Chapter 148: The Official IRA
Contents
Paragraph
Weapons available to the Official IRA 148.7
Explosives available to the Official IRA 148.15
The disposition of Official IRA weapons on Bloody Sunday 148.17
Evidence of specific weapons 148.27
Assurances sought from and given by the Official IRA 148.56
The need for assurances 148.76
Martin Ingram’s evidence of the IRA’s plans for the day 148.80
The Official IRA’s standing orders 148.85
The suggested need for the Official IRA to show that it could take
aggressive action 148.94
Orders given to Official IRA volunteers 148.100
Other accounts of the orders 148.108
Official IRA patrols on Bloody Sunday 148.111
The purpose of the patrols 148.114
The arrival of Official IRA cars in the Bogside and paramilitary activity
in the area of the Bogside Inn 148.119
The meeting of the Official IRA Command Staff 148.178
General conclusions on the activities of the Official IRA 148.184
148.1 We set out below an organisation chart showing a “best fit ” picture derived from the available material. The evidence of the Official IRA witnesses suggested that there were between 20 and 30 members of the Official IRA in the city in January 1972. Reg Tester, who told us he was the Quartermaster, recorded in his first written statement to this Inquiry that he thought that there were 30–40 members. He later revised that to 20–30. PIRA 24 said that one-third of the members of the Official IRA defected to the Provisional IRA shortly before Bloody Sunday. The chart assumes that the Official IRA had about 30 members following any such defection.
148.2 Johnny White’s anonymity was withdrawn. However, much of the evidence refers to him by the cipher OIRA 3 so, where appropriate, we add this cipher after his name.
148.3 It seems likely that there were about 16 members of the Creggan Unit. OIRA 61 and OIRA 72 gave evidence to this effect. Both OIRA 8 and OIRA 11 gave lower figures.3 However, these figures seem to us likely to be inaccurate and perhaps reflect a lack of knowledge of the organisation on the part of junior members.
148.4 If there were about 16 members of the Creggan Unit and a total membership of about 30, then there must have been about 14 volunteers in the Command Staff and the Bogside Unit. The evidence indicates that, of the six Command Staff members, OIRA 1 and OIRA 2 were volunteers in the Bogside Unit and Johnny White (OIRA 3) may have been OC of the Creggan Unit. If the other Command Staff members did not belong to the Bogside Unit, then the Bogside Unit must have had a total of about ten members.
148.5 Reg Tester was the only witness who referred to an intelligence officer. He suggested that such an officer was a member of the Command Staff but in fact worked largely alone.1 OIRA 7 and Reg Tester said that Johnny White (OIRA 3) was OC of the Creggan Unit.2 OIRA 6 told us that his section leader of the Creggan Unit was dead.3
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1 AT6.6 |
3 AOIRA6.2 |
148.6 We have placed “Red ” Mickey Doherty as a member of the Bogside Unit because intelligence material indicates that he was at some time the section leader of that unit.
Weapons available to the Official IRA
148.7 Reg Tester, the Command Staff Quartermaster, said that weapons and ammunition were in short supply. His evidence was that the Official IRA at the time of Bloody Sunday possessed 20–30 weapons, including some old Lee-Enfield .303s, some .22s, some shotguns, a .306 rifle, a Sterling sub-machine gun, an antique Sten gun which was never used, a Thompson sub-machine gun, a new M1 carbine, a Garand and a selection of pistols and revolvers. Most were in good working order. The Official IRA possessed ammunition for some but not all these weapons. Reg Tester said that the Thompson sub-machine gun was rarely used because the Official IRA could not obtain ammunition for it.1
1 AT6.2; AT6.9; Day 414/11; Day 414/88; Day 414/114-115
148.8 The evidence of other Official IRA witnesses was that the Official IRA in Londonderry had a substantially smaller number of weapons. OIRA 1, OIRA 2 and OIRA 7 gave accounts which suggested that the Official IRA possessed 12–15 weapons of various sorts.1
1 Day 395/38; Day 393/17; AOIRA7.18
148.9 OIRA 2, OIRA 4, OIRA 7, OIRA 8 and OIRA 9 all accepted that the Official IRA possessed at least one Thompson sub-machine gun at the time of Bloody Sunday.1
1 Day 393/107; Day 394/5; AOIRA7.18; AW14.15; AOIRA9.3
148.10 Other Official IRA witnesses did not support Reg Tester’s evidence that the weapons were generally in good working order. OIRA 6 told us that there were weapons that were carried “for show ” but which did not work.1
1 AOIRA6.1
148.11 Johnny White (OIRA 3) gave the following account in his second written statement to this Inquiry:1
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“There were very few weapons available to OIRA at that time and, although I can’t now remember exactly the number I recall that there were limited numbers with some old rifles, some handguns and at various times some automatic weapons. The majority of the weapons were in a poor state and a significant number did not work, I know there were always more volunteers than there were weapons. It was never the case that everyone was armed at the same time. Also, many of the weapons that we had were antiquated, by which I mean not working, and a number were real antiques. We were further hampered by the lack of ammunition available and we had to co-ordinate operations to make sure that the right weapons had the right ammunition for any operation. It is for this reason that I regard it as a joke for the army to say that they came under heavy fire that day. Apart from the fact that no-one went on the march with the intention of causing trouble, and we had not prepared for trouble in the Bogside, we simply didn’t have the weaponry to even think of taking on the British army in any form of large scale attack. ” |
148.12 Other Official IRA witnesses also told us that ammunition was in short supply and that there were more volunteers than weapons.1
148.13 It is difficult to determine from this evidence the precise, or indeed approximate, number of weapons available to the Official IRA in the city in January 1972. It seems to us on the whole that there were probably rather fewer than Reg Tester recalled. We are of the view that the weaponry included at least one Thompson sub-machine gun.
148.14 We accept that weapons and ammunition were probably in short supply and it is likely that some weapons were not in working order.
Explosives available to the Official IRA
148.15 Reg Tester told us that he was solely responsible for the Official IRA’s stock of Gelamex. He said that the Official IRA obtained gelignite “once in a blue moon ”. Explosives were kept in various places including the Official IRA’s headquarters in the Creggan, which was a vacant dentist’s shop next door to Otto Schlindwein’s pharmacy.1
1 AT6.1; AT6.7; AT6.8; Day 414/17
148.16 Reg Tester’s evidence was that the Official IRA had no explosives on Bloody Sunday and did not make up any nail bombs.1 In our detailed examination of the five sectors into which we divided the events of Bloody Sunday, we concluded that nail bombs were seen in and close by Glenfada Park North. We do not know whether these were Official or Provisional IRA nail bombs. We have concluded elsewhere in this report2 that Gerald Donaghey was probably in possession of four nail bombs when he was shot. His association with the Provisional Fianna suggests that the bombs may have come from Provisional IRA sources, but we are far from certain about this. In these circumstances, although we are sure that no-one threw or attempted to throw a nail bomb on Bloody Sunday, we do not accept the evidence from either Official or Provisional IRA sources that there were no nail bombs available for use in the Bogside on Bloody Sunday.
1 Day 414/18 2 Paragraph 145.25
The disposition of Official IRA weapons on Bloody Sunday
148.17 The representatives of the majority of represented soldiers pointed out that many of the Official IRA Command Staff witnesses initially told this Inquiry that it was agreed that all weapons were to go to the Creggan and the Brandywell, but then changed their evidence and said that the weapons were to go to the Creggan. The evidence of Johnny White (OIRA 3) remained consistent in his two written statements to this Inquiry. In both he said that the weapons were to go – and did go – to the Creggan and the Brandywell. Johnny White was too ill to give oral evidence to this Inquiry.
148.18 Reg Tester told us that he was ordered to ensure that all weapons were removed from the Bogside and taken to the Creggan; and that the weapons were placed in cars that drove around the Creggan during the day.1 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, Reg Tester said that the weapons were taken to the Official IRA’s headquarters, a former dentist’s shop in the Creggan. According to him, they were then placed in cars.2
148.19 Johnny White (OIRA 3) told us that he inspected the two cars on the morning of Bloody Sunday and that one was in Central Drive in the Creggan and one in Lone Moor Road.1 Lone Moor Road runs along the boundary between the Creggan and the Brandywell.
148.20 According to the Official IRA witnesses, the weapons were withdrawn either so that they could be used to defend the Brandywell and the Creggan or to prevent them from being found by soldiers should the Army come into the Bogside. OIRA 2 agreed at one point in his oral evidence that one possible additional reason was to prevent the use of the weapons. Later he rejected that possibility.
148.21 In our view the essential questions are not so much concerned with the reasons put forward to explain why, according to the Official IRA witnesses, weapons were removed, but whether they were in fact removed as alleged, or were used on Bloody Sunday.
148.22 In support of their submission that the weapons were not removed, the representatives of the majority of represented soldiers referred to the evidence of OIRA 1 to the effect that he was not surprised to learn during the course of Bloody Sunday that soldiers had opened fire on marchers. These representatives invited us to conclude from that evidence that the Official IRA believed that the security forces were “all too likely ” to fire on the marchers, and that in those circumstances the Official IRA would never have removed its weapons from the Bogside, leaving the people undefended.1
1 FS7.562
148.23 OIRA 1 said that in the past, it was not unusual for the Army to fire at unarmed civilians. In the course of his oral evidence to this Inquiry there was this exchange:1
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“Q. Is it true you were not particularly surprised by the shooting by the soldiers? A. That is correct, yes. Q. That is correct. Thank you. Is it also correct that it was not out of the ordinary for people, according to you, for people to be shot by the Army at such demonstrations as this? A. Well, I think that what I said – I am not sure exactly the words in my statement, but what I was inferring was that it was not unusual for the Army to shoot unarmed civilians in different circumstances. Q. In the course of a demonstration? A. Possibly in the course of a demonstration, possibly in the course of a confrontation, possibly in the course of when nothing was happening. Q. Is it true that it was not out of the ordinary for shots to be fired by the Army at these types of demonstrations for no good reason? A. Yes, it would not be true to say that the Army opened fire in the manner they did on Bloody Sunday on a regular basis on demonstrations. It would be true to say that the Army, on various occasions, had opened fire on innocent civilians in a number of different situations and, therefore, the fact that they had opened fire on Bloody Sunday before the full scale of the event became apparent, it was not such a shock to anyone that somebody innocent had been shot by the Army for no reason. Q. Was it not out of the ordinary, in your experience, for soldiers to shoot civilians who were taking part in these type of demonstrations, such as the Bloody Sunday march? A. I did not give it actually much thought at that particular point, whether it was out of the ordinary. ” |
148.24 We are not aware of any previous occasion on which soldiers had shot civilians engaged in marching or demonstrating. Our understanding of OIRA 1’s evidence is that he was unable to point to any such occasion, but was speaking in generalities; and that his remark was really intended only to mean that, according to him, after the event he was not surprised that the Army had fired. The submission appears to depend on the proposition that in the belief that the Army had previously fired on civilians, the Official IRA would have made arrangements to defend the people in an attempt to prevent this happening again; and so would not have removed all its weapons from the Bogside.
148.25 In our view some weapons may have been moved from the Bogside in order to help protect the Brandywell and the Creggan. However, we do not accept the suggestion that weapons were moved to prevent them from being found by soldiers should the Army come into the Bogside. We have found no evidence that suggests to us that it was thought that soldiers were likely to come into the Bogside on Bloody Sunday. As we have described earlier in this report,1 Colonel Derek Wilford (the Commanding Officer of 1 PARA) himself decided to send Support Company of 1 PARA into the Bogside only a few minutes before that happened.
148.26 In these circumstances we accept that it was unlikely that the Official IRA would have planned to move all its weapons from the Bogside on Bloody Sunday.
Evidence of specific weapons
148.27 As we describe below, Reg Tester told us he thought that the pistol missing from his stores was the personal protection weapon of Johnny White (OIRA 3).1 OIRA 4’s evidence was that the pistol in his possession was one that he habitually carried.2 Johnny White’s evidence was that each member of the Command Staff was permitted to carry a personal protection weapon, subject to such a weapon being available. He told us that there were not enough handguns for each member of the Command Staff to carry one. Johnny White told us that he was certain that only OIRA 4 was carrying such a weapon on Bloody Sunday.3
148.28 In the course of considering the events of the five sectors, we have drawn attention to the fact that there was an Official IRA vehicle in Glenfada Park North with weapons in the boot, that OIRA 1 fired a rifle at soldiers from a position in Columbcille Court, and that OIRA 4 fired a pistol.
148.29 The representatives of the majority of represented soldiers, when dealing with the question of whether the pistol in the possession of OIRA 4 was or was not the pistol allocated to Johnny White (OIRA 3), observed that Johnny White had had only three days to establish a habit of “always ” holding a pistol, since he had been OC for only three days.1 However, Reg Tester, who gave evidence of the OC “always ” holding a pistol, did not say whether he was referring to the person who at any one time held the office of OC or to Johnny White, who was the OC on the day. Since his release from detention in August 1971 (only a short time after being detained), Johnny White had been the Adjutant and was, according to OIRA 9, the true leader of the Official IRA, having been their leader before his arrest. Since Johnny White did not give oral evidence to this Inquiry, it was impossible to ask him; it might be, though, that it was his practice, both as Adjutant and OC, to carry a weapon. OIRA 9 had taken over command when Johnny White was interned; he retained the title of OC when Johnny White was released, but, according to him, “worked under ” Johnny White. OIRA 9 was arrested two days before Bloody Sunday.2
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2 AOIRA9.1 |
148.30 The representatives of the majority of represented soldiers referred to the evidence of OIRA 2, who said he was aware that another member of the Command Staff was carrying a personal protection weapon.1 OIRA 2 thought that Reg Tester might have had such a weapon.2 Reg Tester’s account was that he was in the Creggan with a large quantity of firearms.
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148.31 The representatives of the majority of represented soldiers refer to the report of Vincent Browne that “a number of other volunteers in the parade were armed for their personal protection ”.1 In our view this is likely to have been the case.
1 FS7.579
148.32 The representatives of the majority of represented soldiers criticise the failure of the Official IRA witnesses, and Johnny White (OIRA 3) in particular, to admit from the outset the activities of “Red ” Mickey Doherty who, away from the five sectors and as we describe elsewhere in this report,1 fired a shot that hit a soldier in his flak jacket, but did not injure him.2 Since Johnny White did not give oral evidence to this Inquiry, it was not possible to ask him the reason why he failed to mention “Red ” Mickey Doherty in his first written statement to this Inquiry. However, we are not sure whether Johnny White was trying to conceal “Red ” Mickey Doherty’s actions. The latter’s engagement with the Army (in which he was injured by Army gunfire returning his shot) was acknowledged immediately after Bloody Sunday. On the evening of Bloody Sunday, Johnny White gave an interview in which he admitted that a volunteer had been wounded.3 In a press statement issued on 31st January 1972, an officer of the Official IRA said:4
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“there had been certain ‘Military activity’ on the part of the Officials outside the immediate district and during an exchange with troops the volunteer received leg and neck injuries. ” |
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3 X1.25.14 4 ED12.5 |
148.33 By the time that the Official IRA witnesses came to make statements, the Inquiry had received evidence from Dr Domhnall MacDermott who treated “Red ” Mickey Doherty on the day. It may be that the Official IRA witnesses considered “Red ” Mickey Doherty’s actions irrelevant, in that they took place outside the area in which the paratroopers fired and also took place late in the day, since they can hardly realistically have hoped to conceal from the Inquiry the fact that “Red ” Mickey Doherty had fired a shot on Bloody Sunday.
Weapons under the control of Reg Tester
148.34 The initial impression created by the Official IRA Command Staff witnesses was that virtually all weapons were removed from the Bogside and placed under the control of the Quartermaster, Reg Tester.1 However, the evidence seems in most cases to reflect the understanding of the witnesses as to the orders given. The members of the Command Staff, other than Reg Tester and Johnny White (OIRA 3), did not give evidence of the implementation of the orders.
1 AOIRA1.4; AOIRA2.2; AOIRA4.2; AOIRA5.2; AOIRA3.2; AOIRA3.8
148.35 Johnny White (OIRA 3), in his first written statement to this Inquiry, told us that all weapons had been recovered from the Bogside and taken to the Creggan and the Brandywell areas, with the exception of the .303 rifle in Columbcille Court and the handgun in the possession of a Command Staff member.1He identified that Command Staff member as the person who had fired two shots at what he described as the British Army Saracens in the Rossville Flats area.
1 AOIRA3.8
148.36 In his second written statement to this Inquiry, Johnny White (OIRA 3) told us that the weapons were removed from the Bogside, where he did not expect them to be needed, and taken to the Creggan and the Brandywell, which were areas that he thought might have to be defended against Army incursion.1 He stated that all the weapons were placed in two cars. One of these cars was parked in Central Drive and the other in Lone Moor Road. On the morning of the march, he gave a cursory check to each car to see what was in it.2 Johnny White also told us that the weapons in the cars and in the possession of the volunteer in Barrack Street were the totality of the Official IRA’s working weapons.3
148.37 However, evidence emerged which indicated that all the weapons were not in fact taken to the Creggan headquarters and put into cars. In his first written statement to this Inquiry, Reg Tester told us that before Bloody Sunday the OC had ordered him to ensure that all weapons were collected from the Bogside and taken to the Creggan. He stated that he obeyed this order but said that two weapons were missing: a .303 rifle and “the pistol which was carried by the OC at all times ”.1
1 AT6.2
148.38 In his second written statement to this Inquiry, Reg Tester told us that all weapons belonging to the Official IRA were placed in two cars and driven around the Creggan during the afternoon of Bloody Sunday, with the exception of one missing rifle, one pistol and a rifle allocated to a volunteer. It appears that the volunteer was “Red ” Mickey Doherty.1
1 AT6.7
148.39 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, Reg Tester gave a different account, saying that those weapons that were already in safe dumps in the Creggan and the Bogside were left where they were. His evidence was that he needed to know where all the weapons were and to be sure that no volunteer had one in his possession.1 However, he also said that there were weapons that were not under his control; these were ones that had been issued to the Bogside Unit.2
148.40 The solicitors acting for former members of the Official IRA submitted that the Inquiry should prefer the evidence of the other Command Staff members on this issue to that of Reg Tester.1 We do not accept that submission. Reg Tester, as Quartermaster, was better placed than other members of the Command Staff to know the location of the Official IRA’s weapons on the day. Johnny White (OIRA 3), if he inspected the cars as he said he did, could in our view not have failed to notice that weapons were missing. We consider below other evidence that to our minds supports Reg Tester’s account.
1 FS13.34
148.41 The representatives of the majority of represented soldiers submitted that the Inquiry should not accept that Reg Tester was wholly in control of the weapons in the Creggan, because he was unaware that “a member of [the Creggan] section, OIRA 4, was armed on the day”.1
1 FS7.597
148.42 The representatives of the majority of represented soldiers did not identify the evidence on which they relied to support their allegation that OIRA 4 was a member of the Creggan Unit. We do not know whether or not he was. In any event, the evidence suggests to us that the pistol in the possession of OIRA 4 was one that Reg Tester knew to have been taken from his stores. Reg Tester said he thought that the pistol was in the possession of Johnny White (OIRA 3). He may have been wrong about this and the pistol may have been in the hands of another member of the Command Staff, OIRA 4. However, to our minds that would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Reg Tester did not have control over the weapons for which he was responsible.
148.43 According to the oral evidence of Reg Tester,1a .303 rifle, a pistol in the possession of Johnny White (OIRA 3) or OIRA 4, the M1 carbine allocated to “Red ” Mickey Doherty, weapons in one or more dumps in the Creggan, and weapons in one or more dumps in the Bogside were not under his control on Bloody Sunday. In our view this account is more likely to be accurate than that which he gave in his written evidence to this Inquiry.
1 Day 414/13; Day 414/30-32; Day 414/37-40; Day 414/41-46; Day 414/110-111
148.44 Reg Tester said that “Red ” Mickey Doherty did not obtain a weapon from him. His evidence was that any arms in the possession of Official IRA volunteers, other than one personal protection weapon and the .303 rifle, must have come from the arsenal kept by the Bogside Unit of the Official IRA, which was not under his control.1 In our view he was probably right about this.
148.45 Some support for Reg Tester’s evidence to this Inquiry about the Bogside dumps comes from the account that he gave to Peter Pringle and Philip Jacobson of the Sunday Times Insight Team in March 1972:1
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“the Officials orders of the day for Sunday, drawn up the previous day, were as follows: 1. There were to be no weapons in the bogside except for those held by the Bogside Official unit, and those were to be kept in several safe dumps. All other Official weapons were to be kept in two cars which would be on hand in the Creggan. ” |
1 S34
148.46 A further account of weapons having been available in the Bogside appears in the note John Barry of the Sunday Times Insight Team made of an account given to him by OIRA 1:1
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“The Bogside section was under his charge. He had the available arms stored in the boot of a car in Glenfada. (I think he said it was a green Avenger, but my notes don’t record that). … [OIRA 1] was appalled. Someone shouted to him, and he went round the gable to see. Behold, the Saracens approaching. He sped back into Glenfada, and shouted to them to get the car out. He thought one of the Saracens would come into Glenfada and catch them red-handed. There were five or six Stickies [Official IRA] around the car, and they couldn’t get the thing out in time. [OIRA 1] said to abandon it, and get the arms out of the boot. They did: the arms consisted of a Sten, a carbine, two 303s and a .22 automatic. ” |
1 AOIRA1.1
148.47 OIRA 7, who claimed to have accompanied OIRA 1 to the car in Glenfada Park in order to place in the boot the .303 rifle recently fired by OIRA 1, said that there were no other weapons in the boot.1 We have considered these accounts in detail elsewhere in this report, in the context of the events of Sectors 1 and 4. In our view there were other weapons in the boot.
148.48 There is no evidence as to whether the dumps to which Reg Tester referred were being guarded or as to the number of people who knew of their location. OIRA 7, who was not a member of the Command Staff, gave evidence that the Official IRA’s main arms dump was at the shops in the Creggan.1 OIRA 1, OIRA 2 and Johnny White (OIRA 3) all knew the location of the Columbcille Court dump, as did the volunteer who had placed the weapon there and the supporter who, according to Johnny White, managed the dump.2 It should be noted by way of contrast that the evidence of Provisional IRA witnesses was that the locations of Provisional IRA arms dumps were a closely guarded secret. Although there is no direct evidence concerning knowledge of the Official IRA Creggan and Bogside dumps (other than the one in Columbcille Court), we got the impression that these were likely to be known to a wider extent.
148.49 We have concluded elsewhere in this report1 that there were weapons in a car in Glenfada Park North that were accessible to members of the Official IRA.
The extent of the Command Staff’s control over weapons and ammunition
148.50 In his first written statement to this Inquiry, Reg Tester told us:1
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“I was in charge of hardware i.e. weapons, ammunition and explosives. My role was to obtain and distribute arms. Each volunteer had to account for each round of ammunition issued to him and god help him if he couldn’t account for it. ” |
1 AT6.1
148.51 Johnny White (OIRA 3) also told us that he would check the ammunition when a weapon was returned and so would know whether a volunteer had fired; and that if he were not available, the Quartermaster would check.1
148.52 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry,1 Reg Tester said that he did not know immediately after Bloody Sunday or for many years that “Red ” Mickey Doherty had fired in Barrack Street or that OIRA 4 had fired from the Rossville Flats car park. He said he knew of the Columbcille Court shot fired at soldiers on the other side of William Street, but had believed that this had been fired by “Red ” Mickey Doherty.
148.53 The evidence of Johnny White (OIRA 3) was that he did learn at the Command Staff meeting on the evening of Bloody Sunday about these shots.
148.54 The representatives of the majority of represented soldiers submitted that Reg Tester had no knowledge of or control over the weapons that were fired, because he had no control at all over weapons in the possession of the Bogside Unit.1 However, somewhat inconsistently, these representatives also invited us to disbelieve Reg Tester’s claimed ignorance of the firing that took place.2We ourselves do accept Reg Tester’s evidence that he did not control the weapons in the possession of the Bogside Unit. It is difficult to accept, however, that Reg Tester did not know until long afterwards of the firing by “Red ” Mickey Doherty in Barrack Street or that OIRA 4 had fired from the car park of the Rossville Flats.
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2 FS7.598 |
The purpose for which weapons were held
148.55 The representatives of the majority of represented soldiers queried whether OIRA 4 would have been allowed to carry a personal protection weapon when arms were in such short supply.1 The evidence of Johnny White (OIRA 3) was that on Bloody Sunday there were 12–15 men on patrol, 8–10 of them in cars containing arms.2 The representatives of the majority of represented soldiers pointed to the evidence of Official IRA witnesses that there were in general terms more volunteers than weapons; however, if only a few volunteers were on duty, there would be likely to have been more weapons than volunteers.
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Assurances sought from and given by the Official IRA
148.56 We have concluded elsewhere in this report1 that Brendan Duddy (at the time a businessman in Londonderry and a member of the Derry City Centre Police Liaison Committee) did seek and obtain an assurance from the Official IRA. His evidence to this Inquiry, which we accept, was that Chief Superintendent Frank Lagan had requested him to seek assurances from paramilitary groups to the effect that individual members would be told not to march and that they would make sure that all weapons were removed from the vicinity of the march. He told us that a few days later he met Malachy McGurran, whom he regarded as a leading Official Republican in Derry, and told him what Chief Superintendent Lagan had requested. According to Brendan Duddy’s recollection, Malachy McGurran’s immediate response was that the request for these assurances was unnecessary and superfluous, because he felt confident that there would be no shooting and that if people wanted to march they should be allowed to do so. However, he did give an assurance that all guns would be removed.2 In his oral evidence Brendan Duddy told us that there was no discussion at all on what might happen after the march had finished.3 He also said that he might have spoken to Malachy McGurran on or about 22nd, 23rd or 24th January and would have reported his conversation to Chief Superintendent Lagan shortly afterwards, perhaps on the following day.4
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148.57 As we have noted above, OIRA 9 was OC of the Official IRA in Londonderry until his arrest on 28th January 1972. He made a written statement to this Inquiry but was too ill to give oral evidence. His evidence was that he and Malachy McGurran met Brigid Bond (one of the march organisers) in the week before Bloody Sunday. They gave Brigid Bond an assurance that the Official IRA would support the march and would not interfere with it and that there would be no paramilitary activity on the day. There was no need for the Official IRA Command Staff to meet before such an assurance was given because “what Malachy said, or decided, went ”.1
1 AOIRA9.1
148.58 Malachy McGurran and Brigid Bond both died before this Inquiry was established. OIRA 2 said in oral evidence to this Inquiry that Malachy McGurran would have known the plans of the Official IRA Command Staff.1 Johnny White (OIRA 3), who had become OC of the Derry Official IRA by the time of the march, was also too unwell to give oral evidence. He told us in his first written statement to this Inquiry that he was not aware of any assurance having been given:2
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“I am also asked about assurances reportedly given to N.I.C.R.A. [Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association] by both wings of the I.R.A. prior to the march that there would be no weapons carried. In any event I can not give any information as to what assurance may have been given by the Provisional I.R.A. As far as I am aware there were no formal or informal approaches to the Official IRA about assurances over weapons or operations. No such approaches were made to me. No assurances were given. The nature of the march and the presence of our friends and families would in themselves have been an assurance to the organizers. It may well have been noticed |
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in the community that weapons were being moved out of the Bogside and this information may have filtered back to the organizers. It would have been obvious that if we allowed our friends and families to attend the march we did not intend staging any form of attack under cover of the march. ” |
148.59 Johnny White (OIRA 3) also told us that there were no lines of communication between the Official IRA and the Army or the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) through which any assurance could have been given.1 He may well not have been aware of the role played by Brendan Duddy.
148.60 In his written statement to this Inquiry, John Goddard of Praxis Films Ltd told us that he and Tony Stark had interviewed two senior Official IRA men and that he alone had then interviewed the man who had been OC of the Official IRA at the time of Bloody Sunday. He told us that he no longer recollected the names of these men.1
1 M86.16
148.61 Johnny White (OIRA 3) accepted that he had had an informal meeting with a member of the Praxis team but said he had no recollection of its content.1 We set out below John Goddard’s note of his meeting with Johnny White, which in our view was an accurate account of what he was told:2
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“O/c of OIRA at time Officials did give undertaking not to be there with arms, and stuck to it. Given both to organisers (Bonds) and to priests. Not break it – because community would disown them. Would have claimed any of dead – always did and have. No Officials killed or wounded. Not know of any official there with weapons who fired, because would have claimed him – been a propaganda coup to have one of your members take retaliatory or defensive action at time. If get pic of the man to him he will identify it if he knows him. (NB Hoping to see the man this week, and have got second hand account.) ” |
148.62 Bearing in mind that an Official IRA member (“Red ” Mickey Doherty) had been wounded on Bloody Sunday and that there had unquestionably been other firing by members of the Official IRA, in these respects at least what Johnny White (OIRA 3) told John Goddard was clearly untrue. This casts doubt on the reliability of his account that an undertaking had been given. Whether Johnny White was telling John Goddard the truth about an undertaking having been given, in contrast to his evidence to us that there had been no assurance, remains in doubt.
148.63 The Inquiry also has Tony Stark’s and John Goddard’s notes of their interview with the unidentified Official IRA volunteers. These included the following:1
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“Q: SO YOU MADE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE CIVIL RIGHTS ORGANISERS NOT TO USE THE MARCH AS AN EXCUSE TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK ON THE ARMY? A: WELL – IT WASN’T ANYTHING LIKE AS FORMAL AS THAT. LOOKE – EVERYBODY HERE KNEW EVERYBODY ELSE. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ORGANISERS KNEW THE IRA PEOPLE AND THEY MET AND TALKED AND INFORMALLY THEY WOULD HAVE UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WAS GOING TO BE NO MILITARY ACTION THAT DAY. THE CIVIL RIGHTS PEOPLE WANTED IT TO BE A NON-POLITICAL MARCH AND THE IRA SUPPORTED THAT WISH. SO WE TOLD ALL OUR ARMED VEHICLE PATROLS TO STAY OUT OF THE BOGSIDE. THE CARS AND WEAPONS WERE LEFT IN THE CREGGAN. ANYWAY, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN ILLOGICAL TO HAVE HAD OUR CARS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE MARCH. HOW WOULD WE HAVE USED THEM? THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN STUCK IN THE MIDDLE OF THE CROWD. IF THE BRITS HAD HAD ANY INTELLIGENCE AT ALL THEY WOULD HAVE REALISED THAT THE IRA WOULDN’T HAVE BEEN OUT THAT DAY. ” |
1 O17A.1
148.64 In the course of the same interview, the interviewees also gave information that we now know to be false, in that they denied that “Fr Daly’s gunman” was a member of the Official IRA. Since the identities of the interviewees are not known to this Inquiry, it is not possible to say whether they made an honest mistake in speaking to the journalists or were deliberately lying. Despite this, it seems to us that this account indicates that some assurance (albeit informal) was provided by the Official IRA.
148.65 OIRA 1, a member of the Official IRA Command Staff in Londonderry, told us that he was unaware of any assurance having been given.1
148.66 The representatives of the majority of represented soldiers quoted part of OIRA 2’s written evidence on the question of assurances: “I gave no assurances and I think it unlikely that the other members gave assurances. ”1 The full text of this evidence was:
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“As far as I recall I gave no assurances and I think it unlikely that the other members gave assurances. Local people may have been aware that we were not preparing to take action but I cannot say for sure. ” |
148.67 In the course of his oral evidence to this Inquiry, there was the following exchange in relation to this part of OIRA 2’s written evidence to this Inquiry:1
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“A. I would imagine the substance of that is correct because, as I have already replied to you, there was no formal link between the Official IRA and NICRA, so that the orders of the day, which as you say you will come to shortly, could possibly have been verbally given to a member of the – one of the organisers of the civil rights march on the day. Um, and really, as to the assurances, I mean, I personally gave no assurances to the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association because I did not have any discussions or any contact with any member of NICRA in the run-up to Bloody Sunday, so that is just my personal opinion, and I have stated in my statement that I personally gave no assurances. That does not rule out that somebody else on the command staff could have passed on information to NICRA that there would be no activity – there would be no OIRA activity on the particular day. Q. Do you remember it being decided at the command staff that NICRA should be informed of the command staff’s plans? A. No. ” |
148.68 In our view OIRA 2 was not ruling out the possibility that an assurance had been given by someone else. As the representatives of the majority of represented soldiers acknowledged,1 OIRA 2 said that he had heard something of Malachy McGurran having given an assurance.
1 FS7.550
148.69 The representatives of the majority of represented soldiers, in relation to OIRA 9’s evidence that an assurance was given, queried why, if that were the case, the other Command Staff members were not aware of the assurance. The representatives submitted that “how effective such an assurance could be if OIRA 3 himself, the OC on the day of the march, was ignorant of it is not at all clear ”.1
1 FS7.552
148.70 As we have pointed out, we are in doubt as to whether, as he told us, Johnny White (OIRA 3) was unaware that assurances had been sought and given. As to OIRA 1, it is possible that he might not have been aware that assurances had been given, but we place little reliance on his evidence, since in many respects, as we have pointed out elsewhere in this report,1 we consider that he has not told the truth to this Inquiry.
148.71 Anthony Martin told us that he had received assurances from Malachy McGurran and Reg Tester that the Official IRA would not take action during the march. According to Anthony Martin, Malachy McGurran had said that he had given a similar assurance to Brigid Bond.1 Further, Anthony Martin told us that while he accepted assurances that the Official IRA would take no action on the march, he recognised that personal protection weapons might still be carried.2
148.72 Michael Havord said that he had received an assurance from Malachy McGurran that the Official IRA would not abuse the march.1
148.73 Eamonn McCann’s evidence was that he was aware of assurances having been given. In his written statement to this Inquiry he told us:1
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“Although I was not involved in the organisation of the march, I was in touch with the leaders of the Official IRA and I knew from them that the orders of the day on 30 January 1972 was that its members would not be present carrying guns. A number of people would have been aware of these orders. I am talking about hundreds rather than thousands. ” |
1 AM77.2
148.74 We should note at this point that we have considered the evidence given by Ivan Cooper on the question of assurances by the Official IRA.1 While he did not suggest that he had himself received assurances, he appeared to be saying that he was aware that assurances had been given. However, for reasons given in the previous chapter, we treat Ivan Cooper’s evidence to this Inquiry with great caution.
148.75 Although the matter is far from clear, we have concluded that it is likely that some members of the Official IRA did give some form of formal or informal assurance that it would not use the march for the purpose of mounting attacks on the security forces. Such assurances may well have been given in good faith, though in view of OIRA 1’s shot from Columbcille Court over the heads of the marchers at the tail end of the march, in one instance at least the assurance was not kept. If an assurance was given that Official IRA members would not carry arms, as opposed to promising not to use the march to attack the security forces, we do not accept that such an assurance was given in good faith.
The need for assurances
148.76 Brendan Duddy told us that it was his own opinion, as well as that of Malachy McGurran, that it was unnecessary for such assurances to be sought, since neither the Official nor the Provisional IRA used weapons on marches.1
1 AD199.3
148.77 The Official IRA men interviewed by the Praxis journalists also indicated that a march would not have been used by the Official IRA to attack the security forces:1
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“A: ‘YOU HAVE TO UNDERSTAND WHAT IT WAS LIKE AT THE TIME. THE WHOLE OF THIS DISTRICT WAS A NO GO AREA. THERE WERE CONTINUAL PATROLS OF ARMED MEN IN CARS – THEY DROVE AROUND AT WILL. IT WAS VERY CASUAL. SO CASUAL THEY WOULD OFTEN LEAVE THEIR CARS – WEAPONS IN THEM – WHILE THEY WENT IN SOMEONE’S HOUSE FOR A CUP OF TEA OR DOWN TO THE PUB FOR A DRINK. BUT WHEN IT CAME TO MARCHES OR PROSECCIONS [SIC] – IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT MILITARY ORGANISATIONS KEPT CLEAR. |
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Q: WHY WAS THAT? A: ‘LOOK – EVERYONE KNOWS EVERYONE ELSE HERE AND WHILE WE DID HAVE A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CONTROL, WE ALWAYS WORKED UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT IF WE WENT TOO FAR WE’D BE OUT. YOUR BROTHERS OR MOTHERS OR SISTERS WOULD BE INVOLVED IN MARCHES AND NOONE WANTED TO CAUSE THEIR DEATHS. THE RISK WAS JUST TOO DANGEROUS. SO YOUR NEXT DOOR NEIGHBOURS HAD A SORT OF VETO ON WHAT YOU DID BECAUSE, AFTER ALL, WE LIVED IN THE AREA AS WELL. Q: BUT YOU DID OFTEN USE RIOTS AS A COVER FOR ATTACKS? A: ‘WE DID TAKE ADVANTAGE OF RIOTS – BUT ITS NOT THE WAY THE BRITISH MEDIA PORTRAY IT. WE DIDN’T ORCHESTRATE THEM. SURE, IF SOME KIDS WERE RIOTING IN AN AREA IN WHICH HE HAD ALREADY PLANNED AN ATTACK, WE MIGHT ASK THEM TO LEAVE BUT WE DIDN’T SET UP RIOTS. ” |
1 O17A.1
148.78 OIRA 5 told us that marchers would not be used as cover for Official IRA men to shoot.1 He did not accept that riots were used as cover for Official IRA snipers.2 OIRA 7 said that riots might be used but only after people had gone home, enabling the snipers to shoot; there was no strategy to use rioters as cover.
148.79 We have no doubt, from a substantial body of evidence – including that from civilians, paramilitaries and soldiers – that paramilitaries had before Bloody Sunday used riots as cover from which to attack the security forces. We have found no evidence that suggests to us that marches, as opposed to riots, had been used in this way.
Martin Ingram’s evidence of the IRA’s plans for the day
148.80 Martin Ingram told us that while he was working in the Army’s Force Research Unit in the early 1980s he saw documents relating to the IRA’s plans for the day:1
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“I can recall that there was information of intelligence value received prior to the march from both Official and Provisional IRA agents that there was no intent to undertake military activity during the march. ” |
1 KI2.4
148.81 Martin Ingram gave confused accounts in the course of his evidence about the intelligence that he said he saw. In his third written statement to this Inquiry he told us that “The reference to no IRA activity on Bloody Sunday came from a MISR [Military Information Source Report] document ” and that he had spoken to an Army agent, Frank Hegarty, who was an Official IRA member on Bloody Sunday and who had been emphatic when telling him that “the stickies” had planned no activity on Bloody Sunday.1
1 KI2.40
148.82 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, Martin Ingram initially said that he had seen this information in contact forms recording discussions between agents and handlers, and perhaps also in source reports supplied by the RUC (SB50s).1 Later in his oral evidence he told us that the information in this MISR had come from Frank Hegarty, and that he had seen more than one Army contact form setting out the information provided by Frank Hegarty.2
148.83 It was not clear from Martin Ingram’s evidence whether he was intending to say that the documents based on Frank Hegarty’s reporting were the only documents he saw that dealt with IRA plans for the day or whether there was other material as well. He did say that there had been one other Provisional IRA agent at the time but did not say what, if any, information was provided by that agent.1
148.84 We formed the view that Martin Ingram had, at best, an imperfect recollection of events and that it would be unwise to rely upon his evidence.
The Official IRA’s standing orders
148.85 Johnny White’s (OIRA 3’s) evidence was that the Official IRA’s general standing orders were well known to the volunteers. These orders applied to everyone in the Official IRA, not just those in Londonderry. The orders were that no action against the Army or the RUC was to be initiated but that defensive or retaliatory action was permitted if the Army or the RUC initiated action themselves. According to Johnny White, everyone who joined the Official IRA at that time was aware of this policy.1
148.86 It is probable that there were standing orders relating to “defence and retaliation ”, which seem to have been interpreted differently by various members of the Official IRA. The majority of the witnesses appear to have interpreted such orders as permitting the shooting of a soldier on the street in “retaliation ” for his very presence as a member of the occupying forces.
148.87 OIRA 2 told us that the policy of acting only in “defence and retaliation ” was one that had applied to all Official IRA members in Northern Ireland for some time. He stated that he thought that it had been the policy since the introduction of internment in August 1971. In his oral evidence to this Inquiry his initial interpretation of the policy was that it permitted Official IRA members to fire live rounds only if the British Army had first fired live rounds.1 He then said that retaliation in the form of the use of live fire did not have to take place immediately or while the Army was still posing a threat.2 If the Army came in to try to arrest someone and did not fire live rounds, then the Official IRA would use a form of resistance such as rioting that did not involve the use of live fire.3 However, later in his evidence OIRA 2 said that “attacks on members of the British Armed Forces could be clearly seen as part of a defence and retaliation strategy just because of the very fact that they happened to be present ”.4 He sought then to draw a distinction between the general policy and the policy applicable to Bloody Sunday, which, he implied, required the Army to shoot first before shooting by the Official IRA became permissible.5
148.88 OIRA 2 said that the Command Staff reinforced these standing orders to Official IRA members before the march so that everybody clearly understood that there was to be no engagement with the Army on the day.1 He said that the Command Staff did not expect any situation to arise that would cause volunteers to wish to fire in defence or retaliation.2 He agreed3 that the following account, given after the day by Reg Tester to Philip Jacobson of the Sunday Times Insight Team, accurately reflected the position:4
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“… staff officers decided to re-emphasise the existing orders that officials should only open fire on the army if they were shot at first, if the army had shot at other civilians and in any case never to open fire in a crowd situation. ” |
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4 ED20.30 |
148.89 OIRA 5 agreed that the “defence and retaliation ” policy would have permitted an Official IRA member to shoot dead a British soldier, simply because he was on the streets of Derry.1 OIRA 1 agreed with this interpretation of the policy.2
148.90 OIRA 1 said that the standing orders of taking action only in defence or retaliation emanated from Dublin and that the Derry Command Staff had no discretion to override these orders. Action in defence was justified when there had been an “onslaught of one form or another [by the security forces] ”.1 However, the Official IRA would be entitled to shoot a soldier simply because he was a member of the occupying force. Retaliation for Army action days or weeks earlier was permissible under the standing orders. The Official IRA, he said, did not initiate action by going to areas where the Army was, by attempting to engage the Army or by attempting to encourage the Army to initiate shooting.2
148.91 OIRA 4’s evidence was that the standing orders were that the Official IRA was to maintain a defensive stance. OIRA 4 interpreted the standing orders to permit the shooting of soldiers who entered the no-go areas.1
148.92 OIRA 7 said that the standing orders would have entitled the Official IRA to shoot at a member of the security forces who came into the Bogside or the Creggan.1
148.93 Our assessment of the so-called “defence and retaliation ” policy (or standing orders) is that in practical terms it was not understood as limiting the circumstances in which members of the Official IRA could use lethal force against soldiers in Londonderry, but in effect sanctioned the use of such force whenever circumstances permitted. We do not accept OIRA 1’s evidence that the Official IRA would not initiate action. Nor do we accept that the general policy was specially modified as suggested for 30th January 1972.
The suggested need for the Official IRA to show that it could take aggressive action
148.94 The representatives of the majority of represented soldiers submitted that the Official IRA was held in low regard within the city and that its members felt a need to restore their prestige following criticism of their decision to release, unharmed, Private INQ 2245, a soldier kidnapped by the Official IRA on 17th January 1972.1
1 FS7.529
148.95 In support of their submissions, these representatives relied on the evidence of Liam O Comain.1 Liam O Comain gave the following account to Liam Clarke and Kathryn Johnston, the journalists and authors of Martin McGuinness: From Guns to Government:2
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“There’s an interesting twist to Bloody Sunday. There was an element within the Officials that definitely made a decision to open up on Bloody Sunday, and they did. It was nothing to do with Bishop Daly’s gunman. I was on the fringes then, but I tell you this, there was an element there and the thought at the time was that if we can have some form of death on Bloody Sunday, it might pull the Officials back in line again. They might be forced into a situation to place a bit more hope in .” |
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1 FS7.538 |
2 AO82.5 |
148.96 In a written statement to this Inquiry, Liam O Comain asserted that this account was untrue and that he had deliberately told more lies than truth to the journalists.1 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry he said that the information that he had given about Bloody Sunday was based on a rumour that had gone around some weeks after the day. He added that it was a lie but did not, when asked, concede that the rumour was a false one.2 He agreed that the vast majority of the information recorded by the journalists, in a note seven pages long, was true. He suggested that he had told them lots of other lies but that they had failed to record them.3
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1 AO82.8 |
148.97 The representatives of the majority of represented soldiers described Liam O Comain as a “member of the Official IRA on Bloody Sunday ” and provided the transcript reference in which he admitted his membership. However, they do not quote the answers that Liam O Comain gave immediately after making that admission:1
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“Q. Were you a member of the Official IRA on Bloody Sunday? A. I was a member of the Official IRA on Bloody Sunday. I took an oath, the Republic, in 1955. I have stood by that oath since and I consider myself a member of the Irish Republican Army at this present moment in time. Q. If you were a member of the, as you say, the Official IRA on Bloody Sunday, did you receive any instructions or orders from them? A. I have stated clearly in the first paragraph, sir, that I was on the fringes of the movement at that time, and I gave the reasons for being on the fringes of the movement. I was not actively involved. Q. Is the answer to my question that, for that reason, you did not receive any orders? A. I did not receive any orders. Q. Were you told anything about the Officials’ plans? A. No, I was not, as stated in that first paragraph. I was not privy to anything of the Officials; what was going on or anything prior to or the events of Bloody Sunday. ” |
148.98 When assessing the reliability of Liam O Comain’s evidence on this issue, we had in mind the evidence that he gave concerning his relationship with “Red ” Mickey Doherty. Liam O Comain claimed to have known “Red ” Mickey Doherty well.1 However, on the website2 on which he published a verse about “Red” Mickey Doherty, he placed above the verse a picture of an entirely different individual, the Irish National Liberation Army hunger striker Mickey Devine.3
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2 The web address was |
3 There is a reference to Mickey Devine in Tírghrá at page 244. |
148.99 We are not persuaded that Liam O Comain had at the time of Bloody Sunday sufficiently close involvement with the Official IRA to have real knowledge of its plans or activities.
Orders given to Official IRA volunteers
148.100 Johnny White (OIRA 3), the OC, gave the following account in his first written statement to this Inquiry:1
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“I can confirm that the orders given on the days leading up to Bloody Sunday and confirmed on the morning of Bloody Sunday were that there should be a defensive mode only. No units or volunteers were to incite any confrontation with the British Forces, nor was anyone to commence any offensive action against the security forces. This was a march for a political purpose against the sectarian internment policy which |
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was being imposed. This was a cause for which the movement had great support and we would do nothing to risk bad publicity for the march or its purpose. This was a matter which was of importance and meant a great deal to Nationalists in Northern Ireland. I personally had been interned and released and felt particularly strongly about the events. ” |
1 AOIRA3.2
148.101 In the same statement he told us:1
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“I can confirm that there were no units on active duty during the day on Bloody Sunday. In particular there were no units or volunteers ordered to be in the Bogside for any operational reasons. … Some volunteers were based and ordered to remain in Creggan and the Brandywell areas to await any trouble which could occur. We did feel that there may be an attempt to get British Forces into the Creggan and Brandywell areas whilst many people were on the march. ” |
1 AOIRA3.2
148.102 Johnny White also told us that on the morning of the march he met with some of the volunteer units to confirm their orders and to make sure that everything was in place.1 Later in his first written statement he told us that the orders included an order that all weapons were to be removed from the Bogside to the Creggan and the Brandywell.2
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1 AOIRA3.3 |
148.103 In his second written statement to this Inquiry, Johnny White told us that there were three Official IRA units on active duty on 30th January: one unit in cars in each of the Creggan and the Brandywell and one single volunteer who was posted in the Barrack Street area with a rifle. He said that on the morning of the march he reminded the volunteers of his suspicions about a possible Army incursion, speaking to each unit in the Creggan and the Brandywell. The Creggan and the Brandywell patrols each consisted of a car containing weapons and 4–5 men as well as at least one other car containing 4–5 people who provided back-up services.1 Johnny White stated that he was sure that his orders were communicated to everyone and that he had “absolute confidence ” that everybody was reminded of the standing orders on the morning of the march.2
148.104 As we have noted above, Reg Tester, the Quartermaster of the Official IRA Command Staff, said that he was ordered to ensure that all weapons were removed from the Bogside and taken to the Creggan. However, some that were in safe dumps in the Creggan and the Bogside were left where they were. With the exception of the weapons in these dumps, the rifle in the possession of “Red ” Mickey Doherty, the rifle fired by OIRA 1 and one pistol, the remainder of the Official IRA’s arms were, he said, placed in two cars which were then driven around the Creggan.1 Reg Tester gave an essentially similar account to Peter Pringle and Philip Jacobson of the Sunday Times Insight Team in March 1972.2
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1 AT6.2; AT6.10; Day 414/30 |
2 S34 |
148.105 OIRA 2 said that the Command Staff, led by Johnny White (OIRA 3), met on Saturday 29th January and on the morning of 30th January and decided that the Official IRA would not precipitate a situation that would cause the Army to react. Official IRA members, he said, were to be permitted only to act in “defence and retaliation ”.1 We have expressed above our view of what this phrase was understood to mean.
1 Day 392/28-29; Day 392/43; AOIRA2.13
148.106 OIRA 5 said that the orders were that there were to be no weapons in the Bogside and that no volunteers were to carry weapons on the march. No-one was to initiate any action with the security forces, and the defensive standing orders were to be maintained. His recollection was that no specific instructions came to the Derry Brigade of the Official IRA from the Dublin headquarters staff. Had such instructions been given, he would have known of them.1 He said he understood that the weapons in the cars in the Creggan were to be used if an Army incursion into the Creggan took place.2
148.107 OIRA 1 said that the small number of volunteers in the Creggan could not hope to repel a large-scale assault by the Army but might hope to delay an Army invasion and give people time to organise themselves and come out of their homes.1 He said that the Official IRA’s weapons were usually kept in two cars.2 The OC ordered that the cars, one or both of which might otherwise have been in the Bogside, should be removed to the Creggan during the march;3 and that the weapons in the cars could then be used to try to prevent any Army incursion into the Creggan.4
Other accounts of the orders
148.108 The Observer galley proofs contain an account which is attributed to the “acting” OC of the Official IRA in the city, who was Johnny White (OIRA 3):1
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“On Sunday, most of our members were taking part in the march and were unarmed. We had two marksmen on duty, but with strict instructions not to use their weapons until the area was clear of civilians. One was covering Rossville Street from the corner of William Street and Rossville Street. Another was in the Little Diamond covering William Street. ‘Apart from that, we had three sections on duty, marksmen stationed in the usual places well outside the area covering Bishops Street, Blighs Lane, and other volunteers on duty in cars. The marksmen were armed with rifles, and there were sub-machine-guns in the cars. These were the only weapons. There were no nail bombs, as the Army has claimed. ” |
1 ED24.9
148.109 In his second written statement to this Inquiry, Johnny White (OIRA 3) told us that he had no recollection of speaking to anyone from the Observer and added, “I have already dealt with the volunteers and the weapons available ”.1 We are sure that he did give the account found in the Observer galley proofs.
148.110 Apart from the reference to the marksman covering Bishop Street, who was clearly “Red ” Mickey Doherty (whose shooting we consider in Chapter 151), the Observer account given is inconsistent with the evidence given by Johnny White and other members of the Official IRA Command Staff to this Inquiry, and casts doubt on the reliability of that evidence; as does the fact that there was an Official IRA car with weapons in Glenfada Park North; and the firing by OIRA 1 from Columbcille Court at soldiers next to the Presbyterian church.
Official IRA patrols on Bloody Sunday
148.111 Reg Tester said that on Bloody Sunday he placed the majority of the Official IRA’s weapons in the boots of two cars. He and five or six other volunteers spent the afternoon of the march driving around the Creggan in these cars. He said that there was no back-up car as described by Johnny White.1
148.112 The representatives of the majority of represented soldiers referred to the 11 Official IRA witnesses who gave evidence to this Inquiry. They submitted that seven of these witnesses were members of the Creggan Unit but that only one of those seven, Reg Tester, admitted to having taken part in the Creggan patrol on Bloody Sunday. They asked us to consider whether the remaining six would, if there were truly a plan to defend the Creggan, have been left out of the operation.1
1 FS7.564
148.113 Of the Official IRA witnesses, only ten were members of the Official IRA in the city on the day. The eleventh, OIRA 9, had been detained. Of the seven witnesses identified by the representatives of the majority of represented soldiers, it seems to us that only five were admitted members of the Creggan Unit. Two of these (OIRA 7 and OIRA 8) said that they were on duty on the previous night and so were not on duty during the day. OIRA 6 said that he had been on duty the previous day but then agreed that he was in the same section as OIRA 8. Reg Tester, who admitted taking part in the Creggan patrol, did not say that he was a member of the Creggan Unit. We consider that the Official IRA assigned members to the Creggan or Brandywell patrols without regard to the unit to which the members belonged. If that is correct, then the absence from the patrols of a number of members of the Creggan Unit would not be surprising. The Creggan Unit appears to have had two sections, each with about eight members, one responsible for night patrols and one for days. If Johnny White (OIRA 3) is correct in his recollection that there were 12–15 men in the patrols, then the Official IRA would either have had to call on Creggan men who had been up all night or would have had to use men from the Bogside Unit and Command Staff. It was not suggested to Reg Tester when he gave evidence that men had not in fact been deployed to defend the Creggan.
The purpose of the patrols
148.114 OIRA 6 was a member of the Official IRA’s Creggan Unit. He gave the following account of the purpose of the patrols:1
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“We generally did patrol in cars in day shifts and in night shifts. We would have had our three working weapons to be shared by four of us in the car and we just used to drive around and protect the area against incursion by the British Army. It was nothing exciting. I am asked to deal with an issue raised from time to time by the barristers |
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acting for the MOD [Ministry of Defence]. Did we think we could stop the army invading the area with a few men and fewer working weapons? The answer is that we did not really believe we could withstand an out and out assault. But I believed then and still believe that the picture we painted of an armed resistance gave a stronger view of our position and did for some time, until Motorman,2 keep the Army out. ” |
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1 AOIRA6.2 |
2 Operation Motorman was an Army operation carried out in July 1972. |
148.115 His evidence was that he was not on patrol during the day of Bloody Sunday but had expected that the routine patrols of the Creggan would continue as usual that day.1
1 AOIRA6.3
148.116 Reg Tester gave the following account, when speaking in general terms of the actions that the Official IRA might have taken in the event of an incursion by the Army:1
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“Q. ‘If anyone had tried to come into the no-go area in a serious way, then we would have done our best. ’ What does that mean? A. Precisely what it says. We would have done our best to put them [the Army] out. Q. If they had invaded the Creggan? A. Well, if they had invaded there would not have been much we could do, we did not have the manpower or the weapon-power to do anything about that. But a small incursion, if – let us put it this way, if they were threatening, if they came into the area, |
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they threatened people in the area, we would have opened up on them if it was practical to do so. It is, it is not an easy situation. You are surrounded by civilians in civilian homes, you do not want to provoke a lot of fire-power and possibly have civilians killed. Quite apart from the fact that it would be a terrible thing to happen, it would not do your reputation any good either, the population would soon say ‘Hey, out, we do not want you ’.” |
148.117 However, Reg Tester also said that he had a technical role within the Command Staff, did not attend all staff meetings at which policy was discussed and worked alone on his duties as Quartermaster.1
148.118 In our consideration of the events of the five sectors, we have discussed the evidence of paramilitary activity in those sectors. Here we turn to consider Official IRA activity outside those sectors.
The arrival of Official IRA cars in the Bogside and paramilitary activity in the area of the Bogside Inn
148.119 PIRA 24 told us that at about 4.00pm, while he was at home in Meenan Drive, he heard high velocity shooting. According to his account, he went out and met PIRA 17 in Cable Street. He said that together they walked northwards and, while they were in Westland Street near its corner with Cable Street, he noticed shots being fired from the City Walls. He also said that he saw two cars coming down Westland Street towards Lecky Road and recognised them as Stickie (Official IRA) cars, the second of which was a red Cortina. One car stopped about 15 yards from PIRA 24. People got out of the car and took rifles out of its boot. PIRA 24 told the Official IRA men that they should not stop there. They got back into the car and followed the other car, which had not stopped, down into the Bogside. PIRA 24 said he saw both cars stop in the area of the Bogside Inn, but did not see anyone get out of the cars, though he was not looking at them all the time. He told us that by this time the shooting was dying down; and that a few minutes after he had first seen them, the cars passed him again, heading up Westland Street (towards the Creggan).1
148.120 The map below shows Meenan Drive, Cable Street, Westland Street, Lecky Road and the Bogside Inn.
148.121 Johnny White (OIRA 3) gave the following account in his first written statement to this Inquiry:1
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“Later in the afternoon I know that a number of volunteers drove their cars into the Bogside and that at least one fired or attempted to fire a weapon which had been brought down from the Creggan. It is my belief that cars which arrived later in the afternoon, although not significantly later, have been mixed up with other vehicles which may have already been present. ” |
1 AOIRA3.8
148.122 In his second written statement to this Inquiry, Johnny White (OIRA 3) told us that two cars containing weapons came down to the Bogside Inn and that other cars containing unarmed volunteers and supporters came into the area.1
Leslie Bedell
148.123 Leslie Bedell, who was visiting from England, gave both a written statement for and oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry. In his written statement1 he described being near the lorry at Free Derry Corner when the speeches began, seeing an armoured vehicle coming along Rossville Street and hearing the firing start. Although he started to approach the armoured vehicle, he said that when he saw people apparently shot “I turned and ran (or half ran, half crawled) until I got round Free Derry Corner and into the area of the low flats in the square on the map with the reference figure 167 above it. There were a few people milling round there. I asked one the time. It was just after 4 o’clock. ”
1 AB28
148.124 The “square on the map with the reference figure 167 above it ” was a reference to an Ordnance Survey map. The flats to which Leslie Bedell referred were, as he explained in his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry, a block of low flats opposite Westland Street.1The map above shows the relevant area.
148.125 Leslie Bedell’s written statement continued:1
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“13. From the flats I went into Westland Street (I saw the street name up). I saw some old cars – saloons like beat up Ford Zephyrs, and an old Humber – coming down from the direction of the Creggan estate. About 2 dozen men piled out of the cars. These were the only civilian cars I had seen moving that afternoon. The men were wearing a sort of uniform like battledress, one or two had dark berets. They all had a weapon of some kind, rifles mostly. Some had automatic rifles with big magazines, but most had rifles with small magazines. 14. These men dispersed into the flats. I could see them take up positions and start firing at the troops. There were still a lot of people standing around. I just stood with them and watched. If there had been no one else there I would have taken cover. We were protected by the flats and anyway we were not in much danger. I could not hear bullets coming over. There was some firing a long way off, but apart from this the only firing was by the men dispersed in the flats. |
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15. After about 15 minutes I saw a big stocky looking chap who shouted at the firers to pull back. He was obviously in charge, and was wearing sort of battledress. They all came out in ones and twos and went into a hall on my side of Westland Street. They went upstairs outside the building to get into the hall. One young chap – only 15 or 16 – with a rifle got left near the flats, in the courtyard. A helicopter came up overhead and the troops in the Rossville area or in observation posts might have been able to pick him off crossing the road. Then about 50 or 60 people from the bystanders ran over the road, surrounded him and brought him over in their midst. 16. I saw somone come out of the hall. He was a tall thin chap and when he spoke he had an English North-country accent. He stood at the foot of the stairs as if on guard. Everyone began asking him questions and he said that reports were coming in that a lot of people had been shot. Then he said they had decided their actions had not much effect, and anyway they were being hampered by so many people in the area, so their intention was to pull out and come back that night when the area was clear. He said they had decided to shoot 2 soldiers for every civilian killed. I saw them come out then – about 5 o’clock – and drive off in their cars. There was no firing going on at this time. ” |
1 AB28.4-5
148.126 Leslie Bedell gave a similar account in his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry.1 He told the Widgery Inquiry that it was at least 15 minutes between the Army starting to fire and the arrival of the cars from the direction of the Creggan.2
148.127 Philip Jacobson of the Sunday Times Insight Team interviewed Leslie Bedell. According to the notes of this interview, Leslie Bedell gave the following account of what he witnessed after observing the first Army shooting:1
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“When i saw the shootings i thought it was time to get away from the area and i turned and ran back in the direction that my two companions had taken (i.e. towards the small flats at the foot of westland st.) i went through a small passageway and found myself in westland street – i looked up and the name was high on the wall of the small flats (pj; it is). I asked somebody the time and it was just after 4.00. Coming out onto westland street, there were quite a few people milling around and asking eachother what had happened. i was a bit worried as the three blokes i came with had warned me not to speak if possible as my london accent might not go down toowell. Shortly after i got to |
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westland st., two cars came roaring down the hill from the direction of the creggan. they were noticeable as they were revving very hard and squealed to a stop as they turned at the bottom. One was a beat-up Ford Zephry and the other was, I am pretty sure, an old Humber. i cant recall the colours (NB: the Officials used a blue Avenger, unlike either of these cars). They were the onl[y] cars moving about at that stage. I would say that about ten to a dozen men jumped from the cars as they drew up. They were dressed in a sort of uniform, i mean that most of them had greenish combat jackets and jeans on and the majority were wearing black berets. Not all of them were carrying guns openly; those that were had rifles like the ones i used in cadet corps (pj: almost certainly .303s) and three or four others had some more modern kind with a long thin magazine underneat[h]. When the gunmen appeared, people in the crowd started saying ‘the Provos are here ’ and ‘Where have they been all this time’ and so on. I have no doubt that they were Provisionals; people standing around knew some of them by name and I heard the word Provos several times. Ivan Cooper was standing there at this time and he must have seen them arrive. NB; according to bedell’s placing, the provos debussed in full view of the Walker gun post; a chopper was also circling the area, though fairly high. he remembers thinking they were sitting ducks for troops on the walls, having looked up and seen soldiers moving around in the post near the tall monument (Gov Walker) ‘The gunmen, all but two or three, went over into the low flats, using both entrances and spread out going up different flights of stairs. i could see a young chap, estimated 16/17, with what looked like a .22 rifle, he was very close to where I had moved back towards the flats. After they dispersed, the cars roared back up the hill. they came back at least once I am sure, and there were certainly more men who seemed to be Provos appearing after this. Only one had a rifle with him as far as I saw. (PJ: this explains bedells statement that perhaps two dozen IRA piled out of the cars; he didn’t make it clear to the tribunal that the cars came back again.) The men around the flats started firing as soon as they were in position; i reckon they fired about 50 shots at the most. Some sounded like automatic they were so closely grouped, three or four very close together (pj: could be semi-automatic). I would put the time they arrived at just after 4.00 and they stopped shooting about 15 minutes later, say 4.15 to 4.30. |
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Then one of the first carload, a big burly chap about mid-forties, balding a bit, came over from the other side of westland street where there is a sort of community hall. he must have told his men to withdraw becoz they started running back crouched over and went into the hall. they all got across except for the young lad i had seen with the .22. he got into a sweat becoz the helicopyer was quite low then. he started dodging and hesitating and the crowd was all shouting for him to make a dash for it. I saw a chap come to his front door on the first floor of the flats, he was in his carpet slippers, and he beckoned the lad to go into his house but then about 40 of the crowd ran over and gathered round the boy and sort of shielded him across the road into the hall. when they went in, i started to wander around and i found myself in a little alley with a row of shops. there was one serving tea and several of the civil rights people i recognised by sight were in there. Cooper and Devlin were certainly there, i can swear to that. when i wandered out and back into westland street again, there was one of the chaps from the first IRA cars standing outside the hall, on guard i suppose and he was carrying a rifle. he was a tall, thin geezer and he was definitely english; i was close to himaand heard him speak in what i think was a yorkshire accent, certainly North Country. he had a droopy moustache like yours (pj!). some lo[ca]ls were chatting to him; he said they werent sure what had happened but there had been a massacre and they had got their guns and come down in the hope of drawing army fire away from the civilians. he said they had been unable to draw any return fire and that it was suicide to go anywhere near the flats with a gun, so they were pulling out and would be back later in the evening when the area had been cleared of so many civilians. he said ‘then we’ll kill two fucking soldiers for every dead civilian. ’ The rest of the IRA men came out of the hall and got into the same two cars and drove away up the hill. i asked the time again about then and it was just on 5.00. All shooting had stopped before they left. after that i decided to get away as people were sort of asking me directions and things and i was very worried about my english accent. i met two of my friends at the top of westland street and after waiting until about 6.00 we made our way back to the car. ” |
148.128 At the end of these notes Philip Jacobson added the following comments:1
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“NB 1. Bedell could not be budged on claim that it was at least 15 minutes after hearing the first shots and seeing the barricade deaths that the IRA men arrived 2. he stuck to his story about hearing the IRA officer talk about trying without success to draw army fire. 3. he says the majority of the IRA men were late teens/early twenties. the stock[y], big chap he thought was in command was 40ish, maybe a bit older. there were half a dozen men of this age, including the Northern accent man he took to be second in command because he was giving orders but taking them from the stocky man. 4. he says the while the IRA men were firing, people were standing around in full, view of the walls and he noticed through one open door in the low flats that a group [were] placidly watching the Sunday afternoon film (what was it that day???). ” |
1 AB28.28
148.129 Leslie Bedell was not called to give evidence to this Inquiry. His 1972 accounts of a substantial amount of firing by numbers of paramilitaries from near the Bogside Inn towards the soldiers who had come into the Bogside are unsupported by evidence from any other source, civilian or military; and in our view it would be unwise to rely on them though, as will be seen, there is other evidence that a few shots were fired from this area. However, as will also be seen, there is evidence that, to a degree at least, supports his account of seeing armed men arriving in cars some considerable time after soldiers had gone into the Bogside and opened fire. Although he told Philip Jacobson that he was sure that the armed men that he saw were members of the Provisional IRA, he also told Philip Jacobson that one of the men who had got out of the first of the cars to arrive was “definitely English ” and spoke in what he thought was a northern accent. This is a description that could fit Reg Tester, the Quartermaster of the Official IRA in Londonderry, who came from Nottinghamshire.1 Martin McGuinness told us that he was 100 per cent certain that members of the Provisional IRA had not been involved in any such incident as that described by Leslie Bedell.2 However, as we have previously described, we are of the view that one of the Provisional IRA cars patrolling the Creggan did come down to the area of the Bogside Inn after the soldiers had come into the Bogside. It is possible, therefore, that Leslie Bedell saw both Official and Provisional IRA members arriving in this area.
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1 AT6.1 |
148.130 In his first written statement to this Inquiry1 Reg Tester told us that at some time during the afternoon of Bloody Sunday he was with at least two others in one of two cars controlled by the Official IRA which had been driving around the centre of the Creggan and had stopped on New Road, when “word reached us that something had happened in the Bogside ”.2 He told us that he drove his car slowly down Westland Street. His account continued:
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“I got out of the car and took up a position on the balcony of a flat at the junction of Westland Street and Lecky Road at the point marked A on the attached map (grid reference D24). I knew that there was a clear view of Rossville Street from that position. I took a new M1 Carbine from the car and tried to fire it from the balcony. I had taken a new weapon that I was unfamiliar with rather than an old one because the M1 had a higher rate of fire. However, the gun jammed and because I was unfamiliar with such a new weapon, I was unable to unjam it so I returned to the car. I was also concerned because I could see civilians and I did not want to endanger them. I cannot now recall what I did after firing from the balcony. I did not use any other guns because I did not want to hang around and for the army to get their hands on the weapons I had in the car; I knew that the paras weren’t the type to mess around. ” |
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1 AT6.1 |
2 AT6.2 |
148.131 The point marked “A” to which Reg Tester referred was at the north-east corner of the junction of Westland Street and Lecky Road.1 We also mark on this map square D23, to which Reg Tester referred in his supplementary statement to this Inquiry, to which we now turn.
1 AT6.5
148.132 In his supplementary written statement to this Inquiry, Reg Tester gave another account of driving down to the Bogside:1
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“I can remember that when we were driving around, we did stop for a period at the top of the New Road with the engine off. Even there, we did not hear anything going on in the Bogside. It was when we were in this area that people who were coming up the New Road came and told us what was going on in the Bogside and that the soldiers were shooting innocent people dead. I got very het up and I was not thinking clearly. I mention at paragraph 12 of my statement that I drove my car down Westland Street. The people who were approaching us in the car would have known our faces or would have recognised the car as an IRA car and would have come up to tell us that people were being killed in the Bogside. I certainly knew that there were people being shot dead – more than one or two. I cannot recall who actually approached the car or the exact words that were said. In driving down Westland Street, this was a main road. The army had access from Bligh’s Lane and I was also aware that there was an army observation post on |
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the Walls that could see into Westland Street. If our two cars had got stopped, we could have got into terrible trouble with all our weaponry in the cars. However, the mood that I was in was that I wanted to hit back. It was the only time that I can remember that I had lost my cool. We drove down and pulled up at the bottom of Westland Street. I took a gun out of the car and put it down my left side and walked over to the block of flats that was at the corner. I did not know what was happening down Rossville Street. I do remember that when I took the weapon out of the boot of the car (the boot was not facing up at the Walls), there were civilians around me. They did cheer – I think that this was the only time I ever got cheered. I remember it being an encouraging feeling and I clearly remember the thought that I must be doing something right. I made my way up to the balcony of a flat at the junction of Westland Street and Lecky Road; I have marked this as point ‘A’ on the map attached to my first statement, though, on reflection, I am not sure that it is quite in the right location. I think it is more in square D23 at the other side of the building. From the balcony, I looked down Rossville Street and I could see that there was a vehicle that had pulled up outside the Rossville Flats by the area with access to the lifts. Rossville Street was not as busy as I had expected, though I could see figures still moving around. People were still milling around but I could vaguely make out the soldiers around the vehicle. I cannot be sure of the actual time of day but it was getting towards dusk. We did not have any night sights at that time, nor indeed did we have telescopic sights. I then aimed my M1 Carbine at a soldier and tried to fire it but the weapon jammed. I was glad that it had actually jammed because I then calmed down and I realised better what I was doing. I cooled down and started to think that what I was doing wasn’t the best idea. I am asked whether I thought of the terms of our orders at this stage. The truth is that having heard what I had heard, that people were being shot by the army, my simple reaction was wanting to hit back. I didn’t analyse what the orders were to see whether this would have been stretching them or breaching them, but having tried to fire the M1 Carbine and having failed, I calmed down and was thinking more rationally. I think that my weapon had been on single shot; I do not think I would have put it on automatic or semi-automatic when I was up on the balcony. Even in my rage, I still had enough sense for that. |
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Nothing had therefore been expelled from the barrel of my weapon. I think I stayed up on the balcony for a few minutes to see what was going on, and tried unjamming the weapon. Whereas I could strip and reassemble all the weapons in our arsenal, I couldn’t do so with this one, which was a new weapon that had been untried and untested. There were still some civilians in Rossville Street but I do not know if any bodies of those who had been shot had been moved. I couldn’t see any bodies with the naked eye. There were, however, lots of people still around the area of Westland Street and they were angry. When I arrived in the area of Westland Street, I am sure that there were a couple of hundred people already there. My memory of Westland Street at around the time of my arriving and leaving with my M1 Carbine is one of impression rather than clinical observation. I was not too conscious of what was going on around me in that area and I cannot remember who I might have seen. I cannot, for example, remember, in response to a question from Eversheds, whether I saw Eamon McCann in the area. In the five or six minutes that I would have been up on the balcony all told, I could hear no shooting. I think that by the time I got down to the Westland Street area, all the shooting was over. It was only later on that I realised the extent of what had happened. It took some time to sink in. Irish people might have seen this sort of thing before, but I was English, and to me I could not believe what had happened. It was my fellow countrymen who had shot innocent people and I felt ashamed of my nationality, which is something that I don’t think any person should ever feel. I still get emotional when I think about it, though I am not generally a violent person or an emotional person by nature. No one saw me trying to fire my M1 Carbine from the balcony area as far as I am aware. The other two volunteers who had been in my car stayed with the car. After all, it had a boot load of weapons. There was no plan here, and we were simply reacting to a situation. I probably said to them – ‘You stay here and I’ll go and see what I can see.’ I think that the other Official IRA car that was loaded with weapons had stayed up in the Creggan. I am asked if I became aware of any other cars with weapons in the area. I am not aware of seeing any other such cars. I am asked whether I saw any Provisional IRA men in the area. I have a vague recollection that there were some Provos around but they didn’t come near us. I couldn’t identify any of t[h]em now even if i wanted to. I think that they were in the general area of the Bogside Inn. I had parked in the area |
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of a pedestrian crossing. I think that they were the other side of the road to us – nobody came to approach us. Having returned from the balcony, I went back to the car. The people who had seen me arrive in this area had probably moved on. I have a vague recollection that there were less people around by the time I came back from the balcony. Those who were around probably did not know why I have been in the area of the balcony. The two lads who were in the car with me might have asked what had happened. I probably told them. I don’t remember anyone giving me a hard time or booing me or the other volunteers because we had not fired back at the security forces. My attempted shot at the army is the only shot that I knew of against the security forces at that stage. I am asked whether I became aware of any shooting from the area in which I found myself up at the City Walls, or at the army checkpoint. There was certainly lots of confusion in the area as to what was going on, but I know nothing of shooting to or from the Walls. During this time I was at the Bogside Inn area. It is hard to estimate how long I was there but it was probably 10 – 15 minutes after the attempted shot. ” |
148.133 Square D23, indicated by Reg Tester in this statement, was a reference to the square shown on the map reproduced above, directly above the square he had previously marked with an “A”.
148.134 Peter Pringle and Philip Jacobson of the Sunday Times Insight Team interviewed Reg Tester, whom they did not name but whom they described in their notes as an Official IRA staff officer.1
1 S34; Day 190/17; Day 190/93; Day 191/81; Day 191/111-112
148.135 According to these notes, Reg Tester gave an account of the shot fired by OIRA 1 from Columbcille Court at a soldier on the Presbyterian church in William Street. We have considered this shot in detail earlier in this report.1 The journalists’ notes continued:2
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“Around that time, five Officials from the Creggan unit were sitting in a dark blue Avenger – one of their fleet of ‘liberated’ cars – at the roundabout outside the church at the top of the New Rd. Crowds returning from the march were spreading rumours of something very nasty down in the Bogside; the Officials discounted the wildest rumours but still felt it was necessary to go and investigate. They drove off smartly down New Rd and into Westland St. Towards the bottom of Westland St progress got |
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slower as heavy crowds were moving away from the main firing area. The car turned right at the bottom of Westland St into Lecky Rd., then turned right again immediately, into a small car park behind the block of shops. Three of the men jumped from the car: one was carrying an M.1 carbine with two ‘banana’ clips with about 25 rounds in each and a box magazine with 10 rounds. All these mags were not fully loaded as the gun was new and the spring was so strong that it was jamming rounds into the breech too hard, risking malfunction. The mags were underloaded to reduce the pressure. The other two both carried .303 Lee Enfield Number 4 rifles. There may have been a Winchester rifle in the car as well, but it was certainly not taken out. One of the three men went round the back of the Bogside Inn block – taking the chance of being spotted from the Walls, although the M1 carbine can be easily concealed beneath a coat – and crossed Westland Rd into block of modern maisonettes directly opposite. he went straight up to the first floor balcony that looked directly out towards the barricade and rossville street with a clear field of fire. When the men dismounted from their car, there were plenty of people around; most cheered or encouraged them, and the old ladies were shouting ‘be careful ’ etc. When the M1 man arrived on the balcony, people were looking out of their front doors which are not in the line of return fire. The Official fired one shot at a para standing beside the lead pig that had drawn up a little way beyond the barricade outside the Rossville Flats entrance. He doesn’t think he hit the man, who didn’t react at all; the M1 then jammed. Later he realised it was probably becoz he had not let the bolt slam back strongly enough when cocking the gun as is necessary to get the first round into the breech. This meant that gas escaped after the first shot was fired, and the loss of some of the gas pressure meant that the bolt was not forced back far enough. The Official wrestled with his gun for a few minutes then decided to retire. He moved back in the same direction as he had taken be fore and the crowd came forward to cover him in the open stretch of Westland Street. He moved behind the bogside inn, to the area of the shops, still carrying his weapon; he then discovered, to his anger, that the Avenger had driven off. He doesn’t know if the other two Officials went with it, he thinks not. |
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Near the barbers shop, he saw three or four Provos he knew by sight. One, he thinks, was carrying a carbine. He then moved into the car park behind the bogside inn and met another Provo he knew. This man had a .303 and a minute or so later, he fired a single shot towards troops who could be seen moving on the Walls in the vicinity of Roaring Meg, a famous cannon mounted there. The fire was returned immediately, three or four rounds of SLR [self-loading rifle] on semi-automatic, but the bullets didnt come near the area of the incident. A different car then returned to collect this Official and drove him back to the Creggan. ” |
1 Chapter 19 2S35-37
148.136 In his supplementary written statement to this Inquiry, Reg Tester made the following comments about these notes:1
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“Sunday Times Working Papers – S35 onwards I note that Peter Pringle says that the Staff Officer he interviewed is me. I became friendly with Peter Pringle. He came to dinner with me quite recently when he was in Northern Ireland to give evidence to this Inquiry. When he came to my house he brought with him a bundle of notes of interviews he had with me although I do not remember any of these interviews. The difficulty with the description given here is that part of it is right, and part of it is not. For example, the description of the route the car took, turning right immediately it got to Lecky Road, is wrong. As I have said previously, I parked at the foot of Westland Street and the car remained where it was until I came back from trying to fire the M1 Carbine. Also, where it says ‘three of the men jumped from the car ’, this is incorrect. I was the only one who got out. I was carrying an M1 Carbine but I did not have two banana clips with the rounds specified, or a box magazine. I would not have been able to carry them. Comments about the magazines ‘not being fully loaded because the spring was so strong as it was new’ sounds right to me in general terms, but this cannot be a description of the ammunition which I carried. We did not have a Winchester rifle in the car. Further, where it says that the Official fired one shot at the Para standing beside the lead pig, this is incorrect. I aimed a shot but was unable to pull the trigger as previously indicated. Clearly I did not hit the man because I did not fire. A description of moving back in the same direction and moving behind the Bogside Inn into the area of the shops, carrying a weapon, is partly correct; I in fact |
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just got back into the car and we drove back up to the Creggan. The car was parked outside the flats in any event. There is no question that it had driven off as is suggested in this report. The report then says that ‘three or four Provos were sighted near the barber shop – one carrying a Carbine. ’ I did not see that and I have no memory of it. ” |
1 AT6.17
148.137 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, Reg Tester accepted that it was not correct to say that all of the Official IRA’s weapons, with two (his first statement) or three (his supplementary statement) exceptions, were in the two cars, since there were other weapons in a safe dump in the Bogside and perhaps one or two in a safe dump in the Creggan.1 He also told us that, to the best of his recollection, when he had driven down from the Creggan, the other car had stayed there.2
148.138 Reg Tester marked on the following photograph the balcony to which he said he had gone with the M1 carbine.1
1 AT6.19
148.139 Reg Tester initially told us that he had not fired his weapon and that the others with him had stayed with the car.1 On a further photograph Reg Tester marked with a long blue arrow where he said he had aimed his weapon. The short blue arrow marked where he said he was.2
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2 AT6.20; Day 414/53 |
148.140 There was then this exchange:1
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“Q. Could we preserve that image as AT6.20. Were you aiming at an individual soldier? A. Yes, only he moved, apart from anything else. Q. Was there an Army vehicle nearby? A. Yes, there was an Army Pig sitting just where the end of that arrow is. Q. Could you see what the soldiers were doing? A. No, I could not. Q. Were there any ambulances around at that stage? A. No. Q. Or civilians? A. Well, that is what I realised, after I had failed to get a shot off. Q. Where did you realise there were civilians? A. I could see them moving around and it suddenly dawned on me, bearing in mind that I was extremely angry and upset, like anybody else in my position, I wanted to strike back, but I realised after a minute that, thank God, that my rifle had jammed, because I could not see the soldier really clearly enough and there was still civilians wandering around. Q. Whereabouts were the civilians wandering around? A. Somewhere around the, where the end of the front block of flats is, there. Q. Block 1, we call that Block 1. A. Yes. Q. You tell us that you were on this balcony for about five or six minutes; is that right? A. Um, probably, yes. Q. You say that you cannot really recall what you did after you had endeavoured to fire; is that right? A. I can remember leaving the balcony. |
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Q. Yes? A. I can remember returning the rifle to the car. What we did immediately after that, I cannot remember. I know that it would not have been very long. I would not have hung around there for very long, I would have gone back up to the Creggan. ” |
148.141 Reg Tester told us that he had no recollection of seeing cars (apart from his own) in or around Westland Street, the Bogside Inn or Meenan Square that had people with weapons in them, though he agreed that it was possible that he had seen people with weapons, including members of the Official IRA, but that this had faded from his memory.1
148.142 A little later during the course of his oral evidence Reg Tester was shown the passage in Peter Pringle’s and Philip Jacobson’s notes where it described the Official IRA man firing one shot from the balcony.1 He said that his recollection was that he had not fired, but at this stage agreed that it was possible that his recollection was faulty.2 He was then asked:
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“Q. Putting it broadly, is it possible that, understandably, your memory has played you false and that this account, which must have come from you, because you are the only man with an M1 carbine in this location at this stage, is it possible that this account, written down within about six weeks of the events, is accurate? ” |
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1 S36 |
148.143 His answer was “It is possible. That is the best I can do. ”
148.144 In the following exchange, Reg Tester was asked about the policy adopted by the Official IRA regarding firing by its members on Bloody Sunday:1
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“MR CLARKE: Could we have on the screen, please, AT6.3, paragraph 16 on one side and could we have on the other side of the screen AT6.13, paragraph 45. In paragraph 45 you candidly admit in the second sentence that: ‘It is also the case that the Official IRA has been economical with the truth in relation to the firing of this shot. ’ |
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That is the shot across William Street. You say in the next sentence but one: ‘The reason that we have been economical with the truth is that the Army Council decided at the time that there were to be no admissions that any shots had been fired. Indeed, that official line was never changed. ’ Then you point out that the families have approached you and want you to come forward and tell the truth. Was the official line, in both senses, that is to say the line that was to be put forward by the Officials, that the Officials had never fired or that there were no volunteers who could have been carrying a weapon? A. Um, I would say basically because, um, to have admitted any shots had been fired, um, would of course open the floodgates for the opposition to start handing out the accusations, trying to justify why they had massacred 13 people. Q. I do not think I have made my question plain: what you say in paragraph 45 is that: ‘The Army Council decided at the time that there were to be no admissions that any shots had been fired. ’ If we could bring up on the right-hand side of the screen in place of paragraph 45, paragraph 56. At AT6.14 you use the expression there: ‘I have stated above that the official line was that we had no volunteers who could have been carrying a weapon.’ Now, there is a difference between taking the line that nobody had fired and taking the line that no volunteers were carrying a weapon. Is it right that the official line was that no volunteers were even carrying a weapon? A. I would imagine that would have been part of it. Q. Could we come back, please, to paragraph 45 at AT6.13 on the right-hand side. You say that you had been economical with the truth. In paragraph 46, if we go down the page, you say: ‘I do accept, however, that the wording of paragraph 16 of my first statement was deliberately vague because I did not want to openly concede something that went contrary to the Official IRA line. ’ Could you identify for us what it was in paragraph 16 of your statement, which is on the left-hand side of the page, that was deliberately vague? |
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A. (Pause). To be quite honest, I am not too sure. There is nothing specifically vague about that paragraph. Q. Were you thinking – A. Not that I can see. Q. Were you thinking of something else when you were saying that you had been deliberately vague in your second statement by reference to your first statement? A. Quite possibly. Q. One view that the Tribunal might be invited to take, which I would like to raise for your comment, is that the Official IRA could not realistically have maintained a fiction that no shots had been fired because the shot across William Street, the shot seen by Father Daly and Mickey Doherty’s shot or shots at a soldier in Barrack Street were not realistically deniable and that it has therefore adopted plan B, which is to be economical with the truth about the circumstances in which the undeniable shots were fired and about other shooting which is deniable because it cannot be clearly laid at the door of the Official IRA; if that suggestion were to be made, is there any truth in it? A. Um, for us to have, at those early stages, admitted quite openly that we had fired, whether it was one shot or two shots or three shots even, would have simply been to give the authorities all the scope they needed to excuse what they did. Therefore, certainly for a long time, the fact that we had actually fired shots – and bear in mind that not everybody knew that those shots had been fired by any of their colleagues – um, it was simply played down, hushed up, if you like, but it does not really give any reason or excuse for what subsequently happened. LORD SAVILLE: Mr Clarke, there are really two parts to your question, I think Mr Tester may have dealt with one, but it might be helpful to deal with the other. MR CLARKE: Mr Tester, I quite follow what you say: that to accept in 1972 that the Official IRA had fired at all was thought to distract attention from what is said really to have happened, that the soldiers had killed and wounded a number of civilians without justification, but you would I am sure accept that in fact it is quite undeniable but that a number of shots were fired on the day by members of the IRA. A. Well, you cannot deny it, no. |
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Q. Quite. There would, therefore, be no point in continuing to deny it in 2001, 2002 and 2003 because that would be ludicrous? A. It would, which is why they have now been admitted. Q. The suggestion that may, however, be made is that what has been admitted is that which cannot sensibly be denied but that there are other matters that have been denied or given a gloss because the evidence is not wholly plain as to what occurred; do you see what I am suggesting? A. Yes. Q. And amongst the members of the Official IRA has there been an attempt to play down, so far as possible, any evidence that might reflect badly on the Officials? A. I do not think so. Q. Do you know one way or the other? A. No. ” |
148.145 In our view there is little doubt that, contrary to his stated recollection, Reg Tester did fire a shot from the balcony he described.
148.146 According to his supplementary written statement to this Inquiry, Reg Tester aimed but did not attempt to fire his rifle until after he had learned that people had been shot and he had seen an Army vehicle in the area of the entrance to the Rossville Flats, which must be a reference to the entrance to Block 1 of those flats. As we describe elsewhere in this report,1 after the casualties had been sustained in the five sectors, but before some late shooting by soldiers directed at a flat in Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, an Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) moved to the southern side of the rubble barricade to collect the three bodies lying at that barricade. In our view it was probably this APC that Reg Tester saw. In his oral evidence to this Inquiry he said that he had not seen any ambulances. Between about 4.30pm and 5.00pm there were, save for a short interval after about 4.45pm, one or more ambulances in Rossville Street.2 The ambulances did not arrive until after the APC had gone forward to collect the bodies at the rubble barricade and had returned to the northern side of the rubble barricade.
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1 Chapter 122 |
2 Elsewhere in this report (Chapter 124) we discuss in detail the arrival and departure times of these ambulances. |
148.147 There is, however, evidence from soldiers, supported by radio logs, that at about 1610 hours a shot was fired over the Embassy Ballroom Observation Post (OP) from roughly this area; and that a few minutes later (about 1620 hours) a shot was fired from near the Bogside Inn at soldiers near Roaring Meg on the City Walls, in respect of which a soldier (Private AD) fired two shots in return. Later in this report1 we examine the evidence relating to this firing, which we are sure took place.
148.148 According to the account he gave Peter Pringle and Philip Jacobson, soon after firing his shot Reg Tester went to the area of the Bogside Inn, where he saw three or four members of the Provisional IRA, one of whom he thought was carrying a carbine. He then moved into the car park behind the Bogside Inn and met another Provisional IRA man whom he knew. After a minute or so, this paramilitary fired a single shot towards troops who could be seen moving on the City Walls. The fire was returned immediately, three or four rounds of SLR on semi-automatic, but “the bullets didn’t come near the area of the incident ”.1
1 S36
148.149 In our view this shot and the return fire was that which was recorded in Army radio logs as fired at about 1620 hours and which we discuss in detail later in this report.1 It follows, on the basis of Reg Tester’s account to the Sunday Times Insight Team, that he fired his shot before this exchange of fire.
148.150 If this was the case, then Reg Tester must have fired at some stage before 4.20pm. It is not clear when the APC went forward to collect the bodies from the rubble barricade, though this was after all the casualties had been sustained and before the ambulances arrived. It is possible that Reg Tester might have muddled the order of events when giving his account to the Sunday Times Insight Team; and fired his shot after and not before he had witnessed the exchange of fire. In the end we have concluded that Reg Tester probably fired his shot at some stage between about 4.20pm and 4.30pm, namely after the APC had come forward to collect bodies from the rubble barricade and before the ambulances arrived in Rossville Street. This would fit with his description of what he saw when he went on the balcony. We should note at this point that in his evidence to us Reg Tester said that he did not see any members of the Provisional IRA or any Provisional IRA activity when he arrived in the Bogside; but in our view this is another instance where his memory has proved fallible, in view of what he told the Sunday Times Insight Team about witnessing the exchange of fire.1
148.151 The account of Reg Tester as recorded by the Sunday Times Insight Team is the only evidence we have that a member of the Provisional IRA fired a shot at soldiers near Roaring Meg on the City Walls. The evidence from the members of the Provisional IRA is to the effect that they fired neither this shot, nor any others, on Bloody Sunday, but only “symbolic ” shots at a much later stage. In our view Reg Tester probably did witness a Provisional IRA member firing an earlier shot in the direction of the City Walls, though we cannot eliminate the possibility that this shot was fired by a member of the Official IRA.
148.152 On the basis of his evidence to us, Reg Tester could not have been responsible for the shot over the Embassy Ballroom OP, which we describe later in this part of the report,1 and which occurred soon after soldiers had gone into the Bogside and before an APC had got to the position that he described. We have no evidence to indicate who fired this shot, since no-one has admitted to it and the paramilitary witnesses have, in effect, denied that there was any firing by them from this area at this early stage.
148.153 We now turn to consider other evidence that, in some respects, is inconsistent with some of the evidence given to us by Reg Tester.
Seamus Duffy
148.154 Seamus Duffy told us that in the courtyard near the Bogside Inn he saw Reg Tester and two other men, one of whom was armed, being told by someone to go away.1 He marked the location with an arrow on the following photograph.2
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1 AD190.3 |
2 AD190.9 |
148.155 Reg Tester disputed ever having been in that area,1 but in view of Seamus Duffy’s evidence, we consider that Reg Tester was probably wrong about this.
PIRA 14
148.156 PIRA 14’s evidence was that he was among those confronting the troops at the rubble barricade, witnessed the shooting of Hugh Gilmour and, after the shooting, went to the Bogside Inn in the hope of meeting other members of the Provisional IRA. While there, he received an order that Provisional IRA members were to take no action. He saw five or six members of the Official IRA, each armed with a rifle, arrive and deploy in the Westland Street flats but said that he did not think that they fired.1
1 APIRA14.3-5; Day 421/101-102
Maureen Fitzgerald
148.157 Maureen Fitzgerald was a Belfast resident who attended the march. She spoke to the Sunday Times Insight Team, who assessed her as “a good witness, honest where she cant remember things ”. It was also noted that her brother was a member of the Provisional IRA.1 She gave the following account in 1972 to the Sunday Times Insight Team of events after the Army had opened fire and after she had seen two men, whom someone else told her were dead, lying behind a barricade (the location of which is uncertain):2
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“after that i went back along towards the bogside inn and found myself in a little cul-de-sac parking area behind the flats. two cars drove into this area and the people around seemed to get rather angry, i suppose because they thought here was somebody who had just been driving around while the march was on. but the first car, i think it was two-tone, grey top and darker body, not very modern, stopped and the driver threw the door open and held up his hand with a rifle in it. he was about 28 or 30, dressed in a jacket and trousers, not in the green combat jacket thing and i am quite positive that none of the other men from the two cars – there were 6 in all, four in the first car and two in the second – were wearing combat jackets or berets, they were just ordinarily dressed. I should have mentioned that about 15 minutes earlier, while i was sitting on a wall near the flats having a smoke, there were a group of about eight young men, i would say between 17 and 20, and they were dressed in green combat jackets but not wearing black berets. they were talking among themselves but quite openly. one said ‘if the paras do come in this way, it will be a massacre, we haven’t got any gear with us, it was all withdrawn because they said it was too risk[y] with the big crowd. ’ another one said ‘ok. but they never reckoned on the fucking paras coming in like this. ’ other people, not IRA by the look of them, were saying ‘where are the guns, we need some guns to defend us.’. anyway, when the two cars arrived, there were the six men and eye think four had rifles, one of which looked like a sort of machine-gun (pj; probably a thompson, we think there was one around there). two men had pistols, i am quite sure about that. the boot of the second car was opened up and they handed out some more rifles to the young men whom i had previo[us]ly seen talking, the ones with combat jackets on. they all moved off together in the direction of free derry corner, i imagine to take up firing positions, but i didnt hear any immediate firing from our area. ” |
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1 AF20.4 |
2 AF20.3 |
Johnny White (OIRA 3)
148.158 Johnny White (OIRA 3) told us that he attended the march, although he did not join at the beginning, and that he was initially in the company of two other volunteers, one of whom was OIRA 4.1 According to his account, he was in Chamberlain Street or the area of the Rossville Flats when he heard high velocity fire; and at this point he lost contact with the other two volunteers.2
148.159 Johnny White also told us that on realising that the soldiers were shooting at unarmed civilians, he wanted the Official IRA to be able to retaliate, but they could not do so because there were no weapons in the Bogside. “My best hope was that the boys on active duty in the Brandywell and Creggan would hear the shooting and come down with our weapons. ”1 On his account, he said that he made his way to the area of Westland Street around the back of the Bogside Inn, which was the meeting place at which he knew volunteers would assemble, that he found angry but unarmed volunteers and civilians there, some wanting to take action and others saying that members of the Official IRA should not shoot because there were too many people in the area; and that the cars had not arrived and so no shooting was possible in any event.2
148.160 His evidence was that a handful of members of the Official IRA ended up around the Bogside Inn shortly afterwards when the two cars containing weapons arrived. It is unclear whether his reference to a “handful” included or excluded those who arrived by car.1 He told us that there were still many civilians in the area so the members of the Official IRA decided to take no retaliatory action but to meet later that night to make a full report.
148.161 This evidence is consistent with John Barry’s note of his interview with OIRA 1:1
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“Went into Cable Street. Met [OIRA 3]. Who said ‘Where’s the weapons?’ [OIRA 1] said they were safe in the Bog. [OIRA 1] indicated that [OIRA 3] wanted to have a go, or at least was surrounded by people who wanted to have a go. But he was dissuaded. ” |
1 AOIRA1.2
148.162 As we have observed elsewhere in this report,1 there are doubts about many parts of the accounts given by OIRA 1.
148.163 The Observer galley proofs included the following account which is attributed to the “acting” OC of the Official IRA in Londonderry, Johnny White (OIRA 3):1
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“‘We fired only one shot in the area, and that was after the Army had finished shooting. A soldier went into the street by himself and our man covering Rossville Street thought he could get him. ‘He fired one shot and then realised it would be dangerous to go on because, although the immediate street was clear, people were huddled in doorways and running to safety whenever the firing stopped. ‘Two shots were fired by our volunteer covering Bishops Street. Those were the only shots we fired.’ ” |
1 ED24.9
148.164 It is possible that the reference to the shot fired by the man covering Rossville Street is a reference to the firing by Reg Tester. However, we are not sure about this, since according to the Observer galley proofs it would not fit with the account attributed to Johnny White (OIRA 3); the man covering Rossville Street was stated in the galley proofs to have been a marksman on duty covering Rossville Street from the corner of William Street and Rossville Street.
148.165 In his second written statement to this Inquiry, Johnny White dealt only very briefly with the Observer galley proofs, commenting that he had no recollection of meeting anyone from the Observer and denying that the Official IRA had posted a marksman (as the Observer report also recorded) in the Little Diamond.1
148.166 We have noted earlier in this report that, in significant respects, the evidence given by Johnny White (OIRA 3) to this Inquiry is inconsistent with other evidence.
148.167 There is other evidence about the presence of paramilitaries with weapons in the area of the Bogside Inn.
Kevin Clifford
148.168 Kevin Clifford told us that he recalled seeing a man with a gun, he thought near the Bogside Inn, around the junction of Westland Street and Lecky Road, who was moving northwards from between Free Derry Corner and the Bogside Inn:1
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“The man was hiding the gun on his right hand side under his coat or jacket as if he was trying to disguise it. I don’t know what sort of gun it was, but it was not big enough to be a rifle. There were a lot of people about and someone said something like ‘It’s a stickie’ .” |
1 AC67.2
Bernard Heaney
148.169 Bernard Heaney told us that after everything had gone quiet and he was walking up Westland Street, a couple of cars “came flying down ” but stopped before they got to Lecky Road. He recalled seeing six or eight men getting out of the cars, some carrying weapons, and his impression was that there were two or three rifles. He told us he believed that the men ran in a north-easterly direction through the houses up towards Free Derry Corner, but he did not actually see where they went, as he decided to get away.1
Donal Deeney
148.170 Donal Deeney gave us the following account of seeing members of the Official IRA in the area around Meenan Square about half an hour after the shooting had ended:1
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“Nearby I saw a few stickies (by which I mean members of the Official IRA). They were coming out of a house with a rifle but I cannot remember where the house was. One guy looked particularly tense and said that he was going to take up a position in the Bogside. I only recall seeing one rifle, which the man seemed to be hiding under his coat. All the Provos were guarding the Creggan. ” |
1 AD26.7
148.171 In his oral evidence he said that there were two or three Stickies (members of the Official IRA).1 He did not know them but, from their faces and the fact that they had only one gun among three men, he believed that they were Stickies.2 He said that he knew through gossip that the Provisional IRA was guarding the Creggan.3
Noriyuki Kunioka
148.172 Noriyuki Kunioka was a student and a freelance reporter for Japanese publications. He told the Widgery Inquiry that after he had seen a wounded person put into a car near St Columb’s, he saw a man in Westland Street with a weapon that he thought was a rifle. The man was escorted by two other young people, and disappeared behind a building in the direction of Free Derry Corner.1
Michael Harkin
148.173 Michael Harkin was a Private in the Irish Army. A senior officer made a record of what Michael Harkin had told him. Part of this record was in the following terms:1
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“1. A short time after the shooting had occurred a car containing 3 masked men arrived in the area & enquired what was going on as they had heard shooting. Some of the people said to them ‘Where were you fellows the British tps are shooting the people ’. One of the men said ‘Is that right ’ or words to that effect. He had a revolver. He got out of the car and the car then reversed and went away but the man with the revolver went in the direction of the British troops. Within a few minutes the car arrived back with another car. There were about 6 or 7 men in the cars & they were all armed – Thompsons – Revs. – and a Rifle. One of the men said ‘We will give covering fire to the people in order to let them get out’. They went off in the direction of the Brit tps. [Michael Harkin] heard more shooting after this but is NOT sure who fired them and at this stage people were dispersing & he went home. I questioned him as to why the armed men were NOT on the March and [Michael Harkin] thinks that they were left behind to protect the vacated houses in the Creggan and Brandywell and also to protect the marchers from the rear from British tps who might attack them from that direction. ” |
1 AH25.3
Tony Quigley
148.174 Tony Quigley told us that after he had seen Bernard McGuigan shot, he crawled to the area of the Bogside Inn. His account continued:1
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“When I reached the Bogside Inn, I saw about three hundred people standing around. These people were talking about what had just happened and were fearful that the army were going to come further into the Bogside. I also remember seeing a man walking south down Westland Street towards the Bogside Inn. This man was carrying a rifle. I gained the impression that that man had just driven down Westland Street and parked his car a few yards to the north of the Bogside Inn although I don’t remember him getting out of the car. The man said that he was going to take on the British army. The man was tall, fairly muscular with fair hair. He was aged between 25 to 30 and dressed in ordinary clothes although I cannot remember any details about what he was wearing. The people standing near the Bogside Inn protested and told him to go. I remember them telling the man with the rifle that he would make matters worse if he fired at the army and that this was exactly what the army wanted him to do. Eventually the man melted away into the crowd and I didn’t see him again. ” |
1 AQ7.4
Sunday Times
148.175 The draft report that Murray Sayle and Derek Humphry wrote for the Sunday Times a few days after Bloody Sunday contained the following passage:1
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“The IRA did, however enter the picture after the Army shooting ceased. IRA Men on the march included the head of the Bogside provisional organisation, name to come, who was seen by a number of witnesses early on the march. The IRA provisional group had a hasty conference when the shooting began and according to a young woman who was present decided to do nothing. The official group at the march however sent an urgent call for gunmen and one ‘active service unit ’ arrived some minutes after the last army shots were fired. This consisted like all IRA active service units of four men armed with two .38 pistols, a .303 Army rifle and a .22 hunting rifle with a telescopic sight. One of those men fired one pistol shot at long range towards the Army but does not claim he hit any soldier. This shot was the last one fired in the engagement and we believe the only one fired at the Army – we can find no witness among dozens who |
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heard or saw any other. Every Catholic present at the demonstration to whom we have talked, and they include priests and doctors, supporters of both wings of the IRA, and people opposed in varying degrees of vehemence to the IRA, are unanimous that the IRA played no part whatever in provoking the Army operation or fighting back, other than the shot mentioned above. In the atmosphere of shock grief and horror which has followed the shootings (see Sayle story) it is inconceivable that the tightly-knit Bogside community would not lay at least some part of the blame on the IRA if in this case they deserved any. ” |
1 M71.29
148.176 This draft report made no mention of the firing by OIRA 1 from Columbcille Court or of the firing by OIRA 4 in the car park of the Rossville Flats, or of that witnessed by Fr Thomas O’Gara and others, or of other incidents of firing, all of which undoubtedly occurred during the shooting incidents in the five sectors and which we have discussed in the course of our consideration of the events of those sectors. It is possible that the reference to a man firing a long-distance shot with a pistol might have been a reference to Reg Tester, though his account is that he had a rifle. If it was not Reg Tester, we have no evidence to indicate who it might have been.
148.177 We now turn to consider the evidence of a meeting of the Command Staff of the Londonderry Official IRA on the evening of Bloody Sunday, before setting out our general conclusions on the activities of the Official IRA in Londonderry on that day.
The meeting of the Official IRA Command Staff
148.178 There was evidence that the Command Staff of the Londonderry Official IRA met on the evening of Bloody Sunday. Johnny White (OIRA 3) told us that he was informed at that meeting that two volunteers had fired a shot towards the GPO or the Presbyterian church, and that he took the view that this was a defensive shot and one permitted by the standing orders.1 He also told us that he learned that another member of the Command Staff, who had been carrying a handgun for personal protection, had fired two shots at the Saracens (APCs) in the area of the Rossville Flats. According to Johnny White, he was aware that the shots were fired defensively; and that the man who had fired said that nobody appeared to have noticed his shots and that the Army did not return fire.2 He stated that he learned at that meeting of the volunteer in Barrack Street having been shot.3
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2 AOIRA3.6 |
148.179 The Sunday Times working papers contain the following note, which refers to a report compiled by the Official IRA.1
1 S39
148.180 No Official IRA witness has admitted to knowing anything of a report compiled by the Official IRA, although Johnny White (OIRA 3) told us that he made enquiries about the shots fired by Official IRA members and gave a formal decision that the shots had not been fired in breach of his orders.1 However, this note, if it reflects accurately information given to the Sunday Times, suggests that three men fired among them a total of seven unauthorised shots.
148.181 It is possible that the total of eight shots referred to in the note is made up of one shot fired by OIRA 1, three shots by OIRA 4,1 three by “Red ” Mickey Doherty,2 and one by Reg Tester. The total of eight shots is compatible with the evidence of admitted firing. It is inconsistent with the reference in the notes to the shots being the work of three men and to seven of those shots being “unauthorised ”. However, as we have already observed, the Official IRA’s original stance was that its members had not fired at any material time on Bloody Sunday; and thus its mention to the Sunday Times of unauthorised shots may have been a relic of this.
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2 B908.002 |
148.182 The representatives of the majority of represented soldiers drew our attention to the reference made by Johnny White (OIRA 3) to “some incidents ” having occurred after the end of the military shooting, in the course of one of which “Red ” Mickey Doherty was injured. They posed the question, “What were the others? ”1
1 FS7.601
148.183 It seems to us that the firing by Reg Tester (which we have discussed above) might well be one of these incidents. Others might include the firing reported by Private AC or that at the Mex Garage, which we consider below,1 but there is nothing to suggest that Johnny White was referring to incidents occurring before or during the shooting of the casualties in the five sectors.
General conclusions on the activities of the Official IRA
148.184 We have no doubt that there was significant Official IRA activity in the five sectors during Bloody Sunday, though in our view this did not provide an explanation for why soldiers targeted and hit people who were not posing a threat of causing death or serious injury. We formed the impression that a number of former Official IRA members were at pains at this Inquiry to try to disown or distance themselves from this activity.
148.185 As with the Provisional IRA, we have concluded that, with the exception of the shot fired by OIRA 1 at a soldier near the Presbyterian church (which we have discussed in the context of our consideration of the events of Sector 11), there is no evidence that suggests to us that other members of the Official IRA used the march for the purpose of engaging the security forces with guns or bombs.
148.186 As we have already observed when considering the organisation and activities of the Provisional IRA, Fr Denis Bradley described the Official IRA as a “different and disparate ” group compared with the Provisional IRA. “It was an old Catholic thing. They were seen as Marxist left wing and were not particular about who joined them. They were inclined to be considered ‘gangsterish’. There were some very irresponsible people in their organisation. ”1 We accept this view. Thus we regard with some scepticism the evidence of former members of the Official IRA that they were well organised and disciplined and kept tight control of their weapons. Although we cannot be certain, we are of the view that it is likely that much if not all of the paramilitary activity in the five sectors, to which we have referred in our consideration of the events of those sectors, was that of members of the Official IRA, though we cannot exclude the possibility that there was some Provisional IRA activity as well.
1 H1.7
148.187 Our assessment of the evidence considered in this part of the report is that Official IRA members in vehicles, two of the vehicles carrying weapons, arrived in the area of the Bogside Inn after all the casualties had been sustained in the five sectors and all or virtually all the firing by soldiers who had gone into the Bogside had ended; and that Reg Tester then fired one shot towards the soldiers who had come into the Bogside. We are not persuaded that other shots were fired at this stage at those soldiers. We examine in more detail later in this report1 the shot fired at the Embassy Ballroom OP and that (attributed by Reg Tester to the Provisional IRA) fired at soldiers near the antique cannon Roaring Meg.
148.188 Our examination of the evidence considered in this part of the report has revealed nothing that suggests to us that the activities of the Official IRA in the area of the Bogside Inn led to any of the shooting in the five sectors that resulted in the casualties in any of those sectors.
148.189 In the course of considering the events of Sectors 1 to 5, in which civilians were killed or wounded by Army gunfire, we drew attention to evidence of paramilitary firing in those sectors and expressed our conclusions on that firing. After discussing below the evidence relating to the Fianna, we turn to consider other incidents of paramilitary firing outside the five sectors (apart from that by Reg Tester) and there consider whether it is possible to identify whether the Official or the Provisional IRA was responsible for that firing.
