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Summary of identified concerns with the response by CAC during the 7th July 2005 incidents.

Dated: 15th August 2005 (page 1 of 2)

Through collating the CAC paper and electronic logs, the call receipts and radio transmission tapes and debriefs with AOM's and ambulance crew personnel a number of concerns have been identified with the response by CAC to the 7th July incidents.

Several issues that have been teased out of the reports and debrief process are reflected in the 'areas of improvement action plan' though I feel that these are the most important that probably need urgent action:

- It appears to have taken 39 minutes¹ to activate an officer (the AOM at Pinner) to the Kings Cross LUL incident, even though the Camden DSO was at Camden Ambulance Station and had rung the sector desk 'begging' (his words) to attend while he watched the incident on television with Camden crew staff. The deployment of an officer was prompted by a crew report from scene.
- It appears to have taken 30 minutes² to despatch the first ambulance to the Russell Square LUL incident. That ambulance immediately came across a running call. It then seems to have taken a further hour (approximate figure due to lack of records) before more ambulances were deployed to scene. The initial attendance of sufficient ambulances were not despatched until two hours into the incident.
- It appears to have taken 52 minutes³ to have despatched ambulances to the Tavistock Square bus bomb. The first crew to arrive was enroute to the Russell Square LUL incident though had come across the bus bomb as a running call. The second deployment of ambulances were three Harley Street vehicles and an AOM that responded from Leicester Square, 52 minutes after the first call was received.
- At all of the incidents it has been document by crew staff and officers that there were insufficient LAS ambulance and equipment resources despatched⁴, despite logged entries in CAC and Gold Control requesting further resources. A total of 201 ambulances were rostered (this figure excludes vehicles off road/unstaffed) during the period between 0851hrs and 1000hrs, a request was made for mutual aid that resulted in Surrey, Beds & Herts and voluntary aid ambulances responding to the Kings Cross incident. Many of these mutual aid vehicles came from long distances and would have had to come past LAS ambulance stations, that management information statistics suggest had resources on station. CAC received a further 544 calls between 0851hrs-1400hrs.
- Information flow into CAC and Gold Control from the incidents was in fact fairly good. Reports, updates and requests for resources have been documented through the primary incident log, though critical information had not been actioned or in fact 'flagged' with the CAC Incident Commander or overall LAS command structures. These issues seem partly due to log entries being made throughout the control suite with no single person or technical alerting system indicating the critical information.
- Key radio transmissions and phone entries were not logged on either paper or the electronic log system – many entries had to be retrieved from radio transmission tapes (including a declaration message). Other critical information was recorded on scraps of paper rather than on the log systems available. All four incidents were logged on two separate electronic logs which clearly led to some confusion

¹ First call received at 0904hrs, 0943hrs AOM books mobile on radio channel and is deployed to scene, 0946hrs E3 DSO despatched

² First call received at 0918hrs, 0948hrs first ambulance despatched from UCH though comes across running call, further ambulance on scene at approximately 1045hrs

³ First calls received at 0948hrs, 0957hrs ambulance attends as running call, 1040hrs Harley Street ambulances despatched with AOM from Leicester Square

⁴ 17 ambulances despatched to Aldgate (30 requested), 9 ambulances despatched to Edgware Road, 9 ambulance despatched to Russell Square