



The Pakistani Muslim Community in England

Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities



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The Change Institute

March 2009

Department for Communities and Local Government

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1 Executive Summary

1.1 Introduction and context

This report is one of thirteen reports on England's Muslim ethnic communities commissioned by the Cohesion Directorate of Communities and Local Government in order to understand the diversity of England's Muslim population and to help enhance its engagement and partnership with Muslim civil society.

The primary goal of the research was to detail the main population and community locations, identify denominations and religious practices, and identify the strengths of links with the country of origin. An overarching objective for the project was to identify how government could best engage and work in partnership with specific communities.

For many of these communities, there was little pre-existing research specific to the community, although because of the way in which ethnicity is recorded in official surveys there is relatively more research available for the Pakistani and Bangladeshi community than there is for the other communities included in this study.¹ Hence the research was expanded to include other areas such as identity, language use, socio-economic situations, and intra-community dynamics. Since the country and migration contexts are important, these have also been briefly detailed.

The relatively limited scope of this study in relation to individual communities means that there is still a great deal more research needed in order to establish comprehensive knowledge and understanding about the different communities. This study provides first insights into the communities rather than offering firm conclusions, and hence should be understood as a starting rather than an end point in getting to know the different communities covered by the research.

This report details the research findings for the Pakistani Muslim community. Individual reports for the other twelve communities covered by the study, as well as a separate report synthesising the overall research findings, are available from Communities and Local Government.

¹ Whilst this report is about the Pakistani community in England, some data referred to in this report is UK wide and not necessarily specific to England. When data for UK has been used this has been made clear in the text.

1.2 Migration and England's Pakistani Muslim population

Large scale immigration to Britain from Pakistan began in the 1950s, when Britain encouraged migration from the former colonies to satisfy its post war labour needs.² Migration increased significantly in 1961 prior to the Commonwealth Immigrants Act (1962) which restricted automatic entry to the UK for Commonwealth citizens.³

Most of these Pakistani migrants were economic migrants from Northern Punjab and the rural Mirpur District of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), who began to migrate when the town and its surrounding areas were submerged by the waters of the Mangla Dam. The introduction of the 'voucher system'⁴ in the 1960s also aided movement from Pakistan by allowing those who were already in Britain to arrange jobs and vouchers for their relatives and friends. During the 1950s and 1960s, those that migrated were largely single men, who were later joined by their families in the 1970s and 1980s. There are still Pakistani migrants arriving in Britain for marriage purposes, or on temporary student and work permit visas. The latter tend to be highly skilled professionals such as doctors and other health professionals.

According to the 2001 census there were 706,539 Pakistanis in England of which 650,516 identified themselves as Muslim. Forty-three per cent of all Muslims in England are Pakistani. In 2007 the Office for National Statistics provided population estimates for mid-2005 and estimated the Pakistani population in England to have grown to 825,500 by this point. Based on the same growth rate and the census data on religion the Pakistani population in England in mid-2008 would be 899,000⁵ and the Pakistani Muslim population would be 827,080.

Of the three South Asian communities, the Pakistani community is the most evenly spread across the UK, although it is still concentrated in particular areas – Lancashire, Yorkshire, West Midlands and Greater London. Greater London, as a whole has the largest Pakistani population, but at the local authority level Birmingham has the largest Pakistani population followed by Bradford and Kirklees. More than half of the Pakistani population growth since 1991 is accounted for by UK born Pakistanis. Currently Bradford has the largest proportion of its total population (15%) identifying themselves as of Pakistani origin in England.

² Simon Ross Valentine (2005), *Muslims in Bradford, UK*, Background Paper for COMPAS, University of Oxford.

³ Humayan Ansari (2002), *Muslims in Britain*, Minority Rights Group International.

⁴ Commonwealth Immigration Act 1962 introduced the first entry restrictions on British Commonwealth citizens in the form of the work voucher system as the primary means of immigration.

⁵ ONS Population Estimate Updates 2005.

Pakistanis encompass a number of distinct regional and linguistic groups including Pathans, Punjabis, Mirpuris, Sindhis and Balochis. There are no accurate figures available but it is estimated that 60 per cent of the Pakistani population is from the Mirpur District of Kashmir and settled mainly in Birmingham, Bradford, Oldham and surrounding towns. In London the community is more mixed.

1.3 Identity, religion and language

The identity of different generations varies, with the elders from the first generation still feeling a strong connection towards their country of birth. The second generation also has a deep connection to Pakistan, but to a much lesser extent than their parents. The third generation of young people see themselves as primarily British and this forms a strong part of their identity. As the country of birth of their parents and grandparents, they still have a deep personal or psychological association with Pakistan, but one that is a substantially diminished part of their own personal identity in comparison to their parents. However, the majority of community members of all ages and generations unequivocally describe themselves as British Muslims.

The identity issue has become more critical for young people post 9/11 and 7/7. The mass increase in Islamophobia, negative publicity and the general perception about Muslims, are causing many young people to feel unsupported by the British system and culture, and made to feel like strangers in what they consider as their home. Young Pakistanis who are also navigating their way through multiple identity paradigms, both ethnic and religious and emerging identities are not solely linked to a historical past or a cultural present informed and influenced solely by their Pakistani heritage. For a generation of young Pakistanis growing up in the UK, a 'pan-ethnic' identity, informed through contact and interaction with the wide range of cultures that form the Muslim diaspora in the UK, is part of the process of being British.

According to the 2001 Census, 98 per cent of Pakistanis in England are Muslim⁶, with a small (1%) Christian minority. The majority of Pakistanis are Sunni Muslims, though there are smaller numbers of Shi'a Muslims. The four most important movements in the UK are the Deobandis and Tablighi Jamaat, Barelvis or Sunni Sufis, the Jamaat-e Islami and the Ahl-e-Hadith. Other groups with a more Arab influence are the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafis, and Hizb ut-Tahrir. Communities did not arrive in the UK with an automatic loyalty to these movements. This had to be won in the early period of community formation. Between the 1960s and the 1980s, when the sectarian segmentation of mosques was most noticeable, this could be seen in the fierce rivalry for mosque control that was mostly played out between the Deobandi influenced outreach movement, the Tablighi Jamaat, and the Pakistani Sufi orders known as the Barelvis.

⁶ For those who stated their religion.

Key religious organisations for British Pakistanis include the UK Islamic Mission, the British Muslim Forum, the Union of Muslim Organisations, the Islamic Society of Britain and its youth arm, Young Muslims. The Federation of Islamic Student Societies (FOSIS) also represents a significant number of Pakistani youth, as does the Muslim Student Trust. There are also a number of representative bodies which provide a platform for mosques in specific regional or local areas.

There is some difference of opinion concerning the main language spoken by Pakistanis in Britain, which may in part be related to the different parts of the country that respondents come from. Some suggest that Urdu is the most widely spoken, whilst others believe that Punjabi is, in both mainstream Punjabi and Mirpuri dialect forms. There is consensus however that the Urdu script is the most widely used for reading and writing. Other main languages and dialects include Pashto, Sindhi, Saraiki and Balochi. Young people communicate mostly in English.

1.4 Socio economic status

The Pakistani population is one of the most economically disadvantaged ethnic groups in the UK, and are more likely to be considered 'poor' under official classifications than their white counterparts. However, macro-analyses and population averages hide considerable regional, class and ethnic variations. Despite being below-average on most socio-economic indicators, the Pakistani population is steadily improving its educational (secondary and tertiary) and labour market outcomes.

Whilst there is still a substantial gap between the educational attainment of pupils of Pakistani heritage and the national average, increasing numbers of young Pakistanis, male and female, are successfully entering higher education and moving into the professional sphere occupations. There are indications that the economic trajectory of the Pakistani community is now beginning to mirror that of the indigenous population, with a majority middle or aspiring middle class, alongside an underclass of mainly young people who have left school with no qualifications and are caught up in drugs and criminality. Whilst officially unemployed, many are part of a thriving and 'informal economy'.

1.5 Intergenerational dynamics, young people and the role of women in the community

Respondents reported that a key area of concern between the generations is the loss of culture and tradition. This particularly concerns the first generation, and, to an extent, the second generation, who feel that the third generation is losing its cultural and religious identity. Additionally, existing community support structures that were established to meet the needs of the earlier generations have not kept pace with the changing needs of the

community, particularly young people and women, and traditional leadership has not been able to transform community organisations, structures and means of service delivery to serve the needs of young people.

Whilst the Pakistani community is facing similar differences and communication difficulties between the generations as other communities, interviewees stressed that there is still a great deal of respect for one another's achievements. Young people spoke about the need to develop better communication and understanding with their parents in order to bridge the gaps that exist, and many older people express a strong pride in the educational, professional and social advances made by their young people. However, there is also a high level of criticism of those young people who are attracted towards extremism and violence and towards drug use and crime.

There is acute concern within the community about the influence of those promoting and recruiting young people to extremist and violent interpretations of Islam. Older generations in particular feel that there is an ideological battle taking place with a wide range of external and international actors involved and that unless the community actively engages internally with its young generation, external forces will dominate and determine the future direction of the community.

Unlike their mother's generation, who were largely restricted to the home, most young women have the expectation of working and developing their professional careers. Pakistani girls and women are outperforming their male counterparts in compulsory and higher education, and women are becoming more visible in all walks of life: corporate, media, political and community based. Leadership is being demonstrated through a growing number of women who are taking a leading role in politics and other arenas as councillors, mayors, journalists, and by women in high profile jobs in the public sector. However, women stress that they still have to reconcile these aspirations and goals within the framework of a patriarchal culture – 'to be someone in a man's world'.

Women's organisations try and address some of the barriers women and girls face but these kinds of organisations, such as the Henna Foundation and the An-Nisa Society, are rare and poorly resourced. Similarly, a limited number of nascent national Muslim women organisations have emerged in recent years including the Muslim Women's Network, but these represent a range of ethnicities and also face funding constraints. Some male organisations are beginning to be more inclusive of women and have opened up their premises for more activities and planned events which are organised and led by women, for women. However there is still a long way to go before women gain parity and equal status within the community.

1.6 Cohesion and integration

Many of the Pakistani Muslims who took part in this study are critical about current debates about integration and cohesion. They feel that these debates only arise when there is a sense of public crisis, and that these ignore the reality of a multicultural Britain in which communities by and large live side by side in harmony and mutual respect. The use of the term integration is particularly resented, as it is felt to imply a one sided focus on minority communities, as opposed to being promoted as a two way process. There is also a widespread view that no matter how much minorities try, the majority community will never accept them as truly British. Some are also very critical about the low levels of awareness and lack of interest in the host community about minority communities and cultures.

There is a high level of anger about the perceived increase in Islamophobia in British society and the stereotyping of all Muslims as potential terrorists or terrorist sympathisers. This makes people feel that their loyalty and British identity is being questioned. Most people in the community believe that, like mainstream society, the majority of Pakistanis view acts of terrorism as a serious crime and hence the exploitation of terms to link all Muslims with terrorism is a very serious issue.

Whilst undeniably there are some young Pakistanis that are influenced by extremist ideologies, young people in this study were on the whole more positive about integration than older people, and recognised that communities and individuals have to sacrifice and lose a part of their culture in the process on both sides, incomers and the host community. Some young people proposed that differences in cultural values and lifestyles play a significant role in integration. Paradoxically, some also felt that in some ways young people are more segregated and ‘tribal’ than the older generation was and less likely to step outside their own culture and peer group.

1.7 Media and links with country of origin

Perceptions of the UK media are extremely negative and the overwhelming view is that the media is completely anti-Muslim. Most people believe that Muslims only ever make the news as terrorists, fundamentalists or extremists, and air time is generally devoted to people who either speak against Muslims or to Muslims with distorted radical ideologies of their own which do not reflect the views of the majority. Most believe that with such a hostile media, there is no hope of the true nature of Islam to be appreciated by the general public.

Whilst most people use the mainstream British press and TV for news and entertainment, there is also a considerable amount of media consumption that is of Pakistani origin. This includes a wide range of satellite TV channels, both Islamic and entertainment based, radio stations, printed media and the internet. Much of the Pakistani media is of more interest to the older generation, whereas younger people are more likely to access information on the internet and via TV than from the print media.

Pakistani families have maintained close links with Pakistan and their families there since their arrival in the UK but these links are weakening with the third generation. Travel between Pakistan and the UK has consistently been a strong link and sending of remittances to families has been a critical element of connection, and whilst the tradition is still maintained, it is not at the same level as the days of early migration.

Pakistanis remain highly engaged with the political situation as it unfolds in Pakistan, and there are many formal visits by politicians both ways. Another key influence that drives political links is the effort by Pakistani political parties to establish their political structures and affiliations in the UK. These parties have local office bearers in Britain, which creates a local medium for political, social and religious links for individuals and groups, as well as fundraising in the UK.

There are substantial business and commercial links between Pakistanis in the UK and their country of origin. Additionally, the existence of various national charitable organisations that work in Pakistan and Kashmir have also helped in maintaining close links.

1.8 Civil society and civic engagement

The civil society infrastructure varies across different parts of the country. Due to the size and duration of the Pakistani community in the UK, its civil society structures are relatively well developed. In general, the Pakistani community has made limited use of the mainstream civic institutions such as leisure centres and other voluntary sector services. The emphasis has been on separate facilities, which have largely been catered through self funding and some through public grants. There are now literally thousands of associations and support organisations focusing either specifically on the community, or catering for South Asians in a broader sense. Many civil society organisations are religiously informed, and it is difficult to separate discussions about civil society from discussions about religion. Mosque structures have existed for quite some time and have played a primary role in community development over the years.

Mosques and religious leaders have historically been seen as a key influence, but there is a growing feeling that mosques are no longer able to maintain this leadership role. Many management committees are seen to be stuck in the old and traditional approaches which are incompatible with the needs of the younger generation. The most influential people cited repeatedly by respondents after parents and family are local councillors and successful businessmen.

The Pakistani community is actively engaged in local and national politics. Until the 1970s, entry into the public and political sphere was largely in response to concerns about racism and discrimination experienced by Pakistanis and other black and minority ethnic communities in the UK. Political affiliation also developed along UK mainstream party political lines, with the majority of the Pakistani community traditionally viewing the Labour

Party as a natural home. This has changed over time and affiliation now cuts across all three major parties as well as new ones such as the Respect Party. Whilst engagement to date has predominantly involved men, recent years have seen a rise in the number of Pakistani women occupying positions in the public and political realms.

The character of Pakistani political participation has also significantly evolved and is increasingly based on religious identity and Muslim community concerns. This development is said to have had its genesis in the 1980s as a consequence of Muslim organisations and religious groups responding to the publication of the Satanic Verses by Salman Rushdie. The incident is believed to have energised pre-existing Muslim community organisations and networks into a new political and social activism, influencing the emergence of new groups such as the Muslim Parliament and the Muslim Council of Britain. This activism has since been reinforced in response to heightened security and counter-terrorism concerns that many feel discriminate against Muslims and demonstrate a pervasive Islamophobia.

Perceptions about the UK government vary from community to community and person to person. However the perception of unconditional support by the Blair government for American policy on Iraq and Afghanistan has had a considerably negative impact on the level of support that exists for the government. In terms of the wider interests of the community, people appear to be generally happy with the government's policies on health, employment and social welfare.

At local levels there is a strong feeling that small ethnic minority voluntary organisations are being squeezed out by numerous consortiums and forums that now seem to control all funding flows in local areas. These are seen to be dominated by white voluntary or statutory sector staff in full time paid posts, whilst people from the community who are often struggling without pay and resources, or who do not have the appropriate language and communication skills, are being excluded or marginalised. There is also a lot of cynicism about general consultation exercises by local and central government agencies. Many people believe that most of the time public authorities come to them to conduct consultations and questionnaires purely because their own delivery plans requires them to do so, rather than out of any genuine desire to consult or engage communities.

The identified civil society capacity development needs are seen as not very different to the development needs of mainstream communities and voluntary organisations and include: community development funding to support micro community groups, education and training for community groups and management committees to address local needs, consultation that leads to real action in the form of programmes and activities to meet identified community needs, and better coordination and networking to share information and resources and to develop joint provision.

Recommendations arising from community respondents include:

- Improving engagement by identifying and working with those individuals in the community who have the capability and understanding needed to communicate and engage equally with both local authorities and minority communities. Such people would be more effective in sign posting relevant pathways to enable stronger partnerships and networking between authorities and communities
- Direct and public consultations that involve people who have a day-to-day involvement with communities at the grassroots level as opposed to trying to access the community through identified gatekeepers, as well as liaison with existing community organisations in local areas to promote and raise awareness of the issues that the government wants to consult about
- Engagement should not be a one off process but should be embedded as a strategic policy and procedure, perhaps in the form of a partnership document between community and government, with clear milestones to achieve and targets to meet
- Allowing community organisations to govern the approach in structuring strategies for dialogue in ways that are appropriate and accessible, rather than imposing unfamiliar approaches on communities
- Development of a fully representative organisation in each local area that highlights community issues and offers solutions to the Council and government. Young people and women should be particularly encouraged and facilitated to participate in such a body.

Other recommendations:

- Provision of funding and capacity building support to women's organisations and groups
- Further research into the experiences and attitudes of young people from lower socio economic backgrounds
- Research into the impact of radicalism on women and the role of women in preventing extremism
- A detailed study of the historical development and current scope of Pakistani civil society.

2 Introduction

Communities and Local Government recognises that there is a need to enhance its understanding and knowledge of the diverse Muslim ethnic populations in England, particularly relating to some of the specific smaller communities of African, Middle Eastern and other Asian countries of origin. As such, Communities and Local Government commissioned The Change Institute (CI) to deliver the research project 'Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities' (UMEC). The 13 ethnic Muslim communities that the Cohesion Directorate was seeking more information about were those originating from:

- Afghanistan
- Algeria
- Bangladesh
- Egypt
- India
- Iran
- Iraq
- Morocco
- Nigeria
- Pakistan
- Saudi Arabia
- Somalia
- Turkey.

Reports have been provided under separate covers for each diaspora community, along with separate synthesis and technical reports.

2.1 Objectives of the research

There were four objectives for the research:

- **Mapping**
Develop population maps for each ethnic community outlining the spread of the population and identification of high density clusters
- **Identification of denominations and pathways**
Collect information on the grassroots institutions/key individuals working with ethnic communities and the breakdown of these ethnic communities by denomination/sect/clan

- **Identifying strength of links and capacity of ethnic communities**
Collect information on the strength of links between each ethnic community and country of origin (including influential institutions/ individuals/media channels/religious influences). Also to collect information on the relative strengths and weaknesses of civil society infrastructure for each ethnic community, highlighting where capacities need to be developed
- **Identifying how government can best engage with ethnic communities**
Develop recommendations on the ways in which Communities and Local Government can best engage with and understand Muslim ethnic communities in England, including recommendations on avenues of communications and delivery to these communities.

These objectives translated into six key questions that the study needed to address:

1. Where are the key ethnic groups of the Muslim population located?
2. What are the latest estimated sizes and demographic make-up of the key ethnic communities?
3. Which denominations and/or other internal groupings do these ethnic groups belong to?
4. How can Communities and Local Government best engage with these communities?
5. What are the strength of links between the ethnic communities and country of origin?
6. How developed is the level of social infrastructure for each group?

During the course of the desktop research and fieldwork, we obtained data on other facets of the community such as socio-economic position and intra-community dynamics. In order to provide additional context to users of the report we have included this information where it was felt this would be valuable to the reader. However, it should be noted a comprehensive socio-economic description or analysis of the community was outside the scope of this study. We also took the view that the migration and history of each community's country of origin was important and often offered potential explanations for the location; intra-community dynamics, including political, social and cultural characteristics; and development of the diaspora communities in the UK.

2.2 Report structure

The report is structured to address the key research questions set out previously. Sections 6 and 7 are primarily based on quantitative secondary data. Sections 8 to 12 draw primarily on the qualitative research corroborated by secondary sources where these are available. Finally, Section 13 draws together specific recommendations arising from the research.

3 Methodology

The research questions represented a broad area of inquiry and analysis. While quantitative data about the size, location and other demographic features of the priority communities was a key research need, the study primarily focused on enabling Communities and Local Government to ‘know’ these communities in depth.

To fulfil these research requirements, the methodology developed needed to combine documentary research with processes of consultation and dialogue. Data collection consisted of two phases which were consistent across each community.

PHASE	ACTIVITY	METHOD
1	Population mapping	Review of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Existing literature National data sources Local data sources and consultations with local authority, other public bodies and community representatives. These were conducted to cover all 13 communities in this study.
2	Qualitative data collection	Community interviews (205 total, 21 with Pakistani community) Focus groups (30 total, two with Pakistani community and four with Muslim youth from all ethnic backgrounds)

In addition, we conducted 15 interviews with local government and voluntary services stakeholders across England to discuss their existing experiences of working in partnership with and supporting Muslim civil society organisations across all the Muslim ethnic communities that we researched.

3.1 Project Phases

Phase 1: Population mapping

The first phase consisted of collecting mainly secondary quantitative data but also some primary data about locations of Muslim ethnic populations and known civil society organisations. The main method for data collection on population characteristics was through a comprehensive review of a broad range of secondary data sources, including the Census, Annual Population Survey, output of migration and population think tanks and academic research centres. This initial literature review assisted in developing a detailed picture of data currently available in the public domain, and in identifying key gaps in the existing knowledge base. It also helped in identifying key locations for each diaspora to be

targeted in the community research which followed, as well as identifying key stakeholders and community interviewees.

Robust and up-to-date population data is difficult to obtain outside of the 2001 Census although the Office for National Statistics has also provided population predictions by local authority area for 2005. This informs some of the population figures quoted in this study, but they are not available by religion so the 2001 census figures are used wherever statistics are used with respect to religious identity of the Pakistani population in England. It should also be noted that unlike other studies in this series, the data on Bangladeshi, Indian and Pakistani populations is based on 'ethnicity' rather than country of birth statistics because of the categories for ethnicity collection in official surveys. This means that unless stated statistics for the Pakistani population include all 'ethnic' Pakistanis irrespective of the country they were born in.

In relation to Pakistanis, there is a considerable amount of quantitative data since the ethnicity is included in most official surveys. To place some of the qualitative information in context we reviewed the findings from Communities and Local Government's *Citizenship Survey* (2005 and 2007) and the report *Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society* (2007) as well as statistics from the Labour Market Survey and additional academic and policy literature.

Phase 2: Qualitative data collection

Qualitative data collection has been undertaken primarily through 12 one-to-one interviews with key respondents ('those who might be expected to know'), and 2 focus groups with individuals from the Pakistani community. This phase of the research was carried out between April and July 2008.

3.1.1 In-depth interviews

The interviews assisted in developing an overview of national and local contexts: the make-up of diaspora communities, key issues concerning violent extremism including perceptions, experiences and activities, current initiatives in place to counter this and existing civil society structures and development needs. The interviews also assisted in identification of further key contacts for the one-to-one and focus group research and covered a range of topics including:

- Key data sources
- Denominations and pathways
- Key influencers and institutions
- Key issues and needs for the specific diaspora
- Links with countries of origin
- Civil society structures and capacity needs

- Current levels of contact and key barriers to engagement with public authorities
- Media consumption
- Appropriate communication channels for engagement and involvement.

The majority of interviews were conducted face-to-face, with some by telephone where necessary.

Respondents were chosen on the basis that they offered a range of different types of knowledge and perspectives on community issues and dynamics.

Selection of interviewees involved drawing up a 'long list' of key contacts in each community in consultation with community interviewers, expert advisers and contacts made during the first phase of research. Shortlists were produced to ensure that there was adequate female and youth representation and a regional spread that reflected the distribution of the community in England. Additional names were added on the basis of subsequent recommendations made.

Interviews for the Pakistani community research were conducted by a researcher from the Pakistani community. The researcher was already familiar with many of the civil society organisations in the Pakistani community. This added legitimacy to the process of enquiry that was critical in opening up discussion and enabled us to gather rich and sometimes controversial data.

The profile of the twenty-one respondents was as follows:

- Fourteen male, seven female
- Four were in the 18 – 24 age range; six were 25 – 34; Seven were aged 35 – 44 and two were aged 45-55 and two were aged over 55
- Ten were from the Greater London area, and 11 were from outside London (Bradford, Calderdale, Birmingham, Dewsbury and Suffolk)
- Thirteen were involved in community or religion based roles, five were in youth services or education related roles, two were professionals, one worked in the public sector.

A quality control process was used by CI to ensure consistency and quality across each community. This involved:

- Piloting: Each community researcher was required to carry out two to three pilot interviews in each community to refine approaches and questions where necessary. This included a detailed discussion with each researcher following the pilot interviews, with expert adviser involvement where necessary, as well as a review of the interview field notes to ensure that relevant data was being picked up by researchers

- Each community researcher was assigned to a member of the core research team who reviewed field notes on an ongoing basis, and regular internal team meetings were held to share findings and ensure consistency across the project.

3.1.2 Discussion groups

In addition to the individual interviews, we conducted two focus groups that allowed for collective insights to be generated on community needs and issues, including challenges and practical ways forward. These explored partnership issues, civil society infrastructure and capacity development needs, media and communications. While these focus groups were limited in number, they provided a rich and often diverse set of views that complemented the data gathered in the one-to-one interviews.

Focus groups were designed to include a mix of participants from different community networks and different occupational backgrounds who might be expected to hold a wide range of views. Participants were recruited by the core research team through local community organisations and CI networks.

One male and one female focus group was conducted which were attended by individuals over 35 years of age. The focus groups were conducted in Bradford in June 2008.

	Location	Born in the UK	Born outside of the UK	Age range
Group 1 (Female)	Bradford	0	6	35+
Group 2 (Male)	Bradford	0	5	35+

Groups were facilitated by CI directors and analysts, with additional support from community researchers. The female focus group was conducted in Urdu and so any quotes used from this have been translated.

In addition to the two focus groups for each community, four youth focus groups were conducted in London, Birmingham and Bradford with youth from a range of ethnic backgrounds. The findings of these focus groups are discussed in the summary report.

This report uses selective quotes from the interviews and focus groups to illustrate key recurring themes and issues arising during the qualitative data collection. Where necessary they have been carefully edited for ease of reading, or understanding what was meant.

3.2 Analysis of data

Data analysis involved generating understandable patterns by comparing what different respondents/focus groups said about specific themes or questions. The central question was whether the data and information and the range of views expressed led to the same

conclusions. Findings were validated by triangulation of all data and information collected in both project phases so far as possible, and by critical internal reflection and review within the CI team.

The analytical process involved reviewing field notes to develop emerging themes in line with the analytical framework, which was done in collaboration with the field researchers; regular internal meetings to discuss findings from all communities; dedicated internal workshops on the communities to finalise analysis; reviews from expert advisers; feedback from ‘community reviewers’ and a formal peer review process.

Intercultural understanding of responses and non-responses was also essential in considerations of the data generated. A set of commonly held assumptions and understandings in any cultural group may mean that some things are simply left unsaid – because they are commonly understood in the group and do not require articulation. In addition literal translation or interpretation may simply misrepresent or miss the significance of what is being articulated. In this context in particular there will often be a distinction between what is said, and might be noted or recorded, and what is meant. Looking for meaning, silences and body language was often as important as what was said. A good example of potential misinterpretation that came up many times was body language indicating discomfort and unwillingness to pursue a particular line of enquiry.

Finally, and most importantly, we were *reflexive* in our approach, critically reflecting on the role and influence that our own research intervention may be having on key respondents and focus groups, using critical judgment and being conscious of the need to interpret with integrity in relation to what we were seeing and hearing.

3.3 Limitations of the research

Data analysis represents both general and particular challenges in the current social and political context, as well as specific challenges in relation to some of these communities. These include:

- The sample sizes for each community were relatively small and respondents were not intended to be a representative sample of the relevant communities
- Because the interviews were not based on a random sample, the study does not claim to provide an analysis of the Pakistani population as a whole, nor was this the intention of the study. We have analysed views and comments in the context of existing data, knowledge of the current political and social context for these communities, and the comments of other respondents

- Many aspects of the topic guide were designed to identify the key needs and challenges facing the community.⁷ Hence the research tended to generate data on problem areas and challenges, particularly in focus group discussions when respondents felt they had limited time to ensure that their voices got heard. This may not reflect many of the positive and optimistic views of respondents. However, respondents were often aware that the discussions may come across as negative in tone, and were quick to try and balance this by highlighting perceived positive aspects of both their communities and their lives in the UK. We have endeavoured to set out the 'best' story (in terms of explanatory power) in the context of what is already known about why some of our respondents might express negative feelings
- In the current context, the politicisation of the research field meant that all respondents were conscious of being part of a community under public and government scrutiny. Respondents were made aware of the purposes of the research through a 'showcard' that explained the research as well as possible uses of the research.⁸ They were informed that this research would potentially be used to inform a publication that would enter the public domain and would cover aspects such as religion, intra-community dynamics and links with country of origin. A climate of some scepticism within Muslim communities, discrimination, both real and perceived, and awareness of government interest in 'what is happening' on the ground, meant that respondents were often sceptical about the use of the information that they were providing. Many will have had agendas (for positive as well as negative reasons) when asked about issues for their communities, which may have influenced their responses (eg representing their community as having few or no problems, or conversely, as having many or major needs and/or issues with public authorities)
- This also created a number of practical difficulties in research terms, including difficulties in getting interviews with particular types of respondents, hesitancy and caution in some responses, and a closing off of some lines of questioning in relation to religion, identity and differences
- The researchers' analytical response to these difficulties was to be critically attuned to who was speaking, their location in the community, the interests that they may have, and to judge their comments in the light of this context. Researchers were aware that there are dynamic and charged debates and movement taking place within these communities on a whole range of issues ranging from religion, its expression and orientation in the context of being Muslim minorities living in a non-Muslim society, to negotiations about roles, responsibilities, duties, gender relations, and relationships with country of origin. This awareness underpinned the analysis of the data and the conclusions drawn from responses received.

⁷ The topic guide is included in the Technical Report, available from Communities and Local Government.

⁸ The showcard is included in the Technical Report, available from Communities and Local Government.

For all these reasons, the research should be viewed as a ‘snapshot’ in time rather than reflective of the full complexity or range of issues, challenges and changes taking place in these communities (eg, intergenerational relationships, gender roles, perceptions of ethnic and religious identity, changing attitudes among the young (both in liberal and more radical directions) and the levels of integration or tensions within and across communities). We are conscious of the dynamism and the rapid changes taking place in some communities, both positive and negative.

4 Country profile and history



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The Islamic Republic of Pakistan was created following the partition of India in 1947 along predominantly religious lines, involving the largest mass movement of people since the Second World War. Pakistan is the second most populous Muslim country in the world after Indonesia. Of its 168 million people, approximately 96 per cent are Muslim (77%

Sunni, 20% Shi'a).⁹ Under General Zia-ul-Haq in the late 1970s, Pakistan's formerly secular policies came to an end through the introduction of the Shariah legal code, which increased religious influences on both the civil service and the military.

Since its creation, a series of military governments, interspersed by periods of civilian rule, have characterised the political landscape of Pakistan. Between the death of General Zia ul Haq in 1988 and the Pakistani military coup d'état led by General Pervez Musharraf in 1999, Pakistan enjoyed a period of civilian rule, with political power alternating between Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Having resigned his role in the military in order to head off a growing challenge to his Presidency, Pervez Musharraf's position was further weakened following defeat in parliamentary elections in February 2008 that followed the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007. The majority of the votes were won by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), which made an alliance with the Pakistan Muslim League and appointed Yusuf Raza Gillani prime minister in March 2008. Following President Musharraf's resignation in August 2008, Asif Ali Zardari was elected as President in September 2008.

Since independence, Pakistan has faced a series of wars, ethnic tensions and inter-communal violence. In 1971 the creation and independence of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) limited the country to the region of the former West Pakistan, and ongoing disputes with India about Kashmir continue up to present times. In addition to the country's own turbulent history, there has been a close relationship with conflicts and events taking place in neighbouring Afghanistan, for both geopolitical reasons, and because of close cultural ties that exist across the largely porous border of the North West frontier. From being a key supporter of the Taliban regime, since 9/11 Pakistan has become an increasingly important partner in the US led War on Terror, with Pakistani forces actively engaged in the process of identifying and arresting suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban-linked militants. However, since the election of the PPP as the ruling party, with Zardari as President, Pakistan's relationship with the US and the West has become strained. Militants in the northwest are blamed for rising attacks on U.S. and NATO forces in neighboring Afghanistan as well as for the surge in suicide attacks within Pakistan. US frustrations at the perceived lack of Pakistan action against militants has led it to firing missiles across the Pakistan border as well as threatening to undertake air strikes in the region. These actions have angered Pakistani lawmakers and the Pakistani public as violations of the country's sovereignty. Parliament has recently warned against unsanctioned US 'incursions' on Pakistani soil, and called for a review of Pakistan's national security strategy, with dialogue with militants as the highest priority.

Nuclear-armed Pakistan is also in the midst of an unprecedented economic crisis brought on by high fuel prices, dwindling foreign investment, soaring inflation and militant violence. In October 2008, the government formally requested financial help from the International Monetary Fund to avoid an immediate economic meltdown.

⁹ Statistics Division, Government of Pakistan. 2008
www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/statistics/other_tables/pop_by_religion.pdf

5 Migration history and trends

Britain has by far the largest and most prominent Pakistani diaspora community internationally. Migration patterns from Pakistan to the UK have developed according to a complex mix of socio-political, cultural and economic factors. The first migrants set sail in the early 19th century from the Mirpur District of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) in Pakistan. Their final destinations span the globe and populations are found in Australia, Sri Lanka and the UK to name but a few countries of residence. More recently there were two major contributing factors that assisted migration from Pakistan to the UK. The first was the partition of India, when Pakistan (East and West) was created, and the second was the construction of the Mangla Dam¹⁰ in Pakistan in the 1960s.

Large scale immigration to Britain from Pakistan began in the 1950s, when Britain encouraged migration from the former colonies to satisfy its post war labour needs.

Most of these were economic migrants from rural areas of the country who came with a view to returning to Pakistan once they had made enough money in Britain¹¹.

People began to migrate from the AJK region of Mirpur and Mirpur District in the 1960s when the town and its surrounding areas were submerged by the waters of the dam. Approximately 100,000 people were displaced and many were offered either cash compensation or work permits for the UK. Many chose to use their cash compensation to join their friends and families in the UK.

The introduction of the 'voucher system'¹² in the 1960s also aided movement from Pakistan. This allowed those who were already in Britain to arrange jobs and vouchers for their relatives and friends. The voucher system reinforced kinship and friendship bonds and had a major impact on the patterns of settlement. The Mirpuri Development Project has estimated that Mirpuris make up around 70 per cent of the British Pakistani population: the biggest concentrations are in northern mill towns such as Bradford, Leeds, Derby, Rochdale, Blackburn and Huddersfield.¹³ Other Pakistani migrants have come from areas such as Punjab, Campbellpur, Nowshera and Gujarat.

During the 1950s and 1960s, those that migrated were largely single men, both educated and uneducated. They found employment in the UK's industrial and service sectors in areas

¹⁰ The Mangla Dam on the River Jelhum is the twelfth largest dam in the world. Construction of the dam, which was completed in 1967, had a huge impact on surrounding areas, particularly the town and district of Mirpur, large parts of which were submerged by the waters of the dam, displacing approximately 100,000 people. The UK government was one of the international guarantors for the irrigation project, and so the displaced were awarded migrant status to the UK as part of the compensation package. For a detailed account of this migration, see: I. Imran. (1997) *Home from Home – British Pakistanis in Mirpur*, Bradford Heritage Recording Unit (Bradford: City of Bradford Metropolitan District Council Arts, Museums and Libraries) in Gazdar, H (2003) *A review of migration issues in Pakistan*, Collective for Social Science Research p13

¹¹ Anwar, M.(1979) *Myth of Return: Pakistanis in Britain*.

¹² Commonwealth Immigration Act 1962 introduced the first entry restrictions on British Commonwealth citizens in the form of the work voucher system as the primary means of immigration.

¹³ Malik, S (2005), 'A Community in Denial', *New Statesman*.

with labour shortages in the West Midlands, West Yorkshire, and Lancashire, in cities such as Birmingham, Bradford, Manchester, Newcastle-on-Tyne, and Glasgow in Scotland. After some years they were joined by their families and dependants. Until 1962, Pakistanis could enter Britain without restriction as British subjects under the 1948 British Nationality Act. The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrations Act barred new workers from the British Commonwealth, although it still permitted family reunion.¹⁴ The 1962 Act had a decisive effect on the pattern of migration by turning a movement of temporary workers into a permanent immigration of families. The Act was a major spur to permanent settlement as families had to choose between being together in Britain, or divided for lengthy periods between Britain and Pakistan. The threat of forthcoming controls accelerated the process of migration, with the numbers of migrants from Pakistan greatly increasing in the 18 months prior to the passing of the Act.¹⁵ The 1962 restrictions had the effect of reinforcing existing patterns of emigration, with a person's migration depending on prior contacts in Britain.

In five years between 1961 and 1966 the Pakistani population in Britain grew by over 400 per cent, from about 25,000 to 120,000.¹⁶ Between 1973 and 1981 a further 82,000 people came as settlers, almost all of them being the dependants of men already here.¹⁷ The Act also involved the issuing of 'B vouchers' for people with professional backgrounds, and contributed therefore to a more rapid creation of a Pakistani middle-class than would otherwise have happened. In the period 1965-1967 vouchers were issued to 1,264 doctors, 577 teachers and 632 engineers and scientists, all from Pakistan.¹⁸ In 1969, new migration restrictions which restricted migration to incoming marriage partners and immediate family led many Pakistanis to apply for British passports and then began to bring over their wives and children for fear they might lose their entitlement to British citizenship.¹⁹

Family reunification has continued since the 1960s but at much lower levels than its peak in the 1960s and 1970s. The 1980s and 1990s witnessed another wave of migration from Pakistan to the UK due to economic hardship. From the 1960s onwards the region of Mirpur had received a high level of remittances, which over the years has led to the region becoming highly dependent on money from overseas. The 1980s saw a sharp decline in remittances to Mirpur, which in-turn led to a 'severe economic recession' and another wave of economic migration from the District.²⁰ Recently there has been a shift in Mirpur's choice of migration destination. Due to the number of Mirpuris in the UK there is greater knowledge amongst the diaspora of the overwhelming unemployment many face here. According to one academic:

¹⁴ Phizacklea and Ram, 1995 Phizacklea, A., Ram, M. (1995), 'Ethnic entrepreneurship in comparative perspective' *International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour & Research*, Vol. 1 No. 1: 48-58.

¹⁵ Shaw, A (2000), *Kinship and continuity: Pakistani families in Britain*, Amsterdam: Harwood Academic.

¹⁶ Runnymede Trust (1997), *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All*, London: Runnymede Trust.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.


¹⁹ Pnina Werbner (2004) 'Pakistani Migration and Diaspora, Religious Politics in a Global Age' in Melvin Ember, Carol R. Ember, & Ian Skoggard (eds), *Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures Around the World* (pp. xx). New York: Kluwer Academic/ Plenum Publishers.

²⁰ Ballard, R. (2005) 'Migration, Remittances, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction: reflections on some South Asian developments' in Siddiqui, Tasneem (ed) *Migration and Development: Pro-poor policy choices* Dhaka: The University Press p. 333 – 358.

They know that jobs are scarce, and that racism is widespread. So ambitious young men now set their sights on a visa which will allow them to work in Libya, Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates.²¹

Migration in the 1980s and 1990s from other parts of Pakistan has also partly been driven by social and political repression in Pakistan, resulting in a considerable rise in the number of people seeking asylum from the late 1990s onwards (see chart 1). Since 2001, 10,999 applications have been received.


Chart 1: Asylum applications by Pakistanis to the UK 1980 – 2006
(Source: Home Office)



There are still Pakistani migrants arriving in Britain for marriage purposes, or on temporary student and work permit visas. The latter tend to be highly skilled professionals such as doctors and other health professionals. Since 1999 there has been a significant increase in the number of grants of settlement given to Pakistanis as shown in Chart 2. Between 1991 and 1998 grants of settlement averaged 6,400 per year, but since 1999 they have averaged 11,300 per year.

²¹ Ibid.

Chart 2: Pakistani grants of settlement 1991-2006 (Source: Home Office)



6 Community demographics and key locations

Pakistani Muslim population in England (2001): 650,516²²

Pakistan-born Muslim population in England (2001): 287,857²³

Unlike the majority of the other communities in this study, official surveys in England record Pakistanis as a discrete ethnic group. This means that, unlike population figures provided for other communities, the figures for Bangladeshi, Indian and Pakistani populations include individuals born in Britain and outside these countries. According to the 2001 census there were 706,539 Pakistanis in England of which 650,516 identified themselves as Muslim – 43 per cent of all Muslims in England.

In 2007 the Office for National Statistics provided population estimates for mid-2005 and estimated the Pakistani population in England to have grown to 825,500 by this point.²⁴ Based on the same growth rate and the census data on religion, the Pakistani population in England in mid-2008 would be 899,000²⁵ and the Pakistani Muslim population would be 827,080.

More than half of the Pakistani population growth since 1991 is accounted for by British-born Pakistanis. According to the 2001 census, 86 per cent of Pakistanis aged 0 to 14 were born in the UK. Between 1991 and 2001, the number of Pakistanis born in the UK increased by 77 per cent, and the number of people born in Pakistan increased by 58 per cent.²⁶ The age profile of Pakistanis is also much younger than the average for England. For example, the proportion of Pakistanis aged 0 to 15 in London is a third higher than the London population on average and nearly half of Pakistanis in London are aged under 25, compared with under a third on average.²⁷

Of the three South Asian communities, the Pakistani community is the most evenly spread across England, although 77 per cent of the population lives in four regions: West Midlands, London, Yorkshire and Humberside and the North West – see Table 1. The ward with the highest proportion of Pakistanis is the Whitefield ward in Pendle (67%) and in London it is Clementswood ward in Redbridge (19%).²⁸

²² Census 2001, S104.

²³ Census 2001, CO644.

²⁴ This figure is based on ONS Estimates from 2005 assuming the same year-on-year growth to 2008. The most recent official estimate is the 2005 figure noted in the text. ONS (2007), *Estimates by Ethnic Group for local authority districts and higher administrative areas in England for 2005*.

²⁵ ONS Population Estimate Updates 2005.

²⁶ Data Management and Analysis Group Briefing 2005/4, 2001 Census Profiles: Pakistanis, January 2005.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Data Management and Analysis Group (2005), Briefing 2005/4, 2001 Census Profiles: Pakistanis, London: Greater London Authority.

Table 1: Distribution of Pakistani population and Pakistani Muslim population by region (Source: 2001 Census, S104)

Region	% of Pakistani population who are Muslim	Pakistani Muslims	% of total Pakistani population in England	Pakistani Muslims as % of total regional Muslim population
West Midlands	93	144,348	22.2	66.8
London	92	130,653	20.1	21.5
Yorkshire and The Humber	92	133,990	20.6	70.9
North West	93	108,466	16.7	53.1
South East	92	53,602	8.2	49.3
East of England	91	35,324	5.4	44.8
East Midlands	92	25,644	3.9	36.5
North East	92	12,912	2.0	48.0
South West	83	5,577	0.9	23.8
Total	92%	650,516	100%	42.7%

Greater London as a whole has the largest Pakistani population but at the Local Authority level, Birmingham has the largest Pakistani population, followed by Bradford and Kirklees – see Table 2. Currently Bradford has the largest proportion of its total population (15%) identifying itself as of Pakistani origin in England. The latest estimates (from Bradford Metropolitan District Council) indicate that the South Asian population has grown considerably over the last decade to 94,250, and that people of Pakistani/Kashmiri origin number about 73,900. The South Asian population now represents about 19 per cent of the total population of Bradford and 16 per cent of Bradford’s residents are Muslims, compared to the national average of 3 per cent. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the Pakistani population in Yorkshire and Humber.

Table 2: Local authorities with largest Pakistani populations
(Source: 2001 Census, S104)

Local authority area	Pakistani Population	Pakistani Muslim Population	% Pakistani Population Muslim	Pakistani Muslims as a % of total local authority Muslim population
Birmingham	104,017	97,510	94	70
Bradford	67,994	61,638	91	82
Lancashire	26,521	24,601	93	63
Kirklees	26,535	24,593	93	63
Manchester	23,102	21,392	93	60
Newham	20,646	19,168	93	32
Luton	17,012	15,980	94	59
Waltham Forest	17,295	15,969	92	49
Rochdale	15,827	15,095	95	78
Sheffield	15,843	14,632	92	61
Buckinghamshire	15,059	14,282	95	82
Redbridge	14,890	13,932	94	49
Leeds	15,065	13,830	92	65
Oldham	13,754	13,010	95	54
Slough	14,360	12,996	91	82

While 43 per cent of Muslims in England are Pakistani, they represent only 22 per cent of the Muslim population in London according to the 2001 census. The boroughs in London with the largest percentage of Pakistanis as proportion of the Muslim population include Hounslow (43%), Barking and Dagenham (39%) and Croydon (38%). Other boroughs where Pakistanis comprise 30 per cent or more of the Muslim population are Merton, Wandsworth, Ealing, Newham, Hillingdon, Brent and Kingston. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the Pakistani population in London according to Office for National Statistics estimates for 2005.

Figure 1: Distribution of Pakistani population in Yorkshire and Humber, 2005 est (Source: ONS)





Figure 2: Distribution of Pakistani population in London, 2005 (Source: ONS estimates, 2005)



7 Socioeconomic situation

The Pakistani population is one of the most economically disadvantaged ethnic groups in the UK, and is more likely to be considered 'poor' under official classifications than its white counterparts.²⁹ According to the Department for Work and Pensions, 58 per cent of Pakistani or Bangladeshi individuals are considered 'poor', compared to a national figure of 21 per cent.³⁰ Similar to the Bangladeshi population, women are significantly more likely to be unemployed or economically inactive compared to their male counterparts. The employment and educational outcomes for Pakistanis are well documented and monitored by central government through reports such as Communities and Local Government's *Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society*, as well as in academic literature³¹. However, these macro-analyses and population averages hide regional, class and ethnic variations that are highlighted by academics and community respondents.

Despite being below-average on most socio-economic indicators, the Pakistani population is steadily improving its educational (secondary and tertiary) and labour market outcomes. There are also considerable differences between the Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations, which are sometimes masked because of the propensity of grouping them together in analyses. For example the unemployment rate for Pakistani males is 11 per cent compared to the Bangladeshi rate which is five percentage points higher. Pakistani children have also dropped behind Bangladeshi children on GCSE results despite improving overall.³²

Table 3: Pakistani Male and Female employment, unemployment and economic inactivity rates (national averages in brackets) 2006/07

	Employment Rate	Unemployment Rate	Economic Inactivity Rate
Pakistani Males	65% (79%)	11% (6%)	27% (16%)
Pakistani Females	28% (70%)	19% (5%)	66% (26%)

Source: Labour Force Survey, four quarter average, 4th quarter 2006 to 3rd quarter 2007

²⁹ Please note that the figures used in this section refer to all Pakistanis in the UK, not England, and irrespective of religion.

³⁰ Equal Opportunities Commission, *Moving on up? Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Black Caribbean women and work*, EOC, 2006, p. 7.

³¹ For example see Anthony Heath and Doreen McMahon (1991) Education and occupational attainment: the impact of ethnic origins in Valerie Karn (Ed) *Ethnicity in the 1991 census, Volume 4: Employment, Education and Housing among the ethnic minority populations of Britain*, Office for national Statistics. London: the Stationery Office, 91-113; Ceri Peach (2006) Muslims in the 2001 Census of England and Wales: Gender and economic disadvantage, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 29, 4, 629-655.

³² 'From Brick Lane to the fast lane', *The Economist*, 2007.

The current labour market statistics of the Pakistani population must be understood within the historical context of the population's migration and settlement in the UK. After the decline of the textiles and manufacturing industries in the northern cities, the community faced high levels of unemployment and economic hardship, while the depressed housing market in these regions also made it difficult for them to move to more favourable areas.³³ Regional location began to play a vital role in determining the economic activity and outcomes for the population.

Many took the self employment route and set up small businesses, particularly in markets, catering and taxi services. The spur for self-employment was also affected by religious and cultural factors to some extent. A survey in the 1990s found that two thirds of self-employed Pakistani people mentioned that being their own boss meant it was easier for them to perform their religious duties, and suggested that their strong religious faith gave them confidence to set up businesses on their own, despite a lack of formal qualifications and poor access to finance.³⁴

As well as specific regional differences, ethnicity and class also play important roles which are often masked by national indicators.³⁵ It has been suggested that taking account of the lower class resources of Kashmiris, entry rates of non-Kashmiri Pakistanis into business and public service professional occupations appear to be similar to Indians.³⁶ Werbner notes:

This strengthens the argument that the South Asian community cannot be disaggregated simply by nationality or religion, but must be looked at in terms of class background, migration history, and sub-continental regional origins.

Respondents noted that the increasing affluence of the Pakistani community in the West Yorkshire area is evident in many ways, and can be most clearly seen on the impact remittances and investment have had in Mirpur, which is now the most developed area of Pakistan with the best infrastructure in the country. It can also be seen in the increasing number of parents sending children to private schools, in the movement out of inner city areas to affluent white suburbs, and in the recent start up of direct flights from Leeds/Bradford airport to Islamabad so that people from the region no longer have to travel to Manchester or Birmingham for flights.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Hilary Metcalfe, Tariq Modood, Satnam Virdee (1996). *Asian Self-Employment: The Interaction of Culture and Economics in England*, Policy Studies Institute.

³⁵ Pnina Werbner's study on Pakistani migrants in Manchester, *The migration process: Capital, gifts and offerings among British Pakistanis* (1990/2002), provides an analysis of the intersection of class, lifestyle and entrepreneurship within the community.

³⁶ Pnina Werbner (2004) 'Pakistani Migration and Diaspora, Religious Politics in a Global Age' in Melvin Ember, Carol R. Ember, & Ian Skoggard (eds), *Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures Around the World*. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.

The percentage of Pakistani pupils achieving 5+ A*-C grades at GCSE and equivalent in any subject improved by 11 percentage points between 2003 and 2007 from 42 per cent to 53 per cent, and increased 4.3 percentage points when including English and maths.³⁷ However, while Pakistani educational outcomes continue to improve, Bangladeshi pupils have overtaken Pakistanis in GCSE attainment levels. Success rates in further education are also improving. From 2004/05 to 2006/07 success rates for Learning and Skills Council funded learners in all further education institutions increased from 69 per cent to 75 per cent.³⁸ However, there is evidence that Pakistani applicants had a slightly lower than expected offer rate across the whole higher education sector.³⁹

Whilst there are still pockets of educational underachievement across the country, increasing numbers of young bilingual Pakistanis are successfully entering higher education and moving into the professional sphere.⁴⁰ New migration has also seen an influx of Pakistani migrants who are well educated and economically solvent. Sixty per cent of Pakistani work permit holders entering the UK in 2005 were engaged in professional or technical occupations.⁴¹ Employment ranged from IT engineers, to doctors, other health practitioners, sales representatives, and managers. Interviewees have suggested that the economic trajectory of the Pakistani community is now beginning to mirror that of the indigenous population. There is a majority middle or aspiring middle class, acquiring a good education and moving into professional jobs. Alongside this is what respondents have described as an underclass of young people who left school with no qualifications, and who are caught up in drugs (young Pakistanis for example are reported by health workers to represent the highest number of heroin addicts in Bradford) and criminality, and whilst officially unemployed, many are believed to be part of a thriving and 'informal economy'.

³⁷ Communities and Local Government (2007), *Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society*, London

³⁸ Learning and Skills Council Benchmarking Data 2006/07, Learning and Skills Council. www.lsc.gov.uk/providers/Data/statistics/success/FE+benchmarking+data.htm

³⁹ Higher Education Funding Council for England (2005). www.hefce.ac.uk/

⁴⁰ According to Higher Education Statistical Authority, in 2005/06 35% of Pakistanis are entering higher education by age 19 compared to the national average of 28%. www.hesa.ac.uk

⁴¹ Salt (2006) in Chanda, R (2008) 'The Skilled South Asian Diaspora and its Role in Source Economies', Paper for the Institute of South Asian Studies, p. 17.

8 Key characteristics

8.1 Identity

Much of the existing research on identity in the Pakistani community in the UK has focused on the extent to which the population feels or views itself as ‘British’. Jacobson found that national identity for Pakistanis does not have a fixed content but is related to three boundaries: civic, racial and cultural.⁴² The first refers to Britain as a political entity and is related to citizenship; racial identity is related to the idea of being British as having ancestral roots in the UK and being white, which makes it difficult for visible minorities to identify within this boundary; the final boundary, cultural, is related to behaviour, values and lifestyle which is perceived to be typically British.⁴³ In response to the racial boundary, Modood et al found that second generation Asians adopt hybrid identities such as ‘British-Pakistani’ to show and express the two aspects of their culture.⁴⁴ This study also found that the attitudes of white people may act as a barrier against the respondents calling themselves ‘British’.⁴⁵ Jacobson also notes that respondents believed that the acceptance of being British was linked to an unreasonable demand to give up the parent culture as a response to colour exclusion.⁴⁶

Intergenerational difference in perceptions of identity is also a subject of focus in these studies. Jacobson found that second generation Pakistanis often find themselves in conflict with their parents’ ideals and their own religious and cultural practices.⁴⁷ Ballard argues that conforming to expectations in the home is much easier than doing so outside of the home.⁴⁸ Modood et al found that second generation South Asians perceive their identities as more bi-cultural but were aware that there is a need sometimes to minimise ethnic identities in order to be more culturally accepted as British.⁴⁹

Other academics have also analysed the role of religion and its role in identity dynamics in the Pakistani community. For example Werbner notes:

Islam has been incorporative and integrative, providing a legitimate locational identity in an immigrant society. At the same time it has also generated its own contradictions and dilemmas, which have inhibited the integrative process by politicising and racialising the very same religious identity.⁵⁰

⁴² Jessica Jacobson (1997), ‘Perceptions of Britishness’, *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 181-199.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Tariq Modood, Richard Berthoud, Jane Lakey, James Nazroo, Patten Smith, Satnam Virdee and Sharon Beishon (1997), *Ethnic Minorities in Britain: Diversity and Disadvantage – Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities*, London: Policy Studies Institute.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Jacobson, 1997.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Roger Ballard (1994), *Desh Pardesh: the South Asian Presence in Britain*, London: Hurts & Co.

⁴⁹ Tariq Modood, Sharon Beishon and Satnam Virdee (1994), *Changing Ethnic Identities*, London: Policy Studies Institute.

⁵⁰ Werbner, 2004.

Our research confirmed many of these existing findings and the role of religion was as dominant in the responses from community interviewees as it is accorded in the literature.⁵¹ According to views expressed by respondents in this study, the identity of different generations varies, with the elders from the first generation still feeling a strong connection to their country of birth. The second generation also has a deep connection to Pakistan, but to a much lesser extent than their parents. The third generation of young people see themselves as primarily British, and this forms a strong part of their identity. As the country of birth of their parents and grandparents, they still have a deep personal or psychological association with Pakistan, but one that is a substantially diminished part of their own personal identity in comparison to their parents.

In the consultations, when asked about their identity, the majority of respondents of all ages and generations unequivocally described themselves as British Muslims. As an older respondent explained:

*We are British. Our hearts yearn for Pakistan but we live here. We can't break links with Pakistan – and nor should the link be broken. We go for visits, and our children go, but this is our country. The fact is that in a period of 10 years, we are likely to spend less than a year there.*⁵²

Young people consulted for the study defined being British as an essential part of their identity. Within the overall category of British Muslim, some also defined themselves in relation to geographical affiliations such as Brummies, Bradfordians and Londoners. However, according to young respondents, the identity issue has become very critical post 9/11 and 7/7. The mass increase in Islamophobia, negative publicity and the general perception about Muslims, are causing a crisis in the minds of the third generation, who have now begun to feel unsupported by the British system and culture, and made to feel like strangers in what they consider as their home.

According to a respondent who has worked for many years in local authority, civil society and mosque organisations, the impact on young people who feel alienated from the British system, whilst at the same time feeling distanced from their immediate communities, is to look for answers and explanations elsewhere, whether this be in Islamic history, Western conspiracy theories and Islamic revival movements or lobbies.

Like the other established South Asian populations in Britain, there are a substantial number of second and third generation Pakistanis who are navigating their way through multiple identity paradigms, both ethnic and religious. The road to identity formation for second and third generations is complex, and younger Pakistanis are facing and subsequently making sense of this complexity in ways that are resulting in new identity formations. Emerging identities are not solely linked to a historical past or a cultural present informed and influenced by their Pakistani heritage.

⁵¹ See for example Modood et al's (1977) *Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities* (1997, 293, 300-304)

⁵² Pakistani community interviewee: male, 50s.

For a generation of young Pakistanis growing up in the UK, a ‘pan-ethnic’ identity, informed through contact and interaction with the wide range of cultures that form the Muslim diaspora in the UK, is part of the process of being British.⁵³ A number of young respondents in interviews and focus groups questioned the way that the older generations justify cultural boundaries by defining them as religious, and stressed that they wanted to disassociate themselves from what they called ‘Pakistani’ Islam. Interviewees have suggested a number of key themes relevant to identity in this young generation:

- The shift towards a ‘pan-ethnic identity’ that aligns with notions of a global Islamic community (*umma*). Pakistani young people also relate to a range of minority Muslim communities they perceive as being persecuted across a wide geographical spread including in Palestine, Bosnia, Chechnya, Iraq and Kashmir
- Increased engagement with Islam and increasing levels of adherence to orthopraxy or correct conduct with regards to religious activity. This process leads many to question or reject their particular ‘cultural variants’ of Islam
- Continued ethnic discrimination and increased discrimination on the basis of religion which is believed to help strengthen their religious identity.

8.2 Ethnicity

Pakistanis encompass a number of distinct regional and linguistic groups. Most place an emphasis on their distinct language, culture and way of life as a means of distinguishing their unique identity as separate ethnic groups. Hence Pathans distinguish themselves from Punjabis, while many Mirpuris (a group to which some two-thirds of all British Pakistanis belong) choose to define themselves as ‘Kashmiris’ in order to differentiate themselves from other Pakistanis⁵⁴. There are no accurate figures but it is estimated that 60-70 per cent of the Pakistani population are from the Kashmir Mirpur region and settled mostly in Birmingham, Bradford, Oldham and surrounding towns.⁵⁵ In London the community is more mixed and includes comparable numbers of Punjabis, Pathans and Kashmiris. There are also small communities of Sindhis and Balochis⁵⁶ in London.

⁵³ Leweling, M (2005) ‘Exploring Muslim Diaspora Communities in Europe through a Social Movement Lens: Some Initial Thoughts’, *Strategic Insights*, Volume IV, Issue 5, p. 5.

⁵⁴ The Kashmiri identity issue is a complex subject that is linked both to ethnicity and to the historical and political legacy in the region. The ongoing struggle by Kashmiris on both sides of the Pakistan/India border for an independent and self-sustaining state continues to impact on the self-identity of Kashmiris from AJK living in the UK.

⁵⁵ Werbner, 2004.

⁵⁶ Sindh is the southeastern province of Pakistan. It agreed to join Pakistan in 1947 as an “autonomous and sovereign” state but many Sindhis feel aggrieved that it remains deprived of provincial autonomy to govern its own affairs as promised by the Pakistan Resolution of 1940. Baluchistan was an independent nation that was annexed by Pakistan in 1948 and nationalist movements have continued to struggle for autonomy and protest against human rights abuses in the Province.

Respondents suggest that these differences are not so much a question of ethnicities, but about localities of origin and social/family networks characterised by the *biradari* system⁵⁷. Pakistani *biradaris* are still very important to the older generation, and are a key part of their cultural heritage. Within Mirpuris for example there are clear distinctions. According to respondents in Bradford, there are four distinct *biradaris* from different areas in Mirpur, and this geographical division is replicated in the areas these clans/kinship groups occupy in Bradford and surrounding areas.

8.3 Religion

According to the 2001 Census, 92 per cent of Pakistanis in England are Muslim.⁵⁸ The majority of Pakistanis are Sunni Muslims, though there are smaller numbers of Shi'a Muslims. The four most important movements in the UK are the Deobandis and Tablighi Jamaat⁵⁹, Barelvis or Sunni Sufis⁶⁰, the Jamaat-e Islami⁶¹ and the Ahl-e-Hadith⁶². Other groups with a more Arab influence are the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafis, and Hizb ut-Tahrir.⁶³ Communities did not arrive in the UK with an automatic loyalty to these movements. This had to be won in the early period of community formation. Between the 1960s and the 1980s, when the sectarian segmentation of mosques was most noticeable, this could be seen in the fierce rivalry for mosque control that was mostly played out between the Deobandi influenced outreach movement, the Tablighi Jamaat, and the Pakistani Sufi orders known as the Barelvis.⁶⁴

⁵⁷ *Biradaris* are kinship groups encompassing immediate and extended family bloodlines.

⁵⁸ For those who stated their religion. 43,469 (6.2% of the total Pakistani population in England) Pakistanis in England did not offer information on their religion in the 2001 census.

⁵⁹ Deobandi and Tablighi Jamaat affiliated or inspired mosques represent circa 742 mosques or approximately half of all mosques in the UK. Figures are taken from the largest ongoing survey and comprehensive directory of British mosques by Mehmood Naqshbandi (www.muslimsinbritain.org). Due to its 'in progress' nature, the figures represent mosques where the sectarian 'leaning' has been established, alongside an extrapolation in percentage terms of remaining Sunni mosques where affiliation is still being established. Smaller sectarian groups label their mosques more clearly by sectarian affiliation, so are easier to assign to a particular grouping. It is likely that Deobandi mosques, due to their prevalence, operate as generic 'Sunni' neighbourhood mosques for a wider catchment of worshippers. Additionally, Deobandi mosques are not as easily identifiable as their Barelvi counterparts. Consequently it would be erroneous to assume that 50 per cent of British Muslims are Deobandi by sectarian affiliation or leaning. Moreover this is unlikely in light of the existing ethnic and sectarian composition of British Muslims in the UK. Figures supplied November 2008.

⁶⁰ Barelvis and Sunni Sufi affiliated or inspired mosques represent circa 345 mosques or approximately a quarter of the total mosques in the UK. Barelvi mosques are generally easy to identify and the reason why people think that they predominate is due to perception and concentration in a few key areas, namely Bradford, parts of Birmingham, Manchester and in commuter towns around London, such as Slough and Luton. Source: Mehmood Naqshbandi (www.muslimsinbritain.org). Figures supplied November 2008.

⁶¹ Jamaat-e-Islami or Maudoodi-inspired mosques represent circa 57 mosques or approximately four per cent of the total mosques in the UK. Source: Mehmood Naqshbandi (www.muslimsinbritain.org). Figures supplied November 2008.

⁶² Ahl-e-Hadith affiliated or inspired (older generation as distinct from modern Salafi) represent circa 35 mosques or two per cent of the total mosques in the UK. Source: Mehmood Naqshbandi (www.muslimsinbritain.org). Figures supplied November 2008.

⁶³ For more details see Ron Greaves, *Sectarian Influences within Islam in Britain* (Leeds: University of Leeds, 2006), P. Lewis, *Islamic Britain* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994) and J. Nielsen, *Muslims in Western Europe*, 3rd edn (Edinburgh: University Press, 2004), Chs 4 and 9.

⁶⁴ For some comment on the non-aligned nature of early communities see Y. Sikand, 'The Origins and Growth of Tablighi Jamaat in Britain', *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, 9/2, July 1998, pp. 171-192., and M. Khan, 'Devotional Islam in Kashmir and the British Diaspora' (PhD Thesis, Dept. of Theology, University of Liverpool), and on mosque segmentation, see P. Lewis (1994), *Islamic Britain*, London: I. B. Tauris.

Among the Bareilvi Sufi orders, some organised preaching groups like Dawat-e Islami, and politicised groups like Minhaj al-Quran have emerged from these early efforts for influence.⁶⁵ These groupings have been supplemented by non-Pakistani orders such as the Naqshbandi-Haqqanis and neo-traditionalist orders such as the Haba'ib and the Shadhiliya from the Middle East. The Deobandis have concentrated on building educational institutions in Britain, as a result of which 80 per cent of British-trained imams are Deobandi. They also maintain a predominant position in the supplementary school and mosque sectors. Deobandis are largely apolitical in outlook despite looking to the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) for its Muslim political representation, and are internally split between integrationist and isolationist tendencies.

Additionally some smaller groups, which have focused on recruitment of the middle classes, have made a public impact well above and beyond their relatively small size. In Britain, the Jamaat-e Islami (JI) along with the Muslim Brotherhood were pioneers in developing student activism through the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS), and in interfaith and political engagement. In the 1970s, the movement divided at the mosque, activist and youth wing levels, reflecting the independence of Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan at the time.

Key religious organisations for British Pakistanis include the UK Islamic Mission, the British Muslim Forum, the Union of Muslim Organisations, the Islamic Society of Britain and its youth arm, Young Muslims. FOSIS also represents a significant number of Pakistani youth, as does the Muslim Student Trust. There are also a number of representative bodies which provide a platform for mosques in specific regional or local areas, including the Bradford Council of Mosques, the Lancashire Council of Mosques and the Blackburn Council of Mosques.

The JI helped to create and subsequently dominate the leadership of the MCB, currently the largest Muslim umbrella body in Britain, with around 500 affiliates representing a broad set of orientations. Vying for the leadership of the MCB are the Pakistani and Bangladeshi wings of JI, alongside the Muslim Brotherhood and some politicised Deobandis. The current Secretary General is the Chair of the East London Mosque, the key institution for the Bangladeshi wing of JI in the UK.

Respondents report that intra community relations are largely driven by the religious denominations, particularly amongst the first generation. There are splits along sectarian, denominational and geographical lines, and particularly in relation to the countries of origins. Mosques are generally associated with specific communities such as Pakistanis, Indian Muslims and Bangladeshis. They stress however, that mosques do not bar or discourage any Muslim on account of their sect or ethnic origin.

⁶⁵ M. Ahmed, 'Da'wat-i Islami', *ISIM Newsletter*, 4 (1999) and A. Philippon, 'Bridging Sufism and Islamism', *ISIM Review*, 17 (2006).

However, the strength of these links and that of denominations is dwindling, particularly with the third generation, which is questioning the validity of the different sects and their inability to agree on approaches to important religious celebrations, which they see as causing more frictions than bonding amongst Muslims in the country. University students interviewed during the study also spoke about the need to individually decide where they stand in relation to religious practice along the continuum from really strict adherents on the one hand, to people who have completely turned their back on religion on the other. The respondents saw this decision as a personal issue, but felt that there was a lot of peer pressure on them from more overtly religious students. As one student from Bradford expressed it:

On campus there are two sides and there is a lot of peer pressure. There are the fundamentalists on the one hand, and there are people like me, who see themselves as British, and who want to integrate with other communities more. When people like that say 'I can't live here, I need to be in a Muslim country', I say, 'why don't you just go and leave the rest of us in peace'.⁶⁶

8.4 Language

There is some difference of opinion concerning the main language spoken by Pakistanis in Britain, which may in part be related to the different parts of the country that respondents come from. Whilst many commentators suggest that Urdu is the most used, others, particularly from outside London, insist that Punjabi is the most widely spoken, in both mainstream Punjabi and Mirpuri dialect forms. What they do agree on is that Punjabi speakers use the Urdu script for reading and writing purposes. Other main languages include Pashto, Sindhi, Saraiki and Balochi.⁶⁷ Young people mostly communicate in English at home among their siblings and are less reliant on Pakistani languages.

⁶⁶ Focus group respondent, male.

⁶⁷ Use of these other languages is related to area of origin – for example Pashto is spoken in parts of Afghanistan and the Afghan/Pakistan border; Sindhi in Southern Pakistan (Sindh) and Balochi in Baluchistan.

9 Intra-community dynamics

9.1 Intergenerational dynamics

Young respondents born in the UK reported that they see Britain as their home, whereas their parents have a stronger link and desire to return to their country of origin. However, older respondents suggested that even most of the older generation has abandoned its dream of permanent return. Many travel back, for extended periods even, but this is more of a lifestyle choice than a desire to settle permanently in Pakistan. Older people have the financial means now to go and spend more time with their relatives and get away from the worst of the weather, or in their own words, ‘to catch a bit of sun’.

A key area of concern between the generations highlighted by respondents is the perceived loss of Pakistani culture and tradition. This particularly concerns the first generation, and to an extent the second generation, who feel that the third generation is losing its cultural and religious identity. In the words of a young male interviewee:

*We know less than our parents did. What we know, we will try and pass on to our children. The next generation will inevitably know less than us, and have even less of a link.*⁶⁸

Young interviewees however were quite understanding of the pressures their parents and grandparents have faced in relation to ‘transmitting’ their religion and culture. Whilst many said that as young children they resented what they saw as their parents trying too hard, they now appreciate that parents were caught up in a different cultural environment, which forced them to consciously teach them in a way they would not have done in Pakistan, where young people would have just picked up everything as part of normal everyday culture. They also spoke about the way they themselves will face this issue in a few years time when they have their own children, and will have to consciously decide what aspects of their religion and culture they want to pass on to the next generation. They too stressed that it is important to know about their roots and pass this knowledge on.

Whilst appreciating the value of maintaining elements of their culture and traditions, younger respondents also highlighted the pressures imposed by the extended family and community structures which make it difficult for them to establish their own independent ways of living. According to them, existing community support structures were all established to meet the needs of the earlier generations and have not kept pace with the changing needs of the community, particularly young people and women.

⁶⁸ Focus group respondent, male.

Recent commentary has suggested that the *biradari* system, which served rural Pakistani communities well, providing health, social and justice systems, is now unworkable in the UK because of state provision.⁶⁹ The breakdown of the system has contributed to further generational separation as families try to maintain old systems by imposing insular codes of practice upon second and third generations. Coupled with a sense of alienation, sections of young people are finding it difficult to manage differing cultural practices.⁷⁰ However, respondents from outside London have suggested that the *biradari* system is going through a form of revival, and that its effects are most tangible in the area of politics. They also suggested that younger British born politicians are as likely as politicians of the older generation to exploit the influence of the *biradari* as a route and passport for mobilising block votes.

Both young people and second generation respondents stressed that traditional leadership has not been able to transform community organisations, structures and means of service delivery to serve the needs of young people. Youth leadership is seen as a serious issue, and there was a strong feeling expressed by respondents that the Pakistani community has not adequately worked with young people in succession planning, with the consequence that the young are turning increasingly to their own peer group for leadership and direction. However, recent political initiatives such as “Young mayor” and Youth Parliament are felt to have had some encouraging results in this regard.⁷¹

Whilst the Pakistani community is facing similar differences and communication difficulties between the generations as other communities, respondents from across the generational divide expressed a great deal of respect for each other’s achievements. Young people spoke about the need to develop better communication and understanding with their parents in order to bridge the gaps that exist, and many older people spoke proudly about how well young people are doing. This sentiment, as well as concern about the limited prospects well educated young people face in some parts of the country, is reflected in these words of one older interviewee:

*More of our young people are going into higher education and professional jobs. Our children have the tools to change their lives for the better which we did not have. The only problem is that without the appropriate jobs and opportunities for them, most are having to leave the area (Halifax), and that is not going to be good for the community in the long term.*⁷²

⁶⁹ Malik, S, 2005.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Young Mayor initiative – see www.youngmayor4lewisham.co.uk or www.newham.gov.uk/YoungMayor/default.htm. UK Youth Parliament: www.ukyouthparliament.org.uk

⁷² Pakistani community interviewee: male, 50s.

9.2 Young people

The majority of respondents agreed that there is very little youth provision, and that few of the established community and mosque organisations actively reach out to young people. Newer organisations are trying to work with young people but are constrained by lack of long term funding, which impacts on how much sustained provision they can make available. Imams are seen to have particular problems in translating and expressing Islamic values and meanings in English, and in ways that relate to the lived experiences of young people born and brought up in Britain. Some professionals in education who participated in focus groups expressed concerns that generic problems that young children have are usually perceived by white professionals as being linked to their culture and religion, and hence special needs that exist regardless of the children's identity are not being catered for.

Young educated people interviewed stressed the important role that higher education has played in helping them think about their lives and goals. They see friends who have not been to university as living more in the present, rather than looking to the future. For themselves, they have high personal and professional aspirations. They believe that there are still a lot of barriers for them to face, but by being educated and getting into high powered jobs, they are confident that they will be successful and able to make it easier for people younger than themselves to come through. According to one young woman who graduated this summer:

I want to achieve something from my studies – get a good job, buy my piece of land, and put something back into the community to help people who have not had the opportunities I have had.⁷³

Older interviewees, particularly older women, were highly critical of those young people who are attracted towards extremism and violence. In the words of a seventy year old grandmother:

How come our young educated British people can do such a thing? They are giving Islam a bad name. We need to spread Islam with love, and we have to demonstrate its peace. These extremists need to be made to understand and accept that everyone is different, and that killing innocent people is wrong. How can a Muslim commit suicide? These people who do it are not Muslims – I don't know what they are, but they are not Muslims.⁷⁴

Whilst debating how to deal with the issue in the female focus group, women expressed considerable helplessness in the face of what they perceive as the brainwashing of their young people by extremists from outside the Pakistani community. According to them, the only counter measure is to help young people understand the 'right' Islam from an

⁷³ Pakistani community interviewee: female, 20s.

⁷⁴ Focus group respondent: female.

early age, and to keep a closer eye on them. Women spoke of the need to find out where their young sons hang out, who their friends are, and what groups they belong to. Whilst strongly condemning young people who have turned towards violence, they were equally critical of government responses. An elderly woman related the case of a young man who had recently been arrested in the area with some leaflets on him about Jihad. In her words:

So what – if they come to my house they are bound to find some material about Jihad – every house has it. We have it because we want to understand it, so that we have the right information and don't get drawn into what extremists say about it. Will they come and arrest me and say I am a terrorist?⁷⁵

9.3 Women

Pakistani women in the UK have a wide number of experiences that are informed by culture, religion, education, class, age and location. It is clearly evident that things are changing for young women in relation to education and employment. Young women reported that unlike women of their mother's generation who were largely restricted to the home, most young women have the expectation of working and developing their professional careers. They highlighted the fact that Pakistani women are becoming more visible in all walks of life, corporate, media, political and community based, and that leadership is being demonstrated through a growing number of women who are taking a leading role in politics and other arenas as councillors, mayors, journalists, and by women in high profile jobs in the public sector.

Some respondents suggested that young Pakistani women are in the process of acquiring power and status in ways that are very similar to the strategies Pakistani men employed about twenty years ago; through local and national politics, extensive networking, businesses and skilled professions. However, women stressed that they still have to reconcile these aspirations and goals within the framework of a patriarchal culture – 'to be someone in a man's world'. One woman related a saying in the community that you should never marry your son to a teacher or a lawyer, as both talk and argue all day at work and either carry on the same way at home, or are too tired in the head to have any time for their husbands and children.

Respondents from outside London suggested that the experiences of women differ in the larger urban areas such as London and in smaller more close knit communities in some of the northern towns. The latter are believed to have fewer opportunities to enable them to play active roles in society. Women also have a lot of health problems in these areas, and focus group respondents suggested that health services are not understanding enough. According to one of these respondents:

⁷⁵ Focus group respondent, female.

We have so much stress but when we go to the doctors they say, 'what is so stressful about being in the house looking after children?' Many women say that they are okay when they are in Pakistan, but as soon as they get back here, they are back on the Prozac. They give that stuff to our women too readily – their attitude is 'here, take this and don't bother us'.⁷⁶

Local Pakistani or broader Muslim women's organisations are reported to be trying to address some of the barriers women and girls face in such communities by creating safe environments for women to acquire education, work experience and to socialise outside of the home. However, these kinds of organisations are rare and those that exist have pressing capacity building needs. Many interviewees complained about the lack of funding and resources, which are still seen to be monopolized by male run organisations. Some of these male organisations are beginning to be more inclusive of women and have opened up their premises for more activities and planned events which are organised and led by women, for women. Examples cited include activities organised by Minhaj-ul-Quran and Green Street Mosque in London. Some respondents suggested that whilst this is still a new trend, in the not too distant future it will gain recognition of the need for dedicated support and encouragement for women to play an equal part in society.

However, there is still a long way to go before women gain parity and equal status within the community. Many women respondents were critical about male run organisations, especially the mosques, with whom they have very little contact:

We send our children to the mosque, someone comes to the door for the chanda⁷⁷. That's all. What say do we have in how the money that has been collected is spent? Nothing.⁷⁸

Parents still maintain different values and boundaries when it comes to girls and boys. With girls, the overriding concern is about protecting them from men, whereas with boys parents worry more about protecting them from drugs, extremists and petty crime. Expectations are also different when it comes to marriage choices. According to young women respondents, it is easier for boys to marry who they want, and whilst marrying outside of the culture is frowned upon for all young people, it is still more acceptable for men than women to marry outsiders.

⁷⁶ Focus group respondent, female.

⁷⁷ Small and often regular donation collected through a variety of means for mosques. This can be either at Friday prayers, through fund raising events, mosque membership or via groups of people affiliated to mosques either as committee members or volunteers doing house to house collections on a regular monthly or quarterly basis.

⁷⁸ Focus group respondent, female.

A number of other issues have been raised in academic and policy literature with respect to women in the Pakistani community but were not raised in interviews perhaps because of their sensitive nature. These include arranged marriage⁷⁹, cousin marriage⁸⁰ and low participation of women in the formal labour market⁸¹.

9.4 Integration and cohesion issues

According to some respondents, debates about integration and cohesion only arise when there is a sense of public crisis, and many people in minority communities see such terms as purely cosmetic and the current flavour of the month. As one interviewee explained:

*We have seen the use of the term multi cultural and we have valued this as part of our ethos. This term seems no longer applicable and community cohesion and integration are becoming increasingly common. However, as far as parts of east London are concerned, in some areas ethnic minorities are in the majority, and local relations have not been an issue. Communities have lived side by side, respected each other's values, faiths, and learned to live together.*⁸²

The use of the term integration was particularly resented by respondents, who saw it as implying a one sided focus on minority communities, as opposed to being promoted as a two way process. The feeling most strongly expressed was that Pakistani people who have been settled here for a long time have already embraced Britishness to a high level, despite having dual nationalities, and that, although they have families and relations in their country of origin, the majority of the community regards itself as British.

There was also a high level of anger about Islamophobia and the stereotyping of all Muslims as potential terrorists or terrorist sympathisers, which is causing people to feel that their loyalty and British identity is being questioned. The increased use of terms such as extremists, radicals and moderate Muslims have caused a sense of discomfort as people feel these terms have not been used for what they see as 'criminals' from other nations. All respondents stressed that, like other people, the majority of Pakistanis view acts of terrorism as a serious crime and hence the use of these terms to link all Muslims with terrorism is seen as a very serious issue.

⁷⁹ See Roger Ballard, (1990) 'Migration and kinship: the differential effect of marriage rules on the processes of Punjabi migration to Britain' in Colin Clarke, Ceri Peach and Steven Vertovec editors *South Asians Overseas: Migration and Ethnicity*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,, 219 -250 and Alison Shaw (2001) Kinship, Cultural Preference and Immigration: Consanguineous marriage among British Pakistanis', *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, (NS) 7, 315 -334.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ See Ceri Peach (2006) Muslims in the 2001 Census of England and Wales: Gender and economic disadvantage *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 29, 4, 629-655.

⁸² Pakistani community interviewee: male, 30s.

Whilst there are concerns about stereotyping of Pakistanis, there is an understanding and widespread acceptance of the action that the authorities need to take to combat any fears and protect public safety, which they stress includes Muslims of all backgrounds. Some interviewees suggested that at local levels, mosque committees and voluntary organisations are consciously rethinking their strategic approaches towards tackling issues around radicalisation and extremism.

Many respondents stressed that it is difficult for Pakistanis to move into white neighbourhoods, and cited examples of people who had done so but, due to isolation, had subsequently returned to areas with high concentrations of Pakistanis. There is also a widespread feeling that no matter how much minorities try, the majority community will never accept them, and many expressed the sentiment that ‘if they don’t want us, why should we bother’.

Young respondents were more positive about integration. They recognised and accept that people have to sacrifice and lose a part of their culture in the process – on both sides, incomers and the host community. Paradoxically, some also felt that in some ways young people are more segregated and ‘tribal’ than the older generation was. They suggested that young people are less likely to step outside their own culture and peer group. However, this is not a universal attitude and some respondents spoke about feeling freer and less claustrophobic living outside Asian neighbourhoods. They were also critical of the ways that the community can inhibit socialising with people from other cultures and communities:

When you are growing up, there is a lot of ‘you can’t go out because of this’, and ‘you can’t speak to so and so’. ‘What will the family say’ or ‘our Izzat⁸³ is at stake etc’. Parents living in white areas are more relaxed and don’t mind so much what the neighbours will say or think.⁸⁴

Some young people proposed that cultural values and lifestyle play a significant role in integration. Non-Muslim Indians and black people are perceived as being more integrated due to being able to participate in the drinking and music culture that is not shared by Muslims. However, a number stressed the need to make some accommodation with the host culture. As one respondent explained:

I go to pubs with non Muslim friends and drink coke. I go for the company and contact – it is only through contact that you can enhance mutual understanding. When you spend time together people get curious about you and have a conversation. Otherwise you just stick to your own community and people’s negative views and stereotypes are never challenged.⁸⁵

⁸³ Izzat is a complex term. At one level it stands for the honour and reputation of an individual and family, and maintaining Izzat involves not bringing shame to the family or oneself. To have Izzat for someone also means to show respect, as in the injunction that one must have Izzat for one’s elders.

⁸⁴ Focus group respondent, male.

⁸⁵ Focus group respondent, male.

Respondents were also very critical about the levels of awareness and lack of interest in the host community about minority communities and cultures. A number of people mentioned the kosher chicken incident on *The Apprentice* TV programme⁸⁶, and the attacks on Sikhs post 9/11 as typical of the ignorance of the majority community about other cultures. Some suggested that the changing nature and make-up of society needs to be addressed by the education system if such ignorance is to be addressed. However, as one interview put it: *You can't just throw information at them – they should need to want to know.*⁸⁷

9.5 Politics

Pakistani community engagement in civil and public life in the UK has been longstanding, significantly evolving over the last 30 years. Until the 1970s, entry into the public and political sphere was largely in response to concerns about racism and discrimination experienced by Pakistanis and other black and minority ethnic communities in the UK. Political affiliation also developed along UK mainstream party political lines, with the majority of the Pakistani community viewing the Labour Party as a natural home. Through providing both electoral support in key constituencies, alongside participation in Labour Party structures, the Pakistani community developed routes for political involvement and influence across the board. Over time this has extended to electoral support for and representation within other political parties in the UK, principally the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats. In parts of London, particularly Newham, many have in recent times switched their allegiance to the Respect party.

While this development has largely resulted in the dominance of Pakistani men holding public office particularly at local, but also national, level recent years have seen a rise in the number of Pakistani women occupying positions in the public and political realms. Currently, there are over 200 Pakistani local councilors representing all the major UK political parties, alongside four Pakistani MPs, including Cohesion Minister Sadiq Khan. Representation in the House of Lords includes Sayeeda Warsi, Conservative Party Shadow Minister for Community Cohesion and Social Action and Lord Ahmed, the most senior Pakistani Labour Party Peer.

A number of respondents active in local community organisations reported that there have been growing concerns about the way in which some sections of the Pakistani community engage in the public and political sphere, with accusations of Pakistani *biradari* clans operating clandestinely to the detriment of the wider community's political progress and representation. The networks are seen as an extension of systems of allegiance in Pakistan itself. Pakistani community critics believe that this clan system has become a destructive and negative influence, impacting on decisions about who is chosen from within Pakistani

⁸⁶ On UK reality television show *The Apprentice*, a participant who described himself as a 'good Jewish boy' did not know the difference between a kosher chicken and a halal chicken. This incident received significant media coverage. 'What is a kosher chicken?', *BBC News Magazine*, 8.5.2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/7390212.stm>

⁸⁷ Pakistani community interviewee: female, 30s.

communities to go forward for election for public posts. One respondent also cited the example of the postal vote rigging scandals in cities with large South Asian populations as a combined effect of pressure from mosque committees and *biradaris*.

The character of Pakistani political participation has also significantly evolved and is increasingly based on religious identity and Muslim community concerns. This development is said to have had its genesis in the 1980s as a consequence of Muslim organisations and religious groups responding to the publication of the Satanic Verses by Salman Rushdie. The incident energised the pre-existing Muslim community organisations and networks into a new political and social activism that has since been reinforced in response to heightened security and counter-terrorism concerns that many feel discriminate against Muslims and demonstrate a pervasive Islamophobia. It also influenced the emergence of new groups such as the Muslim Parliament and the Muslim Council of Britain.

10 Media

10.1 Perceptions of the media

Perceptions of the UK media are extremely negative and the overwhelming view from respondents was that the media is completely anti-Muslim. It was suggested that Muslims only ever make the news as terrorists, fundamentalists or extremists, and air time is generally devoted to people who either speak against the Muslims, or to Muslims with distorted radical ideologies of their own which do not reflect the views of the majority. Most believe that, with such a hostile media, there is no hope of the true nature of Islam to be appreciated by the general public.

Some expressed the view that the BBC News is somewhat less biased and less likely to put a negative twist on a story, which the press as a whole is accused of doing to boost circulation. The constantly negative and prejudiced coverage is felt to have a very negative influence on young people and many fear that this can drive them towards radicalism.

10.2 Media consumption

Whilst most people use the mainstream British press and TV for news and entertainment, there is also a considerable amount of media consumption that is of Pakistani origin.

TV channels are on the increase and these are seen by elders to be particularly effective in enabling them to learn about current affairs in Pakistan, and there are also a few channels that engage young people. Commonly viewed channels include *PTV News*, *GEO*, *B4U*, *Zee TV (Indian)*, *Star Plus*, and *ARY Digital*. Others mentioned include DM Digital, Noor TV, KBE, and Pakistan TV. Most of these channels are not free to view and hence the cost has an impact on access to satellite TV channels.

PTV News provides a comprehensive selection of news updates on a number of issues ranging from politics to the weather in Pakistan. It also covers South Asian and global issues. Music channels are also equally popular particularly due to the popularity of Pakistani pop. UK based *Islam Channel* is also very popular amongst young Pakistanis with a faith interest living in the UK. *Islam Channel* is the first and currently only English Islamic channel broadcasting globally and is breaking the mould by addressing Muslims of all ethnic backgrounds. Programmes include: Stories of the Prophets, Journey through the Quran, Politics and Media show and City Sisters. *Islam Channel's* 'Model Mosque' programme received widespread attention from the Pakistani community as a number of the Mosques that were featured were Pakistani run. The programme researched over 1000 mosques and gave viewers the opportunity to cast a vote to help decide on the best mosque in the UK.

Zee TV has a reach in more than 80 countries, and accesses more than 225 million viewers globally. It provides a wide array of programmes including: primetime comedy, dramas, movies and game shows. According to some of the younger respondents and focus groups participants, despite being Indian, it still attracts a large Pakistani viewer base, and its Bollywood output is especially popular with younger audiences. Bollywood is more popular with new Pakistani migrants than with those settled for longer in the UK. Other Indian channels are also popular amongst the Urdu speaking community as Urdu is very similar to Hindi. *Sky News* is also used for daily news consumption.

The burgeoning Pakistani music industry has had a far reaching influence. Pakistani pop in particular has become extremely popular at home, in India and amongst British Pakistani youth. Indian TV channels broadcast Pakistani pop due to the large Pakistani audience they have, and hence pop artists like Atif Aslam have become household names across South Asian communities.

Sunrise Radio is an Asian community station with coverage in Hounslow and some other parts of London, Bradford, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Coventry and Wolverhampton. Whilst largely Indian owned, it caters for the wider South Asian community and nationally has a broad mix of presenters from all religious backgrounds. In cities such as Bradford its presenters are mostly Pakistani or Bangladeshi, catering for a majority Pakistani audience. Club Asia (London based) is also a popular radio station in the Pakistani community. There are also many local radio stations that cater for the Asian community, particularly in areas where there are a large number of Asians such as Birmingham, Manchester and London. The *BBC Asian Network* is especially popular.

Urdu newspapers can be accessed in many greengrocers and Asian outlets. Newspaper headlines tend to be concerned with political developments in the broader Asian subcontinent rather than solely in Pakistan itself. The *Muslim News* for example is popular due to its extensive coverage of Muslim issues both nationally and internationally. According to interviewees, many Pakistanis are interested in religious issues and will therefore read papers such as the *Muslim News* and articles/sections on Islam in other newspapers.

Two popular Urdu papers include *Jung* and *Awaaz* which both cover a number of topics including Arts, motoring and travel. The readership is composed of a mixture of people which includes first generation and new migrants.

The younger generations are more likely to access information on the internet and via TV. Internet access and usage, rather than being attributed to intergenerational differences in the Pakistani community, was explained by an interviewee as being dependent upon IT literacy. One interviewee noted that her father, who is IT literate, will use the internet to access information about 'back home', whereas her mother, who is not IT literate, does not. This statement could be indicative of a gender imbalance amongst the older generations in terms of internet usage and access.

11 Links with countries of origin

11.1 Travel

Pakistani families have maintained close links with Pakistan and their families since their arrival in UK but they are weakening now. The term 'Myth of return', coined by Badr Dahya (1974) a social anthropologist, was actually first used with reference to Pakistani migration and settlement in Birmingham and Bradford.⁸⁸ Badr found that many migrants' hopes for return to their country did not match the reality of their situation. The term is now widely used to refer to the experiences of other migrant populations and diaspora.

Travel between Pakistan and the UK has consistently been a strong link. People often visit their families and friends and regularly take children back during summer and other holidays. This is both in order to maintain their own links with their country and place of origin, as well as enabling children to gain more of a cultural influence and interest in maintaining links in future. These links have resulted in further family connections through marriages. Out of 262,000 flights made to the UK from Pakistan by individuals born in Pakistan, 79,700 were returning after a temporary leave of absence, the second highest of all 13 communities.⁸⁹ 11,000 Pakistanis arrived on student visas in 2006 and there were 9,305 Pakistani students paying international student fees in the UK in 2007.⁹⁰

The burial of Pakistanis had traditionally provided a continual link between the community and the country of origin. As recently as the 1990s, regional burial societies (*kommittis*) ensured that most Pakistanis who died in the UK were buried in Pakistan.⁹¹ However, more recently the increasing tendency has been to bury in local Muslim cemeteries, which Werbner notes is: "A sure sign that many families are sinking roots in Britain".⁹²

11.2 Remittances

Sending of remittances to their families has been a critical element of connection as the first generation were economic migrants, and the extended family networks were substantially dependent on members of their family in the UK. This tradition is still maintained but to a much lesser extent. In 2008 the level of remittances and investment by Pakistanis in the UK was acknowledged by the Prime Minister to have made a significant contribution to Pakistan's economic growth.⁹³ Home remittances from the UK to Pakistan through

⁸⁸ Badr Dahya (1974), 'The nature of Pakistani ethnicity in industrial cities in Britain' in A. Cohen (ed.) *Urban ethnicity* (pp. 77-118). London: Tavistock.

⁸⁹ Home Office, 2006. The highest number is by Indians but given that Muslims are a minority within the Indian community, it is highly likely that Pakistan is the highest among Muslims.

⁹⁰ HESA: www.hesa.ac.uk/index.php/content/view/1158/161/

⁹¹ Werbner, 2004.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Overseas Pakistanis (opf.overseaspakistanis.net/wp/1847/overseas-pakistanis-contributing-for-countrys-prosperity/)

banks in 2002 to 2003 reached \$273.83 million (out of a worldwide total of \$4.23 billion, \$1.23 billion from the United States followed by the Gulf States).⁹⁴ Remittance to charities after natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, may add to these figures.

11.3 Political links

The formal visits by politicians of Pakistani origin to the UK and similar visits of UK Pakistani and Kashmiri politicians to Pakistan is a two-way engagement that is seen by respondents as a good source of interaction and mutual exchange which keeps ordinary Pakistanis involved and engaged in the Pakistani social and political structures. Indeed, a number of British Pakistanis have returned to Pakistan and have been successful in the political process and are holding powerful positions within government and mainstream politics.

Another key element that influences political links is the drive by the Pakistani political parties to establish their political structures and affiliations in the UK. These parties have local office bearers in Britain, which creates a local medium for political, social and religious links for individuals and groups.

In addition, the Pakistani High Commission has taken a proactive role in retaining links with the Pakistani community. There have been student visits, and events at the High Commission and within the community which recognise the achievements of Pakistani youth.

11.4 Business and commerce

There are substantial business and commercial links between Pakistanis in the UK and their country of origin. The effect of remittances and investment on the infrastructure and economy of Mirpur in particular has already been touched upon. The impact of this has largely been in the development of large family houses, developments of local shopping centres and the purchase of properties.

Most Pakistani migrants to Britain have invested in houses and property in towns and cities near their villages of origin. However, many of these investments have not provided significant returns and have been detrimental to the financial well-being of many Pakistanis in Britain compared to other South Asians.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ Werbner, 2004.

⁹⁵ Werbner, 2004.

11.5 Return home

Some respondents suggested that the growing hostility towards Pakistanis and other minorities in the UK, be they first, second or third generations, has led many Pakistanis to reconsider their place in UK society. Some young British-Pakistanis indicated that they are now seriously contemplating returning to Pakistan. However, due to deeply settled roots in the UK, few are actually likely to make the journey.

11.6 Natural disasters

The existences of various national charitable organisations that work in Pakistan and Kashmir have also helped in maintaining close links. For example, the earthquake in 2006 in Pakistan and Kashmir resulted in a very high level of support by Pakistani, and indeed other communities.

12 Civil society

12.1 Brief overview

Due to the size and duration of the Pakistani community in the UK, its civil society structures are relatively well developed, and the number and range of organisations that exist across the country are extensive. However, due to resource limitations, it has not been possible to undertake an in-depth mapping of Pakistani civil society in the way that has been possible for some of the smaller and more recent communities. It is also an aspect of the Pakistani community in Britain that has not benefited from previous research. This section therefore outlines some of the key characteristics of Pakistani civil society that were highlighted through the qualitative research, along examples of the types of organisations that exist within the community. It should not be seen as a comprehensive overview of Pakistani civil society in England.

Alongside many faith based organisations, there is also a strong secular civil society sector that includes numerous support and welfare organisations, professional networks and associations, charitable and political organisations. In general, the Pakistani community has made limited use of the mainstream civic institutions such as leisure centres and other voluntary sector services. The emphasis has been on separate facilities, which have largely been catered through self funding, and for some through public grants. There are now literally thousands of associations and support organisations focusing either specifically on the community, or catering for South Asians in a broader sense.

Many of these have well established relationships with local Councils, and indeed many receive funding from them, as well as sourcing funding from other charitable organisations and community donations. However, many smaller organisations are gradually disappearing as there are limited local funds available, and the policy emphasis now is on cross community events and facilities which encourage greater integration. Whereas historically organisations have evolved in response to directly felt community development needs, new developments are perceived as being very much in line with the government's definitions of community needs. Only those organisations that are able to take on board the government's priorities are felt to receive any funding and support. As one community activist interviewee put it:

I have worked in the community for 22 years and it is much harder now to raise money. There is more competition and even white people want a piece now. I have lost count of the number of times I have been asked by white officers and voluntary organisations to organise a local forum or a focus group to inform them about how to go about developing a cohesive society.⁹⁶

⁹⁶ Pakistani community interviewee: female, 40s.

It is difficult to separate discussions about civil society from discussions about religion as many civil society organisations are religiously informed. Mosque structures have existed for quite some time and have played a primary role in community development over the years.⁹⁷ However, by virtue of the fact that these institutions were established for the purpose of enabling Muslims to undertake daily prayers, they have not played as substantial a role in expanding their remit to cover other social, educational or community development needs as they could have done. Notwithstanding this, there are some mosque organisations which have, and continue to, recognise other needs, such as those of the young, elderly and women, and begun to have some impact, but there is still much that needs to be done.

12.2 Types of organisations and services offered

The number and range of Pakistani civil society organisations is immense, but can be divided into the following broad categories:

- Mosques and interfaith institutions offering faith related activities and a range of social and educational provision. For example, the Bradford Council of Mosques and Quest for Economic Development (QED) have worked together to develop the Nasiha citizenship programme⁹⁸
- Secular voluntary social and welfare organisations offering a wide spectrum of welfare, leisure, educational, health and cultural services for different constituencies. Most of these are gender specific
- Emerging business and professional networks, particularly in the Health Sector.⁹⁹ Organisations include the Association of British Muslim Social Scientists, the Association of Pakistani Physicians and Surgeons of the United Kingdom, and the Association of British Pakistani Doctors, which was recently launched at the Ismaili Center in Kensington
- Charities involved in international humanitarian work
- Political networks and organisations affiliated to political parties in Pakistan such as the Pakistan People's Party UK, Pakistan Muslim League UK and Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) UK.

⁹⁷ Werbner notes that within the Pakistani community in the UK historically, the mosque has been "the central locus of cultural value, the focus of communal factional politics, a point of mobilisation, a haven for incoming migrants, and a basis for solidarity in times of crisis". Werbner, 2004.

⁹⁸ <http://www.nasiha.co.uk/>

⁹⁹ According to the General Medical Council there are over 5,000 Pakistani doctors with primary qualifications currently registered.

12.3 Key organisations

The number of local organisations is too large to provide a comprehensive list in this report. Information about key organisations across the country can be sourced from the Muslim Directory, Muslim Green Pages and local branches of the National Council for Voluntary Services, as well as local authorities that list the variety of community organisations in their area. Below is a list of some of the organisations mentioned by respondents as being important. These are divided into the following categories:

- British Muslim organisations that are not specific to any particular national grouping
- Examples of Pakistani community organisations outside London
- Examples of some locally based Pakistani women’s organisations
- Examples of Pakistani or predominantly Pakistani Muslim organisations in London.

12.3.1 British Muslim organisations

This section lists some of the main pan-national Muslim organisations that representatives from the Pakistani community are involved in. Whilst not exclusively Pakistani, these were highlighted as key organisations by respondents in this study:

- **UK Islamic Mission (UKIM):** is a national organisation with over 40 branches and Islamic Centres across the United Kingdom. The UK Islamic Mission was formed in the early 1960s and organises events at the local, regional and national level to improve the understanding of Muslim beliefs and practices, Islamic teachings, Islamic information, Islamic knowledge. Its activities include running daily educational classes for young people, weekly activities for teenagers, youth and male/ female adults, seminars for Muslims and other faith communities, exhibitions at schools and libraries, as well as facilitating visits to Mosques and working with interfaith groups throughout the country (England, Scotland and Wales)¹⁰⁰
- **Islamic Society of Britain (ISB):** Established in 1990, The Islamic Society of Britain was set up to “provide a vehicle for committed British Muslims to combine their knowledge, skills and efforts for the benefit of one another and British society as a whole, through the promotion of Islam and Islamic values” .¹⁰¹ ISB has 16 branches covering England and Scotland
- **Young Muslims UK (YMUK):** The Young Muslims UK is the youth wing of ISB with coverage across the UK. It has branches in nearly all the major cities and members all over the country. It describes itself as a “leading force in encouraging positive contributions to British society through the development of a British Islam”¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ www.ukim.org

¹⁰¹ www.isb.org.uk

¹⁰² www.ymuk.net

- **Muslim Council of Britain (MCB):** The MCB is arguably the largest national representative Muslim umbrella body in the UK with over 500 affiliated national, regional and local organisations, mosques, charities and schools. It aims to promote cooperation, consensus and unity on Muslim affairs in the UK amongst Muslims and; address issues regarding discrimination and community cohesion.¹⁰³ Inaugurated in 1997, after several years of community discussion, in more recent years it had become the focus of controversy for its linkages to Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jama`at-i Islami. Consequently, the government distanced itself from the MCB and started a process of consulting, funding and endorsing other Muslim organisations. However, this led to the perception that the government was promoting sectarianism as well as making the formation of a vigorous, broad front against violent extremism more difficult, with some Muslim groups withholding active support. This has been recognised by the government and the MCB has been re-admitted in the context of widening consultation nationally and locally¹⁰⁴
- **British Muslim Forum (BMF):** Launched in 2005, The BMF claims to represent 600 mosques in the UK. In July 2005, it issued a fatwa in response to the London bombs, condemning the use of violence and suicide bombings. Working with other national Muslim organisations, the BMF aims to provide a coordinating platform to respond to the concerns of Muslim communities in the UK. Collaborative initiatives have included the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB), which was launched in 2006 as a self-regulation body aiming to improve standards and governance of mosques in the UK¹⁰⁵
- **Sufi Muslim Council (SMC):** Launched in 2006 with an avowedly anti-extremism stance and with the support of all the mainstream political parties as well as Anglican and Jewish representatives, the SMC claims to represent 'a silent majority' of Muslims who are frustrated with existing Muslim leadership in the UK. Its inception was seen as a direct challenge to the MCB and the 'politicised' presentation of Islam. The SMC aims to provide practical solutions for British Muslims, based on the traditional Islamic legal rulings of an international advisory board, including some of the highest ranking Islamic scholars in the world in order to integrate traditional scholarship in resolving contemporary issues affecting the maintenance of Islamic beliefs in a modern, secular society¹⁰⁶
- **Muslim Parliament:** The Muslim Parliament of Great Britain emerged from a study into the Muslim situation in Britain by the Muslim Institute (based in London), under the leadership of Dr Kalim Siddiqui, during the Rushdie affair in 1989-90. The Muslim Parliament rapidly established itself as the most popular and, at times, controversial Muslim community body in Britain, focusing on issues such as education, social

¹⁰³ www.mcb.org.uk

¹⁰⁴ 'Studies into Violent Radicalisation: the beliefs ideologies and narratives: In-Country Report – United Kingdom'; The Change Institute & Dr Yayha Birt, European Commission, October 2008.

¹⁰⁵ www.thebmf.org.uk

¹⁰⁶ www.sufimuslimcouncil.org

welfare, halal food and charity work. However, in terms of size and organisational capabilities, the Parliament remained small and depended on the facilities and infrastructure of the Muslim Institute. Following the death of Dr Siddiqui in 1986, the Parliament has arguably declined in influence and reach within the Pakistani communities in the UK, though in recent years it has attempted to re-orientate its focus in light of the national debates about Muslims and violent extremism. Now headed by Dr Ghayasuddin Siddiqui, the Muslim Parliament aims to encourage debate, campaigning and lobbying on issues concerning Muslim communities in Britain and has been instrumental in debates concerning governance of mosques, the role of Imams, sectarianism and Muslim marriage contracts.¹⁰⁷

12.3.2 Pakistani community organisations outside London

Examples of organisations outside London include:

- **Pakistan and Kashmir Welfare Association (PKWA):** The PKWA is a community based association operating from a purpose-built centre in Batley, West Yorkshire. It provides social, welfare and educational services to the local Pakistani and Kashmiri communities as well as advocacy on a range of social issues
- **The Pakistan Association:** based in Huddersfield, the Pakistan Association provides health, education, welfare advocacy specific to Pakistani communities, as well as more general equality and discrimination issues confronting the broader south Asian communities in the area
- **The Pakistan Welfare Association (PWA):** The PWA responds to the social health and language needs of Pakistanis in the Birmingham area. It also provides advocacy, acting as a liaison point between the communities and local authority agencies. Additionally, it undertakes cultural activities through the promotion of cultural events and religious festivals
- **Pakistan Ex-Servicemen Association (UK) (PESA):** based in the Small Heath area of Birmingham, PESA offers advice and guidance on welfare, social services as well as settlement of pensions and allocation of land in Pakistan
- **Association of Pakistani Physicians & Surgeons of the United Kingdom (APPS UK):** based in Manchester, the APPS UK is an independent, educational and not for profit organisation providing advocacy to protect and promote the interests of its members. Its membership comprises of doctors of Pakistani heritage in the UK.
- **Pakistani Resource Centre (PRC):** The PRC provides advice and assistance on benefit claims, immigration cases, education, unemployment, racial harassment and discrimination cases to the Pakistani community in Manchester
- **Pakistan Association Leicester (PAL):** The PAL promotes social and cultural activities, as well as advocacy on educational and welfare issues confronting the Pakistani community in Leicester. There is also a Pakistan Association providing similar services in Sheffield.

¹⁰⁷ www.muslimparliament.org.uk

12.3.3 Locally based Pakistani women's organisations in different parts of the country

Examples of the work of some of the locally based Pakistani women's organisations include:

- **The Pakistan Women's Association (PWA):** The PWA is a Harrow based organisation set up to cater for Pakistani women specifically although in practice its users tend to be from diverse cultural, ethnic, religious groupings. The PWA organises cultural and religious functions and provides advice and counselling, health and educational information and activities.
- **Asian Women's Resource Association (AWRA):** in operation in Halifax since 1986, AWRA caters for all the social, educational and welfare needs of local Asian women, the majority of whom are Pakistani. The organisation has survived over the years with virtually no statutory funding or support and its centre is kept running by volunteers and by renting out space to agencies such as Social Services, Help the Aged and the local further education college.
- **UK Asian Women's Centre (UKAWC):** based in Birmingham, the UKAWC provides services for women from South Asia, with a large membership comprising mainly of Pakistani women. Activities include a primary care group for young women, community transport and the provision of cooked meals for elderly clients.
- **Neesa Well Women Project:** The Neesa project provides one-to-one support, activities, groups, outreach and a mental health service for South Asian, predominantly Pakistani women in Manchester.

12.3.4 London based organisations

Examples of some London based organisations mentioned by respondents:

- **Alliance of Muslim Associations in Newham (AMAN):** Established as the 'Newham Muslim Citizens Association' during the mid-1990's following the murder of a young Muslim. It subsequently evolved into AMAN and currently represents over fifty Mosques and Muslim organisations. It provides a collective platform for the airing of Muslim issues and concerns with the local authority and other external partners. Its membership includes representative organisations of the Pakistani community in the London Borough of Newham.
- **Kashmir Welfare Association Newham (KWAN):** The KWAN represents Pakistani Kashmiri's in the London Borough of Newham, offering advice and counseling on issues such as housing, immigration, employment and welfare rights. Additionally, it promotes Kashmiri history, culture and language.
- **The Asian Centre:** based in the London Borough of Waltham Forest, the centre provides a range of services for the predominately Pakistani community in Walthamstow. It is a popular venue for community meetings and weddings. In 2006, it made national news when the local authority banned a proscribed extremist group, al-Ghurabaa, from holding clandestine meetings at the centre.

- **National Association of British Pakistanis**

A number of non Pakistani Muslim institutions were also mentioned by respondents as offering both religious and community services to their communities. These included the Minhaj-ul-Quran and Anjumen-e-Islamia in Newham, the Albert Road Mosque and Community Centre in Redbridge, and the Lea Bridge Road Mosque and Community Centre in Waltham Forest.

12.4 Key influencers

There are very mixed views and perceptions regarding different influencers, depending upon generational differences. Mosques and religious leaders have historically been seen as a key influence, but there is a growing feeling that mosques are no longer able to maintain this leadership role. Many management committees are seen to be stuck in the old and traditional approaches which are incompatible with the needs of the younger generation. There are also communication issues amongst the younger generation, as the mosques are still predominantly using Asian languages.

Some national organisations such as MCB, BMF and Muslim Parliament do have a degree of influence, but are regarded with some cynicism by many people. They are perceived as not being transparent enough or representative of all Muslims, and are accused of operating along vested interests.

People expressed serious concerns about the role of some of the international personalities who have had a negative impact on the lives and relationships of Muslims in Britain. There is a common view in the community that the activities of such people were not curtailed in time, and that they were allowed to carry on preaching their schools of thoughts far too long, and that this has contributed to the present problems around fundamentalism, extremism and terrorism.

The influence of *biradaris* has been highlighted in earlier sections of the report. The most influential people cited repeatedly by respondents after parents and extended family are local councillors and successful businessmen. Young people in general have no idea who local community leaders are. International influences are largely religion based and politically led. However, according to respondents, the Pakistani community has to a large extent come to focus on local needs as a priority now, rather than be led by international affairs.

12.5 Engagement with public authorities

As highlighted in the earlier section on politics, the Pakistani community is actively engaged in local and national politics, and this high level of engagement is corroborated by the Citizenship Survey findings which suggest that Pakistanis are more confident about their ability to influence local and national political processes than other communities. Asked

whether they felt that they had an influence on government decision making, 31 per cent of the Pakistani community felt that they influence decisions at a national level, and 43 per cent felt that they influence decisions made in their local area. These figures are significantly higher than the average, which are 20 per cent and 38 per cent respectively.¹⁰⁸

Similarly, the survey findings on belonging and neighbourhood echo the strong feelings respondents expressed about being British and regarding Britain as home. Many in the study also expressed strong affiliations to their local areas. According to the survey, 41 per cent of the Pakistani community report very strong feelings of belonging to their neighbourhood, and 44 per cent have fairly strong feelings of belonging. This is higher than the national average, which is 34 per cent and 41 per cent respectively. However, almost half (48 per cent) of Pakistanis also felt that there is more racial prejudice in Britain than five years ago.¹⁰⁹

Perceptions about the UK government vary from community to community and person to person. According to respondents, Pakistani people have historically tended to support the Labour Party, which was seen as the party that supported the rights of the working class people and those of ethnic minorities. However the perception of unconditional support by the Blair government for American policy on Iraq and Afghanistan is believed to have had a considerably negative impact on the level of support that exists for the government, and is also thought to have led to increased support for new political groups such as the Respect Party.

Some people, however, report that since Gordon Brown took office as the Prime Minister, some change in the government's approach and terminology has been visible, and that this has provided a degree of comfort and reassurance. The impact of this has been positive, and support for the government amongst Muslims is reported to have begun rising again, as was evident in the recent Greater London Authority elections. In terms of the wider interests of the community, people appear to be generally happy with the government's policies on health, employment and social welfare.

The Pakistani community has historically been very involved in local party politics. However, whilst elected members are seen as key influencers, many respondents viewed them with the same level of cynicism that the majority community accord to mainstream politicians. According to some, mainly younger people and women, these are people with power issues who can be powerful gatekeepers, and that all they want to be is a leader and sit on as many 'committees' as possible, without actually understanding or representing real community needs to decision makers and service providers. As one interviewee in a small town with three Pakistani Councillors noted: *We have all these 'Chaudharies' (leaders), but we can't get together to create a venue for our children's weddings.*¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ Citizenship Survey: 2007-08, (April 2007 – March 2008), England & Wales, pg 6.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Pakistani community interviewee: female, 50s.

An additional problem identified by respondents is that, although the councillors are from the local community, many have not been educated or trained to deal with the day to day issues relating to the policies and procedures of British politics. This also disadvantages the local community in accessing and voicing its needs.

There are many people, including rising numbers of women, who hold positions on various voluntary and statutory bodies, including as Justices of the Peace, school governing bodies, Non Executive Directors in Primary Care Trusts, NHS Trusts, Regional Assemblies and other trades associations. However, community workers were highly critical of government and local authority consultation and funding mechanisms. In their experience, small Black and Minority Ethnic voluntary organisations are being squeezed out by numerous consortiums and forums that now seem to control all funding flows in local areas. These are seen to be dominated by White voluntary or statutory sector staff in full time paid posts, whilst people from the community who are often struggling without pay and resources, or who do not have the appropriate language and communication skills, get virtually excluded or marginalised. This widespread frustration is illustrated by this respondent: *Unless you are familiar with the correct language and jargon of the local authorities and their departments, and about key people to contact, you are just unable to engage.*¹¹¹

There is also a lot of cynicism about general consultations exercises by local and central government agencies. Many people believe that most of the time public authorities come to them to conduct consultations and questionnaires purely because their own delivery plans require them to do so, rather than out of any genuine desire to consult or engage communities. As with their experiences of difficulties in accessing local authorities, most people also expressed doubts about being able to engage with central government in any meaningful way.

12.6 Community issues and capacity building needs

The key issues highlighted by community respondents include:

- Inadequacy of youth provision
- Training and development needs of young people and women
- Break down in family structures and a growing involvement of youth in crime and anti social behaviour
- Islamophobia and its impact on Muslims at large, particularly young Muslims who feel victimised and alienated
- The need for opening up mosques for other social and community activities, including provision for the elderly, young people and women

¹¹¹ Pakistani community interviewee: female, 40s.

- Succession planning through the involvement of youth and women in the management committees of mosques and other community organisations
- Accessibility, quality and appropriateness of public service provision
- The lack of mentoring, coaching and other forms of support from national and regional organisations that claim to be the representatives of Pakistani communities.

The civil society capacity development needs identified are considered not very different to the development needs of mainstream communities and voluntary organisations and include:

- Community development funding to support micro community groups that are trying to address issues at the grass roots level (the most pressing need). Other issues such as staffing, training resources, sustainability, developing long term plans, engaging in partnerships etc are all seen to stem from the lack of funding
- Education, funding and training for community groups and management committees to address local needs
- Consultation that leads to real action in the form of programmes and activities to meet identified community needs
- Coordination and networking to share information and resources and to develop joint provision.

13 Conclusions and recommendations

The Pakistani community is the second largest of the three South Asian communities in Britain, with a population estimate of 899,000. Over 92 per cent of Pakistanis in Britain identify themselves as Muslim. Whilst a large proportion of the community is concentrated in London, it is more evenly spread across the country than most other Muslim populations, with major settlements in the Midlands, Yorkshire and the North West.

The Pakistani population, which makes up the majority of the UK's Muslim population, is still relatively disadvantaged in education and employment. However, this is gradually changing, with considerable regional variations in employment and education outcomes for Pakistanis. In addition to a growing middle class, new migration has seen an influx of Pakistani migrants who are well educated, in professional jobs and economically solvent. Whilst family and cultural pressures in the personal and social sphere still maintain an important and often restricting influence, growing numbers of Pakistani women are also going into higher education and high profile careers, as well as becoming more involved in the life of the community outside the home.

Alongside the rising prosperity of a large section of the community, there is still a considerable underclass trapped in a cycle of low educational underachievement, lack of employment opportunities, and a growing drugs and crime culture. There is concern that these challenges have not been adequately responded to by civil society organisations in the community, with a lack of leadership as well as concerns about a divide between generations that has led to a lack of youth engagement in many civil society organisations.

The community considers itself to be well integrated and its primary self identification is that of British Muslim. At the same time, it is keen to maintain close links with its cultural heritage and country of origin. Many question the public policy focus on cohesion and integration which is seen by many as a knee jerk response to a current situation that ignores the fact that Britain is a multicultural society in which various communities have lived and continue to live harmoniously. Integration approaches are particularly mistrusted and are viewed primarily as a means to force minority communities to assimilate into an imagined British culture and values.

All generations retain some level of connection, real or psychological, with Pakistan. For older generations this is more tangible and takes the form of maintaining close links with family and relatives, and involvement in politics and financial investments. However, younger generations, whilst retaining an affinity with Pakistan by virtue of their familial links and through culture, music, sport and entertainment, strongly identify themselves as British Muslims. In common with other established South Asian populations in England, many are navigating their way through multiple identity paradigms influenced both by their experiences of racism and discrimination in Britain and their identification with global Muslim concerns.

There is acute concern within the community about the influence of those promoting and recruiting young people to extremist and violent interpretations of Islam. Older generations in particular feel that there is an ideological battle taking place with a wide range of external and international actors involved and that unless the community actively engages internally with its young generation, external forces will dominate and determine the future direction of the community.

Consequently a growing number of civil society organisations are now trying to respond by proactively addressing the concerns of young people in order to turn them away from those who would recruit them to such extremist interpretations and causes. However, this concern about negative external influences on young people is also allied to frustrations about overly negative representations of the community and the faith in the media and recent policy and legislation, which they see as unfairly drawing a direct link between all Muslims and extremism.

The Pakistani community has been actively involved in British politics since the early days of its settlement, particularly at the level of local party politics. At the national level too politicians from a Pakistani background are well represented in both Houses of Parliament. The early majority support for the Labour Party has, over the years, spread out across the main political parties, and whilst involvement with the Labour party still remains strong, many people, particularly in London, have begun to switch their allegiance to the Respect party, which is seen as more sympathetic to Muslim concerns.

Due to the size of the Pakistani community and the length of time it has been in the UK, its civil society structures are relatively well developed. There are literally thousands of associations and support organisations catering for the community, many of which have established good communication and funding relationships with local authorities. However, many of the traditional sources of funding are drying out and there are fears that the impact of money earmarked purely on the basis of government priorities will have a very negative consequence for community development.

Specific recommendations arising from community respondents include:

- Improving engagement by identifying and working with those individuals in the community who have the capability and understanding needed to communicate and engage equally with both local authorities and minority communities. Such people would be more effective in sign posting relevant pathways to enable stronger partnerships and networking between authorities and communities
- Direct and public consultations that involve people who have a day to day involvement with communities at the grassroots level as opposed to trying to access the community through identified gatekeepers, as well as liaison with existing community organisations in local areas to promote and raise awareness of the issues that the government wants to consult about

- Engagement should not be a one off process but should be embedded as a strategic policy and procedure, perhaps in the form of a partnership document between community and government, with clear milestones to achieve and targets to meet
- Allowing community organisations to govern the approach in structuring strategies for dialogue in ways that are appropriate and accessible, rather than imposing unfamiliar approaches on communities
- Development of a fully representative organisation in each local area that highlights community issues and offers solutions to the Council and government. Young people and women should be particularly encouraged and facilitated to participate in such a body.

Other recommendations

- Provision of funding and capacity building support to women's organisations and groups
- Further research into the experiences and attitudes of young people from lower socio economic backgrounds
- Research into the impact of radicalism on women and the role of women in preventing extremism
- A detailed study of the historical development and current scope of Pakistani civil society.

14 Glossary

Ahl-e-Hadith: Adherents of the Shariah being based strictly on the *hadith* and *sunnah*.

AJK: Azad Jammu and Kashmir

Barelvi/Barelwi: Founded in northern India in 1880s, based on the writings of Mawlana Ahmad Reza Khan Barelvi. Barelvis believe themselves to be South Asia's heirs and representatives of the earliest Muslim community. The movement was triggered by the failure of the Indian revolt of 1857 and the subsequent formal colonisation of India by the British, which led to the final dissolution of the Mughal Empire. (Esposito, 2008)

Biradaris: Kinship groups encompassing immediate and extended family bloodlines

BMF: British Muslim Forum

Dawat-e Islami: A non-political, purely religious, international propagational movement.

Deobandi: Associated with the Indo-Pakistani reformist movement centered in the Dār al-'Ulum of Deoband are known by the name Deobandis. The school at Deoband, a country town some ninety miles northeast of Delhi, was founded in 1867. The goal of the school was to preserve the teachings of the faith in a period of non-Muslim rule and considerable social change by holding Muslims to a standard of correct practice; central to that goal was the creation of a class of formally trained and popularly supported *ulama*. (Esposito, 2008)

FOSIS: Federation of Student Islamic Societies

Haba'ib: Sufi *tariqa* (order)

Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT): HT is an Islamist political party founded in 1953 by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, an Islamic jurist of Palestinian origin. Its main goal is the rebirth of the caliphate as the only political structure able to apply Islamic law and to restore glory and prosperity to the *ummah* (community of the believers). (Esposito, 2008)

ISB: UK Islamic Society of Britain

Izzat: At one level it stands for the honour and reputation of an individual and family, and maintaining Izzat involves not bringing shame to the family or oneself. To have Izzat for someone also means to show respect, as in the injunction that one must have Izzat for one's elders.

Jamaat-e Islami (JI): Pakistani Islamic revivalist party founded by Mawlana Abu al-Ala Mawdudi in 1941 in pre-partition India. The party encourages the reformation of society through education and conversion rather than by coercion. Its political agenda was premised on a program of training the vanguard "Islamic elite" to oversee the revival of Islam on the national level and mobilize the masses using religious symbols and ideals. (Esposito, 2008)

Kommittis: Regional burial societies

MCB: Muslim Council of Britain

MQM: Muttahida Qaumi Movement

Muslim Brotherhood

Naqshbandi-Haqqanis: Sufi *tariqa* (order) founded by Sheikh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani.

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

PKWA: Pakistan and Kashmir Welfare Association

PPP: Pakistan People's Party

Salafis: Derived from *salaf*, "pious ancestors", a name given to a reform movement led by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh at the turn of the twentieth century. Emphasised restoration of Islamic doctrines to pure form, adherence to the *Quran* and Sunnah, rejection of the authority of later interpretations, and maintenance of the unity of ummah (Esposito, 2008). This is often confused with Wahhabism – a very radical form of Salafism, founded by Mohammed Abdul-Wahhab.

Shadhiliya: Sufi *tariqa* (order) founded by Imam Shadhili

SMC: Sufi Muslim Council

Sufi/Sufism: Spiritual aspect of Islam. The word Sufi has a range of meanings, deriving from different aspects of the word's etymology but generally refers to those who are interested in inner knowledge and practice towards spiritual awakening and enlightenment. There are a number of Sufi orders or 'paths' (*tariqas*), including the *Tijaniyah* and *Qadiriyah*, many which developed between the 9th and 12th centuries. (Esposito, 2008)

Sunni: Muslims who emphasise the importance of the actions and customs of Muhammad and the first generations of Muslims, viewing as legitimate the establishment of the caliphate, in contrast to Shi'a beliefs. About 85 per cent of all Muslims are Sunnis. (Esposito, 2008)

Tablighi Jamaat: Indian reform movement founded by Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas in 1927 in Delhi. Popular with villagers and peasants. Called for reform of personal religious practices and defense of Islam and Muslim minority populations. Focused on religious, rather than political, aspects of Islam. (Esposito, 2008)

UKIM: UK Islamic Mission

YMUK: Young Muslims

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This report presents a picture of the Pakistani Muslim community in England.

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