Foreword by the Secretary of State for Defence
the Right Honourable Geoff Hoon MP

Throughout this Government’s time in office, the UK’s Armed Forces have consistently risen to the challenges set them, continuing a military tradition of which the whole nation can be proud. This success is no accident. It depends on the ability of our people, properly trained, motivated and equipped, focussed and organised on achieving results and directed by outstanding leaders throughout the chain of command. The British people expect the Government to continue to deliver high quality Armed Forces capable of responding to the uncertainties and threats of today’s security environment, and to ensure our Service men and women receive the level of support they need. This White Paper sets out the policy for doing so, building on the expeditionary strategy first set out in the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) in 1998 and the conclusions reached in the SDR New Chapter in 2002, and adapted to reflect operational experience and the changing security environment.

The Paper sets out our analysis of the future security environment, the implications for defence, and how we intend adapting our planning and force structures to meet the potential threats. While many of the conclusions reached in the SDR remain valid, the threats posed by international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are starker, as are the risks to wider security posed by failed or failing states. Whereas in the past it was possible to regard military force as a separate element in crisis resolution, it is now evident that the successful management of international security problems will require ever more integrated planning of military, diplomatic and economic instruments at both national and international levels. We have also had to look at how we can best take advantage of the opportunities offered by new technologies to deliver military effects in different ways. Our focus is now on delivering flexible forces able to configure to generate the right capability in a less predictable and more complex operational environment. This will require us to move away from simplistic platform-centric planning, to a fully “networked enabled capability” able to exploit effects-based planning and operations, using forces which are truly adaptable, capable of even greater levels of precision and rapidly deployable. This implies significant changes in the way we plan, prepare and execute operations, placing different pressures and demands on our people, equipment, supporting infrastructure and processes.

For these reasons we must be prepared to invest in recruiting and retaining the right people, providing them with the necessary training, development and support. We must invest in the battle-winning equipment they will need and continue to modernise the rest of Defence to effectively support expeditionary operations. Resources must be directed at those capabilities that best deliver the range of effects required, while we must have the determination to dispense with those capabilities that do not. We expect to be in a position to announce significant changes to the current and future capabilities of the Armed Forces and supporting infrastructure next year. These will be considered in the continuing work to establish the nature of a sustainable and affordable future force structure. This White Paper presents the security and policy baseline against which future decisions will be made and gives a clear statement of our future strategic priorities.

A separate publication on Operation TELIC is being published in parallel with this White Paper. We have not yet drawn complete conclusions of the implications on lessons on the operations in Iraq for capability. These will be considered in the continuing work to rebalance the Defence programme.

A separate volume of detailed supporting essays and analysis covers the core topics of International Organisations; Military Tasks and Scales of Effort; Reserves; Defence Relations; People; Defence Management; and Industrial Policy.
1.1 The Balkans, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and Iraq demonstrate the successful performance of British forces in conducting both combat operations and subsequent stabilisation operations. The rapid deployment of some 46,000 personnel to the Gulf confirmed the validity of the vision set out in the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) in 1998 and the expeditionary strategy and modernisation initiated by the Review.

1.2 The SDR was a fundamental rethink of how the UK Armed Forces and their supporting infrastructure should be structured to face the challenges of the increasingly complex security environment which followed the ending of the Cold War and the emergence of uncertainty and instability in many areas of the world. The key conclusions from the Review were:

- Defence is an essential part of achieving the Government’s wider Foreign and Security Policy objectives both through military operations and Defence Diplomacy;
- The need for modern and effective armed forces equipped and supported for rapid and sustainable deployment on expeditionary operations, usually as part of a coalition;
- The largest operation envisaged was a regional conflict, although a requirement to retain the basis on which to reconstitute larger capabilities in the event of a re-emerged strategic threat to NATO remained;
- Our forces need to be prepared to conduct the full range of operations from warfighting through to peace support operations;
- Military effectiveness would be enhanced through increased “Jointery” between the Services, including the establishment of a Chief of Defence Logistics, and most importantly through the creation of the Joint Rapid Reaction Force;
- The supporting infrastructure and services within the MOD needed to be modernised and rationalised to support expeditionary warfare effectively;
- The role of the Reserve Forces should be further adapted to meet the military demands of the post-Cold War world;
- We should harness new technologies to enhance military capability while preparing to counter new threats;
- We should maintain a minimum nuclear deterrent based on the Trident system.

1.4 However, the world has not stood still and since the SDR there has been a series of significant developments:

- More numerous crises of a wider range and in a wider geographical area – Kosovo, Macedonia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as Iraq – have demonstrated that the global security environment is more uncertain than it was five years ago and our Armed Forces face an even broader range, frequency, and often duration of tasks than envisaged in 1998;
- The increased threat from international terrorism, requiring a response both at home and overseas;
- NATO’s enlargement and evolution from large static forces to smaller response forces, able to undertake operations beyond the NATO area itself;

1.3 The Review set the policy framework through which we have operated since 1998. A succession of operations has demonstrated our ability to plan, deploy, operate and sustain forces over considerable distances, alongside a diverse range of allies and partners.
1.5 Following the September 11 attacks, the MOD reviewed its ability to respond to the particular challenges raised by international terrorism. The SDR New Chapter concluded that our emphasis on expeditionary forces enabled the UK to have a key role in the new international environment but recognised that operations against international terrorism required increased precision and rapid delivery of military effect, particularly through NEC. The New Chapter highlighted the need to be prepared to prevent, deter, coerce, disrupt or destroy international terrorists or the regimes that harbour them and to counter terrorists’ efforts to acquire chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. It recognised the role of stabilisation operations and Defence Diplomacy in addressing the causes and symptoms of conflict and terrorism. The New Chapter noted the increased likelihood of deploying forces outside the SDR core regions of Europe, the Middle East and the Mediterranean more often and alongside coalition partners. These conclusions had particular implications for future capability, especially expeditionary logistics. More frequent, and often longer and/or smaller operations require particular key enablers within the force structure, including communications, logistics, medical specialists, and intelligence. While centred on the need to confront international terrorism abroad rather than waiting for attacks within the UK, the New Chapter also recognised the valuable contribution Defence could make to Home defence and security in support of the Home Office and civil authorities.

1.6 As well as helping to sustain relative peace in Northern Ireland ahead of a final settlement, Defence has also played an important role in supporting the civil authorities in responding to a range of civil contingencies. The availability of a pool of highly trained service personnel, combined with expertise in crisis management, planning and command and control, has seen the Armed Forces deployed to support civil authorities during the fuel dispute, foot and mouth outbreaks, flooding and most recently on Operation FRESCO during the fire services’ pay dispute. The Armed Forces’ performance was widely praised, but there was inevitably an impact on personnel and the training and preparedness of units for their operational roles, particularly as Operation FRESCO coincided with the start of the campaign in Iraq.

1.7 While the SDR and the New Chapter set us on the right course to respond to the trends emerging in 1998, the security environment and technology have moved on. We therefore need to adapt further our force structures in light of our operational experience and continue the process of modernisation that SDR set in hand.

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1 The phrase ‘weapons of mass destruction’ is generally held to refer to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

2 NEC has evolved as the UK’s term for the capability enhancement achieved through the effective linkage of platforms and people through a network. It replaces the expression Network Centric Capability used in the SDR New Chapter. NEC is explored in more detail in Chapter 4.
UK Policy Aims

2.1 The security and stability of Europe and the maintenance of the transatlantic relationship remain fundamental to our security and defence policy. The UK is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a leading military contributor to the NATO Alliance and the ESDP. More widely the UK has a range of global interests including economic well-being based around trade, overseas and foreign investment, and the continuing free flow of natural resources. We have responsibilities for 13 overseas territories. Our security and national prosperity depend upon international stability, freedom and economic development, and in support of these the UK seeks to act as a force for good within the international community. The capacity to deliver effective military force in peace support and intervention operations, alongside our EU and NATO allies, is a vital component of our security policy.

2.2 The Government’s security priorities, set out in the SDR and the New Chapter are summarised in our Defence Aim:

To deliver security for the people of the United Kingdom and the Overseas Territories by defending them, including against terrorism; and to act as a force for good by strengthening international peace and stability.

Security Environment

2.3 International terrorism and the proliferation of WMD represent the most direct threats to our peace and security. But, working with Other Government Departments, we need also to consider and address the underlying causes of these threats.

International Terrorism

2.4 The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 demonstrate the strategic effect that a sophisticated and determined group of terrorists can achieve. As well as confronting the threat directly, we are working with our partners to tackle the conditions that promote terrorism and provide ready recruits and to deny terrorists funding and freedom of movement. We supported action in the UN to tackle terrorist finances and to share intelligence more widely between many nations.

2.5 The US-led coalition operations in Afghanistan succeeded in overthrowing the Taliban regime, which had provided a safe haven for Al Qaida. The coalition destroyed Al Qaida’s training camps and disrupted its leadership. More broadly, world-wide action by law enforcement and intelligence agencies has further pursued Al Qaida’s leaders and has successfully diminished its expertise and capability. Nonetheless, Al Qaida remains a sophisticated, if loosely-linked, movement which operates at many different levels. It has not recreated the infrastructure it had in Afghanistan but it has considerable resilience through a number of widespread, covert networks that support its activities. It has made a number of attacks since 11 September and retains the intent and the capability to pose a direct threat to the UK and to British citizens. It has also stimulated other Islamist extremists to attack Western interests around the world.

2.6 We also know, for example from documentary evidence recovered from Afghanistan and arrests this year in France and the UK, that international terrorists are seeking to use chemical, biological and radiological means to enhance their capacity for disruption and destruction. Whilst arrests of senior figures and cell members will have hindered their efforts, their aspirations remain.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

2.7 Continuing proliferation of WMD provides another pressing cause for concern. Some states will continue to seek WMD, particularly as access to the technology and production becomes easier. The means of delivering such weapons are also being proliferated, as we have seen with missile technology transfers from North Korea to a number of states. The international community’s response to such proliferation, particularly of nuclear weapons, must be firm. We do not believe the world community should accept the acquisition of nuclear weapons by further states. Preventing the potential passage of WMD knowledge or weapons from states to terrorist groups is also a key part of the counter-proliferation challenge.
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2.8 Weak and failing states are an increasing problem for the stability of several regions especially on NATO's borders and in Africa. Such states are characterised by political mismanagement, ethnic and religious tensions or economic collapse. They can contain areas of ungoverned territory which provide potential havens and sources of support for terrorist groups and criminal networks involved in drugs production or the plundering of natural resources. Neighbouring states may be drawn into competition for control or influence over these territories and their resources. Internal conflict, poverty, human rights abuse and famine can all create the conditions for mass population movements, adding to pressures on neighbouring countries or emerging as a surge in migration to Europe.

Social and Environmental Factors

2.9 As the world's population continues to grow (particularly in North Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and much of Asia), demographic pressures will have more of an impact on international security. Religious and ethnic tensions, environmental pressures and increased competition for limited natural resources may cause tensions and conflict – both within and between states. The UK may not remain immune from such developments; regional disputes can swiftly become internationalised, and may have a major impact on the global economy, energy security, and our allies and partners.

Regional Analysis

2.10 The UK will engage proactively in shaping the international response to events that impact on our security interests, as well as more broadly fostering international peace and security. But we do not have, or seek, the defence capacity for military responses to each and every risk or crisis. National interest, proximity and responsibility will be among the key factors in determining what, if any, role the UK's Armed Forces should plan to have in dealing with any crisis.

2.11 The SDR judgement that European security is central to our national interests has not changed. The shadow of the Cold War has gone from Europe; NATO and Russia are developing a close working relationship, with their armed forces having deployed alongside each other in the Balkans. There is currently no major conventional threat to Europe, but asymmetric forms of attack, including from international terrorism, pose a very real threat to our homelands. Such threats, along with the proliferation of WMD, are global. We must tackle them assertively at source – wherever that might be – or in transit, using the wide range of tools available to us (political, economic and military). We must also be able to manage the consequences of attacks at home. This approach is reflected in our support for the proposed solidarity clause in the draft new European Treaty which provides that the Union will mobilise all the instruments at its disposal (including the military resources made available by member states) in response to the request of a member state that has fallen victim to a terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster, as well as in our strong commitment to deal with these new threats alongside the US and our other international partners.

2.12 The second enduring SDR judgement was that Europe and those regions immediately adjacent – the Near East, North Africa and the Gulf – are likely to continue to have the most significant bearing on both our own and wider Western security interests. Potentially destabilising social, political, and economic problems demand proactive engagement in conflict prevention, as well as the capacity to respond quickly to emerging crises.

2.13 The Middle East presents the most significant security challenges within this broad area. The Israeli/Palestinian problem is a fundamental issue and the UK will continue to support international efforts to secure a lasting settlement. The Gulf will remain a region of considerable strategic importance, with its energy supplies being crucial to the world economy. Although recent operations in Iraq have neutralised one threat and will continue to have a deterrent effect on others, WMD have proliferated across some countries in the Middle East and beyond and are likely to remain a continuing concern.

2.14 Looking beyond the regions adjacent to Europe, we now need to take a greater account in our planning of a high likelihood of commitments further afield. The threat from international terrorism now requires the capability to deliver a military response globally. Other crises could also occur anywhere across the world but the UK will not be able, nor required, to become involved in every case. For planning purposes, we will as a force focus on those areas where we have strong historical ties and responsibilities.

2.15 Sub-Saharan Africa is a poverty-stricken and unstable region. The conditions that exist are likely to perpetuate a situation of recurring humanitarian disasters. As Sierra Leone has illustrated, there is a political and moral desire to assist in ameliorating the worst atrocities and encouraging, with the EU and other partners, good governance and security sector reform to set the conditions for security in the region. Instability in parts of South Asia may require a significant level of engagement.

International Organisations

2.16 The UK's national security and economic interests are best protected through working closely with other members of the international community. While Iraq exposed differing views within the UN Security Council, NATO and the EU over the handling of that crisis, it does not undermine our continued commitment to the development of these organisations. But we also need the flexibility to build coalitions of the willing to deal with specific threats when necessary.
2.17 The UN will remain the forum through which the international community will debate the handling of major security crises, reinforcing the UK’s key responsibilities as a permanent member of the Security Council. We will therefore seek to foster a strong Council, and support efforts to improve the UN’s performance in peace support operations. However, we need to be realistic about the limitations of the UN and the difficulties of translating broad consensus on goals into specific actions, particularly where proactive military intervention is concerned.

2.18 The UK recognises the pre-eminence of NATO as the alliance upon which Europe and North America depends for collective defence and global crisis management. Since the SDR was published, the Alliance has continued to adapt. It will soon expand its membership to 26 and has developed a working relationship with Russia. NATO’s recently assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan has demonstrated the Alliance’s willingness to undertake tasks outside its traditional areas of concern. The challenge now facing the Alliance is to deliver the capabilities and structures required for effective crisis management and expeditionary forces. The Prague Summit in 2002 set in hand a number of initiatives designed to generate the necessary capabilities, including the creation of smaller and more flexible command structures and the NATO Response Force. A new functional command, the Allied Command for Transformation, has taken responsibility for promoting and overseeing the transformation of Alliance forces and capabilities. The catalyst for this capability development will be the NATO Response Force, with its emphasis on flexible, deployable, technologically advanced and interoperable forces; nations must now deliver the credible capabilities required to make this a reality.

2.19 The UK is a strong supporter of developing EU military capability to complement NATO, rather than competing with it. The EU, with its focus on crisis management operations outside the Union, has now established an operational Common Security and Defence Policy and the military structures required to support it, though significant shortfalls remain to be met before the Helsinki Headline Goal is achieved in full. Arrangements known as ‘Berlin Plus’ provide for the use of NATO planning resources and other assets if these are required for their operations. The EU through ESDP has conducted limited peace support operations in both Macedonia and the Democratic Republic of Congo but considerable further progress, particularly in developing relevant and credible capabilities and eradicating the shortfalls, will be required from nations if the full aspirations set out in the Headline Goal are to be met. We are also encouraging nations to look ahead to the planning of a Future Headline Goal. The UK has promoted a European defence capabilities agency in the draft EU Treaty, to energise the development of capabilities and coordinate associated acquisition policies.
Implications for Defence

3.1 There are currently no major conventional military threats to the UK or NATO – but the threat from proliferation and international terrorism remains very real and in the worst case could result in serious casualties and significant disruption to the national economy and our way of life. The key implications for defence planning that we can draw from our analysis of the security challenge are:

- The UK will remain actively engaged in potential areas of instability in and around Europe, the Near East, North Africa and the Gulf. But we must extend our ability to project force further afield than the SDR envisaged. In particular, the potential for instability and crises occurring across sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, and the wider threat from international terrorism, will require us both to engage proactively in conflict prevention and be ready to contribute to short notice peace support and counter-terrorist operations.

- The UK will not be able to make a military contribution to the response to every international crisis. Generally, where we are involved, we will respond in coalitions with other countries. Therefore we must maintain our existing alliances and develop new partnerships, seek and exploit political and military influence, and ensure access for our forces in times of crisis.

- Our forces must be equipped and configured to fulfil the requirement identified in the New Chapter to protect our citizens at home and counter international terrorism across the globe.

- We must be more prepared for ‘asymmetric’ attacks (those avoiding direct conventional conflict with our military forces) by both state and non-state actors, including the employment of WMD delivered through a variety of means.

Future Need For Forces

3.2 Defending the UK, protecting our interests overseas, dealing with the proliferation of WMD and addressing the threat from international terrorism require a clear focus on projecting force, further afield and even more quickly than has previously been the case. This places a premium on the deployability and sustainability of our forces, sometimes in circumstances where access, basing and overflight cannot be guaranteed. The added demands placed on our Armed Forces by the expanding range of tasks and greater geographical scope of deployment will require our forces and their supporting structures to be more flexible and adaptable. Multiple concurrent Small to Medium Scale3 operations will be the most significant factor in our force planning. Counter-terrorism and counter proliferation operations in particular will require rapidly deployable forces able to respond swiftly to intelligence and achieve precise effects in a range of environments across the world. Regional tensions and potential conflicts are likely to sustain high demand for enduring peace support commitments such as the extended deployments that we have seen in the Balkans and Afghanistan. But our forces must retain the capacity to undertake Large Scale operations at longer notice in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Gulf Region.

3.3 We must therefore plan to support the three concurrent operations, of which one is an enduring peace support operation, that have become the norm in recent years. This requires the rebalancing of the Armed Forces to enable them better to meet the demands of the more likely Small and Medium Scale contingencies and needs to include the enhancement of strategic enablers – communications, logistics and intelligence. We will maintain a broad spectrum of maritime, land, air, logistics, C4ISR4 and Special Forces capability elements to ensure we are able to conduct limited national operations, or be the lead or framework nation for coalition operations, at Small to Medium Scale. But we will not need to generate large-scale capabilities across the same spectrum, given that in the most demanding operations we will be operating alongside the US and other allies, where capabilities such as air defence and naval escorts are less likely to be at a premium.

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3 An example of a Small Scale operation is the UK’s deployment to Macedonia in 2001; Afghanistan (2001) was at Medium Scale; and Operation TELIC, Large Scale. For further information on scales of effort, and the Military Tasks, see Supporting Essay 2.

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3.4 To meet the challenges of the future, in particular the threats posed by international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, and maintain a qualitative edge over potential adversaries, we will need to continue to modernise our forces to concentrate on the characteristics of speed, precision, agility, deployability, reach and sustainability. Key to this process will be our ability to derive the full benefit of advancing technology, particularly in the collection, management and use of information through NEC and increasing the deployability, sustainability and protection of our forces. We will continue to develop effects-based operations and planning, maximising the combined contributions of our available capabilities to achieving decisive military effect (effects are dealt with in more detail in Chapter 4 and Supporting Essay 2). The Ministry of Defence will work with other government departments, particularly the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for International Development (DFID) to ensure that military effects-based planning complements wider strategic planning and the cross-government effort on crisis prevention and management.

3.5 The most demanding expeditionary operations, involving intervention against state adversaries, can only plausibly be conducted if US forces are engaged, either leading a coalition or in NATO. Where the UK chooses to be engaged, we will wish to be able to influence political and military decision making throughout the crisis, including during the post-conflict period. The significant military contribution the UK is able to make to such operations means that we will wish to be able to influence the deployability, sustainability and protection of our forces. We will continue to develop effects-based operations and planning, maximising the combined contributions of our available capabilities to achieving decisive military effect (effects are dealt with in more detail in Chapter 4 and Supporting Essay 2). The Ministry of Defence will work with other government departments, particularly the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for International Development (DFID) to ensure that military effects-based planning complements wider strategic planning and the cross-government effort on crisis prevention and management.

3.6 We must ensure that we continue to play a leading part in the development of NATO and EU (through ESDP) capabilities better configured to conduct expeditionary operations outside Europe. Our Armed Forces will continue to be prepared and equipped to lead and act as the framework nation for ESDP or similar ad hoc coalitions’ operations where the US is not participating.

3.7 As well as contingent operations overseas, routine deployments, combined with our participation in international exercises, do much to promote stability and enhance international engagement. We will also continue to conduct a broad range of non-operational international activities designed to stabilise and strengthen the global security climate by preventing conflict and countering international terrorism. As part of the wider government effort, Defence Relations activities will address the causes of conflict by building regional confidence, reducing tensions and deepening understanding and trust on all sides, through a variety of arms control, counter proliferation, security sector reform and defence education initiatives. Defence Relations efforts will help to combat the symptoms of conflict by enhancing regional conflict prevention, peacekeeping and counter-terrorism capacities through the provision of training and equipment. And when there is the need for the UK to operate overseas to counter threats or contain crises, we will call upon our defence relationships to help secure operational access, interoperability and local political and military support. (The comprehensive strategy that has been devised to better focus and prioritise our Defence Relations activities and resources is described in Supporting Essay 4.)

Home Capability

3.8 The safety and security of the population of the UK is the responsibility of the Home Office and similar bodies and devolved Administrations, delivered through the Police, the other emergency services, HM Customs and Excise, port authorities and local authorities. Some of our military forces are routinely employed to meet specific military responsibilities – such as Air Defence – others support the civil authorities, when requested to do so, in preventing or managing the aftermath of a crisis at home. The military tasks to which the Ministry of Defence allocates specific forces are:

- Air operations to protect UK airspace through radar surveillance and Quick Reaction Alert fighter aircraft – numbers of the latter were doubled after the New Chapter, and will be kept at levels commensurate with the threat;
- Maritime and air operations to deal with threats from renegade shipping – additional investment has been provided since the New Chapter to reduce response times of helicopter-borne response forces;
- Explosive ordnance disposal, including of potential WMD;
- Specialised counter-terrorist operations, including hostage release;
- Operations in Northern Ireland. The Armed Forces will continue to support the Police Service for Northern Ireland’s (PSNI) public order and counter-terrorist operations for as long as they are needed. We will reduce the level of forces committed to this task as soon as the improving security situation and the capability and confidence of the PSNI allows. Ultimately, our aim is to achieve a situation where an element of our deployable force structure is permanently based in Northern Ireland, just as throughout the rest of the UK.

3.9 The New Chapter committed us to improvements in liaising with the civil authorities and emergency services and gave a new role to the Volunteer Reserves – the Civil Contingencies Reaction Force (CCRF). The 14 CCRFs are a way of organising the Volunteer Reserves to exploit their individual and collective strengths based on existing Territorial Army infantry battalions. We have established new posts to administer the CCRF role and their training programmes – an additional two training days for all Volunteer Reserves for tasks assisting the civil authority and an additional five for all CCRF volunteers.
The concept was first set out in a discussion paper in June 2002, with final decisions announced in October 2002. It was welcomed by the emergency services, local authorities, the public and the Volunteer Reserves themselves. The CCRFs will provide a pool of approximately 500 trained volunteers drawn from all three Services in each region to provide, on request, assistance to the local authorities and emergency services whether the problem arose from terrorist attack, accident, or natural disaster.

An Initial Operating Capability was declared on 31 December 2002 with the plan to achieve Full Operating Capability by 31 December 2003. The process of recruiting and training to achieve this goal is well underway. At the end of September, some 5,230 Volunteer Reserves had signed up for the CCRFs. This represents 75% of planned strength, although the geographical distribution is at present still uneven.

CCRF training has focused on the likely roles that individuals and units are likely to undertake in assisting the emergency services, such as access control. Volunteers receive training to familiarise them with their mobilisation process as well as the organisation and procedures used by the emergency services. The command and control of CCRFs has been explored through the participation of Regional Headquarters in contingency planning exercises with the civil authorities. Within each region, a series of practical exercises that include call-out, mobilisation and deployment is now taking place to demonstrate that CCRFs have achieved their Full Operating Capability.

3.10 In liaising with the civil authorities, we learned from the foot and mouth crisis – reinforced by the New Chapter process – that we needed to provide a single point of contact for local and regional authorities and agencies, with the capacity to support round-the-clock operations in the UK when necessary. We announced in the New Chapter that this was to be achieved through Joint Regional Liaison Officers (JrLO) with additional Volunteer Reserve personnel available to augment headquarters as needed. This allows the MOD to participate fully in contingency planning by local authorities and government regional offices. Advance planning makes responses quicker, more reliable and more effective. Most of these 300 people have been appointed.

**The Strategic Deterrent & Missile Defence**

3.11 The Government’s policy on nuclear weapons remains as set out in the SDR. We are committed to working towards a safer world in which there is no requirement for nuclear weapons and continue to play a full role in international efforts to strengthen arms control and prevent the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. However, the continuing risk from the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the certainty that a number of other countries will retain substantial nuclear arsenals, mean that our minimum nuclear deterrent capability, currently represented by Trident, is likely to remain a necessary element of our security. The SDR noted the need to ensure that Trident could remain an effective deterrent for up to 30 years, and the New Chapter noted the continuing role of nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of the UK’s national security. Decisions on whether to replace Trident are not needed this Parliament but are likely to be required in the next one. We will therefore continue to take appropriate steps to ensure that the range of options for maintaining a nuclear deterrent capability is kept open until that decision point.

3.12 Missile defence technology is a growing area of interest following the ending of the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty. Although the technologies are developing rapidly, missile interceptors and other means of destroying missiles will only be able to deal with a limited ballistic missile threat. They are not a substitute for nuclear or other forms of deterrence. However, the addition of active missile defences may complicate the thinking of an adversary. We have agreed with the US to allow the Fylingdales radar to be used for this role, but will continue to examine, with our NATO Allies, the complex web of strategic issues to inform future political and policy decisions. Active missile defences could provide an option for meeting the threat from WMD and its means of delivery. But we will need to consider the right balance of investment between it, forces for nuclear deterrence, and other deterrent, defensive and preventive strategies.

3.13 The UK continues to monitor developments in the potential ballistic missile threat to deployed forces. In parallel, studies looking across the four pillars of Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD) – Deterrence, Counterforce, Active Defence and Passive Defence – have scoped the extent of the capability gap in this area and identified potential solutions. The UK also retains a strong interest in international fora considering how the capability may be met by an alliance. Of particular interest has been the NATO feasibility study that has examined an Active Layered Ballistic Missile Defence capability. The report from this study is in production, and we will assess its implications once it is available.

**Implications for Military Tasks**

3.14 Based on this analysis and our experience from recent operations, we conclude that the UK’s future military capability must be configured to meet a diverse range of contingent operations. These are reflected in a rationalised and updated set of 18 Military Tasks (which are dealt with fully in Supporting Essay 2 and include the Standing Home and Overseas Tasks) that provide the baseline against which we develop our force structures and capability requirements for the future. At home, UK forces must also be prepared to support the UK civil authorities in deterring, countering and responding to the aftermath of a terrorist attack.
4.1 Over the past five years our Armed Forces have consistently and successfully met the extensive operational demands placed on them, clearly demonstrating that the capabilities and force structure put in place by the SDR put the Armed Forces on the right path. If, however, we are to meet future security challenges and exploit to the full the opportunities provided by new technologies, continuing, sometimes radical, changes will be required.

**Delivering Strategic Effect**

4.2 The level of concurrent and sequential crises, and the sheer range of military tasks that the UK is likely to have to meet, place extensive and varied demands on our Armed Forces. Even within individual operations they will often be faced with several tasks at once. This was recently the case in Iraq where our forces simultaneously conducted high intensity combat, stabilisation, and humanitarian assistance operations. Such complexity demands highly adaptive forces that must be able routinely and rapidly to meet the most likely (and frequently occurring) small- and medium-sized operations, whilst also being able to generate appropriate forces for the less frequent, but larger, more demanding and deliberate commitments.

4.3 The SDR New Chapter helped to create a conceptual framework for an effects-based approach to force planning. Further study has confirmed that this approach can be applied beyond a response to international terrorism, across the breadth of military capability. Since the end of the Cold War our force planning has been increasingly more capability-based than threat-driven – reflected in the steadily increased flexibility of our forces. We now focus on operational outcomes in the form of eight strategic military effects – Prevent, Stabilise, Contain, Deter, Coerce, Disrupt, Defeat, and Destroy – which we want to be able to deliver (these are set out in full in Supporting Essay 2) and the joint capabilities required to achieve them. While the concept is still at a relatively early stage, we are now describing our Military Tasks in more generic terms using the language of effects. This supports a future force development process focussed on capability - able to contribute to delivering a range of effects - rather than like-for-like platform replacements. As technology and concepts develop, the joint capabilities needed to deliver these effects will change. This force development approach will ensure that our force structures offer the greatest utility across all contingent military tasks, as well as meeting our routine standing commitments. Conventional calculations of military power in terms of numbers of escort vessels, tanks and fighter aircraft are not yet irrelevant, but they are certainly much less useful.

4.4 Effects-Based Operations is a new phrase, but it describes an approach to the use of force that is well established – that military force exists to serve political or strategic ends. We need a new way of thinking about this that is more relevant to today’s strategic environment. Strategic effects are designed to deliver the military contribution to a wider cross-governmental strategy and are focused on desired outcomes. Our conventional military superiority now allows us more choice in how we deliver the effect we wish to achieve. We have begun to develop our military capabilities so that we can provide as wide as possible a range of options to fulfil operational objectives without necessarily resorting to traditional attritional warfare. Some effects can also be delivered entirely outside the context of active operations, for example through Defence Diplomacy activities as part of long-term conflict prevention.

4.5 In order to deliver a wide range of effects, we need to be able to deploy and configure forces rapidly and have the capability for rapid decision making, accompanied by the precise delivery of force. These characteristics need to be underpinned by an improved ability to exploit information that can then be translated into synchronised responses to achieve decisive military effect. The ability to detect the emergence of threats, to understand their nature, and our adversaries’ motivations, intentions and capabilities allows us to target their weaknesses and better identify our own vulnerabilities.
4.6 Our opponents may now increasingly resort to unconventional means as a way of circumventing the conventional military superiority of Western forces. Achieving a significant information advantage over our opponents will better prepare us to face such asymmetric threats and plan appropriate responses. And Effects-Based Operations demand that we exploit to the full our own capabilities to act asymmetrically.

4.7 NEC is crucial to the rapid delivery of military effect. The SDR New Chapter recognised NEC as being fundamental in countering terrorism abroad, with its ability to deliver precise and decisive military effects, with unparalleled speed and accuracy through linking sensors, decision-makers and weapons systems. Clearly, its applicability and utility is much broader than that and will involve the effective integration of military capability. When implemented, it will allow us to prosecute the full range of contingent operations with greater awareness, confidence and control. It relies on the ability to collect, fuse and analyse relevant information in near real-time so as to allow rapid decision making and the rapid delivery of the most appropriate military force to achieve the desired effect. In addition therefore to the provision of a digitised communications network itself, we must also ensure that the appropriate sensors are available to gather information and that our forces have the appropriate reach and deployability to achieve rapid effect. The ability to respond quickly and decisively to achieve maximum effect should also act as a force multiplier, allowing the same military effect to be achieved with less. NEC will improve communication and understanding of strategic and military intent throughout the chain of command. Through NEC the command structure will improve its responsiveness to events on the ground and have the flexibility to respond in near real-time to fleeting targets, even where higher-level decision making is required prior to engagement.

Capability Implications

4.8 It is highly likely that the Armed Forces will, in future, be more frequently employed on peace support and counter-terrorist operations where the focus will be on conflict prevention and stabilisation, rather than the defeat of opposing forces. But high intensity combat can occur across most of the spectrum of operations, and it is our success in such situations that will remain the benchmark against which to judge operational capability.

4.9 Striking the right balance of capabilities to meet all eight strategic effects will not be easy. We will not be able to hold on to platforms or force elements that do not have the flexibility to meet the demands of future operations. In particular, it is now clear that we no longer need to retain a capability against the re-emergence of a direct conventional strategic threat to the United Kingdom or our allies. Priority must be given to meeting a wider range of expeditionary tasks, at greater range from the United Kingdom and with ever-increasing strategic, operational and tactical tempo. Demand in these circumstances falls most heavily on key enablers, such as logistics, and scarce high value assets. The new capability we plan to introduce will only be effective when employed by highly trained, professional forces. Alongside the investment in equipment and systems, we will also invest in training the people that operate them to develop the skills they will need to realise the potential benefits of the new technology.
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People

Our ability to deliver an effective expeditionary capability will depend on our ability to sustain sufficient, trained and motivated Armed Forces personnel. Developing and sustaining our ‘personnel capability’ – in parallel with our equipment and logistic capabilities – is essential to operational success. Ultimately, the delivery of effective operational capability relies on our ability to deploy sufficient numbers of Armed Forces personnel with the right skills and training, supported by civilian personnel. We are developing a new Service Personnel Plan to better manage delivery in this critical area.

Recent efforts to improve recruitment have delivered results but we are continuing to look for innovative ways to discuss the benefits of a Service career with young people. One recent initiative is the use of a mobile recruitment centre in the London area.

On retention, we have an array of policy initiatives designed to sustain our people and their families. These range from policies designed to impact directly on front-line operational effectiveness, through to policies designed to adequately reward our personnel. Financial Retention Incentives have also been employed to help overcome the shortages of certain specialisms within the Armed Forces. Beyond this there are policies designed to support our personnel away on operations such as the Operational Welfare Package (which we have extended to provide additional assistance for families) and policies for the family which seek to improve both choice for accommodation and the support we offer.

The quality of the training and education we provide is vital for developing and getting the most out of our people - it underpins operational capability, improves retention and enhances personal development. We are one of the largest training organisations in the UK, and to maximise the return on our investment, we conducted a Defence Training Review in 2001. Key initiatives include the creation of a single focus for training and education policy, the formation of the Defence Academy in 2002, and a Defence-wide e-Learning Delivery and Management Capability that will be introduced early in 2004 and enable greater access to e-learning facilities when and where required. The investment in our people has a wider payoff. Every year thousands of service personnel leave the Forces and take up jobs in the outside world, their skills, experience and accredited qualifications gained during service benefiting UK plc through their contribution to the economy and to society.

We must also improve our ability to identify potential problems and to deliver the right solutions. The Joint Personnel Administration system will be essential in achieving this, revolutionising pay and personnel administration. In time it will provide a single source of authoritative and increasingly real time data for the personnel of all three Services, which we can use to develop future policy.

The Supporting Essay on People (Essay 5) contains further details of the particular challenges we face and the specific policies we have developed in response.

Land

4.11 Future land forces will be equipped and trained to deliver a decisive impact across the full spectrum of operations. An appropriate force package will be selected for each operation, drawing from a flexible and balanced land force structure. UK land forces currently consist of a mix of heavy and light capabilities. The former offer firepower, integral tactical mobility and protection necessary to carry out ground manoeuvre warfare but require a considerable effort to deploy and support on operations. Light forces in contrast can deploy rapidly anywhere in the world but lack much of the firepower, mobility and protection necessary to conduct decisive operations against an enemy equipped with armour and mechanised forces. To increase our flexibility in responding to crises, a new set of medium weight forces will be developed, offering a high level of deployability (including by air), together with much greater levels of mobility and protection than are currently available to light forces.

Maritime

4.10 Our emphasis in the maritime environment is increasingly on delivering effect from the sea onto the land, which includes a land attack capability, supporting forces ashore and on securing access to the theatre of operations and protecting the crucial sea lines of communications from the home base. The new amphibious ships coming into service over the next two years, together with the existing small aircraft carriers and Tomahawk land attack missiles, offer a versatile capability for projecting land and air power ashore. We are developing the increased use of secure joint sea-based logistics, particularly for operations where Host Nation Support is limited or where, for force protection or political reasons, we would wish to reduce our ashore footprint. The introduction of the two new aircraft carriers with the Joint Combat Aircraft early in the next decade will offer a step increase in our ability to project air power from the sea. The Type 45 destroyer will enhance protection of joint and maritime forces and assist force projection. Some of our older vessels contribute less well to the pattern of operations that we envisage, and reductions in their numbers will be necessary.
4.12 Medium weight forces will not, however, remove the requirement for heavier armoured forces, the attributes and advantages of which were demonstrated in the conflict in Iraq. Heavy forces will continue to be held for operations where the greater protection and combat power offered by Challenger 2, Warrior and AS 90 is required. Moving to a more graduated and balanced structure of light, medium and heavy forces will over time lead to a reduced requirement for main battle tanks, other heavy armoured fighting vehicles and heavy artillery, offset by a new requirement for medium-weight forces based on the Future Rapid Effects System family of vehicles. We judge that we can reduce the size of our armoured forces now. We intend to create a new light brigade and reduce the number of armoured brigades from three to two. This new brigade will both enhance our existing intervention capability and enable the Army to meet more easily the roulement demands posed by enduring peace support tasks through the availability of an additional pool of combat forces as well as key logistics and other specialist enablers. Plans for future Army forces structures are still evolving – further details will be announced in 2004.

4.13 The forthcoming introduction of the Apache attack helicopter represents a step change in capability compared to current in-service helicopters. Attack helicopters will be in high demand to support the full range of contingent tasks, not just Large Scale operations. We are therefore reviewing how best to integrate the capability into an Army force structure optimised for Medium and Small Scale operations.

4.14 We want to be able to project air power from both the land and the sea, offering capabilities across the range of air operations, but with a clear emphasis on offensive effect. Storm Shadow missiles will provide an air launched long range stand-off precision strike capability, while the increasing availability of ‘smart’ bombs such as Paveway IV ensure high degrees of accuracy in our offensive operations. Additionally, Typhoon and the addition of the Joint Combat Aircraft, will offer much greater flexibility and balance in the air component of the future, reducing the need for single-role fast jets. Multi-role capability will also allow deployed force packages to be smaller where coverage of multiple roles have previously required additional aircraft. We are now considering how and when we should reduce the numbers of combat aircraft in order to reflect these developments.

Strategic Enablers and Logistics

4.15 The increased frequency and duration of operations has emphasised the need to plan carefully and utilise our logistic enablers to best effect. This has led us to consider logistics as a component of capability in its own right. Recent deployments have reinforced the importance of visibility of assets, and better understanding of the relationship between lead times and stockpiles, in order to improve the synergy between our stock-holding requirement and ‘smart’ contracts with industry (either to stockpile for us, or to manufacture quickly as and when required). This in turn will enable us to reduce logistic risks in our planning for future operations.

4.16 We will also strive to minimise logistic demand by improving the inherent reliability and ease of maintenance of equipment, and the effectiveness and efficiency of engineering and asset management processes. This will be optimised within the logistic elements of the NEC framework.

4.17 The requirement to plan to support three concurrent operations, one of which is an enduring peace support operation, requires rebalancing and further investment in a range of strategic enablers and logistics. We will seek to reorganise logistic enablers to maximise their utility on expeditionary operations, seeking to project a smaller, lighter and more rapidly deployable initial presence, while alleviating the demands placed on specialist personnel.

4.18 Such rapid deployment of land and air combat power is dependent on having sufficient sea and air transport with the capacity to lift over-size loads. The core of this capability will continue to centre on the C-130 fleet, and the A400M when the latter replaces older C-130s from 2011. We have already announced that we are considering the options for retaining a small force of C-17s after A400M enters service, in order to carry the largest air deployable items. We now also have our fleet of six Roll-on/Roll-off vessels that proved their worth in moving our forces to the Gulf. They are crucial to achieving a rapid build up for Medium Scale operations. Entering service next year will be the first of four new Landing Ships Dock (Auxiliary) which will replace the older Landing Ships Logistic – each new ship will be capable of deploying twice the quantity of vehicles and stores of their predecessors. We also have plans to procure new ships under the Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability programme, which, when in service, will deliver afloat support to deployed forces. For larger, more deliberate operations, we will continue to need to charter both air and sea lift to augment this core capability.

4.19 Increased protection for our Armed Forces on operations is an area of continued importance and an important strategic enabler. In particular, we will continue to work hard at improving combat identification so as further to reduce the potential for ‘friendly-fire’ incidents. In the face of continuing proliferation of WMD, we must maintain the capability of the Armed Forces to operate when faced with the threat or use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons, by developing enhanced detection systems, physical protection, vaccines and other medical countermeasures.
Expeditionary Logistics

To support future expeditionary operations, our focus is increasingly on the development of logistics as an enabling capability: a highly effective, agile and networked component that underpins the operational commanders’ ability to execute their mission successfully. It will be joint, integrated and interoperable, tested and developed to provide military commanders with confidence in their ability to deliver effect at the required tempo. Success will be built on balanced, adaptable systems and force elements combined with converged, lean logistic processes.

This approach is fundamental to the support of a modern expeditionary strategy that emphasises flexible force packages and their rapid deployability, exploiting maritime, air and land based lines of communication over potentially extended distances. A lean, agile and networked logistic support system can enable rapid deployment, with reduced footprints, whilst providing the required sustainability at the right time to the right place, in order to meet the demands of rapid reaction expeditionary operations.

To implement such an approach – in which we seek to exert influence over industrial capability – we will continually strive to minimise unnecessary logistic demand by improving the reliability and serviceability of equipment; replacing the physical provision of unnecessary stock with assurance of supply from industry; and improving asset and stock visibility.

The benefits of such an approach have already begun to yield results, as was demonstrated in Operation TELIC:

- The procurement of a limited Total Asset Visibility system improved our understanding of the benefits to be derived from a networked logistic component.
- In terms of delivering effect and tempo, the DLO moved similar amounts to that deployed for Operation GRANBY, but did so in half the time.
- Work to minimise logistic demand by improving the inherent reliability of equipment resulted in availability levels of 90% for the 120 Challenger 2 tanks deployed on operation TELIC.

C4ISR

4.20 Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) is the term we use to describe the enabling activities that provide knowledge at all levels of operations so that our response to contingencies can be planned, organised and executed effectively. This includes an understanding of the threat, the environment (political, social and physical) and our own capabilities. Effective C4ISR has the ability to gather, analyse and distribute such information to manage efficiently all aspects of operations and lies at the heart of NEC. Our aim is to be sufficiently proficient at C4ISR to operate at a tempo that will outpace and dominate potential adversaries, including when we face an asymmetric threat. We also need to be able to operate alongside our most technically advanced allies and in coalitions of the willing.

4.21 We are investing heavily in digitised communications systems to provide the heart of the ‘network’. Both BOWMAN, at the tactical level, and FALCON, at the operational level, represent major enhancements to our C4ISR capability. Specialist communications personnel represent a particular manpower ‘pinch point’ and we are reorganisation and enhancing this area so as to provide a more robust deployable capability able to support a larger number of deployed headquarters.

4.22 The MOD has already placed considerable investment in developing stand-off sensors, such as Unmanned Air Vehicles (eg WATCHKEEPER) and improved electronic warfare capabilities (eg SOOTHSAYER). The ASTOR airborne battlefield surveillance system will meet the Army and RAF requirement for surveillance, reconnaissance and target acquisition information. It will also provide the UK’s contribution to the Alliance Ground Surveillance project. Exploiting these systems to the full also requires us to enhance the fusion, analysis and accessibility of data collected so as to improve responsiveness and provide better support to deployed commanders. Improved stand-off sensors do not, however, remove the requirement for timely and accurate human intelligence (HUMINT), particularly in the field at the operational and tactical levels.
**Joint Rapid Reaction Force and Readiness**

4.23 Operational experience since 1998 has confirmed the central importance of the SDR concept of graduated readiness. The Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF) will continue to provide the pool of high readiness forces for rapid commitment to operations, at up to Medium Scale. We are currently assessing what changes need to be made to the forces assigned to the JRRF to reflect the increased frequency of Small and Medium Scale operations. We are also looking carefully, in light of lessons identified from operations in Iraq, at how we can improve the ability of our forces to prepare in advance of a commitment to specific operational deployments. One key step already identified is to seek to organise our land forces in particular with robust, deployable establishments so as to minimise the requirement for units and formations to be reinforced with additional personnel on deployment.

**Harmony**

4.24 The recent level of commitments faced by all three Services has imposed demands on some of our people and assets that are not sustainable on a routine basis. This at least in part is because a number of critical ‘pinch point’ enabling capabilities, including certain logistic support, medical, engineer and other specialists, are not appropriately structured to meet the demands of multiple concurrent operations. A key element of our force rebalancing will, therefore, be to ensure that resources are reallocated to those capabilities currently over-employed on operations. In the Army we will rebalance key support elements towards the brigade from the divisional level. Other more specialist single service and joint capabilities will continue to be held at a higher level, but with sufficiently robust establishments to meet the harmony guidelines established to avoid excessive burdens being placed on individuals.

**Reserves**

4.25 Our Reserve Forces have evolved since SDR to become an integral part of the UK’s military capability for all types of operation. They have played a key role in recent operations (to date, over 7,500 Reservists have been mobilised for operations in Iraq) and the demand for their support seems likely to continue. We will continue to use the Reserves, not only for Large Scale operations but also to reinforce some specialist capabilities such as medical and logistic support to smaller scale deployments. This will require ever-closer integration between the regular and reserve elements of the Services and a commitment to improve the relationship between the Services, the Reservists themselves, their families and their employers. Our Reserves policy is explored in greater detail in Supporting Essay 3.

**Concepts and Doctrine**

4.26 Concepts and Doctrine are the processes through which we develop our requirements for future military capability to meet our required effects and establish how we will subsequently apply military capability to achieve those effects. The Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC), established as a result of the SDR, working with the single Services and the Permanent Joint Headquarters, continues to have an important role in explaining and establishing how we will subsequently apply military capability to achieve those effects. The JDCC is also finalising a new, high level operational concept that integrates the flow of operational information in order to generate fast and robust decision making and enable the Armed Forces to operate at a much higher tempo than a potential adversary, thereby improving our ability to respond to modern crises.

**Collective Training**

4.27 Robust and effective collective military training is critical to the generation of capable forces and the need for more rapid response times will require both joint and combined (i.e. with allies) training to be undertaken on a regular basis before specific operations have been identified. It will continue to be underpinned by a number of fundamentals, including single-Service ethos and fighting spirit, and effective lower-tier training activity in the maritime, land and air environments. However, the focus will be on joint, combined and fully integrated training for operations that cross all components of capability. To meet these demands we must continue to exercise at the operational level, as was so effectively demonstrated in 2001 on Exercise SAIF SAREEA. Additionally, our more routine tactical exercises will build in a greater degree of joint training to ensure that we can meet the full range of short notice Small and Medium Scale commitments. In the future this will include novel ways of using a network of live and virtual training environments.
5.1 Our success will be judged by the operational performance of our Armed Forces and the Department’s aim is therefore to maximise military capability as effectively as we can. This requirement impacts on all areas of the Department, from combat units through to supporting organisations and the processes we use. Our continuing focus is to ensure we have the structures and process to develop, deploy, sustain and operate the military capability required to conduct expeditionary operations and to achieve the range of strategic effects. This focus, encapsulated in the Defence Vision (set out at Annex), combined with our desire to adopt the most efficient and effective way of conducting our business, brings significant operational benefit and value for money for the taxpayer.

Defence Management

5.2 To generate and sustain military forces, we have to combine the components – such as people, training, equipment, logistics support – which together produce military capability. This task of ‘joining up’ is the key one facing all managers in defence. In order to achieve it, we apply a number of tools across the business of defence. These include:

- Clear objective setting through, for example, the introduction of Service Delivery Agreements;
- Identifying cost drivers by thorough analysis of business processes;
- Risk planning through the establishment of risk registers and by fostering a culture that manages risk rather than being risk averse;
- Performance improvement through the Defence Change Programme;
- Performance management through the Defence Balanced Scorecard.

5.3 Effective management needs to be applied across the business of Defence in order to achieve enhanced military capability. Smart Acquisition engages this, from customer to end user, by aiming to acquire and sustain assets and services more effectively at lower risk and with reduced through life costs. The effectiveness and efficiency of logistics processes is being addressed by the Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO) which combines the single-Service elements. The End to End Review of Logistic Processes in the air and land environments (see Supporting Essay 6), which recently reported its findings, examined logistic support processes throughout Defence to find ways of improving their effectiveness and efficiency.

5.4 The need for effective management applies equally in the areas of infrastructure and people. Across the Defence Estate, the Core Site Rationalisation Initiative is starting to provide more coherent estate management. Rationalisation programmes are also underway across defence training and education based on the findings of the Defence Training Review, and in the provision of medical support (the Defence Health Programme). Supporting Essay 6 covers our approach to Defence Management in greater depth.

Lyons Review

The Lyons Review is a cross-government initiative to look at public sector relocation from the South East, where it is concentrated, to the other regions. In recent years the Department has already relocated a significant amount of defence activity from London and the South East, notably to the South West. Through our corporate management of the Estate around key core sites we aim to create a Defence Estate of the right size, shape and location. The implementation of this Core Sites Strategy has informed our active engagement in the Lyons Review, the principles of which continue to inform our estate strategy.
Head Office

5.5 Working closely with Other Government Departments to formulate policy and strategy, and as the directing military headquarters during crisis management and operations, the MOD Head Office needs to be increasingly responsive and flexible. Internal reorganisation and the redevelopment of the MOD Main Building as part of the Head Office Modern Environment (HOME) programme will bring about an important step change in the ways in which we conduct business with improved ways of working and increased connectivity. It will allow the headquarters activities to be concentrated in two Whitehall sites, with one further building in central London, as part of the overall reduction in Head Office staff in central London from over 12,500 in 1990 to less than 5,200 by the time the redevelopment project completes in 2004. Five London buildings will be released as a result (bringing the number of buildings the MOD occupies down from more than 20 in 1990 to just 3). We will continue to work with both the Efficiency Review and the Lyons Review to deliver further reductions in both the size of the estate and numbers of personnel. This process will be enhanced through the Defence Information Infrastructure programme, which will replace 300 diverse information systems worldwide, providing greatly increased interoperability and the basis for progress towards the implementation of e-Government, as well as substantial savings.

Equipment and Technology

5.6 Future military capability is dependent upon the equipment our forces operate, and the technology that underpins this. At the heart of the equipment programme will be the development of our NEC. This will involve both bringing together previously unconnected capabilities and ensuring that new systems and platforms are ‘network ready’. Throughout we will continue to seek the right balance between quality and quantity in the equipment we buy. Our equipment must:

- Be inherently deployable and logistically frugal to reduce the logistic burden on our deployed forces;
- Provide greater protection, including combat identification, across our capabilities and, most importantly, when working with coalition forces;
- Place the lowest practical demands on our manpower with improved ergonomics and more effective, integral training systems;
- Be able to survive and remain useable when faced with the threat of CBRN weapons;
- Be readily adaptable to allow capabilities to be modified to deal with new threats or undertake new tasks, and to capitalise on the opportunities offered by new technologies.

5.7 The increased use of experimentation through the prototyping of live systems and the use of synthetic environments will ensure that equipment is network ready, fit for purpose and used to best effect.

5.8 Continued investment in science and technology will remain critical if we are to develop and sustain effective capabilities in the face of new and emerging threats. Through its new output driven strategy, the Defence Science and Technology Board will ensure that we get the right investment balance between sustaining in-house expertise and developing new technology in our supplier base.

5.9 We are also strengthening the UK defence technology base by expanding our research supplier base and also by developing new partnerships with industry and the academic sector. Following the successful completion of the sale of a controlling stake in QinetiQ to the Carlyle Group, we are progressively introducing competition in the defence research programme. By 2007, some 70% of the programme previously sourced only through QinetiQ will be placed through competition, delivering improved value for money and enabling a far wider supplier network to bid into the programme. Through initiatives such as Defence Technology Centres and Towers of Excellence, we have developed new relations with our key industrial suppliers, small- and medium-sized companies and many Universities. These will help ensure we are able to generate the right technologies in the supplier base at the right time to meet our future capability requirements. Our research focus and partnership strategies are examined further in Supporting Essay 7.
People

5.10 We need personnel policies that cover all stages of a service person’s career, from thinking about joining to leaving the Forces afterwards. The Services develop their people throughout their careers in order to meet the range of tasks required to generate military capability. A series of new initiatives is in hand, including a new strategy for Defence Housing; tri-Service disciplinary arrangements; new pension and compensation arrangements; modernised Joint Personnel Administration and rationalised delivery of individual training. The Veterans Initiative joins central Government and the voluntary sector in a cross-cutting programme designed both to celebrate and make the most of the skills and achievements of our service men and women while ensuring that the more vulnerable are supported. People results this year have been positive – with an increase in the size of the Forces and a reduction in under-manning. But we will need to continue to invest in targeted and effective measures if we are to sustain this improvement. Looking more widely, we will continue to explore every opportunity to work in a more joint fashion (between the Services and with the Civilian Personnel structures), ensuring that the Services, Head Office and supporting organisations work ever more closely together, and by driving forward the key change programmes.

5.11 The modern Civil Service requires a motivated workforce with the right skills and flexibility to support Ministers and the Armed Forces now and into the future. Our new civilian Human Resources Strategy addresses the priority issues of better planning, performance, development, and improved people management to deliver this objective.

Youth and Community Projects

Defence makes some important contributions to the civil community through its, often low, profile work in support of schools and young people, veterans, and life-long learning:

The MOD sponsored Cadet Forces attract 130,000 young people from 12 to 22. These bring adventure and enjoyment to young people with a view to steering them towards responsible citizenship. They also lead many cadets into full-time and reserve service with the Armed Forces.

Skillforce is a national youth initiative that uses recently retired military instructors to provide Key Skill activities to 14-16 year olds who are in danger of becoming disaffected with the formal academic education system. 23 teams involve 2,500 young people in almost 100 schools, with improved attendance rates (over 90%) and reduced exclusions (70%).

Outreach is an Army Cadet Force programme for 12-14 year olds who are identified as either Crime Vulnerable or Socially Disadvantaged.

The Veterans Task Force promotes the interests of Service Veterans through a range of cross-government initiatives. It aims to ensure that at least 80% of Service Leavers find work within six months of leaving the Armed Forces, and works in conjunction with the Homeless Directorate and the Social Exclusion Unit to assist the small percentage of veterans facing difficulty in adjusting to civilian life.
6.1 Our Armed Forces will remain a crucial and important element of our national response to a diverse range of threats and crises that may impact on the UK and our global interests. The breadth of the tasks they will be required to undertake, from peacekeeping, humanitarian support and confidence building operations through to counter-terrorism and large-scale combat operations, demand that our forces be flexible and responsive, multi-roled and able to reconfigure to achieve the desired outcome. In taking forward effects-based planning and operations, our focus will move away from simple calculations of platform numbers to developing network enabled capabilities designed to achieve a range of strategic effects. A new range of equipment and systems entering service over the coming years will greatly enhance capability and ensure that UK forces remain amongst the finest in the world.

6.2 This broad range of operations will continue to be undertaken on a multinational basis in an equally broad alliance/coalition structure. UK forces can expect to conduct operations alongside and integrated with US, NATO, European, UN or other forces under various command arrangements, as well as purely national operations. While a major focus will be on furthering interoperability with US forces, we will need to continue to improve our capacity to operate with our European and other allies. Encouraging and supporting others to develop the skills necessary to engage in multinational operations is also an important strand of our policy.

6.3 To achieve our mission within this challenging strategic environment will require flexibility across Defence, from our people, structures and equipment. We must adapt to stay ahead of potential adversaries and be prepared to make tough decisions to ensure that our forces and equipment deliver the required capabilities. Force structures will need constantly to evolve as we seek to exploit new technologies, techniques and equipment to improve capability and respond to the changing strategic environment. Through this process of continuous improvement and adaptation, we will ensure our Armed Forces are ready and equipped to face successfully the challenges of the future and contribute to wider international security.
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Annex

The Defence Vision

DEFENCE VISION

Defending the United Kingdom and its interests.
Strengthening international peace and security.
A force for good in the world

We achieve this aim by working together on our core task to produce battle-winning forces:
• fit for the challenge of today;
• ready for the tasks of tomorrow;
• capable of building for the future;

We have shown we succeed in what we do. We must continue to adapt to a more uncertain world. We will be flexible and creative, harnessing new technologies and ideas to make best use of our resources.

We will base our future direction on:
Providing strategy that matches new threats and instabilities
We face new challenges and unpredictable new conditions. Our strategy must evolve to reflect these new realities.

For the future this means:
• evolving strategy and military doctrine that is flexible and geared to changing conditions;
• behaving with speed, flexibility and creativity as an organisation—in the way we work and the way we respond to external events;
• holding fast, in the face of change, to our underpinning military traditions and commitment to public service.

Maintaining flexible force structures
As our strategy evolves, we will develop force structures to maintain battle-winning capabilities that are relevant and effective against emerging threats.

For the future this means:
• greater focus on capability rather than delivery platforms;
• developing pace of deployment and impact;
• increasing precision of effect;
• flexibility and agility in terms of platforms and equipment;
• the highest standards of professionalism among men and women imbued with fighting spirit, well trained and properly equipped.

Reaching out into the wider world
We are major contributors to the business of government and to society as a whole. We will increasingly recognise and manage our contribution.

For the future this means:
• working closely with other Departments, with the private and voluntary sectors in the UK, and with our allies abroad, to integrate the military, diplomatic, economic and social components of crisis resolution;
• strengthening our links with the Civil Departments to implement the government’s domestic agenda—making our contribution in the regions, and providing support in civil emergencies;
• playing a key role as part of wider society, for example in our contribution to training and skills and to health;
• helping the rest of government benefit from making wider use of our skills in project management and delivery;
• working in closer partnership with the private sector to deliver value for money.

Leading a high-performing organisation
The many demands on the MOD, including its role as military headquarters, require us to be first class in the way we lead and manage the business of defence.

For the future this means:
• clear leadership at all levels, focussed on delivering the vision;
• managers free to get on with tasks and held to account against clear objectives;
• demonstrably effective management of our resources;
• stripping out bureaucracy, with ways of working that are simple and ‘fit for purpose’ and using common standards wherever possible;
• working flexibly, with project and task-based teams.

Investing in our people
We are world leaders in many aspects of how we manage and develop our people. We will build on this with strong leadership and focused investment.

For the future this means:
• providing strong unified leadership, service and civilian personnel working together;
• benefiting from diversity by recruiting service and civilian personnel reflecting society as a whole and with the right skills for the task;

• balancing rewarding successful performance with robust management of poor performance;

• being a learning organisation, sharing knowledge, committed to developing our people.

By holding true to these principles we will move forward together to maintain and enhance our capability.

We draw on our commitment to public service and military traditions, acting as one organisation to achieve our shared purpose.
SUPPORTING ESSAYS

1. International Organisations
2. Military Tasks and Scales of Effort (Effects Based)
3. Reserves
4. Defence Relations
5. People
6. Defence Management
7. Industrial Policy