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Investigations

Inquiry reports

1989


Opium Derivatives: A report on the matter of the existence or possible existence of a monopoly situation in relation to the supply in the United Kingdom of opium derivatives.

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Summary



On 16 June 1987 the Director General of Fair Trading asked the Commission to investigate the supply in the United Kingdom of six specified opium derivatives, morphine, codeine, dihydrocodeine, diamorphine, ethylmorphine and pholcodine. We established that Macfarlan Smith Ltd (MSL), a subsidiary of Glaxo PLC, had around 87 per cent of this market and was
therefore a scale monopolist as defined in the Fair Trading Act 1973.

The only other manufacturer is the Boots Company PLC (Boots), which produces codeine (and small amounts of morphine), principally for use in-house. There are no imports of opium derivatives into the United Kingdom because it has been Home Office policy for many years not to issue import licences. Opium derivatives are subject to domestic and international controls under the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961 and any person wishing to
manufacture or process these products in the United Kingdom, or to import them, requires a Home Office licence.

MSL faces little competition in the United Kingdom and there is little prospect of new entry. MSL has exploited this monopoly situation by engaging in price discrimination and has been enabled to charge high prices in the domestic market, leading to very high levels of profit. We find that both these aspects of MSL's behaviour are against the public interest.

Shortly before we completed our inquiry, we were informed by MSL that a list of maximum prices dated 26 September 1988 was now available to customers who placed orders. This list already incorporates reductions in prices and is a welcome development.

It is, however, of prime importance to increase competition in this market. We believe that the desirable objective of preserving a United Kingdom manufacturing base for the supply of the reference products is incompatible with either their free importation or more limited unilateral action to allow importation from other EC countries. A preferable alternative would be to negotiate freedom to import on a reciprocal basis within the EC. We therefore recommend that the Home Office, in conjunction with other Government departments, should work towards the creation of a single EC market in the reference products through the reciprocal opening up of trade between EC member countries as soon as possible and not later than 1992.

Meanwhile a measure of price protection for MSL's customers in the United Kingdom is necessary. Hence we recommend that MSL should be required not to increase its maximum prices for reference products to these customers for a period of three years, except in the event of substantial and unavoidable increases in its costs.








Full text



Contents

Chapters

 
Chapter 1 Summary
Chapter 2 The United Kingdom market for the reference products
Chapter 3 The United Kingdom formulated opiate products market
Chapter 4 Macfarlan Smith Ltd
Chapter 5 MSL's pricing of the reference products
Chapter 6 Profitability of MSL's United Kingdom reference business
Chapter 7 Views of MSL
Chapter 8 Views of third parties
Chapter 9 Conclusions
  List of signatories
Glossary  

Appendices

 



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