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Foreword

This is the British Army’s capstone doctrine, containing the enduring philosophy and principles for our approach to operations. It reflects the rapidly evolving dynamics of the contemporary operating environment, but also recognises that many things endure, not least the nature of conflict. It is impossible to know what the future holds, but it is safe to assume a complex mixture of competition and threat. In recent operations we have learned and re-learned many lessons, alongside our sister Services, our allies and our partners. It is the aim of this doctrine to capture those lessons, without reinventing the wheel or inventing unnecessary new labels.

At the heart of this doctrine are two central ideas: the Manoeuvrist Approach and Mission Command. These tenets are as useful now as they were when first articulated in the Army’s doctrine in 1989; although it has been necessary to update the way they are described. There is a fresh look at the context within which operations take place, a greater emphasis on understanding, on influence and on how force is applied alongside other levers of power. But there is also a reaffirmation of the British Army’s identity: derived from the three components of its fighting power, its ethos and its expertise as a force whose primary purpose is to fight.

Many of you will share my concern about the reluctance of some to read and apply doctrine. You will see from the essay at the end of this publication that this is not a new problem. But there is no place in today’s Army for the gifted amateur. We must get better at studying the profession of arms and establishing greater coherence and consistency in how we operate, across our activities. While this doctrine emphasises the importance of minimising prescription, the land operating environment is just too dangerous and complicated to make it up as we go along. I see the chain of command at both formation and regimental level playing a key role in educating subordinates in the importance and application of the key tenets of doctrine. This is a habit we must all acquire.

This capstone doctrine drives our tactical doctrine and its practices. It also helps to explain what the Army is for. There is a professional obligation on you to read, to understand, and to be guided by this book and to ensure that those under your command do the same.

Chief of the General Staff
November 2010
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Essay — Doctrine and Command in the British Army: E-1
An Historical Overview by Professor Gary Sheffield (2010 Version)

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This photograph features Sgt Paul Fox RE, a member of a Brigade Reconnaissance Force, who was later killed in action on 26 February 2010 at Nad ‘Ali.
Chapter 1 describes the purpose, audience, structure and the four unifying themes of this doctrine publication.
With 2000 years of examples behind us, we have no excuse, when fighting, for not fighting well.


**Purpose**

0101. This Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) builds on foundations laid by the highest Defence doctrine to provide the philosophy and principles for the British Army’s approach to operations. The philosophy and principles guide the practices and procedures that are found in tactical field manuals and other subordinate doctrine.

0102. ADP Operations is the primary source of UK higher-level tactical doctrine for the land operating environment and is the capstone doctrine for the British Army. It is based on ADP *Land Operations* (2005),¹ updated to reflect experience from operations, new joint and allied doctrine and contemporary understanding of the enduring nature and evolving character of conflict.

**Audience**

0103. ADP *Operations* is aimed primarily at British Army sub-unit, unit and formation commanders, and staffs at each level, although all officers (commissioned and non-commissioned) are required to have a working knowledge of it and to explain it to their subordinates. It has utility for the Royal Marines and the RAF Regiment. It is also designed to provide allies, joint staffs and civilians, working alongside the Army in the land environment, with an understanding of how it operates. Capstone doctrine is the start point. It gives the reader an overview and a framework for understanding, which should then be reinforced by study, for example of doctrine for particular operational circumstances.

**Structure**

0104. This doctrine publication has 8 further chapters and an essay:

a. **Chapter 2 (Fighting Power)** explains the components of Fighting Power, which gives the British Army its ability to operate and fight. The Principles of War are described in an annex.

b. **Chapter 3 (Conflict and the Application of Force)** examines the nature and character of conflict and their implications for the application of force in the land environment; and then explains the Levels of Warfare.

c. **Chapter 4 (The Joint Operation)** situates land forces in the joint operation. Having defined what is meant by joint operations and set out the contributions of land forces, the chapter examines how air and maritime power are integrated with operations in the land environment; and how these joint operations are supported by other components.
Then there is an explanation of how a comprehensive approach, which joins the military with other levers of power, should be organised. Finally, the multinational dimension of operations in the land environment is described.

d. **Chapter 5 (The Manoeuvrist Approach to Operations)** explains the first tenet of the British Army’s enduring philosophy for operations: the Manoeuvrist Approach. It defines the idea, and sets out what it requires and how it is applied.

e. **Chapter 6 (Command of Operations)** describes the second tenet of the British Army’s enduring philosophy for operations: Mission Command. It does so having first examined decision-making and risk-taking; and then describes how plans should be made, orders issued and the control of operations exercised.

f. **Chapter 7 (Orchestrating Operations)** provides guidance on orchestrating operations in the land environment using Operational Art and the Doctrinal Frameworks.

g. **Chapter 8 (Executing Operations)** explains the primary purpose and broad categories of activities that forces operating in the land environment undertake, and then focuses on the tactical actions and forms of manoeuvre that support them.

h. **Chapter 9 (Sustaining Operations)** describes how land forces should be sustained on operations, in 3 parts: sustainment fundamentals, sustainment planning and sustainment execution.

i. **Essay: Doctrine and Command in the British Army: An Historical Overview**, by Gary Sheffield, Professor of War Studies, University of Birmingham (2010 version), examines the historical role of doctrine in the British Army.

### Four Unifying Themes

0105. There are 4 unifying themes that flow through this doctrine and tie its chapters together:

**Integrity of Purpose**

0106. In a parliamentary democracy such as the United Kingdom’s, a clear integrity of purpose between the state, its armed forces and their missions must exist. Because armed forces are given a legitimate monopoly of the use of collective lethal force, this use must flow from the purposes of the state. From the highest levels of national strategy to the lowest level of tactical engagements, the application of force should be in pursuit of national objectives. Armed forces exist to represent the national interest in situations where nothing and no one else can. This bestows a fundamental responsibility on soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines to act on the Nation’s behalf, with unlimited liability, and on the Nation to provide them with the ends, ways and means to do so.
The Application and Threat of Force

0107. The raison d’être for armed forces is to fight. This is how lethal force is ultimately applied in a military context, so combat (fighting) is the purpose for which forces should be most prepared. But armed forces do not just fight. They should also be able to threaten to use or manipulate the idea of force to shape perceptions and secure influence in pursuit of national objectives. They should do this in conjunction with the other levers of power: diplomatic and economic. Collective lethal force should not be applied for its own sake, but to achieve the ends set. If these ends can be achieved by persuasion rather than coercion, or prevention rather than intervention, the course of implied rather than applied force should be taken. However, in a dangerous, competitive and uncertain world, no such implication is credible if it is not reinforced by intent and capability. If the implication of force fails to influence sufficiently, there will be no choice but to apply it. Furthermore, force cannot be effectively applied or threatened without people who are able to take risks, make decisions and communicate intent, and who understand both the nature and character of conflict.

The Nature and Character of Conflict

0108. The nature and character of conflict are different. The nature of conflict endures and will never change; otherwise it would cease to be conflict. But its character evolves and is changed by human experience, innovation and the dynamics of conflict itself. In its nature, conflict is dangerous, violent, complex, often irrational and frequently chaotic. The character of conflict changes, sometimes very quickly; it can appear that everything is new in conflict, except its nature. The implications of this distinction for armed forces are profound. They need to be agile and relevant to deal with the character of conflict, while maintaining a hold on the realities of its nature. This sometimes contradictory situation particularly prevails in the land environment, the most human and complex of them all. Doctrine can ease the pressure by providing an enduring philosophy, supported by principles, that is based mainly on the nature of conflict. From this philosophy flow practices and procedures which adapt frequently and rapidly if necessary, in order to match and anticipate evolutions in conflict’s character. Against a background of continual change, enduring doctrine is essential to maintaining unity of understanding and purpose.

An Enduring Philosophy and Principles

0109. An enduring philosophy is not immune from change, but it should be altered only after careful consideration. It should be malleable and inclusive so that it can be applied to as many situations as possible. Existing doctrine - based on common sense - should be consulted before new ideas are floated. This demands that its language, although precise in implication, should not be taken too literally in translation. For example, the Principles of War are
useful in all forms of conflict, not just war. The tenets of the British Army’s philosophical approach to operations are the Manoeuvrist Approach and Mission Command. The Manoeuvrist Approach offers a sophisticated route to operational success, which emphasises using and threatening force in violent and non-violent ways, to achieve influence in support of objectives. It focuses on applying strength against vulnerability and recognises the importance of cohesion and will, in ourselves, our allies and our adversaries. Mission Command offers a philosophy of command that advocates centralised, clear intent with decentralised execution; a style that describes the ‘what,’ without necessarily prescribing the ‘how.’ These 2 tenets are well suited to the complexity and subtlety of the contemporary operating environment. They can only be employed by highly capable forces that must be able to fight. They need to have sufficient conceptual, moral and physical fighting power to be able to apply, or threaten to apply, credible force; and ultimately to engage successfully in the art of warfare. That is the subject of this publication.

Notes
Chapter 2 explains the components of Fighting Power, which gives the British Army its ability to operate and fight. The Principles of War are described in an annex.
Fighting Power

0201. Fighting Power provides the British Army with its ability to operate and to fight; to engage in combat. It consists of a conceptual component (the ideas behind how to operate and fight), a moral component (the ability to get people to operate and fight) and a physical component (the means to operate and fight). The Army derives its effectiveness from harmonising all 3 components of Fighting Power, building on solid foundations, as simply and consistently as possible. The conceptual component is pre-eminent - the other 2 are derived from it - but all of them are essential. The key elements of these overlapping and mutually supporting components are highlighted in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1 - The Components of Fighting Power
The Conceptual Component

What you write with ink in small, black letters, can be lost through the work of a single drop of water. But what is written in your mind is there for an eternity.

Tsang Yang Gyatso, 6th Dalaï Lama (1683-1706) in Tibetan Tales, published by Philippe van Heurck, Chants attribués a Tsang Yang Gyatso, sixième Dalaï Lama... (Rikon, Switzerland: Tibet Institute, 1984)

0202. The Conceptual Component of Fighting Power. The conceptual component of Fighting Power provides the ideas behind the ability to fight, which ‘... exist so that one need not have to start afresh each time, sorting out the material and ploughing through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order. The conceptual component is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education.’¹ An understanding of the nature and character of conflict lies at the heart of the conceptual component. This understanding provides the ability to visualise and describe the interaction between forces and other sides in conflict and between forces and populations. Knowing how to seize and hold the initiative in order to be able to dictate events and to impose one’s will on adversaries and situations is integral to developing that understanding. At the heart of the conceptual component is doctrine, supported by an understanding of conflict and context; education and innovation.

Doctrine

At the very heart of war lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory. Doctrine is of the mind, a network of faith and knowledge, reinforced by experience, which lays the pattern for the utilisation of men, equipment and tactics. It is fundamental to sound judgement.


0203. The Role of Doctrine. Doctrine is a set of beliefs or principles held and taught. It provides what JFC Fuller called an army’s ‘central idea,’ based on ‘common sense - that is action adapted to circumstance.’² Its development can be contentious, because this is where points of view become points of understanding, and then principles which have authority. Doctrine turns the sum of subjective thinking into an objective guide for action, thus distilling a sometimes confusing array of ideas and opinions into a clear, simple
essence. Doctrine must be agile and should not be dogmatic, taking past experience and extracting guidance for dealing with future challenges. It needs to be not only what is taught, but what is believed and understood. It provides a foundation from which initiative can be applied with confidence. Every situation needs to be assessed in its own right rather than through a set formula, but without doctrinal foundations, that evaluation will be too subjective and the action that follows more likely to be flawed.

0204. **The Requirement for Doctrine.** Military doctrine provides the basis for education and training and underpins all military activity, in planning and execution. It helps to provoke thought and to organise how to think; not what to think. Doctrine helps the military organisation to understand the causes of chaos and to exploit it, without adding to it from within. It enables the ability to act in concert quickly. Doctrine is authoritative in principle, but requires judgement in its application. Because the nature of war is enduring, but its character changes, a guide is required to identify the constants. Then this guide is needed to deal with varying contexts and interpretations, advances in technology, miscalculation, setback, and with adjustments and shocks to policy. All of this should be in large measure based on adaptable common sense rather than prescriptive processes. Military doctrine provides such a guide. In the profession of arms, there is a fundamental responsibility to read and use doctrine. Just as a surgeon could not function effectively without reference to Gray’s Anatomy, the professional soldier will be ineffective if he does not understand his army’s doctrine.

> The British write some of the best doctrine in the world; it is fortunate that their officers do not read it.

Attributed to Colonel (later Field Marshal) Erwin Rommel

0205. **The Relationship of Doctrine to Policy, Concepts and Capabilities.** To understand how doctrine contributes to the turning of ideas into results, it is important to distinguish between policy, concepts, doctrine and capability. This can be resolved by thinking in terms of ends, ways and means. The calculus of strategy is the term used to describe the alignment of ends, ways and means in order to achieve success:

a. **Ends.** Ends are objectives, which are normally described by policy, stating what is to be done and what is not to be done. Doctrine and concepts should be consulted to inform the decisions made about ends.

b. **Ways.** The ways are how the objectives are achieved or policy is implemented, now and in the future. Doctrine and concepts can provide ideas and guidance for the identification of such ways.
c. **Means.** The means provide what are used to achieve the objectives. The resources with which policy is executed to do this now and in the future are provided by capability. Doctrine should drive the development of that capability in the short term; concepts should do so in the longer term.

A doctrine of war consists, first in a common way of objectively approaching the subject; second, in a common way of handling it.


0206. **The Organisation and Levels of Doctrine.** ADP Operations is part of a UK joint doctrine hierarchy from which it derives its authority. Further doctrine flows from this ADP. Doctrine within the hierarchy is mutually supportive, so few publications can be read in isolation. Higher levels of doctrine establish the **philosophy and principles** underpinning the approach to conflict and military activity. Such doctrine provides a framework to understand the military instrument and a basis for its practical application. The lower levels of doctrine, which are broader, describe the **practices and procedures** for that practical application, some of which are also defined by the theatre in which they apply.

0207. Philosophy is conceptual, enduring, pervasive and largely descriptive. It provides understanding. Principles, which are more specific, build upon the philosophical foundations to summarise that understanding. Both are likely to provide clearer context than faster-moving doctrine can, provided they are malleable. The most fundamental principles of doctrine are the Principles of War, which are explained in Annex A to this chapter. Practices describe the ways in which activity is conducted. Procedures link practices together. Both are intended to be prescriptive. They describe how lower-level tasks should be conducted and are normally organised as ‘tactics, techniques and procedures.’ Levels of doctrine are not aligned to a particular level of conflict or warfare. For example, a command philosophy applies as much to a corporal as to a corps commander. Lower-level doctrine could change relatively rapidly and pragmatically, often from a bottom-up direction. However, practices and procedures should always be consistent with the higher-level philosophy and principles, which change only as a result of measured consideration, which is usually a top-down process.

0208. **Joint and Multinational Doctrine.** UK joint doctrine is generally divided into capstone, keystone, functional (J1 to J9), environmental (for example maritime, land, air or cyberspace), and thematic (specific to a type of operation or
campaign) doctrine. At the higher levels, UK doctrine is broadly consistent with multinational doctrine:

a. **NATO Doctrine.** The NATO standardisation process encompasses development, ratification and subsequent promulgation of Standardisation Agreements (STANAGs) and Allied Publications (APs). It provides agreed standardisation for operations, tactics, techniques and procedures, including terminology. Once ratified, APs are reflected in the UK’s joint and single service doctrine and are mandatory within NATO commands, but not within national formations and units. However, given the UK’s Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) lead nation status, a working knowledge of NATO doctrine is required of national formation commanders and staffs for them to be able to operate within a multinational setting effectively.³

b. **ABCA.** The American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies (ABCA)⁴ programme aims to improve current and future interoperability, mutual understanding and commonality of doctrine and concepts, in support of coalition operations.

c. **US Doctrine.** US forces are pre-eminent in contemporary coalition operations involving the UK and are particularly effective at developing and absorbing doctrine and putting it at the heart of education and capability development. Therefore the UK’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), the Army’s Force Development and Training (FDT) Command and the Service warfare centres maintain close links with US doctrine organisations, for example the US Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). US and UK doctrine, such as the US Army’s Field Manual (FM) 3-0 *Operations* and this publication, are developed in close cooperation.

0209. Although this publication provides the initial point of reference - for UK land environmental doctrine, it is important to also refer to joint and Service lower-level doctrine for more detail and for a broader context. Figure 2.2 situates the UK’s joint capstone, keystone, functional, environmental and thematic doctrine as a hierarchy, within an Army context, using examples.⁵
0210. **Joint Capstone Doctrine.** The capstone Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01 *British Defence Doctrine* (BDD)\(^6\) sits at the apex of the UK’s doctrine hierarchy. It sets out Defence’s philosophy as an instrument of national power and the British military approach to operations when that instrument is employed. BDD explains the relationship between defence policy and military strategy, and - while highlighting the utility of force - emphasises the importance of a comprehensive approach to security, using all the levers of power. BDD is linked to a variety of policy documents, such as Defence white papers and strategic defence reviews, Defence strategic direction and the national security strategies.

0211. **Joint Keystone Doctrine.** Beneath BDD is the joint keystone publication, JDP 01 *Campaigning* which it sets out the principles of joint campaigning. It provides guidance to a joint force commander to help him understand the operational level of campaigns in which he plans, conducts and sustains military operations as part of a comprehensive approach.
The UK uses 3 overlapping categories to organise other doctrine:

a. **Functional Doctrine.** Functional doctrine is categorised by a J1-J9 function, for example, JDP 4-00 *Logistics*. It describes a joint approach and is set at the operational level. Supporting publications provide additional detail for each area of functional doctrine. Campaigning doctrine is supported by JDP 3-00 *Campaign Execution*, which describes the command, integration, coordination, synchronisation and prioritisation of deployed multinational and national joint operations in 2 parts: campaign execution and assessment. JDP 5-00 *Campaign Planning* sets out the process of Defence crisis management and the fundamentals of operational planning within a comprehensive strategic and campaign context.

b. **Thematic Doctrine.** Thematic doctrine operationalises functional doctrine within a specific context or for a particular contingency. For example, JDP 3-40 *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution* draws on joint functional doctrine and adapts it for use within a stabilisation setting, taking account of environmental doctrine too. It is not intended to represent a template for a specific operational theatre, but rather provides a guide to dealing with a particular set of conflict themes. Thematic doctrine is then reflected in environmental publications and lower level doctrine, for example JDP 3-40 feeds the Army tactical doctrine for countering insurgency. For operations in support of security and stabilisation, both books are essential supplementary reading to this publication. Other thematic doctrine is available for specific contingencies, for example non-combatant evacuations.7

c. **Environmental Doctrine.** Environmental doctrine draws on functional and thematic doctrine that is specific to the maritime, land, air, space, information (including cyberspace) and electromagnetic environments. It describes doctrine within the context of the surroundings or conditions within which operations occur. This distinguishes environmental doctrine from single-Service doctrine. However, a single-Service’s doctrine may be dominated by one environment in particular, so that service may take the lead - as it does with ADP *Operations* - to turn the result into its own capstone publication.

0213. **Army Field Manuals.** This capstone doctrine flows down into the Army Field Manual (AFM) lower tactical doctrine series, which describes how to put the philosophy and principles into practice. From the AFMs flow tactical doctrine notes, tactical aide memoire and handbooks, and standard operating procedures and instructions.
Experience from both Iraq and Afghanistan would suggest that there is fundamentally little wrong with our doctrine, although it benefits from being contemporised. (People) can talk a good counter-insurgency operation at a study day. The frailty comes from our ability to translate this into action in the face of reality. Put simply, in Afghanistan too many do not apply our (enduring) doctrine.

Lieutenant Colonel Rupert Jones, Commanding Officer, 4th Battalion, The Rifles, Post Operation Report, 2009 (Operation HERRICK 10)

Understanding of Conflict and Context

0214. Doctrine should be based on an understanding of complex, chaotic and potentially confusing conflict and the context in which it takes place. Such understanding is a key aspect of the conceptual component and not only ensures that the doctrine is relevant and useable, but also that it can be applied pragmatically, rather than by prescription. Understanding is what enables the soldier to calculate the nature and character of the conflict he is involved in. This is the subject of Chapter 3.

Education, Innovation and Lessons

0215. Education and innovation are important elements of the conceptual component. They develop not just understanding, but an interest in understanding. They feed the generation of new ideas, for example by designing concepts that could change doctrine or transform organisations and capability. The UK’s progressive programme of conceptual development, academic engagement and experimentation is organised using the Defence Capability Framework, which has 7 elements: operate (application of the military instrument); command (authority to influence events and issue orders through leadership, decision-making and control); inform (the collection, management and exploitation of information and intelligence); prepare (provision of properly developed forces); project (intervention at a time and place of our choosing); protect (countering threats to operational effectiveness); and sustain (maintaining Fighting Power and freedom of action over time).

0216. Education, which is about personal professional development, runs in parallel with training, which improves individual and collective practical performance. Training without education is unlikely to be sophisticated enough to deal with the complexity of conflict and operations. Education without training will not prepare people to apply the theory. The purpose of military education is to equip the individual with the wider and deeper knowledge and skills necessary to assume greater responsibility, and to increase his employability. Examples are staff, career development and promotion courses, academic
placements and private study. Doctrine is a key enabler of education and hence the development of leadership and leaders. Even in times of a high operational tempo, education should continue as an important priority, because the future versatility of forces depends on it. Education gives people the confidence to improvise and innovate, so that they are able to find solutions to problems which do not fit the contingency expected. Education should also encompass all 3 components of Fighting Power. In education theory the physical component corresponds to psychomotor (skills); the conceptual component to the cognitive domain (knowing, thinking and imagining) and the moral component to affective education (values). Most successful educational models offer layers of progression, from the basic levels of reception, being instructed and imitation; up to fully internalised education, where the subject achieves such things as unconscious, transferable mastery of skills; cognitive creativity and, in the affective domain, inspirational leadership. By the end of the next chapter it will be clear that it is the higher levels that are required by personnel within land forces for them to deal effectively with the nature and character of conflict.

0217. Innovation depends on research, experimentation and operational analysis, as well as having sufficient organisational freedoms and confident people. Innovation is particularly important to military forces that are usually required to achieve more than the available resources appear to permit. An important part of maintaining doctrine’s relevance to education and innovation is to capture lessons at all levels of warfare and exploit them quickly, in the case of practices and procedures, and in a more considered way for philosophy and principles. This is covered further in the later section on the physical component. Whatever the constraints on physical resources, there is simply no excuse not to continually exercise the conceptual component. Tactical exercises without troops (TEWTS), for example, cost nothing except intellectual effort. What can be achieved was demonstrated by the German Army of the 1920s: ten years after exercising with wooden tank models, it was capable of Blitzkrieg across Europe.

The Moral Component

In war the moral is to the material (physical) as three is to one.


0218. The Moral Component of Fighting Power. The moral component of Fighting Power is concerned with the least predictable aspect of conflict - the human element. The human element wins and loses battles. If time and effort is invested in it, all things become possible. If it is neglected, no amount of
resources will compensate for it. The moral component provides the Army’s ability to get its people to operate and to fight, and is built upon 3 priceless commodities: ethical foundations, moral cohesion and motivation. These apply to all of Britain’s armed forces, so the moral component is considered here in general military terms as well as by focussing on the Army in particular.

If you choose...honest men to be Captains of Horse, honest men will follow them ... I would rather have a plain russet-coated Captain that knows what he fights for, and loves what he knows, than that which you call 'a Gentleman' and is nothing else.

Oliver Cromwell, letter from Cambridge in September 1643, from Thomas Carlyle, Oliver Cromwell’s Letters and Speeches with Elucidations, Volume 1, (London: Chapman and Hall, 1857)

**Ethical Foundations**

0219. The ethical foundations of the moral component are constructed from interwoven strands that derive their strength from their relationships with each other, their subtlety and their humanity. The human dimension can make the foundations sometimes fragile: there are fine lines which, when crossed, can cause widespread harm. Therefore, the moral component requires care and effort to be invested in understanding and protecting a number of standards which are developed here: general morality and ethics; the Rule of Law; legitimacy; the laws of armed conflict and rules of engagement; the positive influence of the British attitude to conflict and warfare; and the Military Covenant made between the Nation, its armed forces and their members.

0220. **Morality and Ethics.** Morality provides the ability to act in accordance with a shared view of what is right. Some of the most barbarous armies in history have had tremendous morale and will to fight and have been successful. This may suggest that victory is what counts, regardless of the methods used to achieve it. But the British armed forces are, in their modern origins, rooted in the spirit of democracy. This has created a clear necessity to act within the bounds of popular understanding of what is thought to be right. Soldiers should use force from a position of moral strength, reflecting the contemporary customs and conventions of the Nation, adjusted to be realistic within the unusual exigencies of conflict and war. Ethics provide a professional code of conduct, often unwritten, that captures organisational morality. They are less abstract than morality, so provide a vehicle for steering and measuring behaviour. Ethical behaviour in the British Army results from observance of the law, national morality and prescribed values and standards, which are explained below. All are reinforced by a creed of professionalism.
0221. **Legitimacy.** The UK’s military forces are expected to operate legitimately and must act strictly within the national and international legal frameworks, which underpin that legitimacy; as well as being consistent with the morality and ethics described above. Legitimacy encompasses the legal, moral, political, diplomatic and ethical propriety of the conduct of military forces and directly affects the utility of force. In wars of national survival legitimacy is relatively straightforward to establish and articulate. Legitimacy is harder to assume when part of society sees a war as one of choice, where the case for war has not been effectively made, or where society’s diversity makes it harder to enlist universal support. These factors are exacerbated by the proliferation of information and opinion, and access to them. Regardless of a campaign’s levels of legitimacy, individual members of armed forces must act in accordance with the laws of armed conflict.

0222. **Campaign Authority.** UK military activities should also be perceived to be legitimate, acceptable and appropriate in a more specific sense. A necessary condition of long-term success in campaigns and operations is Campaign Authority. This authority needs to be established by international forces and organisations for them to act in support of, or in place of an indigenous government or organisation if it is not effective, widely accepted or present. Campaign Authority is derived from the perceived legitimacy of the mandate and the manner in which those exercising the mandate conduct themselves, individually and collectively. It also needs support from populations and factions and this depends on their expectations being met or managed. Campaign Authority requires determination, control and confidence in order to maintain support, in a theatre and domestically. Maintaining this authority depends upon continuous anticipation and assessment of the effects and consequences of activities, be they intended or unintended.

0223. **Operations and the Law.** UK forces, whether overseas or within the UK, operate within a legal framework, defined by applicable national and international law. In the latter case there are distinctions between the legal basis for resorting to either international or non-international or internal armed conflict (*jus ad bellum*); and conduct within those conflicts (*jus in bello*), commonly known as the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Through the Armed Forces Act 2006, all members of the UK’s armed forces are subject to the criminal law of England and Wales wherever they serve. Consequently, when deployed on operations, there is a broad range of additional laws potentially applicable to servicemen. These include UK domestic law, the laws of armed conflict, occupation law (a part of the LOAC), international human rights law and, in some cases, host nation law. In addition, these laws may be supplemented by rights and obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs), bi-lateral or multilateral agreements, Status of Forces Agreements
(SOFAs) and Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs). Taken together, such laws establish the baseline for the serviceman’s required standards of personal conduct and operational accountability. The applicable legal framework will vary between operations and sometimes between specific periods or in specific locations within operations. Compliance with the applicable laws is a fundamental aspect of the legitimacy and professionalism of armed forces and to maintaining Campaign Authority.

0224. **Individual and Command Accountability.** The framework of laws brings specific accountability, referred to legally as responsibility. The concepts of individual (or personal) accountability and command accountability are enshrined in law. Individual members of the armed forces are accountable for their own actions on operations, for example, in not giving or obeying orders to commit war crimes. Commanders have additional accountability in that they can be criminally accountable if they knew or ought to have known that crimes were being committed or were about to be committed and they failed to take all necessary and reasonable action to prevent or investigate them.

0225. **Law and Policy.** It is important to differentiate between law and policy. Sometimes constraints are imposed on commanders as matters of policy rather than law. They should know the difference so that they can contribute to, or attempt to influence, the policy debates behind those constraints.

0226. **Laws of Armed Conflict.** The LOAC regulates the conduct of hostilities during armed conflict. These laws are found within Customary International Law and Treaty Law, including the Hague Rules, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1977 Additional Protocol 1 and other international agreements. The 4 core principles of the LOAC are military necessity, humanity, distinction, and proportionality. All members of the armed forces are required to comply with the LOAC and training in it is mandatory. The main purpose of the LOAC is to protect combatants and non-combatants from unnecessary suffering, and to safeguard the fundamental human rights of persons who are not, or who are no longer taking part in the conflict, and of civilians. This law provides protection for certain people and objects, and regulates the types of weapons and ammunition that can lawfully be used. Similarly, it places limitations on who and what can be legally targeted. The LOAC also makes special provision for the wounded, the sick, medical personnel, chaplains and captured persons. These laws present particular practical challenges, because although conflict may involve adversaries that do not respect or follow such provisions, UK forces must comply with them. Ultimately it should be remembered that the LOAC is an enabler, bestowing on soldiers the privilege of being able to use lawful armed force, potentially to take life, while minimising suffering and the brutality of war. The law relating to captured
persons is particularly important for a force to have confidence in; for example understanding their categories, which are influenced by the type of conflict, and the powers and responsibilities that result.\textsuperscript{9}

0227. **Rules of Engagement.** Rules of Engagement (ROE) are commanders’ directives - in other words policy and operational guidance - sitting within the legal framework rather than law themselves. They are expressed as permissions and prohibitions which govern where armed forces can go, what they can do and, to an extent, how and when certain actions can be carried out. They are designed to ensure that action taken by UK forces is lawful and consistent with government policy. They are also used to enhance operational security, avoid fratricide and to avoid counter-productive effects which could destabilise a campaign. ROE do not by themselves guarantee the lawfulness of action; it remains the individual’s responsibility in law to ensure that any use of force is lawful. Moreover, ROE do not restrict the inherent and inalienable right of an individual to act in self-defence.

0228. **The British Attitude to Conflict and Warfare.** The British attitude to conflict and warfare derives from a deep national martial tradition and a pragmatic fighting culture that stretches back centuries, in both narrative and popular sentiment. It has been shaped by the UK’s geography, as an island and in terms of its global location, its imperial experience and its continuous role at the forefront of world affairs. History and mythology exert a powerful influence over popular perceptions of the UK’s armed forces, their perceptions of themselves and their approach to warfare. At its heart are the notions that the profession of arms is an honourable calling - a vocation rather than an occupation - and that the British armed forces try to act in a morally and legally correct way, according to notions that are generally shared by the British people. This is why it is so important that the armed forces maintain strong connections with society, especially locally, so as not to become detached from it. The British expect their armed forces to be different to themselves; but they do not want to lose sight of them and their activities.

0229. The British attitude is also characterised by moderation in response to provocation and confrontation, complemented by resolve and a determination to win in the face of aggression, danger or injustice. The attitude is shaped by adaptation and a preference for empirical rather than theoretical or necessarily technological solutions. In military terms, an emphasis on professional competence engenders an uncompromising approach to training, in order to acquire and maintain the skills necessary to prevail in the most challenging situations. Its most distinctive feature is the recognition that because warfare is a human activity, the most decisive contribution is made by people who are suitably motivated, led, trained and equipped. The British would dislike fewer
things more than to be seen as unable to stand up for themselves and to fight if necessary. Their attitude to crises requires a ‘can-do’ approach and demands that, no matter how difficult the circumstances, scarce the resources or remote the immediate chances of success, the urge to succeed should dominate the need to avoid failure.

0230. **The Military Covenant.** Servicemen are bound by service. The nature of service is inherently unequal in that servicemen may have to contribute more than they receive. They may be called upon to make the ultimate sacrifice in the service of the Nation. In putting the needs of the Nation, their Service and others before their own, they forgo some of the rights and freedoms enjoyed by those outside. In return, British servicemen should be able to expect the Nation, and their commanders, to provide them with the means and ways to achieve the ends set, to treat them fairly, to value and respect them as individuals, to sustain and reward them and their families with appropriate terms of service, and to provide long-term support in the event of death, injury or poverty. This mutual obligation forms the Military Covenant between the Nation, the Service and each individual soldier, sailor, marine and airman and applies to all of the armed forces. It is a covenant, not a contract, so, in itself, it imposes moral rather than legally binding obligations. Unless Nation, Service and servicemen alike recognise and understand that it must be upheld come what may, it will fail. This is likely to cause goodwill and trust to be withdrawn. The Covenant has its greatest symbolic manifestation in Remembrance, when the Nation keeps covenant with those who have given their lives or health in its service, in all conflicts, past and present.

**Moral Cohesion**

0231. Moral cohesion is the preparedness to fight. Cohesion binds together individuals into a team, providing resilience against dislocation and disruption. Moral cohesion is explained here by first looking at its principles, then examining British Army ethos, culture, values and standards.

0232. **Principles of Moral Cohesion.** Operations are not individual enterprises, so their success depends on how well individuals work together in teams. Cohesion provides a team with resilience. However, there is more to strong moral cohesion than achieving collective motivation. It comes from:

a. **Continuity.** Individual friendships and collective bonding are encouraged when teams are kept together over time. The familiarity that results creates a sense of belonging, supported by particular habits and traditions, and continuity, which in turn is a bulwark against adversity.

b. **Shared Experience.** Cohesion is tightened by shared experience. Shared success develops a team’s confidence and shared adversity usually enhances group determination and awareness, both of which build trust.
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c. **Clear Task.** Teams unite around a common purpose. When the task is not clear, cohesion can dissipate quickly. This principle depends on clear articulation of what is required, which is a key requirement of leadership.

d. **Anticipation.** Teams develop over time according to broadly predictable patterns. Underlying divisions are exposed under stress. By understanding and anticipating group behaviour, a team and its leader can use training to prepare for challenges, including identifying roles within the team.

e. **Shared Values.** Shared values provide a predictability of behaviour in teams that enhances their cohesion. People know where they stand, an advantage that becomes important in times of uncertainty and stress. Shared values discourage anti-social behaviour and provide mutual reliability.

0233. **British Army Ethos.** Sustained cohesion gives a group or organisation a distinctive character and identity - its ethos. The British Army has certain enduring characteristics which are part of this, embodied in its **regimental system.** The Army is composed of arms, corps and regiments from which units combine to supply operational groupings. Their number, types and organisation evolve according to the operational need. Roles and structures may also change; they may amalgamate, multiply, disband or be re-established. Despite such change, arms, corps and regiments acquire tremendous spirit and distinctive identity from their operational reputations, which are often centuries old. British soldiers usually remain in the arms, corps or regiments they joined as recruits, for life. They return to the same operational units throughout their service, and remain associated in retirement, resulting in depths of familiarity and comradeship which give a unique edge to the morale and team spirit of the British soldier. This spirit is manifested in Colours, Guidons and Standards, distinctive uniforms, ceremony, emblems, and military music, all of which contribute to the special pride British soldiers have in their particular part of the Army. Building on its ethical foundations, the British Army’s ethos emphasises:

a. **Comradeship.** The arm, corps or regiment is the focus for the comradeship which plays a great part in the strength of the profession of arms. The purpose of soldiering is deadly serious, but it should be enjoyable and rewarding if volunteers are to join and stay. The rewards of soldiering include self-esteem and remuneration. Self-esteem is fostered by recognition of good service, ranging from informal verbal congratulation to awards and honours. Comradeship comes from both the powerful bond of adversity shared in battle or on operations, and the mutual respect and support, familiarity and friendliness which comes from necessary mobility and accompanied service; an active military social life; residential messes organised by rank; and sport and adventurous training. This kind of social interaction and community spirit increases operational effectiveness.
greatly. Comradeship embraces soldiers’ families; indeed units are very often regarded, and regard themselves, as families.

All things were bearable if one bore them ‘with the lads’. Battles would have become terrible beyond endurance if pride did not make a man endure what his comrades endured.

Charles Carrington, *A Subaltern’s War*, (London: Peter Davies, 1929)

b. Example. The knowledge of past adversities overcome by the unit or formation of which they are part, inspires soldiers to live up to the standards of their predecessors. Examples are drawn from regimental histories that illustrate sacrifice and the will to succeed, providing inspiration as to how similar situations can be tackled today.

A moth eaten rag on a worm-eaten pole,
It does not look likely to stir a man’s soul,
‘Tis the deeds that were done ‘neath the moth-eaten rag,
When the pole was a staff and the rag was a flag.

General Sir Edward Bruce Hamley, quoted in Blackwood’s Magazine (London, between 1851 and 1863)

c. Pride. Pride inspires individuals and teams to the greatest heights of self-sacrifice and valour. It brings people from the widest variety of backgrounds together, giving them a common identity which turns a collection of individuals into a professional team.

d. Leadership. Leadership is examined in more detail in the section on motivation later in this chapter. But the British Army’s ethos is partly shaped by a particular attitude to leadership, found throughout the Service, which includes a general view that:

1) Disciplined individuality built on solid uniform foundations should be encouraged. There should be tolerance for differing styles and timely debate - perhaps loyal dissent - so long as they have substance in all three components of Fighting Power; and so long as everyone knows when to step into line in order to get the task done.
2) All ranks are expected to be capable of leadership; the approach to leadership is more decentralised and lower in the British Army than in many other armies.
3) Leaders should be capable soldiers first and foremost, and never ask of others something they would not be prepared to do themselves.
4) Holding rank is in itself not enough, if there is a lack of substance beneath the badges. But rank is given to be used, rather than to
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qualify someone as an observer or a commentator. There is a moral and professional obligation on leaders not to turn a blind eye, although they should try to exercise judgement tempered by proportionality in each instance. This is particularly important when dealing with poor standards of battlefield discipline, behaviour and bearing: operational experience and the pressures of combat should not be used as excuses for compromising the standard of total professionalism.

5) Power and privilege should be visibly and evenly balanced with responsibility and duty.

6) Good leaders should be good managers too. Soldiers will not be prepared to follow a leader more than once if he does not manage their welfare and health, careers and education, or secure for them the resources and training they need.

7) In different ways, leadership in barracks can be as demanding as leadership on operations. They are of course also mutually supporting. In the latter the unit or force usually has a clear focus, the resources required and time. In-barracks leadership may not be so well supported, so requires institutionalised skills and practice: in its routines, its duties, its details and its standards.

8) Leaders should be realistic optimists. It is not good leadership to take a publicly negative or downbeat view in front of subordinates, particularly one that does not provide context, solutions or the upside. This duty to be positive applies at all levels of command.

9) Leaders should be aware of the spiritual dimensions of life and understand how they contribute to operational effectiveness, for example in resolving moral dilemmas, dealing with regret and overcoming grief.

e. A Warrior Spirit. The British soldier should embody a warrior spirit. He should be tough, resilient, innovative, highly-motivated and compassionate. He should have an offensive spirit and a desire to get to grips with adversaries and challenges. He should not hesitate to engage in combat - to fight - using controlled violence when necessary.

0234. British Army Culture. The British Army derives its culture - the socially transmitted pattern of human behaviour within the organisation - from British morality and ethics and national attitudes to conflict and warfare. The Army’s cultural nature comes also from its distinctive ethos and its own values and standards. Together they form a moral foundation for the conduct of operations.

0235. Values and Standards. The British Army has codified 6 values, based on British military attributes generally and the tenets of its own culture and ethos. They are reinforced by standards of professional conduct. The values
and standards are not just lists of moral qualities required of each individual soldier in his or her social behaviour; they have a pragmatic and functional utility because they provide the essence of operational effectiveness. So, for example, the values apply as much to the way a commander exercises command, as to the manner in which a junior soldier conducts himself or herself socially. Upholding values to the required standards is the collective responsibility of the Army, and all its units, supported by the Nation and government policy through the Military Covenant. They form the foundations of teamwork, which multiplies the fighting power of each individual. They are interdependent and are enhanced by good leadership, training, motivation and management, throughout the chain of command. They are published widely as *The Values and Standards of the British Army.*

0236. **Values.** The values are:

a. **Selfless Commitment.** The British Army must be structured and trained to fight. On joining it, soldiers accept a commitment to serve wherever and whenever they are needed, whatever the difficulties and dangers, putting the team and the mission before themselves. Such commitment imposes constraints on individual freedoms and requires a degree of self-sacrifice. The ultimate requirement to lay down one’s life imposes a duty on those in authority to meet their moral responsibilities to their subordinates. A soldier’s commitment is expressed through the Oath of Allegiance to the Sovereign as Head of State, and this underpins the apolitical nature of the Army. The Sovereign is also the authority for the Commissions and Warrants, by which officers and warrant officers discharge their duties, and has a personal relationship with arms, corps and regiments, which find expression in Colours, Guidons, Standards and other emblems.

I swear by almighty God that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, her heirs and successors and that I will as in duty bound honestly and faithfully defend Her Majesty, her heirs and successors in person, crown and dignity against all enemies and will observe and obey all orders of Her Majesty, her heirs and successors and of the generals and officers set over me.

The Oath of Allegiance of the British Army, *Values and Standards of the British Army,* January 2008

b. **Courage.** All soldiers should be prepared for tasks that involve the use of controlled, lethal force. They may be required to take the lives of others and knowingly risk their own. They will need to show restraint or patience, even when doing so increases personal danger. They may witness injury and death, sometimes involving their comrades, but will be required to
continue with the task in hand. This requires physical courage, and soldiers will depend on it in each other. Moral courage is arguably even more important. This is the courage to do what is right, even if it is unpopular or appears to be the most uncertain course. This is also the courage to insist on maintaining high standards. Moral courage fosters trust and respect, so is a vital part of leadership.

Courage is not merely a virtue; it is the virtue. Without it there are no other virtues. Faith, hope, charity, all the rest don’t become virtues until it takes courage to exercise them. Courage is not only the basis of all virtue; it is its expression. True, you may be bad and brave, but you can’t be good without being brave. Courage is a mental state, an affair of the spirit, and so it gets its strength from spiritual and intellectual sources. The way in which these spiritual and intellectual elements are blended, I think, produces roughly two types of courage. The first, an emotional state which urges a man to risk injury or death - physical courage. The second, a more reasoning attitude which allows him to stake career happiness, his whole future on his judgement of what he thinks either right or worthwhile - moral courage. Now, these two types of courage, physical and moral are very distinct. I have known many men who had marked physical courage, but lacked moral courage. Some of them were in high positions, but they failed to be great in themselves because they lacked it. On the other hand I have seen men who undoubtedly possessed moral courage very cautious about physical risks. But I have never met a man with moral courage who would not, when it was really necessary, face bodily danger. Moral courage is a higher and a rarer virtue than physical courage. All men have some degree of physical courage - it is surprising how much. Courage, you know, is like having money in the bank. We start with a certain capital of courage, some large, some small, and we proceed to draw on our balance, for don’t forget that courage is an expendable quality. We can use it up. If there are heavy, and what is more serious, if there are continuous calls upon our courage, we begin to overdraw. If we go on overdrawing we go bankrupt - we break down.


c. **Discipline.** To be effective on operations, the Army must act as a disciplined force. Commanders should be confident that their orders will be carried out and each soldier must have confidence that his comrades will not let him down. Discipline is the glue that binds soldiers together when threatened; it is the primary antidote to fear and the stress of battle.
The best way of generating discipline is through self-discipline and self-control, which is innate rather than imposed. This is expected in individuals, but the Army draws it out through education and training. For example, ceremonial and barracks drill and drills generally are powerful tools for instilling an ability to react to orders, even when under pressure. Good discipline does not stifle individuals; on the contrary, it enables them to achieve more than they would expect of themselves without it. Obedience should not be blind. Good discipline requires that orders are obeyed but with resourcefulness, imagination and according to ethical foundations. Self-discipline is supported by firm, directive leadership when necessary and enforced discipline when needed. This requires fairness, consistency and clear rules. It needs a fair Service justice system, based on the chain of command, but with independence where required, which can deal with offences without civilian equivalence, for example, absence without leave, desertion and insubordination, all of which can seriously undermine operational effectiveness. This system cannot be turned on and off at will, so must apply before, during and after operations. This disciplinary system is complemented by administrative procedures - comparable to employment law - to maintain professional obligations and standards.

d. **Integrity.** There is a unique significance to personal integrity in soldiering, because all soldiers should be prepared to engage in combat by choice. For this, teams are required in which individual needs are subordinated to collective effectiveness and internal frictions are minimised. This can only be done through trust, which in turn comes from the integrity of individuals. Integrity requires adherence to a code, based on common values and standards, and honesty. Soldiers put their lives in each others’ hands and in the hands of their commanders, so there must be sufficient trust for this to be a rational thing to do. Soldiers share close quarters and discomfort and expect consideration from each other. Integrity, and hence trust, is eroded by deceit, selfishness, criminality and anti-social behaviour. Even small failings have a corrosive effect. It is difficult to rely on a person who has undermined his or her own integrity. This increases pressure on the team by introducing uncertainty and suspicion and increasing the workload on others. Such a team loses the cohesion it needs to face the hardships of operations.

e. **Loyalty.** Loyalty binds all ranks in the Army with mutual respect and trust. Loyalty should flow up and down a hierarchy and can transform individuals into teams. The Army depends on the allegiance and obedience of all those that serve and the loyalty of the Nation according to its Military Covenant. Those in authority should be loyal to their subordinates, representing their interests faithfully and ensuring that they are well-prepared and resourced to deal with the most demanding aspects of operations. In return, subordinates should be loyal to their leaders, their team and their
duty. Although such loyalty is expected, it derives its true strength by being earned and nurtured, through shared values, leadership and the familiarity gained from working and socialising as teams. Behaviour that undermines the reputation of the team, the unit, the Army and the Nation is an act of disloyalty, and a breach of trust.

Loyalty is a noble quality, as long as it is not blind and does not exclude the higher loyalty to truth and decency.

BH Liddell Hart, *Through the Fog of War*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1938)

**f. Respect for Others.** Service in the British Army requires not just respect for the chain of command, but for others generally. It flows from selfless commitment and putting other people first. Respect for others is based on self-respect. Combine this with loyalty, integrity and discipline and it is clear how to treat other people. Respect for others means treating others as you expect to be treated yourself. On operations it provides moral guidance to underpin the laws of conflict, ensuring that human rights are respected and behaviour in battle is honourable at all times. An army elevates itself above others not just by its ability to prevail, but by the methods it uses to prevail. Care for the wounded on both sides, treating prisoners and the victims of conflict humanely and applying force with proportionality are aspects of this. Because of the conditions soldiers expect to confront on operations, they need to respect the other members of the team, meaning there is no place for bullying, harassment or victimisation. Soldiering is about duty, or it is nothing, so soldiers should be more ready to uphold the rights of others than to claim their own.

**0237. Other Military Attributes.** As well as the Army’s values, there are a number of attributes which underpin the culture that epitomises all of Britain’s armed forces.

**a. Determination.** A distinctive British attribute is the desire to prevail, whatever the circumstances, even in the face of seemingly insuperable odds.

*Never yield to force: never yield to the apparently overwhelming might of the enemy.*

Sir Winston Churchill, Speech to Harrow School, (London, 29 October 1941)
b. **Patriotism.** Patriotism manifests itself as a collective and individual attachment to the idea of Britishness and the values and way of life that it represents, as well as a love for Britain and its regions in themselves. British soldiers should fondly miss their country when they are absent from it. Owing to history, training and cultural influences, patriotism also engenders the belief that the British soldier is a match for any opponent.

> If your country's worth living in, it's worth fighting for ... you can't fight a war without losing lives. Although no one wants killing, sometimes it has to be. To keep your country free sometimes you have to fight and die. It was to be a great honour to us.

Private William Mabin, 36th Ulster Division, quoted in Philip Orr's *Road to the Somme*, (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 2008)

c. **Duty.** Duty is the devotion to a cause, mission and the team that transcends an individual's personal interests or desires. In times of real adversity, when it appears that there is nothing left to give, duty requires soldiers to lead and strive even more.

> I hold my duty as I hold my soul.


d. **Sacrifice.** Closely allied to duty, sacrifice is the acceptance of a duty to serve whenever or wherever needed, regardless of the dangers or difficulties. Sacrifice requires a willingness to put oneself last. It is the ultimate form of selfless commitment.

> We were all making our way out - there seemed a very fair chance that some of us would make it: to stay here was to stay certainly for capture, possibly for death, when the Chinese launched their final assault on the position. And then I realised that he had weighed all this - weighed it all and made a deliberate choice: he would place his own life in the utmost jeopardy in order to remain with the wounded at the time when they would need him most.


e. **Initiative.** The use of initiative - energy and resourcefulness displayed in the initiation of action - is a well-proven way of dealing with the frictions that occur in dynamic situations, taking advantage of unexpected
opportunities and gaining an advantage. As such, initiative and enterprise should be encouraged at every level.

Initiative simply means that you do not sit down and wait for something to happen. In war, if you do, it will happen all right, but it will be mighty unpleasant. Initiative means that you keep a couple of jumps ahead, not only of the enemy, but of your own men.


f. **Humanity.** Humanity is a combination of honesty, compassion and chivalry, applied professionally and socially. Humanity provides a common moral compass to a force, which offers the ultimate way out of adversity.

For if we lose that faith - if we dismiss it as silly or naive; if we divorce it from the decisions that we make on issues of war and peace - then we lose what’s best about humanity. We lose our sense of possibility. We lose our moral compass.

President Barack Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize Lecture, Oslo, 10 December 2009

g. **Ingenuity.** The British armed forces are renowned for their ingenuity, resourcefulness and their ability to innovate, which stem from either necessity or natural curiosity. The innate ability to make do, and to respond to unfamiliar or unexpected circumstances with pragmatism and industry, gives forces the capacity to adapt and overcome both opponents and difficulties.

Remember that the one great thing to which you should at all times apply your thoughts and brains is the expansion of the power of materiel and personnel without increasing either. It is the man who can make bricks without straw who will make a success of any expedition.

Lord Trenchard’s inaugural address to the RAF Staff College, Andover, 4 April 1922

h. **Humour.** The British sense of humour, capable of raising the spirits of subordinates and colleagues, as well as sustaining morale, even in the most trying circumstances, is a powerful multiplier of a force’s capability. Humour can reduce tension and stress and brings a sense of wider perspective to the worst of situations.
There was a Grenadier at Fontenoy who, as the French presented their muskets for a devastating volley, intoned, ‘for what we are about to receive may the Lord make us truly thankful.’


i. **Trust.** Trust requires people to believe in each other. It provides strength to groups during times of adversity, and the confidence and desire in individuals to act in the collective interest.

Trust is an essential trait amongst leaders - trust by seniors in the abilities of their subordinates, and by juniors in the competence and support of their seniors. Trust must be earned, and actions that undermine trust must meet with strict censure. Trust is a product of confidence and familiarity. Confidence amongst comrades results from demonstrated professional skill. Familiarity results from shared experience and a common professional philosophy.


0238. **Standards.** The 6 values of the Army contribute directly to operational effectiveness. The Service Test is the device used to measure behaviour in order to set standards. The 3 standards expected require lawful, appropriate and totally professional behaviour at all times. The Service Test means that the following question should be asked: has the behaviour enhanced or undermined operational effectiveness? This is a commander’s judgement, but clear values and standards ensure that all personnel understand what behaviour is likely to fail the test. Commanders should issue clear communication of what is expected. Officers and soldiers must avoid behaviour that risks degrading their professional ability or which may undermine morale by damaging the trust and respect that exists between individuals who depend on each other. For this reason the Army takes a more demanding approach towards personal behaviour that may, in wider society, be regarded as a matter of individual choice.

0239. **The Safeguarding Role of Officers.** Leadership is the principal duty of all officers; those holding Commissions, Warrants and non-commissioned officers. Commissioned officers in the British Army have a special responsibility for leadership. The Queen’s Commission\(^{11}\) means that it is always the duty of a commissioned officer to take moral responsibility for the task and those subordinate in rank, whether they are in his direct chain of command or
Operations | 2 — Fighting Power

not. This includes setting an example both on and off duty. In the heat of battle, and in an environment sometimes dominated by high emotion and the pernicious effects of boredom and complacency, officers should have a strong enough moral compass and sufficient backbone to avoid over-familiarity and favour. They are required to prevent breakdowns in standards, ethics and the law; or simply to grip a deteriorating situation, failures in battlefield discipline, dress or bearing. The pressures or achievements of operations should not be used as an excuse to ignore or tolerate poor discipline or low professional standards. That would be a failure of moral courage and professional obligation; and a breach of trust.

You are, in such manner and on such occasions as may be prescribed by us, to exercise and well discipline in their duties such officers, men and women as may be placed under your orders from time to time and use your best endeavours to keep them in good order and discipline...in pursuance of the Trust hereby reposed in you.

Extract from the Queen’s Commission (to all commissioned officers)

Motivation

0240. As well as ethical foundations and moral cohesion, the moral component is built on motivation. Motivation is the enthusiasm to fight, and is a product of training, confidence in equipment, effective leadership and management, firm and fair discipline, self and mutual-respect, reward through fair terms of service, and a clear understanding of what is going on and what is required. While at the tactical level most soldiers will fight for the soldier beside them, they also need a clear view of the cause, and knowledge that this perspective is shared by those at home. Motivation is analysed here by looking at its two primary elements: morale and leadership.

0241. Morale. Successful motivation from a combination of efforts produces high morale, which in turn generates further motivation. Morale is an intangible force that sustains people beyond previously perceived limits, making them feel part of something greater than themselves. Morale feeds on conviction, confidence and success. It gives soldiers a sense of satisfaction, perhaps happiness, in their situation. As well as a common purpose and good leadership, morale requires that physiological needs are provided for. These include food and rest, an element of security and shelter, releases from boredom, the capability to evacuate the injured and to provide some contact for soldiers with the world they have left behind. Morale is stimulated by being valued, having sufficient resources to do the job, balanced routines and having the opportunity to realise personal potential. These requirements of morale are set by the moral component, but provided by the physical component
of Fighting Power. Morale is a commodity that proves the importance of a mutually supporting relationship between the components of Fighting Power.

Morale is a state of mind. It is steadfastness and courage and hope. It is confidence and zeal and loyalty. It is élan, esprit de corps and determination. It is staying power; the spirit which endures to the end - the will to win. With it all things are possible, without it everything else, planning, preparation, production, count for naught.

General George C Marshall, address at Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut, June 1941

0242. Leadership. Doctrine that purports to explain leadership is unlikely to be comprehensive on its own. This is an area that requires wide study and reflection. Thought-provoking sources of advice for all officers - commissioned and non-commissioned, senior and junior - are the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst publications, Serve to Lead and The Queen’s Commission - A Junior Officer’s Guide. Effective leadership is characterised by the projection of personality and purpose onto people and situations in order to prevail in the most demanding circumstances. The British attitude to conflict and warfare places a premium on leadership. It is a matter of personal pride to be seen as a leader rather than a follower or a manager. In Chapter 6 the techniques for turning leadership into command on operations will be examined. Here the moral imperatives that result from ethical foundations and moral cohesion are used to define the fundamental requirements of a leader in the British Army:

a. Leadership through Motivation. A leader should understand how to motivate himself and others. Military leadership is the projection of personality and character to inspire soldiers to do what is required of them, even if they doubt that they are capable of it. It is ‘...that mixture of example, persuasion and compulsion which makes men do what you want them to do.’

A commander needs to generate an electrifying current, and keep a cool head in applying it.

BH Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War, (London: Faber and Faber, 1944)

b. Professional Competence. A leader should be a master of his profession. For his subordinates to have confidence in him, the commander should be professionally competent. This requires knowledge, wisdom and self-confidence. He needs to be able to judge advice and make the right call based on it, even if he is not an expert.
c. **Intellect.** A leader requires intellect. Without intellect, or the capacity for developed thought, a leader will neither understand a complex situation nor be able to decide what to do. The most successful higher commanders in history have displayed a genius for warfare that transcends intellect alone. Whilst genius is an innate quality, intellectual foundations can be developed by education and training. The quality of intellect is closely linked to creativity, innovation, initiative, and judgement:

1) **Creativity.** Leaders at all levels must be creative in order to achieve surprise or to identify novel solutions. Thus, a leader should ask himself what his adversary would least expect; and then be imaginative in engaging him. He should be able to design and visualise an approach to a problem that may never have been tried before. Originality is a hallmark of creativity.

Originality, not conventionality, is one of the main pillars of (leadership). To do something that the enemy does not expect, is not prepared for, something which will surprise him and disarm him morally. To be always thinking ahead and to be peeping round corners. To spy out the soul of one’s adversary, and to act in a manner which will astonish and bewilder him, this is (military leadership).

Major General JFC Fuller, *Generalship; its Diseases and their Cure: A Study of the Personal Factor in Command*, (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1936) 32

2) **Innovation.** The ability to innovate equips a leader for the Manoeuvrist Approach, which is explained in Chapter 5. Imaginative ideas, often reflected in imaginative training, develop collective performance and engender a spirit of individual and collective enterprise. The most successful leaders restless innovatively and sell innovation to their teams. They also know when to leave matters as they are, in order to maintain continuity, consolidate on excellence, or to relieve the pressures of continual change.

3) **Initiative.** Initiative is the ability to recognise and grasp opportunities. It requires flexibility of thought and action. A climate of freedom, trust and confidence is required to allow initiative to flourish, for example to make reasonable mistakes in training. People should be encouraged to take the initiative rather than fear the consequences of failure. This requires a culture which promotes calculated risk-taking: daring to be right rather than being afraid to be wrong.

4) **Judgement.** Judgement is a matter of common sense, tempered by experience. As responsibility increases, broader and deeper judgement is required of commanders. To succeed, a commander should be able
to read a wide range of situations and interpret them correctly and quickly, sometimes with little information. This depends on a refined combination of experience, knowledge, intellect and intuition.

d. **Decisiveness.** A leader must be decisive. Decisiveness is central to the exercise of command and requires a balance between analysis and intuition. Timely decision-making entails the need for a commander to be confident in his own judgement. He should maintain his chosen course of action until persuaded that there is a significant enough change in the situation to warrant a new decision. Sometimes he needs to decide not to decide. A leader in command requires moral courage to adopt a new course of action and the mental flexibility to act purposefully when the opportunity of unexpected success presents itself. Poor commanders shroud themselves in their staff’s processes to avoid being decisive. In times of crisis, a leader should remain calm and continue to make decisions appropriate to his level of command. His calmness prevents panic and his resolution compels action. The temptation to meddle in lower levels of command, when the situation is stressful, should be resisted unless it is vital to the mission.

e. **Resolution.** A leader should be resolute in maintaining his aims, on and off operations. Resolution helps a leader to remain undaunted by setback, casualties and hardship. It gives him the personal drive and will to see the campaign, operation or battle through. The good leader should have courage, robustness and the ability to take risks. He should seek the initiative and be prepared to make decisions where the outcome may be uncertain. A good leader acts boldly and grasps fleeting opportunities, making his own luck, based on foresight and planning. Robustness, consisting of physical and mental fitness, is a pre-requisite of leadership. Leaders need mental and physical stamina to endure the strains of an enduring campaign; they should set an example and keep themselves in good condition.

Keep fit and fresh, physically and mentally. You will never win battles if you become mentally tired, or get run down in health.

Field Marshal Montgomery, *High Command in War*, (London: 21st Army Group Publication, 1945) 44

f. **Confidence.** Leaders should be confident. Self-confidence links to resolve and professional knowledge; it reflects a justifiable confidence in one’s own ability. Self-confidence brings its own assurance and effortlessness, but needs to be tempered by humility. A leader should maintain and project confidence in himself and his plans even when he may harbour inner doubts, but be able to re-think and change course too. A balance is
required between promoting a sense of self-confidence and suffocating substance with style or inhibiting the initiative of others. Commanders should have the confidence to listen constructively to the views of the staff and subordinate commanders without fear of losing authority.

g. **Communication.** An effective leader is able to communicate well. A leader’s powers of analysis and decision-making are of no use if he cannot communicate his intentions clearly. He should be able to think on his feet, without preparation, and be confident and competent enough to brief well and give succinct orders, written and verbal, without choreography. Technology is an aid to communication, but the more human the communication, the more powerful it is likely to be.

h. **Humility.** As well as humanity, leaders must have humility. They should be capable of empathy, benevolence and have emotional intelligence. They must be able to talk and relate to their soldiers with ease. These qualities make them more motivational, better to work for and more likely to make sound judgements about human nature and people. Good leaders carry their ability lightly; they may be humble and lack arrogance, but are never meek.

> Slim was like that: the only man that I’ve ever seen who had a force that came out from him, a strength of personality that I have puzzled over ever since, for there was no apparent reason for it, unless it was the time and the place and my own state of mind. Yet others felt it too, and they were not impressionable men. His delivery was blunt, matter of fact, without gestures or mannerisms, only a lack of them; he just stood with his thumb hooked in his carbine sling and talked. We believed every word - and it all came true. British soldiers don’t love their commanders, much less worship them; Fourteenth Army trusted Slim and thought of him as one of themselves, and perhaps his real secret was that the feeling was mutual.


i. **Tone.** Good leaders know how to set the right tone, adjusting their approach and the atmosphere they create in their commands, according to the context. Proximity to operations, degrees of success or adversity and the collective character of the team are examples of factors which should influence the tone set. Poor leaders use only one tone, regardless of the circumstances.

j. **Vision.** Leaders should have vision, foresight and sagacity: the ability to discern and penetrate, using a combination of wisdom, practical skill and intuition. Such a leader is then able to articulate that vision, so that it results in the motivation of others and translates this into action. Vision
is not synonymous with radical change. In military endeavours, little is truly new and almost everything has been tried in some form before. The reasons for previous successes and failures, placed in context, are as much a part of vision as innovation. There are dangers in avoiding conformity for the sake of it, or in re-inventing wheels that have been hewn at great cost before. Complacency and not recognising when circumstances have moved on should also be avoided. British Army leaders should be alert to these vulnerabilities, so that the right balance between consolidation and transformation can be achieved.

The Physical Component

0243. **The Physical Component of Fighting Power.** The physical component of Fighting Power provides the means to fight: manpower, equipment, collective performance through integrated education, training and the coherent development of capabilities; the ability to deploy, globally if necessary; and sustainment, all at the required state of readiness. The basic requirements of the physical component are that:

a. It must be underpinned by the conceptual and moral components; alone, it does not adequately compensate for their absence. On the other hand, without physical delivery the moral and conceptual components remain, pointlessly from a military perspective, in a theoretical domain.

b. It should be sufficiently resourced. Insufficient resources to recruit and train people, equip them, deploy them and sustain them, on and between operations, dislocates Fighting Power and ultimately undermines the authority of campaigns.

0244. Fighting Power is developed for operations through **force preparation**, which is the continuous process of manning, equipping, training and sustaining the Army for operations in general; and **force generation**, which describes the further activities required to produce forces ready for a particular operation or campaign. This ideal model simplifies planning and organisation of activity, but can be adjusted to deal with the realities of enduring operations that may require prolonged preparation and commitment of forces. In a time of persistent conflict, the training progression should ensure that force preparation leads seamlessly into force generation, without making false distinctions between ongoing operations and operations generically.

**Force Preparation**

0245. Force preparation is common to the whole Army. Conversely, force generation affects nominated forces at specific times, since the whole Army cannot be at immediate readiness for operations permanently. Force preparation is based on all the components of Fighting Power, while force generation tends to focus on the physical component, including equipment and material
preparation, collective training, and bringing units up to strength in manpower and equipment. Some activities that occur during force preparation and force generation are common to both. The stronger the linkages that can be built, the more seamless the progression is likely to be. Force preparation consists of the continuous process of manning, equipping, training and sustaining the Army for operations in general.

a. **Manning.** Manpower is the lifeblood of the Army. People are its core capability. The Army’s ability to attract, recruit and retain the right types of people is critical to its Fighting Power. Once recruited, an individual’s service is shaped by a range of policies covering pay and allowances, promotion, discipline, maximising deployability, welfare and spiritual needs, accommodation, operational tour intervals, career management and personal development, retention, discharge and resettlement. The balance between the terms expected and the conditions attached to those terms is complex and must be based on the moral and conceptual components. If these aspects become purely about physical delivery -the ‘what’ without reference to the ‘why’ - Fighting Power could be fatally undermined. Manpower is organised using establishments, which allocate people to units, ensuring that they have sufficient numbers for their tasks. Establishments should be robust and match the purpose of the unit. While reinforcement is a necessary contingency to deal with tactical opportunity or threat, augmentation should not need to compensate for an inadequate establishment.

b. **Equipping.** Equipping relates to the design, construction and provision of military platforms, systems and weapons - expendable and non-expendable and including updates to legacy systems - needed to outfit or equip an individual, group or organisation. Equipment can be operational or non-operational and deployable or non-deployable; and includes both hardware and software. Affordability of new capability, including through-life costs, is critical in attempting to balance technological risk, performance, equipment numbers and delivery on time. Equipment projects generally follow a cycle of concept, assessment, demonstration, manufacture, in-service use and disposal. Shortfalls in capability - in equipment and sustainability - may be filled rapidly through the Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) process. The requirement must be unforeseen, urgent and meet a new operational need. This may be caused by unforeseen geography or scale of effort or an evolution of enemy tactics. The Army should always seek to reduce the difference between what it procures routinely and what it requires on the basis of operational need, as such a distinction is not efficient. It also needs to decide which of the UORs it needs to bring into its core equipment programme, and how. Key to this is an understanding of the nature and character of
conflict; doctrine; a coherent research and development programme; experimentation and operational analysis.

c. **Training.** Manpower, equipment and the way they are organised are converted into deployable forces by training. Training is an essential part of the Army’s Fighting Power; its importance has rare equivalence in civilian organisations. Force preparation relies on a structured, well-resourced training progression to provide force elements at stated levels of readiness. The shape of the progression will depend on the operating context, tempo and the resources available. The overall progression needs to recruit an untrained civilian and turn him into a soldier. He is then trained in a specific role, individually and as part of a team. The team is trained to be a coherent part of a sub-unit. The sub-unit is then trained to operate within an all-arms grouping; and the all arms grouping is trained within a formation context. This continuous flow can be divided into Individual and Collective Training, which must wherever possible be separated so as to avoid training a force of individuals, at a time when that force needs to be training as a whole:

1) **Individual Training.** Individual training is an integral element of force preparation. It is designed to equip the soldier with the essential skills that he needs to fight on the battlefield and be part of an effective team, with physical fitness, shooting and fieldcraft being the core ingredients. It is delivered after recruitment, and continues throughout careers, building upon special-to-arm expertise. This ensures essential standards are developed because military skills can quickly fade if they are not practised. Soldiers also qualify as specialists through the individual training regime. Individual training is one of the first responsibilities of officers in command. They should ensure that individual training standards are maintained by using, among other things, a cycle of annual skills testing.

2) **Collective Training.** Collective training is the process by which individuals, units and formations are collectively prepared for contingencies and operations. It is delivered at collective training establishments and within units. Being also a part of force generation, it is considered further below. A force cannot be ready for operations until it has undergone robust and realistic collective training in testing conditions set by its higher headquarters or a training organisation. Although simulation has an important role, field training exercises provide the most realistic preparation for operations. They are the only effective method of replicating the real frictions inherent in land conflict environments.

d. **Sustaining.** Sustainment of operations is the subject of Chapter 9. As well as the logistics required to enable deployment and operations themselves, the path from force preparation to generation requires the sustainment
of individuals and teams using the personnel policies listed above, the sustainment of their training using materiel (ammunition, rations and fuel), and the provision of infrastructure and training space so that they can live and train together in suitable conditions.

**Force Generation**

0246. Army force generation flows from force preparation, as specific forces are generated in response to operational tasks and to meet contingencies. Headquarters Land Forces is charged with providing the land and aviation military capability to conduct and support operations in pursuit of defence policy, in the right place, at the right time, and in the most cost effective manner. The process takes trained individuals and teams, and trains them collectively. A regulating mechanism prepares forces in line with priorities and an appropriate readiness cycle. In addition to a regulating mechanism, a coherent and cost-effective training process must be capable of evaluating the performance achieved. This is known as collective training competence, the levels of which describes the training performance achieved and provide an indicator of a unit’s readiness to undertake operations. The elements of collective training are described below, although they should straddle the interface between preparation and generation as a seamless progression. They should be joint and integrated as early as competence allows, are:

a. **Foundation Training.** This allows all units to achieve flexible core competence on core equipments, ultimately at collective training establishments. All training should seek relevance to the contemporary operating environment, building on an adaptive foundation that takes account of how that environment might change or broaden and the unchanging aspects of its nature.

b. **Mission-Specific Training.** The purpose of mission-specific training is to address inevitable shortfalls in foundation training, and follows a unit’s adaptation to meet its specific, intended mission. Mission-specific training focuses exclusively on mission competencies, so should be conducted using mission-specific resources, especially where they may be unfamiliar. Such training will always be required because operations vary so greatly. However, artificial or unnecessary distinctions between the foundation and the mission-specific must be avoided.

c. **Mission Rehearsal Training.** Mission rehearsal training usually takes place in the form of command post exercises, with field dimensions and confirmatory live firing, and is designed to prepare units and formations for specific aspects of the forthcoming mission. They should be joined at this point by multinational and inter-agency elements as appropriate.

d. **Enabling Measures.** Readiness cycles should take account of the enabling actions that a unit or formation undertakes in an operational cycle. These are linked to the enabling actions described in Chapter 8 and include: pre-
deployment leave; Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI), which provides the polish to a formation or unit just before entry to an operational theatre; the relief in place of the in-place force; extraction and recovery; decompression and post-operational tour leave.

0247. **Readiness and Collective Training Competence.** Readiness to deploy is assured by the chain of command, in consultation with training organisations. Competences are awarded by a unit or formation commander for performances tested in challenging training events. For battle groups and below, completion of both live firing and field training exercises is required in order to attain a collective competence rating at each level. There are six training levels, from 1 (team training in the context of a platoon) to 6 (divisional training in the context of a multinational corps). In theory, a seventh level could be considered to situate corps training in an even wider context.

0248. **Maintaining Sustainable Supply.** Effective force generation depends on maintaining a sustainable supply of capable, ready force elements. To ensure that they are properly prepared and generated for operations, a robust model is required to establish, justify and explain reasonable intervals between deployments. This in turn requires a certain number of units to deliver the force levels required to meet the demands of defence policy in an enduring way. It is judged that a sustainable supply for forces that are regularly in contact or operating at a high tempo, on a roulement basis, should be based on 6 months deployment with 24 months between deployments. This has proven to be a workable equation required to sustain Fighting Power.

0249. **Lessons.** An Army that cannot learn lessons is destined to fail. A lesson is an experience, example, or observation that imparts beneficial new knowledge or wisdom for the future. It is something that can be analysed to produce recommendations and actions and as such can be positive or negative. Feedback from activity is essential to ensure that lessons, some of which will have been exposed at great cost, are not only identified but also actually learned. Extracting the benefits of lessons requires that:
   a. Caution should be taken to situate the lessons in context in order to ensure that they are not false or too specific in time and space, for example to place them against the nature as well as the character of conflict.
   b. A culture of humility and trust that encourages examination of what happened, what went right and what went wrong. Positive lessons can be drawn from both, so it is counter-productive to make lessons the subject of an inquisitorial and adversarial culture. The only lessons worth treating in this way are those which have been ignored.
   c. It is understood that learning lessons is an individual as well as a collective activity. A lesson might be clear institutionally, but until it is absorbed
individually, the risks of repeating mistakes or missing opportunities will remain high.

d. A lessons process should be based on lessons identified (an observation from which a remedial action has been developed and responsibility for carrying out the remedial action has been proposed), and lessons learned (the results from the implementation of a remedial action that produces an improved performance or increased capability). This process should harness post-operational and training reports and interviews, inquiries and investigations, study days, doctrinal reviews and operational analysis. The process should specify how lessons that are identified become institutionally learned and how recommendations are exploited to maximise and enhance operational capability. A robust process that captures, examines, codifies, communicates and exploits lessons is required. This path is made smoother if the management of lessons is a routine activity, reinforced by sufficient oversight by the chain of command.

0250. **Reserves.** The Reserves, in particular the Territorial Army, make a major contribution to land forces on operations. Properly preparing and generating the Reserves, which includes their recruitment, training and terms of service, is a fundamental aspect of force generation. Reserves will supplement the military manpower of regular units or provide formed sub-units - potentially units - themselves, some of which are highly specialised, some of which fulfil core combat, combat support, combat command support and combat service support functions. In certain circumstances they will be engaged specifically for their civilian capabilities. Cross-governmental initiatives are used to identify and organise a variety of categories of civilians on the reserve lists who have expertise which will be highly sought after in operational theatres.
Notes


3 NATO publications (ratified and under development) can be accessed at: http://nsa.nato.int/nsa/

4 The US Marine Corps and the Royal Marines have associate status.

5 The Joint Doctrine Hierarchy in detail can be found at: http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/microsite/DCDC/


7 In addition to the DCDC website, go to the (Restricted) British Army Electronic Battle Box at http://lfportal.landforces.r.mil.uk/AKX/Pages/EBB.aspx or order the box on disc (Army Code 71632).

8 Such law may be made applicable as a matter of policy.

9 In international armed conflict there are 4 categories of captured person: Prisoners of War (PW); Retained Personnel; Internees and Detainees. In non-international armed conflict there are 2 types of detainee: Security Detainees and Criminal Detainees.


11 With corresponding obligations derived from the Warrant.


13 Referred to collectively as ‘CADMID’.
The Principles of War
02A1. The Principles of War provide comprehensive considerations for planning and executing all campaigns, operations and activities, not just warfare. The principles are not absolute or prescriptive, but provide a foundation for all military activity and doctrine. Their messages resonate throughout this doctrine publication. The relative importance of each may vary according to context; their application on judgement, common sense and intelligent interpretation. The Principles of War are based on an assumption of legitimacy. They provide a timeless and overarching checklist of things to be remembered at all levels of warfare. Sometimes in doctrine they are confined to a reference, perhaps because they are seen as truisms. There are frequent overlaps with other sections in this ADP, but if experience shows them to be sometimes neglected, it is prudent to highlight them together in detail.

There exists a small number of fundamental principles of war, which may not be deviated from without danger, and the application of which...has been in all times crowned with glory.

Baron Henri Jomini, Précis de l’Art de la Guerre, (Paris 1838)

Selection and Maintenance of the Aim

A single, unambiguous aim is at the heart of successful operations. Selection and maintenance of the aim is regarded as the master principle of war.

02A2. The aim provides a focus for coordinated effort and a reference point against which to gauge progress. Its maintenance prevents unnecessary activity, and the unwarranted expansion or dilution of an operation. It is fundamentally important that a single aim pervades subordinate operations, all of which should contribute coherently to achieving it, and that resources are allocated accordingly. Therefore, plans should be continually checked against aim-supporting objectives. In practice, uncertainty, political reality and insufficient initial understanding of a situation frequently conspire against setting an unambiguous aim from the outset. This ambiguity should be guarded against, in particular in multinational operations and those requiring a comprehensive approach. Operations may begin on the basis of an aim which needs to be formally reconsidered as circumstances change. Commanders should be able to provide clear military advice that informs political decisions regarding the conditions on the ground and the feasibility of achieving the political aim, given the military means available.

Maintenance of Morale

Morale is a positive state of mind derived from inspired political and military leadership, a shared sense of purpose and values, well-being, perceptions of worth, and group cohesion.
02A3. No doctrine, plan or formula for conducting warfare or other military activity is likely to succeed without the maintenance of morale, which depends upon affording personnel the best chances of success, survival and a sense of justifiable purpose, and a feeling of being valued. High morale is characterised by steadfastness, courage, confidence and sustained hope. It is especially manifested in staying power and resolve, the will to win and to prevail in spite of adversity. It is sustained, and progressively increased, by success on operations and is most powerful when it suffuses the whole chain of command.

**Offensive Action**

*Offensive action is the practical way in which a commander seeks to gain advantage, sustain momentum and seize the initiative.*

02A4. Offensive action provides the benefits of action rather than reaction, and the freedom to force a decision. At its heart is the notion of an offensive spirit, which imbues forces with confidence, encourages enterprise and a determination not to cede the initiative, as well as promoting a culture of achievement. As a state of mind, and in practical terms, offensive action is often decisive, and its broader application should not preclude defensive action when circumstances and prudence demand, provided the defence is conducted en route back to offence. Offensive action implies a vigorous, incisive - but not necessarily wholly violent - approach to defeating adversaries and conditions; to exploiting opportunities and to applying constant pressure against other forms of resistance and sources of instability.

**Security**

*Security is the provision and maintenance of an operating environment that affords the freedom of action, when and where required, to achieve objectives.*

02A5. Security always entails balancing the likelihood of loss against the achievement of objectives. It demands prudent risk-taking and the protection of the population, personnel, materiel, information and infrastructure, as well as those military and non-military activities vital to operational success. Security does not, however, imply undue caution or avoidance of risks. Neither does it demand the over-commitment of resources to guard against every threat or possibility, thereby diminishing available fighting power.

**Surprise**

*Surprise is a feeling of relative astonishment or perhaps shock induced by the introduction of the unexpected.*
02A6. Surprise involves using secrecy, concealment, deception, originality, audacity or tempo to confuse, paralyse or disrupt effective decision-making, and undermine an adversary’s cohesion and morale. Surprise is a potent psychological feature of warfare and may be accomplished by manoeuvre, the introduction of novel technologies, or by any activity that is unfamiliar or unforeseen. It may also be attributable to friction or chance. Surprising an adversary is a significant way of seizing the initiative. Surprise is by nature transient, as shock and confusion recede over time, so its effects should be exploited rapidly and aggressively. Commanders should anticipate the effects of being surprised themselves, make appropriate plans to safeguard their freedom of action, and exploit opportunities that may arise out of unexpected circumstances or success. They should also consider the potency of positive surprise, for example by delivering an unexpectedly favourable outcome for a population.

Concentration of Force

Concentration of force involves the decisive, synchronised application of superior fighting power (physical, conceptual and moral) to realise intended effects, when and where required.

02A7. Concentration of force does not necessarily require the physical massing of forces, but needs them to be agile so that they can engage and prevail through the aggregation and coordination of elements of fighting power at critical points and times. Similar outcomes may be achieved by superior command and control, deception, influence, a stronger moral component than the adversary, superior technology or firepower, and the application of money to improve the lives of a population. Ultimately, success depends upon subtle and constant changes of emphasis in time and space to realise results, accepting that concentration at the point of main effort may necessitate economy elsewhere.

Economy of Effort

Economy of effort is the judicious exploitation of manpower, materiel, time and influence in relation to the achievement of objectives.

02A8. Central to the conservation of fighting power, are a commander’s considerations of the requirements and relative priority between individual engagements, actions and activities, the sustainability demands of the campaign as a whole and the longer-term balances in his force. He should consider what type of power is likely to work best, rather than automatically choosing the most violent. Economy of effort is judicious and considered; it is not code for a negligent level of investment. Economy of effort is best summarised as the right tool in the right place, at the right time, leading to the right result.
**Flexibility**

*Flexibility - the ability to change readily to meet new circumstances* - comprises versatility, responsiveness, resilience, acuity and adaptability.

02A9. Flexibility has both mental and physical dimensions. To lead to success, it needs to be associated with an organisation and culture that encourages people to think creatively, and to be resourceful and imaginative - especially in the face of the unexpected. Versatility is the physical and structural ability that allows forces to adjust rapidly and decisively, especially when operating in complex situations, or in the face of new or unforeseen circumstances. Responsiveness is a measure not only of speed of action and reaction, but also how quickly the initiative can be seized or regained. Resilience is the degree to which people and their equipment remain effective under arduous conditions or in the face of hostile action. Acuity is sharpness of thought, characterised by intellectual and analytical rigour, enabling intuitive understanding of complex and changing circumstances. Adaptability embraces the need to learn quickly, to adjust to changes in a dynamic situation, and to amend plans that, in the light of experience, seem unlikely to lead to a suitable outcome.

**Cooperation**

*Cooperation entails the incorporation of teamwork and a sharing of dangers, burdens, risks and opportunities in every aspect of warfare.*

02A10. Cooperation is based upon team spirit and training. It relies on three related elements: mutual trust and goodwill; a common aim, or at least unity of purpose; and a clear division of responsibilities, including understanding of, and compensation for, the capabilities and limitations of others. Within coalitions or inter-agency approaches, potentially disparate goals and interests will need to be harmonised, with political and military cohesion promoted and protected, to ensure solidarity in the face of difficulties or dangers, and to preserve overall unity of effort.

**Sustainability**

*To sustain a force is to generate the means by which its fighting power and freedom of action are maintained.*

02A11. The ability to sustain a force, during every stage of a campaign, from force preparation and generation, through deployment and operations in theatre, to redeployment and recuperation afterwards, is a critical enabler of fighting power. Sustainability involves the physical and psychological sustenance of personnel; the maintenance and repair of vehicles; equipment and materiel; the provision of combat supplies and service support; and the evacuation, treatment and replacement of casualties. A rigorous assessment of logistic
realities is essential to operational planning; indeed, it may be the deciding factor in assessing the feasibility of an operational choice.

- Avoid the strong, attack the weak: attack and withdraw.
- Protecting our fighters is more important than causing enemy casualties.
- Strike only when success is assured.
- Surprise is essential to success: if you are spotted, you have failed.
- Do not get into a set piece battle. Slip away like smoke, before the enemy can drive home his advantage.
- Attaining the goal demands patience, in order to discover the enemy's weak points.
- Keep moving; avoid formation into a front line.
- Keep the enemy on constant alert, at the front and in the rear.
- The road to the great victory passes through thousands of small victories.
- Keep up the morale of the fighters; avoid notions of the enemy's superiority.
- The media has innumerable guns whose hits are like bullets. Use them in battle.
- The population is a treasure: nurture it.
- Hurt the enemy and then stop before he abandons restraint.

Operations Chapter 3
Chapter 3 examines the nature and character of conflict and their implications for the application of force in the land environment; and then explains the Levels of Warfare.
Strategic leadership often takes place in the space where we don’t even know the question, and have to find it out before we can find the answer…


0301. **Distinguishing Nature and Character.** Nature and character are different. Nature is inherent and endures; character evolves. When this distinction is applied to conflict it has fundamental implications for the land operating environment. There are two benefits of examining both the nature and character of conflict and how they affect the land environment. First, understanding of the conflict environment is significantly enhanced, increasing the potential for operational success. Second, balanced deductions can be made about what land forces need to be capable of. Deductions from nature alone would lead to plans and forces ill-equipped for the subtleties of the contemporary environment. A design based on character alone, might succeed once, but would be lucky to succeed thereafter. A balanced approach is therefore essential: nature first, shaped by character.

You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you…


**The Nature of Conflict**

0302. While the character of conflict and war changes, its nature is unchanging. At its heart lies politics, and politics can rationalise the use of violence to achieve objectives. But what starts off as an instrument of policy can become something less rational; engagement in conflict further shapes policy and changes conflict itself. Conflict represents a constant struggle to achieve understanding, opportunity and control. Whilst there will always be a need to rationalise conflict in a contemporary setting in order to engage in it effectively, its enduring nature will never change, otherwise it will cease to be conflict. Conflict will always be a violent contest: a mix of chance, risk and policy whose underlying nature is human and volatile. There is always:

a. **Friction.** Friction is the force that frustrates action, makes the simple difficult, and the difficult seemingly impossible. Friction may be mental, perhaps caused by indecision, or physical, for example caused by the effects of violence. It may be externally imposed, by an adversary or the environment, or be self-induced, for example by a poor plan.

b. **Uncertainty and Chaos.** No matter how much information there is in conflict, a ‘fog of war’ will descend that can lead to uncertainty and
chaos. Chaos amounts to disorder and confusion that is so unpredictable as to appear random. It is inherent in conflict. Conflict is a human activity - an ‘option of difficulties’ - that is uncertain and subject to inaccurate or contradictory information. Chaos might be deliberately exacerbated by adversaries, and presents opportunities for the bold to seize. It is something to be exploited rather than endured.

c. **Violence and Danger.** The threat or use of violence is the means by which one side in conflict ultimately seeks to succeed over another, by using force. Violence results in bloodshed, destruction and human suffering. It brings surprise, shock, danger and fear. Danger - the possibility of harm - will be caused by the use or threat of force and damage, or other forms of compulsion. Furthermore, ‘...dangers bring fears, and fears more dangers bring.’

The antidotes to danger are found in Fighting Power, particularly in the moral component.

d. **Human Stress.** Although technology impacts on the human reactions to the character of conflict, in its nature human stress will always feature. Combat - fighting - can be horrific, and the prospects of violence, danger, fear, exhaustion, loneliness and privation adversely affect the will of all those involved. Success in battle is as often decided by the psychological ability of each side to withstand these stresses in order to protect its own cohesion and will, as it is by physical results.

0303. **Implications for the Land Environment.** The land environment derives much of its enduring identity from the nature of conflict. It will always be a physically, physiologically and psychologically demanding, dangerous and harmful place for human beings to fight and survive in. The nature of this environment is derived from: terrain, climate, human dynamics and the consequences of military action, explained as follows:

a. **Terrain.** The land environment is defined primarily by terrain: open grassland, cultivated land, forests, mountains, deserts, jungles, rivers, swamps, conurbations and littoral areas. Each creates its own constraints and freedoms, placing different demands on people and equipment. Both need to be capable of operating across such terrain. Terrain blocks communication and movement, slowing it, but also providing cover for it. Technology helps to deal with terrain, shortening distances and providing protection from its demands. Human beings can manipulate terrain by clearing it, or obstructing it. Ultimately they need to engage personally with the physical world they inhabit; they are forced to see it, feel its texture, smell it, hear its sounds and experience the discomfort it causes. Terrain is usually different at close hand from how it appears from a distance. It takes very little for the trappings of technology to be stripped away, leaving the human being to survive, as part of the landscape and in primal terms, using instinct, cunning, camouflage and brute strength.
b. **Climate.** The demands of terrain are accentuated by climate: heat, cold and precipitation. Climate degrades and enhances terrain, sometimes changing it permanently. It affects visibility, going and speed of movement, as well as physical and virtual communication. Human beings are highly susceptible to the impacts of climate, physically and psychologically. Climate can isolate, debilitate and kill. But it also sustains life, affords protection and provides cover and opportunity. Linked to climate is light: conflict in the dark is often very different to conflict in daylight. Climate interacts with terrain to dramatically affect the operating environment, for example by redirecting rivers, cutting off mountain passes and flooding coastal plains. These effects can rarely be mitigated by technology alone. They need to be overridden by human will and endurance, or a new plan.

c. **Human Dynamics.** At the most basic level, human beings are motivated by 3 things: survival, self-interest and values. In the face of danger they unavoidably flee, freeze or fight. Their behaviour is naturally competitive and not always rational; their actions lead to unintended as well as to intended consequences. Human beings seek to control, exploit and protect their environment. They will migrate to reach the resources they need to survive or prosper. They are able to alter terrain and perhaps climate. Human beings are fundamentally innovative, always seeking explanations and solutions, capable of questioning everything, and driven by the pursuit of power and progress. These dynamics ultimately lead to conflict of varying degrees of intensity, including violent conflict. This conflict is indiscriminate in who it involves - those who fight, freeze or flee will be dragged in - and it will lead to loss, damage and death. Because human beings live in the land environment, it is there that conflict - this fundamentally human activity - mostly takes place and is usually resolved.

d. **The Consequences of Military Action.** In conflict in the land environment, the terrain, climate and human dynamics shape, and are themselves shaped by, the consequences of military action themselves:

1) Land forces are physically large, but their mass is made up of individuals, who do not necessarily act as one. They consist of many people who would move around as individuals or groups of individuals, in order to bring effects to bear, to achieve a decision or to protect themselves. Each person is an individual manoeuvre unit, with individual instincts, perceptions, attitudes to risk and decision-making techniques. Land forces therefore use structures and drills, simply to ensure that their units operate to a common purpose and, when required, move in the same direction. But they need to balance some prescription with trust and experience, because military action on land cannot be choreographed in every detail.
(In spite of...changes), the task of the soldier in the front line remains as it has always been, and the soldierly virtues and skills he needs remain remarkably unchanged. He must be skilled in the use of his weapons and of ground; he must be alert, steadfast and brave, and must be able to endure hardship of every kind. He must be prepared to stay where he is or to move forward in the face of firepower...risking wounds or death, and himself be prepared to kill.


2) Military action in the land environment is usually ‘up close and personal,’ where the killing and destruction cannot be left behind: the smell, noise and feel are personally felt and never forgotten. There is no easy detachment from the consequences of using or facing force. Land forces seek to protect themselves not only by moving, but also by not moving or by hiding, deceiving, or attacking. They attack or defend themselves by using firepower, which may be direct or indirect; physical or psychological. They use violent and non-violent means to break apart an opponent’s cohesion, shatter or reduce his will or protect these things in themselves and their own populations. These means can cause great damage, which can exacerbate as well as subdue the causes of conflict. Land forces usually operate among people, many of whom will be bystanders in the conflict. The many resulting interactions can have decisive impacts on the outcomes of conflict.

3) Land forces consume materiel which needs to be moved to them, since they cannot easily disengage from activity. Logistic movement, the evacuation of casualties and the deployment of reinforcements create physical trails across the landscape that cannot cross without impact on each other. A wide variety of actions taking place concurrently and in close proximity to each other, with the effects of terrain, climate and the human dynamics, makes the land environment the most complex and challenging of them all.

4) Military action in the land environment has a timeless quality: the tribal nature of a land force’s ethos, the personal nature of combat on land, and the way land forces organise and group themselves, has changed little throughout human history. Technology has not removed the need for the small team, the personal weapon, the shield and the trench, and in substance it never will.
War (on land) moves in an atmosphere composed of danger, physical effort, uncertainty and chance. Everything in war is simple, but even the simplest thing is difficult, and these difficulties, largely unforeseen or unpredictable, accumulate and produce a friction, a retarding brake on the absolute extension and discharge of violence. These difficulties consist of danger, bodily exertion, information or the lack of it, and innumerable other small and incalculable circumstances and uncertainties originated by chance. These are some of the inevitable things that always prevent wars in reality from ever approaching war on paper and in plans.


5) The military instrument has rarely been operated in the land environment independently of the other levers of power. The Romans recognised that the application of force required complementary efforts, to stabilise or sustain, or simply to achieve economy of effort. Most successful campaigns in human history have been by nature orchestrated comprehensively, and, with the development of conflict at sea and then in the air, joint. This is because it is in the nature of conflict that each side seeks an advantage wherever it can be found. The land commander must have the ability himself to synchronise these comprehensive and joint effects in time and space.

6) Conflict in the land environment usually endures for longer than its participants expected or planned for. It is almost always less discretionary than hoped for, expected or at first appears. These considerations in turn change conflict’s character. Unintended consequences lengthen the conflict, but this can be regarded as a price worth paying, for what is gained or prevented. It is harder to terminate, resolve or transition conflict in the land environment than in any other.

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.

The Character of Conflict

You wanted an open war. Let it be an open war. Your government wanted to change the rules of the game. Let the rules of the game change.

Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, General Secretary of Hezbollah, *An Unambiguous Warning to Israel on the Eve of the Lebanon War*, a speech on 14 July 2006

0304. The character of conflict evolves. It changes because of human experience, innovation and the dynamics of conflict themselves. The character of contemporary conflict, which also provides indicators for the future, can be better understood by describing it as congested, cluttered, contested, connected and constrained. These characteristics provide important contextual guidance for land environmental doctrine, as follows:

a. **Congested.** Although land forces seek freedom of manoeuvre, they need to bring military effect to bear where it achieves goals, not just where it is easiest to operate. Forces cannot avoid being drawn into operations in the urban and littoral regions, where the majority of the global population lives, and where most political and economic activity is concentrated. Therefore the ground is often densely populated, frequently by dissatisfied and disadvantaged people, a number of whom will be armed, living in conditions of physical hardship. The maritime environment contains large numbers of vessels, busy shipping-lanes, choke-points, ports, canals and waterways. The airspace is similarly congested, with the diffusion of technology causing a proliferation of airspace users, including unmanned aircraft. The proliferation of space-based assets and independent launch capabilities and the greater commercial use of satellites make orbital space increasingly congested. The electromagnetic spectrum and cyberspace are also becoming more congested. Because of their interconnection, congestion will exist between as well as within these physical and virtual environments.

b. **Cluttered.** Clutter leads to an inability to distinguish individuals, items or events. Particularly in congested environments, clutter provides opportunities for concealment, and serves to confound battlefield sensors and public opinion. Contemporary adversaries try to blend into the background. If they are indigenous to the theatre, they will exploit their intimate local knowledge. The demands of legitimacy, and the avoidance of collateral damage, make it difficult to acquire, understand, track and engage targets. Adversaries are able to exploit underground facilities, hospitals, schools and places of worship and dense urban, populated conurbations. In cyberspace, the ability to remain concealed whilst
attacking at range, with plausible deniability, provides the opportunity for even small groups to achieve strategic effect against powerful opponents.

c. 

**Contested.** Contemporary adversaries, thinking laterally, seek to contest all environments where they want to deny freedom of manoeuvre or to have influence. Technological diffusion and the innovative use of existing technologies underpin this threat. On land, mobility is contested by the use of minefields and improvised explosive devices, often arrayed like minefields. Adversaries will try to hold and exploit significant ground for political and military purposes. In the maritime environment, a proliferation of mines, anti-ship missile systems, fast-attack craft and submarine capability threatens access from the sea. In the air, the ability to operate is contested, especially in the lower airspace and around air bases. Similarly, anti-access and area denial capabilities, including the disruption of satellites on which networked capabilities rely, is maturing. Adversaries may try to limit access to theatres of operation, either directly, for example through the use of missile attacks or barrages, swarm attacks by unmanned aircraft, by mining the approaches to disembarkation ports, or indirectly by influencing political will and public opinion. These adversaries seek to spread their influence more widely and also to threaten the UK home base. Strategic narratives are as contested as physical spaces. Activity in cyberspace will increasingly be both stand-alone and coordinated with physical means. State and non-state adversaries seek to acquire chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear capability, and their success in doing so will affect the balance of power and threaten regional security and stability.

d. 

**Connected.** Global activity will continue to gravitate towards interconnected nodes. Nodes are centres of activity which require protection and offer opportunities for exploitation. Nodes range from critical infrastructure such as air and sea ports, and satellite ground stations, to strategic locations including centres of governance. They are also where adversaries’ strategic interests are clustered, for example areas of narcotics production, nuclear weapons facilities or ethnic concentrations. Networks, such as logistic re-supply routes, sea and air lanes of communication and computer networks, connect the nodes. These networks can be disrupted, so require robustness and adaptability. Access to a theatre, whether physical or virtual, is likely to be via nodes, so cannot be taken for granted. In the virtual environments all sides in a conflict seek to use the same nodes, so protection of friendly virtual networks is non-discretionary. The world is connected by global media, making it particularly challenging to control or even influence the narratives of campaigns.

e. 

**Constrained.** In today’s battlespace, liberal, democratic, legal and societal norms place great constraints on the conduct of operations. The increasing difficulty in distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants requires extensive targeting preparation and restraint in execution.
Expanding individual rights and opportunities to litigate have placed greater onus on commanders to consider how they take risks. The ubiquity of the media threatens operational security and can undermine instantly a narrative that in previous conflicts could have been unassailable. These are some examples of how the constraints of the operating environment, which are unlikely to apply to all sides in a conflict equally, have changed its character substantially.

0305. **Implications for the Land Environment.** The changing character of conflict affects the land environment in the following ways:

a. **Threats.** Threats emanate from all around, concurrently and defying neat categorisation. There are no longer any rear areas in the traditional sense, even at home. States do not monopolise warfare and the actors in the battlespace are becoming more varied; including failed and failing states, irregular groups, networks, proxies and corporations. This hybrid character creates an intense friction when it reacts with increasing constraints. The means employed by these adversaries will vary more than ever before, from combined arms manoeuvre, to guerrilla tactics, to chemical, nuclear and biological attacks, to exploiting global information technology. But, although adversaries will come in many guises and will vary in scale, they will still probably be presented either as fielded forces or exhibit some of the basic characteristics of a fielded force, for example, a command system and a common ethos, by natural inclination rather than by design. It is also important to understand that threats are relative. They may in fact be no more than risks; or they may be worse than threats, if they are realised. Threats should be measured in terms of either likelihood or gravity. An analysis that fails to measure threats in this way will lead to excessive risk aversion. This subject is examined further in Chapter 6.

b. **Categories of Military Activity.** Military activities in the land environment are only categorised in this doctrine to aid understanding. However, the categories will probably never take place in isolation, so they should not be seen within rigid compartments. Most conflicts will require concurrent, overlapping or connected military activities, sometimes in adjacent streets. The relationships between these activities and conflict makes a mosaic a more accurate way of visualising the environment than a spectrum, which has previously been used in UK doctrine, but is too simplistic. A mosaic is formed by small pieces, all of which are required to see the full picture. In this mosaic, each piece represents a military activity or groups of activities. These activities take place in a conflict environment affected by 5 principal drivers. The first is globalisation (the internationalisation of markets and communication). The second is the breakdown of boundaries between environments and between traditional state and non-state activity. The third is innovation, leading to exponential technological progress and
widening access to technology. The fourth is acute competition caused by scarcity of resources and global inequalities. The fifth is the development of multiple and concurrent hybrid threats in conflict. In Chapter 8 the primary purpose of military forces - combat - and the complementary categories of military activity are explained in detail. An understanding of what each involves is not required at this stage of reading. However, they are used in the model at Figure 3.1 to illustrate how conflict can be visualised as a mosaic: a conflict environment - shaped by drivers - in which military activities of different categories take place, concurrently in time and space, with elements of many of them occurring in most scenarios. The activities' proportions vary in terms of longevity, scale and intensity. The model is illustrative, to give an impression, rather than to act as an exact categorisation of conflict.

Figure 3.1 - Illustrative Military Activities in a Mosaic of Conflict
c. **Time and Space.** Increasing speed of communication and change, added to increasing physical congestion are together reducing the freedom to manoeuvre in the land environment, physically and psychologically. Margins for error are reducing. Tactical mistakes have always had the potential to have strategic impacts, but the chances of this happening are increasing exponentially.

d. **Joint and Multinational Operations.** Operations in the land environment cannot be conducted in isolation of the others. Air, space and cyberspace will always have a direct effect, and the sea environment will have an effect directly or indirectly. The physical limits of land operating areas are becoming more difficult to define and sustain as borders become more porous, instability more regional and threats more global. Most operations involve multinational coalitions and a multi-agency dimension.

e. **Technology.** Diffusion, which widens access to technology, is removing the ability of sides in conflict to achieve technological dominance over each other; and technology will never be able to sanitise the physical demands of conflict in the land environment. Reversionary modes - low-technology solutions to high-technology failures - are essential for operations in the land environment, to compensate for the effects of a declining technological edge, and to mitigate the inherent frictions.

f. **Narratives.** Coherent narratives are an increasingly important aspect of operations in the land environment because of the ubiquity of onlookers and media coverage, on a scale rivalled only in cyberspace. Deception and surprise are becoming more difficult to achieve in the environment but remain attractive for the economies of scale, effort and risk that they afford.

g. **Physical Factors.** The physical environment is becoming yet more demanding owing to increasing temperatures, climatic variation, urbanisation and declining natural resources. Notwithstanding investigations into non-lethal and precise solutions, the lethality of weapons is increasing, as is the size of the areas of danger they create. Conflict is generally becoming more protracted than the limited, set piece battles of the past. The soldier on the battlefield is becoming more exposed. Even among the clutter, it is becoming harder for the conventional soldier to camouflage himself; physically, as well as in terms of narrative and influence.

h. **Sustainment of Operations.** Sustaining activity in the land environment is becoming more difficult, as the layout of the battlespace becomes less linear, and lines of supply and communication more vulnerable. The enduring realities of demand, destination, duration and distance mean that only land forces of sufficient mass and logistic expertise can survive. However, such scale makes forces more difficult to project over long distances and the logistics architecture that they have to rely on can fix as well as enable them. This also means that their eventual withdrawal or redeployment requires particularly complicated activity.
The Application of Force

0306. It is possible to draw on the nature and character of conflict and deductions about the nature and character of the land environment to describe how force is most effectively applied by land forces. Properly applied force gains physical and moral ascendancy over an adversary. It is ultimately the purpose of armed forces to apply or threaten to apply force, which may be lethal. But the consequences of physical damage can erode advantage, militarily or politically. Commanders need to balance often competing demands: limiting military casualties by using remote methods and high levels of force protection; engaging with the population in order to develop understanding and trust; and implanting in the mind of an adversary a sense of personal risk and uncertainty. The general principle should be to use minimum, but not minimal, force. It is better to modify behaviour by coercion than by actually using force. This needs a subtle combination of threats and incentives that allows the commander to retain control without losing the initiative or public support. Demonstrations of force, without resorting to its use, can also have a powerful deterrent effect, but they will only work if the potential for force is recognised and understood.

The Nature of the Application of Force

0307. The nature of the land operating environment determines how force should be applied there; and what land forces need to be capable of (in their nature) to apply it. They need to be able to:

a. **Understand that People are the Capability.** Land forces are unique among military forces, in that their ‘people are the capability.’ Air and maritime forces generally man the equipment; land forces generally equip the man. In air and maritime forces the aim is usually for people to get a piece of equipment into a position from which it can have an effect. For land forces, the aim is usually to employ equipment to get people into positions from which they can have an effect. This distinction fundamentally affects land forces’ ethos, leadership and the way they use resources. People are the land force’s capability, so this capability depends on people: well-motivated, trained, valued and in sufficient numbers.

b. **Use a Philosophy and Principles, not Prescription.** In the land environment, prescription should be limited to basic drills and structures, creating space for freedom of action based on clear philosophy and principles. A premium is placed on understanding the intent, the situation, the threats and the capabilities of the force, rather than on following a procedure. This understanding is then exploited, using an indirect approach which applies strength against weakness. This capability should be underpinned by a philosophy of command that centralises intent and decentralises execution. It also requires doctrine and core skills that are...
malleable to multiple situations. This in turn requires imagination and lateral thinking in matching the skill or doctrine to the situation found.

c. **Overcome Complexity.** In the land environment the complexity is such that actions do not lead to effects with any degree of certainty. Furthermore, generating and using land fighting power takes time and a great deal of fine-tuning. This fundamentally affects command, staff work and methods of operating and fighting, leading to a requirement for headquarters that are capable of grappling with complexity. Dealing with complexity demands that people become adept at understanding the environment, with all its nuances, visualising it and then producing and executing simple plans; sensing the exact moments when situations change. These skills cannot be achieved without individual education, flexible and adaptable organisations, and repeated collective training.

d. **Take Risks.** Risks are a neutral, not a negative. They offer opportunities as much as they present threats. Because ‘Murphy’s Law’ (what can go wrong, probably will) applies ubiquitously in the land environment, a confident attitude to risk is required. The environment requires commanders and operators who are capable of calculating, exploiting and mitigating risks, making decisions and communicating them clearly. This capability should be a cultural norm in an effective land force, which draws its people from a society where the norm is to avoid risks. Risk-taking is examined further in Chapter 6.

e. **Act Pragmatically.** The unpredictability of conflict in the land environment means that some courses of action that should work, do not. Flexibility, experience and common sense come together to achieve pragmatic, rather than pure results. Land forces - who never enjoy perfect awareness or unassailable technological dominance - should therefore be comfortable with ambiguity and expert at improvisation.

f. **Understand Asymmetry.** Operations in the land environment are by definition asymmetric because adversaries always differ, even if sometimes only marginally. These differences may be reflected in their physical attributes - their organisation, equipment, tactics, numbers - or in more abstract ways, for example in their intent, culture and values. This natural asymmetry can be accentuated deliberately as adversaries seek an advantage, enhancing their own strengths and targeting their opponents’ weaknesses. To understand asymmetry requires a subtlety that is obscured by a simplistic compartmentalisation of conflict. The key question is not: is the conflict asymmetric, but how and in what way is it asymmetric?
Up to this time our fighting...had always been done between one army and another. It was only here...that we learned how terrible a thing it is to fight against a people. On the one hand there is no glory, for what glory could be gained by defeating this rabble of elderly shopkeepers, ignorant peasants, fanatical priests, excited women and all the other creatures who made up the garrison? On the other hand there were extreme discomfort and danger, for these people would give you no rest, would observe no rules of war, and were desperately earnest in their desire by hook or by crook to do you an injury ... It was not for us soldiers to think about politics, but from the beginning there always seemed to be a curse upon this war...

Sir Arthur Conan Doyle writing in 1903 about the Peninsular War in The Complete Brigadier Gerard, (Edinburgh: Canongate Classics, 1995), 358

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g. Manoeuvre, Strike and Protect. There is an enduring requirement, unchanging in its essential nature, to manoeuvre across ground, with some form of protection and materiel support, to reach a place from which to strike, using a form of firepower, in order to achieve a decisive condition which will often require the occupation and protection of ground. To move without organic protection and integrated firepower in a high threat environment, against a capable adversary, will almost certainly result in defeat. These capabilities cannot be bolted together just before a fight; such combined arms manoeuvre requires a great deal of expertise, integration, and practice.

h. Seize the Initiative. Holding the initiative creates the ability to dictate events, a prerequisite for success in conflict. In the land environment, opportunities to seize the initiative may be fleeting and difficult to recognise. Land forces should be capable of recognising the moment to seize it and then protect it, either from being grasped by an opponent or from the results of becoming over-extended. This depends on understanding, physical and mental agility, and robustness.

i. Maintain Cohesion. As was explained in Chapter 2, land forces are largely ineffective without cohesion. The complexity and uncertainty of the environment and its physical demands, requires forces that are capable of exploiting chaos rather than adding to it. Cohesion holds the moral, physical and conceptual dimensions of a force together. It will be the primary target of a thinking adversary.

j. Withstand the effects of Shock. At a personal level, shock disturbs personal equilibrium and causes a violent disruption of thought, emotions and physical aptitude. It can substantially reduce participation, and cause panic and irrational responses in groups of people. Because shock is a natural effect of conflict, a force that is able, individually and collectively, to override it or
at least work through it will gain a real advantage. This requires discipline, cohesion and above all inoculation through realistic training.

Hail, soldier, huddled in the rain,
Hail, soldier, squelching through the mud,
Hail soldier, sick of dirt and pain,
The sight of death, the smell of blood.
New men, new weapons, bear the brunt;
New slogans gild the ancient game:
The infantry are still in front,
And mud and dust are much the same...

AP Herbert, Salute The Soldier, 26 March 1944, in Light the Lights,
(London: Methuen and Co, 1945)

The Character of the Application of Force

0308. From the character of the land operating environment, it is possible to add further guidance as to how force should be applied. To be capable of applying, or threatening to apply force, land forces need to be:

a. **Homogenous.** Land forces’ structures derive much of their agility from homogeneity. The greater the degree of specialisation and variation, the lower the force’s overall level of versatility, because no specialisation can be held in unlimited quantities. Homogeneity is achieved through many of the elements of Fighting Power explained in Chapter 2. For example, training based on an adaptive foundation, maximising the number of skills that are treated as core rather than specialised, adopting robust force structures that do not require augmentation, and fielding equipment with as few variants as possible.

b. **Expeditionary.** An expeditionary mindset (go anywhere, at any time, for any task) should underpin individual and collective ethos. This purposeful attitude should be reinforced by: a preparedness to fight; personal resilience; a philosophy of clear, centralised intent and properly-resourced decentralised execution; professional mobility supported by suitable terms and conditions of service; and the ability to project force strategically and quickly, and then to sustain it. Expeditionary is not necessarily the same as rapid response. An expeditionary approach should have an element of continuous engagement in order to anticipate, understand or prevent conflict, as well as to respond to it.

c. **Intelligent.** The ability to understand, as well as find, is essential in the land environment. This is partly what gives people an edge over their rivals. Forces need to be capable of understanding the character of the conflict that they are in. Imagination is also important because it feeds innovation and exploitation of indirect approaches. The land force requires people
who can think to the finish, and are able to plan for second and third order consequences and anticipate those beyond. A culture of education and learning, led - sometimes enforced - from the top of the organisation is required. Also part of this culture should be trust, clear direction and professional competence, brought about by repeated practice and exposure to challenge. On operations, these qualities should be brought together by headquarters that are structured and resourced to deal with spans of command, able to control events on the ground and handle the downward pressure from governments and higher headquarters.

d. **Improvisational.** Land forces need to create the conditions for their people - the capability - to gain and hold an edge over a variety of capable adversaries. This requires people who have a personal expeditionary ethos, a commitment to soldiering as a profession of arms; risk takers, and people with high standards of physical fitness, mental resilience, fieldcraft, battlefield discipline and confident bearing. Most importantly, it should be recognised that there is truth in the clichés: no plan survives contact with the enemy; most equipment is designed to fight the last war; and doctrine can be dated in detail as soon as it is published. These clichéd constraints apply to all sides in conflict. Therefore, the side that prevails will be the one that is most effective at improvisation. Improvisation is the key to seizing and holding the initiative and provides the agility - relative to the adversary - that this skill requires. The 3 components of Fighting Power provide the critical start points for our success, but improvisation will give us the edge.

e. **Decisive.** Land forces have limited utility if they are not robust enough to bring about a decision. They should be capable of shaping and sustaining events and conditions. But the true measure is their ability to commit decisive acts: to use lethal force if necessary and then protect the conditions achieved, perhaps for the long-term. The application of force involves finding and identifying the threat, fixing it to deny it freedom and striking or neutralising it. Exploiting a favourable situation comes next. Throughout, the effort needs to be sustained and the force’s own vulnerabilities need to be protected. This is likely to require joint, combined arms manoeuvre for achieving a favourable situation, and a wide area security lay down for sustaining it. In conflict today, victory may be too absolute an objective, with more subtle definitions of success required. In this respect, land forces are uniquely placed to switch or modify decisive effects, instantly if necessary.

f. **Legitimate.** As was explained in Chapter 2, moral cohesion in an effective land force is in part based on its legitimacy. There needs to be a justification to engage in conflict and to use the methods selected. The land force needs to be able to deal with endlessly broadening threats, with apparently narrowing freedoms of action. Therefore, a deliberate approach to legitimacy is required, with no aspect taken for granted.
The Levels of Warfare

0309. The distinction between the nature and character of conflict is complemented by visualising a broad approach to conflict on 3 levels. These are the Levels of Warfare, the structure and discipline of which help to maintain a clear integrity of purpose between the state, its armed forces and their missions.

0310. The Levels of Warfare are strategic, operational and tactical. They are the levels at which war, campaigns, operations, military activities and tactical actions are conducted and controlled. They are not tied to levels of command. Corps, divisional, brigade, or battalion commanders may all operate at the operational or tactical level. The growing complexity of the operational environment, including advances in global communications, makes it more difficult to categorise these levels, but the concept remains helpful to understanding conflict and developing strategy.

Nor is there any truth in the idea that the practice of strategy in the field can be confined to the higher ranks. Every officer in charge of a detached force or flying column, every officer who for the time being has to act independently, every officer in charge of a patrol, is constantly brought face to face with strategical [sic] considerations.


The Strategic Level

0311. In highlighting the importance of the strategic level, David Fraser referred to Field Marshal Alanbrooke as regarding the art of strategy as ‘...(determining) the aim, which is, or should be, inherently political; to derive from that aim a series of military objectives to be achieved; to assess these objectives as to the military requirements they create, and the pre-conditions which the achievement of each is likely to necessitate; to measure available and potential resources against the requirements; and to chart from this process a coherent pattern of priorities and a rational course of action.’

0312. Two aspects of strategy are particularly relevant to military forces:

a. National Strategy. A successful national strategy sets out a path, using the diplomatic, economic and military instruments of power, to achieve the national interests. Successful strategies tend to be those which are integrated from the outset. They involve all government departments and agencies. Four broad responsibilities flow from national strategy, to:
   1) Specify the strategic objectives for military activities.
   2) Stipulate limitations on those activities, including the circumstances for the activity to end.
3) Make the required resources available. This should include the direction of the national economic base if necessary.

4) Explain the interaction of strategic military and non-military lines of operation, and describe how success in these is integrated to achieve overall national objectives.

b. **The Military Contribution to Strategy.** The military contribution to strategy is the application of military resources to achieve national strategic objectives, particularly to ensure that a designated Defence main effort is sufficiently resourced. It encompasses the art and science of the employment of forces. During planning for operations, the military contribution to strategy determines operational-level objectives, identifies freedoms and constraints, sets out the desired end-state and describes the military activity and resources required. This enables coherent military advice to be given to government decision-makers. The campaign is then conducted. A campaign is a set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve strategic objectives within a theatre or operating area.

0313. **The Strategic Narrative.** The land environment requires an understanding, at all levels, of the strategic context of operational and tactical actions. In a globalised, networked battlespace, there are few situations where tactical actions cannot have strategic consequences. The strategic context can be understood by wider reading, starting with the UK’s national security strategies. A successful campaign requires a strategic narrative that articulates why the campaign is necessary, the legal basis for it, how it will succeed, and what the costs to the Nation of not undertaking it might be. This message must resonate to those deployed, the domestic audience and a broader international audience, including those in the conflict region. The narrative sets the scene for expressions of intent and main effort, providing the benchmark against which tactical actions are tested. Meanwhile, adversaries will create their own narratives. They may be adept at articulating these narratives and exploiting globalisation and technology to promote them. Because they are agile and less encumbered, for example by scrutiny, and they are adept at exploiting simplicity and emotional resonance, their narratives are frequently first to enter the public domain. The battle of the strategic narratives is as important as any other aspect of campaigns.
We had to arrange their minds in order of battle, just as carefully and as formally as other officers arranged their bodies; and not only our own men’s minds, though them first; the minds of the enemy, so far as we could reach them; and thirdly, the mind of the nation supporting us from behind the firing line, and the mind of the hostile nation waiting the verdict, and the neutrals looking on.

TE Lawrence, *The Evolution of a Revolt*, (Tavistock: Army Quarterly and Defence Journal, October 1920) 11

**The Operational Level**

0314. Joint campaigns and operations are constructed and directed at the operational level in fulfilment of national or coalition strategy. At this level, abstract strategic objectives are translated into practical tactical actions and then resourced. ‘...Tactics form the steps from which operational leaps are assembled; strategy points out the path.’ An operational commander designs, plans, sequences and sustains a campaign, according to the authorised campaign plan, within his area of operations. He directs operations within the campaign. Joint doctrine concentrates on the operational level, unifying tactical and environmental operations into a coherent campaign. In practice the distinction between strategic and operational levels is rarely tidy and is often blurred.

**The Tactical Level**

0315. Battles and engagements are planned and executed at the tactical level to achieve campaign objectives as articulated by the operational commander within the campaign plan, using tactical missions. It is at the tactical level that troops are deployed directly in military activities and the tactical actions that result. Care should be taken not to treat a tactical commander as if he were operating at the operational level, particularly in multinational operations, just because he might be the most senior national commander on the ground. Successes at the tactical level do not translate automatically into campaign success. There needs to be an effective and comprehensive campaign at the operational level, driven by a coherent strategy of ends, ways and means in harmony, to bridge the gap; otherwise tactical battles will probably be fought in vain.
So we come down, uneasy, to look; uneasily pacing the beach. These are the dykes our fathers made: we have never known a breach. Time and again has the gale blown by and we were not afraid; Now we come only to look at the dykes - at the dykes our fathers made.

Now we can only wait till the day, wait and apportion our shame. These are the dykes our fathers left, but we would not look to the same. Time and again we were warned of the dykes, time and again we delayed. Now, it may fall, we have slain our sons, as our fathers we have betrayed.

Walking along the wreck of the dykes, watching the works of the sea! These were the dykes our fathers made, to our great profit and ease. But the peace is gone and the profit is gone, with the old sure days withdrawn… That our own houses show as strange, when we come back in the dawn!

Notes
3 These characteristics are drawn from the authoritative MOD paper entitled the Future Character of Conflict, (Shrivenham: DCDC, October 2009).
5 It is the view of the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS) that National Strategy is not synonymous with Grand Strategy which was dropped as a term in BDD, so re-introduction of the latter is possible. Grand Strategy allows for a coalition strategy based on a blend of a number of national strategies. See RCDS's Strategy Handbook, 2nd Edition (London: Seaford House, 2010) 7
Chapter 4 situates land forces in the joint operation. Having defined what is meant by joint operations and set out the contributions of land forces, the chapter examines how air and maritime power are integrated with operations in the land environment; and how these joint operations are supported by other components. Then there is an explanation of how a comprehensive approach, which joins the military with other levers of power, should be organised. Finally, the multinational dimension of operations in the land environment is described.
A joint approach is one of the foundations of the UK’s defence policy. Most campaigns in British military history have been joint. Defence reform has produced economies of scale, not without some disadvantages, by creating joint or tri-service organisations to replace triplcation. A joint approach should be, in essence, about combining capabilities to make them more effective, not just cheaper. In contemporary operations this requires more than a tri-service perspective: air and maritime capabilities should be included in planning in the land environment from the start, rather than as adjuncts. Furthermore, joint operations increasingly need to integrate military efforts with those of non-military organisations, and almost always involve allies. This leads to a comprehensive approach - essentially an enhanced joint approach, which is examined later in this chapter. What are sometimes referred to as joint enablers are frequently critically important to operations in the land environment, but may not be controlled all of the time by land forces. This factor needs to be kept in mind.

Separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single, concentrated effort.

President Dwight D Eisenhower, Speech to the United States Congress, 1958

In military terms, expeditionary campaigns are usually conducted by Joint Task Forces (JTFs), created specifically for an operation. JTFs are tailored to a mission, and furnished with the capabilities necessary to achieve specified objectives. They are usually multinational and their titles differ depending on the alliance or coalition involved. JTFs are commanded by JTF headquarters (HQs) under a JTF Commander (JTFC) who usually answers to a Joint Force Commander (JFC) or to the Joint Commander himself, who in the UK’s case is likely to be the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO). Combined JTFs (CJTFs) usually describe alliance or coalition joint task forces.

A JTF consists of a headquarters and a number of components: land, maritime, air, logistics and special forces. The first four should be fundamentally integrated, practically and culturally, from the start of operations. JTF headquarters plan and conduct the campaign at the operational level. Components prosecute and coordinate battles and tactical engagements to achieve operational-level objectives. Components are normally created for a specific campaign and are likely to be multinational. In this context UK land forces may work within a land component under the
command of a coalition partner and alongside contingents from other nations or, may lead such a component.

0404. **Supported and Supporting Commanders.** One method of making components work together effectively is to use the ‘supported/supporting’ relationship to maximise the overall effect of the joint force. A supported commander has primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by higher authority. A supporting commander provides augmentation or other support to a supported commander, or develops a supporting plan. Land forces may receive support from, or give support to, other components for each joint objective in a campaign. The distinction is useful at all levels of warfare, for example to emphasise where the primary effort lies. It is important that the supported/supporting relationship has substance, to avoid command by committee. Although the framework aids understanding, it is not a device for avoiding integration when and where it is necessary.

0405. **Integrated Headquarters.** In a land-centric operation, the preferred headquarters model is to integrate air, maritime, logistic and special forces’ capabilities into a single theatre-level land headquarters. These integrated headquarters strengthen existing land expertise and competence through the close integration of the capabilities of other services, and may be more coherent than a series of separate component headquarters. Another form of integration is to fuse more than one level of formation command for a temporary period. This should only be done where it improves synergy, for example during a transitional period in a campaign. In both cases the integrity of the organisational structure is less important than the success of the campaign, which in turn is likely to depend on a flexible approach to command and control. Also included in a fully integrated headquarters will be a wide variety of non-military experts and advisors.

0406. **Joint Operations Areas.** A Joint Operations Area (JOA) is an area of land, sea and airspace defined by higher authority, for example in a Chief of the Defence Staff’s Directive, in which a JFC or Joint Commander plans and conducts operations to accomplish a specific mission. The JOA, including its defining parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area, is contingency or mission-specific. In terms of influence, the global dimension of JOAs, beyond their geographic limits, should be considered. This highlights that, although the area of operations can be narrowly defined physically, it cannot be treated in isolation and there are seams around and within it that are vulnerable. Instant media coverage, the cyberspace connections between actors inside and outside the JOA, the potential inter-relationships between a campaign in one JOA with a campaign in another are all factors that require an openness
operations.

**Contributions of Land Forces**

0407. This section examines the broad roles land forces are required to plan for, how they are organised and what specific, in some cases singular, contributions they make to the joint operation. This general perspective links to the more specific descriptions of military activities in Chapter 8.

**Tasks for Land Forces**

0408. UK land forces, of which the Army will often form the core and majority, undertake operations which fall from three broad categories of Defence tasks: permanent tasks, contingent tasks and tasks in circumstances which are unlikely to arise without a significant period of preparation.

a. Permanently committed forces are dedicated to the protection and security of the UK and its Dependent Territories. They include strategic nuclear forces, forces for counter-terrorism and permanent joint overseas garrisons.

b. National contingency forces provide the core capability to meet a challenge to national interests and for operations in support of international stability. Such high-readiness forces should be properly trained and available for operations world-wide, some at short notice. It should be noted that there are deployments which become enduring but are conducted by contingency, not permanently committed forces.

c. All forces, be they permanently committed or contingency forces, units or individuals employed in the recruiting and training organisation, or the reserves, form the basis of the residual capability required to enable regeneration and reconstitution for general war or other tasks likely to be preceded by a significant period of warning and preparation. Additionally, most forces are also required to be available to support the civil authorities in the UK.

0409. To meet these varied tasks, the Army requires forces capable of:

a. Conducting rapid intervention and expeditionary operations, possibly at great distances from the home base, for extended periods. These may involve rapid deployment to prevent, pre-empt or respond to a developing crisis; deterrence or coercion of potential belligerents to discourage escalation or confrontation; the disruption or the defeat of a determined adversary, typically in conjunction with allies; or participation in other military activity aimed at stabilising conflict zones.

b. Contributing to the defence and resilience of the UK. This requirement includes maintaining a regional command and control infrastructure; providing a national strategic reserve of units, trained and equipped to
conduct a range of military tasks, including aid to the civil authorities; and fielding units to carry out specialist tasks.

**Organisation of Land Forces**

0410. Allied land forces are generally structured hierarchically into formations, units and sub-units, based on their size and range of grouped capabilities. A typical hierarchy flows down from army group to army, corps, division, brigade, unit and sub-unit. The British Army is capable of conducting divisional level operations and commanding at corps level, within a coalition. Units of the Army are called regiments or battalions. Their sub-units are squadrons, companies or batteries.

a. **Formations.** A deployable formation, for example a division or brigade, is a grouping of several combat units, together with dedicated command, combat command support, combat support and combat service support elements. Command is exercised at an appropriately capable level. Formations normally consist of varying combinations of units of several arms and services. This makes them, ‘all arms,’ or ‘combined arms’ when operating as an integrated whole. Certain levels of formation are required to deal with the complexity of contemporary operations. For example, even if just one brigade and any other capability deploys, it will almost certainly require command at the divisional level above it, because that is the level best equipped to deal with the demands of joint, inter-agency and multinational operations. Where a single, isolated formation is required to operate - concurrently - both upwards operationally and downwards tactically for protracted periods, without a level immediately above it, serious command and control problems are likely to occur.

b. **Units.** A unit is the smallest grouping capable of independent operations with organic capability over long periods, although some sub-unit groups are capable of doing so for short periods. It contains integral combat command support, combat service support and limited combat support elements, and is normally commanded by a lieutenant colonel. Units typically comprise between 400 and 1000 people, the majority of which are of one arm or service. A Royal Marine unit is called a commando.

c. **Sub-units.** A sub-unit is a subdivision of a unit, which has 3-5 sub-units. Sub-units are normally commanded by majors, and typically comprise between 60 and 150 personnel. They are normally subdivided further into troops or platoons, of between about 12 and about 35 soldiers, which are then organised as vehicle crews of about 3 and dismountable sections of a minimum of 8. For land forces outside the Army, Royal Marine commandos also have sub-units, but the RAF Regiment’s optimal grouping is a large squadron, rather than a battalion or unit. None of these groupings are sized in this way by accident; experience throughout the history of warfare has shown what is required.
0411. **Structures for Operations.** Where possible, armies organise routinely as they do for operations. Most armies derive flexibility by adopting a modular approach which enables grouping for specific operations, or phases within operations. This is particularly the case for brigades and divisions. Homogenous structures at this level strengthen the rotation through operations, training, contingency and recuperation. All of the descriptions below should be seen as building blocks, in the context of increasingly dual or multi-role units. Versatility between roles is a fundamental requirement of any unit.

a. **Organisational Tables.** Units and formations are organised according to organisation tables or establishments, which are used to scale the provision of manpower, equipment, barracks infrastructure and pay.

b. **Orders of Battle.** Although there is a standing master order of battle (ORBAT) for the British Army, the working meaning of the term is a list of those forces generated and deployed for a campaign or operation.

c. **Task Organisations.** The grouping of forces for specific operations and phases within operations is described by a Task Organisation (TaskOrg). It is typically within the TaskOrg that units are collectively organised to form combined groupings.

d. **Combined Arms Groupings.** Grouping and re-grouping is used to integrate several arms, such as infantry, armour, aviation, artillery and engineers, together in order to combine and increase their fighting power. Combined arms groupings should be used to create the most potent combinations of armoured, mechanised, light or air manoeuvre forces. Properly resourced, combined arms groups provide a complementary range of capabilities to overmatch a less well-balanced force.

e. **Battle Groups and Task Forces.** In the British Army the term battle group has a particular meaning. A Battle Group (BG) is a combined arms grouping based on the headquarters of an armoured, armoured reconnaissance, infantry or aviation unit designed for the full range of tactical actions, usually created by attaching and detaching sub-units. A more general term for a force created by cross-attaching elements from parent formations, units or sub-units is a task force. This description can also be applied to a grouping at the brigade level of command.

f. **The Principle of Four.** The capability of any land fighting unit, task force or formation is substantially driven by its grouping or task organisation. As a guide, a grouping or task organisation should be designed to be capable of 4 complementary and concurrent tasks. It should provide: a **covering force** to find, gain understanding and fix; a **manoeuvre force** to strike (or influence decisively); an **echelon force** to exploit and an **uncommitted force**, as a reserve. The Principle of Four at the very least allows a commander to understand what sorts and levels of risks he is taking with his force structure.
0412. **Land Force Elements and Types.** A land force comprises several different functional elements and employment types. The land force should be selected and assembled from these elements and types so that it forms a cohesive and versatile whole.

0413. **Force Elements.** A land force consists of combat, combat support, combat service support and combat command support elements. The proportion of each will vary between operations. All elements should be capable of combat, but these categories help to focus on their core roles:

a. **Combat.** Combat elements are those that engage adversaries directly. They manoeuvre and fight, typically employing direct-fire weapons, to gain ground, to find and defeat the adversary, or to acquire information. They include armoured, armoured reconnaissance, infantry and attack aviation units.

b. **Combat Support.** Combat Support (CS) provides indirect firepower and other essential operational assistance to combat elements. CS elements include indirect fires, unmanned aircraft, air defence, combat engineer, some aviation, military police, dog units and electronic warfare capability.

c. **Combat Service Support.** Combat Service Support (CSS) is the organisational support provided to combat and combat support forces, primarily in the fields of administration and logistics. These force elements include logistic, medical and equipment support, personnel welfare and administration, and force support engineers providing water and electrical power supply, infrastructure and supply routes.

d. **Combat Command Support.** Combat Command Support (CCS) elements assist commanders in the exercise of command. They provide sometimes highly technical communications at each level of warfare; intelligence and information (management, support to exploitation, administration and assurance); force policing; and elements to protect, sustain and move commanders and staffs in headquarters of several constituent parts.

0414. **Force Types.** Combat units and those grouped with them in support are further characterised by type as reconnaissance, ground manoeuvre or air manoeuvre forces. It should be noted that, due to combined arms grouping, a formation is rarely of only one of these types.

a. **Reconnaissance Forces.** Reconnaissance forces are combat elements whose primary purpose is to find, in order to gain information on and understanding of adversaries, other human dynamics and the ground. They could be considered in close, medium and long range categories to aid understanding of how and where they could operate. Their 'find' missions are usually supported by a range of other assets, for example unmanned aircraft. UK reconnaissance is preferably conducted using stealth, but sometimes fighting for information may be required, particularly when surrounded by potential threats. Given their physical position on the battlefield, these forces can be isolated and at points of decision, so need to be robust, flexible and capable of integrating into or
co-ordinating the application of a range of capabilities, including fires and those which are organised as the intelligence support functions. Ground reconnaissance forces need to be capable of protected manoeuvre, either using armoured or light vehicles. They are often uniquely equipped and placed to make forensic, informed and timely judgements, communicated directly to the commander, and to exploit fleeting opportunities. These forces’ ‘man on the ground, in the loop’ information should be used with material provided from other sources, but creating technical groups that constrains ‘reconnaissance forces’ freedom of action should be avoided.

b. **Ground Manoeuvre Forces.** There are three broad types of ground manoeuvre forces: armoured, mechanised and light. These are, in the first instance, descriptive of the type of protected mobility or manoeuvre platform that they operate with or from, and hence of the capabilities they provide, rather than of their modus operandi. They usually operate in combination, for example, by being task organised together within a single formation. Most units are not rigidly of one type, but the categorisation is helpful to organise groupings and training and does have an effect on ethos. It is also important to note that the more capability that is demanded of a unit in terms of firepower, mobility, protection and endurance, the heavier it will inevitably become.

1) **Armoured Forces.** Armoured forces harness automotive power to deploy considerable capability into battle, principally through the use of armoured fighting vehicles. They provide the mounted close combat capability on which dismounted close combat forces usually depend for mutual support particularly to get them onto an objective. Armour can be massed or used as individual platforms. Armoured forces can apply concentrated firepower to achieve shock action, manoeuvre rapidly to exploit it and provide high levels of protection. They will usually provide the most effective opposition to other armoured forces and are particularly effective in seizing terrain occupied by a determined and well-established adversary. Armoured forces’ utility can be restricted in some complex terrain, particularly if they are not closely supported by dismounted infantry which should be integral, and their operational and strategic mobility is constrained by weight and logistic demands.

2) **Mechanised Forces.** Mechanised forces also use armoured vehicles, but in slightly lighter combinations overall and are tactically more deployable than armoured forces, so may be included among the first elements to deploy into a theatre. Their equipment is less capable than that of armoured forces in terms of firepower and protection, but these forces are more capable than light forces in terms of manoeuvre, protection and firepower. The strategic assembly of both mechanised and armoured forces will require the use of sea as well as air deployment.
3) **Light Forces.** Light forces have significant strategic mobility, since they can be transported by aircraft to any theatre. They may be the only forces that are able to operate in some complex terrains. However, their firepower is limited compared to armoured or mechanised forces and in terms of organic protection they are vulnerable, relying on protection by dispersion, concealment or fortification, rather than by the platforms they operate. They have little capacity for manoeuvre so they become fixed relatively quickly. Provision of greater mobility or firepower gives them some of the characteristics of mechanised forces, but the cost is a reduction in their strategic mobility and an increase in sustainment demands; they cease to be light.

c **Air Manoeuvre Forces.** Air manoeuvre forces exploit the mobility of aircraft to provide reach and agility and hence depth or speed of reaction. Air manoeuvre forces include attack, support and reconnaissance helicopters, air assault and airborne infantry with organic CS, CSS and CCS elements. Their actions should be closely integrated with all forms of air power and the actions of ground manoeuvre forces if also deployed. Once on the ground, these forces exhibit the strengths and weaknesses of light forces.

**The Contribution of Land Forces to the Joint Campaign**

0415. If land forces are the principal tool through which a nation, coalition or non-state actor imposes its will forcibly upon other people, they will often provide the means of achieving the decisive result in a joint campaign. They make the following notable and enduring, but not necessarily exclusive, contributions:

a. **Land forces can comprehensively defeat other land forces.** Although air and maritime forces can do great damage to a land force, adaptive adversaries can adopt techniques to survive their attacks and avoid overall defeat. Land forces are required to close with an enemy to achieve this defeat.

b. **Land forces can secure terrain objectives.** Physical occupation by land forces is the only assured way of securing terrain.

c. **Land forces have the greatest direct influence on the people.** Human interaction is the surest method of creating influence, which is critical for longer-term stability. Personnel, deployed amongst the population, can have a major impact on that population, which can be positive or negative if poorly judged. Land forces are required to build the sense and reality of security and to prepare indigenous forces to assume responsibility for it.

d. **Land forces enable other agencies to operate.** In post-conflict periods long-term stability is likely to depend on governmental and non-governmental agencies, both indigenous and international, dealing with essential services, governance and development. These agencies will work most effectively in an environment in which land forces have created a measure of security, although sustainable security then depends on the success of the civil effort.
e. **Land forces represent the strongest evidence of political commitment.**
   The committal of land forces is an overt demonstration of political intent, commitment and willingness to take risks. A significant land component contribution is therefore likely to achieve the greatest influence within a coalition or alliance, and on regional actors.

f. **Land forces contribute greatly to the deterrent effect of the joint force.** The deterrent effect of land forces flows from the preceding characteristics which, when coupled with an apparent willingness to use force, creates a credible ability to coerce that is reduced in a joint force without a significant land element.

### Air-Land Integration

0416. The most important environmental interface for land forces is that with the air, which covers and affects all ground areas of operations. Gaining, maintaining and exploiting control of the air is critical to success in most operations in the land environment. The integration of air and land actions and effects requires first an understanding of air power.

### Air Power

0417. **Doctrine.** UK doctrine for air and space power sets out 4 fundamental roles: Control of the Air, Air Mobility, Intelligence and Situational Awareness, and Attack. It explains the tactical exploitation of these roles, summarised as:

a. **Control of the Air.** Control of the air is the primary role of airpower because it enables freedom of manoeuvre for all of the physical environments. Control of the air helps commanders to seize and hold the initiative. Rather than talking of air ‘superiority,’ it is more accurate to define control of the air as the freedom, bound by time, to use a volume of airspace, while, if necessary, denying its use to an opponent. Control of the air should not be taken for granted, given that some potentially threatening states have advanced air forces and some non-state adversaries are also able to challenge control, particularly at lower altitudes. Commanders should expect the lower airspace to be contested with portable air defence systems, rockets, rocket-propelled grenades and small arms. Rotary and slow fixed-wing aircraft, conducting tactical mobility, fires, air assault and medical evacuation necessarily operate within the envelope of these weapons, so are vulnerable, particularly during take-off and landing. Consequently, a robust protection plan for the terrain around airfields and forward operating bases is required. In general, control of the air is achieved by counter-air operations that are designed to destroy, disrupt or degrade adversaries’ air capability. Counter-air missions are divided into: offensive missions (aiming to destroy, disrupt or degrade air and missile threats) and defensive missions (passive and active operations to detect, identify, intercept and destroy or negate air and missile forces attempting
to penetrate the battlespace). There are then 2 forms of air defence: active, for example using air-to-air fighters or surface-to-air missiles; and passive, for example using camouflage and dispersion.

b. **Air Mobility.** Air mobility supports deployment, sustainment and manoeuvre. It includes precision air drop, air-to-air refuelling, air assault and airborne missions, air logistic missions, personnel recovery and aero-medical evacuation. Air mobility enables the global, regional and local deployment of personnel and materiel, both military and civilian. It is the fastest way to move supplies and amass forces at high tempo. Intra- and inter-theatre air mobility is often the only way to get wounded personnel to medical facilities quickly enough to save lives and to conduct an efficient relief of troops. Airlift usually uses hub-and-spoke or direct delivery designs. The former sees personnel and cargo delivered from a tactical area to a more secure hub, usually a deployed operating base, from which inter theatre assets deliver them, out of the JOA. Direct delivery provides personnel and materiel directly to the point of need. Two techniques can be used: ‘airland,’ which lands directly at the objective and unloads people or cargo on the ground; and ‘airdrop,’ which uses parachutes or freefall delivery.

c. **Intelligence and Situational Awareness.** The high vantage point afforded by air and space allows a view across the entire electromagnetic spectrum. Air power provides layers of air sensing in depth that, integrated with other environmental sources, allow commanders to search out information on adversaries, populations and the ground. These assets can be used not only to map terrain but also to protect the force, for example by covering a formation’s movement. Fields of view options offer choices between a ‘floodlight’ view of a wide area and a ‘searchlight’ view of a specific target. Unmanned aircraft are changing the way the air environment is exploited to find information, in terms of flexibility, endurance and risk.

d. **Attack.** Counter-land operations gain and maintain a degree of control of the land environment by targeting the enemy and infrastructure, or by using the psychological effects of air power to attack will, for example by making shows of force. Air attack can be executed to shape the strategic context or to support operations or tactical engagements. In urban areas, even the most precise weapons may be difficult to employ, but help to transfer pressure from land forces to their adversaries. There are two attack types: first, Air Interdiction (AI) to destroy, disrupt, divert or delay adversaries’ surface potential before it can be used effectively. This is normally used against pre-determined targets, such as command and control nodes, bridges and lines of communication. AI is carried out at such a distance that detailed integration with land forces manoeuvre is not required. Second, Close Air Support (CAS), which provides pre-planned or immediate action against hostile targets. CAS requires detailed integration
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with the fire and manoeuvre of land forces for targeting guidance and to avoid fratricide. Coordination and integration is the responsibility of ground-based forward air controllers. CAS provides land forces with firepower in offensive and defensive actions, by day and night, to destroy, suppress, neutralise, disrupt, fix or delay an adversary, often in close proximity to friendly forces.

**Air-Land Integration**

0418. **Interaction of Air Power with Land Forces.** Because of the complex and sometimes chaotic nature of the land environment, there is a need to visualise zones around land forces when planning air support to them. There are 3 such zones. The closest is defined by the range of direct fire weapons. This makes it the easiest to observe; the land force can move rapidly within this zone and it is where close fighting takes place. The second is the area into which land forces can observe and fire using their longest range organic systems. Land reconnaissance forces operate in this area. Third, and furthest out, is the zone into which the land force can project force or create effects only occasionally and deliberately, based on detailed planning. Deep aviation attacks, air manoeuvre, special forces’ operations and long range missile strikes are examples of activity in this zone. Interaction between air and land forces will vary between these three zones. The zones are fluid because the land force manoeuvres and ground areas are affected by terrain and climate. As a minimum, tactical air and land co-operation should be integrated in the inner zone, co-ordinated in the middle zone and de-conflicted in the outer zone.

0419. **Air-Land Integration (ALI)** is a concept that requires strong joint relationships, effective joint training, an awareness of joint doctrine and capabilities, and detailed co-ordination and liaison between air and land components. ALI is one of 3 levels of interaction between the air and land environments that are required to achieve synergy between them. Deconfliction divides responsibilities in time and space. It avoids fratricide and duplication and ensures that effects complement each other. Coordination requires air and land forces to act together to achieve shared objectives. Integration brings the parts together to create a whole and occurs when the effects of air and land activity are planned from the start to reinforce each other.

0420. **Planning Guidance.** The following guidance should be considered when planning ALI:

a. A balance needs to be struck between pre-planning of air sorties and responsiveness. While it is more efficient to pre-plan, from a land force perspective the latter might often be more effective. Air power can be switched readily across a theatre, so the air component’s perspective is usually theatre-wide and that is the level at which it is commanded for
greatest effect. On the other hand, land forces are normally commanded through several echelons, due to the complexity of the environment and the human limits on spans of command. On the ground, the impact of airpower may appear transitory because the view is necessarily localised; an aircraft moves rapidly through a land-based field of view. The land force requires the sudden application of force from the air, combined with its own manoeuvre, at a specific location, and expects to see local results.
b. The use of offensive air power in the urban environment should be planned differently to employment away from population centres. As with all firepower, care must be taken not to destroy infrastructure that could be essential to an operation later and to avoid damage that may provide short-term tactical advantage, but only at a significant operational or strategic cost.
c. Air attacks on strategic assets can substantially shape the land environment before a decisive act begins. This will add significant tempo to the fight, but planners should take account of the destabilising effects of damage to strategic infrastructure in the post-combat period. AI can deal with threats early, that later may require CAS instead, with increased risk.
d. The collection of information by air platforms, manned and unmanned, with the associated analysis, exploitation and dissemination tools offers a greater reach and lower risk, but is a less enduring and potentially discerning alternative to ground reconnaissance. Fusing both sources offers the most potent combination.
e. Air mobility is a fundamental enabler of surface manoeuvre, having particular utility for light and special forces operating in a high ground threat environment. Air assault is a potent way of accurately projecting force, adding tempo to a mission and achieving local surprise.
f. Air platforms are increasingly flexible and are able to switch between tasks, within the same mission.

0421. **Air Liaison and Coordination.** Effective liaison between forces is essential for successful joint operations. Component liaison officers should be familiar with the details of each component's missions, in order to coordinate their impact on air operations and vice versa. Inside the land headquarters, air liaison elements exchange air intelligence, air management and operational data and support requirements, and organise the integration of control measures. Land liaison teams fulfil a similar function in the air component headquarters. Land manoeuvre units, from battle group to corps, have their own embedded air control teams working to the air component headquarters or operations centres. Control and coordination measures, for example control lines, are driven by the location of land forces, the time it takes them to move and how long it takes to promulgate changes to measures. Efficient staff procedures in this area are essential. Also vital is the integration of air staffs within the headquarters core planning team; they must not be adjuncts. Experience has
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shown that they must be involved from the start, not brought in to advise on a plan that has already taken shape.

0422. **Joint Fires Integration.** The incorporation and synchronisation of precise and suppressive joint fires with manoeuvre, from platoon to divisional level, and their contribution to ALI is essential. Control and exploitation across the joint fires spectrum is important, using joint fires cells and fire support teams from sub-unit to battle group and brigade levels.

> It would be difficult for me to pay an adequate tribute to the work and achievements of the Desert Air Force; suffice it to say here that the Desert Air Force and the Eighth Army formed one close, integrated family: collectively they were one great fighting machine, working with a single purpose, and at all times with a single joint plan.


0423. **The Manoeuvrist Approach.** The significant contribution of air power to the Manoeuvrist Approach is explained in Chapter 5.

**Space and Cyberspace**

**Space**

0424. Support to operations in the physical environments and cyberspace, from space-based or space-enabled capabilities, is pervasive and presents vulnerabilities as well as advantages. The UK’s space capabilities can be broadly divided into 4 areas: Data Networks in Space (which includes satellite communications and Position, Navigation and Timing applications), Surveillance from Space, Surveillance of Space and Space Control. The first 3 are immediately relevant to the land environment, and all are explained further in joint doctrine.

**Cyberspace**

0425. Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment, consisting of inter-dependent networks of information technology infrastructures which include: the internet, telecommunication networks, computer systems and embedded processors and controllers. Activities within cyberspace can have effects locally, regionally or globally. As this space is not greatly bound by physical location or even time, its expansion in terms of use and understanding is having a significant effect on the character of conflict. The implications for forces in the land environment are profound. Both offensive and defensive exploitation of cyberspace is required, to use the space in support of physical activities and effects and to protect that use. States do not have a monopoly
on cyberspace; indeed one of its defining features is how it can enfranchise physically isolated or disempowered actors. Commanders should consider the following broad factors:

a. How, and to what degree, capabilities depend on cyberspace; and how those capabilities (design and utility) are affected by it.
b. How activity in cyberspace can be integrated into activity, or is affected by activity, in the other environments.
c. How cyberspace could have both positive and negative impacts, across the doctrinal frameworks described in Chapter 7 and how they can be exploited or mitigated.
d. How cyberspace affects and connects the levers of power, military, diplomatic and economic.
e. How cyberspace affects the nature, character and range of adversaries faced.
f. How cyberspace can be exploited in a manoeuvrist way; to achieve understanding and influence; gain intelligence; seize the initiative; to break or protect cohesion and will; and to support a narrative.

Maritime-Land Integration

0426. **The Maritime Environment.** Land forces should understand the roles of maritime components, their interaction and integration with the land environment, and the importance of the littoral and waterways, both for exploitation and denial to adversaries. It is important that land forces are equipped to address the complexities of this environmental seam. Over two thirds of the world’s population live within 200 kilometres of the sea and 85% of the member states of the United Nations have a coastline. Furthermore, as the UK is an island, all significant land force deployments will have a major sea dimension.

0427. **The Role of the Maritime Component in the Joint Operation.** The principal attributes of maritime forces are: access, sustained reach, versatility and lift. They have the ability to remain poised at sea for extended periods as an act of coercion, with limited political liability, and then take direct action against limited targets ashore. The major categories of maritime actions are power projection, sea control, sea raiding, deterrence, demonstrations of presence, intelligence collection and provision of security at sea, including counter-terrorism, counter-piracy and counter-narcotics. The maritime component should also be able to provide air power projection from carriers into the land environment when no land basing is available in range. Most of these categories require some integration between the maritime and land environments.

0428. **Amphibious Actions.** When operating in or near the littoral, land forces may be complemented by a range of amphibious actions. Amphibious
demonstrations tie down enemy forces near the coast and weaken defences elsewhere. Amphibious raids distract or confuse an adversary, destroy key elements of his infrastructure, gain intelligence, or are used to evacuate non-combatants. Amphibious assaults open access to a theatre for land forces or can open another flank in an existing theatre. In either case it is usual for land forces to reinforce the amphibious landing once established, permitting further exploitation inland. Amphibious withdrawals may be the only practical way of extracting a land force or non-combatants.

0429. **The Littoral.** Operational theatres with coastal borders present both opportunities and challenges for land forces. Early dominance followed by sustained control of the littoral is required to ensure freedom of manoeuvre in the land environment, unhindered by threats from the sea flank. Maritime capabilities afford commanders operational flexibility, from the demonstration of political intent, early theatre entry or enduring littoral operations, to long-term sustainment and support to stabilisation tasks or humanitarian relief. Land forces can exploit littoral areas by using amphibious shipping and inshore craft. Maritime CAS and other joint fires and air mobility are significant enablers to inland activity, especially in the early stages of an operation, before a land foothold has been established.

0430. **Riverine Actions.** The riverine operating environment is an inland, coastal or river delta area comprising both land and water, characterised by limited land lines of communication. The area is likely to have extensive water surface, with inland waterways, including lakes, that provides natural routes for transportation and communications. It is 3-dimensional, with surface, sub-surface and air environments. Waterways frequently constitute key terrain, the control of which requires control of all 3 environments. Waterways are extensions of the littoral, and so provide an important conduit for the conduct of amphibious actions, offering natural penetration points as well as obstacles. Riverine actions can provide greater freedom of movement to land forces or deny it to an adversary.
The most important part of (the) counter-indirect fire (battle) was creating a riverine capability. That was a bit outside our comfort zone, because an armoured brigade usually thinks of rivers as obstacles. In Basra, however, the river was the last unpatrolled highway in the city. We cobbled together a capability; bringing in boats from the UK, and giving them to a strike battlegroup. It used specialist boat handlers from the joint force engineers and assault crews from a formation recce squadron. This was hugely successful (in denying waterway firing points to enemy rocket and mortar teams).

Brigadier Sandy Storrie, Commander 7th Armoured Brigade, Post Operation Interview, 2008 (Operation TELIC 12)

0431. Other Maritime Support to Land Forces. Maritime platforms can contribute significant intelligence, area surveillance and communications capabilities to land forces. They can also provide air defence over littoral areas, including potentially against theatre ballistic missiles. Logistic support for land forces can be provided from the sea and will reduce the logistic footprint required ashore. Maritime platforms have the capability to provide clean facilities for deep maintenance and casualty treatment. They can also be used as command and control locations by headquarters, especially in the early stages of an operation. Maritime forces can protect land forces by providing a sea-based defensive barrier, or by preventing enemy manoeuvre from the sea.

0432. Threats to Maritime Actions in the Littoral. When operating close inshore, with limited sea room, maritime forces may be threatened by mines, fast attack craft, coastal anti-ship missiles and shore batteries, operated by conventional forces or irregular groups. Land forces ashore should enhance the protection of offshore maritime units by identifying and securing potential firing points, and by providing mutual support in depth generally.

Strategic Deployment

0433. Land forces are dependent upon air and maritime strategic lift capability to launch, sustain and recover from expeditionary operations at a distance from the UK. The ability to secure, develop and protect a primary Air Port of Embarkation or Disembarkation (APOE/D) or a Sea Port of Embarkation or Disembarkation (SPOE/D) will be fundamental in ensuring that forces can be delivered to a crisis in time and then sustained. Land forces will depend on secure air and maritime environments, occasionally supplemented by long intra-theatre land lines of communication. The ability to deploy strategically is a key condition in making a meaningful contribution to US-led coalition operations. Contracted or dedicated shipping and a robust air bridge are
necessary enablers for enduring operations in the land environment. Frictions that affect them will be felt quickly and keenly by land forces.

**Other Military Components**

**Logistics Component**

0434. A joint logistic or support component will normally be deployed on UK operations to coordinate support forward to other components and rearwards to the strategic home base. As with the other components, it will be task-organised as a result of a military strategic estimate; it may be built around an existing land logistics formation, for example a logistics or force support brigade. How logistics is planned and executed in operations in the land environment is one of the subjects of Chapter 9.

**Special Forces Component**

0435. UK Special Forces (SF) form a further component operating in the land environment. SF, often alongside coalition special operations forces, will frequently operate in close proximity to, and in cooperation with, land forces. SF are a scarce and valuable resource, and are employed according to enduring principles: used for strategic effect; commanded at the highest appropriate level; employed using higher level directives to maximise freedoms; committed in a timely manner; given access to the highest levels of intelligence and subject to high levels of operational security.

0436. SF are often employed on the theatre-level main effort, which may or may not be in the UK’s main operating area. They offer a critical force multiplier for the operational commander and are particularly useful in shaping the environment or creating the conditions for theatre entry. This should be borne in mind when scarce assets are allocated against many conflicting requirements, especially in the fields of information, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance. SF may employ assets drawn from other components, for example reconnaissance and light forces, unmanned aircraft and attack helicopters.

**A Comprehensive Approach**

0437. Although military forces - often land forces - can play the decisive part in a campaign, crisis management (the process of preventing, containing or resolving crises) needs active inter-agency engagement, using all three instruments of power - military, economic and diplomatic - in order to succeed. A comprehensive approach requires proactive engagement, shared understanding, thinking based on the outcome rather than the input, and collaborative working. Although the UK may choose to act alone, in most cases its forces are likely to operate as a contributing or lead nation, probably within an alliance or as part of an ad hoc coalition. They will often also work in partnership with an indigenous or regional host nation. Thus, most of
the campaigns and operations that the British Army is likely to participate in will be inter-agency and multinational as well as joint. This means that a comprehensive approach is required.

**The Inter-agency Dimension of Operations**

0438. Doctrine defines campaigns as inherently joint, so campaign plans are joint plans. Increasingly, the term ‘joint’ has a broader meaning than the involvement of more than one service or set of military capabilities. Strategic success requires more than military means alone; military activities at all three of the Levels of Warfare will often support, or be supported by, other agencies, some of which will be civilian. The components of a comprehensive, joint, inter-agency and multinational approach are examined here individually. They are explained in detail in joint thematic doctrine for campaigning and stabilisation, but do not apply exclusively to these areas; most military activities need to be comprehensive to be successful.

0439. The levers of all instruments of power should be operated in concert at all Levels of Warfare, or across the campaign. The key military role is usually to create the conditions for the other two to work, or to work better, either by fighting or by helping to stabilise. It is governance, economics and better lives, facilitated and explained by diplomacy, that provide lasting campaign success in many conflicts. It is important to understand which agencies should feature in a multi-agency effort (which is referred to as inter-agency when it achieves synergy at the operational level), where they will impact on the tactical level, and the freedoms and constraints that should be considered as a result. These agencies include supranational organisations, for example the EU and the UN, UK government departments other than the MOD, national intelligence agencies, host nation or other indigenous partners, non-governmental organisations, humanitarian groups, private military and security companies and other contractors; and the representatives of inward investors.

0440. It is often military headquarters that provide the physical means to enable a broader comprehensive approach because they have the resources and can provide their own security. But the approach does not need to be military-led throughout and, once security has been firmly established, it usually should not be. Human relationships will be decisive in making the approach work or fail. Underlying the approach should be the common desire to achieve unity of effort and an acceptance that all three instruments of power are required for success. Inter-agency organisations that liaise, rehearse, set up or work with each other in advance of operations have the best chances of success.

0441. ** Freedoms and Constraints. ** A comprehensive, inter-agency approach can increase tactical freedoms if it harnesses the 3 instruments of power in
the same place. It should apply expertise where and when it is needed and improves the prioritisation, synchronisation and coordination of activity. The approach contributes to a sense of stability because when power is exercised in a civil context it creates perceptions of normality. There are also potential constraints that can be caused by an inter-agency approach. The test of success is not numbers of agencies, but the degree of cooperation achieved between them; incorporation of agencies should not become an end in itself. There might be different perceptions of risk, competing resource priorities, language difficulties, differences in operating procedures, clashes of organisational culture and variations in empowerment and operational objectives. Even within a common strategic goal, all are potential sources of friction which could impact adversely on military activity.

0442. **Integrated and Collaborative Planning.** One of the challenges for a fully effective inter-agency approach is that organisations have different planning processes, attitudes to sharing information and varying lead times for action. Military commanders and staffs should not assume that military processes will be understood or accepted by other actors. Planning could involve a combination of military and other methods. Such collaborative, or perhaps integrated, planning cuts across stovepipes and increases concurrency and unity of effort.

**The Multinational Dimension of Operations**

0443. **Alliances and Coalitions.** A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action, with a clear lead nation. Such an arrangement could be based on an alliance organisation, for example NATO. However, alliances usually provide only a framework (rather than a lead) nation, so it may not be as easy to discern clarity of intent as it would be in a national or coalition operation. National policy envisages that most major overseas military operations involving UK land forces will be as part of a coalition that will probably, but not exclusively, be led by the US. Coalitions create frictions and shape the whole approach to a campaign as well as providing the mass required; but they are almost unavoidable in contemporary circumstances, unless a small scale operation is envisaged. There are benefits and costs in joining coalitions, often replicated in alliances. At every stage of a campaign it is important to resolve disparity between nations in order to keep strategic ends, ways and means in harmony. Membership of coalitions requires different attitudes and behaviour to those required of leadership of coalitions.

a. **Benefits.** Membership of a coalition provides members with a voice and a vote; the ability to be heard and to influence internationally, not only to pursue a campaign but also to shape that campaign in the national interest. This benefit applies in particular should the UK lead a coalition or command a multinational formation within it. Membership also confers
representation in the coalition chain of command; unity and economy of effort and a common purpose which adds to legitimacy and provides access to capability and mass; a sharing of risks, and a share of the benefits of a successful outcome from the campaign. Coalitions concentrate resources and provide flexibility which most nations could not generate independently.

b. **Costs.** Membership of a coalition means bearing a share of additional risks; and demands interoperability, the pursuit of which can be expensive and time-consuming. Coalition membership can dilute national and military priorities. Other costs include the need for consensus and a consequent reduction in freedoms. If a campaign goes badly, it is difficult to disengage from collective responsibility. The committal of resources to a coalition reduces the freedom to conduct other tasks. Economy of effort across a coalition can undermine the arguments for national military capabilities and versatile forces.

0444. **Partnerships.** Partnerships in the land environment normally refer to the relationships between coalition and indigenous security forces. In stabilisation in particular, UK forces should establish an evolving relationship with indigenous forces that is likely to follow an overlapping formula, using security sector reform and indigenous capacity building. Reform of the security sector should be based on a comprehensive, inter-agency approach and take care to understand the dynamics at play, particularly perceptions of legitimacy. There are dangers in dismantling structures without understanding the consequences of doing so. Reform should be executed quickly, to enable the sector to be developed in order to be capable of taking the security lead. The contribution of military forces to this effort is referred to as military capacity building, which focuses on the security forces, particularly the armed forces. In partnerships, a pragmatic view needs to be taken of the values a force holds compared to those of indigenous partners. Cultural differences mean that compromise and patience will be required, but a line must also be drawn. A campaign that supports a corrupt or brutal state undermines Campaign Authority, so it is quite reasonable to seek to change some partners’ values, while being pragmatic about others.

0445. **Joint Multinational Appointments.** A UK commander could act as a Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC)\(^4\) on a national operation; a JTFC or JFC on a multinational operation where the UK is the lead or framework nation; a UK National Contingent Commander (NCC) where the UK is contributing forces to an operation led by another nation; and a UK component commander within a multinational headquarters. UK commanders could also assume an alliance or coalition command appointment.
Command of Multinational Operations

0446. The command of operations conducted by alliances and coalitions is often a contentious subject because it is in command relationships that factors such as varying national interest and the amount of influence each member derives from their level of commitment become crystallised. This section outlines the differences between national and multinational command and how they should co-exist in theory.

National Command

0447. A national chain of command would be implemented for national campaigns like the Falklands Islands (1982) or Sierra Leone (2001), or if the UK were to act as the framework nation for an operation, or in the event that the military are tasked with providing support to the UK civil authorities. In this national chain, Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) would command one or more joint task force headquarters, with components as was explained above. Figure 4.1 below illustrates a national chain of command. Equally likely is that the UK would link to an alliance or coalition chain of command, so the diagram includes examples of such chains. In part, these explain where the overlaps and frictions could exist; they also show how they should complement each other.

Multinational Command

0448. Multinational command is either exercised within an established alliance or in an ad hoc coalition. In these cases the UK will commit forces and acquire proportionate representation in the chain of command of that alliance or coalition. There is likely to be a direct correlation between the level of UK commitment of forces and the influence and freedoms gained within the multinational force. In addition, nations will seek to retain a degree of sovereign control over their forces, so will never commit them unconditionally. Within a coalition there may be strategic variations between partners, for example levels of domestic support may vary and there will be operational differences, for example in rules of engagement. These variations and differences can cause frictions that will be amplified as contributing nations attempt to retain strong chains of national command concurrently with their commitment to the force. If the military instrument were wielded in a political vacuum, logic would dictate total subordination to the most effective, unified chain of command possible, but the reality is usually very different.
Frictions between National and Multinational Command

It is inevitable that frictions will arise where parallel chains of command are created; even if they could be perfectly aligned. However, these frictions can be managed by taking a complementary approach. Accepting that no nation will be comfortable with allocating national capabilities without retaining some form of national command relationship to them, the key is to ensure that the national contribution - force elements and tactical commanders, operational commanders and staffs - can be effectively used, without abrogation of national responsibility or interest. An approach is required that accurately maps how national and multinational chains of command might be able to co-exist, making equivalence of points of command clear and establishing robust links between them.
The true basis...for allied unity of command...lies in the earnest cooperation of the senior officers assigned to an allied theatre. Since cooperation, in turn, implies such things as selflessness, devotion to a common cause, generosity in attitude and mutual confidence, it is easy to see that actual unity in an allied command depends directly on the individuals in the field. This...involves the human equation and must be met day by day. Patience, tolerance, frankness, absolute honesty in all dealings, particularly with all persons of the opposite nationality, and firmness, are absolutely essential.

General Dwight D Eisenhower, memorandum to Admiral Lord Mountbatten, (Abilene, Kansas: Eisenhower pre-Presidential Files, Eisenhower Library, 14 September 1954) Box 84

**UK National Contingent Command**

0450. In a short campaign the most effective method for harmonising national and multinational chains of command is likely to be by appointing a Senior British Military Representative or Advisor (SBMR or SBMA). But in an enduring campaign and in the interests of continuity and consistency, the most effective method is to replace the SBMR or SBMA with an NCC. The NCC integrates the national contribution into the overall force, advises and influences the deployed multinational force commander, applies national policies and caveats, and has the ultimate in-theatre responsibility for national activities. Ultimately he can play 'red cards' of non-compliance, but the potential for these should be made clear at the start of a campaign. If the UK’s contribution is significant enough, the NCC may also occupy a senior position within the multinational chain of command, perhaps operating as the force deputy, but not positioned at the tactical level. This arrangement frees up the commanders of the UK force elements to act as tactical commanders, confident that their direction is only from the multinational chain of command, but has benefited from the required national synthesis. The NCC needs to be empowered and positioned to provide leadership and oversight. This requires a robust NCC headquarters, with a capable staff and sound communications. In detail, an NCC’s roles are to:

a. **Influence.** In order to:

1) Shape coalition or alliance plans, exploiting strong personal relationships.
2) Advise the multinational force commander on national capabilities.
3) Identify and deal with the strategic and operational levels of risks for national forces.
4) Engage with senior diplomatic and inter-agency partners to encourage unity of effort.
b. **Direct.** In order to:

1) Exercise operational control of national forces and direct their use in accordance with national policy.
2) De-conflict, prioritise and direct the integration of national force elements into the multinational force.
3) Assure that the force brings with it sufficient sustainment capacity or negotiate multinational enhancements.
4) Determine and coordinate national force protection policy and posture.

c. **Support.** In order to:

1) Act as a national figurehead; building and sustaining national contingent cohesion and unity of effort.
2) Provide legal advice to the contingent and the multinational force commander.
3) Facilitate the integration of national contributions into command, control and strategic intelligence architectures.

d. **Inform.** In order to:

1) Articulate the strategic case for further national contributions as may be necessary and help to set the conditions for achieving long-term UK objectives.
2) Report tactical and operational developments, including risks to strategic objectives, via lines of national command.
3) Develop memoranda of understanding and status of forces agreements with host nations.
4) Hold up metaphorical national ‘red cards,’ potentially to veto an order given by the multinational force commander if it is believed to be severely contrary to the national interest, or would contradict national law, or could compromise the UK’s position in international law. Use of such caveats should be avoided as much as possible by early engagement and pre-emption, because frequent use of red cards erodes trust within coalitions.

**Multinational Cooperation**

0451. Effective interaction and cooperation with multinational partners stem from the following principles:

a. **Rapport.** Effective personal relationships between commanders will influence multinational cooperation at all levels. Commanders must strive to develop genuine and robust rapport with each other.

b. **Respect.** Mutual respect for the professional ability, culture, history, religion, customs and values of participants strengthens relationships. Understanding and respecting these aspects will enhance the cohesion of the force.

c. **Knowledge.** Time taken to understand the doctrine, capabilities and aspirations of partners will pay dividends. It is important that national
contingents are given a role commensurate with their aspirations, tempered by their capabilities.

d. **Patience.** Differences of opinion, perspective and understanding, whilst natural, may generate friction. A patient approach built on mutual trust and respect and combined with effective cooperation takes time, but will ultimately bear fruit.

**Multinational Staff Interoperability**

0452. Interoperability is the subject of NATO and ABCA standardisation programmes. Interoperability of staffs is a particular consideration. When UK force elements join a multinational force, or staff officers join a multinational headquarters, they should be prepared for differences in staff processes as well as doctrine and culture. They should study the techniques used by allies, so they are able to contribute and understand. One example is the US use of story-boarding and graphical representations of plans. For the staff officer familiar with the orders process explained in Chapter 6, some preliminary research into the alternatives is required in order to ensure that he is confident working with or alongside other methods.
Notes
1 Formerly Command Support.
2 Electronic Warfare (EW), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) [with sub-sets of Geospatial Information (GEOINF) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)], Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and Technical Intelligence (TECHINT).
4 The JTFC controls subordinate component commanders but is subordinate to the JFC.
5 In the examples quoted, but not UK-based operations.
6 The alliance and coalition chains of command here are examples, and will vary in each operation.
Chapter 5 explains the first tenet of the British Army’s enduring philosophy for operations: the Manoeuvrist Approach. It defines the idea, and sets out what it requires and how it is applied.
Introduction

0501. Structure. This chapter sets out the fundamental requirements of the contemporary Manoeuvrist Approach. It then breaks down the application of the approach into 6 parts:

a. Understanding the situation.
b. Influencing perceptions.
c. Seizing and holding the initiative.
d. Breaking cohesion and will.
e. Protecting cohesion and will.
f. Enhancing the Manoeuvrist Approach.

Fundamentals of the Manoeuvrist Approach

0502. The first tenet of the British Army’s capstone doctrine is the Manoeuvrist Approach to operations. This is an indirect approach which emphasises understanding and targeting the conceptual and moral components of an adversary’s fighting power as well as attacking the physical component. Influencing perceptions and breaking or protecting cohesion and will are essential. The approach involves using and threatening to use force in combinations of violent and non-violent means. It concentrates on seizing the initiative and applying strength against weakness and vulnerability, while protecting the same on our own side. The contemporary Manoeuvrist Approach requires a certain attitude of mind, practical knowledge and a philosophy of command that promotes initiative.

a. An Attitude of Mind. The Manoeuvrist Approach is an attitude of mind. It is based on being able to understand and manipulate human nature in order to identify vulnerabilities and points of influence. It depends on organisational agility and being prepared to decentralise, the ability to identify threats and solutions to threats, take risks to reduce an adversary’s fighting power in order to achieve tactical and operational objectives. In this indirect approach, the effect achieved is more important than how it is done. Attrition is not discounted but, whatever the technique, the results sought should be disproportionately greater than the resources applied. The Manoeuvrist Approach is about ‘manoeuvring the mind,’ rather than just physical movement. It is not synonymous with the term 'manoeuvre warfare', which largely describes physical activity and is no more than a sub-set of the Manoeuvrist Approach.

b. Practical Knowledge. The Manoeuvrist Approach requires broad foundations of practical professional knowledge, based on individual education and collective training. This knowledge instils confidence, which in turn provides the freedom to use originality, innovation and doing the unexpected, combined with a determination to succeed and an ability to seize and hold the initiative. Emphasis is placed on ingenuity, backed up
by physical means. The manoeuvrist must be capable of patience and endurance as well as boldness and decisiveness.

**c. A Philosophy of Command.** The Manoeuvrist Approach is underpinned by a command philosophy of centralised intent and decentralised execution that promotes freedom of action and initiative. The doctrine of Mission Command stresses the importance of understanding what effect is to be achieved rather than specifying the ways in which it should be done. Mission Command is the second core tenet of the Army’s philosophy for operations, and is examined in Chapter 6.

0503. At the end of this Chapter, Figure 5.2 gathers together and summarises the elements of the Manoeuvrist Approach.

**Application**

0504. The application of the Manoeuvrist Approach requires 5 skills, supported by a series of enhancements, as follows:

**Understanding the Situation**

0505. The practical application of the contemporary Manoeuvrist Approach in the land environment first requires an understanding of the situation, which consists of using information, intelligence and intuition; understanding people and ground and understanding effects and outcomes. Understanding is defined in general terms as an individual’s comprehension or judgement of a situation. Doctrinally, understanding is the accurate interpretation of a particular situation, and the likely reaction of individuals or groups to it, which is required to provide the context for effective decision-making. Social and cultural perspectives have an impact on understanding, because different societies view the same issues differently. Understanding in the land operating environment requires 2 consistent levels: first, an understanding of the nature of conflict in general and the character of the current conflict in particular. Second, it requires an understanding of the current situation, including the people involved as well as the characteristics and features of the ground. Individual understanding needs to be combined to produce collective understanding, for example in a headquarters or across a dispersed force and with allies, in order to become operationally meaningful. This requires the ability to convey and to communicate understanding in order to reduce its potential subjectivity.

0506. **Using Information, Intelligence and Intuition.** Understanding the situation is based on having access to information, turned into intelligence and exploited with intuition:

a. **Information.** Information consists of unprocessed items, series or groups of data, which are collected by sensors or sources and then interpreted
and placed in context, in order to expose meaning, accuracy and reliability. Information is only of value if shared, within a secure system.

b. **Intelligence.** Intelligence is the result of the processing of information, which then has judgement applied to it. Intelligence usually concerns threats, risks, intentions and factors affecting a situation. It should provide a coherent and comprehensive narrative and be as accurate and as timely as possible. Intelligence supports decision-making so it should be articulated in a way that is useful to the decision-maker. This includes presenting reasoned advice rather than regurgitated data. Intelligence may only be able to identify gaps in the information held but then helps to assess the risks associated with ‘not knowing.’ Intelligence, as a term, also refers to product (intelligence that is relevant to a particular context); process (a requirement-driven cycle that generates product); organisation (structures and staffs for production); and activity (the integrated acquisition, processing and dissemination of information and intelligence).

c. **Intuition.** Intuition is the power to comprehend without a lengthy process of reason or analysis. Intuition is largely subconscious: a decision-maker just ‘knows what to do.’ TE Lawrence identified this as the ‘…irrational tenth (part)…like the flash of the kingfisher across the pool.’ Although such intuition can be regarded as something of a gift, it must be based on and enhanced by intellect, experience, education, training and effort which together provide the ability to recognise patterns, problems and solutions. Commanders should be encouraged to use their intuition, supported by the information and intelligence they receive.

0507. **Intelligence in Practice.** In pursuit of intelligence, a commander tells his intelligence staff what he wants to know and when. He should articulate the requirement clearly and simply. But all staff need to understand information and intelligence, all of the time; these things should not be the preserve of experts operating inside stovepipes. The staff should translate the commander’s requirements into information needs and collection tasks and identify the assets to be used in processing. The commander might use the results of his requests for information to test his plans or hypotheses; perhaps to try to prove them wrong. Therefore, staff officers should be confident enough to provide advice that contradicts and challenges, as well as confirms, even the most advanced plans. They should be capable of analysis in depth, rather than simply stating the apparent facts. The collected information should be processed into intelligence and disseminated quickly and systematically to those who require it. This process of **direction**, **collection**, **processing** (which includes collation, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation) and **dissemination**, is commonly referred to as the **Intelligence Cycle**. Direction is the most important and often the least practised. Direction provides the gears to drive the cycle, which is dynamic and goes back and forth, rather than
in one direction and at one speed. The cycle must be driven; otherwise the stages will become ends in themselves. Direction is what ensures that the cycle serves to deliver the answer to the question the commander has asked, and needs to know.

0508. **Understanding People and Ground.** Operations can be conducted to control ground, to defeat an adversary or to win the support of a population in order to stabilise an area. It is as important to ‘map’ the people as it is to have maps of the ground. People cannot be separated from the ground, either symbolically or physically, as that is where they live. In addition, these perceptions can be affected by more distant influences, for example from a diaspora. Understanding requires comprehension of topography and climate, and their effects on manoeuvre in particular, as well as detailed awareness of populations, actors and adversaries; their motivations and needs, history, culture and language. This is based on reconnoitring wide areas, which military forces are well-equipped to do. What is sometimes referred to as ‘human geography’ looks at the ground in terms of its relationships with the people who live there, for example by examining land ownership or ethnic composition. This can be supported by Human Terrain Analysis (HTA), which is a part of the Intelligence Cycle. This is a forensic discipline that seeks detailed knowledge of the people themselves, individually and in groups. Reconnaissance products - of the physical space and the way it ‘feels’ - and HTA can be fused together by an Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE) which provides integrated, graphical products, and is complemented by an intelligence estimate. A number of other tools can be selected to aid understanding, for example PESTEL-ED, PMESII-PT or ASCOPE analyses.²

0509. Understanding in military headquarters depends on a mindset in the commander and his staff that does not settle for a superficial level of awareness. Study, persistent exposure and proximity and access to a network of experts, are important aids to gaining a true understanding of situations, particularly if they are geographically or culturally unfamiliar. Time on the ground absorbing the true nature of the environment is essential; complex human situations cannot be properly understood by remote means and in moments of crisis there may be insufficient time to create the depth of understanding required. Tactical investment in gaining human understanding on the ground will reap strategic dividends in the future. Training should be based on generic and consistent scenarios that match realities or potential realities as closely as possible. It should be assisted by training support organisations that can replicate the range of actors in the battlespace.

0510. Populations have a decisive role to play in military operations. Even in warfare between organised states, it is impossible to ignore the people. Populations
create congestion and clutter and apply constraints on the exercise of power. They can mobilise, physically or virtually, and at some stage will take sides. People are defined by their motivations, which are caused by their needs. Motivations will be based on the need to survive, on self-interest, and on values. Examining motivations in this way explains people beyond simplistic categories such as friendly forces, enemy forces or the civilian population. People who wield the power to make decisions that could affect operational objectives are defined as ‘decisive actors.’ People can be mapped along a spectrum from friendship to enmity. There are few neat distinctions and people will move along the spectrum; indeed that may be the effect sought. A mixture of compulsion and persuasion should be applied to do this, depending on where an actor sits. The aim is to pull people away from becoming adversaries and then protecting them if necessary. It should be remembered that people on this spectrum are not passive. Adversaries, particularly those at the irreconcilable, most threatening end of the spectrum, will seek also to apply coercion and persuasion in opposite directions to ours, although they may not categorise actors in the same way.

0511. Although the distinction between ‘enemy’ and ‘friendly forces’ is insufficiently subtle, the shorthand remains useful when it comes to a fight. An adversary is any person or group who threatens operational objectives, with the enemy being the most implacable adversary. Adversaries will present hybrid threats, combining military ‘conventional,’ irregular and high-end asymmetric threats, sometimes concurrently and in the same place. Adversaries are not likely to be unthinking and cooperative. The most dangerous and manoeuvrist of adversaries will seek to apply their strengths against our weakness, which they will seek to understand as we aim to understand theirs.

0512. Culture and beliefs influence how people behave, and how this behaviour is interpreted. Culture plays a role in why people engage in conflict, so developing an understanding of it is an important military capability. There are 3 levels of cultural capability: cultural awareness, which is the basic level of comprehension required to mitigate threats and exploit opportunities at the tactical level; cultural competence, which requires a broader and deeper knowledge in order to deal directly with cultural groups; and cultural expertise which is the most advanced level and applies to cultural advisers to senior commanders.

0513. **Understanding Effects, Outcomes and Success.** The Manoeuvrist Approach depends on commanders and subordinates who understand **effects**, **outcomes** and their linkages to **success**. They should be prepared to open their minds to think laterally about the relationships between them. This
section should be read in conjunction with the schematic at Figure 5.1 and seeks to provoke thought about the relevant considerations.

a. **Effects.** A commander should set out the effects he wants to achieve, supported by the actions he requires his subordinates to conduct. Those actions are normally worded as tasks which, together with their purpose, constitute subordinates’ missions. At the tactical level, such missions are typically fixed: they require specific activity, such as an attack on a part of a network or the seizure of terrain. But an ingrained ability to think laterally, beyond these missions, is required. Effects are the consequences of actions. Actions will cause intended and unintended effects that may be immediate, short-term or long-term. Thinking in terms of effects encourages a broader and longer-term view of a situation and is more of an art than a science. Effects should not be over-formalised in a planning process. It is dangerous to base operations on the belief that effects can be modelled or made the subject of systemic design: that if Activity A takes place in Location B, Effects C and then D will automatically happen. Conflict is rarely predictable enough to provide manageable chain reactions. Also, effects are perceived differently by different audiences. Another risk is that subordinates may not understand the effect the commander intends, especially if it is summarised in a single word. This makes it important to avoid ambiguity by using a common and limited vocabulary of effects. It should be noted that effects are not the same as mission verbs which are explained later.

b. **Outcomes.** An outcome describes the circumstances that are caused by the effects. The aim is to achieve the outcome sought, but because of the chaotic nature of conflict, often the outcome achieved is not the one intended. The outcome can be most reliably achieved - and the effects orchestrated - by using objectives, which are used to connect intent with the outcome via the effects envisaged. They provide tangible links between strategic, operational and tactical goals to provide a clear chain of purpose. At the tactical level, an objective should be clear and attainable, for example seizing a terrain feature or destroying a force. Objectives are usually interdependent, so setting them needs to be collaborative and comprehensive, for example across all arms or using all the levers of power. It is important to always start with the outcome sought, then identify the objectives required. It is unwise to get this the wrong way around which happens when, for example staffs focus on inputs obsessively without reference to the output required.
c. **Success.** Success is a relative rather than an absolute commodity, but it still should be defined and measurable using the objectives. This can be achieved by defining an end-state - the overall desired outcome - although these are not usually used at the tactical level. The end-state is the military (or political) situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved. It is, in short, ‘where the commander wants to be, mission accomplished.’ There are degrees of success in conflict which should be weighed against both the physical and human cost of operations. A conflict may be resolved either when one side subjugates the other to its will, or when terms are found that are acceptable to all parties. When an adversary feels he is beaten, he withdraws his participation from battle or engagement. The withdrawal of participation may not be total. A partial retreat or surrender may create a fleeting opportunity. If exploited, that opportunity could lead to defeat at a higher level and eventually bring about the successful conclusion of a campaign. The collective withdrawal of an adversary’s participation in battle is most importantly a psychological rather than a physical process, and may not be rational. Conversely, it may be an explicit and rational decision: the loser can see that unless he desists he will lose not only his objectives but his forces as well. Sometimes an adversary will stand and fight even if his destruction, defeat or capture appears inevitable. He may judge that his tactical failure may set the conditions for operational or strategic success elsewhere, for example by achieving influence through martyrdom. Alternatively he might set up a protracted and possibly even more costly period of resistance, of another form to the combat that appears to have ended.
Loss of hope rather than loss of life is the factor that really decides wars, battles and even the smallest combats. The all time experience of warfare shows that when men reach the point where they see, or feel, that further effort and sacrifice can do no more than delay the end, they commonly lose the will to spin it out, and bow to the inevitable.


**Influencing Perceptions**

0514. Influence is an outcome - a result of activity - rather than an activity in itself. It is achieved when perceptions and behaviour are changed through the use of power; directly or indirectly. Achieving influence is not just about messaging and media, but about how deeds and words are interpreted and understood by audiences, through varying lenses of culture, history, religion and tradition. Securing influence is a sophisticated art; it will be contested by those who seek it for their opposing aims. Military forces should avoid becoming preoccupied only by physical results - for example, an area seized - although these results are often essential conditions for success. Influence is usually recognised as important but can often be treated as an enabler. This is a mistake, which some adversaries, who see the achievement of influence as their raison d’être, will not make. Influence is a contest, in which narratives compete to be heard and to shape perceptions. No side in a conflict has a clear run at the perception of any actor. The achievement of influence needs to be central to all military activities and it should be planned and orchestrated as such.

0515. **Gaining Influence.** Military activity should be conducted in context, in order to match the prevailing circumstances and to achieve the desired influence. ‘Not all problems are nails,’ and if the military instrument is always wielded like a hammer, then situations that demand a more nuanced approach are likely to be mishandled. All actions will bring different degrees of influence to bear on the perceptions of a range of audiences, which should be identified as targets. Analysis, planning, execution and assessment become a function of 2 questions: what effect is required and what actions will best achieve that effect?

0516. **Planning for Influence.** Planning to achieve influence should refer to the full range of military activities and actions; the application of the other instruments of power; the use of words and images; and the behaviour of adversaries and other actors. The commander should anticipate how influence takes effect, to comprehend the possibility of unintended consequences; and to take account of the numerous cultural prisms through which actions and messages are interpreted. This will affect the measures of effectiveness he uses, which should be established at the start of planning. He should also be...
comfortable with the limits on his ability to control every sphere of influence in his operating area. A commander should first be familiar with national information strategies which aim to articulate a narrative that will be used across government, consistent with its security strategies, but tailored to each operation. The information strategies set out the campaign objectives and end-state, target audiences and core scripts, and will be included in directives to operational commanders.

0517. **Orchestrating Influence.** The commander’s role at the start of an operation or tactical action is to establish the effects required to support the aims he has been given or to contribute to an end-state at the operational level. He then decides what influence is needed to create those effects. Influence must be orchestrated to affect the perception, cohesion and will of adversaries and other actors, especially those who are decisive. The orchestration of influence is inextricably part of the Manoeuvrist Approach. The situation faced should be addressed as a whole and plans designed that combine physical and mental effects. This mix is enhanced by accurate and timely information and intelligence. The aim is to achieve influence in the right place, at the right time, in order to have effects which support the achievement of objectives. The activity within this orchestration could be organised as: **fires, manoeuvre, posture presence and profile; and special influence methods.** 4

a. **Fires.** Fires should usually be applied from more than one element, through integrated and coordinated actions. The key to fires - which are usually joint - is that optimum effect on the target is provided by the most appropriate weapon or weapon system. Fires that are capable of both suppression (of wide areas) and precision attack (of more specific targets) are required. Fires offer the deliberate use of physical means to realise destruction or other effects, which are mainly focused on an adversary’s capability, including that which enables him to understand the situation. Fires may be employed to realise psychological effects (such as lowering morale) or physical effects (such as destruction or attrition), either directly or indirectly. Fires can generate negative influence, for example by causing collateral damage to civilian property and infrastructure. Also contributing to fires are 2 related activities: Counter Command Activities (CCA) which are specifically undertaken to reduce the effectiveness of an adversary commander or to deny him his ability to command. Some CCA may be direct, for example, attacking a headquarters; some may be indirect, such as discrediting the adversary in the eyes of his force or the population. Electronic Warfare (EW) mainly exploits the use of the electromagnetic spectrum and aims to prevent or reduce its hostile use by adversaries.

b. **Manoeuvre.** Manoeuvre involves coordinated activity to gain advantage, in time and space. It requires positioning from which to have an effect, in the right place at the right time. Manoeuvre can have an effect without
any supporting actions; for example, re-deploying a force might deter an adversary from acting to the extent that fires become unnecessary. Furthermore, a force can conduct manoeuvre without necessarily physically moving, by forging a partnership or an accommodation or by blocking access across a virtual network.

c. **Posture, Presence and Profile.** Posture (a force’s stance and methods), presence (where it is) and profile (its visibility) can be adjusted not only in relation to threats, but also as an effective means of communicating with a variety of audiences. Carefully considered and reversible adjustments in one or any combination of these 3 characteristics will alter their perceptions. In activity to support stabilisation, or after combat, adjustments of this type can create a powerful perception of improving normality, which in turn reduces the threat. In such a way a virtuous circle can be created. Or they can be used to deter or coerce. Clearly, posture, presence and profile probably include aspects of both fires and manoeuvre.

I did not expect to be back on the Basra streets patrolling in berets, alongside the Iraqi Army or mounting strike operations into the Hiyyaniyah and Al Qibla without huge public or militia retaliation. The Brigade’s contribution to this transformation was a preparedness to take risk, to move fast and get back amongst the people.

Brigadier Julian Free, Commander 4th Mechanised Brigade, Post Operation Interview, 2008 (Operation TELIC 11)

d. **Special Influence Methods.** A range of specific or special methods which aim to have direct influence can be grouped together. Although they are likely to require specialised preparation, it is likely that much of the force will be directly or indirectly involved in them. Sometimes these are referred to as influence activities, but should not be referred to as ‘influence operations,’ a term that implies something discrete. Special influence methods can have significant consequences for comparatively little expenditure and risk. However, they are difficult to plan, to execute and subsequently to assess. Agility and rapid communication are essential, both of which are challenging for big organisations operating in the frictions of the land environment without a monopoly on the means. Special influence methods are organised into:

1) **Information Methods.** Information Methods have previously been referred to as ‘Info Ops.’ They are the means by which military staffs coordinate a number of tasks designed to have direct influence, consisting of:
   a) **Computer Network Action.** Computer Network Action (CNA) has been referred to in other doctrine as ‘Computer Network
Operations (CNO). It has attack, defence and network exploitation applications, all of which can be used in cyberspace to support operations in the land environment.

b) **Psychological Methods.** Psychological Methods (previously referred to as ‘PsyOps’) are planned, culturally sensitive, truthful and attributable activities directed at approved target audiences within the operational area in order to achieve political and military objectives by influencing attitudes and behaviours. They serve to weaken the will of the adversary, to reinforce the will of supporters and to gain the support of the uncommitted.

2) **Deception.** Deception is defined as measures designed to mislead an adversary by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react against his interests. The object is to ‘...make the enemy very certain, very determined, and very wrong.” There are 2 methods: simulation, which is deliberately allowing an adversary to see false activity, and dissimulation which is hiding the reality by concealing it or making it appear to be something else. All deception must be supportive of the commander’s plan. It must be assessed and measured to ensure it has the effect intended. Deception is also used by adversaries, so a sceptical mind-set is required of commanders and their staffs. Deception should have a clearly defined aim; be aimed at a target’s perceptions, prejudices and likely reactions and be comprehensive, coherent and consistent, layering the deception from a number of operational perspectives. It also needs to be convincing and flexible, without consuming disproportionate resources or time.

In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.

Winston Churchill, a remark to Joseph Stalin at the Tehran Conference, 30 November 1943

3) **Key Leader Engagement.** Key Leader Engagement (KLE) provides the commander with personal conduits through which he can influence decisive actors, continually, perhaps even during combat, or during negotiation periods or ceasefires. Bespoke strategies for engaging each leader are required. Context is crucial: without understanding the object of the engagement, it is likely that false conclusions will be drawn. Refined negotiation skills, from training and practice, are essential for military commanders. Linked to KLE are the broad disciplines of conflict resolution and termination; accommodation and reconciliation. These have relevance at all levels of warfare and are covered extensively in joint doctrine and by academia.
4) **Civil-Military Cooperation.** Civil-military cooperation - or ‘CIMIC’ - frameworks enable commanders to interact effectively with the civil environment (governance, the legal system, municipal services and commerce), within a theatre of operations. It provides for cooperation, coordination, mutual support, joint planning and information exchange between military forces and civilian agencies. It thereby assists the commander with the achievement of his military objectives and maximises the effectiveness of the military contribution to the overall mission. Increasingly the centrality of a comprehensive, inter-agency approach renders a separate CIMIC category less useful than it once was.

5) **Operations Security.** Operations Security, or ‘OPSEC,’ is the discipline of protecting plans and operations from disclosure and interference. It requires uniform discipline across a force at all levels. OPSEC should be balanced by the need to decentralise as much as possible and to share information across agencies or with indigenous forces. However, the adversaries of the information age are so adept at exploiting and adapting to information gleaned on their opponents, that the contemporary land force needs to apply considerable cultural effort and discipline to protecting its advantages and avoiding giving its secrets away freely.

6) **Media Communication.** Media Communication (referred to in other doctrine as ‘Media Ops’), is conducted to provide factual information to a number of audiences, via the media, to support the aims of the national and operational information strategies. Media Communication is a key method of promulgating the strategic narrative.

I say to you that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media.

Ayman al-Zawahiri of Al-Qaeda in a letter written to Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi, July 2005

0518. **Targeting.** Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritising targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking into account operational requirements and capabilities. A target is an area, structure, object, person, force, organisation, mindset, thought process, attitude or behavioural pattern which can be influenced or changed by the application of a capability. Targeting processes vary according to the level of warfare and the size and role of a headquarters. A number of cycles, which complement the Intelligence Cycle, are described by joint and land functional doctrine. But there is no ‘one size fits all’ method. Effective targeting depends on understanding the situation; deciding how best to influence perceptions; selecting methods and communicating them; seizing the initiative; assessing the results and exploiting them.
Seizing and Holding the Initiative

0519. The initiative is the ability to dictate the course of events; the power or opportunity to think or act before adversaries do to gain an advantage. To seize and hold the initiative, a commander needs to be right, first; making assessments, anticipating correctly and then selecting, communicating and acting on the right choices, all more effectively than his adversary. It is the ‘supreme military weapon’ and lies at the heart of the Manoeuvrist Approach, because without the initiative, operations cannot succeed. It is impossible to win, or even to avoid failure, without the capacity to dictate the course of events, certainly if an adversary holds that power instead.

0520. Methods of Seizing and Holding the Initiative. Commanders must never take it for granted that they hold the initiative. It may only be held locally and can be easily lost. In combat, if one side acts first and uses or threatens force, the other side usually reacts to protect itself. This constrains its ability to initiate actions or to act offensively. Seizing and holding the initiative requires:

a. A competitive advantage over an adversary, derived from better doctrine, commanders who are confident taking risks and making decisions, meticulous planning; more efficient sustainment (logistics and administration); seamless integration of capabilities and effective situational awareness. All of these need to be exploited by rapid communication and, very often, greater mass.

b. Recognition that holding the initiative may not be universal across the Levels of Warfare. For example, initiative seized at the tactical level may be subsequently lost at the strategic level.

c. Awareness that there is a paradox of success: plans that appear to be too daring or innovative have great potential but carry with them nagging doubts. Therefore, their success is neither believed in time nor fully exploited. There is a fine line between a well-timed pause and extending too far. The ability to take informed risks helps to get this judgement right.

d. Once seized, the initiative should be protected by anticipating and deterring threats; and by discouraging risk aversion, complacency, and inflexibility. Concurrently, there is a need to add momentum to exploit its use, for example, with a strong narrative, unity of effort and command, organisational agility and reinforcement.

e. An ability to achieve and exploit surprise, which is examined in detail later in this chapter.
It was to employ mobility as a psychological weapon: not to kill but to move; not to move to kill but to move to terrify, to bewilder, to perplex, to cause consternation, doubt and confusion in the rear of the enemy, which rumour would magnify until panic became monstrous. In short, its aim was to paralyse not only the enemy’s command but also his government.

Major General JFC Fuller (referring to Guderian’s doctrine of Blitzkrieg) in *The Conduct of War* (1789-1961), (New Brunswick: Da Capo Press, 1961) 256

**Breaking Cohesion and Will**

0521. This section examines how the cohesion and will of adversaries can be broken or reduced. These are the central targets of the Manoeuvrist Approach. A complementary aspect of this offensive dimension is a defensive one, which aims to protect in our own side that which we seek to break or reduce in others. The defensive dimension is examined later.

0522. **Cohesion.** Cohesion is the action or fact of forming a united whole. It is central to the effectiveness of teams of all sizes. Like fighting power itself, cohesion has 3 elements: moral, conceptual and physical. Moral cohesion was explained in Chapter 2. Conceptual cohesion is achieved through the application of common doctrine; and through training and education. It also encourages the development of a sense of perspective; being able to see success and setback in context, so that the reaction to both is proportionate. Physical cohesion largely results from good tactics and balanced, well-trained organisations.

0523. **Will.** Will is the determination to persist in the face of adversity. It has 2 aspects; intent and resolve. Both can be influenced, attacked and undermined. An adversary’s intent is thwarted when he realises that his aim is no longer achievable, so he desists from that course of action. His resolve is his strength of will. It is overcome when he is demoralised. Resolve can be destroyed or manipulated by influence; conversely it may be unintentionally stiffened by the application of the wrong sort of influence at the wrong time.

They’re killing our soldiers, not to defeat us, but to make you think that this is too hard, and to break our will.

Methods of Breaking Cohesion and Will. Breaking will and cohesion requires understanding of the adversary’s culture and motivations. An attack should seek simultaneous effects wherever possible; but should not be scientifically or prescriptively organised. The key is to select the right approach and remain flexible. The target should be kept unable to respond effectively. The most powerful way of achieving this is by inducing combinations of surprise, pre-emption, dislocation, disruption, shock action, destruction, collapse, and exploitation:

a. **Surprise.** Surprise is induced by the introduction of the unexpected and can be one of the most significant contributors to military success at all levels, with effects out of proportion to the resources applied. Surprise can be generated through unexpected timing, or an unexpected direction or method of arrival or attack. It may be part of the original plan or may result from opportunities created. For example, surprise can be generated through achieving unanticipated defensive depth; penetration or bypassing; the concealment and employment of reserves; or by a sudden withdrawal to defensive positions in the rear. In counter-insurgency, surprise can be directed at the population as well as the insurgent, perhaps to turn its scepticism into optimism at a key moment. The major factors in achieving surprise are deception, intelligence, security, speed and originality. Commanders at all levels should create and exploit every available opportunity to surprise an adversary. Surprise need not be total, but merely sufficient to instil doubt, delaying a decision or an action until it is too late. Surprise is transitory, so its effects should be exploited rapidly.

b. **Pre-emption.** To pre-empt an adversary is to seize an opportunity, which may itself be fleeting, in order to deny him an advantage before he acts. It denies him the initiative and frustrates his plan. Its success lies in the speed with which the situation can be subsequently exploited.

c. **Dislocation.** To dislocate the enemy is to deny him the ability to bring his strengths to bear. Its purpose is wider than the frustration of his plan. It seeks to render his strength irrelevant. It may be deliberate or a fortunate consequence of other actions. Deep penetration, coup de main (or desant) and envelopment are 3 methods of dislocation. In counter-insurgency, marginalising the insurgent is a form of dislocation. Another means of dislocation is distraction, encouraging an adversary to cover more options than he can afford.
It is usually necessary for the dislocating move to be preceded by a move, or moves, which can best be defined by the term ‘distract,’ in its literal sense of ‘to draw asunder’. The purpose of this distraction is to deprive the enemy of his freedom of action, and it should operate in both the physical and psychological spheres. In the physical, it should cause a distension of his forces or their diversion to unprofitable ends, so that they are too widely distributed, and too committed elsewhere, to have the power to interfere. In the psychological sphere, the same effect is sought by playing upon the fears of, and by deceiving, the opposing command…To mystify and to mislead constitutes ‘distraction’, while surprise is the essential cause of ‘dislocation’. It is through the ‘distraction’ of the commander’s mind that the distraction of his forces follows. The loss of his freedom of action is the sequel to the loss of his freedom of conception.


d. **Disruption.** Selective disruption can be used to break apart and confuse assets that are critical to the employment and coherence of an adversary’s fighting power. It aims to rupture the integrity of a force to render it incapable of deciding and acting purposefully. The identification of suitable targets for disruption may not be easy, especially in counter-insurgency. Military targets might include communication networks, command centres, transport nodes, or logistic facilities. Against irregular forces, links to sponsors or other parts of the network might be targeted, provided that there is a legal basis for doing so.
42 Commando assaulted Mount Harriet in the Falklands on the night of 11 June 1982 in a surprise attack from the enemy’s rear. The 4th Argentine Infantry Regiment, defending Harriet, expected an attack from Mount Wall to the west; a diversionary attack by 12 Troop of 42 Commando reinforced that perception. The main body attacked from the south-east and approached to within about a hundred metres of the Argentine positions before it was detected. The assault was very rapid: leading elements reached the crest of Mount Harriet within 40 minutes; the crest line was cleared within about two hours; and the fighting largely complete within 5 hours.

The Argentine regimental command post and mortar platoon were overrun early in the assault: a lucky consequence of the chosen axis of attack, but the effects of this selective destruction were significant. The Argentines lost much of their primary indirect fire support and command and control of their forces; both affected their cohesion. An Argentine company commander attempted to organise a counter-attack force on the north side of the ridgeline; however a sudden, concentrated artillery fire mission broke up the attack. The survivors were seen fleeing east towards Stanley through the smoke and darkness. The surprise attack, shock action and some aspects of the destruction achieved had overcome the 4th Infantry Regiment’s cohesion; it collapsed and was effectively destroyed as a fighting force.

Abridged from Nicholas van der Bijl, *Nine Battles to Stanley*, (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1999)

e. **Shock Action.** Shock action is the sudden, concentrated application of violence, exploiting shock to disturb personal equilibrium, causing a violent disruption of thoughts, emotions and physical aptitude, to numb, deter and frighten. It is characterised by concentrations of fires or a high tempo of manoeuvre. The mental perception of shock is reinforced by the rapid approach and impact of aircraft or heavy armour, by the employment of intimidating and seemingly invulnerable weapon platforms or an aggressive strike into the heart of a network at the least expected time, perhaps by light or special forces. Shock action can be particularly effective if it can be achieved at night, in close country or at a place that the enemy thinks is secure. Like surprise, the effects of shock action may be transient and local. It should be exploited vigorously to lead to success at higher levels.
At about half-past seven on the morning of the 15th I was woken up with the news that M. Reynaud [the French Premier] was on the telephone. He spoke in English, and evidently under stress. “We have been defeated...we are beaten, we have lost the battle...the front is broken near Sedan; they are pouring through in great numbers with tanks and armoured cars.” A gap of some fifty miles had in fact been punched through the French line, through which the vast mass of enemy armour was pouring, and the French 9th Army was in a state of complete dissolution.


f. **Destruction.** Unsupported or unfocused destruction is not normally a major contributor to shock, other than when used on a strategic scale. The careful selection and destruction of discrete capabilities or force elements amplifies the effect of surprise and shock action; considerable impact will be achieved when surprise, shock action and destruction are synchronised. In most cases destruction does not need to be comprehensive and the consequences of not being sufficiently forensic in its use, for example by causing damage to the vital support of the population, or acting unlawfully, will be significant.

g. **Collapse.** Shock effects can sometimes be observed as collapse, which is either progressive or catastrophic. Progressive collapse occurs when a force surrenders incrementally or retreats gradually. Catastrophic collapse occurs when all, or a large part of a force, gives way simultaneously. Although the two may not be clearly distinguished, catastrophic collapse is more effective. Panic is a major indicator of catastrophic collapse and is infectious. It is transmitted as much by rumour as by fact because bad news travels fast. The perception of failure is the best mechanism by which to promote actual failure.
During the morning of 26 March 2003, an armoured raid into Az Zubayr by the 2 RTR battle group achieved shock and surprise...The objective was an enemy command and control centre, which was to be attacked just before H-Hr with...precision munitions. An armoured squadron would then assault the objective, supported by armoured infantry. The enemy was completely paralysed by the surprise attack, especially the JDAMs. What had previously been a concentrated area of enemy strength was neutralised by the shock and surprise of the bombing, followed up by tanks into the heart of the enemy’s perceived stronghold. That there was no resistance during the conduct of the raid, demonstrated the psychological effect as well as the physical blow this achieved. The enemy tried to reorganise but only offered limited resistance further in depth.

Lieutenant Colonel Piers Hankinson, Commanding Officer, 2nd Royal Tank Regiment Battle Group, Post Operation Report, 2003 (Operation TELIC)

h. **Exploitation.** The breaking of cohesion and will is likely to be local and temporary. A capable adversary will try to recover and seek ways of regaining the initiative, therefore the breakage should be exploited to extend and expand its effects. Exploitation can be planned or opportunistic. Planned exploitation is designed in advance to follow anticipated success and may require fresh, echeloned forces. Opportunistic exploitation is a way of building on local success. It should be carried out with the resources at hand and should be initiated as soon as an opportunity is recognised, particularly at lower tactical levels. Exploitation requires a decentralised command philosophy, effective understanding and strong reconnaissance forces. Also essential to exploitation is a mobile and flexible reserve or echeloned forces, which can be deployed rapidly to take advantage of the opportunities presented.

Always mystify, mislead and surprise the enemy, if possible; and when you strike and overcome him, never give up the pursuit as long as your men have strength to follow; for an army routed, if hotly pursued, becomes panic-stricken, and can then be destroyed by half [its] number... To move swiftly, strike vigorously and secure all the fruits of victory, is the secret of successful war.

One of the maxims of General Stonewall Jackson, quoted in GFR Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War*, Volume 1 (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1903) 420
Protecting Cohesion and Will

0525. The contemporary Manoeuvrist Approach requires us to protect our own will and cohesion while seeking to break or reduce it in an adversary. This is the approach’s defensive dimension. In a force, this is best done by ensuring that fighting power is designed to protect as well as to attack. When the mission is to stabilise, to fight an insurgency, or to protect the home base, the cohesion and will of the population is essential. It will be threatened - using the offensive techniques described above - by those who aim to destabilise. This section looks in particular at this form of protection, because it is a specific adjunct to the general protection of a force; a theme that is covered frequently elsewhere in this doctrine, for example in Chapter 7; and defensive actions which are explained in Chapter 8.

0526. Methods of Protecting Cohesion and Will. UK stabilisation doctrine provides a framework for protecting the cohesion and will of the population, using four functions: shape, secure, hold, and develop. These functions are based on principles which include the primacy of political purpose, a focus on the population, fostering indigenous governance, authority and capacity, and the isolation of threats.

a. Shape. As the perceptions of individuals and groups matter, influence becomes the guiding reference point for securing the cohesion and will of the population. Shaping activity consists of 4 elements: developing situational understanding; developing options to influence audiences; persuading and empowering other actors to make choices that are advantageous; and conducting limited offensive actions in order to keep adversaries off-balance. All of these elements will need to be refined as the operation progresses. They require engagement on the widest possible scale using a coherent and consistent narrative.

b. Secure. Securing activity also comprises of persuasive, supportive and coercive effects. The re-establishment of government control is supportive; the reduction of the influence and freedom of action of adversarial groups is coercive. Both protect cohesion and will. It is vital to strike the right balances in the use of force for the population to be convinced that their security needs can be adequately met. During the securing period violence may spike and security will take time to establish. Military forces will need inter-agency support to retain the security initiative. The key operational components of this security activity, which are contained in Army counter-insurgency doctrine, are a focus on the population; measures to control the population, establishing who is who; and containing, isolating and disrupting the adversary.

c. Hold. Holding a secured area demonstrates commitment and establishes the conditions for development. Once achieved, security must not be lost, as physical security and the credibility of the forces providing it are
critical guarantees of cohesion and will. Holding secured areas provides hope and an example, so acts as a fulcrum on which campaign progress is balanced. During this stage it is hoped that popular consent consolidates into active support so that the emphasis can shift from military forces to civilian organisations. Operational aspects of holding a secured area include a focus on the Rule of Law and policing; and the synchronisation of comprehensive measures to improve people’s lives.

d. Develop. In the held areas, prioritised long-term investment and development should take place to build social capacity, to stimulate the economy and to develop sustainable indigenous security forces. This further enhances cohesion and will by increasing government credibility and eroding support for destabilising groups. Military forces should be, at this point, in support of a civilian effort, but the periods in this framework are not compartmentalised; security, for example, is ongoing business. Operational aspects of development will include the training of indigenous forces; and support to the development of governance and economic development. It will also eventually include transition, which is the transfer of authority and responsibility for the delivery of pre-defined, discrete functions from one set of empowered, legitimate actors to another. The process is often two-way. The first transition will be from indigenous to coalition capability. Then, as capacity builds, responsibility will be handed back incrementally in order to restore indigenous control. Transition, a risky period, will be based on conditions. These can be either time-based, which serve to galvanise, but can become constraints; or conditions based on what it is realistically like on the ground, which can be open-ended. Transition will lead to a loss of situational awareness; there will be setbacks and nerve will be required as direct control recedes.
After three weeks it became apparent that we did not have the initiative, and that we were likely to remain reactive unless we did something big soon. I decided to take some risk and conducted a series of battle group operations to focus the insurgents’ minds on us; making them reactive to our actions, rather than vice-versa. The insurgents had built a defensive line of IEDs, bunkers and strong houses that prevented Afghan Army manoeuvre. I wanted to restore freedom of movement. There was an obvious gap in the patrol base ring which the insurgents exploited daily. It needed to be blocked and I thought I had identified how and where to place this block. Our resulting operations met with some success. They re-engineered the security envelope around the District Centre and defined the contested and uncontested zones that would come to characterise the area. We established two new patrol bases around which all subsequent insurgent activity coalesced. Forward-basing and living alongside the population, and interacting with them daily while on our feet, resulted in a steady drip of targetable intelligence. We also re-learned that, in the Afghan mindset, a static position equates to security; manoeuvre does not. Of equal importance, British troops were becoming increasingly tired of deploying, fighting, winning and recovering only to lose our reach and hold on the situation and see the insurgents come back immediately. Of course you cannot just sit and hold, so having secured the ring, subsequent strikes out of it kept the insurgents on the back foot and away from the population we sought to influence.

Based on an account by Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Darby, Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, The Royal Gurkha Rifles Battlegroup, Post Operation Interview, 2009 (Operation HERRICK 9)

**Enhancing the Manoeuvrist Approach**

0527. The Manoeuvrist Approach is enhanced by simplicity, flexibility, tempo, momentum and simultaneity. The air dimension to the approach is also examined here.

0528. **Simplicity.** All manoeuvrist plans should be tested against their simplicity and flexibility and a balance of the two. Simple plans are less vulnerable to friction than complex plans and are more easily remembered in the heat of battle. The more complex the plan, the more there is to go wrong, but simplicity is not an excuse for plans that lack the co-ordinating detail necessary to make them work. There are 2 guides to planning for simplicity:

a. As few actions as possible should depend on the completion of a prior action. The successful completion of a prior action conducted in contact with an adversary cannot be guaranteed, so strictly sequential operations may increase the possibility of failure.
b. Ideally there should be multiple paths to success, and an adversary should be overloaded by simultaneous activity of more than one type and from multiple directions. But wherever possible, the activity on the priority effort should be one of several in parallel at that stage. In this way a simple switch of effort will immediately open up a different path to success if the priority path is blocked.

0529. **Flexibility.** Flexibility is a requirement that applies to individuals and to the force as a whole. Individual flexibility is largely psychological, requiring an enquiring mind, quick reactions and the ability to consider alternatives. It is often a product of a broad education. Physical flexibility is the ability of a force to transition from one activity to another. It should be nurtured through grouping, training, good battle procedure and robust and well-practised drills. It relies on fast and effective decision-making and sound staff work.

0530. **Balancing Simplicity and Flexibility.** Increasing the number of planned options within an operation may appear to increase flexibility, but undermine simplicity. Focus can be diluted, and each option planned in less detail, when time is short. Conversely a simple switch of priority effort should not require much planning. Judgement is required to decide how many options should be planned in detail. The higher the level of a headquarters, the better it will be able to deal with multiple options simultaneously. At lower levels, with smaller planning teams, multiple options within a plan increase complexity and make it more difficult to act purposefully. Imposing such plans on subordinates may be counter-productive.

0531. **Tempo.** Tempo is the rhythm or rate of activity of operations relative to an adversary’s. The side which consistently decides and acts fastest should gain and hold an advantage. However, tempo does not always require high physical speed: the primary goal should be to maintain the initiative, which requires activity which is qualitatively as well as quantitatively of higher tempo than the adversary’s. Therefore, to maintain tempo, there is often value in pausing in order to gain or improve understanding.

0532. **Momentum.** If seizing the initiative is about being right, first, momentum is about staying right, quickest and for longer. Momentum is the product of a combination of velocity and mass, providing weight behind impetus, in terms of both length of time and substance. Momentum can be adjusted by a change in either velocity or mass. It is the vehicle upon which the initiative can be exploited, so they are essential partners. Initiative seized but not used is of little military value on at least one Level of War; exploitation of momentum creates the bridge from seizing the initiative to achieving success. In operations where the will of the population is important, momentum must be felt by
the people and regarded as irreversible, and will provide a key source of their confidence.

While coolness in disaster is the supreme proof of a commander’s courage, energy in pursuit is the surest test of his strength of will.

General Sir Archibald Wavell in *Allenby: A Study in Greatness*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1941)

0533. **Simultaneity.** Simultaneity seeks to overload the adversary by attacking or threatening him in so many ways or from so many directions at once that he cannot concentrate on any one, nor establish priorities between them. He cannot chose how and where to react; he is torn between multiple threats and finds it hard to respond to them coherently. Acting simultaneously against several layers of command has a cumulative effect on cohesion. Simultaneity in counter-insurgency can also be achieved through the application of a comprehensive approach, across multiple lines of operation.

It looked like an attack against a numerically superior enemy with a relatively small offensive force. ...Strength would derive from the mass of effective firepower; not simply the number of boots or tank tracks on the ground. Our (armoured) ground forces, supported by overwhelming air power, would move so fast and deep into the Iraqi rear that time and distance factors would preclude the enemy’s defensive manoeuvre. And this slow-reacting enemy would be fixed in place by the combined effect of (fires). Without question, our lines of communication would be long and exposed in places, stretching more than three hundred miles from the border of Kuwait to the outskirts of Baghdad. But the object was to destroy the Iraqi military’s will to fight. A larger, slower, methodical, attrition-based attack model could defeat the enemy in detail, and our lines of communication could be better protected. But the time it would take to launch such a juggernaut would leave Saddam too many options: he could destroy Iraq’s water or oil infrastructure, launch missiles against his neighbours, or use WMD against our troops. Manoeuvre speed would be our most important asset. If high-balling armour units could sustain that speed for days on end, they would own the initiative, and our momentum would overwhelm Iraq’s ability to react. We would not apply overwhelming force. Rather, we would apply the overwhelming ‘mass of effect’ of a smaller force. Speed would represent a mass all of its own.

The Air Dimension to the Manoeuvrist Approach. The integration of air and land power is an important part of the operational implementation of the Manoeuvrist Approach. When properly integrated, air power can help to shape the battlespace, attack an adversary’s cohesion and will; it can protect the joint force and the cohesion and will of the population and can be used to exploit success.

a. Shaping. Control of the air can be employed to protect land forces from air and missile attack and maintain their freedom of action. In turn land forces can contribute to control of the air by finding, raiding and suppressing adversary air defences. Control of the air denies information to an opponent and helps to find it for the land force, reducing the other side’s freedom of action. Air power can be used to close off terrain and channel a mobile adversary or to undermine him in the defence. It can also shape his perception, for example, by contributing to deception.

b. Attack. Air attack on land forces can cause delay, disruption and attrition. This may take place where and when land forces are in close contact or elsewhere, for example by cutting a line of communication or destroying a headquarters. Because land forces are generally dispersed, breaking their cohesion means convincing their commander of his defeat. Air power, with its potential for ubiquity and relentless violence, is a highly effective tool for shattering will, particularly when combined with indirect fires, an airmobile or airborne coup de main or desant manoeuvre (dropping troops behind the adversary) and immediate exploitation by ground manoeuvre forces. This synergy can create a sense of overwhelming force, from multiple directions.

c. Protection. The converse is to prevent an adversary doing this. Reserves must be shielded from aerial attrition and the whole of the force needs to be adept at avoiding detection from the air. As a protective measure, the adversary’s framework for co-ordinating joint fires should be attacked. Aerial reconnaissance provides advance warning of approaching forces. Other forms of tactical surveillance from the air are able to identify specific threats to the force, for example, ambushes or preparations to assault operating bases.

d. Exploitation. Exploitation by joint forces should seek opportunities in the air as well as on land. Air power gives a manoeuvring land force greater reach into the furthest areas of the battlespace. Air forces can join a pursuit, harassing a withdrawing enemy to prevent him from re-organising for a counter-attack or linking up with reinforcements.
Figure 5.2 - Summary of the Manoeuvrist Approach
Notes

1 TE Lawrence, *The Evolution of a Revolt* (Tavistock: Army Quarterly and Defence Journal, October 1920) 9

2 PESTEL-ED represents examining a situation from Political, Economic, Societal, Technological, Environmental, Legal, Educational and Demographic angles and setting priorities according to their relative impact. PMESII-PT does a similar task with Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, Physical and Time. ASCOPE covers Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organisation, People and Events.

3 The detail in this model can be expanded by applying, in due course, some of the tactical planning concepts described in Chapter 7.

4 These groups are similar in name to those in the ‘joint action’ model which is not used in this doctrine. The way the orchestration is explained here aims to clarify subjects that have become generally over-specialised, despite the centrality of influence, removing labels and prescription where possible. This represents a new, clearer way of explaining influence.

5 The use of the label ‘operations’ to describe these actions is incorrect, but familiar terminology, which should be avoided henceforth. Operations are groups of military activities executed to meet the objectives of a campaign, rather than single activities.


7 David Holden, article in the Manchester Guardian, 14 May 1964, in Robert Heinl, *Dictionary of Military Quotations*, (Naval Institute, Annapolis: 1966)

8 The concept that applies to the priority effort is known as the Main Effort and is explained in Chapter 6.
Chapter 6 describes the second tenet of the British Army’s enduring philosophy for operations: Mission Command. It does so, having first examined decision-making and risk-taking; and then describes how plans should be made, orders issued and the control of operations exercised.
Making Decisions

0601. Decision-Making. Making decisions is a commander’s primary duty. Although he can be advised and provided with information by his staff, and can delegate some decisions, the responsibility and authority remain his. Timely decision-making lies at the heart of the exercise of command at all levels. It is one of three complementary and overlapping aspects of the classical command model, consisting also of leadership (covered in other chapters) and control (also covered in this chapter). Decision-making is an essential skill that should be supported by the ability to assess and visualise situations, solve problems, plan solutions and communicate them. Military decision-making should be based on logical analysis, which is normally a collective endeavour, and the application of the commander’s military judgement.

The higher [the commander] stands the more he needs another quality which cannot be taught by any quick means, but is either there, by a stroke of genetic chance, or more usually, is deposited cell by cell on the subconscious during long years of study and practice. It is this quality which tells a commander, instantly and without cerebration, whether a plan is inherently sound or unsound. It is this that enables him to receive the advice of specialists and experts … or to overrule them even when they speak with one voice.


0602. The Decision-Action Cycle. In order to decide on a course of action, make a plan, and put it into operation, a commander requires timely and accurate intelligence, together with a robust means of communication to carry his orders to subordinates. The classical decision-action cycle - sometimes referred to as the OODA (observe, orientate, decide, act) loop - is illustrated in Figure 6.1. It can be complemented by a range of doctrinal frameworks which are explained in Chapter 7. The model does not demand a strictly sequential approach. In fact, there should be a continuous cycle, with observation, orientation, decision and action all happening concurrently and bound together by effective communication. The decision-action cycle is not an end in itself. The end sought is tactical success, which depends on the ability to take better - not necessarily faster - decisions and actions than those of adversaries. The loop does not demand a race around the stages; the importance of getting the orientation (understanding) right cannot be overstated. Also, a decision might be not to act rather than to do so. That said, a perfect plan too late is less useful than an imperfect one on time, so the caveats on speed are not excuses for procrastination. The model also requires an effective method of analysing the problem, producing a range of solutions,
creating a plan around the one selected and communicating that plan. These depend on effective doctrine, estimates and orders.

Figure 6.1 - The Decision-Action Cycle

0603. **Framing the Problem.** It is the duty of the commander and his staff to assess the situation and to achieve a common understanding of it, by ‘framing the problem’ in broad terms. The commander can then begin to work out his plan. This gradually details the actions required, in time and space, to get from the current situation to the intended situation. The result is what is referred to in joint doctrine as a ‘theory of change.’ This assessment should be distributed across the force, perhaps as a warning order (WngO), to foster early understanding of the direction likely to be taken and allow anticipatory activity to begin. Such an order should normally cover a review of the situation and context, including the threat; progress in achieving the current mission and likely future missions; the actions and tasks likely to be required of principal subordinates; perhaps a listing of concerns, and certainly early consideration of sustainment, time and space factors. As the plan emerges, further warnings should be sent out to enable concurrent planning and activity to continue and become refined.

0604. **Testing the Plan.** As the plan unfolds, it should be tested to refine the decisions made and to identify potential flaws that could flourish because of the tendency of organisations to ‘follow the herd.’ This is sometimes referred to as ‘groupthink.’ This prospect can be overcome by appointing an empowered red team\(^1\), by wargaming, or by conducting Operational Analysis (OA). Both red teaming and wargaming are intrinsically adversarial
techniques; their purpose is to pitch planners against each other in a deliberate attempt to spark debate and generate new ideas. These techniques are also used within the estimate process. OA is a modelling technique which allows the staff to better understand the potential outcomes of intended actions. Other techniques aimed at testing the plan include back-briefing, ROC-drill\textsuperscript{2} and physical rehearsal. A back-briefing is designed to confirm subordinates’ understanding of the plan. It usually represents the last chance to modify a plan before execution. Back-briefings are not merely vehicles for commanders to re-impose their will, as this negates their utility as tests of the plan. A ROC-drill is aimed at synchronising the details of a plan rather than to amend it, unless major problems are identified. Physical rehearsals may contain an element of training and will benefit the cohesion of the force. They significantly aid visualisation and ‘actions-on’ at all levels. A further technique is to employ a prism cell or an ‘initiatives’ group, which can help to forge a comprehensive approach from the start. These groups should consist of individuals with alternative backgrounds and perspectives who are independent of the chain of command and not involved in the planning to date, but who may be able to offer ‘Devil’s advocacy.’ The making of plans is examined in more detail below.

0605. A Sequence for Decision-Making. A further simple framework to explain decision-making may be of use. Decision-makers could consider the following steps:

a. **Sense.** The need or potential for a decision should be sensed and anticipated. If commanders depend on their staff or subordinates to tell them that a decision is required, it is not likely to be timely. Understanding the situation and how it might change, recognising how higher intent might evolve and being aware of the capabilities of the force are examples of what is required to sense accurately. A mixture of intuition and knowledge is required.

b. **Warn.** As soon as the need or the potential for a decision is sensed, those who depend on it should be warned, so they can sense their own decision-making requirements. Warning should be repeated throughout the sequence.

c. **Consider.** The decision-maker should then conduct research, take advice, carry out an estimate and make time to think through the problem faced. Decision-makers should try to re-create the conditions around them that they know helps them through this kind of thinking.

d. **Decide.** The decision-maker must then decide; or decide not to decide. It needs to be clear to him, his staff and subordinates what he has decided. Decisions should not be ambiguous or open to interpretation.

e. **Execute.** The decision should not be left in the theoretical domain. It needs to be executed. This requires the communication of direction; the
application of time and resources; a way of measuring progress; and the identification of what future decisions may be required, along with ideas for how they might be sensed.

Taking Risks

The Nature of Risk

0606. Military success comes through the identification of when to take decisive risks, not from a mindset that avoids them. This section examines the nature of risk before suggesting ways of dealing with it.

0607. **Risk.** By its very nature, military activity is about understanding, balancing and taking risks, rather than avoiding hazards. Risk is an expression of the probability and implications of an activity or event, with positive or negative consequences, taking place. It is a measure of the likelihood of something going right or wrong, and the associated impact, good or bad. Therefore, risk is a neutral. Because risk is part of the essence of military activity, it is not simply something to avoid or apply a process to. The acceptance of risk presents real opportunities as well as the potential for grave consequences. Commanders must therefore differentiate between taking calculated risks and gambling. The former provides for changes of course or recovery; the latter only leaves things to chance.

0608. **The Risk Paradox.** A commander needs to deal with the tension between protecting his force and accepting risks that must be taken in order to achieve his objectives. The logic involved in such calculations can appear to create a paradox: the more effort spent in trying to reduce risks, the more they may increase. Understanding the environment is the most substantial step to getting this judgement right. Also important is to select and maintain an aim, underpinning it with moral courage. This means that, when things go wrong or casualties are taken, the force does not grind to a halt, culminating by becoming focussed on the setback, at the expense of the task in hand. It might seem cold-hearted to encourage soldiers to complete the mission before treating casualties, but if the force collectively gets the balance wrong, more of it could suffer in the long run, as will the mission. On the other hand, the strategic consequences of tactical setbacks, including the taking of casualties, should be understood when setting this balance.
You can’t commute to this fight. Living among the people is essential to securing them and defeating the insurgents. Move mounted, work dismounted. Patrol on foot and engage the population. Situational awareness can only be gained by interacting with the people face-to-face, not separated by ballistic glass. Vehicles insulate us from the people we are securing and limit our situational awareness so we gain little in safety, but sacrifice much in effectiveness. Stop by, don’t drive by.

Lieutenant General David Petraeus, extract from the Multinational Force-Iraq Counter Insurgency Guidance, (Baghdad, June 2008)

0609. **Understanding Risk.** Personal experience of risk influences appetite for it. In unfamiliar situations, especially when under pressure or stress, perceptions of risk will affect individual behaviour and decision-making. Commanders need to be aware of their own attitude towards risk as well as those of others, especially in an inter-agency effort, and this includes adversaries and the population. The appetite for risk of the domestic population fluctuates, and the impact of this - both immediately and in the longer-term - should be considered. Attitudes to risk will often be specific to situations. Commanders should consider the following factors:

a. Human perception of risk is underpinned by two components; how much an individual fears a potential outcome; and the extent to which he feels in control of events. In a worst case situation, decisions may be made and actions taken for fear of losing, rather than with any realistic expectation of winning.

b. Attitudes towards risk are driven by individual tendencies to pay more attention to information that confirms assumptions or hypotheses than to information that contradicts them; and to give disproportionate weight to beliefs that are easily accessible or recalled. This may result in assumptions that techniques or tactics that have worked in the past will automatically work again, even if the situation differs. A further tendency can be to behave as if one can exert control in circumstances where this is highly unlikely.

0610. **Impact of Risk and the Levels of Warfare.** Risk has different implications at each Level of Warfare. In the same way that tactical events can have strategic repercussions and vice versa, risks at the tactical level can have consequences at both the operational and strategic levels.

a. **Strategic Risk.** Events that impact upon or change the overall strategic context may have strategic implications, in extremis jeopardising a successful campaign. Two common areas of strategic risk in this context relate to strategic cohesion and multinational appetite for risk. In the case of the former, linking the UK’s national aims to those of the coalition can present strategic risks. For the latter, because each nation determines how
its own personnel are employed, risk appetites are unlikely to be uniform across a coalition and will be influenced by the perceptions of threat and discretion surrounding a campaign.

b. **Operational Risk.** Risk at the operational level is often associated with the need to link strategic objectives and tactical activity. The operational level provides a bridge from strategy to tactics. The traffic crossing the bridge in both directions can be both positive and negative and include the consequences of risk-taking, good and bad. So, for example, a tactical risk leading to a strategic consequence is likely to change the freedoms and constraints that apply to the operational commander. His freedom of action might be curtailed, perhaps causing the force to pause, culminate, or lose the initiative. On the other hand, an opportunity might be presented to exploit a tactical risk more widely, seizing on local best practice to create operational effects across a theatre.

c. **Tactical Risk.** Tactical risk arises from the effects of both planned activity and other anticipated events, and unplanned and unforeseen events or chance. Some of these risks can be addressed through contingency planning, but those that are unforeseen, or arise from activities or events that are themselves unforeseen, are the most difficult to take or mitigate. Low-level tactical awareness, agility and properly understanding the tactical environment all help to deal with this type of risk.

**Dealing with Risks**

0611. **Risks as Opportunities.** Although it is tempting to consider risks as only being negative, risk aversion is symptomatic of a failure to understand the nature of risk. Risks lead to opportunities, for example greater freedom of action and a wider range of options. It is the taking of risks that advances the human condition. Frequently, the greatest opportunities are in the areas of most risk. Exploring those areas requires an ability to deal with ambiguity and complexity, without attempting to reduce them to patterns and certainties that do not exist. It also requires moral courage. Additionally, risk-taking is supported by timely and accurate information; speed of response to problems and crises; experience with similar problems and crises; sufficient resources to weather storms; and inherent flexibility.

0612. **Risk Analysis and Management.** Risk analysis and management are essentially defensive techniques, used to adjust or limit plans. This distinguishes them from the more positive treatment of risks as opportunities. They are too often the default setting, but should be regarded as a complementary or supporting activity rather than drivers. Risk analysis is a 2-part process used to identify activities and events that may give rise to significant risk. Risk identification helps identify what could go wrong and how; whilst risk assessment judges the likelihood of those risks occurring,
estimates their potential impact and identifies who should be responsible for taking them. Risk management reduces the possibility of unwanted events occurring, mitigating their consequences and exploiting the opportunities they may present. Techniques used here may include: termination (remove the risks entirely); treatment (reduce the risks’ effects or mitigate them); toleration (put up with the risks); and transfer (move the risks elsewhere).

0613. **Responsibility for Taking Risks.** It is important to try to identify where the consequences of taking or not taking risks are most likely to be felt. This informs the decision as to who should have responsibility for risk-taking, analysis and management. Even if a risk impacts most at one level, its effects may also be felt at others. Commanders must be clear not only about what risks they might face, but where responsibility for dealing with them lies. While analysing and managing risks can be passed to subordinates, responsibility for taking them should not be delegated, as a matter of principle.

0614. **Risks, Threats and Realised Threats.** It is important to distinguish between risks, threats and realised threats. Just as it is counter-productive to regard all risks as negatives, it is unwise to see all threats as imminently dangerous. A risk is something that might happen; a threat is a risk with an element of danger. But only a realised threat will cause actual harm rather than a perception or fear of harm. This understanding aids a rational approach to threats, as an alternative to seeing ‘high-threats’ everywhere. This discernment will ensure that effort and resources are applied as efficiently as possible, rather than spread over too wide a range. Threats should be considered in terms of their likelihood and gravity; how likely are they to happen, and how serious would the consequences be if they did?

0615. **Proximity of Risks.** It is militarily inadequate to approach risks only in terms of their proximity: becoming preoccupied by how identifiable, near and apparently pressing the risk is, or how clear will it be ‘where the buck stops’ if things go wrong. The greater risk may actually be downstream. In mitigating an apparently immediate risk, a commander might miss a more substantial threat or opportunity which is further away in time and space. An illustrative example can be found in training. Risk aversion in training, for example ceasing an activity because it might lead to the death or injury of a single soldier in a ten year period, could lead to a loss of expertise that will in turn contribute to the death or injury of ten soldiers in one year of operations. The conclusion is that whatever processes are used, it is ultimately reasonable judgements, leadership, moral courage and clear communication that are required to deal with risk effectively.
**Force Protection and Risks**

0616. Protection is examined in general terms as a tactical function in Chapter 7. Force protection maintains operational effectiveness by countering the threats posed by an adversary, as well as natural or human hazards. It enables the commander to optimise his capability; but he must balance effort between protecting his force and undertaking the necessary activity to achieve the mission. The commander should be wary of undue caution or the commitment of resources to guard against every perceived threat, and should routinely review force protection measures. An unrealistic expectation of avoiding all risks may impact adversely on the accomplishment of the mission and, if casualties ensue, undermine political and military resolve. Such an expectation also, perversely, can increase the dangers to the force.

By the time that you add Osprey body armour, Bowman (radios), the helmet and all the other stuff that soldiers have to carry like water, platoon weapons, ammunition, (grenade launchers, visual aids) and miscellaneous batteries, you cannot do normal infantry things - like dash, down, crawl, observe, sights and fire - because you are carrying far too much weight. We have to reduce the weight we carry; in some cases our protection adversely affects our mobility, and mobility affects survivability. We are going to have to manage the risk(s) better.

Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Williams, Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion The Parachute Regiment Battle Group, Post Operation Report, 2008 (Operation HERRICK 8)

**Mission Command**

Diverse are the situations under which an officer has to act on the basis of his own view of the situation. It would be wrong if he had to wait for orders at times when no orders can be given. But most productive are his actions when he acts within the framework of his senior commander’s intent.

Generalfeldmarschall Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder), *Taktisch-Strategische Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1857 bis 1871*, (Berlin: 1900)

0617. Against a background of understanding, decision-making and risk-taking, Mission Command provides a philosophy of command to complement the contemporary Manoeuvrist Approach. It is the second core tenet of the British Army’s approach to operations.
The Nature of Command

0618. Land forces are complex. They typically comprise large numbers of fighting elements with multiple levels of command and several headquarters at each level. These forces are usually dispersed and operating in physical conditions that handicap cohesion and communication. Each person in a force has individual perceptions and a unique position on the ground. Decision-making in a coalition, alliance or inter-agency force will be even more complicated. All of this places considerable emphasis on unity of effort, mutual understanding, good drills and common intent across the force; and the need for good communications, as well as a coherent command philosophy. This is the subject of the remainder of this chapter.

0619. Authority, Responsibility and Accountability. Command is the authority vested in an individual for the direction, coordination and control of military forces. It has a legal and constitutional status, codified for the Army in Queen’s Regulations, and is vested in a commander by a higher authority that gives him direction and assigns forces to him to accomplish a mission. The exercise of command is the process by which a commander makes decisions, impresses his will on and transmits his intentions to his subordinates. It entails authority, responsibility and accountability. A commander needs to have all 3 in balance to command effectively and the Army should support its commanders by ensuring that they do. This requirement is derived from the Military Covenant:

a. Authority. Authority involves the right and freedom to enforce obedience and apply resources. A commander can devolve specific authority to subordinates to decide and to act within their own areas of delegated responsibility, but the overall responsibility is his.

b. Responsibility. Responsibility is defined as professional obligation, held by someone who ultimately takes the credit for success and the blame for failure. Commanders should be clear that whilst they may delegate their authority, they should be careful how they delegate responsibility if at all. They are responsible for how those under their command act and should not derogate that responsibility by failing to supervise.

c. Accountability. Accountability involves a liability and an obligation to answer to a superior for the proper use of authority and resources. It includes the duty to act and execute missions in line with direction. Accountability should be accompanied by sufficient authority, given to a subordinate for him to be able to carry out what he is responsible for.

0620. The Constituents of Command. Military command at all levels is an art that requires an understanding of desired results, an appreciation of concepts, doctrine, missions and priorities and the allocation of resources. It also requires an ability to assess people and risks and involves a continual process of re-evaluating the situation. The 3 classical constituents of command, which
overlap, are **decision-making**, **leadership** and **control**. Most major decisions will have implications for leadership and control, while the demands of leadership may influence decisions and the way in which control is exercised. It may also affect the physical positioning of the commander and his staff. A commander’s ability to harness decision-making, leadership and control is a major contributor to all three components of Fighting Power. If any of the constituents of command is deficient, it will have a detrimental effect on a force’s fighting power as a whole.

**A Philosophy of Command**

0621. Mission Command is a philosophy of command, with centralised intent and decentralised execution, that is particularly suitable for complex, dynamic and adversarial situations. The Manoeuvrist Approach demands a philosophy of command that promotes freedom of action and initiative. Like the Manoeuvrist Approach, Mission Command focuses on outcomes, as it stresses the importance of understanding what effect is to be achieved, rather than specifying the ways by which it should be achieved. It has the following key elements:

a. A commander gives his orders in a manner that ensures that his subordinates understand his intentions (intent), their own missions, and the context of those missions.

b. Subordinates are told what effect they are to achieve and the reason why it is required.

c. Subordinates are allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions.

d. A commander uses the minimum level of control possible so as not to unnecessarily constrain his subordinates’ freedom of action.

e. Subordinates then decide how best to achieve their missions. They have a fundamental responsibility to act in line with their commander’s intent.

I have (had) published under my name a good many operational orders and a good many directives…but there is one paragraph in the order that I have always written myself…the intention paragraph.

Field Marshal Lord Slim, Lecture to the Army Staff College, 2 November 1967

0622. **Intent.** Intent is similar to purpose. A clear intent initiates a force’s purposeful activity. It represents what the commander wants to achieve and why; and binds the force together; it is the principal result of decision-making. It is normally expressed using effects, objectives and desired outcomes, as was explained in Chapter 5. The complexity of operations demands cogent, short orders, highlighting a clear intent. Intent must be in language the recipients will understand, noting that they may be from other nations, or not be
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military. The best intents are clear to subordinates with minimal amplifying detail. They are personal to the commander and should be written by him, applying all of his experience and intuition, bound together with the advice and intelligence he receives. Intent is facilitated through control, which coordinates activity and takes account of risks. This is the function of the staff, although the commander will (sometimes) intervene to ensure that his intent is being met.

Modern...warfare demands quick movement, quick thinking and quick decisions...There simply is not the time to put a decision into writing or the opportunity for putting it into effect may be lost: and it is the effect [emphasis added] of the decision that matters, not the writing of it out...Recent operations have shown that...situations develop and change so rapidly that more and more it is becoming necessary for subordinate commanders to be ‘in the mind’ of their superior so that they will instinctively take the right course of action in accordance with his general intention, acting upon the briefest of instructions and often upon none at all.

Transcribed from a War Office report on operations in the Western Desert, 1940

Principles of Mission Command

0623. Mission Command has 6 enduring principles. This philosophy is designed to promote a robust system of command, balancing unity of effort with freedom of action at all levels. It requires the development of trust and mutual understanding between commanders and subordinates throughout the chain of command. The exercise of command requires timely and effective decision-making based on initiative and creativity, leading towards the achievement of objectives and, first among them, a specified Main Effort.

0624. Unity of Effort. Unity of effort is essential to ensure the maximum synergy between the elements within a force. To achieve this, the commander must identify where his top priority lies and reflect this in the allocation of resources. In addition, the commander should ensure that his own higher commander’s intent is always clear in his subordinates’ minds. Unity of purpose begets unity of effort. Unity of effort stems from the commander’s ability to formulate a clear intent and mission statements; the use of common doctrine and tactics; a common language of command; a high standard of collective training; and the designation of a priority or main effort. Taken together, these provide a framework of common understanding throughout a force. They also assist the coordination of actions in time and space and the
ability to anticipate and respond swiftly to changes in the situation. Failure to achieve unity of effort will probably lead to confusion and missed opportunity.

Much of the Eighth Army’s inability to concentrate force effectively at Gazala was rooted in a lack of both unity of effort and a disciplined approach to command at all levels. The British were plagued by feebleness, by lack of instant authority in the high command. Intentions were too often obscure. Orders at army, corps or divisional level were too often treated as the basis for discussion, matters for visit, argument, expostulation even. The result was a system of command too conversational and chatty, rather than instant and incisive.


0625. Unity of effort is enhanced by subordinates having an understanding of the intentions of superiors, 2 levels up. This is described as vertical integration and allows subordinates to nest their own plans within those of their superiors. The concept of horizontal integration, which helps subordinates understand how their missions interact with others at their own level, is equally important. Horizontal and vertical integration are essential to understanding the contribution to the battle of a formation or a unit, and hence the part it plays in fulfilling the superior commanders’ intentions.

0626. In a volatile situation it is important that a force understands both its tasks and the purposes behind them. Subordinates well-versed in Mission Command should be able to work within constraints and thus avoid the pitfalls. Therefore directives and orders should express the commander’s intent and his plan for operations in such a way that everyone understands, not just the aim, but also the manner in which it is to be achieved; including the key constraints demanded by the operational context of the tactical situation.

0627. **A Specified Main Effort.** A Main Effort balances unity of effort and freedom of action. The Main Effort requires a concentration of forces or means by which a commander seeks to bring about a decision. It is a mental tool to provide a focus for that activity which a commander considers crucial to the success of his mission. Unity of effort is enhanced through the selection and maintenance of the aim and concentration of force. Both are supported by designating a Main Effort. The Main Effort must attract resources and sufficient fighting power. It will have relevance for all subordinates, even those who do not sit astride it, because they will support it or lose resources to it. These main and supporting efforts will ultimately need to be integrated into a concept of operations. This might require the narrowing of boundaries to concentrate force, requiring economy of effort elsewhere. Although there
may be a sequence of main efforts, there cannot be more than one at any one time. The Main Effort should be expressed as a single action together with the principal force undertaking it. Shifting the Main Effort is the primary way of responding to changing situations. It should be shifted if the commander can identify a more effective way of achieving his mission.

0628. **Freedom of Action.** The Manoeuvrist Approach accepts that operations are often chaotic and outcomes are unpredictable, so favours freedom of action at all levels. Therefore, when an unforeseen event occurs, subordinates have the authority to act, within the commander’s intent. Commanders should not seek to over-coordinate. They should accept that overly coordinated plans made in advance will probably not work quite as intended. In particular, synchronisation (the coordination of activities at specified times) is unlikely to succeed unless responsibility for its implementation is delegated to the lowest practical levels. It is important that coordination is conducted, but subordinates should also cooperate between themselves, within the framework of intent provided by the superior commander. Cooperation, not coordination, is a Principle of War, and detailed coordination from above is contrary to the spirit of Mission Command. However, freedom of action depends on capable, well-trained forces and commanders. Without this confidence in ability, Mission Command would be no more than derogation of command. Decentralisation is an important method of increasing freedom of action and is covered later in this chapter.

0629. **Trust.** Trust - one of the elements of moral cohesion - is a pre-requisite of command at all levels: trust by commanders in their superior commanders’ plans; and trust by commanders in their subordinates that they will sensibly interpret their intent and persevere to achieve it. Trust must be earned, not demanded. Personal trust can only be built up over time with experience, rather than by reputation. The spirit of Mission Command requires a presumption of trust between superiors, subordinates and peers that will develop through shared experience. Bonds of trust include tolerance of well-intentioned mistakes and a preparedness to take risks, together. If a subordinate cannot trust his superior to support him in such circumstances, the bond of trust will be eroded; the subordinate will not act on his own initiative; and the moral fabric of Mission Command will be lost. Trust is based on a number of qualities, including personal example, integrity, professional competence and attention to detail. Montgomery was trusted because his ‘... appeal across the chasm between leader and those led rested in great measure on the trust he inspired: a trust that he had the ordinary soldier’s well-being at heart, that he would not risk life unnecessarily but would wage war with a studied attention to casualties and the cost of victory.’

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0630. **Mutual Understanding.** Allied closely to trust is mutual understanding. The emphasis on understanding the intent behind orders, rather than simply the details of the immediate task, makes it clear that mutual understanding is an important aspect of both the Manoeuvrist Approach and Mission Command. The commander must also understand the realities facing his subordinate commanders and take account of their problems. Like trust, mutual understanding requires time and study to establish, and is challenging to achieve in modular formations assembled just before operations. Orders may have to become longer to allow more detailed descriptions of intent. The commander may visit subordinates more often and use carefully chosen liaison officers. This is particularly relevant in a coalition and in an inter-agency environment.

0631. **Timely and Effective Decision-Making.** Successful execution of the Manoeuvrist Approach requires determination to gain an advantage over an adversary. This, in turn, drives the imperative to know when it is necessary to make timely and effective decisions and to know it relative to an adversary’s decision-action cycle. In order to achieve a greater tempo than the adversary, decisions will often have to be taken on the basis of incomplete information. This requires an acceptance of risks. The commander who always waits for the latest available or ‘complete’ information is unlikely to act decisively or in good time. On the other hand, commanders need to know when to take a deliberate pause, to see how a complex situation might develop. The ability to take difficult decisions, particularly when the outcome is uncertain, marks out a strong commander. Fleeting opportunities should be grasped. Commanders must know when to take advice and when to decide; when an idea should be command-led, rather than staff-driven. Fear of risk is corrosive. So is an absolute fear of failure, especially when driven down through organisations by commanders.

**Making Plans and Giving Orders**

0632. Once risks have been assessed and intuitive judgements made, there is then, within the spirit of Mission Command, a need to put substance into the plan. This requires an estimate, and the writing and communication of orders.

**Estimates**

0633. An estimate is a logical process of reasoning by which a commander, faced with an ill-structured problem, arrives at a decision for a course of action to be taken in order to achieve his mission. Commanders at all levels use estimates of one form or another. They may have different titles (such as appreciations or assessments), and be conducted in different ways, but there is a consensus that rational planning depends on formal analysis. In practice, planning is neither a strictly linear nor a sequential process.
An estimate should be command-led, because the process is designed to support commanders’ decision-making. It encompasses, first, an understanding of the situation and the problem. Then there is a need to ascertain what needs to be achieved and by when; to identify possible courses of action (CoAs) and to select the best one. Finally, decisions as to how the chosen CoA should be executed need to be made. The format of the estimate is designed to save time, because there will rarely be enough of it. The steps provide depositories for ideas and findings, rather than bureaucratic constraints. The estimate is dependent upon a commander’s skill in determining:

a. The essentials of the problem, in terms of the assigned mission and its key elements or objectives; and,
b. The art of the possible, specifically in relation to capabilities, resources, sustainability, legitimacy, time and space.

Estimate Methods. The British Army uses 3 recognised estimate methods: the Operational Estimate, the Tactical Estimate and the Combat Estimate (sometimes referred to as the 7 Questions). The deliberate planning that occurs at the operational level should make use of the Operational Estimate. The Combat Estimate is ideal for quick planning to generate tempo at the tactical and lower operational level. The Tactical Estimate is an alternative sitting between the two, but will probably be the least commonly used by the audience for this ADP.

a. Operational Estimate. The Operational Estimate takes a broad view of the problem or situation. It is a 6 step process which is designed to provide an understanding of the operating environment. It is used to gain an understanding of the specific nature of the problem that the commander has been tasked to deal with, before he determines a range of potential solutions. Subsequently, the estimate is employed to evaluate these solutions, to decide on their suitability, and to select the preferred solution. The Operational Estimate is generally employed at the operational level.

b. Tactical Estimate. The Tactical Estimate consists of analysis in 6 linked stages, common in format, processes and outputs to the Operational Estimate.

c. Combat Estimate. The Combat Estimate is more narrowly focussed and, as its name suggests, is used by commanders to focus specifically on the adversary or a specific situation, so has more utility at the tactical and lower operational level. The 7 basic questions to be answered are:

1) What is the enemy (adversary) doing and why and/or what situation do I face and why, and what effect do they have on me?
2) What have I been told to do and why?
3) What effects do I need to have on the enemy (adversary) or situation, and what direction must I give to develop the plan?
4) Where can I best accomplish each action or effect?
5) What resources do I need to accomplish each action or effect?
6) When and where do the actions take place in relation to each other?
7) What control measures do I need to impose?

0636. **Guidelines.** Regardless of the method of estimate being used, there are a number of guidelines that should be referred to:

a. **Agility based on Preparation.** Mental agility underpinned by sound preparation is essential to tackling an estimate, which could depend on incomplete information. It will be conducted in changing circumstances, to achieve sometimes ambiguous objectives and against challenging timelines. Delegation, proven standing operating procedures and concurrent activity at all levels will also mitigate the frictions.

b. **Practice.** A well-practised team will be capable of working through complex problems and meeting tight timelines. A disciplined working environment should be created, which needs to be as tidy, as sterile and as free of as many internal frictions as possible. It should not be assumed that this work can always be done in secure and sterile spaces with plenty of workable information technology. Headquarters should be comfortable with conducting estimates in more austere field conditions, perhaps on the move, perhaps in contact with an adversary or a chaotic situation. The problem faced is likely to be difficult to solve, probably ill-structured; so the best estimate teams place a premium on rigour, time-keeping, concurrent activity and cooperation.

c. **Information and Intelligence.** The estimate should be command-led but information and intelligence-driven. Not only will information and intelligence requirements come to light during the estimate, but it is incumbent on intelligence staffs to anticipate requirements and to be proactive in meeting them.

d. **Staffing Timeline.** For staffing, the 1/3 - 2/3 rule is applied so that sufficient time is allocated to subordinates to conduct their own planning. This allocation can be supported by the prompt issuing of warning orders to generate concurrent activity. As a guide, the staff should give 2/3 of the time available to subordinate levels of command and use the remaining time (the 1/3 share) as follows:
   1) 30% to understanding the situation and the problem.
   2) 50% to formulating, developing and validating potential CoAs.
   3) 20% to producing and issuing formal direction.

e. **Feedback.** The staff should be capable of integrating feedback received into the process and examining the effects that the feedback has on the plan. Without this, plans will become detached from the unfolding realities of a situation and will probably lose their focus.
Plans and Orders

0637. **Pragmatic and Flexible Plans.** Planning determines the commander’s initial balance of effort, within a framework of available time, resources and freedom of action. However, in a dynamic operating environment with adaptive adversaries, prescriptive plans are unlikely to prove successful. Pragmatic and flexible plans are required to assess the progress of operations and to keep them aimed at achieving the objectives and heading towards the desired outcome. The commander needs to develop contingency plans to address other outcomes that could be foreseen, and should always be poised to cope with the unexpected.

0638. **Orders.** Orders should be as comprehensive and as formal (following established headings) as time allows. An operation order (OpO) and its subsidiaries, for example fragmentary orders (FragOs), should include the detail necessary for subordinate commanders to be able to understand the context for the operation. They also need to understand the intent, extracting what it means for them, and what it means to others. This requires a disciplined and forensic receipt of orders briefing at the start of the estimate. The subordinate commanders should be able to issue their own orders, to ensure that their units act purposefully. Mission Command requires orders which concentrate on imparting an understanding of the context of the operation and ‘what’ needs to be done rather than ‘how.’ Attention to detail in the production of orders is of paramount importance.

Some 30,000 US troops and 9 landing ships were committed to Exercise TIGER, a rehearsal of the D-Day landings, conducted on the Devon coast. Protection for the exercise was afforded by a naval screen, to prevent interference by German E-Boats. Staff mistakes in the detail of the exercise communications instruction caused difficulties in communications between the naval screen and the exercising troop ships. When the presence of E Boats was detected it could not be reported to the landing ships by the screening force; as a consequence they did not take avoiding action. The landing ships were attacked, with the loss of 749 American lives.

Drawn from Charles B MacDonald, *Slapton Sands: The ‘Cover Up’ That Never Was*, Army 38, no. 6 (US Naval Historical Center, June 1988) 64-67

0639. Mission Command also requires a minimum of control measures to be included in orders. This has implications for the way in which orders are written and delivered and the manner in which the staff exercises control. At the beginning of an operation or mission the initiating operation order may have to be highly detailed. Thereafter short FragOs are the most appropriate method for Mission
Command at the tactical level; writing and acting on them should be a key training objective. Not only do long orders take time to prepare, they take time to transmit, read, interpret and analyse. They act as a brake on tempo and may constrain freedom of action. But length is not the same as substance - the art is to generate short orders with substance and to understand the audience. As with any other aspect of Mission Command, the more expert the executor of the order, the less prescriptive it needs to be.

Formulating Concepts of Operation and Mission Statements

0640. The commander needs to select what will be decisive to his mission and how to achieve it. At the tactical level, ‘what a commander is to achieve’ is given to him in his mission. The mission should be described in terms of a task or tasks with their unifying purpose: the commander is required to achieve the stated tasks within the spirit of their purpose. Since ‘what he is to achieve’ is given to him, ‘how he intends to achieve it’ is at the core of his own decision-making. It requires him to select an action that would be decisive, together with the shaping, sustaining and protective actions necessary for success. ‘How he intends to achieve it’ will normally be through a combination of actions to be undertaken by subordinates; what they are to achieve, where and when. Thus, the CoA the commander selects should include one decisive action and a number of shaping or sustaining actions. The chosen CoA will include a broad allocation of troops to task and the most important coordinating instructions, which provides the detail to link the plan together, for example, timings.

0641. Concepts of Operations. The commander must then make his decision explicit. He does so by formulating a ‘concept of operations’ and stating missions for subordinates. The concept of operations describes how the commander intends to achieve his mission, so he will first clear it with his own superior. The concept of operations flows directly from his decision and has three elements to it:

a. **Intent.** Intent is a concise and precise statement of what the commander intends to do and why; expressed as the effects he intends to achieve.

b. **Scheme of Manoeuvre.** The scheme of manoeuvre expands the intent to describe how the commander sees his operation unfolding. It explains where, when and how (in relation to the overall plan, but not with individual prescription) the force is to achieve its purpose, so that subordinates can understand their roles in the plan and the effects that they and others are to realise. A clear intent should minimise the length of the scheme of manoeuvre, where brevity is an important quality.

c. **Main Effort.** The Main Effort is what the commander considers to be the activity which is crucial to the success of the mission. He must give it substance by allocating sufficient resources to the unit assigned to it. Illuminating, in the minds of all members of the force, the most important
‘thing to be done’ ensures that, if the situation becomes more confusing, that task will be remembered and provide a rallying point for effort.

0642. **Mission Statements.** A mission statement is a clear and direct order to a subordinate. The commander should allocate each subordinate a task or tasks, with the unifying purpose. One task will be the commander’s Main Effort. Resources should be allocated so that every task is achievable. The aim should be to give subordinates only one task wherever possible. This may not be realistic, particularly for the subordinates on the Main Effort, and it is better to be explicit about ‘specified’ tasks in the mission than to bury them in other parts of the orders. It is usual for the mission of the reserve to have a series of contingent tasks without necessarily being tied to the unifying purpose.

0643. Tasks contained in mission statements should be substantive and specified. Lesser or ‘implied’ tasks, such as conducting preliminary moves or establishing liaison, should not normally form part of mission statements. They should be contained elsewhere in the orders, typically as coordinating instructions, to avoid obscuring the central idea. Implied tasks are extracted by subordinates analysing their orders thoroughly.

0644. Tasks and purposes should both be expressed in terms of action, or mission verbs whose success is measurable. Thus ‘to attack’ is not a clear task; ‘to seize’ is better since its success is measurable. The task, ‘to attack to seize’ is not within the sprit of Mission Command because it directs the subordinate how he is to achieve his task, possibly excluding other better methods, for example, in this case, by infiltration.

0645. Occasionally it may not be possible to express a purpose with such precision. However, relatively vague terms such as ‘to shape’ or ‘to set the conditions for’ should be avoided. Greater precision, such as an explanation of what shaping is required, or what the relevant conditions are, should be sought. Mission verbs are not the same as effects, although there may be some commonality. The verbs should be taken from an authorised list, defined in tactical doctrine, so that subjectivity does not obscure understanding. This also applies to effects, as was justified in Chapter 5.

0646. For clarity, the statement of unifying purpose should normally be separated from the task by the words ‘in order to.’ If there is no single common or unifying purpose, the plan is flawed, probably in the selection of task or because of the task organisation. Alternatively the commander has not generated a clear view of how he wishes the operation to proceed; his intent is not clear. In that case he should revisit the estimate.
0647. The total list of tasks assigned to subordinates should be sufficient, in that together they fulfil the whole of the commander’s mission. They should also be necessary, in that activities which are not required to fulfil his mission should be excluded. Listing missions in the logical or chronological order of the plan, for example reconnaissance forces first, should be used rather than Army precedence. This helps to visualise how the plan will unfold.

0648. Orders should be clear, concise, and unambiguous when taken as a whole. Repetition should be avoided and the minor conventions of service writing are to be broken if it adds clarity. Repetition between the concept of operations and mission statements should be avoided in particular. If a tactical level concept of operations runs to more than 4 or 5 sentences, the underlying plan is probably too complicated.

0649. What the commander is to achieve is given in the mission assigned to him. The outcome sought (at some levels expressed as an end-state) is also given, usually as the fourth element of the concept of operations. The end state will occur when that mission is achieved. Research has shown that expressing an end-state in tactical concepts of operations, although well-intended, generally contributes to, rather than reduces, confusion on the part of subordinates. It should not be used at the tactical level. Effort should instead be directed to ensuring that the mission given clearly indicates what is to be achieved. If the mission is not clear in terms of what is to be achieved, the commander should be asked to reconsider it.

0650. Commanders should give orders that cover as much of the assigned mission as possible, but it is legitimate to state that further detail will follow. The situation may change between giving the order and its execution. In such circumstances the commander should review his mission and, if appropriate, give new orders, revisiting the estimate where it asks the question; ‘has the situation changed?’ It is perhaps at this point that the commander decides to initiate a prepared contingency plan.

0651. **The Duty to Follow Orders.** At the tactical level, a mission to a subordinate is a direct order which should be followed. This requires discipline throughout the chain of command. But the subordinate’s duty to carry out the order is complemented by a responsibility to recognise changes to the circumstances that render the mission no longer appropriate, unlikely to succeed or that make it unlawful. At such a time, the subordinate should have the confidence to seize the initiative and act differently, reporting the deviation as soon as possible. The degree to which this succeeds is set by the quality of the relationships between commanders and subordinates and the clarity of the intent. This is one of the tests of Mission Command.
0652. **Personal Initiative.** Commanders at all levels should exercise initiative in order to exploit opportunity. To foster a spirit of initiative-taking, the censuring of well-intentioned mistakes should be avoided; apparent errors should be considered by a superior from the subordinate’s perspective; initiative at all levels should be rewarded. Repressing initiative early on will make it more difficult to develop it later.

**Chains of Command**

0653. **Chains, Unity and Spans of Command.** A *chain of command* is the succession of commanding officers, from a superior to a subordinate, through which command is exercised. It is a hierarchical structure that links points of command from the strategic to the tactical levels and it requires communication and coordination between each point. The relationships between each level are defined by states of command. **Unity of command** refers to the requirement that each commander is accountable to only one superior, thus ensuring clarity of effort. ‘…Nothing in war is as important as undivided command.’\(^9\) While a chain of command is concerned with vertical perspective, the *span of command* refers to a horizontal perspective; the number of subordinate organisations given to one commander to command directly. A sensible span of command should not exceed about 5 subordinate elements, except for brief periods.

0654. **States of Command.** States of command and control explain the status of formations, units and commander, relative to each other. States could include: Full Command (Full Comd), Operational Command (OPCOM), Operational Control (OPCON), Tactical Command (TACOM), Tactical Control (TACON), Under Command for Administration (UCADMIN), Under Command for Administration (with Caveats) (UCADMINLESS) and Under Command for Daily Maintenance (UCDM). States of command are concerned primarily with the ability to assign an independent mission, to reorganise a unit to suit its task or to direct specific tasks within an agreed mission. In order to establish the status of units placed under his command, a commander should seek answers to the following four questions:

a. Can he use the unit for any purpose; in other words, give it a mission?

b. If a mission cannot be assigned, can he give the unit tasks within the given mission; in other words direct the execution of it?

c. Can he break up a unit, or must he retain its integrity?

d. Are there any caveats on the use of units, for example employment limited to use for a specified duration?

0655. **The Command Estimate.** The exercise of effective command and control requires the design of a chain of command for each operation. This should be the subject of an early command estimate, which should make deductions about
command states, unity and spans of command and staff structures, as well as how best to achieve common purpose in a comprehensive, inter-agency sense.

**Control of Operations**

**Control**

0656. Control is the coordination of activity, through processes and structures, that enables a commander to execute his intent. The extent of military control over a situation is influenced by the balance between military and other, inter-agency actors’ engagement and their contribution to comprehensive objectives. In purely military terms, control is frequently delegated to the staff, except where a commander needs to intervene personally to ensure that his intent is achieved. Commanders should, wherever possible, increase the freedom of action of subordinates through decentralisation and delegation, controlling only when absolutely necessary, perhaps because of the limits on resources or the complexity of the task. However, a commander is unlikely to be successful if he is not supported by a well-organised, well-trained and efficient headquarters which is practised in exercising the right degrees of control in the most demanding conditions, which includes during manoeuvre in contact with an adversary, while co-ordinating combined arms actions. The deduction is that formation and battlegroup headquarters should be as comfortable exercising control from mobile platforms, with sufficient protection (‘under armour’) as they would be in a staff trainer.

0657. Control is not the same as management. Management describes a function equivalent to control for a civilian organisation and has some applicability in an inter-agency context. A skilled commander will exploit both methods to run an inclusive operation and ultimately to aid the transition from a military to a civilian lead if required. Management is not the same as management processes, which are primarily about the allocation and control of human, material and financial resources. Whilst military organisations are commanded not managed, they make use of management processes to enhance the planning, organisation and execution of aspects of operations; personnel and financial management, logistics, administration and procurement in particular.

0658. **Constituent Parts of a Headquarters.** Headquarters should be generically structured into 4 parts: a main headquarters (main); a tactical element (tac) to allow the commander and key staff to deploy elsewhere with a lower profile; a step up to enable movement without loss of control and an alternative (alt) to maintain control if main loses it. This combination provides flexibility, reach and endurance but comes with a cost in terms of manpower, protected mobility, infrastructure and communication equipment.
Information. An effective headquarters should be adept at using information, rather then becoming swamped or driven by it, as an end in itself. Particularly at times of high tempo, for example when planning and executing missions concurrently, or during reliefs of troops, it is vital to have robust, consistent and well-understood methods. A manoeuvrist headquarters requires proficiency in information management or IM (integrated processes and services to provide exploitable information); information exploitation or IX (use of information to gain advantage); information assurance or IAssurance (the confidence that information is reliable, accurate and secure) and information superiority or I Sup (possessing better information relative to an adversary). Effective methods in these areas also help to capture lessons and support disclosure when required.

Decentralisation

Decentralisation has marked the practice of many successful commanders in military history. It applies to all levels and is an important facet of Mission Command. It allows subordinates to use their initiative within their delegated freedom of action and provides them with a greater sense of involvement and commitment. Decision levels should be set as low as possible. This permits decisions to be made swiftly in the confusion and uncertainty of battle, and is increasingly necessary in an environment dominated by ill-structured problems and multiple actors, some of whom have minimalist structural identities. It also reduces the need for all but essential information to be passed up and down the chain of command and ensures that decisions are taken by the commander with the most up-to-date information. This is only possible when the intent is clearly understood and the chain of command is sufficiently robust.

In contemporary operations, effort to reduce centralisation and increase decentralisation is especially important. A commander could retain a high degree of control himself, thereby reducing his own level of uncertainty, but he should aim to delegate decision-making authority to his subordinates, perhaps reducing his own ability to influence events directly. This will have the benefit of reducing uncertainty at lower levels and improving the ability of his subordinates to act and react themselves. Decentralisation is not code for abrogation of responsibility. Commanders remain responsible for what happens ‘on their watch’; this requires expressions of clear intent, periodic supervision and moral substance to the command climate they set.
Commanders at all levels had to act more on their own; they were given greater latitude to work out their own plans to achieve what they knew was the Army Commander’s intention. In time they developed, to a marked degree, a flexibility of mind and a firmness of decision that enabled them to act swiftly to take advantage of sudden information or changing circumstances without reference to their superiors… (this) requires in the higher command a corresponding flexibility of mind, confidence in subordinates, and the power to make its intentions clear throughout the force.


0662. **Delegation of Authority.** Decentralisation of decision-making requires delegation of authority in the exercise of command. Assessing which authorities to delegate, and if responsibilities should accompany them, is therefore an essential part of decision-making. Control, in the form of reporting performance and progress to a higher commander, remains an important component of command. The quality of a superior’s decision-making depends upon honest and frank reporting from subordinates. It is particularly important in military activity in support of stabilisation or in counter-insurgency to delegate financial authority. Relatively small amounts of cash should be entrusted down as far as possible (certainly to sub-unit commanders) because it can have disproportionate effects on a situation, possibly preventing or avoiding more costly circumstances or actions later. The provision of such money should be subject to an ‘accounted for’ rather than ‘bid for’ process, to maximise responsiveness and minimise the extent of unnecessary bureaucracy.

0663. **Allocation of Resources.** As a matter of principle, resource allocation should be a corollary of delegation of responsibility. A commander who delegates responsibility for action to a subordinate should furnish him with sufficient resources. Such a tidy relationship between responsibility and resources is unlikely to survive in the complex and uncertain conditions of operations, especially where resources are tight and there are competing demands for them. Here, the allocation of resources is much more dependent on judgement and can never fully allow for the actions of the adversary. The requirement to allocate sufficient resources implies a responsibility to sustain the force in terms of personnel, equipment and materiel and to prevent wastage. The demands of a force as a whole, or of a particular part of it, may require austerity elsewhere. This is consistent with the Principles of War: economy of effort in one activity allows the concentration of force in another, usually in support of the Main Effort.
Control of the Battlespace

0664. **Battlespace.** The battlespace can be described as all aspects of air, surface, subsurface, land, space and the electromagnetic spectrum that encompasses the area of operations. In terms of control, battlespace encompasses all aspects of a JOA within which military activities take place. It has 7 dimensions: maritime, land, air, space, information, electromagnetic and time. Activity in one is likely to have implications in the others. As the battlespace will be congested, cluttered, contested, connected and constrained, it will never be clear, sanitised, nor monopolised by military forces.

0665. **Control Categories.** When 2 or more force elements operate in the same area of the battlespace, whether physical or virtual, their activities should be coordinated. Where these activities are concurrent, and cannot be separated, they should be subject to some form of control. The degree of control required depends on the likely level of interaction. These methods are not mutually exclusive and controls may be used simultaneously. Not all of the battlespace needs to be controlled in the same way, all of the time. The control categories are:

a. **Procedural Control.** Procedural control relies on the implementation of commonly understood procedures across a force for the regulation of activity within and between force elements. One example is Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Procedural control can, for example, be used to allocate a volume of battlespace to individual elements for a period of time. Although sometimes perceived as an air control technique, procedural control should be applied across all environments. In the land environment, such control also includes Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCM) to coordinate land, air and maritime fires. While procedural control is simple, it is also less flexible than other forms of control and can curtail a commander’s ability to exploit developing opportunities.

b. **Positive Control.** Instead of such general control, a commander may wish to direct control in a particular place or on specific elements, for specific periods of time. One example is a movement control order. Positive control allows for control of activities in real time. However, even where resolution of the position of friendly forces is good, that of adversaries and the population is seldom sufficiently timely nor accurate enough to support positive control as the sole means of battlespace management.

c. **Dynamic Procedural Control.** In the absence of positive control, a commander may exercise procedural control that is adapted for a particular situation or period of time. Dynamic procedural control still requires a pre-established architecture of control measures, but presupposes that these measures can be rapidly activated and deactivated. This not only enables activities to be synchronised from the outset, but also to be varied.
in response to a changing situation. Dynamic procedural control offers the benefit of agility, but introduces the risk of dynamic orders and procedures being misinterpreted or incorrectly applied. It also requires good situational awareness and increases pressure on the staff. A commander usually instigates dynamic procedural control to increase tempo for a finite period.

d. **Active De-Confliction.** Short of positive control, but exploiting similar degrees of shared situational awareness across a force, a commander may choose to increase tempo further, beyond that attainable through dynamic procedural control. Given sufficient battlespace resolution, forces can be controlled actively, with less need for pre-planned de-confliction. With sufficient shared situational awareness, a commander can use active de-confliction to minimise separation of activity in both time and space.

0666. **Control Measures.** Control measures are presented in a directive given graphically or orally by a commander to subordinate commands. They assign responsibilities, coordinate fires and manoeuvre, and control activities. Each control measure should be portrayed graphically and be identifiable physically. Freedom of action is assumed unless constraints are specified, either by control measures or by missions and resources. Control measures enhance unity of effort, reduce the risks of fratricide and improve economy of effort. They should be applied to maximise freedom of action rather than constrain it. They include:

a. Report lines, phase lines, code words and nick numbers.
b. Routes, contact and coordination points.
c. Assembly and engagement areas, objectives and limits of exploitation.
d. Fire control lines and areas.
e. Boundaries, named and target areas of interest and decision points.
f. ROE, OPSEC, CBRN measures, emission control and communications security measures and other battlespace management arrangements.
Operations | 6 — Command of Operations

Making Decisions
Decision-Action Cycle
Framing the Problem
Command Model

Taking Risks
Nature of Risk
Dealing with Risks

Making Plans
Estimates
Testing the Plan

Giving Orders
Intent
Concepts of Operations
Mission Statements
Schemes of Manoeuvre
Main Effort
Chains & States of Command

Exercising Control
Control
Decentralisation
Battlespace Control
Control Measures
IX, IM, ISup, IAssurance

Principles
1. Unity of Effort
2. A Specified Main Effort
3. Freedom of Action
4. Trust
5. Mutual Understanding
6. Timely and Effective Decision-Making

Mission Command

Figure 6.2 - Summary of Considerations in the Command of Operations
Notes

2 ROC is the US Army acronym for Rehearsal of Concept. It is widely used in the British Army.
3 A specified Main Effort is added here to the 5 principles listed in doctrine to date.
4 The corps operation order for Guderian’s crossing of the Meuse at Sedan in 1940 did not even include the location of the crossing site or sites. That was a matter for subordinates to decide, advised by their engineer advisers. Having selected those sites, it was the duty of those subordinates to inform higher, lower and flanking headquarters.
6 For a full explanation of the Operational Estimate, see JDP 5-00 *Campaign Planning*, 2nd Edition, Chapter 2 (Shrivenham: DCDC, 2009). The 6 steps are: Understand the Operating Environment, Understand the Problem, Formulate Potential CoAs, Develop and Validate CoAs, Evaluate CoAs and the Commander’s Decision.
7 The 6 steps (see Army command and staff procedures tactical doctrine) are: Review the Situation; Identify and Analyse the Problem (Mission Analysis and Initial Object Analysis); Formulate Potential CoAs; Develop and Validate CoAs; Evaluate CoAs; and the Commander’s Decision.
8 The Combat Estimate may be modified sensibly (for example, widening the traditional references to ‘enemy’ to include other actors or the situation more generally) to broaden its use for all military activities, without replicating the Operational Estimate.
9 Napoleon Bonaparte, *Maxims of War*, (Paris 1831)
The Battle of Al Haniyah, 26 February 1991. The Assault on Objective COPPER SOUTH by the 14th/20th King’s Hussars. Reproduced by kind permission of David Rowlands and the Regimental Trustees of the King’s Royal Hussars.
Orchestrating Operations

Chapter 7 provides guidance on orchestrating operations in the land environment using Operational Art and the Doctrinal Frameworks.
The stroke of genius that turns the fate of a battle? I don’t believe in it. A battle is a complicated operation that you prepare (for) laboriously. If the enemy does this, you say to yourself I will do that. If such and such happens, these are the steps I will take to meet it. You think out every possible development and decide on the way to deal with the situation created. One of these developments occurs; you put your plan into operation and everyone says, ‘What genius …’ whereas the credit is really due to the labour of preparation.

Field Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Interview, April 1919, taken from Robert Heinl, Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1966)

0701. This chapter and the one that follows aim to add explanations of how operations are orchestrated and executed, whilst adhering to the philosophy and principles of the Manoeuvrist Approach and Mission Command. Being able to understand, visualise and then explain and illustrate are essential skills for dealing with the complexity and orchestration of operations in the land environment. The techniques explained here originate in use at various Levels of Warfare, but all have utility or relevance at the tactical level. They provide:

a. The means to convert strategic objectives into tactical activity using Operational Art; and

b. Tactical Planning Concepts, which can be used as building blocks for designing operational and tactical activity.

c. Doctrinal Frameworks for describing clear concepts of operation.

Operational Art

0702. Operational Art translates strategic direction into tactical execution. It is the orchestration of a campaign, in concert with other agencies, to convert (at the operational level) strategic objectives into tactical activity and employment of forces, in order to achieve a desired outcome. This art needs to be understood by those operating at the tactical level because it provides the source of the intent they seek to meet. Furthermore, Operational Art, and its associated planning concepts, provides a useful framework for understanding what should go into planning and executing actions at the tactical level.

0703. Operational Art translates the mission into success, through a combination of judgement and labour, art and science, analysis and intuition. The term Operational Art emphasises the importance of a more intuitive alignment of ends, ways and means, than that provided by science alone. It is realised through a combination of the commander’s skill, and the staff-assisted processes of campaign design and campaign management, together
translating creative and innovative thinking into practical action. This combination is shown graphically by Figure 7.1.

0704. Operational Art should be based on a detailed understanding of the situation: political dynamics, threats, physical conditions and so on. An important task for the commander is for him to adapt the thinking, organisation, tactics and procedures of his force to the military activities required. He should recognise that his adversary will also practise a form of operational art.

![Figure 7.1 - Operational Art](image)

**Commander’s Skill**

0705. In Operational Art the personality, manner, experience and influence of the commander are important. He requires a comprehensive insight into adversaries’ and actors’ values, aims and anticipated responses; an ability to visualise the effect of tactical actions, which demands an understanding of capabilities and the talent of bringing his visualisations to life. He also requires an ability to take risks. The commander needs to be adept at physical and mental positioning; physical on the battlefield and mental in terms of where to exert influence. He must be as comfortable with persuasion as with compulsion or direction, using comprehensive means; he must know which one to select, when and how. Some of what follows repeats aspects of the wider examination of Command of Operations in Chapter 6. They are highlighted here to provide a full explanation of Operational Art.

0706. **Creating the Command Climate.** A commander has considerable influence on the morale, sense of direction and performance of his staff and subordinate commanders which is shaped by his personality and command style. This
applies both in training and on operations. It is a commander’s responsibility to create and maintain an effective climate within his command. ‘…Inspiration and guidance must come from above and must permeate throughout the force. Once this is done there is never any difficulty, since all concerned will go ahead on the lines laid down; the whole force will thus acquire balance and cohesion, and the results on the day of battle will be very apparent…’\(^2\) Commanders should foster a sense of involvement in their decision-making in order to harness shared commitment and individual confidence in using initiative.

0707. **Personal Qualities.** There is no unique formula for the right combination of command qualities. Clausewitz described 2 indispensable qualities of command: ‘…First, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to the truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may go…’\(^3\) Churchill’s view was that ‘…there is required for the composition of a great commander not only massive common sense and reasoning power, not only imagination but also an element of legerdemain,\(^4\) an original, queer and sinister touch, which leaves the enemy puzzled as well as beaten.’\(^5\) These qualities combined provide a sound start point for an effective command style.

0708. **Command Considerations.** Prior to the commencement of operations, a commander directs, trains and prepares his force and ensures that sufficient resources are made available. The development of subordinates is a key responsibility in peacetime which, if neglected, will seriously undermine fighting power. The training of future commanders should reflect the requirement under Mission Command to understand operations 2 levels of command up. In addition, all officers should be trained to assume command one level up. This requires that they should also be capable of thinking 2 levels up from that. Once appointed, a commander should study the personalities and characteristics of his subordinates. Some will be content with general directives, others will prefer more detail. Some subordinates will tire easily and require encouragement and moral support. Others, perhaps uninspiring in peace, may flourish in conflict. Matching talent to tasks is thus an important function of command, as is dealing decisively but humanely with weaknesses in the command structure. Commanders need to be able to command modular organisations where grouping and re-grouping will mean that they may not directly command all or any of the elements they take on operations before they deploy. But they should try to give subordinates their missions and tasks as early as possible in order to give preparations some coherence. They should also foster an understanding of conflict and warfare. Operational Art requires professional development that includes the realistic, critical study of past campaigns and battles and the realities of war, in order to learn relevant
lessons for the future. On operations a commander should apply the Principles of War, especially by selecting and maintaining the aim, to lead his force to a successful mission quickly, at minimum cost to his force, while maintaining their morale and material well-being.

0709. **The Position of the Commander.** Part of Operational Art is the commander choosing his position in relation to the forces he commands and his mission. His decision can have important consequences and shapes how the constituent parts of a headquarters (its main, tactical, step-up and alternate) are deployed. The most suitable position for the commander is that point where he can best lead and make timely decisions, appropriate to his level of command. Digitised communications should allow greater choice of location, but can sometimes also be a constraint. The enduring moral requirement to show leadership to troops in dangerous conditions will influence his decision, particularly at the tactical level. Conversely, if a commander remains too close to the action, he risks becoming embroiled in a side-show that obscures his overall vision. The basic factors influencing that decision are common to both the operational and tactical levels; they are:

a. The ability to assess the situation, including judging the condition and morale of the force and being able to impose will upon it.
b. Access to other information which is important to the mission, such as assessments of an adversary's condition.
c. Secure and reliable communications to the points of command.
d. Access to staff support for planning and decision-making in order to maintain continuity.
e. Security, including physical and electronic protection, taking into account the size and signature of a headquarters and its constituent parts.

0710. **Pragmatism.** All commanders should examine critically what actually works on the battlefield and then follow their conclusions; this is the essence of pragmatism. It calls for simple practices and procedures that are adaptable to the situation, and are rapidly communicated across the force more quickly than the adversary sends his corresponding messages. Although practices and procedures may change, philosophy and principles should be amended only after reflection, away from the immediate pressures of operations.

0711. **Command after Operations.** A commander's responsibility to his force extends beyond the operation, especially in recording the lessons identified, and contributing to the process by which those lessons are learned. There is a danger that lessons are collected but not acted upon. A commander's responsibility for lessons does not end until he is satisfied that they have been identified, communicated effectively and, within reason, properly exploited. The initial means of identifying lessons is the post-operational
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report and interviews, augmented by the Commanders’ Diary, which forms part of the Operational Record. Commanders should also make sure that their force recuperates properly after operations - psychologically as well as physically - and is able to recover ground lost, for example in training, personal development, and aspects of the moral component that may have been neglected during deployment. During this period the force will require time and resources to care for the injured and the families of those who were killed in action. The organisation and posting of the Army should avoid breaking apart command teams immediately after operations for these reasons.

Campaign Design

0712. Campaign design (analyse and plan) is used to frame the problem and then to develop and refine a commander’s operational ideas - his vision of how he sees the campaign unfolding - to provide detailed and actionable plans. Campaign design, through review and refinement, should be continuous because the situation will change, in response to actions, reactions and the unavoidable consequences of chance and friction. But campaign continuity is also important, and commanders in enduring operations should accept that their periods in charge cover only a proportion of a longer campaign, which cannot be broken down into 6 to 12 month segments. This requires a high degree of humility in command and awareness of the context for individual contributions. It should not be routinely necessary to re-design a campaign, operation or even tactical actions, every time commanders and staffs change over or troops are relieved.

Campaign Management

0713. Campaign management (assess and execute) integrates, coordinates, synchronises and prioritises the execution of activities within operations and assesses their progress. Adversaries’ responses will inevitably affect the course of a campaign or operation, as will those of other actors. Assessing the course of the campaign, then acting quickly, in order to modify the plan to meet objectives in a new light, is the essence of successful campaign management.

Tactical Planning Concepts

0714. Campaign design and management is aided by Tactical Planning Concepts which are based on the joint doctrine Campaign Planning Concepts. These provide the building blocks of Operational Art. With their campaign-level context put aside, these concepts are useful for designing, visualisation and explaining plans at the tactical level, by using them as building blocks for activity. They are illustrated together by Figure 7.2.

a. Objectives. An objective is a goal, expressed in terms of one or more decisive conditions, that needs to be achieved in order to meet an aim.
b. **Decisive Conditions.** Decisive conditions are specified combinations of circumstances deemed necessary to achieve an objective.

c. **Supporting Effects.** Supporting effects are the consequences of activities and actions. When these effects are realised, decisive conditions are achieved.

d. **Endstate.** An endstate is the state of affairs which needs to be achieved at the end of an operation, so it also explains the extent of the contribution required from a commander or a force. Endstates should be understood, but not used, at the tactical level.

e. **Centre of Gravity.** A centre of gravity is the identified aspect of a force, organisation, group or state’s capability from which it draws its strength, freedom of action, cohesion or will to fight. Again, this concept’s relevance at the tactical level is based on understanding it rather than using it.

f. **Lines of Operation.** Lines of operation describe the routes through decisive conditions to objectives and the aim, and by inference, sometimes through centres of gravity and endstates. These lines may be functional, thematic or environmental.

g. **Sequencing and Synchronisation.** Sequencing is the logical arrangement of effects and activities based on their interdependencies. Synchronisation applies time and space considerations to sequences and thus establishes their feasibility.

h. **Phase.** A phase is a period of time characterised by a predominant type of military activity or action or a set of decisive conditions.

i. **Contingency Planning.** Contingency planning is the process by which options are built into a plan to anticipate changes to the situation, opportunities or reverses. It has 2 forms: branches which provide alternative ways to achieve decisive conditions within a phase and sequels which provide an alternative option for the next phase, based on the outcome of the current phase.

j. **Operational Pause.** An operational pause can be imposed on an operation out of necessity or through choice. Although a pause tends to reduce tempo in the short term, it may increase it later on. Pauses are used to avoid culmination. They should be exploited to regain or strengthen a hold on the initiative and increase momentum.

k. **Culminating Point.** A culminating point is reached when the current situation can be maintained, but not developed to any greater advantage. To attempt to do so, without a pause or reinforcement, would risk over-extension and the vulnerability this may cause.

l. **Tipping Point.** A tipping point (referred to as a fulcrum at the campaign level) is the point in an activity or action where equilibrium is disrupted to allow one side to start winning and the other to start losing or, for example, the point at which local popular support for a force starts to
be won or lost, or the point at which a force culminates and loses its offensive spirit.

Figure 7.2 - An Illustration of the Tactical Planning Concepts

The Doctrinal Frameworks

0715. Another, complementary, method for organising and visualising activity in the land environment is to use Doctrinal Frameworks, some of which correspond to joint doctrine. Such frameworks are used to describe concepts of operation by, for example, articulating CoAs or explaining sequences and co-ordination. Missions can be related to each other by time, space, function and geography. It helps commanders to see what purpose they have, what effect that purpose should have, and how those effects support or are supported by the effects of others. The Doctrinal Frameworks in this doctrine are: the Operational Framework, the Tactical Framework, the Geographic Framework along with the Tactical Functions. The first 3 are set out to aid visualisation in Figure 7.3, and all are summarised together in Figure 7.4 at the end of this chapter. The frameworks are tools; so there is no prescription for their use. What matters is what works. They can be used selectively, individually or in combinations.
The Operational Framework in this publication is adapted for the land environment from joint doctrine and consists of **decisive**, **shaping**, **sustaining** and **protecting** acts and tasks as a purposive framework. Decisive acts are then broken down into **engagement** and **exploitation**. The Operational Framework helps to describe how the missions of subordinates interact in terms of their purposes. The commander selects one act which he considers will be decisive, and then describes the other tasks required to support it as either shaping, sustaining or protecting. The key is to integrate the tasks in planning and coordinate them to achieve simultaneity in execution. This framework can be used in orders at the tactical level to provide the parts of a concept of operations.

**Shaping Tasks.** Shaping tasks create or preserve the conditions for the success of the decisive act, before, during or after it. Those conditions relate to adversaries, the environment and a force itself. Achieving economy of effort is
an important aspect of shaping tasks as it supports the concentration of force, in time and space, required for the decisive act. Shaping will often be aimed at influencing the perceptions of adversaries or a population, for example, by reassuring it. Shaping tasks could involve the use of fires, combined with psychological manipulation, for example, by leafleting, designed to weaken an adversary’s will, before the decisive act is initiated. Shaping will also include alterations to the physical environment such as the construction of obstacles or the denial of infrastructure.

0718. **The Decisive Act.** A decisive act is one which, if successful, should lead inevitably to the achievement of a mission. The decisive act in a plan is therefore the one which the commander selects as leading to success within his concept of operations. The choice of decisive act, and the tasks required to support it, defines the plan uniquely. If a commander finds that he has more than one decisive act, he should either refine his analysis, group the tasks he considers decisive into one or treat some of them as shaping, sustaining or protecting. In some activities, a single decisive act, for example the physical destruction of an enemy formation, may be possible. In other activities a broader state of affairs, for example, achieving enough security to enable indigenous self-sufficiency, could be decisive in a tactical area of operations. Decisive acts can be achieved in 2 ways:

a. **Engagement.** Decisive engagement is that which a commander envisages will make a significant contribution to achieving operational or tactical objectives, for example by striking in order to defeat. This requires gaining and retaining the initiative and the maintenance of tempo. Circumstances may not, however, always demand or permit a strike or high tempo. In some situations, greater benefits may be derived from gradual and iterative resolution - constructive dialogue and reconciliation rather than action and attrition - using indirect approaches in order to influence long-term behaviour, rather than diminish hostile capabilities in the short term.

b. **Exploitation.** Exploitation itself can be decisive. Making the most of exploitation opportunities, whether they be created through successful engagement or arise through chance, relies upon an ability not only to identify them in advance but to be able to generate the means to exploit them. Recognising when the initiative has been lost at the operational and tactical levels can be especially challenging. It is too easy to assume that the initiative is held, until the moment when its absence is felt. It is important to be able to recognise when it is exploitation that is most likely to be decisive rather than the more immediate engagement.

0719. **Sustaining Tasks.** Sustaining tasks - which overlap but are not identical to the narrower definition of sustainment, explained later as a Tactical Function and further in Chapter 9 - enable land forces to survive, move and fight in
order to conduct the decisive act, or shaping or protecting tasks. Sustaining
tasks include: reception into theatre; the assembly, movement and security
of reserves or echelon forces; redeployment of forces out of contact; host
nation support; the establishment and protection of operating bases;
establishment of lines of communication; and support for, and protection of,
civilians and civilian installations. Sustaining tasks are likely to be the target
of an adversary’s shaping or decisive acts. Sustaining is also about protection,
through a balance of active measures to neutralise a threat and defensive
measures which include guarding, dispersal, camouflage and deception. Unity
of command is essential to coordinate the many dispersed and complicated
sustaining tasks required.

0720. **Protecting Tasks.** Protection activity preserves the capabilities of a force so
that they can be applied as planned, perhaps decisively, in time and space.
The definition of this activity and the factors that need to be considered, are
described below in the section on the Tactical Functions

**The Tactical Framework**

0721. At the tactical level the focus is narrower than will probably be provided by
the Operational Framework alone. The priority is the achievement of tactical
missions derived from a campaign, then an operational plan. To do this a
Tactical Framework, based on four core functions,\(^7\) can be used. The functions
are: **find, fix, strike and exploit.**\(^8\) Sun Tzu used the terms ‘ordinary force’ for
the function of fixing an adversary or denying him the freedom to achieve
his purpose; and ‘extraordinary force’ for the function of manoeuvring into a
position of decisive advantage from which he can be struck. Whilst finding and
fixing contribute to the shaping part of the Operational Framework, striking
and exploiting have the potential to be decisive. Finding, fixing, striking and
exploiting should be conducted concurrently or at least a seamless transition
from one to another should be attempted. The Tactical Framework has utility
across all military activities; finding is as much about gaining a contextual
understanding as it is about locating an enemy unit. Fixing can be achieved
by a range of methods that deny adversaries recourse to their desired courses
of action, for example by reducing their popular support; whilst striking may
entail the launch of activity aimed at influencing an opponent’s perceptions or
those of his supporters. In detail:

a. **Find.** The basic function of finding occurs throughout an operation. It
includes locating, identifying, tracking and assessing an adversary or
applying these skills to a situation, for example the mood of a population.
The priority is to understand and interpret, rather than just to describe the
situation seen. Forces may be directed specifically to find, particularly at
the start of an operation. This will normally be a sound investment when
the situation is not clear. Whatever its source, information is never wholly
reliable. It may need cross-checking or corroboration. Conversely, too much information is a form of friction that can impede decision-making. It is insufficient only to know the location, motivation, organisation and strength of an adversary; it is equally important to have contextual understanding of the situation, to understand the physical and cultural aspects of the environment, and to understand the likely consequences of activity on the adversary - for example on his morale - and perhaps on a population.

b. **Fix.** To fix is to deny an adversary his goals, to distract him and thus to deprive him of his freedom of action. This increases our own freedom of action. An adversary who has no freedom of action cannot dictate the course of tactical events; he has lost the initiative. Depriving him of his freedom of action has both physical and psychological aspects. Physically, his force can be blocked, or pinned against an obstacle. Psychologically, he is fixed if he believes he has no freedom of action, if he feels himself compelled to do something, or if he believes he should persist with something which in practice will not bring him success. Often the easiest way to fix an adversary is to threaten something that he must protect. Deception may fix him until it is too late for him to regain the initiative.

Fixing can be broken down further into:

1) **Denial of Goals.** A commander can gain freedom of action by preventing his adversary from achieving his goals and by putting him in a reactive frame of mind. The aim is to constrain him and throw him off-balance. The principal means are to surprise, deceive and lure. When an adversary is surprised, he will be uncertain how to react, possibly until it is too late. When he is deceived, he may be confident in acting, but his confidence will be misplaced. The lure invites him to take a course of action which makes him vulnerable.

2) **Distraction.** As was suggested in Chapter 5, freedom of action may be gained by distracting an adversary, to reduce his ability to interfere with operations. Uncertain of his opponent’s objectives, a distracted adversary may try to cover all options, thereby dissipating his force and being driven off his intended purpose.

3) **Deprivation of Freedom of Action.** A target can be fixed by being denied information, the ability to pass orders and to co-ordinate actions and effects. In an insurgency this can be achieved by separating the insurgent from his support. In any fixing activity designed to cut down an opponent’s freedom of action, his command and control system and ability to manoeuvre or focus effort should be the primary targets.

4) **Tactical Methods.** Fixing can be achieved using a range of tactical methods, for example through the use of direct or indirect firepower, deception, saturation patrolling, overt surveillance and electronic warfare.
c. **Strike.** To strike is to manoeuvre and then take direct action to achieve the purpose of the mission. Depending on the operational context, the commander can undertake these activities in either the physical or psychological domains, or in both simultaneously:

1) **Manoeuvre.** Manoeuvre is explained more fully below. It means more than movement in combination with fire. It allows a commander to marshal his capabilities so that they are focused for greatest effect, avoiding strengths and exploiting weaknesses. Successfully doing so will exploit an adversary’s weaknesses before he can protect them, presenting him with multiple threats to which he is unable to respond coherently.

2) **Direct Action.** Direct action in combat usually means seizing objectives or destroying enemy forces. In a broader sense, direct action incorporates any decisive action that is focused on undermining an opponent’s will, cohesion, understanding or capability. It is generally preferable to apply concentrated violence to win quickly at minimum cost. However, a more protracted approach may be forced. Then, actions should be sequenced and sustained so that the effects are cumulative.

d. **Exploit.** As a core function in the Tactical Framework, exploitation is the seizure of opportunity created by previous activity in order to achieve an objective, or to directly fulfil part of a commander’s intent. Opportunities vary according to the nature of the operation, from identifying a gap in a main defence to sensing an armed group’s interest in switching sides. These opportunities should be sought out, not waited for. Equally, subordinates should be both encouraged to exploit opportunities presented and enabled to do so; only being told how far they may go by using a limit of exploitation. ‘…First gain the victory and then make the best use of it you can…’ At the tactical level, exploitation has concrete, physical aspects. It usually requires the use of manoeuvre, fire, or both. Opportunistic exploitation allows unforeseen tactical advantages to be turned into operational or even campaign success. It requires commanders with initiative, decisiveness and a readiness to do the unexpected. Successful exploitation depends on effective finding, which in turn requires capable reconnaissance forces. These forces can join the exploitation itself, because they are likely to be well-placed, highly mobile and of independent attitude. The seizure of these opportunities needs to be consolidated, using reserves and forces in echelon, not least to avoid culmination or being counter-attacked from a flank. A final element of any exploitation is assessment; taking stock, so that opportunities and threats are recognised and balanced.
For success in the attack, two major problems must be solved - dislocation and exploitation. One precedes and one follows the actual blow. You cannot hit the enemy with effect unless you have first created the opportunity; you cannot be decisive unless you exploit the second opportunity that comes before he can recover.

BH Liddell Hart, *Thoughts on War*, (London: Faber & Faber, 1944)

**The Geographic Framework**

0722. The way in which operations in the land environment relate to each other can also be described geographically, in terms of a **deep**, **close** and **rear** framework. Geography in the land environment is important as it describes where intended operations take place and because so often the terrain, and who controls it, is vital or at least key. Even in a non-linear battlespace, the concepts of deep, close and rear - and a sense of range and proximity - aid understanding and, when used in combination with the Operational and Tactical Frameworks, provide a powerful method in helping to visualise, organise and integrate activity. Despite the name, the framework does not have to be confined to the physical landscape. The sense of range and proximity can be applied in a psychological sense; for example to describe a nation’s will to conduct operations as ‘deep’ or to use ‘close’ to convey a sense of imminence in time as well as space.

a. Deep. The deep area or activities are usually conducted at long range and over a protracted timescale, against an adversary’s forces or resources not currently engaged in the close battle. Deep activities include: influencing, other shaping tasks, deep surveillance and target acquisition; joint fires and disruption of lines of communication and intentions.

b. Close. The close area or activities involve the forces in direct contact with an adversary or situation. They are usually conducted at short range and in an immediate timescale, or perhaps just one of these will apply. The means include, for example, destruction, arrest, deception, direct fire and rapid manoeuvre.

c. Rear. Rear areas are where most administrative and logistic activities take place, or they describe areas of vulnerability. These areas are usually relatively rather than absolutely secure. Rear area tasks are intended to be conducted out of contact, although one side’s rear actions may be confronted by the other side’s deep actions, so this can never be assumed.

**The Tactical Functions**

0723. When organising operations it is useful to have a check list of functions which provides a comprehensive description of everything that military organisations do prior to, during, and after them. The resulting framework ensures that all
aspects of operations are addressed. It provides a common vocabulary and points of reference, as well as a way of describing a force’s overall capabilities.

0724. **Tactical Functions.** The 6 Tactical Functions\(^{11}\) describe tactical battlefield dimensions, representing the practical expression of the physical component of Fighting Power. The Tactical Functions, which feature frequently throughout this doctrine, are: **Command, Information and Intelligence, Firepower, Manoeuvre, Protection and Sustainment.** For completeness they are explained briefly here:

a. **Command.** Command is the exercise of military authority by a designated commander for the planning, direction, coordination and control of a military force. Control is a supporting means by which command is exercised and regulated and is normally the province of the staff. Successful command requires leadership and teamwork and the application of a common doctrine of command. The direction to subordinates that follows a decision and its communication, rests on delegation of authority, together with the allocation of the resources required. Coordination and liaison ensure that unity of effort is maintained.

b. **Information and Intelligence.** Accurate and timely information leading to intelligence is fundamental to the success of operations. Intelligence is the product of the organised efforts of commanders, staffs and collection assets to gather, analyse, and distribute information about adversaries and the operational environment. The process should be timely and responsive to support decision-making, and flexible enough to support the requirements of the whole force. Information and intelligence are central to gaining and orchestrating influence.

c. **Firepower.** Firepower destroys, neutralises and suppresses. It is essential in defeating an adversary’s ability and will to fight and has utility in both decisive acts and shaping and protecting tasks. The application of firepower should be judged by the effect required, with consideration of its volume, duration and lethality, as well as the precision, ranges and combinations of weapons to be employed. Fires widen the definition of firepower to include methods which are not necessarily physically destructive. Firepower is usually treated as:

1) **Firepower in Isolation.** Firepower may be used in isolation from manoeuvre to cause attrition, to delay, or to disrupt an adversary. For firepower to be effective, weapons should be linked to sensors in order to acquire targets and assess effects. There are limits on firepower in isolation; not least it can lead to failures to capitalise on the temporary effects achieved.

2) **Firepower and Manoeuvre.** Firepower and manoeuvre enhance each other. The manoeuvre commander should control the fire. This requires flexible command and control arrangements which allow the effects of firepower to be allocated between manoeuvre elements. Firepower is
likely to be a joint function, particularly in shaping tasks, but needs to be integrated within the commander’s overall scheme of manoeuvre.

d. **Manoeuvre.** Manoeuvre involves coordinated activity to gain advantage in time and space. It requires positioning from which to have an effect in the right place at the right time. It offers the means of concentrating force or the threat of force decisively in order to achieve surprise, shock and opportunities for exploitation. Manoeuvre has both spatial and temporal dimensions which can be exploited to keep an adversary off-balance, so it also protects. The generation of a higher tempo than an adversary causes him to react, thus generating freedom of action; he is out-manoeuvred. Manoeuvre enhances the potential effects of firepower, and firepower in turn enables manoeuvre. However, firepower can rarely be a lone substitute. Manoeuvre used to secure a position of advantage has an enduring effect, which compels the adversary to respond by acting on terms that are not his own. Land manoeuvre embraces ground and air manoeuvre and manoeuvre support:

1) **Ground Manoeuvre.** The positional advantages gained by ground manoeuvre forces are irreplaceable by other means. Seizing, holding and denying ground, blocking and penetrating all contribute directly to achieving decisive conditions. The effects of ground manoeuvre can be sustained with a long-term presence, for example, the provision of wide area security.

2) **Air Manoeuvre.** Air manoeuvre is conducted within the land environment in order to achieve advantage, through shaping, and sustaining tasks. It can also provide the decisive act. Air manoeuvre unites attack helicopters, ground, air assault and airborne forces, support helicopters and fires within a combined arms and joint framework. This significantly increases, in the third dimension, the force’s capacity for manoeuvre and tempo. Air manoeuvre forces can find, fix, strike and exploit and are especially effective in achieving effects geographically distant from the ground force. Air manoeuvre consists of: close combat attack, providing responsive and intimate fires in close support; tactical air manoeuvre, which provides the co-ordinated employment of attack aviation and air assault troops to achieve surprise; and operational air manoeuvre which seeks to achieve physical and psychological dominance at range, probably at air assault formation level.

3) **Manoeuvre Support.** Manoeuvre support, primarily military engineering, shapes the battlefield to enable strategic, operational and tactical freedom of manoeuvre on land, by breaching obstacles, such as minefields, improvised explosive device belts and rivers. It also creates expeditionary basing and air landing options for manoeuvring forces. Manoeuvre support should also be capable of limiting an adversary’s
mobility, for example by laying anti-vehicle minefields\textsuperscript{12} and other obstacles. In the British Army, manoeuvre support is derived from the founding principles of military engineering. These provide for 3 effects: live, move and fight. These are found in 3 areas of capability: design, resource and construct; using personnel who are all concurrently soldiers, engineers and artisans.

e. **Protection.** Protection preserves the fighting power of a force so that it can be applied decisively. It allows a force to function in the face of attack and hostile environments. Protection can be active or passive: fixing or destroying an adversary or taking measures to protect the force itself. The levels of protection and the effort devoted to it will evolve during an operation, taking into account threats and risk-taking. Protection functions include among other things air and missile defence; protected mobility; electronic counter-measures; Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) defence measures; defensive information activity; field fortifications; protective security; the prevention of non-battle injuries and ill-health; and the hardening of bases and equipment. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assist protection through understanding threats and warning of them. Deception, OPSEC and dispersion also contribute to protection. OPSEC is required to a high standard which should not be taken for granted. Close attention should be given to weapons, equipment and information security as these are areas in which an effective opponent will seek to exploit weakness. Counter-mobility limits the ability to manoeuvre and so enhances protection. An imaginative and broad approach to protection is required, in order to identify the indirect methods. Commanders should also look beyond the protection of the force to consider the protection of populations, infrastructure, the environment, the reputation of the force and support for its mission.

f. **Sustainment.** Land forces and their fighting power need to be sustained. This includes their deployment from the home base, operations in theatre, redeployment and recuperation. Sustainment influences the tempo, duration and intensity of all operations. This function includes the sustenance and moral well-being of troops, the maintenance of equipment and materiel, the provision of expendable commodities and the treatment and replacement of casualties. It is therefore an integral function, influencing at every stage the planning and execution of
The primary examination of sustainment in this doctrine can be found in Chapter 9.

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Figure 7.4 - Summary of the Doctrinal Frameworks
Notes

1 These aspects could be described as operational and tactical design and management when seeking to apply the ideas behind operational art at the lower levels of warfare.

2 Field Marshal Montgomery, *High Command in War*, (21st Army Group, June 1945) 21.


4 Legerdemain is a French word meaning ‘sleight of hand’, a display of skill or cleverness for deceitful purposes.


6 Most of these are illustrated graphically and in relation to each other by Figure 7.2.

7 In previous doctrine the term Core Functions was used on its own. Given their role and relationship to the Operational Framework, these core functions are now referred to as the Tactical Framework.

8 The Tactical Framework should not be confused with the Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Assess (F3EA) variation which is sometimes used in targeting processes and by Special Forces.

9 Horatio Nelson before the Battle of the Nile, 1 August 1797.

10 Formerly referred to in land doctrine as the ‘Operational Framework’, a term which has been adopted by joint doctrine to apply to a different framework (see above).

11 Formerly referred to in doctrine as the Functions in Combat.

12 Note that UK forces are not permitted to use anti-personnel mines according to international law.
Chapter 8 explains the primary purpose and broad categories of activities that forces operating in the land environment undertake, and then focuses on the tactical actions and forms of manoeuvre that support them.
Military Activities in the Land Environment

0801. The 6 military activities that take place as part of operations in the land environment are: Deliberate and Focussed Intervention; Military Assistance to Stabilisation and Development; Counter-Insurgency; Peace Support; Peacetime Military Engagement and Conflict Prevention; and Home Defence and Military Aid to the Civil Authorities. These categories are not designed to be, nor necessarily correspond to, Defence planning tools or assumptions or to convey a scale of effort. Nor are they contained and isolated from each other. On the contrary, as was seen in the analysis of conflict in Chapter 3, the demands of conflict cannot be organised in such a compartmentalised or linear fashion. These overlapping categories are used in this doctrine only to aid understanding and examination of the wide range of activities potentially conducted by land forces.

0802. All 6 military activities are linked by the primary purpose of land forces executing operations in the land environment; combat. The table at Figure 8.1 lists all of these activities together.

The Primary Purpose - Combat

0803. Combat is a fight or struggle between armed groups. It is, by definition, adversarial and physically and mentally demanding. Combat is ultimately what armies are for. The primary purpose of an effective army should be the application of force or the threat of force, potentially through combat. Combat involves a combination of uncertainty and chaos, violence and danger, friction, stress, complexity and unpredictability. It is never symmetrical; it has degrees of asymmetry. The aim of combat is primarily to defeat an adversary, either by closing with him or from a distance; or to secure an objective by force.

0804. In combat, operations take place in a situation usually characterised as war, in which fighting, damage, coercion and persuasion are frequent, widespread, intense and conducted by formed groupings, units or formations. Combat is necessary when interests are directly threatened. Combat is a demanding purpose because of its high tempo; the complexity of all arms, all-environment integration; the high degrees of manoeuvre, firepower and protection required; the level of risk and the potential for destruction and loss. Combat is characterised by battles, probably at several levels of command, requiring complex control methods, sophisticated exploitation of information and situational awareness. There will be significant rates of physical activity and material consumption. Combat demands advanced levels of collective training and performance. Despite its demands, it can never be discounted or wished away: the British Army must be capable of this most demanding of roles. Combat thus becomes the Army’s primary purpose; its raison d’être.
0805. Combat on a significant scale is sometimes regarded as ‘conventional’ or ‘industrial’ warfighting between uniformed, state forces in a space conveniently absent of people. This characterisation is simplistic. Combat could take place against a state, supported by an irregular force, operating like a conventional army or not, with insurgent influences at play, where some areas of the battlespace are free of clutter and congestion, while others are not. Combat has always included asymmetric frictions, including the significance of populations, although during the Cold War, conventional military approaches did not give them sufficient attention. This does not mean that they were not there.

0806. Combat cannot be considered in isolation from the 6 military activities. It is vital, when preparing for combat to consider how it might impact on other, perhaps subsequent, activities. It is also important that the build-up to combat does not gain unstoppable momentum. Conflict prevention - for example through deterrence - is usually preferable to the consequences of committing to battle. However, a force will only deter if it is militarily credible and this means being capable of combat. Combat occurs or is liable to occur in most of the military activities described below. It is the intensity of the combat that varies. Intensity can be measured in terms of scale (size and numbers), longevity, rates of consumption and degrees of violence and damage.

**Deliberate and Focussed Intervention**

0807. Intervention is action taken to exert influence over or to control a situation or activity. Military intervention will be launched to prevent a crisis from escalating or from spreading, to contain a threat, to reinforce a fragile peace, secure an objective or to protect a vital interest overseas. The ability to intervene is one of the key means by which defence of the territorial integrity of the UK is enhanced by military activity at a distance. Intervention is likely to be required when the other levers of power or other military activities, for example conflict prevention, have not succeeded in achieving national objectives. Intervention requires capable military forces at varying levels of readiness, some high, which can conduct, among other things, joint, combined arms combat to secure the outcomes sought.

0808. **Deliberate Intervention.** Deliberate Intervention (DI) should be authorised by the UN Security Council or be otherwise legitimate under international law. The widest possible support from the international community will be sought. In such an intervention UK forces, almost certainly acting within a coalition, probably at the request of a regional party, will conduct operations to remove an aggressor from territory and protect it from further aggression. DI is likely to require a broad range of capabilities, in relatively large quantities, but should not lead to an enduring operation, because post-conflict liabilities
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should rest with regional actors. If this does not happen, the activity is then described in different terms, explained below.

0809. **Focussed Intervention.** Focussed (or limited) Intervention (FI) has limited objectives. These operations can be offensive, such as a strategic raid, perhaps to secure an objective briefly or to neutralise a specific threat. They are normally intended to be of short duration and specific in their objectives and scope, although this focus may be a precursor to a larger and more deliberate intervention. FI should be mandated by the UN Security Council or be otherwise legitimate under international law, and can be mounted unilaterally or multinationally. The risks, for example of the intervention losing its focus, must be understood. These interventions may be planned to seek combat, or to avoid it. The key characteristic is that they are intended to take place to disrupt or destroy threats, over a limited period, although transition to another military activity in the same theatre is not excluded. Thematic doctrine may be available to assist in planning some of these operations, for example for non-combatant evacuations.

**Military Assistance to Stabilisation and Development**

0810. Military Assistance to Stabilisation and Development (MASD) is separated from other activity in NATO doctrine. Operations that feature security and stabilisation are highly likely to require elements of, and overlap with, other activities, for example, conflict prevention. They could also could follow a DI. It could be judged that it is in the national interest to support, improve or re-establish the security and stability of a region where the UK has a direct or indirect interest. These policies might require the use or the threat of the use of force, which in turn could entail significant combat, and hence potentially increased instability for a time. There is likely to be a form of counter-insurgency required during MASD. The UK’s joint doctrine for stabilisation provides comprehensive coverage of how the military contribute to security and stabilisation, in accordance with national objectives. The tactical actions that result from this military activity are called stabilising actions and are described in the next section of this chapter.

0811. **Security Principles for Stabilisation.** In a similar approach to NATO, UK’s thematic doctrine for stabilisation provides a bespoke set of principles which should be applied in conjunction with the Principles of War. They are:

a. **Primacy of Political Purpose.** The purpose of UK military participation in security and stabilisation is to achieve national political aims. Military stabilisation activities must support a political outcome between a coalition, a host nation government, competing actors and the population; accepting that different interests, goals and methods will create tensions between political purposes.
b. **Understand the Context.** A common understanding is the basis of a common approach. To understand the contextual aspects of security and stabilisation, anthropological, religious, ethnographic, social, political and economic information is required. It is essential that the conflict is understood and that the analysis is shared. The campaign's big ideas, or its theory of change, will flow from such understanding.

c. **Focus on the Population.** The inability of a state to provide for the basic needs of its population can be both the cause and the result of insecurity and instability. Adversaries will seek to fill the vacuum where the government is absent or ineffective. The contest for security will be fought amongst the people and for their support. The military aim should be to protect the population and marginalise adversaries in order to prevent them from gaining influence and control.

d. **Foster Host Nation Governance, Authority and Indigenous Capacity.** Legitimate governments function with the consent of those they govern. They will be undermined by the perception or reality of corruption, greed, incompetence, bias, disregard for the Rule of Law and disenfranchisement. Therefore, one aim of a campaign should be to foster indigenous authority and capacity, through military and other capacity building, economic support and diplomatic activities.

e. **Unity of Effort.** Cross-government and inter-agency cohesion is vital in achieving security and stability. Much will rest on the comprehensive willingness of all inter-agency actors to collaborate. Once unity of effort has been agreed, and the tone set by leaders, it needs to be supported by action and liaison. Unity of effort should be manifested in a joint, inter-agency plan, collaborative planning and integrated headquarters.

f. **Isolate and Neutralise Adversaries.** The primary roles of military forces should be to provide sufficient security for the population and to establish control over the operating environment. Security cannot be achieved solely through the presence of military forces or only by killing or capturing insurgents. The objective is not the defeat or destruction of adversaries per se, but the neutralisation of the threats they pose to stability. This will require military forces to separate the adversary from the population and they will need to fight in the physical, psychological and virtual domains to achieve it.

g. **Exploit Credibility to Gain Support.** Credibility is capital which must be earned; it can be lost or exploited. It is important to create campaign momentum by moving from a situation of partial opposition, through consent - which can be passive - to one in which the host government enjoys the active support of the majority, at the expense of the adversary. This requires Campaign Authority, the articulation of a vision, a narrative that explains how lives will change for the better, and, ultimately, demonstrable success.
h. **Prepare for the Long Term (Perseverance and Sustainability).** The political need to balance the cost of national commitment to a stabilisation campaign against other domestic priorities may adversely affect campaign design and resourcing. A key insurgent strategy is to attempt to outlast their opponents’ will to stay. The population must be convinced that external support for their government will endure. Early investment in infrastructure and capacity are essential, both for the successful conduct of the campaign and as an indication of commitment.

i. **Anticipate, Learn and Adapt.** Constant evolution is not a sign of failure: it is a defining characteristic of operations in support of stabilisation. Anticipation and adaptation should therefore be seen as a sign of initiative, an active process that the commander should drive throughout a campaign. Assessment should be used to identify and interpret the results of actions and events, to exploit success and to correct errors.

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**Counter-Insurgency**

0812. **Insurgency.** Insurgency is usually described as an organised, violent subversion used to effect or prevent political control, as a challenge to established authority. It is an armed political struggle, the goals of which may be diverse. Insurgent groups attempt to force political change through a mix of subversion, propaganda and political and military pressure. They aim to persuade or intimidate the population to support or accept change on their terms. Insurgencies are different to campaigns of national resistance which aim to liberate a country from government by an invader, or to overthrow a government imposed by an invader. Importantly, there is an element of subjectivity in defining insurgency. Insurgencies typically occur where there is inherent social division and lack of cohesion. They may be powered by cultural, religious, ethnic or ideological differences. They feed on weakness caused by poverty or political and economic failure. Corruption, external interference, a lack of justice and historical grievance also play their part. Insurgencies are not necessarily contained by conventional borders and may be trans-national. These are particularly hard to counter as they project ideas which are grasped by anyone with whom they resonate, anywhere. Insurgent groups defy physical classification: they may appear as terrorists in one period, but evolve into units with the characteristics of armies the next.

0813. **Counter-Insurgency.** Counter-insurgency or COIN (sometimes also referred to as a category of counter-irregular activity) can be described as those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civil actions taken by a government or its partners to defeat insurgency. COIN may feature in M ASD and may have a direct link to home defence within the UK. The approach requires neutralising the insurgent by killing, capturing, marginalising or reconciling him, controlling the level of violence and securing the population.
COIN is characterised by instances of combat, normally conducted at relatively low tactical levels. Consumption and violence are low - relative to DI for example - but the nature of violence is likely to be more shocking because of its context, where normality is sought or actually appears to exist. For detailed land forces thematic doctrine the reader should consult the Army COIN manual, within a context of broader understanding provided by joint doctrine.

**Peace Support**

0814. Military peace support activities (using the ‘operation’ label results in the common abbreviation ‘PSO,’ used in joint doctrine) are defined as those contributing to an operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of UN Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace, in accordance with a mandate. This could include military contributions to **peacemaking**, **peace enforcement**, **peacekeeping**, **peace building** and **humanitarian emergency relief**.

0815. In Peace Support a balance of military and non-military means is required. The role of land forces is often to create a safe and secure environment and to provide specialist help to civilian agencies. Peace Support can be long-lasting, so perseverance and patience are required. Campaign Authority is essential. There is less tolerance of risks in Peace Support than in COIN, and instances of combat and rates of consumption should be lower. However, peace enforcement moves the Peace Support closer towards COIN, or perhaps the need for intervention, and the requirement for combat increases. The principles of Peace Support are:

a. **Conduct Comprehensive and Complementary Campaigning.** Effective Peace Support should integrate the efforts of all military and non-military agencies. Since pure centralised command of the operation is unlikely, unity of effort should be achieved through collaboration and coordination. This requires the establishment of mutual trust between military forces and non-military agencies.

b. **Take Preventative Action.** To prevent worsening of a situation, military forces need intelligence of any intent to disrupt the operation. They also need the military ability to coerce or deter and the determination and mandate to take preventative action if required.

c. **Conduct Sensitised Action.** Military forces should understand the law, religion, customs and culture of the elements of the population they are dealing with. Such understanding is necessary to predict the psychological effect of physical action. It will determine the subsequent plans and responses of the force.

d. **Provide Security.** Protection of the force and civilian agencies is an important requirement, particularly if some national contingents have fragile mandates. But a balance should be struck between robust force
protection and the need to protect and, in turn, be approachable to the population.

e. **Ensure Transparency.** There should be no doubt in the minds of factions or the population as to the aim and mandate of Peace Support, nor of the penalties for transgressing the terms of any peace agreement.

**Peacetime Military Engagement and Conflict Prevention**

0816. In conflict, prevention is preferable to cure. Any military activity that prevents or mitigates conflict should be exploited in preference to more costly activity. But a paradox often applies: significant investment in defence activity is not usually made unless the need is obviously compelling. By definition, a return on investments in prevention activity is less visible, so is harder to justify. Peacetime Military Engagement (PME) and Conflict Prevention encompass all military activities intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. They include programmes and exercises conducted on a bilateral or multinational basis, counter-terrorism, the provision of advisers and specialist training teams, defence sales support, engagement by embassy defence staffs, the nurturing of personal relationships, and military staff talks. Activities within this area are normally long-term and have the lowest levels of risk attached to them. They are aimed at encouraging local or regional stability and cooperation. Combat is not envisaged in these activities, unless in dealing with a threat against deployed elements.

0817. One powerful aspect of PME and Conflict Prevention is deterrence. Deterrence depends on the credible threat of military force for it to be an instrument of containment and coercion. The ability of the UK to conduct effective intervention in the land environment sends a message to adversaries and into situations that could make the use of force unnecessary. PME and Conflict Prevention depends on the credibility of UK forces - if they are not seen as capable, fewer parties will consider it worth engaging with or taking notice of them.

**Home Defence and Military Aid to the Civil Authorities**

0818. The security of UK’s national territory itself should be the primary concern of the Government and hence the priority for the use of military forces. The UK needs to be secured by operations at a distance because it is usually insufficient or too late to protect the state only at its borders. Land forces should be prepared to contribute to Home Defence and to support the civil authorities when required. This is distinct from operations to protect UK territorial integrity, for example from invasion, although that would be the ultimate form of home defence. Military support to internal operations are described under the generic heading Military Aid to the Civil Authorities or MACA. This is divided into three distinct categories, each with a different legal basis and with different political and military implications:
a. **Military Aid to the Civil Community.** Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC) is the provision of unarmed assistance to the country at large and has three sub-headings: emergency assistance; routine assistance and the attachment of volunteers.

b. **Military Aid to Government Departments.** Military Aid to Government Departments (MAGD) is the assistance provided to other government departments in urgent work of national importance to maintain supplies and services essential to life, health and the safety of the community.

c. **Military Aid to the Civil Powers.** Military Aid to the Civil Powers (MACP) is the provision of military assistance to the civil powers in the maintenance of law, order and public safety, using specialist capabilities or equipment, in situations beyond the capabilities of the civil powers. Such assistance may be armed and would normally be subordinated to police primacy.

0819. **CONTEST.** The UK counter-terrorism strategy\(^1\) is known as CONTEST. The strategy has 4 key elements. **Pursue** to stop terrorist attacks; **prevent** to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism; **protect** to strengthen protection against terrorist attack; and **prepare** where an attack cannot be stopped, but mitigation measures are implemented. Defence contributes to all 4.

0820. **Resilience.** Resilience, which is covered in detail by joint doctrine, is the overarching term used to describe activities and structures that ensure the Government can continue to function and deliver essential public services in time of national crisis, including terrorist attack and industrial action, or in civil crises such as floods. The Army’s regional command structure, its mass, some of its technical skills, many of its MACA activities and its secure real-estate and infrastructure are examples of capabilities that contribute significantly to national resilience.

Figure 8.1 - Summary of the Military Activities
Tactical Actions in the Land Environment

0821. Within these activities, land forces conduct all or some of a range of tactical actions, often concurrently. Tactical Actions provide the ways in which the activities are implemented. The balance between the different types of action varies from one operation to another over time. Land Tactical Actions are either offensive, defensive, stabilising or enabling. All of them can be conducted simultaneously by elements within a force. There are no impermeable barriers between these groups of actions, for example all offensive actions should include aspects of defence. A single force element may link them by a simple transition from one action to another without breaking contact with an adversary; for example from a defensive action to an offensive one. Enabling actions are never conducted for their own sake; their purpose is to enable or link the other groups. Stabilising actions are unlikely to have substance without consisting of some offensive, defensive and enabling actions. These actions are laid out in tabular form in Figure 8.2.

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Figure 8.2 - Types of Land Tactical Actions

Offensive Actions

0822. **Purpose.** The main purpose of offensive actions is to defeat an enemy though the use or threat of force. Supporting purposes are: pre-emption to gain the initiative, disruption of an adversary’s offensive action, deception or diversion, seizing ground and fixing. In offensive actions, the attacker seeks to create the conditions for freedom of movement and manoeuvre; confuse the adversary’s understanding; break or reduce his cohesion and will, or defeat his forces selectively. Offensive actions are not synonymous with combat; they are relevant to most military activities.
0823. **Characteristics.** The main characteristics of offensive actions are: surprise and shock; the seizure and retention of the initiative; agility, by which fleeting opportunities are taken; and superior tempo, through which the intensity and sequence of activities is maintained to keep the adversary off balance. In offensive actions, the real damage to the adversary’s will is caused by surprise and shock. Inflicting physical damage is but one means of doing so. The effects of firepower, tempo, simultaneity and surprise should be exploited by operating throughout the depth of an area. Manoeuvre in the adversary’s depth poses a threat, to which he is obliged to respond. Coordination is also important, in order to prevent an adversary from mounting a coherent defence. It will not always be possible to out-manoeuvre the adversary. Considerable force may have to be applied, either directly or indirectly, to neutralise or dislodge him if he cannot be by-passed. Commanders should seek to create surprise and shock, to achieve a break-in to an opponent’s defences, followed by aggressive exploitation within and beyond them.

0824. **Principles.** In summary, the principles of the offence, which derive from the Principles of War, are to:
   a. Seek surprise.
   b. Maintain security.
   c. Seize key terrain or targets vital to influencing perceptions.
   d. Achieve superiority of fires and other effects.
   e. Exploit manoeuvre.
   f. Concentrate the effects of force or the threat of force.
   g. Plan to exploit success.
   h. Keep it simple.

0825. **Types.** There are 10 offensive actions, each with a specific purpose:
   a. **Attack.** Attack, using:
      1) **Deliberate attacks** to defeat the adversary, with an emphasis on massing fighting power at the expense of time.
      2) **Hasty attacks** to defeat the adversary, trading mass for time, in order to seize fleeting opportunities.
      3) **Counter-attacks** and **spoiling attacks** to defeat or disrupt an adversary made vulnerable by his own offensive action. Spoiling attacks have the more limited aim of disruption.
   b. **Raid.** A raid is launched as a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the adversary, seize a high value individual or target, or to destroy physical positions. Raids end with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.
   c. **Exploitation.** Exploitation as a Tactical Action is characterised by a rapid advance against lessening resistance. The purpose is both physical and psychological. Physically, the aim is to retain the initiative by preventing
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an opponent from reorganising his defence or conducting an orderly withdrawal. The psychological effect of exploitation is to create confusion and apprehension throughout the adversary’s command, reducing his, or its, capacity to react. This may be decisive in itself.

d. Pursuit. The role of a pursuit is to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape or an absconding individual, with the aim of defeating or perhaps destroying it or him. It should develop from a successful exploitation and commence when the target is demoralised and beginning to disintegrate under pressure. A pursuit may target an adversary seeking to escape from his own initiated ambush. In this case, rapidly following up into his depth in order to cut off his extraction would be vital.

e. Feint. The purpose of a feint is to distract an adversary force by seeking combat or contact with it.

f. Demonstration. The role of a demonstration is to distract an adversary’s attention without seeking contact. Both feints and demonstrations can contribute to fixing, and should be designed to have psychological as well as physical effects.

g. Reconnaissance in Force. Reconnaissance in force is used to induce an adversary to disclose the location, size, strength, disposition or the intention of his force by making him respond to offensive action.

h. Ambush. The purpose of an ambush is to inflict damage on the adversary while denying him an opportunity to counter-attack, principally through surprise, in an action concentrated in space and time.

i. Breakout of Encircled Forces. A break out leads to an encircled force taking offensive action to link up with a main force. The breakout should attempt to surprise the encircling adversary, so there is considerable advantage in attempting to break out at the earliest opportunity, before the encirclement solidifies.

j. Infiltration. An infiltration is penetration using stealth, entering an adversary’s physical or virtual space without being detected, probably to gain understanding or to execute another offensive action.

Defensive Actions

0826. Purpose. The purpose of defensive actions is to defeat or deter a threat. They are generally intended to protect the force and to provide the right conditions for offensive actions. Defensive actions alone do not usually achieve decisive conditions, without a subsequent offensive action, but they can be strategically decisive, for example by creating the secure conditions required to defeat an insurgency. Like offensive actions, defensive actions apply to combat and all of the military activities. Defensive actions should not be seen as synonymous with weakness or defeat. Whilst an ‘offensive spirit’ is an important principle of war, the ability to conduct defensive actions well, is just as important.
Characteristics. Defensive actions may be necessary in some operations or at certain stages in a campaign, for example in order to buy time, or to generate or maintain opportunities for offensive action. By holding key terrain or fixing the adversary in one area, the conditions for offensive actions in another can be created. The object is to force an adversary into action that narrows his options, reduces his fighting power and fixes him for a counter-attack. The challenge is to seize the initiative from the attacker. While maintaining the integrity and cohesion of his force, the defender should seek to hold off the attack. He should lure the attacker into situations where he can create and exploit surprise, denying him information, both passively and actively, for example by attacking his command systems. Through this range of actions, he should try to fix his adversary for subsequent defeat by counter-attack.

Principles. In summary, the principles of the defence, which derive from the Principles of War, are:

a. Offensive Action, in order to seize or regain the initiative.
b. All Round Defence, in order to anticipate a threat from any direction.
c. Depth, in order to prevent penetration or its effects.
d. Mutual Support, in order to increase the strength and flexibility of a defence.
e. Concealment and Deception, in order to deny the adversary the advantages of understanding.

Types. The 3 principal types of defensive action are mobile or area, with combinations of both, and delay:

a. Mobile Defence. Mobile defence is used to defeat an adversary’s attack through destruction. Mobile defence combines a fixing element that denies the adversary freedom of manoeuvre, and an element to counter-attack him. The balance between these two forces depends upon the mission and relative capabilities.

b. Area Defence. Area defence is used to defeat an attack by denial of ground through the concentration of forces and counter-mobility effects, for example using obstacles or field defences. The most effective area defences operate in combination with screening, delaying, blocking actions and counter-attacks, some of which require mobile defence, in order to weaken the attacker by inflicting losses on him, slowing him down and canalising him, before he arrives at the area defence.

c. Delay. Delaying actions are those in which a force being pressed by an attacking adversary trades space for time, reducing the adversary’s momentum and inflicting damage without itself becoming decisively committed. Delay is conducted to slow an adversary’s advance; interdicting movement and gathering information about his intentions, without giving information away. Delaying actions also allow the commander to prepare
for a counter-attack. These actions require a particularly high standard of collective performance in manoeuvre and command and control.

**Stabilising Actions**

0830. **Purpose.** Stabilising actions are bespoke tactical methods for implementing MASD, although they could feature to degrees in all the military activities. They operate in conjunction with the other Tactical Actions.

0831. **Types.** Stabilisation and combat are not mutually exclusive; both are likely to involve aspects of the other. In addition to achieving military objectives defined by the primary purpose of combat, there is likely to be a wider remit laid on military forces, particularly in non-permissive environments, to undertake non-traditional military tasks and to engage with a wide array of actors in order to develop the indigenous capacity necessary for stability. This will require actions grouped as: Framework Security; Security Sector Reform and Military Capacity Building; Support to the Delivery of Essential Services; Support to Governance, Economic Development and Reconstruction. All of these need to take place as part of a comprehensive, inter-agency approach:

a. **Framework Security.** Security - a life without fear - is the most fundamental human need and is most likely to motivate and regulate behaviour. Security (human, personal, national and physical) creates the conditions in which other activity crucial to well-being can take place. People will generally give their loyalty to the group that best meets this need. Winning the contest for security is therefore essential to establishing the security of a state. Framework security actions include providing reassurance patrols, public order and population control, incident response, and protection of key sites. Persistent, wide area security of this type, in areas secured and held, requires the commitment of mass, in conjunction with targeted action against adversaries.

b. **Security Sector Reform and Military Capacity Building.** Stabilising a state depends on transferring responsibility for the provision of security to indigenous forces. This requires a comprehensive approach to reform the security sector (Security Sector Reform or SSR) itself, for example by removing those who contribute to insecurity and fear, although care must be taken not to undermine the fragile security architecture that may exist. Military forces can contribute to this approach by developing and working with indigenous security forces. Being able to deploy early to shape or prevent is important and may make a larger operation less necessary. Although it is not strictly a military task, building indigenous police force capacity may also fall to land forces, so long as it does not handicap the development of the state’s military forces, if they are required first. Military Capacity Building (MCB) includes the following formula of overlapping tasks:
1) **Inward Investment.** Depending on poverty levels and the effects of conflict, the new indigenous security structure will require inward investment. Advice and training will be meaningless without equipment, bases and other resources being made available. The establishment of the new sector’s credibility and confidence depends on outward perceptions of change; this is expensive, but cannot be avoided.

2) **Training.** Indigenous forces should be individually and collectively trained at secure and well-resourced centres away from the population, using the train-the-trainer model whenever possible. They should not be exposed to the population until they are effective enough to inspire confidence. Training should be based on considered, cultural understanding of the audience, rather than on a template.

3) **Mentoring.** Once deployed on operations, the indigenous forces should be mentored. This requires a subtle blend of encouragement, advice and compulsion, emphasising independence and confidence and playing down dependency. Mentoring teams should be small, self-sufficient and agile. They should be capable of living and fighting alongside indigenous forces. Their subordinate role is to provide their own force with situational awareness and assessments of conditions.

4) **Partnering.** Once the indigenous force is confident and capable of independent operation with coalition support, the relationship should change further, to one of partnering. This might involve the provision of niche capabilities, joint operations with the indigenous force in the lead, or UK units or individuals working alongside or even subordinated within an indigenous chain of command.

5) **Transition and Overwatch.** Over time, partnering elements can themselves withdraw to a position of overwatch, inside or outside the theatre, in support of the independent indigenous force, following a transition of responsibility and power. Re-engagement is likely to be controlled by operational protocols followed by formal bi-lateral agreements, which provide an overlap with PME and Conflict Prevention.

c. **Support to the Delivery of Essential Services.** Sustainable security is dependent on providing essential services, for example, electricity, water, sewerage and food delivery. The more demanding the physical environment and the more destructive the fighting may have been, the keener the lack of these services will be felt. The solutions are in the hands of the civilian components of an inter-agency approach. But if the security situation is not permissive to civilian specialists, military forces need to be able to improve delivery of these services in the short-term, because they are often the outward and actual signs of a better life. It is also likely to be a framework security task to protect the key nodes and distribution points.
from disruption. A lack of essential services will be exploited by adversaries and will create discomfort, tension and disorder.5
d. **Support to Governance, Economic Development and Reconstruction.** Although the development of national and local legislatures, executives and courts, a constitutional and legal system and other aspects of a functioning government is not core military business, military forces will need to understand and to some extent be involved in these institutions. At the very least, they will require protection. But the expertise is found elsewhere so the quicker developing capacity in governance becomes a civil lead, the better. Military activity in governance, for example support to elections, requires mass as well as suitable individuals. Beyond the establishment of essential services, which are linked closely to security, is the development of a state’s economy and infrastructure. These are strategic and generational projects, but the degree of early progress will have a direct effect on the success of the campaign. While there is some relevant military expertise, for example in civil engineering, military forces are only likely to be capable of tactical levels of support, although this could have strategic effect. The military priority is to create the security required for trade, relief of poverty, infrastructure development and enterprise to take place.

**Enabling Actions**

0832. **Purpose.** Enabling actions link other Tactical Actions together. They include those intended to make or break contact with an adversary, and those conducted out of contact. They were formerly called ‘transitional phases.’ As with offensive and defensive actions, their applicability across all military activities should be understood. They all require frequent collective training and high-grade staff work to be controlled successfully.

0833. **Types.** Enabling actions can be described as:
\[ a. \] **Reconnaissance.** Reconnaissance actions are missions to obtain, by observation and detection, information about, and understanding of, the enemy, adversaries and other actors, the population, and the physical landscape: ground and weather. Ground reconnaissance can be mobile (scouting) or static (for example, surveillance by using observation posts) and is conducted in conjunction with reconnaissance from the air, space and cyberspace.
\[ b. \] **Security.** Security actions provide early and accurate warning of adversary actions in order to protect the force. They provide time for a force to react effectively to the adversary; the two specific security tasks are to screen (cover a force) or to guard (a screen with the addition of fires or offensive action).
\[ c. \] **Advance to Contact.** The advance to contact seeks to regain contact with an adversary under the most favourable conditions. It is normally executed in preparation for subsequent offensive action and therefore ends when
a force is positioned for the attack. Even in COIN there will be advances to contact, for example probing contested space to understand it better, recognising that contact is likely and will be instructive.

d. **Meeting Engagement.** A meeting engagement involves action between 2 moving forces. The meeting may be intentional or unintentional on either side. The general conditions for a meeting engagement are that neither force is prepared for defence, both are generally moving, and there is an element of surprise on both sides. The commander should have thought through the possibilities and the need to gain the initiative as rapidly as possible, by fixing his adversary and manoeuvring assertively. In a meeting engagement in particular, the commander with the most effective decision-action cycle will prevail.

e. **Link-Up.** The aim of a link-up is to join two or more units or formations. Link-up actions normally occur in contested territory and may involve different types of forces. A typical example is a link-up between ground and air manoeuvre forces in which the former relieves the latter in place.

f. **Relief of Encircled Forces.** The purpose of relieving an encircled force is to restore its freedom of action and security of re-supply and to enable it to regain the initiative, before the adversary is able to execute a decisive act against it.

g. **Relief of Troops.** The relief of troops occurs when one force takes over actions or activities from another. There are 3 types of relief action. The first is the **Relief in Place** in which all or part of a force is replaced in an operating area by an incoming unit. This can be a theatre level, operational level, or a tactical level action, for example, to and from a forward operating base. The second is the **Forward Passage of Lines**, in which one force moves through another, for example holding a bridgehead, or attacks through a unit in contact with the enemy. The third type of relief operation is the **Rearward Passage of Lines**, in which a force moving from contact passes through another unit in defence. In all reliefs of troops, the in-place force is required to prepare for, brief and accommodate the needs of the relieving force in order to maintain continuity and sustain effect. These are complicated enabling actions which require very effective planning, control and integration of capabilities, particularly between the land and air environments.

h. **Withdrawal.** A withdrawal occurs when a commander seeks to disengage his force from physical contact with an adversary, for example to transition to another action. Contact may be maintained through means such as indirect fire, reconnaissance or surveillance. The withdrawal should be conducted so as to minimise interference by an adversary and to preserve fighting power. The ability to move rapidly to offensive or defensive actions should always be retained. Withdrawal is also used to change conditions on the ground or to allow a reinvestment of fighting power in a different way. Operational withdrawal may be implemented to change the dynamic in a
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stabilisation context, for example by changing perceptions of occupation, or to allow indigenous capability its independence during a transition period.

i. **Retirement.** A retirement is a movement by a force away from and out of contact with an adversary. Such a force may require protection, for example a screen or guard, and should be wary of being interdicted by an adversary’s deep missions; or surprised by the actions of a population.

j. **March.** A march is conducted to move a force efficiently to its place of tactical employment. Units should be prepared to come into contact with the enemy, but not expect to do so. The march is distinct from tactical movement, in which units move in battle formations and are either in contact with an adversary or expect to meet him. When planned and conducted efficiently, a march adds tempo to operations. A march, and the relief of troops, requires regulation when conducted at formation level; this is often conducted by reconnaissance troops, because of their mobility and aptitude for communications.

k. **Breaching and Crossing Obstacles.** The breaching and crossing of obstacles, for example minefields, IED belts and rivers, normally occurs during offensive actions, but may also be necessary during defensive and enabling actions, such as withdrawal. These enabling actions can occur throughout the operating area and will often involve a passage of lines. They are complicated and require extensive planning, rehearsal, and specialist capabilities because they have a significant impact on the tempo, manoeuvrability and the security of the force.

**Forms of Manoeuvre**

0834. To get a force into a position to execute Tactical Actions, the commander and his land force need to be proficient at manoeuvre. The key skill is to be able to visualise the battlefield; to see it from a bird’s eye view and have a feel for positioning. This visualisation needs to be recreated in the minds of others. This section describes forms of land manoeuvre. Land manoeuvre comprises ground manoeuvre and air manoeuvre. Land manoeuvre has utility in all of the military activities described above, perhaps using aviation, special forces and indigenous capability as alternatives, or to complement massed land forces.

0835. Manoeuvre has been defined previously. Its purpose is to gain a position of advantage relative to an adversary and it can be used at all Levels of Warfare. Short descriptions of the forms of manoeuvre follow. They are not, as is sometimes thought, synonymous with or confined to combat or ‘manoeuvre warfare.’ They provide a language to describe how to get into a position of advantage in any activity, physically and even psychologically, to coerce or to persuade an opponent, so their application should be interpreted imaginatively and not necessarily literally. These tactics can be used as much by a platoon as a division.
Envelopment. Envelopment, as depicted in Figure 8.3, is an offensive manoeuvre in which the main attacking force passes around or over the adversary’s principal defensive position to secure objectives to their rear. It is designed to apply force against the adversary’s weakness, but will normally require a diversionary or fixing attack (for example a demonstration or feint) against his strongest defensive position, to distract it. Considerable speed of movement and the identification of weak points is required if the enveloping force is to be able to reach its objectives in depth. The envelopment may cause the adversary to redeploy or to withdraw. It may cause disruption to his command and control or logistic systems, or open the way to objectives which he was trying to defend. It may be undertaken in order to outflank or trap adversary forces, possibly against a geographical feature. Air manoeuvre forces may be employed as part of an enveloping force; this is also known as a vertical envelopment.

Figure 8.3 - Envelopment
0837. **Double Envelopment.** A double envelopment, as depicted in Figure 8.4, is an envelopment operation mounted on 2 axes which is designed to outflank an adversary from both sides with a view to forcing him to abandon his intentions, redeploy or withdraw, or as a prelude to encirclement and destruction of the trapped forces. It may be also complemented by a diversionary or fixing attack against one of his positions.

Figure 8.4 - Double Envelopment
0838. **Encirclement.** If the arms of a double envelopment are strong enough to meet after trapping a force and to prevent it from breaking out, large forces may be neutralised or destroyed within the circle. Figure 8.5 is a schematic that depicts such a manoeuvre. Large encirclements may be costly operations in terms of troops and the time taken to reduce the fighting power of the trapped forces. Properly encircled forces can only be resupplied by air or by the population inside the encirclement.

![Figure 8.5 - Encirclement](image)

**Encirclement manoeuvre**  **Diversionary or fixing attack**  **Encirclement manoeuvre**
**Turning Movement.** In a turning movement the attacking force passes around or over the adversary’s principal defensive positions to force him to abandon his position or divert major forces to meet the new threat. A turning movement should make those forces more vulnerable to attack. The attacking force is organised into a turning force, a main body and a reserve. The turning force’s manoeuvre causes the adversary to leave his positions. The main body may initially distract the adversary from the turning manoeuvre. It should subsequently exploit the success of the turning force. The turning force is normally smaller than the main body and should be able to operate independently, beyond the supporting range of the main body. Either group could conduct the decisive operation. This is shown in Figure 8.6.

![Figure 8.6 - Turning Movement](image-url)
0840. **Penetration.** Penetration seeks to reach the depths of an adversary’s position on one or a number of narrow axes. Penetration may be necessary in order to achieve any of the other forms of manoeuvre. The elements of penetration are shown in the schematic at Figure 8.7. It has 4 variants: deep, or multiple penetration; a combination of both, and infiltration. All may be combined in the same operation. The idea is to seek the depth of an adversary’s position as rapidly as possible, preferably without fighting. This requires adversary forces to be bypassed by design. There is a risk that the penetrating force may itself be attacked in its developing flanks. The fear that this might happen may cause forces to move cautiously when boldness is required. Determination will be required of commanders. Flank protection of the penetrating force is critical to success, although at times protection can be afforded by sheer speed. Commanders should think about penetration in terms of influence as well as in the physical sense, given that, with all forms of manoeuvre, the perception and behaviour of an opponent is so important.

a. **Deep Penetration.** Deep penetration aims either to seize features or to destroy specific objectives more deeply inside the adversary’s territory. In doing so it perforates the adversary’s positions, introduces a force behind them and thereby causes fear and uncertainty. It may of itself persuade an adversary commander that he has lost, particularly if objectives are critical to him, for example escape routes or defiles behind his position.

b. **Multiple Penetration.** Multiple penetration aims to disrupt and dislocate the cohesion of a defensive position. In doing so it achieves simultaneity, presenting the defender with a number of threats. It creates multiple opportunities for surprise and shock. However, it risks dispersion of forces for little overall effect if it is not generally successful.

c. **Combination of Multiple and Deep Penetration.** Multiple and deep penetration could be combined. The effects can be dramatic. Each penetrating force will normally require at least two elements. The leading element is tasked to penetrate to the objective or limit of exploitation as rapidly as possible, bypassing opposition. The second element is tasked to follow the first in order protect its flanks and rear. Subsequent elements are reserve or echelon forces. They are tasked to destroy the bypassed adversary, take over the lead of the advance, or exploit beyond the immediate objective.
d. Infiltration. Infiltration is penetration based on stealthy movement of troops into a penetrative position, which could also be added to the combination described above. It may be used to occupy an objective in depth, or as a precursor to an attack mounted on such an objective. It may be along a single or multiple lines. Airborne and reconnaissance troops and special forces are particularly suited to this action because they are more likely to be able to manoeuvre without detection.
Mobile Defence. In terms of manoeuvre, in mobile defence a fixing force denies the adversary his freedom of action while a striking force manoeuvres in order to defeat him. This is shown in Figure 8.8. Forces may also use any other form of manoeuvre, as part of a mobile defence. Commanders conducting a mobile defence use terrain, obstacles, depth and deception, together with firepower and manoeuvre, to encourage an adversary to focus on the wrong objective or perhaps to delay him. This renders the adversary vulnerable to attack. Therefore depth, time and the ability to manoeuvre are particularly important factors in the conduct of mobile defence. Successful mobile defence requires rapid switching between activities, and a readiness to concede ground where appropriate.

Figure 8.8 - Mobile Defence
Area Defence. The purpose of area defence, which also requires elements of manoeuvre, is to hold ground or deny it to an adversary. Unlike mobile defence, a force committed to area defence does not seek the destruction of the attacking force. Instead, it relies on a separate but coordinated attack by other forces to deliver tactical success. In area defence, commanders employ their forces in a framework of static and mutually supporting positions, assisted by screening, guarding, counter-attacks or spoiling attacks at all available levels. This is depicted in Figure 8.9. The balance between static and screening, guarding, counter-attack or spoiling attack elements is largely dictated by terrain. The closer the terrain, the greater the proportion of counter-attacking forces and the lower the level at which they should be employed. In both forms of defence, deception should be considered, to disguise the type and locations of the defensive action.

Figure 8.9 - Area Defence
0843. **Defence by an Encircled Force.** An encircled force may break out, or exfiltrate towards friendly forces, attack deeper into the adversary, or defend itself. The purpose of defending an encircled force may be to retain ground or draw adversary forces as part of a larger manoeuvre, or to preserve the fighting power of forces unexpectedly encircled and unable to break out or exfiltrate. An encircled force may conduct either an area defence or a mobile defence if it has sufficient supplies. The key consideration in organising the defence of an encircled force is to anticipate how the adversary will attempt to split the force in order to reduce it piecemeal.

0844. **Integrating Forms of Manoeuvre.** Although individual forms of manoeuvre may lead directly to the achievement of the mission, it may be necessary to integrate them into a larger *scheme of manoeuvre*. Similarly, forms of manoeuvre will often need to be sub-divided. For example, encirclement will typically require at least two penetrations, exploitation into the adversary’s depth, and a link-up operation. That may be followed by defence of the outer flanks of the encirclement, and either attack or defence on the internal flanks. Physical manoeuvre allows the manipulation of both the threat and the use of force. Actions against flanks or the rear, bypassing and penetration, create shock and surprise at several levels, and hence the possibility of command paralysis and collapse. Any penetration is an opportunity for aggressive exploitation. Manoeuvre is not limited to offensive actions; the most skilful counter-attacks from a position of defence have often been turning movements. Such movements compel an attacker to desist from his attack, and create a threat to the rear of his forces. It can be seen that these are complicated manoeuvres, especially when integrated. This is why the Manoeuvrist Approach and Mission Command philosophies require repeated, realistic collective training and well-practised control. These measures confer advantages that enable a force to manoeuvre as second nature.
Notes


2. In previous land doctrine these principles have appeared at the tactical field manual level and below only. Here they are lifted up into higher tactical doctrine and updated slightly.

3. In previous land doctrine these principles have appeared at the tactical field manual level and below only. Here they are lifted up into higher tactical doctrine and updated slightly.

4. Some of the tasks within some of these actions could be referred to collectively and alternatively as Military Assistance to Civil Effect or MACE.

5. It should be noted that the Geneva Convention IV Articles 54-55 impose obligations on 'occupation' forces to keep indigenous public officials in place wherever possible, and to ensure that food and medical services are provided.

6. Formerly referred to in land doctrine as the ‘relief of troops in combat.’
Chapter 9 describes how land forces should be sustained on operations, in 3 parts: sustainment fundamentals, sustainment planning and sustainment execution.
Victory is the beautiful, bright-coloured flower. (Logistics) is the stem without which it could never have blossomed. Yet even the military student, in his zeal to master the fascinating combinations of the actual conflict, often forgets the far more intricate complications of supply.


**Sustainment Fundamentals**

0901. Throughout military history, successful commanders have recognised the importance of sustainment. As a divisional commander during the 1991 Gulf War, General Rupert Smith, stated that ‘... a commander (should) only fight the battle he can sustain.’ He was emphasising that commanders should properly understand their freedoms and constraints. The conflict environment described in Chapter 3 poses many challenges for sustainment. Operations are often enduring and conducted in arduous conditions, at long distances from the UK. They usually involve joint forces that may have considerable mass but are widely dispersed. These operations require complex equipments and cause high rates of materiel consumption in places where the threat comes from multiple directions and there are not necessarily any definable rear areas. There are expectations that the best possible life-support should be made available, and that no life should be lost through an avoidable logistic failing. These challenges need to be absorbed into the Army’s doctrine in a way that builds on the enduring aspects of sustainment.

**Philosophy of Sustainment**

0902. This doctrine introduces the central ideas of the British Army’s approach to sustainment using a philosophy of 5 parts. This land philosophy provides general guidance on how sustainment should be approached by the whole of a force, both collectively and individually. The philosophy is followed by the most common sustainment terminology; an explanation of the enduring principles of logistics; and a list of the functional groupings engaged in the sustainment of operations, sufficient to give a broad introduction to the subject, which should be supplemented by functional doctrine.

a. **Sustainment is central to Fighting Power.** Sustainment is not an adjunct to Fighting Power; it lies at the heart of all 3 components. Sustainment shapes, and is itself shaped by, concepts and doctrine. It underpins the moral cohesion and motivation of the force; and it contributes to the art of the physically possible. This significance has a number of implications: sustainment needs to be driven by capstone doctrine rather than confined to functional publications. It must be the business of every member of the force, rather than a ‘black art.’ The sustainment implications of a plan should be made clear to commanders. Finally, no provider of sustainment...
should forget that there is a responsibility placed upon him to ensure that
his actions strengthen rather than undermine the moral component of the
Fighting Power of the force.

b. **Sustainment is a Means to an End.** Sustainment should be a means to an
end; it should always support the mission, although there may be occasions
where sustainment is the mission, for example in humanitarian emergency
relief. The raison d’être for sustainment activity is to meet the commander’s
intent; to inform him how it can be achieved, rather than why it cannot
be. However, because sustainment affects the art of the possible, only a
poor plan is based on unrealistic expectations. Integrated planning and
trust across staffs, with shared responsibility and mutual support during
execution, are therefore essential.

c. **Sustainment depends on Responsibility.** Sustainment is never only
someone else’s business. All professional soldiers should be capable
logisticians in order for their good intentions to become actionable plans,
actions and effects. This bestows 2 general requirements on individuals
and teams:

1) **Awareness.** Every member of a land force should have sufficient
awareness of how the force is sustained, logistically and
administratively, to be able to contribute positively to both. At an
individual level, this includes doctrinal understanding; being flexible
and pragmatic; anticipating needs; being able to express requirements
clearly; and having sufficient familiarity with equipment and materiel to
use them responsibly and efficiently.

2) **Diligence.** Diligence requires a consistent, conscientious level of
attention to detail and care, even when it may be unnoticed. It
requires a professional attitude of mind that abhors waste; maintains
equipment, infrastructure and materiel with the respect that they
deserve; and is meticulous in administration. Profligacy and neglect
are deeply unprofessional and breach the Military Covenant by causing
the Nation unnecessary expense. They also harm the cohesion of the
force by undermining the efforts of others. The Army’s ‘kit’ should
be maintained to the highest standards; the aim should be to transfer
items to others in better condition than when they were received. This
is a cultural standard that means more than being well-prepared for
annual inspections.

d. **The Agility of the Force depends on Agile Sustainment.** Fighting
soldiers traditionally expect to blame the specialist logisticians for his lack
of imagination and judgement when things go wrong, while taking his
successful support for granted when they go right. But the contemporary
character of conflict has blurred these stereotypes, as the distinctions
between the fighting and supporting echelons become less clear. A linear
visualisation of supply is increasingly insufficient. Within the tactical
environment, a support network of sustainment is a better description of what is required than a limited number of linear supply chains, with compartmentalised responsibilities; although a network will include a number of such chains. Logistic movement needs to be lateral as well as linear; across as well as forward and back. Materiel or people should be moved to and from points of need, by using a network of nodes, links and options. This requires the whole force to take an imaginative approach, consisting of: minimal bureaucracy; energetic solution-finding; speedy communications and information systems; agile specialists and effective methods of tracking assets. The agility of the force will be hollow if it is not based on agile sustainment, and it will not be able to apply the Manoeuvrist Approach.

e. Soldiers First. The experts who provide functional sustainment capabilities are highly-specialised and, in some critical trades, are few in number. Their specialist skills are rarely inter-changeable, so regular employment outside of these disciplines is normally avoided. However, in the contemporary operating environment, it is essential that all of them are ‘soldiers first’ and specialists second. Although there are relatively secure areas, there are no absolutely secure areas in a mosaic; a non-linear land environment where threats can emanate from all directions and at any time. An agile adversary will seek to apply his strength against our weakness. The experts who underpin sustainment of the force need to be robust soldiers, capable of ‘fighting logistics through,’ self-defence and providing mutual support to others in combat. This requirement should determine their individual and collective training levels, the structures within which they operate and their tactical employment.

The need to deploy armed forces throughout the world rapidly will remain, and for those deployments to remain credible and sustainable, they must be properly supported with logistic troops that are at least at the same state of readiness as the fighting troops.

Major General Martin White, *Gulf Logistics - Blackadder’s War*, (London: Brassey’s, 1995) 249

**Terminology**

0903. A basic understanding of the terminology used to describe aspects of sustainment is required by all users of this doctrine. These are descriptions of what takes place, rather than strict definitions, which can be found in joint doctrine.

a. **Sustainability.** Sustainability measures the capability and resilience of a force; its ability to maintain the necessary level of fighting power for the duration required to achieve its objectives, without culmination.
b. **Sustainment.** Sustainment is the actual business of maintaining a force by enhancing and prolonging its capability and resilience. Sustainment includes logistics, administration and the organisations and resources required to deliver sustainability.

c. **Logistics.** Logistics is the art and science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. Logistics comprise the development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, recovery and disposal of materiel; transport of personnel, acquisition and construction; the maintenance, operation and disposal of facilities; the acquisition or furnishing of services; and medical and health services.

d. **Support Network.** A support network seeks to ensure that resources are delivered precisely and responsively when required. The aim is to exploit the logistic footprint of the force to ensure agile means of delivering resources. This depends on a joint, integrated approach, with visibility and effective stock management systems, to get resources to where they are needed, on time. An adaptive support network is required in operating environments where forces are much dispersed in non-contiguous positions, and do not always control their lines of communication.

2 approaches can be used, probably in combination. **Directed Logistics** aims to deliver resources when and where required, rather than holding them in larger quantities than might be immediately needed. **Stockpiling Forward** sees supplies, medical cover and equipment support being pushed forward as close as is necessary to the point of use, maybe in more than the immediately required quantities. This may increase waste, or the chances of materiel being held in one location at the expense of another. But these risks should be balanced against the advantages of redundancy in forward positions likely to be under pressure, and the risks of re-supplying them in contact.

> It is very necessary to attend to detail and to trace a biscuit from Lisbon to a man’s mouth on the frontier, and to provide for its removal from place to place, by land and water, or no military operations can be carried on.

The Duke of Wellington, *The Dispatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington during his Various Campaigns of 1796 to 1818*, (London: John Murray, 1838) 406

e. **Administration.** Administration is the management and execution of all non-tactical military preparation. It includes staff and personnel support; medical support; welfare support; the provision of legal advice; chaplaincy and pastoral care; and provost support including military police and investigative services. Staff and personnel support includes the
maintenance of casualty and reinforcement plans; the management of pay and documentation; and the issuing of routine orders. Preventative medical expertise and medical force preparation are administrative functions, whereas medical treatment to deployed units and formations is a logistic function.

f. **Combat Service Support.** Combat Service Support (CSS) is a term often used colloquially to refer to the sustainment of operations in general, but should be used only to describe the organisational support provided to combat and other deployed forces, primarily in the fields of administration and logistics, by functional groupings.

g. **Command, Control and Liaison.** A **Joint Force Logistic Component (JFLogC)** is a task-organised, joint logistic command and control organisation that provides a single focus for all logistic activity in support of a deployed joint force and its components. A **National Support Element (NSE)** provides the national logistic focus in a multinational operation, providing coordination and liaison between the UK, the force and national elements within it. Sustainment of operations should not be stove-piped; its command and control is best enabled by a **Force Support** staff integrated into the operational headquarters. Understanding of sustainment is aided by considering it in functional terms, but if its effects are not planned for holistically it is unlikely that they will be synchronised. A recognised theatre logistics picture provides situational awareness of a force’s resilience, plotting resources against consumption and effects over time and showing changes to demand and the identified risks.

### Principles of Logistics

0904. **Principles.** The 5 enduring principles of logistics, which also apply to all sustainment activities, including administration, are: **Foresight, Efficiency, Simplicity, Cooperation,** and **Agility.** These principles should be considered in combination with the Principles of War. They should be applied using the planning yardsticks contained in logistic publications and formation standard operating procedures. They apply to the whole force, not just logistic specialists:

a. **Foresight.** Foresight is the ability to predict and take or manage risks potentially affecting the commander’s freedom of action. Planners at all levels should analyse the probable course of future activity and forecast the likely requirements. Users of materiel should also anticipate their usage and communicate expected requirements in good time. The purpose of logistic staffs is to resource the operational plan and confirm that it is viable in terms of sustainment. Foresight becomes particularly important as resource levels reduce, without a commensurate reduction in operational tempo.

b. **Efficiency.** Efficiency involves achieving the maximum level of support for the least logistic effort to make the best use of finite resources, the supply
network and lines of communication. Logistic and administrative efficiency will ultimately determine the most appropriate operational structures and resources to support an operation, if necessary employing alternative, possibly non-military, support arrangements.

c. **Simplicity.** The complexity of sustainment activity demands a robust plan that is widely understood and that absorbs friction. Simplicity enables plans, systems and organisations to react well to the unforeseen.

d. **Cooperation.** Cooperation helps to share logistic and administrative responsibilities and resources, and requires all elements within a force to interact effectively. It also enables multinational economy of effort, and can be increased by using indigenous capability and contractor support.

e. **Agility.** Logistic and administrative agility provides the commander with the ability to respond quickly to the unexpected, remain effective under arduous conditions and be flexible in overcoming the unforeseen. A balance should be struck between adopting clear and consistent systems and structures and the need for functional agility.

**Functional Groupings**

0905. **Groupings.** There are 5 main functional groupings in CSS organisations. They are Logistic Support, Medical Support, Equipment Support, Administrative Support and Infrastructure Support.

a. **Logistic Support.** Logistic Support links a deployed force to its sustaining nodes, using 4 echelons: unit (which is further divided into F, A1, A2 and B echelons); formation; force or theatre; and base. The activities of Logistic Support groupings can be explained under 3 headings:

1) **Provision of Materiel.** Materiel encompasses all items provided through a support network or a supply chain. It includes the procurement; storage; management and configuration; and distribution of supplies, from the strategic to the tactical level. Usage planning figures are used to anticipate need and the best form of distribution. This is referred to as predictive provisioning.

2) **Provision of Movement.** Deploying a force and managing the flow of personnel and equipment into and out of a theatre is a joint activity. Deployment can be by a combination of air, land and sea, using military or commercial assets. Transport is a generic term to describe the movement of personnel and materiel. General Transport provides container movement, palletised and loose freight, and personnel movement. It uses ships, aircraft, rail or road vehicles. Specialist Transport provides the movement of casualties, bulk fuel, water, some armoured vehicles and chilled transport for specialist medical supplies and some rations.

3) **Logistic Support Services.** Logistic support services are those activities not providing materiel or movement. They are wide-ranging,
and include health, safety, sanitation and services to support the
maintenance of morale directly. They include postal and courier
services; catering; elements to maintain stock availability, reliability and
safety; recovery and handling of human remains; operational hygiene
(field showers and laundry); limited infrastructure, logistic engineering
and skilled manual labour; movement control; an Expeditionary Forces
Institute (EFI) to provide recreational facilities; unskilled labour support;
and fire services.

b. **Medical Support.** Having influenced the operational plan to ensure that
it is medically supportable, the principal task of the medical services is
to maintain the fighting strength of the force by preventing disease and
other non-battle injuries, and tending to the sick and wounded. Medical
services identify hazards to health and recommend measures to alleviate
their effects. Preventable loss of soldiers should be minimised by nutrition,
shelter, clean water, suitable clothing, sleep, immunisation and health
education. Medical services are responsible for clearing the battlefield in
order to maintain tempo, freedom of action and the ability to manoeuvre.
They treat battle casualties and organise their evacuation from theatre.
Although every soldier needs to be capable of initial life-saving treatment,
medical assets should be distributed to meet treatment timelines. Medical
support contributes in particular to the physical (maximising forces
available) and moral (maximising their morale) components of Fighting
Power. Registered medical staffs are non-combatants and all medical
facilities, including hospitals and transport, are not military objectives
under international law, although this might not be respected equally by
all sides in conflict. Medical staffs are permitted to carry weapons, but only
for self-defence and for the defence of those in their care. Medical support
facilities are categorised as:

1) **Role 1.** Role 1 provides medical sections and unit aid posts. These are
organic to combat units and most combat support units and provide
professional medical care from doctors and combat medical technicians.
Role 1 medical care includes: primary healthcare, specialised first aid,
triage, resuscitation and stabilisation.

2) **Role 2 Light Manoeuvre.** Role 2 Light Manoeuvre (R2LM) facilities
conduct triage and advanced resuscitation procedures, up to damage-
control surgery. Post-surgical cases will usually be evacuated to Role
3 (or Role 2 Enhanced) for stabilisation and possible primary surgery
prior to evacuation to Role 4. R2LM is based upon Role 1 capabilities
being augmented by consultant-led resuscitation. There will be a limited
holding capacity.

3) **Role 2 Enhanced.** Role 2 Enhanced (R2E) is built on R2LM, with the
addition of primary surgery capability that includes surgical and medical
intensive care assets and beds with nursing support. A R2E facility is
able to stabilise post-surgical cases for evacuation to Role 4 without the need to put them through Role 3 first.

4) **Role 3.** Role 3 Medical Treatment Facilities (MTF) provide secondary care on operations to the highest clinical standards. Medical services are responsible for transferring casualties between medical facilities while administering care; sometimes this starts at the point of wounding, for example when a Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT) is used.

5) **Role 4.** Role 4 medical facilities, usually in the home base, receive patients from operations and then provide access to definitive and specialist care and rehabilitation. With casualties arriving 24-48 hours after wounding, Role 4 is part of the continuum of care and should hold reserve capacity for surges of casualties. When clinically feasible, casualties should be nursed together in a military environment. The Role 4 medical grouping is charged with further patient care, which includes immediate support to patients’ families.

c. **Equipment Support.** The purpose of Equipment Support (ES) is to keep the required quantity of operational equipment available to the force. This is achieved by actively managing equipment and equipment components and by maintenance. Maintenance is organised into levels, determined by the engineering content of the task. Level 1 is the least complex and is delivered by the equipment user; it includes **Equipment Care (EC),** a universal responsibility. Levels 2 tasks and above are only carried out by technical tradesmen and are more complicated or time-consuming. Levels 3 and 4 see equipment being repaired by formation workshops or defence contractors. ES groupings and staffs are responsible for the command and control of ES elements, the provision of technical and planning advice to commanders and supporting the delivery and sustainment of equipment capabilities.

1) **Equipment Support Principles.** ES is underpinned by 4 principles. First, repair forward ensures that equipment critical to an operation is repaired as close to the point of need as is tactically and technically feasible. Second, more technically demanding maintenance needs stability for the necessary time and resources to be applied it. Third, echelons of ES are used to simplify the layering of ES on the battlefield. They consist of mobile, well-protected assets integral to combat and many combat support elements, and less mobile and well-protected, but more technically capable, assets in areas where there is greater security. Fourth, for the output of the ES organisation to be responsive and effective, command and control at every ES echelon is essential.

2) **Equipment Support Terminology (Functions of Battlefield Maintenance).** A basic understanding of the terminology that describes the functions of battlefield maintenance is required across the force, so that, for example, staffs can accurately describe the ES requirements
of a mission in orders. The majority of routine and preventative maintenance servicing is conducted by equipment users and may include cleaning, lubrication and minor repairs. Inspection and diagnosis assess the suitability of equipment for its task. Recovery involves the extrication of abandoned, disabled or immobilised vehicles to a maintenance point. Backloading is the movement of damaged equipment to a suitable place for repair. Repair is the technical operation to restore operational functions to equipments or damaged parts. Expedient repair, including battle damage repair, is repair on operations designed to return damaged or disabled equipment to the current mission, or to enable onward movement for a subsequent, more permanent repair. Reclamation is the process by which repairable components are removed from un-repairable equipment, in order to supplement the supply network. Salvage is a similar process in which fit components are removed from irreparable equipment. Cannibalisation should be used as a last resort, taking fit components from repairable equipment to respond to an urgent need. Modification enables equipment enhancements, either to rectify faults or to improve operational effectiveness, before deployment or in-theatre. Engineering and technical policy is provided to the commander to help him preserve, restore and enhance the capability of his equipment.

d. Administrative Support. Administrative Support encompasses the activities required to manage a force effectively.

1) Personnel Support. Deployed forces require routine administration on operations, just as they do in barracks. Personnel support maintains the terms and conditions of service that underpin the moral component of Fighting Power. It includes pay, allowances and charges; documentation; appraisals; legal assistance; the raising of honours and awards and the reporting of occurrences. Deployed tasks include notification of casualties; support to movement of individual reinforcements and other movement in and out of theatre; banking services, contract payments and local currency issues; and financial regulatory advice. Like all aspects of administration, these are not solely specialist areas, but functions of leadership and command.

2) Staff Support. Staff support provides headquarters with clerical personnel and information management systems. These personnel provide a wide range of services including: burial registration and the disposal of personal records and effects; recording prisoners of war, captured persons or detainee custody details; education and training support; and civil affairs support. Staff support also includes legal advice on disciplinary and other legal matters; service enquiries and complaints; training on the LOAC and ROE; and advice on detention. Provost staff support includes the investigation of crime and serious
tactical incidents; crime prevention; aspects of CBRN warning and reporting; and traffic control during the regulation of movement. Although organisationally grouped as staff support, provost capabilities are usually employed tactically as combat support elements. Staff Support formerly included the provision of working dogs, dog handlers and veterinary services. These capabilities are also now regarded as combat support elements, given their importance in the counter-IED battle and manoeuvre support to the force generally.

3) **Welfare Support.** The emotional and physical strains of combat and other military activities can be mitigated by welfare support, provided by: operational welfare packages for telephone and internet access; reading and recreational materials; enhanced financial packages; and chaplains offering spiritual, pastoral and moral support. These services should be available in conjunction with welfare-enhancing logistic support services, like the EFI. They should be complemented by similar support at home via capable rear parties and regimental associations.

4) **Budget and Finance Support.** The budget and finance (J or G8) staff provide financial management advice, including on scrutiny of expenditure, for an operation. The oversight and award of local contracts, and the provision of policy advice on the legality and probity of expenditure, should be delivered in a realistic way, to avoid undermining operational effectiveness by imposing unnecessary process.

5) **Civil and Policy Advice.** The principal function of the J or G9 staff is civil and policy affairs and the advice required to support the commander as he operates along civil-military interfaces. In the inter-agency environment, this is not only to be practised by specialists on the margins. Military J or G9 staffs sit within a wider framework, which is responsible for the provision of political advice and civil-military cooperation generally. Within the framework, military J or G9 staffs also focus on humanitarian matters, for example displacement caused by military activities. They also provide military support to civil capacity-building through, for example, a military stabilisation and support group; noting that this sits more logically under combat support for its tactical employment.

e. **Infrastructure Support.** Infrastructure Support can be explained in terms of:

1) **The Operational Estate.** The operational estate consists of operational and indigenous infrastructure. Infrastructure includes fixed installations, fabrications, physical structures and facilities, including utilities. Indigenous infrastructure is the infrastructure within the JOA used by the local population. Operational infrastructure is the infrastructure within the JOA introduced by the force; the 2 will overlap.
2) **Infrastructure and Engineering.** Infrastructure is built and sustained through engineering. This engineering is provided by a combination of a military construction force and contractors.

   a) **Combat Support Engineering.** Intimate and immediate support to current or imminent operations is termed Combat Support Engineering.

   b) **Force Support Engineering.** Force Support Engineering is the deliberate, longer-term work to sustain the force.

   c) **Military Works Areas.** The creation of a Military Works Area establishes the geographic boundaries within which the needs of operational imperatives are balanced against gradually increasing regulatory and statutory obligations, depending on the operational situation.

**Sustainment Planning**

The more I see of war, the more I realise how it all depends on administration and transportation (what our American allies call logistics). It takes little skill or imagination to see where you would like your army to be and when. It takes much knowledge and hard work to know where you can place your forces and whether you can maintain them there. A real knowledge of supply and movement factors must be the basis of every leader’s plan; only then can he know how and when to take risks with these factors, and battles are won only by taking risks.


0906. Sustainment planning should be versatile, support the mission, be integrated into operational planning, and is usually conducted jointly, across agencies and multinationally.

0907. **Factors.** Sustainment planning at all levels requires consideration of the enduring sustainment philosophy, the principles of logistics and factors specific to the theatre or operation. Sustainment activity often has long lead times. An understanding of four main factors helps to predict requirements in order to meet them on time. These are known as the Four Ds: **destination, distance, demand and duration**, and apply to both troops and materiel:

   a. **Destination.** The destination is defined by the environment of the operation. It determines the pattern of wear on equipment and the physiological demands on troops and informs preventative measures. The destination of resources defines the character of the lines of communication; the design of the regeneration system; and the resources,
timing, speed of deployment, reaction and execution of subsequent plans. Destination includes consideration of the degree of dispersion of the force.
b. **Distance.** The length of strategic and intra-theatre lines of communication, including the threats, capacity and topography that apply to them, all affect how resources are deployed and determines the design of the re-supply and evacuation aspects of the support network.
c. **Demand.** Demand is influenced by the type of force requiring support, and its rates and amounts of consumption. Complicated groupings clearly demand more complicated and varied sustainment. Demand stems from the commander’s intent and the type of military activity that it leads to, and is the sum of 3 elements. ‘Steady state’ demand represents daily sustainment needs that have little variation, such as predictable non-battle injuries or the consumption of rations. ‘Cyclical’ demand represents additional needs to the steady state, caused, for example, by seasonal conditions. ‘Surge’ demand is driven by increases in activity. It is the least easy to predict and the most susceptible to variation. Surge demand requires a network of responsive command systems, reserve stocks, and a delivery capability able to switch between priorities. It is important to emphasise that demand is not just about scale or volume of supply, but also requires consideration of the wide range of support required. In this context it may be useful to consider the individual dependencies within a grouping, as a subset of demand.
d. **Duration.** The duration of the operation and the rate of demand determine the quantities of personnel and materiel required. Mathematically, volume = rate (or Demand) x time (or Duration). The duration of an operation dictates endurance requirements and the need to rotate or replace equipment and personnel. A commander should balance the risks of a rapid, lightly supported operation against those of a better resourced, more deliberate operation that takes longer to mount.

0908. **Sustainment Reach.** Sustainment reach defines the limit at which a force can assure sustainment. It requires an assessment of the optimum design for the support network required and the balance between Directed Logistics and Stockpiling Forward. Beyond this reach, a force may culminate, be cut off or become fixed, unless stockpiles are created. Reach is affected by the availability of stocks and movement assets; and by the 4Ds: destination by terrain, obstacles, and climate; distance by the length of the re-supply loop and dispersal of force elements; demand by the type of operation; and duration by stock consumption. Reach starts in the sustaining base or node and ends where the item is used.
Risks. In effective sustainment, risks should be taken to concentrate resources at critical points rather than everywhere. The Main Effort informs such concentrations. Two aspects of sustainment risks should be considered:

a. Sustainment planning should assess where risks may be taken so as to achieve agility and enhance freedom of manoeuvre. This is done by expressing sustainment reach in terms of options available to the commander, with resulting constraints or freedoms. Excessive pessimism or attempting to over-insure should be avoided.

b. Reduction in the volume of stocks increases the vulnerability of supply to unforeseen circumstances. Sustainment assets have an easily identifiable signature and they operate along obvious lines of communication between sometimes obvious nodes, so they need to be protected against detection and attack. They can be protected by enhancing their integral defence capability; by using deception and camouflage; by integrating them into a scheme of manoeuvre; or by allocating other forces to their defence.

Contractor Support to Operations. The use of contractors and defence agency personnel on deployed operations is an increasingly important sustainment feature. Employment of contractors will depend on the stage and the duration of the operation and the permissiveness of the environment. Even during combat, contractors will feature in the battlespace and sustainment often relies on their skills and availability. To maximise the benefits available from contractors and to minimise the impact and risks inherent in their use, it is vital that they are integrated into the force, and that a clear commercial strategy is constructed. Their involvement will free-up or supplement finite military logistics resources, and increase reach. However, there will also be constraints, for example contractual limitations; the demands of protecting contractors or facilitating their self-defence; coordinating them and influencing their behaviour in the battlespace; and dealing with the risks of using them, not least that they might withdraw from operations, leaving a sustainment vacuum.

Sustainment Execution

Levels of Sustainment

The sustainment of operations can be considered on 4 levels: strategic, operational, tactical and individual. The more tactically focussed the sustainment, the more appropriate it is to think of the supply being provided by a support network rather than linear supply chains.

a. Strategic Sustainment. Strategic sustainment links the national industrial base to a deployed force. It contributes to the generation of forces at readiness by obtaining materiel, by building stocks and by ensuring strategic mobility. It also balances between civilian and military assets, the structure of the national defence industrial base and the lead times...
required to obtain materiel. It is a pan-Defence activity and is influenced by many factors, including cost.

b. Operational Sustainment. Operational sustainment consists of synchronised activity covering the following broad stages and requirements:

1) **Pre-Deployment.** Pre-deployment activities include defining the requirements for lines of communication, developing a sustainability statement, preparing a force administratively and medically and determining theatre and logistic command structures. The identification, acquisition and integration of UORs and Theatre Entry Standards (TES) should be undertaken as early as possible. Early logistic planning allows the assessment of potential deployment areas, including infrastructure such as ports of disembarkation, road, rail and inland waterways, materiel and resources. It will indicate the potential for using host nations to support the force. Stocks should be checked, configured and prepared for out-loading, including those required for RSOI.

2) **Deployment.** Deployment establishes the lines of communication. It includes mounting, strategic deployment and RSOI. Enabling capabilities, such as movement teams, should be among the first into theatre. Stocks can be moved by air, sea or land to sustain the force and provide a reserve optimised for the environment and the type of operation. RSOI is normally provided by a joint force logistic component, another formation headquarters or the headquarters of one of its units. The land force commander is responsible for ensuring that the RSOI of his units is conducted effectively.

3) **Infrastructure and Facilities.** Infrastructure and facilities are created to sustain a force in theatre. Their purpose is to join incoming units and formations with their equipment; carry out modifications; and deploy the force to its training, acclimatisation or operational locations. Infrastructure and facilities can then be used to sustain the force during operations. Logistic expertise is required to coordinate port, maritime, movements, supply, local purchase, fuel handling, catering, water, sanitation and engineering and construction tasks. The contribution of these activities to stabilisation should not be overlooked: local employment may be created; resources are injected into the economy and improvements to infrastructure that benefit the force, should be designed to benefit the population if possible.

4) **Legal and Finance.** Legal tasks include advice to the commander on: LOAC, ROE and targeting, the Regulatory and Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) and detention. Finance tasks include the provision of civil secretariat assistance to funding and accounting.

5) **Supporting the Operation.** Supporting the operation links sources of supply with tactical sustainment to ensure the supply and distribution
of materiel. Additional assistance, such as support during the redeployment of formations or support to stability actions, may also be required.

6) **Rehabilitation and Reconstitution.** The rehabilitation of personnel and equipment and the reconstitution of units and formations may be required during and after combat and the military activities. It is likely that resources for rehabilitation will be controlled at the operational level.

7) **Security of the Support Network.** Interruption of operational sustainment by adversaries or the impact of the actions of the population should be expected. Dedicated forces may be required to protect nodes, installations and lines of communication.

8) **Redeployment.** Redeployment from operations includes recovery into a port of embarkation, clean-up and rehabilitation of equipment; repackaging of unused materiel; environmental clean-up; and movement back to a home base. An explicit theatre closure phase may be required at the end of an operation, requiring additional logistic units. An important part of most redeployments is decompression, at a location outside of the theatre, which ensures that personnel are physically and psychologically prepared for their return to the home base, in formed groups.

c. **Tactical Sustainment.** Tactical sustainment encompasses supplying and maintaining the physical needs of tactically-deployed forces. This includes arming the force by the secure provision and replacement of weapons and ammunition to meet expenditure rates; fuelling the force by providing fuel to meet consumption rates; supplying and distributing materiel required by a force, such as engineer stores, field equipment, spare parts, replacement assemblies; and the recovery, repair and maintenance of equipment. Tactical sustainment is best supplied by a flexible support network offering breadth and as many options as possible, rather than a narrow, linear chain.

d. **Individual Sustainment.** Individual sustainment supports the moral component of Fighting Power by maintaining the soldier’s will to fight. There are 3 primary areas of individual sustainment, which provide examples of how the physical component draws on the moral component:

1) **Individual needs,** which are mostly physiological, are met by the provision of food, water, shelter, clothing, hygiene and sanitation services.

2) **The treatment and evacuation of casualties,** which requires a system consisting of medical assistance from the point of wounding or falling ill, through treatment and evacuation, to the home base. This system needs to take account of the treatment of adversary combatants and, in some circumstances, civilians.
3) Manning an operation requires the provision of sufficient trained manpower to meet the required order of battle. It includes an estimate of likely casualty rates and the provision of battle casualty replacements, including their reception, induction, training and preparation for operations through RSOI. Manning also includes the provision of reinforcements and the mobilisation of reservists.

**Command and Control of Sustainment**

0912. **The Commander’s Role.** Before operations, a commander should ensure that he is able to deploy, sustain and regenerate his force. He should consider the implications of casualties, consumption and materiel losses; and then plan, allocate and balance resources accordingly. A commander should also evaluate the risks to, and security of, his sustainment assets, nodes and links; and adapt his plans to reduce the impact of unavoidable constraints on the resources readily available.

0913. **Logistic Estimate.** Straddling the planning and execution of operations is the Logistic Estimate. This follows the operational estimate sequence, and should consider the logistic and the administrative requirements of an operational plan, including the character of the support network required. It is undertaken concurrently and in collaboration with operational estimates. It should be delivered in time for the operational commander to assess whether he needs to adjust his plan. At each level, the estimate can be refined, implications assessed and detail added. **Logistic Preparation of the Environment** can identify local or regional sources of support and highlights shortfalls of support to be addressed in the logistic estimate. This applies to indigenous forces and adversaries as well as the force. A logistic estimate should also consider the affiliation of CSS elements to the units and formations they will support, to ensure that support is directed where needed. The 3 products of a logistic estimate are: administrative and logistic affilliations and control measures; a logistic concept of operations; and a sustainability statement.

0914. **Sustainability Statement.** Accurate forecasting of demand will improve the economy and efficiency of the support network. Anticipated demand should be predicted by a progressively more accurate estimate, from which a sustainability statement can be developed. Accurate analysis during the planning stages improves the assumptions underlying the statement. Sustainability statements are issued at strategic and operational levels in consultation with tactical commanders. For enduring operations, the sustainability statement should be reviewed regularly to ensure that it remains relevant to the operation. The statement has 2 purposes:

a. It attempts to provide the commander’s direction to planners and resource providers on what needs to be delivered. It may be modified as an
operation progresses. Lead-times for the manufacture of materiel should be anticipated at the strategic level.

b. It attempts to define the level of resources made available to an operation which allows risks to be identified. It is important to emphasise that it would be practically impossible for a statement to accurately forecast beyond the short to medium term; its primary purpose is to provide commanders with parameters, rather than to set rigid constraints.

0915. A sustainability statement normally includes: the expected duration of an operation; the essential equipment and availability requirements; the level of self-sustainment required; predicted casualty rates for personnel and equipment; and information on the climate, environment, topography and human factors that influence a force’s requirements.

Recuperation after Operations

0916. When the operation has been concluded, the force - personnel, equipment and unused stocks - are returned to the home base and are recuperated for further deployment, within readiness cycles. These are the final activities of an operation and are planned at the strategic level, since it is at that level that resources required to achieve recuperation can be directed, protected and, in the case of concurrent operations, prioritised.

0917. **Recuperation of People.** Activity during this period, which needs to be planned in detail during the operation, should include: rest, care and employment of casualties and measures to take care of the families of casualties. Recuperation should also encompass: Remembrance; recovery of the training foundation, particularly for those units who were deployed in new roles and need to revert to others; learning lessons from operations; and education and personal career development. Recuperation of people is an essential part of the moral component. It is a time when the conceptual component is similarly strengthened, as commanders and staffs reflect on what their operational experiences have taught them, and seek to influence doctrine.

0918. **Recuperation of Materiel.** Recuperation is also the process by which unused stocks are inspected and returned for storage, depleted stocks are replenished; and materiel and equipment is returned to pre-operation standards and levels of availability. Recuperation is a complex activity that is likely to involve lengthy, in-depth planning; a considerable amount of time to execute; and significant force elements and other resources to conduct. An attitude should be fostered across the force that the equipment that has served it on operations should be made ready immediately, before the force stands down, for the operations ahead.
Notes
Operations Essay
Doctrine and Command in the British Army: An Historical Overview

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Introduction

While some armed forces have been famed for their doctrinal approach, until 1989 the British Army was not one of them. Largely eschewing formal, written doctrine, the Army made a cult of pragmatism, flexibility and an empirical approach, the latter defined as ‘based or acting on observation or experiment, not on theory; deriving knowledge from experience alone’. That is not to say that the British Army entirely neglected ‘doctrine’, broadly defined, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, doctrine tended to be semi-formal at best; was centred around one individual commander or existed in a specific set of circumstances, and was not necessarily easily transferable elsewhere; and in some cases it was more honoured in the breach than the observance. The reinvention of the British Army since 1989 as a doctrinally-based organisation is as profound a revolution as any experienced in its 350 year history.

Military doctrine can mean different things to different people and organisations. The Army’s first modern doctrinal pamphlet, the 1989 Design for Military Operations defined it as ‘that what is taught’. Rather more helpfully, NATO defines doctrine as ‘fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgement in application’. British Defence Doctrine states that the ‘principal purpose of military doctrine is to provide the Armed Forces with a framework of guidance for the conduct of operations’. Two blinding glimpses of the obvious may be mentioned here. First, doctrine is not intended as a substitute for thought. Second, if an army’s doctrine is flawed that can be worse than having no doctrine at all. Changing an army’s doctrine in the middle of a major war is a difficult and dangerous process.

This essay will employ the military thinker JFC Fuller’s 1923 definition of doctrine as the ‘central idea of an army’. This has the virtue of simplicity and brevity, and also of being broad enough to encompass the wide varieties of ‘doctrine’ that have influenced the British Army over the last century or so. Fuller went on to amplify his definition of doctrine, arguing that:

‘To be sound (it) must be based on the principles of war, and which to be effective must be elastic enough to admit of mutation in accordance with change in circumstance. In its ultimate relationship to human understanding, this central idea or doctrine is nothing else than common sense - that is, action adapted to circumstances.’

The relationship between military thought and doctrine is complex. They are not synonymous, although clearly the first can influence the second. In the case of counter-insurgency, the ideas promulgated by military thinkers played
a significant role in the formulation of a semi-formal doctrine. Ultimately, unofficial military thought, such as that produced by Basil Liddell Hart and JFC Fuller in the first half of the twentieth century, or Richard Simpkin in the 1970s and 1980s, can be accepted or rejected by officers according to their taste. Formal doctrine, if the system works properly, cannot. Rather, doctrine should establish a framework of understanding and action, which should inform the decision-making process. Doctrine at the higher levels should permeate the language and thinking of those in high command, and their subordinates should be able to gauge their thoughts, and indeed, anticipate them because of a common background and training.

Doctrine can be disseminated in many ways: through formal publications; unofficial books and articles; teaching at military colleges; lectures to bodies such as the Royal United Services Institute; by senior commanders establishing informal ‘schools’ of disciples; and by hard-won experience being passed on informally at regimental level. For most of its existence, the British Army has relied primarily on informal rather than formal methods of disseminating doctrine. This was a consequence of the historic structure of the British Army, as a loose federation of individual regiments and corps, which inhibited the imposition of ideas from on high. While the importance of the regimental system in retarding the acceptance of doctrine can be overestimated, it was certainly a factor, reflecting a trend in wider British society of empiricism and suspicion of theory. The British Army officer corps has traditionally been characterised by the ethos of the gentlemanly amateur. Soldiers who took their profession seriously were likely to be regarded as a little odd, and some - such as Bernard Montgomery - as ‘military s**s’.

Lack of doctrine was also a manifestation of the political context within which the Army has operated. It is conceivable that a reform-minded government could force the acceptance of Army-wide doctrine, but the general attitude has been one of benign - or sometimes not so benign - neglect. General Sir Mike Jackson’s comment in the 1990s that ‘…political guidance can be really helpful if you get it…’ would have been echoed by many of his predecessors down the centuries. In the period immediately before the Second World War, for instance, the government only made a formal decision to send an expeditionary force to the Continent in early 1939, which left little time to prepare the Army for its new role. Moreover, one might defend the Army’s lack of intellectual readiness for the type of high intensity war that it was to fight between 1939 and 1945 by arguing that in the absence of strategic direction, it was only natural that officers should concentrate on the type of conflict in which they were most likely to engage, that is, colonial small wars. Operating more often than not in a political vacuum, for much of its history, the Army has simply got on with what it is good at: fighting small wars, which gave full rein to the units
exercising the virtues of flexibility, pragmatism, and working out each problem as it came along.

The absence of joint doctrine has caused problems over the years. During periods of close cooperation, for example between the Army and the Royal Navy during the Napoleonic Wars, each service eventually came to understand the other’s perspective and requirements, allowing an effective partnership to be forged. But this was dependent on two variables. First, that the mix of personalities was right. The role of personalities should never be underestimated, but effective doctrine can help ameliorate its more dangerous aspects, and conversely individuals who forge a good working relationship can help to overcome the problems posed by a lack of common doctrine. Second, it is all too easy for experience gained through constant practice to be lost if individuals, or circumstances, change. The relationship of the Army and the Royal Air Force is a case in point. Until April 1918, the Royal Flying Corps was part of the Army, and was largely dedicated to supporting the land battle, thanks in part to the fact that Trenchard, Haig’s Air Component Commander (to use a modern term), shared the C-in-C’s strategic vision. After the First World War, a gulf opened between the Army and the newly-independent RAF. The ‘central idea’ of the RAF under, ironically, Trenchard, became strategic bombing, and Army cooperation became the light blue Cinderella. The lessons of land-air cooperation learned so painfully on the Western Front had to be relearned, at even greater cost, during the Second World War.

Colonial Warfare to Counter-Insurgency to Peace Support

British counter-insurgency (COIN) practice admirably demonstrates both the existence of a body of semi-formal doctrine, and the way in which it was disseminated. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the British Army acquired a vast amount of experience in ‘small wars’, first in colonial campaigns and then, after 1945, during the retreat from empire. There was no systematic attempt to produce a formal doctrine in the modern sense for small wars - such a thing would have run counter to the ethos and practice of the Army at that time. However, a body of unofficial but nonetheless influential writings was produced, which, along with teaching at military colleges such as the staff colleges at Camberley and Quetta, and, most important of all, the passing on of experience by individuals, something approximating to a ‘central idea of an Army’ did emerge in the form of a number of basic principles that were generally recognised as effective, to which troops facing insurgency usually adhered.

These included the use of minimum necessary force, the use of local resources, and the gathering of intelligence, as well as a basic recognition that unrest was usually rooted in a political grievance, and that political reform could be
an appropriate response. Underpinning this doctrine was a highly pragmatic approach to problem solving, to which flexibility was the key. This doctrine was certainly not a rigid template, and the principles were undoubtedly breached on occasions, most famously at Amritsar in India (April 1919), when 380 demonstrators were killed.

The experience of colonial campaigning was codified by CE Callwell in Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (1896 and subsequent editions) and other writers produced books along similar lines. Some tactical pamphlets were produced with titles such as Notes on Imperial Policing (1934) and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power (1937). These contained strict instructions for use of military forces, for it became standard practice for the Army to be called in by the civil authorities only if the police could not handle the situation. The military commander usually remained subordinated to the civil authorities, unless martial law was proclaimed. The use of minimum force emerged as an ideal, stressed by Sir Charles Gwynn in his book Imperial Policing (1934) - an unofficial text, but which was nonetheless widely used at Camberley where he had been the commandant in the 1920s.

How many officers actually read, and even more importantly, internalised these works is a moot point. Probably more important was the dissemination of knowledge at regimental level, with old hands passing on the wisdom gained from hard experience to newcomers. Similarly, senior commanders would carry ideas and methods from campaign to campaign, which would act as a form of localised, de facto doctrine, if only while they remained in command. Indeed, one scholar has referred to ‘historical amnesia’, which suggests that the British approach in this period ‘was a matter of broad principles transmitted informally from one generation of soldiers and civil servants to the next’.4

After 1945 the British Army followed a similar route, relying on best practice being passed on by regimental osmosis, backed up by official tactical manuals and some unofficial but influential writings. The colonial warfare experience proved a firm basis on which to base COIN in the post-1945 era, with tried and tested methods being added to an enhanced understanding of the political-ideological dimension. However, the concentration on ‘conventional’ warfare during the Second World War meant that a certain amount of reinvention of the wheel had to be carried out in the late 1940s and early 1950s. This produced a form of doctrine that although still semi-formal, was even more pervasive than its pre-1939 ancestor had been. The formative experiences were the campaigns in Palestine (1945-8) and Malaya (1948-60). Out of these, and other campaigns, emerged ‘a distinctive pattern of counter-insurgency… [not] a theory, elaborately complied and rigidly adhered to… but a series of responses which, when adapted to fit specific conditions, proved successful in maintaining
at least a measure of political stability, even under the pressure of (the) strident nationalism of communist revolutionary warfare’. 5

This semi-formal doctrine had the virtue of flexibility, in that it could be adapted to suit very different circumstances. This was not always successful. The expedient of uniting civil and military authority in the person of one individual - Sir Gerald Templer who served as both High Commissioner and Director of Military Operations in Malaya in 1952 to 1954 - was less successful when Field Marshal Harding carried out a similar role in Cyprus several years later. Moreover, COIN principles were also on occasions inconsistently applied. The British Army’s approach to operations in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s sometimes departed from the principles of COIN that had emerged over previous years.

Nevertheless, certain broad principles can be identified as threads running through British COIN campaigns, including identification of the essentially political nature of the problem, the primacy of civil control, the coordination of civil and military activity, the emphasis on intelligence, the separation of the insurgent from the mass of the people, the battle to win ‘hearts and minds’, appropriate and proportionate military response and political reform to prevent a resurgence of the problem.

Just as in earlier years, the British writings on COIN did not enjoy ‘official’ status, but were nonetheless regarded as significant within the Army. Probably the most celebrated were the works of Sir Robert Thompson (such as Countering Communist Insurgency, 1966). His ‘five principles’ laid heavy stress on political responses, and reflected his experience of the Malayan Emergency, in which he participated as a high level administrator. There was another writer whose influence rivalled Thompson: Frank Kitson, who served in the counter-insurgencies in Kenya, Oman and Cyprus. He commanded in Belfast at the height of the Troubles in 1970-2, and was Commandant at the Staff College in 1978-80. His books (Gangs and Countergangs, 1960; Low Intensity Operations, 1969; Bunch of Five, 1977) were broadly similar to Thompson’s, although he placed especial emphasis on intelligence. The COIN era also produced some official manuals, the Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya pamphlet being a particularly significant example, which was, interestingly, published by the government of Malaya rather than the British Army.

In the early years of the COIN era, Sandhurst and the Staff College played a fairly minor role in passing on doctrine. It was not until the early 1960s that relevant material formed a significant part of the curriculum at Sandhurst, and much the same appears to have been true at Camberley. From the 1970s onwards, things improved, with periods being devoted to COIN at both
institutions. At Sandhurst, students were exposed to some quite sophisticated discussions of COIN, albeit briefly. John Pimlott, who taught at the Academy from 1973 until his death in 1997, was a particularly influential figure. Regularly lecturing on the subject, he played an important role in codifying British COIN principles, and passing on their essence to generations of student officers. He also had an influence on the first formal British COIN doctrine, which appeared in the 1990s.

The semi-formal COIN doctrine was the product of a very British approach to problem-solving, based on empiricism rather than theory. As Thomas Mockaitis has written of the pre-1960 period, while the British approach to COIN was ‘distinctly different from that of other nations’, each campaign was approached on a more or less ad hoc basis, according to the general principles of minimum force, civil-military cooperation and tactical flexibility. Asked to explain their methods, officers often referred to them as ‘common sense’ or ‘making it up as we went along’; the military establishment was singularly resistant to preserving and transmitting its experience in an orderly fashion. Fortunately, an almost unbroken string of internal security missions allowed effective methods and principles to develop and be passed along informally.6

The argument that the Army was resistant to formal doctrine is at first sight supported by the reaction to the introduction of Wider Peacekeeping (WPK), a controversial doctrinal work published in 1994.7 Possibly, however, perceived flaws in the doctrine were more important than opposition to doctrine per se. The background was the commitment of British troops to Bosnia from September 1992 onwards. It is clear that British commanders felt that the Army’s experience of COIN and peacekeeping were more than adequate preparation for dealing with the ‘complex emergency’ in former Yugoslavia. Brigadier Andrew Cumming, for instance, commented that:

‘Both our doctrine and education and, most importantly, our officers and soldiers are good enough to adapt to any change of role or circumstances to achieve the best results.’

WPK laid stress on impartiality and consent as absolutes. Critics of WPK saw it as overly timid, and risk averse. Such criticisms reflected wider unhappiness with what some perceived as the Army’s excessively passive role in Bosnia. Rod Thornton sees WPK as a ‘political’ document that ‘served the Army’s need to advertise to a wider world why it acted the way it did in Bosnia’8. It was overtaken in 1997 by Joint Warfare Publication 3-50, Peace Support Operations, which was influenced by the changed strategic environment in Bosnia. This was a doctrine for peace enforcement that envisaged the Army being used in a much more robust fashion than in the early stages of
the intervention in Bosnia. JWP 3-50 drew on the essentials of COIN, and recognised that ‘judicious’ use of force might be beneficial. In the words of one of its authors, ‘…the approach that JWP 3-50 offers is based upon a combination of enforcement and consent-promoting techniques - a combination of the stick and carrot.’

Several conclusions can be drawn from the WPK saga. The first is that the British Army’s tradition of empiricism and flexibility continued to be important into the post-1989 doctrinal era. The second was that a specific piece of doctrine caused considerable controversy - something that, for good or ill, was largely avoided during the pre-doctrine era. Finally, the semi-formal British COIN doctrine proved a firm basis for the construction of doctrine for Peace Support.

British operations in Iraq after the 2003 invasion prompted a reassessment of the Army’s COIN methods. Perceived deficiencies and failures, not least high profile cases of alleged and proven ill-treatment of Iraqi civilians, brought British COIN methods into question. This coincided with, and may in some cases have prompted, revisionist accounts of earlier COIN campaigns (such as Kenya, 1952-60) that stressed violence and coercion rather than hearts and minds. Such works have been important in acting as a corrective to overly-sentimentalised and sanitised views of British COIN, let alone casual assumptions of the superiority of British doctrine, and the military arrogance that comes with them. Failures of British COIN such as in Palestine (1945-48) and Aden (1964-68) have tended to be downplayed by the military. But in doctrinal terms it is important not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. In the last years of the twentieth century and the first years of the twenty-first, the British Army has been engaged in a number of complex operations, in which elements of COIN and Peace Support (with frequent combat, not least in Afghanistan and Iraq) have existed side by side. In these operations British troops have employed the traditional approach of flexibility and pragmatism, but now it is buttressed by doctrine that provides a framework for thought and decision-making. The evidence suggests that carefully and intelligently applied, traditional British COIN retains its value.

The First World War
The British Army of the First World War has had a bad press. Any attempt to assess the British commanders and the way they conducted operations has to get past a series of tired stereotypes. The popular image is of ‘lions led by donkeys’. Baffled by trench warfare, it is commonly believed the generals (who were unimaginative at best and downright stupid at worst) could think of nothing better than to throw ever more men into battles of attrition. Some historians, while moving far beyond such overly simplistic views, have also
taken a dim view of the British Army. It has been portrayed as inflexible, overly conservative, addicted to the offensive, wedded to manpower-centred methods of warfighting, exalting morale over technology, and seeing sheer mass of men and shells as the key to victory. It has also been criticised for its lack of a coherent doctrine, and compared unfavourably with the innovative, doctrinally-based German Army. One wonders, if the critics are correct, how it came about that the British Army won the First World War, and the German Army lost it.

The truth is rather different. Overcoming enormous problems, between 1914 and 1918 the British Army transformed itself from a colonial gendarmerie into a continental-sized army. In 1918 this Army took the lead in defeating the German Army on the field of battle, winning the greatest series of military victories in British history. In order to achieve this success, the Army had to overcome the problems of expansion, from 6 divisions on the Western Front in 1914 to about 60 two years later. The small Regular Army became a vast citizen force of volunteers and, later, conscripts. To provide commanders and staffs for these formations meant rapid promotion and officers having to learn how to handle greatly expanded responsibilities. This was on the job training with a vengeance, as all too often it took place while in contact with the enemy. This all took place at a time when, as Major General Jonathan Bailey has demonstrated, profound changes in the conduct of war were occurring, which amounted to a Revolution in Military Affairs.\textsuperscript{12} The wonder is not that mistakes with bloody consequences occurred, but rather that given such an unpromising beginning, the Army reached such a peak of military excellence.

The British Army went through the First World War without a formal doctrine in the modern sense. Indeed, senior officers had deliberately rejected the notion of adopting prescriptive doctrine, seeing it as likely to hamper the exercise of initiative and flexibility. In 1911, an article in a professional journal concerning the updated version of Infantry Training stated that ‘…considerable latitude in applying principles and instructions to local conditions have been left to commanders’ - an important consideration given that British troops were likely to have to fight in very different circumstances all over the globe.\textsuperscript{13}

The Army did, however, have a body of doctrine in the form of Field Service Regulations (FSR). Rather than being prescriptive, FSR set out broad principles for action. General Sir Douglas Haig was the key figure in the formulation of FSR 1909. Under his direction, FSR 1909 included the lessons that he had learned from his time as a Staff College student in 1896 that battles fell into four stages: the advance to contact; the establishment of the firing line, in which the British would achieve fire superiority; the assault; and the pursuit. These stages in the battle had, Haig declared in 1917, ‘proved successful in war from time immemorial’. The aim was ‘the quickest and most complete
destruction of the enemy forces’ which would deliver ‘decisive success’. As Albert Palazzo has written, although the British ‘concept of battle’ was based on a much smaller scale of conflict than the one they found themselves engaged in on the Western Front, ‘since the principles were believed to be timeless they did not require any change or modification. Instead it was simply the scale of the engagement that had to be adjusted…’ Senior commanders saw trench warfare as an aberration from the norm. Seen in the longer perspective of the development of warfare, they were right; mobile or semi-mobile warfare became once again the norm by the spring of 1918. Because the principles were so broad, they allowed commanders to exercise the pragmatism, flexibility and empiricism that the pre-war Regular Army cherished, and which resulted in much successful innovation.

Some writers have shied away from describing FSR as a doctrine. Certainly, the principles it contained were much broader than the semi-formal doctrine for COIN, although FSR was more formal and ‘official’. It can nonetheless be fairly described as the ‘central idea of an army’. There was much emphasis on moral factors in FSR. ‘Success in war depends more on moral than on physical qualities’, stated FSR 1912; ‘neither armies, armament, resources, nor skill can compensate for lack of courage, energy, determination, and the bold offensive spirit which springs from a national determination to conquer. The development of the necessary moral qualities is, therefore, the first object to be attained in the training of an army.’ Such statements echo thought in other European armies, and taken to extremes, as for instance in France, leading to the disastrous cult of the offensive of 1914. The emphasis on maintaining the Army’s morale, and destroying that of the enemy, underpinned the British style of warfighting on the Western Front. If morale was the first plank of British doctrine, manoeuvre and firepower were the other two, reflected in the development of the tank, aircraft, infantry tactics, and above all, artillery techniques.

By painful trial and error, between 1915 and 1918 the British Army evolved a coherent method of warfighting. This involved the adoption of technology, the codification of tactics, and the establishment of an Army-wide training organisation. By late 1917 a distinctly British style of warfighting had emerged, based around the all-arms ‘weapons system’, artillery-heavy ‘bite and hold’ operations, and the use of technology as a substitute for numbers. It would be foolish to deny the weaknesses displayed (for example, a tendency for rigidity in command systems and over-control from the top, at least in the middle years of the war), the problems experienced, and mistakes made. It would be equally wrong to deny the success achieved by these methods in the 100 Days of victories, between August and November 1918.
The British Army’s continued adherence to pre-war principles has been seen by many as an example of military myopia and pigheadedness. Certainly, looking at the horrific casualty lists and the failure of many British offensives, it seems that such critics have a point. This is to misunderstand the nature of the problem. All armies found themselves having to adjust to trench warfare, a form of conflict the realities of which had been only dimly perceived before the war, and for the reasons given above the British Army had particular handicaps to overcome. The British doctrine provided a framework within which tactical solutions could be sought. It was not perfect: while achieving fire dominance was critical to the British victories in 1917-18, in the last days of the war, when mobile operations had been resumed, a full-blown cavalry-based pursuit eluded the British Army, much to Haig’s frustration (although, contrary to popular belief, cavalry did have a role on the battlefield). It is possible, but unlikely, that had the Army entered the war with a different doctrine, it would have proved more successful. Bill Slim, who unlike Haig has a firm place in the pantheon of great operational commanders, wrote of the Battle of Imphal in Burma in 1944 in remarkably similar terms to Haig’s principles. Above all, it is difficult to argue with success. The German Army changed its doctrine in the course of the war, and it did not lead to victory. Indeed, a strong case can be made that it hastened its defeat. The British, who maintained the same doctrine throughout, ended the war as masters of the battlefield.

Between the Two World Wars
The huge and effective army that Britain possessed at the end of the First World War was rapidly demobilised and dispersed. The end of the war against Germany did not mean an end to fighting. The Army was committed to a myriad of small wars and police actions: in various parts of the Empire, newly enlarged with the acquisition of territory from their former enemies; in Ireland; and in Russia, where British and other forces intervened against the Bolsheviks. This rapid return to the small change of British soldiering had an important impact, as it denied the Army any breathing space for the leisurely examination and analysis of its Great War experience. Soldiers were too busy soldiering.

Moreover, in a strategic situation that resembled that of the early twenty-first century, there was no obvious conventional enemy on the horizon, so it is not surprising if soldiers tended to concentrate primarily on the COIN campaigns that were their immediate problems. Certainly, politicians showed little inclination to think about the possible role of the Army in a future major war, still less to direct the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to prepare for one. The general view of the First World War, shared by politicians, soldiers and the civilian population alike, can be summed up in two words: ‘Never Again.’ Almost anything, especially appeasement and strategic bombing - was seen as preferable to a repetition of the Western Front.
On top of this, the interwar years were a period of tight budgets. The ‘Ten Year Rule’, by which planning was to be made on the assumption that there would be no major war for ten years, was introduced in 1919 by Winston Churchill, largely as an economy measure. The introduction of new equipment, and even carrying out training, was circumscribed by financial considerations. After the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy had taken their slices of the defence budget, the Army usually was left with the crumbs. Budgetary decisions taken in the 1920s and 1930s were high on the list of reasons for the ill-preparedness of the British Army in 1940.

The popular view of the higher reaches of the Army in the interwar period is of an intellectual wasteland, devoid of official military thought. The lessons of the Great War were not analysed until it was too late; and the prophetic utterings of a few visionaries such as Liddell Hart and Fuller were ignored by the dinosaurs at the top of the Army. This led inexorably to the defeat in France in 1940. This portrait of the inter-War scene, fostered by the self-serving writings of military critics (like Liddell Hart and Fuller themselves), is little more than a caricature. In reality, under successive CIGS, senior soldiers wrestled with the lessons of the First World War, reformed the army, and formulated doctrine. At a lower level, a perusal of the pages of the Journal of the Royal United Services Institute or Army Quarterly reveals many articles written by officers of all ranks that analyse aspects of the Western (and other) fronts. Reform may not have moved fast or far enough for the taste of some military radicals, but that is not to say that reform was absent. In this period, Liddell Hart and Fuller produced important and stimulating military theory. However their contributions fall under the heading of military thought rather than the subject of this essay, military doctrine (although they may have exerted some influence on the latter).

To a far greater extent than before 1914, senior officers recognised the importance of doctrine. The 1920 edition of *FSR Volume II - Operations* contained this blunt statement in the very first paragraph:

‘The Army will be trained in peace and led in war in accordance with the doctrine contained in this volume. The principles of this doctrine should be so thoroughly impressed on the mind of every commander that, whenever he has to come to a decision in the field, he will instinctively give them their full weight.’

This emphasis on a ‘universal’, Army-wide doctrine continued throughout the interwar period. Two obstacles stood in the way of the British Army of the 1920s and 1930s becoming a doctrinally-based service in the modern sense.
First, although successive versions of the FSR contained much good sense, they were closer to the pre-1914 semi-formal style of doctrine than the modern, more prescriptive variety. Second, the host of factors referred to above - the regimental system, leading to a lack of inter-arm cooperation; the dispersion of the Army in colonial garrisons across the globe; suspicion of doctrine; anti-intellectualism; adherence to the empirical tradition - all these prevented the FSR being thoroughly internalised, and truly becoming the central idea of the British Army. The FSR of 1935, largely written by Archibald Wavell, was a fundamentally sound document. Nevertheless, during the Desert campaigns of 1941 and early 1942, it was largely ignored (ironically, by forces under Wavell’s ultimate command) in favour of a locally improvised ‘doctrine’. This stressed unsupported actions by tanks, and neglected the importance of the combined arms battle. Such an approach led, all too often, to disaster.

The assessment of the lessons of the Great War and the construction of a new doctrine began immediately after the War. The CIGS, Sir Henry Wilson, was determined that the Army should in future fight a mobile rather than a static war, and so invested in tanks. Over the next two decades horses were phased out, to be replaced by motor transport and tanks; permanent armoured formations were established; and the Bren light machine gun replaced the Lewis Gun of Western Front vintage. Various trials were carried out, most famously the establishment of the brigade-sized Experimental Mechanised Force in 1927-28. As a result, the Field Force sent to France in 1939 was the most highly mechanised army in the world. Doctrine was essentially sound, being based around the all arms battle, with the lessons of the Great War incorporated in FSR 1935 via the Kirke report of 1932. FSR 1935 stressed the importance of high morale, surprise, and superior firepower. Attrition was to be avoided. In short, in David French’s words, ‘…the very last thing the Army was equipped, organised or trained to do was to repeat the trench warfare of the Western Front’.

Nevertheless, several grave flaws can be identified in British doctrine at the outbreak of the Second World War. The Kirke report on the lessons of the First World War - striving to prevent trench deadlock - had identified that ‘our methods are apt to be too stereotyped, which again tends to produce the same weakness in our methods of attack’. One solution was to move towards what we would today refer to as Mission Command:

‘In mobile operations, however, precise orders cannot be issued to meet every possibility, and commanders will have to act on general instructions. All commanders should, therefore, be trained to work at times on instructions, and not to rigid orders.’
The problem was that this laudable aspiration remained just that - an aspiration. Rigidity of command and the culture of the interwar Army militated against developing the type of qualities of independent thought in officers, although those who had seen extensive active service in small wars tended to buck this trend. Moreover, there was a tendency to see operations in the terms of 1918, of set-piece advances of perhaps 40 miles, rather than the mobile battles being contemplated by the British Army's counterparts in Germany and the Soviet Union. This led to British soldiers being, on the whole, ill-prepared for the type of fast moving battle they encountered in 1940.

A further hazardous consequence of this line of thought was reinforced by the theories of Fuller and Liddell Hart. They assumed, and many agreed with them, that in future war the great artillery bombardments of 1916-17, that had sacrificed surprise and smashed communications rendering movement all but impossible, would be unnecessary. The Kirke report concludes cautiously and significantly: ‘this question of speeding up the organisation of artillery fire plans has been closely studied but so far the results have not been very encouraging.’ The solution in the 1930s was the decentralisation of artillery command systems, which resulted, especially in the Desert campaigns of 1941 and early 1942, in an inability to concentrate artillery fire at the decisive point. Under Haig, artillery had been the Army's most technically advanced arm, a true battle-winner. Under Montgomery, it was to become so again. In the meantime, there was a dangerous gap in the Army's doctrine.

In 1918, the British had conducted a highly effective form of air-land battle. Partly because of institutional pressures that stemmed from the independent Royal Air Force's struggle for survival, the battlefield role of airpower was neglected in the interwar years. Strategic bombing became, for the RAF, the Holy Grail. FSR could not rely on having aircraft in the ground support role, and Kirke had airpower excluded from his remit; he could only suggest the desirability of aircraft as part of the larger package. The British Army was to pay the price for this neglect time and again during the Second World War.

**The Second World War**

The British Army's first major victory of the Second World War, O'Connor's defeat of the Italian Tenth Army in 1940-1, demonstrated the essential soundness of its pre-war doctrine. O’Connor’s methods, which involved a surprise attack using all-arms, followed by a dash through the desert to outflank the Italians and cut their line of retreat, were based not on the theories of the armour radicals but on common sense. However, O’Connor was captured in early 1941, and things were rather different under his successors.

Willingness to undertake radical experiments with armour rather than building
on the sound foundations of FSR 1935 was a self-inflicted wound. In 1941, it appeared that the German blitzkrieg had transformed the nature of warfare; and that the future lay with the tank. The terrain in the Western Desert encouraged a false analogy with war at sea. In this environment, the classic principles of war no longer seemed relevant, for the tank had seemingly created new ones. Accordingly, armoured commanders, influenced by radical thinkers such as Liddell Hart, improvised new tactics, which had the fatal flaw of neglecting the coordination of all arms. Armoured units in particular were prone to try to fight independent battles. This was especially unfortunate given the propensity of some units for the frontal ‘Balaclava’ charge and the German tactic of using panzers to lure British tanks onto their anti-tank guns. Frequent changes of commander and units within the Eighth Army did not make the task of establishing a sensible coherent doctrine any easier.

As we have seen, British problems were exacerbated by misuse of their artillery, and dispersal of artillery was a symptom of a wider malaise. The generation of high commanders of the Second World War had been junior officers in the First, and the Western Front style attrition was anathema to them. Liddell Hart’s ‘indirect approach’ offered a seductively attractive way of avoiding the attritional warfare of the Western Front. Although far from consistent as a theory, the indirect approach replaced the military principle of concentration of force in favour of dispersion. Major General Eric Dorman-Smith, Auchinleck’s Deputy CGS, openly admitted Liddell Hart’s influence. While recognising that a flaw in the British Army’s fighting methods had been a tendency towards overextension of forces, Dorman-Smith failed to acknowledge that this was a risk of the indirect approach, unless it was balanced.

Two formations epitomise the British Desert Army’s ‘indirect approach’: the Jock Column and the Brigade Group. The former was a tiny, all-arms unit, effective enough in a raiding and screening role. In principle, the Brigade Group was a healthy step towards a combined arms battlegroup on the German or American model, but in practice it institutionalised dispersion of effort and made command and control more difficult. The decision by XXX (British) Corps, after surprising Rommel during Operation CRUSADER in November 1941, to dispatch the three armoured brigades of 7th Armoured Division to divergent objectives contrasts strongly with Soviet and German practice of concentrating armour. The Gazala battles of 1942 showed again the danger of splitting the forces of Eighth Army into small units lacking in fire power and ‘punch’. Dispersion was a matter of practice as well as organisation. The arrival of Montgomery to command Eighth Army in August 1942 brought about a return, doctrinally speaking, to 1918, codified and modified by Kirke and FSR 1935. Gone was the era of the Jock Column and Brigade Group; the division again became the basic tactical unit. Artillery was centralised, and massive bombardments proved
highly effective - not least against German anti-tank guns. All-arms cooperation took pride of place, aided by alterations to the structure of formations, begun under the previous regime, which made them less ‘tank-heavy’. In place of the free-wheeling if half-baked mobile warfare of the previous two years, Montgomery’s hallmark became the tightly controlled, centralised, attritional battle, a phenomenon neatly encapsulated in the phrase ‘the tidy battlefield’. After his unhappy experience with a large armoured corps de chasse (X Corps) at the Second Battle of El Alamein, Montgomery was reluctant to let armour off the leash.

Moreover, Montgomery placed much emphasis on getting logistic preparations in place before the attack. In this he was lucky in that, by late 1942, British commanders were receiving adequate supplies of war-making material, as industry in Allied countries geared up for total war. His method was one of launching what he called ‘colossal cracks’ against the enemy. The Monty style was thus based on heavy firepower and methodical advances. He was concerned to keep casualties as low as possible, and thus conserving the morale of his armies.

Montgomery was undoubtedly a highly skilled commander. He had, unusually for a British soldier of his generation, a thorough understanding of what is now called Operational Art. Yet Montgomery’s cautious approach to warfighting is controversial. He can be criticised for sloth and overkill in his approach to operations such as crossing the Straits of Messina in September 1943, or the Rhine Crossings of March 1945. His wariness is explicable in terms of his realistic appraisal of what his army could actually achieve, and his mistrust of British armour. It is instructive when he tried something more imaginative during Operation MARKET GARDEN in September 1944, it went badly wrong. He returned to type in subsequent operations, and returned to his winning ways. The Monty method suited the British Army. It was a conscript force, badly overstretched, and had ever-dwindling manpower reserves, and was thus unable to sustain heavy casualties. Montgomery delivered victory at an acceptable cost in British casualties, and this compensates for much that might be criticised about his methods.

Montgomery created and disseminated effective warfighting doctrine. However, effective application of that doctrine depended to a large degree on Montgomery himself being present. Nothing if not didactic, he groomed his protégés (such as Oliver Leese, who succeeded him in command of Eighth Army in December 1943) in his methods of command. However, the record of Montgomery’s acolytes was patchy at best. His successors in Italy often seemed to lose sight of the importance of massive force. Attacks, although impressive on paper, were often too weak to achieve success. The complaint of
General Alphonse Juin, the commander of the French Expeditionary Corps in Italy, that the British had ‘a congenital inability to think in terms of large scale manoeuvres with an Army Group or even an Army’ contained much truth. In the first three battles of Cassino in 1944 the Allies fought a series of actions at corps level, only vaguely co-ordinated. Only in Operation DIADEM, the fourth battle, did the Allied forces fight as a cohesive whole. In part the improvement was thanks to the influence of Major General ‘John’ Harding, General Alexander’s chief of staff.

Tactical doctrine also proved surprisingly difficult to get right. Unlike in the First World War, there was no single major theatre in which the Army was engaged from beginning to end. Hard-won lessons from one theatre did not necessarily transfer well to another. In part this was because some tactics were theatre-specific, but there were also institutional problems and the ‘not invented here’ syndrome was alive and well. Thus in Normandy in 1944, troops had to relearn some of the lessons acquired in the Mediterranean. There were similar problems with joint doctrine. Following the 1940 campaign, there was a fierce bureaucratic battle between the Army and RAF over the control of aircraft, including a call in the 1940 Bartholomew Report for a tactical air force under Army control. During the Desert campaigns soldiers, airmen (and indeed, sailors) learned to work together, and by the end, cooperation between ground and air was very good indeed. But it proved difficult to transfer air-land doctrine to Normandy - a process that was exacerbated by personality clashes between Montgomery and some senior airmen.

On the other side of the world, another British general created effective warfighting doctrine and imposed it on his command. However, General Sir William (‘Bill’) Slim’s approach during the Burma campaign was markedly different from Montgomery’s. His methods accord closely with the modern ‘manoeuvrist approach’. During his greatest victory, Operation EXTENDED CAPITAL, the Mandalay-Meiktilla campaign of 1945, Slim, a model joint officer, matched strength against weakness, achieving momentum and tempo. He never lost sight of his ‘fundamental aim of destroying the enemy’ rather than taking ground for its own sake. Slim sought to attack the enemy commander’s mind by destroying his will, using deception and surprise. In Robert Lyman’s words, ‘Slim’s intent was to persuade his enemy that the battle was lost rather than prove it to him through the physical destruction of his army’. However, Slim also recognised the need to destroy the Japanese forces in battle, although he strove to avoid frontal assault, a mark of his mastery of operational art. Nevertheless, he was not afraid to throw his forces into attritional fighting when he deemed it necessary.

Slim penned one of the classic descriptions of the Manoeuvrist Approach.
It comes as no surprise to find that Slim’s guiding light was the advice given to him as a young officer, by a grizzled sergeant major: ‘There’s only one principle of war and that’s this. Hit the other fellow, as quick as you can, and as hard as you can, where it hurts him most, when he ain’t lookin!’

Slim certainly warrants Duncan Anderson’s description of him as ‘the very model of a modern manoeuvrist general’, but even models can have flaws. He took risks with logistics that courted defeat. It is debatable whether Slim’s methods would have worked as well under different circumstances, in Normandy, for instance, had he swapped places with Montgomery. Moreover, Slim’s practice of ‘mission command’ did not always match the ideal he preached; indeed, as Anderson has suggested, sometimes his control of Fourteenth Army’s corps and divisional commanders bore a resemblance to Montgomery’s methods in Europe. This was not the only area of similarity between the two men. Both created a coherent warfighting doctrine and indoctrinated their respective commands. Both nurtured a group of protégés (although Slim claimed that he hadn’t), reminiscent of the Wolseley and Roberts ‘Rings’ of the late Victorian Army. Above all, both were successful.

The Army and Doctrine since 1945

Thus at the end of the Second World War there were two warfighting cultures in the British Army. The Monty method emphasised attrition and the tidy battlefield, while Slim’s approach was more manoeuvrist. Both men served as CIGS, Montgomery from 1946 to 1948, when he was succeeded by Slim, who was in office until 1952. In theory both had the opportunity of imposing their vision on the Army. In practice, Montgomery cast a long shadow over the Army in Europe. Many of his protégés were placed into important positions, and the Monty method prevailed until the 1980s. The British Army had entered Germany as occupiers in 1945, but within a few years had turned itself into a force that prepared to defend the North German Plain from Soviet attack. Hemmed in literally by geographical constraints, and metaphorically by the politically imposed strategy of forward defence, the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) adopted an approach based on positional defence and firepower leading to attrition of attacking enemy forces. One of the problems was the view that, ultimately, conventional forces were a nuclear trip-wire. As the 1952 pamphlet *The Armoured Division in Battle showed*, the Army had not entirely abandoned ideas of manoeuvrism, but the parallel pamphlet on infantry reflected the tidy battlefield. Mobility remained important at the tactical level, but overall in the 1950s and 1960s:

‘The British Army viewed the defence of Germany in terms of a series of small tactical-level engagements and failed to develop a coherent corps plan or operational concept for defending its sector of NATO’s front.’
Montgomery’s legacy had become debased indeed. Thinking changed somewhat in the 1970s. The introduction of NATO’s ‘Flexible Response’ strategy in 1967, which enhanced the importance of conventional defence, triggered a reassessment of BAOR’s methods. While positional defence and firepower remained at the heart of 1 (BR) Corps’s scheme of manoeuvre, such as it was, greater flexibility was built into it. There were plans to carry out a phased withdrawal, and to wear down Soviet forces by drawing them into killing zones and using modern firepower such as the MILAN anti-tank missile. If the unthinkable had ever occurred, several facts would in all likelihood have rendered this approach ineffective. First, Soviet forces were too strong. Second, 1 (BR) Corps was too weak and ill-equipped. Third, 1 (BR) Corps aimed to fight not as a corps, but as a sort of ‘holding company’ for a series of tactical battles, thus effectively surrendering the initiative to the enemy. Fourth, there was little cooperation with the other NATO corps, and certainly no notion of fighting as a coherent Army Group.

This unsatisfactory state of affairs was to lead to a doctrinal revolution in the British Army. This was affected by external influences. In its efforts to recover from the trauma of defeat in Vietnam, from the mid-1970s the US Army entered a heady period of doctrinal debate and experimentation. This was informed by intensive study, by British and American military academics, of the forces of the Soviet Union. One result of this was the acceptance, in both the UK and USA, of the concept of an operational level of war, between the strategic and the tactical. Another was the recognition that the US experience of air mobility in Vietnam had important lessons for the Central Front. The concepts of Follow on Forces Attack (FOFA) and AirLand (sic) Battle were introduced partly by the British through NATO, especially in the 1983 tactical doctrine Allied Tactical Publication 35.

This doctrinal ferment in the US forces was paralleled by a rather more low key debate in the British Army. Key manoeuvrist texts such as William Lind's *Maneuver Warfare* (sic) and Richard Simpkin’s *Race to the Swift* (the latter possibly more quoted than read) were being perused by British officers at Staff College. Lower down the Army, Sandhurst’s War Studies Department introduced officers to historical examples, especially those drawn from the German Blitzkrieg and Soviet campaigns of the Second World War, and the Arab-Israeli Wars. The political climate of the early 1980s, marked by the rebirth of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, made a strategy based on the battlefield use of nuclear weapons increasingly unacceptable.

All this coincided with the advent of a handful of British senior officers who were determined to place BAOR onto a sounder footing. General (later Field Marshal) Sir Nigel (‘Ginge’) Bagnall rates as one of the most significant
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reformers in the 300 year history of the British Army. As commander of 1(BR) Corps in 1981, he began the process by which the British Army embraced the tenets of the Manoeuvrist Approach and Mission Command. Moreover, he introduced the idea of the corps-level counterstroke. This involved fighting the corps as a corps, leading to, in the words of an official publication ‘a much better chance of defeating the enemy rather than delaying him’. At NORTAG from 1983-85, Bagnall carried on his work of reform, and as CGS from 1985 to 1988, he commissioned Design for Military Operations (1989), often, if misleadingly, described as the British Army’s first ever formal doctrine.

Bagnall was not a one-man band. If he had been, his reforms would have hardly taken root as firmly as they did. He had supporters within the Army, the punningly-named ‘Ginger Group’, which included the then Colonel Timothy Granville-Chapman, principal author of Design for Military Operations. Equally, if Bagnall’s labours had been followed by a reaction, the move to a doctrinal army would have been stillborn. Instead, Bagnall’s successor at 1 (BR) Corps and NORTAG, General Sir Martin Farndale, extended the corps counterstroke concept, and in the mid to late 1980s the ideas of the Manoeuvrist Approach, Mission Command and the operational level of warfare became firmly embedded into the Army’s style of warfighting. As many commentators have pointed out, it is a rich irony that the British Army should have reached a peak of intellectual and doctrinal readiness to defend northern Germany at the very moment when the Soviet threat disappeared. Belatedly, the legacy of Slim supplanted that of Montgomery.

The publication of Design for Military Operations was only one half of the story of the British Army’s doctrinal revolution. For much of the post-1945 period, in Lieutenant General John Kiszely’s words:

‘To most officers there was no such thing as ‘doctrine’, only ‘pamphlets’ and they were, at best a basis for discussion, and for quoting in promotion exams.’

From the 1990s onwards this began to change, as doctrine was taken seriously and internalised by Army officers. One major reason for this was that it was promptly validated in the most dramatic fashion, by being applied successfully by the British Army in offensive operations in the First Gulf War (1991). Another was Bagnall’s powerful influence in ‘forcing through a complete change of attitude and practice’ not least through making sure that Staff College DS ‘left to command their units properly indoctrinated’. One might point to other factors: the move to an overwhelmingly graduate officer corps; the shake up occasioned by the end of the Cold War; the establishment in 1988 by Bagnall of a Higher Command and Staff Course (HCSC) for top-rate colonels
and brigadiers, focused at the operational level: these and other factors may account for the remarkable change in attitude towards doctrine. While some officers may claim, perhaps with justice, that today there is too much doctrine; it is rare to hear anyone argue that there should not be any at all.

The period since 1989 has seen further dramatic changes. The ending of the bipolar world of the Cold War has seen the disappearance of the Central Front, and a return to expeditionary warfare, with the Army being almost constantly on operations. Digitisation and other technical revolutions - if some pundits are to be believed - have a profound impact on future warfare. Moreover, doctrinal change has been accompanied by a revolution in jointery. The creation of Permanent Joint Headquarters, the emergence of properly structured Joint Task Forces, the Joint Services Command and Staff College, the development of the HCSC from an Army course to a joint course, and the setting up of such organisations as the Joint Helicopter Command are testimony to the radical changes in the way the Services do business. So is the development of joint doctrine. The RAF and RN followed the Army in producing single service doctrine in 1991 and 1995 respectively, while in 1997 the first edition of British Defence Doctrine appeared. The Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (now the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre) opened its doors in 1998. For all that, change in British Army doctrine since 1989 has been evolutionary rather than revolutionary, although the original context in which doctrine was developed, high intensity war on the Central Front, has receded. Perhaps this reflects a belief that, like, the FSR of earlier days, the original doctrine was fundamentally sound, and has proved capable of being adapted to a range of circumstances.

The British Style of Command

The historically non-doctrinal, pragmatic nature of the British Army has been reflected in the British style of command. The Duke of Wellington once said of the French commanders that he faced during the Peninsular War (1808-1814) that ‘they planned their campaigns just as you might make a splendid piece of harness. It looks very well; and answers very well; until it gets broken; and then you are done for. Now I made my campaigns of ropes. If anything went wrong, I tied a knot; and went on’. British generals down the ages have had to display similar pragmatism and improvisation in their campaigns, making use of scant resources. ‘The British style of command’ has been influenced by a number of factors.

The first might be termed ‘the generalship of poverty’. Anthony Eden, who served as a junior officer in the First World War and a senior politician in the Second, once counselled against holding high command ‘in the first two years of any war in the British Army’. Rather, it was ‘better wait until the stuff begins to come along… after the third year or later’. This was certainly the
experience of the two world wars, and can be applied to many other conflicts. Wavell’s campaigns in the Middle East in 1940-41, which involved an extremely delicate balancing of resources and commitments have been described as ‘a thing of shreds and patches’. Post-1945 campaigns, such as the initial stages of Korea (1950), the Suez operation (1956) and the two Gulf Wars (1991 and 2003) saw the cobbled together of forces amid much improvisation. On only one occasion, in 1918 on the Western Front, has the British Army had the luxury of fighting a ‘rich man’s war’ with unlimited resources. This was the product of mobilisation for total war and the Army being given priority for resources. Even then it was for a brief period, had the war gone on into 1919, Haig’s forces would have faced drastic cuts, for Britain’s manpower budget faced exhaustion. Even in 1944-45, there were severe limitations on manpower.

The second factor is the small wars tradition. For most of its existence, the main focus of the British Army has been small-scale conflicts of various types (colonial conflicts, COIN, Peace Support) rather than large-scale ‘conventional’ wars. Such conflicts also tended to be fought on a shoestring. With the exception of the high commanders of the Second World War, most of whom (but by no means all) cut their teeth on the Western Front, the formative influences of British commanders have tended to be in small wars. This has had positive effects: the flexibility and ‘rope-tying’ skills acquired in small wars are excellent training for high command. The small wars inheritance also has its down side. The very nature of this sort of conflict often involves troops scattered in relatively small packets over a wide area, which inhibits formation training. When major wars come along, expeditionary forces have to be hastily assembled for specific tasks, such as those scraped together for the campaigns in Norway (1940) and Korea (1950).

To step up from successful command in even a ‘big small war’ such as the Second Boer War (1899-1902) to a major conflict against a first class enemy is to ask a great deal of a general. Some, notably Sir John French in 1915, have failed the test. Other commanders experienced a ‘halfway house’ between the two extremes, by conducting a big small war in the midst of a major conflict. Campaigns such as those against the Turks in Palestine in the First World War, and the Italians in the Second, have the feel of large-scale colonial wars, and certainly have more in common with each other than with Passchendaele or Normandy. ‘Big small wars’ tended to play to the strengths of British commanders with colonial experience. Allenby, a relative failure on the Western Front, thrived in Palestine, in 1917-18. Wavell served under Allenby and was guided by his experience in the Middle East rather than his earlier service on the Somme.

Of course, it would be wrong to judge the small wars tradition solely in
terms of its deleterious effect on the performance of the British Army and its commanders in high intensity operations. Over the last two centuries the British Army has had an enviable record of success in small wars. Such conflicts are the British Army’s bread-and-butter, they were the only experience of active service command that many British officers have undergone. We should not lose sight of the fact that, with the debatable exception of the BAOR era, the British Army has primarily been a small wars organisation capable of generating an expeditionary force in times of emergency. That pattern has continued into the first decade of the 21st century.

Coalition warfare has been a virtually ever-present influence on the British style of command. Of all the major wars fought by Britain since 1688, only one - the American War of Independence (1775-83) - was fought without Great Power allies: and that war ended in Britain’s only major defeat. In this sense the Falklands War is not defined as major. Coalition wars are conducted, often painfully slowly, by committee, and the opportunity for unilateral action is severely constrained. An ability to negotiate, and an aptitude for diplomacy, have been invaluable assets for a high commander to possess.

As a rule, the larger the number of troops a commander possesses, the greater his influence with his coalition partners. The exact status enjoyed by British commanders within a coalition has varied over time. Marlborough and Wellington, in 1704 at Blenheim and 1815 at Waterloo respectively, presided over multinational forces, with British troops constituting a relatively modest proportion. Both men operated alongside allies with sizeable forces. Earlier, in the Peninsular, Wellington had commanded an Anglo-Portuguese-Spanish Army in which British troops were in the majority. French and Haig during the First World War were always the junior partners to the French. However at Gallipoli, where the British Empire contingent outnumbered the French, Hamilton was the senior man. In Italy during 1943-45 British and US forces were roughly equal, but in North-West Europe during 1944-45 Anglo-Canadian forces declined steadily as an overall percentage of the total Allied forces. This contributed to the decline in Montgomery’s influence in the coalition, already undermined by his abrasive personality. By contrast, Alexander was a great success as a coalition commander in the Mediterranean, in the sense that he smoothed over inter-Allied difficulties; however he conspicuously lacked ‘grip’ over subordinates, and the conduct of operations suffered as a consequence.

Since 1945, the challenges of coalition warfare have reasserted themselves in various ways. British generals have several times found themselves in the position of commanding a relatively small contingent within a US-dominated coalition force (Korea 1950-53, Gulf 1991 and Iraq 2003-2009, and Afghanistan from 2001, through 2006 and thereafter), or in a position
of near-equality within a coalition operation (at Suez with the French in 1956; operations in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s). Many of the problems of coalition warfare are repeated in small wars, with the need to cooperate with individuals or bodies that may not come within the military chain of command, or at least cannot be treated simply as a subordinate. This might involve cooperating with police units, as during the phase of ‘police primacy’ in Northern Ireland in the 1970s and 1980s; or with non-government organisations in Peace Support; or training indigenous forces.

It should not be forgotten that an enduring theme of British operations, in both small wars and high intensity conflicts, is that numbers of foreign and imperial troops have been under British command. Many small wars were only possible because the British were able to make use of locally raised troops, such as the pre-1947 Indian Army, the firqats in Oman in the 1970s, or the Ulster Defence Regiment in Northern Ireland. Likewise, in both world wars ‘British’ armies such as Haig’s on the Somme or Montgomery’s at Alamein or in Normandy were actually Commonwealth coalition forces, as sizeable Australian, Canadian, South African, New Zealand and Indian contingents served under British command. This complicated command arrangements, as Commonwealth contingents could not be treated simply as if they were from the Mother Country; as Currie, commander of the Canadian Corps in 1918, and Blamey, the Australian commander in the Middle East in 1941, both made clear.

Several other factors that have shaped the British style of command are also worth mentioning. The first is the lack of joint structures, doctrine, and training until the late 20th century. Given the long association of the Army and Royal Navy in amphibious and expeditionary operations, this state of affairs was surprising, to put it mildly. Long practice of the Services and commanders working together, as in the Mediterranean in the Second World War, could overcome these problems. In the best British spirit of pragmatism, commanders displaying a ‘can do’ attitude and willingness to cooperate frequently compensated for structural inadequacies - General Hamilton and Admiral de Robeck at Gallipoli are a case in point. But all this depended to an alarming degree on the ability of the commanders to work together.

These problems have been at least partially remedied by the ‘jointery revolution’ of the 1990s. Current doctrine increasingly captures the complex character of contemporary conflict, including the need to take a comprehensive approach to the use of force. Similarly, the lack of a doctrine for command has been addressed with the introduction of Mission Command, and the HCSC provides some of the training for high command that was singularly lacking throughout much of the Army’s history.32
Conclusion

For most of its history, the British Army has eschewed prescriptive doctrine, priding itself on its empirical attitude to problem solving. The British style of command has been characterised by a similarly pragmatic, undogmatic, approach. However, it is a fallacy to believe that the Army lacked any sort of doctrine. Doctrine did exist, but it was either semi-formal, associated with a specific commander in a specific theatre, or took the form of broad principles. With the adoption of formal doctrine in 1989, the Army entered a new era. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003, and the occasional lack of doctrinal consistency that has been seen, have demonstrated that complacency is extremely unwise. That being said, in the early years of the 21st century, the British Army is probably better prepared intellectually to face the challenges of complex operations than at any time in its history, provided it continues to learn from it.

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Notes

6 Mockaitis, 187, 189.
8 Ibid 42.
14 Ibid.19, 23.
17 French, 296.
18 Holden Reid, Doctrinal 22.


21 Quoted in Lyman, 100, 103.


24 McInnes, 55-6.


26 Kiszely, 185.


28 Holden Reid, Doctrinal 29-42.


32 First fully codified in Army Doctrine Publication Vol. 2 *Command* (1995), although mission-oriented orders had been introduced some years before by Field Marshal Sir Nigel Bagnall.
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There are good reasons for considering Marlborough Britain’s greatest soldier, for there was no talent for war that he did not possess. He had the imagination and the command of detail to plan a grand strategy; he was an able generalissimo of allied armies, always ready to flatter a foreign ruler for some political advantage. His capacity for innovation really lay off the battlefield; in his immense gifts as an organiser and administrator (his battle plans themselves were not as original as some other commanders of equal genius). But his greatest strength lay in his attention to the economic underpinning of war, and his concern for morale and the welfare of his men. He ensured that he always possessed proper resources for the campaign that he had in mind; his friend, Godolphin, ensured that the English Treasury always kept him in funds. He was thus able to pay his troops regularly and ensure proper channels of supply. This concern for supply was directly concerned with his deep concern for his men’s welfare. ‘Corporal John,’ as the soldiers called him, never wasted lives unnecessarily, or asked them to perform tasks that were not necessary. As a result, he could call for feats of courage and pertinacity greater than those given to any other general. In this combination of military virtues, Marlborough’s greatness nestled, but most of all in his understanding that the army was precious and that its value resided in the officers and men who made it up.

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