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Full Hearings

Hearing: 28th November 2008, day 82

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held at:
The Interpoint Centre
20-24 York Street
Belfast BT15 1AQ

on Friday, 28 November 2008
commencing at 9.45 am

Day 82









1 Friday, 28 November 2008

2 (9.45 am)

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Currans, the checklist. Is the public

4 area screen fully in place, locked and the key secured?

5 MR CURRANS: Yes, sir.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Are the fire doors on either side of the

7 screen closed?

8 MR CURRANS: Yes, sir.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: Are the technical support screens in place

10 and securely fastened?

11 MR CURRANS: Yes, sir.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Is anyone other than Inquiry personnel and

13 Participants' legal representatives seated in the body

14 of this chamber?

15 MR CURRANS: No, sir.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Mr (name redacted), can you please

17 confirm that the two witness cameras have been switched

18 off and shrouded?

19 MR (NAME REDACTED): Yes, sir, they have.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: All the other cameras have been switched off?

21 MR (NAME REDACTED): Yes, sir, they have.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

23 Bring the witness in, please.

24 The cameras on the Panel, Inquiry personnel and the

25 Full Participants' legal representatives may now be





1 switched back on.

2 Would you please take the oath?

3 B552 (sworn)

4 Questions by MR SKELTON

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, please sit down.

6 Yes, Mr Skelton?

7 MR SKELTON: For the purposes of this Inquiry you are known

8 as B552 and your statement is at RNI-846-108

9 (displayed). That's the first page of it. The last

10 page is at page RNI-846-144 (displayed) and your

11 signature has been replaced by your redacted cipher,

12 but that's your statement dated 8 January 2008?

13 A. Yes, that's correct.

14 Q. Thank you. You say in your statement that you joined

15 the RUC, I think, in 1982 and you were initially in

16 uniform in Lurgan. Is that right?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. How long were you there for?

19 A. Up to about seven years in uniform.

20 Q. And during that period what was going on in Lurgan?

21 A. Well, Lurgan was traditionally known as the murder

22 triangle, so there was quite a lot of terrorist activity

23 in and around the area. But my role at that time was in

24 what would be called response policing now, in section

25 work, dealing with crime, dealing with the day-to-day





1 calls that police officers would go to, and then

2 latterly in a crime team, specifically dealing with

3 crime issues.

4 Q. And you went to the Crime Operations Unit. Is that

5 correct?

6 A. The crime team is probably what you are referring to,

7 which was a small team that worked specifically on crime

8 matters for CID.

9 Q. And after that you transferred to Special Branch?

10 A. To Special Branch, yes.

11 Q. As a DC?

12 A. Yes, as a DC.

13 Q. So you were initially a handler, were you?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. You, I think, were initially in Craigavon. Is that

16 right?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. And then transferred to Portadown in about 1997?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. How long did you work in SB for?

21 A. I had a stint initially for just over 16 years prior to

22 going back out into uniform for three years.

23 Q. And you are still, I think, in the PSNI now?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. Are you back in Special Branch?





1 A. Just recently I have moved back in, yes.

2 Q. What rank are you now?

3 A. Detective Inspector.

4 Q. Thank you. The first thing I would like to ask you

5 about really is the nuts and bolts of intelligence

6 reporting and how it is recorded and disseminated.

7 A meeting takes place between a handler and his

8 source. The handler then returns to the office. Would

9 a handler then have a discussion with you as his

10 sergeant about what has just been talked about?

11 A. Normally, yes, that would be the process. The text --

12 or the context of the meeting would be discussed.

13 Q. What sort of things are you discussing: whether there is

14 anything significant and how it should be recorded?

15 A. Yes. Generally you would be going through the content

16 of the meeting to see are there any threats to life

17 which -- prioritising the intelligence really. If there

18 is anything that should be dealt with expeditiously, or

19 are there issues which require further examination,

20 research. Are there questions where we need to retask

21 either that source or other sources who may be able to

22 develop that intelligence; issues around the meeting

23 security, welfare issues around the CHIS, welfare issues

24 around the handlers?

25 Q. Would this occur for every meet?





1 A. Obviously for high profile meets it would be the

2 preferred option. There would be other meets where

3 maybe if the source was the eyes and the ears and was

4 providing low level intelligence, you wouldn't require

5 a specific debrief like that.

6 Q. What kind of research might you want to do?

7 A. It could be research around maybe individuals, or

8 sometimes the sources may just know individuals by

9 nicknames or they may have a partial addresses or

10 partial vehicle numbers or whatever. So there would be

11 a number of areas that may require further research.

12 Q. So, for example, if the source has told the handler that

13 he had met with X and there was a plan to target Y, you

14 might want, if you didn't already know, research as to

15 who X and Y were?

16 A. Yes, obviously if there was a specific threat to life

17 and you weren't aware of specific details, you would

18 have to try and research systems to see if nicknames

19 were stored in systems to try and develop that

20 intelligence.

21 Q. Whose decision was it to record a piece of intelligence

22 as being implicitly significant?

23 A. Well, over my years within the department, it developed

24 or became more streamlined in that the system would have

25 been taken from handlers recording details through to





1 what became known as controllers, which would have been

2 the detective sergeants, and further on up the line, who

3 would have received the debrief and decided on actions

4 as to what we would do.

5 Q. What about in 1998/1999, which is the period we are most

6 concerned with? You have a discussion with one of your

7 DCs about what has just been talked about in the meet?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Are you determining yourself, as the supervising

10 officer, what's going to go on and be reported?

11 A. You are -- you are not determining; you are prioritising

12 what is dealt with expeditiously. Obviously if it is

13 a threat to life or a potential threat to life, you need

14 to be dealing with that expeditiously. Whereas if it is

15 a partial --

16 Q. We will come on to the threat to life. But somebody

17 makes a decision about whether something is significant

18 because a report is going to be made, and presumably not

19 everything that's discussed is significant, by any

20 stretch. Is that for the handler to determine which

21 snippet of information should find its way on to the

22 PRISM debrief?

23 A. Normally in practice a handler would have retrieved

24 everything. So everything that would have been recorded

25 from the meeting, whether taken down in notes or through





1 memory, they would be presenting that. So they would be

2 presenting that to the controller and then that would be

3 the joint decision: we need to put this in now or we can

4 do further research on that and submit it tomorrow, the

5 next day.

6 Those would have been the decisions around the

7 controller.

8 Q. And was all of the intelligence that was gathered from

9 a particular meet contained in one original document

10 produced by the handler?

11 A. Yes. Normally if there was -- if there was notes taken,

12 that would have been your original notes. As I say, if

13 there was further research required, the actual putting

14 of that information on to the system may have been a day

15 later or the day after that, but the original notes

16 would have been taken at the time.

17 Q. Well, the Inquiry has seen a number of documents on

18 PRISM which seems to contain the sort of early

19 debriefing intelligence from sources. Were there

20 documents prior to that, like a contact note, for

21 example, or an SB50, which recorded a greater amount of

22 intelligence and detail?

23 A. It sort of developed. In my early days, you dealt with

24 SB50s and that was really where you came in and put

25 information down directly on to the form.





1 THE CHAIRMAN: It would certainly help me if you could

2 concentrate on 1998/1999/1997, not what happened in

3 recent years.

4 Yes, Mr Skelton?

5 MR SKELTON: Were SB50s in use in 1998/1999?

6 A. No, I think at that time it had progressed and it had

7 become more streamlined and we were using computer

8 systems, and there were guidelines around what we should

9 be doing, original contact notes and retaining

10 information.

11 Q. And did you produce a handwritten contact note in that

12 period at all?

13 A. I think that was the preferred option that -- again, it

14 is hard to be specific because sometimes a meeting may

15 not produce intelligence, in which case, you know, there

16 wouldn't have been any specific intelligence recorded.

17 Q. Were these contact notes kept or were they got rid of,

18 shredded or otherwise at some point?

19 A. No, it developed into where contact notes -- as is the

20 case today, [ redacted ]

21 [ redacted ].

22 Q. And they are handwritten, are they?

23 A. Yes, normally handwritten.

24 Q. If you have a handwritten contact note, who then creates

25 of PRISM debrief document?





1 A. Well, the process really was that the intelligence was

2 put on to the computer, really feeding in from the

3 handwritten note. So the intelligence was processed

4 through the computer. And that was then -- sorry, that

5 was then processed through to a source unit, who then

6 were responsible for dissemination to different areas of

7 that.

8 Q. Was the handler himself, or his assistant, his

9 administrative assistant, adding in the PRISM

10 intelligence?

11 A. They would have processed it through a computer and I

12 think it was probably MACER at that stage. CAISTER --

13 I'm a wee bit fuzzy about it at this stage.

14 Q. I'm trying to really unpack exactly how it was working

15 and I appreciate it is difficult for you, but what we

16 have seen is PRISM documents which appear to be the sort

17 of earliest computerised record of the intelligence?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. We have also seen what appears to be produced slightly

20 later in some cases: SIRs, secret intelligence reports,

21 which are on the MACER system.

22 Now, in some cases there is a process of

23 sanitisation when the original intelligence is turned

24 into a SIR and then into a SIDD, which is the

25 dissemination document. What I'm trying to establish is





1 who is producing the original PRISM document and then

2 the SIR?

3 A. As an office, in working with the pure intelligence, the

4 intelligence was probably, for clarity -- it was

5 discussed in the office. The wording of the

6 intelligence was produced on to the computer system,

7 I believe it was CAISTER or MACER at that stage, and

8 then that was processed through to the source unit. And

9 I think that the PRISM system was around the source unit

10 as such. I think that's what they referred to there --

11 in their dealings with the intelligence.

12 Q. So in fact the earliest input from your office would be

13 on to the MACER system?

14 A. From my knowledge, that is, I believe, what we referred

15 to it as, MACER.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry to interrupt again, but the handler

17 produces the contact note. Is that right?

18 A. That's correct.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: Who then puts the material, the relevant

20 intelligence in the contact note, into the computer

21 system first?

22 A. That would be the responsibility of the handler.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

24 SIR ANTHONY BURDEN: Just on that point, if I heard you

25 correctly, PRISM was a system held at the source unit





1 level?

2 A. I believe that is how they referred to the system that

3 they dealt with, which may have -- I'm not particularly

4 sure about the systems. I'm a wee bit fuzzy because

5 they did progress through, but I think that what we did

6 was we put them on to the system and I believe it was

7 called MACER at that time.

8 SIR ANTHONY BURDEN: So you think at your local level, the

9 system was MACER?

10 A. Yes, yes.

11 SIR ANTHONY BURDEN: That went through to the source unit

12 within your region?

13 A. Yes.

14 SIR ANTHONY BURDEN: Then any PRISM computer record, which

15 then went on through to E departments, was produced by

16 the source unit, was it?

17 A. They were responsible for the dissemination of that.

18 Now, they referred to their system, I believe, as

19 PRISM, but I think that was MACER. But they obviously

20 had different levels that they could progress through,

21 whereas as a handling team we processed it through the

22 MACER system.

23 Q. I can understand your confusion. Just one more question

24 from me: intelligence input into the computer system at

25 your local level, was that raw intelligence?





1 A. Yes, that was the product from the meeting, yes.

2 SIR ANTHONY BURDEN: It was the product from the meeting.

3 It was not sanitised in any way at your level?

4 A. There may be certain sanitisation, in that there may be

5 things that weren't relevant.


7 A. But, you know, the information was processed from the

8 handler, from the contact note, the relevant information

9 was discussed and that information was then processed

10 through myself as a controller and that was put through

11 to the source unit.

12 SIR ANTHONY BURDEN: If the intelligence contained names, if

13 there was a need to protect sources or individuals,

14 where was the discussion? Where was the decision made

15 that names perhaps should be left out?

16 A. Well, there would be an initial discussion as a result

17 of the intelligence and the meeting.

18 [ redacted ]

19 [ redacted ]

20 [ redacted ]

21 [ redacted ]

22 [ redacted ]

23 SIR ANTHONY BURDEN: That was a discussion which took place

24 locally?

25 A. That would be a discussion at handler level, handler and





1 controller, and those decisions would be made around the

2 security and welfare issues surrounding the source.


4 THE CHAIRMAN: When you were in Portadown, as a detective

5 sergeant, in effect, although you may not have been

6 called the controller at that time -- but you were the

7 supervisor of the handler at that stage. Is that right?

8 A. That's correct.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: Where was your source unit?

10 A. The source unit operated out of Mahon Road.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: And you were in a different station,

12 were you?

13 A. Yes.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: Or were you in Mahon Road as well?

15 A. No, my office was located within the local police

16 station.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, thank you.

18 Yes, Mr Skelton?

19 MR SKELTON: Sir, two things arising from that. First of

20 all, the issue of the production of intelligence and the

21 use of the computer systems in 1998/1999 is an issue of

22 clear significance for the Inquiry. May I suggest that

23 we ask the PSNI's assistant to produce a definitive

24 version of this issue so that the witnesses who give

25 evidence aren't racking their memories to assist us?





1 SIR ANTHONY BURDEN: I would certainly welcome that.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, we would welcome that, Mr Donaldson.

3 Obviously you can't do it now.

4 MR DONALDSON: No, I can't. No, I listened and heard, sir.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

6 MR SKELTON: The second thing is I think you were mentioning

7 about writing reports in order to protect the sources of

8 it, and I think one of the driving forces, as

9 I understood it, was that you don't want a person

10 reading the intelligence report to know exactly where it

11 has come from?

12 A. That would be one -- it could be a consideration.

13 Q. While at the same time you want to maximise the amount

14 of information contained within it?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. And that is the balancing exercise, isn't it?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. The role of the regional source unit: you were sending

19 your reports via, it appears, the MACER system to the

20 regional source unit. What were they doing in terms of

21 analysing it and changing it in to a source that could

22 be disseminated more widely?

23 A. Really, there was a system of quality control.

24 Sometimes information would have been put on the system

25 and maybe a recognised name or intelligence that had





1 previously been submitted, that name would have had

2 a specific Special Branch number attached to it.

3 Sometimes information would go through and maybe that

4 number wasn't added on to the report and they would have

5 the facility to send it back for those things to be --

6 so there was quality assurance around that.

7 Q. Would there be a dialogue then with you or your handlers

8 and the regional source unit before the report was

9 finalised in the PRISM form that we have seen?

10 A. They had the facility to send, electronically on the

11 system, to send it back to you to have a number put on

12 and then that would be amended again and then submitted

13 through to them. And then they had the responsibility

14 to disseminate it to -- if it was information that may

15 have related to, say, Dungannon or Belfast or whatever,

16 they had the facility then to ensure that the readership

17 there had access to it.

18 Q. And on some of the reports we have seen, particularly

19 the PRISM documents, we have seen the phrases such as

20 "action, copy on E3 and IMG"?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. That's a decision made by the regional source unit,

23 is it?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. In consultation with you?





1 A. It could be in consultation. Obviously if it was

2 information that was highly sensitive, you would need to

3 convey the sensitivity of that information.

4 Q. Who would create the report that went to an outside

5 region or outside subdivision?

6 A. Well, normally the source unit would have prepared the

7 report that was released to, say -- for instance, to

8 Belfast.

9 Q. And is that a SIDD or is there another electronic form?

10 A. I'm not sure what they referred to it as. I'm not

11 exactly sure.

12 Q. And again, I don't know whether you can assist with

13 this, but you mentioned that they were transferred

14 electronically, or could be?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. How was access limited to such reports? How did they

17 determine, well, it has got to go to Belfast, but it

18 shouldn't go to Antrim, for example?

19 A. Normally the information would be quite specific. If it

20 was specific as relating to an area of Belfast, well,

21 then it could be tied down to going to, say,

22 Special Branch North Belfast or Special Branch East

23 Belfast. If it related to Antrim or Dungannon, it could

24 be shared with specifically Dungannon without there

25 being a readership of the whole of the Province.





1 Q. When it works the other way round, when, for example,

2 Antrim Special Branch had got something which they sent

3 to their regional source unit which was of interest to

4 you, how were you told about it?

5 A. They could be shared electronically and the readership

6 would appear as an entity on the system that you could

7 click into and specifically read. That was processed,

8 again, through source units.

9 Q. And that's probably the MACER system, is it?

10 A. I'm sorry, I'm absolutely confused about it all, but

11 I believe it -- certainly, yes, I think it was.

12 Q. So on whichever system it was, you would have had

13 readership access from your office to something which

14 the regional source unit had determined you should see?

15 A. Yes. And, again, that -- Antrim, they would have

16 probably worked to Belfast source units, the Belfast

17 source unit would have processed that through to share

18 the readership of that.

19 Q. Just in practice, to try and nail down exactly how it

20 worked, would you log on to the computer system?

21 A. Hm-mm.

22 Q. You would have your access; you would open it up and you

23 would see what reports had been considered worthy of

24 your receipt?

25 A. Yes. You would have had a list of the documents that we





1 had put on and you would have had a list then --

2 occasionally you would have had a shared readership of

3 something that may have been of particular interest to

4 me as a controller in Portadown.

5 Q. And when you received that sort of information, did you

6 have the opportunity to ask questions about it and, if

7 so, how did you do so?

8 A. Well, normally, you could have went to the authorities

9 and said -- you know, had a discussion around it and

10 that could have been fed back in or, you know, if you

11 knew the controller within that area, you could have

12 made a phone call to see if there was any potential or

13 future development on that. Or sometimes it is

14 a specific snippet and there is no chance to develop it

15 or no chance to retask on it.

16 Q. So to take a hypothetical example, you receive on your

17 system intelligence that Antrim Special Branch have

18 picked up that there may be some munitions moved from

19 Antrim to Portadown. Could you then, if you had

20 a relationship, call the controller in Antrim directly

21 and say, "Can you tell me anything more about that?"

22 A. If you knew someone there, you could have referred him

23 to a document and said, "Is there anything more on that

24 and will we get any more on that?" and they may say no.

25 Q. If you didn't have a contact in Antrim, would you go to





1 your superior officer or your regional source unit to

2 seek that information?

3 A. Yes, you had the facility to go and say, "Well, here is

4 a piece of information. Can I speak to the boss?" or,

5 you know, you could have had a discussion, yes, to see

6 if that could be developed.

7 Q. Now, on a number of SIDDs we have seen, the

8 dissemination documents, there is the phrase "box

9 partial" written on. Now, "box" as we understand it,

10 was the Security Service. Is that correct?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And was the decision to disseminate documents to the

13 Security Service one that was made by Mahon Road?

14 A. Yes, it would have been outside of local office control.

15 Q. And do you know what "box partial" means?

16 A. No, you would need to speak to someone who worked within

17 the source unit as to those issues really.

18 Q. Did you yourself have liaison with the Security Service

19 about intelligence that your officers were bringing in?

20 A. On occasions, yes.

21 Q. And what sort of occasions would that be?

22 A. Specifically, if it was leading to operational activity

23 and you had a CHIS who was providing information along

24 those lines.

25 Q. And your contact would have been with what sort of





1 officer? I don't want you to give a name or anything

2 like that, but what kind of liaison?

3 A. Well, I wouldn't have been able to lift the telephone.

4 It would have been done through Mahon Road, in that

5 saying, "Here is information that there is an

6 operation". And specifically, if it was referred to

7 mainland, you would have been put in touch with someone,

8 and if an operation was developing then that was taken

9 over by box.

10 Q. We've talked a lot about human source reporting. Can

11 I ask you some questions about the technical side as

12 well, please?

13 When a telephone is being intercepted, there are

14 officers listening to the conversations at various

15 points and tapes are being made of those conversations

16 if they are pertinent. Is that correct?

17 A. Well, initially it was a computerised system and it

18 wasn't specifically taped, as you would say; it was

19 a computerised system.

20 Q. I'm using "taped" sort of colloquially. It is being

21 recorded on to a computer system?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Who decided whether the taped conversation, the recorded

24 conversation, should find its way into a report?

25 A. Well, in my dealings with it, the people who listened to





1 it transcribed a script in which I would have went in

2 and I would have reviewed it. And the potential existed

3 then to go in and listen to it, to see if anything had

4 been missed or if I could add value to the transcript,

5 and then it would have been my decision to report that

6 through, through a system that, again, was presented in

7 through a computer -- through the computerised system.

8 Q. So the officers listening to the conversations, they

9 produce a dialogue, written down?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. So they are making the decision about whether or not it

12 is significant?

13 A. I suppose initially, yes.

14 Q. But they are not transcribing everything, are they?

15 A. No, not everything.

16 Q. You then see the transcribed conversation and you have

17 the possibility of going to listen to the original

18 recording if necessary?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Is it you, as the sergeant, that is producing the

21 computerised reports, the short reports, out of that

22 dialogue that has been transcribed?

23 A. That's correct.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: And you were doing this, were you, at

25 Portadown in the back of the police station?





1 A. No, [ redacted ].

2 THE CHAIRMAN: So when you were a detective sergeant at

3 Portadown, were you doing this -- looking at the

4 dialogue, and if necessary listening to the recording --

5 or not, or was that later?

6 A. That would have been a facility [ redacted ] and I

7 would have been allocated as a case officer in relation

8 to specific telephones, so --

9 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

10 A. -- one of my responsibilities would have been to

11 [ redacted ] ensure that that information --

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

13 MR SKELTON: When you did that, i.e. you looked at

14 a transcribed conversation and converted it into

15 a report, you were necessarily summarising what was

16 being discussed and making judgments about it?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Was there a danger that the distortion could become too

19 much in that transcript, the process from transcription

20 to report, in that you could misunderstand something or

21 render apparently explicit something which wasn't that

22 clear in the original conversation?

23 A. I suppose in the whole dealings of it, yes, you had

24 occasions where you could have misjudged or put too much

25 emphasis in to a statement or a word or ... but in





1 general, you know, you erred with caution around all of

2 it. These were guarded conversations. The people were

3 aware that telephones were being monitored, so you were

4 doing your best in trying to interpret what was being

5 said and the context behind it.

6 Q. So, again trying to take a hypothetical example, which

7 I appreciate may be difficult, if you considered that

8 they were talking about munitions but weren't using the

9 word "bomb" or "explosives" or "weapons", would you try

10 and find some way in the report of explaining what you

11 thought they were talking about even if you weren't

12 entirely sure?

13 A. You could try and put some clarification around it, if

14 it wasn't specifically mentioned. It is hard to

15 explain.

16 Sometimes, you know, they think they are being

17 guarded, but they are not; [ redacted ]

18 But on occasions, yes, you did have

19 to examine it quite closely.

20 Q. You mentioned earlier that intelligence in relation to

21 specific attacks was something which you wanted to

22 prioritise immediately when you heard about it, i.e. when

23 your handler came in to the office with that

24 information?

25 A. Yes.





1 Q. Was it your job to initiate the steps to deal with that

2 threat?

3 A. Yes. Well, it was initiated by the handler in

4 presenting the information to the controller. The

5 controller was then -- it would have been my

6 responsibility to quality assure and ensure it was

7 processed expeditiously.

8 Q. How would you do that?

9 A. Most of the time it was quite obvious, you know. It was

10 quite obvious that there was a threat to life and it was

11 processed, in that the information was put into the

12 system through the source unit. And what would have

13 been known as an action sheet would have been produced

14 and that would have been then given over to uniform to

15 present a message to the person who was under threat.

16 Q. What I'm trying to focus on is whether you have a role

17 beyond ensuring it gets on the system quickly. Do you

18 have a role in deciding, in consultation with the source

19 unit, that an action sheet is necessary, an action needs

20 to be taken?

21 A. There were specific guidelines around threat to life.

22 There really wasn't any room to manoeuvre. You had

23 specific policy around it.

24 Q. The handler tells you someone's life is being

25 threatened; you ensure that gets on to the system





1 quickly?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Is it the regional source unit that decides to take

4 action and issue the action sheet or force-wide warning?

5 A. They processed it, so yes, you would have agreed a form

6 of wording and that would have then been sent back

7 through the system and that would have been disseminated

8 down. It was normally given out to a uniformed officer

9 to go out and get the details of the threat to the

10 person who had been threatened.

11 Q. So in fact it is a consultation, is it, between you and

12 the source unit as to what appropriate action should be

13 taken?

14 A. Not particularly. As I said, there were specific

15 guidelines, but certainly there was consultation around

16 the wording of it.

17 Q. And the particular type of action can vary, I think,

18 depending on how sensitive the source was and what was

19 needed in the circumstances. Sometimes it appears from

20 the documents we have seen that it could be necessary

21 just to set up a vehicle checkpoint to stop a particular

22 movement of weapons occurring, and sometimes it could be

23 necessary to go and speak to the person who may be

24 targeted and warn them. Is that your --

25 A. No, there was no ambiguity around it. If there was





1 a threat to life, that person was told.

2 Where there was room for manoeuvre was around the

3 wording of it. Obviously if it was extremely sensitive

4 to the CHIS, the wording of it would be slightly

5 different from something that may have been overheard in

6 a bar, in a crowded room, in which, you know, you didn't

7 have to worry about the sensitivity. But the threat

8 should always have been given to the person.

9 Q. Were there no instances then when instead of actually

10 going to speak to someone directly, what was decided was

11 to stage an operation of some kind to stop it from

12 taking place? For example, replacing the weapons that

13 were going to be used or literally stopping the

14 attackers from carrying it out physically by

15 intercepting them and arresting them?

16 A. Well, if the intelligence was of a high enough grade and

17 valuable and could be exploited and there were

18 opportunities, yes, you would be looking at making

19 arrests and trying to prevent things. But sometimes the

20 intelligence couldn't be developed and obviously people

21 had to be told of threats to them.

22 Q. And what if telling the person would lead to

23 compromising the source of the intelligence?

24 A. Well, again, we are guided very specifically now, but

25 previously it was a grey area, but you had individuals





1 working within C3 who had high morals and wouldn't take

2 risks. And in my experience, the threats were always

3 given to the people; once a police officer became aware

4 of it those threats were always given to the person.

5 Q. Was consideration given, for example, to the fact that

6 if your source was compromised, that actual greater loss

7 of life in the future would occur because that

8 particular intelligence would be lost to you in the

9 future? Did that sort of consideration bear upon the

10 decision to warn someone and thereby burn a source?

11 A. It would be considered, but at the end of the day the

12 value of the life at the other end would have taken

13 higher priority than the protection of the CHIS, and

14 that's enshrined now in the guidelines.

15 Q. I think you had some liaison with your colleagues in the

16 subdivision, through the subdivisional action

17 committees?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Did you attend those?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Was it your role to provide briefings on your patch to

22 that committee?

23 A. Yes, that's correct.

24 Q. And likewise your colleague, DSs from Lurgan and

25 Castlereagh, presumably did so?





1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Was that the only exchange of information that occurred

3 between the subdivisional DSs, or did you have contact

4 with each other outside of that?

5 A. Within -- I'm sorry, within Special Branch?

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. No, we would have known each other, but specifically

8 briefing uniform. The DS within Lurgan briefed the

9 Lurgan Subdivisional Commander, I briefed the Portadown

10 Subdivisional Commander. If that clarifies --

11 Q. What about briefing each other? One of the things that

12 we appear to have picked up is that there was a big IRA

13 contingent in Lurgan and there was a big LVF contingent

14 in Portadown. It seems obvious that to join the dots

15 there needs to be some contact between the two. Now,

16 you share an inspector. That's correct, I think?

17 A. Yes, that was correct.

18 Q. But did you also have contact with the DS yourself?

19 A. Oh, yes, I knew the DS and we had contact.

20 Q. To discuss what sort of things?

21 A. Things that would have been mutually -- if you had

22 identified an IRA unit who were based in Lurgan but who

23 operated in Portadown, well, then there'd be areas of

24 mutual responsibility, so if there was a significant

25 sighting or if there was information that they felt you





1 needed to know, you would be told about that. So there

2 was contact, yes.

3 Q. Is it fair to say that each of you would have known what

4 was going on in your respective areas?

5 A. I think you knew some things. You didn't know

6 everything that was going on because certainly in those

7 days, you know, you worked very much as -- I covered

8 Portadown and worked on the assets around Portadown. So

9 you were particular around the security of your assets.

10 You wouldn't have known everything, but certainly you

11 would have shared some things.

12 Q. You wouldn't necessarily have known the source, human or

13 technical, of reporting in to Lurgan Special Branch, but

14 you might have known the product?

15 A. You may have got some product, yes.

16 Q. And in relation to knowing the sources?

17 A. Not particularly because if -- it was a need to know.

18 There was an issue of needing to know. If you needed to

19 know, you may have been told, but if you didn't need to

20 know, you wouldn't have been told.

21 Q. I think it is right, isn't it, that the LVF were the

22 major paramilitary group in Portadown in this period,

23 1998/1999. Is that correct?

24 A. They were one. They were only one grouping within

25 a very volatile situation.





1 Q. What were the others?

2 A. You had the UDA. You had the UVF. You had PIRA, INLA,

3 all operating within Portadown.

4 Q. And in terms of the Loyalist activity in this period, as

5 we had understood it, the LVF were considered to be the

6 most dangerous group post-peace process?

7 A. Yes, they were very volatile at that time.

8 Q. I think it is right that Billy Wright and Mark Fulton --

9 and you mention this in your statement -- have been the

10 main UVF operatives in your area until about the

11 mid 1990s?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. Then I think Billy Wright forms the LVF, having left the

14 UVF, in about 1996?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. And takes some close associates with him, which would

17 include Mark Fulton and his close associates?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. And I think, as we understand it, the split was

20 precipitated because Billy Wright and others disagreed

21 with the UVF's engagement in the peace process through

22 the Progressive Unionist Party. Is that right?

23 A. That would have been key to the split.

24 Q. And there were others, I think, in Belfast who had

25 a similar view. What liaison did the LVF contingent in





1 Belfast have with the Portadown contingent?

2 A. Well, to put it in context, Billy Wright and Mark Fulton

3 were considered very competent operatives within the UVF

4 and, as such, commanded respect at a very high level

5 within Belfast UVF. So whenever they actually stepped

6 across the line and split, there were a number of people

7 within the UVF in Belfast who would have supported them,

8 either upfront or by word of mouth, without exposing

9 themselves to Belfast UVF, but still offered and

10 proffered support.

11 Q. So they may have stayed, as it were, nominally within

12 their original paramilitary groups, such as the UDA or

13 UVF, but in fact been behind the scenes supporting

14 Billy Wright?

15 A. But could have offered support, yes.

16 Q. And you have said they were highly respected as

17 operators. Do you mean by that that they were effective

18 killers?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. One of the things that you mention in your statement is

21 that the friction between the LVF and the UVF in this

22 period was a bit like the wild west. What do you mean

23 by that?

24 A. Well, the friction occurred firstly because of the

25 split. The UVF obviously didn't want a split and would





1 have preferred to have those operatives working with

2 them rather than against them. But it became -- and

3 especially around the issue of Drumcree and the

4 political issues that were developing at that time, it

5 became very high profile and very volatile, in that both

6 groups were locked head to head in trying to win

7 support. The LVF were trying to establish themselves as

8 a major grouping.

9 Q. Were they fighting between the two of them?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. They were?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And were they trying to prove themselves in the context

14 of Drumcree as being the sort of most loyal?

15 A. Well, Drumcree provided a melting pot for all militant

16 people to express themselves.

17 Q. In your statement you imply that after Billy Wright's

18 death, the LVF lost, to a considerable extent, a degree

19 of their sort of strategic weight or authority?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And that there was a sort of sense in which it was now

22 being run in a more gangster-like way. Could you

23 explain that a bit more, please?

24 A. Billy Wright as an individual was strategically more

25 acute and more aware than Mark Fulton. He was





1 a renowned operative, but also a political thinker.

2 When he was murdered, Mark took over but wouldn't have

3 had the same calibre of thinking along the political

4 lines that Billy Wright had.

5 Q. What about operationally? Was Mark Fulton as capable

6 operationally as Billy Wright in terms of directing

7 attacks on people?

8 A. Yes, he was experienced. He was experienced in it, but

9 not necessarily to the same calibre as Billy Wright, but

10 was highly experienced at it.

11 Q. I think in your statement you discuss the fact that he

12 was, as you put it, a shooter?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And likewise members of his family were considered to be

15 in a similar category. Was that their modus operandi

16 generally, to shoot people?

17 A. That was their preferred option. I wouldn't say that it

18 was their only means, but Mark specifically was known as

19 a hired gun. He referred to himself as a hired gun.

20 Q. What other means did they have?

21 A. As a terrorist organisation, you know, they were keen to

22 develop all means, but specifically and historically

23 they preferred shooting.

24 Q. And when you say they were keen to develop them, what

25 you are meaning, I think, is that they wanted to perhaps





1 have access to explosives and the like?

2 A. Well, as a terrorist organisation, yes, they wouldn't

3 have ruled anything out. They wanted the full gambit of

4 capabilities.

5 Q. Mark Fulton was imprisoned in December 1998, as we

6 understand it, and thereafter his brother became the

7 head of the LVF. Is that correct?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. Can you describe his leadership abilities and

10 capabilities?

11 A. Well, he was basically -- he was coming in on the

12 coattails of his brother. Operationally he wouldn't

13 have been as experienced or respected. Where Mark was

14 respected within Belfast and outside of the Portadown

15 area, his brother wasn't and obviously struggled then to

16 command the respect of the people within that area.

17 Q. Now, in this period, 1998 to early 1999, did you see any

18 intelligence to state that the LVF had received

19 explosives or bombs?

20 A. Well, during that time there were numerous reports

21 concerning the LVF and the UVF and it is impossible for

22 me to recall an individual report. If you were to show

23 me something and I can analyse, I maybe could but to

24 refer to one specific report, I just couldn't.

25 Q. I don't think in this period we have seen direct





1 reporting that they had access to a bomb in 1998 or

2 1999, certainly pre-Rosemary Nelson's murder. But we

3 have seen some reporting that they had access to a bomb

4 maker in the form of a particular bomb maker from

5 Belfast. Were you aware of that connection?

6 A. I was aware that there was a connection in Belfast who

7 was friendly disposed towards the hierarchy of the LVF

8 who had those capabilities.

9 Q. So he fell into the category which you have previously

10 adverted to of people that may stay within a different

11 organisation but have behind the scenes sympathies with

12 the LVF?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Do you know much about that person, may I ask you, first

15 of all?

16 A. I know some details, but I wouldn't say that I'm an

17 expert on that person.

18 Q. Was it something that you were interested in from your

19 Portadown perspective, whether or not your terrorists

20 had contact with a bomb maker from Belfast and could

21 thereby obtain --

22 A. Oh, yes, it would be of particular interest, yes.

23 Q. Can you recall whether you did obtain any intelligence

24 that such contact was made for the purposes of gaining

25 a device?





1 A. Well, specifically I don't know whether there was

2 contact made around that, but there was specific contact

3 with that individual and other individuals.

4 If I could explain that. You know, a lot of this

5 activity occurred around Drumcree and, you know, there

6 was numerous contacts with all over the Province with

7 people offering support. But specifically around that

8 individual, yes, I was aware that there was contact.

9 Q. You say in your statement in paragraph 17, which is on

10 page RNI-846-114 -- if we can wait for that to come on

11 the screen (displayed). You can see you say you don't

12 have any recollection of seeing intelligence that

13 "blank" was supplying bombs into your area in Portadown,

14 but he would certainly have been there for the LVF to

15 discuss tactics with him?

16 A. Hm-mm.

17 Q. Is that correct?

18 A. Yes. I think the individual you are talking about there

19 was certainly of a calibre similar to Billy Wright, and

20 I was aware that that individual thought very highly of

21 Billy Wright. And in there lay probably the reason for

22 their support of the LVF within Portadown.

23 Q. Might it have been possible that a bomb could have been

24 passed to the LVF without you knowing about it?

25 A. Oh, yes.





1 Q. Mark Fulton was in prison, as I have described earlier,

2 and there is an issue about prisoner releases in this

3 period because many of the paramilitaries fall in to the

4 Government offer of being released, given that they were

5 on ceasefire. Did that to your mind put a dampener on

6 the LVF's activities in this period?

7 A. I think there was a lot of political manoeuvring around

8 that time. Mark was serving a sentence at that time and

9 didn't like prison. So there was a lot of manoeuvring,

10 political manoeuvring, around that time and him trying

11 to secure an opportunity to be released.

12 Q. My specific question was really more about whether or

13 not that might have changed the LVF's activities?

14 A. I think there may have been an element of that, you

15 know. This was a terrorist organisation who were very

16 volatile and, you know, they were prepared to kill

17 people, they were prepared to tell lies to everybody if

18 it suited their purpose, yes.

19 Q. And one of the things that we have heard about

20 repeatedly is that some of the mainstream groups, which

21 would include the LVF, would use cover names -- for

22 example, Orange Volunteers or Red Hand Defenders -- in

23 order to attack people but without claiming

24 responsibility themselves?

25 A. Yes, that was a tactic, yes.





1 Q. Are you familiar with those names: Red Hand Defenders

2 and Orange Volunteers?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And were they -- or at least that cover name -- used in

5 your area?

6 A. Yes, that's correct.

7 Q. By which individuals?

8 A. There were a number of individuals. Those were

9 groupings -- and, again, around Drumcree. Drumcree

10 provided an arena for those groupings to operate within.

11 But those individuals operated, you know, not

12 necessarily only in Portadown but on a Province-wide

13 basis. So there were a number of individuals involved

14 in that.

15 Q. So it might not be the same crew of people each time

16 that acted under the name Orange Volunteers or Red Hand

17 Defenders. It could be an ad hoc grouping, could it?

18 A. There was a possibility of that, yes.

19 Q. We have received evidence about those groupings being

20 used by people from North Belfast and Antrim?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And there was a particular person in the group called

23 Justice for Protestants, who used those terms for his

24 activities, or appears to have done. Do you know who

25 I'm talking about?





1 A. There is a possibility of two people, two or three

2 people probably, who could have fitted that profile.

3 Q. It may be something we will have to take up in the

4 closed hearing in order to discuss it more openly.

5 A. As I say, there was a number of individuals involved

6 around Drumcree.

7 Q. That would include, would it, individuals from far

8 outside of Drumcree, for example, from Antrim or

9 Belfast?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. When you say "involved in Drumcree", what were they

12 involved in doing?

13 A. They were involved in -- obviously, Drumcree attracted

14 the most militant people within these paramilitary

15 groups because it provided an opportunity for them to

16 secure support, support amongst young people, support

17 within areas. So it was a melting pot for everybody to

18 move forward and try and make impressions.

19 So, yes, they were from all over around Drumcree.

20 They were from Fermanagh or Armagh, Tyrone, everywhere.

21 Q. In your statement you talk at length about the issue of

22 Drumcree. Would it be right to say that there were

23 essentially two aspects to your intelligence gathering

24 there? One was operational or tactical; in other words,

25 you were trying to find out about the intentions and





1 capabilities of paramilitary groups. And secondly,

2 strategic: You are trying to find out about what was

3 going to happen in relation to the march, what people

4 were thinking about it, what long-term consequences that

5 could have on issues of peace process and the stability

6 of the area. Is that a fair description?

7 A. Yes, I think it is a fair description, yes.

8 Q. And does it follow then in relation to the tactical side

9 of things that you were trying to, as best you could,

10 keep an eye on the Loyalist groups in order to ascertain

11 whether or not they were planning on bringing some form

12 of attacks to people or areas?

13 A. Yes, that's correct.

14 Q. The LVF, as you have stated, had an active interest, as

15 did many other groups, in Drumcree. And you said, I

16 think, earlier as well that they were under pressure to

17 do something in order to prove themselves in their, as

18 it were, rivalry with the UVF?

19 A. Hm-mm.

20 Q. What sort of things do you think they needed to do? Are

21 we talking about an attack on a high profile individual,

22 or that kind of thing?

23 A. Well, they wanted to prove themselves, so they could

24 have done anything or would have done anything to

25 ingratiate themselves with the local communities so that





1 they could gain support from the young militant elements

2 within mid-Ulster. But also to stamp their authority.

3 They were engaged in a volatile situation with the

4 UVF itself. So, you know, there were a number of

5 options that they really could have progressed and could

6 have moved forward on, along the terrorist lines.

7 Q. If there was a pressure on them to make an impact in

8 relation to Drumcree -- I'm talking about the LVF

9 here -- does it follow that they themselves would claim

10 responsibility for such an attack in order to gain the

11 glory or kudos as a result, or would the LVF, as far as

12 you were concerned, use a cover name?

13 A. I think they wouldn't have -- they wouldn't have

14 excluded that tactic. Obviously if it suited their

15 purpose to have a high profile operation that was

16 successful and it suited their purpose to be known for

17 it, yes, they would have taken the kudos for it. But on

18 the other hand, if it was something that they wanted to

19 disguise their involvement in, they could do that too.

20 Q. One of the things the Inquiry has heard about is the

21 issue of pamphlets that were being circulated in this

22 period, particularly by Loyalist groups, that contained

23 details of individuals and comments about them and

24 possibly malicious comments?

25 A. Yes.





1 Q. Was this a pretty common issue for you, to pick up these

2 pamphlets?

3 A. It wasn't unusual, given the sensitivity around the

4 Drumcree incident, and specifically, you know, the --

5 the impact it was having on the Loyalist community as

6 a whole. And I don't mean the terrorist community, but

7 the Loyalist issue as a whole.

8 There was a lot of hotheads and there was a lot of

9 people had very staid opinions around it, and the

10 situation provided a opportunity for them to exploit

11 that. And, yes, one of the tactics was -- it was like

12 a propaganda, I suppose you could call it, a propaganda

13 campaign.

14 Q. From your perspective as a Special Branch officer on the

15 ground, when you saw these pamphlets, did you take them

16 at their word when they said things like, "This person

17 is going to be killed" or "They will die" or "Doomsday

18 is coming", et cetera?

19 A. I think you had to take it in the context of the

20 situation, in that you had very strong opinions on both

21 sides and statements were said that could never have

22 been followed up or were said out of spite rather than

23 out of an opportunity or a means to do it.

24 But, yes, you know, it provided an opportunity for

25 people to vent their frustration and vent their





1 polarised opinions around things.

2 DAME VALERIE STRACHAN: You say it wasn't unusual. Could

3 you give a sort of very rough guess about how many

4 different pamphlets were floating around Portadown, say,

5 in 1998?

6 A. I couldn't really put a number on it, but, you know,

7 they utilised everything from -- they had websites, you

8 know, in which, you know, they would lambast various

9 participants on the GRRC, et cetera. So, you know, this

10 was a tactic that was mired in the other pressure groups

11 around the parades issue.

12 So on a Province-wide basis, you had these leaflets

13 that were being put out concerning key individuals

14 within this Drumcree issue, and I couldn't really put

15 a number on it but it wasn't unusual that these things

16 were in circulation.

17 DAME VALERIE STRACHAN: 10, 100? Somewhere between the two?

18 Fewer?

19 A. Probably -- I don't want to be specific, but probably

20 within 10 and 100. But, you know, there was

21 a propaganda campaign. It was a tactic that was used

22 and, you know, it was -- I suppose to understand, it was

23 nearly a battle of hearts and minds, so it was, from the

24 Loyalists and the Orange Order and various groupings

25 around that who were in direct conflict with the GRRC





1 and obviously the participants around that. So I

2 couldn't specifically put a number on it because it

3 would be a guess, but it was definitely a tactic that

4 was being used on both sides.

5 MR SKELTON: So it is a tactic of propaganda and

6 intimidation, is it?

7 A. Yes, you could say that, yes.

8 Q. And if those notes or pamphlets do contain threats about

9 individuals saying, "You will die" or something to that

10 effect, is that something which Special Branch would

11 view as constituting a threat to someone or would you

12 fall back on your source reporting to back that up?

13 A. Normally, if a leaflet came into the possession of one

14 of the handlers, the leaflet itself would have been

15 processed through a system and put in and there would

16 have been assessment made around that. And normally any

17 of the leaflets that were circulated became knowledge of

18 the people that they referred to because the word seeped

19 back through various contacts and through various ways

20 back to the people. And in the majority of cases, the

21 people were already aware and were aware of the

22 leaflets. But, as pure intelligence, yes, they would

23 have been processed through a system.

24 Q. But only if they had been given to the handler, not if

25 they had been posted on a billboard outside the office?





1 A. I'm sorry, I don't understand that.

2 Q. I think the answer you gave was that if they came into

3 the system from the handler --

4 A. Yes, if a handler became aware and processed it through

5 the system. Obviously a handler may not trawl through

6 websites looking for these things, but if they became

7 aware of this, they would submit it through the system.

8 Q. Do you mean became aware of it through any contact or

9 specifically with a CHIS?

10 A. If a CHIS came in and handed a leaflet or if a leaflet

11 was being sent around houses and a CHIS handed it over,

12 well, obviously, then, as pure intelligence, it would be

13 processed and a copy of the leaflet would be processed.

14 But, as I say, the handlers didn't have time to sit down

15 and trawl through websites and go looking for these

16 things. If it became in their field of knowledge, yes,

17 it would have been processed.

18 Q. The other aspect of the intelligence gathering which

19 I mentioned earlier, was the more strategic side of it.

20 And one of the things you discuss in your statement is

21 the relationship between the mainstream political

22 parties, including Sinn Fein and the GRRC. Was that

23 something which you were interested in specifically?

24 A. Oh, yes, yes.

25 Q. And in looking in to that issue, who were you answerable





1 to in terms of your product? Who were your customers?

2 A. Well, the customers ranged from the Subdivisional

3 Commander of the area, who had a responsibility for

4 policing the issue, then the intelligence family in and

5 around the PSNI, again, strategically who were looking

6 at the strategic issues, and also the Government who

7 obviously, as Drumcree was a very high profile

8 situation, had specific intelligence requirements around

9 who was responsible and who was driving political

10 issues.

11 Q. In your statement, you describe it rather pithily as

12 a crazy situation and you mention also that the NIO, the

13 Northern Ireland Office, were all over Drumcree, as it

14 were?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Does that mean that you, as in Portadown Special Branch,

17 had a relationship with the Northern Ireland Office and

18 were being instructed by them to find information?

19 A. Not specifically, obviously there were intelligence

20 requirements which I was aware of, but there was no

21 specific face-to-face tasking of me along specific

22 issues. But this situation was a political situation

23 and the Northern Ireland Office were involved in many

24 strands of it with the various -- with the Orange Order,

25 with the GRRC and with other participants within it.





1 Q. Who in your region was tasking you in relation to that

2 issue?

3 A. Well, being -- specifically having an operational

4 responsibility around Portadown, I was receiving

5 intelligence requirements around the Drumcree situation

6 and specifically around rioting or proposed rioting or

7 things like that there. But then there was also the

8 political issues in which we had intelligence and were

9 able to provide intelligence around. So those were of

10 interest to a number of parties, including the Parades

11 Commission, et cetera.

12 Q. I understand the interest. What I'm trying to focus on

13 is where your tasking was coming from. Did it come from

14 the IMG, for example, or did it come from your superior

15 officers?

16 A. Yes, there would have been tasking from superior

17 officers.

18 Q. In what form?

19 A. There would have been verbal taskings. It is hard to

20 explain. This was a situation that changed on a daily

21 basis. The intelligence was coming in on a daily basis

22 and emphasis around it was changing on a daily basis.

23 So, you know, you would have been receiving phone calls

24 from officers to say is there any intelligence around

25 a specific incident or a meeting or contact between this





1 person and that person. You would have had taskings

2 along those issues, but it was very obvious to me what

3 the intelligence requirement was.

4 Q. Now, many of the reports, or at least, I think it is

5 fair to say, several of the reports about the Drumcree

6 issue which we have seen exhibited to your statement,

7 appear to have been sent to the Security Service?

8 A. Hm-mm.

9 Q. And that decision, as I understood it earlier, would

10 have been made by the regional source unit?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Were you conscious that the Security Service were

13 interested in that issue as well?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. How did you know that?

16 A. Well, a number of our taskings were specifically linked

17 in to the Security Service. For instance, you know,

18 monitoring telephone lines was linked in to the security

19 services. So, you know, it was obvious that they did

20 have an interest. It was obvious of their involvement

21 through the Northern Ireland Office in the situation

22 that there was an intelligence requirement.

23 MR SKELTON: Sir, that might be convenient for a break

24 before I move on to another topic?

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Right. Mr (name redacted), before the witness





1 leaves, would you please confirm that all the cameras

2 have been switched off?

3 MR (NAME REDACTED): Yes, sir, they have.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Please escort the witness out.

5 There will be a 15-minute break.

6 (11.00 am)

7 (Short break)

8 (11.20 am)

9 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Currans, the checklist. Is the public

10 area screen fully in place, locked and the key secured?

11 MR CURRANS: Yes, sir.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Are the fire doors on either side of the

13 screen closed?

14 MR CURRANS: Yes, sir.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Are the technical support screens in place

16 and securely fastened?

17 MR CURRANS: Yes, sir.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: Is anyone other than Inquiry personnel and

19 Participants' legal representatives seated in the body

20 of this chamber?

21 MR CURRANS: No, sir.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Mr (name redacted), can you please

23 confirm that the two witness cameras have been switched

24 off and shrouded?

25 MR (NAME REDACTED): Yes, sir, they have.





1 THE CHAIRMAN: All the other cameras have been switched off?

2 MR (NAME REDACTED): Yes, sir, they have.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

4 Bring the witness in, please.

5 The cameras on the Panel, the Inquiry personnel and

6 the Full Participants' legal representatives may now be

7 switched back on.

8 Yes, Mr Skelton?

9 MR SKELTON: It appears from your statement there were two

10 aspects of Rosemary Nelson's work which brought her to

11 your attention. The first was her representation of the

12 GRRC, which was something directly affecting your area,

13 and secondly, her representation of Colin Duffy and

14 other suspected IRA members. Is that a fair assessment?

15 A. The first one would have been a major issue in my

16 responsibility around intelligence. The second one

17 would have been known to me, but not a big pile because

18 she lived and operated in Lurgan, really.

19 Q. I will come on to the second in a while, but I would

20 like to focus on the first one, please, initially.

21 In relation to the GRRC, the Inquiry has heard from

22 a coalition member, Eamon Stack, who I think you will

23 recall was a Jesuit priest who was part of the

24 Coalition?

25 A. Yes.





1 Q. And he told the Inquiry that it was effectively a local

2 group which arose out of the Drumcree Faith and Justice

3 Group and had an explicitly peaceful agenda and

4 motivation. He also mentioned other factors about the

5 GRRC, such as the fact that it was democratically

6 elected and the fact that it explicitly didn't ally

7 itself with mainstream Republican politics -- it wanted

8 to retain its independence -- and that was an important

9 factor in its workings.

10 Does that accord with your recollection of how the

11 GRRC saw itself and functioned?

12 A. I think in its formation, yes, it was formed initially

13 from local residents and using the expertise of

14 Father Eamon Stack to set it up and organise it, but I

15 think as things developed it changed its direction and

16 people had maybe more sinister influence over it.

17 Q. One of the things that appears from the reports that we

18 have seen in relation to Drumcree and the GRRC is that

19 there isn't any intelligence to suggest that they

20 themselves had violent intentions towards anyone. Do

21 you recall or accept that?

22 A. No.

23 Q. And could you explain what intentions you recall

24 they had?

25 A. I was aware it was basically a pressure group, in





1 essence, a pressure group. It attracted -- because of

2 the situation, it attracted people with maybe a much

3 more militant outlook, and I'm aware that -- maybe in

4 the initial stages I would agree with your assessment,

5 but certainly as things developed there was a much more

6 sinister element who operated within it and around it.

7 Q. When you say later, do you mean 1998/1999?

8 A. Yes, it was a progressive issue, so it was.

9 Q. What was the sinister element which you are mentioning?

10 A. Well, Sinn Fein in particular took particular emphasis

11 around this issue and linking it in with other issues.

12 And then latterly, as Sinn Fein became involved in the

13 peace process, well, then there were other elements

14 around dissidents who had contact within the group or

15 the group had contact with. So the group led the field

16 as far as having influence with various organisations.

17 Q. Well, in relation to the dissident groups, there is

18 a document I can show you and perhaps we can discuss it

19 in a more focused way, and that's at RNI-542-100

20 (displayed).

21 Now, can we go to the previous page, which will be,

22 I think, RNI-542-099, just to see when the date of that

23 is (displayed)? Now, this is a SIR dated April 1998,

24 and its title is "Republican general activity" and the

25 originating unit is Portadown, I think you can see





1 there. If we go overleaf, I think we can see the text

2 of it. It says:

3 "[Somebody from] Belfast is in frequent contact with

4 Breandan Mac Cionnaith ... in relation to the GRRC

5 demonstration being organised for [July 1998].

6 Sinn Fein are concerned that the event remains under its

7 control and is not going to be hijacked by elements

8 sympathetic to INLA or CIRA and used to gain support for

9 these organisations.

10 "To this end, the GRRC, through Mac Cionnaith, has

11 been instructed to draw up a list of local personalities

12 who are likely to be sympathetic to INLA/CIRA and

13 forward the list to Sinn Fein."

14 That indicates apparent contact between Mr Mac

15 Cionnaith and Sinn Fein?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And it also indicates that he may be making contact with

18 members of other organisations in order to assist

19 Sinn Fein, and I think there is other reporting that

20 such contact may have occurred?

21 A. Yes, I would agree with that statement.

22 Q. But isn't this just ordinary back room politics at

23 a time when those organisations, particularly Sinn Fein,

24 are turning themselves into a political entity rather

25 than a militant entity?





1 A. No, I think a lot of this activity was quite sinister in

2 its nature in that it was intended to ensure that events

3 evolved around the wishes and desires of the GRRC.

4 Q. Well, isn't that just a standard thing for a small

5 political group to do that started to find itself

6 engaged in national, and possibly international,

7 politics: to maintain links with national and

8 international groups that may support it? What is

9 sinister about that?

10 A. The sinister element here is that these aren't pressure

11 groups, these are terrorist groups that they are linking

12 in with and trying to elicit support. And there lies in

13 the sinister element around the activities of the GRRC,

14 not necessarily their political aspirations.

15 Q. Looking at this report, it looks like Sinn Fein are

16 wanting to maintain control over the GRRC and that, I

17 think, in itself must be understandable and not

18 necessarily sinister given that their lead in from the

19 Republican side within the Good Friday Agreement and the

20 discussions with the Government about the peace process.

21 Would you agree with that?

22 A. Well, Sinn Fein were the political arm of the IRA. So

23 you needed to bear that in context, in that Sinn Fein

24 were the public face of the GRRC, but were certainly

25 implementing policies and issues that had been discussed





1 and put forward by IRA army council.

2 Q. But it is right, isn't it, that at this stage, 1998,

3 they were engaging with the political process in

4 a positive way, not a militant way?

5 A. Well, yes, but they maintained both options.

6 Q. Now, in relation to this report, it looks like what is

7 happening is that they are trying to keep control and

8 prevent the GRRC from becoming part of the dissident,

9 more militant group?

10 A. I think what you're saying there is that Sinn Fein -- it

11 was a battle of hearts and minds amongst the community

12 within the GRRC and the community in and around the

13 Garvaghy Road area, and because of the high profile,

14 issues surrounding Drumcree, Sinn Fein did not want to

15 lose control. And I think that's what you are saying in

16 that statement, in that elements within the INLA or

17 Continuity IRA also had influence with personalities

18 within the GRRC, and Sinn Fein did not want to lose

19 their controlling influence over it.

20 Q. Now, there is a number of reports to do with

21 Rosemary Nelson and the GRRC. I don't want to go

22 through every one of them, but I would like to show you

23 a few of them and ask you some questions about them.

24 The first I would like to show you is a PRISM

25 document from July 1997, which we can find at





1 RNI-541-122 (displayed). It is simply entitled "Matters

2 relating to the Garvaghy Road situation", and the

3 particular bit that refers to Rosemary Nelson is

4 actually at page RNI-541-124. But can we just look

5 quickly at the next couple of pages to get the idea of

6 the context.

7 It is quite a long report about a lot of matters

8 relating to the GRRC and relating to

9 Breandan Mac Cionnaith and contacts they are having with

10 the Irish Government. You can see those paragraphs

11 there. And if we go, again, to the next page, please,

12 the bit about Rosemary Nelson at paragraph 10:

13 "Rosemary Nelson contacted the Secretary of State's

14 office later on Saturday night. She was pushing to get

15 a decision on the parade for Saturday, stating that they

16 needed to know in time to get legal action started if

17 necessary."

18 Now, this sort of report about Rosemary Nelson, on

19 the face of it, just looks like it is reporting her

20 ordinary legal work, doesn't it, when you receive that

21 kind of intelligence? It just so happens that it is

22 about legal issues; it is not to do with militants or

23 fomenting violence?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And it is fair to say that really this kind of activity





1 is just part and parcel of her legal role?

2 A. It would be fair to say that would be part of her role.

3 Q. Could I look at another document, please, which is

4 RNI-541-134 (displayed), and this is dated at a similar

5 period of time, July 1997. The originating unit in this

6 case is Portadown, and if we go overleaf to see the text

7 of it, it says:

8 "Breandan Mac Cionnaith is getting people to go to

9 the community centre to make statements regarding

10 injuries sustained on 6 July 1997 on the Garvaghy Road.

11 Rosemary Nelson has every member of her staff available

12 to deal with this issue and has prepared statements and

13 dossiers to send to the European courts."

14 And then it goes on to say:

15 "Mac Cionnaith and Nelson are not happy with the

16 Irish Government's attitude to the situation and intend

17 to meet them on 9 July in Dublin to put forward their

18 viewpoints."

19 Now, the first section of is that again appears to

20 be to do with complaints which Rosemary Nelson is

21 marshalling. Now, from one perspective these complaints

22 are simply, again, part of her job because her clients

23 are the GRRC and the residents. Do you draw any

24 sinister inference from that?

25 A. No, I think the background to that was that this was





1 a concerted effort to record the complaints from people

2 who may not necessarily have normally come forward to

3 make complaints. It was a pressure situation.

4 Q. So did you think that she was using complaints to make

5 a political point?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And what was that point?

8 A. It was creating pressure. It was creating pressure for

9 both the British Government in their decision-making

10 processes around the parade being allowed down the

11 Garvaghy Road, and also in the latter part of it, it is

12 creating pressure on the Irish Government to proffer

13 support for the GRRC in their dealings with the British

14 Government.

15 Q. But if there are complaints to be made, and if she has

16 contacts with the Irish Government, and she is

17 representing the GRRC, that's presumably something she

18 is entitled to do, isn't it?

19 A. Oh, yes, she is entitled to do that.

20 Q. So one wouldn't draw from this an inference that she is,

21 as it were, toeing a Republican, IRA line in any way?

22 A. No, I don't think it intimates that, but there was

23 a concerted effort to ensure that every opportunity to

24 create pressure on Government bodies was exploited. I

25 think it does suggest that.





1 Q. Can I just look again at the full document? Put that

2 page on screen, please, and if we could go overleaf?

3 Now, you can see there the phrase that I have mentioned

4 earlier, "SIDD partial box only."

5 Is this an example of intelligence then that would

6 have been passed to the Security Service?

7 A. Again, that would have been a comment that would have

8 been put on via the source unit who would process the

9 dissemination. I would be offering a guess around that,

10 but yes, I believe that information would have been

11 processed and made available to the box.

12 Q. Now, another report I would like you to look at, which

13 again is from July 1997, can be found at RNI-541-139

14 (displayed). Again, this is a PRISM document. The

15 origin is "JD". Does that mean it has come from --

16 A. This meant it came from the office I was

17 responsible for.

18 Q. Thank you. If we go overleaf, please, you can see again

19 the title is "Parades issue: general" and

20 Rosemary Nelson is mentioned in paragraph 4. It says:

21 "She has received an invitation from a firm of

22 New York lawyers to fly her out within the next few days

23 to review material concerning the RUC's handling of

24 civilians on the Garvaghy Road on 6 July 1997."

25 And really, again, what I wanted to ask you about or





1 emphasise is that this again seems to be just part and

2 parcel of her ordinary work and lobbying on behalf of

3 the GRRC, and not necessarily something which is being

4 manipulated by Sinn Fein, at least as far as she is

5 concerned?

6 A. Well, I don't know if that was being manipulated by

7 Sinn Fein, but certainly from an intelligence point of

8 view, the reason that would have been -- if that's --

9 I'm unsure if that's what you are trying to see, why

10 that was submitted, but it would have been submitted

11 because it shows that Rosemary has moved from being

12 a small lawyer in Lurgan to now having credence on an

13 international stage.

14 So that would be of intelligence value. I'm not

15 sure if that's really what you are pressing towards.

16 Q. It shows that she has contacts with New York lawyers,

17 and you can see if you look in to the final paragraph,

18 it says:

19 "Joanne Tennyson has been put in charge of

20 collecting and copying all such material, and

21 Breandan Mac Cionnaith will attempt to get this material

22 available to Rosemary Nelson before she goes in order

23 for her to take it aboard with her. Nelson is keen to

24 keep American pressure on the situation and stated that

25 the lawyers had represented Nelson Mandela and had





1 contacts with many US senators."

2 There she is being, in effect, a strategist for the

3 group and she is also using her contacts in order to

4 bolster its interests?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Nothing untoward about that?

7 A. No, nothing other than, well, possibly

8 Breandan Mac Cionnaith and his influence in relation to

9 this all. But certainly from an intelligence point of

10 view of interest.

11 Q. As we understand it, Breandan Mac Cionnaith had been

12 a member of the IRA and had been convicted of

13 terrorist-related activities in the 1980s, but we have

14 heard that by this stage he was really very much an

15 independent person. He was the spokesperson for this

16 group and he saw this group's interests as being

17 paramount.

18 We have also seen a lot of contacts that he appears

19 to have had with mainstream Republican groups, and one

20 of those we saw earlier. But is her association with

21 Breandan Mac Cionnaith something which led you to

22 conclude that she was associated with the IRA?

23 A. No, there was additional information that would have

24 suggested that she was sympathetic to a more militant

25 element within Republicanism.





1 Q. And do you mean that from her contact with her clients

2 as opposed to her contact with the GRRC?

3 A. Probably in two strands, because Breandan Mac Cionnaith

4 was a very strong individual within the grouping and was

5 rising to prominence. Rosemary would have probably been

6 a challenge to his prominence within the grouping. So

7 there was a lot of infighting within the grouping as

8 well as to jockeying for position, and there was a lot

9 of egotism involved in it. So all of that would have

10 been of interest, but specifically Breandan and Rosemary

11 did have contacts with paramilitaries and known members

12 of paramilitary organisations.

13 Q. It may be that the document you are talking about can be

14 found at RNI-541-093 (displayed). Actually, can we have

15 the page RNI-541-092 first, please (displayed)?

16 This is dated June 1997, so a similar period of

17 time. The originating unit is Portadown. Go overleaf,

18 please to RNI-541-093 (displayed), and it says:

19 "Rosemary Nelson, solicitor, Lurgan, was present in

20 a legal capacity for the GRRC at their meeting with the

21 Secretary of State on 17 June 1997. Comment: Nelson has

22 firm PIRA sympathies."

23 Now, there are sensitivities attaching to this

24 report which mean that we can't discuss it in detail,

25 but when you gave the answer you gave previously, was





1 this what you were thinking of?

2 A. Not specifically and not individually this, but in the

3 round of things the comment would have been made as

4 a result of the handler's extracting from the CHIS their

5 opinions and then also influenced by other intelligence

6 surrounding that.

7 Q. But again, isn't there a danger that the fact that

8 Rosemary Nelson is assisting with the GRRC to a very

9 great extent -- and was also apparently doing it for

10 free -- could be confused with her being sympathetic

11 towards the wider Republican movement?

12 A. I'm not sure. Could you expand on that, please?

13 Q. Well, it says here:

14 "Nelson has firm PIRA sympathies."

15 It is difficult to see the context of that from this

16 report because the report is just basically about

17 a meeting she had with the Secretary of State, and this

18 comment seems to sit quite oddly with the text of the

19 document. You are saying that you received intelligence

20 reporting to that effect from your sources?

21 A. What I'm saying is that the handlers would have made

22 assessments round the origin of that intelligence. The

23 CHIS or the agent or the source who provided that

24 obviously would have been putting influences or

25 inferences in -- relating that intelligence to the





1 handlers. I'm not sure if that one piece of

2 intelligence was submitted on its own for a particular

3 reason or not. I'm not sure at this stage. It may have

4 been part of two or three different pieces of

5 information but has been separated for a specific

6 reason. I'm just not sure at this juncture.

7 Q. Having received that from your source or sources, do you

8 in Special Branch reach the same conclusion?

9 A. Which is that ...?

10 Q. That she had firm PIRA sympathies?

11 A. I personally believe that, yes, she had firm PIRA

12 sympathies.

13 Q. Based on what your sources were telling you?

14 A. Based on that and based on the situation at the time.

15 Q. What do you mean by the latter?

16 A. I think it is very easy to look at one piece of

17 information here and get concentrated in it, but this

18 was a situation that developed from 1996 up until the

19 present day. It is still running. So this was

20 a situation that evolved.

21 Drumcree didn't finish in July; Drumcree ran all

22 year. So this was a situation that, once the parade was

23 either directed through the road or prevented from going

24 down the road, ran all year. So there was information

25 being supplied on a continual basis relating to this.





1 Q. To be fair to you, we don't unfortunately have the time

2 to take you through every report that's about this

3 period of time, but I'm interested in the general

4 conclusion.

5 Are you reaching that conclusion in part because she

6 was a key member of the GRRC and remained a key member

7 of the GRRC throughout this period when I think you were

8 saying that moderates were in effect being pushed aside?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Because I don't think you would reach that conclusion

11 about someone like Eamon Stack, would you?

12 A. No, maybe because of my knowledge of what was happening

13 and the dynamics within the group, I might have

14 different opinions. But, you know, I believe that Eamon

15 Stack was sidelined because he didn't share the same

16 viewpoints as Breandan Mac Cionnaith and

17 Rosemary Nelson.

18 Q. So you are inferring from the fact that she wasn't

19 sidelined that she was herself party to the more

20 militant aspects of the group?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Might there not be an alternative inference that could

23 be drawn: that she was a very, very useful lawyer to

24 have engaged with their work? In other words, she was

25 the one with the contacts, she was the one that could





1 bring the judicial review proceedings, she was the one

2 that knew how to initiate complaints, and her value was

3 more in that regard rather than the fact that she was

4 toeing some form of militant line behind the scenes?

5 A. I think you could have that viewpoint, but if you were

6 to follow that viewpoint through, was Rosemary Nelson

7 the best placed person to present the human rights

8 aspect that of group?

9 Well, within the legal field, there is better

10 qualified people. The reason Rosemary Nelson was there

11 was because she fitted the purpose.

12 Breandan Mac Cionnaith wasn't particularly liked within

13 that grouping, but he fitted the purpose.

14 Q. But Rosemary Nelson, as we have seen from, I think, open

15 source reporting and as she herself acknowledged, was

16 personally committed to this issue. She felt strongly

17 about the issue of the march; so much so that she worked

18 for free for a very lengthy period of time to assist the

19 committee.

20 Again, that doesn't necessarily mean that she

21 supports the IRA, who were influencing the committee at

22 the same time, does it?

23 A. No, that statement doesn't suggest it.

24 Q. You, I think, knew about her association with

25 Colin Duffy, as in her representation of Mr Duffy for





1 his conviction for the Lyness murder and his arrest for

2 the murder of the two constables?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Were you aware of that from discussions with your

5 colleagues?

6 A. I was aware of that and also, because of my awareness

7 around the sources, of some of this intelligence and,

8 you know, this was source intelligence and I was aware

9 of the source and had contact with the source. So it

10 wasn't purely through conversations with the police

11 officers as such.

12 Q. May I look, please, at a document at RNI-541-010, which

13 is a SIDD, dated April 1996 (displayed)?

14 You can see the text of the SIDD there. I haven't

15 shown you the cover sheet, but the text says:

16 "Rosemary Nelson, Lurgan, is using her position to

17 gather information for PIRA in Lurgan. This includes

18 details of RUC members who she comes into contact with."

19 And the comment there is:

20 "Nelson is known to represent a number of Republican

21 activists in the Lurgan area."

22 Did this information, that she was gathering

23 information about RUC officers, come to your attention?

24 A. I'm not -- can I see the front sheet of that --

25 Q. Yes, of course (displayed).





1 A. Again, that information did not originate from my

2 office, so ...

3 Q. It didn't, but it forms a SIDD, I think?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And it affects people that weren't that far from your

6 area, i.e. --

7 A. I could give you an assessment on it, but I didn't

8 generate that information or process that intelligence.

9 Q. Its dissemination level is level 7, you can see there,

10 which is one of the lower levels of dissemination; in

11 other words, it implicitly doesn't appear to have been

12 a particularly sensitive piece of intelligence, it is

13 not a level 19, which Special Branch intelligence was

14 routinely at. So it would appear that people could see

15 it without it compromising the sources. Do you think it

16 likely that you would have seen it?

17 A. I could have. I just don't know. There was so much

18 information flowing about the situation that I couldn't

19 comment on one particular document, but it is possible

20 that I did, yes.

21 Q. Leaving aside this specific document, did you pick up

22 intelligence or information that she was gathering

23 intelligence or information for the IRA in relation to

24 RUC officers, which is a significant thing, I think,

25 isn't it?





1 A. Well, yes, it would be significant. I would say that it

2 wouldn't surprise me that information was being passed

3 across relating to police officers she may have had

4 contact with. That wouldn't surprise me. But as I say,

5 I have no recollection of specific information that

6 I submitted in relation to that.

7 Q. Why do you say that about not being surprised?

8 A. Because the opportunities were there and, being aware of

9 the contacts that Rosemary had, it wouldn't surprise me

10 that information did leak across.

11 Q. Well, had you formed the conclusion that she was

12 supportive of the IRA people that she came into contact

13 with and, therefore, was helping them?

14 A. Yes, I believe that.

15 Q. Based on what?

16 A. Based on my knowledge around the situation, based on

17 information over a period of time that I was aware of.

18 Q. Would this have been in part based on information which

19 you got from your colleagues in Lurgan, who were

20 reporting more directly on Colin Duffy?

21 A. Yes, that would have influenced it, but not -- but

22 certainly not based on it.

23 Q. Another report which we have that I would like to show

24 you, please, is at RNI-542-063 (displayed). This is

25 dated February 1999, and this is from Lurgan. It is





1 a secret intelligence report and it says:

2 "No dissemination outside SB level ..."

3 And I think that's probably "19" there that's hidden

4 by the text. Can we go overleaf, please, to RNI-542-064

5 (displayed)? It says:

6 "Rosemary Nelson continues to have a close

7 association with Lurgan PIRA, in particular Colin Duffy.

8 Following [someone's] arrest and detention for the

9 murder of Kevin Conway, she regularly briefs Colin Duffy

10 on the CID investigation and actively assists him in

11 creating alibis for IRA members."

12 More intelligence coming from Lurgan sources to

13 support the view that she was assisting the IRA. Were

14 you aware that of?

15 A. I may have been aware of it. Again, it is not jumping

16 out at me as a document, but if you are asking me to

17 comment on it, it wouldn't surprise me that that

18 happened.

19 Q. Were you aware of information to do with her assistance

20 with alibis outside of this particular document and this

21 particular case?

22 A. Well, I was aware of her contacts -- but not

23 specifically in relation to the Kevin Conway murder,

24 let's say that. I was aware that she had a certain

25 sympathy and certain contacts, but regarding this one





1 piece, this information, I couldn't say. It is so long

2 ago and, as I say, there was so much information coming

3 in around it.

4 Q. As I said earlier, I think this dissemination level

5 was 19?

6 A. Hm-mm.

7 Q. Was it right that that was your -- I say "your" --

8 Special Branch's level of source reporting intelligence?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. What was level 7 that we saw previously?

11 A. Again, I think that's maybe a question for someone

12 involved in the source unit end of things, but obviously

13 there would be certain levels that different groups

14 would have had access to. Military, for example,

15 wouldn't have the same clearance level as

16 Special Branch.

17 So specifically what 7 -- it should be a matter of

18 record, but I'm not aware of it.

19 Q. In your statement you mention that you were aware that

20 there were rumours about Mrs Nelson's relationship with

21 Colin Duffy?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. That they were having an affair, to put it bluntly?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. How did that come to your attention?





1 A. I believe that may have been through general

2 conversation with colleagues within Lurgan. It may have

3 also been based on some of the things that I had read,

4 but I just can't recollect specifics things that I could

5 tie down to it. But I was aware that there was

6 a relationship.

7 Q. In terms of the discussions you may have had with your

8 colleagues in Lurgan, we know from the reporting we have

9 seen that there was a variety of reports that seemed to

10 support that conclusion. Did you discuss with them

11 those reports?

12 A. It wouldn't have been -- it wouldn't have been

13 a specific conversation around a report that I can

14 remember, but certainly it would have been of interest

15 that Rosemary, in her role within the GRRC, and the fact

16 of the intelligence requirement around that, the fact of

17 her relationship with Colin would have been of interest.

18 Again, Colin Duffy coming in and being involved

19 around GRRC activity would be of interest, so it would

20 have been along those lines as such that it would have

21 been important.

22 Q. Now, without breaching any sensitivities, do you know

23 the source or sources of the intelligence that said that

24 relationship was happening?

25 A. Off the top of my head, no.





1 Q. So it is something you had picked up second-hand from

2 discussions with your colleagues, is it?

3 A. Yes, I wouldn't have had a direct controlling role

4 within the processing of that intelligence.

5 Q. And was this something that was known outside of

6 Special Branch as well?

7 A. It was known within the community, yes.

8 Q. The wider civilian community?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. How do you know that?

11 A. Because there are a number of CHISs working outside of

12 this specific information who were aware of it. It

13 wasn't a secure secret between the two of them, but yes,

14 there were members of the community who were aware

15 of it.

16 Q. Is that the only way in which you can back that

17 statement up? And I don't mean that critically, but

18 when you say it was "known in the wider community", do

19 you mean that the paramilitaries who were giving

20 intelligence knew about it?

21 A. Some of them, yes. It wouldn't have been a wide -- it

22 wouldn't have been widely known, but certainly there

23 were elements within it who knew there was

24 a relationship.

25 Q. Would it have been known to Loyalist paramilitaries too?





1 A. I would assume -- again, I don't know, but I would

2 assume that if it was known within the community, that

3 would certainly get back to them at some stage.

4 Q. And do you think inferences would have been drawn about

5 her support for the IRA, if that were the case?

6 A. I think, because of her high profile within the GRRC,

7 there were elements -- Loyalist elements who were

8 convinced, and there would have been nothing that would

9 have convinced them otherwise, that she was involved.

10 There was a perception amongst the Loyalist

11 community that the GRRC were being run by Sinn Fein and

12 being influenced by the IRA. So any person who was

13 involved with the GRRC, there was a perception amongst

14 certain elements within the Loyalist community, and you

15 couldn't have convinced them otherwise that it was

16 a pressure group or set up -- they just would not have

17 believed that.

18 Q. From the answers which you gave earlier, that seems to

19 be a conclusion which can be applied to Special Branch

20 too, doesn't it?

21 A. In that?

22 Q. You drew the same conclusion?

23 A. Well, working within the intelligence field, maybe our

24 conclusions were more firmly based, but there were

25 people within the Loyalist community who are so bitter





1 that just the mere fact of any contact with the GRRC

2 would have been enough -- and that's evidenced in the

3 fact of these leaflets, et cetera, that go out about

4 people. You couldn't have convinced them otherwise.

5 You couldn't have turned round and said that Rosemary

6 was there purely in an unpaid capacity to represent

7 those people through goodwill or through a strong desire

8 or support of that grouping. There are people within

9 the Loyalist community there who you would never

10 convince of that.

11 Q. Now, you did a threat assessment or assisted with

12 a threat assessment in relation to Joe Duffy, who was

13 another senior Coalition member during this period?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Can we look at that on the screen? It is at

16 RNI-101-321.502 (displayed).

17 Now, I don't think this is something you actually

18 filled out yourself, is it? Is that your handwriting?

19 A. No.

20 Q. So this, I think, would have been filled out by the

21 officer in HQ to whom you gave this information. But I

22 think it is right, isn't it, you mention in your

23 statement, that the information has come from you?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And you can see actually in parenthesis there it says





1 "Portadown" in the middle on the right-hand side. It is

2 to do with an enquiry, an intelligence assessment --

3 that is the subject -- about Joe Duffy, and the date is

4 31 July 1998. The result is:

5 "States: no intelligence re any threats to subject.

6 However, as he was elected on GRRC, he would be a prime

7 target for Loyalist paramilitaries."

8 So what you have done in order to answer this is

9 look on your computer to see if there is a specific bit

10 of intelligence that may say he is being attacked. Is

11 that right?

12 A. That would be correct.

13 Q. Not found anything positive in that record?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. But you have recognised that he was in a prominent

16 position and, therefore, would necessarily be a prime

17 target?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Now, from what you have said about Rosemary Nelson and

20 in particular her connection with Colin Duffy, which was

21 well known, would this conclusion apply equally to her?

22 A. I would suggest that even without her connection to

23 Colin Duffy, her role within the GRRC would have placed

24 her in the same context as Joe Duffy.

25 Q. So she would have been -- from the Loyalist





1 perspective -- a prime target?

2 A. As I said, anybody with a role within it. There were

3 militant elements within Loyalist circles, who you

4 couldn't convince otherwise, would have perceived that

5 as being enough for them to be -- basically targeted or

6 a subject of targeting.

7 Q. And did the fact that there was extra material about

8 Rosemary Nelson -- in other words, she had not simply

9 a connection with the GRRC but a connection with a

10 suspected IRA man from Lurgan, indeed, a suspected

11 relationship with him -- add to her being considered

12 a target?

13 A. I would say that if that was within their knowledge, it

14 certainly would add to it.

15 Q. I think you said earlier it was in their knowledge?

16 A. Well, I think I maybe said it -- I wouldn't be surprised

17 if it was within their knowledge. I'm not sure if that

18 was or not. I can't comment on that.

19 Q. Was Special Branch intercepting Rosemary Nelson's

20 telephone, either her personal phone or her office

21 phone, during this period?

22 A. Well, I can't speak for Special Branch as a whole, but

23 certainly around the Drumcree issue

24 [ redacted ]

25 Q. I don't want you to discuss any other intercepts in





1 relation to other areas at this time, but just the

2 specific answer about her telephone, either in her

3 office or her mobile or her home telephone.

4 Were you involved with any interception of any of

5 those phones?

6 A. Not that I'm aware of. I'm not aware of anything around

7 those, [ redacted ]

8 [ redacted ].

9 Q. Can I have on the screen, please, RNI-542-259.500

10 (displayed)?

11 Now, the photocopy is not great so it is quite

12 difficult to read this, but I think you have had the

13 advantage of seeing it outside of the hearing chamber.

14 Is that right?

15 A. I think there is potentially a hard copy here as well.

16 Q. In summary, it is an application for a telephone

17 interception of Rosemary Nelson's office phone at

18 William Street in Lurgan. Sorry, can we have the full

19 still on the screen? Thank you.

20 It appears to have emanated from the Lurgan branch

21 of Special Branch, which you can see in the stamp which

22 is at the top right-hand side, in July 1998. Did you

23 know that that draft for an application had been made?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Would you have expected to have been involved, since you





1 can see from the text of it that it is really to do with

2 her involvement with Drumcree that is precipitating the

3 application?

4 A. It wouldn't have been necessary for me to know that. I

5 can see that the reasoning behind -- one of the strands

6 for maybe an application for that would be through their

7 involvement with Drumcree, but that is being processed

8 specifically by the Lurgan office, so no, I wouldn't

9 necessarily have knowledge of it.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: The Detective Inspector, Special Branch

11 Lurgan, was he also your line manager?

12 A. Yes, I would suggest that he would have an overview of

13 it, whereas my overview would have been specific to

14 Portadown and the responsibilities around Portadown

15 office.

16 MR SKELTON: Had this application proceeded, would you have

17 been involved in assessing the intelligence and its

18 relevance to what was going on in Drumcree?

19 A. On that application, a case officer would have been

20 appointed who probably would have been my equivalent in

21 the Lurgan office, and they would have a responsibility

22 for process -- I may become aware through consultation

23 at a later stage if it had have developed or whatever.

24 I may have been asked because, if there was contact

25 around Drumcree -- my knowledge around that. But no, it





1 wouldn't necessarily be me who would process that.

2 Q. I would like now to move on to a different area, which

3 is Operation Shubr, which is an operation to undertake

4 surveillance on the LVF during 1998 and into 1999.

5 May I show you RNI-546-001 (displayed)? You can see

6 the title there "Operation Shubr" and the date

7 is April 1998. The original is TCG (South) and you can

8 see there is a particular inspector from there who had

9 charge of this operation. Can we go overleaf to

10 RNI-546-003, please (displayed)? Thank you. This is of

11 the detail of the operation. It is called Shubr. The

12 objectives are stated broadly as:

13 "Surveillance to identify individuals involved in

14 possible targets in relation to terrorist activity

15 planned for the near future by Mid-Ulster LVF."

16 Were you aware that this operation was taking place

17 in your area?

18 A. My reading of this is that Shubr is an operational name

19 given to a generic operation around this grouping within

20 the mid-Ulster area. So I may not necessarily have been

21 aware of an operation within Portadown.

22 Q. Well, it was about the Portadown LVF and I think you are

23 right that it was a generic operation and appears to

24 have been running for a long period of time. And this

25 may not in fact be the earliest document in relation to





1 it, but I think it is the earliest document we have.

2 Would you not have been told that there was

3 surveillance being undertaken on to the LVF in your

4 area?

5 A. Not necessarily, no.

6 Q. Why not?

7 A. There could be various reasons: Security around the

8 operation; the sensitivity. Again, there could be

9 a number of impacting factors on it, but it is not

10 necessary that I would have been told.

11 Q. Was it for TCG to determine whether or not you should be

12 told or was that a decision for your superior officers?

13 A. I would suggest that possibly the senior management

14 would have been aware of it, but not necessarily myself.

15 Q. Did you get to see product of this surveillance?

16 A. No, not particularly, no.

17 Q. So who in your office would have seen product?

18 A. We may not have seen any product in relation to --

19 obviously that looks like a surveillance operation, so

20 if there was something that maybe we could assist them

21 with or they wanted clarification around, we may have

22 been consulted. But not necessarily as a default

23 situation would we have been aware of it.

24 Q. The operation, as I have said, continues through 1998

25 and is still going in 1999, and it appears that it is





1 precipitated or activated by intelligence about specific

2 things which the LVF are suspected of doing. Was it the

3 case that you would feed in your intelligence about the

4 LVF to your source unit and it was then up to the source

5 unit to inform possibly TCG to activate a particular

6 surveillance operation which could then occur without

7 your knowledge?

8 A. That would happen, yes.

9 Q. Can we look at RNI-548-023, please (displayed)? This

10 is, again, a document from TCG, this time in Belfast,

11 not from the TCG in South Region. The originating

12 office is JL, which means ...?

13 A. Lurgan.

14 Q. Lurgan?

15 A. Hm-mm.

16 Q. And if we go overleaf, you can see there that the date

17 is February 1999. And it is a heavily redacted

18 document, so it is difficult to understand exactly what

19 it is saying, but in essence from the text that we can

20 see it is about contact between the LVF and someone in

21 Belfast in order to allow the provision of munitions to

22 take place to be moved to Portadown.

23 Now, we discussed earlier the issue of who gets to

24 see what when it affects your area. Would you expect to

25 have been told that munitions were going to be moved to





1 your area by the LVF from Portadown?

2 A. I would expect it, but it didn't necessarily always

3 happen. The management may have been aware with an

4 overview of the whole operation around it, but it would

5 not have been necessary for me personally maybe to know

6 that.

7 Q. Well --

8 A. If this was a specific operation that was being run in

9 Belfast.

10 Q. I should say I have connected the document with

11 Operation Shubr, which we will come on to in due course,

12 and that may not necessarily be a correct assumption.

13 But just in terms of this intelligence, as it stands by

14 itself, can you recollect being told that munitions were

15 going to be moved to Portadown from Belfast?

16 A. I don't specifically recollect that, but again, I would

17 like to qualify that with the fact that over the

18 Drumcree situation, we reported all year around activity

19 and, you know, all factions were moving bits and pieces

20 in and around. Some of it happened, some of it didn't,

21 some of it was aspirational and never happened. And I'm

22 not aware specifically of this being passed across to

23 me, but I wouldn't be surprised if I hadn't been told.

24 Q. If you hadn't?

25 A. Yes.





1 Q. Simply because it is a common occurrence?

2 A. Well, I think there was so much activity around this

3 situation. Again, if this was -- and I don't know from

4 looking at this page, you know -- if this was

5 a surveillance operation in Belfast, it is not necessary

6 that I would be told about it as being a detective

7 sergeant in Portadown.

8 Q. I think the operation appears to have been conducted

9 jointly with South Region TCG, where the LVF originated

10 and Belfast TCG, where the contacts were meant to be

11 taking place.

12 A. It is possible that that is purely around resourcing, in

13 that surveillance operators within Belfast and South

14 Region, as in Mahon Road TCG, maybe cooperated. But

15 from an intelligence end of things, you know, certainly

16 I may not necessarily have been told. I don't know if

17 that provides any clarification?

18 Q. That is of assistance, and it does indeed chime in with

19 what we have received from other witnesses about the

20 coordination of these operations. But a broader point

21 perhaps is whether or not you, during this period, had

22 any involvement in initiating surveillance on the LVF?

23 A. Yes, as a grouping within Portadown -- well, let me

24 clarify that. There was groupings of LVF scattered

25 throughout Northern Ireland. Its main bases operated





1 out of Portadown, but again, as was suggested, they had

2 contacts all over the place. But yes, you know, I did

3 submit intelligence which would have resulted in

4 surveillance opportunities around the LVF.

5 Q. When you submitted that intelligence, would you have

6 asked for surveillance or would it be for others to take

7 that decision?

8 A. I certainly could ask for it, but the decision would be

9 made at a higher level.

10 Q. Can you remember having any involvement in the process

11 of asking for surveillance in February or March 1999?

12 A. I can't recall. Again, it is so long ago. If there was

13 specific information here I could comment on it, but

14 I have no recollection of it.

15 Q. The operation, as we understand it, was running

16 in February and early March of 1999, then stopped before

17 Rosemary Nelson's death, wasn't running on the weekend

18 and then was running afterwards.

19 Were you aware, after Rosemary Nelson died, that

20 surveillance was continuing to take place in relation to

21 the LVF?

22 A. I would have expected there to be surveillance

23 operations running against the LVF. Yes, I would have

24 fully expected there to be surveillance operations

25 against them.





1 Q. In your statement at paragraph 112, which is on

2 page RNI-846-143 (displayed), you make the point in

3 response to a question from those interviewing you about

4 allegations of collusion, that every RUC station had

5 potential for information leaks. What do you mean by

6 that?

7 A. Well, the situation that we worked in in relation to

8 intelligence, intelligence we were submitting, that

9 obviously if there was a potential threat to any

10 individual's life, should that be police officers or

11 civilians, that information has to be shared out. And

12 once that information is shared out, you have

13 a potential, due to the necessary functions around, how

14 a police station operates -- you have civilian staff

15 working in it, you have cleaners, you have -- you know,

16 you have -- at that stage, you would have had part-time

17 police officers who operate within the station and also

18 live within those communities. So the potential for

19 leakage of information exists in every police station.

20 Q. Now, in discussions about Rosemary Nelson, we have

21 discussed the fact that you had intelligence to support

22 the view that she was sympathetic to the IRA, and we saw

23 one particular report where there was a comment written

24 to that effect.

25 Do you think that that intelligence may have found





1 its way from Special Branch to outside Special Branch

2 through contacts between your officers and others?

3 A. I think that the potential existed. I'm not aware of

4 any specifics, but I think the potential existed for

5 information that may have been generated by

6 Special Branch and disseminated to uniform, for it to

7 leak through to factions within the communities.

8 Q. So there were links that you were aware of, were there,

9 between certain parts of uniform in your area and

10 Loyalists sections of the community?

11 A. I was aware of the potential of that, given the

12 circumstances and the volatile nature of the Drumcree

13 situation in Portadown.

14 Q. You are talking about the potential for it, but we are

15 interested in the actuality. Was there actually, from

16 your perspective, any contact?

17 A. I suspected it, but nothing was ever proven. Obviously

18 I formulated a strand in our decision-making process

19 around the wording of information being released to

20 uniform.

21 Q. What kind of information?

22 A. It was an element that had to be considered in any type

23 of information disseminated out.

24 Q. Was there particular sorts of information that would be

25 considered helpful for those paramilitaries and,





1 therefore, was more likely than not to be passed on?

2 A. Well, no, I think -- any information that had to be

3 processed and passed on that related to a threat was

4 passed on, but there had to be considerations around the

5 security of that information and the potential of it

6 leaking out and getting back to the organisations. And

7 that was a very prudent attitude to have around

8 Portadown, given the sensitivities of the situation.

9 We did have a suspicion that stuff was leaking back

10 into the community through stuff that was being briefed

11 out, but there was nothing that we could actually prove.

12 But it was a major concern amongst the handlers

13 themselves.

14 Q. Would you have briefed your uniformed officers about

15 Rosemary Nelson? For example, if you had received

16 intelligence, as Lurgan appears to have received, that

17 she was gathering information on officers, would that

18 have been something which you would have told to the

19 uniformed officers, in order for them to be wary of

20 giving their names and numbers to her?

21 A. I'm not aware of that specifically being briefed to

22 police officers. In my opinion, it would need to be

23 more specific in relation to a police officer or

24 information around her dealings with a particular police

25 officer. I think generically it may not necessarily





1 have been briefed out because of her contact with so

2 many police officers.

3 Q. To take another example in relation to her, if

4 Special Branch received intelligence that she was very

5 close to Colin Duffy, both in terms of her political

6 allegiances and her sexual allegiances, if I can put it

7 that way, might that have been information which uniform

8 could have heard about and potentially that could have

9 spilt out into the community as well?

10 A. I wouldn't have seen the value that of particular

11 information being briefed out particularly to uniform.

12 But I also couldn't rule out the fact that because you

13 have members of the community operating and working

14 within the police environment, that they wouldn't be

15 able to have access to that information from other

16 areas.

17 Q. Now, there is a particular leaflet that appears to have

18 been produced after Rosemary Nelson's death, and that

19 can be found at RNI-401-113 (displayed). Could you flip

20 it 90 degrees? Thank you. It has the title "Monster

21 mash" and it is specifically about Rosemary Nelson, and

22 it mentions quite a lot about her but also about

23 Colin Duffy, her client.

24 Can I ask you just this first question: Were you

25 aware that this leaflet was produced in the locality





1 after she died?

2 A. I don't really have a particular recollection around

3 this one document.

4 Q. Does it accord with the type of leaflet which we were

5 discussing earlier, that were being produced by various

6 Loyalist individuals at this time?

7 A. Yes, it would be of a similar ilk.

8 Q. So it is the sort of information about her past, about

9 her allegiances, about her personal connections, that

10 would be designed as propaganda or intimidation to

11 people?

12 A. Yes, and designed specifically for those purposes.

13 Q. Some of the things that it mentions are clearly true,

14 for example, that she is a human rights lawyer in the

15 broad sense and that she was the legal representative of

16 Colin Duffy. Other things appear to have been concocted

17 and, one could only assume, maliciously, for example,

18 the fact that she was a member of the junior IRA and had

19 blown herself up.

20 But there are particular aspects of this which

21 appear to link to the kind of intelligence that

22 Special Branch was gathering. Can I ask you to look at

23 the bit at the top right? It says:

24 "She became the Provos' house lawyer for the area,

25 constantly on call, visiting arrested scum and seeking





1 to undermine cases by inventing complaints against RUC

2 and UDR men."

3 Now, you mentioned the complaints that

4 Rosemary Nelson had brought in respect of the GRRC

5 against police officers. Do you remember that?

6 A. Yes, I remember that, yes.

7 Q. Were you also aware that she brought complaints on

8 behalf of her clients in relation to comments they had

9 received, or were alleged to have received while being

10 interviewed in Gough Barracks?

11 A. Yes, I was aware of that.

12 Q. And this appears to be broadly referring to those sorts

13 of complaints by her clients. Can you see that?

14 A. Yes, I can see where you are make that assumption.

15 Q. The other point that you can see just after that in the

16 next sentence is:

17 "In addition, her access to confidential court files

18 allowed her to identify members of the security forces."

19 And it goes on to say:

20 "IRA informers and Loyalists for the Provo death

21 squads."

22 So it appears that there was an assumption made by

23 the author of this that she was using her position as

24 a lawyer to assist the IRA. Can you see that?

25 A. Yes.





1 Q. And that seems to be the same sort of assumption or same

2 sort of conclusion as was made in the intelligence that

3 I showed you earlier. Do you think that this sort of

4 leaflet could be the result of a leak of Special Branch

5 intelligence somehow to the kind of people that wrote

6 this?

7 A. I think that you can assume that, but I think you would

8 need to qualify it by there is nothing stated there that

9 wouldn't have been in the public domain and had been

10 discussed within -- or believed by members of the

11 Loyalist community whether it happened or not. It would

12 have been an assumption on their behalf as well.

13 Q. Just taking one example --

14 A. I think it would be -- I think it would be remiss to say

15 that it could solely come from a Special Branch source.

16 Q. Taking one example -- and it may not necessarily be

17 a Special Branch source, but the point about the

18 complaints against RUC officers, was that something

19 which you think was widely known within the community,

20 that she was bringing lots of complaints against the

21 RUC?

22 A. Well, I think it would have been. I think, if you look

23 on, it says "and UDR men". UDR men compromised members

24 of the community, the Loyalist Protestant community

25 mainly. So that would have been in the public domain,





1 that Rosemary was involved in making complaints about

2 people.

3 Q. And what about the bit about the confidential files?

4 Again, are you assuming that that was something which

5 anyone would infer from her ordinary legal work?

6 A. I think someone who is involved in it, which is

7 basically a smear campaign, a campaign of threats and

8 intimidation, could make assumptions around her work.

9 It is not a detailed sentence. It really is hinting at

10 stuff that she could have done. It is saying that she

11 did do it, but someone could make an assumption without

12 having access to intelligence.

13 Q. And it goes on to say that her most high profile client

14 was Mr Duffy. You can see that in the third paragraph,

15 and it discusses them in the terms:

16 "the gruesome twosome ... closer together than is

17 normal for client and lawyer."

18 This, again, appears to indicate that someone within

19 the Loyalist community was aware of the rumour about the

20 relationship between the two of them. Does that back up

21 your earlier answer that this may have been a rumour out

22 there in the community?

23 A. Well, what I'm saying is that it doesn't necessarily

24 suggest that it came from Special Branch intelligence.

25 As I say, people within the community were aware of





1 it. It would have been spoken about, and to be honest,

2 if Special Branch and intelligence services are hearing

3 about it, there is the potential that that information

4 does get to people within the other community. So it

5 doesn't necessarily suggest that the information came

6 from Special Branch sources.

7 Q. Sir, those are the questions I was intending to ask in

8 open session.

9 We have indicated earlier this week that we were

10 intending to have a closed aspect to this evidence.

11 Given that it takes half an hour to convert from open to

12 closed, I think we have, I'm afraid, timed out. It may

13 be appropriate to call this witness for a short closed

14 session at a convenient date.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Each member of the Panel agrees with that.

16 MR SKELTON: Thank you. Do you have anything else you would

17 like to add before the Panel ask you some questions?

18 A. No, I'm open to any questions.

19 Questions by SIR ANTHONY BURDEN

20 SIR ANTHONY BURDEN: Mr Skelton referred you to three

21 intelligence reports: one concerning Rosemary Nelson's

22 intention to contact the Secretary of State re the

23 Drumcree parade; secondly, encouraging people to make

24 complaints at the community centre; and the third, an

25 offer from American lawyers to fly her to the United





1 States to review statements.

2 After that, you were quite emphatic in your own

3 personal view that she had firm PIRA sympathies. Are

4 you personally in possession of further intelligence

5 which would support that statement that can either be

6 presented in open session here or, probably more

7 appropriately, in a closed session?

8 A. I think I probably could explore that further within

9 a closed session.

10 SIR ANTHONY BURDEN: Within a closed session. Excellent.

11 Thank you.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you for coming today. We will see one

13 another on another occasion.

14 A. Thank you.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Before the witness leaves, Mr (name redacted), would

16 you please confirm that all the cameras have been

17 switched off?

18 MR (NAME REDACTED): Yes, sir, they have.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: Please escort the witness out.

20 We will adjourn until 1.00 pm on Monday afternoon.

21 (12.30 pm)

22 (The Inquiry adjourned until 1.00 pm on Monday,

23 1 December 2008)






1 I N D E X

B552 (sworn) ..................................... 2
Questions by MR SKELTON ...................... 2
Questions by SIR ANTHONY BURDEN .............. 94