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Posted By Daniel W. Drezner Share

One of the drawbacks of being a foreign policy blogger is that it becomes very awkward to avoid discussing international relations events that make the front page for consecutive days.  I am therefore duty-bound to comment on Kim Jong Il's death, Kim Jong Un's ascension to leadership, and what it means for North Korea. 

Except I have no friggin' clue what will happen. 

I am in good company on this total lack of knowledge.  I'm bemused by all the U.S. officials anonymously commenting on what Kim Jong Un is like, given that our intelligence on this country is so awesome that Washington didn't know his father was dead until 50 hours after he died, and then only because the North Koreans announced it on television.  To be fair, however, it's not like the South Koreans knew either, and some reports I've seen suggest the Chinese were in the dark as well. 

Despite the near total lack of information outside of North Korea about North Koprea, the International Brotherhood of Foreign Policy Pundits require I provide at least two predictions per post.  So, here's my first prediction, courtesy of Mr. T

What we do know about the triumvirate of Kim-Jong-Il selected leaders guiding Kim Jong Un into power does not bode wel for the North Korean economy.  The only bright spot for the DPRK's economy in recent years was a modest step towards private economic activity.  The fact that one of them "published articles about the need for the government to curtail market-oriented activity" does not bode well for the per capita income of your average North Korean. 

My second prediction is that Kim Jong Un will hold power for longer than any Western analyst expects him to hold power.  Most of the pundit chatter has been about the Kim the Youngest's lack of gravitas and the asbsence of sufficient time to groom him as the successor to Kim Jong Il.  As I'm hearing this, I keep thinking of Hua Guofeng, Mao's successor.  It's an imperfect analogy, but Hua was a relative unknown plucked from obscurity by Mao only a few years before his death.  In the end he was outmaneuvered by Deng Xiaoping and his allies, but even Hua managed to stay in power for a few years before that happened, putting down an attempted coup by Mao's wife Jiang Qing and the Gang of Four. 

To use more game-theoretic language, I'm not sure there is a first-mover advantage to any ambitious North Korean challenging Kim the Youngest.  Because of that, and because the entire DPRK elite likely fears internal division when concerned about natiional survival, the tyranny of the status quo will likely persist for longer than anyone realizes.  Which, unfortunately, in this case, happens to be actual tyranny. 

Am I missing anything? 

 
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GRANT

3:40 AM ET

December 21, 2011

Let's not be certain that the

Let's not be certain that the U.S and/or other nations weren't aware of his death. Were I a spymaster or intelligent politician I would avoid showing any knowledge of this to protect the source. After all it's not as though D.C, Seoul, Moscow or Beijing had anything to gain from making mention of it before the official announcement.

With that said, I also don't think it's too likely that there is an intelligence source from Pyongyang. The C.I.A and S.I.S appear to have had incredible difficulty getting agents into the Soviet Union and Communist China. Paranoia, extreme restrictions on communications and the inability of the U.S to easily bribe North Koreans mean that it would be insanely difficult.

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HILLMENTA

7:34 AM ET

December 21, 2011

Let's not be

The C.I.A and S.I.S appear to have had incredible difficulty getting agents into the Soviet Union and Communist China. Paranoia, extreme restrictions on communications and the inability of the U.S to easily bribe North Koreans mean that it would be insanely difficult.Free Auto Accept Dofollow Blog List

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Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

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