Safety Executive.
HSE Hazardous Installations Directorate.
HSE Nuclear Safety Inspectorate.
HSE Railway Inspectorate.

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www.hse.gov.uk/railways
Meteorological Office.
National Radiological Protection Board.
NIE Dept of Agriculture and Rural Development.
NIE Dept of the Environment, Environment and Heritage Service.
Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network.
Scottish Centre for Infection and Environmental Health.
Scottish Environment Protection Agency.

Voluntary Organisations
British Red Cross.
Disaster Action.
First Aid Nursing Yeomanry.
Missions to Seafarers.
Mountain Rescue.
Mountain Rescue Committee of Scotland
Radio Amateurs Emergency Network. RNLI.
St Andrew’s Ambulance Association.
St John Ambulance.
St John Ambulance Wales.
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