

**RNI DE-CLASSIFIED**

questions related to in handwritten form myself so that office staff of the MIT would not be aware of who the individuals concerned were. The MIT were by now aware that there was intelligence naming [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] as having played an active role in the murder; I therefore filled in the blanks with these names, together with the names of others in relation to whom we required further intelligence, including [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] D95 records that I asked ACC Special Branch and the Regional Heads of both Belfast and South Region to consider how intelligence could be developed with the evidentiary nature of the investigation in mind. In relation to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] whose involvement had been stated in Special Branch intelligence I asked further questions on the type of role they had played, [REDACTED]

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70. We made numerous attempts to go beyond and behind the intelligence given to try to weigh its significance, develop it and relate it to the information we had. Any suggestion (which I understand has been made in evidence) that we were not focused and prioritising in our requests would be incorrect. There are many other examples of this approach which clearly show that the MIT did not simply accept the intelligence given. I would highlight, for example, the following attempts by the MIT to validate the intelligence given:

- The later meeting that Colin Port and I had with the two ACCs concerned on the 8<sup>th</sup> April when we requested amongst other things, information and the identity of sources [REDACTED] information on the grading of the intelligence provided and access to surveillance logs;
- Document RIBA **RNI-620.137-140** dated 19/7/2000 which was a series of questions forwarded to Detective Superintendent **B503** about intelligence [REDACTED]