JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 01
CAMPAIGNING

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Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff, Development, Concepts and Doctrine

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JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS

The successful conduct of military operations requires an intellectually rigorous, clearly articulated and empirically-based framework of understanding that gives advantage to a country’s Armed Forces, and its likely partners, in the management of conflict. This common basis of understanding is provided by doctrine.

UK doctrine is, as far as practicable and sensible, consistent with that of NATO. The development of national doctrine addresses those areas not covered adequately by NATO; it also influences the evolution of NATO doctrine in accordance with national thinking and experience.

Endorsed national doctrine is promulgated formally in Joint Doctrine Publications (JDPs).¹ From time to time, Interim Joint Doctrine Publications (IJDPs) are published, caveated to indicate the need for their subsequent revision in light of anticipated changes in relevant policy or legislation, or lessons arising from operations.

Urgent requirements for doctrine are addressed in Joint Doctrine Notes (JDNs). JDNs do not represent an agreed or fully staffed position, but are raised in short order by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) to establish and disseminate current best practice. They also provide the basis for further development and experimentation, and a doctrinal basis for operations and exercises.

Details of the Joint Doctrine development process and the associated hierarchy of JDPs are to be found in JDP 0-00 ‘Joint Doctrine Development Handbook’.

¹ Formerly named Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs).
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PREFACE

1. The operational level of warfare provides the two-way bridge between the strategic and tactical levels. It is the level at which a Joint Force Commander (JFC)\(^2\) plans, conducts and sustains military operations as part of an overall campaign. The orchestration of a campaign, which translates strategic objectives into tactical direction, is termed Operational Art. A JFC’s skill provides the mainspring of Operational Art, itself realised through the application of effective staff processes.

2. Joint, frequently multinational and always multi-agency, the operational level provides a JFC with invariably complex challenges. Success rests upon the concerted application of all the instruments of national power, using a Comprehensive Approach, to achieve national policy aims and objectives.

3. **Purpose.** Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 01 (2\(^{nd}\) Edition) ‘Campaigning’ is the keystone publication within the UK joint operational level doctrine hierarchy.\(^3\) Based on enduring principles and good practice, updated to reflect recent experience, it provides guidance to a JFC on contemporary military operations and how best to understand operational level challenges. As well as outlining the staff procedures that underpin Operational Art, JDP 01 highlights the centrality of command and the role of the operational level commander in ensuring campaign success.

4. **Structure.** JDP 01 is divided into 4 chapters:
   a. **Chapter 1 – Operating Environment** describes how military activity is conditioned by the context within which it occurs.
   b. **Chapter 2 – Military Strategy** introduces the levels of warfare and describes the place of military strategy within national crisis management.
   c. **Chapter 3 – Campaigning** describes the JFC’s key contribution, as part of a Comprehensive Approach, to achieving operational success.
   d. **Chapter 4 – Command** considers the challenges of command at the operational level, including multinational considerations.

5. **Readership.** JDP 01 is the pre-eminent reference for joint command and staff training. It is intended primarily for JFCs and those engaged in or studying operational level decision making. It provides authoritative guidance for established

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\(^2\) ‘A general term applied to a commander authorised to exercise operational command or control over a joint force.’ (Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01.1 ‘United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions’).

\(^3\) Campaign planning in respect of contingent operations overseas has no direct equivalent for operations conducted in the UK. The UK’s approach to military operations in the UK is addressed separately in JDP 02 ‘Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience’.
and *ad hoc* operational level headquarters, and also for commanders and staffs at the strategic and higher tactical levels.

6. JDP 01 also provides the provenance for subordinate joint doctrine publications. Other Government Departments (specifically the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development and the multi-departmental Stabilisation Unit) will also find this publication relevant.

7. The historical vignettes contained within JDP 01 have been provided by Dr Stuart Griffin and his colleagues at the Joint Services Command and Staff College. Professor Anthony King of Exeter University has also contributed significantly to the discussion of command and decision-making.

**LINKAGES**

8. JDP 01 is linked with:

   a. JDP 0-01 ‘British Defence Doctrine’.
   b. JDP 1-00 ‘Personnel Support to Joint Operations’.
   c. JDP 2-00 ‘Intelligence’.
   d. JDP 3-00 ‘Campaign Execution’.
   e. JDP 4-00 ‘Logistics for Joint Operations’.
   f. JDP 5-00 ‘Campaign Planning’.
   g. JDP 6-00 ‘Communications and Information Systems’.

9. Knowledge of UK doctrine alone will not be sufficient to prepare headquarters staff for planning a multinational operation. The most likely coalitions will be US led and, although this doctrine is compatible with that of our major allies, it is not identical. Therefore, every effort should be made to become familiar with the equivalent doctrine of the lead nation or organisation. JDP 01 reflects principally UK national arrangements. Commanders and more probably their staff should know where to access relevant alliance and coalition lead nation doctrine.


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4 Due for promulgation in 2009.
b. **Other Multinational Doctrine.** Useful guidance on operating within an *ad hoc* coalition can also be found in the Multinational Interoperability Council ‘Coalition Building Guide’.

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CAMPAIGNING

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Lexicon
CHAPTER 1 – OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

Chapter 1 describes the operating environment and how military activity, and its underlying purpose, is conditioned by the context within which it occurs.

Section I – Introduction
Section II – Character of Operations
Section III – Military Activity in Context

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

101. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01 (3rd Edition) ‘British Defence Doctrine’ describes the nature of war and warfare, enduring principles, the utility of force, and the employment of armed forces. It also addresses the British way of war (including aspects such as command and ethos). This section highlights, and in places expands upon, those aspects most pertinent to a Joint Force Commander (JFC).¹

102. War is an instrument of policy, normally triggered by some combination of self-interest, fear, ideology or values; it involves a violent relationship between 2 or more states or groups. Warfare is the act of waging war. However, not all military operations constitute war, or necessarily fit any other specific or discrete label. Operations are more usefully characterised by the activities undertaken and by the context within which they take place. These are discussed below.

103. Enduring principles of war (Selection and Maintenance of the Aim; Maintenance of Morale; Offensive Action; Security; Surprise; Concentration of Force; Economy of Effort; Flexibility; Cooperation; and Sustainability) guide commanders and their staffs in the planning and conduct of all types of military activity, not just warfighting. Legitimacy is a significant additional factor, influencing the application of force in particular; legitimacy is broader than legality, and encompasses political, moral, and ethical propriety as well. It is an important factor in creating and sustaining Campaign Authority: ‘the authority established by international forces, agencies and organisations within a given situation in support of (or in place of) an accepted (or ineffective, even absent) indigenous government or organisation’.

104. The British Armed Forces are normally employed as part of a cross-Government response to crisis, alongside other diplomatic and economic means, very often as part of a collective multinational, as well as a multi-agency endeavour. Commanders should not expect other players automatically to recognise the military

¹ ‘A general term applied to a commander authorised to exercise operational command or control over a Joint force.’ (Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01.1 ‘United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions’). It encompasses the roles of Joint Commander, Joint Task Force Commander and National Contingent Commander.
principles for and the approach to operations; it will often require sustained advocacy and patience.

105. ‘Defence Strategic Guidance’ describes the broad policy and strategic context within which the Armed Forces operate, establishing planning parameters and priorities for activity, resource allocation, and the development of capability. The ‘DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme’\(^2\) indicates likely drivers for change, and their security implications, over the next 30 years.

### SECTION II – THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF OPERATIONS

#### Enduring Aspects of Conflict

106. The ability to fight – to bring violence, or the threat of violence, to the operating space – is the Armed Forces’ *raison d’être*, which is critical to success wherever there is the prospect of hostility. The nature of warfare, for example danger and human stress, remains constant, but the character of warfare is changing. Some adversaries are adapting faster than we are to advances in technology and the interconnected nature of the international environment. This has revealed in some cases institutional complacency, which all commanders must guard against. Some aspects of warfare are unchanged:

a. **Friction.** Friction is the force that frustrates action and which makes the simple difficult and the difficult seemingly impossible. Friction may be mental (indecision over what to do next) and it may be physical (the effects of intense enemy fire). It may be externally imposed (by the action of an opponent or the weather) and it may be self induced (by a poor plan, clashes of personality, bureaucratic inertia or organisational incoherence).

b. **Chaos.** Because it is a human activity, conflict is uncertain and chaotic. Incomplete, inaccurate or contradictory information creates a *fog of war*, which limits perceptions and causes confusion. Any worthwhile opponent will also deliberately manipulate situations to exacerbate chaos and seek to deceive others about his intentions. A commander should exploit chaos by imposing it on his opponent, yet bringing greater order to his own plans. Understanding the nature of his opponent; how he thinks, and how he might act and react, is a prerequisite of gaining this advantage. Because armed conflict is essentially chaotic, chance invariably plays a part, and the exact outcome is always uncertain. Commanders must seize the initiative, but never take it for granted that they have it; holding the initiative is vital.

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\(^2\) [www.dcdc-strategictrends.org.uk](http://www.dcdc-strategictrends.org.uk)
c. **Danger.** Force, whether applied or threatened, is the likely means by which a commander coerces or compels an opponent to do what he wants. In all forms of warfare, but especially that which is asymmetric by design, an enemy will seek to maximise the widespread propaganda of the deed. These uses or threats of force bring danger and with it fear. Everyone feels fear to a greater or lesser degree and a commander has an important role to play in helping those he commands to overcome their trepidation.

d. **Human Stress.** Combat is a stressful activity; the effects of danger, fear, exhaustion, loneliness and privation adversely affect, to a varying degree, the willpower of all those involved. To defeat an opponent militarily it is necessary to erode the willpower of its commander and the forces under his command, while maintaining the willpower and morale of one’s own forces and increasingly those neutrals who we seek to influence.

107. Conflict remains inherently adversarial, dynamic and fundamentally human. The party which decides and acts first, and fastest, gains a material and moral advantage. This places a high premium on nimble, timely decision-making at the operational level. It also means that campaign plans will inevitably become overtaken by the passage of events, some of which will be instigated by the adversary. This places a demand on the ability of commanders to produce – as the norm – cogent short orders and clear intent without the detail that might accompany more measured planning.

**Evolving Character of Conflict**

108. In practice, British Armed Forces operate throughout a continuum of human activity, within which peace and war cannot always be distinguished absolutely. No conflict is likely to be played out entirely at a single point along this continuum; its scale and intensity varying between war (*in extremis* a war of national survival), through inter- and intra-state conflict, ultimately to peace. A JFC may confront a variety of threats, both state and non-state, potentially at the same time and in the same place. Moreover, many complex problems faced by commanders do not lend themselves to straightforward analysis; the relationship between cause and effect, for example, is hard to predict. Therefore, too much effort spent on analysis of intractable problems, may be time wasted. A commander’s skill in framing complex problems from the outset, and in maintaining an up-to-date understanding of the problem as it evolves over time, is important. However, when chaos ensues, a commander may need simply to focus on events, seeking the opportunity to adapt and regain the initiative.

109. The Armed Forces must be prepared to engage in conventional warfighting against well-resourced opponents, with technologically advanced weapon systems and equipment. They should be trained and equipped for major combat operations, but be
optimised for the most likely, which could be a mixture of high-intensity combat, security and stabilisation. As these are most likely to be carried out in conjunction with allies, and the US in particular, interoperability is another key requirement for an effective force. Recent experience has underlined the importance of shared understanding (common or comparable doctrine shared between coalition partners) and collective learning (to adapt at tempo to changing circumstances, across a coalition, by continuous learning during as well as between conflict(s)).

**The Character of Contemporary Warfare - Iraq**

One month into a Brigade’s tour, a patrol was ambushed while on a routine patrol. Engaged from 2 directions and with one man down, it applied minimum force in returning fire, thus preventing escalation or harm to civilians. It was a bold decision that put soldiers at risk, but it was the right one. However, as the assailants made their escape, the patrol gave chase, eventually entering a mosque still bearing arms. In hindsight, this was judged the wrong decision and the wider impact was significant, sparking major demonstrations against British forces. The Brigade spent 3 weeks repairing the damage to local relations after suffering a ‘nightmarish loss of cooperation’. The fact that this occurred despite cultural-awareness training and a clear grasp of the volatility of Iraqi society demonstrates the ease with which stabilisation can be derailed; even when the mission was clearly understood and the troops were sensitive to the potential impact of their actions.

110. A JFC may be confronted by groups or individuals operating in unpredictable, intuitive and innovative ways and employing tactics that have no regard for either international law or widely accepted norms of morality. Those engaging in irregular forms of conflict, including insurgency, terrorism, criminality and disorder, often exploit civilians in order to promote their aims and maximise the impact of their actions. Conducting operations where “the people in the streets and houses and fields – all the people anywhere – are the battlefield” has significant implications for a JFC. Circumstances may well inhibit identification and engagement of opponents, particularly in urban areas, heightening the risk of collateral damage, with women, children, refugees, internally displaced persons, and other vulnerable groups being especially affected.

111. Where the will of the indigenous population becomes the vital ground (i.e. it must be retained or controlled for success), a JFC is likely to place a premium on shaping their perceptions using a combination of physical and psychological means. To do so, he requires a thorough understanding of the human dynamics at play and the other agencies that may help to achieve the desired effects.

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112. The UK may intervene in crises in order to: strengthen, uphold or restore peace and security; to help re-establish governance and authority; or provide other forms of assistance. Very often military activity is only part of the overall crisis response, and the Armed Forces may be but one contributor. While different participants’ respective goals may be broadly aligned, each is nevertheless shaped by different perspectives, priorities, motivations, mandates, timeframes, cultures and processes. This complex of actors may include, in addition to multinational military forces, the indigenous population, media, diplomats, Other Government Departments (OGDs) from both UK and other nations, International Organisations (IOs) such as the United Nations (UN), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), private military and security companies, multinational companies and other opportunists.

113. The UK Government seeks to influence these complex situations through the application of Diplomatic, Military and Economic instruments of power. While each is limited, in terms of its discrete influence and impact, careful use of all instruments in concert – using the commonly understood principles and collaborative processes of a Comprehensive Approach – improves the chances of a favourable outcome. But in situations of extreme violence, the ultimate responsibility must rest with the military commander.

Understanding the Operational Context

114. Crises, conflict and war are inherently dynamic and frequently unbounded; they are subject to continual change, external intervention and other influences. Indeed, military activity alters the dynamics of a situation, precipitating both intended and unintended consequences, frustrating the achievement of any pre-ordained sequences of events. The commander’s response is more art than science. A JFC gains his understanding of the operational context through analysis of the situation, including both the overt symptoms and underlying causes of conflict. Thereafter, his awareness of and feel for how a situation is being changed by military activity and other influences, is cultivated and maintained by continuous assessment.

115. A commander can develop his understanding of an operational environment by considering: the overall context, which is characterised by the circumstances past, present and anticipated future conditions; the participants involved and their relationships; and the surroundings including location and environment. Collectively, these factors include:

   a. The physical, political, cultural and other conditions within which military activity may be required.

   b. The actors involved (opponent, friendly, neutral, belligerent and spoiler), to what extent they are involved, and why.
c. The military forces deployed.

d. National or societal factors: Rule of Law, Education, Commerce, Humanity, Health, Information (including the media), Military, Economy, Diplomacy, Administration and Governance.

e. Other external influences (such as overseas diasporas or regional hegemony).

116. A JFC’s situational understanding upon which he bases and incrementally adjusts his assessment is critically dependent upon him determining the involvement of all those implicated in a crisis (illustrated in Figure 1.1). An appreciation, albeit inevitably imperfect, of their inter-relationships can indicate the appropriate purpose for military action and the range of effects required. The effectiveness of some irregular activists, for example, may be diminished by isolating them (physically and morally) from the rest of the civilian population, as well as any regional or international sympathisers upon whom they depend. Alternatively, the disarming or disciplined co-option of a militia which had previously dominated a society may not only alter the balance of power, but also send a forceful signal to the affected community that, with a secure and stable environment, investment in development and reconstruction may follow.

117. The importance, allegiance and objectives of the various participants in a crisis are situation-dependent and the interplay between them changes as the situation evolves. Recent experience has shown how state-on-state armed conflict between regular forces, even after one side has been technically defeated, can develop into an asymmetric contest between the notional victor and those unsuppressed elements that continue to have access to the means of perpetuating violence. Multiple causes of violence, including unresolved internal struggles for power, can emerge at the moment of apparent victory, frustrating progress and leading to regression of good will.
Figure 1.1 – Relationship between Actors in a Potential Crisis

118. Figure 1.1 depicts a notional allegiance of different actors or alignment of interests that will influence patterns of behaviour. People will naturally seek to exploit opportunities as the dynamics of a situation unfold and hostile elements are likely to engage where their former opponent is most vulnerable, perhaps supported by a compliant or disaffected population. They may even seek to perpetuate the struggle or to achieve their objectives by irregular means. The alignments of interest and the relationships between groups is, therefore, likely to shift over time as illustrated in Figure 1.2.

Figure 1.2 – Relationship between Actors in an Evolving Crisis
SECTION III – MILITARY ACTIVITY IN CONTEXT

119. The global security environment is an intricate and dynamic blend of cooperation, confrontation and conflict between states, between groups and factions within states, and between other state and non-state actors. Any significant deterioration in relations may be triggered by a crisis or constitute one. The Armed Forces operate across this spectrum.

120. Strategic planning objectives include: conflict prevention; deterrence; coercion; disruption; defeat and destruction; and stabilisation. Planning seeks to prevent confrontation from escalating into conflict (or at least to contain it) and ultimately to resolve armed conflict when it arises. However, planning necessarily includes assumptions that may prove to be flawed and therefore it provides the basis for operational plans, not a template for them.

Cooperation, Confrontation and Conflict

121. During periods of stable cooperation within and between states, demonstrable military capability and measured power projection contribute to deterrence (to dissuade would-be aggressors from acting against the UK’s interests). Faced with either an imminent crisis or a more gradual deterioration in relations causing or threatening instability, military force may be required to prevent further deterioration in security or the eventual resort to armed conflict. Deterrence may be supplemented or replaced by more assertive coercion and conflict prevention activities, such as timely pre-emption and focused or preventative military intervention.

122. Some differences may be irreconcilable without recourse to armed force. A focus on deterrence before conflict may shift to compulsion through the application of force. In extreme cases, combat operations are conducted to disrupt, defeat or destroy opposing forces, in order to remove major threats to security and other causes of instability. To be genuinely successful, combat operations should be accompanied by the longer term prevention of future insecurity. The striking of an opponent is likely to be combined with an often concurrent or at least over-lapping stabilisation of the overall situation (including addressing the underlying causes of conflict to ensure that resolution is enduring and self-sustaining).

123. Military activity often seeks to re-establish and maintain security in order to enable stabilisation, which is a comprehensive rather than an exclusively military endeavour. The military contribution is likely to focus on reducing the causes of conflict and insecurity in a nation or region, and enabling OGDs to restore host-nation governance, capacity and authority (thereby ensuring that conditions do not again foment conflict). The achievement of these inter-related objectives of security and stability, requires the application of military effort to a variety of activities, potentially concurrently.
124. Conflict and stabilisation is invariably complex, and the military contribution (including what is sometimes referred to as military assistance to stabilisation and development) is discussed further below. As with security, stability tends to be relative rather than an absolute. From a military perspective an important criterion is a sufficiently permissive environment to enable OGDs, NGOs, indigenous authorities and others to fulfil their responsibilities. A distinction, albeit not an exact one, is therefore drawn between different types of stabilisation activity: firstly, where, following a successful intervention or other settlement, a high degree of protection is still required; and secondly, where the environment is generally benign but military forces are still required, for example, to deter or contain local hostilities.

**Campaign Evolution**

125. Each campaign is likely to involve a different and dynamic balance between: high intensity conflict to defeat or destroy threats to security; associated security operations to enable and support the process of stabilisation; and (subsequent or concurrent) operations including periodic peacetime military engagement where local governance is established. Distinctions between the roles of military forces may be blurred; they may change suddenly and very obviously, or more gradually, even imperceptibly, over time. As the situation changes, and emphasis shifts between different activities, so a JFC modifies the posture and approach of his force to deliver the weight of effort to each as he deems appropriate.

126. The JFC should resist the temptation to prejudge or prematurely classify a crisis situation, based upon an initial impression of the past or prevailing circumstances. The character of a particular campaign, at any point in time, is reflected in the combination of activities being undertaken and their associated purpose(s). Figure 1.3 provides an illustration of the relative weight of military effort during the course of a campaign to improve security and stability.

127. Campaigning invariably requires coordination between military partners of different nations, and also between military and non-military actors, to achieve the desired outcome. The command and control relationships between cooperating nations require a commander’s particular attention and the relationship between military and non-military actors is equally vital. In practice, military activities and those of non-military actors tend to be inter-dependent; for clarity, however, Figure 1.3 shows only the former.
Figure 1.3 – An illustration of the weight of military effort afforded to a variety of concurrent purposes over the course of a campaign

128. Priorities will ebb and flow as the environment shifts between the permissive and the non-permissive; the shift is rarely linear and progress will frequently be offset by setbacks. Activities are more likely to be undertaken simultaneously than discretely or sequentially, and are unlikely to adhere to any set pattern. An appropriate mix may be ascertained from:

a. The desired outcome sought, and the military contribution to achieving it (in terms of objectives and the effects sought through military intervention).

b. The nature of destabilising influences, including the type of opposition in terms of capability, motivation and tactics.

c. The likelihood (prevalence, scale and intensity) of combat.

d. Freedoms and constraints due to political direction or mandate, the legal framework, and resource availability and suitability.

e. The degree of security, which will determine the primacy of the military commander vice OGDs, International Organisations and NGOs. Each will
inevitably have different perceptions of (and requirements for) risk management.

f. Time, including anticipated or permitted reaction time, and duration or deadline by which the desired outcome must be reached.

### Evolution of Military Activity – Iraq 2003-04

British policy in Iraq was predicated on the United Nations (UN) undertaking reconstruction in the aftermath of warfighting. The UN’s inability to assume this mantle in a hostile environment forced Britain into the role of reluctant nation builder, when the UN Headquarters was attacked and the risks to UN staff were judged to be too high. In the time that it took to formulate an appropriate strategy, the lack of a secure environment within which even basic services could be delivered allowed organised crime and Islamist groups to prosper. The campaign subsequently evolved from one of humanitarian and post-conflict reconstruction, for which the ends, ways and means had become inappropriate, into a counter insurgency, with wide-ranging and prolonged ramifications for military activity in theatre.

### Defining Characteristics of Operations

129. In practice, the resolution of contemporary crises involves a complex, often uncertain, and dynamic mixture of:

a. Actors (conventional and irregular opponents, and a range of friendly, neutral or belligerent actors).

b. Individual and group motivations, objectives and other purposes.

c. Military and other tasks (with varying supporting/supported relationships).

130. Rather than focusing on the discrete labelling or packaging of specific types of operation, therefore, crises (and the military contribution to their resolution) can best be understood in terms of who is involved, why and what is happening, and what needs to be done (when and where). A JFC should continuously monitor his framing of the problem, to ensure that he establishes and maintains an accurate understanding of the ‘kind of war on which [he is] embarking’.

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5 ‘The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish,...the kind of war on which they are embarking’ (Clausewitz, Carl Von, ‘On War’ edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, page 7 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).
Range of Operational Command Experiences

The characteristics of different campaigns influence commanders’ actions and experiences, as demonstrated by General Rupert Smith’s varied operational roles in the 1990s. The 1990-1 Gulf War saw him as *de facto* Land Component Commander and GOC 1(UK) Division, forming part of the US VII Corps’ left hook. As Commander UN Protection Force in Sarajevo in 1995 he faced the multinational challenge of breaking the City’s siege through the creation of the UN Rapid Reaction Force. He then moved to a national appointment as GOC Northern Ireland, supporting civil authorities. All these roles not only shared attributes of operational-level command, but also exhibited diverse requirements and priorities.

131. The paragraphs that follow describe military operations in terms of their underlying purposes and associated activity. The order in which they appear does not suggest that they are necessarily successive or discrete events. The changing character of conflict suggests that many different activities may occur simultaneously in what some have described as hybrid conflict. High intensity (albeit relatively small-scale) conventional combat, mixed with irregular warfare tactics is one noticeable ongoing adaptation to Western prowess in conventional combat. Success in this type of warfare, such as that used by Hezbollah against Israel in 2006, may also have inspired others to adopt similar tactics. There is separate doctrine for some military activity, such as the military contribution to security and stabilisation, disaster relief operations and non-combatant evacuation operations. Again, this should not be misinterpreted as suggesting that these activities are necessarily discrete.

**Major Combat**

132. Major combat operations may arise from the direct defence of the UK against a major aggressor as part of a war of national survival or, more likely, during a large-scale military intervention overseas. This has in the past involved conventional force-on-force combat, of varying scale, frequency and intensity, between opposing states’ armed forces (that is to say, warfighting). Belligerents act principally as instruments of national policy, are readily identifiable as combatants, and generally abide by the laws of armed conflict. Even major combat operations, however, may be exacerbated, perpetuated, or simply exploited by those seeking to benefit from instability, through insurgency, terrorism, criminality or disorder.

133. Major combat tends to be characterised by a series of battles and major engagements, and has the potential to be accompanied by intense combat activity and logistic consumption. Particular emphasis is placed upon maintaining freedom of action and denying that freedom to an enemy. The tempo of activities is usually high, with a need to prioritise resources and generate additional fighting power. Major
combat operations often involve large-scale manoeuvre by complex and multi-faceted joint forces, organised and commanded as functional components.

**Security and Stabilisation**

134. The transition from combat operations to defeat an opponent, to multi-agency stabilisation operations to re-establish security, stability and prosperity (underpinned by the rule of law and good governance) is a critical period. It may be characterised by the achievement of specific end-states (such as absolute victory) but, more likely, by incremental conditions-based outcomes (albeit ones that reflect significant political imperatives, for example to achieve particular goals according to a set timetable). The mix of actors, and their respective motivations, is also likely to be complex and constantly changing. Conventional opponents, even once vanquished, may re-appear or be reinforced by irregular activists; the threat they pose must be countered often at the same time that legitimate indigenous governance and authority are being re-established in order to address the underlying causes of internal conflict. In countering such irregular threats, a JFC may also contribute to protecting, strengthening and restoring civil society and the rule of law.

135. Typically, irregulars operate against the armed forces, security agencies, national administration, civilian population and economic assets of established states. They do not conform to accepted national or international norms of behaviour and use methods that are often perceived to be illegal, unethical or immoral in order to achieve their objectives. Identification of irregular activists is made difficult by the nature of their organisation, the complex terrain and population within which they tend to operate, and their diverse character. For instance, an insurgency can take several constantly shifting forms, with the belligerents involved motivated by a mixture of ideology, disaffection and grievance, often bolstered by the belief that there is no alternative to their chosen course.

136. The long-term goal should be to soothe the underlying tensions that led to the inception or resurgence of conflict, and to create the conditions for successful longer-term development. The immediate military contribution, however, is likely to be to re-establish and maintain sufficient security for the local populace and civilian agencies to enable the stabilisation process to advance. This involves preventing or containing violence, and protecting people and key institutions. The long-term goal is to promote those (largely political) processes which lead to lasting stability, through the development of indigenous capacity, rule of law and a robust civil society. The requirement for military activity depends upon the context of the campaign and the ability and willingness of non-military organisations, such as OGDs, International Organisations and NGOs, to operate, with appropriate protection, despite perceived security risks.
137. In addition to providing security (until indigenous forces are capable of containing the residual threats), military forces may be required to support a broad range of other initiatives.

a. **Security Sector Reform.** Security Sector Reform (SSR) involves reforming security institutions so that they can play an effective and accountable role in providing internal and external security. It can apply to any security institution, including police and militias, and may be preceded by Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. It encompasses: host nation defence ministry reform; training and development; education; and support for the enhancement of judicial and law enforcement institutions. The operating environment will inevitably be unstable at times and armed forces may need to be firmly embedded in SSR structures to engage in combat where required.

b. **Capacity Building.** Capacity building involves the enhancement of national and regional institutions in order to reinforce their credibility with, and authority over, an indigenous population. The aim is to cultivate sufficient authority within local, regional and national institutions that their ability to govern becomes self-sustaining.

c. **Interim Governance.** Long-term governance should be indigenous. Where an existing government has insufficient authority, or instability has arisen in ungoverned space, then an intervening force may need to establish some form of interim governance. The military-strategic commander should provide a JFC with relevant objectives concerning the military contribution to governance, agreed across Government and, where necessary, between nations and by relevant international institutions. As an occupying power, a commander will have specific rights and responsibilities.

d. **Restoration of Essential Services.** In the immediate aftermath of a conflict, when appropriate civil agencies may be unable to act quickly enough or operate with sufficient safety, the reconstitution of critical infrastructure and the restoration of essential services may fall to the military. The aim is likely to be two-fold: to provide support to those in need, and to gain the consent and acceptance of the civil population. Services deemed essential depend on the situation and the concomitant expectations of the indigenous population. They may include: the protection and restoration of medical care, the re-establishment of communications and transportation systems, and the provision of potable water, electrical power and other utilities. As the security situation becomes more benign, non-military organisations (including indigenous ones) should (re-)assume responsibility for reconstruction, drawing upon international funding where appropriate.
Peace Support and Peacetime Military Engagement

138. Peacekeeping follows an agreement or ceasefire that has established a permissive environment where the level of consent and compliance is high, and the threat of disruption is low. The purpose is to sustain a situation that has already met the steady-state criteria established by international mandate; the use of force by peacekeepers is normally limited to self-defence. Typical peacekeeping activities include interposition and protection, the interim management of selected civil administration, and humanitarian assistance.

139. Peace enforcement is also predicated on the existence of a cease-fire or peace agreement, but the level of consent and compliance is uncertain, and the threat of disruption is considered to be high. Consequently, military forces contributing to peace enforcement should be capable of applying credible coercive force, impartially, to apply the provisions of any peace agreement.

140. Peacetime military engagement encompasses those military activities involving other nations that are intended to shape the peacetime environment (for example confidence building measures including, where appropriate, the deployment of combat forces) to encourage local or regional stability. Routine activity, such as bilateral or multinational training and exercises, and the provision of advisers and specialist training teams, may have both an immediate and a longer-term cumulative impact, reinforcing cooperation and promoting stability. Military effort may also be required, quite separately, to support OGD-led disaster relief and non-combatant evacuation operations, focused on preserving the security of the civilian population.
CHAPTER 2 – MILITARY STRATEGY

Chapter 2 explains the levels of warfare and the development of military strategy for crisis management.

Section I – Levels of Warfare
Section II – Military Strategy
Section III – Crisis Management

SECTION I – LEVELS OF WARFARE

“You cannot run the details of an operation by politicians around the Cabinet table. You can set straight criteria, strict parameters, strict rules of engagement. Then, the precise way in which those are carried out is up to the military.”

Margaret Thatcher

Strategic

201. The strategic level is the level at which national resources are allocated to achieve the Government’s policy goals (set against a backdrop of both national and international imperatives). The achievement of these goals invariably requires a combination of diplomacy, military force and economic measures (the instruments of national power), as well as collaboration with other nations, their armed forces, and other international organisations and agencies.

202. Military strategy determines the military contribution to the achievement of national policy goals; it is an integral, not a separate, aspect of strategic level planning. Although the changing nature of politics, economics and technology have added to the complexity of the strategic level, military strategists face the same challenges as their forbears: developing, deploying, sustaining, recovering and re-deploying military forces for the attainment of policy objectives.

Operational

203. The operational level is the level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained, within theatres or areas of operation, to achieve strategic objectives. Military campaigns are orchestrated in concert with other actors and agencies; they are most effective as part of a Comprehensive Approach to crisis management.

204. It is at this level that a Joint Force Commander (JFC) constructs a bridge, or campaign, linking military activity at the tactical level with its rationale established at
the strategic level. The bridge is supported on one side by the commander’s understanding of the strategic context and the outcomes sought and, on the other, by his ability to apply his joint force effectively, in conjunction with other actors.

205. Professor Hew Strachan’s essay, at the end of this publication, traces the evolution of the operational level of warfare.

**Tactical**

206. The tactical level is the level at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives. Military formations, units and individuals, often working in conjunction with allies, coalition partners, other agencies, and sometimes elements of an indigenous force, confront their enemies and other belligerents in order to accomplish assigned missions.

207. Tactical activity has to be purposeful, and it is at the operational level that the JFC provides the necessary direction to his subordinate commanders, applying mission command, to ensure this is so.

**Relationship between the Levels of Warfare**

208. The Cold War provides a useful illustration of the different levels of warfare. At the strategic level, the UK (as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)) sought to deter the Warsaw Pact from attacking the Alliance. The military strategic contribution to deterrence included, amongst other things, the demonstrable forward defence of mainland Europe. At the operational level, land and air power were charged with separating echelons of the enemy, in time and space, in order to disrupt their advance, buying time for operational reinforcement, mainly by sea. At the tactical level, maritime assets were to maintain sea lines of communication to neutralise the Warsaw Pact’s submarine and air interdiction threat. All this would enable the timely reinforcement of Europe with sufficient combat power to ensure the Warsaw Pact’s eventual defeat.

209. The levels of warfare, shown in Figure 2.1, provide a general framework for the planning and execution of operations, and a useful tool for organising and considering political/military activity. This framework does not imply hard and fast rules as to where decisions must be made, nor that events at one level can be isolated from those at another. There is invariably compression and blurring and the framework should be applied with judgment. For example, tactical events can have strategic repercussions and strategic decisions can have tactical implications.

210. There is, however, a key difference between command at different levels; the military strategic commander *allocates* objectives and resources, and sets relevant freedoms and constraints, while the operational commander *orders* the activities of his assigned forces, in accordance with his campaign plan, to achieve specific purposes.
In practice, even this apparently clear distinction does not preclude an operational commander receiving specific direction on what to do as well as how to do it, in circumstances where, for example, there is a political imperative to intervene at a certain time, in a certain place and/or in a certain way.

Figure 2.1 – Relationship between the Levels of Warfare

211. The framework illustrates the extent of possible effects; it does not infer necessary causality. The achievement of military objectives, even at successive levels, will not necessarily lead to a desired political outcome. An impractical policy or a flawed strategic plan, however well executed militarily, is only ever likely to lead to ‘a strategically barren victory - meaning military achievements that however impressive in their own terms nonetheless fail to alter the political context in which they occur.’

SECTION II – MILITARY STRATEGY

National Strategy

212. Policy dictates ends, and strategy determines and balances the ways and means of achieving them. Together they describe what needs to be achieved, how, and with what. A successful national strategy sets out a path, using all 3 instruments of national power – diplomatic, military and economic – to maintain political independence, achieve the long-term aims of the nation and/or protect its vital interests.

213. Figure 2.2 depicts the key questions to be answered by the Government in determining a national strategy.

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2 Recognising the increasing importance of Information, the US has added it to the 3 traditional instruments, resulting in ‘DIME’. The UK’s view is that Information enables the application of all 3 instruments of power, and is not a separate and discrete instrument. See BDD (3rd Edition).
214. This process may (but will not always) lead to a single, integrated whole-of-government strategy; it should, in any event, result in the effective coordination and synchronisation of the instruments of power. Individual plans may, for example, be brought together and managed under central Government auspices. A lead department, acting on behalf of the Government, should then:

a. Review and where necessary revise the policy outcome sought.

b. Assess progress and adjust priorities, across government, as necessary.

c. Ensure the coherent and efficient use of national resources.

215. The importance of what has been described variously as whole of government, a comprehensive, unified, integrated or simply a joint approach, is widely recognised. The significant practical, organisational and cultural challenges involved in its implementation, however, continue to be addressed (principally by the Cabinet Office and the multi-Departmental Stabilisation Unit).

Military Strategy

216. A winning military strategy hinges on the successful union of ends (outcomes), ways (objectives) and means (resources). Senior leaders should bring these 3 into balance; to demand a particular way to meet the stipulated ends without providing the requisite means, or to set ends without accepting the risk to the means that will result from the chosen way, is to court failure.
In the summer of 1940, Britain feared that Germany might seize control, from Vichy France, of the key harbour and airfield at Dakar in West Africa, and thereby threaten vital sea communications. Britain’s armed forces were severely overstretched, ruling out the option of a conventional assault, and the British government was anyway reluctant to use force against the French (with whom Britain was not at war).

Encouraged by reports from Dakar of support for the allies, and the Free French, Churchill placed his faith in persuasion, backed by the hopefully intimidating presence of a British fleet. In fact, Dakar proved to be solidly pro-Vichy and insusceptible to persuasion. Without the power to destroy Dakar’s defences or the surprise necessary to mount an amphibious assault, the operation ended in humiliating retreat.

Churchill had conceived ambitious ends, not only of denying Dakar to the Germans but also inspiring other Vichy colonies to join Free France. Yet British forces lacked the means to deliver them. Churchill deluded himself that something between outright force and peaceful persuasion could provide the way of squaring this circle.

Some policy goals, such as those expressed in defence policy, are long-term and aspirational; associated strategy concerns the development of military structures and capabilities within allocated resources. With regard to a particular crisis, on the other hand, more immediate and specific political outcomes may be sought. Political intentions may be expressed in the form of an overarching strategic aim and associated objectives to achieve a specific result (to change a situation, or to create a favourable outcome). In this case, military strategy is about gauging the optimum military contribution, based upon appropriate and available capability.

Alanbrooke described military strategy thus:

“The art of strategy is to determine the aim, which is or should be inherently political; to derive from that aim a series of military objectives to be achieved; to assess these objectives as to the military requirements they create, and the preconditions which the achievement of each is likely to necessitate; to measure available and potential resources against the requirements; and to chart from this process a coherent pattern of priorities and a rational course of action.”

Any military strategy should explain how it is to be integrated with other non-military elements of a national or multinational strategy, and how the achievement of military strategic objectives relates to the achievement of the desired outcome. Where the UK intends to act in concert with other nations, either as part of an alliance or an ad hoc coalition, then the outcome sought should be agreed between nations (accepting the additional time and complexity involved and, potentially, the reduced
clarity or precision of the product), or at least national perspectives harmonised in order to unify individual national efforts. While negotiation and consensus building may need to precede agreement, formal direction must follow, ultimately delivered through national chains of command. In the interim, military preparations and some preliminary operations may already have started.

220. As an integral part of a national or multinational strategic planning process, military strategy involves developing, deploying, sustaining, recovering and re-deploying military forces. Military feasibility and sustainability, which should be weighed against political acceptability and suitability, are 2 important aspects:

   a. Competing demands for military resources, to meet concurrent operational commitments, should be prioritised and balanced accordingly.

   b. Military effectiveness should be maintained, and developed, to meet future requirements based upon the assessed strategic context and political intent.

221. It is principally in these 2 regards that military strategy informs policy, as well as being driven by it. Liddell-Hart reinforced this notion, of military considerations influencing policy, when he commented:

   “*The military objective should be governed by the political objective, subject to the basic condition that policy does not demand what is militarily...impossible.*”

In any event, policy goals are likely to evolve over time as situations develop and priorities change; it is for this reason that strategic planning is continuous and dynamic, and why commanders at all levels need to be responsive to changes in both circumstances and political intent.
Incremental Strategic Decision Making – Operation HUSKY 1943

Seven months before the Allied forces invaded Sicily in the summer of 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had met at Casablanca to set the objectives for the Italian campaign: to make the Allies lines of communication in the Mediterranean more secure; to divert as much German strength as possible from the Soviet front; and to intensify pressure on Italy. Yet despite an agreement to eliminate Italy from the War, the next strategic move – namely how, where and when – was deliberately left undecided. Only if HUSKY proved to be successful would the Allies go directly to mainland Italy. General Marshall argued that the next moves should be selected with great care based on a close calculation of the requirements and the conditions anticipated based on an assessment of the German and Italian reactions to the initial invasion. Once HUSKY was underway, when the beachheads had been secured and when the Allies were making clear progress, the next moves were agreed and the vital resources were finally assigned to the planners. In Washington, Marshall and his staff had always kept one eye on the progress of HUSKY with the other on post-HUSKY planning, carefully judging when finally to commit from a general agreement to a specific plan. This preserved operational flexibility to the last sensible moment.

Political Military Interface

222. The formulation of military strategy by the MOD, on direction from the Secretary of State for Defence, is shaped by the UK’s particular approach to crisis management. Conflict prevention is paramount, but the ability to intervene effectively using force to achieve, or contribute to the achievement of, desired policy outcomes is equally important.

223. The key aspects of political-military engagement are covered in Annex 2A, including the iterative relationship between:

a. Political Strategic Analysis, a function owned by the Ministerial Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development (Overseas and Defence) (NSID(OD)), and

b. Political-Military Estimate, carried out by the MOD’s Strategic Planning Group (SPG) with significant contributions from Other Government Departments (OGDs) (notably the Cabinet Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department for International Development (DFID) and the Stabilisation Unit).

The strategy adopted to address a particular crisis, and the military contribution to doing so, is determined by a combination of the Political Strategic Analysis and the Political-Military Estimate.
SECTION III – CRISIS MANAGEMENT

224. Section III describes briefly the UK’s approach to crisis management (JDP 01-1 ‘British Defence Doctrine’ (BDD) (3rd Edition) has more details) as a precursor to a more detailed explanation of campaigning in the following chapter.

225. The UK’s approach to crisis management involves an iterative process of analysis (of the situation or context), planning (to reach the desired outcome - a more favourable situation), execution (of activities to improve the situation), and assessment (of progress towards reaching the desired outcome). This approach uses terms such as effects, conditions and outcomes to describe how goals and objectives are to be achieved, and why particular activities are to be conducted. Some other nations have adopted titles such as ‘effects’- and ‘outcome-based’ to describe a similar philosophy.

226. Crisis management is a cross-Government process, and very often multinational as well as multi-agency. Different actors employ different procedures and use different terms to describe their individual approaches.3 Notwithstanding these variations, this section describes (and Figure 2.3 illustrates), in an indicative fashion, crisis management at the strategic level in order to orientate a JFC to his role at the operational level (described in Chapter 3).

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3 See JDP 5-00, Chapter 3 and associated supplements.
Figure 2.3 – Crisis Management at the Strategic Level

ACDS (Ops) - Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Operation)
DCDS (Ops) - Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Operations)
D Op Pol - Director Operational Policy
DG Sec Pol - Director General Security Policy
NSID (OD) - Ministerial Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development (Sub-Committee on Overseas and Defence)
PJHQ CPT - Permanent Joint Headquarters Contingency Planning Team

Information enables the application of all 3 instruments of power – diplomatic, military and economic.

See Figure 3.3 for description of crisis management at the operational level
227. The organisations involved are outlined at Annex 2A, and the MOD’s crisis management process is covered in detail in JDP 5-00 ‘Campaign Planning’. Throughout the planning and implementation of any crisis response, it is important that military staff recognise their proper contribution to cross-Government processes. The military should focus on giving sound military advice, based upon experience and judgement, rather than second-guessing what they think politicians require. The tendency to offer ‘politically aware advice’ or to make judgements about ‘what the market will bear’ is unhelpful and counterproductive in the long term.

**Understanding the Current Situation**

“Strategic leadership often takes place in the space where we don’t even know the question, and have to find it out before we can find the answer.”

228. A crisis may arise in numerous different ways and, as importantly, be perceived differently by individual actors. Those involved may each have separate factional, political or ethnic perspectives; those in adjacent countries may also have their own views based on historical or economic factors; and, for a variety of reasons, the wider international community may also fail to reach a consensus. There are seldom objective facts upon which to establish with any certainty what is happening and where, let alone why. In the absence of information, assumptions are likely to play an important part in participants’ perceptions of the situation. Ambiguity, confusion and contradiction are likely to permeate more or less continuously. Experienced commanders and other decision makers may be used to living with this complexity, but others involved in crisis planning may struggle to cope with the uncertainty, imprecision and fluidity.

229. Complex crises do not lend themselves to precise definition, but a significant start point in the crisis management process is a description of the current situation that promotes shared understanding across as broad a range of stakeholders as possible. For example, a particular crisis situation may usefully be visualised as a series of conditions that describe what is wrong, and begin to indicate what has to be changed to improve matters. A vital need – in the absence of cross-Government doctrine for a Comprehensive Approach – is to ensure that the terms being used, for example ‘strategic’ or ‘campaign’ are understood and agreed by all players.

230. Understanding the broad nature of a crisis situation helps to identify and frame the problem, but this is separate from (and should precede) determining the solution. The former is expansive and exploratory; the latter is definitive and, to be effective, needs to be narrow and specific. Any initial misperception of the problem, perhaps caused by erroneous intuition, is very likely to result in an inappropriate attempt at a solution. Gaining situational understanding is critical, however seemingly

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4 Hugh Courtney, ‘20/20 Foresight’.
unproductive this may appear in the short term. Of note, few commanders return from operations without expressing a wish to have known, at the outset, what experience and circumstance had subsequently taught them about the context in which they operated (some of which, on reflection, they might have known in advance).

**Understanding the Current Situation – Lebanon 2006**

The Israeli Defence Force’s operations in Lebanon, in summer 2006, were unsuccessful because they failed to understand the overall situation or the potential for unintended and undesirable consequences of military action.

The Israeli plan to coerce Lebanon and undermine Hezbollah remotely, using aerial attack in particular, was based upon a misunderstanding of the socio-political context, an overly-optimistic assessment of precision technology, and a mis-appreciation of the ability of Hezbollah to adapt to the Israelis’ chosen method of attack.

Collateral damage from Israeli air attacks resulted in unforeseen international outrage. The military impact was mitigated by Hezbollah (using camouflage, shielding and deception), while unfavourable political fallout was exacerbated by Hezbollah’s media strategy. Israel fundamentally failed to understand that, rather than inducing the Lebanese government to move against Hezbollah, their intervention mobilised the population against the Israeli population. The use of force produced political results diametrically opposite to those intended by Israel; despite many Israeli tactical successes, the end game was a weakened Lebanon and a psychologically strengthened Hezbollah.

The need for a commander to understand his situation, and to keep on updating that understanding, is not new. Indeed a main function of an operational level headquarters is analysis of the situation and assessment of the conduct of the campaign, as a trigger for further planning, orders and execution. There are, however, 2 reasons why analysis (the detailed examination of all the constituent elements of a situation, and their inter-relationships, in order to obtain a thorough understanding of the past, present and anticipated operational context) is particularly important.

a. First, it provides a commander with as clear a picture as possible of complexity. This is not to suggest, however, that complex situations can necessarily be dissembled into a series of discrete, and less complex, objects and inter-relationships and simply addressed piecemeal. Analysis should be comprehensive and detailed, but focused on interpretation and understanding rather than the disaggregation of a problem as an end in itself.

b. Second, the process begins to indicate (based on existing unfavourable conditions) what might represent a more favourable situation in the future. In
addition to affording analysis sufficient time, the other critical requirement is to gather a broad range of perspectives, including perhaps most importantly those that challenge any existing (national and/or military) paradigm.

Context and Complexity

232. The term context is used to describe the relevant circumstances, participants and relationships, surroundings, and other influences that, collectively, form the setting for an event. Understanding context depends on not only acquiring the requisite knowledge, drawing upon information and intelligence, but also on applying the requisite intellect; it is ultimately a commander’s own reasoning and judgement that provide him with his comprehension or individual perception of a situation. It is this which frames his subsequent problem solving.

233. Because crisis situations are invariably complex (with a multitude of interconnected parts and dynamic inter-relationships) they also tend to be:

a. Adaptive – such that any action causes reaction and any benefit has an associated opportunity cost.

b. Uncertain – often confusing; some risks may be incalculable.

c. Ambiguous – perceived in quite different ways by different actors or external observers. There is seldom a universal view of the context to any particular problem (however manifestly ‘clear’ the situation may appear from an individual perspective).

d. Competitive or adversarial – requiring compromise, if not submission, in relation to conflicts of interest, or need, or perceived security.

e. Constrained – by different parties’ varying commitment to resolve any crisis, their capability to do so, and (internal and external) legitimacy to try.

f. Unbounded – permeating, or being affected by, regional dynamics and, with increasing globalisation, the rest of the international community as well.

g. Dynamic – altering from the moment that military or other intervention occurs (or, in some situations, simply anticipated). An implication is that a detailed plan or campaign that depends only upon a predicted sequence of causes and effects will fail. Engagement alone, much less other factors, changes the problem and can invalidate the original solution.

Establishing a Future Desired Outcome

234. In the context of crisis management, a desired outcome is defined as: ‘a favourable and enduring situation, consistent with political direction, reached through
intervention or as a result of some other form of influence’. If a situation is deemed to
be unfavourable (i.e. a crisis), then the outcome sought through intervention should be
more favourable, that is one in which conditions have improved to the extent desired
or considered feasible. The nature of a desired outcome will vary from one situation
to another; it may be articulated in narrative form (sometimes referred to as a strategic
narrative) and should include, as a minimum, the conditions and circumstances that
need to exist for the more favourable situation to be reached (and sustained).

235. British Defence Doctrine portrays relationships between states, between
factions and groups within a state, and between state and non-state actors, in terms of
cooperation, confrontation and conflict (with any significant deterioration in relations
constituting a crisis). A desired outcome is likely to involve:

a. Cooperation (re-)established – stability based upon at least mutual co-
existence between entities (notwithstanding sometimes intense competition for
resources, territory and influence).

In place of:

b. Confrontation – an unreconciled but contained clash of wills, or

c. Conflict – a resort to violence, stimulated by self-interest, fear or
survival, or values and ideology.

236. A desired outcome need not be conclusive; in practice, it may only be possible
to look ahead months rather than years. Success may be less than victory or peace; an
example is the Northern Ireland peace process, where the process itself became the
vital ground. Agreement amongst relevant stakeholders may, in any event, be more
likely if the outcome is perceived as achievable within a realistic rather than a
hypothetical timeframe. All those involved need to agree on the general direction of
travel, but they may genuinely not share, or be prepared to subscribe to, a common
view of the ultimate solution to a particular crisis. Furthermore, maintaining
multinational as well as multi-agency cohesion, on the basis of a degree of
constructive ambiguity or lack of precision (and some short term-ism), may sometimes
be preferable to risking schism in pursuit of absolute proscription and coincidence of
purpose (or a longer-term perspective). In practice, it may only be feasible to
determine future goals in terms of criteria upon which to transition from one form of
intervention to another; for this reason, some actors may prefer to use flexible terms
such as transition conditions rather than, seemingly more final or definitive, outcomes
or end-states (and Chapter 3 accommodates this possibility).

Comprehensive Approach

237. Creating the conditions necessary to achieve a desired outcome requires not
only a mixture of diplomatic, military and economic measures, but also effective
collaboration between military and non-military actors, both across Government and including other national and multinational institutions, agencies and organisations. Although the implementation of this Comprehensive Approach may vary between levels (of warfare) and from one crisis to another, its guiding principles continue to enjoy widespread support. Its success depends upon:

a. **Proactive Engagement** – between actors, before and during a crisis.

b. **Shared Understanding** – engendered through cooperative working, liaison, education and a common language. Different participants bring distinct professional, technical and cultural disciplines, values and perceptions and thereby introduce breadth, depth and resilience.

c. **Collaborative Working** – based upon mutual trust and a willingness to cooperate, born out of institutional familiarity, personal contact and information sharing. Trust and understanding help to offset cultural and organisational differences.

d. **Outcome-Based Thinking** – as part of which actors work towards a common goal (or outcome) and, ideally, mutually agreed objectives underpinned, even in the absence of unity of command, by a unity of purpose.

238. From a military perspective, a Comprehensive Approach involves 3 elements: shared situational understanding (including what has to be done and broadly how), a comprehensive response (to achieve mutually agreed objectives), and a military plan (that recognises both supported and supporting relationships with other actors). Experience suggests that these elements are inter-dependent, and that a military plan is most likely to succeed (in terms of making a significant contribution to the desired outcome) when it is nested within a comprehensive response, itself based upon a shared understanding of the problem and a universal commitment to solve it. In the absence of unity of command, it may only be through negotiation that commanders and leaders can confirm responsibilities, resolve differences, facilitate coordination and create the optimum unity of effort across a potentially diverse multinational and multi-agency ‘coalition’. An enthusiasm and determination to collaborate needs to be imbued in all actors, military and civilian, at all levels; commanders should ensure that their subordinates understand fully their respective responsibilities.

### Translating Desired Outcomes into Actionable Objectives

239. The Government’s decision to intervene in a crisis, in order to seek a particular outcome is informed by Political Strategic Analysis. The extent to which this is formalised will vary from one situation to another; Political Strategic Analysis tends to

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be an iterative process, and may be led by the Cabinet Office or Foreign and Commonwealth Office, with a key contribution from the MOD (informed by the Political-Military Estimate). The required output is broad agreement across Government (and often between nations and with international organisations such as NATO and the UN) as to what can realistically be achieved, by whom, and in what timeframe. The Government’s aspirations, and the requisite contributions from different instruments of national power, are then translated into a firm intent, or National Strategic Aim, and associated Strategic Objectives.

a. A national strategic aim is the government’s declared purpose in a particular situation, normally expressed in terms of reaching a future desired outcome.

b. Strategic objectives are goals to be achieved by one or more instruments of national power in order to meet a national strategic aim.

240. It is important at this stage, that the Government identifies and accepts the cost (as well as the feasibility) of achieving the national strategic aim. The implications of the requisite finance and other resources being subsequently unavailable, or unsustainable throughout a campaign, should be flagged up in advance (and alternative or contingency plans prepared accordingly).

### Realism in Egypt – 1973

Following defeat in the ‘Six Day’ war, Egyptian objectives for the 1973 ‘Yom Kippur’ war were considerably more limited - focusing on local military defeat of Israeli forces in the Sinai, rather than comprehensive, and lasting, victory over Israel, or even recapture of the peninsula as a whole. The Egyptians hoped that this more realistic aspiration would return Sinai to the diplomatic agenda and strengthen their negotiating position with Israel. In practice, while over confidence on the part of the Egyptians left them vulnerable to a decisive Israeli counter-attack, the operation had a positive political impact. Subsequent negotiations resulted in a treaty, which realised the underlying goal of returning the Sinai to Egyptian control.

### Ambiguity and Incrementalism in Strategic Direction

241. In reality, commanders should expect strategic direction to be developed incrementally. During initial crisis planning, this phenomenon can increase pressure significantly – both in terms of compressing military planning and preparation, and obliging military commanders to contend with ambiguity at the very time that they seek certainty and reassurance, in respect of the underlying purpose of any intervention (as well as the objectives they are assigned to achieve). That ‘uncertainty will be the norm’ is an important insight, and no amount of doctrine – however clear
and seemingly logical – can entirely mitigate its disruptive impact. Understanding why political decision-making and strategic direction occur as they do can however go some way to helping military commanders accommodate uncertainty. Indeed, one of the JFC’s responsibilities is to minimise the impact of changes in guidance by coordinating upwards, as well as downwards.

242. Decision-making horizons may be intentionally limited. Political leaders, for example, may wish to test reactions (both home and abroad) to the inference, formal announcement or actual execution of a particular course of action, before committing to some more comprehensive involvement. The decision – not to decide upon a definitive long term course of action from the outset – also acknowledges the adaptive nature of crises, with intervention from any quarter inevitably altering the dynamics between actors, and hence the relevant objectives to be sought at any time throughout an intervention. Moreover, incremental decision-making may enable political leaders to manage risks with greater sophistication, making only those commitments that are necessary rather than merely expedient.

243. Decision-making between nations involved in a coalition, or in multinational alliances such as NATO or other forums such as the UN, is likely to be even more complicated than that in a purely national context. The process of consensus-building, for example, can be both complex and time-consuming. While the logic of establishing shared understanding and common goals across coalitions and alliances may be immutable, the reality is fraught with both conceptual and very practical challenges. The reasons why nations, other groups and even individuals choose to engage in a coalition, or to adopt a particular stance in an alliance, will reflect an amalgam of factors, including national or other forms of self-interest, fear or self-preservation, and belief or ideology, including humanitarian concern. It is highly unlikely that all those involved in a putative intervention will share exactly the same motivations, and it is upon their differences that ambiguity and delay are inevitably founded. These challenges notwithstanding, some form of broadly agreed or at least congruent desired outcome remains an essential start point for further planning.

Translating Strategic Objectives into a Campaign Plan

244. The aim of all crisis management activity is to reach a desired outcome. There is, however, a potentially significant difference between a desired outcome being reached (i.e. favourable conditions ‘having been’ created), and objectives being achieved. As alluded to earlier, in the context of levels of warfare, there can be no assumption of necessary causality. Not effects, nor conditions, nor the outcome ultimately sought, can necessarily be created as desired, because:

a. Crises are complex and that makes them inherently unpredictable. The foreseen consequences of activities, whether desirable or not, can be planned for (and associated risks duly managed) but unforeseen consequences cannot.

2-16
b. Crises are by their nature autonomous and not amenable to precise management or control. Conditions exist, or not, as a result of myriad factors and influences. While commanders may be expected to achieve realistic objectives, they cannot necessarily create specific conditions on the ground.

245. The military contribution to the national strategic aim should, therefore, be expressed in terms of military strategic objectives. These may include discrete military objectives, to which others are required to provide support, and also the military support required by others to enable them to achieve their allocated objectives. Planning to deliver the military contribution to an overall comprehensive response is undertaken by the Defence Crisis Management Organisation on behalf of the Chief of Defence Staff (and the Secretary of State for Defence). Executive orders are issued in the Chief of Defence Staff’s Directive, which provides direction to an assigned JFC (to achieve specified campaign objectives within an assigned Joint Operations Area) and to others (such as Chief of Defence Intelligence and Director Special Forces to contribute directly to military strategic objectives).

246. The relationship between military strategic objectives and contributory campaign objectives is important. Campaign objectives relate to a single theatre of operation and are ‘owned’ by the respective JFC. Where the JFC is not British, an additional layer of complexity is added, and the mechanisms to integrate UK elements into the campaign become a key enabler. For example Deputy Commanding General Multinational Force - Iraq is also the Senior British Military Representative - Iraq. The achievement of a JFC’s assigned campaign objectives contributes to, but may not necessarily represent the entire military input to, a particular desired outcome. There may, for example, be an additional reliance on strategic level contributions, including those made by forces retained under the command of the military strategic commander. Moreover, on a larger scale, the achievement of military strategic objectives may require a number of JFCs, in different theatres, to complete their respective campaign objectives.

247. The extent of the military contribution to the national strategic aim is bounded by the allocation of military strategic objectives. These both define and limit the military commitment and, once achieved, indicate the conclusion of the military campaign (noting that others may remain involved long after security has been re-established and military involvement has ended).

248. It is important that those directing a strategy, as well as the JFC, understand the potential contribution that military force can make to the achievement of a desired outcome. If the successful use of force leads directly to the achievement of the national strategic aim then it can be said to be decisive (the operation to liberate the Falklands in 1982 being an example). But if the military contribution simply enables or supports the achievement of the national strategic aim by others, then military force is not decisive (as in Sierra Leone in 2001). In the case of the latter, planning should
include from then outset those other measures – political, civil, and economic – required to exploit military success, otherwise the strategic initiative may be lost.
ANNEX 2A – POLITICAL/MILITARY INTERFACE AND DEFENCE CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Cross-Government Crisis Management

‘We will continue to seek ways to work more effectively ... to deliver greater coherence and effectiveness across government, including support for the Cabinet Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development’.


2A1. Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) is collectively responsible for taking decisions of national importance, including those on crisis management; the Cabinet is the primary forum for such decision-making. The Cabinet Office stands at the centre of government; its purpose is to make government work better through 2 core functions:

   a. To support the Prime Minister – to define and deliver the government’s objectives.

   b. To support the Cabinet – to drive the coherence, quality and delivery of policy and operations across departments.

2A2. The Cabinet Secretariat’s aim is to ensure that the business of government is conducted in a timely and efficient way and that proper collective consideration takes place when it is needed before policy decisions are taken. It is composed of 6 individual secretariats of which 4 provide the main support to Cabinet and its committees: Economic and Domestic Affairs; European (Euro); Defence and Overseas; and Civil Contingencies. It is the Overseas Development Secretariat, responsible for coordinating policy on a wide range of defence, security and foreign policy issues, which coordinates the government’s comprehensive response (diplomatic, military and economic) to crises overseas.

2A3. A comprehensive response is directed through the Ministerial Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development,1 specifically its Sub-Committee on Overseas and Defence (NSID(OD)).2, 3

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1 The NSID, whose membership equates to the Cabinet, is charged with ‘considering issues relating to national security, and the Government’s international, European and international development policies’.
2 The Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (DOPC) has been superseded by NSID(OD).
3 Others include: NSID(EU) – Europe; NSID(OD)(A) – Africa; NSID(OD)(T) – trade; NSID(E) – extremism.
a. **Composition** of the Ministerial Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development (Overseas and Defence):

- Prime Minister (PM) (Chair)
- Secretary of State (SoS) for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
- Chancellor of the Exchequer
- SoS for Defence
- SoS for International Development
- Other Ministers, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), the Chairman of Joint Intelligence Committee and the Heads of the Intelligence Agencies may be invited to attend as required.

b. The NSID(OD) **Terms of Reference** are ‘to consider issues relating to conflict, and defence, foreign and development policy; and report as necessary to the Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development (NSID’).

c. The NSID(OD) provides the forum for **Political Strategic Analysis** through an understanding of: the crisis situation; options open to the international community; options open to HMG; and how the UK might utilise its assets already in the region, or deploy additional assets, and any associated risks. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) is a vital contributor to the NSID(OD); through the iterative process that seeks to balance national policy and priorities with political-military realities, underpinned by recurring revisions to a series of **political-military estimates** relating to crises areas of the world, it provides a leading influence from across all government departments.

2A4. The NSID(OD) is fundamental to the UK’s approach to crisis management; it maintains and directs both national policy and the national strategic objectives that underscore that policy. The Overseas and Defence Secretariat maintains a crucial role in securing timely decisions from the NSID(OD) and ensuring that the resulting direction, whether policy or strategy, is coordinated across government departments with the main interlocutors, under the auspices of the Stabilisation Unit, being the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Department for International Development (DFID) and the MOD. While each of these latter organisations has its own approach to strategic planning, cross-departmental coordination, resulting from the government’s drive for a Comprehensive Approach, is improving. The reality is, however, that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ model for cross-government integrated planning; bespoke arrangements, drawing from existing departmental approaches,

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4 By way of example, the Iraq Strategy Group and the Afghan Strategy Group, ad hoc bodies set up to develop national strategy as their names imply, report to the NSID(OD).
capacity and experience, and heavily influenced by personalities, are adopted on a case by case basis.

**Ministry of Defence Roles and Responsibilities**

2A5. The MOD has a dual role as both a Department of State and a Military Strategic Headquarters. As a Department of State, the MOD develops policy, allocates resources and procures capability. The Military Strategic Headquarters conducts military planning and advises on the allocation and deployment of forces on operations. It translates political direction into military strategy, to be enacted by its subordinate military headquarters (the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ)).

2A6. CDS provides military advice to SofS for Defence and the PM. The Chiefs of Staff (COS) Committee, chaired by CDS, is the principal forum through which military advice is garnered, from across Defence, and through which CDS discharges his responsibility for the preparation and conduct of military operations. The Permanent Under Secretary (PUS), as senior advisor on defence policy, attends COS Committee meetings, as does a senior official from the FCO. Others in attendance may include Deputy Chiefs of the Defence Staff, the Policy Director, Chief of Joint Operations (CJO), Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI), Chief of Defence Materiel (CDM), Director General Media and Communications (DGMC), and representatives from other agencies such as the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and Secret Intelligence Service (SIS).

**The Defence Crisis Management Organisation**

2A7. The Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) is a virtual organisation formed by CDS, single-Service COS, MOD Security Policy and Operations staff, and PJHQ, supported by the Front Line Commanders (FLCs), Director Special Forces (DSF) and CDM. It performs a monitoring, directing and planning function before and during crises, and throughout enduring operations. It also provides a mechanism for routine liaison with Other Government Departments (OGDs), allies, coalition partners, International Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The DCMO spans the strategic and operational levels, acting as the conduit for briefings to ministers and for the rapid dissemination of direction through PJHQ (or the Standing Joint Commander (UK) to deployed commanders. CDS provides military advice to SofS and the PM.

**MOD Security Policy and Operations Area – Command Group**

2A8. The MOD Security and Policy Area is headed by two 3-Stars, one civilian and one military, each with discrete responsibilities, but with their subordinate 2-Star

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5 COS(R) meetings review routine matters; Op-COS discusses current operations; and Strat-COS considers longer-term issues relating to ongoing campaigns.
directorates working as one team. The paragraphs below set out the principal responsibilities for the Command Group at 3 and 2-Star level and also list the subordinate 1-Star appointments within each area.

2A9. **Director General Security Policy.** Director General Security Policy (DG Sec Pol), in conjunction with Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations) (DCDS (Ops)), provides ministers with military and political advice for operations. DG Sec Pol receives the political context from ministers for UK strategic planning and the direction of current and contingent operations. Responsible for Defence international relations, DG Sec Pol also leads the MOD contribution to Government-wide security policy and is the MOD lead on counter-terrorism policy.

2A10. **Director International Security Policy.** Director International Security Policy (DISP) is responsible for advice on the conduct of defence international relations with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU) and the United Nations. With DG Sec Pol, he engages on the cross-Government approach to security. DISP is responsible for Head of NATO and Europe Policy (NEP) and Head of Counter Proliferation and Security Cooperation (CPSC).

2A11. **Director International Acquisition Policy.** Director International Acquisition Policy (DIAP) is responsible for drawing up the policy framework for strategic guidance on the acquisition aspects of international security policy, with particular emphasis on UK dealings with the US, France, the EU and NATO. DIAP is responsible for Head of International Acquisition Policy.

2A12. **Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (International Security Policy).** Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (International Security Policy) (ACDS (ISP)) is responsible for advice on the conduct of defence international relations, relations with the African Union and engaging with OGDs as part of a cross-Government approach to security. ACDS (ISP) is responsible for Head of International Policy and Planning (IPP) and Head of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Policy (CBRN Pol).

2A13. **British Defence Staff United States.** British Defence Staff United States (BDS (US)) is a stand-alone 2-Star directorate based in Washington DC reporting to DG (ISP) and DCDS (Ops).

2A14. **Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations).** DCDS (Ops) supports CDS in commanding military operations worldwide. In conjunction with DG Sec Pol, he provides ministers with military and political advice on operations and takes a cross-Government approach by engaging with OGDs. He maintains a 24 hour a day capability to manage crises and support ministers. DCDS (Ops) conducts operational planning and assessment in coordination with OGDs out to 5 years.
2A15. **Director Operational Policy.** Director Operational Policy (D Op Pol) is responsible for formulating advice, advising ministers and giving direction on all aspects of policy relating to current military operations. D Op Pol shares with ACDS (Ops) a responsibility for the Operations Directorate, including Head of Counter Terrorism and UK Operations (CT&UK Ops), Head of Counter Terrorism and UK Policy (CT&UK Pol), Head of Special Forces and Legal Policy (SF&LP), Head of Overseas Operations (Overseas Ops), Head of Iraq Policy (Iraq Pol) and Head of Afghanistan Policy (Afghan Pol).

2A16. **Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations).** The Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations) (ACDS (Ops)) supports CDS in commanding military operations worldwide and manages current UK and overseas operations and crises through the Defence Crisis Management Organisation. ACDS (Ops) shares responsibility with D Ops Pol for the Operations Directorate and has additional responsibility for Head of Targeting and Information Operations (TIO) and Head of Joint Capability (JtCap).

2A17. **Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Logistic Operations).** Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Logistic Operations) (ACDS (Log Ops)) provides support to DCDS (Ops) in the DCMO and, within the Defence Equipment and Services structure, is responsible for the strategic planning and direction of logistics for current and contingent operations. ACDS (Log Ops) is responsible for Head of Defence Logistic Operations (Def Log Ops).

**Other Elements of Strategic Planning**

2A18. **Director General Strategy (DG Strategy).** DG Strategy is responsible for departmental strategy that includes the equipment programme. His Strategy Unit interfaces with CDS, PUS, Vice Chief of Defence Staff and the Second Permanent Under Secretary (2PUS) and provides strategic context, strategy choices and longer-term strategy for Defence white papers. 1-Star Heads of Operational Capability and of the Tribunals and Inquiries areas work within the Security Policy and Operations area, but do not engage directly in crisis planning.

2A19. **Chief of Defence Intelligence.** CDI provides ministers, COS and the MOD policy and operations staffs with focused collation, fusion and dissemination of operational and crisis-related intelligence, and the management of strategic indicators and warnings.

2A20. **Chief of Joint Operations.** CJO at PJHQ routinely acts as UK Joint Commander. Appointed by CDS, he exercises operational command of forces and is responsible for the deployment, direction, sustainment and recovery of forces on deployed operations overseas. CJO also supports DCDS (Ops) and DG Sec Pol to formulate, and where necessary review, defence policy and strategy.
2A21. **Defence Crisis Management Centre.** The MOD’s Defence Crisis Management Centre (DCMC), in Whitehall, provides working and briefing facilities, living accommodation and secure communications for the DCMO. The Chief of Defence Staff’s Duty Officer monitors world events around the clock from within the DCMC. The DCMC also enables interaction with other cross-government crisis management centres, such as the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR), the FCO Crisis Centre, and DFID’s Humanitarian Operations Centre.

**Operational Staffs and Structures**

2A22. **Permanent Joint Headquarters.** CJO plans and executes joint, potentially joint and UK-led multinational operations from PJHQ. As Joint Commander (Jt Comd), he exercises OPCOM of UK forces assigned to national and multinational operations. He gives direction and advice to commanders in theatre,\(^6\) deploys, sustains and recovers forces, and monitors and reports to CDS on the progress of campaigns. He is responsible for the Permanent Joint Operating Bases (PJOBs)\(^7\) and a variety of other headquarters and staffs deployed on missions world-wide. He is supported by:

a. **Chief of Staff (Operations).** Chief of Staff (Operations) (COS (Ops)) is responsible for the planning and day-to-day running of current operations, including deployed logistics issues.

b. **Chief of Staff (Joint Warfare Development).** Chief of Staff (Joint Warfare Development) (COS (JWD)) is responsible for the orchestration of future operational readiness, including the training of nominated commanders and their staffs.\(^8\)

2A23. PJHQ, as an integral part of the DCMO, provides operational level military advice to the MOD. Close contact is maintained with the FLCs to ensure that single-Service views are woven into any overall response.

2A24. **Joint Task Force and Other Deploying Headquarters.** The Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ), an integral part of PJHQ, is the UK’s permanent operational-level headquarters at readiness to conduct joint and multinational command and planning. Once a Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) is appointed, JFHQ becomes a Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ). If the JFHQ is not available, or if another type of headquarters is required, alternatives are drawn from the single-Services (or

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\(^6\) CJO does not have responsibility for defence of the UK or its territorial waters, for the Strategic Nuclear Deterrent, for NATO Article V (General War) Operations or for certain maritime operations for which Operational Command (OPCOM) is delegated to Commander-in-Chief FLEET.

\(^7\) Gibraltar, Cyprus, the Falkland Islands, Ascension Island and British Indian Ocean Territories (BIOT) (Diego Garcia).

\(^8\) Such as the standing pool of potential Joint Task Force Commanders (JTFCs), from which UK national and multinational JTFCs, and National Contingent Commanders (NCC), are drawn. His staff also train some deploying operational, and indeed tactical, headquarters.
the Standing JFLoc may be used if available and suited to the crisis), who adapt their processes.

2A25. **Supporting Commands.** The 3 single-Service FLCs, together with CDI, CDM and DSF, provide force elements for joint and multinational operations. When these forces are placed under the Operational Command (OPCOM) of a nominated Jt Comd (normally CJO), the FLCs are referred to as Supporting Commands.
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SECTION I – FEATURES OF THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

301. **Joint Operations.** Operations in which 2 or more Services participate are defined as joint. Effective joint operations are, however, more than just a series of discrete operations carried out under a single command. A successful joint campaign resembles a composite rather than just a combination of elements, making best use of all available capabilities and managing, in particular, the vital interplay between land/air, maritime/air and maritime/land assets. Although the operational level is invariably joint, joint operations are not always set at the operational level; tactical activity frequently involves more than one Service.

302. **Componency.** Components are collections of forces drawn from one or more Services and grouped into functional elements (Maritime, Land, Air, Logistics, Special Forces (SF) and, if the situation dictates, Amphibious). They are often organised under Component Commanders subordinate to a Joint Force Commander (JFC). Componency reduces a JFC’s span of command, improves internal cooperation (including functional input into campaign planning), and provides organisational agility. While it has particular utility on major combat operations, componency may be less useful in other situations where, by dint of scale, tempo or complexity, forces may be orchestrated more effectively in other ways (using extant single-Service Command and Control (C2) arrangements, by fielding integrated national headquarters, or by providing UK national contingents to a multinational force). The practical application of componency, in its various forms on national and coalition operations, remains the subject of debate.

303. **Multinational.** UK forces frequently deploy on operations as part of an alliance (North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Union (EU)), or as part of an ad hoc coalition, often under US leadership. Multinationality has a variety of political and legal implications, as well as presenting additional command and control challenges. The commander of a multinational force should be clear about the terms under which individual national contingents are authorised to operate as well as the potential impact, on the cohesion of the coalition, of the manner in which multinational operations are conducted. Chapter 4 addresses the particular issues relating to command of multinational forces.
304. **Multi-Agency.** The operational level affords a practical opportunity to unify the efforts of the various instruments of national power and other agencies, as part of a Comprehensive Approach. The success of such an approach requires coordination and cooperation developed, in part, through institutional familiarity, trust and transparency. The scale and tempo of military planning may need to be tempered to enable the full participation of Other Government Departments (OGDs), and to ensure coherence with their respective planning processes. While a JFC may wish to influence the activities of non-military actors, to meet particular shared outcomes, this can only be achieved through dialogue rather than direction. In doing so, a JFC should acknowledge the distinctive cultures of different OGDs; he should be aware of variations on such issues as priorities of effort, tempo, the acceptability of risk and Rules of Engagement. Irreconcilable differences may need to be referred up the chain of command for resolution at the strategic level between respective Government departments. Where, ultimately, the situation precludes active cooperation, then a JFC should put in place mechanisms for coordination, or de-confliction as a minimum.

### Comprehensive Approach – Malaya 1948-1960

The Malayan Emergency demonstrates how collaborative planning and activity can decisively affect the outcome of a campaign. Due to an initial failure to comprehend the complex Chinese Malayan scene, including the communist Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA), there was little agreement at the outset between the police and the military as to how best to deal with the deteriorating security situation.

In May 1950, a new plan was developed by General Briggs, and then implemented by General Templer, that included systematic cooperation between administrative, police and military actors at all levels. In conjunction with improved intelligence, resettlement, propaganda and increasing discrimination in the use of force, this approach effectively isolated the MNLA from the rest of the population. The progressive integration of police, intelligence agencies, civil service, and multinational armed forces, with a shared intent and common purpose, helped defeat the insurgency.

### Joint Force Capability

305. A JFC should naturally be experienced and familiar with his own single-Service environment, perhaps less so with the other environments, but he should have a clear understanding of the capabilities available to him, in both quantitative and qualitative terms. He should consider:

a. What sort of tempo they *are* capable of, and what sort of tempo they *need* to be capable of.
b. How they are organised (e.g. with sufficient interoperability and agility to be re-organised).

c. Whether they are capable of working with civil agencies, at what level, and whether some reorganisation is required.

d. The optimum command, control and communication arrangements, and how to align authority with responsibility (which is difficult in multinational operations).

e. How to get everybody into the fight, and to match tasks with groupings to avoid creating inter-component friction.

f. The key strengths, weaknesses and dependencies of the principal fighting systems, and whether the force is sustainable during each phase of the operation.

306. **Operational Reach.** Operational Reach is the ability to project and sustain fighting power over a given geographical area for a specific period of time; it is an important aspect of force projection. Understanding reach contributes to the assessment of risk, but it should not promote an overly cautious approach. Reach relates to more than the capacity of an armoured vehicle’s fuel tank or the range from a Forward Operating Base to a target. It is affected by a range of both tangible and intangible factors, and provides a realistic understanding of the capacity of a force, in a given environment, and under a particular set of operational circumstances.

307. **Command and Control.** While national C2 relationships and command states always involve discussion, in a multinational joint force they attract considerable debate. A JFC should be clear what authority he has over the employment of participating forces, and the circumstances under which that authority may change. Whether stated or not, the senior players in a Comprehensive Approach need to understand where the boundaries of authority lie.

308. **Application of Resources.** A JFC is unlikely to have a surfeit of resources; identifying and directing the right tool, in the right place, at the right time, leading to the right result is crucial. Success depends upon subtle and constant changes of emphasis in time and space, accepting that concentration of force at the point of main effort may necessitate economy of effort elsewhere.

309. **Overall Effect.** The operational level should be concentrated on unity of purpose (ideally with unity of command) and not simply unison of military postures. The power of the whole campaign should be greater than the sum of its parts (the major operations, battles and engagements). A JFC should be able to visualise the tactical activity that makes up his campaign plan, asking himself:
a. Does the action have the possibility of materially altering the situation, in terms of the overall campaign? Is there a political dimension?

b. What effect does the action seek to achieve? Effects can be a combination of: intended/unintended; desired/undesired; positive/negative; expected/unexpected; physical/psychological; instantaneous/delayed; localised/distributed; or permanent/temporary.

c. How are the various impacts of military and other activities to be monitored and assessed? How can the unintended effects, as well as those intended, be captured (how and where to focus the necessary monitoring activities)? Do the staff know enough about the JFC’s intent, and recognise his command style, to understand the significance and implications of their observations and assessments, and how to respond appropriately?

310. **Public Support.** Public support, together with an endorsement from the international community, plays a significant role in reinforcing the will of the joint force as well as the will of respective national governments to continue to commit forces to a campaign. It is imperative that an information policy, cultivating a positive image of the joint force’s efforts to achieve its campaign objectives, should be incorporated into the campaign plan and executed with determination and vigour.

**SECTION II – INTRODUCTION TO CAMPAIGNING**

311. The military contribution to crisis management, explained in Chapter 2, is encapsulated within a campaign: ‘a set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve strategic objectives within a Theatre of Operations (TOO) or Joint Operations Area (JOA), which normally involves joint forces’. A JFC plans and executes his campaign, in concert with other actors, on the basis of allocated campaign objectives and set in the context of an overall desired outcome. The geometry of the operating environment, in which a campaign occurs, is described at Annex 3A.

312. Campaigning demands a way of thinking and specific supporting processes that together enable the effective use of military capability, usually as part of a comprehensive response, to achieve favourable outcomes. It is underpinned by a number of guiding principles:

a. Take a long-term view about both the underlying causes and symptoms of conflict.

b. Focus on strategic and operational outcomes as well as the conditions required to realise them.
c. Plan and execute a campaign in concert with the other instruments of power where practicable.

d. Embrace collaborative engagement with those multiple agencies sharing the intent to improve the situation.

e. Consider the whole situation and recognise that it is complex, adaptive, non-linear, and to a certain extent unpredictable.

f. Conduct continuous analysis and assessment to deepen understanding of changing environments and to modify planning and execution.

313. The rest of this Chapter addresses a range of different tools and approaches, shown in Figure 3.1, and designed to assist a JFC at the operational level. Note that these are tools and not templates. The process is the servant (and provides a model upon which to base staff training); but it is not the master.

![Figure 3.1 – Approaches to Visualising the Operational Level](image-url)
Operational Art

“The operational level commander stands astride the political/military interface with his weight on the military foot. His mastery of the art of war, tested against that of his opponent, links the successful achievement of the strategic objective with the actions of his command. He must have a broad understanding of the science of war, but it is he, and he alone, who paints the masterpiece.”

314. Operational Art lies at the core of the operational level of war. The term has been accredited to Soviet military theorists of the 1920s, although much of their work had German antecedents. It emerged from the development of the Soviet idea of deep battle in which the coordinated use of a range of capabilities, in close harmony with key enabling functions such as intelligence and logistics, avoided tactical deadlock or heavy losses through attrition. Although developed to address bi-polar, force-on-force campaigns, the concept is entirely applicable to contemporary campaigns in which crisis resolution is not necessarily hinged on military success.

### Operational Art – US Civil War

Robert E. Lee and ‘Stonewall’ Jackson have been characterised as examples of military genius. By contrast, Ulysses S. Grant’s success has often been attributed to dogged persistence. The focus of Lee and Jackson was, however, on the pre-eminence of tactical activity, while it was Grant who recognised the cumulative effect of coordinated military action against the enemy’s overall capability. These examples demonstrate that while operational art has objective elements, driven by the material conditions of war pertaining at the time, it also has subjective aspects, derived from the character, personality and capability of individual commanders.

315. Operational Art is the orchestration of a campaign, in concert with other agencies, to convert strategic objectives into tactical activity in order to achieve a desired outcome. It embraces a commander’s ability to take a complex and often unstructured problem and provide sufficient clarity and logic (some of which is intuitive) to enable detailed planning and practical orders. It is realised through a combination of a commander’s skill and the staff-assisted processes of Campaign Design and Campaign Management, illustrated in Figure 3.2.

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Campaign Design frames the problem, and then develops and refines a commander’s operational ideas – his vision of how he sees the campaign unfolding – to provide detailed and actionable plans. Campaign design continues, often interrupted by changes in strategic guidance, throughout the duration of a campaign; it should not be deemed complete or immutable from the outset and never simply implemented as a given without adaptation in the face of changing circumstances. Review and refinement are critical aspects of continuous campaign re-design, as a situation changes in response to military intervention, the actions and reactions of other actors (including opponents), and the unavoidable consequences of chance and friction. It is for this reason that a JFC should become accustomed to uncertainty, and should thrive on turning chaos to his advantage. To that end, he should exploit assessment (including the invaluable contributions from his own battlefield circulation, dialogue with allies and collaboration with other actors) as an integral part of his campaign design process.

Campaign Management integrates, coordinates, synchronises and prioritises the execution of operations and assesses progress. Because conflict is inherently adversarial, an opponent’s responses will inevitably affect the course of a campaign. Assessing the course of the campaign and then acting quickly (in order to modify the
campaign plan to meet assigned objectives in light of changed circumstances) should be the main way in which a JFC commands the joint force.

318. Orchestrating a campaign is not a purely mechanistic process; there is a significant human dimension centred on a JFC and the charismatic reach that he is able to extend across the theatre of operations, including and beyond his joint force. The function of design and management, drawing extensively from a JFC’s considered view, is to guide and marshal thought and to focus staff effort – the key being decisive advantage rather than process-led output. Design and management both rely upon an appreciation of the context within which conflict is occurring and the effects, or changes, required to create the necessary conditions for a successful outcome. Although campaigning doctrine guides the translation of that appreciation into purposeful activity, success is underpinned by a JFC’s understanding of the situation, of the problem that he faces, and his determination to impose his will on events.

319. A JFC has to balance the time it may take to develop an ideal breadth of understanding (of the overall political or social context, for instance) with the necessary depth of understanding (of his enemy and the ground, for example) required to conduct military operations. He may have to compromise on the former in order to gather and apply the latter. Only in this way, and supported by a staff that can when necessary adopt an agile approach to planning, may he be able to deliver a decision on time, albeit at some risk, rather than waiting too long for ‘absolute clarity’ (and potentially failing to act in time, or at all) – perfection can be the enemy of the good. Of course, the inherent danger of acting promptly, but without good situational understanding, is that the problem addressed through military action (potentially, in retrospect, ill-informed military action) may turn out to be more complex than envisaged. The outcome may be a military victory, but without the intended strategic success.

320. Operational Art provides the linkage between tactical success and the achievement of strategic objectives; it is the skilful execution of the operational level of command in which the personality, manner and influence of a JFC is paramount. It requires: a comprehensive insight into the adversary(s), opponent(s) or key actor(s) – their values, aims and intentions, and their anticipated responses; an ability to visualise the effect of tactical actions (which demands an understanding of force capabilities); and an understanding of risk, its effect and how it may be managed.

321. In the same way that ends, ways and means provides a useful framework at the strategic level (Chapter 2), so too an operational level commander should address:

a. **Ends.** What is the strategic intent? What are the requisite objectives and what role does the military instrument play in achieving them?
b. **Ways.** What conditions are necessary in order to achieve assigned campaign objectives? How are military activities, and their associated effects, to be coordinated with those of other actors, to ensure mutual support and synergy? This is the crux of campaigning.

c. **Means.** What resources are available, what are their capabilities and what are the risks attendant upon their use?

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### Operation BARBAROSSA – Soviet Union 1941

Operation BARBAROSSA, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, represents a classic failure to balance ends, ways and means. The German strategic objective was to bring about the collapse of Soviet Union (the end) through a short, yet decisive, campaign (the way). A combination of over-confidence and poor intelligence, however, led to a fundamental miscalculation of the resources (the means).

There was no significant economic mobilisation and force levels comparable to those committed to the invasion of France were deemed adequate. The assumption that the Soviets could only deploy some 300 divisions proved flawed, however, and they in fact raised 600 by December 1941. At the same time, indecision as to the Soviet’s Centre of Gravity (CoG) (eventually agreed as Moscow) led to constant changes in the German concept of operations. As a result, despite losing nearly 5 million men in 1941, the Soviet Union retained the capacity to continue the war.

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### Campaigning Logic

322. Chapter 2 described the process whereby, at the strategic level, the Government’s policy goals (or **National Strategic Aim**, couched in terms of seeking a favourable outcome to a particular crisis) are translated into a series of objectives (some of which are then assigned to a JFC as his **Campaign Objectives**). Figure 3.3 illustrates how a JFC may then **plan** to translate his assigned campaign objectives into actionable tasks and purposes that can be assigned to his subordinates. Planning determines how objectives are to be achieved; orders for execution communicate to subordinates what is to be achieved and why. There is, however, nothing predictive nor necessarily causal in a commander’s initial plan – which acts as a start point for execution. In reality, campaigning is characterised by continuous adaptation.

323. **Activities** are tasks undertaken by elements of the joint force with the purpose of achieving specific **Supporting Effects**; they are directed through mission statements (containing task and purpose). A single supporting effect tends to require the successful completion of a number of military tasks and may also, on occasion, depend upon contributions from other non-military actors. The effectiveness of the collaboration between different actors, and the extent of mutual trust and shared
understanding between them, will influence any requirement for military contingency planning (to address any potential shortfall in other actors’ delivery).

The national strategic aim is ‘the government’s declared purpose in a particular situation, normally expressed in terms of reaching a future desired outcome’. The desired outcome is ‘a favourable and enduring situation, consistent with political direction, reached through intervention and/or as a result of some other form of influence’. It invariably requires contributions from all instruments of power; it should be determined collectively.

The national strategic aim provides the unifying purpose for strategic and operational level commanders, and leaders from non-military organisations.

A strategic objective is ‘a goal to be achieved by one or more instruments of national power in order to meet the National Strategic Aim’. Military strategic objectives are goals to be achieved principally by the military (and are the responsibility of the military-strategic commander (CDS)). The campaign end-state is reached when all the campaign objectives have been achieved. It therefore represents ‘the extent of the JFC’s contribution to meeting the national strategic aim’. A campaign objective is ‘a goal, expressed in terms of one or more decisive conditions, that needs to be achieved in order to meet the national strategic aim’. A decisive condition is ‘a specific combination of circumstances deemed necessary to achieve a campaign objective’. A supporting effect is ‘the intended consequence of actions’; supporting effects contribute to decisive conditions.

Figure 3.3 – From National Strategic Aim to Activity
324. Campaign objectives, derived from military strategic objectives, are a JFC’s responsibility. They are conditions-based – expressed in terms of **Decisive Conditions** – with purposes consistent with the national strategic aim. A JFC should not, however, be averse to revising his campaign objectives, in conjunction with the military strategic commander, in the light of changing circumstances. A JFC’s **Campaign End-state** is reached through the achievement of campaign objectives. It is the point at which the joint force’s contribution to the national strategic aim is complete, presaging campaign termination.

325. In practice, the military contribution to the overall national strategic aim is considerably more complex and dynamic than Figure 3.3 might suggest. Military activities are seldom entirely successful in achieving, and sustaining, desired effects without the involvement of other actors and agencies. Collaboration between military and civilian actors, to achieve shared goals, is much more likely than discrete, exclusively military endeavours. The very act of military intervention – let alone the dynamic interplay of other actors, contingency and chance – will change a crisis situation, always, and often in unpredictable ways. The adage that ‘no plan survives contact with the enemy’ holds true, exacerbated on contemporary operations by their increasing susceptibility to external and indirect influences (due to increased globalisation, for example). So, while the planned and intended relationship between activities, supporting effects, and decisive conditions is an important one, it is neither fixed nor immutable. The linkages shown in Figure 3.4 are fluid and adaptable; they should not be treated as predictive or mechanistic.

326. Accordingly, a vital element of operational art is the skill of the JFC to determine *when* and *how* to adjust his plan.

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**Figure 3.4 – The Adaptive Nature of Campaign Design**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analysis &amp; Assessment – Stakeholders:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The Staff – ‘hunt’ the information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• JFC – Battlefield Circulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Coalition relationships</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Diplomatic relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Host Nation liaison / rapport</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Higher command engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Collaboration with other agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Intelligence (fused open and secret sources)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
327. To make the necessary judgements, a JFC relies upon his staff to provide him with the information he needs, in time to make the requisite changes, communicate them to his subordinates (and allies, partners and other interested parties), and still retain the initiative. Campaign success relies upon this combination of momentum, tempo and agility; information, and especially that emanating from formal and informal assessment, is a critical enabler.

**Manoeuvrist Approach**

328. The Manoeuvrist Approach to operations places a premium on shattering an enemy’s overall cohesion and will to fight, rather than simply depleting his materiel or gaining territory for its own sake. It applies strength against identified vulnerabilities, targeting the conceptual and moral components of an opponent’s fighting power, as well as his physical capacity. Significant features are momentum, tempo and agility which, in combination, aim to achieve shock and surprise. The manoeuvrist approach calls for an attitude of mind, which thrives on dealing with uncertainty, whereby originality and doing the unexpected are combined with a ruthless determination to succeed. It offers the prospect of achieving results that are disproportionately greater than the resources applied. The ability for a commander to assess and to take risk is crucial. The degree to which a Comprehensive Approach is or is not brought to bear is a significant risk. The tension between the longer term development goals which seek to ‘do no harm’ – and the shorter-term security imperatives that may allow no option but to undermine that view – may at times be insoluble.

329. The manoeuvrist approach emphasises the neutralisation of an opponent through ingenuity, even guile, rather than necessarily or exclusively through the destruction of his capability. It does not, however, preclude the use of attrition. Degradation of an opponent’s ability to make timely and well-informed decisions – getting inside his decision-action cycle – reduces his ability to act appropriately or conceivably to act at all.
Operation IRONCLAD – Madagascar 1942

In the face of Japanese advances, Britain feared seizure of the East African port and airfield of Diego Suarez from the Vichy French, cutting sea communications with the Middle East and India. Britain could not, however, spare large forces for a protracted military campaign, and was anyway reluctant to inflict significant French casualties.

The solution was strikingly manoeuvrist. Rather than storm the harbour, Major General Sturges planned to land at night on the lightly defended western coast, hitherto considered impossible due to reefs, currents and mines. Assisted by an east coast deception, simultaneous amphibious landings and air strikes, the British assault force gained the initiative, and duly exploited their advantage by not lingering on the beaches but advancing immediately. When the advance stalled Sturges took bold action again. HMS ANTHONY ran the gauntlet of the harbour defences to land a diversionary party, while 2 brigades launched a simultaneous night assault, causing the defences to collapse.

Joint Action

330. The ability of any actor – opponent, friend, neutral, belligerent or spoiler – to use force, or the threat of force, to achieve a desired outcome is dependent upon his will to act, his understanding of the situation, and his capability to act decisively. Together, these elements determine an actor’s military effectiveness.

a. **Will.** At the strategic level, will is influenced by factors such as national culture, ideology and political resolve; at the operational and tactical levels it is based upon the social unity of communities of interest or armed groups, their morale, *esprit de corps*, and cohesion. Once an actor loses the will to act, he relinquishes his ability to actively influence events.

b. **Understanding.** An actor’s understanding of his situation originates from the information he receives, but is shaped by his thoughts, experience and senses. As a result, an actor’s perception of his situation is as important as reality in determining his actions and, indeed, in affecting his will to act at all.

c. **Capability.** An actor’s capacity for action is dependent upon his physical capabilities and their utility in a particular situation. Although quantity and quality tend to confer advantage, a variety of other factors also impact upon effectiveness. Some, such as geospatial factors, are situation-depdendant but others, such as prioritised resource allocation to achieve competing tasks, are subject to a commander’s discretion and influence.
331. The cohesion within an organisation is also an important facet of operational effectiveness. For example, it is collective will or resolve, ranging in strength from tacit acceptance through to absolute allegiance, which mobilises a group of individuals in pursuit of a common goal. A group’s cohesion reflects the extent to which those motivations bind individuals together, and inspire them to act in unison.

332. Joint Action involves the deliberate use and orchestration of military capabilities and activities to realise effects on other actors’ will, understanding and capability, and the cohesion between them. It is implemented through the coordination and synchronisation of:

a. **Fires.** Fires are the deliberate use of physical means to realise, primarily, physical effects. They are focused on another actor’s capability (to destroy someone or something, including that which enables understanding); fires may also influence indirectly behaviour, attitudes or decisions.

b. **Influence Activities.** Influence Activities seek to affect understanding and thus the character or behaviour of an individual, group or organisation. They do so by manipulating information ahead of its receipt, or perceptions of that information once received.

c. **Manoeuvre.** Manoeuvre gains temporal and spatial advantage. It places those seeking to create either physical or psychological effects, or frequently both, in the most appropriate time and space to do so. Manoeuvre can also realise a variety of effects in its own right, and may be used to supplement the impact of fires and influence activities.
COIN – Borneo 1963-66

Between 1963-66, Commonwealth forces defeated a complex insurgency in Borneo, which was being actively supported by Indonesian Forces infiltrating across the border. This successful counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign provides a good example of effective Joint Action.

A combination of security, judicial and political action based on a coordinated civil-military plan, and extensive use of Psychological Operations and propaganda, managed to suppress the insurgency in urban areas. The conflict then moved to the jungle interior, where again a well-coordinated ‘joined-up’ approach ultimately realised the insurgents’ defeat.

Extensive manoeuvre, using aviation, created an illusion of large-scale military presence, the impact of which was amplified by highly aggressive, but carefully targeted, military action. Sensitive handling of the local population led to Commonwealth forces, rather than the insurgents, being regarded as the providers of security. Through this well-orchestrated combination of physical and psychological effects, the Commonwealth succeeded in the complete demoralisation of Indonesian Forces and the virtual extinguishing of any internal insurgency within Borneo.

Operational Framework

333. Derived from the manoeuvrist approach, the Operational Framework provides a JFC with a way to visualise effects and activities and, potentially, to articulate his intent. The 5 broad functions can be used to describe how subordinates’ missions relate to each other in time, space, function or purpose, and (sometimes) geography. They are, however, neither necessarily sequential nor separated into discrete phases.

334. **Shape.** In major combat operations, a commander should identify a decisive act or engagement that, if successful, should lead to success within his chosen Concept of Operations (CONOPS). The choice of decisive act, and the actions required to support it, define the plan uniquely. This concept, shared by all the levels of warfare, is complemented by shaping operations which seek to create, or preserve, the conditions for the decisive act or engagement. These conditions may relate to the environment, an opponent, or to own or friendly forces. Short of major combat operations, opportunities for a single decisive act may be rare. Although dependent upon the mission, it may be more appropriate, for example, to consider security within a region as being decisive with associated shaping operations ranging from low-level intelligence, to protection of key infrastructure, to winning hearts and minds. In a Comprehensive Approach, the notion of a ‘theory of change’ can be a helpful way to reach agreement on the essence of the problem and the broad approach. This will be developed further in JDP 2-00 ‘Intelligence’ and JDP 5-00 ‘Campaign Planning’.
Frequently, shaping operations are aimed at the perceptions of one or more parties; influence activities play a significant role.

335. **Engage.** Decisive engagement is that which a JFC envisages will make a highly significant contribution to achieving campaign objectives. Gaining and retaining the initiative is also a vital aspect of all operations, requiring a JFC to conduct complementary attacks against will and cohesion. Successful engagements, based upon Joint Action, should exploit:

a. **Tempo.** Tempo is the rhythm or rate of activities relative to an opponent, or object. It comprises: speed of decision; speed of execution; and speed of transition from one activity to the next. A JFC who consistently decides and acts faster than his opponent should gain and hold an advantage, as well as being more likely achieve shock and surprise. Circumstances may not, however, always demand or indeed permit high operational tempo. In some situations, greater benefits may be derived from gradual and iterative resolution (constructive dialogue and reconciliation rather than action/attrition), in order to influence long-term behaviours and not just diminish hostile capabilities in the short term.

b. **Simultaneity.** Simultaneity seeks to overload an opponent or win over the uncommitted by attacking or threatening him from so many angles at once that he cannot concentrate on one problem at a time, or even establish priorities between them. Simultaneity should be viewed from an opponent’s perspective and its use judged by the intended effect on his cohesion and ability to make timely decisions. The cumulative effect of high tempo and simultaneity, against multiple command levels, often has devastating consequences on an opponent’s will and cohesion. Simultaneity is not restricted to military activities; comparable success can be achieved by a combination of activities by multiple agencies.

c. **Surprise.** Surprise, a principle of war, is one of the most significant contributors to success at all levels of warfare. Its effect is often out of all proportion to force ratios. It is built on speed, security and deception and is fundamental to shattering an opponent’s cohesion. The key is not necessarily to engage an enemy who is unaware but to engage him at a point in which he is too late to react effectively. Surprise will frequently unearth opportunities; a JFC’s ability to exploit such opportunities is paramount.

336. **Exploit.** A JFC should exploit opportunities to seize and retain the initiative (the ability to dictate the course of events), or regain it once lost, in order to achieve his mission. Making the most of such opportunities, whether they be created through successful engagement or arise through chance, relies upon a JFC’s ability not only to identify them in advance but to be able to generate the means to exploit them.
Recognising when the initiative has been lost, at the operational level, can be especially challenging (it can be all too easy to ‘assume’ the initiative, until the moment when its absence is painfully felt). Effective exploitation is underpinned by continuous planning (based upon the anticipation of potential opportunities), mission command, and a preparedness to take risk at all levels.

337. **Protect.** Protection preserves the capabilities of a joint force so that they can be applied as planned, perhaps decisively, in time and space. The same components against which a JFC seeks to engage an opponent – will, understanding and capability – are also those that must be protected, as it is these upon which an opponent is likely to focus his hostile activities. A JFC should acknowledge his own critical vulnerabilities and protect them accordingly. Successful force protection (the difficulties of which are exacerbated on multinational operations) rests upon sound risk management and a holistic approach to countering assessed threats.

338. **Sustain.** Sustaining operations underpin the freedom of action for a JFC to shape, engage, exploit and protect. From a JFC’s perspective they include Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI), the assembly and movement of reserves or echelon forces, the redeployment and replenishment (or reconstitution or rehabilitation) of forces out of contact, host nation support, and the establishment of operating bases and lines of communication. They are most readily associated with the physical component of fighting power, but have equal impact on the moral component. Sustaining operations represent an obvious target for an opponent’s operations; an appropriate balance of force protection, in accordance with both the perceived risks and the necessary priorities afforded to shaping and engaging operations, should ensure a JFC’s continued freedom of action.

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**Operation URANUS – Russia 1942**

Though the brutality of the close-quarters fighting in the city itself form the popular image of the Battle of Stalingrad, its real significance lies in Operation URANUS, the Soviet counter-strike. The former provided the necessary **shaping** for the subsequent **decisive engagement**. As the Germans became drawn deeper and deeper into the current battle, the Soviets amassed a sizeable counter-attack force, and the resources necessary to **sustain** it; this was done with the utmost secrecy to ensure **protection**. The URANUS counter-attack, launched only after meticulous planning and preparation, was designed to regain the initiative and then rapidly **exploit** success. The result was the first major Soviet victory of the war, presaging the more complex successive, and eventually simultaneous, operations that saw the Soviets drive all the way to Berlin.
SECTION III – CAMPAIGN DESIGN

339. The main activities within campaign design are analysis and planning. Analysis is continuous. Planning should be initiated if and when a major contingency is anticipated, or a change to an existing campaign plan is required.

Analysis

340. Before embarking on an operational estimate, to seek the optimum solution to a complex crisis, a JFC requires a thorough and up-to-date understanding of the strategic context. The process of analysis, underpinned by intelligence, furnishes a JFC with basic knowledge. It is, however, his reasoning and judgment that provide him with the necessary depth of understanding to plan and execute appropriate military operations, in concert with others.

341. In reality analysis does not start with crisis planning; it should have been a key contributor to contingency planning and should have driven the National Security, International Relations and Development (Overseas and Defence) sub-committee and MOD Strategic Planning Groups in reaching their conclusions on policy and national strategy. When a JFC is assigned operational level command, he may therefore expect a considerable amount of information and intelligence already to have been gathered. However, he should not be surprised if conditions have conspired against it, as happened in Kosovo in 1999. A JFC is not only the principal beneficiary of analysis, he is also likely to be a key contributor, based upon his unique pan-theatre perspective and privileged access to key stakeholders. He should develop his own analysis community of interest, drawn from across his headquarters and beyond, to include multinational partners, OGDs and multi-agency representatives, host nation officials, and subject matter experts drawn from a multitude of specialist or environmental areas.

342. Analysis (introduced in Chapter 2 in the broader context of crisis management) involves the examination of all the constituent elements of a situation, and their inter-relationships, in order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the past, present and anticipated future operational context. A situation should be examined in its entirety, as an inter-dependent and dynamic system, recognising that individual elements seldom exist in isolation or in perfect equilibrium. The process involves consideration of the broad strategic context (geo, socio, politico, economic and military) in order to provide the backdrop to a closer examination of the problem.

343. Climate and topographical details, sources of water and energy, and givens such as fixed points and their implications (e.g. Suez Canal, Rhine crossings) will shape Courses of Action (CoAs) and responses. An analysis of the people involved, their wealth, society and culture, their neighbours and their relationships will also be critical to campaign design. However, a JFC may rarely appreciate fully how other
actors make their policy decisions, or how an unfamiliar economy, society or individual and collective psychology of leaders and citizens actually work. Extreme caution should be exercised in trying scientifically to model ‘system’ behaviour and the results of military action against selected ‘nodes’.

344. The results of analysis are never exhaustive, or absolutely certain, for the dynamics are too complex and volatile. The process is instead a continuous one to gain, and then maintain and enhance, contextual knowledge of the circumstances, actors, surroundings and influences that characterise a particular crisis. Analysis primes the initial planning process; it also continues throughout the duration of a campaign to inform subsequent planning. The results of campaign assessment are used to update analysis together with a range of other informants as shown in Figure 3.4. It is this combination of continuous analysis (and assessment) which indicate to a JFC changes that have occurred since (but not necessarily because of) his operations. This process also indicates to a JFC the potential impact of planned activities in the future, allowing him to maximise positive (and minimise negative) effects, and avoid unintended, undesirable consequences.

### Analysis – Somalia 1992-1995

The ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident in Mogadishu, in October 1993, was symptomatic of UN failure in Somalia. It was characterised by flawed intelligence, and poor command and control. Perhaps more importantly, however, it reflected a lack of understanding of: the underlying situation; the past, as well as contemporary, context; and the nature of the operating environment. The UN mission’s pre-deployment reconnaissance had been limited and analysis of the various factions, issues, ethnic and tribal dynamics minimal, while the resources were initially woefully inadequate for the task at hand. Incremental changes to the mandate and forces levels were reactions, but never solutions, to the situation.

### Planning

“*I will not on any account be drawn away from first principles: that it is for commanders to make plans and give decisions, and staffs then to work out the details of those plans; on no account will I have a plan forced on me by a planning staff.*”

Field Marshal Montgomery

345. Crisis management addresses 3 questions: what are the features of the current (crisis) situation; what should the (more favourable) situation look like at the end; and how should the situation change or be changed? Within this overall construct, campaign planning addresses the achievement of specified campaign objectives
designed to contribute to closing the gap between the current situation and the desired outcome. The achievement of the campaign end-state is not a discrete or isolated activity, but rather it is nested within a broader framework:

a. The conduct of military activities to achieve specific effects, and the subsequent achievement of objectives, are frequently inter-woven with the activities, intended effects, and associated objectives of other non-military actors. Whether or not such inter-dependencies are reflected in formal supporting and supported relationships, participants are unlikely to be entirely effective in their respective endeavours without coordination and, where appropriate, cooperation.

b. Campaign planning links aspiration at the strategic level and activity at the tactical level. Both are dynamic and subject to the constraints and urgencies of time: changes in political intent and strategic priorities (potentially spanning a number of concurrent campaigns) will influence a campaign from above; and changes in the tactical situation (including the correlation of forces) will influence a campaign from below.

346. A JFC will seldom conduct his planning in isolation, and a major challenge is likely to be the synchronisation of his work with that of other commanders and headquarters, and with other agencies. In practice, other headquarters are likely to disrupt a JFC’s planning cycle, so he should consult early to take the views of other relevant commanders, and plan in outline early to provide something concrete upon which to frame subsequent discussions with them. Collaborative planning is invariably more effective when planners are collocated, to ensure full participation, detailed negotiation, and the timely and equitable consideration of all points of view. Where commanders themselves cannot be collocated or available from the outset of planning, then trusted and empowered representatives should act on their behalf to maintain momentum. Network Enabled Capabilities can help collaboration, particularly if battle rhythms can be harmonised and secure Video Teleconferencing exploited.

Planning – The Dardanelles and Gallipoli 1915
The evacuation from Gallipoli, without a single casualty, was the best planned stage of a disastrous campaign to force Turkey out of the war. Earlier planning displayed nearly every conceivable weakness: friction between commanders; no proper planning staff; poor intelligence; dreadful operational security; a lack of inter-service coordination; inexperienced troops; and a lack of amphibious shipping. Moreover, attention was devoted to the landings rather than their purpose, leading to a catastrophic failure to exploit opportunities to break out.
347. While campaigning is quite correctly focused on achieving situational change, a JFC should never forget that it is also inherently adversarial: ‘the other side gets a go, too’. Planning should not focus on friendly actions alone, and neither should it assume a compliant, patient or predictable enemy. In reality, the side which decides and acts first, and reacts quickest, will generally seize the initiative and be able to impose its will on the enemy.

348. A JFC’s role in campaign planning comprises: the formation and development of operational ideas; translation of those ideas into one or more feasible CoAs; selection of a particular CoA; and the determination of an appropriate CONOPS. The principal elements of Campaign Design – by which a JFC’s ideas are translated into actions – are: the Operational Estimate, the Campaign Planning Concepts, and the Campaign Plan. These are described below.

Risk

There will often be a balance to strike between emphasis on carefully considered longer-term strategic objectives and the fleeting much higher risk opportunities to seize the short-term initiative. In 2007, General Petraeus was willing to take short term risks in Iraq, for example by exploiting the ‘awakening’ of former insurgents who had turned against Al-Qaeda in Iraq. He understood that without risking such progress in the short term, there might be no viable long term.

Operational Ideas

349. Campaign planning relies upon a commander’s skill in creative thought. Potential solutions, or elements of them, are termed operational ideas; these form the mainspring of operational art. They are grounded in an appreciation of the situation, the desired outcome sought, and the operational context; they naturally form an essential pillar of operational level command. Operational ideas are developed progressively throughout the operational estimate, with each stage refining or modifying earlier thinking; they culminate in campaign ‘big ideas’ which stimulate the development of alternative CoAs. Ideas may be tangible or abstract, concern broad swathes of a campaign, for example a ‘theory of change’, or relate to specific stages or phases. A JFC may express his ideas in terms of the operational framework, in relation to selected campaign planning concepts by using a campaign plan schematic, or using some other format of his own. Ideas, and potential decisive conditions, are likely to emanate from a JFC’s consideration of campaign end-state (in terms of campaign objectives) and CoG (sometimes likened to the hub of a wheel, to emphasise its pivotal or focal significance).
Campaign End-State

350. The campaign end-state, including its relationship to the desired outcome, provides the focal point for campaign planning. It is the goal to which available ways and means are applied; the military contribution, at the operational level, to the desired outcome. Its achievement depends principally upon military activity, but reaching and sustaining a campaign end-state may rely, to an extent, on the contributions of other actors and instruments of power. A JFC may be given the campaign end-state or he may have to derive it himself from strategic direction. Subsequent end-state analysis should clarify and confirm a JFC’s understanding of the direction he has received, validate his campaign objectives, and establish the foundations on which to determine military activities.

Centre of Gravity

351. A CoG is any characteristic, capability or influence from which a nation, a military force or other civil or militia grouping draws its freedom of action, physical strength, cohesion or will to fight. Enemy CoGs represent the most significant hurdle, or obstruction, to attaining the end-state. It follows that the purpose of CoG identification is to determine who and what is important, and why, with CoG analysis focused on potential strengths and weaknesses. Alongside the campaign end-state, they provide another source from which to derive decisive conditions. As well as identifying an adversary’s CoG, and determining ways of attacking it, a JFC should also assess his own CoG in order that he can protect it. In bi-polar conflicts, where the military dominate, the CoG has obvious utility. In more complex operating environments, where the goal is not simply victory in combat but changing the socio-political and economic dynamics of a society, a single enemy CoG may not be appropriate. A JFC may nonetheless use CoG analysis (described in more detail in JDP 5-00) to help him understand the critical aspects of the situation, including the characteristics of key actors, in order to shape his decision-making and focus his resources. The use of the CoG in complex crises also ensures that a JFC does not lose sight of the military contribution to the desired outcome.

352. Centre of Gravity Selection. At the strategic level, a CoG is often an abstraction such as the cohesion of an alliance; at the tactical level it is usually a capability or strength that can be addressed through defined engagements. The nature of an operational level CoG, which sits somewhere between the 2, depends on individual circumstances and the type of military activity envisaged. During major combat operations, involving bipolar (friendly and opposing) forces, an enemy’s operational CoG is likely to be something physical from which he draws strength and which can be attacked via its critical vulnerabilities. In other situations, such as the provision of security to enable a process of post-conflict stabilisation for example, there may be myriad different actors. It may then be appropriate to consider each actor’s CoG separately (generating multiple CoGs). In particularly complex or
ambiguous situations, a JFC may select an all-encompassing CoG that encapsulates the significant circumstances, participants, surroundings and other influences, and provides a focus for further analysis. In more benign settings, such as disaster relief operations, there may not be a readily-discriminate CoG at the operational level.

**Operational Estimate**

353. The Estimate is a problem solving process, applied to often ill-defined problems in uncertain and dynamic environments, in high stake and time-pressured situations. It combines objective, rational analysis with the power of intuition (a combination of experience and intelligence, but also creativity and innovation). Its output is a *decision* about what to do and when and where to do it. In practice, and especially in situations where military forces and military commanders are involved with other agencies and interested parties, that decision may reflect a judgement or compromise on the appropriate balance of interests across the relevant ‘operational community’.

354. The Estimate is based upon:

a. **Understanding the Problem.** The problem is of prime importance and is composed of 2 parts: the assigned *mission*; and the *object* of that mission. The object is the thing on which the mission bears or which provides the greatest resistance to that mission; often, particularly in major combat operations, it will be the adversary’s military forces. Detailed analysis of mission *and* object, early on in the planning process, should enhance the prospect of selecting a winning concept.

b. **Establishing the Art of the Possible.** A thorough understanding of the problem establishes a logical basis for a commander to provide direction to his staff. Their focus is to establish the art of the possible, using planning factors tailored to the problem rather than some predetermined generic checklist.

355. The Operational Estimate (so called as it describes the process carried out by the operational level commander and his staff) is an iterative process for the initial formulation of a campaign plan, and its subsequent adaptation over time, and the generation of successive orders and directives. It is designed to:

a. Examine strategic guidance and the context within which it is provided (framing the problem).

b. Ensure clarity, where possible in concert with other agencies, on the desired outcome and the contribution represented by the achievement of campaign objectives.
c. Validate the campaign objectives, confirming the relationship between these objectives and the efforts of the other instruments of power.

d. Develop potential CoAs to achieve the campaign end-state (in terms of decisive conditions, supporting effects and activities).

e. Enable a JFC to select a CoA or, during campaign execution, to revise his chosen CoA.

**Estimate Process**

356. The estimate process (detailed at Annex 3B) is command-led; it enables a JFC to decide how best to achieve his campaign end-state. It generates a plan, or modifies an existing one, on the basis of which a JFC issues orders. It is not a single event or static display, but is kept alive throughout a campaign, informed by command-focused assessment of progress, and responsive to changes in the operational situation or in strategic direction. A variety of functional staff checks and analyses support a JFC’s decision-making; some provide information and intelligence, others indicate logistic, engineering, or Communications and Information Systems (CIS) freedoms and constraints; but there is only one operational estimate.

357. The process of planning should be kept as simple and logical as possible; failure to do so risks confusing both staff and subordinate commands. It should also be capable of interruption and re-direction in order to deal with changes in the situation. It should be kept coherent with similar processes being carried out elsewhere, at the strategic level for example, to ensure that assumptions are consistent and that planning proceeds on the basis of the latest strategic intelligence and superior commander’s intent. Similarly, deductions reached by subordinate commanders, and information concerning their respective capabilities, should be factored in. Effective information management (IM) is vital to the conduct of an estimate.

358. Planning is generally primed by a review of analysis products, intended to:

a. Provide all those involved in the estimate process with a common understanding of the background, underlying causes and dynamics of the current situation. Shared understanding, amongst those with whom the military intend to cooperate, is one of the principles of a Comprehensive Approach.

b. Apply rigorous scrutiny and testing of that understanding. Red teaming may be used to ameliorate the effects of mirror-imaging (the tendency to assume that others will behave and respond in the same way as ourselves) and to garner external, especially contrary, perspectives (to test prevalent national or military paradigms).
c. Set the context within which the JFC can confirm his understanding of his mission, and of the end-state he has been charged with reaching. This may involve clarification being sought from the chain of command, or the JFC setting information or intelligence requirements for his own staff.

359. The planning process presents some real challenges to those engaged in the collection and presentation of timely information and intelligence. While in theory intelligence requirements are initiated by the commander and his staff during the estimate, in practice it would be extremely inefficient for J2 staff to simply wait for such direction, and then respond to it as quickly as they can, rather than anticipating requirements in advance. The continuous inter-relationship between planning and intelligence is best tackled by a close and dynamic working relationship, and constant dialogue, between the JFC and his Chief J2.

Decision-making Support

360. Decision-making for military commanders has become an inherently complex, often vexed, collective process in which – notwithstanding the merits of rational planning – sometimes quite arbitrary social, inter-personal and institutional factors play an important role. In the face of these challenges, individual JFCs will, on the basis of their personal experience and preferences, invariably develop their own decision-making approaches and techniques. There are, however, a number of methodologies that can assist.

a. **Risk Analysis and Management.** A JFC should identify, assess and manage the risks involved in his military operations, and provide appropriate guidance to his staff and subordinates for risk reduction, mitigation and exploitation (including delegating appropriate risk ownership to subordinates or transferring intolerable and unmanageable risk to his superior(s)).

b. **Red Teams, Wargaming and Operational Analysis.** A JFC may form an independently-minded ‘Red Team’, augmented as necessary by J5 planners, to scrutinise and critique the logic and validity of his planning, as it evolves both before and during execution. The process is likely to involve wargaming and should lead to the generation of contingency plans. Operational Analysis specialists should provide additional objectivity and technical rigour to operational planning and decision-making.

c. **Mentoring.** A JFC may be appointed a mentor, by the relevant military strategic authority, or acquire one under his own auspices. The purpose of senior officer mentoring is to provide a JFC with the benefit of confidential,

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2 Analysis of the run-up to Coalition operations in the Gulf, in 2003, would suggest that linking national and multinational, political and strategic imperatives frustrated effective planning (and led, in particular, to undue attention being focused on defeating the Iraqi Army rather than preparing for the aftermath).
objective third party experience in order to improve the quality of his decision making.

d. **Facilitation.** Facilitation differs from mentoring; it has particular application in relation to cooperative planning in a multi-agency context. The benefits of using a trained facilitator (normally distinct from the commander or leader, and without executive or representational authority) include:

   (1) Effective participation by, and consultation with, all actors (including those otherwise inexperienced in formal planning practices).

   (2) Management of internal conflict within a potentially disparate planning group, leading to auditable buy-in and co-ownership of decisions reached in forum.

e. **Institutionalised Dissent.** An experienced planning team may develop high levels of cohesion which can, in some circumstances, diminish the effectiveness of decision-making. Perils such as groupthink (coming to premature conclusions that affirm prevailing assumptions) may be offset by the employment of an external devil’s advocate, to question internal assumptions and perspectives, and ensure that agreement is not simply achieved on the basis of conformity and acquiescence within the planning team.

   **Perils of Groupthink**

   In Vietnam, the US Army persisted in seeking to destroy the enemy using their distinctive advantage in artillery, close air support and mechanised forces, despite evidence that these tactics were unsuccessful in accomplishing strategic objectives.

   Before Operation MARKET GARDEN, in 1944, British planners systematically ignored intelligence indicating that 2 panzer divisions were re-equipping in the Arnhem area. The desire for a British-spearheaded airborne assault overwhelmed rational analysis of the chances of operational success. The result was a military disaster and the destruction of the 1st Airborne Division.

f. The JFC may choose to appoint a reflexive ‘Blue Team’ (of high status, independent of the chain of command, and detached from the mechanics of the headquarters itself) to assess critically the effectiveness of his planning process, and thereby indicate the validity of his decision-making. The key roles of such a team are to observe and critique (often institutional) factors likely to impede effective planning, and then determine the impact of such factors upon decisions being reached, in order to indicate to the commander the potential weaknesses of his plan (or at least the weaknesses in its rationale).
Campaign Planning Concepts

361. Plans are constructed and expressed using the Campaign Planning Concepts listed in Table 3.5. Campaign planning concepts fulfil a number of functions; they focus effort, assist a JFC to visualise how his campaign may unfold, provide a common lexicon for disseminating ideas and instructions, and assist in monitoring the execution of a campaign.

- Campaign End-state
- Centre of Gravity
- Campaign Objectives
- Decisive Conditions
- Supporting Effects
- Lines or Groupings of Operation
- Sequencing and Synchronising
- Phases
- Contingency Plans (Branches & Sequels)
- Culminating Point
- Operational Pause
- Campaign Fulcrum

| Table 3.5 – Campaign Planning Concepts |

Campaign Plan

362. A Campaign Plan conveys to subordinates (and also superiors, allies, partners and potentially other actors) a JFC’s vision, from broad overview down to actionable detail. It provides a common understanding across the joint force of the JFC’s initial CONOPS, especially his Intent, Scheme of Manoeuvre, and Main Effort. The plan is articulated through a variety of directives, plans and orders: campaign design, Operation Plans (OPLANs) and Operation Orders (OPORDs). The campaign design, focused on an end-state, addresses the long term; the OPLANs and OPORDs implement the design, describing and directing near-term activities.

363. Communication of the JFC’s plan requires considerable time, effort and practice, and an appropriate level of JFC involvement. It is his plan and he should be content with not only the content but also the presentation, language and timing of the various directives, plans and orders. Battlefield circulation provides an opportunity for the JFC to clarify, and reinforce as necessary, his direction and guidance.

364. Early planning should be sufficiently detailed to provide subordinates with clear and unambiguous direction, and yet broad and agile enough to permit subsequent adaptation informed by ongoing assessment. In reality, it may be counter-productive to over-regulate in advance what is inherently complex and chaotic; placing absolute faith in detailed and closely sequenced plans is unlikely to prove successful against an agile opponent. A JFC should, therefore, maintain a balance between proactive contingency planning and adapting rapidly to unforeseen events.
365. **Concept of Operations.** A JFC’s CONOPS, and associated mission statements for subordinates, forms the essence of the campaign plan. The selected CoA is translated into a concise statement of a JFC’s decision – *what* the joint force is to do and *why*, as well as explaining *when*, *where*, *who* and *how*. The ultimate test being that subordinate commanders can act independently as though they were directly ordered by the JFC. In setting out his vision clearly to subordinates, he also indicates to them the likely nature and scope of subsequent orders and plans. While a JFC should have engaged with his superior commander throughout the planning process, he may nonetheless wish to confirm his proposed concept prior to promulgation, giving him an opportunity to endorse the plan formally and, if necessary, obtain political approval (including that required from international partners as necessary). A CONOPS has 3 main elements:

a. **Commander’s Intent.** Intent is a concise and precise statement of what a JFC intends to do and why. It focuses on the objectives of joint force operations and their anticipated contribution to the desired outcome. It should not be a synopsis but it should demonstrate the enduring logic underlying the whole campaign plan. Clear, direct and simple language is vital. A commander’s personal imprint will also help to engage his subordinates and wider stakeholders, stimulating the broadest possible comprehension.

b. **Scheme of Manoeuvre.** The scheme of manoeuvre builds on the commander’s intent and describes how a JFC sees his campaign unfolding; it sets the missions assigned to subordinate commanders in a broader (and potentially multi-agency) context. It explains where, when and how the joint force is to achieve its purpose (potentially in concert with others), so that subordinates can understand their particular role in the overall plan and the effects that they and others are to realise. Knowing that few plans will survive contact with an adversary, a commander should also state his intent to review and adapt his plans when required. Advising subordinates that he will take stock at appropriate junctures will help to keep their minds open, plans flexible and individuals better pre-disposed to seize the initiative if the original objectives become irrelevant.

c. **Main Effort.** A JFC states his main effort to direct ‘the concentration of capability or activity in order to bring about a specific outcome’. Main effort is what a JFC considers, at a particular point in time, to be crucial to the success of his campaign. Main effort is given substance in a variety of ways:

1. Additional resources may be allocated to the component assigned the main effort.
2. Other components may be assigned specific tasks to support the main effort either directly or indirectly.
(3) Other steps may be taken, such as the narrowing of boundaries and economy of effort elsewhere, to concentrate fighting power.

(4) And most importantly, cognisant of the JFC’s main effort and priorities, subordinates use their initiative to take timely and independent decisions and action, in fast-moving and changeable operations, thereby optimising tempo. Subordinate commanders may have their own main effort; each should reinforce the JFC’s main effort.

366. **Mission Statements.** A JFC should write a mission – a clear concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose – for each of his subordinate commanders. There are 3 broad types of mission statement: single task; multiple task; and (usually for reserves) a list of contingent or ‘be prepared to’ tasks.

   a. A mission statement contains task, purpose, and unifying purpose (the ‘in order to’ or effect required in relation to the CONOPS). Subordinates’ freedom of action and scope for initiative is made clear.

   b. It should be expressed in terms of: who (the subordinate command), what (what the command is to achieve), when and where (the parameters) and why (the purpose).

   c. The sum of the purposes, of all the JFC’s mission statements, covers his entire scheme of manoeuvre (otherwise some aspect will have been left untasked). When collectively achieved, they enable the JFC to achieve his own mission.

   d. Mission statements are expressed precisely and unequivocally, using defined language. This is particularly important in multinational operations, where orders are translated, and in multi-agency situations where military terminology has to be interpreted (abbreviations and jargon should be omitted).
Communication

Communicating intent can be surprisingly difficult to achieve, particularly when language and cultural barriers intervene. Montgomery used simple speech patterns and phrases when speaking to his soldiers, pitched at a level where reasonably complex ideas could be articulated, but using a simple vocabulary that would normally be associated with a 14 year old. He was rarely misunderstood. Care should be taken in a multinational environment. Metaphors that add much colour to the English language rarely translate well. Moreover, a large proportion of communication is non-verbal, using gestures and body-language, therefore face-to-face communication is often a most effective means. Even where a common language is used, understanding is conditioned by factors that cannot be vocalised, including: expectations, based on personal style and the depth of experience working with someone; military expectations, based on doctrine, training and ethos, which do not always translate well across departmental boundaries; and cultural expectations based on societal values, which are deeply rooted and hard to overcome. In the multinational environment, plain language and clear, unhurried speech or written text is invariably effective.

Preparing for Opportunities and Reverses

367. A JFC should monitor the progress of his campaign and adapt his plan to exploit opportunities as they arise – he must be ready for success. At the same time he should attempt to anticipate reverses and plan to overcome setbacks. To do both effectively he should make time – to think, to step back, take a longer-term view and not be distracted by short-term expediency. In considering the establishment and committal of the operational level reserve, the following questions should be addressed:

a. Is a reserve really needed? What effect may it be required to achieve? What size does it need to be and what capabilities does it need? Can the joint force afford one?

b. Where does it need to be placed (consider each element separately)? In which environment is it most likely to be used?

c. How long does it take to launch (in total or in part)? At which level should it be kept?

d. How should its location and movement be concealed from an opponent?

368. Success can breed complacency, particularly when dealing with an ‘outclassed’ adversary, and can lead to disastrous consequences. Care should be taken to prevent
stagnation, to avoid becoming predictable. Although restraint should be displayed, a JFC should beware of the failure to drive home advantage.

**Campaign Transition and Termination**

369. This is a difficult and complex issue for which there is no clear set of rules or accepted practice. It is a critical area that requires early consideration by a JFC, and a great deal of discussion and consultation with non-military organisations at the strategic level of war. Both events, transition and termination, take place over an extended period and are rarely marked by a single event or point in time. They each require early planning; planning that, although conditions-based, is backed up by command-led, objective assessment to provide the necessary indicators for any change in force posture and configuration.

370. Campaign Transition involves a significant shift in the weight of effort afforded to a particular type of military activity. Key considerations include:

a. What structures, capabilities and postures are required next? Over the period of an operation a joint force changes, adjusting balance, configuration and posture; this change is dictated by the evolving operating environment and the prevailing conditions. It may well look substantially different at the end of an operation to its original state. The difficulty associated with such changes, for a force shaped both mentally and physically for a different operation should not be underestimated. For example, a policy of ‘police primacy’ in Iraq in 2004 may have been the right idea, but applied too early (the indigenous force was not ready to assume primacy) and in the wrong context (the policy had worked well in other theatres of operation, but the cultural context in Iraq was different from Northern Ireland or the Balkans).

b. The focus of commanders and staffs at all levels is key, never more so than at the operational level. If focus is shifted too early, there is a danger of taking ‘an eye off the ball’ and losing current advantage; if too late, an unnecessary and disruptive period of instability may result while force adjustment takes place. For example, making a change to the force protection posture could lead to a near collapse of vital intelligence feeds.

371. The term campaign termination is not meant to convey an idea of traditional ‘victory’ with the formal signing of a cease-fire. Instead its focus is on what happens when the campaign end-state has been achieved: how to preserve that which has been gained, and how to make it enduring. A JFC, recognising that the desired outcome may only be reached some time after the campaign end-state has been achieved, should ensure:
a. Early identification of those decisive conditions that indicate successful achievement of the campaign end-state, together with a system of measuring them. These conditions are not immutable and may alter as the campaign progresses.

b. Confidence in avoiding a resumption of hostilities. What state should the indigenous forces or warring factions be left in? How will responsibilities be transferred to indigenous or follow-on forces, or other agencies?

SECTION IV – CAMPAIGN MANAGEMENT

372. The main functions within campaign execution are ordering and supervising the execution of tactical activities, and assessing campaign progress.

Execution

373. Clausewitz noted that “War has a grammar of its own but no logic”. Understanding this ‘grammar’ is not the same as imposing a false sense of order on a complex and constantly evolving situation. Rather, a JFC should seek to turn this chaos to his advantage by having a clear understanding of the impact of tactical activity on the campaign plan. Such an understanding should establish an advantage over an adversary who is unable or unwilling to recognise this essential linkage. This necessitates a JFC’s close involvement in the measurement of campaign effectiveness in order to assess progress – to know if he is ‘winning’.

374. Execution encompasses the integration, coordination, synchronisation and prioritisation of a joint force’s military capabilities and activities. It involves fires, influence activities, and manoeuvre orchestrated through Joint Action. The results or consequences of activities may be intended or unintended, desirable or undesirable.

375. A JFC’s role in execution comprises: the command of joint and potentially multinational forces; management of the strategic/operational interface; maintaining and strengthening a coalition; and oversight of the processes and procedures that underpin the execution of his campaign plan. Furthermore he should make a careful assessment of other agencies operating within the JOA.

a. This may include diplomatic and military representatives and forces from political authorities other than his own, as well as a potentially large number of International Organisations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Despite a JFC’s efforts to collaborate throughout campaign design, the reality is that many of these organisations are under no obligation to coordinate their activities with those of the military and may be operating to a different set of objectives and values. Coordination, leading to unity of effort, may prove a challenge. The key, described in Chapter 2 as a
Comprehensive Approach, is not to view the operating environment as one that may lead to a military-civil transition, but rather one that reflects a partnership from the very outset.

b. The use of Special Forces (SF) is, by its nature, complex and potentially high risk but can offer disproportionate gains. SF require careful coordination and are reliant on Operations Security (OPSEC). While the JFC may not directly command these assets, the effects resulting from their operations are likely to impact on conditions within the JOA; they should therefore be factored into a JFC’s campaign management deliberations.

**Enabling Joint Action**

376. **Targeting.** Targeting is an integral part of Joint Action; it is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate responses to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. It underpins the use and orchestration of all capabilities and activities (fires, influence activities and manoeuvre) to ensure that they are focused on realising intended effects. A JFC should:

a. Ensure that all activities are effectively targeted, not least to ensure that they are mutually supporting and undertaken in accordance with the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC).³

b. Integrate, and provide coherence, between targeted tactical activity and those activities occurring within his JOA that are targeted by strategic level decision-makers.

c. Consider the influence of national or multinational policies and strategies on operational level targeting decisions.

377. **Coordination and Synchronisation.** Detailed coordination and synchronisation of military activities, based upon explicit priorities and, where at all possible, coherent with other instruments of power, is complex. Three functions are paramount to this process:

a. **Situational Awareness.** Situational Awareness (SA) is ‘the understanding of the operational environment in the context of a JFC’s mission (or task)’. It is a JFC’s responsibility to promote accurate, shared situational awareness throughout his joint force to enhance decision-making, enable management of the battlespace and improve operational effectiveness. In reality, perfect situational awareness is impractical; a JFC should, therefore, judge what represents sufficient situational awareness. Shared situational

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³ The principles of the LOAC are distinction, proportionality, military necessity and humanity.
awareness is particularly challenging in multinational and multi-agency operations.

b. **Battlespace Management.** Battlespace Management (BM) is ‘the adaptive means and measures that enable the dynamic synchronisation of activities’. It fosters freedom of action. Battlespace management planning should be driven by a JFC and woven into his campaign plan (it should not be a mere adjunct to it). The extent to which force elements interact on operations, varying from close integration to well-separated independence, places correspondingly significant demands upon the levels of control required. A JFC can only exercise battlespace management, with any certainty, over his subordinates; he can seek to involve other actors, operating within his JOA, but cannot necessarily influence them.

c. **Combat Identification.** Combat Identification (Combat ID) should provide a JFC with rapid, secure, positive identification of platforms, equipment and personnel in or approaching the JOA. The process of Combat ID – a combination of situational awareness, target identification, and other tactics, techniques and procedures – is a battlespace management measure. It optimises the potential of weapon systems and reduces the engagement of non-valid or friendly targets. On multinational operations, a JFC may have to keep force elements physically apart, or institute other limitations, to accommodate contributing nations’ varying levels of Combat ID capability and interoperability.

378. **Supported and Supporting Commanders.** The supported/supporting principle is fundamental to joint operations. It is the principal means by which a JFC designates how support is to be provided between his subordinate commands and makes clear his resource priorities. Successful management of these relationships allows a JFC to shift support for a particular phase, or element of an operation, and maintain operational tempo. A JFC directs who is to be the supported commander for a particular task or operation, although the designation of supported commanders may change several times as the campaign progresses. A subordinate commander may act as a supported and supporting commander simultaneously for discrete yet concurrent operations. The supported commander is usually responsible for the direction of the supporting effort. It follows that the supporting commander(s) should be allowed an opportunity to participate in the planning process in order to advise on apportionment and ensure optimal use of intended capabilities. Where multiple agencies share a common purpose, it is entirely feasible (and recommended) to incorporate non-military organisations into the supported/supporting command concept.
Campaign Rhythm

379. Campaign management is conducted largely through a series of routine and periodic boards and meetings organised under the banner of Campaign Rhythm. Exactly how this is done will vary with the nature of the operation, especially in multinational operations, but whatever the circumstances, the JFC should be clear about what information he needs and how it should be presented to him so that he can make timely and effective decisions.

380. Campaign rhythm is ‘the regular recurring sequence of events and actions, harmonised across a joint force to regulate and maintain control of a campaign’. Where a commander can consistently decide and act quicker than his opponent, he is likely to generate greater tempo and gain a significant advantage. Campaign rhythm should therefore be focused on enabling effective and timely decision-making within and between headquarters. It is a means to an end not an end in itself.

381. A JFC is likely to leave the mechanics of campaign rhythm to his chief of staff, but he should provide sufficient direction to ensure that:

   a. An appropriate balance is struck between addressing short term imperatives and longer term campaign management.
   
   b. Those engaged, and often engrossed, in the campaign rhythm do not lose perspective, by dint of either insularity (addressed through battlefield circulation) or process-driven myopia (including being too busy or tired to think straight). Superiors should balance their demands for information with actual need. Commanders should guard against becoming a prisoner of process, the threat of which is increased by network enabled capability and the demands of working across time zones.

382. In short, campaign management should involve focused and purposeful activity to regulate and control the campaign (including the assessment of progress addressed below). Should it become unwieldy, ineffectual or ultimately self-serving, it may take the broader perspective of the JFC to direct its revision. A JFC who finds himself relying on ad hoc or alternative means of campaign management (distinct from supplements to the formal structure, such as a commander’s initiative group), is probably being poorly served by his headquarters.

Information

383. Information in itself serves little useful purpose; it is knowledge that brings power. An increase in the quantity of information is not synonymous with an increase in its quality. More channels often mean low-grade, spurious and specious information. Such a barrage of information can make it even more difficult to discern the big picture or to identify the key issues against this background noise.
384. Information Management (IM) is a critical aspect of effective campaign management both within a JFC’s own headquarters and across the joint force. Information management encompasses ‘the integrated management processes and services that provide exploitable information on time, in the right place and format, to maximise freedom of action’. A JFC should design his own information framework and be confident of the quality of his information, especially that which will directly influence his critical decisions. He can increase the chances of effective information management by:

a. Correctly identifying information exchange requirements within and between headquarters, and across the force; this is a Chief of Staff/J3 function.

b. Servicing that requirement with sufficiently capable and resilient CIS; this is a J6 function.

**Freedom of Action**

385. A joint force’s freedom of action can be considered ‘an aperture’ through which its fighting power can be applied – or an amount of it, for a particular period, or in a particular place. If certain conditions or criteria are present then a JFC can employ his forces freely; if circumstances are more restrictive, then his options may be more limited and he may, for example, be unable to concentrate force where it is required or employ sufficient offensive action (both principles of war). Relevant criteria are likely to vary from one situation to another (a JFC can define the aperture as he sees fit), but legitimacy, sustainability, and security afforded by force protection are likely candidates.

a. **Legitimacy.** The use of force must be legitimate. It is an essential foundation upon which a JFC builds and sustains Campaign Authority; it also bolsters morale and promotes cohesion within a force. It reflects an amalgam of what is considered legally permissible (both nationally and internationally), and what is judged ethically and morally acceptable.

b. **Sustainability.** Sustainability maintains a force’s fighting power, and enables it to survive, to move, and to fight, for the duration required to achieve its objectives. It is a critical enabler (albeit there are others, such as CIS that could be included under the same banner).

c. **Force Protection.** The security afforded by force protection enables a JFC to make optimum use of his assets and capabilities. He needs to strike a balance, however, between committing too many resources to protection, and thereby denying sufficient capability to exploit the freedom that it creates. The correct balance in any situation will be a matter of risk management, the
elements of which – threat, vulnerability and impact – should be kept under regular review.

**Assessment**

386.  The measurement of progress is a fundamental aspect of military operations that should be foremost in the mind of every commander. It should never become a bureaucratic burden, but a means to help trigger those points in a campaign where a JFC should test and adjust his plans, if necessary by engaging higher headquarters. It should be a key consideration throughout campaign design and review, specifically prompting new CoA development and contingency planning.

387.  Assessment is ‘the evaluation of progress, based on levels of subjective and objective measurement in order to inform decision-making’. It reflects not only the impact of friendly activity but also that of opponents, including their efforts to achieve their own campaign aims and frustrate those of the JFC. There are 3 broad categories:

a.  **Measurement of Activity.** Measurement of Activity is ‘the assessment of performance of a task and achievement of its associated purposes’. Have planned activities been carried out successfully?

b.  **Measurement of Effect.** Measurement of Effect is ‘the assessment of the realisation of specified effects’. Have planned activities, carried out successfully, been effective?

c.  **Campaign Effectiveness Assessment.** Campaign Effectiveness Assessment is ‘the evaluation of campaign progress, based on levels of subjective and objective measurement in order to inform decision-making’. Do the effects of planned and successfully executed activities, and the conditions thereby created, indicate progress towards the achievement of campaign objectives and, hence, the end-state?

388.  Assessments support decision-making by drawing together information and intelligence to inform auditable judgements on the progress of operations. Having defined the nature of success, as part of planning, judging progress is a fundamental review and feedback function within the JFC’s decision-action cycle. While the rationale for assessment is clear-cut, and the benefits obvious, its effective conduct can be extremely challenging. There are a number of considerations:

a.  Assessment is a tool to support decision-making, not an end in itself. It consumes time and resources, and so its benefits have to be weighed against the costs. A JFC may conclude, for example, that he only has the capacity to assess certain aspects of his campaign or he may choose to assess progress at different times or places. While selective assessment may be efficient (or at least economical); the downside is a loss of trend information against which to
judge relative performance over time. Furthermore, un-assessed aspects may gain less attention than those being more actively scrutinised or monitored, distorting the JFC’s view of his campaign as a whole. In practice, however, not all supporting effects and decisive conditions will be equally important, all the time, and so weight of assessment effort should be balanced accordingly.

b. A JFC has a personal responsibility to engage in the design of metrics. There is a significant difference between measurement and assessment; the first indicates, for example, ‘how much?’ but the second addresses the ‘so what?’ Measurement itself requires careful consideration, particularly that of effect rather than simply activity. For example, if a commander has a specific interest in Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), he must specify precisely what it is that he needs to know, otherwise staff will collect data that has apparent relevance (how many IEDs are being planted), but no real relevance to what the commander might be trying to assess (who is planting them and why, or how successful the force is in interdicting the threat). Measurements should be carried out consistently, at all levels, against a standardised baseline. It is the interpretation of metrics, data and other reporting that judgement plays a significant role. It is for this reason that a JFC should balance his close-up but detailed perspective, including for example the benefits of face-to-face engagement with key leaders, with the potentially more detached perspective of, for example, a home-based superior headquarters or political leadership. There is unlikely to be an objectively right or universal interpretation of events on the ground, so a JFC should expect periodic discrepancies between his perception of progress, and that of those assessing (and querying) campaign progress from afar.
ANNEX 3A – OPERATIONAL LEVEL GEOMETRY

3A1. The area within which military operations are conducted is described and labelled so that all elements of a joint force have a shared understanding of its overall geometry, and especially its principal boundaries. An additional benefit of a common lexicon across Defence is that non-military actors can base their understanding of military operations on a single set of clearly defined terms.

a. **Theatre of Operations.** A Theatre of Operations (TOO) is ‘a geographical area, or more precisely a space, defined by the military-strategic authority, which includes and surrounds the area delegated to a Joint Force Commander (JFC) (termed the Joint Operations Area (JOA)), within which he conducts operations’. A Theatre of Operations may include countries with facilities or arrangements of use to a JFC, and territories or sea areas through or over which forces have (or have not) been given authority to transit. It may include areas occupied by other JFCs on separate or related operations. Theatres of Operations are not necessarily mutually exclusive and may overlap.

b. **Joint Operations Area.** A JOA is ‘an area of land, sea and airspace, defined by higher authority, in which a designated JFC plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission’.  

c. **Area of Operations.** An Area of Operations (AOO) is ‘a geographical area, defined by a JFC within his JOA, in which a commander designated by him (usually a component commander) is delegated authority to conduct operations’.

d. **Area of Interest.** An Area of Interest (AOI) is ‘the area of concern to a commander, relative to the objectives of current or planned operations, including his JOA/Area of Operations and adjacent areas’.

e. **Battlespace.** Battlespace encompasses ‘all aspects of a JOA within which military activities take place (subject to Battlespace Management (BM))’.

f. **Operating Space.** Operating space encompasses ‘all aspects of a JOA within which activities, both military and non-military, take place’.

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1 JDP 0-01.1 ‘United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions’.
2 JDP 0-01.1.
3 Based on Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-6 ‘NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions’.
4 New definition developed for this publication and future UK doctrine.
5 New definition developed for this publication and future UK doctrine.
3A2. The orchestration of capabilities and activities within a JOA requires a combination of integration, coordination, synchronisation (in time and space), and prioritisation. Depending upon circumstance, such orchestration may be required across all environments, throughout all domains, and in all dimensions, and is particularly important at the boundaries or seams that exist between them.

a. **Environments.** The operating environment is the term used to describe the surroundings or conditions within which operations occur. It refers to a particular operation (its Area of Operations and Area of Interest) or to operations in general, depending upon the context. The operating environment is further classified as: maritime, land, air, space, information (including cyberspace), and electromagnetic.

b. **Domains.** There are 3 domains (spheres of activity or knowledge):

   (1) **Physical Domain.** The sphere in which physical activity occurs and where the principal effects generated relate to capability.

   (2) **Virtual Domain.** The sphere in which intangible activity occurs, such as the generation, maintenance and transfer of information (for example, the internet is part of the virtual domain). The principal effects generated are relate to understanding.

   (3) **Cognitive Domain.** The sphere in which human decision-making occurs as a result of assimilating knowledge acquired through thought, experience and sense. The principal effects generated relate to will and understanding.

3A3. **Dimensions.** In addition to describing environmental surroundings or conditions, the terms maritime, land, air, space, information and electromagnetic are also used in relation to dimensions of size, shape, and extent. For instance, the land environment is *what* land activity takes place on (the ground), while the land dimension (of the battlespace) is *where* it does so. Time is an additional dimension, indicating *when* or for how long.
ANNEX 3B – OPERATIONAL ESTIMATE

3B1. **Step 1 – Understand the Operating Environment (Framing the Problem).**

Understanding the operating environment – a composite of conditions, circumstances and influences – is the vital first step in the estimate process. This must draw upon not only military resources but also those of other instruments of power and appropriate agencies (civilian agencies, and the media, may already be deployed in the crisis area). Examination of the situation sets a frame around the crisis problem and allows a Joint Force Commander (JFC) to visualise how the environment may be shaped and altered to advantage; it also indicates how the environment may limit the planning and conduct of the campaign. Understanding the operating environment gives the JFC a better feel for time, timing and consequences: when to do something; how long to do it for; and what the resultant range of effects may be. The operating environment is characterised by 4 dominant factors, shown in Figure 3B.1:

a. What is the nature of the threat and how and where will it manifest itself? What does this mean for the Rules of Engagement (ROE) profile? It is not sufficient to focus solely on a military opponent; in some cases there may be no defined protagonists in the conventional military sense.

b. What is the potential for combat? How should the force be manoeuvred in the face of the threat – in a traditional sense or is a different approach required? Does this threat have greater individual or force connotations? What force structures and capabilities are required? What implications on the level and extent of multinationality?

c. What civil-military interaction is needed? How should the joint force engage with both indigenous and external agencies? What engagement with, or reliance on, the civil population – who, at varying times as the situation develops, may be considered hostile, an obstacle, a neutral, an ally or an aide? The needs of an indigenous or displaced population are also likely to prove a significant factor. This interaction may be the crucial flank.

d. What is the basis of authority and legitimacy and how could it be undermined? What is the level of consent and compliance\(^1\) and where does it vary/is it uncertain? What does this mean for force posture? Is compliance enough or does it need to be turned into consent? If so how/where?

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\(^1\) Consent implies **freely given** permission or approval whereas **compliance** is more to do with **enforced** submission.
3B2. **Step 2a – Understand the Problem (Mission Analysis).** Mission analysis focuses a JFC on his end-state and mission, higher commanders’ intent, specified and implied tasks or (preferably) outcomes, freedoms and constraints. On completion, he should be absolutely clear about the role of his joint force within the wider strategic plan. There are a number of key aspects for a JFC to consider:

a. He should determine the utility of force in relation to the campaign end-state and National Strategic Aim. The ability to bring significant force to bear may suit the more immediate military objectives, but may be counter-productive in the long term.

b. He should consider the way his opponent(s) operate, and the size and organisation of their forces in relation to his own. He should draw out relative strengths and weaknesses, Centre(s) of Gravity (CoG(s)) and critical vulnerabilities. A decision may be made in principle as to whether to approach directly or indirectly.

c. He should look ‘over the horizon’ and focus on the desired outcome. There is a risk of preoccupation with what are frequently the initial combat aspects of a crisis which could undermine efforts for long-term resolution.

3B3. **Step 2b – Understand the Problem (Evaluate Objects and Factors).** Step 2b is conducted by the JFC’s staff, who draw iteratively upon the outputs of mission analysis (main object(s), potential CoG(s), and key factors likely to impinge on mission success) to begin to explore the art of the possible. Evaluation requires guidance from the JFC: firstly, to focus enquiry on the relevant objects and secondly, to provide the staff with sufficient insight into the JFC’s thinking that they can identify...
pertinent factors and deduce their impact. At the conclusion of Step 2b, the JFC is back-briefed by his staff, on the basis of which he can generate his operational ideas.

3B4. **Step 2c – Understand the Problem (Commander’s Confirmation).** Step 2c marks the point at which the JFC assesses whether he has sufficient information upon which to develop one or more campaign ‘big ideas’. To provide a firm basis for subsequent detailed planning, he should confirm: his campaign objectives and end-state (including their relationship to strategic intent), the CoG(s) and the potential decisive conditions underpinning each objective; the key object(s) of the mission and the key factors relating to that object(s); the significant factors that may affect, good and bad, the ability of the joint force to influence each object(s); and any factors that may influence the completion of the remainder of the planning process (planning time constraints, events, participation by other actors, etc). At this point he may issue a Warning Order capturing the main deductions of the planning conducted to date.

3B5. **Step 3 – Formulate Potential Courses of Action (What to Achieve).** The JFC should now articulate his Campaign Big Ideas – one or more potential outline Courses of Action (CoAs) – describing what, in a JFC’s opinion, has to be achieved in order to meet the campaign end-state. Determining potential CoAs rests on an understanding of: the operating environment, the complete problem which has been set, and the forces and resources that are anticipated to be available throughout the period of the campaign, including the likely contribution from other contributing nations and agencies. Each CoA should be expressed using outline campaign schematics depicting those decisive conditions, together with any further relevant campaign planning concepts, necessary to achieve the campaign objectives and campaign end-state. This is the point where a JFC would wish to test and adjust his ideas with higher headquarters.

3B6. **Step 4 – Develop and Validate Courses of Action (How to Achieve It).** The focus for Step 4, using guidance from a JFC but conducted predominantly by the staff, is to develop detailed alternative CoAs that describe how each campaign ‘big idea’ may be achieved. Alternative CoAs are validated according to considerations such as:

a. The initial disposition of the joint force; this is particularly true for a large land force, which may be slow to redeploy, and logistic basing, potentially limiting the movement of forces. Air and maritime elements can provide alternatives and keep options open. The configuration of the joint force to deal with the opening phase of a campaign may not fit subsequent operations.

b. Balancing any political imperative to ‘get there and do something’ with more considered options that limit the prospect of the joint force becoming prematurely committed. Undue caution should be avoided; a bold decision and early intervention may be key to achieving the desired outcome.
c. The inter-dependence between diplomatic, military and economic instruments of power, and their respective lines of operation, may influence alternative CoAs.

d. Ensuring an appropriate balance of activities between fires, influence activities (including deception) and manoeuvre. The ability to measure the effects of some activities may impact upon this balance, for example in situations where a JFC requires confidence that unintended consequences can be avoided or that a combination of effects can be coordinated effectively.

e. Good planning is an exercise in compromise, for example concerning the allocation of resources to meet competing requirements. Closely linked to compromise is risk, arising from threats and perceived vulnerabilities. A JFC’s view of, and reaction to, risk will be based on his experience and judgement, informed by detailed input from his staff. Ultimately, it is a JFC who decides on the levels of acceptable risk associated with his plan, although these cannot be considered in isolation. Any military action is likely to have potential political, economic, environmental and humanitarian consequences; what may be a low risk option for the military may be high risk elsewhere.

f. You can only ‘fight the battle’ that you can sustain and administer. A balance needs to be struck between adequate provision of logistic, medical, Communications and Information Systems (CIS) and administrative support to the joint force, and over-provision that reduces tempo and constrains agility.

3B7. **Step 5 – Evaluate Courses of Action.** Depending upon the situation and the JFC’s personal preferences, evaluation of alternative CoAs may involve comparison against specific criteria (for example, the principles of war, the operational framework or functions in combat) and/or opponents’ most likely and/or dangerous CoAs.

3B8. **Step 6 – Commander’s Decision.** The commander’s decision to execute a particular CoA completes the initial Operational Estimate (albeit the process is kept alive throughout the campaign as described above). Timing plays a critical role in decision-making. Notwithstanding the tangible benefits that can be gained from forewarning, as well as the psychological impact of being seen to be decisive, a JFC should generally only make a decision if and when he has to do so, and not before. Again, the JFC will wish to discuss with higher headquarters the degree of consensus on which his freedom of action subsequently depends, especially in a coalition where the UK is leading.
CHAPTER 4 – COMMAND

Chapter 4 considers the challenges of command at the operational level in 4 sections:
Section I – Introduction
Section II – Command Philosophy
Section III – Nature of Operational Level Command
Section IV – Decision-Making
Section V – Practice of Command

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

401. At the heart of a campaign sits the operational level commander. Through his skill, he identifies what is likely to be decisive in achieving his objectives, and determines the most effective and efficient ways of doing so with the forces and other means at his disposal.

402. A Joint Force Commander (JFC) is responsible for both the plan and its subsequent execution. His personal effectiveness is determined by a combination of his ability, intellect and intuition; it is often, however, his creative genius, instinct and vision that confer distinct advantage. Moltke referred to this decisive aspect as ‘talent’:

“The war becomes an art – an art, of course, which is served by many sciences. In war, as in art, we find no universal forms; in neither can a rule take the place of talent.”

and TE Lawrence as the ‘irrational tenth’:

“Nine tenths of tactics are certain, and taught in books: but the irrational tenth is like the flash of the kingfisher across the pool and that is the test of generals. It can only be ensured by instinct sharpened by thought, practising the stroke so often that at the crisis it is as natural as reflex.”

403. Taken together, these qualities of intellectual and practical ability, and creative talent, embody the particular skill that a JFC brings to a campaign. This skill is applied through a variety of established principles, practices and procedures, themselves honed through training, education and experience. While attention tends to focus on the additional benefit of a commander’s genius or instinct, this can only be effective if it is based upon a firm footing of skilled and drilled professionalism, rather than simply ingenious amateurism, engaging eccentricity or good luck.

SECTION II – COMMAND PHILOSOPHY

‘Uncertainty being the central fact that all command systems have to cope with, the role of uncertainty in determining the structure of command should be – and in most cases is – decisive.’

404. Command is the authority vested in an individual to influence events and to order subordinates to implement decisions; command is exercised by, or on behalf of, commanders. It comprises 3 closely related elements: leadership, decision-making (including risk assessment) and control. These functions are described more fully in Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01 ‘British Defence Doctrine’ (3rd Edition). The commander’s role in ‘command’ (employing the ‘art of war’) is critical, regardless of the technological and other improvements in ‘control’ (the ‘science of war’). Without exception, commander-centric headquarters and organisations outperform staff-centric ones.

405. Military command at all levels is the art of decision-making, and motivating and directing all ranks into action to accomplish given missions. It requires a vision of the desired result, an understanding of concepts, mission priorities and allocation of resources, and a requirement to maintain the cohesion of the complex of higher actors, be that MOD, allies or the host nation. It also needs an ability to assess people and risks, and it involves a continual process of re-evaluating the situation. A commander requires, above all, to decide on a course of action and to lead his command. Thus leadership and decision-making are his primary responsibilities. Command also involves accountability and control. However, control is not an equal partner with command but merely an aspect of it. The execution of control is shared between the commander and his staff.

406. Command is an intrinsically forceful, human activity involving authority as well as personal responsibility and accountability. The British command philosophy has 4 facets: a clear understanding of superior commander’s intent; a responsibility on the part of subordinates to meet that intent; the importance of making a timely decision; and a determination, on the part of the commander, to see the plan through to a successful conclusion. This philosophy requires a style of command that promotes decentralised command, freedom and speed of action, and initiative – but one which remains responsive to superior direction.

Mission Command

407. Mission command is the way in which the British command philosophy is implemented. Its application should take into account both the situation, and the

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ability and level of training of subordinate commanders. It is predicated on the following key assumptions:

a. A commander ensures that his subordinates understand his intent, their own missions, and the context within which they are to act.
b. Subordinates are told what effect they are required to achieve and why it is necessary, and are allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions.
c. A commander exercises a minimum of control over his subordinates, commensurate with their experience and ability, while retaining responsibility for their actions.
d. Subordinates decide for themselves how best to achieve their missions.

408. A JFC should be pragmatic in his application of mission command; not all subordinates are equally capable. He should be flexible in the extent to which he delegates his authority, dependent upon the situation, the nature of his command, the degree of multinational and multi-agency interaction, and the predominant campaign activities being undertaken. As a general rule, control measures such as Rules of Engagement (ROE) should be applied to maximise freedom of action rather than constrain it. Uncertainty or ambiguity within a particular operational context may, however, drive a JFC to exercise more rather than less control. Furthermore, intervention by a JFC may be required to exploit opportunities and mitigate risks that may not be appreciated by subordinates. He should, however, be wary of unnecessary intervention, which tends to create risk-aversion and a dependency culture amongst subordinates.
Mission Command – Gallipoli 1915

The tenets of mission command, if not the term, were probably familiar to General Sir Ian Hamilton, Commander Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, during the 1915 Gallipoli campaign. And yet at least some of the disastrous consequences of that ill-fated expedition have been attributed to his poor judgement in command.

Hamilton effectively communicated his intent, concerning the various beach landings, to his subordinates. They, however, were of variable competence and while Hamilton periodically suggested how they might improve matters, he was reluctant to intervene directly when problems arose. In particular, he failed to act forcibly to prevent General Hunter-Weston (commanding 29 Division) persisting with his ill-judged opposed landings on ‘V Beach’, rather than diverting later waves elsewhere.

In contrast, Col Mustafa Kemal (a regimental commander within the Turkish 19 Division - who clearly understood his superiors’ overall intent) responded to the ANZAC’s unforeseen break-out by redeploying his regiment, contrary to his immediate commander’s initial orders, to halt the threat.

Notwithstanding the obvious merits of mission command, its successful application cannot be taken for granted.

Decentralisation

409. The balance between centralisation and decentralisation is especially important. A JFC may decide to retain a high degree of control himself, thereby reducing his own level of uncertainty (or at least providing him with the wherewithal to react to it, using reserves and highly directive orders). Or he may decide to delegate responsibility and decision-making authority to his subordinates, perhaps reducing his own ability to influence events directly, but reducing uncertainty at lower levels and improving the ability of his subordinates to react themselves. Van Crefeld commented on these different ways of distributing uncertainty as follows:

“Under the first method [centralisation] the security of the parts is supposed to be assured by the certainty of the whole; under the second [decentralisation], it is the other way around.”

410. The success of decentralised command relies upon establishing a number of fundamental requirements:

a. **Unity of Effort.** Unity of effort is essential to ensure the maximum synergy between the different components and elements within a force. To achieve this, the commander must identify where his main effort lies (see below) and reflect this in the allocation of resources. In addition, commanders
must ensure that the higher commander’s intent is always crystal clear in their subordinates’ minds. Unity of purpose begets unity of effort.

b. **Main Effort.** During the conduct of a campaign there are likely to be a number of concurrent and inter-related joint activities. Therefore, the JFC should designate his main effort to focus the intellectual effort of his staff and concentrate the actions of his subordinate commanders. This implies an acceptance of risk and a preparedness to economise on force employed on subsidiary actions. The use of main effort gives a powerful expression of the commander’s intent; it thus aids unity of effort and gives a reference point to subordinates for future actions without necessarily having to seek further orders. Once a main effort has been designated, the necessary resources should be allocated and supported/supporting relationships defined. Once designated, a main effort can - and must - be switched when the situation demands. The JFC should bear in mind that the main effort is not the sole effort and that other key activities will be taking place. The balance of resources allocated to the main effort requires fine judgement.

c. **Freedom of Action for Commanders.** The manoeuvrist approach accepts that operations are often chaotic and outcomes are unpredictable. Technology can help if it enables the commander and his forces to act quickly. For this reason, the manoeuvrist approach favours freedom of action for commanders at all levels, so that when an unforeseen event occurs, they have the authority to act accordingly within the higher level commander’s intent.

d. **Trust.** Trust is a pre-requisite of command at all levels: trust by commanders in their superior commanders’ plans; and trust by commanders in their subordinates that they will sensibly interpret their superior commanders’ intentions and resolutely persevere to achieve them. Closely allied to trust must be a tolerance of genuine mistakes, particularly in training but also on operations.

e. **Mutual Understanding.** Given the value of doctrine and the emphasis on understanding the intent of orders rather than simply the details of the immediate task, it is clear that mutual understanding is key to the manoeuvrist approach and to mission command. The JFC must also understand the realities facing his subordinate commanders and take account of their problems.

f. **Timely and Effective Decision-Making.** Successful execution of the manoeuvrist approach requires a ruthless determination to ‘steal a march’ on one’s opponent. This, in turn, drives the imperative to know when it is necessary to make timely and effective decisions. In order to achieve a greater tempo than the adversary, decisions will often have to be taken on the basis of incomplete information. This implies, correctly, the acceptance of risks.
commander who always waits for the latest available or ‘complete’ information is unlikely to act decisively or in good time.

SECTION III – NATURE OF OPERATIONAL LEVEL COMMAND

411. Military leadership is the projection of personality and character to get a force to do what is required of it. There is no prescription for good leadership; it may be a product of persuasion, compulsion, force of personality, charm or any combination of techniques. What is clear is that the commander should understand what motivates his force; the force in turn should understand his intentions and trust his leadership. When cracks appear, as inevitably they will, the commander may have to call upon all his leadership skills to re-build the morale and motivation of the force. Although command at the higher levels remains founded on the traditional qualities of leadership, it requires a wider range of qualities and skills.

412. Command at the operational level, where the stakes are high, requires a combination of cerebral, moral and physical qualities. Command is personal and different types of commanders are required for different circumstances; there is no unique formula or right combination of qualities. Important though a commander’s personal qualities may be, it is by his actions that he will invariably be judged. It is important, therefore, that strategic level commanders have a choice of whom they select for operational level command to fit the circumstances. To be effective an operational level commander must have at least the confidence of his superiors and subordinates and his allies to get the job done (e.g. Wingate and Montgomery). In other circumstances trust, the ability to build or contribute to a disparate coalition, may be more valuable (e.g. Alexander and Eisenhower). Ideally a combination of trust and confidence is required. These difficult considerations may also affect the tasks an operational level commander gives his subordinates and are especially sensitive in a multinational context.

Qualities of Command

413. Views differ on the combination of qualities that, ultimately, deliver effective decision-making, leadership and control. Clausewitz, for example, described 2 ‘indispensable’ qualities of command:

“First, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to the truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may go.”

Field Marshal Montgomery described command as:

“... the capacity and the will to rally men and women to a common purpose, and the character which inspires confidence.”
Field Marshal Bagnall considered the key qualities of a commander to be:

“intelligence, imagination, decisiveness and judgement.”

Churchill’s view was that:

“There is required for the composition of a great commander not only massive common sense and reasoning power, not only imagination but also an element of legerdemain, an original, queer and sinister touch, which leaves the enemy puzzled as well as beaten.”

414. The UK’s approach to command emphasises agility as a way of dealing with complexity and optimising effectiveness. By remaining agile a JFC is able to seize and retain the initiative, and maintain decision advantage over his opponent(s) and also, critically, to exploit opportunities and reinforce success. As an example, a JFC should seek to identify in advance any change in the weight of effort required in relation to different campaign activities, signalling a potential transition from one posture to another (see again Chapter 1). This ensures that opportunities created by periodic success are not wasted and that inappropriate activity is minimised.

Multinational Command – Kosovo 1999

Commanders of multinational, and especially coalition, forces face additional leadership challenges, not least to ensure unity of effort. Obedience cannot be assumed, and engagement and persuasion assume great significance. During the Kosovo campaign, for example, General Wesley Clark as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) (and de facto joint commander) spent much of his time persuading national political, as well as military, leaders to ‘buy into’ his plan.

“I talked to everyone……. There was a constant round of telephone calls, pushing and shoving and bargaining and cajoling, trying to raise the threshold for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) attacks.”

415. The manoeuvrlist approach emphasises: ‘initiative … doing the unexpected … originality … ruthless determination to succeed’. These themes relate directly to command at the operational level and are worthy of emphasis:

a. A JFC who outmanoeuvres his opponent, physically and mentally, is the one most likely to achieve success, remembering always that he is seeking to surprise and confuse his opponent, not those under his command. Imagination and innovation have enormous potential but are only effective if a JFC understands the operational situation and can apply military effort to influence the respective will, understanding and capability of the actors within it.
b. A JFC should remain calm and collected, especially when chaos and friction are most pronounced. He should be physically and mentally fit, well rested and have sufficient time to think; his staff have a responsibility to help protect him. High personal morale and a spirit that triumphs in the face of adversity are invaluable qualities. A JFC should exploit chaos by imposing it on his opponent, while retaining the agility to seize fleeting opportunities and deal with reverses.

c. Where danger and risk lead to fear and anxiety, a JFC plays an important role in instilling in his subordinates the courage to overcome that fear, and thus create the best chance of success. Furthermore, a JFC should understand the stress experienced by his subordinates, and the attendant threat to his force’s cohesion, and plan mitigation and support accordingly. Conversely, maximising the stress felt by his opponents, by denying them the comforts of surety, security and familiarity, while overloading them through synchronised and simultaneous activity, contributes to decision-paralysis and undermines opponent cohesion.

d. A JFC should be able to think and act quickly but he should also see speed in context; it may sometimes be prudent to defer a decision until the last sensible moment. A JFC’s effectiveness rests on his ability to cut to the essentials, evaluate a situation incisively, determine requisite outcomes, take difficult decisions, and mitigate unintended and unforeseen consequences. A JFC should be prepared to seize the initiative and act boldly, while balancing potential benefits with the risks involved (especially where a balance is required between lethal force with other measures).

e. Once engaged, he should be fully concentrated on his objectives come what may. In a confused and highly charged situation, the will to win calls for determination and relentlessness: an ability to drive through difficulties, to be strong willed, but not stubborn. Important as slick and effective operational procedures and clear doctrine are, fundamental is the generation and fostering of fighting spirit. As van Creveld observes:

“...where fighting spirit is lacking everything else is just a waste of time.”

Command Relationships

416. The way in which a JFC commands his joint force is affected by the relationships that he enjoys with his superiors and subordinates. A JFC should also consider his relationship with other agencies, key leaders and other important actors.

417. **Military Strategic Commander.** A Military Strategic Commander should determine the ends, allocate the means and confer freedoms and constraints on a JFC.
On a day-to-day basis, his primary role may well be to ensure that a JFC is not distracted from the business of planning and executing his campaign. He may also, from time to time, need to advise a JFC on how best to reconcile his operational plans with shifting political imperatives. For instance, politicians may need to keep open a range of options and therefore wish to leave decision-making to the last moment, especially in a fluid and media intensive situation. In multinational operations where the UK is not in the lead, it is important that national issues are attended to by close relationship between the national and operational chain of command. A JFC should recognise this challenge and ensure that he and his joint force are sufficiently agile to operate effectively in this imperfect decision-making environment. The relationship between a Military Strategic Commander and a JFC is critical in managing these and other issues that develop at the interface between the strategic and operational level; it should be one of mutual trust and understanding, developed both prior to and during a campaign, based on:

a. Personal knowledge of the operational level commander by reputation and by previous encounters. It is important that the Military Strategic Commander is closely involved in the selection of the operational level commander.

b. Experience of actual operations, ideally experience which is relevant to the operation at hand.

c. Education in the operational level of warfare.

Command Relationships – Kosovo 1999

Effective command relationships can be especially challenging on multinational operations. In 1999 Commander Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, General Sir Mike Jackson, disagreed with SACEUR, General Wesley Clark, as to how best to respond to the movement of Russian forces into Pristina Airport, as part of the deployment of Kosovo Force. Ultimately, their differences could only be resolved by dialogue at the national level.

418. **Tactical Commanders.** There should be similar mutual trust and understanding between a JFC and his subordinate tactical commanders to promote unity of effort. A JFC should involve them fully in planning and ensure that each is allocated sufficient resources and freedom of action to achieve their respective missions. He should make sure that each individual commander has access to him and that he displays no single-Service prejudice. His subordinates should be confident in his decisions and follow his direction in the understanding of its spirit. A clear grasp of the capabilities, strengths, weaknesses etc of each component, and fostering a spirit of mutual understanding and trust, is critical to achieving success, and is a key task for
the JFC. He should understand the ethos of each Service and the relevant principles of command, not just the mechanics but also the underlying logic. This will require more time and effort in a multinational context.

“A skilled commander seeks victory from the situation, and does not demand it from his subordinates.” Sun Tzu

419. A JFC is likely to be most experienced in one particular environment and his leadership style may also reflect the distinctive features of his particular Service. At the very least, his underlying ethos and culture are likely to have been conditioned by his own Service. A JFC should, therefore, appreciate the impact of his own personal experience and tailor his command style and staff composition accordingly.

420. **Supported and Supporting Commanders.** Supported and supporting relationships between tactical commanders are fundamental to the conduct of joint operations. They are the principal means by which a JFC designates cross-component support and makes clear his priorities in support of his main effort. Successful management of these relationships allows a JFC to shift support for a particular phase or element of a campaign, and maintain operational tempo. A JFC designates the supported commander for a particular operation, perhaps associated with the creation of a particular condition or effect; such designation may then change several times as the campaign progresses. A tactical commander may act as both a supported and supporting commander simultaneously, for different but concurrent operations. A supported commander is responsible for the direction of any supporting effort, while a supporting commander is responsible for contributing to its delivery. It follows that the latter should participate in planning with the former, to ensure that best use is made of his supporting capabilities.

421. **Multinationality.** A UK commander may find himself acting as: a Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) on a national operation; a JTFC on a multinational operation where the UK is the lead or framework nation; a UK National Contingent Commander where the UK is contributing forces to an operation led by another nation; a UK Component Commander within a multinational Component Command Headquarters; or in an alliance/coalition command appointment. Operating multinationaly, either as part of a formal alliance or an *ad hoc* coalition, introduces a range of challenges for both the multinational JFC and contributing nations’ National Contingent Commanders. Regardless of the UK commander’s role, he should be cognisant of both perspectives; these are described in Annex 4A.

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4 Supported Commander: ‘A commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by a higher military authority’. Supporting Commander: ‘A commander who furnishes forces, equipment, logistics or other support to a supported commander, or who develops a supporting plan’. (JDP 0-01.1)

5 For example a UK Air Component operating as part of a multinational Air Component, and reporting to both the Air Component Commander and to the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) as the UK Operational Headquarters. Although strictly operating at the higher Tactical level, experience has illustrated that such commanders are frequently required to make operational level decisions.
422. **Multi-Agency.** Within a Comprehensive Approach, command of military forces may be quite separate from control of the overall situation. Where control is ceded to an Other Government Department (OGD), for example, a JFC should support coordinated planning with timely military advice and contribute to the collective execution of the overall mission. He should be prepared to assume responsibility for some or all of the non-military lines of operation in the event that the security or political situation precludes delivery by other agencies or authorities. The resource implications of such a contingency may be significant and a JFC should be prepared to prioritise his efforts accordingly.

423. **Supported Indigenous Regime.** Where a national or multinational force is deployed in support of another government, a JFC may need to develop a close relationship with the political elements of that regime. In some instances, such regimes may be unstable and one of his roles may be to support and empower them. Indeed this may become his primary focus, take up much of his time and require him to engage fully within the prevailing political context. Significant factors include: key leaders and factions within the indigenous country or region; the national objectives of alliance and coalition partners; the influence of other neutral or belligerent nations; and the manner in which the other instruments of UK national power are used to influence the situation.

424. **Unity of Purpose and Effort.** In circumstances where he lacks unity of command, for instance where military forces are working with other agencies, a JFC should seek unity of purpose, or at least unity of effort. Multinational and multi-agency environments are often characterised by the competing aims of, for example, military forces, the indigenous Government, OGDs, International Organisations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). It is important in these situations that a JFC seeks to align divergent perspectives and priorities. Moreover, where there is a lack of any formal unifying mechanism in theatre, a JFC should be prepared to fulfil this, customarily strategic, coordinating role.

**SECTION IV – DECISION-MAKING**

425. Timely and effective decision-making (including risk assessment) underpins command and enables the optimisation of tempo; it is critical to success on operations. Much of the art of command depends on recognising when to *decide* as well as when to *act*, which relies on good judgement and intuition, based on situational awareness. Efficient information management ensures that the potentially overwhelming volume of information available to a JFC does not obstruct or overload his capacity for decision-making. In addition to the quality and timeliness of his decisions, a JFC should also focus on effective and, where feasible, personal communication of his decisions to subordinates. Above all, however, it is his ability to make difficult
decisions, particularly when information is ambiguous or incomplete, that characterises a strong commander.

426. It is only by understanding the true nature of the problem that a commander is likely to be able to make the high quality decisions required of him. Strategic guidance, the operational estimate and the intelligence process all help the commander in this respect. But a full understanding of the more intangible and wider factors surrounding the issue may only come from research, study, visits and discussions with key military and non-military people. Some of this may come from previous experience but this ‘feel’ should be developed rapidly from the moment the operational level commander is appointed and continue throughout the campaign. Developing an instinctive feel for the operational environment should help the commander in deciding when to make decisions, as well as in making the decisions themselves. Charles de Gaulle put it this way:

“Great war leaders have always been aware of the importance of instinct. Was not what Alexander called his ‘hope’, Caesar his ‘luck’ and Napoleon his ‘star’ simply the fact that they knew they had a particular gift of making contact with realities sufficiently closely to dominate them.”

Decision-Making Process

427. Even when a very rapid decision is required, decision-making should be structured and supported by appropriate tools and procedures. The 4 stages of decision-making are:

a. **Direction.** A JFC first determines the nature of the decision required and the time available in which to make it, allowing sufficient time for subordinates’ planning and preparation. He then needs to issue sufficient planning guidance to his staff and subordinates to set in hand all the action required to enable him subsequently to arrive at his decision in an orderly and timely fashion.

b. **Consultation.** Early engagement with other headquarters should enable the JFC to understand the concerns of other commanders and to manage the likelihood and impact of subsequent changes in direction. Such consultation should occur at 3 levels:

   (1) Upwards to the strategic level to seek guidance and direction and also to ensure that the Military Strategic Commander is kept abreast of a JFC’s intentions.

   (2) Sideways, to other senior national representatives, agencies and his own specialist advisers and senior staff.
(3) Downwards to subordinate tactical commanders to ensure that they understand the problem, have the opportunity to contribute to its solution, and feel a sense of ownership for any subsequent decision.

A JFC will often derive considerable benefit from generating an initial plan quickly, and seizing the initiative in consultation with other headquarters. He should, however, put in place robust procedures to manage the consequences of his initial plan’s ‘first contact with friendly forces’.

c. **Consideration.** Before reaching his decision a JFC should consider any advice or information from his tactical commanders, and the work of his staff. While a JFC invariably exercises his judgement using incomplete information, such risk can be reduced if critical information requirements are identified and satisfied early.

d. **Decision and Execution.** A JFC must make decisions personally and express these decisions clearly and succinctly; this is the cornerstone of effective command. Back-briefs, by subordinates to the JFC, provide an opportunity for clarification and reinforced understanding. Thereafter, he must ensure that his direction is disseminated in the manner he requires and that his decision is executed correctly. In the words of General Patton:

> "Promulgation of an order represents not over 10 percent of your responsibility. The remaining 90 per cent consists in assuring through personal supervision ... proper and vigorous execution."

428. Consultation, consideration and decision-making will frequently be compressed, and undertaken concurrently rather than consecutively. The time by which a decision has to be taken may be self evident from the circumstances but, if not, it should be clearly established during the direction stage. Consultation and consideration may become inseparably blended, leading to decisions being taken on the spot. Reaching a decision will invariably involve the commander exercising his own judgement on incomplete information. Risk cannot be avoided; to wait in hopeful anticipation of complete clarification may result in paralysis. The risk can be reduced if critical information requirements are identified during contingency planning and during the lead-up to conflict, and regularly refined by the operational level commander thereafter. Commanders should possess the judgement to know what to delegate and to whom. They should be clear that whilst they may delegate their authority, they always retain responsibility.

**Decision-Making in a Multinational and Multi-Agency Environment**

429. Effective decisions in a multinational and multi-agency environment can be viewed as a combination of quality thinking and acceptance. In a situation where
many nations and agencies are present, or in a headquarters that may be ad hoc or inexperienced, generating high quality decisions while maintaining the approval of all participants is particularly challenging. The key is not to wait until a decision has been made, before working on acceptance, but to get ‘buy-in’ early through dialogue and collaborative planning.

### Decision-Making in Multinational Operations

– The British Alliance with the Spanish, 1808-1814

Anglo-Spanish relations during the Peninsular War reflect the additional challenge, over and above collaborative decision-making, of ensuring that allies cooperate in achieving the commander’s intent.

At Salamanca, in July 1812, Spanish troops charged with cutting off the French at the bridge of Alba de Tormes, withdrew under the orders of General Carlos de España, without notifying Wellington, and thereby allowed the defeated French remnants to escape. Wellington later responded to Spanish requests that their troops, under his command, be amalgamated into a single corps: “I had not lately heard of any Spanish troops acting independently as one corps which had not been destroyed; and that the last which so acted had been destroyed by half their own number.”

430. Furthermore, under a Comprehensive Approach, the requirement to integrate, coordinate and synchronise or, at the very least deconflict the capabilities and activities of other agencies creates an even more complex environment for operational level decisions. Decision-making is strengthened by empathy for different organisational cultures, engendered by institutional familiarity, trust and transparency, and through frequent personal contact and information sharing.

431. **Other Government Departments.** At the operational and tactical levels, each department may expect to monitor and conduct activity, including the allocation of manpower and resources, within its own area of responsibility. Consequently, a JFC may play a vital role in helping to coordinate a range of competing priorities and to sequence activities. His headquarters may well have to act as the ‘peer integrator’ for a Comprehensive Approach in a non-permissive environment. The overriding consideration is to focus effort on the achievement of any National Strategic Aim and objectives. To that end, reaching a shared understanding of the situation, and potential responses to it, facilitates the coordinated application of the instruments of national power, and retains the cultural and professional diversity required in a complex situation.

432. **Multi-Agency.** Increasingly, military operations are coordinated and harmonised with those of other agencies including NGOs, International Organisations, donors and regional organisations. Many such organisations may have been present.
for years in a particular operating environment and have unique and valuable experience and insights. Each is likely to have its distinctive culture and specific agenda, and some may resent and dispute the suggestion of coordination with, let alone by, military forces. The onset of operations, however, frequently acts as a catalyst for collaboration under either loose or more formalised frameworks.⁶

**Significant Decisions**

433. Apart from the selection of a winning concept, there are very few *critical* decisions that the commander at the operational level will consistently be called upon to make, but those he makes are likely to determine the success or failure of the campaign. Amongst the significant decisions an operational level commander might be called upon to make, 3 stand out:

a. **Initial Positioning of the Force.** The initial positioning of the force in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) is vital, as subsequent re-positioning of force elements may not be possible. An operational level commander should focus on what he is trying to achieve in the JOA and work back from this to determine the initial positioning of his force.

b. **Designation of the Main Effort.** It is vital that the operational commander designates his main effort in order to focus the activities of the force on those actions that he deems to be of a critical nature. Shifting main effort requires careful consideration and should not be done to a prearranged timetable. Shift too often and there is a danger of dissipating combat power instead of achieving concentration, although the main effort should be able to be shifted quickly as it can be an excellent way to reinforce the exploitation of an unforeseen opportunity.

c. **Committal of the Operational Level Reserve or Second Echelon Force.** If the commander elects to keep an operational level reserve, the decision to commit that reserve force/effort rests solely with him. Two factors bear upon this decision: timely committal, and security of the force. The commander must have a good understanding of the deployment and transit times of the reserve so as to have the desired effect on the enemy - too early or too late can have disastrous consequences. The commander should also mask his intentions to increase the uncertainty of the enemy and thus amplify, once committed, the effects of reserve/echelon forces.

434. A JFC should make few decisions other than those listed above. Making too many decisions will tend to impact on his subordinates’ freedom of action, and involve

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⁶ The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), for instance, normally establishes a humanitarian coordination centre in any major humanitarian crisis.
the JFC in tactical issues. The role of the JFC is to command at the operational level; his most important decisions are those which change the campaign plan.

Risk

435. A risk is the probability and implications of an activity or event, of potentially substantive positive or negative consequences, taking place. Risk indicates the likelihood of something going right or wrong, and the impact, good or bad. The potential adverse consequences of any event (or risk) are generally referred to as threats, and potentially beneficial consequences as opportunities; many events present a combination of the two. The evaluation of risk is a vital ingredient of command at the operational level and much of the intellectual process that underpins risk assessment is dependent upon the skill of a JFC and his staff.

436. **Understanding Risk.** People’s experiences and perceptions tend to influence their appetite for, or acceptance of, risk. A JFC should be aware of his own attitude towards risk, that of his staff and subordinates, as well as that of other actors, including opponents, neutrals, alliance and coalition partners, OGDs and other agencies. In doing so, a JFC may wish to consider the following:

a. Human perception of risk is underpinned by 2 components: how much an individual fears a potential outcome; and the extent to which he feels in control of events. Decisions may be made and actions taken for fear of losing rather than with any realistic expectation of winning, but ‘secure’ in the knowledge of ‘doing something’.

b. Attitudes towards risk are driven by unconscious bias based on, for example, individual tendencies to:

   (1) Pay more attention to information that confirms previous assumptions or hypotheses than to information that contradicts them.

   (2) Give disproportionate weight to beliefs that are easily accessible or easily recalled, such as media reporting which may be potentially unbalanced or inaccurate.

   (3) Behave as if one can exert control in circumstances where this is impossible or highly unlikely. Stressful conditions, an exclusive focus on goals at the expense of reflection, and a high frequency of a run of success can all encourage the illusion of control.

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7 Mission rehearsals can be particularly useful in ascertaining the risk appetite of different participants.

8 Military history is replete with examples of this form of unconscious bias. The limited acceptance of accurate intelligence by senior commanders and staff during the planning of Operation MARKET GARDEN, the assault by the Allies on the main river bridges in the Netherlands in September 1944, is a good illustration.
437. **Risk Management.** In order to promote a positive approach to risk taking, and avoid unnecessary risk aversion, it is important that risks are seen as opportunities as well as threats. Unanticipated but entirely positive events should be exploited. Risk management is described further in JDP 5-00 ‘Campaign Planning’.

438. **Risk versus Gamble.** A JFC should understand the difference between accepting and managing a calculated risk and taking an unwarranted gamble. In the case of the former, deliberate provision can be made in advance to enable recovery from a reverse; in the case of the latter, unintended and undesirable consequences may be beyond his capacity to mitigate.

**SECTION V – PRACTICE OF COMMAND**

“… at the lower levels it takes a robust nature to cope with the overwhelming mixture of physical hardship, stress and danger. At the higher levels, uncertainty, combined with responsibility for life and death, can easily crush those who are unprepared to deal with it. Often a great mental force is required just to keep one’s sanity, let alone maintain control and operate effectively. Unless it takes due cognisance of the things that men fight for, as well as the motives that make them fight, no doctrine is worth a fig; conversely, it is from these problems that any attempt at understanding war must proceed.”

**Early Activity**

439. The JFC should be appointed as early as possible so that he can have the greatest influence on the way in which the campaign is constructed. On appointment he should be given some form of guidance, normally in the form of a directive.

440. At this point he will be firmly in the spotlight and there will be a number of competing demands placed on him. He is likely to be receiving a flood of information from a wide range of sources and there may be a thousand questions and thoughts racing round in his head:

a. How do I get my mind around this problem?

b. Who is dealing with what?

c. What work has been produced and what is in hand?

d. Who are the key personalities (national and multinational)?

e. How do I get the right information feeds?

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9 Martin van Creveld.
441. Time, inevitably, will be short and he cannot do everything and be everywhere. His intellectual effort in these early stages is critical and he must do for himself, or control, those activities where his experience and expertise are paramount. It is imperative that he quickly gathers his team around him and gives clear and early direction, including priorities, to get everybody properly focused and working purposefully. The key players are his Chief of Staff (COS), Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS) and Political Adviser (POLAD) and he should have a say in their selection.

**Command Approach**

442. Moral and physical courage are important qualities in a commander, of whatever level, although at the operational level moral courage is particularly important. A command style is heavily dependent on personality, but in deciding on his approach to command the JFC may consider the following issues:

a. At what level are decisions to be made? Avoid the danger of commanding too little and interfering too much. Consider the command responsibilities and authority in relation to the type of opponent (conventional, irregular etc).

b. How to maintain morale (largely through a combination of 4 characteristics: effective leadership, strong discipline (self and group), a feeling of comradeship and self-respect).

c. How to build relations with subordinates (the importance of generating trust, shared confidence and knowledge from similar experiences, noting the value of credibility).

d. How to bond the headquarters to deliver effective control and coordination (Mission Command is as applicable to subordinate staffs as it is to subordinate commanders).

e. How to disseminate Commander’s Intent widely. The JFC must personally issue his mission and concept of operations, and be closely involved in command and signal (in which he must articulate how he is going to command the operation). These elements, but especially Commander’s Intent where the JFC expresses the overall effect he wishes to achieve against the adversary, are critical in enabling subordinates to act purposefully when faced with unforeseen opportunities, or in the absence of orders.

443. A JFC must be prepared to alter his approach to the command and control of his joint force as circumstances change, as he learns from his experience (and learns lessons from the experience of others), and as new enabling systems and techniques become available. This is often termed ‘adaptation in contact’ and requires a JFC to instil throughout his command the need to learn continuously, and adjust accordingly,
rather than simply adhering to the familiar and the well-established. Some of this necessary agility may require Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) action; some may require no more than embracing smarter ways of operating.

**Command, Control and Communications Architecture**

444. The UK’s command model is explained in JDP 3-00 ‘Campaign Execution’. It sets out the standard arrangements for command and control of deployed joint operations, including guidance on command states for the NATO and coalition operations. It is, however, only one approach and should not be applied rigidly. Although there are others, the major considerations when deciding on, and subsequently adjusting, the Command and Control (C2) architecture both external to and within a deployed force are listed below:

a. **Situation.** The scale, nature, range and likely duration of the campaign, the evolution of the operational situation, and the impact of other concurrent operations or campaigns all affect the demand for, and availability of, C2 resources.

b. **Personal Influence.** The requirement to influence both domestic and international decision-makers is an important factor. In multinational operations, the identification of the point where the greatest national influence can be achieved, underpinned by the contribution of credible and robust military forces, is vital.

c. **Command.** Where and how best to exercise command of a force is a challenge faced by all commanders. A JFC should always make time to go forward, conduct his own estimate of the situation, and carry out battlefield circulation as frequently as he can. Personalised and networked communications allow a JFC more flexible options for C2 and headquarters location, although this should be tempered by the attendant risk of increasing his vulnerability, potentially removing him from locations of political influence (especially when he has chosen to collocate his own headquarters at the diplomatic focal point), and of him becoming unnecessarily and adversely entangled in tactical activity. Furthermore, where a JFC relies upon support provided from some distance away and potentially shared by other commanders elsewhere (for instance by an Air Component located outside the JOA), then this dislocation and potential competition for resources should be factored into his planning.

d. **Communications.** Communications and Information Systems’ (CIS) capacity, including redundancy, is an important determining factor. Modern CIS assets allow greater distance between the deployed force and strategic level decision-makers but, even with the reach of modern communications,
there are occasions when face-to-face discussions are required. Whatever the situation, communications should enable, not emasculate, the exercise of command.

445. **Information Architecture.** Information is crucial to the JFC but he should consider information in the round not just in a narrow ‘J2’ sense. He should be clear about what he needs to know and when he needs the information.

“All the business of war, and indeed all the business of life, is to endeavour to find out what you don’t know by what you do; that’s what I called ‘guessing what was on the other side of the hill’.”

Wellington

446. But he should also consider who else around him needs information and ensure he is giving it to them in the right timeframe, matching information flows with decision-making levels. At the same time as considering his own information requirements, he should also consider what he wants the adversary to know or not to know.

447. However, Wellington was not simply referring to gathering information. He was intimating that there will be occasions when, in order to ‘find out what you don’t know’, one has to do something. By testing and probing an adversary, the reaction will often provide insights into a wide range of issues: “when in doubt start a fight”\(^{10}\). In this sense it could be said that all operations are, in effect, intelligence operations.

**Command and Staff Relationships**

448. A JFC’s relationship with his staff determines, to a significant degree, the effectiveness of his headquarters. The force of his personality, leadership, command style and general behaviour will have a direct bearing on the morale, sense of direction and performance of his staff. He should:

a. Set standards and be clear about what he expects from his staff. The reciprocal duty of the staff, at any level, is to state the practical truth.

b. Cultivate a climate that encourages subordinates to think independently and take the initiative. A JFC should encourage timely action and a willingness to take measured risks in the pursuit of significant advantage, imbue a tolerance of mistakes and ensure that his staff understand that they serve those beneath them.

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\(^{10}\) General Sir Rupert Smith.
c. Create a climate of mutual trust and respect rather than one that is sycophantic and unquestioning. A JFC should tolerate, and even cultivate, loyal opposition particularly during Red Teaming.

d. Foster a sense of involvement in decision-making and of shared commitment and empowerment. A JFC should pay particular attention to the delegated authority and responsibility within his core team (COS, DCOS, POLAD, Cultural Adviser, Legal Adviser (LEGAD) and Deputy Commander, if one is present).

Commander’s Relationship with the Media

449. The media has become so important in maintaining public and political support that a commander cannot disconnect himself from it, nor can he allow it to be the sole focus of his efforts. Military operations, and particularly the senior commanders involved, invariably attract media scrutiny. A JFC should anticipate such attention, which may be highly intrusive, and prepare himself and his headquarters accordingly. He should be honest about his ability to deal with the media and carefully balance the use of a media spokesperson with his own appearances; there are likely to be moments where the importance of the message to be conveyed will require his personal lead. Occasionally the issue may be of such a critical nature that he may have to compromise Operations Security (OPSEC). In every instance he must ask himself: who am I engaging and for what reason? A JFC should not be overly passive in his dealings with the media, but should engage actively using as many channels as possible to persuade, rebut and advocate his chosen message(s). Media advice and training is available both prior to and during deployments. A JFC’s staff should include, as a minimum, a Chief Media Operations and, ideally, a Media Adviser and a Media trained linguist.

Commander’s Relationship with the Media – Suez 1956

After the debacle of Suez in 1956, Operation MUSKETEER’s commander, General Keightley, summed up the over-arching problem of relationships with the media:

“The one overriding lesson of the Suez operation is that world opinion is now an absolute principle of war and must be treated as such”

Legal Considerations

450. All military operations must be conducted within a legal framework. The laws that apply will, like the ROE, vary depending upon the nature of the operation. The applicable law may be a combination of international and domestic (national) laws and will include human rights law. Failure to comply with the law, or even perceived
failure, can significantly undermine Campaign Authority. Considerations for a JFC are likely to include:

a. A JFC should ensure that both he and those under his command understand their legal responsibilities and obligations and are trained on the relevant ROE.

b. All commanders have a further duty to ensure compliance with the law, and observance of the ROE, by exercising command authority over their subordinates.

c. In a multinational context, a JFC should consider the differing national policy positions and legal obligations of respective national contingents (including his own). National participation in the operation may be predicated upon certain conditions and national ROE may differ.

d. Any suspected unlawful activity should be reported immediately and thoroughly investigated.

e. Commanders should always have access to specialist legal advice, ordinarily from a deployed LEGAD on the staff of a JFC’s headquarters. Legal advice will always be available via reachback, in any event.

Legal Considerations – Kenya 1952-1960

During the Kenyan Emergency, initial disregard for legal considerations proved counter-productive in the long run for British-led counterinsurgency.

In 1952 the British embarked upon a campaign to defeat the Mau Mau, a land reform and national liberation movement in Kenya. In the opening months, some 70,000 people were forced from contested land, a number of civilians were shot by military units (in an ambiguous legal situation and under weak command arrangements), and insufficient attention was paid to constraining the activities of the Kenyan Police Reserve and Home Guard (who had acquired a reputation for beating and torturing civilians). The Army’s reputation was tarnished, civilians lost confidence and thousands joined the insurgency.

When General Erskine assumed command in 1953, however, he instituted a series of courts and enquiries, and specific orders concerning the treatment of civilians and prisoners, thereby improving the discrimination and long-term effectiveness of subsequent operations.
Political Considerations

451. A JFC may find that political realities, both national and multinational, preclude the definition of clear strategic objectives, either for the campaign as a whole or for individual troop contributing nations. In these instances he may have to derive his own campaign end-state from the limited or equivocal direction he has received. Additionally, due to the sometimes capricious nature of national and multinational strategic decision-making bodies, a JFC may spend a disproportionate amount of time managing his strategic links at the expense of time spent in his own headquarters or dealing with subordinate commanders. This may be further compounded by the frequent need to host visiting political and military dignitaries in order to cultivate and maintain positive strategic relations. The requirement to coalition build (advising, encouraging and informing multinational partners) and the need to manage crises by consensus in multinational and multi-agency operations, tends to slow down decision-making, introduce uncertainty, and place even greater time pressure on the JFC. However, handling these issues, including frequent visits by senior partners, is not just desirable, but a core feature – like it or not – of 21st Century command. A commander has to plan and gear for it, execute it well and work proactively to cement these vital relationships.
ANNEX 4A – COMMAND IN A MULTINATIONAL CONTEXT

Introduction

4A1. Nations participating in multinational operations have to balance the collective objectives of the relevant alliance or coalition with their own respective national agendas. National troop contributions are often determined by the anticipated benefits (largely political) that such commitment brings to an individual nation. Regardless of the motives, the commitment by multiple nations to contribute military forces in order to accomplish agreed goals brings 3 advantages: increased political muscle and enhanced legitimacy across the international community; shared risk and cost; and increased military power and effectiveness. The latter is perhaps the most difficult to leverage to full advantage.

4A2. Multinationality, whether as part of an alliance or a coalition, is likely to be an enduring theme for the British Armed Forces. Coalition operations may be:

a. UN-sponsored.
b. NATO-based coalitions, which may include a few non-NATO partners (Operation ALLIED FORCE, Kosovo, 1999) or alternatively with the majority of partners coming from outside of NATO (Gulf War, 1991).
c. Operations involving both the UN and NATO (Bosnia, 1995).
d. EU operations (Bosnia from 2004, Darfur from 2006).
e. Informal coalitions, such as the cooperation in Kosovo in 1999 between NATO forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army, or in Afghanistan in 2002-03 between US forces and the Northern Alliance.

4A3. In any of the cases above, a Joint Force Headquarters will orientate to a Campaign Planning process which may only partially resemble that espoused in UK doctrine. In such circumstances the friction of multinationality can be markedly reduced if the staff become familiar with the processes and personalities of their parent Headquarters as early as possible, including where appropriate its relevant doctrine.

Selection of a Multinational (or Coalition) Force Commander

4A4. Where a single nation plays a dominant role in a coalition, then it will normally assume command. If, however, there is no obvious contender then consensus is required on the choice of force commander. In UN operations, it is the

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1 This Annex draws extensively on Whitehall Report 1-08, ‘Coalition Command in Contemporary Operations’, by Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely.
force commander’s nationality, and associated political complexion, that is likely to be the most important factor. In short, selection of a coalition force commander is a political decision.

4A5. A multinational force commander requires political acumen, patience and tact both to align potentially disparate national aspirations and agendas and, more practically, to integrate national contingents into an effective multinational force. His key challenges will include achieving unity of effort (although he may aspire to unity of command) and organisational agility.

**Multinational Command – Unity of Effort**

4A6. Outwith a formal alliance, attaining unity of command on a multinational operation may not be politically feasible, but it should be a goal. Where unity of command is unrealistic, a force commander should strive for unity of purpose.

4A7. A force commander should understand each national contingent’s particular strengths, weaknesses and political objectives, as well as its national ethos, history and culture. He should balance capabilities and distribute the workload and risk equitably, so that no one nation sustains disproportionate casualties or receives undue credit, either of which may weaken the cohesion of a multinational force.

4A8. Common doctrine and agreed structures underpin unity of effort (unity of purpose plus coordination) within an established alliance such as NATO. Conversely, *ad hoc* coalitions frequently have sub-optimal command structures and can be hampered by a number of national political aims. There may be cultural or procedural differences between national contingents that create friction and reduce tempo. A force commander may be required to accept no more than unity of purpose in such circumstances.

4A9. Consensus and cooperation may initially be based on little more than an agreement on the art of the possible. This should be developed progressively through mutual trust, understanding, patience and respect for national perspectives and positions, and promoted through personal and professional relationships between a multinational force commander and National Contingent Commanders (NCC) – see below. A force commander should make the time to engage personally with any national political representatives who visit the Theatre of Operations (TOO), both to improve his perspective on any national agendas and foster improved relations across the coalition.

4A10. A force commander should appreciate the linguistic and cultural challenges of multinational operations, recognising that it is his responsibility to communicate with all his subordinates including those for whom English is not the first language. Clarity
and brevity are important, as is the use of simple English and defined terms, noting that even these may not translate directly into another language.

4A11. Force generation is likely to be carried out at the military strategic level, with limited consultation with the force commander. As a result the needs of the coalition to meet its mission may not be matched by the respective national force contributions. Shortfalls, particularly in capabilities such as helicopters and airborne surveillance assets, are a common feature of coalition operations.

4A12. The presence of international and national media, and the need to align what may be contrasting national positions, is a further factor to be addressed by the force commander. A proactive and coordinated approach is essential. Supportive media coverage plays a major role in maintaining the endorsement of both the international community and domestic audiences – fundamental factors in the maintenance of coalition morale and cohesion.

Multinational Command – Organisational Agility

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<th>Multinational Command – Strengths and Vulnerabilities in Iraq²</th>
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<td>The organisation and command and control arrangements for large-scale multinational operations are always complex. In Iraq, the Coalition was an <em>ad hoc</em> arrangement comprising diverse national contingents with different levels of experience of working together and variable degrees of interoperability. While NATO forces have largely compatible equipment and practices, non-NATO forces do not always share the same advantages. Problems therefore manifest themselves in different ways: lack of technological compatibility, poor understanding of working practices and, most important, the trust that may or may not exist from years of working together. The UK’s ability to work with the US is rarely replicated in other coalition forces, yet the pace and price of change is making it problematic even for the UK to keep up. After its initial setbacks, the US adapted in contact quickly. Experience operating alongside the US military gave UK forces a good insight into their ally's mindset and <em>vice versa</em>, although the dynamics remain so fluid that such insight should never be taken for granted. However, the long history of mutual support has engendered sufficient trust to allow unparalleled access to respective intelligence and decision-making forums.</td>
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4A13. The impact of multinationality on organisational agility is often significant. The most fundamental impact is one of time and tempo; activities take longer to plan and execute. Decisive engagement with an opponent (who is often more agile) is more difficult to achieve than in national operations. While a range of factors may contribute towards a lack of organisational agility in multinational operations, the 2 most prevalent are interoperability and information management.

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4A14. A broad range of different equipments, technologies, languages, doctrine and training is indicative of what may be expected from troop contributing nations. While some alliances, most notably NATO, attempt to mitigate the impact of such issues through various protocols on standardisation and forums such as the Multinational Interoperability Council, the problem remains; clearly, the challenge for ad hoc coalitions is much greater. Any lack of interoperability, which impacts on concentration of force, is a significant limitation on a force commander’s plans.

4A15. In contemporary operations, the reliance that commanders place on information is beyond dispute. The challenge is well-known and shows no signs of getting easier. In multinational operations the problems are exacerbated by the limitations and constraints on information management. Not only are many nations’ Communications and Information Systems (CIS) incompatible with each other, but the constraints on the handling and sharing of information and intelligence also compound the difficulties faced by the force commander.

**National Command and Control**

4A16. Each NCC is a key decision-maker in his own right, though none share the force commander’s authority within the multinational force. NCC functions include:

a. **Influence.**

   (1) Shaping coalition plans based on personal relationships.

   (2) Advising the force commander on national capabilities and limitations (such as interoperability and Rules of Engagement (ROE)).

   (3) Identifying and managing levels of risk for national forces.

b. **Direct.**

   (1) Exercising operational control of national forces, and directing/approving their use in accordance with national direction.

   (2) De-conflicting, prioritising and, where appropriate, directing the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration of national forces.

   (3) Assuring logistic, medical and CIS support.

   (4) Determining and coordinating national force protection policy and posture.

   (5) Coordinating and shaping national media.
c. **Support.**

(1) Acting as a figurehead; building and sustaining national contingent cohesion.

(2) Providing legal advice.

(3) Facilitating strategic intelligence integration, and command and control architecture.

d. **Inform.**

(1) Determining any requirement for military strategic support.

(2) Reporting tactical and operational developments (including risks to strategic objectives).

(3) Developing Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) and Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) with host nation(s) as required.

4A17. A force commander should make it his business to understand the national political sensitivities of each of his contingents; any anticipated points of difference should be resolved in advance. Nevertheless, a NCC does hold the metaphorical ‘national red card’ providing him the ability to veto any order to given by the force commander, if the NCC believes that the order is contrary to national interest. It is rarely used, although heightened political sensitivity over coalition operations, and the risk-aversion of some nations’ governments ensure that the potential for national veto remains a key factor in contemporary coalition operations.

4A18. National limitations on a force commander’s freedom of action can arise from a variety of angles:

a. Nations and their NCCs may see their mission in totally different terms. Some may perceive long term reconstruction as the priority where others see counter-insurgency and its urgent security requirements. Time spent conceptualising is seldom wasted; it will help to reduce coalition friction and shocks.

b. The command authority passed to the force commander, sometimes complicated by differing national interpretations of command authority (Operational Command (OPCOM), Operational Control (OPCON), etc).

c. The rules given to the force commander about the use of force – ROE – may not be entirely helpful. Furthermore, different contingents may have varying interpretations on the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC).
d. Individual nations may have different outlooks on force protection – reflecting varying levels of acceptable political risk. In some cases, a force commander may be constrained by the requirement to provide additional force protection for a national contingent.

e. The targeting process, which may require agreement from all coalition members to each and every target, is likely to be written into the coalition mandate.

f. Examples of other constraints include: restrictions on the use of national contingents to a specified area only, involvement in public (dis)order, movement outside of daylight hours, and so on. Some of these lesser constraints may only come to the attention of a force commander during the course of planning an operation or issuing orders, or they may only arise in reaction to events – such as casualties, an unwelcome task or changes in domestic public opinion.
1. The Operational level of war was an invention of the twentieth century. Its origins lie less with the German army than with the Soviet Union. In the First World War, the German army’s principal planner, Erich Ludendorff, when preparing the March 1918 offensives on the western front, declared: “I object to the word ‘operation’. We shall punch a hole...For the rest, we shall see”. His methods nearly worked. In May 1940 they did. His successors, inspired by Ludendorff’s achievement of a tactical, if not a strategic, breakthrough in 1918, made tactics do duty for strategy. In defeating France, the German army followed, not a grand design, but its own nose.

2. They rationalised what they had achieved as Blitzkrieg: here, as often in military history, doctrine followed practice, rather than preceded it. The effect was disaster. A series of stunning tactical victories, scaled up for the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 but unrelated to any overall strategy, proved barren. Moreover the Germans were up against an army, forced by the scale of its territory as well as by the enormous size of its formations, to give much greater attention to Operational Art and to develop its thinking about ‘deep battle’. Just as importantly the Soviet army was firmly subordinated to political control, and so its operational thought was set firmly in the context of policy.

3. During the Cold War the Soviet army was NATO’s putative enemy. This, more than the Second World War, forced the armies of NATO to confront the need for operational thought. In 1973, bruised by its defeat in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the US Army established its Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and in the 1980s, as the armies of Europe followed the US in trying to raise the nuclear threshold by enhancing their conventional capabilities, they too developed doctrines for the Operational level of war. In 1988 the Higher Command and Staff Course (HCSC), devoted specifically to the study of operations, was run at the British Army Staff College for the first time.

4. In some senses, therefore, the history of operational thought in the British Armed Forces is less than 20 years old. Assessing what represents real change and what represents continuity, is proportionately difficult. Military commentators are wont to talk about increasing threats and changing environments not only as though the challenges they present are entirely novel but also as though the perspective which comes from a sense of continuity is unhelpful and even dangerous. The fear of fighting the next war with the doctrine of the last often seems greater than the much worse sin, that of not studying the lessons of the past with sufficient care.
5. In fact it is not quite true to say the British Armed Forces did not consider the Operational level of war before 1988; the problem was that until at least 1918 they called it strategy. In the nineteenth century, what governments did was policy, and what armed forces did was strategy. There was no need to make the distinction, as modern UK doctrine does, between a broader based conception of strategy and more specifically military strategy. It was the 2 world wars of the twentieth century which conflated policy and strategy, largely because the principal business of government in such conflicts was to wage war. In major war the distinction between policy and strategy proved largely immaterial in practice.

6. In wars where the political goal is not national survival, but something more limited, a tension is created between the constraints created by policy and the inherent nature of war, which – because violence is at its core – pushes to extremes. In the ‘small wars’ waged since the end of the Cold War, decisions taken by subordinate military commanders can have directly political consequences, even if inadvertent rather than intended. Furthermore, the operational commander has not only to orchestrate all military activity but also to coordinate it with the activities of other agencies, both those of his own Government and of its allies and those of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). In these circumstances political awareness is a prerequisite for operational effectiveness. Post-Cold War conflicts, having demanded the reiteration of the role of policy in the conduct of armed conflict (not just in the reasons for going to war in the first place), should ideally have generated a tighter and more helpful definition of strategy. On the whole they have not. The principal task of the operational commander remains that of converting strategic objectives into tactical actions, but without a clear sense of policy and of the Strategy designed to put that policy into effect, Operational Art does not know precisely where it sits.

7. To describe the coordination of its efforts, military and non-military, in the 2 world wars, Britain adopted the phrase ‘Grand Strategy’. As strategy drew away from its nineteenth century definitions, and became more overtly political, its military component seemed separate. The Operational level of war, although a subordinate theme within strategy, began to acquire a life of its own.

8. The Principles of Warfare, normally no more than ten in number and reasonably consistent across armies and their doctrines, are the historical departure point for the Operational level of war. They were mentioned but not specifically identified in the British Army’s very first ‘Field Service Regulations’, published in 1909. ‘The fundamental Principles of War’, the regulations declared, ‘are neither very numerous nor in themselves abstruse, but the application of them is difficult and cannot be made subject to rules. The correct application of principles to circumstances is the outcome of sound military knowledge, built up by study and practice until it has become an instinct.’ The editions of the ‘Field Service Regulations’ which appeared after the First World War named 8 principles, including the maintenance of the objective,
concentration on the decisive point, the need to take the offensive, the value of surprise, economy of effort, security, mobility and cooperation. The Principles of Warfare suggest that Operational Art is underpinned by unchanging characteristics. In digesting the lessons of the battle of El Alamein in 1942, British 30 Corps concluded: ‘In all forms of warfare new methods should never disregard basic principles’.

9. The challenge to the notion that there are unchanging Principles of Warfare is posed not just by change over time, but also by geography and geopolitics. Principles formulated in the context of major war in Europe would not necessarily be applicable in colonial war outside Europe, and even within colonial war procedures which seemed to work against Zulus in South Africa were not straightforwardly transferable to the north-west frontier of India. This point still has relevance. Lessons learnt in Iraq are not necessarily applicable to Afghanistan, and where they can be transferred successfully to conflict in another society, with its differences of culture, history and economic structure, frequently they will be converted from solutions to factors that deserve consideration, from answers to questions. Moreover, those questions will need to be addressed from the perspectives of anthropology and history as much as of doctrine and political science. The answers will rest on a keener sense of difference than of similarity.

10. This, at bottom, is the meaning of doctrine. Doctrine is not prescriptive, but must be suggestive; it is not about what to think, but about how to think. Each situation is unique, at least in the eyes of doctrine, but what doctrine provides is a common way of thinking through the problems presented by a given situation. Thus doctrine begins by posing questions. If the questions themselves are the wrong ones, then there is not much hope that the answers which it produces will be right. If doctrine is dogmatic, its solutions are unlikely to be related to the specific realities of the situation.

11. That does not mean that doctrine does not rest on core commonalities. The growth of military doctrine in the nineteenth century was the product of increasing army size and the greater distances between the commander and his forces. Without real-time systems of communication, commanders had to delegate responsibility but could only do so if their subordinate commanders took decisions which were compatible with the supreme commander’s overall intent. Contemporary thinking about mission command therefore has its origins in technological inadequacy. Today real-time communications provide the capacity for direct command and control. Moreover, the ideal of mission command may be impossible in practice, not least because of the limited intellectual capacities and leadership qualities of individuals in junior positions. Where operations meet tactics, set drills which ensure rapid, effective coordinated responses according to a doctrine which is prescriptive, may be best.

12. The ideal in war therefore has to be tempered in the light of what is most effective. This is not just a matter of realism; it is also about commanders adopting plans that reflect the capabilities of their forces so that they get the best out of them. A
commander needs intellect and ability, from which he can be expected to develop operational competence. Experience, possibly reinforced by a critical reading of military history, may help the process. None of these attributes stands in isolation. A battle-hardened veteran may have plenty of experience, but that does not qualify him for command if he lacks the intellect to draw value from his experience. Most commanders will not in fact also possess what Clausewitz called genius, although the ideal definitions of both doctrine and Mission Command assume that they will. The military genius, because it knows that doctrine is not prescriptive, has the capacity to use the intellectual disciplines which doctrine provides to rethink possible solutions in fresh and original ways.

13. Traditional expectations of operational command couched the need for this sort of creativity in purely military terms. A corps commander of the Second World War had to function at a level where political considerations did not have a high profile. That cannot be the case in ‘small wars’, where the political effects of the actions of subordinate commanders can be far reaching and where the immediate operational goals can never be purely military. A ‘Comprehensive Approach’ demands political awareness from the commanders required to implement it; conventional protestations that servicemen must remain apolitical (at least in its broader meanings) will be counter-productive. A national force commander in a coalition operation must show political tact towards his allies; he will need to be aware of the political and cultural framework of the country in which he is operating; he will have to work alongside non-military agencies to carry out non-military tasks, and not all of them will be other departments of his own government; and he must be sensitive to the effects of media reporting on public opinion not only at home, but also internationally. The military tendency is to see the effects of political considerations on war as constraining and limiting; but this list suggests that policy is also an enabler. Success in all these areas acts as a force multiplier. Moreover, just as policy and the military are most obviously in harmony in major war because policy is then asking the military to use force in its most extreme form, so there can be circumstances in which politicians demand that armed forces do things which exceed their capabilities. Then the restraining factor in the use of armed force is not policy but the military themselves. One of the ways in which the commander uses his intellect and experience can be to remind politicians of the actual capacities of the forces which he has under command and of the limitations of what military force more generally can realistically achieve.

14. The aim of policy, therefore, is not necessarily peace; policy can aim not only to moderate war and to end conflicts, but also to cause war and promote its escalation. Once war has begun, war ceases simply to be an instrument of policy. The utility of military force lies precisely in its ability to change policy. Because war is an interactive process, depending on the reciprocal actions of opposing sides, the changes required are often reactive and unpredictable. The policy itself frequently has to be
adapted. These changes of political direction may well be the consequences of what happens at the Operational level.

15. War and peace are less the opposites of each other, and more different means to serve the same end – that of policy. In ‘small wars’, the operational commander uses peace as well as force to fulfil the strategic objectives set by policy. Building security to end conflict involves the creation of pockets of peace, and then using armed force to protect that security in the hope that its stabilising effects will spread. Even in major war, there can be pauses in the fighting, sometimes for prolonged periods, although the reasons may be no more than mutual exhaustion. Thus the distinction between war and peace is less absolute in reality than theory – or even the daily experience of many – suggests it ought to be.

16. UK military doctrine therefore describes war and peace not as absolutes, but as a continuum. From the perspective of British Policy, that is a half-truth. Government rests its legitimacy on its monopoly of armed force so that it can guarantee peace at home and provide security from threats abroad. It uses its military capability to provide peace. But from the perspective of operational thought, particularly in contexts short of war for national survival, that is a truth which carries important messages about the use of armed force. If there is peace within war, then restraint in the use of armed force in war is a means by which peace can grow within war. Moreover, it follows that an important quality inherent in operational thought is the capacity to deter as well as to strike.

17. In the Cold War the political value of deterrence was integrated into strategic thought more broadly defined by its place within a hierarchy of threats. Nuclear weapons achieved their ends through the dissuasion of the enemy. Operational thought beneath the nuclear threshold had a dual function: it was to create a viable option for use in conventional war; and it was to enhance deterrence by providing a credible escalatory ladder. Deterrence, and the operational component within it, therefore fulfilled its purposes by using the threat of war to sustain the peace. After the end of the Cold War, deterrence lost its primacy, and indeed in many quarters seemed redundant. The big change after 1990 was the readiness to use war itself, not the threat of war, as an instrument of policy. Operational thought, conceived in one context, was applied in another. UK doctrine applies military force across a range of scenarios – ideally to foster cooperation, to confront if required and to engage in conflict if necessary. Deterrence therefore functions within the Operational level. Although we tend to forget its antecedents, operational thought as used in war today has enfolded within it the use of deterrence for the purposes of the war; the ability to desist from fighting, while retaining the capacity to renew operations, gives the Operational level of war a role in the creation of security.

18. Deterrence needs to be reintegrated into mainstream strategic and operational thought. Ever since the Falklands War of 1982, it has become customary to point out
that the actual use of force enhances deterrence because it makes the use of force credible. But over time this has had 2 counter-productive effects. First, the preservation of deterrence has, ironically, become a reason for going to war, not for avoiding it. Second, the focus on actual operations has made nuclear capabilities especially seem separate from, and even antithetical to, the primary purposes of the armed forces. The function of strategy is to integrate policy and operational capabilities, and the deterrent functions of operational doctrine, even if concerned primarily with the threatened use of conventional forces, not of nuclear weapons, are one way in which that can be done.

19. Deterrence in the Cold War implied that there could be no victors in the event of an all-out nuclear exchange. One way in which the Cold War legacy has survived lies in the belief that victory in war is elusive. This is not just a strategic calculation; it is also a cultural expectation among the democratic societies of Europe, their national memories blighted by the death rates of 2 world wars. UK military doctrine implicitly reflects these assumptions by eschewing the concept of victory, and it does so at 2 levels.

20. Firstly, within war, it warns against the dangers of a ‘strategically barren victory’, the sort of decisive battlefield success which has not delivered victory in the war as a whole. Napoleon won victories on the battlefield, because he was a master of Operational Art, able to seize the initiative by uniting masses on the decisive point, but he lost the war. Clausewitz, who fought against him, defined strategy as the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war. Napoleon used the war for the purpose of the engagement, believing that victory in battle would decide everything. It does not; the art of command depends not only on the ability to assemble forces, motivated and adequately supplied, at the right place and right time, but also on the ability to exploit the victory – to use it to fulfil the objectives of the war.

21. Secondly, UK military doctrine, reflecting presumptions dictated by peace enforcement and counter-insurgency operations, speaks not of victory in war but of end-states and exit strategies. But the fact that the achievement of a military victory may prove barren should not obscure its priority within operations, even if other considerations, presumably political, may shape the definition and use of that victory. Moreover, in certain contexts, as in the Falklands War in 1982, victory will remain the more appropriate descriptor. The challenge is then to turn victory into a durable peace, which is as well as being the opposite of war is also its true objective. The conduct of the war can shape the outcome. Victory is not defined solely by the claims of the victor, but also requires the acknowledgement of the enemy. On the one hand, moderation in the conduct of the war may lessen its legacy of hatred and animosity, and so hasten the advent of a stable peace. On the other hand an opponent may interpret moderation as weakness, and in these circumstances the more devastating the
consequences for the vanquished, the more exhausted his resources and the more demoralised his people, the more he may accept the verdict of the war.

22. Understanding war therefore rests on dialectics: definitions arise through debate and discussion, through proposition and counter-proposition. Moreover, no definition, however apparently axiomatic, is absolute. Consider the ‘manoeuvrist approach’, currently described in British Defence Doctrine as ‘one in which shattering the enemy’s overall cohesion and will to fight, rather than his materiel, is paramount’. ‘Manoeuvrism’ first entered NATO doctrine in the 1980s, as it confronted what it saw as the overwhelming conventional superiority of the Soviet Union. The emphasis in the ‘manoeuvrist approach’ on ‘indirect ways and means of targeting the intellectual and moral component of an opponent’s fighting power’ therefore proceeded from an assumption of material weakness, where ‘originality and doing the unexpected’ could be counters to the effects of massed firepower and methods of attrition. When the Operational level of war was applied for the first time, in the Gulf War of 1990-91, its use conformed to this expectation, against an enemy, Iraq, who was reckoned to be much stronger numerically. Iraq’s actual strength may have been exaggerated, but its defeat still validated manoeuvrism.

23. In practice in most conflicts since 1991 the advantage enjoyed by Britain and its allies, particularly the United States, has been that of superior firepower; the incentive for manoeuvrism has lain more often with the enemy. British forces can now expect to be able to dominate the battlefield through directly affecting an opponent’s capability. The ‘manoeuvrist’ approach is therefore not an absolute but has to be kept in a dialectical relationship with firepower and its application: the polarity of the operational thought of the 1980s, between manoeuvre and attrition, was always a false one, since armed forces manoeuvre for a purpose, and that includes bringing concentrated fire to bear. Experience since 1991 has made that point increasingly clear.

24. The centrality of dialectics in doctrine means that the Principles of Warfare are debates in disguise. The offensive cannot be applied in all circumstances and at all times; moreover, an army on the operational defensive may still employ the tactical offensive and vice versa. The principle of concentration of strength on the decisive point may seem to be at odds with that which advocates economy of force. All theory therefore must be grounded in reality and can be no more than a tool which enables the pragmatic interpretation of the actual situation.

25. This is what the UK’s approach to campaigning seeks to encapsulate. Its heart actually lies less in its effects and more in analysis. Today’s operational doctrine depends far more on intelligence and its interpretation than did its predecessors. Quantity of information is not the same as quality of information. Signals intelligence is not much use if the enemy is avoiding the use of electronic communications, and positively pernicious if it creates a lop-sided or distorted view of the enemy through
the suppression of other sources. Much could have been learned about Iraq or Afghanistan by the study of history and anthropology than by the collection of real-time signals intelligence, and the former would have provided the context for the interpretation of the latter. But the key point is that the analytical process is itself reinforced by the conduct of the campaign. Most military intelligence in the past, at least at the operational and tactical levels, has been gathered not by dedicated intelligence agencies but by the experience of units in combat. Paying attention to the guerrilla warfare and terror tactics of the fedayeen in the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003 would have revealed much about the long-term nature of the conflict.

26. The point here is that at least some of the effects of operations are likely to be unpredictable and unintended. An approach to campaigning that differs from this premise will be deeply dangerous. Any doctrine for warfare must rest on an appreciation of war’s nature. The hierarchy of policy, strategy, operations and tactics, and the recognition that they must be shaped in coordination with other governmental agencies, with allies and – increasingly – with NGOs, address only the means brought to bear in war, not war itself. War itself is chaotic, characterised not only by what Clausewitz called ‘friction’, but also by the play of chance and probability. Indeed the whole point of doctrine is to give shape to what is inherently disorderly. But what doctrine too frequently fails to allow for is that there is a rational force, as well as a random one, seeking to disrupt the application of an operational design: that is the action of the enemy. All hostile forces, not just irregulars, are likely to engage in dimensions that suit their own purposes rather than those of their opponents.

27. Other governmental agencies and Britain’s allies, however divergent their methods, are likely to be trying to achieve the same objectives as the armed forces, even if they have different routes for getting there. It is the enemy who is doing his level best to stop the achievement of those objectives. He will be seeking effects that are very different from our own. The outcome of the war, and of operations within war, is the consequence of the interaction of reciprocal effects. There are means for minimising the effects of enemy action. The use of overwhelming force or the pursuit of quick victory are 2, both designed to produce an outcome that is consistent with one side’s intent at the start of the war. However, the probability that military action will have effects which are not wholly predictable is inherent in its application, and those effects will in turn shape the objectives for which the forces are committed. Particularly if the conflict becomes protracted, then the chances of the policy which originally precipitated the war itself remaining unchanged are remote. Governments may use war as an instrument of policy, but war itself is the clash of 2 or – in today’s increasingly complex environment – more wills. The Operational level of war, like every other level of war, must be therefore be rooted in the nature of war.
LEXICON

The Lexicon contains acronyms/abbreviations and terms/definitions used in this publication. Many of the terms and their definitions detailed in Part 2 are either new or modified following a recent review of this and other Capstone/Keystone doctrine.¹ The source of each term is shown in parenthesis. For fuller reference on all other UK and NATO agreed terminology, see the current edition of JDP 0-01.¹ ‘The UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions’.

PART 1 - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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<td>ACDS (LOG OPS)</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Logistic Operations)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACDS OPS</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations)</td>
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<td>ACO</td>
<td>Allied Commander Operations</td>
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<td>ACOS</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>AOO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
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<td>AOI</td>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
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<td>BDD</td>
<td>British Defence Doctrine</td>
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<td>BM</td>
<td>Battlespace Management</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Component Command(er(s))</td>
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<td>CDI</td>
<td>Chief of Defence Intelligence</td>
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<td>CDM</td>
<td>Chief of Defence Materiel</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDSDO</td>
<td>Chief of the Defence Staff Duty Officer</td>
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<td>CEA</td>
<td>Campaign Effectiveness Assessment</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<td>CinC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Communications and Information Systems</td>
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<td>CJO</td>
<td>Chief of Joint Operations</td>
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<td>CoA</td>
<td>Course of Action</td>
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<td>COBR</td>
<td>Cabinet Office Briefing Room</td>
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<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Combatant Command (US)</td>
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<td>CoG</td>
<td>Centre of Gravity</td>
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<td>Combat ID</td>
<td>Combat Identification</td>
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<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
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<td>COS</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
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¹ This Lexicon also includes new/modified Terms/Definitions extracted from JDP 3-00 (3rd Edition) and JDP 5-00 (2nd Edition).
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>Campaign Planning Concept</td>
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<td>Contingency Planning Team</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism</td>
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<td>CTT</td>
<td>Current Commitments Team</td>
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<td>DC</td>
<td>Decisive Condition</td>
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<td>DCDC</td>
<td>Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCDS (Ops)</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations)</td>
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<td>DCJO (Ops)</td>
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<td>DCJO (Op Sp)</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Joint Operations (Operations Support)</td>
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<td>Defence Crisis Management Centre</td>
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<td>DCOS</td>
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<td>DCT &amp; UK Ops</td>
<td>Directorate of Counter-Terrorism and United Kingdom Operations</td>
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<td>D Def Log Ops</td>
<td>Directorate of Defence Logistics Operations</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DGMC</td>
<td>Director General Media and Communications</td>
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<td>D Op Pol</td>
<td>Director Operational Policy</td>
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<td>DG Sec Pol</td>
<td>Director General Security Policy</td>
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<td>DIS</td>
<td>Defence Intelligence Staff</td>
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<td>DJC</td>
<td>Directorate of Joint Commitments</td>
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<td>D Jt Cap</td>
<td>Directorate of Joint Capability</td>
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<td>DOPC</td>
<td>Defence and Overseas Policy Committee</td>
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<td>DOps</td>
<td>Director of Operations</td>
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<td>DSF</td>
<td>Director Special Forces</td>
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<td>DSG</td>
<td>Defence Strategic Guidance</td>
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<td>Directorate of Targeting and Information Operations</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<td>FLC</td>
<td>Front Line Command</td>
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<td>FP</td>
<td>Force Protection</td>
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<td>GCHQ</td>
<td>Government Communications Headquarters</td>
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<td>HMG</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Government</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>Host Nation</td>
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<td>HNS</td>
<td>Host-Nation Support</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>IA</td>
<td>Irregular Activity</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IM</td>
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<td>ISTAR</td>
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<td>JFC</td>
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<td>JFE</td>
<td>Joint Force Element</td>
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<td>JFHQ</td>
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<td>JFLogC</td>
<td>Joint Force Logistic Component</td>
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<td>MACA</td>
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<td>Military Aid to Government Departments</td>
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<td>ME</td>
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<td>National Contingent Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSID</td>
<td>National Security, International Relations and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>PJHQ</td>
<td>Permanent Joint Headquarters</td>
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<td>PJOB</td>
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<td>Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration</td>
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<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>UOR</td>
<td>Urgent Operational Requirement</td>
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<tr>
<td>VCDS</td>
<td>Vice Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
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PART 2 – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Agency
A distinct non-military body which has objectives that are broadly consistent with those of the campaign. (JDP 0-01.1)

Allotment
The temporary change of assignment of forces between subordinate commanders. The authority to allot is vested in the commander having OPCON (i.e. JTFC). (JDP 0-01.1)

Analysis
The examination of all the constituent elements of a situation, and their inter-relationships, in order to obtain a thorough understanding of the past, present and anticipated future operational context. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Area of Operations
A geographical area, defined by a Joint Force Commander within his Joint Operations Area, in which a commander designated by him (usually a Component Commander) is delegated authority to conduct operations. See also Joint Operations Area. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Area of Interest
The area of concern to a commander, relative to the objectives of current or planned operations, including his Joint Operations Area/Area of Operations and adjacent areas. See also Joint Operations Area and Area of Operations. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Assessment
The evaluation of progress, based on levels of subjective and objective measurement in order to inform decision-making. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Battlespace
All aspects of a Joint Operations Area within which military activities take place subject to Battlespace Management. See also Battlespace Management and Joint Operations Area. (JDP 3-70)

Battlespace Management
The adaptive means and measures that enable the dynamic synchronisation of activity. (JDP 3-70)

Campaign
A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve strategic objectives within a Theatre of Operations or Joint Operations Area, which normally involves joint forces. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)
Campaign Authority
The authority established by international forces, agencies and organisations within a given situation in support of (or in place of) an accepted (or ineffective, even absent) indigenous government or organisation. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Note: Campaign Authority is an amalgam of 4 inter-dependent factors:

- the perceived legitimacy of the authorisation or mandate for action;
- the perceived legitimacy of the manner in which those exercising the mandate conduct themselves both individually and collectively;
- the degree to which factions, local populations and others accept the authority of those executing the mandate;
- the degree to which the aspirations of factions, local populations and others are managed or met by those executing the mandate.

Campaign Design
Campaign Design develops and refines the commander’s (and staff”s) ideas to provide detailed, executable and successful plans. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Campaign End-State
The extent of the Joint Force Commander’s contribution to meeting the National Strategic Aim. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Campaign Effectiveness Assessment
Evaluation of campaign progress based on levels of subjective and objective measurement, in order to inform decision-making. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Campaign Management
Campaign Management integrates, coordinates, synchronises and prioritises the execution of operations and assesses progress. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Campaign Objective
A goal, expressed in terms of one or more decisive conditions, that needs to be achieved in order to meet the National Strategic Aim. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Campaign Rhythm
The regular recurring sequence of events and actions, harmonised across a Joint force, to regulate and maintain control of a campaign. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Civil-Military Cooperation
The process whereby the relationship between military and civilian sectors is addressed, with the aim of enabling a more coherent military contribution to the achievement of UK and/or international objectives. (JDP 0-01.1)
Centre of Gravity
Characteristic, capability, or influence from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other civil or militia grouping draws its freedom of action, physical strength, cohesion or will to fight. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Coalition
An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JDP 0-01.1)

Command
The authority vested in an individual to influence events and to order subordinates to implement decisions. (BDD 3rd Edition)
Note: It comprises 3 closely inter-related elements: leadership, decision-making (including risk assessment) and control.

Commander’s Intent
A concise and precise statement of what a JFC intends to do and why, focused on the overall effect the Joint Force is to have and the desired situation it aims to bring about. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Components
Force elements grouped under one or more component commanders subordinate to the operational level commander. (JDP 0-01.1)

Comprehensive Approach
Commonly understood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular situation. (BDD 3rd Edition)

Contingents
Force elements of one nation grouped under one or more multinational component commanders subordinate to the Joint Task Force Commander. (JDP 0-01.1)

Contingency Plan
A plan which is developed for possible operations where the planning factors have identified or can be assumed. This plan is produced in as much detail as possible, including the resources needed and deployment options, as a basis for subsequent planning. (AAP-6)

Control
The coordination of activity, through processes and structures that enable a commander to manage risk and to deliver intent. (BDD 3rd Edition)
Countering-Irregular Activity
The coordinated measures, incorporating military activity with the other instruments of power within a Comprehensive Approach, that deal with the threats to security from irregular activity, while building governance and authority and addressing the underlying causes. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Crisis Management
The process of preventing, containing or resolving crises before they develop into armed conflict, while simultaneously planning for possible escalation. (BDD 3rd Edition)

Decisive Condition
A specific combination of circumstances deemed necessary to achieve a campaign objective. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Desired Outcome
A favourable and enduring situation, consistent with political direction, reached through intervention or as a result of some other form of influence. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Domain
There are 3 Domains:
1. Physical Domain. The sphere in which physical activity occurs and where the principal effects generated are upon capability.
2. Virtual Domain. The sphere in which intangible activity occurs, such as the generation, maintenance and transfer of information. The principal effects generated are upon understanding.
3. Cognitive Domain. The sphere in which human decision-making occurs as a result of assimilating knowledge acquired through thought, experience and sense. The principal effects generated are upon will and understanding. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Note: The internet is part of the virtual domain.

Fires
The deliberate use of physical means to realise of, primarily, physical effects. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Fighting Power
The ability to fight, consisting of conceptual component (encompassing the thought process involved in producing military effectiveness); a moral component (the ability to get people to fight) and a physical component (the means to fight), measured by assessment of operational capability. (JDP 0-01.1)
Influence Activities
The capability, or perceived capacity, to affect the character or behavior of someone or something. (BDD 3rd Edition)

Information Management
The integrated management processes and services that provide exploitable information on time, in the right place and format, to maximise freedom of action. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
The prioritised integration, coordination and synchronisation of capabilities and activities to acquire, process and disseminate information and intelligence, to support the planning and execution of operations. (JDP 3-00 3rd Edition)

Irregular Activity
The use, or threat, of force, by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)
Note: Irregular Activity could include a mix of insurgency, terrorism, criminality and disorder.

Joint
Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at least two Services participate. (AAP-6)

Joint Action
The deliberate use and orchestration of military capabilities and activities to realise effects on other actors’ will, understanding and capability, and the cohesion between them. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)
Note: It is implemented through the coordination and synchronisation of Fires, Influence Activities and Manoeuvre.

Joint Commander
The Joint Commander, appointed by CDS, exercises the highest level of operational command of forces assigned with specific responsibility for deployments, sustainment and recovery. (JDP 0-01.1)

Joint Force
A force composed of significant elements of two or more Services operating under a single commander authorised to exercise operational command or control. (JDP 0-01.1)

Joint Force Commander
A general term applied to a commander authorised to exercise operational command or control over a Joint force. (JDP 0-01.1)
Joint Operations Area
An area of land, sea and airspace defined by a higher authority, in which a designated Joint Task Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A Joint Operations Area including its defining parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission specific. (JDP 0-01.1)

Main Effort
The concentration of capability or activity in order to bring about a specific outcome. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Manoeuvre
Coordinated activities necessary to gain advantage within a situation in time and space. (BDD 3rd Edition)

Manoeuvrist Approach
An approach to operations in which shattering the enemy’s overall cohesion and will to fight is paramount. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality is combined with a ruthless determination to succeed. (JDP 0-01.1)

Measurement of Activity
Assessment of the performance of a task and achievement of its associated purpose. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Measurement of Effect
Assessment of the realisation of specified effects. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Military Risk
The probability and implications if an event of potentially substantive positive or negative consequences taking place. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Military Strategic End-State
The extent of the Military Strategic Commander’s contribution to meeting the National Strategic Aim, reached when all the Military Strategic Objectives have been achieved. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Military Strategic Objective
Goals to be achieved by the military in order to meet the National Strategic Aim. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Mission Command
A style of command that seeks to convey understanding to subordinates about intentions of the higher commander and their place within his plan, enabling them to carry out missions with maximum freedom of action and appropriate resources. (JDP 0-01.1)
Multi-agency
Activities or operations in which multiple agencies, including national, international and non-state organisations and other actors, participate in the same or overlapping areas with varying degrees of inter-agency cooperation. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Multinational
Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations, in which forces or agencies of more than one nation participate. See also Joint. (JDP 0-01.1)

National Strategy
The coordinated application of the instruments of national power in the pursuit of national policy aspirations. (BDD 3rd Edition)

National Strategic Aim
The Government’s declared purpose in a particular situation, normally expressed in terms of reaching a future desired outcome. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

National Strategic Objective
A goal to be achieved by one or more instruments of national power in order to meet the National Strategic Aim. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Non-Governmental Organisation
A voluntary, non-profit making organisation that is generally independent of government, international organisations or commercial interests. The organisation will write its own charter and mission. (JDP 0-01.1)

Operational Analysis
The use of mathematical, statistical and other forms of analysis to explore situations and to help decision-makers resolve problems. Facts and probabilities are processed into manageable patterns relevant to the likely consequences of alternative courses of action. (JDP 0-01.1)

Operational Art
The orchestration of a campaign, in concert with other agencies, involved in converting strategic objectives into tactical activity in order to achieve a desired outcome. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Operational Level
The level of warfare at which campaigns are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives and synchronise action, within theatres or areas of operation. (BDD 3rd Edition)

Operation Order
A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. (AAP-6)
Operation Plan
A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation ‘plan’ is usually used instead of ‘order’ in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order. (AAP-6)

Operating Space
All aspects of a Joint Operations Area within which activities, both military and non-military, take place. See also Joint Operations Area. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Security Sector Reform
The reform of security institutions to enable them to play an effective, legitimate and accountable role in providing external and internal security for their citizens under the control of a legitimate authority and to promote stability. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Situational Awareness
The understanding of the operational environment in the context of a commander’s (or staff officer’s) mission (or task). (JDP 0-01.1)

Strategic Objective
A goal to be achieved by one or more instruments of national power in order to meet the National Strategic Aim. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Supporting Effect
The intended consequence of actions. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Supported Commander
A commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by a higher authority. See also Supporting Commander. (JDP 0-01.1)

Supporting Commander
A commander who furnishes forces, equipment, logistics or other support to a supported commander, or who develops a supporting plan. See also supported commander. (JDP 0-01.1)
**Targeting**
The process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate responses to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. *See also Joint Action.* 
(JDP 01 2nd Edition)

**Notes:**
1. Targeting is an integral part of Joint Action.
2. It underpins the use and orchestration of all capabilities and activities (fires, influence activities and manoeuvre) to ensure that they are focused on realising intended effects.

**Theatre of Operations**
A geographical area, or more precisely a space, defined by the military-strategic authority, which includes and surrounds the area delegated to a Joint Force Commander (termed the Joint Operations Area), within which he conducts operations. 
(JDP 01 2nd Edition)