Multinational Interoperability Council

Coalition Building Guide

2nd EDITION

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# COALITION BUILDING GUIDE

## 2nd EDITION

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PREFACE

This Guide was prepared for the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC). The MIC provides a multinational environment for identifying and articulating actions that, if nationally accepted and implemented, would contribute to more effective coalition operations. It serves as a senior-level, executive body for member nations to address and resolve interoperability issues. Membership at the time of publication of this Guide includes Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The overall goal of the MIC is to provide a venue for exchange of relevant information across national boundaries to support the war fighter in coalition operations. It is intended to promote a responsive dialogue among the key elements of interoperability: operational planners, defense policy analysts, and experts from the command, control, communications, computer and intelligence community. It is not intended to duplicate or to subsume other interoperability working groups or forums.

The MIC creates and provides guidance to subordinate Multinational Interoperability Working Groups (MIWGs). A MIWG is task-oriented and outcome-based in its approach to exploring issues concerning coalition interoperability. The MIWG on Policy and Doctrine, prepared this Guide for the MIC.

Background

In October 1999, the Six-Nation Council on Interoperability (now the MIC) created the then Doctrine, Plans and Procedures. MIWG directed that it undertake an investigation of the Lead Nation Concept for the organization and conduct of multinational coalition operations. This was pursuant to a May 1999 seminar and command post exercise conducted by the Council’s Coalition Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) MIWG. The latter produced a recommendation that the Council recognize the ‘planning assumption’ that future coalition operations will (or should) be organized around the Lead Nation Concept. Following the Council’s transition to the current MIC organization, a Doctrine Plans and Procedures meeting was held in April 2000. The United States was given the lead for writing and coordinating a White Paper on the subject, utilizing the May 1999 report as a start point. That White Paper, published in December 2000 and updated in June 2002, provided the basis for the Coalition Building Guide (CBG). The CBG was updated in April 2006 (Change 1). A major review of the CBG took place during 2009/2010 and this CBG represents Edition 2. The CBG comprises of 2 parts: the main body, which is designed to be a stand-alone guide to a Coalition Force Commander and his staff; and supporting annexes which highlight national factors.

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1 In 2006, this Multinational Interoperability Working Group (MIWG) was renamed Policy and Doctrine (P&D).
Every effort was made to reach consensus on the issues addressed in this Guide. In those few instances where any difference remains, the divergence is explained in footnote format and recorded as a national reservation.

The MIC agreed that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allied Joint Doctrine, unless otherwise specifically directed, is default doctrine for planning and conducting multinational coalition operations\(^2\). This Guide does not constitute official policy or doctrine, nor does it represent a definitive staff planning or military decision-making guide. It is offered to assist MIC member nations and their potential partners in serving together in future coalitions, and to assist other MIWGs in their exploration of related interoperability issues. Unlimited local reproduction and distribution is authorized.

**Purpose of the Coalition Building Guide**

The purpose of this Guide is to define and address the coalition building process as it applies to multinational military operations. It seeks to identify essential factors associated with coalition building, within the context of multinational military operations, in order to assist a lead nation, Coalition Force Commander and coalition staff. The Guide concentrates on the strategic and operational levels of multinational joint operations. In addition, it attempts to provide a common framework of reference for contributing nations.

**Key Assumptions**

1. Future military operations are increasingly likely to be multinational and inter-agency/multi-agency in character.

2. A multinational operation may be carried out within an established alliance framework or through the formation of a coalition.

3. There is common recognition by MIC members of the need to be more thoroughly prepared for coalition operations.

4. In most cases, coalition operations will be facilitated by the selection of a lead nation, the definition and responsibilities are within this Guide.

5. Each MIC member recognizes that it may be called upon to perform the role of lead nation in future multinational operations.

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\(^2\) This guide uses established NATO Allied Joint doctrine as a basis. NATO doctrine is the ‘default’ doctrine for a MIC-led coalition unless the lead nation specifies the military doctrine to be used. If a lead nation chooses to use other than NATO doctrine it must ensure all participating coalition partners have access to the doctrine in use. Operating procedures as well as tactics, techniques and procedures will be prescribed by the lead nation.
6. There will be a recognized international organization (e.g. the United Nations (UN)) that provides sanction and oversight for coalition activity.³

Coalition Building Guide Change Proposal Process

The CBG is a living document which should develop in response to lessons identified during the conduct of coalition operations, training and experimentation. It should also be influenced by, technological advances, which may enhance aspects of coalition interoperability and communications, as well as national and alliance doctrinal development. The process required to amend this publication follows:

1. Any member nation of the MIC may suggest a change to the CBG. Change suggestions are forwarded to the P&D MIWG no later than 45 days prior to a scheduled MIWG meeting.

2. The P&D secretary will review the change, then using line-in line-out procedures incorporate the change into the current CBG. Subsequently he/she will send the proposal to P&D MIWG members for review.

3. The P&D MIWG will discuss the proposed changes during the working group and make recommendations to the Steering Group to accept, reject or modify the change during the MIWG meeting.

4. The Steering Group can choose to follow the recommendation of the P&D MIWG, open the topic for discussion with all working groups or defer a decision until the change can be reviewed further. Should the Steering Group choose to delay the decision, working groups will agree upon a timeframe for comment.

5. The P&D MIWG secretary will collect comments and present findings to the P&D Chair, who will subsequently communicate the consensus of opinion to the Steering Group Chair.

6. The P&D and Steering Group chairs will approve the final acceptance or rejection of the change. The Steering Group chair will brief the MIC on the recommendation. The change will be incorporated upon approval of the MIC.

³ NATIONAL RESERVATION: France does not agree with wording as it suggests that a body other than the United Nations can act to sanction coalition actions. Germany supports the French national reservation. For DEU operations can only be executed within the framework of international organizations and on a sound legal basis (preferably a UN mandate) German troops may contribute to ad hoc coalition operations.
CHAPTER 1 – LEAD NATION, COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH AND LEVELS OF WARFARE

SECTION I – LEAD NATION

0101. The Coalition Building Guide (CBG) is based upon the lead nation concept. For the purposes of the CBG, the lead nation is described as:

The Lead Nation is that nation with the will and capability, competence, and influence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning, mounting, and execution of a coalition military operation. Within the overarching organizational framework provided by the Lead Nation, other nations participating in the coalition may be designated as Functional Lead Agent(s) to provide and/or coordinate specific critical sub-functions of the operation and its execution, based on national capability. These constructs may apply at the strategic, operational, and/or tactical levels.

To avoid possible confusion, it must be noted that the CBG definition differs from, but is roughly analogous to, terms utilized in NATO. The ‘lead nation’ referred to here would be recognizable within NATO as the ‘framework nation,’ whereas ‘functional lead agent’ would correspond to a nation within NATO which is designated as a ‘Lead Nation’ for functional specialty support. NATO’s AJP-3, Allied Joint Operations defines ‘framework nation’ as follows. Forces based on a framework nation are commanded by an officer of that nation. A significant proportion of the staff and the headquarters support will come from the framework nation; its working language is of that nation. Staff procedures, although based on Alliance standards, will also reflect those of the framework nation. In practice, however, once command and staff teams work together, procedures may incorporate the ‘best ideas’ of the contributing nations.

NATIONAL RESERVATION: France believes there may be instances in which will justify the creation of a ‘group of lead nations,’ which may be possible if discrete nations have the strategic, operational and tactical leads, for example. This may also be the case in a situation which demands the ‘division of labor’ across nations at all levels in order to maximize specialist capabilities. This Guide does not explore that level of complexity. France believes that this definition should read as follows:

‘The lead nation, or group of lead nations, is ‘that nation with the will and capability, competence and influence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning, mounting, and execution of a coalition military operation. Within the overarching organizational framework provided by the Lead Nation, other nations participating in the coalition may be designated as Functional Lead Agent(s) to provide and/or coordinate specific critical sub-functions of the operation and its execution, based on national capability. These constructs may apply at the strategic, operational, and/or tactical levels.’
0102. The selection of a lead nation will occur within the international strategic context as a coalition begins to form. It is assumed that coalition operations will be conducted in accordance with a mandate recognized under international law originating with such an authority as the United Nations Security Council.\(^4\) This recognized ‘civil authority’ will most likely act to initiate or approve the coalition activity under consideration, as well as to define overarching objectives and the desired end state. It is further assumed that this same entity would designate, or accept the offered services of a lead nation. The lead nation must be willing and capable of assuming the role. It must be able to organize consultation on and the development of the coalition’s political objectives, act as sponsor and spokesman for the coalition’s operations in the world community, lead coordination and building of consensus during the coalition’s planning and execution phases, and be competent to carry out the anticipated operation. It must above all be a politically acceptable choice for the other coalition partners. The latter is likely to include consideration of the lead nation’s ties to and interests in the specific region or conflict and its acceptability to the regional actors involved. International political consultation and control of the operation needs to be carried out through an appropriate council of national leaders duly empowered by their respective governments. A preponderance or operationally significant share of the overall force contribution is a clear factor in selection of a lead nation; however, that nation must also possess the strategic and political attributes required to sustain a coalition, or the coalition effort is likely to fail.

**SECTION II – COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH**

0103. Recent experiences of coalition operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo and other operations confirm the complexity of contemporary crises. Complex crises do not lend themselves to simple definition or analysis. Today’s challenges demand a comprehensive approach by the international community, including the coordinated action from an appropriate range of civil and military actors, enabled by the orchestration, coordination and de-confliction of coalitions’ military and political instruments with the other instruments of power. The coalition’s engagement in a comprehensive approach to crisis management is focused at 3 levels:

a. At the political and strategic level, the coalition concentrates on building confidence and mutual understanding between international actors.

b. At the operational level, the priority is to cooperate with other international actors in the overall planning for complex operations in which a large degree of civil-military interaction will be required.

\(^4\) **NATIONAL RESERVATION:** France does not agree with the wording which suggests that a body other than the United Nations can act to sanction coalition actions such as those described in this Guide.
At the theatre level, coalition force commanders must be empowered to conduct effective cooperation and coordination with indigenous local authorities and other international actors in the execution of operations.

All 3 levels should function in a complementary manner to achieve success.

0104. Doctrine considers there to be 3 targets in the successful prosecution of a comprehensive approach:

a. Improving the coherent application of the coalition’s own crisis management instruments, including its military and political planning procedures.

b. Improving a coalition’s practical cooperation at all levels with partners, the UN (and other relevant international organizations), governmental and Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and local actors in the planning and conduct of operations.

c. Enhancing the coalition’s ability to bring military support to stabilization operations and reconstruction efforts in all phases of a conflict in concert with other actors.

0105. In the context of crisis management, the success of a comprehensive approach is dependent on a common sense of purpose and resolve, mutual understanding and collaboration, and appropriate resourcing. This requires political agreement on the desired outcome, which is likely to involve aspects related to security, governance, and economic development. The complexity or evolving nature of a crisis may preclude unambiguous defining of the desired outcome. It may only be possible to look ahead months rather than years and reframing the problem and desired outcome may become necessary.

0106. Political agreement on a desired outcome is necessary for clarity on strategies and objectives. However complete agreement between different actors may be difficult to achieve and, in that case, developing a shared vision or unity of purpose should be pursued. Creating the conditions to achieve a desired outcome requires active involvement from each of the instruments of power. It also requires effective collaboration between military and non-military actors, across both the coalition and a broad range of multinational institutions, agencies and organizations. Although the implementation of this comprehensive approach may vary between the levels of operation (strategic, operational and tactical), and from one crisis to another, a number of guiding principles apply:

a. The need for proactive engagement between all actors, before and during a crisis.
b. The importance of shared understanding engendered through cooperative working, liaison, education and a common language.

c. The value of collaborative working based upon mutual trust and a willingness to cooperate – institutional familiarity and information sharing are key.

d. Thinking focused on outcomes, ensuring that all actors work towards a common goal (or outcome), and ideally mutually agreed objectives, underpinned, even in the absence of unity of command, by unity of purpose.

0107. From a military perspective, a comprehensive approach is founded on not only a shared situational understanding, but also recognition that sometimes non-military actors may support the military and conversely on other occasions the military’s role will be supporting those actors. Recent coalition operations suggest that these elements are inter-dependent. A military plan is most likely to succeed (in making a significant contribution to the desired outcome) when it is nested within a comprehensive response, itself based upon a shared understanding of the problem and a universal commitment to resolve it. Unity of command may be elusive and, realistically, only unity of purpose can be achieved. In this case only through negotiation will commanders and other actors be able to confirm responsibilities, resolve differences, facilitate coordination and create unity of effort across a diverse multi-agency ‘coalition’. Having Terms of Reference, Memorandums of Understanding or agreements at a high level provides some framework for coordination. Implementing the comprehensive approach requires sensitivity, rapport, respect, trust, patience and tact, as well as a determination to collaborate by all actors, military and civilian, at all levels.

0108. The role of military force in achieving the desired outcome should be very carefully considered and understood by those directing the strategy. If the successful use of force leads directly to the achievement of the desired outcome, then it can be said to be decisive. But if the military contribution simply enables, or supports, the achievement of the desired outcome by others, then it is not decisive. In the case of the latter, it will be important to include from the outset those elements – diplomatic, civil, and economic – that are to be enabled by military success. Failure to do so will at best lose the strategic initiative; at worst, it will result in strategic failure. This is the basic premise of a comprehensive approach, which applies to coalition operations.

SECTION III – LEVELS OF ACTIVITY

0109. This Guide adheres to the 4-tiered strategic (political/governmental) – military-strategic-operational-tactical paradigm for the direction of operations (Figure 1.1). Note that some nations may insert a theatre strategic level between the national levels and operational levels. The political level concerns the application of the full range of national resources, across all instruments of power, to achieve national policy objectives. It is the domain of Heads of Government and ministers and encompasses the recognized civil authority, whose mandate underpins the multinational response.
Within a coalition, responsibility for the application of resources in the pursuit of agreed objectives, which will be driven by both national and coalition interests, will be shared by coalition members at this level. Operations are then directed at the strategic level and planned, executed and sustained at the operational and tactical levels, based on their intended effect or contribution to realizing the stated objectives. This Guide is focused upon the military-strategic and operational levels.

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**Figure 1.1 – Tiered Levels**

**SECTION IV – THE POLITICAL/GOVERNMENTAL LEVEL**

0110. **Coalition Command.** Coalition command demands an international perspective. In order to generate productive interaction and cooperation with multinational partners a commander will need to develop effective personal relationships between politicians and military leaders based on a genuine rapport. He should also foster a constructive culture based upon:

a. **Rapport.** The personal relationship amongst military leaders, civilian leaders and personnel will influence every aspect of coalition cooperation.

b. **Respect and Trust.** Mutual respect for the professional ability, culture, history, religion, customs and values of participants. It is important to focus on the
positive aspects of national contributions. Respect and trust cannot be assumed or quickly implemented; they should be developed over time.

c. **Knowledge.** Time taken to understand the doctrine, capabilities and aspirations of partners will pay dividends. It is important that nations are given a role commensurate with their capability.

d. **Patience.** Differences of opinion, perspective and understanding may generate friction. Effective cooperation takes time and patience to develop.

0111. **Advantages of Coalition Cooperation.** Coalition cooperation allows political and military objectives to be achieved when unilateral action would be insufficient or undesirable. Merging the capabilities of different military forces adds depth (strength in numbers) and breadth (additional capabilities), as well as providing access to national and/or regional infrastructure and, potentially, logistics, information and intelligence. National contributions will, however, be shaped by national interest and political imperatives. They should, therefore, be viewed in terms of their wider political, as well as purely military, benefit. The political advantages of multinational cooperation include sharing political risks, demonstrating economic, diplomatic, military or political support to other regions as well as influencing national and international opinion, all of which may be as, if not more, critical to delivering an enduring resolution to a crisis than any discrete capability.

**Challenges of Coalition Cooperation**

0112. However well a force is organized, multi-nationality poses a number of key challenges that threaten the success of the campaign. These include the formation of an effective command system, an intelligence system which can draw and share data from a number of multinational and national sources, the existence of national caveats on employment that may affect the utility of force elements, and a logistic system that acknowledges national responsibilities for support but also caters for multinational needs.

0113. Multinational command may lead to slower response times than purely national command arrangements and the speed and quality of decision-making may be reduced. Such detrimental effects can be minimized through the adoption of common doctrine and procedures plus realistic training. Some of the challenges that may need to be addressed are:

a. **Shared Situational Understanding.** It is important to establish and maintain a common understanding of the operating environment and the problem that must be addressed in the operation that coalition forces are assigned to. For longer duration campaigns it is especially important for campaign continuity understand the overall campaign design and underlying logic that plans are developed from. This must be maintained and not lost during key personnel (commanders and planning staff), headquarters or unit rotations.
b. **Mission Creep.** Mission creep is the adoption of additional tasks to a mission that may not conform to the original purpose. In such situations there is a danger of disconnection between strategic objectives and the realities in the Joint Operations Area resulting in poorly defined, unrealistic or inappropriate missions. This is distinct from deliberate reframing of the problem as the commander’s understanding of the environment or problem changes.

c. **Interoperability.** The complexity of an operation will determine the appropriate level of interoperability and the composition of the force will determine interoperability standards that are to apply. A lack of interoperability in the areas of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities is likely to have a negative effect on force cohesion and capability. Procedural and tactical differences present the force with situations where units from different services and nations may not be able to work effectively together. Language differences present communications problems that may result in differences in interpretation of the mission or assigned tasks. Technical difficulties can cause a lack of system compatibility. Inability to exchange information, intelligence, technical data, or communications can result from a lack of interoperability and national security concerns. Inability to use common sources may degrade logistic capabilities and thus affect the sustainability of the force. Joint and multinational forces must have interoperable combat identification procedures and capabilities to minimize the risk of fratricide and enhance operational efficiency.

d. **Force Protection.** Nations have different force protection philosophies, policies and priorities. In a multinational force these differences should be reconciled into an overall Coalition Force Protection policy otherwise an adversary can exploit them.

0114. **Coordinating Activities in the Information Environment.** It is important that Coalition partners coordinate influence activities, in support of a multinational Information Strategy from the earliest stages of the Coalition building and strategic planning process. Individual nations will have full responsibility for then implementing these activities affecting their domestic audiences. Nations may also undertake additional influence activities independently, provided they are consistent with the agreed strategic-political guidance.

0115. **Political Consensus.** Besides interoperability, which allows operational efficiency, political consensus is a necessary condition for coalition success. Political consensus depends on at least 5 conditions.

a. **Legitimacy.** The use of force must be legitimate, and be seen to be so. It is the essential foundation upon which a commander builds authority for the campaign; it also bolsters morale and promotes cohesion within a force. It is based on international law and a clear mandate. However, it encompasses not
only what is considered legally permissible (both nationally and internationally), but also what is judged ethically and morally acceptable. Normally a recognized international civil authority, such as the UN, will endorse coalition activity and may also designate, or accept the offered services of, a lead nation. It will also provide overarching political guidance, as well as endorsement of strategic goals and the desired end-state. While it is possible that a coalition might act in the absence of formal sanction from a recognized authority, such a decision could undermine legitimacy from the outset.

b. **Lead Nation.** The lead nation provides the commander and the majority of staff with the coalition headquarters. Moreover, it is likely to dictate the language and command and staff procedures utilized. Ultimately the lead nation assumes responsibility for all aspects of planning and execution and provides the Command, Control, communications and Information’s (C3I) structure, doctrine\(^5\) and logistic\(^6\) coordination which supports it. Other nations then assign contributions to the force, and fulfill some positions within the lead nation’s staff. Clearly, a prospective lead nation must seek or consent to the role, which is likely to be driven by national interests across the spheres of security, economic, political, and culture. Such a commitment will be pivotal to selection. However, selection will also be shaped by acceptability to both coalition partners and the indigenous political structure.

c. **Political Consultation Allowing All Participating Nations to be Part of the Decision-making Process.** Within the context of a firm legal basis and a designated lead nation, a forum for political consultation is essential. It must be inclusive and comprehensive – all nations should be represented at an appropriate level (e.g. Ambassador). Military participation in this process should be provided by a corresponding military authority.

d. **Political Control through all Phases of the Operation.** Political direction of the operation will be exercised through the designated political authority. The lead nation is then required to coordinate the political/military interface, assisting in the translation of political objectives into supporting strategic military objectives, with a desired end-state. Essentially, it converts policy and political guidance into military direction. Moreover, as well as implementing decisions, it must report to the international community. Functional links between the political and military authority should be established early.

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\(^5\) NATO Allied Joint Doctrine is the default doctrine for MIC-led coalition operations.

\(^6\) According to NATO’s AJP-4, Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine, lead nation logistic support might be separately carried out by a nation without being responsible for the total planning and execution of an operation.
e. **Coalition Information Strategy.** For the authority of the campaign to be maintained and the operation executed in a coherent fashion, a Single Information Strategy will be required to provide a framework within which the commander can work. It should set out key themes, messages and audiences, which shape his general approach and the conduct of specific activities, both physical and psychological. It must be based on a sound understanding of the information environment.

0116. In the conduct of operations, political control would be exercised through directives to the coalition commander in accordance with individual nations’ intent and Rules of Engagement. These directives may be guided by periodic reports on the progress of the operation and situation assessments from the coalition commander.

SECTION V – THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

0117. The strategic level encompasses broad politico-military national and coalition plans, policies, security objectives and guidance, as well as the use of national and multinational resources to accomplish objectives.

0118. Military Strategy is ‘that component of national or multinational strategy, representing the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations’. A winning strategy hinges upon the successful union of **Ends** (objectives), **Ways** (strategic guidance) and **Means** (resources). Documents which set out the military aspects of strategy must contain an explanation of how military objectives relate to the realization of the strategic end-state. The role of the military force must be carefully considered by those setting out the strategy, and be clearly understood by the operational level commander.

0119. Selection of the lead nation enables the development of the military-strategic options and the corresponding operational level planning by initiating the multinational planning process. At the strategic politico-military level, nation-states are influenced by internal and external factors that shape national interests. The convergence of national interests is one of the main objectives of the political and military authorities. They play a key role in establishing an appropriate decision making process among coalition-nations, linking together the consultation and planning processes. It is in this strategic context that the lead nation will be selected from among the members of an emerging coalition.

0120. Political and military authorities will establish an effective consultation process to assist the lead nation in establishing and promoting a strong political position in the international strategic context. The consultation process includes routine reports and updates, as previously discussed, as well as a concerted effort to sustain the political consensus necessary to see the operation through to its conclusion.
The first task for the lead nation is to develop strategic guidance and build political consensus for it. Though not normally considered as planning, the development of strategic guidance is critical and sets the context for the more detailed activities of the Coalition Force Commander (CFC) and his staff. Strategic guidance should define the coalition’s objectives and overall political-military approach, then provide specific direction for planning and execution. It should also make the scope of the coalition’s mandate explicit, with any constraints or restrictions clearly articulated. In principle, this process of development should be comprehensive in nature.

As discussed, in military terms it will be necessary for the lead nation to assume overall responsibility for planning, in the context of strategic mission guidance from the political authority, including the development of a concept of operations and an operations plan to fulfill the mission. These documents will be approved by the political authority. (Further implications for planning are discussed later in this Guide). Finally, it must coordinate and synchronize the execution of the plan, which will demand constant adjustment in response to iterative assessment. Essentially, the lead nation will be required to provide overarching command and control architecture (encompassing personnel, organizations and structures, processes and equipment/capabilities which support them), potentially down to component commands. At the same time, however, it is also incumbent upon the lead nation to promote coalition unity of effort to include political and public advocacy, legal coordination, information sharing, and implementation of the Coalition Information Strategy.

The breadth of demands placed upon a lead nation mean that criteria for its selection extend beyond availability and will of any one nation to undertake the role, to include consideration of whether a nation is actually competent to do so. Furthermore, international acceptability across the coalition and across the region will be a key factor. Regional ties to parties in conflict will shape any decision and the nation selected must be perceived as an ‘honest broker’ by parties to a regional conflict, if it is to have credibility.

Notwithstanding the above, the selection of a lead nation may be driven by level of commitment – the nation who provides the largest force contribution leads the coalition. Though this is a very simplistic approach it has logic and the nation with a preponderance of forces (or some indispensable capability) may be most capable of providing the necessary overarching command and control, and support structures required to sustain an operation. However, the other factors mentioned above, and acceptability in particular, should not be ignored.

In summary, the lead nation must be willing and capable of assuming the role. It must be able to: facilitate the development of the coalition’s political objectives, broad consensus and strategic guidance; act as sponsor and spokesman for the coalition’s operations across the international community; lead coordination and building of consensus during the coalition’s planning and execution phases; and be sufficiently
competent to carry out the anticipated operation. It must above all be a politically acceptable choice. The latter is likely to include consideration of the lead nation’s ties to and interests in the specific region or conflict and its acceptability to the regional actors involved. A preponderance of force contribution is a clear factor in selection of a lead nation. However that nation must possess the strategic political attributes required to sustain a coalition.

**Essential Strategic Guidance**

0126. During the activation and forming of a coalition military task force a useful construct is that of *Essential Strategic Guidance*. This construct is one that has been validated over the past decades as being the minimum essential guidance that the lead nation should provide to the strategic and operational military commanders of a multinational task force. It also provides a framework from which to pursue guidance from the lead nation if lacking during a crisis response situation. It contains 9 elements as a starting construct for a coalition operation (Figure 1.2). Development of this guidance involves the informal or formal consultation and coordination between the highest levels of national leadership from the respective nations involved in the coalition effort.

<table>
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**Figure 1.2 – Essential Strategic Guidance Construct**

0127. Ideally all elements are fully addressed prior to the execution of multinational operations. In reality many of the elements may be incomplete or lacking due to the uncertainty and ambiguity present within a crisis response situation. The lead nation’s strategic and operational level coalition military commanders and staff must fully engage at the national strategic level to address incomplete or lacking essential strategic guidance. Additionally, the lead nation strategic and operational level military
commanders may have to assist in the national strategic levels in the shaping of this guidance based upon their forward assessments of the problem underpinning the crisis.

0128. In all cases the goal is to reach agreement on the guidance with all participating nations, or, when UN channels are involved, to obtain an approved UN resolution and/or mandate(s) prior to execution of a multinational military response. It is essential to recognize and acknowledge that this guidance is normally dynamic and undergoes continual refinement as the crisis evolves and situational conditions change. This simply requires that lead nation’s strategic and operational military commanders and staff to maintain close and continuous coordination with the national strategic level (political and military) to advise and participate in this refinement process.

SECTION VI – THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

0129. The operational level is ‘the level of operations at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations’. The operational level provides the vital link between strategic objectives and the tactical employment of forces. Without this link, it is unlikely that tactical actions will lead to the achievement of the operational (and therefore strategic) end-state. So not only should appropriate actions be linked by the operational level to the aims of the overall strategy, but the strategy should also be linked through the operational level to what is tactically realistic. Of prime importance is for the operational level commander to understand clearly how his activities mesh with other strategic lines of operation.

1030. The complexity of operations increases especially where there is a significant presence of non-military participants who are likely be reluctant, even hostile, to the perception that they are functioning in a close or supporting role with the military. In all circumstances, the commander of a task force is placed at the centre of a 3-dimensional web that extends upward to the strategic level, downward to the tactical level, and laterally to a range of military and civilian groupings and organizations.

Principles of Coalition Operations

0131. Although there is a common agreement on the importance and relevance of the principles, they are not absolute and the operational situation may demand greater emphasis on some of them rather than others. For commanders the principles are important guidelines in forming and selecting a course of action and in commanding and controlling operations.

7 Modified Allied Administrative Publication (AAP-6), NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.
a. **Definition of Objectives.** Joint multinational operations should be directed towards clearly defined and commonly understood objectives that contribute to the achievement of the desired end-state. The mission and objectives should be defined with absolute clarity before operations begin. When an objective has been identified as the ‘main effort’, all Joint activity should be directed towards its achievement. 4 key questions should be considered in the process of defining the objectives and the end-state:

(1.) What is the purpose of the mission?

(2.) What criteria constitute mission accomplishment?

(3.) What are the exit criteria?

(4.) Who declares success or victory?

b. **Unity of Purpose.** Operations depend on cooperation in order to coordinate all activities to realize the maximum combined effort. Military forces achieve this principally through *unity of command*, which provides the necessary cohesion for planning and execution of operations. It is achieved by vesting the authority to direct and coordinate the action of all forces and military assets in a single commander. In a complex operational environment the commander is also striving to achieve coordination with the other instruments of power. Unity of command is rarely possible when dealing with non-military agencies, so *unity of purpose* is more appropriate; where goodwill, a common purpose, clear and agreed division of responsibilities, and an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of others, are essential elements of achieving unity of purpose and achieving the maximum collective effort.

c. **Sustainment.** Planning for sustainment comprises making all administrative arrangements necessary for the successful implementation of the operation plan, including logistic and personnel support. Ensuring a sound administrative baseline should be part of operational planning from the outset. Logistics will often be one of the most important factors in the development and selection of courses of action.

d. **Concentration of Force.** Combat power should be concentrated at the decisive time and place to achieve decisive results. Superior force is not just a matter of numbers but also of fighting skills, cohesion, morale, timing, selection of the objectives, and the employment of advanced technology.

e. **Economy of Effort.** In the absence of unlimited resources, it will be necessary to take risks in those areas that do not meet the primary objectives. The principle of economy of effort recognizes that, if decisive strength is to be applied in the areas where it will have most effect, achievement of those objectives cannot be
compromised by diversions to areas of lower priority. Thus economy of effort implies the employment of resources in such a manner that a commander’s primary objectives can be achieved.

f. **Flexibility.** Plans should be sufficiently flexible to allow for the unexpected and to allow commanders freedom of action to respond to changing circumstances. This requires an understanding of the superior commanders’ intentions, flexibility of mind, rapid decision-making, good organization and good communications. Flexibility also demands physical mobility to allow forces to concentrate quickly at decisive times and places.

g. **Initiative.** Initiative can be developed and fostered through trust and mutual understanding and by training. It is about recognizing and seizing opportunities and solving problems in an original manner. For a climate of initiative to flourish, a commander should be given the freedom to use initiative, and should in turn encourage subordinates to use theirs. Commanders should be encouraged to take the initiative without fearing the consequences of failure. This requires a training and operational culture which promotes an attitude of risk taking in order to win rather than to prevent defeat.

h. **Maintenance of Morale.** Commanders should give their command an identity, promote self-esteem, inspire it with a sense of common purpose and unity of effort, and give it achievable aims. High morale depends on good leadership, which instills courage, energy, determination and care for the personnel entrusted.

i. **Surprise.** Surprise is built on speed, secrecy and deception and is fundamental to the shattering of an adversary’s cohesion achieving results that are disproportionate to the effort expended.

j. **Security.** Security enhances freedom of action by limiting vulnerability to hostile activities and threats. Active and passive security measures help to deny critical information to an adversary. They assist deception and help counter offensive actions.

k. **Simplicity.** Simple plans and clear orders minimize misunderstandings and confusion.

0132. In addition to the principles identified above, which apply to all operations, predominate campaign themes such as security and stabilization may also require the consideration of a number of other principles:

a. **Impartiality.** Some operations should be conducted impartially, in accordance with its mandate, and without favor or prejudice to any party.
b. **Consent.** The degree of acquiescence to the presence of a force charged with a peace support mission. Consent will vary in time and space horizontally across all elements of the population and vertically within the hierarchies of the parties to the conflict.

c. **Restraint in the Use of Force.** Commanders and their forces use a measured and proportionate application of force sufficient to achieve a specific objective. Constraints and restraints on the circumstances in which, and the ways and means by which, force may be used may be established in the mandate as well as by international law, domestic law of the force providers and, in certain circumstances, host-nation law.

d. **Perseverance/Long Term View.** The achievement of the political end-state will require a patient and persistent pursuit of objectives.

e. **Legitimacy.** The legitimacy of the operation and the wider perception of that legitimacy will provide the foundation for support from the international community, contributing nations, and involved parties (including the indigenous civil community).

f. **Credibility.** For an operation to be effective, it should be credible and perceived as such by all parties. The credibility of the operation is a reflection of the parties’ assessment of the force’s capability to accomplish the mission.

g. **Mutual Respect.** The respect in which a joint force is held is a direct consequence of its professional conduct and how it treats the parties to a conflict and the local population.

h. **Transparency.** The Joint Force’s mission and concept of operations should be easily understood and obvious to all parties. Failure to achieve common understanding may lead to suspicion, mistrust or even hostility.

i. **Freedom of Movement.** Freedom of movement is essential for the successful accomplishment of any operation; where freedom of movement is constrained, objectives become more difficult to attain, at all levels.

j. **Environmental Protection.** Environmental protection is the application and integration of all aspects of environmental considerations as they apply to military operations. Factors that should be considered include pollution prevention, waste management, conservation heritage protection and protection of flora and fauna.
The Operational Level Framework

0133. There are 5 key functions, underpinned by the principles above, at the operational level, which considered together form a framework for operations; they assist the commander in both execution and visualization. The 5 functions are: shape, engage, exploit, protect and sustain. They help the commander to visualize how major operations, battles and engagements relate to one another within the overall campaign. They should not be viewed as sequential, or separate and distinct phases; the key is to maintain a clear focus on success, balancing the need to be bold and decisive with the constraints and limitations of modern operations. The functions also enable a commander to describe how subordinates’ missions relate to each other in time, space and purpose.

0134. **Shape The Operational Environment.** This viewpoint focuses on manipulating the operational environment to the coalition’s advantage and to the disadvantage of an adversary. This includes identifying those areas where coalition strengths can be exploited and information superiority attained while the adversary’s strengths are minimized. Threatening an adversary, or appearing to threaten him, throughout his depth, and never allowing him to feel secure anywhere, while using coordinated Information Operations (Info Ops) within a Coalition Information Strategy can seriously undermine his understanding of the environment and reduce his freedom of action. Simultaneously, and acting within the wider political context, the legitimacy and justification for the use of force should be conveyed in order to build and maintain support for own actions in home and other audiences. The difficulties of doing this should not be underestimated and illustrate the importance of a detailed understanding of the nature of the problem. In fact, so important is the process of problem framing (placing the crisis in the correct context to maximize understanding), that it could be argued that Framing the Operational Environment is a first, separate function in its own right.

0135. **Engage, to Attack the Adversary’s Will and Cohesion.** The decisive element of a campaign will usually involve some form of offensive action against the will and cohesion of adversaries. By breaking an adversary’s cohesion, he is unable to coordinate and organize military and other actions; usually it is then much easier to defeat him piecemeal. By undermining his will, an adversary will be less able to motivate his forces to take risky action, and may be more willing to accept political or other compromise. Will and cohesion are inter-connected: if an adversary’s will is undermined his force will be less cohesive; if his cohesion is shattered his will to continue is likely to be reduced. It may be difficult to determine how to attack the cohesion of non-traditional military forces such as dispersed insurgent groups; nevertheless there will normally be some form of coordinating organization, however

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8 In a situation where there is no clear adversary, this might be the object of the mission, i.e. the thing which provides the greatest resistance to the mission and in this sense is ‘affect’ rather than ‘attack’.
loose knit and dispersed. Understanding the organization of such groups, and how they adapt to survive, is the key to attacking their cohesion. Will and cohesion can be attacked through:

a. **Synchronization of Fires, Influence Activities and Maneuver.** Although they can achieve a significant effect on their own, the synchronized use of fires influence activities and maneuver has the greatest effect.

   (1.) Firepower destroys, neutralizes, suppresses and demoralizes. Firepower effects are the sum of volume, accuracy, lethality, suddenness and unpredictability, and these are magnified by synchronizing joint firepower in time and space. The effects of firepower must be exploited by maneuver and where possible by influence activities if the results are to be more than transitory.

   (2.) Operational maneuver seeks to place the adversary at a disadvantage and may be physical or conceptual in nature. In the physical sense the psychological effect may be so great as to render fighting unnecessary. In the conceptual sense, maneuver may be applied in such a way as to present the adversary with such a poor choice of options that he is forced to concede.

b. **Tempo and Simultaneity.** Tempo is the rhythm or rate of activity of operations, relative to the adversary.

   (1.) Tempo comprises 3 elements: speed of decision; speed of execution; and speed of transition from one activity to the next. Greater tempo will overload the adversary’s decision-making process at critical moments and is likely to cause paralysis, inaction and a breakdown of resistance to the point where he loses the cohesion needed to continue the fight. This can be achieved by speeding up or slowing down, or changing the type of activity.

   (2.) Simultaneity seeks to overload the adversary by attacking or threatening him from so many angles at once that he is denied the ability to concentrate on one problem at a time, or even establish priorities between problems. He faces dilemmas about how and where to react, he is torn in different directions and even if he is not paralyzed, he finds it hard to respond coherently. Simultaneity should be seen through the eyes of the adversary and its use judged by the effect on his cohesion.

   (3.) If the effect of simultaneity and tempo is repeated concurrently against a number of levels of command, a cumulative effect on cohesion is felt throughout the adversary force. By using the full range of friendly capabilities, the adversary’s problems are compounded, his response to
one form of attack either making him vulnerable to another, or exacerbating a different problem.

a. **Surprise.** Surprise is built on speed, security and deception and is fundamental to the shattering of an adversary’s cohesion. As with tempo, time is the key factor. It is not essential that the adversary is taken unaware but only that he becomes aware too late to react effectively. Absolute surprise may totally paralyze the adversary, but partial surprise will also degrade his reaction. Surprise involves identifying, creating and exploiting opportunities, which may be fleeting. It means doing the unexpected or reacting in an unexpected manner, playing on the adversary’s perceptions and expectations.

b. **Relative Advantage.** In joint operations the aim of a commander should always be to achieve a relative advantage over his adversary. This can be achieved by:

1. Overwhelming force.
2. Decision superiority.
3. A favorable shaping of the battle space.

Exploiting an opponent’s weakness is fundamental to success, just as is the identification of the own forces’ weaknesses that an opponent might potentially be able to exploit.

0136. **Exploit Opportunity.** A commander should exploit opportunities to seize and retain the initiative (the ability to dictate the course of events), or regain it once lost, in order to achieve his mission. Making the most of such opportunities, whether they be created through successful engagement or arise through chance, relies upon a commander’s ability not only to identify them in advance but to be able to generate the means to exploit them. More broadly, it involves not only identifying or creating opportunities, but having or obtaining the means and will to exploit them and achieving a higher tempo relative to the adversary.

a. Exploitation of the other methods of attacking will and cohesion is a critical role for Info Ops. Military or other success can have a much greater impact if the Info Ops staff understands the motivation and psychology of the target audience to ensure that will is actually undermined, as opposed to building their spirit of resistance.

b. The use of maneuver and offensive action is fundamental to seizing and holding the initiative, which is the key to being able to exploit opportunities. Mission Command allows Component Commanders or subordinates to exploit opportunities that present themselves, providing they are within the overall intent.
c. The ability to do this successfully relies on continuous planning, including accurate risk analysis and management. Both subjective and objective risk analysis is required and intuition has a role to play. The Commander should promote a culture that is risk-aware, rather than risk-averse. This approach requires that commanders at all levels are able to identify those areas where significant risk lies and then choose to accept, avoid or mitigate against them. The commander who analyses, assesses and actively manages risk is frequently able to seize opportunities and take bold decisions. Key events or effects are identified in each phase of the Course of Action (COA) that are judged to be: of significant operational concern; could provide a potential opportunity for exploitation; or of unknown quantity whose outcome could be significant.

0137. **Protect Coalition Force Cohesion.** At the same time as attacking the adversary’s cohesion, that of the coalition force must be protected. Cohesion of coalition operations poses a particular challenge. Contributing nations may have differing agendas and provide forces with varied degrees of fighting power, including different doctrine and incompatible equipment. Personalities and political influence are likely to have a disproportionate effect on the cohesion of a multinational force. Cohesion is maintained through:

a. **Maintenance of Morale.** The adversary will make every effort to identify and attack weaknesses in the coalition force, to reduce morale and thus erode cohesion. In multinational operations, the adversary may try to inflict disproportionate casualties on one particular nation’s forces, or exploit religious or cultural differences. The commander should attempt to mask these vulnerabilities and focus the force on the maintenance of the aim, whilst ensuring a comprehensive and coordinated approach to force protection based upon risk management and a measured assessment of the threat.

b. **Unity of Purpose.** Unity of purpose is a key contributor, in concert with the other instruments of power, to the effective employment of military forces. It demands that they be directed relentlessly towards the achievement of a common aim or mission. Commanders play a key role in focusing their commands on achieving the mission and in generating a common sense of purpose by developing a clear, concise Commander’s Intent. Within multinational operations, individual goals and interests will need to be harmonized to ensure a common purpose, and consensus will need to be maintained to ensure political and military cohesion.

One of the key contemporary challenges within the realms of protection is defensive information operations, specifically cyber, communications and command and control systems’ protections. This is an area of increasing vulnerability, directly proportional to NATO’s levels of dependence on such systems.
0138. **Sustain.** Sustaining operations underpins the freedom of action available to a commander to shape, engage, exploit and protect. From a commander’s perspective they include deployment and recovery, the assembly and movement of reserves or echelon forces, the redeployment and replenishment (or reconstitution or rehabilitation) of forces out of contact, host nation support, and the establishment of operating bases and lines of communication. They are most readily associated with the physical component of fighting power, but have equal impact on the moral component. Multi-nationality and interoperability present the Alliance with particular challenges to sustainment. Sustaining operations represent an obvious target for an opponent’s operations; an appropriate balance of force protection, in accordance with both the perceived risks and the necessary priorities afforded to shape and engage operations, should ensure a Commander’s continued freedom of action.

**Stages of a Joint Operation**

0139. A joint operation normally consists of a number of stages, some of which occur at the military strategic level (e.g. force generation). Typical stages at the operational level, which may overlap and can occur at the same time depending on the situation and mission, are:

a. Knowledge development/Analysis (framing the problem).

b. Development of a campaign plan/Operation Plan (OPLAN).

c. Force preparation, including build-up, assembly and pre-mission training.

d. Build-up of logistic support, including host nation support.

e. Deployment to the area where operations are to be conducted or the reinforcement of in-place forces.

f. Execution of operations.

g. Operation Re-deployment of forces.

h. Termination and military post operation activities.

i. Operation/Campaign analysis – doctrine evaluation and lessons learned.

0140. The CFC should have, within constraints, the greatest possible freedom of action in the planning and execution of operations in a designated joint area of operations. All stages of an operation require continuous coordination and review. Except where specifically restricted by agreements with nations, the CFC may reassign operational command and/or forces under his command as deemed appropriate. The following guidance applies: ‘all command relationships must facilitate the smooth transition of all stage’. 
CHAPTER 2 – CAMPAIGNING

0201. A campaign is a: ‘a set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces’.\(^9\) It demands a way of thinking and specific processes that together enable the effective use of military capability, usually as part of a comprehensive response, to achieve favorable outcomes. Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 01(D), Allied Joint Doctrine, Chapter 5 provides further detail on campaigning within North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Campaigning is underpinned by a number of guiding principles:

a. Take a long-term view about both the underlying causes and symptoms of conflict.

b. Focus on strategic and operational outcomes as well as the conditions required to realize them.

c. Plan and execute a campaign in concert with the other instruments of power where practicable.

d. Embrace collaborative engagement with those multiple agencies sharing the intent to improve the situation.

e. Consider the whole situation and recognize that it is complex, adaptive, non-linear, and, to a certain extent, unpredictable.

f. Conduct continuous analysis and assessment to deepen understanding of changing environments and to modify planning and execution.

0202. Operational Art is the orchestration of all military activities, in concert with other agencies, to convert strategic objectives into tactical actions with a view to achieving a desired outcome. Although developed to address bi-polar, force-on-force operations, the concept is equally applicable to contemporary operations in which crisis resolution does not necessarily hinge on military success. It embraces a commander’s ability to take complex and often unstructured problems and provide sufficient clarity and logic (some of which is intuitive) to enable detailed planning and practical orders.

0203. Operational Art indicates considerations at the operational level which should reflect more than just the employment of procedures and techniques based on knowledge of doctrines and manuals. It should be applied with a broad knowledge and understanding of the complicated relations of all the factors influencing the planning and execution of a campaign:

\(^9\) AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.
a. Operational Art includes the effective use of campaign planning tools and seeks to ensure that commanders use forces, space, time and information effectively through the design of campaigns and operations. Such a design provides a framework to help commanders order their thoughts and understand the conditions for success.

b. It should take account of the full range of potentially simultaneous military operations, across the spectrum of conflict with predominant campaign themes shifting over time. This aids commanders and staffs in understanding that:

(1.) All major operations are combinations of tasks executed simultaneously.

(2.) Operations change over time.

(3.) Operations conducted over one phase of a campaign directly impact on subsequent phases.

c. It also requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, a careful understanding of the relationship of means to ends and an understanding of the inherent and effective synergy that flows from properly coordinated joint operations.

0204. Operational Art is applied during the operational planning process, in:

a. Formulating the overarching idea and intent for an operation and envisaging how operations will unfold.

b. Determining necessary links between the tactical employment of forces and the achievement of strategic and operational objectives.

c. Establishing critical lines of operations as a basis for sequencing and synchronizing actions and effects.

d. Designing ways to achieve the end-state with appropriate means.

0205. Ends, Ways, and Means. Operational Art seeks to match ‘ends, ways, and means’ in planning and conducting operations. It requires that a commander and his staff appreciate the strategic context and answer 3 basic questions:

a. Ends. What conditions should be attained in the operational area to achieve the strategic objectives? If the political objective changes, as it sometimes will, over time or in response to changing events, that new objective will invariably create a requirement for a change in the plan or even a new campaign plan.

b. Ways. What broad approaches will establish these conditions? Which instruments of power combine within these approaches?
c. **Means.** What capabilities and other resources are available and should be applied, within established limitations, to produce these conditions? How are the military and non-military instruments integrated to achieve these conditions? The commander considers the nature of the force, what objectives are within its grasp, and the nature of the risks, and their possible mitigation, inherent in pursuing that objective with the given force?

0206. Operational Design frames the problem, and then develops and refines a commander’s operational ideas – his vision of how he sees the campaign unfolding – to provide detailed and actionable plans. Operational Design continues, often interrupted by changes in strategic guidance, throughout the duration of the campaign; it should not be deemed complete or immutable from the outset and never simply implemented as a given without adaptation in the face of changing circumstances. Review and refinement are critical aspects of continuous operational re-design, as the situation changes in response to military intervention, the actions and reactions of other actors (including adversaries), and the unavoidable consequences of chance and friction. It is for this reason that a commander should become accustomed to uncertainty, and should thrive on turning chaos to his advantage. To that end, he should exploit assessment (including the invaluable contributions from his own battlefield circulation, dialogue with coalition partners and collaboration with other actors) as an integral part of his campaign design process. ¹⁰

0207. Operational Management integrates, coordinates, synchronizes and prioritizes the execution of operations and assesses progress. Because conflict is inherently adversarial, an opponent’s responses will inevitably affect the course of an operation. Assessing the course of the operation and then acting quickly (in order to modify the plan to meet assigned objectives in light of changed circumstances) should be the main way in which a commander commands the force. ¹¹

**SECTION I – OPERATIONAL DESIGN**

0208. **Operational Ideas.** Operational art demands creative and innovative thought to find broad solutions to operational problems; solutions that might be termed Operational Ideas. Its output is the source of the commander’s intent and subsequent concept of operations. The output represents the basis of the Campaign Plan and is further refined by the process of Operational Design. As such it is the domain of the commander and the foundation of a command-led staff system. The key to Operational Art is to identify beforehand what is going to be decisive in bringing about the downfall of the adversary. Identifying that decisive act comes from an analysis of Centre of Gravity (COG).

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¹⁰ Extracted from Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 01(D), Allied Joint Doctrine, Chapter 5.
¹¹ Ibid.
The Principal Elements of Operational Design. The application of Operational Art requires a sound understanding of many different operational design concepts and tools. They are useful in analyzing strategic and operational factors, understanding operational requirements, enhancing creativity and imagination, and ensuring a logical relationship and balance between ends, ways and means. Operational Design is a process which further develops and refines Operational Ideas. Three things together comprise the principal elements of Operational Design: the Operational Estimate, the Operational Design Concepts (ODCs), and the Plan. The Plan, which articulates the operational level commander’s overall scheme for operations, results from the Operational Estimate and is largely, constructed using a number of theoretical building blocks collectively known as the ODCs.

Visualization. The centrality of the commander to the process of operational design, with his unique blend of intellect, experience and instinct, cannot be overstated. For every mission, the commander determines what should be achieved and begins to develop plans for the force to accomplish the mission. His visualization embodies the intent for the conduct and outcome of the operation. It is a mental picture of the current situation and intended end state, and how (based on the higher commander’s intent, on the information available and on intuition) to move from one to the other. The commander’s intent is an expansion and expression of how a mission is to unfold. It must include a succinct statement of a mission’s overall purpose, the desired end-state, and any essential information on how to get to that end-state; it should be clearly understood by all subordinate commanders for adequate preparation of their own Operation Plans (OPLAN)s and/or orders, and perhaps more importantly to provide the foundation for effective mission command.

Focus on Results. The Intent defines the end-state in relation to the factors of mission; adversary, operating environment, terrain, forces, time and preparation for future operations. As such, it addresses what results are expected from the operation, how these results might enable transition to future operations, and how, in broad terms, the commander expects the force to achieve those results. Its focus is on the force as a whole. Additional information on how the force will achieve the desired results is provided only to clarify the commander’s intentions.

Unifying Concept. The commander’s intent is the unifying concept for all elements of the force. It provides an overall framework within which subordinate commanders may operate. It pertains even when a plan or concept of operations no longer applies, or circumstances require subordinates to make decisions that support the ultimate goal of the force as a whole rather than a set of sequenced events that may no longer reflect what ‘makes sense’ at that time or place. In this way it enables mission command.
The Operational Estimate

0213. The operational estimate is a problem solving process. In NATO it is described in AJP-5/Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) and is central to the formulation of the commander’s OPLAN and subsequent updating of plans in a NATO Alliance joint operation. However, the process has an application at all levels of command. The process is also applied to often ill-defined problems in uncertain and dynamic environments, in high-stakes and time-pressured situations. It combines objective, rational analysis with the commander’s intuition (a combination of experience, intelligence, creativity and innovation). Its output is a visualization, design and decision about what to do, when and where to do it. In practice and especially in situations where Coalition military forces and commanders are involved with other agencies and actors, that decision may reflect a judgment or compromise balanced against other parties’ interests. Guided and energized by the commander, the operational estimate is a mechanism designed to draw together a vast amount of information necessary for the thorough analysis of a set of circumstances, in order to allow the development of feasible courses of action and the subsequent translation of a selected option into a winning plan. It is, essentially, a practical, flexible tool formatted to make sense out of confusion and to enable the development of a coherent plan for action.

0214. The operational estimate is based upon:

a. **Understanding the Problem and Environment.** The problem is of prime importance and is composed of 2 parts: the assigned mission; and the object of that mission. The object is the thing on which the mission bears or which provides the greatest resistance to that mission; often, particularly in major combat operations, it will be the adversary’s military forces. Framing the operational environment is equally important as it places the problem in context. Detailed analysis of the mission, object and environment, early in the planning process, should enhance the prospect of designing a winning concept.

b. **Establishing the Art of the Possible.** A thorough understanding of the problem and environment establishes a logical basis for the commander to develop his operational design, his big idea, and then to provide direction to his staff. The focus is to establish the art of the possible, using planning factors tailored to the problem rather than a predetermined or assumed generic check list.

0215. **Mission Statement.** The mission analysis is a logical process for extracting and deducing, from a superior’s order and planning guidance, the specified and implied tasks necessary to fulfill a mission. Further it establishes constraints and identifies whether further guidance is required. As such it is a dynamic process that triggers and then regulates the remainder of the estimate process. Having confirmed an understanding of the operation/mission directive issued by higher authority, and its feasibility within
allocated resources, this leads to the issue of the commander’s mission statement. The mission statement is one of the key outputs of mission analysis. It is formulated to provide a clear, concise statement detailing who will conduct the operation, what is to be done, when it will take place, where it will occur, and why it is being conducted (i.e. the purpose of the operation). However, the mission statement does not state how the operation will be conducted. It must be scrutinized to ensure that it identifies the command’s mission-essential tasks to achieve the higher authority’s military objectives and strategic end-state. Simplicity and clarity should be overriding considerations in the creation of the mission statement.

**Operational Design Concepts**

0216. ODCs are used to build the structure within which operations take place, and can be seen as a bridge between Operational Art and Operational Design. In seeking to conduct operations, battles and engagements in pursuit of the strategic objective, the operational level commander will design the plan of campaign around the ODCs which help him visualize how the campaign will unfold and manage the development of operations. The commander uses them to articulate a vision or concept of operational design, a statement of intent for the plan and a command structure for executing the plan. In broad terms, the ODCs serve three purposes: to focus effort during the operational estimate, to help describe in plans and directives what is required to be achieved, and to assist in monitoring the execution of a campaign or major operation.

a. **End-state.** The end-state is the political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved.\(^{12}\) It is the political and/or military situation that needs to exist when an operation has been terminated on favorable terms and should be established before execution. An understanding of the end-state is a crucial element of any plan without it there is no focus for campaign planning. All activities and operations should be judged against their relevance to achieving the end-state.

b. **Objectives.** Joint multinational operations should be directed towards a clearly defined and commonly understood objective that contributes to the achievement of the desired end-state. In simplest terms an objective is an aim to be achieved. Commanders establish objectives at their level to focus the actions of subordinates and to provide a clear purpose for their tasks. Objectives are therefore established at each level of operations. At the operational level an objective is defined as a clearly defined and attainable goal, to be achieved by a campaign that will contribute decisively to the strategic outcome.\(^{13}\) Operational level objectives are achieved through the realization, sequenced in time, of one or more decisive conditions. It is likely that at the operational level, objectives

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\(^{12}\) AAP-6.
\(^{13}\) AJP 01(D), Chapter 5.
will require action from multiple instruments simultaneously, for example establishing a secure environment might require both military action and civil reconstruction. It is a primary responsibility of joint commanders to coordinate military activity with that of other organizations, seeking unity of purpose in achievement of the objective.

c. **Centre of Gravity.** The COG is that element of the adversary’s overall capability or system that most resists the achievement of the Alliance’s end-state and which, if defeated or neutralized, will lead inevitably to the achievement of our objectives. A COG is defined as those characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. COGs exist at all levels of operations, and there may be more than one at any level. As well as determining COGs of adversary forces, it is also necessary to determine Alliance COGs and assess their vulnerability to attack by opposing forces in order to provide for their protection. The initial analysis of friendly and adversary COGs requires constant re-appraisal both during the planning and execution phases of an operation, as does the protection of friendly COGs.

d. **Decisive Condition.** While it may be possible to defeat or neutralize the adversary’s COG, it is more likely that a series of coordinated actions will be required; the cumulative effects of these actions are described as Decisive Conditions (DC): a point from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened. This point may exist in time, space or the information environment. It is further described as a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving an operational objective. DCs are the keys to unlocking COGs and can be attacked directly by the commander designating the most important decisive points as objectives and allocating resources to protect, control, destroy or neutralize them. DCs are logically determined from the COG analysis process and are arranged along Lines of Operation leading to the adversary’s COG. A DC can be a place, a precise moment or a distinctive characteristic or quality upon which a COG depends to maintain its freedom of action and power. They need not necessarily constitute a battle or physical engagement, nor need they have a geographical relevance. The ability to establish favorable DCs allows the commander to retain freedom of action, maintain momentum and gain or retain the initiative.

e. **Effect.** Effect is a result, outcome or consequence of one or more actions or other causes, that will influence the physical or behavioral state of a system (or

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14 AAP-6.
15 Ibid.
system elements) thereby contributing towards the realization of one or more decisive conditions.\footnote{AJP 01(D).}

\textbf{f. Line of Operation.} In a campaign or operation, a line linking decisive conditions in time and space on the path to the COG.\footnote{AAP-6.} Lines of Operation establish the relationship that may not always be sequential in time and space, between DCs and the COG and can be functional or environmental. Commanders use them to focus the instruments of power toward a desired end-state, applying force throughout the 3 dimensions of space, over time and in a logical design that integrates all the military capabilities of a joint force in order to converge upon and defeat the COG of adversary forces.

\textbf{g. Sequencing.} Sequencing is the arrangement of events within an operation or campaign in the order most likely to achieve the defeat or neutralization of an adversary’s COG. It usually is best to undertake simultaneous operations on multiple lines of operation to achieve synergy across all instruments of power and to overwhelm an adversary’s ability to resist; but within those lines of operation some operations will depend on the successful conclusion of others before they can be initiated. For example, forward operating bases may need to be secured before initiating offensive operations. A commander may also wish to sequence his operation due to lack of resources or capability, or to limit the risk. Once the overall sequencing of the operation has been determined, the commander may choose to divide his operation into phases.

\textbf{h. Phases.} Phasing is a method of describing where an operation cannot be developed until set activities are complete or a change to task organization is required. Phases are sequential but may overlap, particularly in peace support operations. In some cases the beginning of a phase may be contingent on the successful completion of a preceding phase. The aim in phasing an operation or campaign is to maintain continuity and tempo and to avoid unnecessary operational pauses.

\textbf{i. Contingency Planning (Branches and Sequels).} For every action there are a range of possible outcomes that may or may not create conditions necessary to accomplish the objectives to reach the end-state. Outcomes that are more favorable than expected may present opportunities that can be exploited while outcomes that are worse than expected may pose risks that can be mitigated. However, the ability to exploit opportunities and mitigate risks depends first on anticipating such situations and second on developing contingency options for effectively dealing with them. Commanders should anticipate possible outcomes and ensure that options are provided in their operational planning in order to
preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing circumstances and to allow them to keep the initiative despite the actions of the adversary. There are 2 broad approaches to contingency planning, branches and sequels, which are developed both during initial operational planning and during the execution of the plan.

(1.) Branches are contingency options within a particular phase, planned and executed in response to an anticipated opportunity or a reversal within that phase, in order to provide the commander with the flexibility to retain the initiative.

(2.) Sequels are options for the next phase, one of which may be the next pre-planned phase. They are planned based on the likely outcome of the current operation or phase, in order to provide the commander with the flexibility to retain the initiative and/or enhance operational tempo.

j. **Culminating Point.** Culmination has both offensive and defensive applications. In the offence, the culminating point is that point in time and location when the attacker’s combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender and the attacking force should transition to the defense or risk counter attack and defeat. A defending force reaches its culminating point when it no longer has the capability to mount a counter-offensive or defend successfully and is forced to disengage or withdraw or face defeat. Identification of the culminating point allows full exploitation of the event, or the planning of operational pauses in order to avoid it. Sequencing and phasing should be designed to ensure that operations by opposing forces culminate well before they can achieve their objective while ensuring that friendly operations achieve their objective well before any culmination.

k. **Operational Pause.** An operational pause is a temporary cessation of certain activities during the course of an operation to avoid the risk of culmination and to be able to regenerate the combat power required to proceed with the next stage of the operation. As activities cannot be conducted continuously, there may be a need for periodic pauses, while initiative is retained in other ways, perhaps in other environments and it is sometimes necessary to pause on one line of operation in order to concentrate activity on another. Ideally, the operational pause should be planned in order to minimize any overall loss of tempo. Implicit in the term ‘pause’ is the ability to re-activate the line of operation in order to maintain momentum and the initiative.

l. **Termination and Transition.** The term *termination* in this context is really more about transition than traditional notions of cease fires and victory parades. Instead the commander seeks to focus on what happens when the operational end-state has been achieved - how to preserve that which has been gained and how to make it enduring. As military objectives may be achieved well before the
m. **Direct or Indirect Approach.** While it may be possible to defeat the opposing COG by direct attack, it is more likely that a series of operations at DCs will be required to neutralize it. There are 2 alternative approaches for dealing with opposing COGs:

(1.) **Direct Approach.** The direct approach is a sequential or simultaneous, uninterrupted approach against an adversary’s COG, often by way of decisive points. This approach may mean engaging the adversary’s strengths (the protection of his COG and decisive points). The direct approach is appropriate when a force has superior strength compared to the opposing force and the risk is acceptable.

(2.) **Indirect Approach.** The maneuverist approach is an example of an indirect approach. The indirect approach seeks to exploit adversary force physical and moral vulnerabilities, while avoiding its strengths. The indirect approach is appropriate when a force is insufficient to operate directly against opposing COGs or critical strengths in a single operation or if the risks of a direct approach are deemed unacceptable, and instead should concentrate on exploiting the adversary’s critical vulnerabilities in a series of operations that eventually lead to the defeat of the COG.

n. **Criteria for Success.** For each objective the commander establishes criteria for success that provide measurable or observable requirements with respect to the essential conditions or effects that should be created, as well as any conditions or effects that cannot exist for the objective to be successfully accomplished.

0217. **The Campaign Plan.** The Campaign Plan, the practical expression of Operational Art, conveys the operational level commander’s vision for how he sees the operation unfolding and is translated into actionable detail by operations orders and directives. It is essential in providing the crucial common understanding across the joint force of the commander’s intent and his overall concept of operations.

0218. **Concept of Operations.** This is the heart of the Campaign Plan and belongs to the Coalition Force Commander (CFC). His mind should be focused on forming the essence of the Campaign Plan, and then communicating it to his subordinates. The ultimate test being that subordinate commanders can act independently as though they were directly ordered by the CFC. A Concept of Operations (CONOPS) has 5 main elements:

a. **Situation.** A description of the circumstances that have led to a requirement for the CONOPS. Where appropriate it would also include details of political objectives, limitations and assumptions.
b. **Mission.** A clear, concise definition of the purpose and nature of the operation, the responsible military commander, the operation’s location and likely execution timeframe. The CFC should write his Component Commander’s missions personally. A mission should contain a clear, concise statement of the task and its purpose and expressed in terms of: *Who* (the subordinate command), *What* (what the command is to achieve), *When, Where* (the parameters) and *Why* (the purpose). Mission statements should always have a unifying purpose (i.e. the ‘in order to’) and these should fall logically out of the concept of operations. The unifying purposes of subordinates’ missions should, when collectively achieved, enable the CFC to achieve his own mission.

c. **Execution.** A description of the commander’s view of how the operation will be executed, detailing:

1. Planning assumptions.
2. A summary of the key elements of the mission analysis.
3. A summary of the commanders intent and purpose of the plan including military objectives, desired military end-state and the criteria for success. The commander’s intent should focus on the overall effect the force is to have on the adversary. It should be a concise and precise statement of how the CFC intends to achieve the operational end state by defeating the adversary’s COG, and should not be a synopsis of the operation. In effect it provides the driving logic behind the whole campaign plan.
4. A description of how operations will be conducted and any phases envisaged.
5. A description of military key and supporting tasks.
6. A summary of force and capability requirements.
7. Identification of any coordination requirements with other operations.

d. **Service Support.** A description of the support requirements necessary for mission accomplishment, including outline concepts for logistics, Communications and Information Systems, movements, medical and host nation support.

e. **Command Arrangements.** A description of command arrangements.
SECTION II – OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT

0219. Modern Joint operations are complex and require careful organization. A number of control mechanisms exist that are used to order activities in time and space, and to ensure that priorities are clearly understood. The following paragraphs concentrate on those areas in which the operational level Commander should play a significant role.

0220. **Supported and Supporting Commanders.** The supported/supporting principle already described is fundamental to Joint operations. It is the principal means by which the commander designates cross-component support and makes clear his resource priorities (within the overall assignment process). Successful management of these relationships will allow the commander to shift support for a particular phase, or element of an operation, and maintain operational tempo.

0221. **Sustainability.** The commander should plan to organize his command and conduct his operation to ensure he obtains the optimum fighting power with the greatest reach from his forces and resources with the least expenditure and waste. In doing so, the principles of logistics provide the framework, but while making these plans the commander should bear in mind that the business of supply, maintenance and administration are not the problem; they are part of the solution to the problem. Such plans are vital to the success of an operation, but without the commander’s leadership and direction from the outset, they are unlikely to be as effective as they need to be, and under pressure risk collapse and hazard the force.

0222. **Monitoring and Assessment of Campaign Progress.** The measurement of progress or success is a fundamental aspect of military operations that should be foremost in the mind of every commander. The commander will have specified criteria for success in his CONOPS and OPLAN; these must be achievable and measurable. The aim is to take a broad view of the operation and determine if the required effects, as envisaged in the plan, are being created, which in turn determines if objectives are being achieved. This monitoring is much wider than observing whether an individual target has been destroyed. It is particularly relevant in activities where the emphasis is on changing the attitudes of the adversary rather than on his physical destruction. Whatever the nature of the operation, the commander should ensure that a monitoring and assessment process is rigorously conducted and that his staff does not get distracted by tactical level events and so lose sight of the operational end-state. Assessment is the evaluation of progress, based on levels of subjective and objective measurement in order to inform decision making. It must reflect not just the impact of Alliance activities but also those of other actors including the host nation and adversary. There are 3 broad categories:
a. **Measurement of Activity.** Measurement of activity is the *assessment of performance of a task and achievement of its associated purposes.*\(^{18}\) Effectively have the planned activities been carried out successfully?

b. **Measurement of Effectiveness.** Measurement of effectiveness is the *assessment of the realization of specified effects.*\(^{19}\) Have the planned activities, carried out successfully, been effective?

c. **Campaign Effectiveness Assessment.** Campaign effectiveness assessment is *the evaluation of campaign progress, based on levels of subjective and objective measurement towards the campaign end-state.*\(^{20}\) Do the effects of the planned and successfully executed activities, and the decisive conditions thereby created, indicate progress towards the achievement of operational objectives and ultimately the campaign end-state?

0223. Assessments support decision-making by drawing together information and intelligence to inform auditable judgments on the progress of operations. Judging progress is a fundamental review and feedback function within the commander’s decision cycle. If correctly assessed, this process will allow the commander to make judgments on:

a. **Apportionment.** The process should assess the likelihood of achieving individual decisive points and so inform the commander’s apportionment of effort between component commanders.

b. **Contingency Planning.** The process should be able to gauge whether the campaign plan is on track and so identify the need for contingency plans, in the form of branches and sequels.

c. **Confirming Adversary Centre(s) of Gravity.** The process should confirm that the correct COG(s) and associated critical vulnerabilities have been selected. The commander should be alert to the possibility that new critical vulnerabilities may be exposed, or that previously identified ones may be too well protected to be attacked. Thus COG analysis should be an iterative process for planning staff and the COG(s) should be reviewed periodically.

0224. **Managing Lines of Operation.** Lines of operation show the interrelationship between decisive points and as such, they are a way of visualizing the overall activity within a force, and coordinating and deconflicting component activities. Careful management of lines of operation allows the realization of the full potential of the force. Two tools which can assist in this are: the Campaign Plan Schematic; and the Synchronization Matrix. The Campaign Plan Schematic enables the overall plan to be visualized at a

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\(^{18}\) AJP 01(D).

\(^{19}\) Ibid.

\(^{20}\) Ibid.
glance and can be used to monitor its progress. The synchronization matrix is the method for planning the coordination of activity between components, in time and space, along the path to the objective.

0225. **Operational Rhythm.** Where a commander can consistently decide and act quicker than his opponent, he will generate greater tempo and gain a significant advantage. Operational rhythm should therefore be focused on enabling effective and timely decision-making within and between headquarters. It is the principal means by which time, information and activity are managed and directed at providing the right information at the right time so that the right decision can be made. It should never become a self-fulfilling prophesy, it is a means to an end not an end in its own right. Operational rhythm is key to creating a ‘command advantage’, i.e. orders and directives that are designed to seek tactical opportunity, plus a command structure that has a clear and common view of the situation and can communicate quickly and direct operations.

**Termination and Transition**

0226. Coalition operations inherently have both political and military goals. Exclusively military lines of activity are unlikely to achieve the strategic end state. While every campaign and major operation is directed towards a goal, at some point the military action is no longer the main effort. It may be necessary for one mission to terminate and be replaced by and other as part of a wider strategic plan. As described in paragraph 0216l the term ‘termination’ in this context is about transition. Coalition forces will eventually hand over responsibilities to other military forces, governmental agencies, or the host nation government. Similar to a traditional ‘relief-in-place’ the coalition forces will carefully plan, coordinate, and manage the transition.

0227. The CFC should plan for termination and transition before deployment or as soon as possible during the initial phase. Transition between military forces may take the form of relief-in-place or a transition by function, such as medical, engineer services, communications, security and logistics. The ultimate goal is to transition all functions performed by the CFC and the coalition forces in a smooth and orderly fashion. Some of the functions may develop into a combination of coalition, host nation, intergovernmental and non-governmental activities during the as the transition advances. Once all transition activities are complete the coalition forces can depart.

0228. The keys to successful transitions can include:

a. Conducting early planning with host nation, involving international organizations and non-governmental organizations.

b. Coordinating information activities in concert with the host nation, international organizations and non-governmental organizations.
c. Establishing realistic objectives, goals and end states.

d. Providing adequate intelligence and communication to all agencies involved in the transition.

e. Ensuring unity of effort.

f. Establishing the appropriate command and control to manage the transition.

0229. The CFC and his staff must consider the need to prevent a return to conditions that caused the crisis and required involvement of the coalition. The CFC, in coordination with the political level of the coalition, and civilian agencies in the operational area must identify ‘high risk’ transition points. These points occur when the CFC passes responsibility to an international governmental organization, non-governmental organizations or host nation. It is incumbent on the CFC to manage these transition points to avoid the deterioration of the situation.

Types of Planning

0230. **Advance Planning.** Advance planning (also referred to as contingency planning (CONPLAN)) is deliberate planning conducted with the intent of addressing future security risks. Typically this type of planning is performed by a nation or a standing regional alliance structure. The ‘on-the-shelf’ plans resulting from this process may provide the basis for coalition plan development dependent upon their applicability to the actual situation.

0231. **Crisis Planning.** Crisis planning is conducted in response to an actual or developing crisis, and its output is an OPLAN. If a crisis was foreseen the OPLAN might be developed from an appropriate CONPLAN; if the crisis was not foreseen the OPLAN must be developed in response to the prevailing circumstances. An OPLAN is a detailed and comprehensive plan capable of execution, which has forces assigned and for which preparations are complete.

0232. **Political Consensus and Strategic Guidance.**

a. Although it is not normally considered a ‘type of planning’ in a military sense, the development of strategic guidance is a key consideration for coalition operations. One of the major functions of the lead nation is to organize mechanisms for consultation in order to achieve political consensus among coalition members, and between the coalition and a recognized international authority or entity (e.g. the UN) sanctioning the operation. This process must produce strategic level guidance in order for the CFC to proceed with planning.

b. Strategic guidance should define the coalition’s military objectives and overall political-military approach, and coordinate strategic direction for planning and
executing coalition operations. It should additionally specify the scope of the coalition’s mandate, and any constraints or restraints on coalition operations.

Planning Architecture for Coalition Operations

0233. The planning architecture employed for coalition operations will, in most cases, be based on that of the lead nation. This architecture must provide the basic structure necessary to facilitate the timely, efficient and coherent development of CONOPS and OPLANs. It comprises guidance, personnel and facilities, reference documentation and enabling tools available to assist coalition commanders and staffs in the development of plans.

a. Guidance must include the overarching strategic guidance provided to the CFC. The lead nation must provide for the continuing exchange of political-level guidance and military advice throughout the planning process.

b. The core of the coalition force’s personnel and facilities will most likely be provided by the planning establishment of the lead nation. Each coalition partner, as a minimum, will provide a military planning liaison cell. Each cell will be actively engaged in the coalition planning process and provide a link to its respective national planning process. This applies at both strategic and operational levels, and extends to logistical as well as operational planning. These cells may be physically collocated or, through use of electronic communications and collaborative planning tools, work together in a virtual manner.

c. Reference documentation is available from existing alliances, national sources and non-alliance international bodies. Other resources may include:

(1.) Pre-existing advance (contingency) plans and other off-the-shelf plans developed by the lead nation and/or other coalition members may provide the basis for crisis planning.

(2.) This document and other Multinational Interoperability Council products.

(3.) Enabling tools, such as the coalition Wide Area Network(s), when available.

Planning Structure and Responsibilities

0234. Coalition operations will be conducted in accordance with a mandate recognized under international law originating with a recognized civil authority such as the United Nations Security Council. This recognized civil authority would act to initiate or approve the coalition activity under consideration, as well as to define overarching objectives and the desired end state.
0235. The lead nation, as a minimum, is responsible for providing the overarching framework for consultation and planning. Through this process, the coalitions’ strategic guidance and objectives will be developed. The lead nation, through the consultation process, will provide a coalition strategic-level CONOPS and OPLAN for review and approval. The lead nation will probably be responsible for orchestrating continued liaison and reportage to the civil authority mandating the operation.

0236. The CFC is responsible for translating political guidance into military strategic direction for coalition forces, and for developing an OPLAN. Once the latter is approved, the CFC provides direction to subordinate coalition commander(s) responsible for developing the operational-level CONOPS and OPLAN(s). Subordinate coalition commands develop subordinate plans.
CHAPTER 3 – OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

0301. The planning architecture employed for coalition operations will, in most cases, be based on that of the lead nation. This architecture must provide the basic structure necessary to facilitate the timely, efficient and coherent development of Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) and Operations Plans (OPLANs). The lead nation, as a minimum, is responsible for providing the overarching framework for consultation and planning. The lead nation, through the consultation process, will provide a coalition strategic-level CONOPS and OPLAN for review and approval. The Coalition Strategic Commander is responsible for translating political guidance into military strategic direction for coalition forces, and for developing an OPLAN.

0302. Operational planning addresses the following major areas:

   a. Conduct of operation to achieve strategic or operational objectives.
   b. Force capabilities required conducting the operation.
   c. Deployment of forces into the Coalition Joint Operation Area (JOA).
   d. Logistical sustainment.
   e. Arrangements for command and control (C2).
   f. Cooperation with civilian authorities.
   g. Force protection.
   h. Medical.
   i. Meteorological and Oceanographic Centre (METOC).

0303. Operational planning may be carried out at different levels under varying circumstances and produce different outputs. In any case, the following basics are fundamental to any operational planning effort:

   a. Understand the strategic aim or desired end-state, i.e. the purpose of the military action.
   b. Understand the operational environment, including non-military aspects.

21 Allied Joint Planning (AJP)-5, Allied Joint Planning has an planning architecture familiar to all Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) member nations.
c. Understand the capabilities, limitations and likely intentions of the adversaries or factions involved in a conflict.

d. Focus on linking the military objectives to the desired end state established by the higher command authority, integrated with Information Objectives provided with the Coalition Information Strategy.

e. Implement the higher commander’s intent.

f. Orient on Centers of Gravity (COGs) of adversary or factions.

g. Ensure protection of own COGs.

h. Establish favorable conditions at decisive points.

i. Determine the forces required to set conditions necessary to achieve the objective and desired end-state. Clearly define criteria for measuring success in reaching the end state.

j. Achieve unity of purpose and effort with assigned forces as well as in coordination with the United Nations (UN) and other international and non-governmental organizations as required.

k. Achieve coordination in the use of lethal and non-lethal capabilities.

l. Describe the sequence of related Joint operations from initial entry through termination throughout the Courses of Action (COA).

m. Provide direction, establish objectives, and assign tasks to subordinates as the basis for their planning.

n. Establish the task organization of forces and command arrangements.

o. Ensure the provision of funding and adequate sustainment.

p. Make an overall assessment of the risks associated with the operation.

0304. The coalition OPLAN translates the strategic concept into a Joint and multinational plan for military actions by specifying how operations, logistics, and time will be used to attain strategic objectives. It may be necessary to develop one or more Supplementary Plans (SUPLAN(s)) to address all aspects of an operation in sufficient detail. These may include Coalition SUPLANs or National SUPLANs.

0305. The mechanics of this planning process will be simplified if coalition partners provide a planning liaison cell(s) early to complement the lead nation’s planning staff. This applies
at both strategic and operational levels, and extends to logistic as well as operational planning.

SECTION II – STAGES OF THE OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS

0306. The actual steps and iterations in a coalition planning process may vary from case to case, however the stages described in this section are a generic model as depicted in Figure 3.1.

a. Stage I – Initiation. Initiation establishes the requirement to conduct operational planning as well as the general planning direction and planning limitations.

b. Stage II – Orientation. Orientation analyses the situation to determine what must be accomplished to meet the higher authority’s direction and guidance as well as to precisely determine the mission and desired end-state. It focuses on the conduct of a thorough mission analysis. The principal products are a mission statement, an operational design and the Commander’s Planning Guidance (CPG).

Fig 3.1 – Operational Planning Process Overview

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22 For a detailed description of the planning process see Annex A.
c. **Stage III – Concept Development.** Concept Development determines *how* to accomplish the mission most effectively and efficiently. It focuses on developing and analyzing different possible COA for accomplishing the mission, including the means required, in order to assist the commander in determining the best COA. The commander’s selected COA provides the basis for the development of a CONOPS and a supporting Statement of Requirements (SOR), which are the principal products of this stage.

d. **Stage IV – Plan Development.** Plan Development further identifies forces required to implement the Plan, organizes their timely deployment into the Coalition JOA and plans for their protection, training and sustainment. It includes coordination with other headquarters and nations. It results in a fully developed plan (or a family of plans as required), complete with Annexes for required functional areas, approved by the next higher authority.

e. **Stage V – Plan Review.** Plan Review ensures a plan remains valid, in terms of continuing requirements, policy and doctrine as well as viable in terms of feasibility, suitability and acceptability. It includes periodic reviews of a plan, which may identify required changes and result in new planning guidance.

**SECTION III – OPERATION EXECUTION**

0307. While Component Commands have the means by which military action can be prosecuted and delivered at the tactical level, their capabilities are most effective only when applied in concert. This is the principle of synergy, which is achieved through effective integration, coordination and synchronization. In this capacity the role of the Coalition Force Headquarters as the coordinator of the various component operations, is key. Having made his operation plan, the Coalition Force Commander (CFC) will:

a. Apply the military resources allocated to him to achieve the assigned mission within any constraints imposed.

b. Identify and weigh up the effect of each action, in terms of the impact it will have on achieving his objectives, the risks that it entails, and the resources required for its success and means of minimizing the risk.

c. Exploit the situation by adjusting and developing his plans in order to contend with changing circumstances and to take advantage of opportunities.

d. Re-visit the operational estimate at regular intervals or whenever there is a change in the operational situation or when assessment dictates a change in emphasis is required.

0308. It is counterproductive to try and over-regulate what is an inherently complex and chaotic activity; placing absolute faith in closely sequenced plans made in advance does
not work. However, what is vital is the close synchronization of strategic, operational and tactical planning in the build-up, and to have a series of robust mechanisms in place to both keep the operation on track and to cope with the unexpected. An important and parallel consideration is to endeavor to keep the coalition force agile enough to cope with change in a responsive manner.

0309. Most military operations consist of 3 generic phases: Preparation; Execution; and Termination and Transition; although the execution phase itself may have sub-phases. It is not always possible to determine a point at which a specific phase starts or ends. This point can differ for each element participating in an operation. Additionally, an element conducting an operation can be confronted with several simultaneous different activities, or even with different activities from different phases. In other words, the conduct of an operation may be planned linearly and sequentially but its execution may appear to be chaotic and event-driven.

**Preparation**

0310. During the preparation phase, nations and, depending on transfer of authority, an assigned CFC will deploy the forces, establish Lines of Communication (LOC) and liaison with host nations, international organizations and relevant agencies. The CFC has to shape the JOA in order to facilitate the actual conduct of the operation.

0311. Steps the CFC may consider as part of the preparatory activities are:

a. Establish C2 for the Joint Force and communications arrangements with the coalition headquarters through the Coalition Strategic Commander and with troop contributing nations.

b. Coordinate military activities to shape the information environment

c. Create and protect the LOCs.
d. Coordinate the deployment of the forces.
e. Build-up the forces.
f. Develop logistic support, including host-nation support.
g. Prepare and execute combined training to integrate the forces within the coalition JOA.
h. Sustain forces during build-up and preparation for operations.
i. Protect and secure the forces.
j. Establish, when required, a liaison network.
k. Conduct, when required, preliminary operations.

l. Request an enabling budget and prepare a mission budget.

0312. Many of the activities that are conducted during the preparation phase are not the CFC’s primary responsibility. Often he depends on the Coalition Strategic Commander and the troop contributing nations to facilitate the activities of the Coalition Force. For example, the strategic deployment is predominantly a national responsibility, with the Coalition Strategic Commander in a coordinating role and the CFC only monitoring progress.

0313. In addition, the CFC has limited influence over initial preparation and training of national troop contributions, although he can be asked to issue directives and guidance on the focus of the preparation and training program. After transfer of authority of the national troop contributions, the CFC will be, among other aspects of the operation, in charge of the protection and security of the forces, their build-up (including in-JOA preparation and training) and, when required the conduct of preliminary operations.

0314. A critical function of the lead nation will be the identification of ways and means available to achieve the strategic objective. This will translate into a matching of resources to the operational plan developed. This is likely to be an iterative process and one subject to considerable negotiation among the coalition members. The formation of a planning liaison cell(s) will also facilitate this process by providing a mechanism for exchange of detailed information regarding the capabilities of each partner and the willingness and/or ability of each to commit resources. Funding authority to support coalition forces and the financial commitments of each partner should be identified as early as possible and procedures developed to ensure that there will be no adverse impact on operations.

Coalition Force Readiness Training

0315. For most coalition operations, multinational collective training prior to deployment will not be feasible. Therefore, this training will have to be completed upon arrival in theatre. As time available for this training will be limited, it is the responsibility of each troop contributing nation to prepare its forces prior to deployment to theatre.

0316. The Coalition Force Readiness Training Plan will have 2 main objectives. First, it will prepare the troop contributing nations’ forces for battle. Units and formations require the opportunity to conduct collective training with coalition nations in order to gain confidence and to integrate procedures and practices at all levels within the coalition. Secondly it provides commanders with the opportunity to assess the readiness of their forces. This is especially important when units and formations are assigned to the coalition from nations that do not have a formal program of exercises and exchange.

0317. During force readiness training some of the primary training objectives should include:
a. Staffing and planning processes;
b. Understanding the information environment;
c. Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) and Intelligence, Surveillance and Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) procedures;
d. Specific operational tactics, techniques and procedures (offensive, defensive, transitional operations);
e. Joint Fires planning and execution;
f. Force protection measures;
g. Logistical support procedures;
h. Combat identification; and
i. Medical evacuation and treatment protocols.

0318. **Exercises.** The purpose of exercises is to integrate, synchronize, test, evaluate and assess operations, tactics, techniques and procedures. The principal objectives of exercises are to practice the C2 chain, initiate understanding of the CFC’s routines for control of the operation and practice Rules of Engagement (ROE). Exercises used for the purpose of deception and deterrence can have a considerable influence, especially as they usually attract wide coverage in the local and international media. Exercises may include the generation and deployment of reserves.

0319. **Rehearsals.** The CFC should conduct a rehearsal prior to an operation. The aim of the rehearsal is to synchronize systems and to identify operational issues and concerns. This rehearsal allows for interaction between the CFC’s staff and the various component staffs across the full spectrum of the CONOPS and allows the Component Commanders and selected CFC staff to brief their CONOPS and situational assessment. These efforts will collectively synchronize the CFC staff and the components in the execution of key military tasks during a given time period and identify issues and concerns. Rehearsals provide substance to the written OPLAN and provide the foundation upon which effective synchronization of the elements of the Coalition Force is based.

**Mission Execution**

0320. In the planning phase, the CFC, acting at the operational level, will have identified the military conditions or end-state required to achieve the strategic objective. He will then seek to structure activities, sequentially and simultaneously, so as to fulfill the military conditions for success. Execution consists of the application of the allocated military resources to sustain this sequence of actions. In the execution phase, the commander
focuses on 3 fundamental processes: an intelligence function that seeks to determine the nature and extent of the threat or situation; the employment of allocated resources and capabilities in order to create a favorable situation for execution; and the operation to achieve the desired end-state.

0321. The CFC is responsible for:

a. Defining the concept of operations and operational objectives.
b. Determining the sequence of operational activity in space and time.
c. Establishing operational priorities.
d. Harmonizing coalition military activities.
e. Coordinating logistics support.
f. Delegating authority to subordinate commanders as appropriate.
g. Establishing a combined Joint targeting system.
h. Applying force or presence at decisive points.
i. Coordinating the actions of subordinates to achieve integration of activities.
j. Maintaining awareness of the region’s political, economic, cultural, and religious situation.
k. Refining the operational plan as the situation develops.
l. Refining the intelligence plan as operations progress.
m. Implementing information strategy guidance.
n. Keeping higher authorities informed of the situation.
o. Requesting ROE changes as needed.
p. Requesting the necessary administrative and logistic support to sustain operations.
q. Resolving various issues related to coalition operations.
r. Maintaining liaison and interaction with the local civil authority within the operational area, and with those non-governmental organizations and private voluntary organizations who may be engaged in the operational area.
s. Estimating costs and monitoring funding.

t. Establishing lessons-identified procedures for the operation.

u. Maintaining accountability to the coalition for the outcome of operations.
ANNEX 3A – OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS

3A1. The following summary describes the stages of the planning model that occur at both the strategic and operational level and is covered in detail in Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-5.

STAGE I – INITIATION DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY STRATEGIC-LEVEL PLANS

3A2. In consultation with coalition partners, the lead nation prepares a political-military estimate in response to the crisis. This estimate should take account of both strategic political and military factors, and seek to identify potential broad options for military responses. Coalition political and military authorities would then use this analysis to further examine the situation and assist in planning and decision-making.

3A3. Once coalition consensus is reached on an appropriate response, the lead nation will develop strategic military guidance, in consultation with coalition partners and the mandating authority. As a minimum, this guidance should include a clear description of political objectives, the broad outline of any military activity envisioned to achieve these objectives, and the desired end-state. It should also contain key planning assumptions and any constraints or restraints upon military operations or actions.

a. The first stage of strategic-level plan development is the military strategic-level estimate process. This includes Mission Analysis, followed by identification of various Courses of Action (COA) available. The Coalition Force Commander (CFC) is an integral part of planning and should maintain overall control throughout the process by providing Commanders Intent. The commander will select the preferred COA and develop a strategic-level concept of operations (CONOPS). This CONOPS is a brief and clear statement of how the Commander intends to accomplish the mission, to include the military end-state desired. The CONOPS normally includes a situation overview, mission statement, outline concept for execution, force capability requirements, a combat service support concept, and key command and control arrangements. The level of detail should be kept to the minimum required to obtain CONOPS approval by the coalition political leadership.

b. The next stage is CONOPS approval. In this case, the lead nation, through arrangements for strategic political-military consultation, facilitates review of the CONOPS by coalition members. Upon reaching consensus and/or directing revision of the CONOPS as required, the Coalition authorizes the Coalition Strategic Commander to move on to the next step, military strategic-level Operation Plan (OPLAN) development. (CONOPS approval is not a pre-requisite for beginning OPLAN development, but it is for full development of the OPLAN).

c. In addition to coalition approval of the CONOPS, a confirmation of capabilities and/or forces to be contributed should be obtained from participating coalition
partners before full OPLAN development commences. This will be essential for the production of an OPLAN that details force assignment and missions.

d. OPLAN development entails detailed planning and synchronization of operations within the campaign. The OPLAN should translate strategic concepts into Joint and multinational plans for military action by specifying how operations, logistics and time will be used to attain strategic objectives. It will be incumbent upon the Coalition Strategic Commander to identify any shortfalls in capability or force contributions that seriously impede OPLAN development and/or execution. Consultation must then ensue to address the shortfalls, or the OPLAN must be modified to mitigate them.

e. In a process similar to that described in A-3b, the coalition nations will conduct consultation and review, comment on, and reach consensus regarding the OPLAN.

f. Upon OPLAN approval, the coalition nations will then finalize any Supplementary Plans (SUPLAN)s required to effect their participation in the operation. (Development of SUPLANs may begin in parallel with OPLAN development vice awaiting OPLAN approval).

g. Operational-level CONOPS and OPLAN development follow a similar process with the initiating and approval authority vested in the Coalition Force Commander who will issue direction to subordinate commander(s).

**STAGE II – ORIENTATION**

3A4. **The Estimate Process.** The estimate process is central to the formulation of CFC’s OPLAN and subsequent updating of plans in a coalition Joint operation. However, the process has an application at all levels of command. The framework of an estimate is standard, comprising a mission analysis, the mission statement, a situation analysis, analysis of opposing force and friendly COA, a comparison of opposition and friendly COA, selection and refinement of the best COA.

3A5. The estimate must lead to a COA that is suitable, feasible and acceptable, leading to the commander’s decision and his concept of operations. The weighting given to each aspect during the process will depend on the overall mission, the intelligence assessments and the prevailing circumstances.

3A6. **Mission Analysis.** Mission analysis is a logical process for extracting and deducing, from a superior’s order and planning guidance, the tasks necessary to fulfill a mission. The commander would establish what constraints and restraints apply and determine, as the campaign progresses, whether further decisions are required. As such it is a

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23 Detail in Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-5, Chapter 4.
dynamic process which triggers and then regulates the remainder of the estimate. It is continued thereafter as the situation and the mission are reviewed. The mission analysis is the first step in the process: it includes the determination of the higher command authority’s intent; the analysis of allied security and military-strategic direction, including short and long-term objectives to achieve the end state; pre-conditions for success; restrictions; and any assumptions made.

3A7. Strategic end-state objectives describe in broad terms what the coalition intends to achieve through military action. Military objectives describe what has to be accomplished militarily in order to get there. Once the commander determines what set of military conditions exist, then the focus shifts to how the force will achieve that objective. Mission analysis should also include the specified and implied tasks, and determine priorities where appropriate. Completion of the mission analysis results in a restated mission for the force, i.e. a mission statement.

3A8. **Mission Statement.** The mission analysis, having confirmed an understanding of the operation/mission directive issued by higher authority, and the capability of achieving the mission, leads to a reiteration of the commander’s mission statement. The Mission Statement is one of the key outputs of the Mission Analysis. It is formulated to provide a clear, concise statement detailing who will conduct the operation, what is to be done, when it will take place, where it will occur, and why it is being conducted (the purpose of the operation). However, the Mission Statement does not state how the operation will be conducted. It is reviewed to ensure that it identifies the command’s mission-essential tasks required to achieve the higher authority’s objective and desired end-state. The order of the elements of the mission statement may vary; the priority is clarity.

3A9. **Analysis of the Situation, Adversary and Friendly Forces.** An analysis of the factors that affect the mission is conducted before potential COAs are evaluated. These factors are assessed under three broad headings:

a. **General Situation.** The general situation analysis should consider the politico-diplomatic short and long-term causes of the conflict. It should also consider: political influences; economic, legal and moral constraints; international interests; the characteristics of the operational area; economic and social conditions; and the science and technology factors affecting the operational area. It should also ascertain strategic requirements (e.g. access to territory, territorial waters and airspace) and associated diplomatic, economic and information factors. Completion of the situation analysis has an important influence on the analysis of the adversary and friendly forces.

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24 Ibid.
b. **Adversary Forces’ Situation Analysis.** The adversary forces’ situation analysis should consider the opposing forces’ location, capabilities and vulnerabilities.²⁵ Analysis should include: an assessment of current and potential COA and their political and military intentions and objectives; the adversary forces’ military-strategic and operational advantages and limitations by defining its strategic and operational COG; the adversary force’s operational characteristics and assessed combat effectiveness.

c. **Friendly Situation Analysis.** The friendly situation analysis should follow the same pattern as for the adversary force. The commander would normally have available specific supporting estimates, including personnel, intelligence, logistic and medical/health care service support, command and control (C2) and communications plus public information estimates. Development of the possible friendly COA is derived from the foregoing analyses, and determines how the mission will be accomplished.

### 3A10. Operational Analysis and Design

The next step is to perform the operational analysis and develop the operational design. The process is described in detail in AJP-5.

### 3A11. Commander’s Critical Information Requirements

²⁶ Properly developed information requirements ensure that subordinate and staff effort is focused, scarce resources are employed efficiently and decisions can be made in a timely manner. The analysis of key factors will typically highlight gaps in information that are essential to planning and the commander’s decision making that cannot be covered by assumptions. The Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) identify information on friendly activities, adversary activities, and the environment that the commander deems critical to maintaining situational awareness, planning future activities, and assisting in timely and informed decision-making. Commanders use CCIRs to help them confirm their vision of the battle space, assess desired effects, and how they will achieve a decision to accomplish their mission or to identify significant deviations from that vision due to, for example, adversary actions. CCIRs must be linked to the critical decisions the commander anticipates making. They focus the commander’s subordinate commanders and staff’s planning and collection efforts. They are central to effective information management, which directs the processing, flow and use of information throughout the force. CCIRs should be limited in number to ensure focus, and be continually reviewed to remain relevant. The Operations Planning Group should manage acquisition of essential planning information by addressing these requirements in Requests for Information (RFI) to higher headquarters and other agencies. Critical elements of information that will focus collection efforts should be recommended to the

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²⁵ The commander would normally have available a formal intelligence estimate to which the analyst can refer.

²⁶ AJP-5, Chapter 4.
commander for approval for each phase of the operation. CCIRs\(^ {27} \) are divided into 3 categories:

a. **Priority Intelligence Requirements.** Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) are ‘those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decision-making’,\(^ {28} \) particularly in selecting a COA; for example the enemy’s intentions, or an assessment of the enemy’s operational capability. These are further broken down by the staff in sequence into:

1. **Specific Intelligence Requirements.** Once the PIRs are produced, the staff will break them down into Specific Intelligence Requirements (SIR) or an intelligence requirement that configures the PIR in current terms. Example: The PIR ‘How to Maintain a Safe and Secure Environment’ could have ‘How will paramilitary groups/organization interfere with or impede the operation?’ as an SIR.

2. **Essential Elements of Information.** Once all the PIRs are configured with SIRs, the SIRs will be further broken down into Essential Elements of Information (EEI), which are the fine, detailed information required to give a complete answer to the related SIR. Referring to the above example, for each group, EEIs might be ‘Goals, leadership, membership, procedure, area of operation, and links’.

3. The commander’s intelligence staff will, when the PIRs are approved, develop a collection plan.\(^ {29} \) The collection plan is a dynamic document that drives collection and provides constant indications on the stage reached by the intelligence support, in a planned or ongoing operation.

b. **Essential Elements of Friendly Information.** Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) are the critical aspects of a friendly operation that, if known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation, and therefore must be protected from enemy discovery. EEFIs can be thought of as key questions that are likely to be asked by adversaries and adversary intelligence systems about specific friendly intentions, capabilities and activities critical to the ability of the adversary to accomplish their missions, and therefore must be protected from enemy detection. EEFIs determine which activities must be protected by friendly force operation security measures.

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\(^{27}\) See AJP 2.1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Procedures.

\(^{28}\) AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.

\(^{29}\) ‘A plan for collecting information from all available sources to meet intelligence requirements and for transforming those requirements into orders and requests to appropriate agencies’. (AAP-6)
c. **Friendly Force Information Requirements.** Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR) are information the commander needs to know about his own forces, which may affect the commander’s ability to accomplish the mission. This includes personnel, maintenance, supply, ammunition, and petroleum, oils, and lubricants status, host nation and national contingent experience as well as leadership capabilities and time for initial and full operational capability.

3A12. **Initial Force Estimate.** An initial estimate of force requirements is developed by conducting a ‘troops-to-task’ analysis of the mission-essential tasks identified during the mission analysis. This estimate updates the preliminary force estimate made by the Coalition Strategic Commander in the military assessment. It should be compared against force planning guidance, especially constraints, established at the political-military level and other estimates. This estimate will be further refined during the Concept Development stage. However, it allows informal enquiries to nations by the Coalition Strategic Commander concerning the potential availability of forces.

3A13. **Mission Analysis Briefing.** The purpose of the Mission Analysis Briefing to the CFC is to review the estimate of the situation, confirm the mission statement, the operational design, as well as to refine the proposed Commander’s Planning Guidance for own and subordinate headquarters’ use. The briefing brings together all of the analysis developed by the commander and the Operations Planning Group considered during the Orientation stage and confirms the commander’s guidance for concept development. The commander’s guidance focuses on his initial intent and may address possible friendly COAs. Based on the briefing and any additional guidance, the staff then finalizes the Commander’s Planning Guidance.

3A14. **Commander’s Planning Guidance.** The output of the Orientation stage is the Commander’s Planning Guidance, a formal document that serves to guide further planning by the staff and initiates and orient planning by subordinate headquarters. Three key elements of the Commander’s Planning Guidance are: the desired end state; mission statement; and commander’s initial intent. The commander’s initial intent reflects his vision of the operation in terms of its purpose and the essential conditions that must be set at decisive points in order to achieve the desired end state. He may articulate his assessment of his adversary’s intent as well as risks during the operation and direct specific COA to be developed or excluded.

**STAGE III – CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT**

3A15. Concept Development begins with a review of the Commander’s Planning Guidance as the basis for further staff analysis and the development of friendly COA. COAs are initially described in broad terms and tested for validity. They are refined through analysis, red-teaming and war-gaming. The results of the staff analysis and comparison of the various COAs are presented with a recommendation to the commander in the form of a decision briefing. On the basis of the commander’s decision and any further
guidance, the staffs further refine the selected COA and produce a CONOPS and a Statement of Requirements (SOR), which represent the final products of this planning stage.

3A16. **Comparison of Courses of Action.** Based on the commander’s selection criteria, the Operations Planning Group conducts a comparison of the resultant COAs to enable the selection of the most appropriate COA. The comparison includes the following aspects:

a. **Friendly versus Adversary Courses of Action.** An assessment of the relative effectiveness of each friendly COA against each adversary COA, drawn largely from wargaming.

b. **The Commander’s Courses of Action Selection Criteria.** Guidance that the commander provides to his staff to assist his staff in determining which COA best supports the Commander’s Intent.

c. **Compare Friendly Courses of Action.** A comparison of the relative advantages of each friendly COA against the other friendly COA, based on wargaming, staff estimates and the Commander’s COA selection criteria.

3A17. **Commander’s Input to Courses of Action Selection.** Often the solution to a problem will be apparent at an early stage to an experienced command team and by this stage the CFC will have certainly identified in his own mind a number of potential outline COA. There will have been a wide range of issues which will have influenced his thinking. Some of the more difficult to balance are:

a. **Initial Dispositions.** There will almost certainly be a political need to ‘get there quickly and do something’. In trying to satisfy this imperative there is a danger that later options are collapsed or severely constrained, or the force becomes definitively committed. The character of a campaign will change, sometimes suddenly, and the force structure to deal with the opening phase, may not be right for subsequent operations. At the operational level the initial disposition of a force is a major consideration. This is particularly true for a large land force, which will often be difficult to redeploy within a JOA, and logistic basing, which is a potential limitation to the movement of forces. Air and maritime elements can provide alternatives, including sea basing, and keep options open. Consideration of this issue should not promote an overly cautious approach. In the right circumstances a bold decision can achieve an early effect that can be exploited later.

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30 This process is covered in detail by AJP-5, Chapter 4.
b. **Offence and Defense.** All defensive operations should be of a defensive-offensive nature; a static defense is bound to be defeated in due course. Any defensive posture consists of 2 main parts:

(1.) A system of defense which aims at netting, weakening, slowing up and eventually immobilizing an opponent, and a large-scale counter attack designed to defeat or destroy.

(2.) In planning for defensive operations, the CFC should decide which areas are essential to him and which are vital to the success of the opponent’s offensive. He should then dispose his force to destroy the adversary when he launches attacks against these areas. However, only the offence can be decisive and the defensive phase of an operation should be viewed as transitory.

Offensive operations should be designed to seize and retain the initiative, and apply unremitting pressure on an adversary. Any offensive plan should set balanced and realistic objectives, be flexible enough to exploit success, robust enough to withstand setbacks, and will rarely be successful without the achievement of at least local air superiority. Adequate time for the training and rehearsals of force elements (which will all have different requirements, e.g. air tends to need less time) before major offensive operations is critical, especially in a multinational campaign.

c. **Compromise and Risk.** Good planning is an exercise in compromise. Resource allocation is the CFC’s decision and is where the biggest compromises are to be found. Closely linked to the idea of compromise is risk. Risks are taken when needed in pursuit of operational aims, or when the consequences can be accepted. It is often possible to recover from a risk but not from a gamble, but the pay-off from a gamble is likely to be much greater. Risk concerns threats to the plan and the actual and perceived vulnerabilities to that threat. The CFC’s view of, and reaction to, these threats will be based on his experience and judgment, as well as detailed input from the staff. Ultimately, it is the CFC who will make the final decision on the levels of risk associated with his plan, although these cannot be considered in isolation. Any military action will have potential political, economic, environmental and humanitarian consequences; what may be a low risk option for the military may be high risk elsewhere.

d. **Concentration of Force and Economy of Effort.** These 2 principles are of particular relevance to the operational level. Throughout the planning and conduct of the campaign, the CFC will be constantly reflecting on where he can concentrate his force (not the same as massing) to achieve the desired effect. The accurate identification of where he can be economical will be vital in order to permit concentration at the point of greatest impact.
e. **Logistics and Administration.** Striking a balance between the provision of support to components and national contingents, the location and size of mobile and static stocks, at the same time as preventing over-insurance, is critical. This hinges on giving logistics staff enough knowledge at the right time to allow anticipation, which will in turn generate confidence and prevent over-insurance and an unnecessarily large logistic footprint. Reducing logistic drag while ensuring support is in the right place at the right time will affect the ability of a force to seize and exploit opportunities. This requires both static and mobile logistics to be focused on the combat organization, and quickly reorganized if necessary. Logistics capacity is a common thread through all the above issues and is a key determinant in the selection of a winning concept at the operational level. As such the administration and sustainment of the force requires leadership and direction of as high an order as any engagement, and should not be left solely to subordinate logistic and administrative staff.

3A18. **Course of Action Selection.** Following presentation of the viable COAs, supported by staff analysis, recommendation and the COA comparison the CFC will decide on the best friendly COA that meets his operational objectives. This may require the commander to solicit advice from his subordinate commanders. The CFC’s decision may not be a simple selection of one of the offered COAs, he may decide to select a COA with or without modification, or combine various aspects of the various COAs into a new option, or direct that additional COAs be investigated.

3A19. **Development of the Courses of Action into a Concept of Operations.** Following the Commander’s COA decision and guidance, the staff develops the chosen COA into a CONOPS.

3A20. **Statement of Requirements.** As part of the CONOPS development process the staff develops a provisional SOR listing the force elements and capabilities required to implement the CONOPS, including the requirements of subordinate commanders.

3A21. **Concept of Operations Approval.** The CFC forwards his CONOPS for approval, together with his contribution to Coalition Strategic Commander’s provisional SOR. CONOPS approval is required before submitting a fully developed OPLAN. However, the staff may continue with the planning process and begin the Plan Development stage.

**Commander’s Intent**

3A22. **Visualization.** For every mission, the commander determines what should be achieved and begins to develop plans for the force to accomplish the mission. This visualization

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31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 See AJP-5, Chapter 4 and Annex 4I for detail, AJP-3(A) for details of the force generation process.
embodies the intent for the conduct and outcome of the operation. It is a mental picture of the current situation and intended end-state, and how (based on the higher commander's intent, on the information available and on intuition) to move from one to the other. The commander should transmit this vision to subordinates in clear and simple terms through the articulation of the Commander's Intent which is a key part of the CONOPS. The Commander's Intent is an expansion and expression of how a mission is to unfold. It is a clear and concise statement of a mission's overall purpose, the desired end-state, and any essential information on how to get to that end-state. It should be clearly understood by all subordinate commanders for adequate preparation of their own OPLANs and/or orders.

3A23. **Focus on Results.** The Commander’s Intent defines the end-state in relation to the factors of mission, adversary, operating environment, terrain, forces, time and preparation for future operations. As such, it addresses what results are expected from the operation, how these results anticipate transition to future operations, and how, in broad terms, the commander expects the force to achieve those results. Its focus is on the force as a whole. Additional information on how the force will achieve the desired results is provided only to clarify the commander’s intentions.

3A24. **Unifying Concept.** The Commander’s Intent is the unifying concept for all elements of the force. It provides an overall framework within which subordinate commanders may operate. It pertains even when a plan or CONOPS no longer applies, or circumstances require subordinates to make decisions that support the ultimate aim of the force as a whole rather than a set of sequenced events that may no longer reflect what 'makes sense' at that time or place. In this way Commander’s Intent enables Mission Command.34

3A25. **Enabling Mission Command.** In stating the Intent, the issuing commander provides subordinates with the freedom to operate within the larger context of the mission, rather than within the restrictions of a particular CONOPS or scheme of maneuver. The Commander’s Intent provides subordinates with the flexibility to adapt their actions to achieve success. By focusing on the end-state rather than sequential events, it allows commanders to operate with increased speed and efficiency in decision-making. This allows subordinate forces, and hence the whole force, to operate faster, and with greater agility, than the adversary. This keeps the adversary off-balance and unable to respond coherently. The end-state focus supports the initiative of commanders at all levels by freeing them to focus on the desired results, even when the CONOPS should be adapted to changing events, when communications are disrupted, or additional guidance or directives are lacking. The Commander’s Intent provides subordinates with the same opportunity of developing a vision of their end-state, as it supports that of the force as a whole.

34 See Chapter 5.
3A26. **Command Involvement.** Because of its criticality, it is essential that the commander personally prepares and delivers the Intent. While time constraints and combat conditions may require the commander to deliver the intent verbally, possibly even by radio or electronic means, it is best when it is articulated to subordinates personally and in written form. Face-to-face delivery ensures mutual understanding of what the issuing commander wants, and the provision of a hard copy provides subordinates with the foundation of their own planning.

3A27. **Summary.** The Commander’s Intent provides the link between the mission and how the commander plans to accomplish that mission. The Intent should be expressed in simple sentences that clearly state why the operation is being conducted, the desired military end-state and criteria for success, the military objectives and how the force as a whole will achieve the end state.

**STAGE IV – PLAN DEVELOPMENT**

3A28. Following promulgation of the commander’s CONOPS, detailed planning of operations within the campaign is conducted by the staffs.35 The purpose of the Plan Development stage is to identify further the forces required to implement the CONOPS, to provide for their sustainment as well as protection and to organize and coordinate their timely deployment into the JOA. It also includes the further elaboration of details in each functional area required to ensure the full integration and effective implementation of the CONOPS.

3A29. **Force Generation/Activation.**

a. **Manpower Planning.** Manpower planning produces a manpower SOR that identifies the manpower requirements for the in-place headquarters/coalition headquarters as appropriate that are required to support the C2 of the planned force.

b. **Sustainment Planning.** Sustainment planning ensures that the logistic plan is sufficient to support operations, and that re-supply procedures provide continuity of support throughout the operation.

c. **Force Protection.**36 Force protection planning should develop requirements and identify all necessary measures to be taken and means to be used to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment, stocks, plans, orders and operations to any threat in all situations, in order to preserve the operational effectiveness of a force.

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35 See AJP-5, Chapter 4.
d. **Force Deployment.** Although deployment of forces is a national responsibility, the Coalition Strategic Commander plays a leading role in coordinating deployment planning, as well as the CFC.

3A30. **Plan Approval.** The Coalition Strategic Commander, after consultation at the political-strategic level, will gain approval for OPLANs. All subordinate OPLANs and SUPPLANs require the approval of the initiating authority.

**STAGE V – PLAN REVIEW**

3A31. During an operation, the plan should be continually reviewed. This is essential to react to changes in the situation, from the strategic to the tactical. The maintenance of a running intelligence analysis enables an accurate appreciation of the opposing force’s situation. If it has changed markedly, the existing plans should be reviewed to determine if additional plans are required or if revisions to current plans will suffice. This review links to the monitoring of campaign progress described above, which will determine whether the required effects are being achieved and the campaign is advancing towards the end-state.

3A32. Alliance operations inherently have both political and military goals. As such, exclusively military lines of activity will invariably not achieve the strategic end-state. While every campaign or major operation is directed towards a goal, at some point military action is no longer the main effort. The CFC should have a clear idea of the conditions that should exist, and how to measure them, before the end-state can be said to have been achieved is required. He may also consider:

a. What structures, capabilities and postures are required next?

b. How to change the organization and focus of the staff? Too early and there is a danger that they lose focus, too late and a period of instability may occur as readjustment takes place; and how to avoid a resumption of hostilities?

c. What state should the indigenous forces or warring factions be left in? How will responsibilities be transferred to indigenous or follow-on forces, or other organizations?

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37 See AJP-5, Chapter 4 and AJP 3-13 ‘Allied Joint Doctrine for the Deployment of Forces’.
National Interest

0401. The decision to commit military force is ultimately a national, political matter. The national interest will therefore be both the first and the last factor to be considered while taking that decision - all other considerations are subordinate. National interest is impossible to define absolutely, being the product of economics, history, geography, national characteristics, party politics and the views of allies. The examination of a national interest may offer nothing conclusive in predicting a state’s behavior, however, an understanding of the influences on coalition members’ national interests would be helpful. MIC partners would wish to understand members’ national perspectives on, amongst others: vital ground and national survival; non-negotiable principles; domestic and international public opinion; perceived legitimacy of military involvement; political and economic factors (unlikely to be military factors); and history and historical obligations. Each state will decide to take military action based on the expected benefits for its own political, domestic, strategic and economic interests. Domestic public opinion may be a major consideration in governments’ decisions. Often politicians take campaign stances based on the endurance of their state’s military commitments, as well as limiting the duration of existing commitments in order to retain domestic political balance. Historically states have also withdrawn their contributions from ongoing coalition operations for national reasons. Finally, national interests change and are often redefined. New governments are elected; domestic policies are dynamic; economies adapt; and other higher priority interests may factor in a state’s decision-making process. Thus it follows, due to the primacy of the national interest, that it is not possible to say in advance how a state might react when considering courses of action. In sum, the various states’ national interests, and how those interests might determine national behavior, are not definable or binding.

Legal

0402. A firm legal foundation is a fundamental requirement for the resort to the use of force (jus ad bellum). The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) provides the legal framework for the way in which force is used (jus in bello). The classic exceptions to the basic prohibition on the use of force in the UN Charter Article 2(4) are United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) under Chapter VII and self-defense, whether national or collective. Some say there is also a customary international law exception of humanitarian intervention. It is possible that states may differ in their legal reasoning for the use of force in the same coalition operation, or differ in their understanding on the width of the self-defense ground and the actions that can be carried out in self-defense, or differ on any express or implied authorizations of the UN Security Council. Once a state has established it is lawful to used armed force it is unlikely that this
decision will be revisited in the course of an operation. However, during ongoing operations military activity will be continually scrutinized and reviewed, to reflect policy and military objectives. Not only national policy but also national legal interpretation will likely constrain national conduct within operations. At a tactical level national ‘red cards’ and caveats are used to avoid or remove national responsibilities for disputed coalition action. In a non-international armed conflict the domestic laws of the troop contributing nation as well as relevant international law, including treaty obligations (e.g. the Geneva Conventions) and customary international law, and where operating within another state with its consent that host nation’s own domestic laws, will provide the applicable envelope of laws. A Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) typically will set out important jurisdictional arrangements. International Human Right Laws must also be carefully considered, especially in complex operating environments other than armed conflict, such as a crisis resolution.

Rules of Engagement

0403. Rules of Engagement (ROE) should reflect the policy and military parameters for the use of force. ROE are not law, but they should be lawful. ROE development is a vital component of campaign planning. While coalitions can operate under national ROE, there are many advantages of operating under agreed coalition ROE.

**ROE, Self-Defense and Defense of Others.** In coalition operations it is vital to understand the relationship between ROE, self-defense and defense of others. Different national views exist. Usually self-defense is considered an inherent right which stands apart from ROE. ROE are not needed to grant it and they cannot take it away. Defense of others may, however, be a matter of ROE, according to national policy and law.

0404. ROE are directives to military forces and individuals that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which the use of force or other action may or may not be applied. ROE are intended to avoid ambiguity that could lead to a commander inadvertently violating national (or coalition) policy and objectives, or to a violation of international law through inappropriate action or reaction in a given situation. In regards specifically to international law, the Law of Armed Conflict, and other conventions and laws to which coalition members may be subject, ROE only exist to give guidance and cannot by themselves guarantee the lawfulness of any action. It remains the commander’s responsibility to ensure that action is lawful. ROE are written as a series of prohibitions and permissions applicable to situations spanning the entire range of military operations.

0405. Although coalition participants may have similar political mandates, each nation is likely, as a starting point, to bring to the coalition a different national ROE reflecting that nation's unique political and legal interests and its reason for entering the coalition.
Some national ROE will be relatively free of constraint, while others may not. Commanders of deployed forces may lack the authority to speak on behalf of their nation in the ROE development process. To facilitate interoperability efforts should be made to standardize ROE with a view to developing Coalition ROE, but this may not be achievable. Therefore, it may be necessary to tailor the employment of contingents to conform with and optimize their own national ROE. In these circumstances the commander will need visibility of coalition members’ ROE so that he can work round national differences as much as possible.

0406. Coalition ROE development is a time-consuming process and should begin early in the planning process. As with national ROE doctrine, there will need to be rules for implementing, authorizing and requesting ROE, as well as a common understanding on delegations and permissions.

**Constitutional Constraints**

0407. A nation may impose additional constraints on itself through its constitution and its domestic law; these constraints may apply to both the commitment of military force and the use of troops once committed. Constitutional constraints should be distinguished from policy constraints; the former are likely to be considerably less flexible than the latter. Individual national advice will be required not only to describe the constraint, but to determine the extent to which it is nationally binding.

**Treaty Obligations**

0408. National obligations arising from multilateral and bilateral agreements influence national decisions both *ad bellum* and *in bello*. While membership of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), might oblige a state to act in a certain way in a given set of circumstances, that would only be if that nation judged the participation in an operation to be lawful (*ad bellum*). Similarly, being a signatory to, for example, the Geneva Conventions will oblige a state to constrain the way its forces operate during the operation (*in bello*).

**Policy Constraints**

0409. Policies, that is to say the way governments decide to do business, are within governmental control in a way that constitutional constraints may not be. Policy positions are likely to be taken in reaction to other factors rather than be factors themselves. Noting the distinction between national policies and national constitutional constraints, policy constraints will not be considered further.

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38 The principles on which a state is governed that may be embodied in a statute or evolve by precedent.
Cultural Factors

0410. Cultural factors must also be considered:

a. What language does the troop contributing nation speak?

b. Will it need interpreters?

c. What language will its liaison officers speak?

d. What cultural barriers exist in establishing harmonious relationship with other coalition partners?

e. Are there any specific nutritional standards/constraints?

SECTION II – COMMAND PHILOSOPHY

0411. While all command and control (C2) arrangements must be sufficiently flexible to cope with additional subordinate elements, the commander and his headquarters should not be overloaded to the extent where efficiency and tempo are adversely affected. The formation of additional subordinate headquarters may become necessary in order to prevent such circumstances.

0412. Control of Significant Resources. Some specialist, and often scarce, force elements provide critical cross-component capabilities. To ensure efficient employment they demand C2 at the operational level and are not generally delegated to subordinate commanders. Discrete national contributions, as well as embedded component assets, may be brigaded under the control of a specific commander within the coalition headquarters. Specialist coordination at the operational level provides a pan-Joint Operations Area (JOA) view and the ability to re-balance resources across the force.

SECTION III – COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURES

0413. The lead nation will be responsible for establishing an effective C2 architecture, which may extend to component level, and is likely to adopt predominantly national or alliance structures and procedures. However, no single command structure necessarily best fits all circumstances. Specific C2 architectures must be driven by the context and may require iterative adjustment as the situation or tempo develops. Political imperatives, in particular, may have a significant impact. Participating nations should, however, strive to maximize unity of command, with missions, tasks, responsibilities, and authorities clearly defined and understood by all participants.

0414. In formal alliances, national political objectives are addressed, and generally subsumed, within wider multinational objectives. Moreover, alliances are characterized by a degree of commonality, or standardization, across aspects of doctrine, process,
Coalitions, however, typically represent less coherent and unfamiliar groupings brought together for a limited period to address a specific crisis. Political considerations may dominate decisions regarding force composition, organization, and command arrangements. Moreover, the disparate amalgam of forces involved may have limited commonality or compatibility. National pride and cultural considerations may also exacerbate the problem by limiting organizational options and thus constraining freedom of action. This complex set of factors is also likely to change as the situation, political dynamic, and potentially national contributions, changes over time. The strategic level commander is designated as the Coalition Strategic Commander and should be attuned to such changes and adjust the command structure and training program to mitigate negative impacts where possible.

**National Contingent Command.** Regardless of how the force is organized operationally, each nation furnishing forces will normally establish a national contingent headquarters, with a dedicated National Contingent Commander (NCC) and logistic support element. Although the NCC does not share the same command responsibility or authority within the force as the operational commander, he should understand the operation to the same extent in order to provide effective advice and support.

a. In general terms, the role of the NCC is to integrate his own national contingent into the force, promoting cohesion, trust and understanding while implementing his own nation’s policies and caveats. He would also act as a national figurehead; a conduit back to his nation on tactical incidents and operational developments; matters of support to, and force protection of, his contingent; and media issues.

b. The NCC will implement national caveats, although he will usually delegate elements to his national commanders within each component so that issues can be resolved early at lower levels, thus minimizing the overall impact on coalition cohesion. Any issues that are likely to cause friction should be identified early and discussed with the operational commander in an effort to resolve the problem.

**Integrated Command Structures.** Formation of a fully integrated command structure greatly complements unity of command. However, this type of structure is more likely to be found within a formal alliance. Within the NATO, for example, a commander is designated from a member nation while staff and subordinate commanders and staff are of multinational composition. The key ingredients in an integrated command structure are that a single commander be designated, that the staff is composed of representatives from all member nations, and that subordinate commands and staffs are integrated to the lowest echelon necessary in order to accomplish the mission. This type of command structure may not be possible in an ad hoc multinational coalition operation.
Coalition Force Headquarters and Staff Functions

0417. As previously stated, the lead nation will provide the overarching framework for command, which will encompass not only the commander and majority of his headquarters’ staff, but also structure, language, procedures, command and control, communications, intelligence and information management systems. It will generally lead all the key functional areas such as J3, J5 and J9, with staff from contributing nations being integrated throughout. Figure 4.1 illustrates a notional operational level command and staff framework. The combination of a mature and experienced staff and the broader perspective of coalition partners is essential in building effective coalitions. Staff training and rehearsals prior to operations are crucial.

Figure 4.1 – Notional Multinational Operational Level Command

Notes:
1. The operational level commander is designated the Coalition Force Commander (CFC).
2. It is likely that the staff in J3, J5 and J9 will be largely from the lead nation. The remaining staff divisions may be led by the other contributing nations.
3. Although certain intelligence assets will be available across the force, each nation is likely to retain a separate intelligence element. The role of the J2 staff is to provide as full and coherent an intelligence picture as national caveats allow. Wherever possible national restrictions should be minimized.
4. The Lead Nation will normally provide framework CIS assets and leadership of J6.
5. Multinational Logistic Centre (MNLC) - Cell for logistic coordination, not a component command. Contributing nations may deploy a separate National Support Element.
6. In the same way as the CFHQ, component headquarters are likely to be based on a single nation with integrated staff from national contingents. National contributions may be discrete, self-contained force packages (an armored brigade) or individual capabilities (AAR). The level of multi-nationality will be dictated largely by the nature of the operation. The diagram depicts illustrative force elements within each component. Certain additional strategic capabilities (e.g. SOF, TLAM, ISR etc), retained under national command, may be made available for specific operations to the coalition.
7. CFACC will control the CAOC, which will have clear linkages across all components.
Staff Functions

0418. The Coalition Force Commander (CFC) usually has 4 principal advisers: the Chief of Staff (COS), the Deputy COS (DCOS), the Political Adviser (POLAD) and the Legal Adviser (LEGAD). In addition to these advisors, the CFC can add other functional advisors, such as a medical (MEDAD), gender or cultural advisers, the Chief Information Operations (Info Ops), and the Chief Public Affairs Officer.

0419. **Chief of Staff.** COS is responsible for operations, operations support, plans and intelligence. He coordinates work across the headquarters, with particular interest in Information Management. He is pivotal to the efficient running of the headquarters; a good COS can engender and sustain mutual trust and understanding between individual staff members, advisers and subordinate headquarters.

0420. **Deputy Chief of Staff.** DCOS coordinates logistics, personnel and often finance. Though normally of equivalent rank, the COS is *primus inter pares*.

0421. **Political/Policy Adviser.** POLAD advises a commander on:

   a. Coalition policy.

   b. Local, national, regional and international political issues.

   c. Political issues specifically related to coalition members, partners, and the host nations.

   d. The relationship with International Organizations such as the United Nations (UN) as well as non-governmental organizations (NGO)s.

0422. **Legal Adviser.** LEGAD provides legal advice and can be either civil servants or military lawyers selected to advise the CFC. Principally they advise on:

   a. International law and mandates.

   b. Use of force and compliance with the relevant international law, primarily through ROE.

   c. Judicial issues specifically related to coalition members, partners, and the host nation.

   d. All legal matters arising from the conduct of the operation.

0423. **Personnel and Administration (J1).** The J1 staff’s principal role is to advise the CFC and his staff on the personnel policies and manpower management systems and procedures established by national authorities for their force components. The J1 responsibilities include personnel management, accounting, entitlements and benefits, morale, welfare,
recreation, postal services, safety, provost and discipline, prisoners of war, administration and casualty reporting. The J1 should also coordinate personnel matters with the personnel staffs of the national contingents and will usually establish a Joint Personnel, Resources and Finance Center.

0424. **Intelligence (J2).** The J2 staff is responsible for the provision of accurate, timely and relevant intelligence to meet the CFC’s operational and security requirements within the JOA and maintaining situational awareness in the CFC’s Area of Interest and Area of Intelligence Responsibility. The J2 will usually establish a Joint All Sources Information Centre.

0425. **Operations (J3).** The essential role of the J3 staff is to act as the focal point through which the CFC directs the conduct of an operation, ensuring unity of effort and the most effective use of resources supporting immediate and planned operations. As such the J3 is responsible for establishing a Joint Operations Centre (JOC). The J3 may comprise sections/cells that cover: maritime, land and air operations; special forces operations; space operations; information operations; psychological operations; Chemical Biological and Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) activities, Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), targeting; coordination of refugee support; multinational specialized units operations; and military police operations.

0426. **Provost Marshall.** The Provost Marshall is the CFC’s advisor on security, order and discipline inside the force. Together with the multinational specialized unit commander (if established), he is responsible for matters related to the civilian population security issues and police matters.

0427. **Logistics (J4).** The J4 staff is responsible for assessing the logistics required for the achievement of the CFC’s objectives and for ensuring that these support requirements are met throughout the operation. Based on this assessment, the J4 staff develops the logistic concept and plans in support of operations and coordinates the overall logistic effort. The size and complexity of operations, component participation and force contribution of the nations as well as the degree to which national and/or multinational logistics are to be integrated into the logistics concept may require specific logistic coordinating activities. If appropriate, a multinational joint logistic centre in support of the CFC’s logistics staff may be activated to coordinate support between component commanders, National Support Elements (NSE), the host nation and NGOs.

0428. **Medical Support.** In order to ensure proper medical planning and support for the forces under command, the CFC needs a medical staff structure to enable him to make

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39 Detailed information is in Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-2 Allied Joint Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Security Doctrine and subordinate documents.
40 Detailed information in AJP-4 Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine and subordinate documents.
41 Detailed information in AJP-4.10 Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine and subordinate documents.
medical assessments, plan and deal with national medical support. The MEDAD in a coalition headquarters is responsible for ensuring that the commander and his staff are properly aware of health and medical implications of a course of action and any issues connected to the operation. As a special staff officer, he maintains direct access to the commander.

0429. **Plans and Policy (J5).** The J5 staff assists the CFC in the preparation of his campaign plan and the planning for future operations. J5 coordinates planning efforts within the headquarters and with higher, subordinate and adjacent commands as well as civil authorities. The J5 staff is responsible for establishing and forming the core of a Joint Operations Planning Group (JOPG). The J5 staff may subdivide into advance planners and implementation planners. The advance planners focus their effort on long-range analysis and subsequent required products. They will initiate and develop scenario-based plans in anticipation of a future event or circumstance that a coalition force may face. Implementation planners act as the conduit between J5 and J3. They focus their effort on crisis response planning and initiate/develop plans in response to a current or developing crisis. They are responsive to tasks assigned by J3 and assist J3 in the transformation of operation plans (OPLANs) into an operations order (OPORD), and continue to assist the J3 organization during plan execution.

0430. **Communications and Information Systems (J6).** The J6 staff should ensure that adequate communication and information support is provided and that interoperable communication and information systems (CIS) procedures are used at all levels. Furthermore, J6 staff should be included in the planning, coordination and execution of C3 architectures and in-JOA CIS systems to provide the capabilities necessary to enable the CFC’s C2 requirements. The J6 staff usually establishes a Joint C3 support centre. Activities which are probably critical to the coalition CIS should be fully coordinated between the Info Ops cell, the JOC and the Joint C3 support centre.

0431. **Civil-Military Cooperation (J9).** The J9 staff is responsible for advising the CFC on the implications of all the activities undertaken which directly concern the relations between the armed forces, local government, civil population, international organizations, NGOs and other agencies of the countries where the coalition force is deployed, employed and supported. J9 staff members are not necessarily individual specialists with skills applicable in a civilian environment. However, they should have broad military experience, understand CIMIC principles and procedures, understand the environment in which they will operate and understand the workings of NGOs and international organizations. They should be capable of explaining military requirements to civilian organizations and vice versa. Finally, they should be able to carry out accurate

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42 Detailed information in AJP-5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning.
43 Detailed information in AJP-6 (under current development).
44 Detailed information in AJP-9, NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine.
assessments and provide tactical advice to the commander. The J9 staff usually establishes a Joint CIMIC Centre to coordinate CIMIC and related activities.

0432. **Information Operations.** Info Ops is a military function which coordinates information activities in order to create desired effects. The Chief Info Ops is the Commander’s adviser on activities and effects in the information environment, and leads the implementation of the Coalition Information Strategy. The Chief Info Ops should be granted Coordinating Authority in order to enable cross-functional coordination.

0433. **Public Affairs.** The Public Affairs office advises the CFC on all media-related matters, taking guidance on overall information strategy from the highest political level through his line of command. To ensure synergy of effort, public affairs offices closely coordinates at all command levels with all other actors involved in information activities, and participate in the Info Ops advice and coordination process. However, it should be noted that, in order to safeguard the integrity, credibility and efficiency of military public affairs, such close coordination should not result in either organizational or direct integration of public affairs with other tools of the common information effort. A close liaison with the CIMIC staff should be maintained, and therefore the public affairs staff is normally integrated in the Joint CIMIC Centre in a separate Public Information Centre. The PIC will coordinate with the public information agencies of associated international organizations in the JOA (e.g. the UN and European Union (EU)). The Public Information Centre will interface with the international press and the local press, and is responsible for implementing the public affairs related aspects of the Coalition Information Strategy. The Chief of Public Affairs is the commander’s spokesperson and as such has direct access to the commander at all times. As the success and credibility of the spokesperson relates to continuous efforts and established trust with the media, frequent change of the commander’s spokesperson should be avoided.

0434. **Lessons Identified.** The coalition lessons identified effort should be proactive, starting at the earliest stages of the coalition. Coalition lessons identified efforts should run in parallel with national efforts, allowing timely collection and sharing of lessons, whilst acknowledging national sensitivities. Lessons identified will become lessons learned largely through national processes affecting their forces. However, the CFC should not be constrained in immediately applying lessons identified as the situation dictates. Lessons identified are an essential element in learning from current coalition operations and preparing for the next. A coalition headquarters should establish a Lessons Identified Cell from the outset of the coalition effort. This cell will collect, analyze and share lessons amongst coalition members during the planning, deployment, conduct and handover or termination of operations. Lessons may be of immediate importance, such as those concerning force protection throughout the coalition, whilst others may be less urgent and could be analyzed later in the mission, or on completion of the operation.
Liaison and Coordination

0435. Regardless of the specific command and information structures established, differences in doctrine, organization, equipment and training are mitigated by a robust liaison structure. During multinational operations, participating forces should establish liaison early at all levels in order to: foster a better understanding of mission and tactics; facilitate transfer of information; enhance mutual trust; and develop an increased level of teamwork. Liaison is often accomplished through the use of liaison teams. These teams should be knowledgeable about the structure, capabilities, weapons systems, logistics, command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, and planning methods employed within their own commands, as well as having regional (or partner-specific) training and experience. These teams can provide communications using systems that might not be shareable with some coalition partners. Non-military organizations, (for example host governments or the UN) could also be recipients of these services. Liaison teams can act as filters for the exchange of information consistent with national disclosure and dissemination policies.

0436. **Liaison Officers.** Military personnel possessing regional language capabilities, cultural awareness, as well as experience of working and training with other countries’ militaries, other agencies or the indigenous population are invaluable in ensuring understanding and increasing tempo. Liaison demands usually outstrip the availability of suitable personnel and additional requirements must be identified early in the planning process.

0437. **Coordination Centers.** Coordination centers can also facilitate control of multinational operations, which require interaction with a variety of agencies, both military and non-military. A coordination centre can assist in C2 as well as coordinate a variety of functions, including logistics and civil-military operations. It can be the focal point for support issues, alert and warning, host-nation support, movement control, and training. As a coalition matures, the role of a coordination centre can be expanded to include command activities. Member nations provide a staff element to the centre that is comprised of action officers familiar with the relevant support activities. Coalition nations should be encouraged to augment this staff element with linguists and communications capabilities in order to maintain contact with their parent headquarters. A central coalition coordination centre may be established as well as a number of functional coordination centers.
SECTION IV – TROOP CONTRIBUTING NATIONS’ COMMAND AND CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS

0438. Although the highest level of commitment is when a nation provides combat forces (troops, ships, aircraft and staff officers), other contributions are also vital to the success of coalition operations (Figure 4.2). Diplomatic, financial and logistic support is required for all coalition operations. Logistic, lift and sustainment resources along with basing, access and over flight rights are required to sustain coalition operations. Stabilization and reconstruction resources, along with other governance and non-military ministerial support, is required to resolve conflicts allowing military forces to eventually withdraw.

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* Diplomatic Recognition
* Opening Embassy or Mission
* Supporting UNSCR
* Debt Forgiveness
* Unfreezing Assets
* Direct Financial Assistance
* Logistic Infrastructure
* Strategic Air and Sea Lift
* Intra-theater Lift
* Basing Rights
* Access to Facilities
* Overflight Rights
* Humanitarian Assistance
* Public Infrastructure
* Constitutional Support
* Ministerial Mentoring
* Civil Service Training

**Figure 4.2 – Coalition Contributions**

0439. The following are C2 considerations for a lead nation in determining the parameters that will define troop contributing nations’ involvement in a coalition force:

a. The proposed level of staff integration.

b. National contingent headquarters expectations.

c. Coalition Commander and Deputy Commander nominations/appointees if known.

d. Potential functional leads (e.g. functional lead nation for logistics).
e. What C2 doctrine does the troop contributing nation(s) normally use? Is it willing to work under the lead nation’s C2 doctrine?

f. Does it understand and accept the likely command relationship, which will place its contingent under operational control (OPCON) of the CFC?

g. At what point will the troop contributing nation(s) be comfortable with the transfer of authority of the contingent to under control of the designated coalition commander?

h. Is it comfortable with the planned coalition headquarters structure?

i. What staff contribution will it wish to make to the coalition headquarters?

j. Does it have the capacity or national intent to fill senior coalition command positions such as Deputy Command and/or formation command of other troop contributing nation elements?

k. Does it speak the same language as the lead nation, or is it able to provide sufficient Liaison Officers and linguists who can speak the lead nation’s language?

l. What are its in-theatre National Command Headquarters intentions/arrangements?

m. Does it have the capacity to provide Liaison Officers at all levels within the lead nation framework?

n. Can it provide a Planning Liaison Cell immediately to the coalition planning process?

o. Will it agree to the connection of its national network to the Coalition wide-area network? Is it accredited to do so? Will the lead nation’s major allies accept intelligence exchange with the troop contributing nation through the coalition framework?

p. What CIS capacity/technology does it have? Is it compatible with the lead nation? Will it require augmentation? Does it have the technological and skills capability/capacity to act as the coalition network manager?

q. Do troop contributing nation forces have/require reach back to the troop contributing nation?
ANNEX A – COMMAND AND CONTROL DURING OPERATIONS OTHER THAN COMBAT

4A1. MIC identified the need to highlight national C2 factors during operations other than combat:

- Who has the legal authority to commit military forces to a coalition for these missions? What government agency/ministry has the lead for the missions defined above?
- Who has the authority to deploy and redeploy military forces as part of a coalition to complete the missions defined above.
- Within a coalition, who has national command authority to conduct the mission?
- Who is the approving authority for your nation for ROE within the coalition? If the lead nation wishes to change ROE what national source has the authority to approve the change?
- Should the mission change or transition from a single mission to multiple missions, who has authority to commit your nation’s force to new missions (short of combat)?

4A2. The following national abbreviations are used:

| AUS   | PM – Prime Minister  
|       | MINDEF – Minister for Defense  
|       | NSC – National Security Committee (of Cabinet)  
|       | DOD – Department of Defense  
|       | DFAT – Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
|       | AFP – Australian Federal Police  
|       | CDF – Chief of the Defense Force  
|       | CJOPS – Chief of joint Operations  
|       | COMASC – Commander Australian Contingent  
|       | N.B. Australia does not use the term Humanitarian Operations and Peacemaking in Defense Doctrine  
| CAN   | CDS – Chief of the Defense Staff  
|       | DFAIT – Department of Foreign Affairs, Industry and Trade  
|       | DND/CF – Department of National Defense / Canadian Forces  
|       | Governor-in-Council – Federal Cabinet  
|       | ROE – Rules of engagement  
| DEU   | MoD – Ministry of defense  
|       | MoFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
| FRA   | MOD – Ministry of Defense MOD /  
|       | MINDEF – Ministère de la défense  
|       | MFEA – Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs /  
|       | MAEE – Ministère des affaires étrangères et européennes  
|       | NSC – National Security Council  
|       | SGDSN – Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale  
|       | DNSC – Defense and National Security Council  
|       | CDSN – Conseil de défense et de sécurité nationale /  
|       | CHOD staff – Chief Head of Defense Staff  

2nd Edition
September 2011
### Annex 4A

**EMA – Etat major des armées /**
**PJHQ – Permanent Joint Headquarters**
**CPCO – Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations /**
**EMIA/FE – Etats major interarmées/ Forces et entraînement /**
**JFTHQ – Joint Force and training Headquarters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Agency/Role</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GBR</strong></td>
<td>DFID Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **ITA** | MoD – Ministry of Defense  
MoFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
CHOD – Chief of Deface Staff  
COMJOHQ – Joint Operational HQ Commander |
| **USA** | SECDEF – Secretary of Defense  
FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency |

### MISSION: HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER RELIEF

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Authorization</th>
<th>Lead Agency/Role</th>
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<th>Approval</th>
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<td>DFAT and/or DOD</td>
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<td>MINDEF as advised by CDF</td>
<td>CJOPS</td>
<td>CDF thru CJOPS</td>
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<td>CHOD, through MoD, once authorized</td>
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### MISSION: NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATION

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<th>Who has the legal authority to commit military forces to a coalition?</th>
<th>What national government agency has the lead for this kind of operation?</th>
<th>Who has command authority to conduct operation for your national contingent?</th>
<th>Who approves national ROE and changes?</th>
<th>If the op changes, who approves nation’s participation?</th>
<th>Who has the authority to deploy and redeploy forces?</th>
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CHAPTER 5 – CROSS-LEVEL FUNCTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

SECTION I – TROOP CONTRIBUTING NATIONS’ FORCE CONTRIBUTION

0501. The following are key information requirements for a lead nation in determining the parameters that will define troop contributing nation involvement in a coalition force.

a. What type of troops will be contributed by troop contributing nation? (combat forces, combat support forces, logistic forces, observers, civilian police, and/or civilian monitors?)

b. What size force is troop contributing nation planning to commit?

c. For how long are forces committed?

d. What national rotation policy for troops will be followed?

e. Will troop contributing nation contribute to a transition force?

f. What capstone doctrine does the troop contributing nation operate under?

g. Are troop contributing nation forces provided high or low-tech forces?

h. What skill-specific training do troops from contributing nations require before joining the coalition?

i. What levels/types of technical assistance will the troop contributing nation require to be interoperable with the lead nation and other troop contributing nations?

j. Where does the troop contributing nation’s military expertise lie? Does troop contributing nation have niche specialties?

k. Does the troop contributing nation have a warfighting approach?

l. What are the professional standards employed by its junior and senior leadership?

m. What levels of force preparation will be required in or out of theatre before troops are committed to the coalition?

n. What degree of acclimatization is required by troops before entering the theatre?
SECTION II – SHAPING THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

0502. Information pervades all areas of activity and spans the scope of civil and military, national and multinational, as well as governmental and non-governmental activities, and involves the consideration of both the inherent and deliberate informational impact of actions. Shaping the information environment includes activities conducted to create and maintain Information Superiority.

0503. Information Superiority describes the state of a relative superior ability of an actor to collect, process, and disseminate information compared to competitors in the same arena and to draw an operational advantage from it. Physical actions as well as cognitive and social processes of humans are based on information. Information is necessary for the development of situational awareness and understanding, for decision-making, and the implementation of decisions by actions. Therefore, information is a fundamental prerequisite for planning, execution, and assessment of operations at all levels of involvement. Competitive advantages resulting from shaping the information environment can become a major factor for mission success.

0504. The ability to understand the operational environment heavily depends on the availability of (in terms of quality and quantity) appropriate information and the functionality of information systems. Therefore, shaping the information environment will consequently affect the capabilities and understanding of actors and, ultimately, their will and behavior.

0505. Effects in the information environment can result from a multitude of actions, including influence activities and other operations and actions, conducted by governmental and non-governmental, civil and military actors. In order to become effective, these activities require a minimum of internal and external coordination. However, because of the multitude of actors and actions, the identification of responsibilities and appropriate mechanisms for coordinating actions and effects in the information environment is often challenging, in particular in complex security situations involving a range of instruments in a comprehensive approach.

0506. Coalition influence activities can shape the course of events and thus must be seen as an integral part of the multinational political effort. Although Coalition partners may conduct their own respective activities based on their own national and organizational objectives, actions and messages must be consistent with the overall Coalition Information Strategy. For Coalition operations 2 overriding, and partly conflicting, requirements have to be considered: conducting relevant and timely information activities, attuned to the crisis country/region; and ensuring maximum coherence among the multiplicity of actors involved.
SECTION III – INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, TARGET ACQUISITION AND RECONNAISSANCE

0507. Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) is an operations-intelligence activity that integrates and synchronizes the planning and operation of sensors and assets, and the processing, exploitation, targeting and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. ISTAR is a ‘system of systems’ that derives synergy through integrating surveillance, reconnaissance and target acquisition assets together with the intelligence process through a methodology of centralized coordination. ISTAR links intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance systems and sensors to cue maneuver and offensive strike assets, with particular emphasis on the timely passage of both critical and targeting information. The principal users of ISTAR are the operations, intelligence and targeting staff.

0508. An effective ISTAR capability will allow the commander to identify an adversary’s weaknesses and enable him to make the decisions that will exploit those vulnerabilities. Systems that produce ‘coarse grain’ information are used to provide a general picture of the adversary’s activity and cue ‘fine grain’ systems that permit the development of intelligence at the level of detail that the commander requires within his battle space. ISTAR permits fleeting opportunities to be exploited and mobile targets to be monitored and tracked. ISTAR provides intelligence support to the commander from the inception of his decision-making process, through the making of his plan and throughout the subsequent conduct of his operations. It is a key enabler of operational success.

0509. **ISTAR Architecture.** The ISTAR architecture is the structure that enables ISTAR. It encompasses the command and control (C2), common processes and communications that link the collection assets and their controlling organizations, analysis elements, the users of the product and the coalition information sharing infrastructure, allowing these separate elements and systems to operate as a synergistic whole.

0510. **ISTAR Planning.** The use of ISTAR collection assets must be carefully planned. This is not solely a J2 or ISTAR function but is one that requires involvement of staffs in many areas and across multiple levels of command. There must be strong linkage between the J2/ISTAR staff and the J3 staff to ensure consistency of effort. The allocation and tasking of ISTAR assets is the responsibility of the J2/J3 staff.

0511. **Multinational ISTAR.** The effective provision of intelligence support to multinational operations requires the ISTAR process to be conducted in accordance with agreed common procedures for the sharing of information and for the coordination and use of ISTAR collection assets. During multinational operations, the intelligence product supporting that operation must be shared and early liaison should be initiated at the

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45 There is no NATO definition for ISTAR. This description is based on definition of ISR in US Joint Publication 2-01.
highest levels of the coalition to ensure that the intelligence operations of each participant are coordinated. Such procedures must be in place and ideally, must have been practiced, prior to the commencement of multinational operations. Two broad approaches to the resolution of these problems are possible depending on the nature of the multinational operation and the participants:

a. **Integrated Information Sharing.** Under integrated information sharing, ISTAR collection assets, processes and personnel are fully integrated. This allows for the ready flow of information and intelligence and a synergy in the use of collection assets. It also reduces duplication and simplifies the dissemination of the product in formats that are readily useable by dissimilar national force elements. However, the ability to release sensitive national information and intelligence may cause difficulties for participants that will often only be solved through pragmatism linked to an understanding of the sensitivities involved.

b. **Parallel Information Sharing.** With parallel information sharing, different national ISTAR capabilities work separately, and often in parallel, with some integrated links to provide an ability to exchange information. This allows for national control of product, collection and security issues, but promotes duplication of effort and may lead to suspicion of the amount of knowledge not being released by partners.

**SECTION IV– INFORMATION OPERATIONS**

0512. Information Operations (Info Ops) coordinates activity and is not a capability in its own right. Info Ops advises planning, execution and assessment of military operations from a comprehensive and systemic understanding of the information environment, considering all or any capability or activity able to create effects; the extent is only limited by imagination, availability, policy, doctrine and international law.

0513. Info Ops advice and coordination requires relevant training of the staff, but only a minimum adjustment of headquarters’ structures and procedures. The Info Ops staff must be positioned in a way that allows cross-functional activity and participation in all primary staff routine throughout planning, execution and assessment of operations. Info Ops does not require specific C2 arrangements other than coordinating authority to involve functional/capability expertise, as appropriate.

**SECTION V – TARGETING**

0514. The Coalition Force Commander (CFC) is responsible for establishing a combined Joint targeting system. This system will undertake an analysis of adversary capability and make the recommendation and/or selection of those elements of capability whose destruction, degradation or negation would significantly advance the achievement of the coalition’s strategic objectives. The desired effect on the selected target may be achieved through either lethal or non-lethal means (e.g. direct attack by conventional
weapons to achieve destruction or information operation attack to negate/influence the target function).

0515. The targeting process will normally be based on that used by the lead nation but would be expected to conform with the generic 6-phase sequential model depicted in Figure 5.1.

![Figure 5.1 – The Targeting Process](image)

0516. The staff necessary to implement the targeting process could be drawn predominantly from the lead nation but ideally would be an integrated staff comprising suitably qualified personnel from all coalition-member nations.

0517. The national political imperative of each of the coalition members will vary. Moreover, some member nations may have international treaty/convention obligations that are different to other coalition partners. These differences may impose nation-specific limitations on the types of targets that can be engaged, the types of weapons that can be employed or the Rules of Engagement (ROE) applicable to various types of target. Consequently, very close liaison between the coalition force headquarters and the national contingent headquarters is imperative to insure that only appropriate tasking is allocated to individual nations during the planning process.

SECTION VI – COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

0518. An effective information sharing and exchange capability extends vertically, through national systems and horizontally, into the systems of other coalition nations. This information exchange ‘environment’ enables rapid transfer of information to appropriately designated receivers, whilst rigorously protecting information from
unauthorized disclosure and release. The environment provides robust information assurance and network defense capabilities.

0519. A Coalition Information Exchange Environments (CIEE) is ‘the aggregation of individuals, organizations, system capabilities, processes and infrastructure for the common purpose of creating and sharing data, information and knowledge necessary to plan, execute and assess coalition operations.’ The CIEE provides the coalition with the ability to rapidly share information, knowledge/ideas, reduce planning timelines and enhance coalition operations by enabling common-shared situational awareness and collaboration at all levels.

0520. The primary mission of coalition Communication and Information Systems (CIS) is to facilitate command, control and support functions in conjunction with national affiliations at all levels. It is incumbent upon the lead nation to coordinate for, create, or provide communications and information management structures organized so as to accomplish specific mission-related information-conveyance and processing functions. The identification and establishment of CIS links between the ‘recognized civil authority (e.g. UN), political and strategic CIS links in the early stages of planning is paramount. Existing links such as diplomatic channels (e.g. Ambassadors) and military channels (e.g. Military Attaches/Advisers) should be utilized in the first instance and expanded where necessary to meet additional political and strategic requirements.

0521. Coalition CIS planners need to recognize the requirement to plan for and provide total CIS integration at all levels between participating nations in order to allow the rapid passage and exchange of information. It is also recognized that spectrum management has become a key element of CIS that must be addressed in planning both prior to deployment and during operations. It is therefore important that CIS planning representatives from participating nations and particularly those from any identified supporting force are included early in the planning process. This will ensure that any significant differences in methods of operation and the allocation of resources can be resolved at an early stage. It is assumed that the framework nation will provide the staff and tools to perform the spectrum management function.

**Lead Nation CIS Responsibilities**

0522. The lead nation’s primary responsibilities in any coalition CIS planning process are:

a. Coordinates the planning and execution of the overall coalition CIS framework and providing the strategic level J6 leadership.

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46 Adapted from USCFCOM’s definition for their Collaborative Information Environment (CIE). Although a national environment, functionally, it is mirrored with the CIEE. The CIE includes guards and protection services as would be needed in the CIEE. Consequently, and in order to remain aligned with US efforts, this definition should stand.
b. Coordinates the design, architecture, governance and specifications of coalition secure and non-secure network requirements that will support the operation or activity including collaborative planning tool requirements.

c. Ensures adequate CIS strategic to operational command links are in place.

d. Identifies and organizes the provision of critical and specific CIS assets.

e. Plans, organizes, and provides effective information-sharing among all coalition participants.

f. Prepares the CIS, security and information release policy, guidance and requirements to enable the designated CFC to effectively operate within the coalition force CIS structure.

g. Coordinates coalition force CIS releasability issues.

h. Coordinates the CIS activities of the coalition force with relevant national organizations, contributing nations’ forces and other entities as appropriate e.g. recognized civil authority, CIA, Gendarmes.

i. Coordinates host nation lead-time CIS requirements (e.g. frequency clearance and permission to operate CIS equipment) through the relevant strategic commands as required.

j. Ensures that measures are taken to minimize system degradation caused by network attack, action damage, system overload and/or Electronic Warfare.

k. Provides guidance to the CFC on Emission Control (EMCON) and Communications Security (COMSEC) requirements.

l. In coordination with national administration/spectrum management agencies determines the spectrum access requirements of the proposed coalition forces and develops a spectrum management plan.

m. Provides the spectrum management function in the CFC headquarters with links to national and subordinate spectrum management elements.47

**National Contingent Commanders**

0523. The National Contingent Commanders’ (NCC) primary responsibilities that need to be recognized in any coalition CIS planning process are:

47 Note that items k, l and m contain significant spectrum management elements.
a. Establishes CIS liaison with the lead nation and CFC.

b. Ensures own national CIS linkages within the CFC headquarters and coalition force as appropriate.

c. Supports the CIS activities of the CFC and coalition force with relevant national organizations, contributing nations’ forces and other entities as agreed e.g. recognized civil authority, CIA, Gendarmes.

d. Prepares and promulgates own national CIS policy and guidance to enable subordinate forces to effectively operate within the coalition CIS structure.

e. Provides national input into coalition force security policy, standards and guidance.

**Coalition Force Commander**

0524. The CFC primary responsibilities that need to be recognized in any coalition CIS planning process are:

a. Ensures adequate CIS operational to tactical level command links are in place.

b. Requests adequate and effective CIS assets to support the coalition force.

c. Plans and publishes CIS plans, annexes and operating instructions, including EMCON, COMSEC, and Spectrum Management plans that support the CFC and coalition force assigned missions.


**Organization**

0525. The organization of coalition CIS staff is critical to the overall accomplishment of the coalition force mission. It is imperative that the organization capitalizes on the capabilities of all participating forces and that the organization has a cross-section of all participants assigned to the various CFC and coalition force CIS staff positions. Formal and informal agreements may need to be prepared designating who furnishes, installs, operates and maintains key network systems and hubs as well as determining CIS staffing. Figure 5.2 depicts notional CIS organizational relationships between coalition participants from the strategic, operational and tactical levels.
CIS Planning Considerations

0526. CIS Planning needs to consider the provision of a range of secure and non-secure CIS services available to the political, strategic, operational and higher tactical levels as listed in priority order. Planning CIS support in the dynamic environment of a coalition operation is a challenge. The situation may require several iterations of the planning process. Maintaining an awareness of the strategic and operational environments should be the first consideration for CIS planning. Some items to consider as potential situations develop are:

a. Strategic guidance given by the lead nation (including guidance given on ‘recognized civil authority’ CIS connectivity, assistance and requirements).

b. The commander’s mandate in respect of rights of administrations as defined in the International Telecommunication Union Convention and Radio Regulations.

c. Existing coalition CIS assets within the JOA.

d. The operational status and availability of CIS assets.

e. Ability to use extant or ‘in-country’ telecommunications infrastructure.

f. Coalition information exchange requirements.

g. Nature of the Information Operations threat.

h. Bandwidth availability and projected requirements.
i. Availability of CIS personnel, assets and spares.

j. Ability to obtain reinforcements or rotate personnel for sustained operations or activities.

k. State of CIS training.

l. Compatibility and interoperability of CIS between Joint, Coalition and other integrated forces e.g. CIA, Gendarmes.

m. Existing host or ‘in-country’ telecommunications infrastructure.

n. Sitting requirements for CIS equipment and location of existing commercial infrastructure and cable routes.

o. Priority accorded to CIS requirements.

p. Coalition information exchange releasability and system accreditation requirements.

q. The availability/implementation of a coalition-wide capability required to more effectively support the coalition CIS information exchange requirements.

r. Existing CIS agreements, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and standards.

s. Spectrum management coordination, clearance and permissions to operate specified transmission and processing equipment within the area of operations.

**Other CIS Planning Considerations**

0527. The following should also be considered in the CIS planning process:

a. Determination of CIS requirements by phase.

b. Allocation of responsibility against capability (based on probable assigned force elements).

c. Provision of capability domains e.g. national, allied and coalition.

d. Use of commercial telecommunications carriers for sustained operations or activities and their legal considerations.

e. Compilation and promulgation of EMCON, COMSEC and Spectrum Management policy based on direction and guidance from the lead nation.

f. Sovereign rights over bandwidth.
g. Diplomatic clearance requirements.

h. Use or provision of necessary agreements (Service Letters of Agreements, Letters of Assist or Memorandum of Agreement or Status of Forces Agreements). This should include agreements made to meet interoperability engineering standards through such means as NATO Standard Agreements (STANAGS) and Quadripartite Agreements (QSTAGS).

i. Establishment of a CIS Management Group (strategic and operational) to provide oversight of the operation. 48

j. Bandwidth requirements for transmission of imagery and video teleconferencing.

k. Lessons learned or identified from previous coalition operations eg MIC, NATO and contributing nations databases.

l. Security Policy and accreditation.

Allocation of Resources

0528. Once CIS requirements have been established, tasks should be allocated to individual participating nations. Where appropriate, each nation, by Service, should tentatively allocate its own resources to ensure that overall commitment can be met with some reserve capacity. If at any stage of planning it becomes apparent that CIS resources are insufficient to support the mission or activity, the lead nation should be notified.

Other CIS Planning Doctrine and Publications

0529. Besides reference to relevant Allied Communications Publications (ACPs), the outcomes from the following forums, committees and working groups may be able to offer further guidance to coalition CIS planners, particularly in regards to CIS interoperability issues:


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48 A strategic/operational CIS Management Group need only be established where the level of CIS activity and complexity is considered to require a group that is able to specifically coordinate, manage, oversee and provide higher level guidance to the CFC J6 and CISCCC. The group should normally be headed by the Lead or Framework nation J6 and consist of nominated participating nation CIS liaison officers.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multinational/Coalition</th>
<th>Combined</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Single Service</th>
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<tr>
<td>NATO CIS Planning Guide</td>
<td>Combined Communications Electronic Board (CCEB)</td>
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<td>Australia/Canada/New Zealand/United Kingdom/United States Naval C4 Organization (AUSCANNZUKUS).</td>
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<td>Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT)</td>
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<td>Air Standardization Coordinating Committee (ASCC)</td>
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<td>Multinational Force Standard Operating Procedures (MNF SOP)</td>
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<td>Coalition Communications Interoperability Guide (CCIG)</td>
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**Coalition Networks**

0530. Coalition operations involve different communities of interest (domains). These are:

a. **National Domains.** The internal sharing of information is assumed to be seamless where proven technology allows full information exchange.

b. **Allied Domains.** These do not need a specific coalition operation to be formed. Rather, they require a permanent and protected environment for the sharing of classified or sensitive information. Bilateral domains offer the richest exchange of information between nations based on firm trust and mutual understanding, facilitated by common standards and proven technology shared between 2 nations.

c. **Coalition Domains.** Wider coalitions require robust but flexible C2. The CBG calls for a lead nation to provide a mechanism for the exchange of information
between the coalition partners. A separate domain may be created for each operation so that a multinational coalition can work together, ideally, at all levels of command and at the necessary security level. Coalition domains are established for a specific operation or purpose and include non-traditional partners.

0531. *Ad hoc* networks will usually be required because of the constraints in exchanging information across national boundaries. These networks, usually provided by the lead nation in an operation, provide the user with applications and reach into the operational and tactical environment that cannot be connected to national systems. Additionally, Network Centric Warfare 49 supports highly reactive Coalition Joint Task Forces through smaller and more agile mission groups. Commanders will have differing information requirements across the various levels of command and will require near-real time information. Domains between coalition partners must enable the sharing of information in a seamless, coherent and timely manner.

### Tiered Coalition Networking

0532. The end-state for allied and coalition information exchange and collaborative planning is between national C2 systems, with the integrity of national information being maintained by Boundary Protection Services. Currently, Boundary Protection Services are not available for all coalition information exchange capabilities. Until a novel approach to the protection of national information appears, new capabilities will continue to be introduced which need Boundary Protection Services. Work should be undertaken to develop a standard Boundary Protection Services architecture for use in coalition operations recognizing that the selection of the key hardware, guard and cryptographic components is the responsibility of the lead nation. It is worth noting that this selection could be constrained by a list of approved hardware if such exists. Therefore, 2 types of capabilities will always exist: ones with Boundary Protection Services and those without. Until now, no model has been available that describes this current 2-state Coalition Information Exchange Environment (CIEE).

0533. A 2-Tier approach provides a model to develop capabilities and evolve current and future networks. These are

a. **Tier 1** – those capabilities (infrastructure and applications) with Boundary Protection Services solutions and can be connected to national classified C2 systems.

b. **Tier 2** – those capabilities that do not have Boundary Protection Services solutions and require additional coalition C2 infrastructure.

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49 NATO refers to NCW as NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC).
0534. Planners should note that both tiers require the development of agreed multinational domain policy, procedures and standards that include security and Computer Network Defense. The end-state for coalition information sharing between traditional partners is the migration of all Tier 2 capabilities into Tier 1. However, until such time as Boundary Protection Services solutions are available, Tier 2 capabilities will remain. In coalitions where the connection of national systems is not desired, but unfettered access to information is required, the provision of Tier 2 capabilities must be implemented.

**Existing Coalition Networks**

The AUSCANNZUKUS developed Maritime (Mobile) Wide Area Network (MWAN) which provides tactical networking capabilities between mobile platforms. The CCEB-MIC developed MIC Wide Area Network - a multi-nationally developed initiative at the strategic-operational levels of command upon which to build, improve and evolve the coalition information exchange environment between national C2 capabilities. This wide area network includes the infrastructure, applications, services, policy and procedures at the strategic and operational levels of command using national C2 systems. Directory services and a basic web-browsing capability are being incorporated.

Lead/single nation controlled/provided networks offer some applications and collaborative planning tools that do not have the boundary protections services solutions at this time. Services provide a range of security domains at the operational and tactical levels, primarily between closed coalition systems. These networks will continue to be needed for information exchange and be maintained until such time as their capabilities are available at Tier-1.

The CCEB, as the agreed body for coordinating C4 interoperability between the nations, will lead the development, consolidation and evolution of both Tier 1 and Tier 2 solutions. The development and evolution of solutions will address both technological and procedural aspects to allow the deployment of an effective capability.

0535. The MIC has recognized and identified services considered necessary for future development of Tier 1 networks. These should be considered by CIS planners for implementation in support of coalition networks:

- **Initial Web Capability.** This is the ability to share simple web page based information between nations;

- **Directory Services.** As the Tier 1 user community expands, the Directory Service needs to be enhanced;
c. **Chat.** Chat provides operators with the ability to hold real-time or near real-time informal discussions with other operational planners through instant messaging;

d. **Basic Common ( Relevant) Operating Picture.** A common situational awareness database or data structure and geographic format, used by commanders and staffs at all levels, to present relevant tailored situational awareness views. These may or may not use the same rendering software;

e. **Military Messaging.** Military Messaging is essential for the transfer of accurate, timely and non-repudiated information; and

f. **Reachback.** Reachback is technically not a service, but provides a capability for nations to extend national connectivity to remote, deployed or liaison national elements embedded within another nation.

0536. The increasing demands of mobility and network-enabled capability can result in congestion of the electromagnetic spectrum which is likely to be exacerbated in coalition operations. This is another area in which a common coalition approach and advanced planning will be beneficial. Not only communications, but all uses of the radio spectrum must be carefully planned for well in advance and coordinated to maintain fighting capability and operational tempo.

**SECTION VII – LOGISTIC PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS**

**Benefits and Challenges of Multinational Logistics**

0537. Individually, nations face significant challenges in deploying and sustaining their expeditionary forces. Historically, the participation of military logistic planners has been limited in the early phases of coalition and or multinational contingency planning due to security concerns or national policy. The ad hoc planning of many coalition operations does not generate the familiarity and trust conducive to management and execution of multinational logistics. Arrangements for cooperative logistics occur in many cases later during execution phases of an operation, which lends itself to redundant, and perhaps unnecessary, capabilities by all nations in an operational area, thus potentially creating a larger than needed logistic footprint and multinational competition for scarce in-theatre resources. Consequently this guide encourages the early and active participation of logistic planners in the coalition-building process with the overarching aim of maximizing logistic cooperation among the coalition nations. Additionally, these same motivating factors support a growing trend away from logistics as solely a national responsibility – the historical norm. While nations have ensured logistic effectiveness in troop support by ‘going it alone’, it is now recognized that efficiencies may also be achieved without sacrificing effectiveness through burden-sharing and meticulous early planning. This section is intended to enable logistic planners at the strategic and operational level to achieve these objectives.
0538. Multinational logistics is a general term used to describe any coordinated logistic activity involving 2 or more countries or organizations in support of a multinational force. To permit the CFC to execute his responsibilities for logistics effectively and efficiently, certain principles must be observed. These important principles have been developed by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO):

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<tr>
<th>Primacy of Operations</th>
<th>Coordination</th>
<th>Timeliness</th>
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<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>Provision and Sufficiency</td>
<td>Economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>Transparency and Visibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>Simplicity</td>
<td>Synergy</td>
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0539. **Potential Benefits.** Multinational logistics, in the form of centralized coordination, management of common-user logistic activities and multinational support arrangements, can significantly enhance the ability of the participating nations to effectively and efficiently deploy and sustain forces. Multinational logistics potentially may:

a. Expedite and simplify logistic planning.

b. Speed force deployment, increase operational flexibility, and enhance logistic sustainment of the coalition forces.

c. Utilize in-theatre resources more effectively and efficiently through coordination of host-nation support and theatre-support contracting.

d. Reduce competition among nations for scarce resources.

e. Enable nations to contribute to the overall coalition logistic support plan according to their capabilities and strengths (without necessarily being self-sufficient).

f. Optimize logistic footprint.

g. Reduce force protection requirements.

h. Drive enhanced interoperability.

0540. **Challenges to Multinational Logistics.** Planners must be aware of the following constraints and challenges to multinational logistics. Ongoing planning between nations responds to these challenges; however, some are likely to remain constraints for the foreseeable future. During an emerging crisis, early engagement and collaboration between national logistic planners will help overcome these challenges. During peace time, coalition exercises and training that set objectives to overcome multinational logistic constraints and challenges is also be helpful.
a. Nations may be reluctant during the force generation process to commit logistic forces to support the overall multinational operation. This reluctance can complicate the timely establishment of multinational logistic arrangements that are crucial for streamlining support from the outset of the operation. Advance planning and early involvement in the mission planning cycle can aid in overcoming this reluctance.

b. Most nations lack the deployable logistic assets to support both their own forces and to provide additional logistic units for general support of the coalition. The establishment of bilateral/multilateral arrangements with other nations and the involvement in the formation of multinational logistic support units can overcome these deficiencies.

c. Lack of a pre-established multinational logistic planning capability leads to disorganized multinational logistic operations, which in turn adversely impacts the effectiveness and efficiency of logistic support, especially during initial stages of operations. Advance planning before the advent of a crisis can develop outline organizational strategies for the provision of support of a coalition in a variety of scenarios. On the other hand, there will always be an ad hoc nature to multinational logistics. An approach that encourages flexibility, adaptability and robust ‘plug and play’ communication can mitigate many challenges.

d. Some functional areas are more challenging because of national sensitivities. Advanced planning and bilateral/multilateral arrangements/training may overcome some of these sensitivities. Examples include blood supply, sustaining ammunition and mortuary affairs.

e. It is difficult to achieve consensus during the planning phase regarding common funding for financing/reimbursement arrangements, yet up-front common funding can significantly reduce critical support costs associated with strategic lift, common infrastructure and Ports of Disembarkation improvements.\textsuperscript{50}

f. There are many gaps in standardization, particularly between Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) and non-MIC military forces that impede multinational logistics. Workaround procedures implemented by participating nations are often required to lessen the adverse impact of this lack of standardization.

\textsuperscript{50} Common funding is defined as expenses for forces required as either deployment or ongoing support enablers to establish/maintain an in-theatre presence through the provision of such services as Strategic lift, Combined Joint Task Force and component headquarters, Communications backbone infrastructure, ports and line of communications improvements, real estate and infrastructure improvement and select common user supplies/services.
g. The current lack of commonality and capabilities in national database systems does not lend itself to the sharing and passage of logistic information that is crucial to the establishment and maintenance of multinational logistics. Coordination among the MIC nations prior to the outset of a crisis can produce a greater level of interoperability.

h. At the outset of a crisis there is often not enough time for mission analysis to include all coalition partners. Issues concerning releasability and the requirement for the national decision-making processes only add to the ‘time-shortage’ dilemma. Advance planning and the establishment of support arrangements are required to resolve common issues and to make multinational logistic contingency plans.

i. There is a lack of common understanding, training and exercises focused on multinational logistic planning and execution. Familiarity with multinational logistic concepts and procedures gained through education, training and exercises can substantially reduce the conflicts of multinational logistics and maximize its benefits.

Key Planning Issues

0541. Logistic Standardization. Standardization is a continuum that extends from compatibility through interoperability and interchange ability to commonality. The focus of nation’s intent on future coalition building is interoperability, while simultaneously balancing national interests with a larger common mission. This is best achieved through cooperatively developed doctrine and procedures. Where possible, the adoption of NATO standardized agreements (STANAGs) and ABCA quadrennial agreements (QSTAGs) could facilitate the standardization of procedures within the coalition. Early exchange of logistic planning information will contribute to interoperability. Though more difficult to achieve at the tactical level, multinational logistic standardization can increase the freedom and flexibility of action of tactical forces.

0542. Mutual Logistic Support. Mutual Logistic Support (MLS) is assistance between 2 or more nations in the transfer, exchange, loan or lease of logistic support, including contractor support. It is an important enabler in order to reduce support redundancies within the theatre and to fill national capability gaps. By working together and sharing resources, especially service delivery capabilities, nations, individually and collectively, can achieve economies in their logistic operations. The requirement for MLS should be

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51 Interoperability is defined as the ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.

52 America-Britain-Canada-Australia.
considered early in the planning process so that nations can initiate negotiations for the establishment of MLS arrangements with other coalition members and factor in such dependencies into national planning.

0543. **Mutual Logistic Support Arrangements.** Mutual Logistic Support Arrangements (MLSA)s provide a framework for the exchange of logistic support between nations. MLSAs can be either generic documents covering any transfer of logistic support, supplies and services for a period of years, or an emergent document designed for a specific operation or exercise where no generic document exists. Many nations have developed mutual support agreements or arrangements, either bi- or multi-laterally, to ensure provision of logistic support to their forces to cover a range of military operation support. Full coalition visibility of such arrangements and other agreements is essential to ensure support arrangements fit into the overall coalition concept of support. Once MLSAs are in place, mission specific arrangements at the operational and tactical level can be quickly negotiated and initiated in the emergent context. Where pre-existing arrangements are not in place, significant time may be required to reconcile differences in national law and policy. In order to minimize the potential for differences in national law/ policy and regarding the content/language within MLSAs, it should be the intent within the MIC to establish MLSAs between all coalition members before the development of a situation requiring the deployment of a coalition force. When authorized by nations, the agreements and arrangements may be negotiated and/or established by a CFC on their behalf. Nations may differ in their national interpretation of what constitutes an agreement’s legal authority. However, authority may be provided by a nation to a CFC in order to negotiate operational-level implementing or technical arrangements.

0544. **MLSA Development and Documentation.** Normally a MLSA is developed with subordinate documents elaborating the mission-specific procedural aspects and the detailed support requirements to implement the MLSA. Documents within a generic MLSA may include MOUs, Technical Arrangements (TA), Implementing Arrangements (IA) and/or Request/Invoice Forms. Planners should ensure that these subordinate documents are put in place as early as possible and be aware that variations in interpretation and in format and content between nations are likely.

0545. **Financial Considerations.** While there may be circumstances where logistic support, supplies and services could be provided free of charge to some nations, the normal expectation is that MLS will be subject to reimbursement by the requesting/receiving nation to the supplying nation through cash, equal value exchange or replacement-in-kind transactions. Planners should ensure that financial procedures are understood and promulgated. For example, MLSAs will normally provide not only procedures, but also process timelines, order formats for supplies and services, dispute resolution procedures, credits and payment currency. Similarly, contractor logistic support to

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53 In the case of the US, a MLSA is referred to an Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA).
multiple countries will normally be arranged through bilateral contracts. Terms, conditions, services rendered and payment will be clearly articulated in such contracts.

0546. **Authorities and Responsibilities.** In multinational operations, coalition nations typically retain operational command (OPCOM) but assign operational control (OPCON) of combat forces to the CFC. OPCON in itself does not include authority over administrative and logistic functions, and nations may adopt C2 arrangements for logistic units that are different from other forces. Consequently, command, control and support relationships for multinational logistics need to be clearly delineated in planning and reflected in relevant plans and orders. Planners should consider:

a. Routinely granting the CFC coordinating authority for logistics.

b. Obtaining agreement from the nations to place some logistic elements under OPCON of the CFC for tasking in support of the coalition. OPCON of logistic elements may be limited to specific phases, time, roles, sorties/operations and/or units reflecting the capabilities and limitations of coalition nations.

c. Obtaining agreement from nations to grant the CFC the authority to redistribute specified logistic resources to meet urgent and/or critical requirements during an operation. The circumstances that might meet this criterion should be identified during planning.

d. Obtaining agreement from nations to grant the CFC directive authority for common support capabilities in other areas consistent with the OPCON of assigned and attached forces.

Routinely granting the CFC authority to exercise Tactical Control (TACON) of ground units transiting through the area normally designated as the Joint Rear Area (JRA). The authority and responsibility for TACON of units in the JRA or other designated rear area is normally subordinated to the commander assigned responsibility for these areas in order to coordinate security requirements and control main supply routes.

0547. **Logistic Liaison and Planning Teams.** From the outset, to facilitate planning and execution, the maximum use should be made of standing logistic liaison officers in relevant national headquarters. The requirement for logistic liaison officers increases commensurate with the complexity of command, control and support arrangements. While it may be obvious, it is essential to send qualified logistic liaison officers with tactical and operational experience in the type of operations in which they are intended to plan for. The lead nation will request the early dispatch of logistic liaison officers from nations that are considering participation in the coalition— and an logistic liaison officers matrix should be developed. Within the lead nation planning structure, these officers will assist the logistic planning teams at the strategic level and will facilitate the exchange of information between the nations represented and the lead nation. It is expected that the logistic liaison officer will be capable of advising the lead nation
logistic planning staff of any national logistic constraints that may be faced by their respective nations and its potential impact on the coalition. The logistic liaison officers should also be capable of providing the logistic capability that potentially may be available from their respective nations should they decide to participate in the mission, however, the sharing of this information in no-way represents a commitment on behalf of the nation.

0548. **Logistic Command and Control Organization in Coalition Operations.** The logistic C2 organization of a coalition operation encompasses both the internal logistic staff elements of the Coalition Joint Task Force Headquarters and the overall logistic organization, as integrated into the coalition C2 structure.

a. **Small Scale Operations.** If the operation is relatively small or involves only a few multinational partners, the CFC may rely on the Combined-Joint Logistic Officer (CJ-4) and staff, augmented (if necessary) with functional experts, to plan and coordinate coalition logistic activities.

b. **Larger Operations.** In the case of larger, more complex operations requiring more coordination and common support, the CFC may establish a separate organization to assist the CJ-4 in developing and executing the operation’s logistic support plan. NATO designates such an organization for coordinating and managing logistic cooperation a Multinational Joint Logistic Centre (MJLC). NATO has developed detailed doctrine regarding the flexible structures for this centre including the functions and staffing of various coordinating centers.\(^54\)

0549. **Multinational Joint Logistic Centre Structure and Staffing.** The MJLC comprises of logistic staff that executes the theatre-level logistic plans and policies of the CJ-4. Its size, structure and composition strongly depend on the mission, environment and the organizations it is designed to support. Guidelines for the structure, roles and staffing of the MJLC are found in Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-4.6 *Multinational Joint Logistic Centre Doctrine* and if used should be defined early in planning and the obligations of nations for personnel, equipment and funding agreed. To be effective an MJLC should be constituted in sufficient time to allow for relevant induction, training and preparation. It is expected that the lead nation will provide the core of the MJLC; some nations may have standing deployable Joint logistic C2 capabilities that they may choose to contribute to a MJLC.

0550. **Multinational Joint Logistic Centre Functional Coordination.** Within the MJLC, functional coordination centers (or other equivalent cells) may be established, based on the operational need to provide centralized coordination of common support services, such as engineering, movement control, medical activities, contracting, host-nation

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\(^{54}\) Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 4.6 Multinational Joint Logistic Centre (MJLC) Doctrine.
support, and the provision of common supplies, such as bulk fuel and rations. Possible structures are listed in AJP-4.6.

0551. **Multinational Joint Logistic Centre.** When formed, the MJLC has a flexible and modular structure and may be established as one of the following:

a. An augmentation to the CJ-4’s staff, especially during initial planning or for smaller operations of limited duration.

b. A separate staff section within the CJ-4 organization.

c. A separate organization integrated in or collocated with the Coalition Joint Task Force headquarters or other supporting headquarters.

d. A module placed within a component command under the Coalition Joint Task Force.

0552. **Multinational Joint Movements Coordination Centre (MJMCC).** When formed, the MJMCC should be structured to provide the following functions:

a. Coordination of the load-to-mode of all multinational movements assets (air, land and sea) in accordance with the Commander’s priorities and direction.

b. Provide visibility of both inter-and intra-theatre force flow.

c. Movements coordination at designated points of disembarkation and embarkation.

d. Coordinate and liaise with national movement coordination agencies to access and advertise space available that can be utilized by other contributing troop contributing nation or by the multinational force commander. Command and control of multinational movements units and detachments throughout the joint operations area.

0553. **Coalition Logistic Boards and Committees.** Boards and committees should be constituted to address cross-functional issues and to develop solutions to logistic challenges faced in strategic planning and by the CJTF when constituted. When established, boards and committees will seek consensus through representation by coalition participants. They will be convened on an as-required basis to meet specific operational requirements. Early in the planning phase, planners should consider requesting the assistance of standing multinational logistic organizations. Access to industry and key national/multinational logistic organizations can be facilitated through appropriate consultation and/or representation on relevant boards and committees.

0554. **Modes of National and Multinational Support.** The following modes may be employed for the delivery of logistic support to the coalition;
a. **National Logistics.** National logistic support flows from national sources usually based in the home-nation through a strategic line of communications to their most forward-deployed national units in the Joint Operations Area (JOA). Each nation will require national support for national unique materiel and services. Planners must differentiate between what support will be provided nationally and what will be provided by other modes (described below) in order to optimize support and deconflict Lines of Communications (LOCs). Planners should still be alert to opportunities for sharing LOCs and associated resources thereby avoiding transportation/distribution node congestion, reducing logistic footprints and enhancing efficiency.

b. **National Support Elements.** Regardless of the level of multinational or national logistics a nation employs, it is likely to employ a National Support Element (NSE) to provide integral national support to the forces it contributes to an operation.

c. **Host-Nation Support.** In the logistics context, host-nation support involves the provision of goods and services by national/local governments, often reducing costs, increasing efficiencies and avoiding sustainment over long distances. This is initially planned through logistic intelligence, then refined through reconnoiter and best carried out in-theatre in a coordinated fashion by the lead nation to avoid erosion of host-nation goodwill and overstressing host-nation infrastructure/resources.

d. **Lead Nation for Logistics.** Lead nation support involves one or more nations assuming responsibility for coordinating and/or providing specified support and other functions. If the lead nation concept is employed, planners must coordinate agreed lead nation functions with all countries involved and ensure a means of reimbursement (if required) is in place. A lead nation mission is similar to a Role Specialist Nation mission with the main difference being that the lead nation mission is wider in scope for logistic support for all or part of the coalition force. The lead nation will assume responsibility for the coordination of a portion of logistic support to other nations within a defined geographical area.

e. **Role Specialist Nation.** A Role Specialist Nation assumes the responsibility for the provision of a single commodity, class of supply or service. It allows each troop contributing nation to exploit its unique logistic strengths and capabilities that, when combined with the capabilities of the other members of the coalition, can serve to make the whole of the logistic capability stronger than its individual parts. The Role Specialist Nation would not assume responsibility for

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55 A lead nation for support is separate from the lead nation concept for the C2 of the overall coalition operation. An individual nation, who is not the LN for the operation, may agree to be the lead nation for a specific range of materiel or services.
coordination across the coalition; the lead nation for logistics would provide that function.

f. **Multinational Integrated Logistic Units and Multinational Integrated Medical Units.** A Multinational Integrated Logistic Unit (MILU) and Multinational Integrated Medical Unit (MIMU) is formed when 2 or more nations agree to provide logistic and/or medical support to a multinational force typically under OPCON of the CFC. Due to the complexity and degree of coordination required to form these units, planners should initiate assessments and coordination early in the planning process even if the requirement for the units is planned for a subsequent operational phase or force rotation.

0555. **Third Party Logistic Support Services.** Third Party Logistic Support Services is the provision of selected logistic support services by a contractor. This can release scarce military resources for higher priority tasks elsewhere, overcome known logistic shortfalls and provide long-term endurance and sustainability. Planners should consider the cost-effectiveness and cost-sharing of Third Party Logistic Support Services which can be sourced from within the host country, from the international market or from coalition national arrangements; different political and financial challenges may apply to each.

0556. **Coordination of Logistic Support with International Organizations /Non-Governmental Organizations.** Activities of international and non-governmental organizations within the area of responsibility are to be taken into account at all levels of logistic planning. Close contact is to be established and maintained from the outset of the planning process. These organizations most often operate independently from the coalition force, however coordination of their activities is necessary in order to assure appropriate security and to harmonize competing demands for local resources. Establishment of effective working relations with these organizations provides for the exchange of relevant logistic information and cooperation on issues of common interest. International and non-governmental organizations often represent both challenges and opportunities. For example, their labor pool for humanitarian aid distribution may relieve coalition forces from similar tasks. The coalition may provide trucks and transport, while international and non-governmental organizations provide food, water and the people to serve the local distressed civilian population. However, when irregular actors or insurgents target non-combatants, international and non-governmental organizations may require protection that creates an unplanned protection requirement on limited coalition resources.

0557. **Coalition Logistic Information Management.** Appropriate management and timely distribution of logistic information is critical to the success of logistic planning. Exchange of logistic information between multinational and national command elements must be established from the offset. Policies and procedures must assure the timely release of logistic information to enable coalition nations to plan collaboratively.
and to enable the coalition force to operate effectively. Essential subjects to be addressed early during the planning stage are:

a. Lead nation responsibilities for setting up a robust coalition network, architecture and digital ROE;

b. Access to both classified and unclassified logistic networks for hosting logistic application with sufficient bandwidth for logistic communications;

c. Collaborative logistic planning and support tools including shared logistic databases and Logistic Common Operating Picture (LOGCOP);

d. Logistic data management and exchange protocols;

e. Development and management of Logistic Intelligence products, such as Aerial and Sea Ports of Disembarkation metrics and capabilities, road/rail networks, and host-nation support capabilities;

f. Review of lessons-learned from similar contingencies; and

g. Establishment of logistic reporting, data elements, formats and frequency.

0558. **Force Protection.** Force protection is an important consideration as logistic forces are particularly vulnerable. The coalition dimension can present further challenges, including a greater risk of fratricide. The following factors should be considered:

a. Coalition partners do not necessarily share the same views on standards of force protection. The complexities of differing national ROE, force protection profiles and national agreements with the host nation will need to be factored into the planning.

b. Strategic and operational LOCs are particularly prone to interdiction. The assignment of supported and supporting component relationships for force protection is key.

c. When setting the Combined Joint Statement of Requirement (CJSOR) the lead nation should articulate the levels of force protection capability required to ensure uninterrupted logistic operations. Close coordination with the operational commander will be essential in order to tailor force protection capabilities with the threat. Access to coalition intelligence assessments will be a key information requirement to enable this activity.

d. The Coalition force protection guidelines and security plan should incorporate the needs and capabilities all logistic formations and organizations, other governmental agencies, host nation, Third Party Logistic Support Services as well
as international and non-governmental organizations. Cooperation and liaison are keys to success.

0559. Troop Contributing Nations’ Logistic Responsibilities. A guide to what is administratively and logistically expected of troop contributing nations is listed below:

a. To what level the troop contributing nation must be administratively self-contained on arrival at the Force Mounting Base (e.g. arrive self-sufficient for 28 days with 7 days stocks held in theatre and 21 days stocks pre-positioned).

b. Preferred method of stores/equipment packaging for deployment (e.g. ISO containers).

c. The expectation that troop contributing nation will provide their own organic and/or unique support requirements.

d. Detail of the provision of common support requirements by force elements. From where and how? (host nation; contractors, lead nation).

e. The expectation that troop contributing nation will contribute NSE commensurate with the size and structure of their national contribution to the coalition.

Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration

0560. Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) is the essential process that transitions deploying forces, consisting of personnel, equipment and materiel arriving in the JOA, into forces capable of meeting the CFC’s operational requirements. RSOM & I of forces is fundamental to the concept of operations that envisions the projection of mission-tailored combat power into and within a JOA at the right time and in the right sequence. For this reason the CFC must prioritize and exercise coordinating authority and, where granted, C2 over the RSOI process.

0561. During the build-up of forces, the force will expand rapidly in size, which implies that the level of burden borne by the host nation will increase dramatically. The CFC will endeavor to keep relations with the leadership of the host nation as close and amicable as possible and maintain support for the coalition presence at a high level, assisted by public information initiatives. Under no circumstances should the coalition adversely influence life in the host nation to such a degree that public and political support is weakened or lost. This requires restraint, consideration for local customs and traditions and the flexible conduct of all activities by all members of the coalition.

56 Detailed information in AJP-3.13, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Deployment of Forces.
0562. The build-up of forces should also be used as a show of force and power projection. It will directly influence an adversary’s behavior and his situational awareness. The build-up of forces should be closely considered in relation to Info Ops (presence, posture and profile). Therefore the build-up of forces should be carefully planned and is not solely a logistic operation.

Redeployment

0563. The redeployment of forces after termination of an operation is a highly complex matter; politically, militarily, economically and environmentally. It is not simply a case of reversing the deployment plan, but rather a distinct operation in its own right. Redeployment may be directed when operations have terminated or higher authority directs movement of the assigned force. The CFC should give the same considerations to redeployment as for deployment in regard to phasing of C2 and the desired order of departure.

0564. Redeployment planning is directed towards the ordered and efficient movement of forces (units or individuals) and equipment out of the JOA. As a function of the overall redeployment, recovery planning will be an integral part of the CFC’s plans. This section discusses recovery planning, including tasks, responsibilities and coordination of redeployment planning.

0565. Redeployment planning in coalition operations is as complex if not more so than deployment due to a number of factors: environmental restoration; ownership of common-funded items; disposal of property; and the orderly redeployment of forces. Planners must factor these complex issues into initial planning and are likely to have to include them in MLSAs. Every operation has its own unique planning factors; however, the following factors apply to all operations and should be considered at the redeployment planning stage:

a. Clear and detailed operational and logistic requirements to determine the scale of the redeployment.

b. The establishment of a planning team.

c. Residual commitments, for example specialist logistic personnel, may remain in the JOA in an advisory capacity, e.g. to help reconstruction.

d. ‘Earliest move’ and ‘all out by’ timings should be clarified at the earliest stage to identify lead-times and enable strategic lift planning to proceed.

e. The establishment of specialist teams to staff the hand-over of host nation assets and to coordinate termination of contracts. It must be remembered that if the coalition has relied upon support, then a duty of care to the hosts exists. Every
effort must be taken to ensure that environmental, political or financial difficulties do not degrade the relationship.

f. Additional enabling force elements and specialists will probably be required to deploy to the JOA to facilitate the redeployment.

g. Identifying the strategic movement assets to be made available by the troop contributing nations.
**CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS**

0601. Requirements for coalition interoperability transcend ‘simple’ questions of equipment commonality and compatibility. Coalition operations may demand that maximum interoperable materiel interface be achieved even when commonality and compatibility are lacking. The subject requires consideration of all factors impacting interoperability, to include doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, people, and facilities. Planning for, and achieving maximum interoperability in the non-materiel aspects of military operations, can and should be a key focus of multinational cooperation initiatives.
ANNEX A – NATIONAL DECISION-MAKING MIC MEMBER NATIONS

Scope

A1. This Annex outlines the various political-strategic decision-making processes used by the MIC member nations. It is designed to allow the Operational Commander and his staff to better understand the process that leads to decisions within individual nations that may participate in a coalition and how that process may impact operational planning and conduct of operations. This is meant as a general overview and discusses only the processes that are in place in each nation. There is no attempt to interpret how or why a decision is reached in a given situation.

AUSTRALIA (AUS)

A2. In Australia, the pinnacle of the National Crisis Management Machinery (NCMM) is the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC) which considers a broad range of advice in determining the national response to a crisis situation. The Prime Minister chairs the NSC. The Minister for Defense is a standing member and Chief of the Defense Force (CDF) may be invited to attend when defense and security matters are discussed. A lead Government Department is nominated to coordinate the advice considered by the NSC and the implementation of its decisions. Within the Department of Defense, the Strategic Command Group (SCG) provides advice to CDF on military response options for NSC consideration.

A3. There are a number of committees subordinate to the NSC where senior Defense personnel are standing representatives. The 2 primary subordinate committees are:

a. **Secretaries’ Committee on National Security (SCNS).** This is the senior inter-departmental committee and provides coordinated advice to the NSC on national options and strategy. CDF is a standing member.

b. **Strategic Policy Coordination Group (SPCG).** This group has no executive authority but plays a key role in overseeing the day-to-day coordination of responses to international crises. Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) is a standing member.

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57 NSC standing membership is Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Minister for Defence, the Attorney General, and the Treasurer. Other ministers are invited to attend as required.

58 SCNS standing membership is Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Secretary Department of Defence, Secretary Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Secretary Department of the Attorney General’s Department, Secretary Department of the Treasury, Chief of Defence Force and the Director-General of the Office of National Assessments. Other departmental heads may be invited to attend as required.

59 SPCG standing membership is Deputy Secretaries from PM&C and DEFAT, Deputy Secretary Strategy from Defence and Chief of Joint Operations.
A4. An Inter-departmental Emergency Task Force (IDETF) comprising of senior representatives from the involved government departments will normally be formed to facilitate policy and advice coordination and development. Defense representation is normally drawn from International Policy Division (IP Div) and Strategic Operations Directorate (SOD). For time-critical crises the NSC may direct that an IDETF be established immediately, thereby bypassing the formal involvement of SCNS and SPCG in the initial consideration of the crisis. However, these committees would likely be involved in the consideration of on-going issues following the initial response.

A5. Within the Department of Defense the Strategic Command Group (SCG) provides CDF with situational awareness and advice on intelligence, policy and operational issues. SCG is chaired by CDF and membership comprises CJOPS, Chief of Navy, Chief of Army, Chief of Air Force, Deputy Secretary Strategy, Deputy Secretary Intelligence and Security, Chief Information Officer, Commander Joint Logistics and Director General Public Affairs. The Strategic Planning Group (SPG) is responsible for the conduct of immediate strategic level planning for operations and the development of CDF planning guidance to the operational level. Director General Joint Operations and Plans, the Australian Principal on the Multinational Interoperability Council, chairs this group.
Government of Canada Priorities and Policies

A6. The Government of Canada (GoC) decides when and under what circumstances the Canadian Forces will be employed. Normally, decision-making in this context involves 2 closely related planning processes. The first is a political process to assess the national interest and determine policy and/or whole-of-government strategic objectives, which all departments and agencies support by formulating a range of closely coordinated strategies that exist across the spectrum of diplomatic (or political), informational, military and economic elements of national power. The second is a military feasibility process to determine how best to employ the Canadian Forces to achieve potential strategic objectives. From this analysis, a strategy is devised on how to organize and deploy the Canadian Forces given the threat environment, the capabilities required and the resources available.

Integrated Strategic Analysis

A7. Ongoing formal strategic analysis is conducted by National Defense to identify domestic and international threats, crises or trends that may affect Canadian interests. This analysis is a collaborative effort involving ADM (Pol), Chief of Defense Intelligence (CDI), the Strategic Joint Staff (SJS), other strategic staffs and the operational Commands. Output generated from the strategic analysis provides the nucleus for practical considerations of the potential ends, ways and means of Canadian Forces Force Employment in the 3 to 5 year horizon. This is a continuous, iterative process, involving all strategic staffs in a variety of venues and processes such as Intelligence Indications and Warnings, Strategic Operations Planning Group (SOPG), strategic readiness, etc. In anticipation or response to a developing domestic or international event, the GoC will conduct a strategic assessment to consider how instruments of national power could be applied to resolve or influence the situation and whether it is appropriate and in the national interest to do so.

A8. In concert with the whole of government assessment, the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) and senior leadership of the Department of National Defense (DND)/Canadian Forces (assisted principally by strategic level staff) will consider how the Canadian Forces may be employed in conjunction with the other elements of national power to resolve or influence a developing situation. The first desired outcome of the whole of government assessment is the identification of national goals, objectives, priorities, and interests. The second is broad guidance on the manner, or ways, in which instruments of national power will be integrated, directed and applied.
Government of Canada/Cabinet/Minister of National Defense Guidance and
Chief Defense Staff Military Advice

A9. Informed by whole of government/strategic assessment, the GoC may provide guidance
to cease or reorient the active consideration of an issue. Such guidance may include:
the priority of the planning effort; the lead and supporting department responsibilities;
the degree of acceptable risk; the parameters within which the GoC response options
should be situated; and the intended effects or desired outcome of this response.
GoC/Minister of National Defense (MND) guidance at this stage will also articulate
whether continued consideration of the military instrument of power is appropriate. As
the senior military advisor to the GoC, the CDS provides advice to the MND on all
military matters, including military requirements, capabilities and force employment
considerations and options. When and where required, the CDS will also advise the
Prime Minister and Cabinet directly. In parallel with CDS military advice, the Deputy
Minister provides policy advice to the MND.

Initiating Directives

A10. The purpose of a CDS Initiating Directive is to formalize the initiation of strategic and
operational-level planning and communicate the deductions of the strategic
assessment, either concurrently or following its completion. A CDS Initiating Directive
will state planning assumptions, define desired strategic objectives, outline CDS intent,
impose appropriate limitations, appoint Supported and Supporting Commanders,
identify key planning milestones and provide the force apportionment (an initial
estimate of available forces authorized for planning). While the CDS Initiating Directive
initiates planning, it does not confer the authority to execute an operation. It may,
however, authorize reconnaissance, heighten readiness states and permit preliminary
movement.

The Operational Planning Process

A11. The Supported Commander’s planning guidance focuses the planning effort. The
Warning Order provides the necessary preparative guidance to assigned or apportioned
assets to ensure that there is time to prepare and train to the directed level.
Reconnaissance may take place at this stage. Courses of Action (COA) are based on
ideas that may have originated from the Government, the CDS, or the Operational
Commander. Regular and frequent communication between the CDS and subordinate
commanders, as well as their respective staffs, will ensure unity of thought as COA
development progresses. At a certain point, the operational commander will receive an
information brief on the initial COA development process, allowing him to provide
further direction and focus to the planning staff by eliminating some options and
narrowing others. The authority to approve or select a COA very often rests at a higher
level, especially for international operations. In these cases, the operational
commander will therefore confine his direction to the range and nature of the COAs to
be presented to the CDS. Consultation and close coordination with strategic and other
government department (OGD) staff, as well as coalition partners and multinational
organizations, as applicable, will ensure military force employment options support an
integrated ‘whole of government’ approach as well as applicable coalition engagement
strategies and planning efforts.

Courses of Action Back briefs

A12. Once satisfied with the selected COA’s effectiveness the Commander will normally seek
and acquire CDS endorsement before proceeding with the effort to develop the COA
into a Concept of Operations (CONOPs) or Campaign Plan. A formal briefing is
presented to the CDS in which the Commander provides a graphic representation that
clearly and objectively articulates the COA proposal that will best meet national and
coalition objectives. Since the authority to approve or select a COA normally rests at the
GoC level, especially for international operations, the CDS may also confine his direction
to the range and nature of the COAs to be developed.

Joint Statement of Requirements

A13. One of the products of the planning process at this stage is the Joint Statement of
Requirements, which is produced by the supported commander. The JSOR is briefed
and submitted to the CDS in conjunction with the CONOPs. The JSOR illustrates the
supported commander’s requirements in terms of scale of forces, types of capabilities
and equipment, and other resources and enablers needed to execute an operation.

Force Employment CONOPS and CONOPS Backbrief

A14. After an endorsed COA or set of COAs has been developed into a CONOP, with an
accompanying JSOR, the supported commander will brief it to the CDS, either in
segments or as a whole. In some cases, if the GoC has already endorsed a COA, CONOPS
approval allows the CDS to confirm his intent, ensure effective and efficient Canadian
Forces-level coordination of force employment, and identify issues that may require
further interdepartmental coordination. In other cases, a refined CONOPS will require a
CDS briefing to the MND or Cabinet before it is approved. The CONOPS backbrief to the
CDS is conducted in the presence of the Force Generators who will, as appropriate,
complement the force employment CONOPS brief with a force generators brief
outlining, in particular, sustainability over time of the anticipated commitment.

Chief of the Defense Staff Military Advice on Options

A15. The presentation of COAs or a CONOP to the GoC will normally include the following:

a. A summary of policy and strategic goals, objectives and end-state;

b. A broad description of the capabilities involved, in terms of the:
(1.) Number of personnel, type of organization, and major equipment;

(2.) Sustainability over time; and

(3.) Rough Order of Magnitude costs and whether DND will seek additional funding to support the operation;

a. A broad description of the ways, or types of operations, including consideration of inherent high profile factors such detainees and use of force; and

b. A military risk assessment.

A16. A GoC/Cabinet decision is required prior to the commitment of military resources or commencement of any major military operation. The Cabinet can, without parliamentary approval or consultation, commit the Canadian Force to action.

**CDS Directive or Force Employment Strategy**

A17. The approval of the strategic plan by the GoC and the detailed analysis of the selected plan provided through backbriefs (COA, CONOP and Campaign Plan) will drive and aid in the development of CDS Directives, which refines the strategic direction given earlier.

**Sustained Force Generation Supplementary Plan**

A18. Under the coordination of the primary force generator, all supporting commanders will prepare supporting plans to ensure the requirements of the supported commander are sustained over time. This plan will include the identification, training and equipping of forces for operations.

**Plan Review – Strategic Assessment and GoC/Cabinet/Minister of National Defense Direction**

A19. The strategic assessment process is continuously conducted, even after the commencement of operations, to measure progress and identify necessary adjustments. Military assessments also serve to inform whole of government reviews. The outcome of these reviews informs advice to Government. Major changes to an ongoing mission require the same consultation and involvement by the same actors as in its initial stages. The outcome of this stage is GoC direction for the initiation, expansion, conversion, reduction, or termination of force employment activities.
A21. Any decision to engage the French forces in operations is made by the President of the Republic, Commander in Chief of the armed forces, following a political and military decision-making process. The Chief of the Defense Staff (CEMA)\textsuperscript{60} participates in this process and then becomes the Operational Commander of the forces in operations. The Strategic Operations Planning and Control Centre (CPCO)\textsuperscript{61} is the tool allowing anticipation in the crisis and to plan, command and control all the operations conducted by the French forces around the world.

A22. Crisis management requires the co-ordination of the 3 levers: diplomatic; military; and media, but excludes any delegation. Crisis management is a highly centralized process. The speed of communication and the omnipresence of the media may also force political authorities to make frequent re-assessments of the situation. To be effective,

\textsuperscript{60} Chef d’état major des armées
\textsuperscript{61} CPCO centre de planification et de conduite des opérations
the crisis management process must be swift. These two factors, centralization and speed, led France to adopt the process described below.

A23. **Trigger event.** The response begins with an event either in the physical domain or political realm that may have an impact on the safety of French nationals or the interests of France. The event could be reported by various channels (Media, Defense Attachés, allied partners, Military Intelligence Directorate). The event is immediately analyzed by different experts:

a. In the Elysée Palace, the President’s own military staff;
b. In Hotel Matignon, by the Prime Minister’s military advisors;
c. In the Ministry of Defense; and
d. Other concerned Ministries (mainly the Foreign Affairs Ministry); in the various SOPCC’s and MID cells.

This analysis may trigger a planning process which will not necessarily lead to an engagement of forces. However, in case of an emergency, planning can be very fast and rapidly lead to an order of engagement of our forces. Whatever the event, the process is the same and can take a few weeks or a few hours, depending on the situation.

A24. **Military Situation.** This analysis leads to the assessment of the military situation that is carried out in close cooperation with the Military Intelligence Directorate (DRM\(^{62}\)). They assess the relative risks run by the local population and the forces and elaborate various military options.

A25. **The Role of the Chief of the Defense Staff.** These military options are proposed by the Chief of the Defense Staff to the Government. The CDS has a dual role, as the military adviser to the Government and the Operational Commander of the forces. CDS participates in the decision making-process from the beginning of a crisis until the decision is made to commit the forces, if it turns out to be necessary. Once the engagement is decided, the CDS becomes the Operational Commander of the forces. In his dual role, the CDS is in the best position to advise the Government on operations and to assume the responsibility of their conduct.

A26. **Interagency Crisis Cell and Restricted Committee.\(^{63}\)** Involving all the key players described before, the interagency crisis cell drafts an overall situation assessment, initial conclusions and proposals. In his capacity as military adviser to the Government, the CDS (or the DCOS Ops) is a member of the ‘Restricted Committee’ chaired by the Prime

\(^{62}\) Direction du Renseignement Militaire.

\(^{63}\) Networking of crisis management cells: Strategic Operations Planning and Control Centre (CPCO), Interagency Crisis Centre (CIC), Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (MAEE).
Minister, and is responsible for submitting the various options liable to meet the objectives. The possible options are studied, analyzed and, if required, amended by the Restricted Committee that finalizes the proposals to be made to the President.

A27. **Defense and National Security Council and Restricted Council.** During the session of the Council, in which the CDS takes part, the President takes his final decision concerning the commitment of the forces. In addition, once the operation has been decided and as a direct subordinate to the President, the CDS assumes at strategic level the operational command of all the French forces committed.

A28. **Action.** The decision to commit the forces is then transmitted by the CDS to the SOPCC which assumes the operational planning, especially the concept of operation (CONOPS) and the operational plan (OPLAN), in order to prepare the Task Force generation and its deployment, before assuming its conduct under the orders of the CDS. Then the operational order (OPORD) includes the situation, the mission, the assets involved, and of course, the rules of engagement. After taking part in the decision-making process, the SOPCC becomes the tool used by the CDS as Operational Commander to command and control the forces at the strategic level.

A29. **Decision Making Process.** The Parliament is not directly involved in the French decisional process. However, since July 2008, the Parliament has a control role on French military involvements: after 4 months, its approval is required over the pursuit or not of the engagement. In addition, there is a budget specifically allocated to military operations since 2003 as part of the annual budget bill of the State, which is voted by the Parliament.
A30. There are in general 4 phases in the National Decision-Making Cycle: P1 Crisis monitoring and early warning, P2 - Planning phase, P3 - Decision making, P4 - National Command and Control of the Operation. Within P1 lead of the common activities lies with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which is responsible for the overall crisis assessment.

a. For the involvement of German Armed Forces in unarmed operations (e.g. humanitarian/disaster relief) outside German territory a decision of the cabinet of the Federal Government may be required.

b. The participation of German Armed Forces in all other Crisis Response Operations has to be approved by the Parliament. German law however allows for very fast decision making and deployment in special and/ or urgent cases (i.e. EvacOps; Site survey).

A31. Decision Making and Plan Development within the MOD is managed through the elements shaped for quick decision making and effective planning as depicted in Figure A.4.
A32. The initiative to plan an operation can be taken:

a. Either by the Minister of Defense who sees a need to start planning,

b. Or by the declaration of a „National Concern“ by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

c. Or by the analysis of the Crisis Monitoring Team which is a high ranking military body under the chair of the Director of Intelligence.

Figure A.4 – Germany Decision-Making Process

A33. The **Chief of Defense** is responsible for planning, preparation, command and control and after-action activities. In this function he is supported by the Joint Operations Staff. This staff is subdivided in teams for all current operations. Each team comprises of members of all services, staff functions and representatives of other MoD directorates and ministries. The following coordination tasks will be performed:

a. Preparation of decisions for the Minister of Defense/CHOD.

b. Coordination of all relevant activities in the MOD.
c. Preparation of a MOD position for the co-ordination with other ministries and external agencies/nations.

d. Information for the Minister of Defense/CHOD/Government/Parliament about the execution of political-military decisions.

e. Adjustments to given military guidance and direction.

f. Lessons learned.

A34. The Planning Process at the MOD is depicted in Figure A.5. It involves the capacities of the OpsCmd as the executive authority at operational level in an early stage. Planning is coordinated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other departments as appropriate. The Federal Chancellery is also integrated by nature, as for the decision to launch an operation the government has to make a decision, followed by parliamentary discussion/approval.

A35. The necessary co-ordination with Army, Air Force and Navy staffs including the decision on provision of forces and assets is a task that rests within the MOD. The OpsCmd is responsible for further co-ordination with the respective service commands. The forces in theatre report directly to the OpsCmd. There is no operational chain of command to the service chiefs (the services are force providers).
The decision to employ the Armed Forces to cope with domestic or international crisis is made by the political Authority, which has the responsibility to preserve the national interests. In case of a domestic or an international crisis occurs, the Italian Government plays as Cabinet\textsuperscript{64} where the Prime Minister, together with the Foreign Affairs, the Interior and the Defense Ministers, plays a key role, although in recent times others Departments have been more and more involved. The Government proposes military employment to Parliament, which has the authority to approve the military deployment.

The strategic decision-making process starts at the political level when the Cabinet or the Political-Military Cell of the Prime Minister’s Office, through the MoD, informs the Defense General Staff (DGS) of a potential national military involvement in a crisis. DGS develops the strategic estimate, based on political guidelines (if any), and on the

\textsuperscript{64} In this context, it is intended the Strategic Military Committee.
operational estimate provided by the Joint Operations Headquarters (JOHQ) / the Joint Special Forces Operations Headquarters (JSFOHQ) if involved. This gives the CHOD both a political-military and a technical-military assessment of the possible Course of Actions (CoAs).

A38. Based on such assessments, the CHOD will make his recommendations to the Minister of Defense, who afterwards will report to the Parliament for approval or information (in the case of a commitment already signed by the Parliament). Once the intervention is approved by the political authority, the MoD authorizes the CHOD, who has a dual role, being both Chief of Defense Staff (CHOD) and Commander in Chief (CINC) of the Italian Armed Forces (CINC), to begin the operational planning process.

A39. DSG can hence develop the Planning Directive, and send it to the JOHQ/JSFOHQ, responsible for drafting the OPLAN (in case of an exclusive national engagement or ITA as Lead Nation)/National Operational Directive (in case of ITA as TCN). In the meantime, the single-Services General Staffs (Air, Land, Navy) and the Carabinieri General HQ (CC Gen. HQ), as Forces Providers, are involved into the process as well, and kept posted by DSG and/or JOHQ/JSFOHQ through Warning Orders.

A40. CHOD normally retains the OPCOM and delegates the OPCON of the national Forces to the COMJOHQ or to the Operational Commander. In case of national leadership for a Special Operation, JSFOHQ can be the framework for either SOCE, or SOCCE or CJSOTF HQ. Combat Service Support remains a single Service responsibility, coordinated by JOHQ/JSFOHQ.

A41. To be noted that at the political level, together with the Parliament, there is the Supreme Defense Council (SDC), chaired by the President of the Republic, as well. It is a permanent council that, based on the guidance determined by the Government in terms of security and Defense, examines possible options and issues directives to the involved Departments as well as to the CHOD regarding not only potential military involvements in Crisis Response Operations, but also Defense issues in general.
Figure A.6 – Italian Political-Military Chain of Command

Decision Making Process Actors

- **Political-strategic Level**: Parliament, Government, Supreme Defence Council
- **Political-military Level**: Ministry of Defence
- **Military Strategic Level**: CHOD, DGS
- **Operational Level**: JOHQ (JSFOHQ)

### Levels of Decision Making

- **Minister of Defence**
- **Operational Level**
- **Political-military Level**
- **Political-strategic Level**
A42. World events are observed and assessed at the highest political level, and by individual government departments. Departments of state particularly involved will be the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO), Department for International Development (DFID) and the Ministry of Defense (MOD). The Defense Overseas and Policy Committee (DOPC), chaired by the Prime Minister, also includes the Chancellor of the Exchequer (for financial issues), Attorney General (for legal issues) and the President of the Board of Trade (for the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)). There may also be Home Office interest if there is a Counter-Terrorist or Police angle to be considered.

A43. Within the MOD, the Defense Crisis Management Organization (DCMO) monitors World events continuously, taking inputs from the regional departments and the Intelligence services which are looking for indicators and warnings of emerging crises. DCMO has a morning briefing chaired at 3* (or 2*) level by the senior officer available from the MOD, normally Deputy Chief of Defense Staff (Operations) (DCDS (Ops)). Also present are the regional and capability staffs and representatives from Intelligence, the FCO and MOD Media staff. The Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), the single-Service headquarters (Fleet, Land and Strike Commands), Director Special Forces (DSF), and the UK Delegations to HQ NATO, SACEUR and EU join the meeting via video.
teleconferencing. If it becomes apparent that a crisis is emerging, it may be decided to form a Current Operations Group (COG) to study the situation in detail.

A44. A COG may be convened at 30 minutes' notice. It is chaired by Directorate Operations and selected regional and capability staffs attend. The FCO, DFID and Cabinet Office (CO) (used to coordinate cross-government activities) are invited to attend so that a common appreciation of events is gained across government. The COG assesses the severity of the crisis and considers the options for intervention. The need for strategic political direction from the Cabinet is discussed together with the desired end-state and exit strategy. The COG will decide on the need to form a Strategic Planning Group (SPG), if one has not already formed, together with a Current Commitments Team (CCT) dedicated to handling operational problems.

A45. The SPG takes a long-term view and assesses the crisis to evaluate strategic options. It provides military strategic advice for the political process and assists the DOPs and PJHQ on strategic issues. The SPG’s remit extends to forward planning and consideration of end-states. The SPG may initiate a Grand Strategic Estimate (GSE). This seeks to define the UK’s national intent and political objectives, the international community’s probable options and intent, the desirable and acceptable end-states, the resource implications, constraints and the likely reaction of allies. The process produces assessments of the diplomatic, economic, political and military options open to the British Government. Effectively, the SPG fulfils the ‘J5’ role for the MOD.

A46. A CCT is the crisis team formed at MOD. This usually includes staff from regional, capability, intelligence, logistics and movements MOD directorates, and from other Government Departments. The team is usually only 8-10 people, but will be authoritative: a 2* lead is possible but a 1* or OF5 lead would be more usual. Initially, the team forms in the offices of its members but as the crisis deepens it will move into the Defense Crisis Management Centre (DCMC) underground in MOD and work around the clock. The CCT’s role is to handle current operational issues concerning the deployment, action and recovery of forces. The CCT thus fulfills the ‘J3’ role for the MOD.

A47. When the CCT forms in MOD, a Contingency Planning Team (CPT) forms at PJHQ. The CCT and CPT work as a single entity through the medium of video conferencing. Together with the SPG, they produce initial advice on the crisis for the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) who then briefs ministers and, when invited, the Cabinet. The SPG will draft the CDS Planning Directive to the DCMO, based on the political direction given by Government. The product of the planning process is the Military Strategic Estimate (MSE), which is written by PJHQ (based upon the analysis in the GSE). The MSE will detail the military options including the implications for UK and the likely costs.

A48. CDS presents the military options detailed in the MSE to the Cabinet. In a major crisis, the DOPC will form to take the key political decisions. If they decide that UK armed forces will become involved in the crisis, they will choose an option and authorize CDS
to proceed. The CCT will then draft the CDS Directive that will, *inter alia*, nominate a Joint Commander - normally the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) (3* Commander at PJHQ). The CDS Directive will also detail the UK aim, the desired end-state and any constraints applied by the Cabinet.

A49. On receiving the CDS Directive, PJHQ expands the small CPT to become an Operations Team (OT) which then exercises Operational Command to deploy, sustain and recover the committed forces. The Operations Team issues a Mission Directive to the Joint Task Force Commander who would carry out his own Estimate and then ensure a continual 2-way flow of advice upward to Government and clear direction passed down.

A50. On completion of the combat phase of operations, MOD becomes a supporting department to the Stabilization Unit, (and DFID and FCO). The Stabilization Unit is a cross-Government organization which will be closely involved in both the SPG and CCT, and which then provides the coordination of the UK contribution in the crisis country for the reconstruction and economic recovery effort.
A51. National strategic direction is governed by the Constitution, federal law, United States Government (USG) policy regarding internationally-recognized law and the national interest. This direction leads to unified action. The result of effective unified action is unity of effort to achieve national goals. At the strategic level, unity of effort requires
coordination among government departments and agencies within the executive branch, between the executive and legislative branches, with Non-governmental Organizations (NGO)s, International Organizations, the private sector, and among nations in any alliance or coalition.

A52. **Responsibilities for national strategic direction** as established by the Constitution and federal law and practice are as follows:

a. **The President of the United States**, advised by the National Security Council, is responsible to the American people for national strategic direction.

(1.) When the United States undertakes military operations, the Armed Forces of the United States are only one component of a national-level effort involving all instruments of national power. Instilling unity of effort at the national level is necessarily a cooperative endeavor involving a number of Federal departments and agencies. In certain operations, agencies of states, localities, or foreign countries may also be involved. The President establishes guidelines for civil-military integration and normally disseminates decisions and monitors execution through the NSC.

(2.) Complex operations, such as peace operations, may require a high order of civil-military integration. Presidential directives guide participation by all US civilian and military agencies in such operations. Military leaders must work with the other members of the national security team in the most skilled, tactful, and persistent ways to promote unity of effort. Operations of agencies representing the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of power are not under command of the Armed Forces of the United States or of any specific Combatant Commander (CCDR). In domestic US situations, another department such as the Department of Homeland Security may assume overall control of interagency coordination including military elements. Abroad, the US ambassador and the country team may be in control in operations other than war not involving the use of force.

b. **The SecDef** is responsible to the President for creating, supporting, and employing military capabilities. The SecDef provides authoritative direction, and control over the Services through the Secretaries of the Military Departments. SecDef exercises control of and authority over those forces not specifically assigned to the combatant commands and administers this authority through the Military Departments, the Service Chiefs, and applicable chains of command. The Secretaries of the Military Departments organize, train, and equip forces to operate across the range of military operations and provide for the administration and support of all those forces within their department, including those assigned or attached to the CCDRs.
c. **The CJCS** is the principal military adviser to the President, the NSC, and SecDef and functions under the authority of the President and the direction and control of the President and SecDef, and oversees the activities of the CCDRs as directed by SecDef. Communications between the President or the SecDef and the CCDRs are normally transmitted through the CJCS.

d. **Commanders of Combatant Commands** exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over assigned forces and are responsible to the President and SecDef for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands to perform assigned missions.

e. In a foreign country, the US ambassador is responsible to the President for directing, coordinating, and supervising all USG elements in the host nation, except those under the command of a CCDR. GCCs are responsible for coordinating with US ambassadors in their geographic AOR (as necessary) across the range of military operations, and for negotiating memoranda of agreement (MOAs) with the chiefs of mission in designated countries to support military operations. Force protection is an example of a military operation/requirement where an MOA would enhance coordination and integration.

**Unified Action**

A53. The term ‘unified action’ in military usage is a broad term referring to the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and non-governmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Within this general category of operations, subordinate CDRs of assigned or attached forces conduct either single-Service or joint operations to support the overall operation. **Unified action** synchronizes, coordinates, and/or integrates joint, single-Service, and multinational operations with the operations of other USG agencies, NGOs, and IGOs (e.g., UN), and the private sector to achieve unity of effort (Figure B.10). Unity of command within the military instrument of national power supports the national strategic direction through close coordination with the other instruments of national power.

A54. **Success often depends on unified actions.** The CJCS and all CCDRs are in pivotal positions to ensure that unified actions are planned and conducted in accordance with the guidance and direction received from the President and SecDef in coordination with other authorities (i.e. alliance or coalition leadership).

A55. Unity of command in the Armed Forces of the United States starts with national strategic direction. For US military operations, unity of command is accomplished by establishing a joint force, assigning a mission, or objective(s) to the designated CFC, establishing command relationships, assigning and/or attaching appropriate forces to the joint force, and empowering the CFC with sufficient authority over the forces to accomplish the assigned mission.
Roles and Functions

A56. The terms ‘roles and functions’ often are used interchangeably, but the distinctions among them are important.

a. ‘Roles’ are the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services and USSOCOM were established in law.

b. Functions. The appropriate assigned duties, responsibilities, missions, or tasks of an individual, office, or organization. As defined in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the term ‘function’ includes functions, powers, and duties (Title 50, USC, Section 410[a]).

Chain of Command

A57. The President and SecDef exercise authority and control of the Armed Forces through 2 distinct branches of the chain of command (see Figure B.10). One branch runs from the President, through the SecDef, to the CCDRs for missions and forces assigned to their commands. The other branch, used for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned to the combatant commands, runs from the President through the SecDef to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. The Military Departments, organized separately, operate under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of that Military Department. The Secretaries of the Military Departments exercise authority through their respective Service Chiefs over Service forces not assigned to the CCDRs. The Service Chiefs, except as otherwise prescribed by law, perform their duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretaries of the respective Military Departments to whom they are directly responsible.
a. The CCDRs exercise COCOM of assigned forces and are directly responsible to the President and SecDef for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands. CCDRs prescribe the chain of command within their combatant commands and designate the appropriate command authority to be exercised by subordinate CDRs.

b. The Military Departments operate under the authority, direction, and control of the SecDef. This branch of the chain of command is responsible for all military forces within the respective Service not assigned to CCDRs. It is separate and distinct from the branch of the chain of command that exists within a combatant command.
The Combatant Commands

A58. The President, through the SecDef and with the advice and assistance of the CJCS, establishes combatant (unified) commands for the performance of military missions and prescribes the force structure of such commands.

A59. The CJCS assists the President and the SecDef in performing their command functions. The CJCS transmits to the commanders of the combatant commands the orders given by the President, or the SecDef and, as directed by the SecDef, oversees the activities of those commands. Orders issued by the President or the SecDef normally are conveyed by the CJCS under the authority and direction of SecDef. Reports from CCDRs normally will be submitted through CJCS who forwards them to the SecDef and acts as the spokesman for the commanders of the combatant commands.

A60. CDRs in the chain of command exercise COCOM, operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), or a support command relationship as prescribed by law or a superior CDR over the military force under their command. Unless otherwise directed by the President or the SecDef, COCOM is reserved for the CCDR over assigned forces. During contingency planning, generic forces are apportioned to specific plans according to global force management procedures. This requires supported CCDRs to coordinate with the supporting CCDRs on required capabilities during planning and on mission criteria for specific units once they have been allocated.

Relationship between Combatant Commanders, Military Secretaries, Service Chiefs, and Forces

A61. Continuous Coordination. The Military Services and USSOCOM (in areas unique to special operations) share the division of responsibility for developing military capabilities for the combatant commands. All components of the DOD are charged to coordinate on matters of common or overlapping responsibility. The Joint Staff, Service, and USSOCOM headquarters play a critical role in ensuring that CCDRs’ concerns and comments are included or advocated during the coordination.

A62. Interoperability. Unified action demands maximum interoperability. The forces, units, and systems of all Services must operate together effectively. This effectiveness is achieved in part through interoperability. This includes the development and use of joint doctrine, the development and use of joint OPLANs; and the development and use of joint and/or interoperable communications and information systems. It also includes conducting joint training and exercises. It concludes with a materiel development and fielding process that provides materiel that is fully compatible with and complementary to systems of all Services. A key to successful interoperability is to ensure that planning processes are Joint from their inception. Those responsible for systems and programs intended for joint use will establish working groups that fully represent the services and functions that will be affected and interoperability must be considered in all Joint
program reviews. CCDRs will ensure maximum interoperability and identify interoperability issues to the CJCS, who has overall responsibility for the joint interoperability program.
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ANNEX B – DETAINEE OPERATIONS

B1. The sanctioning civil authority should provide political direction and guidance to commanders on detainee operations. Commanders of deployed forces may lack the authority to speak on behalf of their nation and will most likely have to involve government and strategic military decision-makers in any decisions regarding detainee operations policy. Although coalition participants may have similar political mandates, each may have different national detainee policies reflecting that nation's unique political and legal interests and its reason for entering the coalition. As such, detainee operations should be addressed at the highest levels within the coalition as early as possible in the planning process.

B2. It is likely that the lead nation will play an important role in the process of developing coalition detainee operations plans and although consensus on standardization of detainee operations policy should be sought, it may not be achievable. Therefore, the goal of the planning process should be a clear and common understanding of how each coalition participant will conduct detainee operations within a given situation.

B3. Geneva Conventions provide a strong basis for common understanding of terms that may not be explicitly defined or agreed by nations. This common basis has resulted in many similarities; however, differences do exist and national interpretations of existing terms and conventions are dependent on a wide variety of factors. Coalition commanders and planners need to be cognizant of these factors and take measures to mitigate the potential negative impacts on coalition operations of differing interpretations. Table B-1 provides a summary of national similarities and differences in terminology relating to detainee operations.65

65 DEU is currently developing policy guidance but does not yet have agreed doctrine. The USA input is undergoing legal review.
Table B.1 – Summary of MIC Nations Definitions for Detainee Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>AUS</th>
<th>CAN</th>
<th>FRA</th>
<th>DEU</th>
<th>ITA</th>
<th>GBR</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prisoner of War</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>N/U</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protected Persons</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internee</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detaining Power</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captured Person/Detainee</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>N/U</td>
<td>N/U</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>N/U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retained Person</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Detainee</td>
<td>N/U</td>
<td>N/U</td>
<td>N/U</td>
<td>N/U</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>N/U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlawful/Unprivileged Belligerent/ Combatant</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners of Indeterminate Status</td>
<td>N/U</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>N/U</td>
<td>N/U</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>N/U</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C – common definition or understanding of a term exists between indicated nations.
S – similar term/shared basis for use of the term (Geneva Conventions) exists between indicated nations.
D – term or understanding different from other nations.
N/U – term not used or status/understanding of term unknown.

The consequences of differing national detainee operations policy on planning for coalition operations will depend on the circumstances in a particular situation. As discussed below, most nations generally find common ground around core definitions or understanding and use Geneva Convention III as a basis for detainee operations. Therefore, consistency across a given coalition could be good with minimal impact on operations. However, factors such as the nature of the conflict, the status of host-nation governance, judiciary, or security forces, and contributing nations’ interests may dictate broadly differing operating procedures. These differing procedures may impact the following:

a. Force structures may have to be adjusted to avoid placing nations with conflicting national policies within formations that may require them to transfer/transport detainees between each other;

b. Areas of Operations with particular circumstances may have to be assigned to participating nations with complementary detainee operations policy;
c. Information Operations may have to be designed to mitigate the potential impacts of differing national detainee operations. These impacts could include such things as enemy propaganda or the targeting of a specific nation(s) within the coalition;

d. Public Affairs plans may have to include contingencies to mitigate perceptions of disunity within the coalition, strengthen international and domestic resolve, and pre-empt enemy messaging on the subject; and

e. Capacity building measures may have to be emphasized and prioritized within host-nation security forces (military, police, militias, etc.), judiciary, or other local government institutions in order to mitigate the effects of differing national detainee operations. Similarly, capacity building might have to be focused in a particular region or regions of the host nation.

B5. In the planning process it is important to take into account possible difficulties arising from detainee hand-over, considering different constraints embedded in Detaining Power, Host Nation and Coalition Member’s legal systems. For instance, in accordance with international law, there are nations that will not allow detainee hand-over to states that:

a. Maintain the death penalty in their law system;

b. Do not guarantee full respect of Article 3 of Geneva Conventions; or

c. Do not guarantee full respect of UN Convention rules against torture.

B6. Detainee operations are, and will remain, a sensitive issue for a coalition.
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# ANNEX C - NATIONAL FACTORS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>NATIONAL FACTORS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS</strong></th>
<th><strong>AUSTRALIA (AUS)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Definition for insurgency</strong></td>
<td>An organized, violent and politically motivated activity conducted by non-state actors and sustained over a protracted period of time that typically utilizes a number of methods; such as subversion, guerrilla warfare and terrorism in an attempt to achieve change within a state. <a href="https://example.com">Land Warfare Doctrine LWD 3.0.1 (Dec 09)</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Definition for COIN</strong></td>
<td>Those political, social, civic, economic, psychological, and military actions taken to defeat an insurgency. <a href="https://example.com">LWD 3.0.1 (Dec 09)</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fundamentals for a COIN Operation</strong></td>
<td>The solution to any insurgency fundamentally exists with the government’s ability to effectively deal with the cause at the political level. A whole-of-government multi-agency effort towards COIN is critical in order to achieve any measure of success. A comprehensive approach that addresses the root causes of an insurgency and attacks the legitimacy and authority of the insurgent forces thereby providing an enduring solution should form the framework upon which a COIN campaign is designed. This approach also integrates the instruments of national power – DIME.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principles of COIN Action</strong></td>
<td>• Political Primacy and Legitimacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Comprehensive Approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Intelligence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reinforcing the Rule of Law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Support Good Governance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Dominant Narrative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Physical and Moral Isolation of the Insurgent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Presence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Adaptation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Host Nation Primacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational Approach</strong></td>
<td>Shape-Clear-Hold-Build (These should not be viewed as 4 distinct independent phases. Depending on the environment these can be conducted concurrently)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
<td>The fundamentals for a COIN operation are not separately listed in LWD 3-0-1. Arguably, from AUS perspective, the most important COIN principle(s) can be construed to be fundamental in conducting a COIN operation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Definition for insurgency

An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. *Defense Terminology Database (Record 4551)*

### Definition for COIN

Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency. *Defense Terminology Database (Record 3941)*

### Fundamentals for a COIN Operation

Insurgency is not a movement or people. It is a competition, struggle or conflict involving different groups of people. As a manifestation of war, it is a competition of wills.

It must include at least one non-state movement to differentiate it from wars between states.

The established authority need not necessarily be the government of the nation subject to an insurgency. It could be a local authority, a temporary military authority or a government of a third party.

Insurgencies seek political change like all wars. But the political nature of insurgency is so important, it should be emphasized in the definition. The change sought could be government collapse (typically an objective of 1950-60s communist insurgencies) or a lesser objective such as self-determination, regional autonomy or the release of political prisoners. *B-GL-323-004/FP-003*

### Principles of COIN Action

Effect political primacy in the pursuit of a strategic aim.

Promote Unity of Purpose to coordinate the actions of Participating Agencies/International Organizations and NGOs – Comprehensive Approach.

Understand the complex dynamics of the Insurgency, including the wider environment.

Exploit Intelligence and Information.

Separate the Insurgents from their physical and moral sources of strength.

Physically separate insurgents from the population.

Intellectual and Moral Separation.

Neutralize the Insurgent.

Sustain commitment to expend political capital and resources over a long period.

Conduct longer term Post-Insurgency planning. *B-GL-323-004/FP-003*

### Operational Approach

**Shape-Clear-Hold-Build model**

- Plan the COIN campaign.
- Implement and execute the campaign plan.
- Balance the campaign across Full-Spectrum Operations.
- Destruction of Insurgents.
- Build a secure future. *B-GL-323-004/FP-003*

### Observations

Canadian COIN doctrine is primarily Land Doctrine. It is currently under revision.
## NATIONAL FACTORS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
### FRANCE (FRA)

### Definition for insurgency

The actions of an organized, often ideologically motivated, group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent political change of a governing authority within a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion. *(AJP-3.4.4)*

### Definition for COIN

The set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities with the aim to defeat insurgency and address any core grievances. *(AJP-3.4.4)*

### Fundamentals for a COIN Operation

- Necessity in counter insurgency for a political project as a viable alternative;
- Necessity for a self-appropriation by the host Nation of the political project, its authorities and the local population;
- Necessity to integrate the multidimensionality of COIN in a comprehensive approach;
- Necessity to understand the context to guide the action;
- Necessity to develop an influence strategy.

### Principles of COIN Action

- All levels of the Force should adapt to the local context;
- The Force should reinforce its credibility in every fields by making an appropriate use of the full range of military capabilities at its disposal and by systematically exploiting positive asymmetries;
- The Force should take and preserve the initiative; by imposing a decision making rhythm to the insurgents and master the operational pace;
- The Force should seize every opportunity by decentralizing commanding structures and by promoting subsidiary; the force should seek the continuity of actions undertaken (avoid the methods being changed every time military commanders turn over);
- The Force should act as soon as possible in support of local forces;
- The Force should plan and conduct a combined and agile operative maneuver at theatre level;
- The Force should exploit the weaknesses of insurgents, rally the neutrals to the process and people that are less hostile; it should also marginalize and neutralize the irreconcilables;
- The Force should take the population into account: preserve it from insurgents influence and most particularly, protect the figures that have a positive influence;
- The force should seek the synergy between civilian and the military;
- The Force should maintain violence at its lowest level by respecting the principle of sufficiency when actions are undertaken and anticipate on...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Factors for Counterinsurgency Operations</th>
<th>France (FRA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Undesired effects; know, understand and get a grasp of the local context.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Adapt to the local context.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Take the population into account (protect it) and the local authorities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reinforce the credibility of the force in every field.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Make use, in an appropriate manner, of the full range of military capacities at disposal.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Adopt the principle of proportionality in the force actions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Marginalize and neutralize the irreconcilable.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Make the most of the state of grace.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Anticipate and adapt on the long term.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop the synergy between civilian and military actions (“control” military actions and coordinate civilian actions).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Be modest and, if possible, discreet.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Operational Approach**

**SHAPE - CLEAR - HOLD - BUILD**

(These are simultaneous actions and not sequenced phases)

**Observations**

These elements are to be confirmed as the French national doctrine on COIN is in the process of being approved.
| Definition for insurgency | An insurgency is a process, based on political, economic and/or social deplorable conditions which lead to destabilization of a country or region and influences the governmental power and legitimacy. This process is influenced by irregular activities of insurgents. An insurgent is an individual which performs or supports irregular activities within an insurgency. Insurgents used to be organized in groups or are affiliated to a movement. Their motivation may be different but their common goal is maintaining or widening the instable condition. **DEU Basics for COIN (Draft)** |
| Definition for COIN | No literal translation of “COIN”. DEU understanding of COIN: Establishment of security and governmental order in crisis areas. This encompasses the full spectrum of political, economical, social, legal, executive and psychological measures which taken in order to eliminate the root causes of an insurgency. Those measures are carried out by all civil and military actors. |
| Fundamentals for a COIN Operation | Establishment of security and governmental order in crisis areas is a comprehensive and long lasting approach aimed to gain the support of the population in order to strengthen or establish the legitimacy of the government or governmental functions. Therefore, it is necessary to understand and analyze background and root causes of the insurgency |
| Principles of COIN Action | • Comprehensive approach necessary.  
• Population must be the focus of all efforts.  
• Multinational support helpful, but transfer of authority as soon as possible to local government.  
• Support and establishment of governmental structures as soon as possible. |
| Operational Approach | • Military action in accordance with all actors (comprehensive approach, multinational coordination, coordination with local actors in the field of security)  
• Key to success is support of local population and their perception of the security situation.  
• This requires presence in the area of operations in order to maintain contact to the local population.  
**SHAPE)-CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD**-model:  
**Reduce the threat**: Offensive action in order to reduce the threat, support own freedom of action and gain or re-establish the initiative. (=CLEAR)  
**Establish a secure environment**: Establishment of public order in cooperation with local security forces, aimed at the population to foster confidence. (=HOLD)  
**Consolidate a secure environment**: Integrate, train and equip local security forces in order to transfer the authority of security operations to them. (=BUILD)  
**Preparatory and supporting measures**: Intel, Info Ops, CIMIC (=SHAPE) |
| Observations | German understanding of COIN is focused on the comprehensive dimension of security and the underlying strategy. The military is only one actor within this concept. |
### NATIONAL FACTORS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

#### ITALY (ITA)

| **Definition for insurgency** | *The actions of an organized, often ideologically motivated, group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent political change of a governing authority within a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion.*  
*(AJP-3.4.4)* |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| **Definition for COIN**     | *The set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities with the aim to defeat insurgency and address any core grievances.*  
*(AJP-3.4.4)* |
| **Fundamentals for a COIN Operation** | The strategic goal of the counterinsurgent is to promote the local authorities’ legitimate governance by controlling violence and enforcing the rule of law. As such, a comprehensive approach needs to be applied to coordinate all instruments of national power, including diplomatic, information and economic aspects and, when required, the military effort, in order to create the conditions for neutralize the insurgents’ authority and support. |
| **Principles of COIN Action** | • Understand/pursue the political end-state.  
• Legitimacy and credibility.  
• Comprehensive approach.  
• Unity of effort.  
• Rule of Law.  
• Intelligence.  
• Separation of the insurgents from their material and morale support.  
• Understand the key aspects of local culture and language.  
Protect the population. |
| **Operational Approach** | Shape, Clear, Hold and Build (SCHB) is the approach to prepare, plan and execute operations. Depends on the operational environment, these activities can be potentially conducted simultaneously.  
The SCHB concept should be attenuated by emphasizing the non-kinetic effects, i.e. create socio-economical development for the population. |
| **Observations** | The SCHB approach is not present in the Italian Doctrine, therefore the framework could be used is:  
• Understand  
• shape (create the conditions)  
• engage (by kinetic and not-kinetic actions)  
• hold  
• transition |
# NATIONAL FACTORS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
## UNITED KINGDOM (GBR)

| Definition for insurgency | 1. An organized, violent subversion used to effect or prevent political control, as a challenge to established authority. ([Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40, Security and Stabilization: The Military Contribution](#)).  
2. The actions of an organized, often ideologically motivated, group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent political change of a governing authority within a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion. ([AJP-3.4.4](#)). |
| --- | --- |
| Definition for COIN | 1. Those military, law enforcement, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat or contain insurgency while addressing root causes. ([JDP 3-40](#)).  
2. The set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities with the aim to defeat insurgency and address any core grievances ([AJP-3.4.4](#)). |
| Fundamentals for a COIN Operation | **Human Security.** COIN campaigns have failed where basic human security is not paramount.  
**Intelligence and the Rule of Law.** Operations to arrest and prosecute insurgents must be intelligence led. Loyal, trustworthy and professional police forces are key to upholding the rule of law.  
**Political Control.** Population control measure, such as ID cards and check points, are effective in helping to isolate the insurgent from the population.  
**Political Process.** The population needs to be encouraged to enter the political process. ([AFM Vol 1 Part 10](#)). |
| Principles of COIN Action | Primacy of Political Purpose.  
Understand the Context.  
Focus on the population.  
Foster Host-Nation Governance, Authority and Indigenous Capacity  
Unity of Effort.  
Isolate and Neutralize Irregular Actors.  
Exploit Credibility to Gain Support.  
Prepare for the Long Term – Perseverance and Sustainability.  
Anticipate, Learn and Adapt. |
| Operational Approach | SHAPE – SECURE – HOLD - DEVELOP  
Builds on proven COIN theories and enables closer conceptional linkage to governance and development of capacity. ([JDP 3-40](#)). |
| Observations | |
### Definition for insurgency

The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. *(JP 1-02)*

### Definition for COIN

Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. *(JP 1-02.)*

### Fundamentals for a COIN Operation

COIN is primarily political and incorporates a wide range of activities, of which security is only one. Unified action is required to successfully conduct COIN operations and should include all host nation (HN), US, and multinational agencies or actors. Civilian agencies should lead COIN efforts. When operational conditions do not permit a civilian agency to lead COIN within a specific area, the joint force commander (JFC) must be cognizant of the unified action required for effective COIN. The military contribution to countering insurgency, while vital, is not as important as political efforts for long-term success. Military efforts are especially important initially to gain security. The national strategy, military strategy, and theater strategy play key roles in determining COIN strategic context.

There are 3 possible general strategic settings for US involvement in COIN: assisting a functioning government as part of FID, as an adjunct to US major combat operations, or US operations in an ungoverned area. The potential global and regional scope of contemporary insurgency has added to the complexity and therefore the challenge of conducting COIN. This challenge requires a global or regional COIN strategic approach for success. A strategy of disaggregation includes the following activities: containment, isolation, disruption, and resolution of core grievances, and neutralization in detail.

### Principles of COIN Action

The principles of COIN are derived from the historical record and recent experience. These principles do not replace the principles of joint operations, but rather provide focus on how to successfully conduct COIN.

**Counterinsurgents Must Understand the OE.** This understanding includes the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, and other aspects of the OE. Counterinsurgents must pay special attention to society, culture, and insurgent advantages within the OE.

**Legitimacy Is the Main Objective.** The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government. Counterinsurgents achieve this objective by undertaking appropriate actions and striving for a balanced application of both military and nonmilitary means as dictated by the situation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principles of COIN Action (cont)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unity of Effort is Essential.</strong> Unity of effort must be present at every echelon of a COIN operation. Otherwise, well-intentioned but uncoordinated actions can cancel each other or provide vulnerabilities for insurgents to exploit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Factors are Primary.</strong> At the beginning of a COIN operation, military actions may appear predominant as security forces conduct operations to secure the populace and kill or capture insurgents. However, political objectives must guide the military’s approach. Commanders must consider how operations contribute to strengthening the HN government’s legitimacy and achieving US goals—the latter is especially important if there is no HN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intelligence Drives Operations.</strong> Effective COIN is shaped by timely, specific, and reliable intelligence, gathered and analyzed at all levels and disseminated throughout the force. Reporting by units, members of the country team, and information derived from interactions with civilian agencies is often of equal or greater importance than reporting by specialized intelligence assets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Insurgents Must be Isolated from Their Cause and Support.</strong> While it may be required to kill or capture insurgents, it is more effective in the long run to separate an insurgency from the population and its resources, thus letting it die. Confrontational military action, in exclusion is counterproductive in most cases; it risks generating popular resentment, creating martyrs that motivate new recruits, and producing cycles of revenge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Under the Rule of Law is Essential.</strong> To establish legitimacy, commanders transition security activities from military operations to law enforcement as quickly as feasible. When insurgents are seen as criminals, they often lose public support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counterinsurgents Should Prepare for a Long-Term Commitment.</strong> Insurgencies are protracted by nature, and history demonstrates that they often last for years or even decades. Thus, COIN normally demands considerable expenditures of time and resources, especially if they must be conducted simultaneously with conventional operations in a protracted war combining traditional and IW.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Manage Information and Expectations.** To limit discontent and build support, the HN government and any counterinsurgents assisting it create and maintain a realistic set of expectations among the populace, friendly military forces, and the international community. Information operations (IO), particularly PSYOP and the related activities of public affairs (PA) and...
## NATIONAL FACTORS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principles of COIN Action (cont)</th>
<th>Empower the Lowest Levels. Successful COIN is normally conducted with decentralized execution based upon centralized vision and orders that include clear and concise rules for the use of force and rules of engagement.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support the Host Nation (HN). US forces committed to supporting COIN are there to assist a HN government. The long-term goal is to leave a government able to stand by itself, which is also normally the goal even if the US begins COIN in an area that does not have a HN government. US forces and agencies can help, but HN elements must accept responsibilities to achieve real victory.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There are a range of possible operational approaches to COIN. COIN should strive to move from direct to balanced and balanced to indirect. The <strong>direct approach</strong> focuses on protecting US and HN interests while attacking the insurgents. The <strong>indirect approach</strong> focuses on the actions to establish conditions (a stable and more secure environment) for others to achieve success with the help of the US. The <strong>approaches must be adapted to the demands of the local environment</strong>. Three examples are: Clear-hold-build, combined action, and limited support. COIN should strive to move from direct to balanced and balanced to indirect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>COIN Doctrine is primarily ground-centric (Army-Marine Corps). Distinct and detailed SOF, Naval, and Air Force approaches to COIN need to be incorporated in the next doctrinal updates.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

civil-military operations (CMO) are key tools to accomplish this.

**Use the Appropriate Level of Force.** Even precise and tailored force must be executed legitimately and with consideration for consequent effects. An operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of fifty more insurgents.

**Learn and Adapt.** An effective counterinsurgent force is a learning organization. Insurgents constantly shift between military and political phases and tactics. Every unit needs to be able to make observations, draw and apply lessons, and assess results.
# ANNEX D – NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF BIOMETRIC DATA

## NATIONAL UNDERSTANDING/DEFINITION

| AUS | The term ‘Biometric data’ as defined in the draft Defence Instruction is a general term used alternatively to describe a characteristic or a process.  
|     | a. As a characteristic: a measurable, unique or distinguishing biological (anatomical and physiological) and/or behavioural characteristic that can be used for automated recognition and identification.  
|     | b. As a process: automated methods of recognising an individual, based upon measurable (anatomical and physiological) and/or behavioural characteristics.  
|     | The Instruction only authorises the collection of biometric data during ADF operations outside Australia from persons who are neither Australian citizens nor permanent residents of Australia (IAW the Privacy Act 1988) and only applies to biometric data collected for purposes relating to military operations and, does not extend to law enforcement activities; is adhered to under privacy guidelines recent Directive dealing with personal information used for intelligence purposes in support of operations.  
|     | Legal Framework for the Collection of Biometric Data |
| CAN | The Canadian Forces (CF) considers biometrics data if it includes: fingerprints (live and in forensics exploitation), iris scan, facial image, voice, and DNA acquired during forensics exploitation only. Biometric collection will be governed by the following definitions;  
|     | a. Reasonable Suspicion. A reasonable suspicion is a rational inference drawn from evidence or established facts. A reasonable suspicion is more that mere suspicion, but loess that a belief based on reasonable and probable grounds (i.e. less than a reasonable belief);  
|     | b. Reasonable Belief. A reasonable belief requires a subjective honest belief (i.e. the person must personally and actually believe), based on objectively reasonable grounds (i.e. grounds that reasonable persons would consider sufficient to form the belief);  
|     | c. Collection. The process of capturing a biometric sample and related contextual data from an individual;  
|     | d. Verification (Authentication). The one-to-one process of matching a biometric subject’s biometric sample against his stored biometric file;  
|     | e. Identification (Screening). The one-to-many process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against all of the biometric reference templates on file to determine whether it matches any of the templates and, if so, the known identity of the biometric subject whose template was matched; and  
|     | f. Enrolment. The process of collecting a biometric sample from a biometric subject, converting it into a biometric reference and storing it in a database such as the shared US DoD Automated Biometric Information System database for later comparison and sharing. |
## NATIONAL UNDERSTANDING/DEFINITION

French understanding on biometric is that it is a set of techniques that allows the automatic recognition of an individual according to their physical, biological, or behavioural characteristics. Biometric data is personal in nature and allows for the identification of a particular person based upon his unique and permanent traits.

The French framework for the use of biometric is closely related to the notion of personal data. In France, the notion of personal data is clear as it is any information related to an identified physical person or one that can be, directly or indirectly, by reference to an identification number or to several elements that are proper to this person. To determine whether or not a person is identifiable, it is appropriate to consider the whole range of means to allow such identification. These means are in possession or can be accessed by the body responsible of the information treatment or any other person.

### NATIONAL RESERVATION

In France, photos, DNA samples, and genetic prints (genetic fingerprints) collections are strictly controlled by law. Such biometric data can be collected from individuals who are presumably suspected of serious law violations (all offences will not necessarily allow or call for a collection of genetic prints). If there is no conviction resulting from the person being investigated, no biometric data will be stored on any files on this particular person. The personal data of this person will be removed from all databases (those related to sexual offences, genetic data, and “general” databases of convicted people). The French independent national agency, the CNIL, is in charge of ensuring that such rules are indeed being abided.

The French military is allowed to make use of a database integrating biometric identification (whether that be for French citizens or foreigners); to collect and integrate biometrics data of French militaries within a database put in place by allied armed forces; to consult a database constituted by allied armed forces given that a decree from the “Conseil d’État” expressing the finality of the treatment of personal data has been issued. The use of biometric by the French army within the framework of a civilian operation is possible given that the finality of the use was the object of a special law regulation. In theatre: the burden of the use of biometrics would be less important than in France as populations from weak or failed host nations would not be used to any form of constitutional protection. The end would be to provide security and the means would be any measures within the line of International Human Right Law and national (French) standards (ethical, moral if not legal). In certain circumstances, the right to privacy appears less important than the right to have security. Thus in order to be fully operational on the ground French military forces would respect a range of added principles; these principles and procedures would change depending on the host nation (its cultural practices, rules, and vetoes: for instance for a traditional afghan environment) in which data are gathered. These principles would be:

- **a.** Ethic: respect for the population and their local costumes (photos would not be taken in certain circumstances if not culturally accepted).
- **b.** Respect of privacy: measures would be undertaken so as to prevent information
<table>
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<tr>
<th>NATIONAL UNDERSTANDING/DEFINITION</th>
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<td>and personal data leaks.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DEU</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Biometric data is understood as data related with one person and which allows identifying that specific person. A legal definition is included in the national federal data protection act (“personal data”). In the context with biometrics regulations and procedures of “special personal data” (racial and ethnic data, political opinion, health etc.) apply</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ITA</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Biometrics refers to methods devoted to the recognition of the identity of a person, using his physiological (a physical attribute unique to a person) or behaviour (traits which are learnt from a person). Physiological characteristics are fingerprints, iris, DNA, face, voice or retina, and could be used for controlling the access to some restricted areas (force protection), or for forensic purposes (corpse identification, criminal investigation, terrorist identification, etc.). However, being specific biometrics data linked with sensitive information about a person (such as race, gender, etc.), the legal concerns related to their collection and storage have to been taken into consideration.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>GBR</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Biometrics is a general term used alternatively to describe a characteristic or process. As a characteristic – a measurable biological (anatomical and physiological) and behavioural characteristic that can be used for automated recognition. As a process – automated methods of recognising a biometric subject based on measurable (anatomical and physiological) and behavioural characteristics.</td>
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<td><strong>USA</strong></td>
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| According to Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms:
  a. A biometric is defined as: a measurable physical characteristic or personal behavior trait used to recognize the identity or verify the claimed identity of an individual.
  b. The definition of biometrics is: the process of recognizing an individual based on measurable anatomical, physiological and behavioral characteristics.
  The Department of Defense Directive for Biometrics (DoDD 8521.01E) defines biometrics as a general term used alternatively to describe a characteristic or a process. As a characteristic: a measurable biological (anatomical and physiological) and behavioral characteristic that can be used for automated recognition. As a process: automated methods of recognizing an individual based on measurable biological (anatomical and physiological) and behavioral characteristics. |
## CURRENT ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN USING BIOMETRICS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AUS</strong></td>
<td>International Law: Depending on circumstances, elements of Australia’s international treaty obligations may apply as can the customary international law.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CAN</strong></td>
<td><em>Ad hoc</em> biometrics collection was initiated in Afghanistan in 2007 but due to the apparent lack of legal and policy framework, biometrics collection had to be halted until this aspect was rectified. Our biometrics-at-sea capability can be used on ships assigned to a counter-terrorism mandate only and cannot be used for counter-piracy.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
| **FRA** | In the case of an armed conflict, the Law on Armed Conflict (LOAC) applies. Thus any demarche is allowed short of what is forbidden by international conventions. The International Human Right Law article that would be the most appropriate to such topic is article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which holds that “everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person”. Fundamental principles within international law that would apply in the circumstances:  
  a. Individual freedom  
  b. Respect for private life  
  c. Right of image  
  d. Respect of cultures  
Concerning databases use and the notion of proportionality with regard to the information contained in this databases EU legislation is the most complete. France external operations can take place within an agreed framework determined in a SOFA (Status of Force Agreement) signed by France and the host country. This document defines the rules to be applied and followed by French officers deployed within the host country.  
In the absence of such document, the only rules that apply are that of the host country. In the case of an armed conflict, the Law on Armed Conflict (LOAC) applies. Thus any demarche is allowed, provided that it abides by the provisions of international conventions. The French law is always applicable to nationals. The treatment of personal data is understood under the terms of national law (article 2 law 1978, January the 6th) very broadly: use, collection, recording, organisation, conservation, adaptation, modification, diffusion, interlinking, deletion. |
| **DEU** | In the case of an armed conflict, the Law on Armed Conflict (LOAC) applies |
| **ITA** | Italy is a member of several organizations that influence the Country’s treatments of privacy and personal data. Consequently, together with the national legislation, all biometric data collection is conducted in accordance with the International Law, including Human Rights Law, as well as the directives and conventions issued by the European Union, as the European Council Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individual with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. Referring to the national legislation, the “Privacy Code” relating to the protection of |
## CURRENT ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN USING BIOMETRICS

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<tr>
<th>country</th>
<th>law</th>
<th>note</th>
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<tr>
<td>GBR</td>
<td>Data Protection Act.</td>
<td>In case of an armed conflict, the Law on Armed Conflict (LOAC) applies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Together with national legislation, all biometric data collection is conducted in accordance with International Law, including Human Rights Law.</td>
<td>In the case of armed conflict, the Law on Armed Conflict / Law of War apply. The most significant are the Geneva Conventions, of which the United States is a member. Department of Defense Directive 2300.01E, “DoD Law of War Program,” requires all DoD components to comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts. The Law of War is defined as: that part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. It is often called the “law of armed conflict.” The law of war encompasses all international law for the conduct of hostilities binding on the United States or its individual citizens, including treaties and international agreements to which the United States is a party, and applicable customary international law.</td>
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</table>
CURRENT NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES ON THE USE OF BIOMETRICS

In general terms, Australia has lagged behind most Northern Hemisphere countries with respect to developing and enacting policies associated with the use of and sharing biometric data. Up until a year or two ago, Australia has only paid ‘lip service’ to the issues. This, to a large extent, was a consequence of distance and a general view, false or otherwise, that distance alleviates the problem.

However, in September last year a new agreement boosting international cooperation to combat immigration fraud and strengthen border control by sharing biometric data was signed with CAN and the UK. Additionally, a data sharing plan was developed at the Five Country Conference (forum on immigration and border security) between AUS, CAN, NZ, UK and US. Nevertheless, it was stated that the protection of personal information is important to all countries involved. As far as Australia is concerned, protection of personal information is guided by the Privacy Act 1988.

The Privacy Act 1988 provides controls for:

a. The collection of personal information and limitations on collection.

b. The use and disclosure of personal information.

c. The quality and security of data collected.

d. Openness and accessibility to policies on the management of personal information.

e. Rights to access personal information and have inaccurate information corrected.

f. The rights of individuals to anonymity.

g. The transfer of personal information from Australia to someone in a foreign country, and

h. Limitations on collection of more sensitive information.

From a military perspective – while the Australian Privacy Act 1988 provides overarching guidelines for the control of biometric data, increasing involvement in coalition operations, together with cooperation with other government departments in border protection, has shown that in many cases, the use and sharing of biometric data has become a vital tool to enhance operations, both domestically and internationally. The military considers that the availability of biometric data that assists intelligence staff to associate an individual with a particular event, such as an IED attack on an ADF force element, is fundamentally important to enhance force protection measures and to counter direct threats to ADF force elements.

Consequently, a recent Defence Instruction relating to the collection and sharing of biometric data for intelligence purposes is being developed and will shortly be released.

Australian Laws: Some Commonwealth laws apply extra-territorially and are therefore relevant to data collection on ADF operations outside Australia. For example: ADF members remain subject to the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982. Defence employees may be subject to the Crimes (Overseas) Act 1964 and parts of the Criminal Code Act 1995 may also apply.

Host Nation Law: Where ADF operations are conducted with the consent of a host
### CURRENT NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES ON THE USE OF BIOMETRICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Policies and Practices</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CAN</strong></td>
<td>Biometrics falls under the auspices of Measures and Signature Intelligence (MASINT). Currently, the Strategic Joint Staff is the departmental lead to formulate the requirements for the systematic development of an enduring biometrics capability for the future. The CF is also attempting to improve Biometrics Enable Intelligence (BEI) awareness and training. Presently, the CF utilizes the US’s ABIS (Automated Biometrics Identification System), the HIIDE (Hand-held Interagency Identity Detection Equipment) and the CrossMatch SEEK (Secure Electronic Enrolment Kit). Canada is currently working with partner agencies, such as National Intelligence Ground Centre (NIGC), Biometrics Identity Management Agency (BIMA), and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA/DTK). Canada (the CF) can only share biometrics data with the US. First generation biometrics collection platforms have some data marking problems and a work-around (short term and long term solutions were proposed and are being implemented, including modification of the current standards (Electronic Biometrics Transmission Specifications) to include additional field/sub-fields to add the Canadian Caveat and mandated markings).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FRA</strong></td>
<td>The French White Paper on Security and Defence as well as the document presenting future strategic trends for the French Ministry of Defence presents biometric as a technology to be developed in order to facilitate work on the ground. It is an emergent topic and there is a will, at national level, to invest resources in various research programs to develop the techniques and means of security. These various research programs are essentially focused on security missions and aim at developing smart video watch in order to detect in a group of people behavioural anomalies and suspicious movements.</td>
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</table>
| **DEU** | For the German armed forces the following policies apply:  
  a. MoD Directive for the use of personal data  
  b. Bilateral Security arrangements for transfer of personal data  
Basic principle is, that “special personal data” can only be collected with consent. |
| **ITA** | In accordance with what aforementioned, biometric data can be shared within the coalition, also with not-EU Countries, on a case by case basis and, anyhow, in accordance with the International Laws (particularly the Human’s Rights Law), the national legislation and with specific Memorandum of Understanding / Technical Agreements.  
For Force Protection purposes, when established by agreements with the Host Nation, the Italian legislation is applicable within the Italian compound, and therefore, to the Italian personnel (military and civilian) deployed. Said that, and as clarified in some directives issued by the Authority, the admittance in some restricted areas, can be
<table>
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<tr>
<th>CURRENT NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES ON THE USE OF BIOMETRICS</th>
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<td>allowed based on biometric fingerprint recognition.</td>
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<tr>
<td>With regards to the locals, also the ones who are employed within the compound, they are subject to the Host Nation legislation. However, if specific directives are not established, in order to identify the employees, the collection and employment of biometric data (as the ones derived from digitally recorded fingerprints) is allowed in a consensual manner only.</td>
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<td>GBR</td>
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<td>USA</td>
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### BEST PRACTICES

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUS</td>
<td>MOU developed between AUS, CAN, UK, USA and NLD in 2009 to address the procedures by which the participants may collect and share biometric data for operational purposes. However, participants were still required to abide by their respective national laws.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>MOU developed between AUS, CAN, UK, USA and NLD in 2009 to address the procedures by which the participants may collect and share biometric data for operational purposes. However, participants were still required to abide by their respective national laws. Canada is further establishing a strategic level series of principles with US DoD to inform a comprehensive understanding of bi-lateral sharing of biometric data. Two current operations are Op ATHENA, which is the Canadian contribution in Afghanistan and Op MOBILE, which includes a naval deployment off the coast of Libya. Canada is also currently part of two different working groups currently deal with biometrics. The NATO MASINT Working Group (MWG) has been tasked to draft the first version of the NATO STANAG required for biometrics collection, storage and sharing, while the other WG is called the SHAPE Biometrics Panel that will deal more with the operational aspect of biometrics collection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>Nil comment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEU</td>
<td>Operational experiences with ISAF show, that the use of biometrics proofed to be useful especially for access control, force protection and to identify suspects of criminal activities against ISAF, the afghan authorities and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. German soldiers responsible for the collection of biometric data were trained with regard to the specific equipment and with a view to the adherence of the legal restrictions which apply for that task.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITA</td>
<td>Nil comment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBR</td>
<td>MOU developed between AUS, CAN, UK, USA and NLD in 2009 to address the procedures by which the participants may collect and share biometric data for operational purposes. However, participants were still required to abide by their respective national laws.</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>MOU developed between AUS, CAN, UK, USA and NLD in 2009 to address the procedures by which the participants may collect and share biometric data for operational purposes. However, participants were still required to abide by their respective national laws.</td>
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<td>Country</td>
<td>Statement</td>
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| **AUS** | When biometric data that constitutes personal information is collected, the person should be made aware of the following, unless to do so would defeat the purpose of collecting the data:  
   a. The purpose for which the information is being collected.  
   b. The collection of information is being undertaken under the authority derived from the relevant multi-national agreements, arrangements, Security Council resolutions etc.  
   The information may be shared with coalition forces and the host nation as applicable. |
| **CAN** | CAN have been fortunate enough until now to be able to “lean” on the US IM/IT infrastructure but Canadian Forces will require similar capability to deploy and employ a biometrics collection capability anywhere in the world in the future. In Afghanistan, the US infrastructure is used to upload Canadian collection onto the ABIS database. As mandated by legal and policy directives, a caveat had to be in place on all Canadian collection of biometrics data including forensics exploitation of fingerprints that stated: “Canadian inputted biometric data is to be used in a manner consistent with the ISAF mandate and may be shared for purposes of furthering the ISAF mandate. Any nation that wishes to use or share Canadian inputted data for a different purpose must first obtain the permission of Canadian authorities”. This caveat is inserted in all biometrics records collected by Canada and uploaded into the ABIS. There is an on-going development of a biometrics-at-sea capability that will be used on ships assigned to a counter-terrorism mandate only and cannot be used for counter-piracy. This includes the Boarding Operations Support System (BOSS) Mk III System which contains a single-board computer, GPS receiver, passport reader, fingerprint scanner, iris scanner (external attachment), Wireless Wi-Fi camera and radio (microwave). It has a server not only to hold all the data but also to perform the searches and the biometrics collected data comparison. The server will contain face recognition software produced by Defence Research and Development Canada in Ottawa. Collected biometrics data will be compared for matches using the Biometrics Enable Watch List (BEWL) as a first-line or real-time comparison before the data is forwarded on for uploading onto the ABIS. The watch list contains over 34,000 records. The CDS directive to use this capability was initially drafted and provided to the Judge Advocate General but at last check, still had not been blessed by the legal advisors. Acquisition of the necessary capability (software, scanner, etc.) has been completed allowing the several hundred fingerprint cards (cardboard files) of former and current detainees to be digitized and converted to the necessary standard so all these records and any other legacy data uploaded on the ABIS. All SOF biometrics collection is also uploaded to the ABIS. |
| **FRA** | Exchange of personal data: The French law accepts the transfer of personal information databases out of the European union (to NATO allies) if the receiving country can ensure the same standards of protection for private life and respect of |
MIC NATIONS’ CAVEATS AND CONSTRAINTS IN COLLECTING, USING AND SHARING BIOMETRIC INFORMATION (I.E., DATA BASES) DURING OPERATIONS AND IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS (PIRACY).

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<thead>
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<th>Country</th>
<th>Details</th>
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| DEU | The use of biometrics in operations must conform to the following legal frameworks:  
  b. Law of armed conflict.  
  c. German constitutional law.  
  d. National legislation on the use of personal data (e.g. Data Protection Act)  
  e. Parliamentary Mandate for the deployment of German armed forces for the respective operation.  
  Other governmental directives on the collection and use of biometric data.  
  Germany participates fully in the “ISAF Biometrics Plan”. In order to ensure conformance with national legislation and regulations, the German Armed Forces signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the US Department of Defence. This MoU details procedures of storage and use of biometric data collected with ISAF.  
  Biometric data can only be collected or used for the purposes of ISAF. Any other use (e.g. for national prosecution purposes) is forbidden. |
| ITA | The collecting and sharing of biometric information occur within the framework previously mentioned. |
| GBR | UK policy is classified. |
| USA | The United States has few caveats and constraints when collecting, using and sharing unclassified biometric information during operations and in international waters, as long as the biometrics DO NOT belong to a U.S. person. The Deputy Secretary of Defense Memo titled, “Sharing of Biometric Data and Associated Information from Non-U.S. Persons with Coalition Forces and Allies,” signed January 10, 2007, allows the Department of Defense and services to share biometric data. The inclusion of NATO in the Afghanistan coalition allows the sharing of biometric data and associated information with NATO members. NSPD-59 / HSPD-24 included directions for the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the DNI, to coordinate the sharing of biometric and associated biographic and contextual information with foreign partners in accordance with applicable law, including international obligations undertaken by the United States. |
# ANNEX E – NATIONAL POSITIONS: PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AUS</strong></td>
<td>The terms Private Military Firms (PMF)/Private Security Companies (PSC) do not have a legal definition in Australia (AUS). AUS is a strong supporter of the <em>Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict</em> (the Montreux Document) which clarifies existing international legal obligations relevant to States, Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) and their personnel during armed conflict and suggests good practices to assist States fulfil their obligations. AUS is content to use the term ‘PMSCs’ and the definition in the Preface at sub-para 9(a) for the purpose of developing both national and any coalition policy and doctrine. PMSCs are ‘private business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves. Military and security services include, in particular, armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CAN</strong></td>
<td>Canada does not use the term PMF/PSC. There is currently no approved Canadian policy on the use of private military contractors for security operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FRA</strong></td>
<td>The term Private Military Firms does not cover any legal notion in France. The definition for Private Military Companies can be used for the purpose of research and can be formulated as: ‘Private Military Firms are private businesses that provide services in the defence and security arena, for private or public contracting parties. They provide a military know-how. The activities or military missions that are executed by these actors can cover support to peace or post-conflict operations, military logistic training and military advice.’ However, this definition does not address the manner in which French authorities refer to PMF. What is often referred to in France is “Société d’appui stratégique et operational” (SASO): translated as a Company providing strategic and operational support.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **DEU** | Germany does no use any of the terms PMF/PSC in the context of operations of the armed forces, since the contracted service are all of a civil nature. Therefore, Germany refers to the respective companies as ‘contractors’. **Reference/Supporting Documents**
  a. Answers of the Federal Government to question raised by parliament
    i. 15/5824, 16/1296, 16/9190 |
**DEFINITION OF PRIVATE MILITARY FIRM (PMF)/ PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES (PSC)**

| ITA | The terms Private Military Firms (PMFs) and Private Security Companies (PSCs) are not officially defined in the Italian doctrine or in the national legislation. At international level, however, the “Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices of States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict”, agreed on 17 September 2008, and endorsed by Italy in 2009, provides a general definition of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs):

> “Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) are private business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves. Military and security services include, in particular, armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel”.

Although the document is not binding, Nations are expected to comply with the obligations set up by it. However by such definition it can be understood that; the services provided by these companies envisage the use of weapons by the employed personnel and it seems that definition does not include contractors providing logistics support.

**Reference/Supporting Documents**


| GBR | The UK uses the term **Private Military and Security Companies (PMSC)**.

  a. Categorising companies in any industry is challenging, but, in the case of PM/SCs it is exacerbated by the range of services the companies sell, the range of environments they work in and the vastly different customers they support. For the purposes of UK government policy, it has been agreed\(^{66}\) that the term PM/SC should apply to the full range of companies involved in the supply of all types of security, defence and military services, including the provision of support and training to commercial and NGO or public sector interests. It applies to these companies wherever they are registered or based, and to their subcontractors for contact both in the UK and overseas. It does not apply to:

  b. Defence industry contractors, if:

      i. Their activity is regulated through existing export controls;

      ii. An export licence has been issued; and

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DEFINITION OF PRIVATE MILITARY FIRM (PMF)/ PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES (PSC)

iii. The commercial proposals are wholly within the terms of that licence.
   a. Unarmed contractors providing logistic support to operations and covered by the Ministry of Defence (MoD)’s Contractors on Deployed Operations (CONDO) instruction.
   b. Private security companies that operate solely in the UK domestic market where their activity is regulated by the Security Industry Authority.
   c. The UK defines three main categories within the industry which can be described as:
      i. Risk Consultancy. Predominantly concerned with minimising the operational risk to clients operating overseas.
      ii. Armed Defensive Services. This category includes PM/SCs who provide armed defensive security services.
      iii. Armed Offensive Services. At the ‘harder’ end of the range, this category includes those companies prepared to take on contracts which could have an impact on the security and political environment of the state through violent force. Potentially deployed as force multipliers, PM/SC personnel conducting offensive operations could be considered mercenaries.

Reference/Supporting Documents
   b. Defence Instruction and Notices 2008DIN03-012 Contact with Private Military and Security Companies (PM/SCs)

USA

The terms ‘Private Military Firm’ and ‘Private Security Contractor’ are not formally recognized. The generally recognized term is “Private Security Companies.”

   a. In US Statutes, the term is Contractors Performing Private Security Functions. The statutory guidance is very specific on duties and responsibilities for the contractors and the military commands seeking to employ them.
   b. The Department of Defense defines Private Security Contractors (PSC) as ‘a company employed by the Department of Defense, performing private security functions under a covered contract. In a designated area of combat operations, the term ‘PSC’ expands to include all companies employed by U.S.G. agencies performing private security functions under a covered contract. Contractors performing private security functions are not authorized to perform inherently
### DEFINITION OF PRIVATE MILITARY FIRM (PMF)/ PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES (PSC)

*governmental functions. In this regard, they are limited to a defensive response to hostile acts or demonstrated hostile intent.* DOD guidance is very specific when it comes to contractor duties and responsibilities for the qualifications, training and utilization of contractor personnel and the duties and responsibilities of the military commands seeking to employ them.

In common parlance, the term “Private Security Contractors” is used to specifically differentiate armed from unarmed contractors but this is not an officially recognized term.

**Reference/Supporting Documents**

- b. DoD Instruction 3020.50, “Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations”
### NATIONAL POSITION ON PMF/PSC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AUS</strong></td>
<td>The Australian Defence Forces’ (ADF) utilisation of PMSCs relates to ‘security’ rather than ‘military’ services. Any proposal to use a PMSC would be considered on a case by case basis. PMSCs have made a valuable contribution to the delivery of AUS objectives both within AUS and in offshore area of operations, relieving ADF personnel to perform higher priority security tasks. AS will only engage contractors (including PMSCs) to carry out activities where the legal and operational risk is such that an ADF Commander is able to effectively fulfil AUS’ international and domestic legal obligations. Where a security service can be outsourced, AUS will use all means appropriate (contractual, legislative and/or policy) to supervise the PMSC’s conduct so as to ensure that AUS complies with its international and domestic legal obligations with respect to that State function. Where PMSCs are authorised to bear arms and use force in the execution of their duties, it would only be for a lawful purpose such as self-defence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CAN</strong></td>
<td>There is currently no approved Canadian policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FRA</strong></td>
<td>The prerogatives of state sovereignty (such as defence, justice, and foreign affairs and policing) cannot be outsourced or delegated to private actors. In this context, the national position on PMF was defined in 2003. The Ministry of Defence initiated several studies in order to assess this sector level of development, and to develop parameters in which these companies can operate, to include a legal framework regulating their conduct. Although, France has identified a number of areas in which it could make use of PMF there are several imperatives principles that France wants to respect. These imperatives are:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Respect the state monopoly of the use of legitimate force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>No direct participation to hostilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>Preserve the specific role of the military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>No outsourcing or subcontracting of an activity which military or political stakes would out weight the economic gains from such externalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEU</strong></td>
<td>Contractors can be used for non-governmental key tasks. Governmental executive tasks which require coercive measure cannot be contracted. Due to the fact, that there is no definition of governmental (and military) key tasks, each contract will be negotiated on a case by case basis. Current contracts are limited to logistic services (including guard</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reference/Supporting Documents**

- a. Australian Defence Force Publication 4.2.1 *Citizens in Support of ADF Operations* (currently under revision to incorporate PMSCs) (ADFP 4.2.1)
- b. Defence Instruction (General) Operations 5-3 *Citizens in Support of ADF Operations* (currently under revision to incorporate PMSCs) (DI(G) Ops 5-3)
## NATIONAL POSITION ON PMF/PSC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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</table>
| **ITA** | In accordance with the current Italian legal framework, military activities, including logistics support, are considered to be exclusive State duties, therefore it doesn’t provide for outsourcing or delegation to private actor.  
**Reference/Supporting Documents**  
a. Italian Constitution; National law of November 14\(^{th}\), n. 331 concerning the establishment of the professional military service |
| **GBR** | The UK is prepared to contract with PMSCs, with each proposal considered on a case-by-case basis.  
**a.** The UK does **not** contract for **Armed Offensive Services** or with companies that sell, or have previously sold, these services.  
**b.** As with any other company, PM/SCs are entitled to conduct their business within the law, and given the contribution they have made to the delivery of UK objectives, are increasingly considered an effective partner. |
| **USA** | The US is prepared to contract with Private Security Companies for the provision of “security” services. Very specific guidance on contract requirements, contract supervision and standards governing contractor qualifications and conduct, including adherence to the Rules for the Use of Force, are required by law to be written into the contract.  
**Reference/Supporting Documents**  
b. DoD Instruction 3020.50, Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations |
### THE NATIONAL SELECTION CRITERIA FOR PMF/PSC

Selection of a security service follows a robust ADF decision methodology, set out in doctrine, which requires an appraisal of alternative viable source options (including use of the ADF) and a risk assessment for each. If the decision methodology indicates that use of PMSCs as a source is a viable option (including that its use would be consistent with AUS international and domestic legal obligations), the decision on whether to use a PMSC is ultimately determined by an analysis of each viable source solution. Initial factors considered in the risk assessment process for a source include:

- **Functionality.** Is the support capability technically able to perform the required task?
- **Capacity.** Is there enough of the support capability to perform the required task?
- **Utility.** Can the support capability be used to perform more than one required task?
- **Availability of support in the area of operations.** Can the support capability be moved to where it is required in time?
- **Sustainability.** Can the support capability remain in the area of operations for the requisite period of time?
- **Acceptability.** Consideration of strategic issues that may affect the Government’s acceptance of the proposed solution, include such things as constraints imposed by international and domestic legal obligations, immunities and privileges under any relevant Status of Forces Agreements/Arrangements (SOFA), potential for claims against AUS, security clearances, professional standards, health requirements, and public interest issue etc.
- **Harm.** The level of individual personal threat potentially faced by personnel to provide the support capability.
- **Value for Money.** Does using a PMSC provide value for money in comparison to other sources?

A variety of national regulatory regimes are relevant to actually engaging a PMSC. Some of these are imposed by domestic criminal law, financial management and occupational health and safety. Other internal Defence policy requirements are set out in financial instructions, purchasing guidelines, security manuals and doctrine on the use of civilian support to ADF operations. AUS will also take into consideration the selection criteria good practices in the Montreux Document. In addition, Australia considers whether a PMSC is a member of an association with membership requirements (eg a comprehensive membership criteria and charter) that are consistent with AUS’ international obligations.

**Reference/Supporting Documents**

## THE NATIONAL SELECTION CRITERIA FOR PMF/PSC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CAN</strong></td>
<td>There is currently no approved Canadian policy on the use of private military contractors for security operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FRA</strong></td>
<td>The selection criteria would only concern the hiring of private firms for support and logistic activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEU</strong></td>
<td>The legally defined national and European selection criteria are employed. Due to its complex nature, no details are provided here. The contracting agency for the armed forces is the ‘Federal Office of Defense Technology and Procurement”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ITA</strong></td>
<td>There are not specific national laws on the subject matter. As consequence: any assessment on possible relationships with PMFs/PSCs; selection, control and accreditation criteria; and/or the terms of their employment; are unavoidably postponed to future laws regulating this matter. In Italy there are not dedicated bodies responsible to regulate such PMFs/PSCs, neither official norm provide a specific regulation for PMFs/PSCs. However, the Italian agreement to the Montreux Document, which considers the use of private contractors as an undeniable aspect of modern warfare, underlines the national awareness that the phenomenon of PMFs is a significant presence, which is likely to increase. Accordingly, any possible coordination with such companies, when hired by a third State, would be analysed and taken into account on a case-by-case basis. That said, the services provided as well as the relationship between the PMFs and the beneficiary of its activities. In developing this assessment, it has to be taken into account what already mentioned, i.e. that imperatives principles have to be complied with:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. The activities carried out by these companies have to grant the compliance with International Humanitarian and Human Rights Laws;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. The “use of legitimate force” concept can be applied to Armed Forces only, therefore these companies cannot be involved in any military activities;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Their Rules of Engagement/Code of Conduct have to be clearly defined;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. Their own role, which have to been agreed by the Host Nation or, in specific circumstances, by the Lead Nation within the Coalition, have to be clearly defined;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e. They have to grant that their employers are clearly identifiable through the use of uniforms and/or badges, in order to avoid the “blue fire”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## THE NATIONAL SELECTION CRITERIA FOR PMF/PSC

When considering contracting out any task, it is important that a full appraisal is undertaken; including a VFM assessment. This must include a risk assessment, an appraisal of alternative options (which must include using UK Armed Forces capability), and a clear statement of the penalties and risks of each solution. When considering proposals to contract with a PM/SC, there are a number of additional criteria that must be examined:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. <strong>Legal Status.</strong></td>
<td>What is the legal status of the contractor and its staff within the country in which they will be operating?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. <strong>Accountability.</strong></td>
<td>Are there sufficient legal and administrative checks in place to ensure accountability?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. <strong>Command and Control (C2).</strong></td>
<td>PM/SCs deployed on operations in support of a military force must have a clear line of responsibility to the Commander in Theatre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. <strong>Rules of Engagement.</strong></td>
<td>Where contractors are to be employed in an armed role, Rules of Engagements (ROE) must be agreed with the contractor and clearly stated in the contract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. <strong>Operational Situation.</strong></td>
<td>Local security conditions must be taken into account when developing contract parameters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. <strong>Wider Issues.</strong></td>
<td>Are there any reputational, security co-operation, political or presentational issues that would prohibit the contracting out of the task?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. <strong>Capacity and Capability.</strong></td>
<td>Could contracting out the task have a longer term impact on the ability to generate internal capability in the numbers required?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. <strong>Benefit Realisation.</strong></td>
<td>Identify those benefits that would not be realised if the task is undertaken by the private sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. <strong>Recruitment and Retention.</strong></td>
<td>Could contracting out a task encourage a buoyant market for which serving MoD personnel could be recruited?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. <strong>Security and Vetting.</strong></td>
<td>Have all the security considerations been considered?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. <strong>Contract Development, Transparency and Scrutiny.</strong></td>
<td>As with any other contract, consideration needs to be given to monitoring contract delivery. This is of particular importance when contracting for a task previously undertaken by the UK armed forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. <strong>Pre-deployment Training.</strong></td>
<td>Consideration needs to be given to the standards of pre-deployment training package, covering such subjects as, International Humanitarian Law, cultural and situation awareness, their right to use force in self-defence and local legislation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m. <strong>Life Support.</strong></td>
<td>When employed on contracts overseas, consideration needs to be given to the life support arrangements of contract personnel. These would include CASEVAC arrangements, Quick Reaction Force (QRF) responsibilities, medical and dental, insurance, training (including safety and security) and discipline. The principles set out of CONDO policy (JSP 567) applies.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### THE NATIONAL SELECTION CRITERIA FOR PMF/PSC

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>There are no nationality restrictions on the employment of Private Security Contractors. Various national statutes as implemented in US Government acquisition regulations specify the requirements that contractors must meet before they can be awarded a contract and they must maintain in order to keep the contract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Reference/Supporting Documents</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. DoD Instruction 3020.50, <em>Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations</em></td>
</tr>
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</table>

### NATIONAL LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS OF EMPLOYING PMF/PSC?

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUS</td>
<td>Exercising due diligence and ensuring that the contracted security services are performed as required by the contract, that breaches of the contract are identified and that appropriate action is taken immediately to address a breach of any fundamental term of the contract (e.g., particularly those relating to prohibited conduct). Continuing to monitor the legal status of PMSCs in the host country. This includes their privileges and immunities under any applicable SOFA, the application of any UN Mandate and the extent to which they remain subject to the host country’s and Australia’s domestic laws. In particular whether domestic laws:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. Imposes further restrictions on the carriage of and type of weapon (if required) a PMSC employee may carry (to be IAW international law);</td>
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<td></td>
<td>b. Further constrains them in the use of force such as the right to self defence for PMSC carrying weapons and the right to use force to prevent serious crime; or</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>c. Imposes further accreditation requirements.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In addition, AS would be mindful of any potential gaps in AS’s ability to exercise criminal jurisdiction over PMSC personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>There is currently no approved Canadian policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>Consideration for the use of PMF for a mission that does not necessitate the use of force. The logistical support of any current external operation by PMF does not represent any major difficulty and can be easily conducted. Logistic missions include the activities that support the needs of national armed forces, at a given time and place, in adequate quantity and quality:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. The necessary sustainment in terms of food, and combat support;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>b. Provide proper means to ensure health and medical support to the national forces;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. The maintenance of equipment. (PIA 04.201 Doctrine du soutien interarmées en opération).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Consideration for a use of PMF with a use of force limited to the strict principle of self defence of persons and equipments, in the sense of French law, within a national or multinational force. For instance, the securing of military bases or the surveillance of installations can be the object of an analysis for externalisation. The French *Marine nationale* already relies on PMF when disembarking in some areas. However, French national forces should be capable of preserving their autonomy. This type of reliance on PMF services necessitates specific coordination and measures of control at various levels of the State.

In a theatre, as a rule, France does not allow any participation in combat operations of contracted firms. This direct participation to combat can be defined as the accomplishment of specific and concrete actions in relation to the conduct of military operations between the parties to an armed conflict.

The status of PMF employees is subjected to the International Humanitarian Law whether it be in a context of international armed conflict or non international armed conflict. In French law, private businesses are responsible for any act executed in their name by their organisations or their representatives. They have to respect French law as well as that of the country they operate in, especially with respect to the carrying and use of weapons and common criminal law.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEU</th>
<th>See answer to question 2.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ITA</td>
<td>In addition to what previously said, the approach is to tolerate those companies which provide logistical support in post-conflict situations, and which perform their duties within the Host Nation legal framework as well as the International and the Human Rights Laws (through dedicated TAs), as highlighted into the Montreux Document.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBR</td>
<td><strong>Legal Status.</strong> Consideration of employment of PMF/PSC in theatre is determined by a combination of national policy and the legal status of the staff and the contractor in that theatre. This must be defined, although it will not always be clear. Contracts for their employment will need to make reference to the jurisdiction provisions contained in any SOFA, diplomatic agreement or mandate, as well as highlighting the necessity to comply with the law of the host nation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| USA | In the absence of a treaty or Status of Forces agreement indicating otherwise, PSCs must comply with the licensing and other legal requirements of the host nation. There are also US statutes that impose criminal and civil liability on individual Department of Defense contractors for certain forms of personal misconduct. Actual legal status and requirements are usually spelled out in the contract between the US Government and the PSC.  

**Reference/Supporting Documents**

- a. Criminal liability is generally under Section 552, Clarification of Application of Uniform Code of  
## CONTRACTED TASKS

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AUS</strong></td>
<td>AUS policy views civilian support as integral to military operations. AUS may utilise PMSCs for a range of security services in support of operations (within the bounds of AUS international and domestic legal obligations and national policy requirements). Such tasks may include: training; monitoring; demobilisation, disarmament, reintegration; security sector reform; force protection and close protection tasks. However, AUS will only engage contractors (including PMSCs) to carry out activities where the legal and operational risk is such that an ADF Commander is able to effectively fulfil AUS' international and domestic legal obligations and national policy requirements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Reference/Supporting Documents** | a. DI(G) Ops 5-3  
 b. ADFP4.2.1 |
| **CAN** | There is currently no approved Canadian policy. |
| **FRA** | a. Direct participation to combat (offensive). Direct participation to combat actions cannot be outsourced to any private actor as it is a state prerogative. Combat actions can only be exercised by the National armed forces.  
b. Support. The logistic support is a field which can be outsourced. These activities include managing properly transportation, supply and catering, support of infrastructures (guarding properties, furniture and infrastructures, in addition to the security provided by the Gendarmerie) and op maintenance of materials for tpt.  
c. Training and monitoring. There is no training nor monitoring activities outsources to non national forces  
d. Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration (DDR)/Security Sector Reform (SSR). France can outsource post conflicts activities: Security System Reform, demining (land and sea with permanent control to avoid traffic of sensitive materials), de-pollution, quality control. But these tasks are not necessarily “military” in nature.  
e. Force Protection, Close Protection. Force protection which usually includes infrastructure security (base security) is the sole responsibility of national armed forces. A force protection outside the realm of fixed based security is also sole responsibility of national armed forces.  
f. Others. The private sector cannot challenge the state monopolie of the use of legitimate force. Therefore, activities such as command and control, combat and security missions, intelligence and counter-intelligence cannot be outsourced. |
| **DEU** | a. Direct participation to conflict: Cannot be contracted.  
c. Training and monitoring: Partially, depending on the service. Possible for example, for training and monitoring of newly employed weapon systems.  
d. Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration (DDR)/Security Sector Reform (SSR): |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Contracted Tasks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ITA</td>
<td>The lack of rules does not allow any definition of the services that could be contracted. To conclude, it has to be clear that military activities can be conducted only by national Armed Forces (including National Reserve) as authorized by Italian Parliament and Italian Private Security Companies can operate only within domestic boundaries.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| GBR     | The UK will only contract for types of work contained within 2 categories:  
  a. **Risk Consultancy.** Predominantly concerned with minimising the operational risk to clients operating overseas. In delivering these services, companies use a number of tools and techniques including country analysis, intelligence, training and incident response. More recently, this category has developed security and justice sector capabilities in order to compete for stabilisation contracts, including the development of DDR programmes, security reviews and audits, and training and awareness (capacity building).  
  b. **Armed Defensive Services.** This category includes PM/SCs who provide armed defensive security services. Weapons aside, these companies differ little to the security companies working solely in the UK and predominantly focus on the delivery of protection for personnel and assets worldwide, for governmental and commercial organizations. These companies may also deliver training packages for clients and prospective PM/SC employees, which may include training in skill-sets that the UK would consider sensitive, e.g. SF and CIMIC. |
| USA     | PSC’s are barred by law from direct participation in the conduct of combat operations. Their normal duties include: providing training for foreign security forces, security support functions (such as static security to protect military bases, housing areas, reconstruction work sites, etc), personal security and protection, convoy security and provide security for internment operations |
### RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTRACTORS AND THE MILITARY

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AUS</strong></td>
<td>AUS may exercise national criminal jurisdiction over PMSCs in certain circumstances. The <em>Defence Force Discipline Act 1982</em> provides jurisdiction over those contracted personnel who are classified as ‘Defence Civilians’. Defence Civilians must comply with lawful directions given to them by their ADF supervisors. Most PMSC employees will not be Defence Civilians as it is neither practicable nor appropriate that they are in most cases. However, in some situations, the SOFA may nonetheless require PMSCs to be subject to the Force Commander’s command and control. The <em>Crimes (Overseas) Act 1964</em> provides AUS with criminal jurisdiction over Australian citizens or permanent residents who are working on behalf or under the direction of Australia in a foreign country that is a ‘declared’ foreign country (eg. Iraq or Afghanistan). That Act also provides AUS with criminal jurisdiction over Australian citizens or permanent residents working for PMSCs in a foreign country where the person is immune or exempt from criminal proceedings in that country by virtue of certain international agreements or arrangements. The supervision of most PMSCs will occur via contractual means. Accordingly, PMSCs would be accountable to the ADF with the ADF contract manager having immediate oversight of actions. Allegations of breaches of IHL or IHRL would be reported to the appropriate AUS investigative authority and, if appropriate, the authorities of the host nation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CAN</strong></td>
<td>There is currently no approved Canadian policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FRA</strong></td>
<td>There is a control of results by the commander but no command relationship. The national armed forces do not exercise any military or political control. The relation over PMF is one that is characterised by a client/furnisher type relationship. Armed forces ensure PMF is fulfilling its contract correctly, they are the oversight. The commander of an operation is responsible for everything pertaining to that operation and that include the service provided by the PMF and which the French Ministry of Defence would be paying for.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEU</strong></td>
<td>The relationship is defined by the individual contract and depends on the contracted service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ITA</strong></td>
<td>In accordance with that previously explained, ITA does not foresee any direct relationship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GBR</strong></td>
<td>As listed above there would be both a C2 and contractual relationship, but they would be related. This relationship is more difficult when a non-MOD department contracts for the PMSC services – eg the UK Foreign Office for close protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>USA</strong></td>
<td>There is no command relationship between the military and the contractor. The terms of the contract determine the extent of the military’s control over the activities of each contractor. The US uses standard clauses in contracts to ensure that PMSCs are managed/controlled adequately. A contracting officer representative manages the contract on a daily basis. Specific contract language can be crafted to ensure that the PSC is responsive to changes in the overall military situation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## CO-ORDINATING OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUS</td>
<td>Given the risk of damage to AUS’s reputation should a PMSC violate national or international law, a PMSC contract would normally be approved by the Commander Joint Operations or higher. AUS has standard clauses in contracts to ensure that PMSCs are managed/controlled adequately. The ADF ensures that contractual provisions are consistent with AUS’ international and domestic legal obligations and the Montreux Document. A contract manager has overall oversight for managing the contract but an on-site ADF member would be given direct responsibility for liaising with and coordinating the activities of the PMSC as provided for in the contract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>There is currently no approved Canadian policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEU</td>
<td>The German MoD defines and coordinates on the strategic level the need for civil services. The German operational headquarter defines requirements and the joint support command transforms them in statements of work. The Federal Office of Defense Technology and Procurement will then initiate the bidding process and negotiate the contracts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>The French relationship to PMF has not yet needed the construction of a legal framework or the instauration of a global control of the activities of these actors. Such framework and control would be inappropriate or disproportionate with regard to the phenomenon it would try to regulate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBR</td>
<td>In accordance with the wider UK approach, Ministerial approval is required for each proposal to contract with a PMSC. In the UK MoD, this process is managed through a 2-star committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITA</td>
<td>See answer to question 6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Each contract has mandated specific contract language that provide for the close supervision and oversight of the activities of PSC. This mandated language will be supplemented by the theatre combatant commander and, as appropriate, subordinate commanders who will establish additional specific guidance for the employment of PSCs in their area of responsibility. The contracting officer and contracting officer representative are responsible for the close supervision of the PSC’s activities in support of the contract.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### NATIONAL PROS AND CONS TO EMPLOYING PMF/PSC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The main risks with employing PMSCs are:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUS</td>
<td>a. Competence to undertake assigned tasks professionally;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Capacity to perform the requirements of the contract for the duration of the contract;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Adaptability to escalated security environment;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. Inability of ADF to command PMSCs and the risks this creates for ADF personnel;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e. Ability of civilians to adapt a military culture and environment; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f. Use of PMSC is sensitive and can impact on international relations and on Parliamentary and public opinion. The reputation of the PMSC and its previous record may be unknown at the time of hiring.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>g. The perception that PMSCs are legally unaccountable and can act with impunity in foreign countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>h. The perception that PMSCs are motivated by monetary gain instead of national interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits:</td>
<td>a. Allows scope for ADF personnel to undertake priority security tasks.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| CAN | There is currently no approved Canadian policy on the use of private military contractors for security operations. |

| FRA | At national level, the utility of PMF is not denied and the French Ministry of Defence has engaged into a restructuring that could involve an increased reliance upon externalisation via these private actors and that includes their possible use in theatres of operations. The outsourcing of services in theatre concerns mainly operational and logistic support when security conditions on the ground allow it. |

**Pros:**

b. These advantages are **political**, and linked to the reluctance in deploying national forces into low intensity conflicts with no identified or real strategic interests; externalisation allows a diversification in the means of states intervention, an enhanced administrative and political leeway. The financing of PMF being easier in this regard than the deployment of troops. Finally there is the possibility of disengaging military capacities more easily in order to diminish the national visibility.

c. The **operational** gains are to provide additional capacities to national forces in terms of support whenever national forces are involved in high intensity operations with heavy demands in capacities. Subcontracting for activities others than support can be considered on a case by case basis. PMF can also support national forces in their post conflict responsibilities in security systems reforms (SSR) and reconstruction.

**Cons:**

a. The **political** risks linked to the amalgam that can be made between national
# NATIONAL PROS AND CONS TO EMPLOYING PMF/PSC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEU</th>
<th>Pros.</th>
<th>Externalisation allows a concentration to military key tasks and is therefore economically advantageous. It provides more flexibility for the deployment of troops into theatre due to the parliamentary approved national ceiling in theatre.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cons.</td>
<td>The reliance to externalisation in logistic area could possibly lead to dependence to contractors and his will and ability to fulfil the contract in a difficult environment. In an early phase of a conflict or in a degrading security situation it may be necessary, to provide a military “backup” for the contracted services in order guarantee the fulfilment of the necessary requirements of the armed forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITA</td>
<td>At national level such possibility has not taken into consideration. However regarding the outsourcing of services mainly related to the logistics support of forces, there are clearly operational advantages due to the possibility to free military assets from supporting duties.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBR</td>
<td>a.</td>
<td>PMSCs can, in certain circumstances, have a direct and sensitive impact on UK policy, international relations and on UK Parliamentary and public opinion. For these reasons, Ministerial approval must be sought for all proposals to contract with a PM/SC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Reliability. As security risks change, PM/SCs (or their staff) may become unwilling or unable to fulfil their contractual obligations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c.</td>
<td>Behavioural Norms and Culture. In some cases the cultural norms of a PM/SC...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### NATIONAL PROS AND CONS TO EMPLOYING PMF/PSC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>could have a counterproductive effect on UK aims, and make for challenging relationships with the UK Armed Forces.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| USA | There are no established national pros and cons to the employment of PSCs. US statutes, as implemented by Department of Defense regulatory guidance, have addressed the majority of concerns regarding the management of PSCs. The normal considerations that apply to the employment of any armed contractor would include:  
  a. Contractor competence and capability to meet the requirements of the contract.  
  b. Contractor’s ability to dynamically react to changes in the military situation.  
  c. Contractor’s ability to work within the military’s culture.  
  d. International perceptions that PSC are mercenaries and subject to legal authority. |
DOCTRINE REFERENCES

1. Doctrine offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate, and fundamentally shapes the way military forces think about, train for, plan, and execute operations. The principles and tenets of doctrine take into account all of the basic elements of a military force: weapons and other systems; skill levels; experience and training; deployment and sustainment capabilities; organizational issues; command and control philosophy and issues; and command arrangements. Doctrine deals primarily with extant capabilities. Doctrine is not about what is to be done, but about how it is to be accomplished. Doctrine is neither strategy nor policy, though it often influences and is influenced by both.

2. Coalition partners using different national doctrines will obviously have problems harmonizing their efforts, even if they enjoy a high degree of technical interoperability. Forces operating on different fundamental principles will lack unity of effort, and could even work at cross-purposes. Areas where commonality of doctrinal approach is particularly critical include intelligence, command and control, operations and planning, logistics, and communications. Subsidiary functions of force protection, deployment, Coalition Combat Identification, Rules of Engagement (ROE), and civil-military cooperation are also key. Finding ways to harmonize doctrine is therefore an important means to ensure improved coalition ops.

3. This is not entirely new ground. NATO has developed a hierarchy of Allied Joint Doctrine dealing with multinational operations; as stated earlier, the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) agreed that NATO Allied Joint Doctrine, unless otherwise specifically directed by the MIC, is default doctrine for planning and conducting multinational coalition operations. Access to NATO doctrine is gained through the NATO Standardization Agency (NSA) protected website. The NSA protected website is the authority source for NATO pertaining to NATO standardization. The NATO Standardization Document Database (NSDD), accessed through the NSA protected website, is the master repository for all NATO Allied Publications. Figure 1 is an example of the Allied Joint Doctrine Hierarchy (AJDH) and is included for illustrative purposes only. The AJDH is updated regularly and can be found via the NSA website under MC Boards-WG>AJOD>Documents>AJOD WG General Documents>AJDH.ppt.

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68 Procedure to Access NSA Website – connect to https://nsa.nato.int/nsa/. Click the link, request access here. Fill in user registration. Submit the request by pressing, request access. Upon obtaining access to the site, access to the NSDD can be achieved through the publications search link on the left.
4. Access to the NSA website is limited to officials from NATO, Partnership for Peace (PfP), Mediterranean Dialogue (MD)\(^{69}\) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)\(^{70}\) countries that have been certified by the NATO Office of Security. NSA normally does not accept e-mail addresses from civilian providers like yahoo, hotmail, gmail etc. The site is not open to industry.

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\(^{69}\) The Mediterranean Dialogue is an integral part of the Alliance's cooperative approach to security. It is based on the recognition that security in Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean and that the Mediterranean dimension is an important component of Europe's security structures. The aim of the Dialogue is to contribute to security and stability in the Mediterranean, to achieve a better mutual understanding, and to correct misperceptions about NATO among Mediterranean Dialogue countries.

\(^{70}\) NATO's Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), was launched at the Alliance's Summit in the Turkish city in June 2004, with the aim to contribute to long-term global and regional security by offering countries of the broader Middle East region practical bilateral security cooperation with NATO.
NATO References *(See AAP-47)*

Allied Joint Publication (AJP) – 01(D), *Allied Joint Doctrine*
AJP-2, *Allied Joint Doctrine For Intelligence, Counter Intelligence And Security*
AJP-3 (B), *Allied Doctrine for Joint Operations*
AJP-4(A), *Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine*
AJP-4.4(A), *Allied Joint Movement and Transportation Doctrine*
AJP-4.5(A), *Allied Joint Host-Nation Support Doctrine and Procedures*
AJP-4.6(A), *Multinational Joint Logistic Centre Doctrine*
AJP-4.10(A) *Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine*
AJP-9, *NATO Civil-military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine*
AAP–6, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French)*, NATO.
NSA (DNSA) 1042-35/13, Release of NATO Unclassified Standardization Documents.

Other Combined References

## National References

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>Canadian Forces Joint Publication (CFJP) 2.0, <em>Intelligence</em>. CFJP 3.0 <em>Operations</em>, CFJP 4.0 <em>Support to Operations</em>, CFJP 6.0 <em>Communications Information Systems</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEU</td>
<td>All related publications are currently under review.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| GBR | Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 01, *Campaigning*, March 2004;  
JDP 3-00 *Campaign Execution*, October 2009;  
JDP 3-40 *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*, Nov 09  
(all publications available at http://www.mod.uk/dcdc) |
| USA | Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Change 2 *Joint Operations*, 22 Mar 2010;  
**LEXICON**

**PART 1 – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

This Lexicon contains acronyms/abbreviations and terms/definitions used in this publication.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABCA</td>
<td>American-British-Canadian-Australian (Armies Standardization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACPs</td>
<td>Allied Communications Publications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJP</td>
<td>Allied Joint Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3I</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications and Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4ISR</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBG</td>
<td>Coalition Building Guide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Component Commanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIRs</td>
<td>Commander’s Critical Information Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFC</td>
<td>Coalition Force Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIEE</td>
<td>Coalition Information Exchange Environments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Communications and Information Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJSOR</td>
<td>Combined Joint Statement of Requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>Courses of Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG</td>
<td>Centre of Gravity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMSEC</td>
<td>Communications Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>Contingency Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>COPD</td>
<td>Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>COS</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Decisive Condition(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCOS</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEFI</td>
<td>Essential Elements of Friendly Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEI</td>
<td>Essential Elements of Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMCON</td>
<td>Emission Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFIR</td>
<td>Friendly Force Information Requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICI</td>
<td>Istanbul Cooperation Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Info Ops</td>
<td>Information Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISTAR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>Joint Operations Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operations Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOPG</td>
<td>Joint Operations Planning Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRA</td>
<td>Joint Rear Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEGAD</td>
<td>Legal Adviser</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOAC</td>
<td>Law of Armed Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>Line(s) of Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOGCOP</td>
<td>Logistics Common Operating Picture</td>
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<tr>
<td>MD</td>
<td>Mediterranean Dialogue</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEDAD</td>
<td>Medical Adviser</td>
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<tr>
<td>METOC</td>
<td>Meteorological and Oceanographic Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIC</td>
<td>Multinational Interoperability Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILU</td>
<td>Multinational Integrated Logistic Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIMU</td>
<td>Multinational Integrated Medical Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIWG (P&amp;D)</td>
<td>Multinational Interoperability Working Group (Policy and Doctrine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MJLC</td>
<td>Multinational Joint Logistics Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLS</td>
<td>Mutual Logistic Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLSA</td>
<td>Mutual Logistic Support Agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODC</td>
<td>Operational Design Concept</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCOM</td>
<td>Operational Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Operational Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operation Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPORD</td>
<td>Operations Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Contingent Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>NATO Standardization Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSDD</td>
<td>NATO Standardization Document Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSE</td>
<td>National Support Element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIR</td>
<td>Priority Intelligence Requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAD</td>
<td>Political Adviser</td>
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<tr>
<td>QSTAGS</td>
<td>Quadrupartite Agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFI</td>
<td>Requests for Information</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
PART 2 – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Campaign
A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve strategic objectives within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land air forces. (AAP-6)

Centre of Gravity
Characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other civil or militia grouping draws its freedom of action, physical strength, cohesion or will to fight. (AAP-6)

Civil-Military Cooperation
The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the Commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies. (AAP-6)

Coalition Force Commander
The Coalition Force Commander (CFC) is the operational commander of a Coalition force. (CBG)

Coalition Force Readiness Training
Combined or multinational collective training conducted by the assigned units and formations from the troop contributing nations to a coalition under the direction of the Coalition Force Commander with a view to harmonize the Coalition and to foster common understanding, combat efficiency and trust throughout the force. (CBG)

Coalition Strategic Commander
The strategic level commander of a Coalition. (CBG)

Concept of Operations
A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander in order to accomplish his mission. (AAP-6)

Course of Action
In the estimate process an option that will accomplish or contribute to the accomplishment of a mission or task, and from which a detailed plan is developed. (AAP-6)

**Culminating Point**

An operation reaches its culminating point when the current operation can just be maintained but not developed to any greater advantage. (CBG)

**Decisive Condition**

A combination of circumstances, effects, or specific key event, critical factor, or function that when achieved allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an opponent or contribute materially to achieving an operational objective. AJP 01(D))

**End-state**

The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of the operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved.

**Framework Nation**

One nation provides the framework for the required command structure and forces. The key elements of the staff and the headquarters support come from the framework nation. The working language and procedures are based on NATO standards (unless specified otherwise by the framework nation), (CBG based on AJP3)

**Host-nation Support**

Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis or war by a host nation to Coalition and /or other forces which are located on. From, or in transit through the host nation’s territory. (CBG, based on AAP-6 definition).

**Joint Operations Area**

An area of land, sea and airspace, defined by higher authority, in which a designated Coalition Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A Joint Operations Area including its defining parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission-specific. (CBG)

**Lead Nation**

This model is based on one nation assuming responsibility for planning and execution of an operation. The commanding officer, staff, Command, Control, communications and Information’s (C3I) structure, doctrine and logistic co-ordination of the force will normally be provided by one nation (the lead nation). Other nations can assign contributions to this force, and fulfil some staff positions in the lead nation’s staff. (AJP-3(A))

In amplification of the NATO definition this guide considers a Lead Nation to be one with the will and capability, competence and influence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning, mounting, and execution of a coalition military operation. Within the overarching organizational framework provided by the

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71 According to NATO’s AJP-4, Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine, Lead Nation logistic support might be separately carried out by a nation without being responsible for the total planning and execution of an operation.
Lead Nation, other nations participating in the coalition may be designated as functional lead agent(s) to provide and/or coordinate specific critical sub-functions of the operation and its execution, based on national capability. These constructs may apply at the strategic, operational, and/or tactical levels.\(^{72}\) (CBG)

**Line of Operation**

In a campaign or operation, a line linking decision points in time and space on the path to the centre of gravity.

**National Contingent Commander**

The Commander deployed by each country contributing forces to a multinational operation, with the exception of the lead nation, who will exercise national command and represent national interests at the operational level. The role of the National Contingent Commander is to support both the Coalition Force Commander and his national commanders, while informing his own national authority. (CBG – based on AAP-6)

**Operational Art**

The skilful employment of forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration and conduct of strategies, campaigns, operations and battles. (NATO)

**Operational Level**

The level of warfare at which campaigns are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives and synchronize action, within theatres or areas of operation. (BDD 3rd Edition)

**Operation Order**

A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. (AAP-6)

**Operation Plan**

A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation ‘plan’ is usually used instead of ‘order’ in preparing for operations well in

\(^{72}\) (a) To avoid possible confusion, it must be noted that this definition differs from but is roughly analogous to terms utilized in NATO. The ‘Lead Nation’ referred to here would be recognizable within NATO as the ‘framework nation,’ whereas ‘functional lead agent’ would correspond to a nation within NATO which is designated as a ‘Lead Nation’ for functional specialty support. NATO’s AJP-3, Allied Joint Operations defines ‘framework nation’ as follows. ‘Forces based on a Framework Nation are commanded by an officer of that nation. A significant proportion of the staff and the headquarters support will come from the framework nation; its working language is of that nation. Staff procedures, although based on Alliance standards, will also reflect those of the framework nation. In practice, however, once command and staff teams work together, procedures may incorporate the “best ideas” of the contributing nations.’
advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then
becomes the operation order. (AAP-6)

Target
The object of a particular action, for example a geographic area, a complex, an installation, a
force, equipment, an individual, a group or a system, planned for capture, exploitation,
normalization or destruction by military forces. (AAP-6)

Targeting
The process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate responses to them, taking
account of the operational requirements and capabilities. (AAP-6)
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